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DIGEST  OF  DECISIONS 


UNDER 


THE  INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  ACT 


FROM  1908 


BY 

HERBERT  C.  LUST 

AND 

RALPH  MERRIAM 

OF  THE 
CHICAGO  BAR 


CHICAGO.  ILL.,  1913 


X5LX 


COPYRIGHT   A.    D.    1913 

By 

HERBERT  C.  LUST 

and 
RALPH  MERRIAM 


•    •::i  V 


This  book  is  dedicated  to  the  memory  oj 
EDWARD  A.  MOSELET, 

Secretary  oj  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

from  its  inception  until  his  death  in  IQII, 

whose  unfailing  courtesy,  devotion  to  duty,  broad 

knowledge  and  sympathy  won  for  him  the  esteem 

and  affection  of  the  traffic  world. 


261215 


PREFACE 


In  this  book  every  point  of  fact  and  law  in  every  case  arising  under 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  since  1908  has  been  digested  in  full,  includ- 
ing all  decisions  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  (reported  and 
unreported),  and  of  the  various  United  States  and  state  courts.  The 
book  is  arranged  alphabetically  by  such  subjects  as  are  the  ordinary  and 
accepted  divisions  into  which  the  principles  governing  interstate  traffic 
would  naturally  classify  themselves.  This  can  best  be  seen  by  referring 
to  the  Table  of  Contents,  which  immediately  follows,  and  which  is  a 
reprint  of  the  entire  classification. 

It  is  earnestly  suggested  that  readers  of  this  book  study  the  Table 
of  Contents  very  carefully.  As  about  ten  thousand  points  of  traffic  law 
are  classified,  it  can  readily  be  understood  that  familiarity  with  the  classi- 
fication is  necessary  to  make  the  book  of  the  quickest  available  use.  It 
has  been  attempted  to  evolve  a  logical  and  careful  analysis  of  the  field  of 
traffic  law  and  a  classification  which  affords  a  birdseye  view  of  the  entire 
subject. 

All  the  cases  on  any  one  point  are  grouped  together  and  familiarity 
with  the  classification  will  enable  the  reader  to  turn  immediately  to  all 
the  decisions  pertaining  to  the  subject  in  which  he  is  interested. 

Inasmuch  as  there  are  many  points  which  may  not  be  logically 
classified  under  a  particular  heading,  but  may  nevertheless  have  some 
bearing  on  it,  Cross-References  are  inserted,  which  redirect  the  reader  to 
such  points.  Thus,  suppose  the  reader  is  looking  up  Advanced  Rates  and 
wants  all  the  decisions  on  the  question  of  burden  of  proof.  He  runs  his 
eye  down  the  analysis  of  "ADVANCED  RATES"  and  finds :  "II.  Justi- 
fication of  Increase,  §3,  Burden  of  Proof."  By  turning,  then,  to  §3,  under 
ADVANCED  RATES,  he  will  find  the  cases  which  deal  specifically  with 
the  question  of  "Burden  of  Proof"  as  related  to  Advanced  Rates,  and  also 
cross-references  directing  him  toi  other  parts  of  the  book  where  other 
decisions  on  dififerent  phases  of  "Burden  of  Proof"  will  be  found. 

In  all  cases  where  it  is  possible  to  do  so,  a  so-called  Fact  Point  has 
been  made.  These  fact-points  show  tersely,  but  completely,  all  the  evi- 
dence on  which  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  or  the  court  bases 
its  decision  in  the  particular  case.  The  authors  have  attempted  to  sum- 
marize in  easy,  readable  style  ton  mile  revenues,  distances,  commodities, 


PREFACE 


rate  comparisons  and  other  evidence  presented  in  the  particular  case. 
Not  only,  therefore,  have  all  traffic  principles  been  classified,  but  also  the 
economic  principles  and  facts  governing  each  particular  case. 

The  decisions  are  arranged  chronologically  under  each  section,  the 
most  recent  decision  being  placed  first.  If  the  decision  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  has  been  modified  or  reviewed  by  any  court, 
rehearing  denied,  dissenting  or  concurring  opinion  filed,  such  fact  is  noted. 

At  the  back  of  the  book  will  be  found  indexes  to  the  cases,  commodi- 
ties and  localities  involved.  A  reader  interested  in  any  particular  case,  by 
referring  to  the  index,  will  find  reference  to  every  page  of  the  book  on 
which  that  case  appears,  and  also  a  reference  to  the  fact  point  on  each 
case. 

Every  point  of  law  and  of  fact  in  this  book  has  been  rechecked  at 
least  seven  times,  with  a  view  of  avoiding  inaccuracies  of  detail.  If  any 
are  found,  the  authors  will  be  more  than  pleased  to  be  informed,  so  that 
such  discrepancies  may  be  corrected  in  future  editions. 

The  authors  have  contributed  equally  in  the  preparation  of  this  book. 
It  is  proper  to  mention,  however,  that  the  classification  is  by  Mr.  Lust. 

We  wish  to  express  our  appreciation  of  the  courtesy  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  in  giving  us  access  to  and  permission  to  use  its 
official  records,  and  for  its  cooperation  in  other  respects.  Our  thanks  are 
also  due  to  the  West  Publishing  Company  for  courtesies  extended. 

Herbert  C.  Lust. 
Ralph  Merriam. 

(Chicago,  111.,  1913.) 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

References  are  to  pages. 

Page 

ABSORPTION  OF  CHARGES 1 

I.    APPLICATION   OF  ABSORBED   RATE. 

§1.    In  generaL 1 

II.     DISCRIMINATION. 

§2.    Absorption    subsequent    to    shipment 1 

§3.     Refusal    to    absorb 2 

III.    CONTROL  AND  REVIEW. 

§4.    In    general    2 

ACCOUNTING 

I.    POWER  TO  REGULATE 2 

ACT  TO  REGULATE  COMMERCE 3 

I.    CONSTITUTIONALITY 3 

II.    INTERPRETATION   IN   GENERAL    8 

III.  TIME  OF  TAKING  EFFECT    7 

IV,  ENFORCEMENTS 7 

V.    AMENDMENTS 8 

ACTIONS  AT  LAW 8 

Cross-references. 

ADDITIONAL  CHARGES    8 

ADJACENT  FOREIGN  COUNTRY 8 

ADVANCED  RATES 8 

I.  CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction    of    Commission    9 

(1)  Inquiry    into    reasonableness    9 

(2)  Power    to    require    advance 10 

(3)  Prescribing    minimum    rate 10 

(4)  To   suspend   advance    10 

(5)  To   suspend    reduction 10 

§2.    Limitation    on    power 11 

II.  JUSTIFICATION  OF  INCREASE. 

§3.    Burden    of    proof 11 

§4.    Effect 12 

§5.    Right  to  advance 12 

(1)  To  avoid   reducing  other  rates 14 

(2)  To  equalize  rates 14 

(3)  To  preserve  commodity  relationship 16 

(4)  Unreasonably    low    prior    rate 17 

§6.    Right    to    earn 17 

(1)  On    bona    fide    investment 17 

(2)  On    unearned    increment 17 

(3)  On   reproduction   value 17 

(4)  On    surplus    18 

(5)  For  permanent  improvements  19 

(6)  All    traffic    will    bear 19 

(7)  Cost   of   insurance    20 

vli 


vill  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


m.    EVIDENCE.  Page 

§7.    Change  in  conditions  20 

(1)  In   general    ? .'. .  20 

(2)  Increased   operating   expenses    23 

(3)  Impairment   of   credit    24 

(4)  Cessation    of    competition    24 

§8.     Presumptions     26 

(1)  Continuance   of   prior   rate    26 

(2)  Temporary    reduction     29 

§9.    Concerted    action    30 

§10.     Economy    of    management    30 

§11.    Scientific    management    31 

§12.     Branch    lines    31 

(1)  Operation     31 

(2)  Purchase 31 

§13.    Detriment  to   shipper    31 

§14.    Benefit  to   industry    36 

-|         §15.     Standard    for    judging    advance    36 

1          §16.    Uniformity   of   advance    37 

I\\  REASONABLENESS  OF  ADVANCED  RATES. 

\      §17.    In    general    38 

§18.    Circumstances    and    conditions    41 

(1)  Low  receipts  per  ton  mile  41 

(2)  Water   competition    42 

(3)  Heavy  and  uniform  tonnage  42 

(4)  Low-grade   commodity    43 

(5)  Ratio  of  rate  to  value  43 

(6)  To  gain  import  duty   44 

(7)  Rates   in  like  territory   44 

(8)  Circuitous    route    . .  .^ 44 

(9)  Use   of   commodity    .| 45 

(10)  Increased  divisions    ./ 45 

V.  DISCRIMINATION   THROUGH  ADVANCE. 

§19.    In    general    45 

VI.  REMEDIES   AND   PROCEDURE. 

§20.     Injunctions      48 

§21.    Investigation     49 

VII.  REPARATION. 

§22.    In    general    50 

ADVERTISING    51 

I.  OF  EXCURSION  TICKETS    51 

II.     AS    REBATES    51 

AGENCY 51 

Cross-references. 

ALASKA    51 

L     REGULATION    OF    RATES    51 

ALLOWANCES    52 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Commission's   right   to  investigate    52 

'*^*-§2.    Power  to  prescribe   53 

§3.    Effect  of  order 53 

II.  PUBLICATION   AND   TARIFFS. 

§4.    Obligation   to    file    54 

§5.    Effect    of    publication    54 

§6.    Construction     64 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS  Ix 

III.  DISCRIMINATION.  Page 

§7.    Obligation  to  treat  all  alike   54 

— -  §8.    Particular    allowances    55 

(1)  Compressing   cotton    55 

(2)  Cooperage  and  grain  doors 66 

(3)  Elevation  of  grain    56 

(4)  Lighterage    58 

(5)  Spotting  cars   59 

(6)  Staking     60 

(7)  Transfer     60 

IV.  LEGALITY  OF  ALLOWANCES. 

§9.    In    general    61 

§10.    Transportation  service  performed  by  shipper  61 

§11.     Transportation    facility     62 

^^§12.    What  is  not  transportation   service   63 

(1)  Accessorial    or   incidental    service    63 

(2)  Operation   of    plant    facility    64 

V.  REASONABLENESS   OF  ALLOWANCES. 

§13.    In    general    66 

VI.  DAMAGES    AND    REPARATION. 

§14.     In    general    66 

VII.  AS  REBATES. 

§15.    In    general    67 

VIII.  CRIMINAL  LIABILITY 

§16.    In  general   68 

ALTERNATIVE  RATES 69 

I.    ESTABLISHMENT    AND    REASONABLENESS    69 

ANY-QUANTITY  RATE 70 

I.    REASONABLENESS    AND   APPLICATION    70 

ASSOCIATION   71 

I,  RIGHT  TO  SUE   71 

ASSORTING  PACKAGES 72 

ATTORNEYS'  FEES   73 

AUCTION  COMPANY 73 

BACK  HAUL 74 

Cross-references. 

BAGGAGE  TRANSFER    74 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction   of  Commission    74 

II.  EXCLUSIVE  CONTRACT  TO  SOLICIT   74 

BASING  POINTS  AND  LINES 74 

Cross-references. 

BILLS  OF  LADING 74 

I.     CONTROL  AND    REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction    of    Commission    75 

§2.    Recommendation   of   certain   forms    75 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


II.    DUTY  OF  CARRIER  TO  ISSUE.  Page 

§3.    Rail-and-water    transportation    75 

§4.    At  transit  points    75 

§5.    One  lading  for  several  shipments    76 

III.  CONSTRUCTION. 

§6.    In    general    77 

§7.     Statement   of   weight 77 

§8.     Statement  of  shipping  point   77 

§9.    Conflicting    provisions    77 

(1)  Between  rate  and  route   77 

(2)  With  tariff   78 

IV.  LIMITATION  OF  LIABILITY 78 

BLANKET  RATES  78 

I.  CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction    of    Commission    78 

II.  LEGALITY  OF  GROUP  RATES. 

§2.    In     general     79 

§3.    Justification    81 

§4.    Public   benefit    81 

§5.     Custom   82 

in.     EXTENSION   OF   ZONE. 

§6.    In    general    82 

§7.    Equalizing   advantage  of  location    83 

§8,    Proximity  to   established  group   87 

§9.    Grading    rates    90 

§10.    Differentials      92 

IV.     REASONABLENESS. 

§11.    Of    group     93 

§12.    Of  individual  rate   96 

V.    DISCRIMINATION. 

§13.    In    general    97 

VI.  REMEDY  FOR  UNLAWFUL  GROUPING. 

§14.    In    general    99 

§15.    Scope  of  complaint   99 

VII.  EVIDENCE. 

§16,    Burden  of  proof   99 

§17.    Extent  of  zone  100 

§18.    Comparisons     101 

BRANCH  LINES  101 

I.     REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES. 

§1.    In    general    101 

§2.    Compared   with  main  lines    103 

§3.    As  part  of  system   104 

§4.    In  competition  with  main  lines   105 

IL    DUTY   TO   ROUTE. 

§5.    In   general    106 

BREAKING  OF  RATES 106 

Cross-references. 

BRIDGE  TOLLS 106 

I.     REASONABLENESS     106 

BULK  SHIPMENTS 107 

Cross-references. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


Page 

BULKHEADS 107 

Cross-references. 

BURDEN  OF  PROOF 107 

Cross-references. 

BUSINESS  SECRETS   107 

I.    DISCLOSURE    FORBIDDEN 107 

CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY 108 

I.     CONTROL   AND    REGULATION, 

A.  Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

§1.  Over   car    distribution    108 

§2.  Car    regulations    109 

§3.  Fuel    cars    109 

§4.  Private    cars    109 

§5.  Intrastate    cars    110 

§6.  To  award  damages    110 

n.    DUTY  TO  FURNISH  CARS. 

§7.  In    general    110 

§8.  Size  ordered  by  shipper 112 

§9.  Form   of  order    114 

§10.  Tank    cars    114 

§11.  At  transit  point   114 

III.  ASSIGNMENT   AND  DISTRIBUTION, 
A.     Counting  of  Cars. 

§12.    In    general    114 

§13.    Private    cars    116 

§14.    Foreign   cars    117 

§15.     Railway   fuel   cars    117 

§16.     Pooling  by  shipper    118 

§17.    Tank    cars    118 

§18.    Detention   of  cars    118 

§19.    When  counted  for  loading   119 

§20.    Car    famine    119 

§21.    Reward  for  prompt  release 119 

§211^. Shippers  on  branch  lines    120 

B.  Rating   of   Mines. 

§22,    Coke-oven   basis    120 

§23.    Commercial  plus  physical  capacity   120 

§24.    Idle-hour    system    121 

§25.     Mine   capacity   plus  shipments    122 

§26.    Physical  capacity  less  railway  fuel   122 

C.  Removal  of  Discrimination. 

§27.     Effect     122 

IV.  CONTRACTS  FOR  CAR  SUPPLY. 

§28.    In    general    123 

V.     DUTY  TO   TRANSPORT  CARS. 

§29.    In    general    123 

§30.    Interchange   of   cars    123 

§31.    Private  cars   124 

§32.    Rates  on  private  cars   124 

VI.     REMEDIES   AND   DAMAGES, 

§32i^.In  general   125 

§33.    Action  at  law   125 

§34.     Defenses      125 

§35.    Res    adjudicata    126 

§36.    Evidence    126 


xil  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


Page 

CARTAGE  126 

CLAIMS 126 

I.  WHEN   STATUTE  OF  LIMITATIONS  RUNS. 

§1.    In    general    126 

§2.     Claims  accruing  before  Aug.  28,  1906   127 

§3.    Date  of  delivery  of  shipment   127 

§4.    Date  of  payment  of  charges 128 

§5.    Date   of   amending   claim    128 

II.  INFORMAL   COMPLAINTS. 

§6.    Effect  of  informal  letter  128 

§7,    Necessity  of  formal  complaint   130 

§8.    Requisites   of  informal   complaint    130 

III.     PRESENTATION  TO    CARRIERS. 

§9.    Advisability 131 

§10.    Regulations     131 

CLASS  RATES 132 

CLASSIFICATION 132 

I.  RIGHT   OF   CARRIER   TO   ESTABLISH. 

§1.    In  general 132 

§2.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission 133 

II.  BASIS    OF   CLASSIFICATION. 

§3.    In    general    133 

§4.    Bulk  or  weight  of  commodity  134 

§4%."Knocked-down"   shipments    135 

§5.     C.  L.  and  L.  C.  L.  shipments   136 

§6.    Competition     137 

§7.    Mixed    carloads    138 

§8.    Possibility   of  misbilling    140 

§9.     Risk     140 

§10.    Use   of  commodity 140 

§11.    Value  141 

III.  CLASSIFICATION  REGULATIONS. 

§12.    Bulk  shipments  and  ownership  144 

§13.    Loading    and    unloading    145 

§14.    Marking  and  addressing   146 

§15.    Minimum   charge   148 

§16.  Packing      150 

IV.  COMPARATIVE     RATINGS. 
A.    Analogous  Articles. 

§17.    In    general    151 

§18.    Specific    comparisons    153 

(1)  Bar  and  band  iron   153 

(2)  Cocoa  butter  substitutes 153 

(3)  Coffee    percolators    154 

(4)  Earthenware  crucibles   154 

(5)  Iron  and  steel  articles   154 

(6)  Motorcycles      154 

(7)  Multigraphs      155 

(8)  Picture   postcards    155 

(9)  Plate    glass    155 

(10)  Triplex  cloth   155 

(11)  Wire  coat  hooks    155 

§19.    Evidence  and  procedure    156 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS  xlll 


Page 

COMMERCE  COURT   156 

I.    JURISDICTION. 

A.    Review   of  Commission's   Orders. 

§1.    Car   distribution    156 

§2.    Denying  aflarmative  relief 156 

§3.    Granting  affirmative  relief 157 

§4.    Fixing    rates     157 

§5.    Reparation   orders    157 

§6.    Questions  of  law  and  fact   158 

II.     PROCEDURE. 

§7.    Examination   of   record    158 

§8,    Judicial    notice    158 

COMMODITY  RATES 159 

I.     CREATION  AND  PURPOSE. 

§1.    Nature  in  general    159 

§2.    Relation  to  class  rates  159 

II.     APPLICATION    AND    CONSTRUCTION. 

§3.    Specific    commodity    rating    159 

§4.    Creation   subsequent  to  shipment    161 

COMMODITIES  CLAUSE  161 

I.     CONSTITUTIONALITY. 

§1.    In    general    161 

II.     CONSTRUCTION 162 

COMMON  CARRIER 163 

I.    TEST    OF    STATUS. 

§1.    Incorporation      163 

§2.    Lease  of  line 163 

§3.    Public  offer  to  carry    163 

§4.    Refusal  to  publish  tariffs 166 

§5.    Stock    ownership    166 

§6.    Transportation   of  private   cars    166 

II.     DETERMINATION   OF   STATUS. 

§7.    Question    of   fact    166 

COMMUTATION  FARES 166 

COMPARATIVE  RATES  167 

Cross-references. 

COMPETITION    167 

Cross-references. 

COMPRESS  COMPANIES  AND  CHARGES 167 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION    167 

II.     REASONABLENESS    OF    CHARGES    167 

CONCENTRATING  RATES  AND  PRIVILEGES 169 

CONCURRENCES   169 

Cross-references. 


Xlv  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


Page 

CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW 170 

Cross-references. 

CONSTRUCTION    170 

Cross-references. 

CONTRACTS 170 

Cross-references. 

CONTROL  AND  REGULATION 170 

Cross-references. 

COUNTER  CLAIM  170 

Cross-references. 

COURTS    170 

I.  ACTIONS. 

§1.    In    general    170 

§2.    Defenses     171 

§3.    Mandamus      172 

§4,    New    trial     172 

§5.    Suits   against   Commission    172 

II.  APPEAL. 

§6,    In    general    172 

III.  UNITED   STATES    COURT. 

§7.    Concurrent   jurisdiction    173 

§8.    Exclusive    jurisdiction    174 

§9.     Original    jurisdiction     174 

IV.  UNITED   STATES  SUPREME  COURT. 

§10.    In     general     175 

V.     STATE   COURTS. 

§11.    In    general    176 

CREDIT  ACCOUNT 179 

I.  EXTENSION  OF  CREDIT  FOR  CHARGES. 

§1.    Right  to  extend  credit 179 

§2.    Right   to   discriminate    179 

§3.    Criminal  liability 180 

CROSS-REFERENCES  IN  TARIFF 180 

Cross-references. 

CUSTOM 180 

Cross-references. 

CRIMES 180 

I.     THE  ELKINS  ACT, 

§1.    Constitutionality    181 

§2.     Construction 182 

II.  DISCRIMINATION. 

§3,    Credit  account 182 

III.  FREE   TRANSPORTATION. 

§4.    In    general    183 

IV.  MISBILLING. 

§5.    In    general    183 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS  XV 


V.    OVERCHARGES.  Page 

§6.    In    general    184 

VI.     REBATING. 

A.  Elements  of  Offense. 

§7.    In    general    185 

§8.    Intent  and  knowledge  186 

§9.    Payment    187 

§10.    Posting   of    tariff    187 

§11.    Route  and   "common  arrangement"    188 

§12.    Transportation      189 

B.  Number  of  Offenses. 

§13.    Payment     189 

§14.    Shipments    190 

C.  Liability. 

§15.    Act  of  agent    190 

§16.    Connecting    carrier    190 

Vn,    INDICTMENT. 

A.  Charging  Elements  of  Offense. 

§17.    In    general    190 

§18.    Concession  or  rebate 191 

§19.    Description  of  device   191 

§20.    Language    of    statute    191 

§21.    Payment 191 

§22.    Posting  of  tariff  191 

§23.    Route     192 

B.  Joinder  of  Defendants. 

§24.    Principal    and    agents    192 

C.  Proof  and  Variance. 

§25.    In    general    192 

D.  Venue, 

§26.    In     general     192 

VIII.     DEFENSES. 

§27.    Former   jeopardy    193 

§28.    Statute  of  limitations 193 

IX.  PROCEDURE. 

§29.    Province   of   court    193 

§30.     Province   of   jury    193 

§31.     Extent   of   verdict    194 

X.  PENALTIES. 

§32.    Excessive    fine    194 

XI.  STATE   REGULATION. 

§33.    In    general    194 

DAMAGES    194 

Cross-references. 

DEMURRAGE    194 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction    of    Commission    194 

n.    RIGHT    TO    ASSESS. 

§2.    In    general    195 

§3.     Discrimination    196 

§4.    Failure  of  consignee  to  accept    196 

§5.    Fault   of   shipper    197 

§6.    One   shipment  in  two  cars    198 

§7.    Order-notify    shipments    198 

§8.    Pending   dispute    198 

§9.    Prior  to  actual  delivery   200 

§10.    Private  cars   201 


xvi  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


III.  PUBLICATION  AND  TARIFFS.  Page 

§11.     Obligation  to  file    202 

IV,  DEMURRAGE   RULES. 

§12.     Construction   in    general 203 

§13.    Average   demurrage   plan    203 

§14.    Bunching      203 

§15.    Free    time     204 

§16.    Placement  or  arrival-notices    207 

§17.     Railroad  errors   or  omissions    207 

DEPOSITIONS  208 

Cross-references. 

DEPOTS 208 

Cross-references. 

DIFFERENTIALS  208 

I.  ESTABLISHMENT    AND    CONTROL. 

§1.     In  general  208 

§2.    Relation   of   classification    209 

II.  APPLICATION. 

§3.     C.   L.   and  L.   C.  L.  shipments    209 

§4.     Through    shipments     210 

III.     PURPOSE. 

§5.    To   equalize    conditions    210 

§6.     To    equalize    consuming    points    214 

§7.    To   equalize    producing   points    216 

DISCRIMINATION 221 

L     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Construction    of   the    Act    222 

§2.     Jurisdiction    of    Commission    223 

II.     DETERMINATION   OF   DISCRIMINATION. 

§3.    In    general    225 

§4.    Similar   conditions    228 

§5,    Test   of   discrimination    240 

III.  JUSTIFICATION. 

§6.    Carrier  as  shipper  or  consignee   241 

§7.    Carrier  not  serving  prejudiced  point   243 

§8.    Competition     246 

(1)  In   general    246 

(2)  Artificial  competition   247 

(3)  Railroads    in    general 248 

(4)  Short-line    carriers 253 

(5)  Water   carriers    254 

§9.    Disadvantage   of   location    259 

§10.     Encouragement   of   own    territory    266 

§11.    Low  state  rate    267 

IV.  REMOVAL  OF  DISCRIMINATION. 

§12.  Reduction   of  rates    269 

§13.  Disturbance  of  settled   adjustment   269 

V.     PROCEDURE    AND    EVIDENCE. 

§14.  Burden  of  proof   271 

§15.  Showing   of   damage 273 

§16.  Actions   in   state   courts 274 

§17,  Reparation      275 

DISTANCE  TARIFF   275 

Cross-references. 


TABLE    OP    CONTENTS  XVll 


Page 
DIVISIONS    275 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction    of    Commission    275 

IL    PUBLICATION    AND    TARIFFS. 

§2.    Obligation    to    file    276 

III.  AGREEMENTS  FOR  DIVISIONS. 

§3.     Computation      276 

§4.    Inability   to   agree    277 

§5.    Reductions     277 

§6.    Right  to  divisions    277 

§7.    As   evidence    277 

IV.  LEGALITY    277 

V.  REASONABLENESS   277 

DOMESTIC  RATES  279 

Cross-references. 

DRAYAGE  CHARGES 279 

ELECTRIC  LINES  279 

L     CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    279 

XL    THROUGH    ROUTES    WITH    STEAM   ROADS    280 

III.  RIGHT  TO  FUEL  RATE    281 

IV.  TRANSFERS    AND    RATES 282 

ELEVATION 283 

Cross-references. 

ELKINS  ACT 283 

Cross-references. 

EMBARGO   283 

EMPLOYMENT  283 

I.     HOURS   OF  SERVICE  ACT 283 

EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES 284 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction    of    Commission    286 

XL     CIRCUMSTANCES    AND    CONDITIONS. 

§2.    In    general    288 

§3.    Commercial  advantages  and  disabilities   290 

§4.    Competition     297 

(1)  In    general    297 

(2)  Railroad      298 

(3)  Rail-and-water     303 

(4)  Water     303 

§5.    Low    state    rate    305 

§6.    Preference    of    markets    306 

§7.     Size    of    community    310 

III.     EFFECT   OF  EQUALIZATION. 

§8.    Adjustment  of  related  rates    310 

EQUIPMENT 313 

Cross-references. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


Page 

ERIE  CANAL  313 

Cross-references. 

EVIDENCE 313 

I.     BURDEN   OF   PROOF. 

§1.    In    general    314 

II.     CIRCUMSTANCES    AND    CONDITIONS    OF    PROBATIVE    VALUE. 

§2.    Advantage  of  location    317 

§3,    Agreed  facts,  admissions  and  agreements 317 

§4.    Averages    317 

§5.    Basing   point   system    317 

§6.    Bona-fide    investment    318 

§7.    Capitalization     318 

§8.    Car-mile   or   train-mile   revenue    318 

§9.    Change  in  conditions  or  service  319 

§10,    Combinations    to    fix   rates    319 

§11.    Comparison    of    classifications    319 

§12.    Comparisons    of   commodities    319 

(1)  In   general    319 

(2)  Anthracite  and  bituminous  coal    319 

(3)  Bicycles    and    vehicles    320 

(4)  Blacksmith  coal  and  other  coal   S20 

(5)  Brick     320 

(6)  Cement   and   potatoes    320 

(7)  Copper    and    lumber    320 

(8)  Cottonseed  meal  and  hulls   320 

(9)  Cross-ties   and    lumber    321 

(10)  Fertilizer      321 

(10)  Dairy  products   321 

(11)  Flaxseed  and  grain    321 

(12)  Flour  and  grain 321 

(13)  Grain    and    products     321 

(14)  Ice     321 

(15)  Junk  and  scrap  iron   321 

(16)  Lumber  and   products    321 

(17)  Malt  and   barley    321 

(18)  Motorcycles  and  bicycles   321 

(19)  Oil     322 

(20)  Pulpwood    and    lumber    322 

(21)  Letter  copiers  and  presses   322 

(22)  Perishable   produce   and   dairy   products    322 

(23)  Posts  and  poles  and   sawed  lumber   , 322 

(24)  Sash  doors  and  blinds  and  lumber   322 

(25)  Staves  and  headings,  and  hardwood  lumber   322 

(26)  Sulphuric    acid    and   fertilizer    322 

(27)  Wool,  hops  and  oranges 322 

(28)  Wool    and    sheep    322 

(29)  Wheat  and  barley  and  corn,  rye  and  oats  823 

(30)  "Wyandotte  Cleanser"  and  soda  ash    328 

§13.    Comparisons  of  rates   323 

(1)  In    general     323 

(2)  Divisions  and  joint  rates   325 

(3)  Divisions    and    local    rates    326 

(4)  Import  and   domestic   rates    327 

(5)  Proportional  and  local  rates   827 

(6)  State  and  interstate  rates 327 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS  xix 

II.     CIRCUMSTANCES  AND  CONDITIONS  OF  PROBATIVE  VALUE— Cont'd    Page 
§14.     Competition     328 

(1)  In    general     , 328 

(2)  Potential      330 

(3)  Railroad     330 

(4)  Rail  and   water    330 

(5)  Water     331 

§15.    Contract  relying  on  rate    333 

§16.     Cost   of   production    333 

§17.    Cost   of   operation    333 

§18.    Cost   of   service    335 

§19.    Credit      336 

§19i^.Custom      336 

§20.    Distance    of    haul    336 

§21.    Dividends  338 

§22.    Equipment   furnished    338 

§22i^.Expert    evidence    338 

§23.    Failure  to   serve  prejudiced  locality    338 

§24.    Fixed    charges     339 

§25.    Governmental    regulation    839 

§26.     Import  duty    839 

§27.    Investment   relying   on   rate    339 

§28.    Local    rates    and    combinations    840 

§29.    Long  continuance  of  voluntary  rate 340 

§30.    Low  rate  in  opposite  direction  342 

§31.    Manufactured     product     343 

§32.     Market    competition    343 

§33.    Merger  of  terminals   343 

§34.    Mineral  lands  owned  by  carrier  844 

§35.    Municipal    charter    344 

§36.    Need    for    revenue 344 

§37.     New  lines    844 

§38.    New  rates  345 

§39.    Notice     345 

§40.     Oral    testimony 345 

§41.    Original  cost  of  road 345 

§42.    Panama    Canal    346 

§42 H. Practical    construction     346 

§43.    Past    rates     846 

§43 ^.Permanent    Improvements     846 

§44.    Previous   haul   on   raw   material    346 

§45.    Profit  of  shipper    346 

§46.    Rate  to  carrier  as  shipper  or  consignee 347 

§47.    Rate  via   competing   carrier    347 

§48.    Rebates    349 

§49.    Reproduction   value  of  road    349 

§50.    Return  on  investment 349 

§51.    Revenue    of    road    349 

§52,    Risk  of  loss  or  damage   350 

§53.     Size   of  community    351 

§54.     Size  of  load   351 

§55.     Standard    of    lines     351 

§56.    Standard  of  rate    351 

§57.     Surplus     352 

§58.    Ton-mile    revenue    352 

§59.    Two-line  haul    353 

§591^  .Unearned    increment    354 

§60.    Unpublished   rate    354 

§61.    Value   of   commodity    354 

§62.    Value  of  service   855 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


II.     CIRCUMSTANCES  AND  CONDITIONS  OF  PROBATIVE  VALUE— Cont'd    Page 

§63.    Volume  of  traffic 355 

§64.    Voluntary   or    subsequent   reduction    of   rate    356 

§64%.Wages     360 

§65.    Weight    of   shipment    360 

§66.    Widespread    rate   adjustment    361 

III.  JUDICIAL   NOTICE, 

§67.     In    general    362 

IV.  PRESUMPTIONS. 

§68.    In    general    363 

V.     STARE   DECISIS. 

§69.    In     general 363 

EXAMINERS   364 

Cross-references. 

EXCHANGE  ORDERS 364 

Cross-references. 

EXCLUSIVE  CONTRACTS 364 

EXCURSION  RATES 364 

Cross-references. 

EXPEDITED  SERVICE  364 

EXPENSE  BILLS  365 

Cross-references. 

EXPERIMENTAL  RATE 365 

Cross-references. 

EXPERT  TESTIMONY 365 

Cross-references. 

EXPLOSIVES   365 

EXPORT  RATES  AND  FACILITIES 365 

I.  CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction    of    Commission    365 

II.  BILLS    OF    LADING     366 

in.     DISCRIMINATION     366 

IV.     PUBLICATION    AND   TARIFFS    370 

V.     REASONABLENESS     371 

EXPRESS  COMPANIES 372 

I.  CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction    of    Commission    373 

§l^.State   regulation    374 

II.  FACILITIES. 

§2.  Delivery    and    receipt    374 

§3.  C.    O.   D.    shipments    374 

§4,  Export    service     375 

§5.  Free    transportation    375 

§6.  Money   orders    375 

§7.  Prepaid  and  collect  shipments   376 

§8.  Special    contracts    376 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS  xxi 

:il.    DISCRIMINATION.                                                                                                   Page 
§9.     In  general   377 

v.     RATES. 

§10.    Reasonableness  in  general   378 

§11.     Specific    rates    378 

(1)  Bread    and   cake    378 

(2)  Celery     ; .  379 

(3)  Cream    cans    379 

(4)  Drygoods      379 

(5)  Eggs     380 

(6)  Fish     380 

(7)  Guinea  pigs,   rabbits,  rats    380 

(8)  Merchandise     380 

(9)  Milk    and    cream    380 

(10)  Raw   furs    382 

(11)  Sample    brick     382 

V.    ROUTE. 

§12.     In    general 382 

71.    TARIFFS. 

§13.     Construction      383 

§14.    Double    graduate    charges    383 

§15.    Graduate    scale    system    > 383 

§16.     Mixed    shipments     384 

ni.     EVIDENCE. 

§17.    In    general    384 

§18.    Bulk 385 

§19.    Commercial    advantages     385 

§20.     Comparisons 385 

§21.     Competition    385 

§22.    Long   maintenance   of   rate    385 

§23.    Percentage   of  freight   rate    385 

§24,    Profit  and   capitalization    ; 385 

§25.     Surplus 386 

§26.    Value  of  express  property   386 

FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES 386 

I.     JURISDICTION    OF    COMMISSION. 

§1.    In     general     386 

II.     CARRIER'S   DUTY   TO   FURNISH   OR   PERMIT. 

§2.    In  general 388 

§3.     Compression      • 389 

§4.    Concentration     390 

§5.    Cooperage    and    bailing    391 

§6.    Dumping  and  trimming   391 

§7.    Free    back   haul    391 

§8.    Free    storage     392 

§9.    Grain     doors     392 

§10.    Loading,   unloading,   bracing,   etc 393 

§11.    Notifying   shipper  of  rejection    395 

§12.    Scaleage  deductions  and   shrinkage    395 

§13.     Staking    and    binding    396 

§14.    Storing,   grading  and  resacking   396 

§15.    Transit 396 

§16.    Wharfage     401 

II.     PUBLICATION    AND    TARIFFS. 

§17.    Obligation    to    publish    402 

§18.    Reshipping  under  through   rate    403 

§19.    Retroactive    application     405 

§20.    Substitution   of   tonnage    406 

V.     DISCRIMINATION. 

§21,    In    general    408 


xxil  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 

Page 
FERRIES    412 

FEEDING-IN-TRANSIT   412 

Cross-references. 

FIRE  412 

Cross-references. 

FLOATAGE  412 

Cross-references. 

FOREIGN  COMMERCE  412 

I.  CONTROL   AND    REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction    of    Commission 412 

FORWARDERS    413 

I.     STATUS      413 

II.  RIGHT   TO    COMBINE   SHIPMENTS    414 

FREE    415 

STORAGE     415 

TIME    415 

TRANSPORTATION    415 

Cross-references. 

GOVERNME1MT  MATERIAL 415 

Cross-references. 

GRADING  RATES   415 

Cross-references. 

GROUP  RATES 415 

Cross-references. 

IMPORT  TRAFFIC    415 

I.     DETERMINATION    OF    STATUS 415 

XL     REASONABLENESS    OF    RATES    416 

INJUNCTIONS  417 

Cross-references. 

INSPECTION 417 

Cross-references. 

INSURANCE   417 

Cross-references. 

INTERCHANGE  OF  TRAFFIC 417 

Cross-references. 

INTEREST  ON  FUNDED  DEBT 417 

Cross-references. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS  xxili 


Page 

INTERMEDIATE  CARRIER  ; 417 

Cross-references. 

INTERMEDIATE  CLAUSE 417 

Cross-references. 

INTERSTATE  COMMERCE 417 

I.  DETERMINATION. 

§1.    Beginning  and  end  of  transit   418 

§2.    State  shipment  through  another  state   419 

§3.    Participation   in  interstate  movement    419 

II.  CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§4,    State     421 

§5.    United    States    425 

INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION 426 

I.    JURISDICTION. 

§1.    In     general     426 

II.  PRIMARY   JURISDICTION. 

§2.    In    general    429 

§3.     Finality    of   findings    430 

III.  OVER  PROCEDURE, 

§4.  Examiners      431 

§5.  Orders     431 

§6.  Witnesses 431 

IV.  OVER  RAILROADS. 

§7.     Capitalization      431 

§8.     Physical    valuation     431 

V.     OVER   RATES. 

§9.     Interstate      431 

§10.    Intrastate      435 

§10%.Territorial      436 

§11.     Suspension     436 

§12.    Undercharges     436 

§13.    Unpublished    rate    436 

VI.    TO  AWARD   DAMAGES. 

§14.    In     general     436 

INTERVENERS   438 

Cross-references. 

INTRASTATE  COMMERCE 438 

Cross-references. 

JOINT  RATE   438 

Cross-references. 

JUDICIAL  NOTICE  438 

Cross-references. 

JUSTIFICATION  439 

Cross-references. 

KNOCKED-DOWN  SHIPMENTS 439 

Cross-references. 


xxiv  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


Page 

LACHES 439 

Cross-references. 

LAND  GRANT  RAILROADS 439 

LEASE 439 

Cross-references. 

LEGAL  RATE 439 

Cross-references. 

LEGALITY  439 

Cross-references. 

LIGHTERAGE  439 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction     of     Commission     439 

II.    CHARGES. 

§2.    Reasonableness      439 

§3.    Discrimination      440 

III.     ALLOWANCES. 

§4.    In    general    441 

LOADING  AND  UNLOADING 441 

Cross-references. 

LOCAL  RATES   441 

Cross-references. 


k 


I 


ONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS 442 

i   L     CONTROL  AND   REGULATION. 

*               §1.    Constitutionality  of  section   4 442 

§2.    Jurisdiction    of    Commission 442 

n.     SECTION  4  AS  AMENDED. 

§3.     Constitutionality    443 

§4.    Exceptions   443 

m.     APPLICATION  OF  SECTION  4  TO  RATES. 

§5.    Intermediate    points 448 

§6.    Intermediate  points  off  line 457 

IV.     COMPETITION  AS   JUSTIFICATION. 

§7.    In   general 458 

§8.    Markets    459 

§9.    Railroad    460 

§10.    Water    466 

V.     PROCEDURE. 

§11.    Complaints  and  orders 474 

§12.    Evidence    475 

(1)  Burden  of  proof 475 

(2)  Circumstances  of  probative  force 475 

LOSS  AND  DAMAGE 476 

I.    THE   CARMACK  AMENDMENT. 

§1.    Constitutionality    476 

§2.    Construction  in  general 479 

§3.    Effect  of  state  legislation 479 

§4,    Jurisdiction  of  Commission 480 

§5.    Jurisdiction  of  state  courts 481 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS  xxv 

II.     CARRIERS'  LIABILITY.  Page 

§6.    Initial    carrier 482 

§7.    Intermediate   carrier 487 

§8.    Delivering    carrier 487 

§9.    Agreed  or  restricted  valuation 487 

§10.    Common  law  liability 490 

§11.    Notice   of  loss 490 

§12.    Settlements  and  rights  inter  se 491 

§13.    Special   damages 492 

III.     EVIDENCE. 

§14.    Acts  of  connecting  carrier 492 

§15.    Burden  of   proof 492 

§16.    Judicial   notice 492 

MARINE  INSURANCE  492 

MARKING  AND   ADDRESSING 493 

Cross-references. 

MEETING  RATES   493 

Cross-references. 

MILEAGE  SCALE 493 

Cross-references. 

MINIMUMS   493 

I.     APPLICATION  OF  MINIMUM. 

§1.    In    general 493 

§2.    Effect  of  not  publishing 495 

§3.    Furnishing  car  of  minimum  ordered 496 

§4.    Larger  car  furnished  than  ordered 497 

§5.    Minimum  higher  than  car  capacity 500 

§6.    Mixed   carloads 501 

§7.    Reasonableness    501 

§8.    Two  cars  for  one  ordered 608 

MISBILLING 511 

Cross-references. 

MISROUTING 512 

Cross-references. 

MISTAKE   512 

Cross-references. 

MIXED  CARLOADS 512 

Cross-references. 

MOOT  QUESTION 512 

Cross-references, 

NARROW  GAUGE  RAILROADS  512 

I.     REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES 512 

NEWS  STAND  513 

Cross-references. 


xxvi  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


Page 

NOTICE 513 

Cross-references. 

OVERCHARGES 513 

I.     ACTIONS   FOR   RECOVERY. 

§1.    Definition   of   overcharge 513 

§2.    Jurisdiction   of  Commission 513 

§3.     Jurisdiction  of  state  courts 513 

§4.    Jurisdiction  of  U.  S.  courts 514 

§5.    Proof  and  evidence 514 

§6.    Right  to  attorney's  fees 515 

§7.     Statute  of  limitations 515 

II.     DUTY  TO  REFUND. 

§8.    In   general 515 

§9.    Necessity  of  order 516 

III.     CRIMINAL  LIABILITY. 

§10.    In   general 517 

PANAMA  CANAL 517 

Cross-references. 

PASSENGER  FARES  AND  FACILITIES 518 

I.  CONTROL  AND   REGULATION. 

§1,    Jurisdiction  of  Commission 518 

II.  REASONABLENESS. 

§2.  In   general 518 

§3.  Basing    fares 519 

§4.  Certificate   plan 520 

§5.  Commutation    fares 520 

§6.  Mileage  and  excursion  rates 522 

§7.  Party   rates 523 

§8.  Validation    523 

III.  DISCRIMINATION  IN  FACILITIES. 

§9.  In    general 524 

§10.  Baggage    525 

§11,  Colored   passengers 525 

§12.  Free    transportation 526 

§13.  Stations    527 

§14.  Through  routes  and  rates 528 

IV.  CLAIMS  FOR  DAMAGES. 

§15.    Errors  of  ticket  agents 530 

§16.    Lost  tickets 631 

PASSES   531 

Cross-references. 

PAST  RATES    532 

Cross-references. 

PEDDLER  CAR  SERVICE 532 

PERCENTAGE  SYSTEM    532 

Cross-references. 

PHYSICAL  VALUATION   532 

Cross-references. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS  xxvll 

Page 

POTENTIAL  COMPETITION   532 

Cross-references. 

PRECOOLING  532 

I.    JURISDICTION    OF    COMMISSION 532 

II.  RIGHT   OF   SHIPPER 532 

III.  EFFICIENCY  OF  METHOD 533 

IV.  LIABILITY   FOR   DAMAGE 534 

PREPAY  STATIONS   534 

Cross-references. 

PRESUMPTIONS   534 

Cross-references. 

PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMMISSION    534 

L     PRACTICE. 

§1.    In   general 534 

II.     COMPLAINT. 

§2»    Form  and  issues  tendered 535 

§3.    Notice  of  complaint 541 

§4.    Amendment    542 

§5.    Hearing    542 

§6.     Briefs   543 

§7.    Oral  argument 543 

§8.    Rehearing    544 

§9.    Costs,  attorneys'  fees,  etc 544 

III.    MOTIONS. 

§10.    Dismissing   complaint 544 

(1)  In   general    ,,[  544 

(2)  Adjustment  since   filing    644 

IV.     ORDERS  OF  COMMISSION. 

§11.    Modification,  validity  and  effect 547 

12.     Review    549 

V.    PARTIES. 

§13.    Necessary  and  proper  parties 549 

VI.     SET-OFF. 

§14.    In   general 552 

VII.     EFFECT  OF  EVIDENCE. 

§15.    Equities  of  cause 552 

§16.    Judicial  notice  [,  552 

§17.     Res  adjudicata 553 

§18.    Requesting  information  of  carrier 554 

§19.    Tests  of  revenue 554 

PROPORTIONAL  RATES 555 

L     APPLICATION     555 

n.    DISCRIMINATION    556 

III.  LEGALITY   558 

IV.  REASONABLENESS  AND  EVIDENCE   559 

PULLMAN  COMPANY 561 

Cross-references. 

RATE  VIA  COMPETING  LINE  562 

Cross-references. 


xxviii  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


Page 

RATE  WARS   562 

Cross-references. 

REASONABLE  RATES  562 

Cross-references. 

REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES   562 

I.  CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    In    general 563 

II.  ELEMENTS    DETERMINING   REASONABLENESS. 

§2.     In   general 566 

§3.    Actions   of  state  commissions 572 

§4.    Attractiveness  of  traffic 573 

§5.    Capitalization    574 

§6.    Car-mile  or  train-mile  revenue 574 

§7.     Changed    circumstances 575 

§8.     Competition    576 

(1)  In    general 576 

(2)  Railroad   competition 581 

(3)  Rail-and-water    581 

(4)  Water  competition 582 

§9.     Cost  of  service 584 

§10.     Distance 586 

§1L     Earnings    588 

§12.    Economical  management 589 

§12^.Equalizing  of  rates  or  markets 590 

§13.     Equipment  furnished 591 

§14.    Investment  relying  on  rate 591 

§15.     Investment  of  carrier 592 

§16.     Long-continued    adjustment 592 

§17.     Manufactured   product 595 

§18.    Mineral  lands  owned  by  carrier 595 

§19.    Natural  advantages 595 

§20.    Need  for  revenue  596 

§21.     Obsolescence    597 

§22,     Origin  of  traffic 597 

§23.    Ownership  or  use  of  commodity 597 

§24.    Paper    rate 598 

§25.     Past   rates 599 

§26.     Permanent  improvements 600 

§27.     Profits  of  shipper 601 

§28.    Relativity  of  the  rate 602 

§29.    Reproduction  value  of  road 605 

§30.    Revenues  from   facilities 605 

§31.     Special    service 605 

§32.     Standard   for  carriers 605 

§32*^. Subsequent  reduction 606 

§33.     Surplus    607 

§34.     Terminal    facilities 608 

§35.    Time  of  changing  rate 608 

§36.    Ton-mile  revenue 608 

§37.     Two-line  haul 609 

§38.    Value   of   commodity 609 

§39.    Value  of  service 610 

§40.    Volume  of  traffic 611 

§40%.Wages 612 

§41,    Weight   612 


TABLE    OP    CONTENTS  xxlx 


III.     REASONABLE   RATES.  Page 

§42.    Adding-machine  paper 613 

§43.    Agricultural    implements 613 

§44.  Antimony   ware,   baskets,   brushes,   camphor,   earthenware,   gums, 

rugs,  sago,  tea  and  tapioca 613 

§45.    Asphaltum 614 

§46.    Automobile   parts 614 

§47.    Beer    614 

§48.    Beer  bottles  and  packages  615 

§49.     Bottle    caps 615 

§50.     Box   shooks 616 

§51.    Brass  and  iron  tubing 616 

§52.     Brick    616 

§53.    Broom    corn 618 

§54.     Burlap   bags 618 

§55,    Butter   boxes 618 

§56.    Butter,  eggs  and  poultry 618 

§57.    Canned  goods 619 

§58.    Car  wheels  and  axles 620 

§59.     Catsup    620 

§60.    Cement    620 

§61.    Chautauqua   outfits 620 

§62.    Cheese    621 

§63.    Cheese    boxes 621 

§64.    Cinders    621 

§65.    Clam  shells 621 

§66.    Class    rates 621 

§67.     Coal    624 

§68,    Coal-tar  paving  cement 630 

§69.    Coal-tar  paving  pitch 630 

§70.     Coke    630 

§71.    Condensed    milk 630 

§72.     Corn    shucks 631 

§73.     Cotton    631 

§74.    Cotton  linters,  cotton  shoddy  lining 632 

§75.    Cotton  seed  and  products ' 632 

§76.    Cotton    waste 634 

§77.     Doors    634 

§78.    Dried    fruits 634 

§79.    Egg-case    material 634 

§80.    Elm  hub  blocks 635 

§81.    Fertilizer    635 

§82.    Flaxseed  and  oats 636 

§83.     Flour    636 

§84.    Fruits  and  vegetables  637 

§85.    Fruit   baskets 648 

§86.     Furniture    648 

§87.    Gas  machinery 649 

§88.    Go-carts    649 

§89.    Grain  and  hay 649 

§90.    Grates    650 

§91.    Gunpowder    651 

§92.    Hay,  straw  and  alfalfa [[  651 

§93.    Hickory   spokes 652 

§94.    Ice    ; ;  653 

§95.    Iron  and  steel  bars,  plates,  sheets  and  structural  steel 655 

§96.    Iron  ore,  iron  products  and  iron  pyrites ,[  656 

§97.    Iron  roofing,  pipe,  nails,  wire,  iron 658 

§98.    Junk    658 

§99.    Kanite    658 

§100.    Lead  ore 658 


XXX  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


III.    REASONABLE  RATES— Cont'd  Page 

§101.    Leather,  shoe  material 659 

§102.    Lime    659 

§103.    Live  stock 659 

§104.    Locomotives   664 

§105.    Lumber  and  products 665 

§106.    Malt    672 

§107.    Manila  paper  folders 673 

§108.    Masurite 673 

§109.    Merchandise    , 673 

§110.    Metal  furniture  knobs 673 

§111.    Milk  and  cream  673 

§112.    Mine-prop  logs 676 

§113.     Mohair   677 

§114.    Motorcycles   677 

§115.    Mussel   shells , 677 

§116.    Newspaper    677 

§117.    Oil    678 

§118.    Packing-house  products,  meat  and  poultry 678 

§119.    Paper  and  stock 682 

§120.    Passenger   car 682 

§121.    Peas,  beans  and  hominy 682 

§122.    Petroleum   683 

§123.    Petroleum    skimmings 684 

§124.    Plaster  board 684 

§125.    Poles,  piling  and  posts 684 

§126,    Phosphate  rock  and  acid  phosphates 685 

§127.    Potatoes    685 

§128.     Pulp  wood 685 

§129.    Pyrite    cinder 685 

§130.    Roofing   material 686 

§131.    Resin   686 

§132.    Sacked    corn 686 

§133.    Safety  fuse 686 

§134.    Salt   687 

§135.    Sash    weights    687 

§136.    Sawdust    687 

§137.    Second-hand  steel  rails  and  logging  equipment 688 

§138.    Sheet-iron   roofing 688 

§139.    Shingles    688 

§140.    Snapped   corn 688 

§141.    Stamped  ware 689 

§142.    Staves 689 

§143.     Stucco   689 

§144.    Sugar 689 

§145.    Sulphuric    acid 690 

§146.    Tanners'    outfits 691 

§147.    Tent  pins 691 

§148.     Ties   691 

§149.    Tin-plate   scrap 692 

§150.    Vehicles,  wagons  and  buggies 692 

§151.    Walnut    veneer 693 

§152.    Watermelons    693 

§153.    Wheat,  corn  and  rye 693 

§154.    Wire    695 

§155.    Wood    pulp 695 

§156.    Wool    695 

REBATES  696 

Oross-references. 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS  xxxl 

Page 

REBILLING 696 

Cross-references. 

RECIPROCAL  SWITCHING 697 

Cross-references. 

RECONSIGNMENT 697 

I.    LEGALITY, 

§1.    Right  to  grant  privilege 697 

II.    DISCRIMINATION. 

§2.    In   general 698 

III.  REASONABLENESS   OF   CHARGES. 

§3.    In   general 699 

IV.  TARIFFS  AND  PUBLICATION. 

§4.    Necessity  of  publishing 702 

§5,    Construction  in  general 702 

§6.    Retroactive    application 703 

V.     PROCEDURE  AND  REPARATION. 

§7.    In   general 704 

§8.    Parties  to  complaint 704 

RECORDS    704 

Cross-references. 

REDUCED  RATES   704 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission 704 

§2.    Power  to  suspend 704 

II.  LEGALITY  OF  REDUCED  RATES, 

§3.    Charitable   institutions 704 

§4.    Government    material 705 

§5.    Returned  or  old  shipments 705 

REFRIGERATION 707 

I.  CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission 707 

II.  DUTY  TO  FURNISH. 

§2.  In  general 707 

§3.  Incidental  services  and  charges 707 

III.  REASONABLENESS  OF  CHARGES. 

§4,    In    general 708 

IV.  TARIFFS  AND  PUBLICATION. 

§5.    Obligation  to  file 710 

§6.    Construction  in  general 710 

V.    WEIGHTS. 

§7.    Minimums    710 

REGROUPING  OF  TERRITORY 711 

Cross-references. 

RELATIVE  RATES    711 

Cross-references. 


xxxii  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


Page 

RELEASED  RATES   711 

I.  CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission 711 

II.     CONSTRUCTION  AND  APPLICATION. 

§2.    Duty  to  inform  shipper, 711 

§3.    Intention  to  use 711 

in.     LEGALITY. 

§4.    In   general 712 

rV.     REASONABLENESS. 

§5.    In   general 713 

REPARATION    713 

L     JURISDICTION  OF  COMMISSION. 

§1.    Necessity  of  and  primary  action  by  Commission 713 

§2.    Necessity  of,  and  effect  of  finding  of  unreasonableness 715 

§3.    Power  to  award  tort  damages 720 

II.  RIGHT  TO  RECOVER. 

§4,  Necessity   of  protest 722 

§5.  Necessity  of  first  paying  tariff  rate 722 

§6.  Parties  entitled  to  recover 723 

§7.  Statute  of  limitations 727 

in.     CIRCUMSTANCES  DETERMINING  RIGHT. 

§8.  Erroneous   publication 730 

§9.  Failure  to  post  tariff 732 

§10.  Laches 733 

§11.  Rate  via  competing  line 733 

§12.  Readjustment  of  rates 733 

§13.  Res   adjudicata 733 

§14.  Special   rate 734 

§15.  Unpublished    charges 734 

§16.  Voluntary  or  subsequent  reduction 734 

§17.  Willingness  of  carrier  to  pay 741 

IV.     LIABILITY  FOR  REPARATION. 

§18.  Measure  of  reparation 742 

§19.  Parties  to  make  refund 743 

§20.  Release  of  liability 745 

V.     PROCEDURE. 

§21.  Formal   proceedings 745 

§22.  Informal    proceedings 746 

§23.  Court    pleadings 746 

REPORTS    747 

Cross-references. 

RES  ADJUDICATA  747 

Cross-references. 

RESTRICTED  RATES 747 

L    LEGALITY    747 

RETURNED  SHIPMENTS 748 

Cross-references. 

REVENUES , 748 

Cross-references. 


I 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS  xxxiil 


Page 

ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING   748 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission 749 

I  CARRIER'S  DUTY  TO  TRANSPORT. 
§2.  Accustomed  or  natural  route 749 
§3,  Conflict  in  billing  between  rate  and  route 751 
§4.  Direct  and  reasonable  route 753 
§5.  Lower  rate  via  competing  line 760 
§6.  Right  of  carrier  to  route 760 
§7.    Shipper's    instructions 761 

IIL    LIABILITY   FOR  MISROUTING. 

§8.    Burden  of  proof 769 

§9.    Measure  of  damages 769 

§10.    Parties  to  make  refund 770 


m 


ULES  AND  REGULATIONS  771 

Cross-references. 

SCHEDULE    771 

Cross-references. 

SPECIAL  CONTRACTS    771 

L     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Constitutionality  of  Act 771 

II.     LEGALITY  AND  EFFECT   SINCE  PASSAGE  OF  ACT. 

§2.    In    general 772 

IIL     LIABILITY. 

§3.    Criminal   liability 779 

§4.    Damages  for  breach 780 

(1)  Jurisdiction  of  Commission 780 

§5.    Discrimination  through  contract 781 

IV.    ACTIONS   TO  ENFORCE. 

§6.    Defenses    782 

V.     AS  EVIDENCE  OF  REASONABLE  RATES. 

§7.    In   general 782 

SPECIAL   783 

DAMAGES    783 

SERVICES 783 

Cross-references. 

SPOTTING  CARS 783 

Cross-references. 

STATE  RATES  783 

Cross-references. 

STATE  REGULATION  783 

Cross-references. 

STOCK   YARDS   COMPANIES    783 

L     STATUS 783 

STORAGE    783 


xxxiv  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


Page 

SUBSTITUTION  OF  TONNAGE 784 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission 784 

IL     LEGALITY  OF  SUBSTITUTING. 

§2.    In   general 784 

III.     POLICING  BY  CARRIERS. 

§a.    In   general 786 

SUSPENSION  OF  RATES  787 

Cross-references. 

SWITCH  TRACKS  AND  SWITCHING 787 

L     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    In   general 787 

§2.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission 787 

IL    ABSORPTION  OF  SWITCHING. 

§3.    In   general 788 

IIL     DISCRIMINATION  AND   REASONABLENESS  OF  CHARGES. 

§4.    In   general 788 

§5.    Incidental   services 791 

§6.    Reciprocal    switching 793 

§7.    Right  to  connection 793 

§8.    Validity  of  regulations 795 

§9.    Reparation 796 

§10,    Tariffs  and  publication 796 

TANK  CARS 796 

Cross-references. 

TAP  LINES 796 

L     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Definition  of  tap  line 796 

§2.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission 796 

§3.    Test  of  status 796 

(1)  In    general 796 

(2)  Effect  of  Incorporation 797 

§4.    When  plant  facility 797 

§5.    Scope  of  tap-line  investigation 799 

II.     POWERS  AND  DUTIES. 

§6.    As   common   carriers 799 

§7.    Legality  of  divisions  or  practices 799 

§8.    Passes  to  officers 800 

§9.    Right  to  allowances 800 

TARIFFS    802 

L     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission 802 

§2.    Power  of  Congress 803 

II.    PUBLICATION. 

§3.    Effect  in  general 803 

(1)  Adherence  to  published  rate 806 

(2)  Erroneous  quotation  by  carrier 808 

(3)  Notice    to    shipper 810 

§4.    Necessity   of  publication 811 

§5.    Purpose  of  publication 812 

ni.    POSTING. 

§6.    In  general 813 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS  XXXV 

IV.    CONSTRUCTION.  Page 

§7.  In   general 814 

§8.  Ambiguity    827 

§9.  Cancellation    ; 829 

§10.  Concurrences    829 

§11.  Conflict   830 

§12.  Cross-references 831 

§13.  Index     831 

§14.  Legality    831 

§15.  Reasonableness    832 

TELEGRAPH  COMPANY  832 

Cross-references. 

TELEPHONE  COMPANIES  832 

I.     DISCRIMINATION   IN   SERVICE. 

§1.    In  general  832 

TERMINAL  FACILITIES 833 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission 833 

§l%.Juri8diction   of  courts 835 

II.     DUTY  TO   PERFORM   TERMINAL  SERVICE. 

§2.    In   general 836 

§3.    Duty  to  allow  use 835 

§4.    Publication  of  terminal  charges 837 

§5.    Reasonableness  of  charges 838 

§6.    What  are  public  terminals 838 

III.  STATUS  OF  TERMINAL  ROADS. 

§7.    In   general 838 

I  §8.    Definition  of  "terminal  charges" 839 

THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES 840 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission 840 

§2.    What  Is  through  route  or  "common  arrangement" 842 

§3.    What  Is  joint  rate 844 

§3J^.Participatlon  In  through  trafBc 844 

II.     ESTABLISHMENT  BY  CARRIER. 

§4.    In   general 844 

§5.    Dispute  over  divisions 845 

§6.    Circuitous    routes 846 

§7.    Obligation  to  carry 846 

§8.    Relation  of  similar  points 846 

§9.    Right  to  favor  own  line 847 

§10.    Status  of  Intermediate  carrier 848 

§11.    What  Is  satisfactory  through  route 848 

(1)  In    general 848 

(2)  When  through  route  ordered  or  denied 850 

in.     BILLS  OF  LADING. 

§12.    Issuance  In  general 859 

IV.  REASONABLENESS  OF  THROUGH  RATES. 

§13.    In   general 859 

§14.     Divisions    863 

§15.    Exceeding  combinations  of  Intermediates 864 

§16.    Reparation    878 

V.     TARIFFS  AND  CONSTRUCTION. 

§17.    In    general 880 

§18.    Application  of  proportional  rate 880 


xxxvi  TABLE    OP    CONTENTS 


V.    TARIFFS  AND  CONSTRUCTION— Cont'd  Page 

§19.    Breaking    transit 881 

§20.    Change  in  rate  while  shipment  at  transit  point 882 

§21.    Intermediate   clause 882 

§22,    What  is  legal  rate 882 

§23.    Procedure    884 

TICKETS   884 

Cross-references. 

TRACING  SHIPMENTS   884 

Cross-references. 

TRACK  STORAGE   884 

I.  CONTROL  AND  REGULATION 884 

II.  REASONABLENESS  AND  LEGALITY 885 

TRAIN  MILE  REVENUE   887 

Cross-references. 

TRANSIT 887 

Cross-references. 

TRANSPORTATION 887 

L    WHAT  IS  TRANSPORTATION  SERVICE. 

§1.    In   general 887 

II.  DUTY  OF  CARRIER  TO  TRANSPORT. 

§2.    In   general 888 

§3.    Company  material 890 

§4.    Collection  of  charges 890 

§5.    Delivery    890 

§6.    Notifying  consignor  of  rejection 891 

§7.    Prompt  and  safe  carriage 891 

§8.    Special    service 891 

§9.    State   interference 891 

§10.    Unloading  at  terminal 891 

§11.    When  transit  ends 891 

III.  OPERATION  OF  RAILROAD. 

§12.    Right  of  carrier  to  make  regulations 892 

§13,    Economy  of  management 893 

§14.    What  are  operating  expenses 893 

TRANSHIPMENT 893 

Cross-references. 

TRIMMING 893 

Cross-references. 

TRUCKMEN 893 

Cross-references. 

UNEARNED  INCREMENT  893 

Cross-references. 

UNDERCHARGES 893 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission 893 

§11^ .Jurisdiction  of  courts. 894 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS  xxxvii 

II.    DUTY  OF  CARRIER  TO  COLLECT.  Page 

§2.     In   general 894 

§3.    Defences    894 

III.    EVIDENCE. 

§4.    Admissibility  of  tariff  copies 895 

§5.    Burden  of  proof 895 

§6.    Testimony  as  to  rate 895 

UNITED  STATES  COURTS  895 

Cross-references. 

UNPUBLISHED  RATES 895 

Cross-references. 

VALIDATION 895 

Cross-references. 

VENUE   , 895 

Cross-references. 

VERDICT 895 

Cross-references. 

VOLUNTARY  RATES  895 

Cross-references. 

WAGES 895 

Cross-references. 

WAREHOUSEMAN    '. 895 

Cross-references. 

WATER  CARRIERS 895 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    In   general 895 

§2.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission 896 

IL     DISCRIMINATION  AND  REBATES. 

§3.    In   general 899 

III.     TARIFFS  AND  PUBLICATION. 

§4.    In   general 900 

§5,    Reparation    900 

WATER  COMPETITION  900 

Cross-references. 

WEIGHTS  AND  WEIGHING 900 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    In  general 900 

§2.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission 900 

II.  METHODS  OF  COMPUTING  CHARGES. 

§3.    Actual   weight 900 

§4.    Capacity   weight 901 

§5.    Estimated    weight 902 

§6.    Reweighing    903 

§7,    Scaleage  and  shrinkage 904 

III.    DISCRI-MINATION. 

§8.    In   general 904 


xxxviii  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


IV.     EVIDENCE  AND  BURDEN  OF  PROOF.  Page 

§9.    In   general 905 

V.     REPARATION. 

§10.    In   general 906 

VI.    TARIFFS  AND  PUBLICATION. 

§11.    In   general 906 

WHARFAGE 906 

Cross-references. 

WITNESSES 906 

Cross-references. 

ZONE  RATES   906 

Cross-references. 

INDEX  TO   CASES    907 

INDEX  TO  COMMODITIES 973 

INDEX  TO  LOCALITIES   1033 


ABSORPTION  OP  CHARGEt^rVi^^^^ft^) 


ABSORPTION  OF  CHARGES. 

I.  APPLICATION   OP   ABSORBED 
RATE. 

§1.    In  general. 
II.     DISCRIMINATION. 

§2.     Absorption      subsequent      to 

shipment. 
§3.     Refusal  to  absorb. 
III.     CONTROL    AND    REVIEW. 
§4.     In    general. 

I.     APPLICATION        OP        ABSORBED 

RATE. 
§1.     In    General. 

(a)  The  application  of  a  through  rate 
on  coal  from  the  mine  and  absorption  of 
the  switching  charge  to  the  mill  of  an 
industry  in  effect  names  a  through  rate 
from  the  mine  to  the  mill.  Utica  Traffic 
Bureau    v.    N.    Y.    O.    &   W.    Ry.    Co.,    18 

I.  C.  C.  168. 

(b)  Where  a  carrier  absorbs  switching 
charges  on  carload  shipments  of  furni- 
ture, and  for  its  own  convenience,  fur- 
nishes a  shipper  two  cars  in  accordance 
with  its  rules  in  that  regard,  making 
the  same  rate  as  though  one  car  had 
been  furnished,  the  switching  charges 
should  be  absorbed  on  both  cars.  Mil- 
waukee Falls  Chair  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.   C.  217,  218. 

II.  DISCRIMINATION. 

See  Common  Carrier,  §3  (f). 
§2.  Absorption  Subsequent  to  Shipment, 
(a)  Complainant  alleged  that  unrea- 
sonable and  discriminatory  switching 
charges  were  assessed  by  defendants  on 
shipments  of  packing-house  products 
which  moved  from  Kansas  City,  Kan.,  to 
the  train  yards  of  the  defendant,  M.  P. 
R.v.  Co.,  at  Kansas  City,  Mo.  At  time 
of  shipment  the  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.  published 
a  rule  which  provided  for  the  absorption 
of  switching  charges  on  cars  containing 
less-than-carload  freight,  in  lots  of  6,000 
lbs.  or  over,  received  from  connecting 
carriers  within  the  switching  limits  of 
Kansas  City,  when  such  cars  were  des- 
tined to'  its  freight  houses  or  warehouses 
In  that  city,  and  forwarded  over  Its 
lines.  A  few  months  later  this  provi- 
sion was  amended  to  cover  movements 
to  the  train  yards,  as  well  as  to  freight 
stations  and  warehouses.  The  haul  to 
the  train  yards  was  slightly  shorter. 
Apparently  the  cars  were  handled 
through  the  train  yards  for  convenience 
of    the    carrier.      HELD,    that    the    non- 


absorption  of  the  switching  charges  con- 
stituted an  unjust  discrimination.  Swift 
&  Co.  V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  385. 

(b)  Complainants  shipped  lumber,  in 
carloads,  from  Beaudette,  Minn.,  to  Chi- 
cago, 111.,  reconsigned  in  transit  to 
Elsdon,  111.  The  Grand  Trunk  R.  R.  as- 
sessed a  switching  charge  of  $5  for 
switching  the  car  from  Chicago  proper 
to  Elsdon,  which  is  within  the  Chicago 
Switching  District.  Nine  months  later 
the  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.,  the  delivering 
carrier  at  Chicago,  published  a  tariff 
absorbing  the  switching  charges  at  Chi- 
cago. Complainant  did  not  appear  at 
the  hearing.  HELD,  the  fact  that  over 
Dine  months  after  the  shipment  moved 
defendant  provided  for  the  absorption  of 
such  switching  is  not  of  itself  sufficient 
reason  for  a  finding  that  the  charges 
collected  were  either  unreasonable  or 
excessive.  Deeves  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  & 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  482,  483. 

(c)  Where  there  is  no  through  rate  In 
effect,  and  the  local  rates  of  the  Initial 
and  delivering  carrier,  and  the  switching 
charge  of  the  intermediate  carrier  are 
published  separately,  the  Commission 
will  not  authorize  thg  initial  carrier  to 
refund  the  switching  charge  exacted  by 
the  intermediate  carrier,  by  reason  of 
the  fact  that  the  initial  carrier  subse- 
quent to  the  shipment  provides  by  tariff 
for  the  absorption  of  such  switching 
charges,  no  evidence  being  offered  to 
show  that  the  switching  charges  were 
unreasonable  or  that  the  Initial  carrier 
owed  a  duty  to  perform  the  switching 
service,  or  to  make  compensation  there- 
for to  the  intermediate  carrier.  Acme 
Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  P. 
R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  376,  377. 

(d)  On  wood  and  coal  from  Gerster, 
Collins,  Vista  and  Chester,  Mo.,  to 
Kansas  City,  complainants  are  entitled 
to  reparation  for  switching  charges  ex- 
acted after  Dec.  24,  1906,  the  date  at 
which  defendant  issued  a  tariff  clearly 
providing  for  the  absorption  by  itself  of 
such  charges.  Wellington  v.  St.  L.  & 
S.  P.  R.  R.   Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  534,  535. 

(e)  In  order  to  compete  with  the 
rail  lines  it  was  the  custom  of  the 
steamship  lines  to  absorb  the  local  rates 
from  Atlantic  seaboard  territory  to 
New  York,  Philadelphia  and  Baltimore 
on  shipments  destined  to  points  in  south- 
ern states.  Port  Smith  Wholesale  Gro- 
cery Co..  V.  Pt.  S.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
Uurep.    Op.    509. 


^-^        v>_  6PO 


2 


:  S5e§S€MRrif)iij|]^^%H,^iiGES,  §2  (f)— accounting,  i  (def) 


(f)  It  is  not  incumbent  upon  a  car- 
rier to  equalize  the  disadvantage  of 
location  and  a  two-line  haul  by  tht 
absorption  of  the  foreign  line's  entir< 
rate  to  the  junction.  Great  Westeri 
Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F 
Ry.   Co.,   Unrep.    Op.    454. 

§3.     Refusal    to    Absorb. 

(a)  Complainant  operating  a  factor: 
for  the  manufacture  of  sash,  doors  an( 
blinds  near  Sisson,  Cal.,  is  connectet 
with  the  S.  P.  Co.  by  a  spur  track  owne 
by  the  McCloud  River  Railroad  Co.  Fo 
several  years  prior  to  Oct.  5,  1910,  the 
S.  P.  Co.,  which  receives  the  line  hau 
on  traffic  to  and  from  complainants 
plant,  performed  free  of  charge  th' 
switching  service  involved  in  handlin; 
cars  over  the  spur  track.  On  the  dat( 
mentioned  this  privilege  was  withdraw! 
and  the  McCloud  company  established  i 
charge  of  $3  p^r  car  for  the  switching 
service  and  entered  upon  the  perform 
ance  thereof.  The  S.  P.  Co.  only  ab 
sorbs  switching'  charges  on  competitive 
traffic.  HELD,  the  complainant  is  not 
subjected  to  discrimination  as  compared 
with  other  shippers  similarly  situated. 
Curtis  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.  23  I.  C. 
C.   372, 

(b)  Carriers  generally  absorb  switch- 
ing charges  only  upon  competitive  traf- 
fic. Curtis  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  S.  P  Co.,  23 
I.    C.    C.    372     (373). 

III.     CONTROL.  AND   REVIEW. 

§4.     In    General. 

See  Courts,   §11    (cc) ;   Discrimination, 
§1    (q). 

(a)  In  determining  the  reasonable 
ness  of  a  switching  charge  at  point  of 
destination  which  is  absorbed  in  part  b} 
the  originating  carrier,  the  Commission 
will  consider  only  that  portion  of  the 
charge  which  is  not  absorbed.  Uticn 
Traffic  Bureau  v.  N.  Y.  O.  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  1G8.  170. 


ACCOUNTING. 

I.     POWER  TO  REGULATE. 

(a)  In  passing  Section  20  of  the  Act 
giving  the  Commission  authority  to  pre 
scribe  an  accounting  system  and  to  re- 
quire reports  of  carriers  covering  both 
interstate  and  intrastate  business,  Con- 
gress did  not  exceed  its  power  under  the 
Commerce  Clause  of  the  Constitution.    I. 


C.  C.  V.  Goodrich  Co.,  224  U.  S.,  194,  214; 
32   Sup.   Ct.   436,  56   L.   ed.   729. 

(b)  Defendant  water  carriers  on  the 
Great  Lakes  were  engaged  in  carrying 
goods  from  one  port  to  another  in  the 
same  state,  from  a  port  in  one  state  to 
ports  in  another  state,  and  also  from 
ports  in  one  state  to  destinations  in  an- 
other state  in  connection  with  rail  car- 
riers. They  were  also  interested  in 
operating  amusement  parks.  HELD, 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
had  power  under  section  20  of  the  Act 
as  amended  to  order  a  universal  system 
of  bookkeeping  and  accounting  and  to 
require  reports  on  all  the  business  of 
defendants,  whether  interstate  or  intra- 
state, since  the  intrastate  business  was 
so  inextricably  bound  up  with  the  inter- 
state business  that  to  limit  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Act  to  interstate  business 
would  defeat  the  purpose  sought  to  be 
accomplished  by  reports  and  accounting 
systems.  I.  C.  C.  v.  Goodrich  Co.,  224 
U.  S.,  194,  213;  32  Sup.  Ct.  436,  56  L.  ed. 
729. 

(c)  The  granting  by  Congress  in  sec- 
tion 20  of  the  Act  to  the  Commission  of 
power  to  prescribe  for  carriers  a  system 
of  accounting  and  reports  covering  their 
interstate  and  intrastate  business  is  not 
an  unlawful  delegation  of  legislative 
power,  since  having  laid  down  the  gen- 
eral rules  under  which  the  Commission 
should  proceed,  it  may  require  of  the 
Commission  the  application  of  such  rules 
to  particular  situations  and  the  investi- 
gation of  facts,  with  a  view  to  making 
orders  in  a  particular  matter  within  the 
rules  laid  down  by  Congress.  I.  C.  C.  v. 
Goodrich  Co.,  224  U.  S.,  194,  214;  32  Sup. 
Ct.  436,  56  L.  ed.  729. 

(def)  An  order  of  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  required  statistical 
information  of  defendant  water  carriers 
covering  the  routes  of  the  carriers  and 
their  mileage;  the  description  of  the 
equipment  owned,  leased,  or  chartered 
by  the  carrier;  the  amount  of  traffic,  both 
passenger  and  freight,  and  mileage  and 
revenue  statistics,  together  with  a  sepa- 
ration of  freight  into  the  quantity  of  the 
various  products  transported,  showing 
Whether  originating  on  the  carrier's  line, 
or  received  from  a  connecting  line;  and 
a  general  description  of  any  separate 
business  carried  on  by  the  carrier. 
HELD,  the  Commission  did  not  exceed 
its  authority  as  to  the  form  of  the  re- 
ports and  the  system  of  accounting  pre- 


ACCOUNTING,  I  (g)— ACT  TO  REGULATE  COMMERCE.  II  (a) 


scribed.  I.  C.  C.  v.  Goodrich  Co.,  224 
U.  S.,  194,  211;  32  Sup.  Ct.  436,  56  L.  ed. 
729. 

(g)  Under  section  20  of  the  Inter 
state  Commerce  Act  as  amended  Junr 
29,  1906,  Feb.  25,  1909,  and  June  18, 
1910,  the  Commission  is  authorized  to 
require  reports  from  and  to  prescribe 
systems  of  bookkeeping  and  accounting 
for  steamship  companies  operating  oi 
the  Great  Lakes  only  with  respect  to  in- 
terstate business  carried  on  under  a 
common  arrangement  with  rail  carrier? 
and  cannot  so  do  with  respect  to  port 
to-port  interstate  or  port-to-port  intra 
state  business  of  such  carriers.  Good- 
rich Transit  Co.  v.  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission,   190   Fed.   943,   958,  966. 

(h)  The  clause  in  the  United  States 
statute  (Act  Feb.  25,  1909,  C.  193),  de- 
claring it  unlawful  for  carriers  engaged 
in  interstate  commerce  to  keep  any 
other  accounts,  records  or  memoranda 
than  those  prescribed  by  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission,  refers  to  inter- 
state commerce  and  does  not  prevent 
the  states  from  prescribing  additions  to 
the  system  of  bookkeeping  fixed  by 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  so 
as  to  complete  the  information  neces- 
sary for  the  regulating  of  intrastate 
rates.  Railroad  Commission  of  Tex.  v. 
T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Tex.  1911),  140  S.  W. 
829,    835. 

(i)  Congress,  or  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission,  cannot  prevent  a 
sovereign  state  from  adopting  and  en- 
forcing against  interstate  carriers  any 
just  and  reasonable  system  of  bookkeep 
ing  that  it  may  see  fit  and  which  does 
not  interfere  with  interstate  commerce. 
Railroad  Commission  of  Tex.  v.  T.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.  (Tex.  1911),  140  S.  W.  829,  835. 

(j)  Where  a  conflict  with  the  system 
of  bookkeeping  prescribed  by  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  is  found  as 
to  any  particular  item  in  a  system  of 
bookkeeping  prescribed  by  a  state  com- 
mission against  interstate  carriers,  such 
fact,  if  it  be  good  cause  for  setting  aside 
an  order  of  the  state  commission  pro 
tanto,  does  not  justify  setting  aside  the 
entire  system.  Railroad  Commission  of 
Tex.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Tex.  1911),  140 
S.  W.   829,  834. 

(k)  The  only  material  difference  be 
tween  the  system  of  bookkeeping  pre- 
scribed by  a  state  commission  and  that 
prescribed   by   the   Interstate   Commerce 


Commission  was  that  the  former  re- 
quired an  apportionment  of  expenses 
between  freight  and  passenger  and  be- 
tween state  and  interstate  commerce, 
while  the  latter  did  not.  HELD,  the 
system  of  the  state  commission  was  not 
invalid  as  conflicting  with  that  pre- 
scril>ed  by  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission,  or  as  imposing  too  great 
a  burden  on  interstate  traffic.  Rail- 
road Commission  of  Tex.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.    (Tex.  1911),   140  S.  W.   829,  833. 

ACT  TO  REGULATE  COM- 
MERCE. 

I.  CONSTITUTIONALITY 

II.  INTERPRETATION    IN   GENERAL. 

III.  TIME   OP   TAKING   EFFECT. 

IV.  ENFORCEMENT. 
V.  AMENDMENTS. 

I.  CONSTITUTIONALITY. 

See  Constitutional  Law. 

(a)  The  Act  is  not  unconstitutional 
as  Infringing  the  right  of  contract,  or 
as  taking  property  for  public  use  with- 
out just  compensation,  or  due  process 
of  law,  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  it 
invalidates  a  contract  entered  into  prior 
to  its  passage,  between  a  person  an^  a 
railroad,  by  which  the  latter,  in  consid- 
eration of  the  release  of  a  cause  of  ac- 
tion for  personal  injuries,  granted  to 
such  person  and  his  family  free  trans- 
portation for  life.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  v. 
Mottley,  219  U.  S.  467,  482,  484,  31  Sup. 
Ct.  265,  55  L.  ed.  297. 

(b)  The  provision  in  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act  giving  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  jurisdiction  over 
commerce  between  a  state  and  a  terri- 
tory of  the  United  States  is  constitu- 
tional. Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Wood  (Tex.  1912),  146  S.  W.  538, 
541. 

II.  INTERPRETATION  IN  GENERAL. 

(a)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Act  as 
amended  does  not  attempt  to  equalize  for- 
tune, opportunities  or  abilities.  On  the 
contrary  it  in  turn  contemplates  that  if  a 
carrier  receives  services  from  an  owner 
of  property  transported,  or  uses  instru- 
mentalities furnished  by  the  latter,  he 
shall  pay  for  them,  the  only  restriction 
being  that  he  shall  pay  no  more  than 
is  reasonable,  and  the  only  permissive 
element  being  that  the  Commission  de- 


ACT  TO  REGULATE  COMMERCE,  II    (b)  — (n) 


termine  the  maximum  in  case  there  is 
complaint  or  upon  its  own  motion.  I.  C. 
C.  V.  Difeenbaugh,  222  U.  S.  42,  46,  32 
Sup.  Ct.  22,  56  L.  ed.  83. 

(b)  The  intention  of  Congress  in 
passing  the  Act  is  to  be  gathered  from 
the  words  of  the  Act,  interpreted  accord- 
ing to  their  ordinary  acceptation,  and, 
when  it  becomes  necessary  to  do  so,  in 
the  light  of  the  circumstances  as  they 
existed  when  the  statute  was  passed. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Mottley,  219  U.  S. 
467,   474,  31   Sup.   Ct.  265,  55   L.   ed.   297. 

(c)  The  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce 
was  intended  to  be  an  effective  means  for 
redressing  wrongs  resulting  from  unjust 
discrimination  and  undue  preference,  and 
this  must  be  so,  whether  persons  or 
places  suffer.     I.  C.  C.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P. 

.Ry.   Co.,  218   U.    S.   88,   110,   30   Sup.   Ct. 
651,  54  L.  ed.  946. 

(d)  A  carrier  under  section  15  of  the 
Act  as  amended  June  29,  1906,  is  entitled 
to  have  a  finding  by  the  Commission  that 
any  particular  charge  is  unreasonable 
and  unjust  before  it  is  required  to  change 
such  charge.  I.  C.  C.  v.  Stickney,  215  U. 
S.  98,  105,  30  Sup.  Ct.  66,  54  L.  ed. 
112. 

(e)  The  objects  of  the  Act  are  to 
prevent  favoritism  and  to  secure  equal 
rights  to  all  in  interstate  transportation 
and  one  legal  rate,  to  be  published  and 
posted  and  accessible  to  all  alike.  N.  Y. 
Central  v.  U.  S.,  212  U.  S.  481,  495,  29 
Sup.  Ct.  304,  53  L.  ed.  613. 

(f)  Under  the  proviso  of  section  1 
cf  the  Act  to  the  effect  that  its  provisions 
shall  not  apply  to  the  transportation  of 
passengers  or  property,  or  to  the  receiv- 
ing, delivering,  storage,  or  handling  of 
property  wholly  within  one  state  and 
not  shipped  to  or  from  a  foreign  country 
from  or  to  any  state  or  territory,  a  car- 
rier participating  in  the  movement  of 
interstate  commerce  is  not  exempted  from 
the  Act  by  the  fact  that  in  handling  its 
portion  of  the  haul  it  operated  wholly 
within  one  state.  Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  195  Fed.  968,  971. 

(g)  While  the  Act  in  terms  provides 
that  the  Commission  may  order  the  car- 
rier to  pay  damages,  the  word  "pay"  is 
not  to  be  interpreted  in  the  narrow 
sense  of  a  money  transaction.  It  is 
equally  a  payment,  within  the  contempla- 
tion of  the  provision,  to  be  relieved  from 
an    obligation    which    the    law    imposes; 


and  an  order  to  remit  the  excess  above  a 
reasonable  charge  which  the  Commission 
has  fixed  is  in  substance  and  effect  an 
order  for  the  "recovery  of  damages" 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Act.  Arkansas 
Fertilizer  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  193  Fed.  667, 
673. 

(h)  A  statute  of  the  scope  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act,  designed  to 
regulate  the  vast  interstate  transporta- 
tion business  of  the  country,  is  not  to 
be  narrowly  interpreted  in  accordance 
with  the  economic  or  physical  conditions 
prevailing  at  the  time  of  the  adoption. 
Omaha  &  C.  B.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C. 
191  Fed.  40,  47. 

(i)  The  provisions  and  requirements 
of  the  Act  are  not  all  applicable  to  every 
kind  of  carrier  coming  within  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Act,  but  only  such  of  them 
are  applicable  to  a  particular  carrier  as 
are  capable  of  practical  accomplishment 
with  respect  to  said  carrier,  Omaha  & 
C.  B.  St.  Ry.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  191  Fed.  40, 
48. 

(j)  The  fundamental  principle  of  the 
Act  is  one  of  fair  play.  A  railroad  may 
not  control  the  character  of  the  indus- 
tries along  its  line  by  giving  preferential 
rates  as  between  commodities,  nor  dis- 
criminate as  between  one  shipper  and 
another,  even  though  by  following  such 
procedure  it  can  develop  the  greatest 
amount  of  traffic  for  itself.  Mobile 
Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  I.   C.  C.   417,   426. 

(k)  Equality  of  opportunity  in  the  use 
of  transportation  facilities  is  one  of  the 
purposes  of  the  Act.  In  Re  Wharfage 
Charges  at  Galveston,  23  I.  C.  C.  535 
(544). 

(1)  The  Commission  is  not  inclined  to 
adopt  any  construction  which  renders  the 
Act  unconstitutional  or  absurd.  Railroad 
Commission  of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  I. 
C.  C.  329,  334. 

(ra)  A  construction  abhorrent  to  the 
theory  of  our  institutions  is  not  to  be 
presumed  as  the  one  which  Congress 
intended.  Railroad  Commission  of  Ne- 
vada V.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  329.  335. 

(n)  Because  the  words  "undue"  and 
"unreasonable"  are  used  in  the  statute, 
it  does  not  follow  that  Congress  attempt- 
ed to  lodge  arbitrary  power  in  the  hands 
of  the  Commission.  Railroad  Commis- 
sion of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
329,    336. 


ACT  TO  REGULATE  COMMERCE    II   (o)  — (dd) 


(o)  The  law  itself  practically  forbids 
competition  in  rates.  In  Re  Advances 
in  Rates— Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243, 
264. 

(p)  The  provisions  of  the  Act  were 
enacted  with  respect  to  the  American 
method  of  stating  rates.  Associated 
Jobbers  of  Los  Angeles  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.   Co.,    18   I.    C.   C.   310,   315. 

(q)  To  and  from  terminals  within 
the  lighterage  limits  of  New  York  Har- 
bor carriers  are  common  carriers  "whol- 
ly by  railroad"  within  the  meaning  of 
section  1.  Federal  Sugar  Refining  Co. 
V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  40. 
46. 

(r)  The  Act  deals  only  with  the  ob- 
ligations of  carriers  as  carriers,  and  in 
no  way  attempts  to  regulate  or  inter- 
fere with  matters  not  involving  their 
duties  to  shippers  or  passengers  or 
such.  Merchants'  Cotton  Press  &  Storage 
Co.   V.   I.    C.    R.    R.    Co.,    17    I.    C.    C.   98. 

(s)  No  matter  how  long  a  practice 
has  been  in  effect,  it  may  be  challenged. 
Remedial  statutes,  such  as  the  inter- 
state commerce  law,  are  generally  en- 
acted because  of  abuses  of  long  stand- 
ing. Boise  Commercial  Club  v.  Adams 
Express   Co.,    17    I.    C.    C.    115,   119. 

(t)  The  words  "railway"  and  "rail- 
road" are  completely  synonymous  and 
no  significance  can  be  attached  to  the 
choice  of  either  the  name  or  the  use 
of  either  word  in  a  statute,  decision,  or 
discussion,  and  this  rule  is  applicable 
in  the  interpretation  of  the  Act  to 
Regulate  Commerce.  West  End  Im- 
provement Clu'i  v.  O.  &  C.  B.  Ry.  & 
B.   Co.,   17  I.  C.   C.   239,  244. 

(u)  With  general  uniformity  through- 
out the  Act  the  use  of  the  words  "pas- 
sengers or  property"  clearly  denotes 
that  carriers  of  either  the  one  or  the 
other  or  both  are  subject  to  its  pro- 
visions.. West  End  Improvement  Club 
V.  O.  '/c  C.  B.  R.  &  B.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
239,    244. 

(v)  The  Commission  must  determine 
from  the  context,  scope  and  intent  of 
the  Act  whether  or  not  its  provisions 
are  properly  applicable  to  defendants' 
railways.  West  End  Improvement  Club 
V.  O.  &  C.  B.  R.  &  B.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
239,    244. 

(w)  In  every  broad  and  general  law 
there    are    provisions    which   necessarily 


and  reasonably  are  not  applicable  to 
particular  instances.  Whether  or  not 
a  particular  provision  of  the  law  ap- 
plies to  a  particular  common  carrier 
subject  to  the  law  must  be  determined 
from  the  facts.  West  End  Improvement 
Club  V.  O.  &  C.  B.  R.  &  B.  Co.,  17  I. 
C.    C.   239,   245. 

(x)  If  the  contention  is  correct  that 
defendants  are  not  subject  to  the  Act 
to  Regulate  Commerce,  the  reasonable- 
ness of  their  fares  could  be  determined 
only  by  the  common  law  or  by  Con- 
gress. West  End  Improvement  Club  v. 
O.  &  C.  B.  R.  &  B.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
239,    246. 

(y)  The  law  does  not  favor  a  re- 
peal by  implication.  It  is  only  where 
there  is  irreconcilable  conflict  or  repug- 
nancy that  the  special  or  particular 
statute  falls  under  the  repealing  clause 
of  the  general  statute.  West  End  Im- 
provement   Club    V.    O.    &    C.    B.    R.    & 

B.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  239,  246. 

(z)  The  Act  was  clearly  intended  to 
prescribe  the  only  rule  as  to  the  regu- 
lation of  interstate  rates  and  it  should 
and  does  supersede  different  rules  in 
prior  statutes.  West  End  Improvement 
Club   V.   O.    ft   C.   B.   R.   &  B.   Co.,  17   I. 

C.  C.    239,    247. 

(aa)  Where  regulation  of  commerce 
requires  a  uniform  rule  the  power  of, 
Congress  is  exclusive,  but  where  it  re- 
quires different  rules  for  different  lo- 
calities the  states  may  legislate,  but 
only  in  the  absence  of  congressional 
action.  West  End  Improvement  Club 
V.  O.  &  C.  B.  R.  &  B.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
239,    247. 

(bb)  Section  15  is  the  dominating 
and  controlling  expression  of  the  real 
object  and  meaning  of  the  Act.  It 
makes  of  the  Commission  a  special  ex- 
pert body  to  deal  with  rates,  and  not 
to  supplant  the  courts.  Joynes  v.  P. 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  361,  369. 

(cc)  The  language  of  the  Act  being 
of  doubtful  interpretation,  the  Commis- 
sion ought  not  to  take  jurisdiction,  but 
should  resolve  the  doubt  in  favor  of 
the  courts  where  claims  of  this  nature 
(loss  and  damage  resulting  from  discrim- 
ination in  use  of  facilities)  ordinarily 
belong.  Joynes  v.  P.  R.  R-  Co.,  17  I. 
C.  C.  361,  369. 

(dd)  The  Commission  must  give  to 
the  law  such  interpretation  as  it  thinks 


ACT  TO  REGULATE  COMMERCE,  IT  (ee)  — (rr) 


Congress  would  apply  in  each  individ- 
ual case,  taking  its  mind  from  the  lan- 
guage it  has  used.  Enterprise  Fuel  Co. 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  219, 
223, 

(ee)  The  law  does  not  deal  with  car- 
riers collectively  as  a  single  unit  or 
system,  but  its  demands  are  directed 
to  each  with  respect  of  the  service 
which  it  is  required  to  perform.  Chicago 
Lumber  &  Coal  Co,  v.  Tioga  Southeast- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  323,  332. 

(ff)  The  Act  confers  upon  the  Com- 
mission authority  to  investigate  and 
condemn  such  charges  as  are  found  to 
have  been  unreasonable  and  to  pre- 
scribe a  reasonable  charge  for  the  fu- 
ture. Swift  &  Co.  V.  C.  &  A.  R.  R. 
Co.,    16   L   C.   C.   426,   428. 

(gg)  Unquestionably  the  affirmative 
and  mandatory  obligations  of  the  law 
impose  upon  a  carrier  subject  to  its 
provisions  the  utmost  diligence  to  ap- 
prise itself  that  the  rates  are  lawfully 
applied.  It  must  safeguard  against  so 
carelessly  shutting  its  eyes  to  what 
it  was  put  upon  inquiry  as  to  consti- 
tute criminal  disregard  of  the  law's 
requirement  anent  observance  of  the 
tariff  rates  and  rules.  California  Com- 
mercial Ass'n  V.  Wells-Fargo  &  Co.,  16 
I.   C.   C.   458,    461. 

(hh)  Prohibitions  of  law  are  not  in- 
variably directed  against  illegal  acts 
because  they  might  be  numerous;  a 
statute  may  be  considered  equally  nec- 
essary to  prevent  sporadic  or  isolated 
acts  in  contravention  of  public  policy; 
and  a  practice  or  privilege  which  i>er- 
mits  the  movement  of  a  single  ship- 
ment at  less  than  the  rate  lawfully 
applicable  to  such  movement  is  one 
which  the  Commission  has,  under  the 
law,  no  alternative  but  to  condemn. 
Duncan  &  Co.  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  590,  599. 

(ii)  The  Act  applies  to  common  car- 
riers and  provides  no  distinction  be- 
tween those  that  are  operated  as  indi- 
vidual properties,  partnenships  or  cor- 
porations. American  Bankers'  Ass'n  v. 
American  Express  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C,  15,  21. 

(ji)  The  main  purpose  of  the  Act 
was  to  regulate  transportation  by  rail- 
road; the  regulation  of  water  lines 
was  merely  incidental  and  collateral. 
In  Re  Jurisdiction  Over  Water  Carriers, 
15  I.  C.  C.   205,  207. 


(kk)  In  the  case  of  doubtful  or  ambig- 
uous provisions,  reference  may  be  had 
to  the  history  of  the  legislation,  the 
evils  sought  to  be  corrected,  and  the 
remedy  intended  to  be  provided.  In  Re 
Jurisdiction  Over  Water  Carriers,  15 
T.   C.   C.   205,   206. 

(II)  The  underlying  purpose  of  the 
interstate  commerce  legislation  was  to 
put  shippers  on  a  basis  of  absolute 
equality;  to  assure  to  them  not  only 
equal  rates,  but  an  impartial  enjoyment 
of  the  facilities  and  services  of  inter- 
tate  commerce.  Rail  '  and  River  Coal 
Co.  V,  B.  &  O,  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C,  C. 
S6,  88. 

(mm)  In  administering  the  Act  it  is 
manifestly  unwise  to  interfere  with  estab- 
lished usages  unless  they  plainly  offend 
its  provisions  and  in  a  substantial  manner 
abridge  rights  it  was  designed  to  pro- 
tect. National  Wholesale  Lumber  Deal- 
ers' Ass'n  V.  A.  C.  L.  R,  R.  Co.,  14  I. 
a.   C.   154,   163. 

(nn)  The  Act  requires  that  the  rates 
and  regulations  under  which  traffic  is 
handled  shall  be  just  and  reasonable, 
and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Commission 
upon  a  showing  that  such  rates  and 
regulations  are  not  lawful  to  correct 
them,  even  though  the  complainant  does 
not  have  a  direct  pecuniary  interest  in 
such  an  order.  Glenn  W.  Traer  v.  C. 
B.   &  Q,   R.   R.  Co.,   14   I.   C.   C.  165,  168. 

(oo)  The  Act  leaves  carriers  free  to 
initiate  their  own  rates,  rules  and  regu- 
lations. Traer  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  L  C.  C.  165,  169. 

(pp)  The  Act  is  to  be  read  as  a  whole. 
California  Commercial  Ass'n  v.  Wells- 
Fargo   &   Co.,  14  I.   C.  C.  422,  428. 

(qq)  The  provisions  of  "the  Hepburn 
Act  and  the  Elkins  Act  forbidding  car- 
riers to  evade  the  collection  or  payment 
of  its  fixed  tariff  rates  are  not  intended 
to  extend  the  jurisdiction  of  the  carrier 
over  matters  outside  of  its  province 
5s  a  common  carrier,  nor  are  they  in- 
tended to  limit  and  prescribe  the  use 
which  shall  be  made  of  the  rates  which 
the  carrier  puts  into  effect.  California 
Commercial  Ass'n  v.  Wells-Fargo  &  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  422,  428. 

(rr)  Section  3  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act  requires  common  carriers 
by  rail  to  offer  all  reasonable,  proper 
and  equal  facilities  for  the  interchange 
of  traffic  between  their  respective  lines, 


ACT  TO  REGULATE  COMMERCE,  II  (ss)— IV  (d) 


and  for  the  receiving,  forwarding  and 
delivering  of  passengers  and  property 
to  and  from  their  several  lines  thus 
connected  therewith,  and  provides: 
"But  this  shall  not  be  construed  as  re- 
quiring any  such  common  carrier  to 
give  the  use  of  its  track  or  terminal 
facilities  to  another  carrier  engaged 
in  like  business."  HELD,  this  lan- 
guage could  not  be  said  to  amount  to 
a  substantive  enactment.  It  is  a  mere 
interpretation  clause,  which  is  designed 
to  restrain,  if  necessary,  the  generality 
of  the  language  which  precedes  it. 
Pittsburg,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Comm., 
171  Ind.  189,  210,  86  N.  E.  328. 

(ss)  The  construction  of  the  Hepburn 
Act,  as  amended  by  the  Carmack 
amendment,  and  the  scope  of  its  oper- 
ation raise  a  Federal  question,  and  as 
to  such  question  the  state  courts 
will  follow  and  are  bound  by  the  deci- 
sions of  the  United  States  courts.  But 
contracts  for  reduced  rates  not  being 
affected  by  such  law,  no  Federal  ques- 
tion arises  and  no  Federal  right  is  in- 
volved, and  hence  the  state  courts  are 
free  to  apply  their  own  rules  to  their 
construction.  McElvain  v.  Railroad, 
151   Mo.  App  126,   146,  131   S.   W.  736. 

(tt)  An  interstate  common  carrier 
is  free  to  exercise  all  its  rights  under 
the  common  law  to  the  full  extent, 
unless  such  exercise  has  been  made 
unlawful  by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act. 
McElvain  v.  Railroad,  151  Mo.  App. 
126,    151,    131    S.    W.    736. 

(uu)  Under  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act  as  amended  June  29,  1906,  it  ap- 
pears that  it  was  the  purpose  of  Con- 
gress to  assume  jurisdiction  over  the 
entire  subject-matter  relative  to  inter- 
state shipments  from  the  time  of  the 
origin  of  such  shipment  down  to  the 
point  where  the  shipment  is  entirely 
at  an  end  and  its  character  as  a  trans- 
action of  interstate  commerce  ceases. 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  State,  26 
Okla.  62,  72,  107  P.  929. 

(vv)  Where  the  facts  are  such  that 
it  is  not  clear  that  the  conditions  are 
BO  similar  as  to  render  the  Act  to  Regu- 
late Commerce  or  the  rate  published 
thereunder  inapplicable,  such  rate  will 
be  held,  in  a  civil  proceeding,  to  con- 
trol. Coeur  d'Alene  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  (Wash.,  1908),  95  P. 
71.   77. 


IN.     TIME    OF    TAKING    EFFECT. 

(a)  The  law  stands  for  what  it 
means  from  the  date  when  it  takes 
effect  and  not  from  the  date  when  it 
:s  construed  by  the  Commission.  Ordi- 
narily the  date  of  the  announcement  by 
the  Commission  of  its  interpretation  of  a 
l^articular  provision  is  therefore  of  little 
real  importance.  Liberty  Mills  v.  L.  & 
N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  182,  185. 

(b)  A  statute  passed  to  take  effect  at 
a  future  date  must  be  understood  as 
speaking  from  the  time  it  goes  into 
operation,  and  not  from  the  time  of  its 
passage,  and  before  the  time  of  going 
into  effect  no  rights  may  be  acquired 
under  it  and  no  one  is  bound  to  regulate 
Ms  conduct  according  to  its  terms.  Nic- 
ola, .Stone  &  Myers  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  199,  206. 

(c)  The  legislative  intent  was  to 
make  August  28,  1906,  the  effective  date 
of  the  Hepburn  Act,  which  was  approved 
June  29,  1906.  Nicola,  Stone  &  Myers 
Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
199,   206. 

!V.     ENFORCEMENT. 

(a)  A    suit    to    enforce    an    order    of 
eparation     entered     by     the     Interstate 

!!ommerce  Commission  brought  under 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  as  amend- 
ed June  29,  1906,  is  an  action  sounding 
in  tort  for  damages.  Nay  lor  &  Co.  v. 
Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.,  188  Fed.  860, 
861. 

(b)  Section  8  of  the  Act  does  not 
have  any  relation  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Commission.  It  creates  a  substan- 
tive right  of  action  to  recover  damages 
for  the  violation  by  a  carrier  of  some 
provision  of  the  Act,  but  leaves  ihe 
right  enforceable  only  in  the  courts. 
Joynes  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
361,   369. 

(c)  The  decisions  of  the  United 
States  courts  and  the  opinions  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  con- 
struing the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce 
have  no  application  to  intrastate  ship- 
ments. A.  G.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McCleskey, 
160  Ala.  630,   634,  49  So.  433. 

(d)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Act  is 
\  part  of  the  law  of  the  state  of  Mis- 
rouri,  and  enforceable  in  its  courts, 
when  rights  under  it  or  given  by  it  arise 
as    incidents    of    a    trial.      McElvain    v. 


ACT  TO  REGULATE  COMMENCE,  V  (a)— ADVANCED  RATES 


Railroad,    151    Mo.   App.   126,   151,   131   S. 
W.  736. 

V.     AMENDMENTS. 

(a)  The  general  rule  of  construction 
is  that  a  general  statute  will  not  re- 
peal the  provisions  of  a  former  one 
which  is  special  or  particular  unless 
there  is  something  in  the  law,  or  in 
the  course  of  legislation  upon  its  sub- 
ject-matter, that  makes  it  manifest  that 
the  legislature  contemplated  and  in- 
tended a  repeal.  The  law  does  not 
favor  a  repeal  by  implication,  and  where 
it  is  possible  to  so  construe  the  statute 
as  to  maintain  the  integrity  of  both 
it  must  be  done.  West  End  Improve- 
ment Club  V.  O.  &  C.  B.  R.  &  B.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  239,  246. 

(b)  The  law  does  not  favor  a  repeal 
by  implication.  It  is  only  where  there 
is  irreconcilable  conflict  or  repugnancy 
that  the  special  or  particular  statute 
falls  under  the  repealing  clause  of  the 
general  statute.  West  End  Improvement 
Club  V.  O.  &  C.  B.  R.  &  B.  Co.,  17 
I.    C.    C.    239,    246. 

(c)  That  Congress  did  not  see  fit 
to  alter  the  third  and  fourth  sections 
is  highly  persuasive  that  it  was  the 
intention  of  that  body  to  leave  the 
law  and  its  practical  working  exactly  as 
it  has  been.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  388. 

(d)  The  amendments  to  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act  are  to  be  treated, 
as  to  matters  occurring  after  the  enact- 
ment of  the  statute,  as  if  they  had  been 
in  the  original  Act.  State  v.  Adams  Ex- 
press Co.,  171  Ind.  138,  141,  85  N.  E. 
337  and  966. 


ACTIONS  AT  LAW. 

See  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §33;  Dis- 
crimination, §16;  Courts,  I;  Special 
Contract,    IV. 


ADDITIONAL  CHARGES. 

See  Allowances,  §2  (e);  Assorting 
Packages;  Bridge  Tolls,  I  (a); 
Cartage;  Concentrating  Rates  and 
Privileges  (aa).  Facilities  and 
Privileges,  §10  (m);  §21  (e);  Im- 
port Traffic,  M  (b):  Precooling,  li 
(f);   Refrigeration,  §3    (f). 

(a)  An  additior.al  charge  may  be 
made  by  a  carrier  when  an  additional 
service  is  given.  After  the  shipper  pays 
for  team  track  delivery  and  does  not  re- 


ceive it,  but  asks  instead  and  is  given 
side  track  deliery  which  costs  the  car- 
rier no  more,  he  may  not  be  compelled 
to  pay  an  additional  charge  upon  the  as- 
sumption that  he  has  received  a  terminal 
team  track  service  which  has  not  been 
given.  A  carrier  may  not  so  construct 
its  rates  as  to  compel  an  extra  charge 
for  like  service.  Associated  Jobbers  of 
Los  Angeles  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  310,  318. 

ADJACENT     FOREIGN     COUN- 
TRY. 

See  Through   Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 
§1    (n). 

(a)  Although  mandamus  will  not  lie 
so  as  to  interfere  with  the  exercise  of 
its  discretion  by  the  Commission,  it 
will  lie  to  compel  the  Commission  to 
take  jurisdiction  over  carriers  operating 
between  Alaska  and  the  United  St.ites 
and  between  Alaska  and  adjacem:  for- 
eign countries,  where  the  Commission 
has  refused  to  do  so  pursuant  to  its 
belief  that  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act 
has  conveyed  upon  it  no  authority  over 
such  carriers.  I.  C.  C.  v.  H.  S.  Co.,  224 
U.  S.  474,  484,  32  Sup.  Ct.  556,  56  L.  ed. 
849. 

(b)  Cuba  is  not  an  "adjacent  foreign 
country."  within  the  meaning  of  the  Act. 
The  word  "adjacent,"  as  ueed  in  the  Act 
to  modify  the  words  "foreign  country," 
would  seem  to  mean  adjacent  in  the 
sense  of  the  possibility  of  substantial 
continuity  of  rails.  Lykes  Steamship 
Line  Y-  Commercial  Union,  13  I.  C.  C 
310,  315. 

ADVANCED  RATES. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction    of    Commission. 

(1)  Inquiry    into    reason- 

ableness. 

(2)  Power  to  require  ad- 

vance. 

(3)  Prescribing  minimum 

rate. 

(4)  To  suspend  advance. 

(5)  To   suspend   reduc- 

tion. 
§2.     Limitation  on   power. 

II.     JUSTIFICATION  OF  INCREASE. 

§3.     Burden   of   proof. 
§4.     Effect. 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §1    (1)    (a)  — (b) 


§5.     Right  to  advance. 

(1)  To     avoid      reducing 

other    rates. 

(2)  To   equalize    rates. 

(3)  To       preserve      com- 

modity        relation- 
ship. 

(4)  Unreasonably         low 

prior  rate. 
§6.     Right  to  earn. 

(1)  On   bona   fide   invest- 

ment. 

(2)  On     unearned     incre- 

ment. 

(3)  On         reproduction 

value. 

(4)  On    surplus. 

(5)  For     permanent     im- 

provements. 

(6)  All    traffic   will    bear. 

(7)  Cost   of  insurance. 


III.     EVIDENCE. 


§7. 


§8. 


§9. 
§10. 
§11. 
§12. 


§13. 
§14. 

§15. 

§16. 


Change  in  conditions. 

(1)  In   general. 

(2)  Increased      operating 

expenses. 

(3)  Impairment  of  credit. 

(4)  Cessation    of    compe- 

tition. 
Presumptions. 

(1)  Continuance   of   prior 

rate, 

(2)  Temporary  reduction. 
Concerted    action. 
Economy    of    management. 
Scientific    management. 
Branch    lines. 

(1)  Operation. 

(2)  Purchase. 

Detriment   to   shipper. 

Benefit  to  industry. 

Standard      for     judging     ad- 
vance. 

Uniformity    of    advance. 


IV. 


REASONABLENESS         OP         AD- 
VANCED RATES. 
§17.     In    general. 

§18.     Circumstances      and      condi- 
tions. 

(1)  Low  receipts  per  ton 

mile. 

(2)  Water  competition. 

(3)  Heavy     and     uniform 

tonnage. 

(4)  Low-grade      commod- 

ity. 

(5)  Ratio      of      rate      to 

value. 

(6)  To  gain  import  duty. 


(7) 


VI, 


VII. 


Rates    in    like    terri- 
tory. 

(8)  Circuitous   route. 

(9)  Use  of  commodity. 
(10)     Increased     divisions. 

DISCRIMINATION    THROUGH    AD- 
VANCE. 

§19.     In   general. 

REMEDIES  AND  PROCEDURE. 
§20.     Injunctions. 
§21.     Investigation. 

REPARATION. 
§22.     In    general. 


I.     CONTROL   AND    REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction  of   Commission. 

See     Interstate     Commerce     Commis- 
sion, §1    (ee),   §9   (w). 

§1.     (1)      Inquiry    into    Reasonableness. 

(a)  The  final  determination  of  the 
question  of  the  reasonableness  or  just- 
ness of  a  proposed  increase  in  interstate 
rates  is  one  for  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  and  not  for  the  courts.  Ar- 
lington Heights  Fruit  Co.  v.  S,  P,  Co.,  175 
Fed.  141,  142. 

(aa)  The  Commission  is  not  con- 
cerned with  the  motives  of  the  carriers 
which  lead  to  an  increase  in  rates, 
provided  the  rates  which  it  is  proposed 
to  establish  are  reasonable.  It  does 
not  sit  as  a  supreme  traffic  manager 
for  the  railroads  of  the  country.  Con- 
sideration of  the  policy  which  the 
railroads  may  pursue  is  not  a  matter 
delegated  to  it  so  long  as  such  policy 
does  not  infringe  upon  the  prohibitions 
of  the  law.  In  Re  Advances  on  Coal 
to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C.  604,  612. 

(b)  Defendants  filed  tariffs  increasing 
all  the  class  rates  and  about  one-half  of 
the  commodity  rates  in  Official  Classifica- 
tion territory.  Justification  presented  by 
the  carriers  was  -the  want  of  additional 
revenue,  and  the  question  presented  to 
the  Commission  was  whether  defendants 
were  justified  in  laying  the  additional 
transportation  burden  upon  the  public 
for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  greater 
net  revenue.  HELD,  strictly  speaking,  the 
Commission  has  no  jurisdiction  to  hear 
and  determine  that  question;  that  it 
has  no  authority  as  such  to  say  what 
amount  the  defendants  shall  earn,  nor 
to  establish  a  schedule  of  rates  which 
will   permit   them   to   earn  that  amount. 


10 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §1  (1)    (c)— §1   (5)    (a) 


The  authority  of  the  Commission  is  lim- 
ited to  inquiring  into  the  reasonable- 
ness of  a  particular  rate  or  rates  and 
establishing  that  rate  or  practice  whict 
is  found  lawful  in  place  of  the  one 
condemned  as  unlawful.  In  Re  Advances 
in  Rates— Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243 
248. 

(c)  While  the  authority  of  the  Com 
mission  only  extends  to  the  passing  up 
on  the  reasonableness  of  the  rate  pre 
sented  for  its  consideration  it  is  not  con 
fined  to  single  rates.  Any  number  ol 
rates  may  be  embraced  in  the  same  com 
plaint  and  the  duty  of  the  Commissior 
Is  to  consider  and  pass  upon  all  thosf 
so  presented.  When  there  is  involvec 
the  propriety  of  advances  which  affec 
(he  entire  rate  fabric  within  OfFicia, 
Classification  territory  embracing  one 
half  the  tonnage  and  one-half  the  freight 
revenues  of  the  whole  country,  and  wher 
that  advance  is  justified  mainly  upon  the 
ground,  not  of  commercial  conditions,  bu'i 
by  lack  of  adequate  revenue  upon  the 
present  rate  basis,  the  Commission  must 
determine  the  fundamental  question.  Ii 
Re  Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case.  2( 
I.  C.  C.  243,  248. 

(d)  The  restriction  of  the  Commis- 
mission's  order  upon  flexibility  in  rate, 
established  by  it  is  inhibitive  only  of  ai 
advance  within  the  prescribed  period.  Ii 
the  carriers  participating  in  a  join! 
through  rate  desire  to  reduce  or  increase 
the  separately  established  local  rates  vij: 
the  same  route,  the  order  of  the  Commis 
sion  requiring  the  maintenance  of  a  joint 
through  route  is  no  bar  to  their  so  do 
ing.  Michigan  Buggy  Co.  v.  G.  R.  &  I 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  297,  299. 

§1.     (2)      Power    to    Re   -Ire    Advance. 

(a)  The  Commission  has  no  author- 
ity to  compel  the  advance  of  a  rate  for 
the  purpose  of  removing  discrimination. 
In  Re  Advances  on  Fresh  Meats,  23  I. 
C.   C.   652,   655. 

(b)  The  contention  that  there  ex- 
ists no  power  anywhere  to  let  a  shipper 
into  a  market  by  advancing  the  rate 
to  another  shipper  does  not  appear  to 
be  sound.  Boileau  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  640,  654. 

(c)  The  Commission  has  no  power  to 
require  the  increase  of  a  rate.  Mer- 
chants' Dispatch  Storage  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R. 
R.  Co..  17  I.  C.  C.  98,  102.    Kansas  City 


Transportation  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  491,  497. 

§1.     (3)      Prescribing     Minimum     Rate. 

(a)  The  Commission  has  no  authority 
to  prescribe  a  minimum  rate.  Percy  Kent 
Co.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  439,  442. 

§1.     (4)     To    Suspend    Advance. 

(a)  The  Commission  is  not  empowered 
to  suspend  the  operation  of  a  schedule 
after  it  has  gone  into  effect.  Re-hearing 
denied.  In  Re  Investigation  of  Rates  on 
Lumber,  21  I.  C.  C.  16,  17. 

§1.     (5)     To    Suspend    Reduction. 

(a)  The  Commission  was  called  upon 
to  postpone  the  effectiveness  of  certain  re- 
ductions in  rates  because  discriminatory 
against  complainant.  They  consisted  of  re- 
duced proportional  rates  on  packing- 
house products  and  fresh  meats  from  Ft. 
Worth,  Tex.,  to  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  on  fresh 
meats  from  SS^^c  to  o5i/^c,  and  on  pack- 
ing-house products  from  33c  to  32 %c. 
As  these  commodities  from  Ft.  Worth 
moved  largely  to  points  beyond  St.  Louis 
and  these  proportional  rates  were  used  in 
combination  to  make  up  through  rates 
to  such  points  beyond,  the  effect  was  to 
reduce  the  existing  rates  from  Ft.  Worth 
to  northern  and  eastern  points  generally. 
The  contention  was  made  that  these  rates 
discriminated  against  Oklahoma  City, 
Okla.  The  present  differential  in  favor 
of  Oklahoma  City  of  7c  per  100  lbs.  on 
fresh  meat  and  4i/4c  per  100  lbs.  on  pack- 
ing-house products  on  shipments  to 
points  in  Central  Freight  Ass'n  terri- 
tory appeared  to-  be  an  offhand  adjust- 
ment of  a  trade  and  transportation  dis- 
pute of  which  the  Commission  had  no 
means  of  determining  its  fairness  or  cor- 
rectness on  the  present  hearing,  and  com- 
plainants requested  the  reductions  to  •be 
postponed  until  the  general  investigation 
now  before  the  Commission  be  finished 
HELD,  the  Commission  decides  that  it 
has  the  power  to  suspend  reductions  of 
rate  in  any  case  where  such  suspension 
will  operate  to  prevent  an  apparent  dis- 
crimination. However,  a  prima  facie  case 
clearly  and  affirmatively  persuasive 
should  be  presented  before  the  power  to 
suspend  is  exercised.  This,  not  having 
been  done,  the  complaint  is  dismissed. 
In  Re  Suspension  of  Rates  on  Packing- 
House  Products,  21  I.  C.  C  68,  70. 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §2   (a)— §3  (aa) 


11 


§2.     Limitation    on    Power. 

(a)  The  railroad  rates  of  this  country 
have  not  been  constructed,  as  a  rule,  up- 
on any  scientific  basis,  and  this  is  es 
pecially  true  of  the  interstate  rates.  The 
traffic  officials  who  have  established 
these  rates  have  generally  done  so  with- 
out any  special  inquiry  as  to  the  total 
amount  of  revenue  which  ought  to  be 
produced,  or  as  to  the  part  of  that  burden 
which  a  particular  commodity  ought  tc 
bear.  This  Commission  is  called  upon 
to  deal  with  rates  as  they  exist,  and  in 
so  doing  it  ordinarily  considers  them  not 
from  the  revenue  standpoint  but  rather 
from  the  commercial  and  traffic  stand- 
point. At  the  same  time  it  is  now  the 
settled  law  that  there  is  a  limit  below 
which  the  revenue  of  railroads  cannot  be 
reduced  by  public  authority,  and  if  there 
were  no  such  constitutional  limitations: 
it  would  nevertheless  behoove  every  reg 
ulating  body  to  permit  the  existence  ol 
such  rate  when  possible,  as  would  yield 
just  earnings  to  the  railway.  The  ques 
tion  of  revenue  is  therefore  fundamental 
and  ever  present  in  all  considerations 
as  to  the  reasonableness  of  railroad  rates, 
although  it  may  not  be,  and  seldom  is 
where  single  rates  are  presented,  the 
controlling  question.  In  Re  Advances  in 
Rates— Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243.  248. 

II.     JUSTIFICATION   OF   INCREASE. 
§3.     Burden    of    Proof. 

See  Evidence,  I,  §1  (a),  (aa),  (b), 
(k),  §29  (f):  Through  Routes  and 
Joint   Rates,  §4  (e). 

(a)  By  withdrawing  its  concurrence 
the  St.  L.  &  Hannibal  Ry.  put  the 
Clover  Leaf  R.  R.  in  such  a  position  that 
it  was  compelled  to  cancel  the  joint 
through  rates  which  it  had  theretofore 
published  on  coal  of  82c  per  ton,  from 
certain  points  on  its  line  in  Illinois, 
including  more  particularly  the  mines  at 
Panama  to  Hannibal  and  other  destina 
tions  in  Missouri  on  the  line  of  the  St.  L. 
&  Hannibal  Ry.  If  this  rate  was  withdrawn 
there  would  be  available  to  shippers 
only  the  combination  of  local  rates  un- 
der which  it  is  clear  the  traffic  could  not 
move.  HELD,  as  the  withdrawal  of  the 
through  rates  leaving  in  operation  the 
lowest  combination  of  local  rates  would 
increase  the  charges  on  coal  moving 
over  that  route,  the  defendants  were  un 
der  the  burden  of  justifying  their  course 
and  in  showing  that  the  resulting  charges 
would  be  just  and  reasonable.    No  effort 


having  made  to  do  this  and  no  tsubstan- 
tial  reason  given  for  the  cancellation  of 
the  joint  through  rates,  the  present 
through  routes  and  joint  rates  are  or- 
dered maintained.  In  Re  Advances  in 
Rates  on  Soft  Coal,  23  L  C.  C.  518. 

(aa)  In  Hood  &  SonS  v.  Delaware  & 
Hudson  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  15,  the  Com- 
mission found  that  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  fluid  milk  from  Poultney  and 
West  Pawlett,  Vt,  and  Cambridge,  Gran- 
ville, Middle  Granville,  Salem  and  Sbu- 
shan,  N.  Y.,  to  Jagle  Bridge,  N.  Y., 
destined  to  Boston,  Mass.,  a  rate  of  $16 
per  car  of  250  cans  of  40  quarts  each, 
and  61/^c  per  can  for  any  excess  over 
250  cans,  was  a  reasonable  carload  rate. 
The  defendant  sought  to  advance  the 
rate  to  9c  per  can  of  40  quarts  each 
based  on  a  car  minimum  of  250  cans, 
excess  at  the  same  rate  per  can  on 
Boston  shipments  of  milk  from  the 
points  mentioned  to  Eagle  Bridge.  From 
Poultney  to  Boston  the  distance  is 
213  miles.  The  distance  from  Eagle 
Bridge  to  New  York  via  Albany  is  290 
miles.  The  carload  rate  to  New  York 
was  28.8c  per  can  of  40  quarts.  For 
the  haul  from  Eagle  Bridge  to  Albany, 
a  distance  of  about  142  miles,  defend- 
ant got  50  per  cent  of  the  through 
rate  to  New  York,  or  14.4c  per  can 
of  40  quarts,  which  is  equivalent  to 
3.6  mills  per  quart.  For  the  45  miles 
from  Eagle  Bridge  to  Poultney  it  is 
equivalent  to  1.13  mills  per  quart,  and 
deducting  the  terminal  charges  on  New 
York  milk  of  2c  per  100  lbs.  would 
leave  a  net  rate  of  about  1.07.  mills 
per  quart.  Under  the  proposed  advance 
the  rate  on  cf  niplainant's  milk  would  be 
equivalent  to  2.25  mills  per  quart  from 
Poultney  and  intermediate  points  to 
Eagle  Bridge.  Between  Providence,  R. 
I.,  and  Boston,  Mass.,  a  distance  of  45 
miles  over  the  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R., 
the  rate  was  $17.24  per  car,  the  equiva- 
lent of  6.9c  per  can,  or  1.7  mills  per 
quart.  Other  instances  in  nearby  terri- 
tory were  similar.  "The  advanced  rate 
proposed  was  $22.50  per  car,  or  2.25  mills 
per  quart.  HELD,  that  the  proposed 
increased  rate  is  unreasonable  and  un- 
just, but  that  there  is  probable  justifi- 
cation for  an  advance  in  the  present 
rate  to  $17.25  per  car  of  250  cans  of 
40  quarts  each,  and  7c  per  can  for  any 
excess  over  250  cans.  In  Re  Advances 
in  Rate  for  the  Transportation  of  Fluid 
Milk,    23    I.    C.    C.    500. 


12 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §3    (b)— §5    (a) 


(b)  After  January  1,  1910,  under  the 
15th  section  of  the  Act,  the  burden  of 
proof  to  show  an  increased  rate  just  and 
reasonable  rests  with  the  carriers.  Citi- 
zens of  Somerset  v.  Wash.  Ry.  &  Elec. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  187,  188.  Davis  Sewing 
Machine  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  291.  In  Re  Advances  on  Iron 
and  Steel  Articles,  22  I.  C.  C.  486.  In  Re 
Advances  on  Grain,  21  I.  C.  C.  22,  35.  In 
Re  Advances  on  Locomotives,  21  I.  C.  C. 
103,  111.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  by 
Carriers  Operating  between  the  Missis- 
sippi and  Missouri  Rivers,  21  I.  C.  C 
546,  555;  Ohio  Allied  Milk  Products  v. 
Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  522,  528;  U.  S. 
Leather  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  323, 
325;  Victor  Mfg.  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
C.    222,    226. 

(c)  Where  the  cancellation  of  joint 
through  rates  increases  the  total  rate 
from  point  of  origin  to  destination  the 
burden  is  on  the  carrier  to  prove  the 
reasonableness  of  the  increased  rates. 
In  Re  Advances  on  Lumber  and  Forest 
Products,  21  I.  C.  C.  455,  456. 

(d)  Carriers  running  west  of  Chicago 
increased  some  200  commodity  rates.  It 
was  urged  that  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act  as  amended  should  be  given  the  same 
construction  as  the  English  act  and  that 
the  burden  only  rested  on  the  carriers 
to  prove  the  reasonableness  of  the  in- 
crease in  the  rate,  and  not  the  increased 
rate  as  a  whole,  and  that  the  purpose  of 
Congress  was  to  regard  all  rates  in  ef- 
fect on  Jan.  1,  1910,  as  the  maxima  which 
could  not  be  increased  until  it  was  shown 
that  there  was  reason  and  necessity  for 
the  specific  increase  made.  HELD,  it  is 
clear  from  the  language  of  the  statute  as 
well  as  its  history  that  the  purpose  of 
Congress  differed  from  the  purpose  of 
Parliament;  that  Congress  did  not  intend 
to  prescribe  that  any  existing  rates  were 
reasonable;  and  that  it  was  the  duty  of 
the  Commission  to  deal  with  the  in- 
creased rate  and  not  the  increase  in  the 
rate;  that  the  Commission  may  continue 
in  effect  the  present  lower  rates;  or 
may  reduce  the  existing  rates.  In  Re 
Advances  in  Rates — Western  Case,  20  I. 
C.  C.  307,  311,  314. 

(e)  The  English  statute  of  1894  pro- 
vides that  the  carrier  shall  justify  the 
"increa.se  of  the  rate."  The  Interstate 
Commerce  Act  provides  that  the  burden 
of  proof  shall  be  upon  the  carrier  to 
show  that  the  "increased  rate"  is  just 
and  reasonable.    The  English  act  creates 


a  presumption  that  the  rates  in  effect  on 
Dec.  31,  1892,  were  reasonable  rates,  and 
the  justice  of  any  increase  must  be  tried 
by  that  standard.  The  Interstate  Com- 
merce Act  does  not  intend  to  enact  that 
all  rates  in  effect  on  Jan.  1,  1910,  are 
just  and  reasonable,  upon  the  contrary 
it  is  open  to  any  shipper  to  attack  such 
a  rate  as  unjust  and  unreasonable.  The 
only  effect  of  the  Act  is  to  cast  in  cer- 
tain cases  the  burden  of  proof  upon  the 
carrier.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — East- 
ern Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  255. 

(f)  A  rate  which  has  been  in  force 
for  a  long  period  of  years  and  with  re- 
spect to  which  commercial  condition- 
have  been  adjusted — which  rate  has  pre- 
sumably afforded  a  reasonable  return  to 
the  carriers — may  not  be  materially  ad- 
vanced without  imposing  upon  the  car- 
riers the  burden  of  justifying  the  in- 
crease. Pacific  Coast  Lumber  Mfrs. 
Ass'n  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  23,  39. 

(g)  When  certain  rates  have  been  in 
force  for  a  long  period  of  time  and  busi- 
ness conditions  have  become  well  set- 
tled thereon  and  the  carrier  is  earning  a 
liberal  income  and  paying  liberal  divi- 
dends while  expending  large  sums  in  im- 
provements and  renewals,  a  material  in- 
crease in  those  rates  unaccompanied  by 
a  corresponding  decrease  in  other  rates 
places  upon  the  carrier  the  obligation  of 
justifying  the  increase.  Oregon  &  Wash- 
ington Lumber  Mfrs.  Ass'n  v.  U.  P.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  1,  13. 

§4.     Effect. 

(a)  A  group  of  carriers  cannot  cast 
the  responsibility  of  maintaining  the  bur- 
den of  establishing  the  reasonableness  of 
certain  advances  upon  a  single  carrier 
and  claim  the  benefit  of  whatever  the 
case  made  by  that  carrier  may  establish. 
In  Re  Advances  on  Coal  to  Lake  Ports, 
22  I.  C.  C.  604,  611. 

§5.     Right   to    Advance    Rates. 

(a)  Within  certain  limits  it  may  be 
the  right  of  the  Commission  to  consider 
the  question  of  advanced  rates  in  Official 
Classification  territory  as  one  of  public 
policy  and  not  one  of  strict  legal  right. 
If  the  true  interest  of  the  whole  com- 
munity requires  it  the  railroads  might 
perhaps  be  allowed  fair  earnings  with 
which  to  aid  their  properties  in  addition 
to  the  payment  of  return  to  their  stock- 
holders even  though  there  is  not  strict 
requirement  of  law  which  commands  it. 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §5   (b)  — (d) 


13 


In  R€  Advance  in  Rates — Eastern  Case, 
20  I.  C.  C.  243,  266. 

(b)  It  is  not  probable  that  increased 
rates  will  be  necessary  in  the  future  to 
carriers  in  Official  Classification  territory. 
In  Re  Advance  in  Rates — Eastern  Case, 
20  I.  C.  C.  243,  305. 

(c)  The  ordinary  considerations  of 
justice  require  that  money  invested  in 
railroads  by  invitation  of  the  govern- 
ment should  be  allowed  a  fair  return. 
This  does  not  mean  that  the  Commission 
should  permit  rates  which  will  guarantee 
all  railroad  investment,  nor  which  will 
guarantee  any  railroad  investment  at  all 
times,  but  it  should  allow  rates  which 
will  yield  to  this  capital  as  large  a  re- 
turn as  it  could  have  obtained  from  other 
investments  of  the  same  grade.  If  rates 
formerly  in  effect  have  become  insuffi- 
cient then  higher  rates  should  be  per- 
mitted. Rates  should  be  such  as  to  ren- 
der possible  a  high  class,  not  an  extrava- 
gant, transportation  service.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C. 
C.  243,  262. 

(d)  Complainants  attacked  the  advances 
In  rates  effective  Aug.  1,  1908,  on  articles 
included  in  classes  B,  C,  D  and  F,  fresh 
meats,  C.  L.,  grain  and  hay,  grain  products 
and  packing  house  products  from  Ohio 
and  Mississippi  River  crossings  to  cer- 
tain destinations  in  the  territories  em- 
braced by  the  Southeastern  Freight  As- 
sociation and  the  Southeastern  Missis- 
sippi Valley  Association.  The  advances 
to  Atlanta  and  Birmingham  alone  from 
Louisville  were  considered,  as  the  rates  to 
other  destinations  mentioned  are  de- 
pendent upon  them.  Effective  Sept.  1, 
1891,  the  rates  from  Louisville,  Ky.,  to 
Atlanta,  Ga.,  were  reduced  from  what 
they  had  been  for  three  years  thereto- 
fore (practically  from  the  real  basis  es- 
tablished in  1884)  to  class  B  35c,  class 
C  28c,  class  D  24c.  class  F  48c.  These 
rates  to  Atlanta  as  established  Sept.  1, 
1891,  remained  practically  unchanged  un- 
til Feb.  1,  1905,  with  the  exception  of 
some  slight  temporary  changes.  Effec- 
tive Feb.  1,  1905,  the  rates  from  Louis- 
ville to  Atlanta  were  reduced  to  class  B 
33c;  class  C,  22c;  class  D,  22c;  class  F, 
44c.  From  April  22,  1901,  to  July  31, 
1908,  the  rates  from  Louisville  to  Bir- 
mingham were:  Class  B,  31c;  class  C, 
flour  in  sacks,  20c;  class  D,  20c;  class  F, 
40c.  The  advances  made  equaled  the  re- 
ductions given  in  1905  to  Atlanta  and 
actually  increased  the  Birmingham  ra'te.  It 


was  contended  that  the  rates  as  advanced 
were  not  only  unreasonable  and  excessive 
but  also  discriminated  against  Birming- 
ham and  related  points.  The  reductions 
given  Atlanta  in  1905  were  made  after 
exhaustive  conferences  between  the  car- 
riers, the  shipping  interests  of  Atlanta 
and  the  railroad  commission  of  Georgia. 
The  reductions  were  the  result  of  an  ad- 
justment or  compromise  of  litigation  with 
the  railroad  commission  and  controver- 
sies with  the  citizens  of  Atlanta  concern- 
ing the  granting  of  certain  privileges  for 
the  construction  of  the  Atlanta  Terminal. 
HEIiD,  that  the  rates  in  effect  prior  to 
Feb.  1,  1905,  were  presumptively  reason- 
able and  just  with  respect  to  the  public 
and  compensatory  to  the  carriers;  these 
rates  while  presumptively  reasonable  and 
just  in  and  of  themselves  were  discrim- 
inatory as  between  the  various  points  of 
destination  in  that  they  unduly  preferred 
Birmingham  and  related  points  to  the 
prejudice  and  disadvantage  of  Atlanta 
and  related  points.  This  discrimination 
between  Alabama  and  Georgia  destina- 
tions having  been  corrected  by  the  rate 
adjustment  effective  Feb.  1,  1905,  the 
same  having  been  reached  by  a  reduc- 
tion in  the  rates  to  Atlanta  and  the  ad- 
justment having  been  continued  under 
the  rates  as  advanced  Aug.  1,  1908,  which 
so  far  as  Atlanta  is  concerned  was  a 
mere  restoration  of  rates,  it  follows  that 
the  advances  which  are  embraced  in  the 
rates  effective  Aug.  1,  1908,  may  be  ex- 
amined with  respect  to  whether  they  are 
just  or  unjust,  reasonable  or  unreason- 
able to  Atlanta  or  to  Birmingham,  with 
the  assurance  that  whatever  may  be 
found  to  be  true  of  the  rates  to  either 
destination  will  also  be  true  for  the  rest 
of  the  territories  embraced  in  these  com- 
plaints. Most  of  the  articles  embraced 
under  these  classes  is  freight  that  must 
be  moved  promptly  in  order  to  serve  the 
public  as  well  as  to  avoid  claims  for  dam- 
age in  transit.  The  condition  of  most  of 
the  railroads  in  this  section  of  the  coun- 
trv  is  not  yet  up  to  the  highest  standard 
and  in  order  that  their  facilities  may  be 
improved  and  extended  to  the  ultimate 
lasting  advantage  of  the  people  of  the 
South  it  is  necessary  that  the  carriers  be 
permitted  to  charge  rates  that  are  fully 
compensatory  to  the  services  they  per- 
form, so  long  as  such  rates  have  not  been 
shown  to  be  unjust,  unreasonable,  or  ex- 
cessive with  respect  to  the  public.  Look- 
ing at  the  matter  with  respect  to  its 
bearing  upon  the  prosperity  and  develop- 


14 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §5   (1)    (a)— §5   (2)    (c) 


ment  of  the  South  and  testing  it  by  the 
rules  laid  down  by  the  United  States  Su 
preme  Court,  it  is  held  that  the  advanced 
rates  effective  have  not  been  shown  to 
be  unjust,  unreasonable  or  excessive. 
Complaints  dismissed.  (Lane,  Clements, 
Comm'rs,  Diss,  op.)  Morgan  Grain  Co. 
V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  460. 

§5.     (1)     To      Avoid       Reducing      Other 
Rates. 

(a)  Upon  the  facts  the  Commission 
finds  that  it  must  allow  an  advance 
from  Buffalo  of  Ic  per  100  lbs.  on 
flour  and  wheat  products  to  New  Eng- 
land points  and  New  York,  or  must  in 
substance  require  a  reduction  from  all 
territory  west  of  Buffalo.  In  view  of 
the  whole  situation  it  seems  to  the 
Commission  that  the  wisest  course  is 
to  permit  the  advance  from  Buffalo. 
Banner  Milling  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H. 
R.   R.   Co.,    19   I.   C.   C.   128,   131. 

(b)  Complainant  attacked  the  carload 
rate  of  26i^c  on  lumber  and  other  forest 
products  from  Arkansas,  Louisiana, 
Mississippi  and  Texas  to  Omaha  and 
South  Omaha,  Neb.,  and  Council  Bluffs, 
la.  Prior  to  December  15,  1899,  the 
rate  to  Omaha  was  22c.  It  was  then 
advanced  to  and  remained  at  23c  until 
•Tune  1,  1908,  when,  pursuant  to  the 
decision  in  Lincoln  Commercial  Club 
V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C. 
319,  holding  that  the  -rate  to  Lincoln, 
Neb.,  should  jiot  exceed  that  to  Oma- 
ha, defendants  advanced  the  Omaha 
rate  from  23c  to  25c  and  the  Lincoln 
rate  from  24c  to  25c.  On  August  25, 
1908,  pursuant  to  the  decision  in  Great- 
er Des  Moines  Committee  v.  C.  G.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  294,  holding  that 
the  rate  to  Des  Moines  should  not  ex- 
ceed the  rate  to  Omaha,  defendants 
again  advanced  the  rates  to  Omaha 
and  Lincoln  to  the  26^c  rate  com- 
plained of  and  reduced  the  rate  of  Des 
Moines  from  27i/^c  to  26i^c.  In  order 
to  hold  up  through  rates  resulting  from 
this  advance,  defendants  had  to  in- 
crease the  loc^l  factors  in  the  St. 
Louis  combination  so  that  the  combi- 
nation would  be  as  high  as  the  through 
rate.  The  rate  attacked  applied  from 
all  points  in  the  territory  some  450  by 
GOO  miles  in  extent.  By  reducing  the  same 
to  25c  the  per  ton  mile  revenue  based 
on  an  average  distance  would  be  only 
slightly  affected.  HELD,  the  rate  at- 
tacked should  be  reduced  to  25c;  the 
Des  Moines  rate  should  not  exceed  the 


Omaha  rate;  and  the  relation  estab- 
lished by  the  Commission  in  the  cases 
mentioned  should  not  be  disturbed. 
Defendants  were  obviously  satisfied 
vith  the  23c  rate  to  Omaha  and  Lin- 
coln and  only  -raised  these  rates  in 
irder  to  escape  reducing  the  rates  to 
Des  Moines  and  Lincoln.  Commercial 
Olub  of  Omaha  v.  Anderson  &  Saline 
River  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  532,  536,  537. 

§5.     (2)     To   Equalize   Rates. 

See  Equalization  of  Rates,  §5  (a),  §3 
(kk);  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§12>/2    (c). 

(a)  The  live  stock  rates  prescribed 
'o  Kansas  City  in  the  original  report, 
22  I.  C.  C.  160,  were  approved  as  a 
whole,  and  there  is  no  warrant  for 
the  assumption  that  in  those  cases 
where  the  mileage  scale  prescribed  by 
the  Commission  might  be  higher  than 
particular  rates  in  force,  such  rates 
might  be  increased  to  equal  the  mile- 
age scale.  In  Re  Alleged  Unreasonable 
Rates  on  Meats,  23  I.  C.  C.  656,  660. 

(b)  The  rate  on  fresh  meats  and 
packing-house  products  from  Wichita, 
kan.,  to  southeastern  territory  ought 
not  to  be  advanced  unless  that  from 
Kansas  City  is  also  increased  by  a 
corresponding  amount.  In  Re  Alleged 
Unreasonable  Rates  on  Meats,  23  I. 
C.    C.    656,    666. 

(bb)  The  fact  that  rates  are  in- 
creased so  as  to  effect  a  differential, 
or  so  as  to  more  equitably  equalize 
rates  between  competing  coal  fields, 
and  that  such  increase  is  made  without 
regard  to  the  reasonableness  of  the  re- 
sulting rates,  may  not  be  considered  as 
conclusive  or  in  anywise  determinative 
as  to  the  justness  or  reasonableness  of 
the  rates  in  themselves.  The  Commis- 
sion is  not  concerned  with  the  increase 
in  the  rates  but  with  the  increased 
rate.  In  Re  Advances  on  Coal  to  Lake 
Ports,   22  I.   C.   C.   604,  612. 

(c)  In  considering  an  advance  in 
•rates  on  leather  the  defendants  in- 
sisted that  because  the  advanced  com- 
modity rates  were  less  than  the  class 
rates  between  the  points  in  question 
this  showed  the  former  rates  were  im- 
iiroper  and  justified  the  increase. 
HELD,  upon  this  theory  the  advanced 
rates  cannot  be  defended,  for  those 
rates  are  less  than  the  class  -rates, 
and  it  it  be  true  that  there  is  a  fixed 
relation     between     commodities     which 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §5   (2)    (d)  — (f) 


15 


must  he  the  same  in  all  cases  and 
that  the  classification  determines  that 
relation,  then  it  would  be  the  duty  of 
these  defendants  to  advance  these 
leather  rates  to  the  level  of  the  class 
rates.  It  may  b«  further  noted  that 
upon  this  theory  no  commodity  rate 
could  be  justified.  While  it  is  true 
that  commodity  rates  are  always  in 
the  nature  of  a  preference,  not  neces- 
sarily undue,  and  while  it  may  be  true 
that  the  tendency  should  be  to  elimi- 
nate these  special  rates,  and  work 
more  nearly  to  a  class  basis,  still 
the  rates  of  this  country  have  been 
built  up  upon  a  different  theory,  and 
to  apply  that  theory  would  be  revolu- 
tionary and  destructive  of  many  legiti- 
mate business  enterprises.  United 
States  Leather  Co.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co., 
21  I.  C.  C.  323,   325. 

(d)  The  Commission  investigated 
certain  increased  rates  on  cement  plas- 
ter applied  by  the  defendants  from 
Alva,.  Bickford,  Ferguson,  Marlow, 
Okarche,  Cement,  Eldarado,  Okeene, 
Southard,  Chambers,  Roman  Nose,  Wa- 
tonga  and  McAlester,  Okla.,  to  Fort 
Worth  and  Dallas  and  intermediate 
stations  in  Texas.  Fort  Worth  and 
Dallas  are  the  largest  consuming 
points  for  cement  plaster  in  northern 
Texas  and  tha  -rates  in  force  were 
made  in  order  to  place  the  various 
points  of  production  on  substantial 
competitive  equality  at  Fort  Worth 
and  Dallas.  Producers  of  cement  plas- 
ter in  Oklahoma  are  in  competition 
not  only  with  one  another  but  with  com- 
petitors in  the  vicinity  of  Acme,  Tex.  The 
distance  from  Acme  to  Fort  Worth  is 
19G.5  miles  and  to  Dallas  230.3  miles 
via  the  Fort  Worth  &  Denver  City  Ry., 
which  road  has  maintained  rates  of 
10c  from  Acme  to  Fort  Worth  and 
ll^/^c  to  Dallas.  The  Oklahoma  points 
are  further  distant  from  Fort  Worth 
or  Dallas  than  is  Acme  and  take  a 
rate  substantially  the  same.  In  many 
Instances,  also,  rates  from  Acme  and 
from  the  points  of  origin  in  Oklahoma 
are  higher  to  stations  between  Fort 
Worth-Dallas  and  the  Texas-Oklahoma 
state  line  than  to  Fort  Worth-Dallas. 
The  Increase  in  the  rates  suspended 
appeared  to  have  been  made  by  the 
carriers  in  order  to  conform  to  the 
fourth  section  of  the  Act  and  at  the 
same  time  to  augment  their  revenues. 
The  revenue  per  ton  mile  under  a  13- 
cent    rate    would    vary    from    7.3    mills 


to  11.6  mills  from  points  in  Oklahoma, 
distant  from  224  to  353  miles,  and  a 
rate  of  10c  would  yield  a  ton  mile 
revenue  of  from  9.4  mills  to  12.2  mills 
from  the  nearest  situated  point,  dis- 
tant from  164  to  212  miles.  HELD, 
regarding  the  rates  from  the  Oklahoma 
points  of  origin  •  to  Fort  Worth  and 
Dallas  the  points  of  origin  and  at 
destination  should  be  grouped  for  the 
purpose  of  p-rescribing  maximum  rates. 
In  making  such  groups  the  established 
rate-making  customs  in  the  southwestern 
section  of  the  country  and  the  par- 
ticular action  of  the  carriers  in  this  case 
ire  as  follows:  Two  groups  of  points 
)f  origin  seem  to  be  necessary  in  order 
o  do  justice  to  the  -rights  of  shippers 
xnd  carriers  and  these  are  made  sub- 
stantially upon  the  ground  of  distance; 
he  rate  from  Alva,  Bickford,  Ferguson, 
Okarche,  Eldorado,  Okeene,  Southard, 
loman  Nose  and  Watonga  to  Fort 
Worth  and  Dallas  should  not  exceed 
13c  per  100  lbs.,  minimum  40,000  lbs.; 
the  -rate  from  Cement,  Marlow,  Cham- 
bers and  McAlester,  the  nearest  group 
■o  Fort  Worth  and  Dallas,  should  not 
axceed  10c  per  100  lbs.,  minimum  40,- 
000  lbs.  In  Re  Advances  on  Cement 
Plaster,  21   I.   C.   C.   591,   595. 

(e)  Complainant,  a  lumber  manufac- 
turer at  Oakdale,  La.,  attacked  the  ad- 
vanced rate  on  export  lumber  of  9c  (from 
7c)  per  100  lbs.  from  Oakdale  to  Port 
\rthur,  Tex.  The  haul  from  Oakdale 
"0  Port  Arthur,  a  two-line  haul  of  155 
niles,  yields  .0116  cents  per  ton  per  mile 
md  per  car  earnings  of  $45.  HELD, 
:hat    bearing     in    mind     the    fact    that 

ates  on  lumber  west  of  the  river 
lave  been  raised  quite  generally  in 
:*ecent  years  to  the  extent  of  2c  per 
'00  lbs.  the  Commission  would  not  feel 
justified  in  reducing  the  rate  as 
grayed.  Complaint  dismissed  without 
irejudice.  Industrial  Lumber  Co.  v.  St. 
U   W.   &   G.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  50,  52. 

(f)  On  fir  lumber  shipped  in  April, 
'908,  from  Oregon  City,  Ore.,  to  Crip- 
i\e  Creek,  Colo.,  a  through  rate  of  69c 
vas  collected,  made  up  of  50c  to 
Colorado  Springs  and  a  local  of  19c 
)eyond.  From  April  15,  1905,  to  Nov. 
',  1907,  the  rate  over  the  route  in  ques- 
ion  was  40c  to  both  Canon  City  and 
^Jolorado  Springs.  On  the  latter  date  it 
idvanced  to  50c  in  connection  with  gen- 
eral advances  made  at  the  time  on  lum- 
ber from  the  north  Pacific  coast,  which 
idvances  were  subsequently  condemned  • 


16 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §5  (2)    (g)— §5   (3)     (b) 


by  the  Commission.  After  the  order  of 
the  Commissiop  defendants  voluntarily 
restored  the  40c  rate  to  Canon  City,  but 
did  not  apply  same  to  Colorado  Springs. 
For  a  number  of  years  defendants  applied 
a  proportional  rate  of  7c  from  Colorado 
Springs  to  Cripple  Creek  on  lumber  orig- 
inating in  Colorado  and  New  Mexico,  and 
at  the  time  of  shipment  a  rate  of  10c 
was  in  force  on  this  particular  lumber. 
The  lumber  to  which  this  rate  applied 
was  of  an  inferior  quality  and  used 
largely  in  connection  with  mining  «op- 
erations  in  the  Cripple  Creek  district, 
the  lower  rate  being  made  to  encour- 
age the  mining  industry.  The  grades 
involved  in  the  haul  from  Colorado 
Springs  to  Cripple  Creek  exceeded  4 
per  cent  at  some  points  and  on  account 
of  other  physical  conditions  the  road 
was  very  expensive  to  operate.  The 
7c  and  10c  rates  mentioned  were  out 
of  line  with  local  rates  generally  in 
that  locality.  HELD,  the  50c  rate 
charged  from  point  of  origin  to  Col- 
orado Springs  was  excessive  to  the 
extent  that  it  exceeded  40c  in  view  of 
the  former  40c  rate,  the  condemnation 
of  the  advance  by  the  Commission, 
and  the  subsequent  voluntary  restora- 
tion of  the  40c  rate  to  Canon  City;  but 
that  the  19c  local  rate  charged  from 
Colorado  Springs  to  Cripple  Creek  was 
not  shown  to  be  unreasonable,  since 
it  is  not  per  se  unlawful  to  make  a 
proportional  rate  lower  than  the  local 
rate,  and  limit  its  application  to  traf- 
fic coming  from  a  specified  territory. 
Serry  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  554,  555, 
556. 

(g)  An  advance  in  rate  in  order  to 
remove  discrimination  is  justified. 
Lautz  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  L.  V.  R.  R.  Co., 
17    I.   C.    C.    167. 

(h)  Defendants  increased  the  third 
and  fourth  class  rates  2.5c  and  the 
fifth  class  rate  2c  on  soap  and  wash- 
ing powder  from  Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  to 
points  north  of  Whitehall,  N.  Y.,  on 
the  line  of  the  D.  &  H.  Co.  Prior  to 
the  advance  the  class  rates  from  Bos- 
ton and  New  York  to  the  points  in 
question  were  practically  equal  to  the 
rates  from  Buffalo,  the  distance  to 
Whitehall  from  Boston  being  280  miles, 
from  New  York  221  miles,  and  from 
Buffalo  420  miles.  Such  increases  were 
made  to  prevent  discrimination  in  fa- 
vor of  Buffalo  as  against  the  points 
mentioned  and  other  points.  Com- 
plainant   offered    no    evidence    to    show 


the  rates  unreasonable  per  se.  HELD, 
the  increases  being  made  to  prevent 
discrimination,  no  justification  was  es- 
tablished on  the  record  for  disrupting 
the  group  system  of  rates  in  effect. 
Lautz  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  L.  V.  R.  R.  Co., 
17    I.    C.    C.    167,    168. 

(i)  Where  through  error  a  certain 
factor  in  a  combination  rate  was  lower 
than  it  should  have  been  and  this  was 
subsequently  corrected  by  an  increase, 
it  cannot  be  held  unreasonable.  Me- 
nasha  Woodenn-are  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.   Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  476. 

§5.     (3)     To    Preserve    Commodity    Rela- 
tionship. 

See  Comparative  Rates, 
(a)  Rates  on  flaxseed  were  advarced 
from  Fort  William  and  Port  Arthur, 
Canada,  to  Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  and  other 
eastern  points  of  destination.  A  rate 
of  25c  had  originally  been  established 
by  the  Canadian  Pacific  Ry.  from  Fort 
William  to  New  York  City,  with  cor- 
responding rates  to  other  eastern 
points  of  consumption  to  meet  the  rate 
of  23i^c  from  Duluth  to  New  York. 
When  the  Duluth  rate  was  advanced  to 
32i^c  the  suspended  advanced  rate 
from  Fort  William  was  put  into  effect. 
It  appeared  that  rates  from  Fort  Wil- 
liam and  Duluth  to  eastern  points  on 
flaxseed  should  be  approximately  the 
same.  These  rates  were  compared  to 
the  lower  rates  on  grain  and  grain 
products,  but  it  appeared  that  the  value 
of  flaxseed  for  the  past  ten  years  has 
averaged  twice  that  of  corn  and  ma- 
terially more  than  that  of  wheat,  and 
at  the  present  time  is  over  $2  per 
bushel.  The  advanced  rate  to  New 
York  was  32i/^c  for  a  distance  of  ap- 
proximately 1,400  miles,  yielding  a  ton 
mile  revenue  of  about  5  mills,  sub- 
stantially the  same  as  the  advanced 
rate  of  22i/^c  to  Buffalo  for  a  distance 
of  900  miles.  HELD,  there  is  no  rea- 
lon  why  rates  upon  flaxseed  should  of 
necessity  be  the  same  as  correspond- 
ing rates  upon  grain,  but  that  they  may 
somewhat  exceed  those  rates;  that  the 
advanced  rates  published  are  not  un- 
reasonable or  unduly  discriminatory 
and  the  order  of  suspension  is  vacated 
and  the  suspended  tariff  allowed  to 
take  effect.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates 
on   Flaxseed,    23    I.    C.    C.    272. 

(b)  Complainant  attacked  certain  ad- 
vances on  cypress  and  hardwood  lum- 
ber from  Gleason,  Ark.,  to  Kansas  City, 


ADVANCED  RATES,  $5   (4)    (a)— §6   (3)    (a) 


17 


Mo.,  and  other  Missouri  River  crossings 
and  points  in  the  same  territory,  and  to 
certain  Mississippi  and  Ohio  River  cross- 
ings, taking  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  Cairo  and 
Thebes,  111.,  as  representative.  Complain- 
ant established  its  mills  at  Gleason  in  De- 
cember, 1904.  A  short  time  prior  to  this 
the  rate  from  there  to  Kansas  City,  Mo., 
was  raised  from  15c  to  16c  per  100  lbs., 
and  other  Missouri  River  crossings  pro- 
portionately. In  1909  the  carriers  made  a 
general  advance  of  practically  4c  per 
100  lbs.  Prior  to  the  advances  com- 
plained of  the  rates  on  cypress  lumber 
from  Gleason  to  the  west  and  north- 
west were  the  same  as  the  rates  on 
hardwood  lumber,  and  generally  speak- 
ing cypress  lumb-er  was  for  the  pur- 
poses of  rate  making  grouped  with 
the  hardwood  at  all  points  north  of  the 
Arkansas  River.  The  increases  in  the 
cypress  rates  were  caused  by  taking 
cypress  out  of  the  hardwood  group  and 
placing  it  with  the  group  on  yellow 
pine  and  then  raising  the  yellow  pine 
rate.  HELD,  that  the  rates  on  cypress 
lumber  from  Gleason  to  Kansas  City 
and  other  Missouri  River  points  and 
points  west  thereof  should  not  be 
higher  than  the  rates  now  applied  by 
defendants  from  Group  2  points  to 
Kansas  City,  or  18c  per  100  lbs.  C.  L., 
minimum  30,000  lbs.  The  other  rates 
complained  of  are  proportionately  re- 
duced except  on  hardwood  from  Glea- 
son to  St.  Louis,  Cairo  and  Thebes,  as 
the  present  adjustment  of  the  hard- 
wood rates  from  Gleason  to  those 
points  is  practically  the  same  as  it  was 
after  the  general  advance  in  1907  and 
not  out  of  line  with  the  adjustment  at 
other  points  in  general  producing  ter- 
ritory of  which  Gleason  is  a  part. 
Freeman  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M. 
&    S.    Ry.    Co.,   19   I.   C.   C.    348. 

§5.     (4)      Unreasonably   Low   Prior   Rate. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  rate  of  32c 
en  cream  in  10-gallon  cans  from  Concor- 
dia, Kan.,  to  Crete,  Neb.,  in  force  from 
March  1  to  Sept.  5,  1909.  The  rate 
from  190G  to  March  1,  1909,  was  a  special 
rate  of  20c,  put  in  at  the  solicitation  of 
complainant,  and  on  its  representation 
that  a  part  of  its  business  given  to  other 
carriers  could  be  diverted  over  the  de- 
fendant line.  When  the  Beatrice  scale 
(prescribed  in  15  I.  C.  C.  109)  was  put 
in  effect  by  the  defendant,  the  20c  rate 
was  withdrawn  so  that  the  application 
of  the  Beatrice  rates  might  be  uniform 


throughout  the  system.  Then  complain- 
ant withdrew  its  business  from  defend- 
ant and  the  20c  rate  was  restored.  HELD, 
ordinarily  the  advance  of  a  rate  for  a 
short  period  followed  by  a  restoration  of 
the  lower  rate  raises  a  presumption  of 
fact  that  the  advanced  rate  was  unrea- 
sonable, but  to  hold  that  defendant  may 
not  withdraw  an  unreasonably  low  rate, 
merely  because  that  rate  was  voluntarily 
established  in  the  first  place,  would 
amount  to  requiring  unjust  preference 
to  complainant,  and  violate  the  funda- 
mental principle  that  rates  must  be  uni- 
form under  similar  conditions,  and  under 
the  circumstance  the  32c  rate  could  not 
be  considered  unreasonable.  Fairmont 
Creamery  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  252. 

§6.     Right    to    Earn. 

See  Evidence,  §6. 

§6.     (1)     On    Bona    Fide    Investment. 

(a)  The  trend  of  the  highest  judicial 
opinion  would  indicate  that  the  Commis- 
sion should  accept  neither  the  cost  of  re- 
production nor  the  capitalization,  nor  the 
prices  of  stock  and  bonds  in  the  market, 
nor  yet  the  original  investment  alone,  as 
the  test  of  present  value  for  purposes  o* 
rate  regulation.  Perhaps  the  nearest  ap- 
proximation to  the  fair  standard  is  that 
of  bona  fide  investment — the  sacrifice 
made  by  the  owners  of  the  property — 
considering  as  part  of  the  investment  any 
shortage  of  returns  that  there  may  be  in 
the  early  years  of  the  enterprise.  Upon 
thus  taking  the  life  history  of  the  road 
through  a  number  of  years,  its  promoters 
are  entitled  to  a  reasonable  return.  This, 
however,  manifestly  is  limited,  for  a  re- 
turn should  not  be  given  upon  wasteful- 
ness, mismanagement  or  poor  judgment, 
and  always  there  is  present  the  restric- 
tion that  no  more  than  a  reasonable  rate 
shall  be  charged.  In  Re  Advances  in 
Rates— Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307,  347. 

§6.     (2)     On   Unearned   Increment. 

(a)  It  is  a  conservative  statement  of 
the  law  to  hold  that  a  railroad  may  not 
increase  the  rate  upon  a  number  of  com- 
modities solely  because  its  real  estate 
has  risen  in  value.  In  Re  Advances  in 
Rates— Western  Case,  20  L  C.  C.  307.  344. 

§6.     (3)     On    Reproduction  Value. 

(a)  Carriers  running  west  of  Chicago 
advanced  some  200  com.modity  rates.  It 
was  contended  that  the  Mann-Elkins  Act 
made  all  rates  in  effect  Jan.  1,  1910,  rea- 


18 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §6    (3)    (b)— §6   (4)    (c) 


sonable;  that  the  credit  of  the  railroads 
was  becoming  impaired;   that  the  roads 
were    not    earning    an    adequate    return 
upon    the    reproduction    value    of    their 
properties  and  had  a  legal  right  to  earn 
a  reasonable  return  upon  the  actual  fair 
value  of  the  railroad  as  it  exists  to-day 
as     a     going     concern,     and     that     the 
cost     per     unit     of     service     was     In- 
creasing.      HELD,      that      the      burden 
of    proof    under    the    Mann-Elkins    Act 
compelled  the  railroad  to  justify  as  rea- 
sonable the  increased  rate  as  a  whole; 
that  the  net  earnings  of  railroads  under 
governmental  regulation  when  there  was 
stability  of  rates  and  the   extinction  of 
rebates  to  have  been  greater  than  ever 
before,  and  that  the  credit  of  the  rail- 
road was  as  high  as  it  had  ever  been, 
and  the  dividends  paid  greater.    That  to 
allow  a  carrier  to  earn  a  reasonable  re- 
turn upon  the  present  value  of  its  prop- 
erty rather  than  upon  its  bona  fide  In- 
vestment therein  would  mean  to  permit 
rates  to  increase  as  the  value  of  the  prop- 
erty increased  and  would  be  against  pub- 
lic   policy;     and    that    the    Commission 
could  not  sanction  the  idea  that  any  rail- 
road had  a  legal  right  to  do  this.     That 
the   gross  net   earnings   of  the   carriers 
were  greater  than  ever  before  in  their 
history,  and  that  upon  the  record  the  ad- 
vanced   commodity    rates    already    paid 
their  due  share  of  the  value  of  the  service 
rendered  by  the  carrier,  many  of  them 
being  twice  as  high  for  the  haul  imme- 
diately west  of  Chicago  as  corresponding 
rates  for  a  similar  rate  Immediately  east 
of    Chicago.      Carriers    asked    to    cancel 
tariffs  carrying  the  advanced  rates  and 
adhere  to  rates  already  in  effect.    In  Re 
Advances  in  Rates — ^Western  Case,  20  I. 
C.  C.  307. 

(b)  Carriers  In  Official  Classification 
territory  advanced  all  their  class  rates 
and  about  half  of  their  commodity  rates. 
No  testimony  was  introduced  tending  to 
show  the  cost  of  reproducing  the  proper- 
ties of  the  defendants.  HELD,  the  Com- 
mission was  compelled  to  dispose  of  the 
case  upon  the  evidence  available;  that  It 
Is  plain  that  a  physical  valuation  would 
Introduce  into  the  calculation  a  new  ele- 
ment which  might  lead  to  a  different  con- 
clusion. The  Commission  has  several 
times  urged  Congress  to  authorize  a  re- 
productive valuation  of  those  railroads 
subject  to  federal  jurisdiction.  It  Is  re- 
ported that  certain  railroad  companies 
are  making  such  valuations  themselves, 
and  the  results  may  at  any  time  be  urged 
upon  the  Commission  and  the  courts  as 


a  justification  for  higher  freight  rates. 
The  interest  of  the  public  ought  not  to 
depend  upon  a  valuation  made  entirely 
by  the  owners  of  these  properties,  no 
matter  how  honestly  the  work  may  be 
prosecuted.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — 
Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  305. 

§6.     (4)      Right  To    Earn   Surplus. 

See    Evidence,    §57    (a);    Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §33. 

(a)  Carriers  in  Official  Classification 
territory  increased  all  class  rates  and 
ibout  half  their  commodity  rates.  They 
contended  they  should  be  allowed  to 
invest  in  improvements  and  additions 
■o  the  property  an  amount  equal  to 
that  paid  by  way  of  dividends  to 
stockholders.  In  the  year  1910  rail- 
road dividends  aggregated  $450,131,650. 
HELD,  that  inasmuch  as  every  dollar 
thus  added  to  the  value  of  the  prop- 
arty  justifies,  according  to  the  claim 
of  the  defendants,  an  added  net  return, 
^he  Commission  cannot  properly  permit 
m  advance  in  rates  with  the  intent 
o  produce  an  accumulation  of  surplus 
or  this  purpose  until  the  status  of 
he  surplus  is  determined  by  legisla- 
ive  action  or  judicial  Interpretation, 
n  Re  Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case, 
iO    I.    C.    C.    243,    270. 

(b)  Any  new  money  put  into  railroad 
property  whether  derived  from  the  sale 
of  securities  or  from  surplus,  which 
might  have  been  appropriated  to  divi- 
dends, represents  new  value — an  addi- 
tion to  the  property — and  on  this  addi- 
tion the  stockholders  interested  are 
entitled  to  a  reasonable  return  if  that 
can  be  had  for  an  additional  service 
?iven.  But  It  Is  not  equitable  that  be- 
cause the  directors  of  a  corporation 
lee  fit  to  distribute  to  the  stockholders 
ess  than  the  amount  which  the  com- 
oany  earns  and  may  be  appropriated  to 
lividends,  the  shippers  who  made  this 
'arge  dividend  and  surplus  possible 
ihall  be  increasingly  taxed  In  geomet- 
•ical  progression  to  make  return  upon 
t.  New  improvements  should  bring 
lew  revenue.  The  risk  of  the  stock- 
lolders  in  Investing  their  money  in 
these  Improvements  Is  the  same  risk 
•hat  they  took  when  they  invested 
■heir  original  funds  in  the  original 
property.  In  Re  Advances  In  Rates — 
Western   Case,   20  I.   C.  C.  307,  341: 

(c)  A  railroad  is  justified  no  doubt 
'n  maintaining  a  surplus  which  will  in- 
jure  dividends   to   its   stockholders   dur- 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §6  (5)   (a)— §6  (6)   (c) 


19 


ing  lean  years;  and  it  may  accumulat»3 
through  the  years  fui\ds  to  meet  obso- 
lescence in  plan*,  unless  this  charge 
is  taken  care  of  in  maintenance.  The 
one  other  legitimate  end  for  which  a 
surplus  may  in  reason  be  accumulated 
is  to  supply  facilities  in  the  r.ature  of 
luxuries,  which  cannot  be  made  to 
yield  adequate  return  upon  the  capl  ^1 
invested.  This  would  appear  to  be  as 
broad  a  definition  of  a  legitimate  surplus 
as  could  be  desired  and  when  it  is 
considered  that  the  maintenance  ac- 
counts of  these  carriers  practically  re- 
build the  roads  every  ten  years,  it 
seems  to  be  as  broad  a  definition  as 
necessity  would  require.  In  Re  Advances 
in  Rates — Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C. 
307,   336. 

§6.     (5)      For    Permanent    Improvements. 

See  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §26,  §27 
(cc). 

(a)  Both  the  Supreme  Court  and 
the  Commission  are  committed  to  the 
proposition  that  in  fixing  a  fair  return 
upon  railroad  property  for  the  purpose 
of  determining  whether  a  given  ad- 
vance is  reasonable  the  railway  ought 
not  to  treat  as  a  part  of  its  operating 
expenses  the  cost  of  permanent  im- 
p-rovements  or  extensions,  and  this 
must  of  necessity  mean  that  the  rates 
should  not  be  sufficient  to  allow  both 
the  payment  of  dividends  to  stockhold- 
ers and  interest  to  bondholders,  and 
an  additional  sum  for  the  purpose  of 
Improving  and  increasing  the  value  of 
the  property.  Each  generation  may 
well  be  required  to  bear  its  own  bur- 
den, and  the  stockholder  should  not  ob- 
tain both  an  adequate  dividend  upon 
his  stock  and  an  addition  to  the  value 
of  his  property.  In  Re  Advances  in 
Rates— Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  266. 

(b)  It  remains  for  the  Supreme 
Court  yet  to  decide  that  a  public  agency 
such  as  a  railroad  created  by  public 
authority,  vested  with  governmental  au- 
thority, may  continuously  increase  its 
rate  in  proportion  to  the  increase  in 
its  value,  either  (1)  because  of  better- 
ments which  it  has  made  out  of  in- 
come, or  (2)  because  of  the  growth  of 
the  property  in  value  due  to  increase 
in  value  of  the  land  which  the  company 
owns.  Advances  in  Rates — Western 
Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307,  339,  340. 

(c)  Public  policy  forbids  the  theory 
that    a    carrier    is    entitled    to    increase 


rates  so  as  to  earn  a  return  upon  bet- 
terments created  out  of  income.  Its 
return  should  come  from  increased  traf- 
fic and  operating  economy.  Advances  in 
Rates— Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307, 
340. 

i^6.      (6)      All    Traffic    will    Bear. 

See    Evidence,    §45    (c);    Reasonable- 
ness  of  Rates,  §6    (6). 

(a)  Tlie  Commission  has  never  ac- 
:epted  the  doctrine  that  the  best  test 
^f  the  reasonableness  of  the  rate  is 
whether  the  traffic  will  move  freely 
under  it,  although  it  has  alwayi 
deemed  the  state  oT  an  industry  a 
pertinent  fact  in-  considering  the  rea- 
3oiiableness  of  the  rate.  In  Re  Trans- 
portation of  Wool,  Hides,  and  Peits,  23 
[.   C.    C.   151,   156. 

(b)  The  advance  in  rates  on  staves, 
hoops  and  heading  from  various  sta- 
tions on  the  line  of  the  St.  L.  I.  M.  & 
S.  Ry.  in  Arkansas  and  southern  Mis- 
souri to  certain  points  on  the  Atcha- 
falaya  River  and  Bayou  Teche  in 
Louisiana  from  18c  to  24c  per  100  lbs. 
is  not  shown  by  defendants  to  have 
been   justified   and  the  increase   is   held 

o  be  unreasonable,  it  appearing  that 
the  18c  rate  was  necessary  to  enable 
this  traffic  to  move  and  such  rate  not 
appearing  to  be  unduly  low.  In  Re 
.\dvances   on   Staves,   23   I.   C.   C.   382. 

(bb)  It  is  manifest  that  when  addi- 
tional revenues  are  desired  and  rates 
ire  to  be  increased  for  that  purpose 
I  horizontal  advance  in  all  rates  on 
I  fixed  percentage  instead  of  yielding 
idditional  revenues  would  not  improb- 
ibly  result  in  a  reduced  revenue.  Com- 
)etitive  and  commercial  conditions  have 
50  important  a  relation  to  the  move- 
nent  of  particular  kinds  of  traffic  as 
o  make  such  a  readjustment  of  a  rate 
schedule  inadvisable  if  not  altogether 
mpossible.  To  increase  a  rate  on  a 
;iven  commodity  when  it  is  already  as 
ligh  as  competitive  and  commercial 
•onditions  will  allow  means  that  it  will 
ease  to  move,  and  such  a  rate  will 
lecessarily  result  in  a  loss  even  of  the 
evenue  that  has  theretofore  been  en- 
oyed  on  that  commodity.  Railroad 
Commission  of  Texas  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
ly.    Co.,    20    I.    C.    C.    463,    482. 

(c)  The  Commission  cannot  accept 
he  theory  that  rates  may  be  increased 
)y  progressive  advances  as  long  as  th« 
iraffic  moves  freely  and  until  the  high- 


20 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §6    (6)    (d)— §7    (1)    (c) 


est  point  under  which  the  traffic  will 
move  freely  is  reached.  Some  traffic 
must  move,  and  reasonably  freely,  up  to 
the  point  where  the  rate  becomes  pro- 
hibitive. Commercial  Club  of  Omaha 
v.  A.  &  S.  R.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  419, 
421. 

(d)  While  the  Commission  accepts 
the  theory  that  the  mere  fact  of  raising 
a  rate  carries  with  it  no  presumption  that 
the  increase  was  not  rightfully  made,  it 
is  not  ready  to  accept  the  theory  that 
rates  may  be  lawfully  and  reasonably  in- 
creased by  progressive  advances  as  long 
as  the  traffic  moves  freely  and  until  the 
highest  point  under  which  the  traffic  will 
move  freely  is  reached,  since  some  traf- 
fic must  move,  and  reasonably  freely,  up 
to  the  point  where  it  becomes  prohibi- 
tive. Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  An- 
derson &  Saline  River  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
532,  536. 

(e)  Carriers  are  not  justified  in  rais- 
ing rates  on  the  ground  that  the  indus- 
tries served  have  greatly  prospered  un- 
der the  old  rates  and  can  bear  the  ad- 
vance, but  the  lawfulness  of  an  advance 
in  rates  must  be  determined  by  their  rea- 
sonableness. Oregon  &  Washington  Lum- 
ber M'f'rs  Ass'n  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  1,  15. 

§6.     (7)     Cost    of    Insurance. 

(a)  Defendant  rail  and  water  carriers 
in  their  bills  of  lading  exempted  them- 
selves from  all  liability  for  losses  except 
those  due  to  their  own  negigence,  and 
protected  them_selves  by  taking  out  insur- 
ance on  the  shipments  moving  over  rail 
and  water  routes.  Shippers  also  provided 
themselves  with  insurance,  not  being 
able  to  rely  on  those  effected  by  the  car- 
riers, since  on  such  insurance  the  names 
of  the  shippers  were  not  specified,  the 
value  of  the  invoice  was  not  known,  nor 
had  the  shipper  any  information  as  to 
the  company  in  which  the  insurance  was 
placed,  the  nature  of  the  policy  taken 
out,  or  the  conditions  attaching  to  the 
policy.  Defendants  raised  the  class  rates 
on  rail  and  water  transportation  of  mer- 
chandise from  Atlantic  ports  to  Minneap- 
olis and  Chicago,  the  purpose  of  the  in- 
crease being  to  cover  the  cost  of  insur- 
ance incurred  by  the  carriers.  HELD, 
since  the  shippers  were  not  adequately 
protected  by  the  insurance  effected  by 
the  carriers,  the  increases  were  unreason- 
able and  should  be  reduced  to  the  former 
rates.  Wyman,  Partridge  &  Co.  v.  B.  & 
M.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  258,  264. 


III.     EVIDENCE. 

§7.     Change    in    Conditions. 

See   Evidence  §9. 

§7.      (1)      In    General. 

See  Evidence,  §9,  §51  (b);  Facilities 
and  Privileges,  §15  (i);  Reasonable- 
ness  of    Rates,    §7,    §28    (q). 

(a)  The  fact  that  the  cost  of  produc- 
ing wool  has  increased  while  its  market 
price  has  fallen  is  no  reason  why  less 
than  a  reasonable  freight  rate  should  be 
established  for  its  transportation.  In  Re 
Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts. 
23  L  C.  C.  151,  156. 

(aa)  Carriers  in  Official  Classifica- 
tion territory  sought  to  increase  the 
minimum  charge  on  single  packages 
and  small  lots  of  freight  from  25c  to 
35c.  Ever  since  the  passage  of  the 
original  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  and 
the  birth  of  the  Official  Classification, 
the  minimum  charge  in  nearly  all 
Official  Classification  territory  has  been 
25c.  HELD,  that  the  cost  figures  pro- 
duced being  from  but  a  few  of  the 
hundreds  of  stations  in  Official  Classi- 
fication territory,  are  not  sufficiently 
reliable  and  so  representative  of  condi- 
tions of  that  territory  as  to  overcome 
the  presumption  of  the  reasonableness 
and  remunerative  character  of  the  pres- 
ent minimum  charge,  nor  do  they  sus- 
tain the  burden  of  proof  which  the 
statute  places  upon  the  carriers,  and  are 
not  sufficient  to  justify  the  advance 
from  25c  to  35c.  In  Re  Advances  in 
Rates  on  Freight  in  Single  Packages 
and  Small  Lots,  22  I.  C.  C.  328. 

(b)  A  possible  construction  of  a  form- 
ed order  of  the  Commission  adopted  by 
the  carriers  is  not  of  itself  sufficient  to 
justify  an  advance.  Chamber  of  Commerce 
of  Houston  V.  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co., 
23   I.   C.  €.   214,   216. 

(bb)  A  changed  method  of  operating, 
inaugurated  of  defendant's  own  motion 
and  for  its  own  convenience,  is  no 
justification  for  a  proposed  increase. 
In  Re  Advances  on  Milk,  23  I.  C.  C 
500,   502. 

(c)  The  Commission  investigated  the 
propriety  of  advances  in  rates  on  wheat 
and  coarse  grain  from  North  Dakota  and 
South  Dakota  producing  points  to  pri- 
mary grain  markets  such  as  Minneapolis, 
Duhith,  IMilwaukee,  Chicago,  Omaha  and 
points  taking  the  same  rates.  It  ap- 
peared that  since  1900,  while  the  wheat 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §7   (1)    (cc)  — (d) 


21 


has  increased  greatly  in  value,  rates  have 
materially  decreased.  The  cost  of  opera- 
tion has  materially  increased,  so  that 
while  the  reduced  rates  and  higher  wages 
have  come  from  the  carrier's  revenues, 
the  money  has  gone  to  the  farmer.  It 
appears  that  the  situation  in  South  Da- 
kota is  peculiar  owing  to  Canadian  com- 
petition, and  the  short-line  distance  from 
North  Dakota  reflected  in  rates  from  South 
Dakota.  Claims  for  loss  from  leakage  have 
Increased  enormously,  as  well  as  from 
other  causes,  and  the  enormous  increase 
in  the  value  of  the  grain  has  largely  in- 
creased the  amount  of  the  claims.  The 
average  rate  per  ton-mile  on  wheat  in 
South  Dakota  is  8.38  mills  and  the  aver- 
age for  the  four  states  of  Iowa,  Minne- 
sota, North  Dakota  and  South  Dakota  is 
8.48  mills.  HELD,  that  the  carriers  have 
sustained  the  burden  of  proof  which  the 
statute  imposes  upon  them  and  that  the 
proposed  advances  are  not  unjust  or  un- 
reasonable. FURTHER  HELD,  that  the 
former  established  and  recognized  rela- 
tions in  rates  as  between  Minneapolis. 
Duluth,  Milwaukee  and  Chicago  should 
be  restored  except  in  instances  of  bona 
fide  errors  or  of  elimination  of  violations 
of  the  fourth  section  of  the  Act.  In  Re 
Advances  on  Grain,  21  I.  C.  C.  22. 

(cc)  It  has  never  be«n  the  view  of 
the  Commission  that  the  prosperity  of  a 
shipper,  a  locality  or  a  state 'was  a  rea- 
sonable excuse  for  the  imposition  of 
rates  conditioned  on  such  prosperity,  but 
when  coincident  with  very  substantial 
reductions  in  rates  the  price  of  a  com- 
modity has  nearly  doubled  in  value  and 
claims  for  loss  and  damage  have  mate- 
rially increased,  two  of  the  essential  fac- 
tors of  a  reasonable  rate,  value  and  risk, 
have  been  changed  in  favor  of  the  car- 
rier's contention  that  proposed  advances 
in  rates  should  be  allowed.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances on  Grain,  21  L  C.  C.  22,  35. 

(d)  In  Burnham  -  Hanna  -  Munger  Dry 
Goods  Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  299,  reductions  were  ordered  in  the 
portions  of  the  through  rates  on  the  first 
five  classes  applying  from  the  Mississippi 
River  to  the  Missouri  River  on  shipments 
from  Atlantic  seaboard  territory  to  Mis- 
souri River  cities.  The  order  of  the  Com- 
mission was  enjoined,  but  finally  upheld 
by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  in 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  v.  C.  R. 
I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  218  U.  S.  8^.  The  rates 
prescribed  were  thereupon  published,  ef- 
fective Oct.  26,  1910.  The  two-year  limit 
of  the  Commission's  order  expired  Nov. 


10,  1910,  and  thereupon  defendants  filed 
increases  in  those  rates,  restoring  the 
rates  which  had  been  condemned.  The 
proposed  increases  were  suspended,  and 
investigated  in  this  proceeding.  In 
Docket  No.  3684,  consolidated  for  hear- 
ing, it  is  alleged  that  prior  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  rates  prescribed  in  the 
Burnham-Hanna-Munger  case  defendants 
had  for  many  years  applied  the  same 
rates  between  the  Mississippi  River  and 
the  Missouri  River  upon  all  traffic  mov- 
ing under  the  class  rates  involved  from 
all  territory  east  and  southeast  of  the 
Indiana-Illinois  state  line  to  the  Atlantic 
coast;  that  rates  from  all  of  said  points 
excepting  Atlantic  seaboard  territory 
have  since  Aug.  25,  1908,  been  excessive 
and  unreasonable,  at  least  to  the  extent 
that  they  exceed  the  rates  prescribed  by 
the  Commission  on  traffic  from  the  At- 
lantic seaboard,  and  pray  that  rates  be 
established  from  Mississippi  River  cross- 
ings on  traffic  originating  in  Central 
Freight  Association,  southeastern  and 
Carolina  territories,  not  in  excess  of 
those  prescribed  in  the  Burnham-Hanna- 
Munger  case  on  shipments  from  Atlantic 
seaboard  territory.  Reparation  is  prayed 
for  on  shipments  moving  subsequent  to 
Aug.  25,  1908.  It  appeared  that  competi- 
tion has  forced  the  making  of  the  same 
rates  from  all  of  the  Mississippi  River 
crossings  to  the  Missouri  River  cities, 
except  Sioux  City,  where  the  rates  apply 
only  through  the  upper  Mississippi  River 
crossings.  It  appeared  that  the  combina- 
tion of  rates  from  Atlantic  seaboard  ter- 
ritories to  the  JMississippi  River  plus  the 
rates  prescribed  in  the  Burnham-Hanna- 
Munger  case  make  lower  through  rates 
than  the  present  combinations  from  some 
intermediate  points  in  Central  Freight 
Association  territory.  It  is  the  Commis- 
sion's view,  expressed  in  former  opinions, 
that  higher  differentials  applying  between 
the  Mississippi  and  Missouri  rivers  might 
be  maintained  from  Indianapolis  than 
from  the  Atlantic  seaboard  aiid  the  re- 
duction in  the  Atlantic  seaboard  rate  was 
therefore  greater  than  would  have  been 
prescribed  to  apply  to  all  of  the  territory 
east  of  the  Indiana-Illinois  state  line. 
Since  its  former  decision,  the  Commis- 
sion has  carefully  investigated  the  ques- 
tion of  whether^r  not  there  was  justifi- 
cation for  general  advances  in  freight 
rates.  Taking  all  of  the  records  now 
available,  the  Commission  finds  that  de- 
fendants have  to  a  certain  extent  sus- 
tained the  burden  of  proof  cast  upon 
them  by  the  statute  with  regard  to  the 


22 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §7   (1)    (e)  — (f) 


advances  in  these  rates  on  traffic  from 
Atlantic  seaboard  territory,  because  it 
now  has  the  question  of  those  rates  be 
fore  it  upon  the  traffic  from  all  of  the 
territory  east  of  the  Indiana-Illinois  statt 
line.  HELD,  that  defendants'  througl 
rates  upon  the  first  five  classes  to  the 
Missouri .  River  cities,  Kansas  City  to 
Sioux  City,  both  inclusive,  and  to  points 
taking  the  same  rates,  from  points  ol 
origin  east  of  the  Indiana-Illinois  statf 
line,  commonly  known  in  traffic  circlet 
and  described  in  tariffs  as  Trunk  Line 
territory,  Central  Freight  Association  ter 
ritory,  Southeastern  territory  and  Caro 
lina  territory,  and  exclusive  of  points  in 
Atlantic  seaboard  territory,  applying 
through  the  Mississippi  River  crossings 
St.  Louis  to  East  Dubuque,  both  inclu 
sive,  are  unjust  and  unreasonable,  be 
cause  those  portions  of  the  through  ratet 
which  apply  from  those  Mississippi  Rive, 
crossings  to  the  Missouri  River  cities  as 
applied  to  through  shipments  are  unrea 
sonable.  In  both  cases  defendants  shoulc 
be  required  to  establish  and  maintain  foi 
a  period  of  not  less  than  two  years  a^ 
parts  of  the  through  rates  applying  fror 
the  Mississippi  River  crossings  mentioned 
to  the  Missouri  River  cities  mentioned 
and  to  points  taking  the  same  rates, 
except  that  to  Sioux  City  and  to  points 
taking  the  same  rates  they  shall  apply 
from  upper  Mississippi  River  crossings 
East  Burlington  to  East  Dubuque,  inclu 
sive,  rates  from  all  the  said  points  o 
origin,  east  of  the  Indiana-Illinois  stat( 
line,  including  Atlantic  seaboard  terri 
lory,  which  shall  not  exceed  the  follow 
ing: 
Class    1       2       3       4      5 

Rate    55     41     32     24     2f 

That  on  the  lettered  classes  correspond 
ing  reduction   should  be  made   so  as  to 
make  the  rates  as  follows: 
Class   A  B  C.  D         E 

Rate    ........22         18         15         12         10 

That  considering  the  Commission  is  pre- 
scribing what  may  well  be  considered  a 
new  rate  adjustment  for  a  large  terri 
tory  and  an  enormous  volume  of  traffic, 
reparation  should  be  denied.  In  Re  Ad 
vances  in  Rates,  21  I.  C.  C.  54G,  555,  557. 

(e)  All  the  carriers  m  Official  Classi- 
fication territory  advanced  all  their 
class  rates  and  about  one-half  their 
commodity  rates.  The  Commission  in 
stituted  an  inquiry  whether  the  ad- 
vanced rates  were  reasonable  and  what 


was  the  justification  for  publishing  the 
general  advance.  Voluminous  testi- 
mony was  introduced  as  to  the  ex- 
penses of  the  carriers.  The  Commis- 
sion examined  the  evidence  as  to  the 
expenses  the  carriers  were  under,  pres- 
ent and  prospective,  and  compared 
them  with  the  revenues  for  the  year 
1910.  From  a  general  review  of  the 
situation  the  Commission  HELD:  the 
cost  of  supplies  were  not  much  ad- 
vanced; wages  were  not  much  in- 
creased; the  demands  of  the  public 
will  continue  to  grow;  traffic  will  in- 
crease; but  the  same  advantage  may 
not  accrue  to  carriers  in  this  terri- 
tory in  the  future  as  in  the  past; 
something  should  be  expected  from  the 
introduction  of  additional  economy,  but 
perhaps  not  to  the  same  extent  as  in 
the  past;  the  net  revenues  for  the 
year  1910  were  the  greatest  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  railroads;  those  revenues 
would  still  have  been  ample  had  the 
present  rate  scale  been  applied  to  the 
operations  of  that  year;  that  during 
the  last  eleven  years  rates  have  ad- 
vanced and  on  all  the  facts  on  the 
record  the  carriers  are  ordered  to  can- 
cel their  advanced  tariffs  on  file  and 
restore  their  former  rates.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I. 
C.    C.    243,    285,    306. 

(ee)  WJiile  there  doubtless  has  been 
spasmodic  and  demagogic  effort  in  vari- 
ous sections  of  the  country  which  made 
for  the  injury  of  the  carriers,  the  trend 
of  control  and  regulation  as  a  whole 
has  been  conservative,  wise  and  sympa- 
thetic towards  the  investors  in  such 
enterprises.  The  United  States  has 
placed  far  less  restrictions  upon  the 
carriers  than  has  England  or  Canada. 
Advances  in  Rates — Western  Case,  20 
L   C.   C.   307,  319. 

(f)  The  reasonableness  of  a  rate  must 
of  necessity  depend  upon  the  condi- 
tions surrounding  the  traffic  at  the 
time  it  moves.  The  length  of  the  haul, 
the  comi)etition  to  be  met.  the  cost 
of  the  service,  the  value  of  the  service, 
the  density  or  volume  of  the  tonnage, 
as  well  as  the  general  transportation 
conditions  then  existing  are  factors 
that  have  a  more  or  less  definite  re- 
lation to  the  rate  that  a  carrier  may 
reasonably  demand  for  a  transportation 
service.  And  these  factors^  except  pos- 
sibly the  length  of  the  haul,  the  grades, 
and  other  transportation  conditions  are 
in    their    nature    neither    permanent    nor 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §7  (1)    (g)— §7  (2)    (c) 


23 


fixed;  but  necessarily  change  with  the 
general  economic  panorana.  No  pre- 
sumption of  law,  therefore,  can  arise 
against  an  advanced  rate  simply  be- 
cause a  lower  rate  previously  existed. 
Memphis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,    17    I.   C.    C.    313,   318. 

(g)  The  fact  that  the  defendants 
found  it  impracticable  to  maintain  an 
increased  rate  did  not  demonstrate  its 
Inherent  unreasonableness.  Pabst  Brew- 
ing Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17 
I.    C.   C.   359,    360. 

§7.     (2)      Increased    Operating    Expenses. 
See    Reasonableness  of   Rates,  §9,  §20 

(g). 

(a)  Where  a  carrier  voluntarily 
changes  its  method  of  gathering  cer- 
tain milk  shipments  in  order  to  expe- 
dite its  service  and  save  itself  expense 
in  handling  other  shipments  of  milk,  it 
cannot  contend  that  its  changed  meth- 
od of  gathering  has  increased  its  cost 
of  service  to  such  an  extent  that  the 
milk  shipments  first  referred  to  should 
pay  an  increased  rate.  In  Re  Advance 
by  the  D.  &  H.  Co.  on  Fluid  Milk,  23 
I.    C.    C.    500,    501,   502. 

(aa)  In  an  investigation  determining 
the  reasonableness  of  an  advanced  rate 
concerning  exhibits  submitted  by  the 
carriers,  it  is  held,  if  the  mean  of 
the  minimum  and  maximum  averages  of 
the  apportioned  items,  charged  to  the 
unallocated  and  unapportionable  items  of 
cost  of  service,  are  in  excess  of  the 
minimum  charge,  that  fact  will  go  far  to- 
ward establishing  the  burden  of  proof 
which  the  statute  casts  upon  the  carriers. 
In  Re  Advances  on  Freight  in  Single 
Packages  and  Small  Lots,  22  I.  C.  C. 
328,  331. 

(b)  The  Commission  held  in  13  I. 
C.  V.  668  that  an  advance  upon  hard- 
v/ood  lumber  from  75c  to  85c  per  100 
lbs.,  from  Chicago  territory  and  points 
west,  to  the  Pacific  coast,  was  unrea- 
sonable and  ordered  the  establishment 
for  two  years  of  the  75c  rate.  Upon 
the  expiration  of  that  order  the  de- 
fendants filed  tariffs  advancing  the  rate 
to  85c,  which  is  involved  in  this  com- 
plaint. The  testimony  upon  the  pres- 
ent hearing  showed  but  two  particulars 
in  which  a  change  of  condition  had  oc- 
curred since  the  promulgation  of  the 
former  order.  It  appeared  that  the 
competition  of  foreign  hardwoods  was 
somewhat  more  forceful  at  the  present 


time  than  formerly  and  that  while  the 
consumption  of  such  lumber  was  con- 
tinually increasing  upon  the  coast  the 
amount  shipped  from  the  east  was 
rather  upon  the  decrease.  Lumber 
manufacturers  insisted  that  the  effect 
of  any  substantial  advance  in  the  pres- 
ent rate  would  be  to  finally  exclude 
eastern  hardwoods  from  the  market  of 
the  Pacific  coast.  The  carriers 
showed  a  substantial  increase  in  oper- 
ating expenses  as  compared  with  two 
years  ago,  due  mainly  to  an  advance 
in  wages.  HELD,  the  wage  increases 
for  the  most  part  have  not  been  long 
enough  in  force  to  determine  their 
exact  effect  upon  the  cost  of  operation, 
but  the  net  returns  to  these  transcon- 
tinental lines  under  old  conditions 
were  exceedingly  liberal  and  it  is  be- 
lieved will  be  ample  under  present 
conditions  without  any  increased  rate; 
that  the  proposed  rate  of  85c  as  ap- 
plied to  hardwood  lumber  and  staves 
and  headings  from  Chicago  territory 
and  west,  being  that  territory  from 
which  the  present  75c  rate  is  in  ef- 
fect, would  be  unjust  and  unreason- 
able. Rate  of  75c  per  100  lbs.  pre- 
scribed. In  Re  Rates  on  Hardwood 
Lumber,   21  I.  C.  C.   397. 

(bb)  Cost  figures  indicate  that  under 
skillful  management  additional  tonnage 
may  be  handled  under  higher  wages 
without  increasing  the  cost  of  the  serv- 
ice. In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — Western 
Case,  20  L   C.  C.  307,  378. 

(c)  It  is  well  understood  that  in  re- 
cent years  there  has  been  a  continu- 
ous advance  in  the  price  of  most  ma- 
terials and  supplies  used  in  construct- 
ing and  operating  a  railroad;  that 
there  has  been  a  constant  tendency  to 
advance  wages,  and  that  all  this  has 
tended  to  increase  the  cost  of  opera- 
tion. Upon  the  other  hand  there  has 
been  a  steady  improvement  in  the 
method  of  handling  freight.  Trains 
are  longer;  cars  are  larger  and  more 
heavily  loaded;  grades  are  easier;  the 
amount  hauled  by  a  given  engine  is 
greater;  the  density  of  traffic  is  much 
greater.  All  this  tends  to  reduce  the 
expense  of  transportation.  These  two 
sets  of  causes  work  in  opposite  di- 
rections and  tend  to  balance  one  an- 
other. It  is  not  certain  what  the  net 
result  has  been  at  any  time  in  the 
past  or  is  to-day.  It  is  not  improb- 
able that  at  the  outset  the  economies 
of  operation  more  than  outweighed  the 


24 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §7    (2)    (d)— §7    (4)    (a) 


increased  cost  of  labor  and  supplies, 
but  that  of  late  the  reverse  has  been 
true.  Commercial  Club,  Salt  Lake 
City  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Rv.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.  218,  222. 

(d)  On  ground  iron  ore  from  Iron 
Ridge  Junction,  Wis.,  to  Denver,  Colo., 
a  rate  of  $9.52  per  gross  ton  was  col- 
lected, which  represented  an  increase  of 
25  per  cent  over  a  rate  in  effect  shortlj' 
before  the  shipment.  Defendants  sought 
to  justify  the  increase  by  the  increased 
cost  of  operation.  The  evidence  showed 
that  from  1899  to  1909,  the  operating  ex- 
penses of  all  railroads  had  increased  1.3.5 
per  cent  compared  with  gross  earnings. 
The  rates  from  Chicago,  which  took  the 
same  rate  on  ground  iron  ore  as  Iron 
Ridge  junction,  to  Denver  on  analogous 
commodities  were,  on  ground  arsenic, 
25c;  paving  cement,  35c;  foundry  facings, 
361/^c;  lime,  32c;  ground  limestone,  32c; 
crude  magnesite,  32i^c,  and  whiting 
34^c.  HELD,  the  advance  in  operating 
expenses  was  not  sufficient  to  justify 
the  increased  rate  collected  which  was 
unreasonable  to  the  extent  it  exceeded 
371/20  per  100  lbs.  Winters  Metallic 
Paint  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  596,  598. 

(dd)  A  slight  increase  in  the  cost  of 
operation  does  not  justify  an  advance  of 
25  per  cent  on  a  low  grade  commodity. 
Winters  Metallic  Paint  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.    P.    Ry.    Co.,    18    I.    C.    C.   596,    598. 

(e)  Where  the  margin  of  profit  to  the 
carrier  on  a  low  grade  commodity  was 
small  to  begin  with  and  the  business  itself 
is  not  so  desirable  now  as  formerly,  the 
enhanced  cost  of  operation  may  properly 
be  offset  by  an  increase  of  the  rate. 
Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  305,  320. 

(f)  An  increase  in  the  cost  of  labor 
and  in  the  price  of  railroad  materials 
and  supplies  does  not  necessarily  imply 
that  there  has  been  a  decrease  in  the  net 
earnings  of  the  carrier  during  the  same 
period.  A  material  growth  in  its  traffic 
and  economies  resulting  from  an  alert 
and  skillful  management,  may  readily 
overcome  the  increase  in  the  cost  of 
labor  and  its  materials  and  thus  leave 
its  net  revenues  unimpaired.  Shippers' 
&  Receivers'  Bureau  of  Newark  v.  N.  Y. 
O.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  264,  265. 

(g)  Everything  else  remaining  the 
same,  an  increase  in  cost  of  operation 
would     justify     an     advance     in     rates. 


Other  things  remaining  the  same,  in- 
crease in  traffic  requires  a  decrease  in 
rates.  It  may,  therefore,  happen  that 
the  increase  of  traffic  will  more  than 
offset  the  increase  in  operating  ex- 
pense. Cattle  Raisers'  Ass'n  of  Texas 
V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co ,  13  I.  C.  C.  418, 
430. 

§7.      (3)      Impairment    of    Credit. 

(a)  It  was  urged  as  a  reason  for  per- 
mitting an  advance  in  freight  rates  in 
Official  Classification  territory  that  the 
increase  was  necessary  to  maintain  the 
credit  of  American  railroads.  It  appeared 
that  in  1895  the  average  rate  of  interest 
paid  by  all  the  railroads  of  the  country 
was  4.69  per  cent.  In  1909  this  figure 
had  been  reduced  to  3.9  per  cent  and  the 
saving  computed  upon  the  indebtedness 
of  1909  represented  by  this  decrease  in 
the  rate  of  interest  would  have  amounted 
to  $77,000,000.  HELD,  the  credit  of 
American  railroads  has  gained  rather 
than  lost  in  ten  years,  and  if  the  credit 
of  American  railways  is  still  sound  either 
at  home  or  in  foreign  money  markets  it 
is  not  because  of,  but  in  spite  of  the 
declarations  of  railroad  operators.  In 
Re  Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20 
I.   C.   C.  243,   251,  252. 

(b)  The  credit  of  American  railroads 
should  be  first  class.  They  should  be 
able  to  borrow  money  at  rates  as  low 
as  the  most  stable  of  the  great  indus- 
tries and  the  most  solvent  of  municipal- 
ities. The  railroad  is  interested  in  get- 
ting its  money  as  cheaply  as  possible 
while  the  stock  and  bond  buyer  is  inter- 
ested in  securing  as  high  a  rate  as 
possible  for  the  money  which  he  invests 
alone.  So  far  as  the  bond  buyer  is  con- 
cerned it  is  evident  that  no  matter  to 
what  elevation  rates  might  be  raised 
it  would  not  increase  by  the  fraction 
of  a  cent  the  interest  which  he  would 
receive.  It  is  not  to  be  imagined  that 
an  increase  in  railroad  revenues  would 
increase  the  rate  of  interest  upon  rail- 
road bonds.  Advances  in  Rates — West- 
ern  Case,   20   I.  C.   C.   307,   331. 

§7.      (4)      Cessation    of    Competition. 

See   Competition. 

(a)  Complainants  shipped  bananas  in 
carloads,  Charleston,  S.  C,  to  Augusta, 
Ga.,  under  a  rate  of  20c  per  100  lbs. 
These  shipments  moved  between  May  4, 
1909,  and  Jan.  9,  1910.  To  May  3,  1909, 
and  since  Feb.  18,  1910,  bananas  moved 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §7   (4)    (b)  — (d) 


under  a  rate  of  15c  per  100  lbs.,  which 
with  the  above  excel  tion  had  been  con 
tinuoiisly  in  effect  for  more  than  9  years. 
The  ]5-cent  rate  was  established  to  meet 
competitive  conditions  on  the  haul  from 
Augusta  to  Savannah,  Ga.,  and  territory 
intermediate  to  Augusta,  Ga.,  and  Co- 
lumbia, S.  C.  HELD,  that  the  long  ex- 
if^tence  and  use  of  a  rate  is  an  important 
fact  tending  to  show  that  it  is  sufficiently 
high  and  properly  requires  the  carriers 
to  explain  or  justify  an  increase  thereof; 
the  evidential  force  of  such  a  showing  is 
weakened  when  the  rate  has  been  es- 
tablished on  account  of  competitive  con- 
ditions which  the  carrier  in  the  exercise 
of  its  discretion  might  lawfully  meet,  but 
which  it  might  not  be  required  to  meet. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Audley  Hill  &  Co. 
v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  225. 

(b)  Prior  to  Aug.  13,  1907,  the  through 
class  rates  of  defendant  from  New  Oi- 
lcans via  Mobile  to  Montgomery,  Selma 
and  Prattville,  Ala.,  were  in  excess  of  the 
combination  of  locals  on  Mobile  and  the 
same  was  true  of  the  through  rates  from 
New  Orleans  to  said  points  via  Pensacola. 
On  Aug.  13.  1907,  defendant  raised  the 
local  rates  from  New  Orleans  to  Mobile 
and  from  Mobile  to  Pensacola  so  as  to 
make  the  combinations  of  locals  equal 
to  the  through  rates  from  New  Orleans 
to  Montgomery,  Selma  and  Prattville, 
but  did  not  disturb  the  local  rates  from 
Mobile  and  Pensacola  to  such  point  or 
the  through  rates  from  New  Orleans  to 
them.  Complainant  shippers  at  New  Or- 
leans attacked  the  increase  and  also  the 
through  rates  to  them  from  New  Orleans 
via  Mobile  and  via  Pensacola.  The  local 
rates  from  New  Orleans  to  JNIobile  and 
Pensacola  had  been  ini  effect  for  many 
years  prior  to  the  increase  and  had  been 
determined  by  water  competition  which 
had  ceased  to  be  practicably  operative. 
New  Orleans  was  engaged  in  shipping 
f^taple  goods  to  Mobile  and  adjacent  ter- 
ritory and  was  keenly  affected  by  the 
rise  in  rates.  The  rates  from  New  Or- 
leans to  Mobile  and  Pensacola  had  been 
in  effect  for  over  twenty  years  and  there 
was  no  evidence  that  they  were  not  com- 
pensatory. They  exceeded  the  rates 
from  New  Orleans  to  other  transporta- 
tion points,  e.g.,  Natchez,  Vicksburg, 
Greenville,  and  Memphis,  where  the  dis- 
tances were  much  greater  and  also  ex- 
ceeded the  rates  from  Nashville,  INIem- 
phis,  Cincinnati  and  Louisville  to  points 
where  the  distances  were  approximately 
the  same.    Prior  to  the  advance  the  rates 


between  New  Orleans  and  Mobile  and 
New  Orleans  and  Pensacola  were  identi- 
cal in  both  directions.  Under  the  ad- 
vance the  rates  were  in  many  cases 
greater  from  New  Orleans  to  Mobile  and 
from  New  Orleans  to  Pensacola  than  the 
rates  between  such  points  in  the  opposite 
direction.  Between  New  Orleans  and 
Memphis,  New  Orleans  and  Greenville, 
New  Orleans  and  Natchez,  and  New  Or- 
leans and  Vicksburg,  the  rates  were  the 
game  in  both  directions.  The  rates  from 
New  Orleans  to  Montgomery,  Selma  and 
Prattville  were  higher  on  all  classes  than 
the  rates  to  them  from  other  points  typi- 
cal of  the  situation  in  the  southeast, 
from  where  the  distances  are  greater, 
e.g.,  Brunswick,  Ga.,  Savannah,  Ga., 
Charleston,  S.  C,  Wilmington,  N.  C,  and 
Nashville,  Tenn.  From  some  of  the  Vir- 
rinia  cities  to  Montgomery  and  Selma 
the  rates  were  less  than  from  New  Or- 
leans to  Montgomery  and  Selma,  al- 
though more  than  twice  the  distance. 
The  rates  per  ton  mile  were  much  greater 
from  New  Orleans  to  Montgomery,  Sel- 
ma and  Prattville  than  they  were  from 
Memphis,  St.  Louis  and  Louisville. 
HELD,  the  increase  in  the  local  rates 
from  New  Orleans  to  Mobile  and  from 
New  Orleans  to  Pensacola  was  unreason- 
able, and  should  not  exceed  those  in  ef- 
fect prior  to  the  advance;  and  that  the 
through  rates  from  New  Orleans  to  Mont- 
gomery, Selma  and  Prattville  were  un- 
reasonable and  should  not  exceed  the 
combination  of  locals  based  on  Mobile 
and  Pensacola  as  such  locals  stood  prior 
to  the  increase  attacked.  New  Orleans 
Board  of  Trade  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
T.  C.  C.  231,  237;  sustained,  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  L  C.  C,  184  Fed.  118;  enjoined, 
195  Fed.  541   (Mack,  J.,  dissenting). 

(c)  Where  former  rates  were  forced 
down  by  competition,  which  competition 
has  since  ceased,  and  the  advanced  rate 
is  not  shown  to  be  unreasonable  per  se, 
it  will  be  sustained.  Schoenhofen  Brew- 
ing Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C. 
C.  329. 

(d)  While  a  carrier  may  establish 
a  lower  rate  to  meet  competitive  con- 
ditions, and  the  Commission  takes  into 
account  such  conditions  in  passing  upon 
the  reasonableness  of  '  the  rate  ad- 
justment, it  does  not  follow  that  in 
a  particular  instance  the  Commission 
will  condemn  an  advance  of  a  rate 
which  was  formerly  maintained  to  meet 
competition  between   different  producing 


26 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §8  (1)    (a)  — (d) 


points.  Florida  Fruit  &  Vegetable  Ass'n 
V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  552, 
558. 

§8.     Presumptions. 

See  Evidence,  IV. 

§8.     (1)     Continuance    of    Prior    Rate. 

See  Evidence,  §68  (a),  (c) ;  Express 
Companies,  §11  (5)  (a),  §22  (a); 
Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §25  (h); 
Voluntary   Rates. 

(a)  Railways  are  authorized  to  es- 
tablish in  the  first  instance  their  trans- 
portation charges  and  the  presumption 
of  right  doing  attaches  to  their  acts 
in  the  establishment  of  those  rates.  No 
presumption  of  law  against  a  particu- 
lar rate  springs  from  the  fact  that  the 
rate  in  question  was  an  advance  over 
some  previous  rate.  The  burden  of 
proof  is  always  upon  the  party  who 
attacks  an  existing  rate.  The  cir- 
cumstance that  the  railway  has  for  a 
series  of  years  maintained  a  lower  rate 
or  a  different  relation  of  rates  is  an 
evidentiary  fact  which  may  be  intro- 
duced and  considered  like  any  other 
fact.  I.  C.  C.  V.  Chicago  G.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
209  U.  S.  108,  119,  28  Sup.  Ct.  493,  52  L. 
ed.  705. 

(aa)  There  is  no  presumption  of 
wrong  arising  from  the  changing  of  a 
rate  by  a  carrier  and  undoubtedly  while 
rates  are  changed  th'e  carrier  making 
the  change  must,  wheoi.  properly  called 
upon,  be  able  to  give  a  good  reason 
therefor;  the  mere  fact  that  a  rate 
has  been  raised  carries  with  it  no  pre- 
sumption that  it  was  not  rightfully 
done.  I.  C.  C.  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  209 
U.  S.  108,  119,  28  Sup.  Ct.  493,  52  L. 
ed.  705. 

(b)  As  the  law  stood  November  26, 
1909,  the  mere  fact  that  rates  were  in- 
creased by  a  railroad  over  what  they 
had  been  previously  created  no  pre- 
sumption that  they  were  not  fair  and 
reasonable.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  I.  C.  C,  195  Fed.  541,  557. 

(bb)  Ordinarily  the  advance  of  a 
rate  for  a  short  period  followed  by  the 
restoration  and  maintenance  of  a  lower 
rate  formerly  in  force,  tends  to  raise 
a  presumption  of  fact  that  the  advanced 
rate  was  unreasonable.  This  rule  may 
be  modified  where  a  special  rate,  not 
compensatory,  is  put  in  in  order  to 
"scalp"  business  on  competitive  traffic. 
Fairmont  Creamery  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R. 
R.   Co.,  22  I.  C.   C.  252,  254. 


(c)  The  circumstance  that  the  de- 
fendants established  and  voluntarily 
maintained  certain  rates  for  twenty-five 
years  is  not  conclusive  evidence  that  they 
were  reasonable,  but  it  is  in  the  nature 
of  an  admission  upon  their  part  to  that 
effect,  which  requires,  when  these  rates 
are  advanced,  some  satisfactory  explana- 
tion. When  it  further  appears  that  a 
rate  voluntarily  maintained  for  a  quarter 
of  a  century  has  within  seven  years  been 
increased  by  one-fourth,  the  reason  by 
which  it  is  sought  to  justify  a  still  fur- 
ther advance  must  be  even  more  cogent. 
This  does  not  conclusively  show  that  the 
carriers  ought  not  to  be  permitted  to  ad- 
vance such  rate  at  the  present  time  nor 

n  the  future,  but  it  is  evidence  which 
bears  strongly  upon  the  propriety  of  a 
present  increase.  U.  S.  Leather  Co.  v. 
So.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  323,  327. 

(cc)  Complainants  attacked  an  in- 
crease in  the  rates  on  leather  from 
southern  tanneries  to  various  northern 
destinations.  Taking  New  York  as  a 
typical  market  the  average  distance 
from  all  points  in  controversy  was  806 
miles,  and  the  average  ton  mile  rate 
11.22  mills.  Some  time  previous  to  1887 
defendant  put  in  effect  a  rate  of  30c 
per  100  lbs.  from  New  York  to  Chatta- 
nooga on  hides  and  the  same  rate  from 
Chattanooga  to  New  York  on  leather. 
On  account  of  these  low  rates  various 
tanneries  were  located  in  the  South. 
In  1903  these  rates  on  leather  were  ad- 
vanced 5c  per  100  lbs.  In  1907  a  sec- 
ond advance  of  3c  was  made.  In  the 
fall  of  1910  another  advance  of  2c  was 
made,  which  is  involved  in  the  present 
proceeding.  HELD,  that  from  a  trans- 
portation standDoint  leather  is  desir- 
able freight.  That  the  burden  rests 
upon  the  carriers  of  justifying  the  ad- 
vance, and  while  the  fact  they  estab- 
lished and  voluntarily  maintained  these 
rates  for  25  years  is  not  conclusive  evi- 
dence that  they  were  reasonable,  it  is 
in  the  nature  of  an  admission  which 
requires  when  those  rates  are  advanced 
some  satisfactory  explanation.  This 
not  having  been  offered,  the  advanced 
rates  are  held  unreasonaljle  and  defend- 
ants required  to  maintain  in  effect  their 
former  rates.  Leave  given  complainant 
to  file  supplemental  complaint  for  repa- 
ration. United  States  Leather  Co.  v. 
Southern   Ry.  Co.,   21  I.   C.  C.   323. 

(d)  The  long  continuance  of  a  rate 
voluntarily     established     and     not     pub- 


ADVANCED  RATES,>§8  (1)    (dd)  — (h) 


27 


lished  under  the  compelling  influence 
of  competitive  conditions  is  in  itself 
evidence  of  no  little  weight  of  its  rea- 
sonableness, but  the  long  continuance 
of  a  rate  largely  loses  its  value  as 
evidence  in  a  case  involving  an  ad- 
vanced rate  for  the  same  service,  when 
it  is  shown  that  the  prior  and  lower 
rate  was  the  result  of  the  influence 
of  a  strong  movement  by  water.  Com- 
mercial Club  of  Omaha  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
20    I.    C.    C.    631,    636. 

(dd)  An  advance  in  a  long-established 
•rate  at  once  suggests  the  propriety  of 
an  inquiry  of  the  carrier  for  a  state- 
ment of  its  reasons  for  making  the 
advance.  But  in  making  its  explana- 
tion the  carrier  is  not  under  the  neces- 
sity of  overcoming  the  technical  weight 
and  force  of  a  presumption  of  law  that 
the  previously  existing  lower  rate  was  a 
reasonable  rate.  The  long  continuance  of 
a  lower  rate  may  be  said  to  raise  a  pre- 
sumption of  fact  that  the  advanced  rate 
is  unreasonable.  But  this  in  a  sense  is  no 
presumption  at  ftll,  for  it  cannot  carry  be- 
yond the  actual  tendency  of  the  fact  itself 
to  produce  that  belief  in  the  mind  of  the 
investigator.  The  fact  that  the  lower 
rate  has  long  remained  undisturbed 
has  strong  probative  value.  Consid- 
ered merely  as  evidence,  such  a  rate 
history,  in  the  absence  of  some  ex- 
planation that  satisfies  the  judgment  of 
the  propriety  and  need  of  an  increase 
in  rates,  would  ordinarily  have  great 
force.  But  in  every  case  the  Commis- 
sion must  consider  and  weigh  all  the 
other  facts  of  record  before  arriving  at 
the  conclusion  that  the  increase  in 
rates  was  unreasonable.  Memphis  Cot- 
ton Oil  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.    313,   318. 

(e  Where  carriers  voluntarily  main- 
tain a  rate  between  certain  points  for 
a  long  period  of  time  the  presumption 
is  that  such  rate  is  reasonable,  and 
where  a  long  established  rate  is  raised 
for  a  short  period  and  then  voluntarily 
reduced  to  the  former  point  the  pre- 
sumption is  that  the  advanced  rate  is  un- 
reasonable, but  this  presumption  may  be 
overcome  by  proof  to  the  contrary.  Sun- 
derland Brothers  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co., 
16  1.  C.  C.  450,  451. 

(ee)  An  advanced  -rate  in  the  absence 
of  good  showing  by  the  carriers  tend- 
ing to  justify  the  advance  will  be  pre- 
sumed to  be  unreasonable.  Sunder- 
land Bros.  Co.  V.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.   450,  451. 


(f)  Where  a  complainant  in  attacking 
1   rate   as   unreasonable   offers   evidence 

0  show  that  other  carriers  in  the  same 
reneral  territory  are  carrying  the  same 
commodity     for     longer      distances     at 

ower  rates  than  defendant  and  that 
or  many  years  defendant  itself  volun- 
arily  accepted  a  substantially  lower 
rate  for  the  same  service,  the  burden 
)f  justifying  the  higher  rate  com- 
lained  of  devolves  upon  the  defendant 
arrier.  Shippers'  &  Receivers'  Bu- 
•eau  of  Newark  v.  N.  Y.  O.  &  W.  Ry. 
::o.,  15  I.  C.  C.  264,  265. 

(g)  Complainant  attacked  the  prac- 
ice  of  defendants  in  applying  the  4th 
lass,  C.  L.,  and  third  class,  L.  C.  L., 
ardware  rate  to  castings,  japanned,  in 
)fflcial  Classification  territory,  whereas 
castings  took  fifth  class,  C.  L.,  and  fourth 

lass,  L.  C.  L.  The  process  of  japan- 
ling  consists  in  dipping  the  casting  into 

1  black  solution  made  from  asphaltum, 
vhich   gives    an   outside   surface   to   pre- 

ent  rusting,  but  does  not  enhance  the 
value  except  to  the  extent  of  the  actual 
ost  of  japanning,  namely,  l-5c  per  lb. 
Prior  to  the  passage  of  the  Amended 
Act  in  1906,  the  defendants  did  not 
enforce  the  rates  attacked  but  applied 
^fth  class  rates  on  carloads  and  fourth 
class  rates  on  less  than  carloads. 
Under  Southern  and  Western  Classi- 
fications, japanned  castings  took  the  same 
rates  as  castings.  Defendants  applied 
fifth  c'ass  rates  to  washing  machine 
md  sewing  machine  castings,  japanned, 
n  carloads.  The  rates  complained  of 
-esulted  in  increasing  the  cost  of  japan 
astings  to  various  destinations  from 
$9  to  $10.80  per  car.  Defendants  con- 
tended that  they  applied  the. rate  com- 
plained of  on  account  of  the  imprac- 
ticability of  distinguishing  castings  and 
'lardware.  HELD,  the  fifth  and  fourth 
2lass  rates  having  formerly  been  ap- 
plied during  a  long  period  and  the  in- 
crease having  resulted  from  a  rule 
nade  merely  for  the  convenience  of 
he  carriers  and  based  on  no  sound 
transportation  reason,  the  rates  at- 
tacked were  unreasonable  to  the  ex- 
ent  they  exceeded  fifth  class,  C.  L.,  and 
'ourth  class,  L.  C.  L..  Indianapolis 
^'reight  Bureau  v.  C,  C,  C.  &  St.  L. 
Ry.    Co.,    15    I.    C.    C.    504,    529. 

(h)  Where  an  advance  is  made  in 
rates  long  maintained  and  the  evidence 
shows  that  the  trafllc  affected  is 
large,  important  and  constantly  increas- 
ing,   the    advance    will    be    held    unjust 


28 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §8   (1)    (i)  — (ii) 


unless  it  is  satisfactorily  explained. 
Pacific  Coast  Lumber  Mfrs.  Assn.  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  23,  38. 

(i)  Complainants  were  manufacturers 
and  shippers  of  common  lumber,  cedar, 
fir,  hemlock,  larch,  pine,  spruce  and 
shingles  from  points  in  Washington,  Ore- 
gon, Idaho,  Montana  and  British  Colum- 
bia, which  points  were  grouped  into  thi 
"Coast,"  "Spokane"  and  "Montana-Ore- 
gon" rate  groups,  to  points  in  -other  states 
and  territories.  The  increase  in  rates 
attacked  went  into  effect  Nov.  1,  1907. 
From  20,000  lbs.  in  1904,  the  minimum 
on  lumber  had  been  gradually  increased 
until  it  averaged  58,000  lbs.  per  car  in 
1906,  and  as  a  result  the  earnings  per  car 
under  the  latter  minimum  were  consider- 
ably greater  than  in  former  years.  Lum- 
ber from  the  points  of  origin  in  question 
was  sold  in  competition  with  yellow  pine 
originating  in  the  south.'  The  rates  on 
the  commodities  in  question  produced 
greater  per  ton  mile  revenue  than  those 
on  yellow  pine  shipped  from  the  south. 
The  cost  of  construction  and  operation 
of  defendants'  lines,  over  which  this 
western  lumber  moved,  was,  however, 
greater  than  that  of  the  lines  leading 
from  the  south  to  Chicago  and  other 
competitive  points  in  that  region.  The 
rates  in  effect  prior  to  the  advance  were 
established  by  the  defendants  when  the 
empty  car  movement  was  predominat- 
ingly eastward,  whereas,  at  the  time  of 
the  advance,  the  movement  had  become 
predominatingly  westward.  This  result 
was  not,  however,  wholly  due  to  the  in- 
crease in  the  lumber  traffic,  but  in  part 
to  the  increase  in  the  volume  of  other 
commodities  shipped  from  the  west. 
Aside  from  cedar  there  was  but  little 
difference  in  the  selling  prices  of  the 
forest  products  from  the  northwest  and 
from  the  south.  Under  the  rates  pre- 
viously in  effect,  an  enormous  amount 
of  capital  was  invested  in  lumber  produc- 
ing plants  at  the  points  of  origin  in  ques- 
tion, which  were  solely  dependent  upon 
transportation  afforded  by  defendants. 
The  increase  in  rates  attacked  contrib- 
uted toward  the  depression  in  the  busi- 
ness which  immediatedly  followed.  Un- 
der the  old  rates  defendants  prospered 
on  their  general  earnings  derived  from 
all  commodities  and  had  expended  large 
sums  in  permanent  improvements,  which 
sums  were  charged  to  operating  expenses 
and  deducted  from  their  earnings  to  ar- 
rive at  their  net  incomes.     A  large  pro 


portion  of  their  revenues  had  been  de- 
rived from  the  lumber  traffic,  showing 
that  under  the  old  rates  the  transporta- 
tion of  lumber  was  profitable.  HELD, 
in  connection  with  the  decisions  in  Ore. 
&  Wash.  Lumber  Mfrs.  Assn.  v.  U.  P. 
R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  1,  the  rates  at- 
tacked from  the  points  of  origin  in  ques- 
tion to  all  points  in  the  territory  on  and 
west  of  a  line  running  through  and  in- 
cluding Pembina  and  Grand  Forks,  N.  D.. 
Moorehead  and  Breckenridge.  Minn., 
Sioux  City  and  Council  Bluffs,  St.  Joseph 
and  Kansas  City,  and  thence  to  Port 
Arthur,  Tex.,  along  the  K.  C.  S.  Ry.,  in- 
cluding all  points  that  took  the  same 
rates  as  any  of  the  points  located  on  said 
line  between  and  including  Sioux  City 
and  Kansas  City,  were  unreasonable  to 
the  extent  that  they  exceeded  the  rates 
in  effect  prior  to  Nov.  1,  1907;  that  the 
rates  attacked  from  said  points  of  origia 
to  points  in  territory  east  of  the  terri- 
tory above  described  and  excluding  all 
points  that  took  the  same  rates  as  any 
of  the  points  located  on  the  line  between 
nnd  including  Sioux  City  and  Kansas 
City,  were  unreasonable  and  unjust  to 
the  extent  that  they  exceeded  5c  per  100 
lbs.  above  the  rates  in  effect  prior  to 
Nov.  1,  1907;  that  rates  to  points  in 
Minnesota,  east  of  the  line  mentioned, 
should  be  graded  up  from  that  line  so 
as  to  reach  the  maximum  increase  at 
Minneapolis,  St  Paul,  Minnesota  Trans- 
fer and  Duluth;  that  the  rates  from 
Missouri  River  crossings  should  be 
2;raded  up  and  the  maximum  increase  of 
^c  be  reached  at  the  Mississippi  River; 
that  Chicago  rates  should  apply  to  all 
points  between  the  Mississippi  River 
crossings.  East  Dubuque  to  East  St. 
Louis,  inclusive,  and  Chicago;  and  that 
the  rates  to  St.  Louis  and  points  taking 
the  ?ame  rates  should  not  exceed  the 
rates  to  Chicago.  Reparation  awarded 
on  the  basis  of  the  newly  prescribed 
ates  except  where  said  rates  were  lower 
than  those  in  effect  prior  to  Nov.  1,  1907. 
(Knapp  &  Harlan,  Comm'rs,  dissenting.) 
Pacific  Coast  Lumber  Mfrs.  Assn.  v.  N. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  23,  39.  Rehearing 
denied,  16  I.  C.  C.  465;  decision  sustained, 
L  C.  C.  V.  U.  P.  R.  R.,  222  U.  S.  541,  32 
Sup.  Ct.  108,  56  L.  ed  308. 

(ii)  Where  a  rate  has  been  estab- 
lislied  and  maintained  for  a  considerable 
period  for  the  purpose  of  developing  a 
particular  industry  and  with  full  knowl- 
edge that  the  industry  could  not  be  de- 
veloped without  it,  and  where,  under  the 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §8   (1)    (j)— §8   (2)    (b) 


29 


influence  of  such  rate,  large  amounts 
of  money  have  been  invested  in  prop- 
erty the  value  of  which  must  be  seri- 
ously impaired  by  an  advance  of  the 
rate,  that  fact  is  an  important  consider- 

I  ation  in  passing  upon  the  reasonable- 
ness of  such  advance.  Western  Oregon 
Lumber  Mfrs.  Assn.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 

:  •  C.  61. 

(j)     A     past     rate     is     no     estoppel 

against    an    advance.      Western    Oregon 

I     Lumber  Mfrs.  Assn.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 

C.  61,  72. 

(jj)     While    no    presumption    of    law 
j     against    a    particular    rate    springs    from 
I     the  fact  that  the  rate  in  question  is  an 
;     advance    over    some    previous    rate,    and 
the  burden  of  proof  is  always  upon  the 
party    attacking    an    existing    rate,    still 
the  circumstance  that  a  railway  has  for 
a    series    of    years    maintained    a    lower 
rate  or  a  different  relation  of  rates  is  an 
evidentiary  fact  and  is  in  the  nature  of 
an  admission  upon  the  part  of  the  rail- 
way that  the  rate  maintained  was  at  the 
time  a  just  and  reasonable  one.     Banner 
Milling  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  L  C.  C.  398,  408. 

(k)  Even  though  a  rate  experimented 
with  and  kept  in  effect  for  a  substantial 
period  of  time  be  held  to  establish  the 
presumption  that  it  is  remunerative,  it 
cannot  be  held  to  prevent  the  establish- 
ment of  a  different  rate  if  it  be  found 
that  a  different  rate  is  reasonable  and 
proper.  Hartville  Celery  Growers'  Ass'n 
V.  Pac.  Ex.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  590,  593. 

(1)  Where  a  railroad  company  makes 
and  maintains  for  a  long  time  a  rate  for 
the  transportation  of  a  certain  com- 
modity, such  rate  is  presumed  to  be  re- 
munerative. If  it  is  increased,  the 
presumption  is  that  the  increase  is  un- 
reasonable. Detroit  Chemical  Works  v. 
N.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  357,  362. 

(m)  Complainant,  manufacturer  of  sul- 
phuric acid  at  Detroit,  attacked  the  rate 
of  $2.72  per  ton  on  iron  pyrites  from 
Baltimore  to  Detroit,  as  compared  with 
the  rates  accorded  to  competitors  at  Chi- 
cago, St.  Louis  and  Cincinnati,  Prior 
to  the  date  of  advance,  Jan.  1,  1907, 
the  rate  to  Detroit  had  been  $1.74  ex- 
cept for  the  years  1903  and  1906.  when 
it  was  $1.56  and  $2.68,  respectively. 
Prior  to  the  advance,  the  rate  to  Detroit 
averaged  44c  a  ton  less  than  to  Chicago, 
whereas,  under  the  rate  attacked,  it  av- 
eraged only  lie  less.    Over  the  short-line 


distance  from  Baltimore  to  Detroit,  the 
rate  attacked  yielded  4.19  mills  per  ton 
mile,  and  by  the  longer  route  over  which 
the  complainants'  shipments  moved,  3.84 
mills.  Since  the  date  of  the  hearing,  de- 
fendants established  rates  from  Baltimore 
to  Detroit,  Cincinnati,  St.  Louis  and  Chi- 
cago of  $2.21,  $2.53,  $2.86,  and  $3.00, 
respectively.  HELD,  that  while  the 
rate  attacked  yielded  a  low  revenue,  stilj 
the  defendant  having  long  maintained 
the  rates  previously  in  effect  and  com- 
plainant's sale  contracts  and  competitive 
relations  having  been  established  on  the 
basis  of  former  rates,  the  rate  attacked 
was  unreasonable  and  unjust  to  the  ex- 
tent that  it  exceeded  $2.21.  Reparation 
awarded.  Detroit  Chemical  Works  v.  N. 
C.  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  357,  362. 

(n)  Where  a  rate  is  voluntarily  estab- 
lished and  maintained  for  a  considerable 
period,  this  fact,  although  not  conclu- 
sive, is  strong  evidence  of  the  reason- 
ahleness  of  the  rate.  The  force  of  this 
presumption  is  greatly  weakened  and 
may  be  altogether  destroyed  by  the  cir- 
cumstances under  which  the  rate  was 
established  and  maintained;  but  if  no 
particular  reason  is  shown  for  the  putting 
in  of  the  rate,  if  no  commercial  or  com- 
petitive condition  prevents  the  main- 
tenance of  a  higher  rate,  if  the  main- 
tenance of  this  rate  has  been  voluntary 
upon  the  part  of  the  carrier,  the  Jorce 
of  the  admission  becomes  exceedingly 
strong.  Burgess  v.  Transcontinental 
Freight  Bureau,  13  L  C.  C.  668,  677. 

§8.     (2)     Temporary    Reduction. 
See  Evidence,  §64  (dd),   (ee). 

(a)  Ordinarily  the  advance  of  a  rate 
for  a  short  period  followed  by  the 
restoration  and  maintenance  of  a  lower 
rate  formerly  in  force  tends  to  raise  a 
presumption  of  fact  that  the  advanced 
rate  was  unreasonable.  This  rule  may 
be  modified  where  a  special  rate,  not 
compensatory,  is  put  in  in  order  to 
"scalp"  business  on  competitive  traffic. 
Fairmont  Creamery  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q. 
R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  252. 

(b)  Complainants  sought  the  suspen- 
sion of  a  new  tariff  of  the  Atlantic  Coast 
Line  providing  increased  rates  on  vehi- 
cles from  Suffolk,  Va.,  to  North  and 
South  Carolina  points.  The  proposed 
tariff  restored  class  rates  in  effect  prior 
to  June,  1910,  the  present  rate  being 
about  10c  lower,.  One  complainant 
was  organized  before  1910,  and  an- 
other since  1910.     The  former  flourished 


30 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §9   (a)— §10   (c) 


under  the  higher  rate.  The  latter  chose 
a  site  on  defendant's  line  because  of  the 
lower  rate,  and  defendant  was  the  only 
one  of  four  carriers  that  reduced  the 
former  rate.  Other  roads  yielded  com 
petitive  traffic  to  the  defendant.  Com 
peting  points  in  North  Carolina  have 
rates  equal  to  the  class  rates,  and  Frank- 
lin, Va.,  has  the  same  class  rates.  Suffolk 
factories  enjoy  an  advantage  on  inhounc 
'rates  on  buggy  parts.  It  appeared  that 
the  lower  scale  of  rates  was  prepared 
under  a  mistake.  HELD,  the  proposed 
tariff  is  justified  considered  solely  fron^^ 
the  point  of  view  of  the  local  situation 
but  does  not  preclude  the  Commissioi 
from  an  investigation  of  vehicle  rates  in 
this  section  in  general.  In  Re  Advances 
on  Vehicles,  22  I.  C.  C.  124,  127. 

§9.     Concerted     Action. 
See    Infra,    §16. 

(a)  The  Commission  has  uniformly 
held  that  it  has  no  powers  in  the  en- 
forcement of  the  Sherman  Act,  so  that 
even  if  rates  are  advanced  by  agreement 
of  carriers  parties  to  a  tariff  association, 
that  fact  does  not  furnish  a  foundation 
upon  which  the  Commission  may  base  a 
finding  that  they  are  unlawful  under  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act.  Railroad  Com- 
mission of  Texas  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.. 
20  I.e.  C.  463,  4G5. 

(aaj  No  presumption  of  unreasonable- 
ness arises  from  the  theory  that  ad- 
vanced rates  were  established  as  a 
result  of  agreement  between  carriers. 
Railroad  Commission  of  Tex.  v.  A.  T. 
&   S.  F.   Ry.   Co.,  20  I.   C.  C.  463,   465. 

(b)  Although  the  primary  considera- 
tion is  the  reasonableness  of  the  rates 
involved,  through  whatever  agency  es- 
tablished, the  practical  unification  of  car 
riers  in  increasing  their  rates  may  and 
should  properly  be  taken  into  account  in 
determining  whether  an  increase  is  in 
fact  justified  or  is  simply  the  result  of 
a  concerted  effort  to  increase  rates. 
Kiser  Co.  v.  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
430,  440. 

(c)  The  fact  that  carriers  conferred 
in  making  an  advance  of  rates  does  not 
of  itself  necessarily  establish  the  unrea- 
sonableness of  the  rates  resulting  in  part 
from  such  conference.  Chicago  Lumbei 
&  Coal  Co.  V.  T.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  IG  I.  C.  C. 
323,   332. 


§10.     Economy  of   Management. 

See   Reasonableness  of   Rates,  §12. 

(a)  No  general  advance  in  rates  should 
be  permitted  until  carriers  have  ex- 
hausted every  reasonable  effort  toward 
economy  in  their  business.  The  induce- 
ment to  adopt  methods  of  this  kind  which 
necessity  creates  in  private  occupations 
does  not  exist  to  the  same  extent  in 
railroad  operations.  The  Commission 
cannot  escape  the  impression  that  rail- 
road operators  have  not  given  to  this 
important  subject  the  attention  which  it 
deserves.  An  examination  of  the  statis- 
tics before  the  Commission  in  this  case 
shows  the  widest  divergence  in  the  cost 
of  doing  the  same  thing  upon  different 
railroads.  It  appears,  for  example,  that 
the  cost  of  maintaining  locomotives,  per 
train  mile  for  the  year  1910,  was  9.22 
cents  upon  the  B.  &  O.  R.  R.,  as  com- 
pared with  6.15  cents  upon  the  B.  &  M. 
R.  R.  It' is  impossible  to  resist  the  con- 
viction that  railroads  have  not  in  the 
past  given  suflScient  attention  to  these 
details,  and  in  the  future  they  must  be 
prepared  to  explain  these  apparent  dif- 
ferences in  their  operating  costs,  and  to 
show  reasonable  diligence.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C,  C. 
243,  279. 

(b)  Before  any  general  advance  in 
rates  in  OflEicial  Classification  territory 
can  be  permitted  it  must  appear  with 
reasonable  'certainty  that  carriers  have 
exercised  proper  economy  in  tbe  purchase 
of  their  supplies,  in  the  ])ayment  of  their 
wages,  and  in  the  general  conduct  of  their 
business.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — 
Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  305. 

(c)  A  premium  must  be  put  upon 
eflaciency  in  the  operation  of  American 
railroads.  Rates  cannot  be  increased 
with  each  new  demand  of  labor  or 
because  of  wasteful,  corrupt  or  indif- 
ferent management.  Nor  should  rates 
be  reduced  with  each  succeeding  im- 
provement in  method.  Society  should 
not  take  from  the  wisely  managed  rail- 
road the  benefits  which  flow  from  the 
foresight,  skill  and  planned  co-operation 
of  its  working  force.  We  may  ruin 
our  railroads  by  permitting  them  to  im- 
pose each  new  burden  of  obligation 
upon  the  shipper.  And  we  can  make  no 
less  sure  of  their  economic  destruction 
by  takings  from  them  what  is  theirs 
by  right  of  efficiency  of  operation — the 
elimination  of  false  motion,  of  unneeded 
effort  and  the  conservation  of  labor  and 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §11   (a)— §13   (b) 


31 


material.  The  standard  of  rates  must 
be  so  high  that  the  needed  carrier 
which  serves  its  public  with  honest 
and  reasonable  effort  may  live.  And 
yet  rates  should  be  still  so  much  be- 
low the  possible  maximum  as  to  give 
high  and  exceptional  reward  to  the  espe 
cially  capable  management,  the  well  co 
ordinated  force  and  plant.  Advances  ir. 
Rates— Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307, 
334. 

§11.  Scientific  IVIanagement. 
See  Evidence,  §17  (h). 
(a)  In  combating  a  general  advance 
in  rates  in  Official  Classification  territory 
th€  shippers  contended  that  by  the  use 
of  "scientific  management"  $300,000,000 
annually  could  be  saved  by  the  proper 
application  of  these  methods  to  the  busi- 
ness of  railroading  in  the  United  States 
The  witness  who  testified  to  ^is  stated 
that  they  were  not  in  actual  operation 
in  over  one-tenth  of  1  per  cent  of  all  the 
manufacturing  establishments  in  this 
country.  HELD,  the  system  is  every 
where  in  an  experimental  stage  and  the 
Commission  cannot  find  that  the  defend- 
ants could  make  good  any  part  of  their 
actual  advances  in  wages  by  the  intro 
duction  of  scientific  management.  In  Re 
Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20 
I.  C.  C.  243,  279. 

§12.     Branch     Lines. 

§12.     (1)     Operation. 

(a)  If  the  branch  lines  of  a  railroad 
are  judiciously  planned  and  constructed 
they  should  certainly  be  taken  into  ac- 
count in  determining  the  value  of  the 
railroad,  for,  although  they  may  not  earn 
a  large  return  upon  the  cost,  considered 
as  an  independent  proposition,  they  do 
add  to  the  traffic  and  the  earning  power 
of  the  entire  system;  but  it  must  be 
assumed  that  the  new  branches  which 
have  been  constructed  are  good  invest- 
ments, otherwise  they  would  not  have 
been  built,  and  that  they  will  add  to 
the  earnings  of  the  property  in  propor- 
tion as  they  have  added  to  its  cost.  No 
Increase  in  rate  should  be  called  for  on 
this  account.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  162,  171. 

§12.     (2)     Purchase. 

See  Evidence,  §37;  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,    §15. 

(a)  If  the  New  York  Central  Co.  has 
exercised  poor  judgment  in  the  taking  on 


of  subsidiary  properties  at  the  rentals 
which  are  paid,  this  ought  not  to  per- 
manently impose  upon  the  shipping  pub- 
lic an  extravagant  rate  if  the  leases  are 
unprofitable.  The  Commission  should 
indulge  every  reasonable  presumption  in 
favor  of  the  good  faith  and  the  good 
judgment  of*  those  who  put  together  these 
properties,  but  certainly  in  the  final 
analysis  it  cannot  Impose  upon  the  com- 
munity served  by  this  system  an  unrea- 
sonable rate  forever,  simply  because  the 
managers  of  this  property  at  some  time 
in  the  past  agreed  to  pay  more  for  the 
use  of  a  railroad  than  it  was  or  is  ac- 
tually worth.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — 
Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  300. 

§13.     Detriment  to   Shipper. 

(a)  That  advances  made  in  rates 
would  be  severely  felt  by  certain  ship- 
pers is  not  sufficient  reason  for  holding 
that  such  advances  were  not  what  they 
ought  to  be.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  I. 
C.    C,    195    Fed.    541,    560. 

(aa)  Defendants  advanced  the  less- 
than-carload  rate  on  candles  from  Helena, 
Mont.,  to  points  in  the  Coeur  d'Alene  dis- 
trict about  20c  per  100  lbs.,  raising  the 
former  rates  of  about  55c.  No  evidence 
was  offered  to  show  that  the  cost  of  the 
service  had  increased  or  that  the  carriage 
of  this  particular  article  was  not  profit- 
able. These  rates  had  been  in  effect  for 
a  period  of  years.  Complainant  estab- 
lished a  business  under  them  and  has  no 
means  of  reaching  the  market  other  than 
via  defendants'  line.  HELD,  defendants 
have  not  sustained  the  burden  placed 
upon  them  by  the  statute  to  show  that 
the  new  rates  are  just  and  reasonable; 
and  they  should  establish  for  the  future 
rates  not  in  excess  of  those  in  effect 
previous  to  the  advance  in  question. 
Reparation  awarded.  Perry  &  Co.  v.  N. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  247. 

(b)  Complainant  contended  that  the 
rates  on  shipments  of  evaporated  milk 
in  less-than-carload  lots  in  Central  Freight 
Association  territory  was  unreasonable. 
In  1909,  on  the  showing  that  certain  spe- 
cial rates  on  condensed  milk  were  being 
made  in  trunk  line  territory,  the  defend- 
ants named  a  rate  on  less-than-carload 
shipments  of  20  per  cent  less  than  third 
class.  In  June,  1911,  upon  the  carriers 
in  trunk  line  territory  withdrawing  their 
special  rates,  defendants  restored  the 
third  class  rates.  The  evidence  disclosed 
that  complainant's  profit  is  small;   that 


32 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §13   (c)  — (e) 


its  product  is  put  up  in  cans,  and  is 
shipped  in  boxes  that  are  strong,  compact 
and  easily  handled;  that  canned  peas 
which  weigh  more  by  the  case  and  sell 
for  less  than  evaporated  milk,  take  20 
per  cent  less  than  third  class  rating.  The 
advanced  rates  were  more  than  on  other 
similar  articles.  The  Act  of  June  18, 
1910,  provides  that  "the  burden  of  proof 
to  show  that  the  increased  rate  is 
just  and  reasonable  shall  be  upon  the 
common  carrier."  HELD,  the  present 
rates  on  evaporated  milk  in  less-than- 
carloads  are  unreasonable,  and  rates 
should  be  established  for  the  future  not 
higher  than  those  in  effect  prior  to  June 
1,  1911.  Whiteland  Canning  Co.  v.  P.  C. 
C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  261,  263; 
rehearing  denied,  23  I.  C.  C.  92. 

(c)  On  Sept.  13,  1910,  the  S.  P.  Co. 
filed  with  the  Commission  its  tariffs  ad- 
vancing the  rates  on  rough  green  fir 
lumber  and  lath  from  points  in  the 
Willamette  Valley  to  San  Francisco  and 
bay  points  to  $5  per  ton.  In  a  former 
proceeding,  14  I.  C.  C.  61,  the  Commis- 
sion had  reduced  these  rates  to  $3.40  per 
ton  from  points  upon  the  main  line  of 
the  Southern  Pacific,  east  of  the  Willa- 
mette River,  and  $3.65  per  net  ton  on 
points  upon  its  line  west  of  the  river,  and 
it  was  upon  the  expiration  of  its  order 
that  the  proposed  advance  was  made. 
On  the  average  haul  from  the  points  to 
which  it  applied  the  $3.40  rate  produced 
a  rate  per  ton  mile  of  5.48  mills.  HELD, 
that  the  rough  green  lumber  cannot  move 
from  the  mills  of  complainants  to  market 
unless  it  receives  a  rate  lower  than  $5 
per  ton,  and  that  this  rate  in  so  far  as  it 
applies  to  rough  green  fir  lumber  and 
lath  is  unjust  and  unreasonable  to  the 
extent  that  it  exceeds  $3.50  per  net  ton 
of  2,000  lbs.  from  points  upon  the  line  of 
the  defendant  east  of  the  Willamette 
River,  except  from  the  Wendling  branch 
so-called,  and  that  rates  from  the  Wend 
ling  branch  and  from  stations  upon  the 
west  bank  of  the  Willamette  River  should 
not  exceed  $3.75  per  net  ton.  This  rate 
does  not  apply  to  Portland  mills,  which 
are  further  distant  and  where  conditions 
are  dissimilar.  Oregon  &  Washington 
Lumber  Mfrs.  Ass'n  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  L  C. 
C.  389. 

(d)  The  Commission  has  never  under- 
stood that  it  could  dictate  the  policy  of  a 
carrier  in  the  making  of  its  rates  in  so 
far  as  there  was  just  room  for  the  exer- 
cise of  a  policy.    It  has  several  times  ex- 


plicitly so  declared.  It  has,  however,  be- 
lieved that  it  might  consider  what  the 
policy  of  a  carrier  had  been  in  deter- 
mining whether  the  rates  resulting  from 
a  change  in  that  policy  were  just  and 
reasonable.  It  often  happens  that  the 
very  existence  of  an  industry  depends 
upon  the  rate  accorded  to  it.  If,  now, 
a  carrier  has  established  a  particular 
rate  for  the  express  purpose  of  enabling 
an  industry  to  exist,  and  if  upon  the 
strength  of  that  rate  money  has  been 
Invested  which  must  be  destroyed  if  the 
rate  is  withdrawn,  this  fact  might  prop- 
erly be  considered  in  passing  upon  the 
reasonableness  of  the  proposed  change 
in  the  rate.  Such  fact  is  not  controlling 
but  is  one  of  the  circumstances  which 
may  properly  be  kept  in  view.  The  Com- 
mission might  in  a  proper  case  order  the 
continued  maintenance  of  a  rate  upon 
which  the*  investment  of  money  had  been 
induced,  even  though  it  would  not  in  the 
first  instance  as  an  original  proposition 
have  directed  the  establishment  of  that 
rate.  Oregon  &  Washington  Lumber 
Mfrs.  Ass'n  v.  S.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
389.  394. 

(e)  Defendants  attempted  to  increase  the 
rates  on  cream  and  condensed  milk  from 
points  in  Ohio  and  Indiana  east  to  Pitts- 
burgh 50  per  cent,  making  the  rate  45c 
on  ten-gallon  cans  for  distances  from  55 
to  150  miles.  Under  the  tariffs  in  force 
raw  milk,  cream  and  condensed  milk  were 
classified  the  same  and  took  a  rate  of 
30c  on  this  sized  can  for  this  haul.  The 
rate  on  raw  milk  was  not  advanced.  The 
development  of  centralizers  throughout 
Ohio  and  Indiana  has  taken  place  within 
the  past  five  years.  There  was  no  special 
train  service  to  Pittsburgh  except  that 
via  the  L.  S.  R.  R.  and  P.  &  Lake  Erie  R.R. 
The  latter  carrier  operated  daily  an  emptj'- 
can  special  from  Pittsburgh  to  Youngs- 
town,  O.,  at  which  point  a  Lake  Shore 
engine  received  the  cars  and  continued  to 
Dorset,  O.,  and  vicinity.  Upon  return  of  the 
loaded  train  to  Youngstown  the  cars  were 
placed  in  a  regular  passenger  train  of 
the  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  for  Pittsburgh.  The 
chief  justification  advanced  by  the  car- 
riers is  the  greater  value  of  cream  and 
condensed  milk  compared  with  raw  milk, 
and  the  development  of  the  cream  and 
condensed  milk  traffic.  HELD,  although 
general  reference  is  made  to  the  alleged 
increased  cost  of  transportation  of  all 
commodities  in  recent  years  and  to  the 
gradual   development   of   the    cream    and 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §13  (f)  — (k) 


condensed  milk  business  to  a  point  where 
an  advance  is  justified,  aside  from  the 
special  train  service  of  the  Ij.  S.  and  P. 
&  L.  E.  R.  Rs.  to  Pittsburgh,  the  defend 
ant  carriers  have  presented  practically 
no  specific  evidence  or  data  bearing  upon 
the  conditions  surrounding  the  trans- 
portation of  cream  and  condensed  milk 
throughout  the  territory  affected  during 
the  period  of  the  present  rates,  and  the 
operation  of  this  train,  considered  both 
with  reference  to  its  character  and  earn- 
ings, does  not  justify  in  itself  the  pro- 
posed increase  to  Pittsburgh.  As  to  the 
centralizers,  the  lack  of  supporting  evi- 
dence is  even  more  marked,  the  carriers 
in  effect  admitting  that  these  tariffs,  in- 
tended primarily  for  Pittsburgh,  were  not 
considered  in  their  effect  upon  these 
shippers.  The  present  relation  of  these 
rates  has  been  maintained  throughout 
this  territory  for  nearly  30  years,  busi- 
ness has  adjusted  itself  accordingly,  and 
■I  change  therein  should  be  sanctioned 
only  upon  a  clear  showing  of  transporta- 
tion conditions  to  justify  it.  Such  evi- 
dence has  not  been  presented  by  this 
record.  In  arriving  at  these  conclusions 
it  is  not  meant  that  carriers  may  not  in 
any  case  charge  higher  rates  upon  cream 
and  condensed  milk  than  upon  raw  milk 
and  other  dairy  products,  depending  upon 
the  conditions  necessary  to  be  consid- 
ered from  a  transportation  standpoint 
existing  in  the  territory  affected.  The 
Commission  merely  holds  that  upon  the 
facts  presented  in  this  specific  case  affect- 
ing these  specific  rates,  the  carriers 
have  failed  to  sustain  the  burden  of  proof 
cast  upon  them  by  the  statute,  and  the 
advance  is  denied.  In  Re  Rates  on  Cream 
and  Condensed  Milk,  21  I.  C.  C.  522,  523. 

(f)  Complainants  asked  the  permanent 
suspension  of  proposed  schedules  of 
rates  on  lumber  filed  by  the  V.  S.  &  P. 
R.  R.  tariff,  I.  C.  C.  No.  2679,  which  can- 
cels joint  rates  named  in  the  tariff  pre- 
ceding it  from  points  on  the  C.  R.  I.  & 
P.  R.  R.  via  Ruston,  La.,  and  the  V.  S. 
&  P  R.  R,  to  points  south  of,  on  and 
north  of  the  Ohio  River.  The  Commis- 
sion found  that  the  result  of  the  existing 
rate  adjustment  was  that  the  greater  por- 
tion of  the  lumber  traffic  involved  in  the 
complaint  moved  over  the  Rock  Island 
and  not  via  Ruston.  HELD,  that  the 
cancelation  of  the  present  joint  rates 
via  Ruston  could  not  possibly  have  a 
detrimental  effect  on  this  large  percent- 
age of  complainant's  business;    that  the 


effect  of  the  cancelation  of  the  rates  via 
Ruston  would  tend  to  give  the  Rock 
Island  transportation  revenues  which  it 
was  entitled  to  by  reason  of  its  mileage 
and  geographical  situation.  Order  of 
suspension  vacated.  In  Re  Proposed 
Rates  on  Lumber,  20  I.  C.  C.  575. 

(g)  An  advance  in  rates  resulting  from 
an  increase  in  a  minimum  cannot  be 
condemned  merely  because  it  affects  a 
contract  of  sale  based  on  the  lower  mini- 
mum in  the  absence  of  any  evidence  that 
the  rate  or  minimum  advanced  is  unrea- 
sonable. Barnum  Iron  Works  v.  C.  C.  C 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  94,  95. 

(h)  Where  a  plant  has  been  established 
and  money  invested  on  the  faith  of  cer- 
tain transportation  rates  and  conditions, 
upon  which  the  life  of  the  plant  depends, 
a  carrier  may  not  increase  those  rates 
and  charges  to  the  serious  disadvantage 
of  such  investment  without  good  cause 
or  reason.  Douglas  &  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  232,  237. 

(i)  Where  a  particular  industry  has 
grown  up  under  rates  voluntarily  estab- 
lished and  maintained  by  carriers,  these 
rates  cannot  be  advanced  without  con- 
sidering the  effect  upon  that  industry. 
Beatrice  Creamery  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  109,  128. 

(j)  The  Commission  is  bound  to  con- 
sider whether  any  contemplated  read- 
justment of  rates  will  result  in  serious 
impairment  of  business  investments  or 
undue  depreciation  in  the  revenues  of 
the  carrier.  Black  Mountain  Coal  Land 
Co.  V.  Southern  Ry.,  15  I.  C.  C.  286,  295. 

(k)  Complainants,  manufacturene  and 
shippers  of  shingles,  and  forest  ]  rod- 
ucts  consisting  of  cedar,  fir,  hemlock, 
spruce,  etc.,  from  points  in  Oregon, 
Washington.  Idaho,  Montana  and  British 
Columbia  to  St.  Paul,  Chicago,  the  Mis- 
sissippi River,  Missouri  River,  southeast- 
ern Kansas,  Denver,  and  to  points  taking 
rates  in  common  with  these  cities  and 
territories,  attacked  the  increase  in  rates 
on  those  commodities,  made  effective 
Nov.  1,  1907.  Under  the  old  rates,  many 
mills  dependent  upon  rail  transportation 
were  constructed,  and  enormous  capital 
was  invested  in  connection  with  the  lum- 
ber business  at  the  points  of  origin  in 
question.  The  old  rates  wer3  voluntarily 
9Stablished  by  defendants.  In  recent 
years  the  cost  of  manufacturing  lumber 
had  greatly  increased,  the  advance  in 
both  labor  and  material  being  35  or  40 


34 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §13   (1) 


per  cent.  Prior  to  the  increase  attacked, 
the  millmen's  average  profit  per  1,000  ft. 
on  all  classes  of  lumber  ranged  from 
$1.60  to  $2.80,  and  under  the  old  sched- 
ule the  lumbermen  were  very  prosperous. 
The  forest  products  of  the  Pacific  Coast 
competed  in  all  of  the  territory  covered 
by  the  rates  in  controversy  with  yellow 
pine,  cypress  and  white  pine  from  other 
points  of  origin.  The  evidence  indicated 
that  complainants  under  the  increase  at- 
tacked would  not  be  able  to  compete  as 
formerly  with  other  kinds  of  lumber  from 
the  other  points  of  origin,  and  that  they 
would  not  be  able  to  dispose  of  their 
products  in  nearby  markets  without  a 
fatal  lowering  of  prices.  Many  of  com- 
plainants' mills  were  obliged  to  close 
down  shortly  after  the  increase  attacked 
went  into  effect,  the  apparent  reason  be- 
ing the  change  in  rates.  Defendant 
carriers  were  prospering  on  their  general 
schedules  of  rates  covering  all  commodi- 
ties. The  expense  of  operating  railways 
had  increased  greatly  in  the  past  few 
years,  especially  the  cost  of  labor  and 
materials.  On  a  typical  haul  under  the 
old  rate  the  per  ton  mile  revenue  was 
3.97  mills.  For  hauls  of  the  same  dis- 
tances, the  defendants  received  a  per  ton 
mile  revenue  greatly  in  excess  of  that 
on  shipments  from  yellow  pine  points  of 
origin.  Under  the  old  rates,  defendants 
received  larger  revenue  per  car  than  on 
shipments  of  canned  goods,  wool,  hops 
and  green  hides.  Defendants  insisted 
that  lumber  did  not  bear  its  just  propor- 
tion of  the  burden  of  rates  in  comparison 
with  other  commodities,  but  did  not 
specify  what  other  commodity  was  car- 
rying too  high  a  rate.  At  the  time  the 
old  rates  were  established,  the  empty  car 
movement  was  eastbound  and  defend- 
ants testified  that  the  rates  were  made 
low  on  that  account.  At  the  time  of  the 
increase  in  question  the  empty  car  move- 
ment was  westbound.  The  predominat- 
ing westbound  car  movement  could  not. 
however,  be  charged  entirely  to  the  in- 
creased eastbound  movement  of  lumber, 
but  was  largely  due  to  the  eastbound 
movement  of  ore  and  other  products. 
HELD,  the  old  rates  from  the  points  of 
origin  in  question  to  all  points  on  and 
west  of  a  line  drawn  from  Pembina,  N. 
D.,  southward  through  Grand  Forks,  N. 
D.,  Moorhead  and  Breckenridge,  Minn., 
Sioux  City  and  Council  Bluffs,  St.  Joseph 
and  Kansas  City,  and  thence  to  Port  Ar- 
thur, Tex.,  with  certain  exceptions,  were 
reasonable  and  should  be  restored;  that 
rates  from  the  points  of  origin  to  points 


east  of  the  line  above  mentioned  might, 
with  certain  exceptions,  be  somewhat  in- 
creased over  the  old  rates,  such  increase 
not  to  exceed  5c;  that  the  rates  to  points 
in  Minnesota,  east  of  the  line  mentioned, 
should  be  graded  up  from  that  line  so 
as  to  reach  the  maximum  increase  at 
Minneapolis,  St.  Paul,  Minnesota  Trans- 
fer and  Duluth;  that  the  rates  from  the 
Missouri  River  crossings  should  be 
graded  up  and  the  maximum  increase 
of  5c  reached  at  the  Mississippi  River; 
that  Chicago  rates  should  apply  to  all 
points  between  the  Mississippi  River 
crossings.  East  Dubuque  to  East  St. 
Louis,  inclusive,  and  Chicago;  and  that 
the  rates  to  St.  Louis  and  common  points 
should  not  exceed  the  rates  to  Chicago. 
Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis  of  the 
newly  prescrib.ed  rates  except  where  such 
rates  were  lower  than  those  in  effect 
prior  to  the  increase  in  question,  (Knapp 
&  Harlan,  Comm'rs,  dissenting,)  Ore- 
gon &  Washington  Lumber  Mfrs.  Assn. 
V,  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  1,  19;  re- 
hearing denied,  16  I.  C.  C.  465,  468;  deci- 
sion of  Commission  sustained,  S.  P.  Co. 
V.  L  C.  C,  177  Fed.  963;  I.  C.  C.  v.  U.  P. 
R.  R.  Co.,  222  U.  S.  541,  32  Sup.  Ct.  108, 
56  L.  ed.  308. 

(1)  On  April  18,  1907,  the  defendant. 
Southern  Pacific  Co.,  advanced  the  rate 
on  rough  green  fir  lumber  and  lath  from 
points  in  the  Willamette  Valley  to  San 
Francisco  from  $3.10  to  $5.00  per  ton. 
Complainant  shippers  at  these  points  at- 
tacked this  advance.  The  former  rate 
of  $3.10  applied  from  all  mills  east  of 
the  Willamette  River  and  all  mills  west 
of  that  river  south  of  Corvallis.  From 
mills  north  of  Corvallis,  upon  the  west 
bank,  an  additional  charge  of  25c  per  ton 
was  imposed.  This  rate  did  not  apply  from 
Portland.  Complainants  demanded  that 
the  $3.10  rate  be  restored  and  be  applied 
from  all  points  on  the  east  and  west  bank 
of  the  river  and  from  Portland.  Prior 
to  1908,  and  before  the  Southern  Pacific 
combined  with  the  Northern  Pacific,  lum- 
ber could  not  be  shipped  from  the  Willa- 
mette Valley  to  San  Francisco  on  ac- 
count of  the  competition  with  lumber 
originating  at  Portland  and  shipped  by 
a  low  water  rate  to  San  Francisco.  In 
1899,  defendant  Southern  Pacific  put  in 
the  $3.10  rate  in  order  to  develop  the  lum- 
ber industries  in  the  Willamette  Valley 
by  affording  a  market  at  San  Francisco. 
Under  this  rate  a  great  number  of  mills 
were  built  and  a  large  amount  of  capital 
invested  in  the  Willamette  Valley.  In 
1903.   subsequent   to  the    combination   of 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §13  (m) 


35 


the  Union  Pacific  and  the  Southern  Pa- 
cific, the  $3.10  rate  which  was  at  first 
applied  from  Portland  was  withdrawn 
from  that  point,  and  in  1904  it  was  with- 
drawn from  the  entire  Willamette  Valley, 
a  rate  of  $5.00  being  establishel  instead. 
This  increase  in  rates  was  greater  than 
the  profit  which  had  been  realized  by 
lumbermen  in  the  Willamette  Valley  upon 
shipments  to  San  Francisco.  At  the  time 
of  the  hearing,  defendants  indicated  their 
willingness  to  extend  to  the  Willamette 
Valley  the  same  rates  as  applied  from 
Portland  on  shipments  to  Colorado,  Utah 
and  other  eastern  destinations.  While  this 
^•ould  give  complainants  in  the  Willa- 
mette Valley  an  outlet  for  their  higher 
grades  of  lumber,  they  would  still  be  un- 
able to  market  their  lower  grades,  being 
excluded  from  San  Francisco  by  the  $5.00 
rate  attacked.  To  continue  the  $5.00 
rate  would  result  in  driving  the  smaller 
mill  men  among  complainants  out  of  busi- 
ness. Under  the  old  rate  the  lumber 
from  the  Willamette  Valley  constituted 
a  large  percentage  of  the  traflfic  of  the 
Southern  Pacific,  and  in  1907  its  net 
earnings  were  more  than  its  gross  earn- 
ings ten  years  before.  The  average  dis- 
tance from  mills  in  the  Willamette  Val- 
ley to  San  Francisco  was  625  miles. 
Under  the  old  $3.10  rate  the  yield  was  5 
mills  per  ton  mile.  For  the  entire  haul 
the  grade  did  not  exceed  one-haW  of  1 
per  cent  for  500  miles,  and  over  a  large 
portion  of  the  line  operating  conditions 
were  favorable,  although  for  some  250 
miles  grades  and  curvatures  were  severe. 
Lumber  originating  north  of  Corvallis, 
upon  the  west  bank,  was  formerly  hauled 
by  an  independent  line  across  the  river 
to  the  Southern  Pacific  at  a  charge  of 
25c  for  a  distance  of  some  15  miles.  This 
independent  line  was  absorbed  by  defend- 
ant. HELD,  taking  into  account  the  de- 
velopment of  complainants'  lumber  in- 
terests in  reliance  upon  the  former  $3.10 
rate,  the  increase  to  $5.00  was  unreason- 
able; that  a  rate  of  $3.40  should  be  es- 
tablished from  all  mills  in  the  Willamette 
Valley  east  of  the  river  and  from  those 
west  of  the  river,  south  of  Corvallis,  the 
increase  over  the  $3.10  rate  being  per- 
missible in  view  of  the  fact  that  competi- 
tors at  Portland  would  in  time  be  com- 
pelled to  pay  higher  prices  for  stumpage; 
that  the  $3.40  rate  should  not  be  ordered 
to  apply  to  Portland  since  that  point  had 
a  low  rate  by  water,  and  that  a  rate  25c 
in  excess  of  that  applied  to  mills  east  of 
the  river  should  continue  to  be  applied 
to  mills  west  of  the  river  and  north  of 


Corvallis.  (Knapp  &  Harlan,  Comm'rs, 
dissenting.)  Western  Oregon  Lumber 
Mfrs.  Assn.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  61, 
72;  decision  of  Commission  sustained,  S. 
P.  Co.  v.  L  C.  C,  177  Fed.  963;  L  C.  C.  v. 
U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  222  U.  S.  541,  32  Sup.  Ct. 
108,  56  L.  ed.  308. 

(m)  Complainant  millers  located  at 
Buffalo  attacked  an  increase  by  defend- 
ant carriers  of  one  cent  per  100  lbs.  upon 
flour  and  other  grain  products  from  Buf- 
falo to  New  England  points,  and  from 
Buffalo  to  New  York  City,  and  New  York 
points.  The  differential  from  New  York 
City  to  Boston  points  was  two  cents,  and 
from  New  York  City  to  Sherbrooke  points 
in  New  England  was  one-half  cent  above 
the  Boston  differential.  The  Buffalo  to 
New  York  rate  before  the  advance  was 
10c  per  100  lbs.  Millers  at  Buffalo  re- 
ceived their  wheat  from  Duluth.  In  mak- 
ing the  advance  attacked,  no  change  was 
made  in  the  rates  from  Minneapolis  and 
Duluth  to  Buffalo.  Complainants  at  Buf- 
falo were  in  competition  with  millers  at 
Minneapolis  and  Duluth.  The  10c  rate 
from  Buffalo  to  New  York  had,  before 
the  advance,  been  in  effeqt  for  many 
years.  Complainants  showed  that  defend- 
ants transported  'grain  and  its  products 
for  other  persons  for  a  much  less  rate 
per  ton  mile  than  would  be  yielded  by 
the  lie,  or  even  the  10c,  rate  from  Buf- 
falo to  New  York.  The  distance  from 
Buffalo  to  New  York  is  400  miles,  and 
the  10c  rate  would  yield  a  revenue  to  de- 
fendants of  5  mills  per  ton  mile.  Under  the 
export  rate  from  Chicago  to  New  York  on 
wheat  and  flour,  carriers  were  deriving.2.8 
mills  and  3  mills  per  ton  mile,  respectively. 
The  domestic  rate  on  ex-lake  wheat,  on 
corn  and  on  oats  from  Buffalo  to  New 
York  was  10c,  7  ll-12c  and  6  2-3c  per  100 
lbs.,  respectively.  Millers  at  Minneapolis 
objected  to  the  restoration  of  the  10c  rate 
from  Buffalo  to  New  York  on  the  ground 
that  the  differential  between  Duluth  and 
Minneapolis  was  5c  per  100  lbs.,  and  that 
even  under  the  advanced  lie  rate  from 
Buffalo  to  New  York,  millers  at  Buffalo 
had  an  advantage  of  4c  per  100  lbs.  over 
millers  at  Minneapolis.  It  appeared, 
however,  that  on  account  of  the  advan- 
tages of  location,  Minneapolis  was,  de- 
spite this  differential,  a  better  milling 
point  than  Duluth.  HELD,  following 
Banner  Milling  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 
R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C  31,  defendants  in  mak- 
ing an  advance  must  consider  the  effect 
upon  the  business  of  Buffalo  millers,  and 
that  the  one  cent  advance  was  unjust  and 
unreasonable,    and    the    former    10c    rate 


36 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §14  (a)— §15  (e) 


from  Buffalo  to  New  York  should  be  re 
stored,  and  that  the  rates  from  Buffalo 
to  Boston  points  and  Sherbrooke  points 
should  correspondingly  be  reduced  to  12c 
and  12i^c,  respectively.  Banner  Milling 
Co.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
I.   C.  C.  398,   401. 

§14.     Benefit  to   Industry. 

(a)  Carriers  in  Official  Classification 
territory  advanced  all  the  class  rates 
and  about  one-half  the  commodity  rates. 
It  was  urged  that  to  permit  these  ad- 
vances would  induce  larger  expenditures 
in  the  maintenance  of  the  roads,  lead  to 
extensions  and  improvements,  which 
would  in  turn  employ  additional  labor, 
put  into  circulation  additional  money  and 
thereby  improve  general  business  con- 
ditions. It  was  also  urged  that  the  fa- 
cilities of  railway  supply  houses  could 
only  be  utilized  to  the  most  profitable 
extent  in  case  additional  railroads  were 
constructed  and  additional  equipment  re- 
quired. HELD,  the  Commission  must 
stand  for  the  entire  public,  including  the 
railways.  It  cannot  accede  to  the  mere 
wish  of  any  class.  It  must  recognize  the 
just  demand  of  all  classes,  and  it  must 
have  in  mind  those  who  do  not  appear 
as  well  as  those  who  are  represented 
before  it.  The  Commission  ought  not  to 
impose  upon  the  public  rates  otherwise 
unreasonable,  for  the  mere  purpose  of 
temporarily  providing  business  for  the 
factories  of  railway  supply  houses,  even 
though  the  effect  might  be  to  stimulate 
for  the. time  being  other  kinds  of  Indus 
tries.  Just  and  reasonable  rates  should 
be  allowed,  but  the  Commission  is  not 
justified  in  permanently  imposing  rates 
unduly  high  in  order  that  business  con- 
ditions might  be  temporarily  improved. 
In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case, 
-:  >  I.  C.  C.  243,  250,  251. 

§15.     Standard    for    Judging    Advance. 
See    Relative    Rates. 

(a)  Since  the  present  relation  of  rates 
must  be  maintained  and  since  the  same 
rate  must  be  made  by  all  lines,  it  follows 
that  if  any  single  route  be  required  to 
maintain  the  present  scale  between  New 
York  and  Chicago,  no  advance  by  any 
line  can  be  made.  In  Re  Advances  in 
Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  272. 

(b)  In  determining  the  reasonableness 
of  an  advance  in  rates  by  all  the  railroads 
in  Official  Classification  territory  the 
Commission  ought  not  to  make  the  most 


opulent  nor  the  poorest  railroad  the 
standard  by  which  to  measure  the  rea- 
sonableness of  the  rates.  In  this  ter- 
ritory the  Pennsylvania  system,  the  New 
York  Central  lines  and  the  Baltimore  & 
Ohio  may  be  taken  as  typical,  and  what- 
ever rate  might  reasonably  be  imposed 
upon  these  three  systems  must  be  held 
to  be  a  reasonable  charge  for  that  serv- 
ice by  all  lines.  Under  rates  reasonabU 
for  these  three  systems  there  may  be 
lines  whose  earnings  will  be  extravagant, 
but  that  is  their  good  fortune.  There 
may  be  lines  which  cannot  make  suffi- 
cient earnings,  but  that  is  their  mis- 
fortune. The  Commission  ought  not  to 
impose  upon  this  territory,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  allowing  defendants  additional 
revenues,  higher  rates  than  are  adequate 
to  these  three  systems  considered  as  a 
whole.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — East- 
ern Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  274. 

(c)  In  determining  the  reasonableness 
of  rates  advanced  by  the  B.  &  O,  R.  R. 
the  Commission  holds  that  this  road 
should  be  allowed  to  earn  such  an  amount 
that  the  sum  remaining  after  the  pay- 
ment of  fixed  charges,  including  as  a 
fixed  charge  the  dividend  upon  the  pre- 
ferred stock,  should  be  equivalent  to  be- 
tween 7  and  8  per  cent  on  the  common 
stock.  It  should  have  sufficient  earnings 
so  that  it  may  pay  a  dividend  of  5  per 
cent  upon  its  common  stock  and  carry 
2^  per  cent  to  surplus,  or  pay  6  per  cent 
upon  its  common  stock  and  carry  1^^ 
per  cent  to  surplus.  This  is  upon  the 
assumption  that  the  capitalization  does 
not  exceed  its  actual  value.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C 
243,  289. 

(d)  In  determining  whether  railroads 
running  west  of  Chicago  should  be  per- 
mitted to  increase  some  200  commodity 
rates,  the  Commission  bases  its  decision 
upon  the  profits  of  those  roads  which  are 
typical  and  therefore  considers  the  fig- 
ures of  the  Santa  Fe,  Burlington,  C.  & 
N.  W.,  C.  M.  &  St.  P.,  Rock  Island  and 
C.  &  A.  R.  Rs.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates 
—Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307,  324. 

(e)  Defendants  increased  the  class 
rates  and  many  of  the  commodity  rates 
from  St.  Louis  to  Texas  common  points. 
The  Commission  considers  the  M.  K.  & 
r.  R.  R.,  from  a  traffic  standpoint,  as 
the  most  typical  for  this  territory,  and 
analyzes  its  statistics  put  in  evidence 
for  additional  revenue.  It  finds  that  for 
the   purposes   of  computation  it  may  be 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §16  (a)  — (c) 


37 


conceded  this  carrier  has  a  total  appar- 
ent investment  per  mile  of  road  of  $38,- 
993.16,  and  upon  this  valuation  the  net 
return  is  but  5.41  per  cent.  It  also  finds 
that,  owing  to  legislation  and  various 
orders  of  the  Commission,  considerable 
of  its  future  revenue  is  menaced.  It  finds 
that  none  of  the  defendants  has  been 
able  to  pay  very  much  in  the  way  of 
dividends,  finding  it  difficult  to  even  pay 
small  dividends  on  their  preferred  stock. 
HELD,  the  commodity  rates  as  a  whole 
should  not  be  ordered  reduced,  but  that 
the  present  scale  of  class  rates  is  unrea- 
sonable and  discriminatory  with  the 
exception  of  the  first  class  rate;  the 
second  class  rate  reduced  4c  and  de- 
fendants ordered  to  restore  the  prior 
rates  in  the  other  classes.  Individual 
commodity  rates  may  be  attacked  in  the 
future,  however.  Reparation  denied  on 
present  reduction.  Railroad  Commission 
of  Texas  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  463. 

§16.     Uniformity    of    Advance. 
See  Supra,   §9. 

(a)  Tariffs  publishing  a  general  ad- 
vance in  rates  may  not  be  criticized  in 
the  absence  of  testimony  showing  that 
specific  mistakes  or  blunders  were  made 
because  all  the  rates  were  not  advanced 
on  a  fixed  percentage,  or  because  car- 
riers in  going  over  schedules  selected 
particular  commodities  that  seemed  best 
able  to  stand  a  rate  advance  and  others 
that  seemed  likely  to  move  more  freely 
under  reduced  rates  and  thus  produce 
larger  revenues.  R.  R.  Commission  of 
Texas  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
C.  463,  482,  483. 

(b)  The  Commission  investigated  pro- 
posed advances  on  coarse  grain  and 
wheat  from  southeastern  South  Dakota 
producing  points  to  Omaha.  HELD,  a 
superficial  examination  of  the  rates  dis- 
closes many  inconsistencies  which  can- 
not be  accounted  for  even  on  the  basis 
of  reflected  competition  as  contended  by 
the  carriers.  Rates  from  non-competitive 
points  grade  up  too  rapidly  from  junction 
and  competitive  points  and  non-com- 
petitive termini  are  not  accorded  equi- 
tably proportionate  rates.  The  proposed 
advanced  rates  are  unjust  and  unreason- 
able and  the  present  rates  are  reduced 
to  the  basis  of  the  rates  prescribed  by 
the  Commission,  the  average  reduction 
being  about  Ic  per  100  lbs.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances on  Grain,  21  I.  C.  C.  22,  36,  38,  39. 


(c)  Complainant  attacked  the  reason- 
ableness of  a  change  proposed  to  be  made 
by  the  Southern  Classification  Commit- 
tee in  the  rating  of  locomotives  and  loco- 
motives and  tenders,  live  or  dead,  on 
their  own  wheels.  The  proposed  change 
substituted  sixth  class  rates  on  live  or 
dead  locomotives  for  the  previously  exist- 
ing mileage  rate  of  35c  a  mile  on  loco- 
motives dead  and  30  cents  per  mile  on 
locomotives  live.  The  same  rate  existed 
on  locomotives  live,  except  that  an  allow- 
ance of  50  per  cent  of  the  gross  weight 
was  made,  and  also  provided  that  the 
locomotive  must  be  accompanied  by  an 
attendant  paying  full  passenger  fare,  and 
whose  duty  it  is  to  keep  all  running  parts 
well  oiled  and  immediately  report  any 
trouble  to  the  conductor  of  the  train. 
HELD,  that  on  account  of  the  varying 
weights  of  locomotives  it  is  not  fair  to 
tax  the  lighter  locomotives  at  the  same 
rate  as  the  heavier  equipment,  for  what 
would  be  a  reasonable  charge  for  a  200- 
ton  locomotive  manifestly  would  be  un- 
reasonable for  a  locomotive  weighing 
only  50  tons;  that  considering  all  the  cir- 
cumstances connected  with  their  trans- 
portation locomotives  on  their  own 
wheels  are  much  in  the  nature  of  an 
anomalous  commodity  particularly  sus- 
ceptible to  individual  treatment;  that 
both  as  a  matter  of  equity  and  expedi- 
ency it  is  rare  indeed  that  a  flat  ton 
mile  rate  can  be  prescribed.  The  great 
diversity  in  the  characteristics  of  the 
objects  transported  as  well  as  the  kaleido- 
scopic succession  of  the  conditions  under 
which  this  transportation  takes  place 
combine  to  make  such  a  rate  when  uni- 
versally applied  both  unreasonable  and 
discriminatory.  However,  in  so  much  as 
locomotives  stand  in  a  class  by  them- 
selves and  present  a  rate  problem  in  many 
respects  different  perhaps  from  any  that 
has  been  heretofore  brought  to  the  at- 
tention of  the  Commission,  under  all  the 
circumstances  and  accepting  as  a  basis 
the  per  ton  mile  revenue  of  5.83  mills 
arrived  at  by  applying  the  present  mile- 
age rate  of  35c  to  the  average  gross 
weight  of  GO  tons,  a  reasonable  rate  for 
the  transportation  of  locomotives  and 
locomotives  and  tenders  dead  on  their 
own  wheels  in  Southern  Classification 
territory  should  not  exceed  the  follow- 
ing rate  per  ton  mile  applied  to  the  gross 
weight  of  locomotives  and  locomotives 
and  tenders,  distance  not  over  200  miles, 
rate  per  ton  mile  gross  weight  on  loco- 
motives. 6  mills;  over  200  and  under  300 


38 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §17  (a)  — (e) 


miles, 

miles, 

miles,  5.4  mills; 

miles,  5.2  mills; 

miles,  5.1  mills: 


5.8  mills;  over  300  and  under  400 
5.6  mills;  over  400  and  under  500 
over  500  and  under  600 
over  600  and  under  700 
over  700  miles,  5  mills. 
In  calculating  the  total  charge  the  rate 
applicable  to  its  respective  zone  should 
be  applied  for  the  distance  in  that  zone 
only;  the  rate  applicable  to  the  final  zone 
should  not  be  applied  to  the  entire  haul. 
FURTHER  HELD,  no  testimonv  having 


From    Phoenix    to 

Wenden    (A.   &   C.) 

Salome   (A.   &   C.) 

Vicksburg   (A.   &   C.) 

Prescott   (S.  F.  P.  &  P.) 
Bouse   (A.   &   C), 


these  potatoes  cannot  be  safely  loaded 
to  a  greater  weight.  In  Re  Advances  on 
Potatoes,  23  I.  C.  C.  69. 

(c)  Defendants  as  of  July  6,  1911, 
sought  to  increase  the  rates  on  barley, 
bran  and  wheat,  from  Phoenix,  Ariz., 
to  certain  points  on  the  Santa  Fe,  Pres- 
cott &  Phoenix  R.  R.  The  increased 
rates  were  suspended.  The  following 
table  shows  the  present  and  suspended 
rates : 

Present  Suspended 
Rates.         Rates. 


Distance. 

Miles. 
..  103 
..  109 
..  119 
..  137 
..    138 


Prescott  &  Eastern  Junction  (P.  &  E.) 143 

Jerome  Junction  (S.  F.  P.  &  P.) 155 

Cherry  Creek    (P.    &  E.) 157 

Humboldt   (P.    &  E.) 159 

Huron   (P.   &  E.) 163 

Parket  (A.  &  E.) 164 


Rates  in 
Oct.,  1908. 
Cents. 
30 
30 
31 
20 
31 
20 
22.5 
26 
27 
29 
31 


Cents. 
22.5 
22.5 
22.5 
20 
22.5 
20 
22.5 
26 
27 
29 
22.5 


Cents. 
25 
25 
26 
28 
28 
29 
30 
30 
30 
31 
31 


been  presented  on  the  reasonableness  of 
the  advance  over  the  present  rate  of  30c 
per  mile  on  live  locomotives,  the  burden 
of  proof  has  not  been  met  by  the  car- 
riers and  the  proposed  change  must  be 
withdrawn.  In  Re  Advances  on  Loco- 
motives and  Tenders,  21  I.  C.  C.  103,  252. 


OF        AD 


IV.     REASONABLENESS 
VANCED    RATES. 
See  Proportional  Rates,   IV   (g) ;  Min- 
imums,  §1    (aa);   Reasonableness  of 
Rates,   §43   (a). 

§17.     In    General. 

(a)  A  railroad  which  has  duly  pub- 
lished ani  advance  in  rates  may  charge 
a  shipper  the  advanced  rate  despite  a 
private  agreement  with  him  to  carry 
goods  at  the  rate  in  existence  prior  to 
the  advance.  First  Trust  &  Savings 
Bank  v.  Southern  Indiana  Ry.  Co.,  195 
Fed.   330,  334. 

(b)  The  proposed  advanced  minimum 
of  30,000  lbs.  upon  potatoes  originating 
in  Louisiana  and  Texas  and  applying 
from  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  points  east  of 
the  Illinois-Indiana  state  line,  is  held 
unreasonable,  •  it  appearing  that  the 
Texas  and  Louisiana  potato  is  extremely 
perishable,  possesses  little  keeping  qual- 
ities and  requires  the  exercise  of  great 
care  in  loading  to  insure  the  best  possi- 
ble ventilation  and  the  least  possible 
pressure  from  the  weight  of  one  sack 
upon  or  against  another.  Minimum  of 
24,000  lbs.   prescribed,   it  appearing  that 


After  a  hearing  and  investigation  the 
Commission  finds  all  of  the  present  and 
suspendede  rates  unreasonable  and  or- 
ders the  establishment  of  the  following 
as    just   and    reasonable    rates: 

Rates  to  be 
prescribed 
(carload 
Dis-       minimum 
tance.     40,000  lbs.) 
Prom    Phoenix   to  Miles.         Cents. 

Wenden,     Ariz 103  20 

Salome,     Ariz 109  20 

Vicksburg,     Ariz 119  20 

Prescott,    Ariz 137  22 

Bouse,     Ariz 138  22 

Prescott  and  E.   Jet..   Ariz..  143  22 

Jerome    Junction,    Ariz 155  24 

Cherry  Creek,  Ariz 157  24 

Humboldt,     Ariz 159  24 

Huron,    Ariz 163  24 

Parker,    Ariz 164  24 

Investigation  and  Suspension  of  Ad- 
vances in  Rates  for  the  Transportation 
of  Barley,  Bran  and  Wheat,  22  I.  C.  C. 
216,   217. 

(d)  A  carrier  having  voluntarily  put  in 
a  rate  relatively  low  is  not  bound  to 
maintain  that  rate  indefinitely,  but  may 
withdraw  a  rate  found  by  the  Commis- 
sion to  be  unreasonably  low.  Fairmont 
Creamery  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  252,  254. 

(e)  Complainants  attacked  a  pro- 
posed increase  of  rates  upon  lake  coal 
originating  in  the  West  Virginia  coal 
fields  and  destined  to  various  ports  on 
Lake  Erie  for  transhipment  by  vessel 
beyond.  In  the  West  Virginia  coal  fields 
lie  the  Fairmont  district  in  the  north- 
ern   portion   of   the   state,    the   Kanawha 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §17    (e) 


39 


and  Thacker  districts  farther  south,  and 
the  New  River  and  Pocahontas  still 
farther  south.  The  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  serves 
the  Fairmont  district;  the  C.  &  O.  Ry. 
with  its  connections,  the  Kanawha  and 
New  River  districts;  the  Kanawha  and 
Michigan  Ry.  with  its  connections,  the 
Kanawha  district;  the  N.  &  W.  Ry. 
with  its  connections,  the  Pocahontas, 
Thacker  and  other  districts  lying  be- 
tween Bliiefield  and  the  Ohio  River. 
The  proposed  increase  was,  from  the 
Fairmont  district  (B.  &  O.),  96.75c  to 
$1;  from  the  Kanawha  district  (C.  •&  O. 
and  K.  &  M.)  and  Thacker  district  (N. 
&  W.),  97c  to  $1.0625;  from  the  New 
River  district  (C.  &  O.)  and  Pocahontas 
district  (N.  &  W.),  $1.12  to  $1.2175. 
The  per  ton  mile  earnings  under  the 
old  rates  of  the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  upon  lake 
cargo  coal  originating  between  Bluefield 
and  the  Ohio  River  averaged  2.76  mills, 
the  movement  being  from  the  mouth  of 
the  mine  to  the  shipside.  The  proposed 
increase  was  attempted  not  because  the 
old  rates  were  unreasonably  low  in 
themselves,  but  because  of  a  desire  to 
increase  the  differential  between  the 
rates  on  lake  coal  from  the  West  Vir- 
ginia fields,  and  those  from  the  Ohio  and 
Pennsylvania  fields,  and  was  made  upon 
the  complaint  of  shippers  from  the  latter 
fields  that  the  old  rates  were  so  low 
as  to  place  the  shippers  from  these  lat- 
ter fields  at  a  disadvantage.  The  N.  &  W. 
Ry.,  which  took  the  lead  in  the  proposed 
increase,  was  controlled  through  stock 
ownership  by  the  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  and 
there  were  indications  that  the  latter 
railroad  prompted  the  proposed  incraese 
in  order  to  prevent  the  cutting  of  its 
rate  on  traflBc  from  the  Pennsylvania  and 
Ohio  fields.  The  C.  &  O.  Ry.  did  nothing  to 
justify  the  increase.  The  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
merely  pointed  out  that  the  proposed 
rate  earned  only  4.03  mills  per  ton  for 
an  average  haul  of  248  miles;  and  that 
it  was  less  than  that  on  commercial 
coal  intended  for  commercial  consump- 
tion at  the  lake  ports.  The  K.  &  M. 
Ry.  offered  as  a  justification  that  the 
average  proportional  charge  on  coal 
destined  beyond  Toledo,  its  lake  port, 
including  all-rail  and  rail-and-lake 
routes,  was  $1.10  per  ton.  yielding  3.37 
mills  per  ton  mile,  as  compared  with 
the  proposed  rate  of  $1.0625  yielding 
3.2  mills;  that  the  proposed  rate 
was  reasonable  when  compared  with 
other  "lake"  rates  from  various  com- 
petitive fields;    that   the   rate   to   Toledo 


on  commercial  coal  used  in  Toledo  was 
$1.25,  as  compared  with  the  proposed 
rate  of  $1.0625;  and  that  said  $1.10  and 
$1.25  rates  had  been  in  force  for  many 
years  and  had  never  been  questioned. 
The  serious  burden  of  justification  of 
the  increased  rate  was  left  by  the  other 
carriers  to  the  N.  &  W.  Ry.,  which  had 
the  longest  haul  from  the  mines  to  the 
port  and  carried  the  lightest  train 
loads  and  which  was  dominated  by  the 
railroad  serving  rival  coal  fields  in  Ohio 
and  Pennsylvania.  Defendant  N.  &  W. 
Ry.  sought  to  justify  the  proposed  in- 
crease on  the  ground  that  under  the  old 
rates  the  coal  trafl^c  in  question,  while 
paying  its  transportation  cost,  full  share 
of  maintenance  and  overhead  charges 
and  practically  its  full  share  of  interest 
upon  bonded  debt,  did  not  meet  its 
allottable  share  of  dividend  charges. 
The  evidence  indicated  that  2.28  mills 
per  ton  mile  was  the  average  cost,  in- 
cluding concentration,  of  all  traflftc  over 
the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  and  that  the  cost  of  mov- 
ing the  lake  coal  in  question  approxi- 
mated 2  mills  per  ton  mile  between 
Bluefield  and  Columbus,  O.,  where  it 
was  received  from  the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  by 
connecting  carriers.  The  cost  of  opera- 
tion and  the  earnings  of  the  Bluefield- 
Columbus  portion  of  the  N.  &  W.  Ry. 
were  taken  as  a  basis  of  estimate.  As- 
suming that  to  this  portion  of  the  N.  & 
W.  Ry.  a  48  per  cent  division  of  interest, 
taxes  and  dividends  should,  according 
to  the  testimony  of  some  experts,  be 
apportioned,  one  mill  per  ton  mile  of 
charges  should  be  allowed  in  addition 
to  the  2  mills  required  to  cover  cost. 
On  the  assumption  that  a  34  per  cent 
division  of  interest,  taxes  and  dividends 
should,  according  to  the  testimony  of 
other  experts,  be  charged  to  this  por- 
tion of  the  N.  &  W.  Ry.,  .75  mill  in 
addition  to  the  2  mills  required  to 
cover  cost  should  be  allowed  as  charges. 
This  estimate  was  based  on  the  com- 
monly accepted  rule  that  operating  and 
maintenance  expenses  should  amount  to 
two-thirds  of  the  earnings.  Under  the 
old  rates  defendant  N.  &  W.  Ry.  re- 
ceived as  a  profit,  over  and  above  costs, 
17.4  per  cent  on  lake  cargo  coal,  Blue- 
field  to  Columbus,  while  on  all  coal  over 
the  rest  of  its  system  it  received  under 
current  rates  only  16  per  cent  above 
cost.  Defendant  on  coal  shipped  east- 
ward from  Bluefield  to  Norfolk  and  des- 
tined beyond  was  receiving,  under  cur- 
rent   rates,    3.187    mills    with    a   cost   of 


40 


ADVANCED  RATES,    §17    (f) 


2.55  mills,  so  as  to  make  the  ratio  of 
cost  to  revenue  82.6  per  cent.  The 
main  line  cost  of  all  freight  between 
Bluefield  and  Norfolk  was  67.02  per 
cent  of  the  revenue  of  3.187  mills  p^r 
ton  mile  received  on  coal  from  Blue- 
field  to  Norfolk,  and  for  "beyond-the- 
capes,"  while  the  main  line  cost,  Blue- 
field  to  Columbus,  was  70  per  cent  of 
the  lake  cargo  revenue  of  2.76  mills 
per  ton  mile  which  was  being  earned  by 
defendant  under  the  old  rates.  While 
the  rate  per  ton  mile  on  the  carriage 
of  lake  cargo  coal  under  the  old  rates 
of  the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  appeared  low,  the 
real  earnings  of  the  car  or  train  com- 
pared most  favorably  with  the  earnings 
upon  the  highest  class  of  freight  which 
the  railroad  carried.  For  example,  on 
merchandise  from  Norfolk  to  Columbus, 
707  miles,  the  revenue  was  per  train, 
$1,237.70,  per  train  mile,  $1.75,  per  car 
mile,  5c;  and  from  Norfolk  to  Bristol, 
408  miles,  the  revenue  was  per  train, 
$1,132.16,  per  train  mile,  $2.77,  per 
car  mile,  $7.92.  On  lake  cargo  coal 
from  Pocahontas  to  Columbus,  under 
the  old  rates,  the  revenue  was  for  a  dis- 
tance of  330  miles,  $1,222.76  per  train, 
$3.02  per  train  mile,  and  10.58c  per  car 
mile.  Tested  by  per  train  mile  and  per 
train  earnings,  the  old  rates  yielded  on 
lake  Sargo  coal  much  larger  revenues 
than  were  earned  generally  on  the  N. 
&  W.  Ry.  and  Penn.  Co.  systems  and 
the  roads  of  the  United  States  taken 
as  a  whole.  The  summarized  evidence 
indicated  that  the  old  rates,  which  were 
proposed  to  be  increased,  were  lower 
than  the  local  rates  on  coal  to  Sandusky 
(97c  per  Ion  or  $1.12  as  against  $1.25  or 
$1.45) ;  were  lower  per  ton  mile  than 
rates  over  the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  to  Hamp- 
ton Roads  on  "beyond-the-capes"  coal 
(2.76  mills;  3.187  mills);  were  lower 
than  the  rates  from  the  Ohio  and  Penn- 
sylvania fields  to  the  Lakes  on  coal 
for  transhipment  (88c  as  against  97c 
or  $1.12);  were  not  as  low  per  ton  mile 
as  the  rates  on  "beyond-the-capes"  coal 
made  by  the  C.  &  O.  Ry.  (2.76  mills;  2.61 
mills),  nor  as  low  as  lake  cargo  coal 
via  Cincinnati  (2.17  mills);  were  not  as 
low  per  ton  mile  as  proportional  rates 
of  the  I.  C.  R.  R.  and  other  carriers 
on  coal  going  in'to  the  Northwest  in 
competition  with  the  West  Virginia  coal 
in  question  (2.6  mills) ;  that  the  old  rates 
yielded  to  the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  substantial- 
ly as  large  a  net  revenue  above  cost 
as    "beyond-the-capes"    coal     (17.47c    as 


against  20c  out  of  $1  in  revenue) ;  that 
they  paid  to  the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  as  large  a 
net  revenue  per  ton  above  cost  as  did 
all  coal  on  the  system  other  than  that 
carried  over  the  Bluefield-Columbus  line 
(17.47c  as  against  16c  out  of  $1  in  rev- 
enue) ;  that  under  the  old  rates,  since 
1906,  the  traffic  over  the  N.  &  W.  Ry. 
had  increased  some  300  per  cent  and 
over  all  the  carriers  defendant  about 
170  per  cent;  and  that  the  old  rates 
paid  the  cost  of  transportation  and 
maintenance,  their  full  proportion  of 
taxes  and  fixed  charges,  and  made  some 
contribution  toward  dividends.  HELD, 
the  defendants  other  than  the  N.  &  W. 
Ry.  had  presented  no  evidence  to  justify 
the  proposed  increase  on  their  lines,  and 
the  advance  should  be  prohibited;  and 
that  while  a  carrier  was  not  entitled  to 
increase  its  rates  on  a  particular  traffic 
simply  because  that  traffic  was  not  con- 
tributing its  full  share  to  dividends,  and 
the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  had  not  therefore  justi- 
fied the  increase  on  such  ground,  the 
N.  &  W.  Ry.,  taking  into  view  its  right 
to  a  reasonable  latitude  of  discretion  in 
its  rate-fixing  policy,  had  met  the  bur- 
den of  justifying  the  proposed  increase, 
and  the  same  should  be  allowed.  In  Re 
Advances  on  Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I. 
C.   C.    604,   624. 

(f)  All  the  carriers  in  Official  Classi- 
fication territory  advanced  all  their  class 
rates  and  about  one-half  their  commod- 
ity rates.  The  Commission  instituted 
an  injiuiry  whether  the  advanced  rates 
were  reasonable  gind  what  was  the  justi- 
fication for  publishing  the  general  ad- 
vance. Voluminous  testimony  was  in- 
troduced as  to  the  expenses  of  the  car- 
riers. The  Commission  examined  the 
evidence  as  to  the  expenses  the  carriers 
were  under,  present  and  prospective,  and 
compared  them  with  the  revenues  for 
the  year  1910.  From  a  general  review 
of  the  situation,  the  Commission  HELD, 
the  cost  of  supplies  were  not  much  ad- 
vanced; wages  were  not  much  in- 
creased; the  demands  of  the  public  will 
continue  to  grow;  traflfic  will  increase; 
but  the  same  advantage  may  not  accrue 
to  carriers  in  this  territory  in  the  fu- 
ture as  in  the  past;  something  should 
be  expected  from  the  introduction  of 
additional  economy,  but  perhaps  not  to 
the  same  extent  as  in  the  past;  the  net 
revenues  for  the  year  1910  were  the 
greatest  in  the  history  of  the  railroads; 
those  revenues  would  still  have  been 
ample   had   the  present  rate   scale  been 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §17  (g)— §18  (1)    (b) 


41 


applied  to  the  operations  of  that  year; 
that  during  the  last  11  years  rates  have 
advanced,  and  that  on  all  the  facts 
on  the  record,  the  carriers  are  ordered 
to  cancel  their  advanced  tariffs  on  file 
and  restore  their  former  rates.  In  Re 
Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I. 
C.  C.  243,  285,  306. 

(g)  While  advances  in  rates  may  them- 
selves affect  commodities  of  prime  utility 
and  daily  necessity  the  rates  themselves 
are  the  things  for  consideration,  and  the 
question  for  the  Commission  to  deter- 
mine is  whether  such  rates  are  in  any 
respect  in  violation  of  the  Act.  The  ques- 
tion in  any  case  is  not  whether  the  rates 
under  consideration  are  the  result  of  a 
reduction  or  of  an  advance,  but  whether 
the  rates  themselves  are  unjust,  unrea- 
sonable and  unlawful.  A  rate  that  has 
been  reduced  may  still  be  too  high  and 
one  that  has  been  advanced  might  con- 
ceivably be  too  low.  Morgan  Grain  Co. 
V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  460,  467. 

(h)  On  carloads  of  anthracite  coal 
from  Chicago,  111.,  to  Akron',  Colo.,  a 
rate  of  $8  was  assessed.  Said  rate 
yielded  the  defendant  about  9  mills  per 
mile,  though  defendants'  rates  to  points 
in  Nebraska  and  Wyoming,  about  the 
same  distance  from  Chicago,  yielded 
only  from  5V2  to  8  mills  per  mile.  The 
combination  at  time  of  shipment,  through 
Haigler,  Neb.,  was  $7,189.  The  through 
rate  from  1901  to  1907  was  $6.70.  De- 
fendant attempted  to  justify  the  in- 
creased rate  on  the  ground  that  the 
rate  from  Chicago  to  Haigler,  Neb.,  was 
established  by  the  legislature  of  Ne- 
braska and  was  not  sufficiently  remuner- 
ative and  was  being  contested.  Defend- 
ant's combined  rate  through  Haigler, 
prior  to  said  legislation,  was  only  $7.55. 
HELD,  that  the  rate  was  unreasonable. 
Reparation  awarded  on  basis  of  $7.  Lan- 
ing-Harris  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  11,  12. 

(i)  Defendants  raised  the  rates  on 
cottonseed  oil  from  Memphis  to  Louis- 
ville, Cincinnati  and  Chicago,  from  12c 
to  14c,  15c  to  17c  and  18c  to  20c,  re- 
spectively. Complainant  shippers  at 
Memphis  attacked  the  rates  as  unrea- 
sonable. The  rates  before  the  increase 
had  been  in  force  for  many  years.  They 
were  lower  than  rates  from  inland 
points,  and  originally  had  been  made  so 
on  account  of  water  competition,  which 
had  since  disappeared.  The  advance  at- 
tacked   applied   to   all  the   territory  east 


of  the  Mississippi  River,  but  very  few 
shippers  joined  in  the  complaint,  appar- 
ently from  the  belief  on  their  part  that 
the  advance  was  justified,  or  at  least 
amounted  to  so  little  as  to  be  unimpor- 
tant. The  increase  in  rates  attacked 
added  to  the  cost  per  gallon  of  the  oil 
only  about  15-100  of  a  cent.  Although  cot- 
tonseed oil  was  not  readily  spoiled  in  tran- 
sit, still,  because  of  arrangements  be- 
tween the  buyer  aird  the  shipper,  an  ex- 
pedited service  was  required  of  the  car- 
riers and  furnished  by  them.  Defend- 
ants paid  the  owners  for  the  use  of 
tank  cars  a  rental  of  three-fourths  of  a 
cent  per  mile,  which  was  assessed  on 
the  empty  as  well  as  on  the  loaded 
movements.  The  average  value  of  the 
oil  was  about  $2,500  per  car.  The  in- 
creased rates  yielded  the  carriers  about 
$110  per  car,  or  7.5  mills  per  ton  mile. 
The  rate  on  a  carload  of  cottonseed 
of  the  value  of  only  $270  was  practically 
as  high  as  the  increased  rates  on  cotton- 
seed oil  attacked.  It  appeared  that  Mem- 
phis had  for  many  years  enjoyed  a 
lower  rate  than  it  was  entitled  to  in 
comparison  with  other  southern  cities 
on  account  of  the  early  water  competi- 
tion. The  increase  in  rates  applied  to 
those  cities,  so  that  Memphis  was  not 
placed  thereby  at  a  competitive  disad- 
vantage. HELD,  the  rates  attacked  were 
not  shown  to  be  unreasonable.  Mem- 
phis Cotton  Oil  Co.  V.  I.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
[.    C.    C.    313,    318-321. 

§18.     Circumstances   and   Conditions. 

See    Evidence,    II. 

§18.     (1)      Low  Receipts  Per  Ton  IVIile. 

(a)  The  fact  that  a  long  established 
rate  yields  but  small  receipts  per  ton 
mile  cannot  justify  its  increase  to  such 
an  extent  or  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be 
unjust  to  any  shipper.  Circumstances 
and  conditions  may  be  such  that  an  in- 
crease in  a  particular  rate  may  be  un- 
reasonable, although  after  the  increase 
the  rate  will  yield  low  receipts  per  ton 
mile.  Detroit  Chemical  Works  v.  N.  C. 
Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  357,  362. 

(b)  The  reasonableness  of  a  certain 
'ncrease  in  rates  on  cement  from  Stroh, 
Ind.,  Toledo,  Sandusky  and  Baybridge,  O., 
to  Detroit  was  in  controversy.  The  car- 
riers sought  to  increase  the  rate  from 
Stroh  (which  was  considered  the  key 
to  the  adjustment  throughout  the  cement- 
mills  territory)  from  a  4c  to  a  5c  rate  per 
100  lbs.  basis.     Th^  5c  rate  would  yield 


42 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §18   (1)    (c)— §18   (8)    (a) 


about  7  mills  per  ton  per  mile,  incluuing 
an  absorption  of  $3  per  car  switching 
service  at  Detroit.  HELD,  the  advance 
not  unreasonable  and  permitted  to  go 
into  effect.  In  Re  Advances  on  Cement 
Originating^  in  Central  Freight  Associa- 
tion Territory,  22  I.  C.  C.  90,  92. 

(c)  The  complaints  of  several  inter- 
related cases  attack  the  reasonableness 
of  a  suspended  advance  of  3c  per  ton  in 
interstate  rates  on  bituminous  coal  from 
the  Harrisburg  field,  in  southern  Illinois, 
to  Chicago  and  points  beyond,  and  of  an 
advance  of  7c  per  ton  in  the  joint  rate 
from  said  field  to  Milwaukee.  The  route 
of  movement  is  through  a  portion  of 
Indiana.  The  Harrisburg  field  has  en- 
joyed a  rate  3c  lower  than  neighboring 
fields  on  account  of  a  difference  in  the 
mining  wage  scale.  A  large  portion  of 
Harrisburg  coal  is  consumed  by  various 
carriers,  leaving  slack  and  screinings  as 
the  major  portion  of  the  coal  seeking 
market  in  Chicago  and  Milwaukee.  The 
differential  favoring  Harrisburg  has  never 
been  acquiesced  in  by  the  other  coal 
fields  and  the  suspended  3c  advance  was 
intended  to  remove  it.  The  wage  scale 
has  now  been  equalized.  Rates  from  Illi- 
nois fields  to  Chicago  are  adjusted  with 
relation  to  one  another,  regard  being  had 
to  distance,  competitive  conditions  and 
the  quality  of  the  coal.  The  Illinois  com- 
mission investigated  and  allowed  a  7c 
advance  on  intrastate  hauls.  The  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  declined  > 
suspend  its  operation  in  so  far  as  it  ap- 
plied to  the  joint  rate  to  Milwaukee.  The 
general  rule  of  the  carriers  is  to  make 
the  proportional  rate  10c  lower  than  the 
local  rate  to  Chicago.  In  1910  the  rates 
from  Williamson  and  Franklin  counties, 
neighboring  fields,  yielded  3.2  and  2.9 
mills  per  ton  mile  for  the  local  and  pro- 
portional rates.  At  the  same  time  the 
rates  from  Harrisburg  district  yielded 
2.9  and  2.6  mills  per  ton  mile.  After  the 
advance  of  7c  in  1910  the  rates  from 
the  Williamson-Franklin  districts  yielded 
3.4  and  3.1  mills  per  ton  mile.  The  Har- 
risburg rates  yielded  ton-mile  earnings 
of  3.2  and  2.8  mills.  The  suspended  ad- 
vance on  Harrisburg  rates  would  yield 
ton-mile  earnings  of  3.3  and  2.9  mills. 
These  ton-mile  rates  are  figured,  deduct- 
ing terminal  charges  or  other  expense  to 
the  carriers.  Harrisburg  coal  competes 
at  Chicago  and  Milwaukee  with  Appa- 
lachian coal,  which  moves  by  rail-and- 
lake  transportation  at  a  much  lower 
total  rate.  This  rate  does  not  embrace 
the  same  services  aj  the  Harrisburg  all- 


rail  rates,  but  the  cost  of  unloading  the 
vessel,  loading  the  cars  and  switching  at 
the  dock  must  be  advert  to  the  total  cost. 
Harrisburg  is  a  superior  Illinois  coal,  but 
is  inferior  to  eastern  coal.  Illinois  coal 
fields  nearer  Chicago  have  rates  compara- 
tively higher  than  the  Harrisburg  rate. 
HELD,  no  reasons  are  shown  why  Ha^' 
risburg  should  be  entitled  to  a  lower  rate 
than  Williamson-Franklin  fields,  nor  is 
the  proposed  rate  unrrasonable  itself. 
The  defendants  have  sustained  the  bur- 
den of  proving  the  propriety  of  the 
present  and  proposed  increase.  In  Re 
Advances  on  Bituminous  Coal,  22  I.  C  C. 
341,  345. 

§18.     (2)     Water    Competition. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  of 
6c  per  100  lbs.  on  beer,  C.  L.,  Waukesha, 
Wis.,  to  Chicago,  111.,  a  distance  of  102 
miles.  For  11  years  or  more  prior  to 
May  16,  1910,  the  rate  on  beer  from 
Waukesha  to  Chicago  was  5c  per  100  lbs. 
On  that  date  the  rate  was  advanced  to 
6c  per  100  lbs.,  and  the  rate  from  Mil- 
waukee, Wis.,  to  Chicago  to  4c  per  100 
lbs.  Milwaukee  is  about  the  same  dis- 
tance from  Chicago  as  Waukesha,  but  is 
a  lake  port  where  water  competition  ex- 
ists. HELD,  that  a  difference  of  50  per 
cent  in  the  rates  from  two  producing 
and  competing  points  located  as  are  Mil- 
wauKee  and  Waukesha  is  somewhat  ex- 
cessive, and  that  the  rate  from  Waukesha 
should  not  exceed  a  rate  of  5c  per  100 
lbs.  Reparation  awarded.  Milwau  :ee- 
Waukesha  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  472. 

§18.     (3)      Heavy  and    Uniform   Tonnage. 

(a)  Complainants,  jobbers  of  boots 
and  shoes  at  Atlanta,  Ga.,  attacked  the 
advanced  rail  and  water  rates  from  Bos- 
ton and  New  York  to  Atlanta,  as  result- 
ing in  an  adjustment  unduly  preferential 
to  Lynchburg,  Va.,  and  St.  Louis,  Mo. 
Complainants  sold  their  goods  to  dealers 
In  Georgia,  Florida,  South  Carolina,  Ala- 
bama and  Mississippi.  The  combination 
of  the  rates  from  Boston  to  Lynchburg, 
thence  to  points  in  said  states,  was  less 
than  that  from  Boston  to  Atlanta  and 
thence  to  the  same  points.  Complainants 
contended  that  this  gave  to  Lynchburg 
jobbers  an  undue  advantage.  The  per 
ton  mile  earnings  from  Boston  to  Atlanta 
via  Savannah  were  28.6  mills;  via  Nor- 
folk, 19  mills;  from  Boston  to  Lynch- 
burg, 18  mills.  It  appeared  that  the 
Lynchburg  rates  were  influenced  by  the 
proximity    of    lines    reaching    Lynchburg 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §18   (4)    (a)— §18   (5)    (a) 


43 


to  eastern  trunk  lines,  which  took  gen- 
(srally  lower  rates  than  applied  in  the 
sjouth.  The  tonnage  in  boots  and  shoes 
from  Boston  and  New  York  to  Atlanta 
,  )vas  very  heavy  and  evenly  distributed 
Ihroughout  the  year.  Prior  to  the  es- 
tablishment of  the  rates  attacked,  the  car- 
riers had  voluntarily  established  lower 
carload  and  any-quantity  rates  than 
those  in  question.  Carriers  serving  Chi- 
cago. St.  Louis  and  other  cities  in  that 
territory  competed  with  eastern  carriers 
in  hauling  boots  and  shoes  to  Atlanta. 
On  account  of  this  competition,  the  car- 
riers finally  held  a  series  of  conferences 
resulting  in  the  establishment  of  the 
rates  attacked.  HELD,  the  rate  of  $1.05 
from  Boston  and  New  York  to  Atlanta 
should  be  reduced  to  95c.     Riser  Co,  v. 

C.  of  Ga,  Ry,  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  430,  441. 

§18.     (4)      Low-Grade    Commodity. 

(a)  The  advance  -in  rates  on  staves, 
hoops  and  heading  from  various  stations 
on  the  line  of  the  St.  L.  L  M.  &  S,  Ry. 
in  Arkansas  and  southern  Missouri  to 
certain  points  on  the  Atchafalaya  River 
and  Bayou  Teche,  in  Louisiana,  from  18c 
to  24c  per  100  lbs,  is  not  shown  by 
defendants  to  have  been  justified,  and 
the  increase  is  held  to  be  unreasonable, 
it  appearing  that  the  18c  rate  was  nec- 
essary to  enable  this  traflftc  to  move 
and  such  rate  not  appearing  to  be  un- 
duly low.  In  Re  Advances  on  Staves 
and  Other  Articles,  23  I,  C.  C.  382. 

(aa)     The    Santa    Fe,    Frisco,    U.    P., 

D.  R.  &  G.,  M.  K.  &  T.  and  M.  P.  R.  Rs. 
advanced  the  rates  on  cement  from 
points  in  what  is  known  as  the  gas  belt, 
which  lies  south  of  Kansas  City  and 
embraces  such  points  as  lola  and  Cha- 
nute,  and  as  far  north  as  Sugar  Creek, 
Mo.,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Kansas 
City,  and  as  far  south  as  Dewey,  Okla., 
to  Colorado  common  points,  Denver  to 
Trinidad,  inclusive,  and  also  from  the 
gas  belt  to  points  in  Nebraska,  Kansas 
and  Wyoming.  The  increases  ranged 
from  i/^c  to  5c  per  100  lbs.  The  average 
loading  of  cement  from  the  gas  belt  is 
over  50,000  lbs.  per  car,  average  mini- 
mum weight  38,000  lbs.  provided  in  the 
tariff.  The  average  receipts  of  all  freight 
per  ton  mile  of  the  defendants  were  from 
,789c  to  1.054c.  The  earnings  on  cement 
under  the  present  tariff  ranged  from  5.3 
mills  per  ton  mile  to  13.1  mills,  and 
under  the  proposed  advances  would  be 
from  6  mills  to  14  mills  per  ton  mile. 
HELD,  that  cement  is  one  of  the  lowest 


grade  commodities,  from  a  transporta- 
tion standpoint,  there  is,  and  from  the 
evidence  it  appears  that  the  movement 
from  the  gas  belt  to  the  territory  in- 
volved in  the  present  proceeding  bears 
its  proportion  of  the  transportation  bur- 
den of  the  carrier.  Carriers  ordered  to 
withdraw  tariffs  carrying  the  proposed 
advances.  In  Re  Investigation  of  Ad- 
vances in  Rates  on  Cement,  20  I.  C. 
C.    588. 

(b)  An  increase  in  rates  of  25  per 
cent  upon  a  low-grade  commodity  is  not 
justified  because  of  a  slight  increase  in 
the  ratio  of  expenses  to  earnings.  Winters 
Metallic  Paint  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,   18   L   C.   C.   596,  598. 

§18.     (5)      Ratio    of    Rate   to    Value. 

See  Classification,  §11. 
(a)  Defendants  raised  the  rates  on 
cottonseed  oil  from  Memphis  to  Louis- 
ville, Cincinnati  and  Chicago  from  12  to 
14,  15  tX)  17  and  18  to  20c,  respectively. 
Complainant  shippers  at  Memphis  at- 
tacked the  rates  as  unreasonable.  The 
rates  before  the  increase  had  been  in 
force  for  many  years.  They  were  lower 
than  rates  from  inland  points,  and  origi- 
nally had  been  made  so  on  account  of 
water  competition,  which  had  since  dis- 
appeared. The  advance  attacked  applied 
to  all  the  territory  east  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  but  very  few  shippers  joined  in  the 
complaint,  apparently  from  the  belief  on 
their  part  that  the  advance  was  justified, 
or  at  least  amounted  to  so  little  as  to  be 
unimportant.  The  increase  in  rates  at- 
tacked added  to  the  cost  per  gallon  of 
the  oil  only  about  fifteen  one-hundredths 
of  a  cent.  Although  cottonseed  oil  was 
not  readily  spoiled  in  transit,  still,  be- 
cause of  arrangements  between  the  buyer 
and  the  shipper,  an  expedited  service 
was  required  of  the  carriers  and  fur- 
nished by  them.  Defendants  paid  the 
owners  for  the  use  of  tank  cars  a  rental 
of  three-fourths  of  a  cent  per  mile,  which 
was  assessed  on  the  empty  as  well  as  the 
loaded  movements.  The  average  value 
of  the  oil  was  about  $2,500  per  car.  The 
increased  rates  yielded  the  carriers  about 
$110  per  car  or  7.5  mills  per  ton  mile. 
The  rate  on  a  carload  of  cottonseed 
of  the  value  of  only  $270  was  practically 
as  high  as  the  increased  rates  on  cotton- 
seed oil  attacked.  It  appeared  that  Mem- 
phis had  for  many  years  enjoyed  a  lower 
rate  than  it  was  entitled  to  in  comparison 
with  other  southern  cities  on  account  of 
the  early  water  competition  at  Memphis. 


44 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §18  (6)    (a)— §18   (8)    (a) 


The  increase  in  rates  applied  to  these 
cities,  so  that  Memphis  was  not  placed 
thereby  at  a  competitive  disadvantage. 
HELD,  the  rates  attacked  were  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable.  Memphis 
Cotton  Oil  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
313,  318-321. 

§18.  (6)  To  Gain  Import  Duty. 
See  Evidence,  §26. 
(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  ad- 
vanced rate  on  lemons,  southern  Cali- 
fornia to  the  east,  of  $1.15  per  100  lbs. 
Lemons  are  produced  mainly  in  two  lo- 
calities: Sicily,  which  in  1909  shipped 
69,000  carloads,  and  southern  California, 
which  shipped  6,000  carloads.  The 
United  States  consumed  approximately 
12,000  carloads,  of  which  one-half  were 
of  foreign  growth.  A  box  of  lemons 
weighs  84  lbs.,  and  can  be  transported 
from  Sicily  to  New  York  at  from  30  to 
35c,  and  from  thence  to  Chicago  for 
33.6c  more.  Sicilian  laborers  get  from  40 
to  60  cents  per  day,  while  in  California 
they  get  from  $1.75  to  $2.00  per  day. 
Even  with  a  protective  duty  of  $1.00  per 
100  lbs.,  the  American  grower  cannot 
compete  with  the  Sicilian.  In  1901  the 
rate  from  California  was  $1.25  per  100 
lbs.  In  the  winter  of  1902  a  "relief"  rate 
of  $1.00  was  made  effective  to  permit  the 
California  grower  to  compete.  This  rate 
was  renewed  in  the  winter  of  1903.  The 
general  freight  agent  of  the  Santa  Fe 
lines  wrote  to  his  superior  traffic  officer 
to  the  effect  that  the  $1.00  rate  should 
be  given  the  California  grower.  The  last 
tariff  act  increased  the  duty  on  lemons 
from  $1.00  to  $1.50  per  100  lbs.,  and  com- 
plainants asserted  this  was  the  reason 
for  the  increase  in  freight  rates.  HELD, 
that  upon  consideration  of  all  the  facts, 
the  lemon  rate  should  not  exceed  $l.uO 
per  100  lbs.  from  southern  California  to 
eastern  destinations.  Arlington  Heights 
Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co..  19  I.  C.  C. 
148, 153 ;  order  of  Commission  temporarily 
enjoined,  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C, 
182  Fed.  189;  decision  of  Commission  re- 
versed, A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S., 
190  Fed.  591. 

§18.     (7)      Rates   In   Like  Territory. 
See    Comparative    Rates. 

(a)  In  Hood  &  Sons  v.  Delaware  & 
Hudson  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  15,  the  Commis- 
sion found  that  for  the  transportation  of 
fluid  milk  from  Poultney,  Rupert  and 
West  Pawlett,  Vt.,  and  Cambridge,  Gran- 
ville, Middle  Granville,  Salem  and  Shus- 
han,  N.  Y.,  to  Eagle  Bridge,  N.  Y.,  des- 


tined to  Boston,  Mass.,  a  rate  of  $16  per 
car  of  250  cans  of  40  quarts  each,  and 
QV2C  per  can  for  any  excess  over  250 
cans,  was  a  reasonable  carload  rate.  The 
defendant  sought  to  advance  the  rate  to 
9c  per  can  of  40  quarts  each  based  on  a 
car  minimum  of  250  cans,  excess  at  the 
same  rate  per  can  on  Boston  shipments 
of  milk  from  the  points  mentioned  to 
Eagle  Bridge.  From  Poultney  to  Boston 
the  distance  is  213  miles.  The  distance 
from  Eagle  Bridge  to  New  York  via  Al- 
bany is  290  miles.  The  carload  rate  to 
New  York  was  28.8c  per  can  of  40  quarts. 
For  the  haul  from  Eagle  Bridge  to  Al- 
bany, a  distance  of  about  142  miles,  de- 
fendant got  50  per  cent  of  the  through 
rate  to  New  York,  or  14.4c  per  can  of  40 
quarts,  which  is  equivalent  to  3.6  mills 
per  quart.  For  the  45  miles  from  Eagle 
Bridge  to  Poultney  it  is  equivalent  to  1.13 
mills  per  quart,  and  deducting  the  ter- 
minal charges  on  New  York  milk  of  2c 
per  100  lbs.  would  leave  a  net  rate  of 
about  1.07  mills  per  quart.  Under  the 
proposed  advance  the  rate  on  complain- 
ant's milk  would  be  equivalent  to  2.25 
mills  per  quart  from  Poultney  and  inter- 
mediate points  to  Eagle  Bridge.  Be- 
tween Providence,  R.  I.,  and  Boston, 
Mass.,  a  distance  of  45  miles  over  the 
N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.,  the  rate  was  $17.24 
per  car,  the  equivalent  of  6.9c  per  can,  or 
1.7  mills  per  quart.  Other  instances  in 
nearby  territory  were  similar.  The  ad- 
vanced rate  proposed  was  $22.50  per  car, 
or  2.25  mills  per  quart.  HELD,  that  the 
proposed  increased  rate  is  unreasonable 
and  unjust  but  that  there  is  probable 
justification  for  an  advance  in  the  pres- 
ent rate  to  $17.25  per  car  of  250  cans  of 
40  quarts  each,  and  7c  per  can  for  any 
excess  over  250  cans.  In  Re  Advances 
by  the  D.  &  H.  Co.  on  Fluid  Milk,  23 
I.  C.  C.  500. 

(b)  It  not  appearing  that  a  proposed 
advanced  rate  from  Portland,  Colo.,  to 
Denver  of  TV2C  per  100  lbs.  on  cement 
is  too  high  when  compared  with  a  rate 
of  a  same  amount  from  lola,  Kan.,  to 
Kansas  City,  the  former  haul  being  the 
longer  and  more  difficult,  the  proposed 
new  rate  is  permitted  to  go  into  effect. 
In  Re  Advances  on  Cement,  20  I.  C.  C. 
588,  597. 

§18.     (8)      Circuitous    Route. 

See  Througli   Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 
§6. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  reason- 
ableness of  an  advance  in  rates  on  staves 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §18   (9)    (a)— §19   (a) 


45 


and  heading  which  move  at  the  hardwood 
lumber  rate  from  Arkansas  producing 
points  to  Cairo  and  Thebes,  111.,  as  af- 
fecting the  total  through  charge  to  points 
beyond.  Via  the  Frisco  R.  R.  the  typical 
rate  from  McNab,  Ark.,  effective  March 
1,  1907,  was  13c  per  100  lbs.;  effective 
Aug.  14,  1908,  14y2c;  effective  Dec.  10, 
1908,  16c;  effective  Sept.  15,  1909,-  14c; 
effective  July  5,  1910,  16c,  where  it  has 
remained.  The  haul  is  710  miles  to 
Thebes,  revenue  per  ton  mile,  4.5  mills. 
Via  the  Iron  Mountain  R.  R.  the  typical 
rate  was  from  Fulton,  Ark.  This  rate  was 
13c,  effective  March  1,  1907;  UV2C,  effect- 
ive July  28,  1908;  16c,  effective  Dec.  12, 
1908;  14c,  effective  Aug.  19,  1909;  16c, 
effective  Aug.  4,  1910,  the  current  rate. 
The  distance  to  Thebes  is  383  miles, 'rev- 
enue per  ton  mile  8.3  mills.  The  ship- 
ments involved  moved  between  Dec.  12, 
1908,  and  the  dates  when  the  lower  rates 
were  restored  from  the  respective  points 
of  origin.  Reparation  was  asked  on  basis 
of  the  rates  in  effect  to  Thebes,  immedi- 
ately previous  and  subsequent  to  the 
period  referred  to;  i.  e.,  on  basis  of  14c 
from  Fulton  and  McNab.  The  Iron  Moun- 
tain R.  R.  is  the  short  line  to  Thebes, 
but  the  Frisco  in  order  to  retain  the  en- 
tire haul  of  the  traffic  carries  it  by  a 
circuitous  route  making  a  haul  almost 
twice  as  long  as  on  the  competitive  line. 
HELD,  it  is  obvious  that  the  Frisco  R.  R. 
cannot  subject  McNab  to  the  payment  of 
unreasonable  rates  merely  in  order  that 
traffic  may  be  carried  over  its  own  lines 
by  an  unreasonably  circuitous  route, 
whereas  another  reasonable  route  and 
one  about  half  as  long  could  be  had  by  a 
joint  rate  over  the  Frisco  and  Iron  Moun- 
tain R.  Rs.  However,  the  rates  charged  are 
not  so  high  on  their  face  as  to  appear 
unreasonable.  They  are  not  shown  to  be 
out  of  line  with  rates  from  other  Arkan- 
sas points  and  do  not  afford  greater 
revenue  than  rates  from  Arkansas  points 
prescribed  by  the  Commission  in  other 
cases.  Complaint  dismissed.  Winter- 
botham  &  Sons  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21 1.  C.  C. 
266. 

§18.  (9)  Use  of  Commodity. 
See  Classification,  §10. 
(a)  Complainants  attacked  an  advance  of 
331/4  per  cent  in  rates  on  stock  cattle  and 
sheep  throughout  western  states  to  and 
beyond  the  Missouri  River.  For  25  years 
previously  to  the  advance  there  had  been 
a  rate  on  stockers  and  feeders  of  75  per 
cent  of  the  rate  on  market  cattle.   HELD, 


that  from  the  standpoint  of  value  of 
stockers  and  feeders  as  compared  with 
market  cattle,  the  character  and  cost  of 
the  service  of  the  two,  the  heavy  claims 
to  which  railroads  are  subject  for  shrink- 
age and  fall  in  price  from  delays  in  reach- 
ing markets,  the  fact  that  carriers  are 
Insured  a  second  haul  to  market  on  the 
fat  cattle  from  the  point  where  they  are 
fed,  and  the  value  of  the  service  to  the 
shipper,  the  75  per  cent  rate  is  reason- 
able compared  with  the  service  and  rate 
on  market  cattle.  It  is  not  contrary  to  the 
Commission's  rulings  for  defendants  to 
make  rates  on  the  use  to  which  cattle  are 
put  where  there  is  a  substantial  dissimi- 
larity in  the  transportation  service  and 
of  the  value  of  the  service  to  the  shipper. 
In  Re  Advances  on  Stock  Cattle  and 
Sheep,  23  I.  C.  C.  7,  12. 

§18.  (10)  increased  Divisions. 
See  Divisions, 
(a)  These  proceedings  involved  proposed 
increased  class  rates  from  St.  Paul  and 
Duluth,  Minn.,  to  Buffalo,  Pittsburgh  and 
other  points  in  Central  Freight  Associa- 
tion territory.  Commodities  chiefly  af- 
fected were  butter  and  eggs,  less  than 
carloads.  Proposed  increase  of  10,  10,  10, 
4,  1.5c  on  classes  1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  respectively. 
Reason  assigned  by  defendants  was  that 
western  carriers  were  being  deprived  of 
revenue  on  shipments  to  New  York,  on 
account  of  billing  locally  to  Buffalo  and 
reconsigning.  No  joint  rate  existed  from 
St.  Paul  to  New  York.  Combination 
based  on  Chicago  was  $1.15;  based  on 
Buffalo  it  was  $1.12.  Western  carriers 
made  10c  more  on  combinations  based  on 
Chicago  than  on  those  based  on  Buffalo. 
Rate  to  Buffalo  was  lon^  standing. 
HELD,  that  since  the  advance  in  the 
Buffalo  rate  was  proposed  not  because 
the  Buffalo  rate  was  too  low,  but  be- 
cause on  shipments  going  to  New  York 
City  and  rebilled  at  Buffalo,  the  western 
carriers  lose  revenue  to  which  they 
would  be  entitled  were  the  shipments 
billed  through,  the  question  was  one  of 
divisions  and  not  of  increase  of  rates,  and 
the  proposed  increase  was  unreasonable. 
In  Re  Advances  in  Class  Rates,  22  I.  C. 
C.  338. 

V.     DISCRIMINATION    THROUGH    AD- 
VANCE. 

§19.     In   General. 

(a)  Rates  on  cotton  from  Texas  pro- 
ducing points  are,  and  for  some  time 
have  been,  the  same  to  New  Orleans  and 


46 


ADVANCED   RATES,   §19    (b)— (d) 


to  Texas  ports.  Upon  complaint  to  tLe 
Texas  commission  that  this  traffic  was 
being  diverted  from  Texas  ports  to  New 
Orleans,  the  Texas  commission  proposed 
to  reduce  the  rates  to  the  Texas  ports 
if  the  alleged  discrimination  were  not  re- 
moved. The  average  haul  on  cotton  from 
Texas  points  to  Galveston  is  225  miles; 
to  New  Orleans,  488  miles.  On  account 
of  the  contemplated  action  of  the  Texas 
commission,  the  carriers  filed  increased 
rates  to  New  Orleans  (63c),  which,  upon 
complaint,  were  suspended  by  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission.  In  the 
year  1910-11,  under  the  equr  lity  of  rates 
to  New  Orleans  and  Galveston,  New  Or- 
leans received  but  150,392  bales  out  of  a 
production  of  3,258,651  bales  of  cotton  in 
Texas.  HELD,  the  rates  to  Texas  por  i 
not  being  alleged  to  be  unreasonable, 
defendants  have  sustained  the  burden 
cast  upon  them  by  the  statute,  and  the 
proposed  increased  rates  to  New  Orleans 
are  not  unreasonable.  Further,  the  ex- 
port rates  to  Galveston  being  subject  to 
the  federal  Act  it  is  clearly  within  the 
right  of  the  carriers  in  the  absence  of  an 
order  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission to  the  contrary  to  continue  the 
present  parity  of  export  rates  from  Texas 
points  to  New  Orleans  and  Texas  ports. 
In  Re  Advances  on  Cotton  and  Cotton 
Linters,  23  I.  C.  C.  404,  411. 

(b)  Under  an  arrangement  between 
defendants  in  force  for  a  number  of  years 
prior  to  July  31,  1899,  Newport  News  and 
Norfolk.  Va.,  took  equal  freight  rates  to 
and  from  common  points  in  Associated 
Railways  territory  and  in  Southeastern 
Freight  Association  territory.  Because 
of  a  disagreement  as  to  divisions  of  the 
joint  rates,  the  southern  lines  withdrew 
from  the  arrangement,  and  since  that 
time  Newport  News  rates  to  and  from 
such  common  points  have  been  on  a 
higher  basis  than  Norfolk  rates  to  and 
from  the  same  points.  As  compared  with 
Norfolk,  Newport  News  is  placed  in  a  po- 
sition of  material  disadvantage.  As  to 
natural  advantages,  Newport  News  and 
Norfolk  are  practically  on  the  same  foot- 
ing. The  southern  lines  do  not  extend 
to  Newport  News,  but  by  means  of  their 
connection  with  other  defendant  lines 
they  participate  in  Newport  News  traffic 
to  and  from  the  south,  maintain  through 
routes  for  the  movement  of  such  traffic, 
and  in  effect  control  the  rates  applicable 
thereto.  HELD,  that  the  present  rate 
situation  is  unjustly  discriminr^ory 
against  and  unduly  prejudicial  to  New- 


port News;  that  the  southern  carriers 
cannot  escape  responsibility  for  such 
discrimination  merely  because  their 
rails  do  not  extend  to  Newport  News; 
that  Newport  News  is  entitled  to  the 
same  rates  as  Norfolk  to  and  from  com- 
mon points  on  defendant's  lines  in  the 
territories  referred  to,  not  within  150 
miles  of  Norfolk.  Chamber  of  Commerce 
of  Newport  News  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C. 
C.  345. 

(c)  In  a  prior  decision  (The  Okla- 
homa case,  22  I.  C.  C.  160)  the  Commis- 
sion approved  certain  mileage  rates  on 
fresh  meats  and  packing-house  products 
from  Wichita,  Oklahoma  City  and  Fort 
Worth,  to  various  points,  including  points 
in  Arkansas  and  that  part  of  Louisiana 
west  of  the  Mississippi  River,  and  the 
carriers  proceeded  to  file  such  schedules, 
but  before  they  became  effective,  pack- 
ing-house interests  at  Wichita  protested, 
and  the  schedules  were  suspended.  It 
appeared  that  in  many  cases  the  mileage 
scale  advanced  the  rates  from  Wichita, 
Oklahoma  City  and  Fort  Worth  to  points 
in  Arkansas  and  Louisiana,  and  placed 
such  cities  at  substantial  disadvantage 
as  compared  with  Kansas  City  and  St. 
Louis  and  disturbed  the  competitive  re- 
lationship existing  between  these  various 
points.  HELD,  that  discrimination  can 
only  be  removed  by  applying  from  Kan- 
sas City  and  St.  Louis  into  Louisiana 
and  Arkansas  the  same  mileage  scale 
which  has  been  found  reasonable  from 
Wichita,  Oklahoma  City  and  Fort  Worth, 
which  will  result  in  advancing  the  rates 
from  Kansas  City  and  St.  Louis  to  a 
proper  relation  with  those  from  the  other 
points.  However,  the  Commission  has 
no  authority  to  compel  the  advance  of  a 
rate  for  the  purpose  of  removing  dis- 
crimination, and  it  is  therefore  recom- 
mended that  the  carriers  adopt  the  mile- 
age scale  prescribed  in  the  Oklahoma 
case  to  points  in  Louisiana  and  Arkansas 
from  St.  Louis.  Kansas  City,  Wichita, 
Oklahoma  City  and  Fort  Worth  by  proper 
tariffs.  In  Re  Transportation  of  Fresh 
Meats,  23  I.  C.  C.  652,  655. 

(d)  Certain  milling  points  in  central 
and  eastern  Wisconsin  have  been  grouped 
with  Chicago  and  Milwaukee  in  the  pro- 
portional rates  on  grain  and  grain  prod- 
ucts from  Kansas  City,  Omaha  and  Coun- 
cil Bluffs.  On  May  15,  1911,  the  propor- 
tional rates  to  these  Wisconsin  points 
were  withdrawn,  which  raised  the  rate 
from  Omaha  and  Council  Bluffs  from  12c 
to  the  local  rate  of  15%c  and  to  14%c 


ADVANCED  RATES,   §19    (dd)  — (e) 


47 


from  Kansas  City.  The  proportional 
rates  were  cancelled  because  complaint 
had  been  made  that  the  application  of  a 
proportional  rate  of  12c  from  the  Mis- 
souri River  to  Wisconsin  points,  a  distance 
of  700  miles,  while  the  rate  to  Duluth 
was  15c  for  a  distance  of  600  miles,  was 
a  discrimination  against  the  millers  of 
Duluth.  The  12c  proportional  rate  to  Chi- 
cago and  Milwaukee  resulted  to  some  ex- 
tent from  the  competition  of  the  Mem- 
phis and  St.  Louis  gateways,  which  did 
not  apply  to  the  Wisconsin  territory  in 
question.  Chicago  was  not  a  competitor 
of  complainants  who  were  millers  in  cen- 
tral and  eastern  Wisconsin.  While  Chi- 
cago and  Milwaukee  millers  might  receive 
grain  on  the  12c  proportional  rate,  it  could 
be  cleaned  and  milled  only  on  the  basis 
of  the  15%c  rate  with  the  privilege  of 
shipping  the  product  to  points  beyond 
taking  the  same  rate.  Complainants  ex- 
pressly admitted  the  reasonableness  of  the 
local  rates  to  Wisconsin  points,  but  com- 
plained of  the  discrimination  against  them 
by  the  lower  proportional  rates  to  Chi- 
cago and  IMilwaukee.  HELD,  if  the  tran 
sit  privilege  is  not  abused  at  Chicago 
and  Milwaukee  there  is  no  discrimination 
against  the  Wisconsin  millers  based  on 
the  proportional  rates  to  these  two  points, 
because  it  will  cost  millers  at  these 
points  the  same  to  compete  with  the 
millers  in  central  and  eastern  Wisconsin 
as  those  millers  pay.  The  admission  of 
complainants  that  they  do  not  contend 
that  the  present  charges  a^e  unreason- 
able relieves  defendants  of  the  burden  of 
justifying  them,  and  therefore,  there  be- 
ing no  discrimination  apparent,  and  no 
unreasonable  rate  involved,  the  complaint 
must  be  dismissed.  Wisconsin  Stater 
Millers'  Ass'n  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  494. 

(dd)  Carriers  had  maintained  for 
nearly  30  years  the  same  rates  on  cream 
and  condensed  milk  as  on  raw  milk 
from  Ohio  and  Indiana  dairy  points  to 
Pittsburgh.  They  advanced  the  rates  50 
per  cent  on  only  condensed  milk  and 
cream  on  the  ground  that  upon  the  aver- 
age cream  is  five  times  more  valuable 
than  whole  milk,  and  condensed  milk 
three  times  more  valuable.  HELD,  that 
the  value  of  an  article  of  freight  is  but 
one  of  many  factors  to  be  considered, 
and  especially  is  this  true  where,  as  in 
the  present  case,  there  is  no  additional 
cost  or  extra  service  rendered  in  the 
transportation  of  the  article  of  greater 
value.      The    record    discloses    that    the 


claims  for  loss  of  cream  and  condensed 
milk  are  practically  insignificant.  It 
may  also  be  suggested  that  regardless  of 
whether  for  transportation  purposes  the 
classification  of  dairy  products  should 
be  restricted  to  the  primary  one  of 
whole  milk  and  cream,  the  contention 
strongly  urged  by  complainants  that  a 
correspondingly  lower  rate  should  ob- 
tain on  skimmed  milk,  buttermilk  and 
other  dairy  products  of  less  value, 
suggests  the  importance  of  proceeding 
carefully  in  the  disturbance  of  the  existing 
basis.  The  present  relation  of  these 
rates  has  been  maintained  throughout 
this  territory  for  nearly  30  years.  Busi- 
ness has  adjusted  itself  accordingly  and 
a  change  therein  should  be  sanctioned 
only  upon  a  clear  showing  of  transporta- 
tion conditions  to  justify  it.  Such  evi- 
dence has  not  been  presented  by  this 
record.  In  arriving  at  these  conclusions 
it  is  not  meant  that  carriers  may  not 
in  any  case  charge  higher  rates  upon 
cream  and  condensed  milk  than  upon 
raw  milk  and  other  dairy  products,  de- 
pending upon  the  conditions  necessary 
to  be  considered  from  a  transportation 
standpoint  existing  in  the  territory  af- 
fected. Whether  in  a  given  case  such 
difference  in  rate  between  the  respective 
commodities,  if  justified,  should  be  as 
much  as  50  per  cent  is  not  now  decided. 
The  conclusions  herein  are  based  wholly 
upon  the  particular  facts  and  conditions 
disclosed  by  the  present  record  as  affect- 
ing these  specific  rates,  just  as  other 
cases  of  a  similar  nature  rfiust  be  de- 
cided upon  their  individual  facts  and 
conditions.  It  is  merely  held  that  upon 
the  facts  presented  in  this  case  the 
carriers  have  failed  to  sustain  the  bur- 
den of  proof  cast  upoi  them  by  the 
statute.  In  Re  Rates  on  Cream  and 
Condensed  Milk,  21  I.  C.  C.  522,  527, 
528. 

(e)  Davenport  is  on  the  west  bank  of 
the  Mississippi  River  opposite  Rock 
Island  and  Moline.  Prior  to  Oct.  1,  1907, 
the  rate  on  cypress  lumber  from  Minot 
and  Rome,  Miss.,  to  each  of  these  cities 
was  21c  per  100  lbs.  On  that  date  the 
rate  to  Davenport  was  increased  to  23c, 
but  to  Rock  Island  and  Moline  was  not 
advanced.  HELD,  that  Davenport  should 
be  grouped  with  Rock  Island  and  Moline 
for  rate-making  purposes;  that  the  ad- 
vanced rate  was  unlawful  to  the  extent 
that  it  was  higher  than  the  rate  contem- 
poraneously enforced  from  the  same 
points   to   Rock   Island   and   Moline   and 


48 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §19   (ee)— §20   (d) 


that  reparation  should  •  be  awarded. 
Davenport  Commercial  Club  v.  Y.  &  M.  V. 
R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  19. 

(ee)     Complainant     jobbers     of     boots 
and  shoes  at  Atlanta,  Ga.,  attacked  the 
rail    and    water    rates    from    Boston    and 
New    York    to    Atlanta,    as    resulting   in 
an     adjustment    unduly    preferential     to 
Lynchburg,  Va.,  and  St.  Louis,  Mo.  Com- 
plainants sold  their  goods  to  dealers  in 
Georgia,    Florida,    South    Carolina,    Ala- 
bama and  Mississippi.    The  combination 
of  the  rates  from  Boston  to  LyncLburp-, 
thence  to  points  in  said  states,  was  less 
than   +hat   from   Boston   to  Atlanta,   and 
thence  to  the  same  points.  Complainants 
cor  tended   that   tais   gave   to  Lynchburg 
jobbers    an   undue   advantage.     The   per 
ton    mile    earnings    from    Boston    to    At- 
lanta via  Savannah  were  28.6  mills;   via 
Norfolk,  19  mills;  from  Boston  to  Lynch- 
burg,   18    mills.      It    appeared    that    the 
Lynchburg  rates  were  influenced  by  the 
proximity    of    lines    reaching    Lynchburg 
to   eastern  trunk   lines   which   took  gen- 
erally  lower    rates    than    applied    in    the 
South.     The  tonnage  in  boots  and  shoes 
from   Boston  and  New   York  to  Atlanta 
was   very   heavy   and   evenly  distributed 
throughout  the  year.     Prior  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  rates  attacked   the  car- 
riers   had    voluntarily    established    lower 
carload     and     any-quantity     rates     than 
those  in  question.     Carriers  serving  Chi 
cago,  St.  Louis  and  other  cities  in  that 
territory  competed  with  eastern  carriers 
in   hauling  boots  and   shoes   to  Atlanta 
On     account     of     this     competition     thf. 
carriers   finally  held  a  series  of  confer 
ences  resulting  in  the   establishment  o' 
the  rates  attacked.     HELD,  the  rate  o' 
$1.05  from  Boston  and  New  York  to  At 
lanta  should   be   reduced   to   95c.     Kisei 
Co.  V.  Central  of  Georgia  Ry.  Co.,  17  I 
C.   C.  430,  441. 

(f)  Where  an  industry  has  been  re 
quired  to  pay  for  a  long  period  of  time 
rates  of  freight  on  raw  material  which 
bear  certain  relations  to  rates  charged 
to  competitors  at  other  points,  a  marke«I 
change  in  such  relations  of  rates  in  favor 
of  competing  industries  cannot  be  made 
without  an  attendant  presumption  of  un 
due  discrimination.  Detroit  Chemical 
Works  V.  N.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  357. 
362. 


VI.     REMEDIES   AND   PROCEDURE. 

§20.     Injunctions. 

See  Courts,  §6  (i),  (j),  (k),  §9  (k), 
(I),  (n),  §10  (a),  §11  (y);  Demur- 
rage,   §1    (c). 

(a)  Where  the  case  in  which  a  tem- 
porary writ  of  injunction  is  asked  pre- 
sents questions  of  grave  importance  and 
difliculty,  and  it  appears  from  the  plead- 
ings and  affidavits  presented  upon  the 
hearing  for  the  temporary  writ  that  great 
damage  will  result  to  the  complainant  if 
the  writ  is  not  granted  and  he  shall  be 
finally  successful  in  the  litigation,  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  that  the  granting  of 
the  writ  will  not  cause  serious  damage 
to  the  defendant  as  compared  with  the 
damage  which  would  result  to  the  com- 
plainant if  the  same  were  not  granted,  a 
court  of  equity  will  unhesitatingly,  in  or- 
der to  maintain  the  present  status,  issue 
a  temporary  writ  of  injunction.  Nashville 
Grain  Exch.  v.  U.  S.,  191  Fed.  37,  40. 

(b)  Defendants  filed  with  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  tariffs  con- 
taining an  increase  of  rates  a  day  or  two 
prior  to  a  bill  filed  by  shippers  to  enjoin 
the  putting  into  effect  of  the  increase  of 
rates.  At  the  time  of  filing  the  bill  for 
injunction  the  tariffs  containing  the  in- 
crease had  not  been  posted  at  the  sta- 
tions of  defendants.  HELD,  under  Sec- 
tions 9,  13,  15,  16,  22  and  23  of  the  Act,  the 
United  States  Circuit  Court  had  no  juris- 
diction to  enjoin  said  increase  in  rates. 
Wickwire  Steel  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 
R.  Co.,  181  Fed.  316,  318. 

(c)  The  United  States  courts  have  no 
original  jurisdiction  to  enjoin  the  putting 
into  effect  of  a  proposed  schedule  of  rates 
alleged  to  be  unreasonable,  in  advance 
of  a  determination  of  that  question  by 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission, 
since  under  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act 
as  amended  June  29,  1906,  the  question 
of  the  unreasonableness  or  discrimination 
of  a  rate  is,  in  the  first  instance,  vested 
solely  in  that  Commission.  Columbus 
Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  Kanawha  &  M.  Ry. 
Co.,  178  Fed.  261,  263. 

(d)  In  determining  whether  it  should 
temporarily  enjoin  a  proposed  increase 
of  interstate  rates  the  court  must  take 
Into  account  the  balance  of  equity  be- 
tween the  shippers  and  the  carriers.  If 
the  balance  of  detriment  or  inconven- 
ience in  the  event  the  temporary  injunc- 
tion is  refused  is  against  the  shippers, 
then  the  injunction  will  be  granted.    But, 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §20  (e)— §21  (a) 


49 


if  on  the  other  hand,  the  balance  of  detri- 
ment or  inconvenience  is  against  the  car 
riers,  in  the  event  the  temporary  injunc- 
tion should  be  issued,  then  it  should  be 
refused.  Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Co.  v. 
S.  P.  Co.,  175  Fed.  141,  142. 

(e)  For  some  years  prior  to  1904  a 
rate  of  $1.00  per  100  lbs.  on  lemons  from 
California  to  New  York  markets  was 
maintained  as  an  emergency  rate,  and 
for  five  years  after  said  date  by  negotia- 
tions between  defendant  carriers  and 
complainant  shippers  was  maintained  as 
a  permanent  rate  and  plaintiffs  enlarged 
their  orchards  and  their  business  in  re- 
liance upon  this  fact.  Defendant  pro- 
posed to  increase  the  rate  to  $1.15.  There 
was  some  evidence  of  an  increase  in  the 
cost  of  labor  as  applied  to  railroad  opera- 
tion, but  the  entire  cost  of  transportation 
had  not  increased.  If  complainants 
were  refused  a  temporary  injunction, 
they  would  have  to  pay  an  increase  in 
freight  of  about  $250,000  a  year,  whereas 
if  the  injunction  were  granted  the  defend- 
ants would  be  protected  by  bond  for  the 
increase  in  rates  if  the  same  should  be 
sustained  by  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission.  The  increased  rates  threat- 
ened to  destroy  complainant's  industry 
on  account  of  competition  with  lemons 
from  Sicily,  and  it  appeared  that  defend 
ants  were  attempting  to  raise  the  rate  in 
order  to  share  in  the  benefits  of  the  pro 
tective  tariff  imposed  against  Sicily. 
HELD,  complainants  were  entitled  to  a 
temporary  injunction  pending  the  deci- 
sion of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis 
sion.  Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Co.  v.  S 
P.  Co.,  175  Fed.  141,  143,  144. 

(f)  Under  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act,  as  amended  June  29,  1906,  the  courts* 
have  no  power  to  enjoin  the  filing,  publi 
cation  or  enforcement  of  a  schedule  of 
rates  under  a  bill  brought  prior  to  the 
date  of  filing  the  rates  of  the  tariffs,  since 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  has 
exclusive  jurisdiction  of  determining 
questions  of  reasonableness  and  discrimi 
nation  with  respect  to  interstate  rates. 
Columbus  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  Kanawha 
&  M.  Ry.  Co.,  171  Fed.  713,  719. 

(g)  Under  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act,  as  amended  June  29,  1906,  the  corrts 
have  no  jurisdiction  to  enjoin  the  filing 
and  posting  of  a  rate  or  to  enjoin  the 
enforcement  of  a  rate  after  it  has  been 
filed  and  posted,  but  before  it  has  ever 
been  enforced.  Houston  Coal  &  Coke  Co. 
v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  171  Fed.  723,  724, 
725. 


(h)  Under  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act,  as  amended  by  the  act  of  June  29, 
1906,  the  courts  have  no  jurisdiction  to 
entertain  a  suit  in  equity  to  prevent  a 
filing  of  a  schedule  of  rates  or  a  change 
to  unjust  or  unreasonable  rates,  since 
said  acts  lodge  the  question  of  reason- 
ableness of  rates  exclusively  with 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 
(Shelby,  J.,  dissenting.)  A.  C.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Macon  Grocery  Co.,  166  Fed.  206, 
218. 

(i)  Under  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act,  as  amended,  the  courts  have  juris- 
diction to  entertain  a  bill  in  equity  to 
enjoin  the  enforcement  of  a  threatened 
ruinous  schedule  of  interstate  rates  which 
is  proposed  to  be  adopted  in  the  future 
without  any  previous  action  thereupon 
by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Pacific  Coast  Lumber 
Mfrs.  Assn.,  165  Fed.  1,  8. 

(j)  Under  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act,  as  amended,  the  courts  have  no  juris- 
diction to  enjoin  the  enforcement  of 
interstate  rates  after  the  schedule  has 
been  filed  and  put  into  effect,  since  the 
authority  to  determine  the  reasonablenesi 
of  rates  is  vested  by  the  act  exclusively 
In  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission., 
G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Kalispell  Lumber  Co., 
165  Fed.  25,  28. 

(k)  Under  the  Act,  as  amended  in 
1906,  a  United  States  Circuit  Court  may 
enjoin  a  carrier  from  putting  a  proposed 
advance  into  effect,  and,  restrain  such 
advance,  until  the  Commission  shall 
have  an  opportunity  to  pass  on  the  rea- 
sonableness of  the  rates  involved.  Kiser 
Co.  V.  Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Elec,  158  Fed. 
193,    198. 

(1)  A  state  equity  court  has  no  juris- 
diction to  enjoin  the  filing  of  a  schedule 
of  increased  interstate  rates  with  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  as  by 
the  Act  the  Commission  has  exclusive 
original  jurisdiction  to  determine  the 
reasonableness  of  such  rates.  Thacker 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.. 
67   W.   Va.   448,   454,   68   S.   E.   107. 

§21.     Investigation. 

(a)  Where  the  advance  of  an  individ- 
ual rate  has  been  attacked  in  a  general 
inquiry  before  the  Commission,  it  is  not 
necessary  or  proper  to  inquire  into  it, 
pending  the  general  investigation.  Hy- 
draulic Press  Brick  Co.  v.  Vandalia  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  175,  176. 


50 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §22  (a)  — (f) 


VII.  REPARATION. 


See  Reparation.  §2  (k),  (I),  (kk),  §9 
(a),  (b),  (c),  §16  (fff),  (ggg),  (nnn), 
(qqq),    (vvv),    §20    (a). 


^22. 


In    General, 
See    Claims. 

(a)  When  a  rate  is  advanced  and  the 
increased  rate  is  condemned  by  the 
amount  of  the  advance  a  much  more  sat- 
isfactory basis  for  an  award  of  repara- 
tion is  afforded  than  in  the  present  case, 
where  so  far  as  changes  have  occurred 
they  have  been  at  least  for  the  most  part 
reductions  in  a  territory  where  changes 
in  conditions  have  taken  place  which 
contribute  in  greater  or  less  degree  to 
a  present  showing  of  unreasonableness 
in  existing  rates.  Anadarko  Cotton  Oil 
Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
C.  43,  50. 

(b)  Complainant,  a  large  lumber  cor- 
poration, operated  a  lumber  road  con- 
necting its  timber  tract  with  the  Cen- 
tral of  Ga.  Ry.  under  a  contract  whereby 
it  received  a  division  of  2c  per  100  lbs. 
upon  all  traffic  delivered  to  the  trunk 
line.  It  also  carried  freight  for  small 
competitors  located  on  the  tap  line. 
Eventually  an  advance  was  made  in  the 
lumber  rate  of  2c  per  100  lbs.  by  the 
trunk  line  and  the  division  to  the  tap  line 
was  increased  to  5c  per  100  lbs.  It  is 
found  that  the  reasonable  cost  of  hauling 
the  lumber  of  the  tap  line  is  2c  per  100 
lbs.,  and  that  the  advance  in  rate  by  the 
trunk  line  was  unreasonable.  HELD, 
that  the  tap  line  so  far  as  it  was  oper- 
ated in  the  interests  of  the  complainant 
was  a  plant  facility  and  not  a  common 
carrier.  That  on  account  of  the  increase 
in  the  division  of  rates  with  the  tap  line 
it  is  apparent  complainant  did  not  pay 
the  increased  rate.  Reparation  denied. 
Kaul  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  450. 

(c)  Complainant  shipped  snap  corn, 
Calvin,  Okla.,  to  DeQueen  and  Wilton, 
Ark.,  under  a  joint  rate  of  23c.  Prior  to 
date  of  shipment  the  rate  had  been  19c, 
but  was  advanced  at  time  of  shipment, 
but  the  tariff  not  posted  at  Calvin.  Had 
this  been  done  the  increased  rate  would 
have  been  included  in  the  price  of  the 
corn,  which  was  sold  f.  o.  b.  destination. 
HELD,  reparation  should  be  awarded  on 
account  of  the  failure  of  the  carrier  to 
post  the  tariff  changing  the  rate.  Ca- 
nadian Valley  Grain  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  108. 


(d)  Defendants  advanced  the  rate  on 
lemons  from  Southern  California  to  east- 
ern destinations  from  $1  to  $1.15  per  100 
lbs.  Before  the  advanced  rates  became 
effective  an  injunction  was  issued  by  the 
Circuit  Court  of  the  U.  S.  for  the  District 
of  Southern  California  in  favor  of  cer- 
tain of  the  complainants  in  this  proceed- 
ing against  the  collection  of  the  advanced 
rate.  HELD,  if  in  any  case  the  advanced 
rate  has  been  paid,  reparation  will  be 
allowed  on  the  basis  of  the  $1  rate  upon 
proper  proceedings.  Arlington  Heights 
Fruit  Exch.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  148, 
155. 

(e)  Defendants  advanced  in  1907  rail 
and  lake  rates  from  the  Atlantic  seaboard 
and  other  eastern  points  of  origin  to 
Chicago  and  other  western  destinations. 
The  advances  were  to  cover  the  cost  of 
marine  insurance,  which  for  the  first  time 
was  furnished  as  part  of  the  rate.  The 
Commission,  in  13  I.  C.  C.  258,  15  I.  C.  C. 
577  (rehearing),  held  the  rates  were  un- 
reasonable unless  shippers  were  ade- 
quately protected  by  insurance.  For  two 
years  great  uncertainty  prevailed  as  to 
the  extent  of  protection  given  by  the 
carriers,  but  ultimately  the  tariffs  were 
adjusted  in  conformity  with  its  sugges- 
tions. During  this  period  complainants 
insured  their  shipments  themselves  and 
also  paid  the  increased  rate.  The  orig- 
inal petition  filed  by  complainants  con- 
tested the  advances  and  prayed  repara- 
tion, and  this  supplemental  petition  ask- 
ing reparation  to  the  amount  of  the  in- 
surance paid  during  the  period  of  uncer- 
tainty was  filed  soon  after  final  decision 
in  the  original  case.  HELD,  complain- 
ants have  acted  with  due  diligence;  that 
the  exact  measure  of  the  difference  be- 
tween the  rate  which  was  exacted  and 
the  rate  found  to  be  reasonable  by  the 
Commission  in  the  original  proceeding 
was  the  amount  paid  to  secure  the  in- 
surance; that  by  th6  payment  of  the  un- 
reasonable rate  the  complainants  had 
been  damaged  in  precisely  that  amount. 
Reparation  awarded.  Wyman,  Partridge 
&  Co.  V.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  19  L  C.  C.  551. 

(f )  Carriers  who  concur  in  establishing 
an  unlawful  advance  in  rates  are  not 
thereby  rendered  jointly  and  severally 
liable  for  damages  resulting  therefrom, 
where  they  did  not  participate  in  the 
particular  rate  or  receive  any  part  of  the 
overcharge  in  question.  Nicola,  Stone 
&  Myers  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  199,  209. 


ADVANCED  RATES,  §22    (g)— ALASKA,  I    (a) 


51 


(g)  A  rate  on  lumber  was  in  1904 
raised  from  75  to  85c  and  in  1908  was 
found  to  be  unreasonable  to  the  extent 
of  10c.  The  shippers  paying  said  excess 
were  probably  not  themselves  damaged 
jjince  they  simply  added  same  to  the 
selling  price  and  cast  the  burden  upon 
the  public.  HELD,  the  shippers  should 
not  be  permitted  to  slumber  upon  their 
rights  and  to  accumulate  damages 
against  the  carriers  and  should  be 
awarded  reparation  only  for  shipments 
plaint.  Burgess  v.  Transcontinental 
made  since  the  date  of  filing  the  corn- 
Freight  Bureau,  13  I.  C.  C.  668,  680. 

(h)  Rates  on  lumber  were  increased  in 
1908.  The  complaint  was  filed  in  1907. 
Although  the  rates  attacked  were  proved 
to  be  unreasonable  at  the  time  of  the 
bearing,  no  evidence  was  offered  to  show 
them  unreasonable  prior  to  1903.  HELD, 
on  account  of  the  laches  of  complainant 
and  the  lack  of  proof,  reparation  could 
not  be  awarded  on  shipments  made  prior 
to  the  date  of  filing  the  complaint.  Thomp- 
son  Lumber   Co.    v.   I.   C.   R.   R.   Co.,   13 

I.  C.  C.  657,  667. 

ADVERTISING. 

I.     OF  EXCURSION   TICKETS. 

II.  AS  REBATES. 

See    Facilities    and    Privileges,    §1    (I), 
§21    (n). 

I.  OF   EXCURSION    TICKETS. 

(a)  Good  faith  to  the  public  requires 
carriers  to  state  in  their  advertisements 
of  their  excursions  the  total,  amount 
which  will  be  exacted  for  the  trans- 
portation privilege,  of  which  validation 
is  a  part  and  for  which  a  fee  of  50  cents 
is  charged,  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
it  can  be  held  to  be  a  violation  of  the 
Act  to  exact  a  part  of  the  tariff  rate  at 
the  ticket  office  when  the  ticket  is  sold, 
and  the  balance  of  that  rate  at  the  vali- 
dating agency  when  the  ticket  is  vali- 
dated. Riter  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I. 
C.  C.  443,  444. 

II.  AS  REBATES. 

See  Crimes,  §7  (b),  (bb),  (c). 
(a)  The  fact  that  a  state  statute 
under  which  a  railroad  is  organized  per- 
mits it  to  issue  transportation  to  pub- 
lishers in  exchange  for  advertising  does 
not  prevent  such  an  arrangement  be- 
tween the  carrier  and  publishers  from 
being  in  violation  of  the  provisions  of 
the  Act  forbidding  tbf    carrier  to  accept 


rates  "less  than  and  different"  from  the 
rates  exacted  from  the  general  public. 
Chi.  Ind.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  219  U.  S. 
486.  494;  31  Sup.  Ct.  272,  55  L.  ed.  305. 

(b)  Under  the  Act  a  passenger  has  no 
right  to  buy  tickets  with  services,  adver- 

ising,  releases  or  property,  nor  can  the 
railroad  company  buy  services,  advertis- 
ing, releases  or  property  with  transpor- 
tation. The  statute  manifestly  means 
that  the  purchase  of  a  transportation 
ticket  by  a  passenger  and  its  sale  by  the 
company  shall  be  consummated  only  by 
the  former  paying  cash  and  by  the  latter 
receiving  cash  of  the  amount  specified 
in  the  published  tariffs.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
V.  Mottley,  219  U.  S.  467,  477;  31  Sup. 
Ct.  265,  55  L.  ed.  297. 

(c)  A  contract  by  which  a  carrier 
agrees  to  furnish  transportation  to  a 
publisher  and  his  employes  in  exchange 
for  advertising  space  at  the  regular  ad- 
vertising rates  of  the  publisher,  violates 

he  provisions  of  the  Act  forbidding  the 
furnishing  of  transportation  at  rates 
"less  than  and  different"  from  those  ex- 
acted from  the  general  public.  Chi.  Ind. 
&  L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  2:9  U.  S.  486,  494, 
31  Sup.  Ct.  272,  55  L.  ed.  305. 

(d)  A  contract  between  a  magazine 
publisher  and  a  railroad  by  which  the 
'after  is  to  furnish  transportation  to  be 
paid  for  by  advertising  space  supplied 
by  the  former  is  in  violation  of  the 
Elkins  Act  of  Feb.  19,  1903,  as  amended 
by  the  Hepburn  Law  of  June  29,  1906, 
in  that  a  different  compensation  is  pro- 
vided for  than  that  specified  in  the  law- 
fully published  tariffs.  U.  S.  v.  C.  I.  & 
L.  Ry.  Co.,  163  Fed.  114,  115. 

AGENCY. 

See  Crimes.  §15;  Facilities  and  Priv- 
ileges, §21  (a);  Foreign  Commerce, 
§1  (f);  Passenger  Fares  and  Facil- 
ities, §8  (d),  §15;  Routing  and  Mis- 
routing,  §7  (uu),  (vv),  (XX);  Special 
Contract,  §2  (dd),  (mm);  Tariffs,  §3 
(g)r  (r),  §3  (2):  Through  Routes 
and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (vv) ;  Trans- 
portation, §2  (e);  Undercharges,  §2 
(d),    (e),    (f). 


ALASKA. 

See     Courts,     §3     (a),     (b);     Foreign 
Commerce. 

I.     REGULATION  OF  RATES. 

See     Interstate     Commerce     Commis- 
sion,  I. 

(a)     Under    the    amendment    of    June 
29,  1906,  the  Commission  has  jurisdiction 


52 


ALASKA,    I    (b)— ALLOWANCES,   §1    (a) 


over  a  complaint  demanding  a  filing  with 
the  Commission  and  publishing  of  rates 
for  transportation  of  passengers  and 
property  between  points  in  Alaska  and 
points  in  the  Dominion  of  Canada  and 
other  places,  and  the  establishment  of 
through  routes  and  joint  rates  between 
points  in  Alaska  and  points  in  the  State 
of  Washington,  said  amendment  having 
superseded  the  authority  conferred  upon 
the  Secretary  of  the  Interior  by  section 
2  of  the  Act  of  May  14,  1898.  I.  C.  C.  v. 
H.  S.  S.  Co.,  224  U.  S.  474,  483;  32  Sup. 
Ct.  556,  56  L.  ed.  849. 

(b)  Although  mandamus  will  not 
lie  so  as  to  interfere  with  the  exer- 
cise of  its  discretion  by  the  Commis- 
sion, it  will  lie  to  compel  the  Commis- 
sion to  take  jurisdiction  over  carriers 
operating  between  Alaska  and  the 
States  and  between  Alaska  and  adja 
cent  foreign  countries,  where  the  Com- 
mission has  refused  to  do  so  pursuant 
to  its  belief  that  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Act  has  conferred  upon  it  no 
authority  over  such  carriers.  I.  C.  C. 
V.  H.  S.  S.  Co.,  224  U.  S.,  474,  484;  82 
Sup.  Ct  556,  56  L.  ed.  849. 

(c)  Under  the  Act  as  amended, 
June  29,  1906,  Alaska  is  a  territory  to 
which  the  provisions  governing  rates 
apply.  Humboldt  S.  S.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C, 
37  App.  Cas.,  D.  C,  266,  274. 

(d)  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia  will  issue  a  writ  of 
mandamus  to  compel  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  to  entertain  a 
petition  by  a  steamship  company  to 
compel  the  filing  with  the  Commission 
of  rates  and  the  establishment  of 
through  routes  and  joint  rates  on 
traffic  moving  between  Alaska  and  ad- 
jacent foreign  countries  and  Alaska 
and  the  State  of  Washington.  Hum- 
boldt S.  S.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  37  App.  Cas., 
D.    C,    267,    275. 

(e)  Alaska  is  not  a  territory  of  the 
United  States  regularly  organized 
either  in  the  traditional  or  in  the 
•ense  in  which  the  phrase  is  used  in 
the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  and 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
therefore  has  no  jurisdiction  in  the 
District  of  Alaska.  In  re  Jurisdiction 
in  Alaska,  19  I.  C.  C.  81,  92,  94;  Hum 
boldt  S.  S.  Co.  V.  White  Pass  &  Yukon 
Route,  19  I.   C.  C.  105. 


joint     rates     from  Seattle,     Wash.,     to 

Skagway,   Alaska.  Humboldt    S.   S.   Co. 

V.    White    Pass    &  Yukon    Route,    19    I. 
C.    C.    105. 

(g)  The  Commission  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion over  an  alleged  discrimination  in 
wharf  facilities  in  Alaska.  Humboldt 
S.  S.  Co.  V.  W.  P.  &  Y.  Route,  19  I.  C. 
C.   105. 

ALLOWANCES. 

I.  CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Commission's  right  to  investi- 
gate. 
§2.     Power  to  prescribe. 
§3.     Effect    of    order. 

II.  PUBLICATION    AND    TARIFFS. 

§4.     Obligation   to   file. 
§5.     Effect    of    publication. 
§6.     Construction. 

III.  DISCRIMINATION. 

§7.     Obligation  to  treat  all  alike. 
§8.     Particular    allowances. 

(1)  Compressing   cotton. 

(2)  Cooperage. 

(3)  Elevation    of    grain. 

(4)  Lighterage. 

(5)  Spotting    cars. 

(6)  Staking. 

(7)  Transfer. 

IV.  LEGALITY    OF    ALLOWANCES. 

§9.     In    general. 

§10.  Transportation  service  per- 
formed   by    shipper. 

§11.     Transportation    facility. 

§12.  What  is  not  transportation 
service. 

(1)  Accessorial     or     inci- 

dental service, 

(2)  Operation     of     plant 

facility. 
V.     REASONABLENESS        OF        AI^ 
LOWANCES. 
§13.     In    general. 
VI.     DAMAGES    AND    REPARATION. 

§14.     In  general. 

VII.     AS  REBATES. 

§15.     In    general. 

VIII.     CRIMINAL  LIABILITY. 

§16.     In   general. 

CROSS-REFERENCES. 
See    Divisions;    Lighterage,     §3:     Tap 
Lines,    §9. 

I.     CONTROL   AND    REGULATION. 

§1.     Commission's    Right    to    Investigate. 


(f)       The    Commission    has    no    juris-        (a)     The   Commission   has  jurisdiction 
diction  to  establish   through   routes  and  |  under  section   13   of  the  Act  to  inquire 


ALLOWANCES,  §2   (a)— §3   (b) 


53 


Into  the  lawfulness  of  allowances  made 
by  carriers  to  shippers  for  the  alleged 
transfer  by  the  latter  froni  their  refin- 
eries or  warehouses  to  the  cars  of  de- 
fendants under  a  proceeding  instituted 
by  the  Commission  and  without  the  fil- 
ing of  any  complaint  by  the  shipper, 
where  the  defendants  have  been  duly 
brought  in  and  granted  a  hearing.  In 
Re  Allowances  for  Transfer  of  Sugar, 
14   I.   C.   C.   619,   625,  627. 

§2.     Power    to    Prescribe. 

See  Commerce  Court,  §3  (c);  Courts, 
§10  (a);  Facilities  and  Privileges, 
§1  (d);  Special  Contract,  §4  (1), 
(h),  (k),  (m);  Tap  Lines,  §2  (a), 
(b),    (c),    (d). 

(a)  Under  the  Act  as  amended  June 
29,  1906,  elevation  is  made  such  a  part 
of  transportation  as  to  bring  it  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission,  which  is  authorized 
to  determine  what  is  a  reasonable  al- 
lowance to  the  shipper  for  elevation 
services.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Updike 
Grain  Co.,  222  U.  S.,  215,  218;  32  Sup. 
Ct.  39,  56  L.  ed.  171. 

(b)  In  a  suit  for  damages  by  a  coal 
shipper  against  a  railroad  for  unjust 
discrimination  contrary  to  the  Act  to 
Regulate  Commerce  in  making  allow- 
ances for  services  rendered  by  the  lo- 
comotives of  the  plaintiff's  competitors 
in  hauling  cars  over  private  tracks,  the 
U.  S.  Circuit  Court  holds  it  has  juris- 
diction without  a  prior  application  to 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission, 
pending  the  decision  of  such  question 
of  jurisdiction  on  a  pending  appeal  in 
another  case.  Mitchell  Coal  &  Coke 
Co.  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  181  Fed. 
403,    410. 

(c)  Treatment  of  grain  in  the  ele- 
vators, the  cleaning,  clipping,  mixing, 
inspecting,  and  grading  of  it,  is  a  trade 
service;  it  is  no  part  of  transportation 
and  is  not  a  transportation  service.  No 
power  has  ever  been  granted  to  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  to 
regulate,  to  prohibit,  to  separate  by 
miles  from  the  service  of  elevation  and 
transfer  in  transit  or  from  any  other 
transportation  service,  or  to  interfere 
with  this  trade  service.  Peavey  &  Co. 
V.  U.  P.  R.  Co.,  176  Fed.  409,  419. 

(d)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission has  no  power  to  forbid  carriers 
from  paying  or  allowing  for  the  elevation 
and  transfer  of  grain  in  transit  reason- 
able   compensation,    because    there    is    a 


possibility  of  a  future  violation  of  the  law 
arising  out  of  such  allowances.  Peavey  & 
Co.  V.  U.  P.  R.  Co.,  176  Fed.  409,  419. 

(e)  By  section  15  of  the  Amended  Act 
the  Commission  has  power  to  limit  and 
prescribe  the  amount  that  a  carrier  may 
pay  a  shipper  for  the  performance  of  a 
part  of  the  carrier's  duty  and  service  in 
connection  with  the  transportation  of  his 
freight.  Sterling  &  Son  v.  M.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  451.  454. 

(f)  Each  case  involving  an  allowance 
nust  be  determined  upon  the  special 
facts  and  circumstances  presented.  Mer- 
chants Dispatch  Storage  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  98,  106. 

(ff)  Where  a  defendant  railroad  has 
agreed  with  a  shipper  to  allow  it  a  cer- 
tain sum  for  services  performed  by 
the  shipper  in  moving  cars  over  switch- 
ing tracks  connecting  the  storage  tracks 
with  the  shipper's  buildings  and  fac- 
tories, the  Commission  has  no  authority 
to  enforce  the  specific  performance  of 
such  a  contract,  or  to  award  damages 
for  the  breach  thereof.  General  Electric 
Co.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
I.   C.   C.  237,   242. 

(g)  Free  elevation  of  grain  may  be  pro- 
hibited by  the  Commission  since  there  is 
no  difference  in  principle  between  the  giv- 
ing of  the  service  and  the  giving  of  the 
money  with  which  to  buy  the  service. 
TraflSc  Bureau,  Merchants'  Exchange  v. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  317,  330. 

§3.     Effect   of   Order. 

See     Interstate     Commerce     Commis- 
sion,   §5. 

(a)  Where  the  principle  of  a  decision 
prohibiting  elevator  allowances  applies 
everywhere,  the  Commission  expects  that 
all  interests,  though  not  parties  to  the 
proceeding,  will  conform  to  the  ruling  of 
the  Commission.  Traffic  Bureau,  Mer- 
chants' Exchange  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  1.  C.  C.  510. 

(b)  Where  upon  a  petition  to  reopen 
a  former  decision  of  the  Commission 
prohibiting  elevator  allowances,  no  new 
fact  or  argument  is  presented,  and  while 
petitioners  were  not  parties  to  said  for- 
mer decisions,  the  interests  which  they 
represent  were  fully  considered,  the 
petition  will  be  denied.  Traffic  Bureau, 
Merchants'  Exchange  v,  C.  B.  &  Q.  R. 
R.   Co.,   14  I.  C.   C.  510. 


54 


ALLOWANCES,  §4   (a)— §7   (d) 


II.     PUBLICATION   AND    TARIFFS. 

See  Tariffs,  II. 
§4.     Obligation  to   File. 

(a)  Whatever  charges  are  made,  what- 
ever services  are  performed,  and  w^hat- 
ever  privileges  are  allowed  by  carriers, 
must  be  stated  separately  in  the  schedules 
filed  with  the  Commission.  Anderson, 
Clayton  &  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18 
L  C.  C.  340,  350. 

(b)  Carriers  should  not  publish  rates 
in  one  tariff  and  discounts  or  allowances 
from  such  rates  in  another  tariff,  or  even 
in  another  passage  of  the  same  tariff,  but 
wherever  possible  should  file  a  net  rate 
as  such.  In  re  Allowances  for  the  Trans- 
fer of  Sugar,  14  I.  C.  C.  619,  630. 

§5.     Effect   of    Publication. 

(a)  On  a  shipment  of  cheese  defend- 
ant was  directed  by  the  complainant  con- 
signee to  deliver  same  to  a  warehouse  at 
the  point  of  destination.  Defendant's  tar- 
iff provided  for  the  absorption  of  a 
switching  charge  to  this  warehouse.  De- 
fendant's agent  at  point  of  destination, 
misconstruing  the  obligation,  refused  to 
so  switch  the  car  and  unloaded  the  car  at 
the  freight  house.  Complainant  accepted 
the  shipment  at  the  freight  house  and 
hauled  the  same  to  the  warehouse  with 
teams.  He  sought  to  recover  the  cost  of 
drayage.  HELD,  complainant  should  have 
insisted  on  the  switching  services  and  re- 
fused to  accept  the  car  at  the  freight 
house,  and  having  failed  so  to  do,  could 
not  recover.  Crosby  &  Meyers  v.  Good- 
rich Transit  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  175,  176. 

(b)  Defendants  quoted  a  rate  on  ex- 
lake  grain  from  Ogdensburg,  N.  Y.,  to 
Boston  of  31/^c  and  relying  on  this  quo- 
tation, complainant  concluded  a  sale  and 
arranged  for  ocean  transportation  of  the 
grain.  It  was  the  uniform  custom  to  in- 
clude elevation  charges  in  the  rate  under 
which  ex-lake  grain  moved  from  the  lake 
port.  Defendants'  tariff,  however,  simply 
provided  a  rate  of  3i/^c  between  the 
points  in  question,  making  no  mention  of 
elevation  charges.  Complainant  was  as- 
sessed i/^c  per  bushel  for  elevation,  in 
addition  to  the  3^c  rate.  HELD,  the  mis- 
quotation of  the  rate  did  not  relieve  the 
defendants  from  their  obligation  to  col- 
lect the  published  rate.  Ames,  Brooks 
Co.  V.  Rutland  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  479, 
480,  481. 

(c)  A  common  carrier  by  contract 
may  not  impose  upon  itself  any  burden 
or  grant  any  privilege,   or  perform   any 


service,  or  make  any  allowance  with  re- 
spect to  the  traffic  of  a  particular  shipper 
except  under  the  authority  of  its  pub- 
lished tariffs,  and  then  only  when  the 
burden  is  assumed  or  the  privilege  grant- 
ed or  allowance  made  to  all  shippers  un- 
der like  circumstances  and  similar  con- 
ditions. General  Electric  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C. 
&  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  237,  242. 

§6.     Construction. 

(a)  Prior  to  Oct.  29,  1907,  defendant's 
tariffs  provided  that  25c  per  car  would 
be  paid  to  coal  shippers  in  box  and  stock 
cars  in  the  Rocky  Mountain  region  when 
car  door  boards  were  furnished  by  them. 
On  Aug.  18,  1907,  defendant  consented  to 
increase  its  allowance  to  50c  and  agreed 
that  as  to  complainant  the  increased  al- 
lowance should  date  back  to  July  1,  1907. 
The  tariff  announcing  said  increase  was 
filed  and  became  effective  Oct.  29,  1907. 
HELD,  defendant  could  not  lawfully  al- 
low complainant  the  increased  rate  for 
the  period  from  July  1  to  Oct.  29  under 
section  6  of  the  Act.  Victor  Fuel  Co.  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  119,  120. 

III.     DISCRIMINATION. 

§7.     Obligation    to   Treat   All    Alike. 

See    Common    Carrier,    §3     (f) ;     Pro- 
cedure  Before   Commission,   §11    (t). 

(a)  Whatever  allowances  are  made 
must  be  just,  reasonable  and  non-discrim- 
inatory. Suffern  Grain  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  178,  183.  Federal  Sugar 
Refining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
C.  200,  212.  Anderson,  Clayton  &  Co.  v. 
C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  340,  350. 
Brook-Rauch  Mill  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  M. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  158,  161-163. 

(b)  To  pay  an  elevation  allowance  to 
one  shipper  or  at  one  place  while  declin- 
ing to  pay  it  elsewhere  is  undue  discrim- 
ination unless  justified  by  circumstances. 
Suffern  Grain  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I. 
C.  C.   178,  183. 

(c)  A  carrier  is  not  warranted  under 
section  15  of  the  Act  in  making  an  al- 
lowance to  a  shipper  who  provides  a  fa- 
cility and  performs  a  service  in  the  trans- 
portation of  his  own  property  while  re- 
fusing a  similar  allowance  to  another 
shipper  competing  in  the  same  markets 
in  the  same  line  of  business  who  provides 
a  similar  facility  and  performs  the  same 
service  in  the  transportation  of  his  prop- 
erty. Federal  Sugar  Refining  Co.  v.  B. 
&  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  200,  212. 

(d)  No  violation  of  the  Act  can  be 
predicated    solely   upon   the   fact   that    a 


ALLOWANCES,  §8  (1)    (a)  — (d) 


55 


carrier  makes  with  one  independent  com- 
pany a  contract  more  favorable  than  with 
another  for  a  service  which  that  carrier 
is  bound  or  undertakes  to  perform.  The 
Act  deals  only  with  the  obligation  of  car- 
riers as  carriers  and  in  no  way  attempts 
to  regulate  or  interfere  with  matters  in 
involving  their  duties  to  shippers  or  pas- 
sengers as  such.  Compression  of  cotton 
is  a  service  which  the  carrier  procures 
for  its  own  convenience,  and  when  that 
service  is  performed  in  such  a  manner 
as  not  to  prejudice  or  prefer  a  particular 
shipper  or  community,  the  Act  does  not 
limit  the  freedom  of  the  carrier  to  mak- 
ing contracts  in  respect  thereto.  Mer- 
chants' Cotton  Press  &  Storage  Co.  v.  I. 
C.  R.  R.  Co,  17  I.  C.  C.  98,  104. 

§8.     Particular  Allowances. 

§8.     (1)     Compressing   Cotton. 

See  Compress  Companies  and 
Charges,  §1  (e) ;  Facilities  and 
Privileges,   §3. 

(a)  Carriers  have  the  right  to  com- 
press cotton  in  transit.  They  also  have 
the  right  to  grant  or  allow  to  shippers 
or  owners  of  cotton  the  privilege  to  con- 
centrate uncompressed  cotton  at  desig- 
nated compresses  on  their  lines  for  such 
treatment  as  the  shippers  or  owners  may 
desire  to  give  it  with  the  right  of  the 
shippers  or  owners  to  deliver  the  cotton 
back  to  the  carriers  for  transportation  to 
interstate  or  foreign  destination  at  the 
through  rates  from  point  of  origin.  What- 
ever charges  are  made  must,  however,  be 
just,  reasonable  and  non-discriminatory. 
They  may  not  pay  to  compress  companies 
any  unjust  or  reasonable  charge.  Ander- 
son, Clayton  &  Co.  v.  C.  R.  1.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  340,  350. 

(b)  An  allowance  made  at  South  Mem- 
phis for  handliug  cotton  from  inter- 
change tracks  to  compresses  and  ware- 
houses in  order  to  place  South  Memphis 
dealers  on  a  parity  with  Memphis  deal- 
ers, where  there  is  a  free  store  delivery 
is  not  objectionable.  Merchants'  Storage 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  98,  103. 

(c)  Cotton  shipped  into  Memphis  was 
drayed  back  and  forth  by  defendant  car- 
riers to  compressing  plants  located  in 
that  city  to  be  compresed,  and  then 
carried  from  Memphis  to  destination 
points  at  the  through  rate.  Defendants 
paid  the  expense  of  drayage  and  com- 
pression to  private  companies  allowing 
171/^c  and  50c  per  bale  for  drayage  and 
compression    respectively.      Complainant 


was  a  compressor  of  cotton  at  Memphis, 
but  not  a  shipper  thereof.  Defendant 
warehouse  company  established  a  com- 
pressing plant  at  South  Memphis,  some 
two  miles  from  the  municipal  line.  The 
stock  in  the  company  was  principally 
owned  by  dealers  and  shippers  of  cotton. 
The  company  connected  its  plant  with 
the  lines  of  defendants  by  a  system  of 
switch  tracks.  On  cotton  compressed  by 
the  defendant  warehouse  the  defendant 
carriers  allowed  10c  per  bale  for  switch- 
ing the  same  to  and  from  its  warehouse, 
and  50c  per  bale  for  compression.  De- 
fendant carriers  charged  a  rate  of  20c 
a  bale  for  hauling  cotton  from  warehouse 
in  Memphis  to  South  Memphis.  Com- 
plainant alleged  that  the  stockholders  of 
defendant  warehouse  company  at  South 
Memphis  being  themselves  shippers, 
obtained  lower  rates  through  the  divi- 
dends derived  by  them  from  the  profits 
of  their  warehouse  company.  Complain- 
ant introduced  no  evidence  to  show  that 
the  defendant  warehouse  company  made 
any  profit  on  cotton  compressed  by  it  at 
the  10c  switching  charge  and  50c  com- 
pressing charge.  HELD,  complainants, 
not  being  themselves  shippers  of. cotton, 
and  failing  to  show  that  defendant  ware: 
house  company  was  making  any  profits 
at  the  10c  and  50c  charges  failed  to  es- 
tablish a  case  of  unjust  discrimination 
between  shippers,  as  it  was  perfectly  law- 
ful for  carriers  to  make  special  contracts 
with  private  companies  which  were  not 
shippers  on  their  lines.  (Clements  & 
Lane,  Comm'rs,  dissenting.)  Merchants 
Cotton  Press  &  Storage  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  98,  104,  106. 

(d)  Defendant  railroads  expended 
some  $106,000  in  erecting  on  their  right 
of  way  at  Argenta,  across  the  river  from 
Little  Rock,  Ark.,  an  elevator  and  milling 
plant.  It  was  leased  to  one.  Bunch,  a 
grain  dealer,  competing  with  complain- 
ant dealer  at  Little  Rock,  for  his  natural 
life  upon  a  rental  of  $1  per  year.  Bunch 
gave  to  defendants  promissory  notes  for 
some  $37,000  which  was  the  sum  in  ex- 
cess of  the  anticipated  cost  of  the  plant. 
Bunch  as  lessee  agreed  to  pay  taxes,  as- 
sessments and  insurance  premiums  and 
to  keep  the  buildings  and  machinery  in 
repair.  By  the  lease  Bunch  agreed  to 
receive  and  handle  without  cost  and 
without  discrimination  all  grain  tendered 
to  him  by  other  shippers  for  elevation  or 
storage.  As  a  matter  of  practice  he  did 
not  do  so,  and  it  was  never  in  good  faith 
intended  that  he  should  so  do.     The  de- 


56 


ALLOWANCES,   §8    (2)    (a)— §8    (3)    (b) 


fendants  refused  to  extend  similar  privi- 
leges to  complainant.  As  a  result  of  the 
transaction  in  question  Bunch  was  able 
practically  to  monopolize  the  situation  at 
the  points  in  question.  HEILD,  the  prac- 
tices complained  of  were  unlawful  and 
discriminatory  and  must  be  stopped. 
Brook-Rauch  Mill  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  M. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  158,  161-163. 

§8.     (2)     Cooperage   and    Grain    Doors. 

(a)  Complainants  asked  that  the  de- 
fendant be  required  to  provide  by  pub- 
lished rule  that  shippers  of  grain  may 
when  occasion  makes  it  necessary, 
cooper  the  car  that  is  furnished,  and 
recover  therefor  an  allowance  not  to 
exceed  $5,  including  an  allowance  for 
grain  doors.  It  appeared  that  shippers 
of  grain  from  Washington  and  Oregon 
are  furnished  cracked  and  old  box  cars 
by  defendant  for  the  carrying  of  grain, 
which  they  repair  themselves  in  order 
to  save  delay.  HELD,  that  it  is  the 
primary  duty  of  a  railroad  to  furnish 
equipment  that  is  usable,  and  in  the 
event  that  the  car  furnished  is  unfit  the 
shipper  should  reject  it  and  call  for 
another.  Allowances  of  the  kind  re- 
quested are  of  a  dangerous  character. 
The  carrier  cannot  tell  what  the  actual 
amount  of  material  and  labor  used  by 
the  shipper  was.  The  car  is  loaded 
immediately  upon  being  repaired  and  is 
sent  to  some  far  distant  point.  There 
are  no  means  of  adequately  checking  the 
expenditure  of  the  shipper  so  that  it 
becomes  extremely  easy  to  turn  such 
allowances  into  real  rebates.  It  is  a 
safer  and  more  reasonable  practice  to 
curtail  such  allowances  than  to  extend 
them,  since  the  Commission  cannot  in 
any  way  police  such  repairs  and  it  is 
a  far  wiser  policy  for  the  carriers  to 
repair  their  own  equipment  than  to  farm 
it  out  to  shippers.  A  rule  of  this  char- 
acter could  not  be  limited  to  the  repair 
of  cars  for  a  shipment  in  bulk  of  grain 
without  establishing  a  precedent  as  to 
allowances  for  other  commodities.  Com- 
plaint dismissed.  Balfour,  Guthrie  & 
Co.  V.  O.  W.  R.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
C.    539,    540. 

§8.     (3)      Elevation    of    Grain. 

(a)  Complainant  sought  to  compel  the 
I.  C.  R.  R.  to  accord  to  grain  dealers  at 
Decatur,  111.,  the  same  transit  privileges 
and  elevation  allowances  as  those  per- 
mitted at  Cairo,  111.  Decatur  is  situated 
in  central  Illinois,  Cairo  at  the  extreme 


south.  The  I.  C.  R.  R.  runs  through  De- 
catur to  Cairo.  Tariffs  of  the  I.  C.  R.  R. 
permit  grain  to  be  unloaded  and  treated 
at  Cairo  and  reshipped  at  the  balance  of 
the  through  rate.  The  I.  C.  R.  R.  also 
pays  a  %c  elevation  allowance.  Reasons 
were  shown  why  Decatur  should  be  a 
grain-handling  point  for  the  interests  of 
the  public,  such  as  nearness  to  origin, 
central  location,  etc.  The  cause  of  these 
rates  at  Cairo  is  alleged  to  be  competi- 
tion. Cairo  is  on  the  Ohio  River  where 
grain  rates  break.  In  some  instances 
Cairo  is  not  the  breaking  point  but  a 
through  rate  is  established  to  compete 
with  the  breaking  point  and  stoppage  also 
granted.  Other  Illinois  towns  will  de- 
mand similar  privileges,  if  complainant 
is  successful.  Additional  expense  will  be 
required  to  police  such  regulations. 
Peoria,  75  miles  north  of  Decatur,  already 
enjoys  these  privileges.  HELD,  defend^ 
ant  is  guilty  of  discrimination  in  accord- 
ing transit  privileges  to  Cairo  which  are 
denied  Decatur.  The  question  of  advan- 
tage on  account  of  the  rate  breaking  at 
the  Ohio  River  was  not  decided.  Suf- 
fern  Grain  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C. 
C.  178,  182. 

(aa)  A  carrier  has  no  right,  under 
the  pretext  of  a  transfer  which  it  does 
not  require,  to  furnish  a  grain  dealer 
commercial  elevation,  or  what  amounts 
to  the  same  thing,  to  pay  through  an 
elevation  allowance  for  the  commercial 
elevation  of  his  grain,  and  if  it  does 
so,  it  must  accord  the  same  privilege 
or  make  the  same  payment  at  another 
point.  Traffic  Bureau.  Merchants'  Ex- 
change V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I. 
C.   C.    496,   503. 

(b)     In  the  decisions  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  in  the  Diffen- 
baugh    case,   222   U.   S.   42,   and   the  Up- 
dike case,  222  U.  S.  215,  relating  to  the 
legality   of   the   allowances   paid    for  the 
j  elevation  of  grain  by  the  Union  Pacific 
I  at    Council    Bluffs,    ia.,    it    was    the    in- 
:  tention  of  the  court  to  hold  that,  what- 
,  ever    might    be    the    case    if    a    railroad 
;  saw  fit  to  confine  its  payment  to  eleva- 
tion actually  required  in  the  conduct  of 
its  business,  it  must,  when  it  makes  an 
allowance    to    one    elevator    under    such 
I  circumstances    as   to    give    that    elevator 
i  payment    for    commercial    elevation,    ex- 
I  tend  the  same  privilege  to  all  other  ele- 
,  vators    similarly   situated    at   that   point. 
I  Defendant    carriers    ordered    not    to    ex- 
I  ceed    %c    in    the    payment   of   elevation. 


ALLOWANCES,  §8  (3)    (bb)  — (e) 


57 


or  transfer  allowances  on  grain  at  the 
Missouri  River  and  to  confine  that  pay- 
ment to  grain  actually  passing  through 
the  elevators  in  ten  days.  Traffic  Bu- 
reau, M-erchants'  Exchange  v.  C.  B.  & 
Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  496,  505,  506. 

(bb)  Complainant's  competitor  owning 
an  elevator  at  Nebraska  City,  Neb., 
sbipped  grain  from  country  elevators  to 
Nebraska  City  on  local  bills  of  lading 
and  at  intrastate  rates  fixed  by  the  Ne- 
braska Commision.  It  was  allowed  %c 
per  100  lbs.  as  an  elevation  charge  for 
cleaning,  grading  and  mixing  grain  at 
Nebraska  City.  It  was  then  permitted  to 
ship  out  the  grain  or  an  equal  amount  of 
other  grain  to  points  east  at  the  balance 
of  the  through  rate.  In  this  way  it  se- 
cured a  rate  lower  than  the  through  rate, 
which  was  open  to  complainant  which, 
owning  elevators  at  Rosemont,  Upland 
and  other  Nebraska  points  cleaned  and 
mixed  its  grain  at  those  elevators  and 
shipped  the  same  on  through  rates  to 
eastern  points.  The  purpose  of  the  ele- 
vation allowance  in  question  was  to 
foster  grain  markets  on  the  Missouri 
River  for  the  benefit  of  carriers  from  the 
west,  whose  lines  terminated  at  the 
Missouri  River,  without  the  necessity  on 
their  part  of  losing  the  benefit  of  joint 
through  rates.  HELD,  despite  the  decis- 
ion in  Peavey  &  Co.  v.  Union  Pacific 
R.  R.  Co.,  176  Fed.  409,  upholding  such 
allowances,  it  was  in  the  opinion  of  the 
Commission  unlawful,  since  it  was  not  a 
payment  for  a  transportation  service,  but 
for  a  merchandising  operation  and  rep- 
aration based  on  such  allowance  would 
be  withheld  from  complainant  pending 
final  decision  in  the  matter  by  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court.  Gund  &  Co.  v.  C. 
B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  364,  366. 

(c)  On  shipments  of  grain  products 
and  hay  from  Ohio  and  Mississippi  River 
crossings  and  beyond  to  southeastern 
destinations,  dealers  at  Nashville  under 
the  guise  of  "elevation  allowances"  were 
paid  by  defendants  allowances  where  the 
grain  was  unloaded  or  sacked  at  their 
stores  or  warehouses,  irrespective  of 
whether  there  was  any  elevation  in- 
volved, or  whether  the  sacking  was  done 
by  hand  or  by  machinery,  when  the  ship- 
ments moved  out  of  Nashville  to  south- 
eastern points.  These  allowances  were 
not  made  to  dealers  located  at  Atlanta 
and  other  Georgia  points.  HELD,  fol- 
lowing Nebraska-Iowa  Grain  Co.  v.  U.  P. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  90,  such  allowances 


were  unduly  discriminatory  and  should 
be  stopped.  Duncan  &  Co.  v.  N.  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  590,  592. 

(d)  Defendant  in  its  rule,  making  an 
elevation  allowance  of  1^/4 c  per  100  lbs., 
provided  that  said  allowance  would  not 
be  granted  except  where  shippers  re- 
turned to  defendant  the  unloaded  cars 
within  48  hours.  Complainants'  elevators 
at  Omaha  and  Council  Bluffs  were  lo- 
cated off  the  rails  of  defendant  and  were 
reached  by  an  independent  switching 
line.  Under  the  rules  adopted  by  the 
carriers,  loaded  cars  received  by  switch- 
ing lines  must  be  returned  to  the  rail- 
road owning  same  when  unloaded,  if  said 
owner  has  a  direct  connection  with  said 
switching  line;  otherwise  the  switching 
line  has  the  option  of  returning  the 
empty  car  to  the  carrier  presenting  same 
or  of  loading  out  such  car  in  such  a  way 
that  the  road  owning  it  will  participate 
in  the  haul.  Said  switching  road  has  the 
power  therefore  to  determine  whether 
a  car  shall  be  returned  to  the  line  from 
which  it  was  received  and  the  elevator 
cannot  direct  the  disposition  of  the 
same.  Under  the  rule  complainants' 
competitors  having  elevators  located  on 
defendant's  rails  were  able  to  comply 
with  it  and  gain  the  allowance,  whereas 
complainants  were  not  able  to  control 
the  disposition  of  empty  cars  so  as  to 
return  same  to  defendant  within  the  48- 
hour  period.  HELD,  such  limitation  as 
to  time  was  unjustly  discriminatory  and 
illegal  and  the  failure  to  comply  with 
same  did  not  prevent  complainants  from 
recovering  such  allowance.  Nebraska- 
Iowa  Grain  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L 
C.  C.  90,  100,  101.  Affirmed  with  the 
modification  that  reparation  should  not 
be  awarded  where  the  cars  were  actually 
returned  to  the  defendant  by  the  ship- 
pers, but  were-  not  returned  within  the 
48  hours  specified  in  the  rules.  U.  P.  R. 
R.  V.  Updike  Grain  Co.,  178  Fed.  223; 
affirmed  222  U.  S.  215,  32  Sup.  Ct.  39,  56 
L.  ed.  171. 

(e)  Defendant  withdrew  all  elevation 
allowances  from  complainant  at  Atchison, 
Kan.,  but  performed  free  services  for 
complainant's  competitors  at  Coffeyville, 
Leavenworth  and  Kansas  City  in  the  way 
of  elevation,  cleaning,  mixing  and  clip- 
ping grain.  During  the  period  this  was 
done,  elevation  allowances  were  being 
paid  under  the  authority  of  the  Commis- 
sion. The  value  of  the  services  rendered 
to  complainant's  competitors  was  %c  per 


58 


ALLOWANCES,  §8    (3)    (ee)— §8    (4)    (a) 


100  lbs.  HELD,  said  discrimination  was 
unreasonable  and  complainant  was  en- 
titled to  reparation  of  %c  per  100  lbs. 
on  all  grain  shipped  and  elevated  during 
the  period  in  question.  Washer  Grain  Co. 
V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  147,  158. 

(ee)  Defendant  carrier  allowed  to  a 
grain  company  %c  per  100  lbs.  for  grain 
which  remained  stored  in  the  elevator 
beyond  the  elevation  period  of  10  days. 
Said  grain  was  mixed,  treated,  stored, 
weighed  and  inspected  in  the  elevators 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  enhance  its 
value.  HELD,  the  allowance  amounted 
to  an  undue  preference  and  in  effect  an 
unlawful  rebate,  and  should  be  forbid- 
den. In  the  Matter  of  Allowances  to 
Elevators  by  the  Union  Pacific  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  315,  316. 

(f)  Defendant  carriers  allowed  %c  pei 
100  lbs.  to  dealers  in  grain  in  Missouri 
River  cities  as  an  elevation  allowance. 
They  extended  no  such  allowances  to 
dealers  located  in  Mississippi  River 
cities.  As  a  result  it  cost  the  latter  deal- 
ers %c  per  100  lbs.  more  to  move  grain 
from  points  of  purchase  through  their 
elevators  and  beyond  to  points  of  sale, 
than  the  same  transportation  cost  deal- 
ers in 'Missouri  River  cities.  It  appeared 
that  the  weighing  of  grain  to  determine 
the  amount  due  the  original  seller  thereof 
could  only  be  practically  accomplished 
through  the  process  of  elevation.  De- 
fendants were  subjected  at  Missouri 
River  points  to  competition  with  a  carrier 
entering  from  the  northwest,  which  they 
did  not  meet  with  at  Mississippi  River 
points.  HELD,  distinguishing  In  the 
Matter  of  Allowances  to  Elevators  by  the 
Union  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  C.  85, 
that  the  elevator  allowances  constituted 
an  undue  and  unlawful  discrimination. 
Traffic  Bureau,  Merchants'  Exchange  v. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  317,  328- 
331. 

(ff)  The  payment  of  an  elevator 
allowance  of  %c  per  100  lbs.  to  elevators 
located  upon  the  Missouri  River  is  an 
undue  and  unlawful  discrimination.  In 
Re  Allowances  to  Elevators  by  the 
Union  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  315; 
Traffic  Bureau  of  St.  Louis  v.  C.  B.  &  Q. 
R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  317,  510;  Traffic 
Bureau  of  St.  Louis  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R. 
R.   Co.,   14   I.   C.   C.   551. 

(g)  Defendant  carrier  allowed  to  a 
grain  company  (Peavey  &  Co.)  %c  per 
100  lbs.  for  grain  which  remained  stored 


in  the  elevator  beyond  the  elevation 
period  of  10  days.  Said  grain  was  mixed, 
treated,  stored,  weighed  and  inspected  in 
the  elevators  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
enhance  its  value.  HELD,  the  allow- 
ances amounted  to  an  undue  preference 
and  was  in  effect  an  unlawful  rebate.  In 
the  Matter  of  Allowances  to  Elevators 
by  the  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  315,  31G. 
Rehearing  denied.  Traffic  Bureau,  Mer- 
chants' Exchange  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  510.  Orders  enjoined,  Peavey 
&  Co.  V.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  176  Fed. 
409,  419.  The  injunction  sustained  with 
the  modification  that  the  Commission's 
order  of  1907,  diminishing  the  elevator 
allowances  to  %c,  and  so  much  of  the 
Peavey  order  of  1908  as  confined  allow- 
ances to  grain  reshipped  within  10  days  be 
allowed  to  stand.  (McKenna  &  Hughes, 
JJ.,  dissenting.)  I.  C.  C.  v.  Diffenbaugh, 
222  U.  S.  42,  45,  32  Sup.  Ct.  22,  56  L. 
ed.   83. 

§8.     (4)      Lighterage. 

See  Lighterage,  §4. 
(a)  Arbuckle  Bros,  operate  their  ware- 
house and  property  at  the  foot  of  Bridge 
St.,  Brooklyn,  as  the  Jay  St.  terminal  of 
defendants.  For  the  use  of  the  dock  and 
for  their  services  in  conducting  it  as  a 
freight  station  and  in  floating  and  light- 
ering shipments  between  the  dock  and 
the  regular  terminals  of  the  defendants 
in  Jersey  City,  Arbuckle  Bros,  received 
from  defendants  allowances  ranging  from 
3  to  4  l-5c  per  100  lbs.  on  all  mer- 
chandise passing  through  the  terminal 
whether  inbound  or  outbound.  The  floats 
and  barges  used  in  this  service  are  owned 
by  Arbuckle  Bros.,  and  all  persons  em- 
ployed in  the  handling  of  freight  on  the 
water  as  well  as  on  the  dock  are  on 
the  payrolls  of  that  firm.  Immediately 
adjoining  the  dock  property,  Arbuckle 
Bros,  have  erected  a  large  sugar  refining 
plant  of  their  own.  One-third  of  the 
total  tonnage  handled  through  the  dock, 
inbound  or  outbound,  is  sugar  received 
or  shipped  by  them.  The  other  two- 
thirds  is  merchandise  received  or  shipped 
by  the  public  generally.  Complainant  is 
a  competitor  of  Arbuckle  Bros.,  with  its 
refinery  located  in  Yonkers.  It  ships 
its  sugar  by  a  private  transportation 
agency  to  Pier  24  and  from  thence  to 
the  New  Jersey  terminals  of  defendants, 
the  same  terminals  to  which  Arbuckle 
Bros,  deliver.  It  has  to  pay  3c  per  100 
lbs.  for  this  service  to  the  private  agency 
it    employs,    and    receives    no    allowance 


ALLOWANCES,  §8    (4)    (b)— §8    (5)    (a) 


59 


from  defendants.  HELD,  that  when  a 
carrier  undertakes  to  have  a  terminal 
operated  for  it  by  the  owner  of  the  prop- 
erty and  the  owner  happens  also  to  be 
a  large  shipper  over  its  line,  the  law 
reads  into  the  agreement  between  the 
carrier  and  the  owner  the  peremptory 
requirement  that  the  arrangment  shall 
not  result  in  any  undue  and  unjust  dis- 
criminatiou  against  other  shippers  com- 
peting with  the  owner  in  the  same  line 
of  business,  and  that  the  terms  under 
which  the  defendant  carriers  accept  the 
sugar  of  Arbuckle  Bros,  at  their  regular 
stations  west  of  the  river  result  in  in- 
equalities, preferences  and  discrimination, 
and  are  unduly  and  unjustly  prejudicial 
to  the  rights  of  the  complainant  ag  a 
shipper  of  sugar  over  the  lines  of  the  de- 
fendants in  competition  with  Arbuckle 
Bros,  in  the  same  markets.  Reparation 
awarded.  Federal  Sugar  Refining  Co.  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  200,  214. 

(b)  When  a  shipper  tenders'its  sugar 
to  the  defendants  on  lighters  at  their 
regular  receiving  stations  on  the  Jersey 
shore,  it  must  be  received  and  carried 
thence  to  destination  on  rates,  ten  s 
and  conditions  that  are  no  less  favorable 
to  the  complainants  in  any  particular 
than  the  rates,  terms  and  conditions  gov- 
erning and  surrounding  the  sugar  traffic 
of  a  competitor,  brought  by  them  on 
floats  and  lighters  to  the  same  station 
for  carriage  to  the  same  destination. 
Federal  Sugar  Refining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co..  20  I.  C.  C.  200,  217. 

(c)  Complainant,  operating  a  sugar 
refinery  at  Yonkers,  N.  Y.,  was  located 
about  10  miles  north  of  the  free  lighter- 
age limits  prescribed  by  defendants. 
Under  the  free  lighterage  practices,  de- 
fendants carried  traffic  from  points  in  the 
harbor  and  from  the  east  side  of  the  river 
back  and  forth  to  the  ends  of  their  lines 
located  on  the  Jersey  side.  Competitors 
of  complainant  were  located  within  the 
free  lighterage  limits,  and  on  shipments 
from  their  plants  located  across  the  river 
from  defendants'  terminals,  were  allowed 
regular  through  rates  without  the  ex- 
pense of  lighterage.  Complainant  was 
compelled  to  pay  from  3  to  4  l-5c  per  100 
lbs,  for  such  service  in  addition  to  the 
through  rates.  Complainant  could  reach 
defendants'  terminals  over  the  line  of 
another  carrier,  but  such  course  was  im- 
practicable, on  account  of  the  congested 
traffic  of  said  line.  One  of  complainant's 
competitors  owned  one  of  the  terminals 
and    lighterage    systems    located    across 


the  river,  and  used  same  in  lightering  its 
sugar,  being  allowed  by  defendants  the 
same  compensation  as  it  derived  from 
other  freight  lightered  by  it.  Nothing  in 
the  evidence  indicated  this  competitor 
was  making  a  profit  from  the  lighterage 
of  its  sugar  in  excess  of  the  lighterage 
charges  paid  by  the  complainant.  HELD, 
defendants  had  in  fact  extended  their 
lines  and  made  the  terminals  thereof  the 
east  side  instead  of  the  Jersey  side  of 
the  river,  and  inasmuch  as  carriers  could 
not  be  compelled  to  extend  their  lines 
to  new  localities,  complainant  was  not 
entitled  to  compel  defendants  to  extend 
their  lines  to  Yonkers,  a  point  outside 
of  New  York  City;  that  complainant's 
proper  remedy  was  an  application  for 
joint  routes  over  defendants'  and  the 
lines  of  carriers  reaching  Yonkers;  and 
that,  although  the  ownership  of  the  tei- 
minal  system  by  complainant's  competi- 
tor created  a  suspicious  situation,  undue 
discrimination  could  not  be  held  to  arise 
therefrom  in  the  absence  of  evidence  that 
said  competitor  was  making  a  profit  m 
the  lightering  of  its  own  sugar.  (Lane, 
Clements  &  Harlan,  Comm'rs,  dissent- 
ing.) Federal  Sugar  Refining  Co.  v.  B, 
&  O.  R,  R.,  17  I.  C,  C,  40,  45,  47. 

§8.     (5)      Spotting    Cars. 

See  Allowances,  §12  (2)  (e),  (f);  Spe- 
cial Contract,  §4  (1)  (e) ;  Switch 
Tracks  and  Switching,  §5  (c),  §8 
(a);     Terminal     Facilities,     §3     (d), 

(f),  (g). 
(a)  Complainant  sought  the  removal  of 
discrimination  in  that  defendants  did  not 
"spot"  cars  at  loading  and  unloading 
points  within  its  plant,  the  receipt  and 
delivery  taking  place  at  so-called  inter- 
change tracks.  The  plant  in  question  is 
a  modern  steel  plant  at  Ivy  Rock.  Pa., 
14.9  miles  from  Philadelphia,  situated  on 
Pa,  R.  R,  and  on  the  P.  &  R.  R.  R.  An  inter- 
mill  road  engaged  principally  in  hauling 
materials  between  the  steel  plant  and  a 
subsidiary  blast  furnace  across  the 
Schuykill  River  has  performed  the  serv- 
ice of  "spotting."  Some  of  the  trucks 
are  on  complainant's  land,  some  on  de- 
fendants', and  some  on  both.  Some  of 
the  interplant  tracks  are  standard  gauge 
and  some  are  narrow  gauge.  Complain- 
ant's track  arrangement  is  very  good  an^i 
was  designed  with  the  intention  of  c  mi- 
plainant  doing  its  own  switching.  Negotia- 
tions for  connections  were  completed  with 
the  P.  &  R,  R.  R,  with  this  understand- 
ing, the  defendant  building  interchange 
(racks  at  its  own  expense.  Practically  the 
same    understanding    was    had    with    the 


60 


ALLOWANCES,  §8  (5)    (b)— §8  (7)    (a) 


Pa.  R.  R.,  except  that  the  cost  of  con- 
struction was  divided.  These  agreements 
were  subject  to  termination  by  eitlier 
party  on  specified  notice  being  given. 
Later,  complainant  avers  it  found  out 
that  the  switching  services  were  per- 
formed for  other  plants.  Such  service 
had  been  performed  at  complainant's 
other  plant  for  a  long  period.  From  lOOG 
to  1910,  complainant  has  sought  to  have 
defendants  agree  to  perform  this  serv- 
ice or  make  a  switching  allowance.  Dc 
fendants  have  construed  this  as  simply 
a  demand  for  an  allowance  for  switciiin.-^;. 
Defendants  do  perform  switching  fov 
some  other  plants  which  compete  with 
complainant.  They  do  not  perform  such 
service  for  others.  In  some  Instances 
one  road  "spots"  cars  for  a  plant,  while 
the  other  does  not.  In  some  instances 
some  cars  are  "spotted,"  while  others  are 
not.  Defendants  tried  to  make  their  duties 
in  this  matter  rest  upon  whether  or  not 
there  was  an  interchange  track  or  tracks. 
They  also  sought  to  distinguish  between 
old  plants  where  the  original  switching 
has  gradually  increased  and  modern 
plants.  Such  service  by  both  railroads 
may  be  inconvenient,  but  it  is  not  imprac- 
ticable. Complainant  wanted  the  serv- 
ice or  an  allowance  for  the  service. 
Neither  defendant  made  any  switching 
allowance  in  the  Schuylkill  Valley. 
HELD,  the  failure  to  perform  the  switch- 
ing service  or  tax  an  allowance  there- 
for is  discriminatory,  but  complainant 
cannot  complain  inasmuch  as  the  par- 
ties have  an  agreement  terminable  at 
the  option  of  either  party  on  specified 
notice  whereby  complainant  is  to  do  its 
own  switching,  and  as  they  have  not  ter- 
minated this  agreement,  and  there  being 
no  allowance  for  switching  paid  in  the 
Schuylkill  Valley,  the  complainant  is  not 
subjected  to  undue  discrimination.  Wood 
Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  22 
L   C.   C.   540,   545. 

(b)  At  Cleveland,  O.,  and  Buffalo. 
N.  Y.,  various  terminal  railroads  were  al- 
lowed by  defendants  $2.50  per  car  when 
the  freight  rate  is  50c  per  ton  or  more, 
for  spotting  cars  at  certain  blast  fur- 
^naces.  No  allowance  for  this  service  is 
made  by  defendants  to  the  Buffalo  Union 
Terminal  Railroad,  a  terminal  railway 
serving  the  Buffalo  Union  Furnace  Co. 
at  Buffalo,  N.  Y.  HELD,  that  while  at 
common  law  no  obligation  rested  upon 
defendant  carriers  to  do  or  pay  for  the 
spotting  of  cars  at  any  of  the  furnaces 
mentioned,    yet    a    different    question    is 


presented  if  the  carriers  voluntarily 
undertake  to  perform  for  some  and  re- 
fuse to  perform  for  others  the  same 
service  under  substantially  similar  cir- 
cumstances and  conditions;  that  the  Buf- 
falo Union  Furnace  Co.  should  be  placed 
on  an  equality  with  other  furnaces. 
Reparation  awarded.  Buffalo  Union  Fur- 
nace Co.  V.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I. 
C.  C.  620,  627,  630. 

§8.      (6)      Staking. 

See  Infra,  §13   (b'*,   (c) ;  Facilities  and 
Privileges,    §10    (q),    §13. 

(a)  On  a  carload  of  poles  from  La- 
porte,  Minn.,  to  Poplar  Bluff,  Mo.,  no 
allowance  was  made  for  the  weight  of 
stakes  in  collecting  charges.  Subse- 
quent to  the  shipment  a  provision  for 
such  an  allowance  was  inserted  in 
defendants'  tariff.  Defendants  admitted 
such  a  provision  to  be  a  reasonable  one, 
and  that  it  should  have  been  inserted  in 
their  tariffs  at  the  time  shipment  moved. 
HELD,  reparation  should  be  awarded 
to  cover  an  allowance  for  stakes  fur- 
nished by  complainant.  Duluth  Log  Co. 
V.  M.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  627,  629. 

§8.      (7)      Transfer. 

(a)  Defendant  railroads  and  steam- 
ship lines  made  a  "transfer  allowance" 
of  2c  per  100  lbs.  on  shipments  of 
sugar  from  New  York,  the  rail  carriers 
restricting  it  to  shipments  from  refiner- 
ies and  the  water  carriers  restricting  it 
to  shippers  coming  from  certain  desig- 
nated territory  to  their  wharves.  On 
account  of  this  condition  the  refineries 
were  the  only  shippers  of  sugar  from 
New  York.  The  allowance  purported 
to  cover  the  cost  of  cartage  to  the 
terminals  of  the  carriers.  It  was  in 
fact  paid  where  no  cartage  at  all  was 
involved  and  where  the  carriers,  by 
means  of  floats  and  switch  tracks,  re- 
ceived the  sugar  from  the  store  doors 
of  the  shippers.  None  of  the  carriers 
furnished  cartage  to  shippers  of  sugar 
but  pretended  to  undertake  to  pay 
shippers  for  furnishing  cartage  for 
themselves.  The  allowances  appeareO 
to  be  simply  a  continuance  of  a  former 
rebate  before  rebates  were  made  illegal 
and  of  an  allowance  made  to  sugar  re- 
fining interests  for  routing  the  ship- 
ments over  the  lines  of  carriers,  accord- 
ing, to  a  -percentage  agreed  upom  by  the 
latter.  HELD,  the  allowance  amounted 
to  a  rebate,  was  unlawful,  and  should 
he    withdrawn.      In    Re    Allowances    for 


ALLOWANCES,  §9   (a)— §10   (c) 


61 


Transfer   of  Sugar,  14   I.   C.  C.  619,   626, 
630. 

IV.     LEGALITY     OF    ALLOWANCES. 
§9.     In    General. 

(a)  Allowances  and  divisions  to  tap 
lines  recognized  by  the  Commission,  as 
common  carriers  must  have  a  proper  re- 
lation to  the  service  performed  and  be 
such  in  amount  as  not  to  effect  a  rebate 
to  the  industry.  The  Tap-line  Case,  23 
I.   C.   C.  277,   295. 

(aa)  Wherever  an  abnormal  division 
is  allowed  to  a  railroad  which  is  tied 
up  wittt  an  industry,  there  results  an 
indirect  and  hidden  rebate  to  the  ship- 
per, because  of  his  ownership  of  the 
railroad.  In  Re  Divisions  of  Joint  Rates 
on  Coal,  22  L  C.   C.  51,  55. 

(b)  The  15th  section  of  the  Act  as 
amended  clearly  implies  that  a  just  and 
reasonable  allowance  may  be  made  to  the 
owner  of  property  transported  when  such 
owner  renders  a  service  connected  with 
or  furnishes  an  instrumentality  used  in 
the  transportation.  Federal  Sugar  Re- 
fining Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
40,  48. 

(bb)  The  provision  in  the  tariffs  re- 
quiring a  return  to  defendant  of  the  car 
within  forty-eight  hours  as  a  condition 
precedent  to  the  payment  of  an  allcw- 
ance  is  unjust,  unreasonable  and  unduly 
discriminatory.  Nebraska-Iowa  Grain 
Co.   V.   U.   P.   R.   R.   Co.,   15   L   C.   C.   90. 

(c)  The  ownership  by  a  shipper  of  a 
rail  line  which  serves  that  shipper  calls 
for  the  closest  scrutiny  to  ascertain 
whether,  through  divisions  or  allow- 
ances, rebates  are  made  to  the  shipping- 
owner.  Crane  R.  R.  Co.  v.  P.  &  R.  Rv 
Co,  15  I.  C.  C.  248,  253. 

(cc)  The  delivery  of  goods  to  a  carrier 
and  the  receiving  of  goods  from  a  car- 
rier are  duties  devolving  upon  the 
shipper,  for  which  the  carrier  cannot  be 
compelled  to  pay,  and  for  them  to  make 
allowances  based  upon  the  performance 
by  shippers  of  services  which  shippers 
are  legally  bound  to  render  for  them- 
selves is  a  violation  of  the  Act  to  Regu- 
late Commerce.  In  the  Matter  of  Allow- 
ances for  the  Transfer  of  Sugar,  14  I.  C. 
C.  619,  627. 

(d)  In  determining- whether  a  shipper 
is  entitled  to  an  allowance  from  a  rail- 
road for  services  performed  by  the  ship- 
per in  moving  cars  between  the  storage 


tracks  and  the  shipper's  buildings  and 
factories,  no  special  weight  is  to  be  given 
to  the  fact  that  for  a  number  of  years  the 
railroad  actually  paid  the  complainant 
for  such  service,  since  the  question  is  one 
of  general  application  and  must  be  de- 
termined not  by  the  practice  of  particular 
shippers,  but  by  considerations  applicable 
to  all  carriers.  General  Electric  Co.  v. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.,  14  I.  C.  C.  237,  242. 

(dd)  Reparation  awarded  because  of 
failure  to  pay  elevator  allowances  for 
loading  out  grain  prior  to  August  28, 
1906,  in  accord  with  rules  and  practices 
then  in  vogue,  but  not  on  file  with  the 
Commission.  Rosjenbaum  Grain  Co.  v. 
C.  &  E.  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  298. 

§10.     Transportation    Service    Performed 
by   Shipper. 

See   Tap    Lines,    §3    (1);    Transporta- 
tion, §1. 

(a)  Whether  a  company  or  person 
claiming  to  be  a  common  carrier  is  a 
common  carrier  at  all  and  for  all  pur-, 
poses  is  a  question  of  fact,  and  whether 
the  service  performed  for  a  particular 
person  is  a  service  of  transportation  or 
an  industrial  service  is  also  a  question  of 
fact.  The  Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C, 
277.  292. 

(b)  The  fact  that  the  rails,  locomo- 
tives and  cars  of  an  industry  have  been 
turned  over  to  an  incorporated  railroad 
company,  owned  and  operated  by  the  in- 
dustry or  in  its  interest,  does  not  divest 
those  appliances  of  their  character  as  a 
plant  facility  if  such  in  fact  is  the  case. 
If  the  rails  were  laid  and  the  equipment 
acquired  for  the  use  of  the  industry  as 
a  facility  in  the  process  of  manufacture 
and  production,  and  are  so  used,  the  fact 
that  some  outside  traflfic  may  be  carried 
over  the  same  rails  does  not  modify  the 
character  of  what  is  done  over  them  for 
the  industry.  If  in  such  a  case  the 
tracks  and  equipment  are  a  facility  of  the 
plant  and  are  so  used  in  the  process  of 
manufacture,  what  is  thus  done  for  the 
controlling  industry  cannot  be  regarded 
as  a  service  of  transportation.  It  is  clear 
that  a  division  allowed  by  a  public  carrier 
out  of  the  rate  under  such  circumstances 
is  a  rebate  to  the  industry.  The  test  is, 
what  is  the  real  relation  to  the  industry 
of  the  tap  line.  The  Tap-line  Case,  23 
I.  C.  C.  277,  292. 

(c)  The  common  ownership  of  an  in- 
dustry and  a  short  line  serving  it  is  not 
in  itself  sufficient  to  divest  the  railroad 
of  its  status  as  a  common  carrier.     On 


62 


ALLOWANCES,  §10  (d)— §11  (c) 


the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  the  rails, 
locomotives  and  cars  of  an  industry  have 
been  turned  over  to  an  incorporated  raH- 
road  company  owned  and  operated  by  the 
industry  or  in  its  interest  does  not  divest 
those  appliances  of  their  character  as  a 
plant  facility  if  such  in  fact  is  the  case. 
A  line  must  be  drawn  at  some  point  be- 
tween what  is  transportation  and  what 
is  industry  and  between  a  facility  of 
transportation  and  a  plant  facility  or  tool 
of  the  industry.  Each  case,  however, 
must  stand  on  its  own  facts.  On  the  facts 
shown  of  record  the  service  performed 
for  the  proprietary  lumber  companies  by 
the  following  tap  lines  is  not  a  service 
of  transportation  by  a  common  carrier: 
Malvern  &  Freeo  Valley  Railway,  Wilmar 
&  Saline  Valley  Railroad,  Arkansas  & 
Gulf  Railroad,  Little  Rock,  Maumelle  & 
Western  Railroad,  Beirne  &  Clear  Lake 
Railroad,  Mississippi,  Arkansas  &  West- 
ern Railway,  Bearden  &  Ouachita  River 
Railroad,  Arkansas  Eastern  Railroad, 
Blytheville,  Burdette  &  Mississippi 
River  Railway,  Brookings  &  Peach  Or- 
chard Railroad,  Crossett  Railway,  For- 
dyce  &  Princeton  Railroad,  Roman  & 
Southeastern  Railway,  Little  Rock,  Sheri- 
dan &  Saline  River  Railway,  L'Anguille 
River  Railway,  Ouachita  Valley  Railway, 
Southern  Pine  System,  Black  Bayou  Rail- 
road, Bodcaw  Valley  Railway,  Mill  Creek 
&  Little  River  Railway,  Red  River  & 
Rocky  Mount  Railway,  Woodworth  & 
Louisiana  Central  Railway,  Freeo  Valley 
Railroad,  Natchez,  "Urania  &  Ruston 
Railway,  Bernice  &  Northwestern  Rail- 
way, Dorcheat  Valley  Railroad,  Mangham 
&  Northeastern  Railway,  Peach  River 
Lines,  Jefferson  &  Northwestern  Railway, 
Beaumont  &  Saratoga,  Angelina  & 
Neches  River  Railroad.  The  Tap-line 
Case,  23  L  C.  C.  277. 

(d)  What  is  a  plant  facility  cannot 
also  be  a  common  carrier  for  the  plant, 
and  what  is  an  industrial  service  cannot 
also  be  a  service  of  transportation.  The 
Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  277,  298. 

§11.     Transportation    Facility. 

See    Tap    Lines,    §3    (1);    Transporta- 
tion,  §1. 

(a)  The  lumber  rate  west  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi River  applies  from  the  mill.  In 
those  cases  where  the  mill  is  situated  a 
reasonable  distance  of  not  less  than  1,000 
feet  from  the  trunk  line,  that  carrier  may 
arrange  with  the  lumber  company  to  per- 
form the  service  for  it  of  transportating 
the    loaded    cars    from    the    mill    to   the 


trunk  line,  and  may  make  a  reasonable 
allowance  to  the  .  lumber  company  for 
such  service  under  section  15.  The  Tap 
Line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  549,  552,  553,  559. 
568,  596,  599,  603,  605,  607,  608,  611. 

(b)  Where  a  mill  is  distant  more  than 
three  miles  from  a  trunk  line,  and  Is 
connected  with  the  latter  by  a  tap  line 
not  recognized  by  the  Commission  as  a 
common  carrier,  no  allowance  or  division 
may  lawfully  be  made  by  a  trunk  line 
either  to  the  lumber  company  or  to  its 
tap  line.  Such  a  lumber  company,  al- 
though using  rails,  stands  in  no  better 
position  under  the  law  with  resiiect  to 
its  lumber  than  does  a  lumber  company 
that  uses  other  means  of  delivering  its 
lumber  to  a  public  carrier.  Where  a 
mill  is  more  than  three  miles  distant  from 
a  trunk  line  and  is  connected  with  it  by 
a  tap  line  organized  as  a  common  carrier 
and  so  recognized  by  the  Commission, 
the  mill  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  shipping 
point  equally  with  all  other  mill  points 
in  its  rate  group;  and  the  lumber  rate 
is  to  be  regarded  as  in  effect  from  the 
mill,  the  tap  line  being  entitled  to  a 
division  thereof,  according  to  the  extent 
of  its  participation  in  the  through  serv- 
ice under  the  through  rate.  The  Tap 
Line  Case,  23  L  C.  C.  277,  295. 

(c)  Under  their  tariffs  the  public  car- 
riers interpret  the  lumber  rate  as  apply- 
ing from  mills  west  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  as  far  as  three  miles  from  their 
own  lines.  If  a  lumber  company  having 
a  mill  within  that  distance  of  a  trunk 
line  undertakes  by  arrangement  with  the 
trunk  line  to  use  its  own  power  to  set 
the  empty  car  at  the  mill  and  to  deliver 
it  when  loaded  to  the  trunk  line,  it  is 
doing  for  itself  what  the  trunk  line  under 
its  tariffs  offers  to  do  under  the  rate. 
In  such  a  case  the  lumber  company  may 
therefore  fairly  be  said  to  furnish  a 
facility  of  transportation  for  which  it 
may  reasonably  be  compensated  under 
section  15,  whether  its  tap  line  is  in- 
corporated or  unincorporated.  But  an 
allowance  under  such  circumstances  is 
lawful  only  when  the  trunk  line  prefers 
for  reasons  of  its  own  and  without  dis- 
crimination to  have  the  lumber  company 
perform  the  service.  It  is  not  lawful 
when  the  lumber  company  refuses  to 
permit  the  trunk  line  to  do  the  work. 
No  allowance,  however,  ought  to  be  made 
by  a  trunk  line  to  a  lumber  company 
where  the  mill  is  within  1,000  feet  of 
the  trunk  line.    An  allowance  under  such 


ALLOWANCES,  §11   (d)— §12   (1)    (a) 


63 


circumstances  would  be  a  mere  device  to 
effect  an  unlawful  payment  to  the  lumber 
company.  The  same  rule  would  apply 
where  a  short  switch  track  to  the  mill 
has  been  torn  out  or  is  still  available, 
but  not  used,  in  order  to  give  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  longer  haul  to  the  mill 
over  a  spur  or  switch  track  constructed 
by  the  lumber  company  or  by  its  tap  line, 
to  secure  an  allowance.  The  Tap  Line 
Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  277,  294. 

(d)  In  the  cases  of  the  following  tap 
lines  it  is  held  that  they  may  receive  as 
maximum  allowances  the  divisions  men- 
tioned and  the  switching  charges  pre- 
scribed: Saline  River  Railway,  2c  per 
100  lbs.;  Warren  &  Ouachita  Valley  Rail- 
way, a  switching  rate  of  $2.50  per  car 
from  the  Iron  Mountain  R.  R.  and  2c  per 
100  lbs.  from  the  Rock  Island  R.  R.;  El 
Dorado  &  Wesson  Railway,  2c  per  100 
lbs.;  Thornton  &  Alexandria  Railway,  Ic 
per  100  lbs.;  Doniphan,  Kensett  &  Searcy 
Railway,  a  switching  charge  of  $2.50  per 
car  from  the  Iron  Mountain  R.  R.  and  Ic 
per  100  lbs.  from  the  Rock  Island  R.  R.; 
Fourche  River  Valley  &  Indian  Territory 
Railway,  a  switching  charge  of  $1,50  per 
car;  Prescott  &  Northwestern  Railroad, 
$1.50  per  car;  Caddo  &  Choctaw  Railroad, 
$1.50  per  car;  Memphis,  Dallas  &  Gulf 
Railroad,  over  the  Nashville  Division 
only,  the  Iron  Mountain  may  allow  it  a 
switching  charge  of  $2  per  car,  the  con- 
necting carriers  at  Ashdown  may  allow 
it  2c  per  100  lbs.;  Crittenden  Railroad,  2c 
per  100  lbs.  from  the  Rock  Island  and  $3 
per  car  switching  from  the  Iron  Mountain 
R.  R.;  De  Queen  &  Eastern  Railroad, 
$1.50  per  car;  Central  Railway  of  Arkan- 
sas, I1/2C  per  100  lbs.;  Gulf  &  Sabine 
River  Railroad,  Ic  per  100  lbs.;  Sibley, 
Lake  Bisteneau  &  Southern  Railway,  Ic 
per  100  lbs.;  North  Louisiana  &  Gulf 
Railroad,  2c  per  100  lbs.  on  the  products 
of  the  hardwood  mill  only,  except  when 
again  milled  or  planed  at  Hodge,  La.; 
Arkansas  Southeastern  Railroad,  2c  per 
100  lbs.  from  the  Iron  Mountain  R.  R. 
only;  Red  River  &  Gulf  Railroad,  $2  per 
car  for  switching  from  the  Iron  Mountain 
and  2c  per  100  lbs.  from  the  Rock  Island 
and  other  trunk  lines  on  the  product  of 
the  mill  at  Long  Leaf,  La.;  Tremont  & 
Gulf  Railway,  from  the  Iron  Mountain  R. 
R.  and  the  products  of  the  Rochelle  mill 
a  switching  charge  of  $1.50  per  car,  and 
on  the  product  of  various  mills  divisions 
of  li^c  to  2c  per  100  lbs.;  Nacogdoches 
&  Southeastern  Railroad,  $1.50  per  car 
for  switching  only  from  the  Houston  East 


&  West  Texas;  Texas  Southeastern  Rail- 
road, $2  per  car  for  switching,  from  tlie 
Houston  East  &  West  Texas  and  2c  per 
100  lbs.  from  other  trunk  lines;  Timpson 
&  Henderson  Railway,  2c  per  100  lbs.; 
Shreveport,  Houston  &  Gulf  Railroad, 
li/^c  per  100  lbs.;  Groveton,  Lufkin  & 
Northern  Railway,  from  the  Missouri, 
Kansas  &  Texas  Railway  only,  a  switch- 
ing charge  of  $2  per  car,  and  from  other 
trunk  lines  2c  per  100  lbs.;  Moscow, 
Camden  &  San  Augustine  Railway,  l^^c 
per  100  lbs.;  Trinity  Valley  &  Northern 
Railway,  Ic  per  100  lbs.;  Trinity  Valley 
Southern  Railroad,  Ic  per  100  lbs.;  Caro 
Northern  Railway,  $2  per  car;  Butler 
County  Railroad,  $1.50  per  car;  Deering 
Southwestern  Railway,  l^^c  per  100  lbs.; 
Mississippi  Valley  Railway,  l^^c  per  100 
lbs.;  Paragould  &  Memphis  Railway, 
switching  charges  of  from  $2  to  $3  per 
car;  Salem,  Winona  &  Southern  Railroad, 
li/^c  per  100  lbs.;  Fernwood  &  Gulf  Rail- 
road, a  switching  charge  of  $2.50  a  car 
from  the  Illinois  Central  only  and  2c  per 
100  lbs.  from  the  New  Orleans  Great 
Northern  R.  R.;  New  Orleans,  Natalbany 
&  Natchez  Railway,  $1.50  per  car  for 
switching  from  two  mills  only;  Alabama 
Central  Railroad,  l^/^c  per  100  lbs.; 
Washington  &  Choctaw  Railway,  $1.50 
per  car.  The  Tap  Line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C. 
549-650. 

§12.     What    Is    not    Transportation    Serv- 
ice. 

§12.     (1)     Accessorial        or        Incidental 
Service. 

(a)  Arbuckle  Bros,  operate  their  own 
property  under  a  contract  for  the  de- 
fendant carriers,  as  the  carriers'  Jay  St. 
terminal  in  Brooklyn.  Under  their  con- 
tract, Arbuckle  Bros,  carry  their  sugar 
to  this  terminal  in  their  own  lighters,  re- 
ceiving an  allowance  therefor.  Defend- 
ants are  under  no  liability  until  the  ton- 
nage is  delivered  to  them  in  New  Jersey. 
Two-thirds  of  the  traffic  handled  through 
the  Jay  St.  terminal  by  Arbuckle  Bros,  as 
agent  for  the  defendant  carriers  is  for 
the  public  generally.  HELD,  that  in 
lightering  their  sugar  to  the  Jersey  shore 
and  there  delivering  it  to  the  defendants, 
Arbuckle  Bros,  perform  a  purely  acces- 
sorial service  towards  their  own  ship- 
ments and  merely  incident  thereto  and 
do  not  perform  a  transportation  service 
as  agents  of  the  carriers.  It  therefore 
may  not  be  paid  for  by  the  defendants 
under  section  15  of  the  Act,  while  refus- 


64 


ALLOWANCES,  §12  (1)    (b)— §12   (2)    (cc) 


ing  a  similar  allowance  to  another 
shipper  providing  a  similar  facility  and 
performing  the  same  service  in  the  trans- 
portation of  his  property.  Federal  Sugar 
Refining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
C.  200,  209,  212. 

(b)  The  merchandising  of  grain  is  no 
part  of  the  duty  of  a  carrier  and  for  car- 
riers to  pay  shippers  for  any  of  the  op- 
erations of  the  merchandising  is  to  make 
reductions  from  published  rates  by  sub- 
terfuge. Gund  &  Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  364,  367. 

(c)  Defendant  carrier's  terminals  "are 
located  at  Jersey  City  and  all  shipments 
made  over  its  lines  from  across  New 
York  harbor  must  be  lightered  to  its 
docks  at  that  point.  This  service  is  per- 
formed by  the  defendant  without  cost  to 
shippers.  Complainant  found  it  neces- 
sary to  fill  all  the  orders  of  its  customers 
on  the  day  on  which  they  were  received 
and  defendant  was  unable  to  furnish 
barges  and  boats  promptly  enough  to  ac- 
complish this  purpose,  sometimes  com- 
pelling complainant  to  wait  three  or  four 
days.  Complainant  took  the  matter  of 
lighterage  into  its  own  hands  and  per- 
formed the  service  on  its  own  boats.  It 
sought  to  recover  3c  per  100  lbs.  for  this 
service.  Some  years  after  the  shipments 
in  question  the  defendant  provided  in  its 
tariffs  for  the  payment  of  3c  for  this 
lighterage  service  when  performed  for 
the  convenience  of  defendant,  but  at  the 
time  of  shipment  no  tariff  was  in  effect 
authorizing  defendant  to  pay  for  light- 
erage performed  by  the  shipper.  HELD, 
under  the  facts  disclosed,  the  complain- 
ant having  performed  such  lighterage 
service  for  its  own  convenience  and  to 
meet  the  special  requiremehts  of  its  busi- 
ness, was  not  entitled  to  compensation. 
Barrett  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  R.  R.,  etc.,  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  464,  466. 

(d)  The  storage  of  grain  beyond  the 
elevation  period  of  10  days  and  the  mix- 
ing, weighing  and  inspection  of  the  same 
are  commercial  services  and  are  in  no 
sense  a  part  of  elevation,  as  defined  in 
the  Act.  In  the  Matter  of  Allowances  to 
Elevators  by  the  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  315,  316. 

§12.      (2)      Operation    of    Plant    Facility. 

(a)  The  lumber  rate  west  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi River  applies  from  the  mill.  In 
those  cases  where  the  mill  is  situated 
less  than  1,000  feet  from  the  trunk  line 


that  carrier  may  not  lawfully  make  any 
allowance  to  the  lumber  company  for 
hauling  the  loaded  cars  from  the  mill  to 
the  trunk  line.  The  Tap  Line  Case,  2-3 
I.  C.  C.  549,  552,  569,  576,  594,  597.  599, 
601,  606,  608,  611,  618,  632,  641,  645,  646. 

(b)  In  the  cases  of  the  following  tap 
lines  it  is  held  that  they  are  mere  plant 
facilities  and  not  entitled  to  allowances, 
either  as  divisions  or  switching  charges: 
Missouri  &  Louisiana  Railroad,  Saginaw  & 
Ouachita  River  Railroad,  Warren,  Johns- 
/ille  &  Saline  River  Railway,  Blytheville, 
Leachville  &  Arkansas  Southern  Rail- 
road, Gould  Southwestern  Railway, 
Memphis,  Dallas  &  Gulf  Railroad,  as  to 
the  switch  movement  from  Graysonia, 
Ark.,  only;  Louisiana  &  Pine  Bluff  Rail- 
way, Mansfield  Railway,  Louisiana  & 
Pacific  Railway,  Roosevelt  &  Western 
liailroad,  Louisiana  Central  Railroad, 
Morth  Louisiana  &  Gulf  Railroad,  as  to  all 
yellow  pine  mills  only;  Monroe  &  South- 
western Railway,  Victoria,  Fisher  & 
Western  Railroad,  Ouachita  &  North- 
western Railroad,  Lake  Charles  Railway, 
Louisiana  Railway,  Zwolle  &  Eastern 
Railway,  Sabine  &  Northern  Railroad, 
Nacogdoches  &  Southeastern  Railroad,  as 
to  allowances  from  the  Texas  &  New 
Orleans  R.  R.  only;  Gideon  &  North 
Island  Railroad,  Poplar  Bluff  &  Dan 
River  Railway,  Kentwood  &  Eastern  Rail- 
way, Kentwood,  Greensburg  &  South- 
western Railroad,  Liberty-White  Rail- 
road, Natchez,  Columbia  &  Mobile  Rail- 
road. The  Tap  Line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C. 
549-650. 

(bb)  The  payment  of  allowances  or 
divisions  to  a  boat  line,  which  is  a 
mere  plant  facility  of  a  salt  company, 
is  held  to  be  an  unlawful  rebate.  Co- 
lonial Salt  Co.  V.  M.  I.  &  I.  L,  23  I.  C. 
C.   358. 

(c)  Where  a  tap  line  is  merely  a 
plant  facility  hauling  logs  to  the  mill, 
and  the  mill  itself  is  situated  on  a  trunk 
line,  any  allowance  or  division  of  rates 
made  by  the  trunk  line  to  the  I'lmber 
company  or  the  tap  line  is  an  unlawful 
rebate.  23  I.  C.  C.  552,  555,  587,  597, 
599,  602,  606,  613,  632,  635,  641,  642, 
645,  646,  649. 

(cc)  Complainant,  a  large  lumber 
corporation,  operated  a  lumber  road 
connecting  its  timber  tract  with  the 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  under  a  contract 
whereby  it  received  a  division  of  2c  per 
100    lbs.    upon    all    traffic    delivered    to 


ALLOWANCES,  §12   (2)    (d)  — (e) 


65 


the  trunk  line.  It  also  carried  freight 
for  small  competitors  located  on  the 
tap  line.  Eventually  an  advance  was 
made  in  the  lumber  rate  of  2c  per 
100  lbs.  by  the  trunk  line  and  the  divi- 
sion to  the  tap  line  was  increased  to 
5c  per  100  lbs.  It  is  found  that  the 
reasonable  cost  of  hauling  the  lumber  of 
the  tap  line  is  2c  per  100  lbs.,  and  that 
the  advance  in  rate  by  the  trunk  line 
was  unreasonable,  HELD,  that  the  tap 
line,  so  far  as  it  was  operated  in  the 
interests  of  the  complainant,  was  a 
plant  facility  and  not  a  common  carrier. 
That  oil  account  of  the  increase  in  the 
division  of  rates  with  the  tap  line  it 
is  apparent  complainant  did  not  pay 
the  increased  rate.  Reparation  denied. 
Kaul  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co., 
20  L   C.   C.   450. 

(d)  Tap  lines  connecting  lumber  mills 
with  the  Cotton  Belt  were  being  allowed 
from  2  to  6c  for  hauls  varying  from 
practically  nothing  to  150  miles,  leaving 
the  Cotton  Belt's  net  earnings  as  low  as 
4  to  8c  for  its  haul  to  Fort  Worth.  It 
appeared  that  these  tap  lines  were  for- 
merly owned  by  the  mill  owners,  but  were 
subsequently  incorporated  and  given  the 
form  of  common  carriers;  that  for  the 
most  part  they  reached  only  the  forests 
owned  by  their  stockholders;  that  while 
they  held  themselves  out  to  serve  the 
public  as  common  carriers,  there  was  in 
fact  no  public  reached  by  them  except  a 
negligible  amount  of  incidental  traffic; 
that  they  did  not  publish  and  file  tariffs 
as  required  by  law,  join  in  through  rates 
with  the  railroads,  file  schedules  of  di- 
visions of  rates,  or  keep  accounts  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  system  of  accounts, 
prescribed  by  the  commission  for  car- 
riers participating  in  interstate  com- 
merce. These  conditions  were  true  with 
respect  to  tap  lines  generally  over  the 
country.  HELD,  that  any  allowance  or 
division  made  to  or  with  a  tap  line  that 
is  owned  or  controlled,  directly  or  indi- 
rectly, by  the  lumber  mill  or  by  its  offi- 
cers or  proprietors  and  that  has  no  traflic 
beyond  the  logs  that  it  hauls  to  the  mill, 
except  such  as  it  may  pick  up  as  a  mere 
incident  to  its  efforts  to  serve  the  mill 
as  an  adjunct  or  plant  facility,  is  an  un- 
lawful departure  from  the  published 
rates.  Readjustment  of  rates  suggested, 
calculated  to  eliminate  unlawful  prac- 
tices and  give  shippers  reasonable  rates. 
(Separate  opinion  by  Prouty,  Comm'r.) 
Star  Grain  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  338,  345. 


(dd)  Formerly  defendant  delivered 
loaded  cars  to  complainant's  exchange 
tracks  at  Catasauqua.  Complainant  con- 
structed tracks  leading  from  the  ex- 
change tracks  into  its  yards,  and  sup- 
plied locomotives  to  draw  the  loaded  cars 
into  its  yards,  and  return  loaded  cars  of 
its  own  products.  Later  other  indus- 
tries grew  up  beyond  complainant's  plant, 
and  complainant  extended  its  tracks  to 
such  industries  and  charged  them  a 
stipulated  price  per  car  for  moving  cars 
to  and  from  defendants'  terminal.  Said 
other  industries  were  allowed  compensa- 
tion for  this  service  which  they  secured 
from  complainant.  Subsequently  com- 
plainant incorporated  its  private  railroad 
and  demanded  that  defendants  make  it 
an  allowance  for  hauling  cars  back  and 
forth  between  complainant's  yards  and 
its  team  tracks.  HELD,  the  service  was 
not  one  which  the  defendants  owed  com- 
plainant a  duty  to  perform;  that  de- 
fendants might  properly  allow  to  other 
industries  compensation  for  the  hauling 
of  cars  to  their  plants,  since  such  serv- 
ice was  merely  the  equivalent  of  the 
service  rendered  by  defendants  in  plac- 
ing cars  on  complainant's  exchange 
tracks;  and  that  complainant  was  not 
entitled  to  compensation  for  the  services 
rendered  by  its  railroad,  such  service  be- 
ing in  the  nature  of  a  plant  facility. 
Crane  Iron  Works  v.  Central  R,  R.  Co.,  17 
I.  C,  C.  514,  518-520. 

(e)  Complainant,  General  Electric  Com- 
pany of  Schenectady,  N.  Y.,  filed  a  com- 
plaint to  determine  its  right  to  receive 
an  allowance  from  defendant  railroads 
for  services  performed  by  complainant  in 
moving  empty  and  loaded  cars  between 
the  storage  tracks  and  complainant's  fac- 
tories and  shops.  Its  factory  and  shop 
yard  occupied  some  180  acres  of  land, 
and  there  were  about  140  buildings.  It 
had  constructed  three  miles  of  storage 
tracks,  together  with  connecting  switch 
tracks  of  standard  gauge,  aggregating  12 
miles  in  length  and  occupying  some  23 
acres  of  land;  and  in  addition  thereto 
constructed  seven  miles  of  narrow  gauge 
electric  tracks  crossing  and  recrossing 
the  standard  gauge  system.  The  switch 
tracks  leading  to  complainant's  industries 
were  from  400  to  500  feet  long.  Defend- 
ants had  no  right,  and  under  the  cir- 
cumstances it  was  impossible  for  them 
to  make  use  of  complainant's  network  of 
tracks,  which  were  under  the  exclusive 
control  of  complainant.  Complainant 
used    its    own    locomotives    and    electric 


66 


ALLOWANCES,  §12   (2)    (f)— §14   (b) 


motors  in  moving  loaded  and  unloaded 
cars  in  its  yard,  and  performed  about 
112,000  carload  movements  a  year.  De- 
fendants had  been  long  accustomed  to 
move  cars  free  of  charge  between  their 
tracks  and  factories  of  other  shippers  at 
Schenectady.  For  some  12  years  defend- 
ants, under  an  agreement,  had  been  al- 
lowing compensation  for  the  services  per- 
formed by  complainant.  HELD,  defend- 
ants owed  no  duty  to  move  the  cars  over 
complainant's  network  of  tracks  and 
complainant  was  not  entitled  and  could 
not  be  permitted  to  receive  compensa- 
tion therefor.  General  Electric  Co.  v. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
237,  242,  243,  244. 

(f)  Complainant,  manufacturer  of  soda 
products,  constructed  an  elaborate  sys- 
tem of  tracks  leading  from  defendant's 
tracks  to  complainant's  various  factories 
and  buildings.  Complainant's  equipment 
consisted  of  11.8  miles  of  track  within  its 
plant,  six  locomotives  and  175  cars,  and 
handled  over  its  system  of  tracks  some 
850,000  tons  of  its  products  yearly.  This 
track  system  was  entirely  in  control  of 
complainant  and  it  was  wholly  imprac- 
ticable for  defendant  to  perform  the 
service  of  switching  cars  thereon  without 
serious  interference  to  the  conduct  of 
complainant's  business.  HELD,  follow- 
ing General  Electric  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H. 
R.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  1.  C.  C.  237,  that  defend- 
ant owed  no  duty  to  move  cars  about 
complainant's  yard,  and  that  complainant 
was  not  entitled  to  recover  for  the  serv- 
ices performed  and  the  instrumentalities 
furnished  by  it  in  connection  with  the 
movement  of  cars  in  its  said  yard.  Sol- 
vay  Process  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  L  C.  C.  246,  249. 

V.     REASONABLENESS     OF     ALLOW- 
ANCES. 

§13.     In   General. 

(a)  An  allowance  of  50c  per  bale  for 
compression  of  cotton  is  not  excessive 
or  discriminatory.  Merchants'  Storage 
Co.  V.  1.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  98,  102. 

(b)  On  a  shipment  of  poles  from  La- 
porte,  Minn.,  to  Louisville,  Ky.,  the  tariff 
of  one  of  the  carriers  contained  no  pro- 
vision for  allowance  for  the  weight  of  the 
stakes.  The  other  carriers  involved  and 
carriers  generally  in  said  territories 
made  such  allowance.  Defendants  ad- 
mitted it  should  have  been  made.  HELD, 
reparation    should    be   awarded.     Duluth 


Log  Co.  V.  M.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C. 
192,  195. 

(c)  On  shipments  of  lumber  from 
Hines,  Minn.,  to  Inwood,  la.,  Parkston, 
S.  D.,  Charles  City,  la.,  and  Chillicothe, 
Mo.,  on  flat  or  gondola  cars,  defendants' 
tariffs  made  no  allowance  for  stakes  fur- 
nished by  complainant.  Subsequent  to 
the  shipments  in  question  a  tariff  was 
filed  making  such  allowance.  Defendant 
admitted  the  unreasonableness  of  the 
rates  charged  to  the  extent  of  such  al- 
lowance. HELD,  reparation  should  be 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  the  allowance 
made  for  stakes  in  the  subsequently  pub- 
lished tariff.    Kaye  &  Carter  Lumber  Co. 

V.  C.   M.    &   St.   P.  Ry.  Co.,   14  L   C.   C. 
604,  605. 

VI.  DAMAGES    AND    REPARATION. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §22  (b) ;  Claims; 
Reparation. 

§14.     In    General. 

(a)  Where  in  a  suit  for  damages  by  a 
shipper  against  a  railroad  for  unjust  dis- 
crimination contrary  to  the  Act  to  Regu- 
late Commerce  in  making  allowances  for 
services  to  competing  shippers  the  plain- 
tiff, in  its  statement  of  claim,  alleges  the 
loss  of  a  stipulated  sum  per  ton  on  the 
coal  shipped  by  it,  it  is  error  to  award 
damages  on  the  basis  of  the  amount  of 
the  allowance  made  to  the  favored  com- 
petitor. Mitchell  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  181  Fed.  403,  410. 

(b)  Complainants  asked  that  the  de- 
fendant be  required  to  provide  by  pub- 
lished rule  that  shippers  of  grain  may, 
when  occasion  makes  it  necessary, 
cooper  the  car  that  is  furnished  and  re- 
cover therefor  an  allowance  not  to  ex- 
ceed $5,  including  the  allowance  for  grain 
doors.  It  appears  that  shippers  of  grain 
from  Washington  and  Oregon  are  fur- 
nished cracked  and  old  box  cars  by  de- 
fendant for  the  carrying  of  grain,  which 
they  repair  themselves  in  order  to  save 
time.  HELD,  that  it  is  the  primary  duty 
of  a  railroad  to  furnish  equipment  that 
is  usable  and  in  the  event  that  the  car 
furnished  is  unfit  the  shipper  should  re- 
ject it  and  call  for  another.  Allowances 
of  the  kind  requested  are  of  a  dangerous 
character.  The  carrier  cannot  tell  what 
the  actual  amount  of  material  and  labor 
used  by  the  shipper  was.  The  car  is 
loaded  immediately  upon  being  repaired 
and  is  sent  to  some  far  distant  point. 
There  is  no  means  of  adequately  check- 
ing the   expenditure  of  the   shipper,   so 


ALLOWANCES,  §14   (d)— §15   (a) 


67 


that  it  becomes  extremely  easy  to  turn 
such  allowances  into  real  rebates.  It  is 
a  safer  and  more  reasonable  practice  to 
curtail  such  allowances  than  to  extend 
them,  since  the  Commission  cannot  in 
any  way  police  such  repairs,  and  it  is  a 
far  wiser  policy  for  the  carriers  to  repair 
their  own  equipment  than  to  farm  it  out 
to  shippers.  A  rule  of  this  character 
could  not  be  limited  to  the  repair  of 
cars  for  a  shipment  in  bulk  of  grain 
without  establishing  a  precedent  as  to 
allowances  for  other  commodities.  Bal- 
four, Guthrie  &  Co.  v.  O.  W.  R.  R.  &  Nav. 
Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  539,  540. 

(d)  For  unloading  grain  shipped  to 
them  at  Omaha  and  Council  Bluffs  from 
points  on  defendant's  line  in  Nebraska, 
complainants  are  entitled  to  recover  ele- 
vator allowances  at  the  tariff  allowance 
then  in  force,  l^c,  the  case  being  gov- 
erned by  Nebraska-Iowa  Grain  Co.  v.  U. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  90.  Merriam  & 
Homquist  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
337. 

(e)  Complainants  at  Omaha  and  Coun- 
cil Bluffs  sought  to  recover  reparation  of 
li/4c  per  100  lbs.  for  unloading  grain  into 
elevators  from  defendant's  cars.  Prior 
to  June  29,  1908,  the  Commission  held 
that  the  practice  of  granting  said  allow- 
ance had  become  illegal.  All  the  cars  in 
question  were  unloaded  prior  to  June  29, 
1908.  The  effective  date  of  the  order  of 
June  29,  1908,  had  been  postponed  and 
the  allowance  was  still  legal  at  the  time 
of  the  hearing.  HELD,  complainants 
were  not  barred  from  recovering  by  the 
decision  of  June  29,  1908.  Reparation 
awarded.  Nebraska-Iowa  Grain  Co.  v.  U. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  90,  94.  Modified 
in  other  respects,  U.  P.  R.  R.  v.  Updike 
Grain  Co.,  222  U.  S.  215;  32  Sup.  Ct.  39, 
56,  L.  ed.  171. 

(f)  Defendant  withdrew  all  elevation 
allowances  from  complainant  at  Atchison, 
but  extended  free  services  to  complain- 
ant's competitors  at  Coffeyville,  Leaven- 
worth and  Kansas  City  in  elevating, 
cleaning,  mixing  and  clipping  grain.  As 
a  result,  complainant  was  compelled  to 
suspend  business  for  about  a  year.  It 
sought  to  recover  damages  for  interest 
and  depreciation  of  its  elevator  plant, 
insurance,  operating  expenses,  salary  of 
president  and  secretary,  loss  of  business, 
and  loss  of  prestige  and  good-will. 
HELD,  the  Commission  had  no  jurisdic- 
tion  to   award   such   damages.     Washer 


Grain  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 

147,  157. 

(g)  Where  a  defendant  railroad  has 
agreed  with  a  shipper  to  allow  it  a  cer- 
tain sum  for  services  performed  by  the 
shipper  in  moving  cars  over  switching 
tracks  connecting  the  storage  tracks  with 
the  shipper's  buildings  and  factories,  the 
Commission  has  no  authority  to  enforce 
a  specific  performance  of  such  a  contract, 
or  to  award  damages  for  the  breach 
thereof.  General  Electric  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C. 
&  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  237,  242. 

(h)  During  a  shortage  of  cars  suitable 
for  the  shipment  of  hay,  defendant 
offered  to  furnish  complainant  cattle  cars 
for  that  purpose  upon  the  agreement  of 
complainant  to  clean  the  same  and  line 
them  with  paper.  Complainant  did  so 
and  sought  to  recover  the  expense  in- 
curred thereby.  HELD,  reparation  should 
be  denied.  Laning-Harris  Coal  &  Grain 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C. 

148,  151. 

(i)  Complainant,  a  short  line  railroad, 
carried  traffic  between  La  Salle,  111.,  and 
La  Salle  Junction,  111.,  6i/^  miles;  making 
connections  at  the  latter  point  with  de- 
fendant. November  1,  1906,  defendant 
informed  complainant  that  it  would  not 
pay  complainant  the  allowances  pre- 
viously in  effect,  except  on  traffic  on 
which  complainant  named  through  rates 
to  or  from  La  Salle.  No  provision  for 
allowances  to  complainant  was  made  in 
defendant's  tariffs.  Complainant  asked 
an  order  compelling  defendant  to  pay  it 
for  traffic  hauled  between  such  points, 
upon  which  no  joint  through  rates  were 
established  and  asked  that  allowances 
be  made  to  it  on  the  basis  of  the  agreed 
compensation  in  effect  prior  to  Novem- 
ber 1,  1906.  HELD,  the  power  of  the 
Commission  to  award  reparation  does  not 
extend  to  the  division  of  rates  between 
connecting  carriers.  Claims  ex  contractu 
are  not  recognized  by  the  Commission; 
it  cannot  order  the  payment  of  money  for 
services  performed,  nor  for  a  debt  due 
one  carrier  from  another  on  account  of 
joint  rates  for  a  joint  service.  Repara- 
tion denied.  La  Salle  &  Bureau  County 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I'. 
C.  C.  610,  612. 

VII.     AS    REBATES. 

§15.     In   General. 

(a)  If  there  is  a  holding  out  as  a  com- 
mon carrier  for  hire,  and  if  there  is  an 


6S 


ALLOWANCES,  §15   (b)— §16    (b) 


ostensible  and  actual  movement  of  traffic 
for  the  public  for  hire,  the  status  of  a 
common  carrier  exists,  whether  the  hold- 
ing out  is  by  a  company  or  by  an  indi- 
vidual. But  such  a  holding  out  and  the 
existence  of  an  actual  traffic  is  not  con- 
clusive in  all  cases.  Where  the  holding 
out  is  in  furtherance  of  a  plan  to  secure 
unlawful  advantages  and  the  alleged  car- 
rier is  able  to  pick  up  some  traffic  that  is 
incidental  to  that  purpose,  it  must  be  re- 
garded simply  as  a  cloak  or  device  to 
effect  unlawful  results.  The  Tap  Line 
Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  277,  292. 

(b)  The  lumber  rate  west  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi River  applies  from  the  mill.  In 
those  cases  where  a  short  switch  track 
to  the  mill  from  a  trunk  line  has  been 
torn  out  or  is  still  available  but  not  used 
in  order  to  give  the  appearance  of  a 
longer  haul  to  the  mill  over  a  spur  or 
switch  track  constructed  by  the  lumber 
company  or  by  its  tap  line  to  secure  an 
allowance,  any  compensation  allowed  for 
such  service  by  the  trunk  line  to  the 
lumber  company  or  its  tap  line  is  unlaw- 
ful. The  Tap  Line  Case,  23  L  C.  C.  549, 
586,  589,  632,  646. 

(c)  Wherever  an  abnormal  division  is 
allowed  to  a  railroad  which  is  tied  up 
with  an  industry,  there  results  an  indi- 
rect and  hidden  rebate  to  shippers,  be- 
cause of  their  ownership  of  the  railroad 
In  Re  Divisions  of  Joint  Rates  on  Coal, 
22  L  C.  C.  51,  55. 

(d)  The  mere  fact  that  a  railroad  is 
owned  by  a  corporation  which  also  owns 
the  stock  of  the  largest  shipper  over  it, 
and  that  it  was  originally  organized  and 
built  for  the  purpose  of  doing  the  work 
of  that  shipper,  is  not  controlling  against 
its  being  held  a  common  carrier,  al- 
though such  a  situation  calls  for  the 
closest  scrutiny  of  all  charges  and  prac- 
tices to  ascertain  whether  there  is  undue 
discrimination  through  divisions  or  al- 
lowances which  are  the  equivalent  of  re- 
bates to  the  shipping  owner.  Crane  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C. 
248,  252. 

(e)  Defendant  railroads  and  steamship 
lines  made  a  "transfer  allowance"  of  2c 
per  100  lbs.  on  shipments  of  sugar  from 
New  York.  The  rail  carriers  restricting 
it  to  shipments  from  refineries  and  the 
water  carriers  restricting  it  to  shippers 
coming  from  certain  designated  terri- 
tory to  their  wharves.  On  account  of 
this    condition    the    refineries    were    the 


only  shippers  of  sugar  from  New  York. 
The  allowance  purported  to  cover  the 
cost  of  cartage  to  the  terminals  of  the 
carriers.  It  was  in  fact  paid  where 
no  cartage  at  all  was  involved,  and  where 
the  carriers  by  means  of  floats  and 
switch  tracks  received  the  sugar  from 
the  store  doors  of  the  shippers.  None 
of  the  carriers  furnished  cartage  to  ship- 
pers of  sugar,  but  pretended  to  undertake 
to  pay  shippers  for  furnishing  cartage  for 
themselves.  The  allowances  appeared  to 
be  simply  a  continuance  of  a  former  re- 
bate before  rebates  were  made  illegal, 
and  of  an  allowance  made  to  sugar  re- 
fining interests  for  routing  the  shipments 
over  the  lines  of  carriers,  according  to  a 
percentage  agreed  upon  by  the  latter. 
HELD,  the  allowance  amounted  to  a  re- 
bate, was  unlawful  and  should  be  with- 
drawn. In  Re  Allowances  for  Transfer 
of  Sugar,  14  L  C.  C.  619,  627,  630. 

(f)  Defendant  carrier  allowed  to  a 
grain  company  %c  per  100  lbs.  for  grain 
which  remained  stored  in  the  elevator 
beyond  the  elevation  period  of  10  days. 
Said  grain  was  mixed,  treated,  stored, 
weighed  and  inspected  in  the  elevators 
In  such  a  manner  as  to  enhance  its 
value.  HELD,  the  allowances  amounted 
to  an  undue  preference  and  in  effect  an 
unlawful  rebate,  and  should  be  forbidden. 
In  the  Matter  of  Allowances  to  Elevators 
by  the  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  315, 
316. 

VIM.     CRIMINAL    LIABILITY. 
§16.     In  General. 

See    Special    Contracts,    §3    (b). 

(a)  Plaintiff  coal  operator  and  its 
competitors  had  their  private  track  con- 
necting with  defendant's  line.  Defendant 
used  its  locomotive  in  hauling  cars  to 
and  from  plaintiff's  mine  over  plaintiff's 
private  track,  while  the  competitors  fur- 
nished their  own  motive  power,  for  which 
defendant  allowed  them  from  10  to  15c 
per  ton.  In  a  suit  for  unjust  discrimina- 
tion, defendant  offered  no  evidence  to 
show  the  money  value  of  the  services 
rendered  by  the  locomotives  of  the  fa- 
vored shippers.  HELD,  defendant  was 
liable  in  damages  for  giving  a  rebate  in 
violation  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Com- 
merce. Mitchell  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  181  Fed.  403,  410. 

(b)  A  grain  company  shipped  grain 
from  Minneapolis  to  Milwaukee  con- 
signed to  its  agents  at  Milwaukee,  who 


ALLOWANCES,  §16  (c)— ALTERNATIVE  RATES,  I  (b) 


69 


paid  the  lawfully  published  rate.  De- 
fendant railroad  paid  to  the  grain  com- 
pany an  allowance  not  published  in  its 
tariffs  of  i/^c  per  bushel  for  elevation 
services  at  Minneapolis.  Papers  were 
presented  to  the  defendant  by  the  grain 
company  as  vouchers  to  secure  the  re- 
funding of  the  elevation  charge  which 
contained  the  receipted  freight  bills  paid 
by  the  consignees  in  Milwaukee.  There 
was  evidence  of  a  pre-existing  agreement 
between  the  railway  company  and  the 
grain  company  for  the  refund  of  eleva- 
tion charges.  HELD,  in  a  criminal  prose- 
cution iinder  the  Elkins  Act,  there  was 
sufficient  evidence  to  go  to  the  jury  to 
show  that  the  railway  company  knew 
that  the  payment  of  freight  bills  by  the 
consignees  was  made  in  behalf  of  the 
grain  company.  Wisconsin  Central  Ry. 
Co.  V.  U.  S.,  169  Fed.  76,  78. 

(c)  Defendant  railroad  on  grain  ship- 
ped from  Minneapolis  charged  the  legal 
rate  of  7i/^c  per  100  lbs.  and  refunded  to 
the  shipper  l^c  per  bushel  for  elevation 
services,  performed  by  the  shipper  at  the 
beginning  of  transportation.  Defendant's 
published  tariff  contained  no  such  allow- 
ance. Defendant  knew  that  the  freight 
charges  had  been  paid  by  the  consignee 
before  it  made  payment  of  the  allowance. 
HELD,  defendant  was  criminally  liable 
under  the  Elkins  Law.  Wisconsin  Cen- 
tral Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  169  Fed.  76,  78. 

(d)  Defendant  carrier  on  interstate 
shipments  of  grain  from  Minneapolis 
through  Wisconsin  to  Duluth,  when  such 
grain  was  destined  to  lake  points  such 
as  Buffalo,  granted  to  all  Minneapolis 
shippers  without  discrimination  an  allow- 
ance of  i/^c  per  bushel  for  elevation  at 
Duluth,  thereby  reducing  the  lawfully 
published  rate  of  5c  in  effect  between 
those  cities.  Other  competing  carriers 
did  the  same  thing  and  defendant  took 
this  course  to  secure  its  share  of  the 
business.  The  published  tariffs  did  not 
provide  for  such  allowances.  The  de- 
fendant's duty  as  a  carrier  terminated 
upon  the  delivery  of  the  grain  at  Duluth, 
and  it  owed  no  duty  as  a  carrier  to  ele- 
vate the  same  at  that  point.  Defendant, 
however,  acted  in  good  faith  in  the  belief 
that  it  was  not  violating  the  statute. 
HELD,  defendant  was  criminally  liable 
under  the  Elkins  Act  for  granting 
a  rebate.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Rv.  Co.  v 
U.  S.,  162  Fed.  835,  839. 

(e)  Under  the  Elkins  Act  which  re- 
quires that  the  act  of  rebating  must  be 


wilful  in  order  to  constitute  a  criminal 
offense,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  support  a 
contention  against  a  carrier  that  it  know- 
ingly granted  a  rate  by  means  of  an  ele- 
vation allowance  lower  than  the  pub- 
lished rate  without  proof  that  the  de- 
fendant acted  in  bad  faith.  C.  St.  P.  M. 
&  O.  Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  162  Fed.  835,  842. 

ALTERNATIVE  RATES. 

I.  ESTABLISHMENT  AND  REASON- 
ABLENESS. 

See    Commodity    Rates,    §3    (c),     (d); 
Tariffs,   §7    (i). 

(a)  Complainant  sought,  in  connection 
with  a  mixed  carload  shipment  of  iron 
beds  and  wire  mattresses  from  Marion, 
Ind.  (where  its  factory  is  located),  to 
Oakland,  Cal.,  to  have  defendants  embody 
in  their  tariffs  an  alternative  clause,  in 
connection  with  their  rates  on  mixed  car- 
load shipments,  to  the  effect  that  if  the 
aggregate  charge  upon  the  entire  ship- 
ment is  less  on  the  basis  of  the  carload 
rate  and  weight  for  one  or  more  of  the 
articles,  and  the  actual  weight  at  the  less- 
than-carload  rate  for  the  other  articles, 
than  at  the  mixed  carload  rates,  such 
rates  should  be  applied  in  the  place  of 
the  mixed  carload  rate.  HELD,  no  evi- 
dence having  been  offered  to  show  that 
the  rate  upon  the  mixed  shipment  or  the 
rates  upon  the  articles  when  shipped 
separately  were  unreasonable,  upon  the 
record  as  presented,  the  Commission  is 
not  convinced  that  the  defendants  should 
be  required  to  establish  the  alternative 
rule.  Marion  Iron  &  Brass  Bed  Co.  v. 
T.  St.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  272. 

(b)  Complainant  attacked  the  specific 
commodity  rate  of  15.5c  per  100  lbs., 
minimum  30.000  lbs.,  on  machinery  C.  L., 
Chicago  to  Collinsville,  111.  At  the  time 
of  movement  there  was  in  effect  a  sixth 
class  rate  of  16.6c  per  100  lbs.,  minimum 
24,000  lbs.  No  evidence  was  adduced  by 
complainant  tending  to  prove  the  com- 
modity rate  and  higher  minimum  to  be 
unreasonable.  At  the  hearing  it  rested 
its  case  on  the  ground  that  defendant 
should  have  provided  for  the  alternative 
use  of  the  two  rates  with  their  different 
minima  so  that  the  shipper  might  have 
been  charged  whichever  rate,  at  its  cor- 
responding minimum,  would  have  made 
the  lower  charge.  HELD,  carriers  may, 
if  they  chose,  publish  both  class  and 
commodity  rates  in  the  same  tariff  and 
under    Rule    7b    of    tariff    circular    18-A, 


70 


ALTERNATIVE  RATES,  I  (c)— ANY-QUANTITY  RATES,  I  (f) 


subject  to  certain  conditions  specifically 
set  forth  in  the  rule,  they  may  provide 
for  the  alternative  use  of  such  rates  by 
including  in  different  sections  of  one 
and  the  same  tariff  such  class  and  com- 
modity rates.  The  fact  that  the  two 
rates  so  published  take  different  mini- 
ma does  not  modify  this  rule.  The  rule 
referred  to  was  adopted  by  the  Commis- 
sion at  the  request  of  many  shippers  and 
carriers  and  it  frequently  contributes  to 
simplicity  and  clearness  in  tariff  con- 
struction. Its  use  is  permissive.  No  re- 
quirement is  upon  the  carriers  to  so  con 
struct  their  tariffs  and  the  failure  to  do 
so  in  this  case  raised  no  presumption 
that  the  charge  assessed  under  the  com- 
modity rate  and  minimum  was  unreason- 
able because  in  excess  of  the  charge, 
which  would  have  accrued  under  the 
class  rate.  Complaint  dismissed.  Good- 
man Mfg.  Co.  V.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  21  I.  C.   C.  95. 

(c)  The  method  of  stating  rates  by  an 
alternative  clause  giving  the  shipper  the 
right  to  elect  a  combination  rate  when 
that  one  is  cheaper  than  the  class  rate, 
is  an  indefinite  method  of  stating  rates 
that  the  Commission  condemns.  Rail- 
road Commission  of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  238,  240. 

(d)  On  a  carload  of  hand  agricul- 
tural implements  weighing  25,000  lbs. 
shipped  from  Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Denver, 
Colo.,  complainant  was  assessed  a 
through  commodity  rate  of  80c  on  a 
minimum  weight  of  30,000  lbs.  At  the 
time  of  shipment  there  was  in  force  a 
third-class  rate  of  80c  on  a  minimum  of 
20,000  lbs.,  under  which  such  implements 
had  formerly  moved  between  said  points, 
but  which,  on  account  of  the  commodity 
rate,  was  not  then  available  to  shippers. 
Later  the  Western  Classification  was 
amended  and  the  minimum  was  in- 
creased to  24,000  lbs.  At  present,  by  a 
proper  rule  in  defendant's  tariff  namimg 
the  commodity  and  the  class  rate,  the 
alternative  use  of  the  two  rates  is 
provided  for,  thus  making  available  the 
minimum  weight  of  24,000  lbs.  applying 
in  connection  with  the  class  rate.  HELD, 
that  the  charges  were  unreasonable. 
Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis  of 
actual  weight  of  the  shipment.  George 
Tritch  Hardware  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.   Co.,   18  I.  C.   C.  .71,  72. 

(e)  A  provision  in  a  tariff  that 
where   the  combination  of  locals   makes 


lower  than  the  established  through  rate 
it  may  be  used,  is  not  permissible.  Phil- 
lips Co.  V.  G.  T.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
590. 

ANY-QUANTITY   RATES. 

I.     REASONABLENESS  AND  APPLICA- 
TION. 

See  Evidence,  §54  (d);  Narrow 
Gauge  Railroads,  I  (c) ;  Reason- 
ableness of  Rates,  §40  (n).  §56  (a), 
§84   (a);    Reparation,   §8    (t). 

(a)  It  is  manifestly  unjust  to  apply 
for  the  last  thousand  miles  of  through 
business,  loading  to  approximately  27,- 
000  pounds,  a  local  rate  intended  to 
cover  any-quantity  movement  with  an 
actual  average  loading  of  less  than  one- 
third  that  amount.  In  Re  Transporta- 
tion of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I. 
C.    C.   151,   163. 

(b)  When  a  carrier  instead  of  pro- 
viding a  carload  and  less-than-carload 
rate  provides  only  an  any-quantity  rate, 
the  presumption  is  that  it  is  higher 
than  a  carload  rate  and  lower  than  a 
less-than-carload  rate  would  be.  Mutual 
Rice  Trade  &  Devel.  Ass'n,  Houston,  v. 
I.    &   G.   R.   R.,   23   I.   C.   C.   219,   224. 

(c)  A    througjj    carload    rate    should 
not    be    based    on   an    any-quantity   rate. 
Mutual  iace  Trade  &  Development  Ass'n 
V.  I.   &  G.  N.  R.  R.   Co.,  23   I.  C.   C.  219 
224. 

(d)  While  an  any-quantity  rate  con- 
sidered by  itself  may  be  reasonable,  a 
through  carload  rate  may  not  always 
be  fairly  based  upon  it.  Mutual  Rice 
Trade  &  Development  Ass'n  v.  I,  &  G. 
N.    R.   R.   Co.,   23   L   C.   C.   219,   224. 

(e)  Replacing  an  any  quantity  rat? 
by  a  carload  and  L.  C.  L.  rate  is  not 
unlawful.  Jouannet  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,    23    L    C.    C.    392. 

(f)  On  cotton  moving  by  rail  and 
ocean  from  points  in  Georgia  and  Ala- 
bama to  New  York  City,  the  defendants 
made  joint  any-quantity  rates  subject  to 
a  rule  providing  that  on  shipments  of 
less  than  24,000  lbs.  a  lighterage  charge 
of  8c  per  100  lbs.  with  a  minimum  charge 
of  $6  should  be  assessed  when  the  light- 
erage service  was  performed  by  the  steam- 
ship company;  on  shipments  of  24,000  lbs. 
or  more,  the  rate  named  included  light- 
erage service.  Complainants  contended 
that  the  material  factor  in  determining 
the  lighterage  charge  should  be  the  quan- 


ANY-QUANTITY  RATES,  I    (g)— ASSOCIATION,  I   (c) 


71 


tity  delivered  on  one  lighter  or  in  one 
lighterage  service,  and  that  a  charge 
made  for  lighterage  of  smaller  quantities 
than  24,000  lbs.  is  unreasonable,  if  sev- 
eral shipments  aggregating  more  than 
24,000  lbs.  arrive  on  one  steamer. 
HELD,  that  individual  shipments  by  dif- 
ferent shippers  cannot  lose  their  identity 
simply  because  they  are  shipped  on  one 
steamer;  that  the  lighterage  charge  im- 
posed is  on  the  principle  of  a  lower  rate 
on  carload  than  on  less-than-carload 
quantities  and  therefore  must  be  consid- 
ered reasonable.  Weld  &  Co.  v.  Ocean 
S.  S.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  581. 

(g)  The  any-quantity  rate  rests  upon 
sound  public  policy.  It  enables  the  small 
shipper  to  compete  on  fairly  equal  terms 
with  his  powerful  competitor,  thereby 
counteracting  in  a  measure  the  prevalent 
tendency  toward  monopoly.  While  the 
Commission  has  consistently  sustained 
the  legality  of  a  differential  between  car- 
load and  less-than-carload  rates  upon  the 
ground  that  the  difference  in  the  cost  of 
service  justifies  a  reasonable  difference 
in  charge,  it  is  highly  significant  that  no 
order  has  ever  been  issued  requiring  that 
an  any-quantity  basis  be  superseded. 
Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  397,  401. 

(h)  The  Commission  is  not  justified 
in  ordering  a  reduction  of  an  any-quan- 
tity rate  to  39c  per  100  lbs.  upon  a 
commodity  worth  from  15  to  30c  per  lb. 
Schmidt  &  Sons  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  535,  538. 

(i)  On  boots  and  shoes  between  Bos- 
ton and  D^s  Moines  there  were  no  car- 
load rates,  all  traflfic  moving  under  the 
any-quantity  rate.  HELD,  the  question 
of  the  unit  of  transportation  is  one  for 
the  carriers,  and  so  long  as  they  publish 
a  reasonable  any-quantity  rate,  the  mere 
fact  that  they  publish  a  lower  rate  in  car- 
loads on  other  commodities  does  not  jus- 
tify the  Commission  in  ordering  a  carload 
rate  upon  the  articles  in  question.  Ap- 
plication for  joint  rates  denied,  following 
Greater  Des  Moines  Committee  v.  C.  R. 
I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  54.  Bentley 
&  Olmsted  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.. 
17  L  C.  C.  56. 

(j)  Where  carriers  have  in  effect  a 
uniform  rate  per  100  pounds  for  any 
quantity,  which  rate  applies  uniformly  to 
all  shippers,  a  different  rate  applied  to 
carloads  than  that  applied  to  less-than- 
carloads  will  not  be  ordered  when  such 


differential  will  have  a  tendency  to  in- 
crease the  rate  on  less-than-carloads,  and 
permit  the  large  dealers  to  drive  the 
smaller  dealers  out  of  the  market  and  cut 
off  the  consumers  and  small  dealers  from 
purchasing  at  distant  markets  in  less- 
than-carload  lots.  Duncan  &  Co.  v.  N. 
C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  590,  595. 

(k)  One  of  the  benefits,  if  not  one  of 
the  objects,  of  an  "any-quantity  rate"  is 
that  it  leaves  the  carrier  with  some  free- 
dom in  the  use  of  its  equipment.  Such 
a  tariff  gives  the  shipper  no  right  to  de- 
mand a  car  of  a  given  size.  Falls  &  Co. 
V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  269, 
272. 

(1)  Under  a  local  any-quantity  rato 
the  carrier  may  use  any  available  equip- 
ment, notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the 
tariffs  of  a  connecting  lice  provide  a 
minimum  weight  under  a  carload  rate. 
Falls  &  Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  269,  272. 

ASSOCIATION. 

I.     RIGHT  TO  SUE. 

See   Long   and  Short   Hauls,  §11    (a). 

(a)  Under  section  5  of  the  Act  of  June 
18,  1910,  c.  309  (36  Stat.  543),  creating 
the  Commerce  Court,  an  association  of 
grain  dealers  of  Nashville  and  the  Nash- 
ville Board  of  Trade,  the  leading  com- 
mercial organizations  of  the  city,  are 
competent  parties  to  intervene  by  peti- 
tion to  the  Commerce  Court  to  enjoin  the 
enforcement  of  an  order  entered  by  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  requir- 
ing defendant  carriers  from  granting  to 
Nashville  rebilling  or  reshipping  priv- 
ileges so  long  as  they  deny  said  privilege 
to  Atlanta,  Columbus,  and  other  cities. 
Nashville  Grain  Exch.  v.  U.  S.,  191  Fed. 
37,  89. 

(b)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Act  au- 
thorizes incorporated  boards  of  trade  of 
cities  and  associations  of  like  character 
to  apply  to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission for  relief,  and  such  corporations 
and  members  representing  such  associa- 
tions may  likewise  apply  to  the  court  for 
relief  from  injuries  unlawfully  infiicted 
by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 
Peavey  &  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  176  Fed. 
409,  415. 

(c)  A  voluntary  improvement  associa- 
tion consisting  of  business  men  of  Coun- 
cil Bluffs,  la.,  is  a  competent  party  com- 


72 


ASSOCIATION,  I   (d)— ASSORTING  PACKAGES,    (c) 


plainant  to  assail  as  unreasonable  and 
discriminatory  the  fare  charged  passen- 
gers for  a  haul  between  Omaha  and  Coun- 
cil Bluffs,  by  an  interurban  railway  con- 
necting said  cities  over  a  toll  bridge 
crossing  the  Missouri  River.  West  End 
Improvement  Club  v.  O.  &  C.  B.  Ry.  & 
Bridge  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  239,  240. 

(d)  A  commercial  association  is  a 
proper  party  to  maintain  a  petition  for 
relief  from  the  exaction  of  an  illegal  or 
unreasonable  charge  or  for  any  violation 
of  the  law's  requirements.  California 
Commercial  Ass'n  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  458,  463. 

(dd)  An  unincorporated  association 
has  a  sufficient  legal  status  to  be  entitled 
to  demand  service  of  an  express  com- 
pany and  under  section  13  of  the  Act  to 
file  a  coiaplaint  for  the  latter's  failure 
to  furrash  the  same.  California  Com- 
mercial Ass'n  V.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  14 
I.    C.    C.    422,    425. 

(e)  Complainant  Bureau  was  organ- 
ized as  follows:  An  office  was  maintained 
by  its  manager.  Members  became  such 
by  entering  into  written  contracts  with 
the  Bureau  by  which  they  paid  a  stipu- 
lated annual  fee.  The  Bureau  undertook 
to  perform  certain  services  in  the  ad- 
justment of  disputes  with  railroads  and 
in  the  prosecution  of  necessary  proceed- 
ings. HELD,  such  Bureau  was  a  volun- 
tary association  within  the  meaning  of 
section  13  of  the  Act  and  capable  of  in- 
stituting proceedings  as  to  rates  before 
the  Commission.  Forest  City  Freight  Bu- 
reau V.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
118,  121. 

ASSORTING   PACKAGES. 

See   Additional    Services. 

(a)  Services  rendered  by  the  defend- 
ant in  providing  a  place  where  consign- 
ments of  perishable  produce  can  be  han- 
dled and  in  assorting  into  lots  the  pack- 
ages marked  with  the  names  of  the  sin- 
gle dealers  to  whom  they  are  consigned 
is  a  thing  of  value  to  the  shipper  for 
which  he  may  properly  be  required  to 
pay.  Davies  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.  186,  188. 

(b)  In  Wholesale  Fruit  &  Produce 
Ass'n  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  410,  the  Commission  held  that  on  con- 
solidated carloads  of  fruit  consigned  to 
Chicago  the  carriers  should  remove  same 
from   the   cars   to  the   station   platforms 


and  distribute  the  fruit  in  lots  to  the  va- 
rious owners  and  might  charge  one  cent 
per  hundred  pounds  for  this  service. 
HELD,  under  this  order  the  carrier  dis- 
charged its  obligation  by  removing  the- 
fruit  to  the  platform  and  assorting  the 
packages  in  piles  for  the  various  owners, 
and  that  it  was  not  bound  to  deliver  the 
same  to  the  owners  by  checking  off  the 
packages  as  called  for.  Davies  v.  I.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  186,  188. 

(c)  Complainants,  relying  on  the  de- 
cision in  Wholesale  Fruit  &  Produce 
Ass'n  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  410,  asked  that  the  order  in  said  case 
requiring  railroads  at  Chicago  to  bring 
packages  of  fruit  and  vegetables  to  the 
car  door  for  unloading  be  extended  to 
package  freight  of  all  kinds,  and  fur- 
ther asked  that  the  order  with  respect 
to  the  unloading  of  fruit  and  vegetables 
be  applied  to  St.  Paul  and  Minneapolis. 
It  appeared  that  at  Chicago  the  fruit 
and  vegetable  traffic  was  very  con- 
gested; these  products  being  shipped 
in  packages  of  estimated  weight,  it 
was  necessary  for  the  carriers  to  count 
said  packages  upon  unloading;  and  that 
the  men  stationed  to  do  this  could  per- 
form the  service  of  carrying  the  pack- 
ages to  the  car  door  without  additional 
expense  to  the  carrier.  At  IMinneapolis 
and  St.  Paul  different  conditions  pre- 
vailed. Fruit  and  vegetables  were  al- 
lowed to  be  kept  in  the  cars  for  a 
longer  free  time  than  at  Chicago  and 
were  unloaded  at  no  definite  time,  but 
at  whatever  time  the  shipper  desired. 
To  compel  the  carriers  at  those  points 
to  bring  the  packages  to  the  car  doors 
for  unloading  would  impose  a  hardship 
on  them  in  compelling  them  to  have 
men  ready  at  all  times  to  perform  such 
service.  At  said  cities  no  custom  as 
fixed  and  definite  had  grown  up  for  the 
performance  of  said  service  as  at 
Chicago.  Dealers  in  fruit  and  vegeta- 
bles at  St.  Paul  and  Minneapolis  were 
not  in  competition  with  those  at  Chi- 
cago. HELD,  the  rule  applying  to  Chi- 
cago requiring  the  carrier  to  assist  in 
urloading  fruit  and  vegetables  should 
not  be  applied  to  other  package  freight; 
that  on  account  of  different  conditions 
at  INIinneapolis  and  St.  Paul,  carriers 
at  those  points  should  not  be  required 
to  perform  such  service  with  respect  to 
fruit  and  vegetables.  Wholesale  Fruit 
and  Produce  Ass'n  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.    Co.,    17    L    C.    C.    596,    600-602. 


ASSORTING  PACKAGES  (d)— AUCTION  COMPANY   (a) 


73 


(d)  Where  the  owners  of  packages  of 
fruit  and  vegetables  shipped  to  Chicago 
conEolldate  same  in  carloads  in  so-called 
granger  cars,  the  carrier  discharges  its 
full  duty  by  placing  the  carload  upon 
its  team  tracks  and  bringing  the  pack- 
ages to  the  car  door  for  delivery;  it 
is  under  no  obligation  to  furnish  any 
place  for  the  sorting  of  these  packages 
and  making  delivery  to  the  different 
individuals  to  whom  they  are  addressed, 
and  in  Chicago,  where  the  conditions  of 
the  business  require  such  assortment,  a 
carrier  may  charge  Ic  per  100  lbs.  for 
said  additional  service.  Wholesale  Fruit 
&  Produce  Ass'n  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,   14   I.   C.  C.   410,  420. 

ATTORNEYS'  FEES. 

See   Courts,   §11    (j);   Overcharges,   §6; 
Procedure     Before    Commission,    §9. 

(a)  In  a  suit  against  the  initial  car- 
rier to  recover  for  loss  of  goods,  no  au- 
thority is  given  to  tax  attorneys'  fees  by 
section  8  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Com- 
merce of  February  4,  1887.  A.  C.  L.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Riverside  Mills,  219  U.  S.  186, 
208,  31  Sup.  Ct.  164,  55  L.  ed.  167. 

(aa)  The  provision  in  section  16  of 
the  Act  allowing  the  recovery  of  an 
attorney's  fee  in  a  suit  in  the  courts  to 
enforce  an  order  of  reparation  of  the 
Commission  is  rot  unconstitutional  as 
being  class  legislation.  Chicago,  Burl- 
ington &  Quincy  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Feintuch, 
191    Fed.    482,   489. 

(b)  In  a  suit  to  enforce  an  order 
of  the  Commission  awarding  reparation 
for  diverting  a  shipment  from  the  speci- 
fied route,  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  an 
allowance  for  an  attorney's  fee  on  ac- 
count of  the  appellate  proceedings,  in 
addition  to  the  allowance  made  by  the 
Circuit  Court.  Louisville  &  Nashville 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Dickerson,  191  Fed.  705,  712. 

(bb)  The  provision  in'  section  8  of  the 
Act  allowing  attorneys'  fees  to  a  shipper 
in  a  suit  against  the  initial  carrier  for 
loss  of  goods  is  valid.  Riverside  Mills 
V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  168  Fed.  990,  992. 

(c)  Under  section  8  of  the  Act  the 
damages  therein  contemplated  and  the 
attorney's  fee  provided  for  can  only  be 
recovered  in  a  suit  brought  in  a  court. 
Washer  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  T. 
C.  C.  147,  152. 

(d)  The  Commission  has  no  authority 
to    assess    costs    or    to    allow    attorneys' 


fees.    Washer  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  147,  154. 

(e)  In  an  action  in  a  state  court  to 
recover  the  excess  exacted  by  a  car- 
rier over  and  above  the  published  inter- 
state rate,  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  re- 
cover an  attorney's  fee  under  any  provi- 
sion of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act, 
granting  in  certain  cases  the  right  to 
shippers  to  recover  such  fee,  since  the 
suit  is  not  to  recover  a  penalty  from 
the  carrier  for  violation  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act,  but  is  in  the 
nature  of  an  action  for  money  had  and 
received  by  a  carrier  collecting  a  greater 
amount  of  charges  than  it  was  entitled 
to  receive.  Kansas  City  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Tonn   (Ark.,  1912),  143  S.  W.  577,  581. 

(f)  The  provisions  of  the  Act,  as 
amended  June  29,  1906,  and  April  13, 
1908,  relating  to  attorney's  fees  do  not 
give  the  right  to  recover  such  fees  in 
a  state  court  in  a  suit  for  loss  or  dam- 
age in  transit.  Blair  &  Jackson  v. 
Wells.  Fargo  Co.  (la.,  1912),  135  N.  W. 
615,  620. 


AUCTION  COMPANY. 

See    Exclusive   Contracts    (c) ;   Termi- 
nal  Facilities,  §3   (j). 

(a)  Defendant  granted  the  exclusive 
right  to  a  company  to  conduct  its  busi- 
ness as  an  auctioneer  of  fruit  and  vege- 
tables on  its  terminal  premises  at  St. 
Louis.  Complainant,  a  rival  company, 
asked  for  the  same  facilities.  HELD,  that 
the  granting  of  the  exclusive  right  to 
maintain  a  fruit  auction  company  was 
somewhat  analogous  to  the  station  res- 
taurant, news  stand,  barber  shop,  and  other 
conveniences  which  travelers  arriving  at 
a  station  may  make  use  of  if  they  so  de- 
sire. They  are  enterprises  that  outsiders 
are  frequently  permitted  to  engage  in  at 
railroad  terminals,  not  as  a  part  of  the 
service  that  the  carrier  renders  to  the 
public,  but  as  something  that  adds  to 
the  general  convenience  of  the  public. 
The  telegraph,  telephone,  transfer  and 
cab  offices  ordinarily  found  in  passenger 
stations  rest  upon  the  same  basis.  They 
add  to  the  convenience  of  the  passenger 
before  the  transportation  by  the  carrier 
has  commenced  or  after  it  has  been  com- 
pleted without  adding  to  the  service  un- 
dertaken by  the  carrier  for  the  traveler 
under  its  published  rates.  It  is  a  matter 
that  is  wholly  outside  and  apart  from  the 
service    of    transportation    performed   by 


74 


BACK  HAUL— BILLS  OF  LADING 


defendant,  and  is  a  reasonable  use  for 
the  defendant  to  make  of  its  property. 
Southwestern  Produce  Distributers  v. 
Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  458,  460,  462. 

BACK  HAUL. 

See  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §7; 
Long  and  Sliort  Haul,  §1  (xy),  §5 
(f),  (II),  (00),  §7  (i),  §10  (b),  (I); 
Reconsignment,  §3  (I);  Routing  and 
iVIisrouting,   §7   (rrr). 

BAGGAGE  TRANSFER. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
II.     EXCLUSIVE    CONTRACT    TO    SO- 
LICIT. 
I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

See  Exclusive  Contract,  (a);  Spe- 
cial  Contract,   §2    (h). 

§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

(a)  The  Commission  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion over  local  baggage  transfer  agen- 
cies. Cosby  V.  Richmond  Transfer  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  72,  74. 

(b)  If  a  carrier  undertook  to  make 
delivery  of  passenger  baggage,  and  to 
issue  baggage  checks  at  residences  for 
the  rate  of  fare  stated  in  its  tariffs,  this 
would  be  a  service  over  which  the  Com- 
mission would  have  jurisdiction,  and 
which  must  in  all  regards  become  sub- 
ject to  the  mandates  and  prohibitions  of 
the  Act,  even  though  the  service  in 
whole  or  in  part  was  not  performed  by 
the  carrier  itself  but  was  rendered  by 
some  agency  under  contract  or  other 
wise.  But  in  merely  granting  the  ex- 
clusive privilege  of  soliciting  on  its 
trains,  and  issuing  baggage  checks  at 
residences,  to  one  baggage  transfer  com- 
pany, a  carrier  does  not  undertake  an 
additional  service  to  the  public.  The 
carrier's  duty  to  the  public  as  to  baggage 
begins  and  ends  in  the  baggage  room  pro- 
vided by  it.  Baggage  transfer  is  prior 
or  subsequent  to  the  transportation  serv- 
ice, as  to  which  the  carrier  owes  a  duty 
to  the  public,  and  is  therefore  outside  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Commission.  Cosby 
V.  Richmond  Transfer  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
72,  75. 

(bb)  The  Commission  has  no  juris- 
diction over  alleged  unreasonable 
charges  of  a  transfer  company  where 
the  railroad  carrier  does  not  undertake 
to  make  delivery  of  passenger  baggage 
at  residences  for  a  rate  of  fare  stated 


in  a  tariff.     Cosby  v.   Richmond   Trans- 
fer Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  72,  74. 

(c)  The  Commission  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion to  order  a  railroad  to  give  a  local 
baggage  transfer  company  an  opportunity 
to  bid  against  another  one  for  the  privi- 
lege of  soliciting  on  trains,  any  more 
than  it  would  have  power  to  compel  a 
railroad  to  place  its  fruit  venders'  privi- 
lege up  at  auction,  for  neither  one  is 
transportation  under  the  Act,  and  over 
neither  one  has  the  Commission  juris- 
diction. Cosby  V.  Richmond  Transfer 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  72,  77. 

(d)  The  soliciting  of  baggage  on 
trains  by  a  transfer  company  is  no  part 
of  the  transportation  service.  Cosby  v. 
Richmond  Transfer  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  72,  74. 

(e)  Unless  the  railroad  carrier  under- 
takes to  make  delivery  at  residences  a 
transfer  company  is  the  agent  of  the 
passenger  in  transporting  the  latter's 
baggage.  Cosby  v.  Richmond  Transfer 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  72,  76. 

II.  EXCLUSIVE  CONTRACT  TO  SO- 
LICIT, 
(a)  Although  defendant  carriers  give 
to  one  transfer  company,  which  is 
controlled  by  their  ofRceis,  the  exclusive 
privilege  of  soliciting  baggage  transfer 
On  their  trains  without  any  monetary  con- 
sideration, there  is  no  undue  discrimina- 
tion against  a  competitive  company 
which  is  willing  to  pay  for  such  privi- 
lege, because  defendants  owe  no  duty 
to  provide  such  service  either  under 
statute,  common  law  or  custom,  and  have 
performed  what  is  required  of  them  when 
they  accept  baggage  at  their  depot, 
transport  it  and  make  delivery  at  desti- 
nation upon  their  own  terminals.  Cosby 
V.  Richmond  Transfer  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  72. 

BASING  POINTS  AND  LINES. 

See  Evidence,  §5;  Discrimination,  §3 
(L);  Equaiization  of  Rates,  §4  (4) 
(li);  Passenger  Fares  and  Facilities, 
§3;  Proportional  Rates,  I  (c) ;  Rea- 
sonableness of  Rates,  §2  (1),  §28 
(p),  (q);  Routing  and  IVIisrouting, 
§4    (mm). 

BILLS  OF  LADING. 

I.     CONTROL  AND   REGULATION. 
§1,     Jurisdiction  of  commission. 
§2.     Recommendation    of    certain 
forms. 
II.     DUTY  OF  CARRIER  TO  ISSUE. 

§3.     Rail-and-water  transportation. 
§4.     At  transit  points. 
§5.     One  lading  for  several  ship- 
ments. 


BILLS  OF  LADING,  §1  (a)— §4  (a) 


75 


III.     CONSTRUCTION. 
§6.     In  general. 
§7.     Statement  of  weight. 
§8.     Statement  of  shipping  point. 
§9.     Conflicting   provisions. 

(1)  Between      rate      and 
route. 

(2)  With  tariff. 

IV.     LIMITATION   OF  LIABILITY. 

See  Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  II; 
Routing  and  Misrouting,  §3; 
Through    Routes    and    Joint    Rates, 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction   of  Commission. 

See    Interstate    Commerce,   §3   (a). 

(a)  The  Commission  has  authority  to 
consider  and  determine  the  reasonable- 
ness of  regulations  and  practices  in  re- 
spect of  issuance,  form  and  substance  of 
bills  of  lading,  and  to  determine  and  pre- 
scribe what  regulations  and  practices  are 
just  and  reasonable.  Shaffer  &  Co.  v, 
C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  8,  10. 

(b)  The  Commission  in  submitting 
standard  bills  of  lading  does  not  order 
their  adoption,  since  such  an  order  would 
exceed  its  authority.  In  the  Matter  of 
Bills  of  Lading,  14  L  C.  C.  346,  349. 

§2.     Recommendation   of  Certain    Forms. 

(a)  The  standard  forms  of  bills  of  lad- 
ing (copies  of  which  are  set  out  in  14 
I.  C.  C.  351-355),  recommended  by  the 
Commission,  are  designed  for  use  with 
respect  to  miscellaneous  freight  and  gen- 
eral merchandise,  and  as  a  substitute 
for  the  bills  now  in  use  in  the  carriage 
of  such  property,  but  are  not  intended 
to  supplant  special  bills  of  lading  issued 
on  particular  commodities  requiring  ex- 
ceptional provisions,  such  as  live  stock, 
for  example,  and  perhaps  perishable 
property.  In  the  Matter  of  Bills  of  Lad- 
ing, 14  I.   C.  C.   346,  349. 

(b)  The  Commission,  in  submitting 
standard  bills  of  lading,  does  not  attempt 
to  indicate  just  what  commodities  are  to 
be  excepted  from  their  operation,  nor  to 
determine  ths  special  provisions  suited 
to  any  excepted  commodity.  In  the  Mat- 
ter of  Bills  of  Lading,  14  I.  C.  C.  346,  349. 

(c)  The  Commission,  in  submitting 
standard  bills  of  lading  for  Official  Clas- 
sification territory,  expects  carriers  sub-, 
ject  to  the  Act  outside  such  territory  to 
adopt  the  same  to  the  fullest  extent  pos-  i 


sible.     In  the  Matter  of  Bills  of  Lading, 
14  L  C.  C.  346,  349. 

(d)  The  approval  of  the  standard  bills 
of  lading  by  the  Commission  does  not  im- 
ply aceptance  by  it  of  any  construction 
of  the  Carmack  amendment  at  variance 
with  its  apparent  purpose  and  intent,  nor 
does  such  approval  preclude  it  from  pass- 
ing independent  judgment  upon  any  pro- 
vision in  these  bills  of  lading,  which  may 
be  drawn  in  question  in  future  proceed- 
ings. In  the  Matter  of  Bills  of  Lading, 
14  I.  C.  C.  346,  350. 

II.     DUTY  OF  CARRIER  TO  ISSUE. 

See      Through       Routes      and      Joint 
Rates,  §12. 

§3.     Rail-and-Water  Transportation. 

See    Export   Rates,    II;    Foreign   Com- 
merce, §1    (f). 

(a)  There  is  no  legal  obligation  on  a 
rail  carrier  to  give  a  through  bill  of  lad- 
ing covering  movement  by  water  beyond 
its  line.  Such  practice  is,  however,  of 
great  advantage  to  shippers,  and  if  given 
in  the  name  of  one  boat  line,  should  be 
given  in  the  name  of  others  who  are 
similarly  circumstanced.  A  railroad  may 
entirely  destroy  the  export  trafllc  of  a 
port  by  refusing  to  issue  two  bills  of  lad- 
ing; and  to  say  that  it  may  exercise  this 
great  power  wantonly  and  arbitrarily  is 
contrary  to  the  spirit  and  letter  of  the 
Act.  Mobile  Chamber  of  Commerce  v. 
M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  417,  424,  425. 

(b)  If  a  rail  carrier  makes  a  rate  and 
issues  a  bill  of  lading  for  ship-side  de- 
livery at  a  port,  that  rate,  and  a  similar 
bill  of  lading,  should  be  open  to  all  who 
conform  to  the  reasonable  conditions  of 
the  carriers.  A  railroad  cannot  adopt  a 
policy  or  practice  which  will  put  its  fa- 
cilities and  its  rates  at  the  exclusive 
service  of  one  line  of  steamships,  or  of 
one  set  of  shippers  patronizing  that  line. 
Mobile  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  M.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  417,  428,  427. 

§4.     At  Transit   Points. 

(a)  When  carriers  are  parties  to  a 
milling-in-transit  privilege,  it  is  proper 
for  the  inbound  carrier  to  issue  and  sign 
the  bills  of  lading  for  the  outbound  move- 
ments, because,  the  records  of  the  in- 
bound shipments  being  in  its  possession, 
in  no  other  way  could  the  transit  privi- 
lege be  protected  against  abuse.  Brook- 
Rauch  Mill  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  St.  L.,  L 
M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  651,  652. 


76 


BILLS  OF  LADING,  §5  (a)  — (e) 


§5.     One   Lading  for   Several   Shipments. 
See    Allowances,    §14     (h);     Cars    and 
Car     Supply,     §7;      Demurrage,     §6; 
Minimums,     $8     (b),     (d),     (e) ;     Re- 
frigeration,  §3   (h);   Tariffs,   §7  (ee), 

(ggg)- 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  169  barrels 
of  sugar  from  New  Orleans,  La.,  to  Sioux 
City,  la.;  104  barrels  were  loaded  into 
one  car  and  65  into  another,  and  one  bill 
of  lading  was  taken  for  each  car.  Freight 
charges  were  calculated  uron  a  weignr 
of  38,361  lbs.  for  the  car  containing  104 
barrels,  and  upon  the  minimum  carload 
weight  of  33,000  lbs.  for  the  car  contain- 
ing 65  barrels,  the  actual  weight  of  which 
was  24,205  lbs.  Complainant  contended 
that  the  charge  upon  the  second  car 
should  have  been  based  upon  the  actual 
weight.  Rule  8  of  the  Western  Classifi- 
cation applied:  "When  the  minimum  car- 
load weight  or  more  of  one  article  is 
shipped  in  one  day  by  one  consigner  to 
one  consignee  covered  by  one  bill  of  lad- 
ing the  established  rate  for  a  carloa':! 
shall  apply  on  the  entire  lot,  although  it 
may  be  less  than  two  or  more  full  car- 
load lots  ."  HELD,  the  rule  was  in- 
applicable because  of  complainant's 
action  in  securing  a  bill  of  lading  for 
each  car.  Scudder  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
L  C.  C.  60,  61. 

(b)  Complainant  shipped  sugar,  New 
Orleans,  La.,  to  Sioux  City,  la.  He  had 
a  sufficient  number  of  barrels  to  make 
mo-re  than  one  carload  and  less  than  two 
carloads.  He  took  two  bills  of  lading 
for  the  shipments  and  was  assessed  a 
carload  rate  on  one  and  the  less-than-car- 
load  rate  on  the  other.  Western  Classifi- 
cation contained  a  rule  as  follows: 
"When  the  minimum  carload  weight  or 
more  of  one  article  is  shipped  in  one  day, 
by  one  consigner  to  one  consignee,  cov- 
ered by  one  bill  of  lading,  the  established 
rate  for  a  carload  shall  apply  on  the  en- 
tire lot,  although  it  may  be  less  than  two 
or  more  full  carload  lots."  HELD,  under 
the  classification,  to  obtain  the  applica- 
tion of  the  carload  rate  at  the  actual 
weight  of  the  part  carload,  the  entire 
consignment  must  move  upon  one  bill  of 
lading.  Complainant's  action  in  secur- 
ing a  bill  of  lading  for  each  car  rendered 
the  rule  inapplicable  and  each  carload 
became  a  separate  shipment  subject  tJ 
the  prescribed  minimum  rate  per  car. 
Reparation  denied.  Scudder  v.  T.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  60. 

(c)  Two  separate  bills  of  lading  were 
taken  out  by  complainant  covering  two 
cars  of  machinery  shipped  on  the  same 


day  to  the  same  consignee.  Under  rule 
8  of  the  Western  Classification,  defend- 
ants assessed  charges  thereon  on  the 
basis  of  the  minimum  carload  weight  for 
each,  HELD,  that  under  the  rule  the 
established  rate  for  a  carload  can  only 
apply  on  the  entire  lot  when  the  ship- 
ments are  covered  by  one  bill  of  lading, 
that  this  rule  having  been  considered  and 
approved  in  prior  cases  cannot  be  held 
unreasonable,  and  the  charges  were 
properly  assessed.  Goodman  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
C,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  583. 

(d)  Complainant  had  shipped  to  it 
two  carloads  of  news  printing  paper,  Los 
Angeles,  Cal.,  to  Grand  Rapids,  Wis., 
under  a  rate  of  75c  per  100  lbs.  The  first 
car  weighed  51,000  lbs.,  the  second  car 
23,000  lbs.,  shipped  different  days  under 
separate  bills  of  lading.  The  minimum 
weight  for  each  car  was  30,000  lbs.  Rule 
8  of  Transcontinental  Freight  Bureau  tar- 
iff I.  C.  C.  889,  in  force  when  shipments 
were  made,  provided  that  when  minimum 
carload  weight  or  more  is  shipped  in  one 
day  by  one  consignor  to  one  consignee 
covered  by  one  bill  of  lading,  the  estab- 
lished rate,  for  a  carload  shall  apply  on 
the  entire  lot,  although  it  may  be  less 
than  two  or  more  full  carload  lots.  The 
consignor  was  notified  of  this  rule,  but 
loaded  the  cars  in  the  manner  he  did  in- 
stead of  loading  two  cars  to  the  full 
minimum,  or  shipping  them  on  the  same 
day  under  one  bill  of  lading.  HELD, 
complainant  not  entitled  to  reparation  on 
second  car  on  difference  between  actual 
weight  and  minimum  weight.  Consoli- 
dated Water  Power  Co.  v.  S.  P.,  L.  A.  & 
S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  169. 

(e)  Complainant  shipped  a  steam 
shovel  from  Coffeyville,  Kan.,  to  Toledo, 
O.,  under  two  bills  of  lading,  one  cover- 
ing the  steam  shovel  on  its  own  trucks, 
and  the  other  the  crane,  dipper  and  other 
parts.  The  shovel  on  its  own  trucks, 
weighing  66,200  lbs.,  was  assessed  the 
class  rates  of  33c  per  100  lbs.,  and  the 
parts,  weighing  21,900  lbs.,  were  assessed 
60c  per  100  lbs.  on  a  minimum  of  30,000 
lbs.  The  two  bills  of  lading  were  is- 
sued at  the  insistence  of  the  carrier's 
agent.  The  class  E  rates,  under  West- 
ern Classification,  was  applicable  to  loco- 
motives, extension  pile  drivers,  log-load- 
ing machines,  portable  steel-rail  saws, 
snowplows,  steam  wrecking  cranes,  der- 
ricks, etc.,  hauled  in  train  or  on  trucks 
furnished  by  shippers,  but  the  parts 
when  shipped  separately  take  a  higher 
rate.     HELD,  the  shipment  should  have 


BILLS  OF  LADING,  §6   (a)— §9  (1)    (c) 


77 


moved  under  one  bill  of  lading,  and 
a  shipper  cannot  be  required  to  pay 
higher  charges  on  account  of  the  issu- 
ance of  the  two  bills  of  lading  because 
he  yielded  to  the  demand  of  the  car- 
rier's agent.  The  initial  carrier,  the  M. 
P.  Ry.,  should  establish  for  the  trans- 
portation of  parts  of  steam  shovels  nec- 
essary to  make  a  complete  article,  when 
loaded  in  a  car  furnished  by  the  carrier 
accompanying  the  steam  shovel  hauled 
on  its  own  wheels  or  on  trucks  furnished 
by  shipper  when  shipped  on  one  bill  of 
lading  from  one  consignor  to  one  con- 
signee, a  rate  not  higher  than  the  rate 
on  steam  shovels  hauled  on  their  own 
wheels.  The  rates  on  steam  shovel  parts 
should  have  been  assessed  on  actual 
weight  and  on  that  part  of  the  shipment 
reparation  is  awarded.  Vulcan  Steam 
Shovel  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  265. 

III.     CONSTRUCTION. 

§6.     In  General. 

See  Demurrage,  §5  (b);  Export 
Rates  and  Facilities,  III  (b);  Re- 
leased Rates,  §4  (b) ;  Routing  and 
Misrouting,   §2    (c),    (d),    (i). 

(a)  The  bill  of  lading  became,  upon 
passage  of  the  Act,  little  more  than  a 
receipt  for  goods  to  be  transported,  into 
which  could  be  incorporated  nothing  ob- 
noxious to  the  law.  Blinn  Lumber  Co.  v. 
S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C,  430,  432. 

(b)  The  bill  of  lading  should  plainly 
state  the  liability  assumed.  Any  other 
course  of  business  will  inevitably  result 
in  giving  the  shipper  in  many  cases  a  de- 
fective contract.  Wyman,  Partridge  & 
Co.  V.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  15  I.  C.  C,  577,  582. 

§7.     Statement  of  Weight. 

See  Switch  Tracks  and  Switching, 
§8    (c);   Weights   and   Weighing. 

(a)  When  a  car  is  weighed  at  origin 
and  the  weight  stated  in  the  bill  of  lad- 
ing, the  shipper  has  a  right  to  rely  on 
that  weight,  subject  to  correction  only 
by  proof  of  the  correct  weight.  Duluth 
Log  Co.  V.  C,  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.   C.    C.   38,   39. 

§8.     Statement  of  Shipping    Point. 

(a)  Where  no  evidence  is  submitted 
by  defendant  carrier  to  shov.'  thai  the 
point  of  origin  stated  in  the  bill  of  lad- 
ing was  not  the  actual  point  of  origin, 
the  charge  must  be  assessed  according 
to  the  rate  from  the  point  of  origin 
therein  stated.  Duluth  Log  Co.  v.  C,  St. 
P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  38,  39. 


§9.     Conflicting   Provisions. 

§9.     (1)      Between   Rate  and   Route. 
See    Routing    and    IVIisrouting,    §3. 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload  of 
apples  from  Sioux  City,  la.,  to  Chicago, 
from  thence  reconsigned  to  New  Drleans, 
La.,  which  was  assessed  a  combinarion 
rate  of  62c.  Contemporaneously  there 
was  in  effect  via  the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry,,  the 
initial  carrier,  and  the  C.  &  E.  I.  R.  R.. 
conflicting  joint  through  rates  of  42c 
and  39c.  The  reconsignment  order  Ir. 
part  read:  "Route  via  Illinois  Central. 
Protect  through  rate  of  42c  cwt."  HELD, 
the  obligation  rests  upon  the  carrier's 
agent  to  refrain  from  executing  d  bill  of 
lading  which  contains  provisions  that 
are  contradictory  or  impossible  of  exe- 
cution. When,  therefore,  the  rJite  and 
route  are  both  given  by  the  shipper  in 
the  shipping  instructions  and  the  rate 
given  does  not  apply  via  the  route  desig- 
nated, it  is  the  duty  of  the  carrier's  agent 
to  ascertain  from  the  shipper  whether 
the  rate  on  the  route  given  in  the  ship- 
ping instructions  shall  be  followed.  This 
not  having  been  done,  reparation  is 
awarded,  on  the  basis  of  39c.  Gibson 
Fruit  Co.,  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21 
I.  C.  C.  644,  645. 

(b)  It  is  the  affirmative  duty  of  a  car- 
rier to  apply  the  rate  named  in  the  bill 
of  lading  when  a  route  carrying  such  a 
rate  is  available,  and  in  case  there  is  an 
inconsistency  between  a  rate  and  a  route 
when  both  are  named  in  the  bill  of  lading 
furnished  by  the  shipper,  the  carrier 
should  request  of  the  shipper  which  one 
is  to  be  followed,  and  if  the  initial  carrier 
fails  to  inquire  of  the  shipper  and  routes 
the  freight  over  a  route  which  carries  a 
higher  rate  than  shown  in  the  bill  of  lad- 
ing, it  is  responsible  for  misrouting. 
Block-Pollak  Iron  Co.  v.  H.  E.  &  W.  T. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  505. 

(c)  A  rate  inserted  by  the  consignor 
in  the  bill  of  lading  was  not  applicable 
over  the  route  named  by  him,  but  was 
applicable  over  another  route.  HELD, 
that  the  initial  carrier,  instead  of  for- 
warding the  shipment  over  the  route 
specified,  which  carried  a  higher  rate, 
should  have  forwarded  it  over  the  route 
by  which  the  specified  rate  applied.  Is- 
bell-Brown  Co.  v.  G.  T.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Un- 
rep.   Op.   226. 


78 


BILLS  OF  LADING,  §9  (2)    (a)— BLANKET  RATES,  §1  (a) 


§9.  (2)  With  Tariff. 
See  Tariffs,  §11. 
(a)  A  provision  in  a  bill  of  lading  be 
ing  outside  the  tariff  announcement,  was 
in  no  sense  a  limitation  upon  the  right 
of  the  shipper  to  have  his  commodity 
transported  in  the  manner,  and  at  the 
rate,  specified  in  the  rate  schedule. 
Woodward  &  Dickerson  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  170,  172;  decision  of  Com- 
mission sustained,  187  Fed.  874;  191 
Fed.   705. 

IV.     LIMITATION  OF  LIABILITY. 

See    Released    Rates,    §2    (b),    §3    (a), 
(b). 

(a)  A  printed  bill  of  lading  provided 
that  the  carrier  should  not  be  liable  for 
any  loss  or  damage,  except  that  -result- 
ing from  the  fraud  or  gross  negligence 
of  the  company  or  its  servants,  and 
should  not  in  any  event  be  held  liable 
beyond  the  sum  of  $50,  "at  not  to  exceed 
which  sum  the  said  property  is  hereby 
valued,  unless  a  different  value  is  herein- 
above stated."  This  bill  of  lading  was 
delivered  to  plaintiff  to  cover  a  shipment 
of  automobiles  valued  at  $15,000.  Plain- 
tiff was  familiar  with  the  contents  of  the 
bill  of  lading,  was  asked  by  the  defend- 
ant's agent  whether  he  wished  to  put  a 
valuation  on  the  goods,  and  declined  to 
do  so.  He  knew  that  if  he  did  so.  the 
amount  of  freight  payable  would  be  in- 
creased. HELD,  the  fixing  of  the  value 
lower  than  the  real  value  was  not  in 
violation  of  section  10  of  the  Interh:aie 
Commerce  Act.  Pierce  Co.  v.  Wells, 
Fargo  &  Co.,  189  Fed.  561,  565. 

(b)  The  provision  in  the  uniform  bill 
of  lading  that  "the  amount  of  any  loss  or 
damage  for  which  any  carrier  is  liable 
shall  be  computed  on  the  basis  of  the 
value  of  the  property  (being  the  I  ona 
fide  invoice  price,  if  any,  to  the  con- 
signee, including  the  freight  charges,  if 
prepaid)  at  the  place  and  time  of  ship- 
ment under  this  bill  of  lading,  unless  a 
lower  value  has  been  rep-resented  in  writ- 
ing by  the  shipper  or  has  been  agreed 
upon  or  is  determined  by  the  classifica- 
tion or  tariffs  upon  which  the  rate  is 
based,  in  any  of  which  events  sucli  lower 
value  shall  be  the  maximum  amount  to 
govern  such  computation,  whether  o"-  not 
such  loss  or  damage  occurs  from  negli 
gence,"  makes  no  attempt  to  exempt  the 
carrier  from  liability  for  the  full  value 
of  the  commodity  transported  nor  does 
it  in  any  way  limit  the  carrier's  liability 
to  a  sum  less  than  the  value  of  the  com- 


modity. It  is  merely  a  contract  betu-een 
the  parties  fixing  the  time,  place  and' 
manner  of  arriving  at  the  value  of  the 
property,  and  is  reasonable  in  its  na 
ture.  Shaffer  &  Co.  v.  C,  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  8. 


BLANKET  RATES. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 
§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
II.     LEGALITY  OF  GROUP  RATES. 
§2.     In  general. 
§3.     Justification. 
§4.     Public  benefit 
§5.     Custom. 
IIL     EXTENSION  OF  ZONE, 
§6.     In  general. 

§7.     Equalizing   advantage   of   lo- 
cation. 
§8.     Proximity       to       established 

group. 
§9.     Grading  rates. 
§10.     Differentials. 
IV.     REASONABLENESS. 
§11.     Of  group. 
§12.     Of  individual  rate. 
V.     DISCRIMINATION. 

§13.     In  general, 
VI.     REMEDY        FOR        UNLAWFUL 
GROUPING. 
§14.     In  general. 
§15.     Scope  of  complaint. 
VII.     EVIDENCE. 

§16.     Burden  of  proof. 
§17.     Extent  of  zone. 
§18.     Comparisons. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

(a)  While  under  the  Act,  as  amended 
by  the  Hepburn  Act  of  June  29,  1906, 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
may  have  power  to  enter  upon  a  plan 
looking  toward  a  system  of  rates  wherein 
the  rates,  for  longer  and  shorter  hauls, 
will  taper  downward  according  to  dis- 
tance, provided  such  tapering  is  both 
comprehensive  and  symmetrically  ap- 
plied, it  has  no  power,  by  the  use  of 
differentials,  to  artificially  divide  up  the 
country  into  trade  zones,  tributary  to 
given  trade  and  manufacturing  centers  so 
as  to  give  the  Commission  power  to  pre- 
determine what  the  trade  and  manufac- 
turing centers  shall  be.  Orders  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  in  14 
I.  C.  C.  299  and  15  I.  C  C.  555,  enjoined. 
(Baker,  J.,  dissenting.)  C,  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.   Co.   V.   I.   C.   C,   171   Fed.    680,   683. 


etANkEf  RAtEg,  §i  (b)— 12  (j) 


79 


Reversed  218  U.  S.  88,  36  SuJ).  Ct.  651. 
54  L.  ed.  ^46. 

(b)  Tlie  Cdmrnissioii  doubts  whether 
it  has  authority  to  preserifee  a  blanket 
rate  from  the  Pacific  to  the  Atlantic 
coast.  Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Ex- 
change V.  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  149,  155. 

(c)  If  the  court  should  rule  that  the 
Commission  has  no  authority  to  estab- 
lish a  blanket  rate  in  a  broad  territory, 
it  would  seem  to  follow  that  the  carriers 
are  without  such  authority.  Lawrence- 
Wardenburg  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C 
6^8,  63§< 

(d)  The  Commissioii  has  not  the 
aut^ioi-ity  to  make  rates  tipOn  shch  a 
fcasis  as  to  make  the  ratfe  tb  Rfeno  from 
Denver  the  same  as  fr6m  B6stoh.  With- 
out doubt  the  commodity  rStes  made  to 
the  coast  terminals  are  reasonable  from 
a  great  portion  of  eastern  defined  terri- 
tory, but  a  governmental  authority  may 
not  exercise  the  latitude  in  fixing  a  rate 
blanket  which  the  carriers  themselves 
have  exercised.  Railroad  Commission  of 
Nevada  v,  S,  P,  Co.,  19  I,  C.  C.  238,  255. 

II.    LEGALITY  OF  GROUP  RATES. 
§2.     In  General. 

(a)  Group  rates  frequently  are  more 
just  and  promote  healthy  competition. 
It  is  the  almost  universal  custom  to 
create  groups  of  mines,  giving  to  all 
these  mines  the  same  rate,  even  though 
the  distance  may  be  different.  In  Re 
Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and 
Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151,  164. 

(b)  Blanket  system  under  which 
Texas  points  take  same  rate  as  New 
Orleans  to  Pacific  coast  not  found 
unlawful.  All  rates  to  the  Pacific  coast 
are  blanketed.  Mutual  Rice  Trade  &• 
Development  Ass'n  v.  I.  &  G.  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,   23   I.   C.   C.   219,   223,   224. 

(c)  Considered  solely  as  a  group, 
the  area  covered  by  the  rate  here  com- 
plained of  (grouped  points  ranging  from 
316  miles  to  432  miles  distant  from 
typical  producing  point)  is  not  too  ex- 
tensive, nor  is  the  rate  unlawful  as 
applied  to  complaining  points,  the  dis- 
tance to  which  is  only  25  or  35  miles 
less  than,  the  average  to  all  points  in 
group  to  which  commodity  involved  ac- 
tually moved.  Thropp  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
23   I.   C.    C.   497,  499. 

(d)  Slight  differerKV3S  in  distance  are 
'Often  and   propei^j^  dis^,,;^garded  in  nam.- 


ing  tates,  and  the  Conimissioii  hag  ©ftea 
approved  blanket  rates  coverlflg  wid« 
ar^as,  hUt  always  with  the  feservaticwi 
either  that  ilo  oh6  wats  objecting  0r  thai 
a  Substantial  reasofl  lot  that  rate  ad- 
justment tad  been  shoWfl.  Transporta- 
tioh  Bureau  of  Wichita  t.  Si  L.  &  S.  F, 
R.  R.  Ccy.,  23  1  C.  G.  679,  680\ 

(e)  No  competitive  conditions  reauir^ 
maintenance  of  a  50c  rate  on  wool  front 
Chicago  to  the  East.  TraUgott  Schmidt 
&  Song  y.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  h  C.  C 
684,   687. 

(f)  The  voluntary  #»teBsion  of  rea^ 
BOnable  rates  to  points  mttcli  more  dis^ 
tant  in  not  of  itself  unlawful.  Jfoniiwest- 
ern  Leather  Co.  v.  O.  R.  R.  &  .%  Co.,  21 
I.  C.  C.  66,  67. 

(g)  The  Commission  has  often  ap- 
proved blanket  rates.  It  undoubtedly 
should,  in  so  far  as  it  consistently  can, 
approve  suc&  a  rate  upon  citrus  and  de- 
ciduous frUlt»'  fr6m  California.  That  fea- 
ture of  tlie  rate  is  highly  satisfactory  to 
the  grower,  and  bfihg^s^  this  article  into 
more  general  use  at  remote  points  than 
would  otherwise  be.  possible.  In  passing: 
upon  the  reasonableness  of  the  blanket 
rate  the  Commibr«i6h  must  undoubtedly 
ofl'set  the  rate  to  the  ti^afer.  point  agam&t 
that  to  the  more  distant  t^^Hif,  but  whem 
the  application  of  such  a  *|^2^f^^^^^^ 
results  in  imposing  uiijust  auvt  flftreason- 
able  transportation  charges  at  l^^  *^^^f^ 
point  this  fact  cannot  be  ignored  y'^^f. 
cused  simply  because  a  rate  less  thax?  ^^' 
just  is  granted  at  the  more  distant  points. 
Commercial  Club  of  Salt  Lake  City  v. 
A.   T.  &  S.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  218,  226. 

(h)  A  blanket  adjustment  that  ig- 
nores the  geographical  location  of  pro- 
duction cannot  be  maintained.  Fergu- 
son Saw  Mill  Co.  V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  396,  399. 

(i)  Blanket  rates  are  largely  made 
with  respect  to  business  as  distinguished 
from  transportation  conditions,  and  is 
done  with  a  reasonable  disregard  of  dis- 
tance and  with  close  attention  to  com- 
mercial conditions;  Avery  Manufactur- 
ing Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,,  16) 
I.  C.  C.  20,  24. 

(j)  Complainant,  at  Hattiesburg;. 
Miss.,  attacked  the  rates  generally,  andl 
especially  those  on  grain,  grain  prod'r- 
ucts  and  packing-house  products,  from: 
all  directions  to  Hattiesburg,  Miss.,  as 
compared  with  those  to  New  Orleans, 
La.,    Mobile^    Ala.,     Gulfpor^t,    Natchez,^ 


80 


BLANKET  RATES,  §2  (j) 


Vicksburg,  Jackson  and  Meridian,  Miss. 
Jackson  and  Meridian  lie  on  an  east 
and  west  line  96  miles  apart.  Hatties- 
burg  lies  southeast  of  Jackson  and 
southwest  of  Meridian,  90  miles  from 
the  former  and  85  miles  from  the 
latter.  From  Hattiesburg  to  Gulfport 
is  about  70  miles.  The  N.  O.  &  N.  E. 
R.  R.  with  its  connections  made  a  lower 
rate  from  Cincinnati  to  New  Orleans 
than  to  Hattiesburg,  the  traffic  to  New 
Orleans  being  hauled  through  Hatties- 
burg. The  I.  C.  R.  R.  with  its  con- 
nections made  a  lower  rate  from  St. 
Louis  to  Gulfport  than  to  Hattiesburg, 
the  traffic  being  hauled  through  Hatties- 
burg. The  N.  O.  &  N.  E.  and  the  A.  & 
V.  R.  Rs.  hauled  traffic  from  New  Or- 
leans to  Meridian  and  to  Jackson  at 
lower  rates  than  from  New  Orleans  to 
Hattiesburg,  this  traffic  also  being 
hauled  through  Hattiesburg.  The  rail- 
roads leading  to  the  gulf  ports  when 
built  were  obliged  to  compete  with  the 
rates  via  the  Mississippi  River  and. 
following  the  precedent  set  by  the 
steamboat  lines,  established  from  north- 
ern points  the  same  rates  to  Vicksburg 
and  important  landings  between  Vicks- 
burg and  New  Orleans  as  to  New  Or- 
leans. The  rates  from  such  points  to 
New  Orleans  and  Mobile  were  for  the 
same  reason  made  the  same.  The  rates 
to  Gulfport  from  such  points  were  the 
same  as  to  New  Orleans  and  Mobile 
in  order  to  enable  Gunport  to  compete 
with  those  cities.  The  M.  &  O.  R.  R. 
in  connection  with  the  A.  &,  V.  R.  R. 
hauled  traffic  from  St.  Louis  through 
Meridian  to  Jackson  at  the  same  rate 
that  the  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  charged  to  Me- 
ridian. The  A.  G.  S.  Ry.  and  connec- 
tions and  the  A.  &  V.  R.  R.  hauled 
traffic  from  Cincinnati  through  Meridian 
to  Jackson  at  the  same  rate  as  to 
Meridian.  The  I.  C.  and  the  A.  &  V. 
R.  Rs.  hauled  traffic  from  St.  Louis  or 
Cairo  through  Jackson  to  Meridian  at 
the  same  rate  as  to  Jackson.  The  rates 
from  these  northern  points  to  INIeridian 
and  to  Jackson  were  lower  than  to  Hat- 
tiesburg, although  the  distance  to  Jack- 
son through  Meridian  was  substantially 
the  same  as  to  Hattiesburg  through 
Meridian,  and  the  distance  to  Meridian 
through  Jackson  was  substantially  the 
same  as  to  Hattiesburg  through  Jack- 
son. Furthermore,  the  A.  &  V.  R.  R., 
between  Jackson  and  Meridian,  was 
owned  by  the  N.  O.  &  N.  E.  Ry.,  the 
line  running   from   Meridian   to   Hatties- 


burg. The  G.  &  S.  L  R.  R.  from  Jack- 
son to  Hattiesburg  was  controlled  by 
the  I.  C.  R.  R.  The  relationship  of  rates 
at  Jackson  and  Meridian  was  of  long 
standing.  It  appeared  that  the  M.  & 
O.  R.  R.  would  maintain  from  the  gulf 
and  from  St.  Louis  to  Meridian  as  low 
rates  as  the  L  C.  R.  R.  maintained  to 
Jackson;  and  for  the  same  reason  the 
L  C.  R.  R.  would  maintain  at  Jackson 
as  favorable  rates  as  the  M.  &  O.  R. 
R.  maintained  at  Meridian.  The  rates 
of  the  A.  G.  S.  Ry.  and  its  connections 
from  Cincinnati  to  Meridian  had  to  be 
made  with  relation  to  the  rates  from 
St.  Louis  to  Meridian;  and  if  this  line 
was  to  participate  in  any  traffic  from 
Cincinnati  to  Jackson  it  was  compelled 
to  haul  it  to  Jackson  at  the  same  rate 
as  it  received  to  Meridian.  The  M.  &  O.  R. 
R.  making  the  rate  from  St.  Louis  to  Me- 
ridian equal  to  the  I.  C.  R.  R.  rate 
from  St.  Louis  to  Jackson,  the  I.  C.  R.  R. 
and  its  connection,  the  A.  &  V.  R.  R.,  were 
compelled  to  make  the  same  rate  to  Me- 
ridian as  to  Jackson.  Hattiesburg  was  of 
as  much  commercial  importance  as  Meri- 
lian  and  Jackson,  although  its  growth 
was  comparatively  recent.  On  grain 
from  St.  Louis  to  Vicksburg,  New  Or- 
leans or  ^Mobile  the  rate  was  12c,  which, 
added  to  the  rate  of  7c  from  Vicksburg 
to  Hattiesburg,  made  a  rate  of  19c  to 
the  latter  point.  The  rate  from  St. 
Louis  to  either  Meridian  or  Jackson 
was  the  Vicksburg  rate  of  12c,  plus 
21/^c,  or  14i^c,  to  which  was  added  the 
N.  O.  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  differential  of  5c. 
making  a  total  of  19i^c  to  Hattiesburg. 
On  packing-house  products  the  rate  was 
35i^c  to  Meridian  or  Jackson,  to  which 
was  added  oc,  making 'a  rate  of  40i/4c 
to  Hattiesburg.  The  rates  from  the 
East  to  Hattiesburg  were  made  by  add- 
ing the  N.  O.  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  differentials 
to  the  rates  from  the  East  to  Meridian. 
Complainant  demanded  that  Hatties- 
burg be  grouped  with  Meridian  and 
Jackson.  HELD,  the  grouping  of  Vicks- 
burg, Natchez,  New  Orleans,  Gulfport 
and  Mobile  was  a  proper  one;  that  the 
grouping  of  Shreveport,  Alexandria  and 
Monroe,  located  west  of  Vicksburg,  was 
also  a  proper  and  well  established  one; 
that  Jackson  and  Meridian,  as  a  group, 
might  be  defended  for  the  same  reason 
applying  to  the  other  groups;  and  that 
while  defendants  might  voluntarily  add 
Hattiesbrug  to  the  Jackson-Meridian 
group,  the  Commission  could  not  find 
as    a    matter    of    law    that    Hattiesburg 


BLANKET  RATES,  §3   (a)— §4   (bb) 


81 


must  b€  so  grouped  with  Jackson  and 
Meridian  in  view  of  the  peculiar  com- 
petitive conditions  long  existing  between 
Jackson  and  Meridian.  Commercial 
Club  of  Hattiesburg  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R. 
Co.,   16   I.   C.   C.   534,   545-546. 

§3.     Justification. 

(a)  It  may  be  questioned  whether  car- 
riers should  ordinarily  be  permitted  by 
the  mere  form  in  which  they  elect  to 
publish  their  tariffs  to  ordain  that  any 
business  shall  be  transacted  at  a  particu- 
lar point,  as  by  constructing  their  tariffs 
so  that  the  rates  on  corn  break  at  the 
Ohio  River.  Suffern  Grain  Co.  v.  I.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  178,  181. 

(b)  When  carriers  carry  a  blanket 
rate  extending  several  hundred  miles  in 
breadth  almost  up  to  the  doors  of  an 
important  consuming  point,  they  can 
with  difficulty  establish  the  lawfulness 
thereof.  Sawyer  &  Austin  Lumber  Co. 
V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co..  21  I.  C.  C. 
464,  466. 

(c)  Chief  justification  for  a  blanket 
rate  is  that  it  places  all  producers  on 
the  same  footing  at  a  market.  Ferguson 
Saw  Mill  Co.  V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Rv  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  396,  398. 

§4.     Public   Benefit. 

See  Classification,  §3  (b) ;  Evidence, 
§64'/2  (a);  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§2  (bb),  (dd),  §10   (m),  §401/2. 

(a)  It  frequently  happens  that  group 
rates  are  the  most  just  and  promote  in 
the  highest  degree  healthy  competition. 
In  Re  Transportation  of  wool,  hides  and 
pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151,  164. 

(b)  It  is  by  no  means  certain  that 
postage-stamp  rates,  as  applied  to  the 
distribution  of  the  products  of  the  Pa- 
cific Coast  states,  are  not  upon  the  whole 
for  the  general  public  good.  Arlington 
Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  149,  156. 

(bb)  In  19  L  C.  C.  148,  the  Commis- 
sion held  that  the  rate  on  lemons  from 
southern  California  to  territory  east 
of  the  Rocky  Mountairs  should  not  ex- 
ceed $1.  The  Commerce  Court  in  A. 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  190  Fed. 
591,  enjoined  this  order  on  the  ground 
that  the  Commission  in  fixing  this  rate 
was  not  attempting  to  determine  a 
reasonable  rate,  but  was  endeavoring  to 
protect  California  lemon  growers  against 
Sicilian  competition.  The  Commission 
now    points    out    as    the    evidence    upon 


which     it     based     its     former     decision, 
that  the  carriers  for  parts  of  two  years 
prior    to    the    rendition    of    the    former 
opinion    and    for    the    entire    preceding 
six   years  had    voluntarily   maintained   a 
rate    of    $1    on    lemons;     that    the    car- 
riers   had    for   the    better    part    of   eight 
years     voluntarily     maintained     a     rate 
on     lemons,     at     first     25c,     and     subse- 
quently   15c,    lower    than    that    contem- 
poraneously  in    effect   on   oranges;    that 
in  its   former  decision  it  stated  at  con- 
siderable   length    the    various    elements 
in    the    evidence    entering   into   a   deter- 
mination   of    the    reasonableness    of   the 
rate    on    oranges;    that   it    intended   the 
evidence    relating    to    oranges    to    apply 
to    the    question    of    rates    on    lemons; 
that    the    carriers    in    the    former    case 
attempted   to   explain   the   lower  rate   in 
the    past    as    being    established    for    the 
purpose    of    meeting    competition    from 
Sicily;   that  the  average  haul  on  lemons 
was     some     500     miles     less     than     on 
oranges;    that   a   much   smaller   percent- 
age  of   lemons   than    of   oranges   moved 
under  the  expense  of  refrigeration.     The 
Commission   in   addition   points   out  that 
it    deems    the    orange    rate    of    $1.15    an 
extremely   liberal   one;    and   that   on   ac- 
count of  the   shipment  of  lemons  under 
ventilation    instead    of    under    refrigera- 
tion, the  cars  may  be  loaded  to  a  mini- 
mum   of    34,000    lbs.    instead    of    to    the 
former   minimum   of   26,200   lbs.,  thereby 
making  the   per   car   earnings   at  a   rate 
of  $1   amount  to  $340,   as   against  earn- 
ings of  $301.30  per  car  at  the  $1.15  rate 
under    the    former    minimum.      With    re- 
spect  to   the   holding   of   the   Commerce 
Court     that     the     Commission     had     no 
authority    to    prescribe    a    blanket    rate 
extending    from    the    Rocky    Mountains 
east,  the  Commission  points  out  that  the 
carriers    themselves    requested    the    rate 
to  be  fixed  on  the  blanket  plan.    Under 
the    blanket    system    the    producers    are 
given    the    widest    possible    market;    the 
carriers     obtain     a     certain     amount     of 
long    distance    business    at   remunerative 
rates    which    they    would    not    otherwise 
have;    and    the   freight   does  not    so   far 
enter    into    the    cost    of    the    articles    to 
the   consumer,  as   to   impose   any   notice- 
able   burden    upon    any    section    of    the 
country.      To   establish    graded    rates    at 
this    time    would    be    to    break    up    the 
blanket     rate    system    which    is    highly 
satisfactory     to     all     parties     concerned. 
HELD,    the    former    $1.15    rate    was    un- 
reasonable   and    should    not    exceed    $1. 


BLANKET  RATES,  §4  (c)— §6  (b) 


Reparation    awarded.  (Clark,    Comm'r, 

concurring  in  part.)  Arlington   Heights 

Fruit  Fxchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  22  t.  C.  C. 
149,   154. 

(c)  Group  rates,  particularly  on  such 
a  commodity  as  coal,  are  advantageous 
to  the  public,  the  carriers,  and  the  mine 
owners  alike.  American  Coal  Co.  v.  B. 
&  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C,  149,  155. 

(d)  Blanket  or  group  rates  in  many 
cases  are  of  great  advantage  to  the  pub- 
lic without  serious  injustice  to  any  in- 
terest, though  there  is  of  necessity  more 
or  less  disregard  of  distance  and  varying 
degrees  of  inequality.  Chicago  Lumber 
«^  Coal  Co.  V.  Tioga  Southeastern  Ry.  Co., 
16  L  C.  C.  323,  334. 

§5.     Custom. 

(a)  In  the  past  Spokane  rates  from 
St.  Paul  have  applied  on  the  Great 
Northern  Ry.  as  far  west  as  Avery,  111 
miles  from  Spokane,  ard  upon  the 
Northern  Pacific  R.  R.  as  far  west  as  Ken- 
newick,  149  miles.  The  Northern  Pacific 
R.  R.  has  a  branch  line  to  Pendleton 
and  has  maintained  at  Pendleton  the 
Spokane  rate  from  St.  Paul.  HELD, 
that  the  rates  established  by  the  Com- 
mission to  Spokane  should  be  applied 
by  the  Great  Northern  Ry.  and  Northern 
Pacific  R.  R.  to  those  points  at  which 
the  Spokane  rate  has  been  maintained 
In  the  past.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N  P. 
Ry.   Co.,   19  I.   C.   C.   162,  177. 

(aa)  In  transportation  of  low-grade 
commodities  that  move  in  large  quanti- 
ties it  is  a  long-established  custom  to 
group  or  blanket  a  number  of  stations  or 
a  large  expanse  of  territory.  Kansas 
Citv  Transportation  Bureau  v  A  T  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  195.  204.    ' 

(b)  It  is  not  uncommon  to  make  large 
groups    of   distant   points.      Moise   Bros. 

5'?0,^556^''-'-^^-^^-^-'^^^-C-C- 

in.     EXTENSION  OF  ZONE, 
§6.     In  general. 

(a)  All  grouping  for  rate  piirposes  is 
necessarily  more  or  less  arbitrary"^  Grou. 
n1n.Hf."r'"^  "^^"^  '^^  appearance  of 
fpe  Vpf  ?i,'T^  P^^^t  ^"st  acro.s  the 
ime.  Yet  the  Ime  nnist  be  drawn  some- 
JliZI'  Z'l^^  grouping  abandoned  oZ% 
established,  groups  should  not  be  lightlv 
or  unnecessarily  disturbed.  Clyde  Coal 
Co.  V.  P.  R.  a  Co..  23  I.  C.  C.  135,  138 


(^a)  The  Extension  of  trunk  lihe 
rat^s  to  p<3ints  where  such  conditions 
do  not  exist,  is  disapproved.  Corpora- 
tion Commission  of  N.  C.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  303,  309. 

(b)     The  Moundiville  cOal  district  liis 
pear  Wheding.  W.  Va.,  just  east  of  th© 
Ohio  River.     The   eastern   Ohio   dlstriet 
lies   near   Wheelihg    webt   of   thfe   fiver. 
The  differential  in  favor  of  the  eastertt 
Ohio  district  and  againfet  the  MoundSville 
district  Wai  §e  Per  tbn  on  vessel  cai-gO 
shipmfelits  to  Lorain  and  Sandusky,  3c  on 
vessel  fuel  to  Sandusky,  ahd  8e  Oii  vfe§- 
sel  fuel  to  Lorain.     To  ail  other  poiijt^ 
west   and    hofthwest,    the    eastern   Ohio 
district  fehjoyed  a  differential  of  25c  p§r 
ton    lower    than     the     rates    from     the 
Moundsville    district.      The    Moundsville 
district    enjoyed    lower   rates    to    points 
east    than    the    eastern    Ohio    district, 
but     its     coal     was     not     suitable     for 
eastern  markets.   Complainant  asked  that 
the     Moundsville     district    be    included 
in    the    eastern    Ohio    district    and    en- 
joy the  same  rates,  the  former  to  give 
up   its   advantages   in   rates    to   eastern 
points.     It  appeared   that  to  grant  com- 
plainants' demand  would  also  requir©  f  n 
extension  of  the  Ohio  district  to  include 
the     Fairmount,     Pittsburgh    and     other 
mines  lying  north,  east  and  south  of  the 
Moundsville  district.     The  distance  from 
the  Moundsville  district  to  the  points  in 
question  was  greater  than  from  the  Ohio 
district.     The  expense  of  maintaining  a 
bridge  over  the  Ohio  River  was  involved. 
The  Ohio  River  had  been  the  boundary 
line  for  rate-making  for  many  years,  and' 
the     mines,      including     those      in     the; 
Moundsville     district,     were     developed 
while  this,  as  a  boundary,  was  in  exist- 
ence.      Complainant     entered     the     field' 
knowing  of  the   existence  of  the   differ- 
ential.    To  grant  complainant's  demand' 
would   involve   all   the  rate   adjustments; 
from  the  bituminous  coal  fields  of  Ohio;, 
Pennsylvania  and  West  Virginia.  HEI^D, 
the    system    of   rate    making   by   joining 
various  points   into  a   given    group,   and 
establishing    the    same    rate    from    each 
point  in  the  group  to  any  given  destina-. 
tion    has    long    been    followed,    and    haS' 
contributed    to    the    development   of   the^ 
natural  resources  of  the  country.     It  has. 
served    to    put    various    producers    of    a 
given   product  in   the  same  territory  on 
an    equality   as   to   products    destined    to. 
any  common  point  of  consumption.     Nec- 
e^'sarily    a    group    territory    must    have 
definite  boundary  lines,   and  when  once 
they  have  been  established,  their  exten-. 


BLANKET  RATES,  §7  (a)  — (aa) 


83 


sion  should  not  be  forced  unless  clearly 
warranted  by  the  facts  and  circumstances 
in  each  case  presented.  Complaint  dis- 
missed. Hitchman  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  512,  520,  521. 

§7.     Equalizing  Advantage  of  Location. 

See  Equalization  of  Rates,  §1  (e), 
§3,  §4  (4)  (aa),  §6  (h),  (v),  (dd); 
Evidence,  §2  (b),  (c) ;  Long  and 
Short  Haul,  §10  (b);  Through 
Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §8  (b). 

(a)  The  bulk  of  the  rice  crop  of  the 
United  States  is  produced  in  Texas, 
Louisiana  and  Arkansas,  and  New  Or- 
leans has  been  the  leading  milling  and 
marketing  point.  The  milling  interests  for 
Houston  and  Texas  mill  cities  attacked 
the  rates  on  clean  rice  from  Texas  mill- 
ing points  to  the  Southeast,  to  Central 
Freight  Association  territory,  to  Illinois 
territory,  and  to  the  Pacific  Coast  terri- 
tory, as  discriminatory  against  them 
when  compared  with  the  corresponding 
rates  from  New  Orleans.  To  the  South- 
east the  through  rates  were  combinations 
made  of  a  local  carload  rate  of  15c  from 
Houston,  and  Texas  points  east  thereof, 
or  19c  from  Texas  points  west  thereof, 
to  New  Orleans,  and  in  most  instances 
a  local  any-quantity  rate  from  New  Or- 
leans. To  Central  Freight  Association 
territory  (east  of  the  Illinois-Indiana 
state  line)  there  were  joint  rates  applying 
from  Houston,  which  were  10c  on  carloads, 
and  20c  on  less-than-carloads.  higher  than 
the  corresponding  rates  to  New  Orleans. 
To  Illinois  territory  the  rates  from 
Houston  were  5c  on  carloads,  and  10c  on 
less-than-carloads,  higher  than  from  New 
Orleans.  To  the  Pacific  Coast  the  rates 
from  Houston  were  the  same  as  from  New 
Orleans.  New  Orleans  is  on  the  average 
about  150  miles  nearer  to  Illinois  points, 
and  about  200  miles  nearer  Central 
Freight  Association  territory  points  than 
are  the  Texas  milling  centers.  Houston 
is  350  miles  nearer  the  Pacific  Coast  than 
New  Orleans,  but  the  rice  rates,  like  all 
other  rates  to  the  Pacific  Coast,  are 
blanketed,  so  that  all  Louisiana  and 
Texas  points  have  the  same  rate  to'  all 
coast  markets.  In  hauls  to  the  Pacific 
Coast  only  one  carrier  is  involved,  while 
in  hauls  from  Houston  to  the  Southeast 
at  least  two  carriers  participate.  The 
average  haul  from  the  rice  belt  to  the 
Coast  approximates  2,000  miles.  The 
rates  from  Texas  points  to  the  Southeast 
were  combination  rates  ba&ed  on  New  Or- 
leans or  other  Mississippi  gateways.  It 
appeared  that  each  of  the  local  rates  in- 


cluded in  the  through  rates  had  been 
lowered  by  competition  either  of  markets 
or  of  other  carriers.  The  local  rates 
from  New  Orleans  were  in  most  instances 
any-quantity  rates.  The  shipments  from 
Texas  points  to  the  Southeast  were  made 
only  in  carload  lots.  Generally  speak- 
ing, the  carload  rates  that  apply  from 
the  river  to  southeastern  points  were 
relatively  lower  than  the  any-quantity 
rates.  On  Texas  shipments  no  terminal 
service  was  performed  at  New  Orleans, 
while  on  a  local  shipment,  in  and  out, 
such  service  would  be  substantial. 
HELD,  as  to  the  rates  applying  to  Illinois 
and  Central  Freight  Association  terri- 
tory. New  Orleans  possesses  natural  ad- 
vantages entitling  it  to  lower  rates  than 
Texas  points;  that  while  the  Texas 
points  are  nearer  Pacific  Coast  points 
than  New  Orleans,  they  are  not  entitled 
to  lower  rates  becauss  the  rates  are 
blanketed  over  a  large  territory,  and, 
hence,  can  be  justified,  which  they  might 
not  be  were  the  haul  shorter,  as  is  the 
case  to  Central  Freight  Association 
territory;  that  the  through  carload  rates 
of  which  any-quantity  rates  are  factors 
from  Texas  points  to  the  South- 
east are  unreasonable  and  discrimi- 
natory because  the  New  Orleans  shipper 
in  less-than-carload  lots  gets  the  same 
rate  as  the  Texas  shipper  of  carloads, 
and  in  addition  has  a  substantial  ter- 
minal service  performed  for  him,  and 
that  joint  carload  rates  from  Texas  mill- 
ing points  to  this  territory  shoald  be  at 
least  5c  less  than  the  lowest  combination 
of  locals  contemporaneously  in  effect  to 
and  fiom  Mississippi  River  points.  Mu- 
tual Pice  Trade  &  Devel.  Ass'n.  Houston, 
V.  I.  &  G.  N.  R.  R.,  23  L  C.  C.  219. 

(aa)  Complainant  is  a  grain  dealer 
operating  an  elevator  located  on  Erie 
Street,  west  of  Main  Street,  Buffalo,  N. 
Y.  He  attacked  defendant's  rate  of 
$1.30  per  net  ton  for  the  transportation 
of  coal  during  the  period  from  July  7, 
1909,  to  March  20,  1910,  from  Chalfant 
Mines,  Braznell  and  Newell  Scales,  Pa., 
for  delivery  at  his  elevator  to  the  ex- 
tent this  rate  exceeded  the  rate  appli- 
cable from  said  points  of  origin  to 
other  points  of  delivery  in  Buffalo.  Prior 
to  May  1,  1909,  the  rate  On  coal  from 
the  points  mentioned  for  delivery  to 
points  east  of  Main  Street  was  $1.25 
per  net  ton,  while  to  points  west  of 
Main  Street  it  was  $1.30.  Effective  on 
that  date  the  $1.25  rate  was  extended 
to    Bl^ck   Rock,    a   point   west   of   Main 


84 


BLANKET  RATES,  §7   (b)  — (bb) 


Street,  but  no  reduction  was  made 
in  the  rate  to  Erie  Street.  On  April 
1,  1910,  the  rate  for  all  deliveries  in 
Buffalo  was  made  the  same,  $1.25  per 
net  ton.  Complainant  did  not  attack 
the  present  rate,  but  merely  sought 
reparation  on  shipments  which  moved 
during  the  period  when  the  rate  to 
Erie  Street  was  higher  than  the  rate 
to  Black  Rock  and  points  east  of 
Main  Street.  Deliveries  to  points  east 
of  Main  Street  are  jnade  by  a  direct 
haul.  In  making  deliveries  to  Erie 
Street,  however,  because  of  restrictions 
imposed  by  the  city  council,  it  is  nec- 
essary to  haul  the  traffic  entirely  around 
the  city  of  Buffalo  on  the  belt  line 
through  Black  Rock,  a  distance  of  about 
11  miles.  On  account  of  the  switching 
charge  (which  they  absorbed)  the  rev- 
enue derived  by  the  line  carriers  was 
less  on  shipments  to  Erie  Street  than 
to  Black  Rock.  The  rate  to  Erie  Street 
had  been  reduced  because  that  rate  was 
always  grouped  with  the  rate  to  Tona- 
wanda,  N.  Y.,  via  Black  Rock,  and  the 
Tonawanda  rate  having  been  reduced, 
owing  to  the  great  industrial  develop- 
ment of  the  territory  between  Buffalo 
and  Tonawanda,  which  is  about  11 
miles  distant,  the  rate  to  Erie  Street 
was  similarly  reduced  to  preserve  the 
relationship  between  those  two  points. 
HELD,  the  voluntary  reduction  of  a 
rate  by  a  carrier  does  not  in  itself, 
without  proof  that  the  former  rate  was 
unreasonable,  furnish  a  sufficient  basis 
for  reparation,  acd  that  on  the  record 
it  cannot  be  found  that  the  rate  charged 
was  unreasonable  or  unduly  'discrimina- 
tory. Complaint  dismissed.  Pierce  v. 
P.   &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  89,  91. 

(b)  When  general  rate  adjustments, 
in  and  between  large  territories,  which 
contemplate  substantial  justice  between 
all  shippers  generally,  result  in  indi- 
vidual instances  of  disproportionate  in- 
equality, they  fail  in  their  purpose,  and 
their  strict  observance  in  such  cases 
upon  no  other  ground  than  the  arbitrary 
theory  of  their  existence  should  yield 
to  the  extent  necessary  to  prevent  in- 
justice. Alpha  Portland  Cement  Co.  v. 
B.   &   O.  R.  R.   Co.,   22  I.   C.   C.   446,  449. 

(bb)  The  Commission  investigated  cer- 
tain increased  rates  on  cement  plaster 
applied  by  the  defendants  from  Alva, 
Bickford,  Ferguson,  Marlbw.  Okarche, 
Cement,  Eldorado,  Okeene,  Southard, 
Chambers,    Roman    Nose,    Watonga  -and 


McAlester,  Okla.,  to  Fort  Worth  and  Dal- 
las, and  intermediate  stations  in  Texas. 
Fort  Worth  and  Dallas  are  the  largest 
consuming  points  for  cement  plaster  in 
northern  Texas,  and  the  rates  in  force 
were  made  in  order  to  place  the  various 
points  of  production  on^  substantial  com- 
petitive equality  at  Fort  Worth  and  Dal- 
las. Producers  of  cement  plaster  in  Okla- 
homa are  in  competition  not  only  with 
one  another  but  with  competitors  in  the 
vicinity  of  Acme,  Tex.,  distant  from  Fort 
Worth  196.5  miles,  and  from  Dallas  230.3 
miles,  via  the  Fort  Worth  &  Denver 
City  Ry.,  which  road  has  maintained  rates 
of  10c  from  Acme  to  Fort  Worth  and 
lli/^c  to  Dallas.  The  Oklahoma  points 
are  further  distant  from  Fort  Worth  or 
Dallas  than  is  Acme  and  took  a  rate  sub- 
stantially the  same.  In  many  instances 
also  rates  from  Acme  and  from  the  points 
of  origin  in  Oklahoma  were  higher  to  sta- 
tions between  Fort  Worth-Dallas  and  the 
Texas-Oklahoma  state  line  than  to  Fort 
Worth-Dallas.  The  increase  in  the  rates 
suspended  appeared  to  have  been  made 
by  the  carriers  in  order  to  conform  to  the 
fourth  section  of  the  Act  and  at  the  same 
time  to  augment  their  revenues.  The 
revenue  per  ton  mile  under  a  13c  rate 
would  vary  from  7.3  mills  to  11.6  mills 
from  the  further  situated  points  in  Okla- 
homa, distant  from  224  to  353  miles,  and 
a  rate  of  10c  would  yield  a  ton  mile  reve- 
nue of  from  9.4  mills  to  12.2  mills  from 
the  nearest  situated  points  distant  from 
164  to  212  miles.  HELD,  regarding  the 
rates  from  the  Oklahoma  points  of  origin 
to  Fort  Worth  and  Dallas,  the  points  of 
origin  and  destination  should  be  grouped 
for  the  purpose  of  prescribing  maximum 
rates.  In  making  such  groups  the  estab- 
lished rate-making  customs  in  the  south- 
western section  of  the  country,  and  the 
particular  action  of  the  carriers  in  this 
case,  are  followed:  two  groups  of  points  of 
origin  seem  to  be  necessary  in  order  to 
do  justice  to  the  rights  of  shippers  and 
carriers  and  these  are  made  substantially 
upon  the  ground  of  distance;  the  rate  from 
Alva;  Bickford,  Ferguson,  Okarche,  Eldo- 
rado, Okeene,  Southard,  Roman  Nose  and 
Watonga  to  Fort  Worth  and  Dallas  should 
not  exceed  13c  per  100  lbs.,  minimum 
40.000  lbs.;  the  rate  from  Cement,  Mar- 
low,  Chambers  and  McAlester,  the  near- 
est group  to  Fort  Worth  and  Dallas, 
should  not  exceed  10c  per  100  lbs.,  mini- 
mum 40,000  lbs.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates 
by  Carriers  on  Cement  Plaster.  21  I.  C.  C. 
591,  595. 


BLANKET  RATES,  §7   (c)  — (e) 


85 


(c)  The  highest  main  line  rates  to  be 
found  in  the  United  States  are  those  from 
eastern  points  to  stations  in  Nevada.  For 
carrying  a  carload  of  first-class  traffic 
containing  20,000  lbs.  from  Omaha  to 
Reno,  the  U.  P.  and  S.  P.  lines  charge 
$858.  If  a  like  carload  is  carried  154 
miles  further  to  Sacramento  the  charge 
is  but  $600.  The  first-class  rate  to  the 
more  distant  point,  Sacramento,  is  $3  per 
100  lbs.,  and  to  the  nearer  point,  Reno, 
$4.29  per  100  lbs.  If  a  light  carload  of 
freight  originates  at  Denver,  500  miles 
w^est  of  Omaha,  the  same  rates  to  Reno 
and  Sacramento  apply,  and  if  the  freight 
originates  at  Boston,  1,700  miles  east  of 
Omaha,  the  rates  are  the  same.  This 
arises  because  the  whole  of  the  United 
States  from  Colorado  common  points  to 
the  Atlantic  seaboard,  barring  a  few  of 
the  southeastern  states,  is  one  wide  group 
or  zone  from  which  practically  uniform 
rates  to  Pacific  coast  water  points  are 
made,  and  the  rates  to  Reno  are  based 
upon  these  blanket  rates  to  coast  cities 
and  amount  to  the  sum  of  the  rates  to 
the  coast,  'plus  the  local  rates  back  to 
point  of  destination.  There  was  a  time 
doubtless  when  Nevada  traffic,  save  to 
the  mines  on  its  westernmost  border,  was 
but  trifling.  At  present,  however,  it  has 
a  traffic,  both  freight  and  passenger, 
v/hich  is  far  too  considerable  to  be  over- 
looked under  the  rule  de  minimis.  Upon 
freight  shipped  from  Boston,  or  New 
York,  or  Chicago,  or  St.  Louis,  or  Omaha  to 
Sacramento,  or  to  Reno,  the  carriers  east 
of  Ogden  receive  precisely  the  same  earn- 
ings on  both  shipments,  but  the  S.  P.  Co. 
west  of  Ogden  receives  far  more  upon  the 
Reno  shipment  than  on  the  Sacramento 
shipment.  HELD,  the  time  has  come 
when  the  carriers  west  of  the  Rocky 
Mountains  must  treat  the  intermountain 
country  upon  a  different  basis  from  that 
which  has  hitherto  obtained.  Nevada  can- 
not to  the  fullest  extent  be  given  rates 
as  low  as  those  given  to  Sacramento,  be- 
cause in  making  rates  to  Reno  from  a 
territory  as  large  as  that  of  the  east  con- 
sideration must  necessarily  be  given  to 
existing  rates,  to  other  intermediate 
points,  and  to  points  upon  the  Pacific 
coast.  The  class  rates  to  Reno  and  points 
east  thereof,  through  but  not  including 
Winnemucca,  from  groups  of  eastern  de- 
fined territory  are  unreasonable  first-class 
(other  classes  reduced  proportionately) 
to  the  extent  they  exceed  the  following: 
From  Denver  and  other  points  in  Group 
J,  $2.10;  Grand  Island  and  other  points  in 


Group  G,  $2.30;  Omaha  and  Group  F, 
$2.50;  Clinton  and  Group  E,  $2.80;  Chi- 
cago and  Group  D,  $2.90;  Cincinnati-De- 
troit common  points,  $3.05;  Pittsburgh- 
Buffalo  common  points,  $3.20;  New  York 
common  points,  $3.50;  rates  to  Winne- 
mucca and  points  east  thereof  to  the 
Nevada-Utah  state  line  reduced  about  5 
per  cent  less  than  the  foregoing.  Com- 
modity rates  reserved  for  further  consid- 
eration. Railroad  Commission  of  Nevada 
v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  238. 

(d)  Because  carriers  have  constructed 
a  system  of  rates  on  a  zone  or  blanket 
system,  is  not  sufficient  reason  to  justify 
the  collection  of  unreasonable  charges 
to  any  point.  Every  city  is  entitled  to 
the  advantage  of  its  location,  and  may 
not  lawfully  be  subjected  to  high  freight 
charges,  merely  because  carriers  for  rea- 
sons of  convenience,  or  otherwise,  in- 
clude it  with  a  number  of  other  points  in 
surrounding  territory,  which  latter  points 
are  not  similarly  situated.  Corporation 
Commission  of  North  Carolina  v.  N.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  303,  309. 

(dd)  It  is  improper  to  place  a  par- 
ticular commodity  in  a  given  zone  with- 
out due  regard  to  geographical  boun- 
daries of  production.  Ferguson  Saw 
Mill  Co.  V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18 
I.    C.    C.    391,    394. 

(e)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates  on 
cypress  lumber  from  Little  Rock  and 
Woodson,  Ark.,  a  point  17  miles  southeast 
of  Little  Rock,  to  points  on  the  Iron 
Mountain's  lines  in  Oklahoma,  Kansas 
and  Missouri.  For  over  20  years  cypress 
had  been  classed  as  a  hardwood.  The 
cypress  producing  territory  extends  from 
southeastern  Missouri  to  the  Arkansas 
River,  and  to  some  distance  south  of  that 
river,  paralleling  it  to  the  Mississippi 
River.  The  yellow  pine  region  sets  in  at 
the  Arkansas  River  and  extends  south  to 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  two  regions  do 
not  therefore  at  all  correspond  in  geo- 
graphical location.  The  rates  attacked 
were  the  result  of  applying  to  cypress  the 
blanket  rate  governing  yellow  pine.  The 
cypress  rates  to  the  destinations  in  ques- 
tion were  blanketed  over  a  territory 
from  Memphis,  Tenn.,  and  ranged  from 
16c  to  18c  over  distances  ranging  from 
309  to  477  miles,  and  yielded  from  6.9 
mills  to  1.1c  per  ton  mile.  The  rate  from 
Little  Rock  ranged  from  18c  to  24c  for 
distances  of  from  179  to  355  miles,  and 
yielded  from  1.35c  to  2c  per  ton  mile. 
The  rates  from  Woodson  ranged  from  18c 


86 


BLANKET  RATES,  §7  (f) 


to  24c  for  distances  of  from  197  to  373 
miles  and  yielded  from  1.29c  to  1.83c  per 
ton  mile.  The  rates  attacked  were  from 
21/^0  to  8c  higher  than  those  previously  in 
effect  from  Woodson  and  Little  Rock,  and 
a  typical  result  was  to  give  a  24c  rate  from 
Woodson  and  Little  Rock  to  points  in 
eastern  Kansas  as  compared  with  an  18c 
rate  from  Memphis  and  other  more  dis- 
tantly located  points.  HELD,  defendant 
was  not  justified  in  ignoring  geographical 
location  of  production,  and  placing  Wood- 
son and  Little  Rock  so  as  to  take  the 
yellow  pine  blanket  rate,  and  that  rates 
from  Woodson  and  Little  Rock  should  not 
exceed  those  from  Memphis.  Rates  at- 
tacked ordered  reduced  according  to  a 
schedule  set  out  in  the  opinion.  Fer- 
guson Saw  Mill  Co.  V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  396,  399. 

(f)  Complainants  attacked  the  rates 
on  all  classes  of  freight  and  commodities 
between  Atlantic  Coast  territory  and  the 
cities  of  Saginaw,  Flint  and  other  points 
within  the  counties  of  Saginaw  and 
Genesee,  Mich.,  making  up  the  Saginaw 
Valley  territory,  not  as  unreasonable  per 
se  but  as  unjustly  discriminatory  in  com- 
parison with  the  Detroit-Toledo  groups, 
and  other  groups.  The  rates  in  Central 
Freight  Association  or  percentage  terri- 
tory are  made  up  upon  percentages  of 
the  Chicago-New  York  rate.  From  the 
assumed  rate  of  25c  from  Chicago  to  New 
York  there  is  first  deducted  the  sum  of 
Gc  to  represent  the  fixed  terminal  ex- 
penses, at  the  points  of  origin,  and  des- 
tination. The  remaining  19c  represents 
the  assumed  charge  for  the  rail  haul  ex- 
clusive of  service  at  either  terminal.  This 
rate  being  divided  by  920,  the  short  line 
mileage  from  the  Chicago  to  New  York, 
yields  a  rate  per  mile  of  0.0206c.  This 
rate  per  mile  is  used  as  the  factor  for 
establishing  an  assumed  rate  from  any 
particular  junction  or  competitive  point 
on  the  basis  of  its  mileage  to  New  York. 
This  factor  or  rate  per  mile  multiplied 
by  the  number  of  miles  from  the  partic- 
ular point  to  New  York  gives  an  assumed 
rate  from  that  point  exclusive  of  any 
terminal  service  at  either  end  of  the 
movement.  To  this  assumed  rate  the  6c 
is  again  added  to  cover  the  terminal  ex- 
penses. The  result  gives  an  assumed  rate 
from  the  particular  point  to  New  York, 
including  terminal  charges.  The  per- 
centage which  this  assumed  rate  bears  to 
the  assumed  rate  of  25c  from  Chicago  to 
New  York  is  the  percentage  of  the  Chi- 


cago rate  which  the  particular  point 
takes  on  any  given  class  of  merchandise. 
This  percentage  system  was  at  first  ap- 
plied only  to  junction  and  competitive 
points,  but  later  the  rates  were  extended 
to  nearby  non-competitive  points,  thus  es- 
tablishing zones  or  groups.  This  per- 
centage system  has  in  the  course  of  time 
been  somewhat  modified  by  the  building 
of  new  lines,  by  water  competition,  and 
other  influences.  Under  the  percentage 
system  Flint  and  Saginaw  took  92  per 
cent  of  the  Chicago  rates.  This  percent- 
age was  figured  on  the  haul  to  New  York 
through  Toledo,  a  distance  of  828  miles. 
Since  the  establishment  of  this  rate  the 
Grand  Trunk  R.  R.  by  the  acquirement  of 
Canadian  roads  reduced  the  haul  from 
Saginaw  to  New  York  to  731  miles 
through  the  Port  Huron  gateway.  Com- 
plainants contended  that  the  rates  from 
Saginaw  and  Flint  should  be  figured  on 
this  731-mile  haul,  making  the  percentage 
rate  to  New  York  84  per  cent  instead  of 
92  per  cent  of  the  Chicago  to  New  York 
rate.  Toledo  and  Detroit  took  78  per 
cent  of  the  Chicago  to  New  'York  rate, 
this  percentage  being  arrived  at  by  ignor- 
ing terminal  charges  in  consideration  of 
the  enormous  traffic  passing  through 
Toledo  and  Detroit  and  in  view  of  water 
competition,  such  rate  being  therefore 
lower  than  it  would  have  been  had  the 
percentage  formula  been  strictly  fol- 
lowed. At  the  time  of  filing  the  com- 
plaint Detroit  and  Toledo  were  able  to 
ship  to  points  in  northern  and  western 
Michigan  at  a  less  rate  than  jobbers  in 
the  Saginaw  Valley.  Since  the  filing  of 
the  complaint  the  local  rates  from  this 
territory  and  from  Detroit  were  so  ad- 
justed as  to  put  jobbers  in  the  Saginaw 
Valley  on  an  equality  with  Toledo  and 
Detroit  with  respect  to  shipments  to 
Michigan  territory.  To  grant  the  reduc- 
tion demanded  would  have  the  effect  of 
compelling  a  readjustment  of  the  rates  in 
many  zones  and  territories  about  which 
no  complaint  had  been  offered.  Toledo 
and  Detroit  have  natural  advantages  on 
account  of  the  immense  tonnage  passing 
through  them  and  on  account  of  their 
proximity  to  water  transportation. 
HELD,  the  proximity  of  Detroit  and 
Toledo  to  the  great  channels  of  through 
transportation,  and  their  location  on  di- 
rect through  routes  where  the  density  of 
traffic  is  very  great  and  the  general  op- 
erating and  traffic  conditions  are  favor- 
able, are  advantages  which  cannot  be 
ignored.     The  disadvantages  in  location 


BLANKET  RATES,  §7   (ff)— §8   (aa) 


87 


of  the  Saginaw  Valley  in  not  being  favor- 
ably situated  for  lake  navigation,  and  in 
other  respects,  cannot  be  equalized  by  an 
order  of  the  Commission.  Complaint  dis- 
missed. Saginaw  Board  of  Trade  v.  G. 
T.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  128,  132-138. 

(fC)  Where  three  towns  are  strong 
competitors,  it  is  important  to  have  a 
common  rate  if  the  conditions  justify  it. 
Railroad  Commissioners  of  Florida  v. 
S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  16  I.  C.  C.  1,  2. 

(g)  Relief  cannot  be  denied  to  a  typi- 
cal point  in  a  group  for  the  reason  that 
other  points  in  like  situation  may  be  en- 
titled to  a  similar  order.  Indianapolis 
Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  1.  C.  C.  56,  71. 

(h)  To  impose  upon  any  point  in  the 
territory  around  St.  Louis  a  blanket  rate 
higher  than  could  be  obtained  by  using 
the  combination  on  St.  Louis  would  be 
denying  to  that  point  the  just  benefit  of 
its  location.  Hydraulic  Press  Brick  Co. 
v.  Vandalia  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  175,  176. 

(i)  On  pressed  brick  in  carloads  from 
Collinsville,  111.,  to  Galveston,  T^x.,  via 
St.  Louis,  a  joint  through  rate  of  27c  was 
collected.  This  joint  rate  was  applicable 
from  a  large  section  of  territory  north  of 
the  Ohio  River.  The  combination  of  local 
rates  based  on  East  St.  Louis,  however, 
was  only  23c,  consisting  of  Ic  to  East  St. 
Louis  and  22c  from  East  St  Louis  to  des- 
tinations. HELD,  the  rate  charged  was 
unreasonable  to  the  extent  it  exceeded 
23c.  While  defendants  might  establish  a 
blanket  rate,  such  rate  must  be  subject 
to  the  limitation  that  from  no  part  of  the 
group  could  a  lower  rate  be  constructed 
on  the  combination  of  locals.  Hydraulic 
Press  Brick  Co.  v.  Vandalia  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  175-176. 

§8.     Proximity  to   Established  Groups. 

See  Discrimination,  §7  (e);  Througli 
Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11  (1) 
(a),   §15   (II). 

(a)  Clyde  siding,  Fredericktown,  Pa., 
is  just  outside  the  Pittsburgh  coal  district 
as  established  by  defendants,  but  is  only 
about  30  miles  from  Pittsburgh  proper, 
while  the  boundary  line  drawn  by  defend- 
ants takes  in  mines  as  far  as  35  miles  dis- 
tant. The  Clyde  mine  is  west  of  the 
Monongahela  River  and  separated  from 
the  Connellsville-Fairmont  district  on  the 
other  side  of  the  river,  with  which,  how- 
ever, it  does  not  compete.  In  forming  the 
Pittsburgh  district  the  carriers  followed 


no  hard  and  fast  rule,  and  the  fact  that 
the  boundary  line  of  that  district  makes 
a  sudden  dip  so  as  to  avoid  taking  in 
complaint's  mine  at  Clyde,  suggests  an 
unusual  arbitrariness.  In  Boileau  v.  P.  & 
L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  640,  the  Com- 
mission established  a  rate  of  78c  per  net 
ton  on  coal  from  the  Pittsburgh  district 
to  Ashtabula  Harbor,  O.,  when  for  trans- 
shipment by  vessel  on  the  great  lakes  to 
points  beyond,  and  complainant  requested 
this  rate.  HELD,  the  accessibility  of  com- 
plainant's mine  to  one  of  defendant's  as- 
sembling points  for  lake-cargo  coal  and 
the  other  facts  combined  to  show  that  it 
properly  belongs  within  the  Pittsburgh 
district  and  is  entitled  to  the  rate  of  78c 
ordered  by  the  Commission  to  become 
effective  from  such  district,  and  which  is 
established  for  the  future  from  the  Clyde 
mine.  Clyde  Coal  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
L  C.  C.  135. 

(aa)  The  rates  on  cement  shipped 
mainly  on  the  B.  &  O.  Ry.  from  Man- 
heim,  W.  Va.,  to  territory  between  Cum- 
berland and  Baltimore  and  Virginia 
cities  in  the  East  and  the  Central 
Freight  Association  territory  in  the 
West  were  attacked  as  unreasonable  and 
discriminatory  to  the  advantage  of 
the  Universal  Portland  Cement  Company 
at  Universal,  Pa.  Manneim  is  situated 
77  miles  west  of  Cumberland  on  a 
branch  road.  Universal  is  within  the 
switching  limits  of  Pittsburg.  A  general 
revision  was  requested  in  1909.  Some 
realignment  was  made  but  definite  ac- 
tion was  delayed  on  most  demands  until 
the  present  complaint  was  filed,  when 
the  most  pronounced  discriminations 
were  relieved.  The  present  rates  from 
Manheim  ranged  from  $1.75  to  $2.80 
per  net  ton;  the  distance  from  331  to 
739  miles.  A  contemplated  increase  in 
Universal  rates  was  given  as  the  rea- 
son for  the  delay,  but  the  tariffs  of 
1910  intensified  the  discrimination.  The- 
oretically there  is  no  difference  in  the 
basis  from  Manheim  and  Universal,  but 
Manheim  rates  are  constructed  on  west- 
ern termini  basis  while  Universal  rates 
are  based  on  actual  distance  with  refer- 
ence to  Central  Freight  Association  ter- 
ritory. Universal  is  considered  a  Cen- 
tral Freight  Association  point,  while 
Alanheim  is  regarded  as  a  Trunk  Line 
point,  and  its  rates  are  the  same  as 
those  of  Baltimore.  2G9  miles  further 
east.  There  was  no  claim  of  different 
transportation  conditions  other  than 
this.      At    the    time    the    complaint   was 


88 


BLANKET  RATES,  §8    (b)  — (c) 


filed  the  differential  per  ton  over  Uni- 
versal ranged  from  5c  to  86c  on  dis- 
tances from  331  miles  to  739  miles.  The 
differentials,  however,  appeared  arbi- 
trary and  not  based  on  distance.  HELD, 
carload  rates  on  cement  from  Man- 
heim  to  points  shown  in  the  labia  an- 
nexed to  the  opinion  are  unjustly  discrim- 
inatory to  the  advantage  of  Universal, 
Pa.,  said  undue  advantage  being  meas- 
ured by  the  difference  between  the  pres- 
ent differential  and  the  one  prescribed 
in  the  table,  which  ranged  from  5c  to 
45c  per  net  ton.  Reparation  awarded 
for  this  difference  on  all  shipments  for 
two  years  prior  to  the  filing  of  the  com- 
plaint. Alpha  Portland  Cement  Co.  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  446,  451, 
455. 

(b)  Complainant  shipped  carloads  jf 
citrus  fruits  from  various  California 
points  to  Miles  City,  Mont.,  under  a  rate 
of  $1.79  per  100  lbs.  on  the  first  car,  $1,755 
on  the  next  three  cars,  and  $1.35  on  the 
other  16  cars.  At  the  time  the  first  four 
shipments  moved  no  joint  rate  applied 
and  combinations  of  intermediate  rates 
were  charged.  Subsequently  a  through 
rate  of  $1.35  was  established.  Later  a 
joint  commodity  rate  of  $1.15  was  pro- 
vided. For  a  number  of  years  a  blanket 
rate  of  $1.15  has  been  maintained  from 
California  points  to  eastern  and  inter- 
mediate points.  HELD,  that  no  reason 
appears  why  that  rate  should  not  have 
been  given  to  Miles  City.  Reparation 
awarded.  Gamble-Robinson  Fruit  Co.  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C  421. 

(bb)  Davenport  is  on  the  west  bank 
of  the  Mississippi  River  opposite  Rock 
Island  and  Moline.  Prior  to  October 
1,  1908,  the  rate  on  cypress  lumber 
from  Minot  and  Rome,  Miss.,  to  each 
of  these  cities  was  21c  per  100  lbs. 
On  that  date  the  rate  to  Davenport  was 
increased  to  23c,  but  to  Rock  Island 
and  Moline  was  not  advanced.  HELD, 
that  Davenport  should  be  grouped  with 
Rock  Island  and  Moline  for  rate  mak- 
ing purposes;  that  the  advanced  rate 
was  unlawful  to  the  extent  that  it  was 
higher  than  the  rate  contemporaneously 
enforced  from  the  same  points  to  Rock 
Island  and  Moline.  Reparation  awarded. 
Davenport  Commercial  Club  v.  Y.  &  M. 
V.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  19. 

(c)  Complainant  manufacturers  and 
merchants  of  Red  Wing.  Minn.,  attacked 
the  class  rates  from  Trunk  Line  ter- 
ritory to  Red  Wing,   which  were  higher 


than  those  to  St.  Paul,  La  Crosse, 
Winona,  Eau  Claire  and  Stillwater  by 
arbitraries  of  15,  12.  10,  7,  4  and  4c 
for  classes  1,  2,  3,  4,  5  and  6, 
respectively.  Red  Wing  is  intermedi- 
ate on  the  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  to  the 
points  in  question  and  St.  Paul  and  lies 
40  miles  south  of  St.  Paul,  60  miles 
west  of  Eau  Claire,  60  miles  north  of 
Winona,  and  90  miles  north  of  La 
Crosse.  It  is  served  by  branch  lines 
of  the  Chicago  Great  Western  R.  R. 
On  traflac  to  and  from  Central  Freight 
Association  territory,  Red  Wing  was 
given  the  St.  Paul  rates  and  only  from 
the  Trunk  Line  points  was  it  accepted 
in  the  general  adjustment  of  rates  ap- 
plicable to  competitive  points,  north, 
east  and  south.  For  many  years  prior 
to  May  20,  1908,  Red  Wing  took  the  St. 
Paul  rate  on  shipments  from  Trunk  Line 
points  via  lake-and-rail  routes.  On  that 
date  the  arbitraries  attacked  were  ap- 
plied to  Red  Wing,  Eau  Claire,  Chip- 
pewa Falls,  La  Crosse  and  Winona.  In 
August,  1908,  all  these  cities  except 
Red  Wing  were  restored  to  the  St. 
Paul  rate.  In  October,  1908,  Red  Wing 
was  given  the  same  rates,  but  in  June, 
1909,  the  arbitraries  attacked  were  re- 
established as  applicable  to  Red  Wing 
only.  Transportation  conditions  beyond 
Chicago  are  precisely  the  same  whether 
the  traffic  originated  in  Trunk  Line  or 
Central  Freight  Ass'n  territory.  No 
points  of  any  importance  south  of  St. 
Paul  took  as  high  rates  as  Red  Wing. 
The  lake-and-rail  competition  through 
Duluth  urged  by  defendants  as  justify- 
ing the  higher  rate  to  Red  Wing  was 
only  effective  during  the  open  season, 
about  seven  months  of  the  year,  and 
no  freight  was  shown  to  move  from 
Trunk  Line  points  to  Red  Wing  through 
the  Duluth  gateway.  The  application 
of  the  St.  Paul  rates  to  Red  Wing 
would  not,  as  urged  by  defendant,  re- 
quire the  extension  of  the  St.  Paul  rate 
to  points  west  of  Red  Wing,  since  no 
point  west  of  Red  Wing  was  similarly 
surrounded  by  competing  cities  taking 
lower  rates.  -HELD,  Red  Wing,  being 
intermediate  on  the  main  line  of  the 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  should,  on  account 
of  its  relative  distance  from  Duluth 
and  Milwaukee  and  its  proximity  to 
competing  points  in  the  same  region, 
take  St.  Paul  rates;  but  that  the  order 
to  cancel  the  arbitrary  attacked  would 
apply  only  to  the  Chicago,  Milwaukee 
&  St.  Paul  Ry.,  leaving  the  carriers  reach- 


BLANKET  RATES,  §8   (cc)  — (e) 


89 


ing  Red  Wing  by  branch  lines  to  adopt 
the  lower  rate  ordered  if  they  desired  so 
to  do  in  order  to  meet  competition. 
Reparation  denied.  Frederich  &  Kempe 
Co.  V.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  481,  484. 

(cc)  The  proximity  of  one  city  to 
competing  points  in  the  same  region 
makes  higher  rates  thereto  .unlawful. 
Frederich  &  Kempe  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H. 
&  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  481,  484. 

(d)  Prior  to  the  decision  in  Georges 
Creek  Basin  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  127,  the  rates  on  big-vein  and  small- 
vein  coal  from  Georges  Creek,  Md.,  was 
10c  higher  when  water-borne  to  competi- 
tive points  inside  the  Chesapeake  and 
Delaware  capes,  and  15c  higher  when 
destined  to  points  outside  than  small-vein 
coal  shipped  from  Pennsylvania  and  West 
Virginia  fields  to  the  same  points.  In 
that  case  the  Commission  ordered  defend 
ants  to  reduce  the  rates  on  small-vein 
coal  from  Georges  Creek  to  such  points 
so  as  to  be  on  a  parity  with  small-vein 
coal  from  West  Virginia  and  Pennsyl- 
vania fields,  but  left  open  the  question 
of  ordering  a  like  reduction  on  big-vein 
coal  from  Georges  Creek.  In  the  present 
case  it  appeared  that  on  account  of  the 
higher  expense  of  mining  big-vein  coal  at 
Georges  Creek,  complainants  were  unable 
to  ship  the  same  to  the  Cape  points  at  the 
higher  rates  on  big-vein  coal  left  in  effect 
by  the  former  decision.  Since  that  de- 
cision one  of  the  defendants  voluntarily 
removed  the  10c  difeerential  obtaining 
against  big-vein  coal,  but  left  in  effect 
the  15c  differential  relating  to  coal  water- 
borne  to  points  outside  the  Capes.  The 
mines  at  Georges  Creek  were  from  50  to 
100  miles  nearer  the  Cape  points  than 
those  in  the  Pennsylvania  fields,  and  from 
60  to  85  miles  nearer  than  the  mines  in 
the  West  Virginia  fields.  These  three 
fields  had  for  many  years  been  grouped 
together  in  the  fixing  of  rates  and  a  dis- 
ruption of  them  would  lead  to  a  wide- 
spread confusion  in  coal  rates.  While 
Georges  Creek  was  not  exactly  on  the 
lines  of  defendants,  being  reached  by  a 
short  lateral  line,  it  was  practically  so 
located  and  was  for  practical  purposes 
to  be  treated  as  intermediate  to  the  other 
two  fields  with  respect  to  shipments  to  the 
Cape  i)oints  and  to  points  in  New  .Jersey, 
New  York,  Connecticut,  Massachusetts, 
Rhode  Island  and  Pennsylvania.  Com- 
plainants demanded  that  on  both  small- 
vein  and  big-vein  coal  they  be  accorded 


lower  rates  than  from  the  other  two 
fields  on  account  of  the  shorter  hauls  in- 
volved. HELD,  first,  pursuant  to  the  in- 
timation made  by  the  Commission  in  its 
former  decision  the  rates  on  big-vein  coal 
from  Georges  Creek  to  Cape  points  should 
be  reduced  to  equal  those  on  small-vein 
coal  from  the  Pennsylvania  and  West 
Virginia  districts  mentioned;  second, 
that  the  grouping  of  such  three  fields 
should  not  be  disturbed  and  that  Georges 
Creek  should  not  be  accorded  lower  rates 
On  coal  than  the  other  two  fields  on  ac- 
count of  the  shorter  hauls  involved; 
third,  that  the  rates  charged  from 
Georges  Creek  to  points  in  the  states 
above  mentioned  being  higher  than  from 
the  other  two  fields  should  be  reduced  to 
the  same  rates.  American  Coal  Co.  v.  B, 
&  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  149,  154-157; 
decision  of  Commission  sustained,  Phila. 
&  R.  Ry.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  174  Fed.  687. 

(dd)  Montchanin,  Del.,  is  situated  be- 
tween Wilmington,  Del.,  and  Chadds  Ford 
Junction.  Pa.,  eight  miles  from  the  former 
and  seven  miles  from  the  latter.  All 
three  points  are  in  Philadelphia  Rate 
Basis  territory,  from  and  to  which  rates 
are  the  same.  The  Penn.  R.  R.  extended 
to  Wilmington  and  Chadds  Ford  Junction, 
but  did  not  reach  Montchanin.  On  traffic 
from  Montchanin  to  points  on  its  line  in 
Pennsylvania  and  Ohio  it  would  have 
been  obliged  to  divide  the  Philadelphia 
basis  rate  with  the  initial  carrier,  had  it 
applied  said  rate  to  Montchanin.  On  ship- 
ments of  powder  from  said  point  it  re- 
fused to  join  in  through  routes  and  joint 
rates  to  Pennsylvania  and  Ohio  points 
and  complainant  was  obliged  to  pay  the 
local  rate  from  Montchanin  to  Chadds 
Ford  Junction  and  the  Philadelphia  basis 
rate  beyond.  The  Penn.  R.  R.  contended 
that  it  could  not  profitably  join  in  rates 
from  Montchanin  since  it  did  not  get  the 
benefit  of  hauling  the  raw  material  for 
the  powder  to  said  points.  HELD,  such 
practice  was  unjustly  discriminatory  and 
Montchanin  being  in  Philadelphia  Rate 
Basis  territory  was  entitled  to  the  same 
rates  as  other  competitors  of  complainant 
located  in  that  territory.  Du  Pont  De  Ne- 
mours Powder  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  544,  546. 

(e)  From  a  geographical  standpoint, 
Kalispell  and  Missoula  groups  are  corre- 
sponding lumber-producing  sections  and 
for  that  reason  should  take  same  rates. 
B'g  Blackfoot  Milling  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  173.  175. 


90 


BLANKET  RATES,  §8   (f)— §9   (aa) 


(f)  LInndale,  because  of  its  proximity 
to  Cleveland,  ought  to  take  the  Cleveland 
rate.  American  Agricultural  Chemical 
Co.  V.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  320,  322. 

(ff)  On  shipments  of  empty  oil  bar- 
rels from  various  points  in  New  Mexico 
to  El  Paso,  Tex.,  complainant  was  as- 
sessed fourth-class  rates.  At  the  time 
shipments  moved,  defendant  had  in 
effect  rates  from  the  i>oints  of  shipment 
into  Santa  Fe,  Albuquerque,  and  other 
stations,  one-half  of  fourth-class  rates 
with  a  minimum  charge  of  25c  per  bar- 
rel. Complainant  was  in  competition 
with  dealers  located  at  New  Mexico 
points  enjoying  one-half  fourth-class 
rates,  and  shipped  oil  into  the  same  gen- 
eral territory.  HELD,  El  Paso  should 
be  granted  the  same  basis  of  rates  as 
that  accorded  to  competing  points  in 
that  locality,  and  defendant  should  es- 
tablish and  maintain  classification  of 
and  minimum  charges  from  points  in 
New  Mexico  to  El  Paso  not  to  exceed 
those  from  the  same  points  to  Albu- 
querque. Reparation  awarded.  Great 
Western  Oil  Co.  v  A  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.. 
16   I.   C.   C.   505,   506. 

(g)  Defendants  charged  on  19  car- 
loads of  range  cattle  shipned  from  Mid- 
land. Tex.,  to  Kennebeck.  S.  D..  15c  from 
Midland  to  Fort  Worth:  $95  per  car  from 
Fort  Worth  to  Chamberlain,  S.  D..  and 
a  rate  of  914c  thence  to  destination. 
Kennebeck  is  located  30  miles  west  of 
Chamberlain.  HELD,  the  $95  per  car 
rates  should  have  been  extended  to  Kenne- 
beck, and  complainant  was  entitled  to 
renaration  for  the  9'^c  excess  paid. 
Philin  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C. 
418,  419. 

(gg)  Waben*^,  Wis.,  where  complain- 
ant had  a  saw  mill,  was  placed  in  the 
Rhinelander  group  for  the  purpose  of 
fixing  rates  on  lumber  and  lumber  nrod- 
ucts  to  points  in  Illinois  and  Towa. 
The  Wausau  .'-roun  adjoined  the  Rhine- 
lander  group  on  the  southwest  and  the 
rates  from  the  latter  were  Ic  higher  to 
Chicago  and  other  points  in  northern 
and  western  Illinois  and  V'>c  to  1c  higher 
to  lo^a  points  than  those  from  the 
Wausau  group.  Wabeno  was  in  the 
apex  of  the  angle  which  formed  the 
southerly  extension  of  the  Rhinelander 
group;  was  only  a  short  distance  from 
the  boundary  line  between  the  two 
groups:  and  was  nearer  to  Chicago  and 
said  points  in  Illinois  and  Iowa  than 
many     points     in     the     Wausau     group. 


HELD,  Wabena  was  entitled  to  the 
same  rates  as  points  in  the  Wausau 
group  on  account  of  its  geographical 
location.  Jones  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  &  N. 
W.   Ry.   Co.,   15   L   C.   C.   427,   428. 

(h)  Since  Seattle  and  Tacoma  have 
long  been  grouped  with  Portland  with  re- 
spect to  rates  on  lumber  and  coal  on 
shipments  from  those  points  to  eastern 
and  southeastern  destinations,  this  group 
system  should  not  be  disturbed  by  at- 
tempting to  give  a  lower  rate  from  the 
two  former  cities  than  from  Portland.  Ore- 
gon &  Washington  Lumber  Mfrs.  Ass'n 
V.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  1,  18. 

(i)  Certain  points  omitted  from  terri- 
tory, subsequently  inserted.  Reparation 
awarded.  Clemons  Horst  Co.  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,   Unrep.    Op.   291. 

(j)  For  rate-making  purposes,  except 
to  nearby  points,  the  cement-producing 
territory  in  Kansas  gas  belt  is  treated 
as  a  group,  and  the  same  rates  apply 
from  all  of  these  manufacturing  centers. 
Great  Western  Portland  Cement  Co.  v. 
M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  559. 

§9.     Grading   Rates. 

See  Differentials,  §1  (a), 
(a)  The  blanket  system  of  making 
rates  on  wool  from  the  West  to  eastern 
points  should  be  broken  up  and  graded 
rates  established.  In  Re  Transportation 
of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C. 
151,   165. 

(aa)  Covington,  Brownsville  and  Jacki 
son,  Tenn.,  are  situated  upon  a  line 
drawn  east  from  the  Mississippi  River, 
Covington  116  miles  from  the  river, 
Brownsville  20  miles  east  of  Covington, 
and  Jackson  25  miles  east  of  Brownsville. 
Covington  Is  38  miles  north  of  Memphis. 
The  rate  on  cotton  from  Memphis  to 
New  England  points  was  4714c;  from 
Covington,  60i/^c;  from  Brownsville, 
eoi/^c,  and  from  Jackson,  70c.  The  60y2C 
rate  from  Covi  igton  was  forced  by 
the  rate  from  Memphis,  since  under 
a  higher  rate  from  Covington  cot- 
ton would  move  from  the  surround- 
ing country  to  Memphis*  to  be  com- 
pressed and  shipped.  The  60i/^c  rate  at 
Brownsville  was  for  the  same  reason 
forced  by  the  rate  at  Covington.  In  the 
same  way  Jackson  felt  the  competition 
with  Brownsville.  The  derendants  re- 
fused to  cut  the  Jackson  rate,  and  as  a 
result  the  cotton  grown  about  Jackson 
moved  to  Brownsville  for  shipment.  De- 
fendants   contended    that    the    rates    at 


BLANKET  RATES,  §9    (b) 


91 


Covington  and  Browr.sville  being  estab- 
lished by  the  initial  carriers  reaching 
those  points,  the  Commission  had  no 
authority  to  change  the  rate  at  Jackson. 
HELD,  the  rate  from  Jackson  was  a  joint 
rate  which  could  not  exist  but  for  the  act 
of  the  connecti'  j  carriers,  and  for  which 
they  must  stand  responsible;  that  the 
fair  way  to  meet  a  competitive  situation 
of  this  kind  was  to  gradually  grade  up 
the  rate  as  the  river  became  more  dis- 
tant, and  that  the  rate  from  Jackson 
should  be  adjusted  so  as  not  to  exceed 
that  from  Brownsville  by  more  than  5c. 
(Knapp  and  Harlan,  comm'rs,  dissenting.) 
R.  R.  Com.  of  Tenn.  v.  Ann  .  :bor  R.  R., 
17  I.   C.  C.   418,  420,  421. 

(b)  Complainant  lumbermen  with 
mills  in  the  "Kalispell  District,"  Mont., 
located  between  Leonia,  Idaho,  and  Kali- 
spell,  Mont.,  attacked  the  rale  on  lumber 
to  points  in  North  Dakota  located  on 
defendant  Gt.  N.  R.  R.,  including  all  lo- 
calities between  the  "Buford-Edgemont" 
and  the  "Pembina-Port  Arthur"  lines. 
Abcut  1893,  defendant,  Gt.  N.  R. 
R.,  established  a  late  of  40c  from  the 
Pacific  Coist  to  St.  Paul.  Minn.,  and 
points  intermediate.  As  new  lumber- 
producing  sections  sprang  up  between 
the  Pacific  Coast  and  the  Rocky  Moun- 
tains, or  new  points  of  destination  sprang 
up  in  the  states  of  North  Dakota  and 
Minnesota,  this  40c  rate  was  applied, 
irrespective  of  the  length  of  the  haul. 
In  1906  the  rates  from  the  Calispell 
district,  and  other  points  in  the  eastern 
or  Montana-Oregon  group,  were  reduced 
and  the  city  of  Kalispell  and  places  ap- 
proximate thereto  were  accorded  on  an 
average  a  10c  differential  lower  than 
Spokane  to  points  in  North  Dakota.  The 
mills  between  Kalispell  and  the  city  ef 
Spokane  were  given  a  rate  graded  up- 
ward in  amount  toward  the  city  of  Spo- 
kane, where  it  remained  40c.  On  No- 
vember 1,  1907,  the  defendant  advanced 
its  rates  generally  from  the  Coast,  Spo- 
kane and  Montana-Oregon  groups.  This 
advance  was  attacked  in  Pacific  Coast 
L.  M.  A.  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  23, 
and  in  Potlatch  L.  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  41.  By  the  decisions  in  these 
cases  the  old  rates  were  restored,  except 
that  the  differential  existing  between  the 
Kalispell  district  in  the  Montana-Oregon 
group  and  the  Spokane  group  was  de- 
stroyed. Complainants  in  the  present 
case  demanded  a  differential  under  the 
Spokane  group  of  5c  per  100  lbs.  at  the 
Pembina-Port  Arthur  line  graded  upward 
westwardly  to  7c  at  Buford,  N.  D.     The 


history  of  the  rates  from  these  groups 
as  affected  by  these  decisions  shows  that 
on  October  31,  1907,  the  coast  rate  and 
the  Spokane  rate  to  points  in  North  Da- 
kota was  40c,  constituting  a  blanket  rate 
over  the  entire  state.  Kalispell  had  a 
differential  under  these  rates  of  5c  at 
the  Pembina-Port  Arthur  line,  graded  up- 
ward to  14c  at  Buford,  N.  D.  By  the 
advance  in  rates  on  November  1,  1907, 
Spokane  was  given  a  substantial  differ- 
ential under  the  coast  rates  and  the 
differential  existing  between  ^^pokane  and 
Kalispell  was  reduced,  but  this  favor 
granted  to  the  Spokane  group  was 
brought  about  by  raising  the  rates  from 
both  the  coast  group  and  Kalispell.  On 
October  15,  1908.  as  a  result  of  the  de- 
cisions referred  to,  the  coast  rate  was 
reduced  to  40c  through  North  Dakota, 
and  the  Spokane  rate  was  made  a  differ- 
ential under  the  coast  rate  3c  at  the  Pem- 
bina-Port Arthur  line,  graded  upward  to 
7c  at  Buford.  The  differential  between 
Kalispell  and  Spokane  was  practically 
eliminated.  Complainants  demanded  a  dif- 
ferential under  the  Spokane  rate  on  ac- 
count of  (1)  geographical  and  transporta- 
tion reasons,  (2)  commercial  reasons. 
They  contended  that  on  account  of  the 
inferior  quality  of  the  lumber  produced 
in  the  Kalispell  district,  as  compared 
with  that  produced  in  the  Spokane  dis- 
trict, competitive  considerations  de- 
manded that  they  be  accorded  a  lower 
rate.  Ti^oy  further  demanded  a  low^r 
rate  than  from  the  Spokane  group  on 
account  of  the  shorter  haul  from  the 
Kalispell  district,  and  on  account  of  the 
fact  that  in  the  past  defendants  had 
-voluntarily  recognized  the  right  to  such 
a  differential.  The  average  distance 
from  the  Spokane  group  to  the  Kalispell 
district  was  about  309  miles.  The  dis- 
tance of  a  typical  haul  from  the  Kalispell 
district  to  the  destinations  in  question 
was  about  71  per  cent  of  a  typical  haul 
from  the  Spokane  group.  The  Spokane 
group  is  separated  from  the  coast  by  the 
Cascade  Mountains  and  a  wide  strip  of 
treeless  country,  200  miles  in  length. 
There  is  no  un timbered  country  between 
Spokane  and  the  Kalispell  district,  nor  is 
there  any  natural  boundary  between  the 
two.  HELD,  in  view  of  transportation 
conditions  and  the  differential  formerly 
established  by  defendant  in  favor  of  the 
Kalispell  district,  a  differential  from 
Leonia.  Idaho,  and  points  on  defendant 
Gt.  N.  R.  R.  east  thereof  to  and  including 
Rexford,  Mont.,  to  points  on  the  Pembina- 
Port  Arthur  line   should  be   established 


92 


BLANKET  RATES,  §9   (bb)— §10  (a) 


2c  under  the  Spokane  group  rates  graded 
up  westwardly  to  4c  under  the  Spokane 
group  rates  at  Buford,  N.  D.,  and  from 
points  on  the  Gt,  N.  R.  R.  in  Montana 
east  of  Rexford  to  points  on  the  Pembina- 
Port  Arthur  line  3c  under  the  Spokane 
group  rates  graded  up  westwardly  to  5c 
under  the  Spokane  group  rates  to  Buford, 
N.  D.  Kalispell  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  164,  171. 

(bb)  Differences  in  rates  from  two 
points  of  origin  disappear  as  the  most 
distant  common  market  is  approached. 
Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C. 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  254,  264. 

(c)  Complainant  stockmen  of  Iowa  at- 
tacked defendants'  average  live-stock 
rate  of  22c  per  100  lbs.  from  Iowa  points 
to  Chicago  on  an  average  haul  of  300 
miles  as  excessive.  In  support  of  their 
contention  they  established  zones  of  10 
miles,  beginning  with  150  miles  from  Chi- 
cago. The  distance  to  each  station  upon 
defendants'  lines  within  these  zones, 
and  the  rates  in  effect  at  those  stations 
were  taken,  and  the  average  rate  for 
each  zone  in  this  way  secured,  which 
rate  complainants  proved  greatly  in  ex- 
cess of  the  Illinois  and  Iowa  state  rates, 
the  Missouri  to  St.  Louis,  the  Missouri  to 
Kansas  City,  the  Nebraska  to  Kansas 
City  and  the  Nebraska  to  Omaha  rates. 
Defendants,  to  prove  such  comparison  un- 
fair, showed  that  such  averages  were 
based  on  stations  where  no  traffic  actu- 
ally moved;  and  that  points  lying  south 
of  Iowa  points  on  the  same  meridian,  but 
at  greater  distances  from  Chicago,  were 
able  to  secure  the  same  rates  on  account 
of  the  ability  of  shippers  to  drive  cattle 
to  the  station  offering  the  lowest  rates. 
The  differential  between  Missouri  and 
Mississippi  River  cities  upon  live  stock 
was  8%c  per  100  lbs.,  and  this,  when  sub- 
tracted from  the  23i^c-rate  from  Mis- 
souri River  cities  to  Chicago,  left  a  rate 
of  14y2C  St.  Louis  to  Chicago.  The  state 
rate  from  Illinois  points  to  Chicago  was 
very  low.  These  facts  tended  to  show 
that  the  system  of  comparisons  offered  by 
complainants  was  unfair.  The  rates  from 
points  in  Missouri  to  St.  Louis  and  Kan- 
sas City  and  from  points  west  of  the 
Missouri  River  to  Kansas  City  and 
Omaha  were  lower  than  the  Iowa-Chi- 
cago rates  on  account  of  the  rates  es- 
tablished by  the  state  commissions  of 
Missouri  and  Nebraska  in  connection 
with  competitive  conditions  which  did 
not  obtain  in  Iowa,  whose  sole  market 
for  practical  purposes  was  Chicago.    The 


rates  involved  in  complainants'  compari- 
sons from  points  east  of  Chicago  to  Chi- 
cago were  low  on  account  of  the  normal 
movement  of  live  stock  being  toward  the 
East  rather  than  toward  the  West.  The 
Wisconsin-Chicago  rates  were  lower  than 
the  Iowa-Chicago  rates  on  account  of 
competition  with  the  Milwaukee  market. 
Defendants,  to  show  the  Iowa-Chicago 
rates  not  unreasonable,  pointed  out  the 
special  items  of  expense  to  carriers  con- 
nected with  shipments  of  live  stock  in- 
cluding the  cost  of  carrying  attendants 
in  charge  of  stock,  expense  of  placing 
cars  at  the  chutes  for  loading,  of  bedding 
and  cleaning  the  cars,  the  charge  for 
unloading  at  the  stock  yards  at  Chicago, 
the  damages  which  carriers  were  re- 
quired to  pay  for  injuries  to  the  stock 
in  transit,  and  the  cost  of  moving  such 
stock  at  high  rates  of  speed.  The  total 
of  this  extra  expense  appeared  to  amount 
to  from  $2  to  $3.50  per  car.  Defendants 
were  shown  to  receive  a  larger  per  ton 
mile  revenue  on  live  stock  than  that 
made  by  other  carriers  on  other  commodi- 
ties. HELD,  while  the  Iowa  to  Chicago 
rates  attacked  were  higher  than  the 
state  rates  of  Iowa,  Illinois  and  Wiscon- 
sin, they  could  not  on  this  evidence  be 
held  to  be  unreasonable,  so  as  to  warrant 
a  general  reduction;  but  that  the  23i/^c 
Omaha  to  Chicago  rate  which  was  carried 
150  miles  east  before  the  process  of 
grading  down  to  the  Mississippi  River 
was  begun  should  be  altered,  and  the 
grading  down  should  be  commenced  at  a 
point  50  to  75  miles  east  of  the  Missouri 
River.  Corn  Belt  Meat  Producers'  Ass'n 
V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  376, 
393,  394. 

§10.     Differentials. 

See  Differentials, 
(a)  Complainants  are  lumber  com- 
panies operating  sawmills  and  wood- 
working establishments  in  South  Port- 
land, a  part  of  Portland,  Ore.  They 
complained  that  defendants  imposed  up- 
on their  traffic  to  certain  destinations 
higher  rates  than  were  exacted  from 
their  competitors  also  located  in  Port- 
land. Owing  to  the  location  and  boun- 
daries of  the  switching  limits  in  Port- 
land such  arrangements  have  been  made 
for  the  absorption  of  switching  charges 
within  certain  defined  switching  limits 
that  as  a  practicable  matter  what  is 
known  as  the  Portland  rate  is  applied 
to  lumber  traffic  to  eastern  destina- 
tions from  all  mills  within  the  city 
limits    of   Portland,    excepting  only  those 


BLANKET  RATES,  §10   (b)— §11    (a) 


93 


of  the  complainants.  In  the  price  of 
labor,  the  hours  of  service,  the  cost 
of  construction  and  supplies,  the  cost 
of  logs,  and  in  all  the  advantages 
and  disadvantages  which  are  peculiar  to 
other  city  mills,  and  in  which  there 
is  often  an  essential  difference  from 
country  mills,  there  is  no  distinction  be- 
tween the  mills  of  tne  complainants 
and  their  competitors.  HELD,  that 
from  the  mills  of  complainants  to  Utah 
common  points  the  Portland  rate  snould 
be  applied  instead  of  the  differential 
of  2i^c  per  100  lbs.  now  imposed  against 
it,  while  to  the  other  points  complained 
of  the  differential  now  existing  against 
them  of  4c  should  be  reduced  to  Ic 
per  100  lbs.,  a  sligntly  higher  charge 
than  the  Portland  rate  being  justified 
on  account  of  the  peculiar  location  of 
complainant's  mills.  Reparation  award- 
ed; certain  through  routes  and  joint 
rates  established.  Portland  Lumber  Co. 
V.  O.  W.  R.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C. 
292. 

(b)  With  particular  force  as  applied 
to  grouped  points  of  origin  and  grouped 
points  of  destination,  differentials  either 
above  or  below  rates  from  any  given 
point  become  less  and  less  important  as 
distance  of  ultimate  destination  in- 
creases. Williams  Co.  v.  V.  S.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  482,  487. 

IV.     REASONABLENESS. 

§11.     Of    Group. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §5  (2)  (d),  §8 
(1)  (i);  Evidence,  §20  (h);  Long 
and  Short  Haul,  §10  (aa);  Reason- 
ableness  of   Rates,    §28    (J),    §84    (c). 

(a)  In  an  investigation  dealing  with 
the  rates,  regulations  and  practices 
touching  the  transportation  of  wool 
between  points  of  origin  in  territory 
west  of  the  Mississippi  River  and  points 
of  destination  upon  or  east  of  that 
river  the  Commission  finds  that  the  cost 
of  producing  wool  in  the  western  terri- 
tory has  increased  and  is  rapidly  in- 
creasing, and  tnat  the  increasing  cost 
of  land  is  one  of  the  most  serious  fac- 
tors contributing  thereto;  that  since 
1896  the  present  rates  have  been  in 
effect  with  but  some  slight  variations, 
altnough  during  that  period  the  wool 
clip  has  nearly  doubled  and  the  busi- 
ness and  earnings  of  the  transconti- 
nental lines  enormously  developed  to 
such  an  extent  that  any  general  level 
of  rates  that  was  just  and  reasonable 
in    1896    would   be   extravagant   in   1910; 


that  from  Colorado  common  points  the 
rate  on  sheep  in  double-deck  cars  to 
Chicago  is  51c,  the  wool  rate  $1,225; 
from  Idaho  the  wool  rate  is  $1,655,  the 
sheep  rate  80c;  sheep  in  double-deck 
cars  load  approximately  22,000  lbs.,  the 
wool  loading  is  24,000  lbs.;  the  stock 
car  returns  empty,  the  wool  car  may  be 
availed  of  for  a  return  load  of  almost 
any  kind,  and  therefore  the  cost  of 
the  service  is  in  every  sense  greater  in 
case  of  sheep  than  in  case  of  wool; 
that  it  is  difficult  to  justify  any  such  dif- 
ference in  these  rates  as  now  exists,  and 
it  is  therefore  from  the  whole  record 
found  that  these  rates  are  unjustifiable 
and  should  be  revised  and  reduced,  as 
follows:  The  rates  prescribed  are  in 
all  cases  in  carloads  with  a  minimum 
for  sacked  wool  of  24,000  lbs.  in  the 
standard  36-foot  car  and  with  a  corre- 
sponding increase  in  minimum  if  the  car- 
ders elect  of  cars  of  larger  size.  In  case 
of  wool  compressed  to  a  density  of  19  lbs. 
to  the  cubic  foot  the  minimum  is  32,000 
lbs.  for  a  36-foot  car  with  a  correspond- 
ing increase  for  larger  sizes.  On  the 
Northern  Pacific  R.  R.  the  rate  from 
Mandan,  N.  D.,  to  St.  Paul  and  Duluth 
when  for  movement  beyond  ought  not 
to  exceed  50c.  Beyond  Mandan  the 
rate  should  increase  2c  for  every  25 
miles.  On  the  Great  Northern  Railway 
the  rate  from  Mondak,  Mont.,  to  Du- 
luth, 633  miles,  ought  not  to  exceed 
63c  per  100  lbs.  in  sacks.  Beyond  this 
point  the  rate  should  increase  not  ex- 
ceeding 2c  for  every  25  miles.  From 
St.  Paul  to  New  York,  practically  1,400 
miles,  the  present  rates  should  not  be 
lower  upon  either  sacked  or  baled  wool 
from  St.  Paul  and  Duluth  to  Boston  and 
New  York.  The  average  distance  from 
Colorado  common  points  to  St.  Louis  or 
the  Mississippi  River  by  the  short  line 
is  about  900  miles.  The  present  rates 
on  wool  from  Colorado  common  points 
to  fcjt.  Louis  ought  not  to  exceed  in 
sacks  80c  per  100  lbs.  Beginning  at  Chey- 
enne upon  the  Union  Pacific  R.  R.  and 
going  west  these  rates  should  increase 
2c  for  each  25  miles.  Beginning  at  Trini- 
dad upon  the  Santa  Fe  lines  and  going 
west  the  same  measure  of  increase 
should  be  applied.  Upon  the  Denver  &  Rio 
Grande  R.  R.  a  rate  of  90c  may  be  ap- 
plied at  the  first  station  west  of  Pueblo, 
beyond  which  the  rate  should  increase 
at  stations  upon  its  main  line  not  ex- 
ceeding 2c  for  each  25  miles.  Upon  the 
line  of  the  Burlington   railroad  between 


94 


BLANKET  RATES,  §11  (aa)  — (b) 


Omaha  and  Billings  the  rate  from  Al- 
liance, Neb.,  to  St.  Louis  should  not 
exceed  71c,  and  beyond  Alliance  should 
increase  by  not  to  exceed  2c  for  every 
25  miles.  Rates  should  be  constructed 
in  this  manner  upon  both  brarch  and 
main  lines  of  the  G.  N.,  N.  P.,  Burling- 
ton, I  .  P.  R.  Rs.,  and  in  connection 
with  the  latter  upon  the  Oregon  Short 
Line,  Oregon- Washington  R.  &  N.  Co., 
and  upon  the  Santa  Fe.  Upon  the  D. 
&  R.  G.  R.  R.  these  rates  should  apply 
only  at  stations  upon  its  main  line. 
The  above  rates  are  in  all  cases  upon 
sacked  wool.  Rates  upon  baled  wool 
of  the  density  and  with  the  minimum 
hereinbefore  indicated  should  be  less 
by  15  per  cent  than  the  maximum  rates 
named  for  sacked  wool.  In  computing 
these  rates  fractions  of  less  than  one- 
half  cent  should  be  disregarded.  Those 
of  one-half  cent  or  more  should  be 
treated  as  one  cent.  A  reasonable 
through  rate  from  western  points  of 
origin  to  Boston  and  New  York  would 
be  constructed  by  adding  to  the  rates 
which  have  been  prescribed  up  to  St. 
Louis  in  case  of  sacked  wool  52c  from 
there  to  Boston  and  48c  to  New  York; 
in  case  of  baled  wool  47c  to  Boston  and 
43c  to  New  York.  The  rate  so  estab- 
lished may  be  named  by  the  carriers 
either  as  joint  through  rates  or  as  pro- 
portional rates  up  to  and  from  the  Mis- 
sissippi River  or  any  other  point  se- 
lected as  the  equivalent;  but  they  should 
be  applied  only  to  an  actual  through 
movement  and  should  not  be  applied 
when  the  traffic  has  been  unloaded, 
taken  possession  of  by  the  shipper 
and  rebilled  from  the  intermediate 
point.  Transit  should  be  allowed  at 
intermediate  points  on  a  direct  line 
upon  payment  of  2.5c  per  100  lbs.  and 
upon  the  condition  that  it  applies  only 
to  wool  originating  west  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi River,  which  must  be  kept 
separate  from  wool  originating  at  points 
east  of  the  river.  So  far  as  applications 
for  relief  from  the  operation  of  the 
icurth  section  are  concerned  rates  to  in- 
termediate territory  shall  be  constructed 
upon  the  mileage  scale  prescribed  in 
this  opinion,  increasing  with  distance 
until  they  meet  the  effect  of  water 
competition,  and  so  long  as  the  water 
competitive  rates  are  themselves  made 
by  combination  upon  the  terminal  rates, 
uniformly  ard  without  discrimination, 
the  rate  on  sacked  wool  not  exceeding 
that   on   baled   wool   by   more   than   25c 


per  100  lbs.  from  such  water-controlled 
territory,  the  entire  fabric  of  rates  is 
a  just  and  reasonable  one  and  the  in- 
termediate rate  with  respect  to  any 
more  distant  competitive  rate  is  just 
and  reasonable.  Carriers  given  until 
May  1,  1912,  to  check  in  rates  in  sub- 
stantial accord  with  the  opinion.  In 
Re  Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and 
Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151. 

(aa)  Wool  dealers  at  Detroit,  Mich., 
attacked  the  lawfulness  of  the  blanket 
rate  of  50c  per  100  lbs.  from  Chicago 
east  on  wool.  Wool  is  classified  under 
Official  Classification  as  first  class  L. 
C.  L.,  second  class  C.  L.,  with  a 
minimum  of  10,000  lbs.  In  Western 
Classification  the  Commission  held 
(Wool  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  151)  it  shouU 
be  classified  as  second  class  L.  C.  L. 
and  fourth  class  C.  L.,  but  conditions 
west  of  the  Mississippi  River  are  ma- 
terially different  from  those  prevailing 
east,  and  western  wool,  on  account  of 
the  dirt  and  grease  it  contains  *  is  not 
as  valuable  as  eastern  wool  until  it  is 
scoured.  Detroit  in  the  Official  Classi- 
fication takes  78  per  cent  of  the  Chi- 
cago rate.  The  present  first  class  rate 
from  Chicago  to  Boston  is  82c,  from 
Detroit  65c;  the  present  third-class  rate 
is  55c  from  Chicago  and  44c  from  De- 
troit. In  the  original  investigation  the 
carriers  had  contended  and  the  Com- 
mission had  assumed  it  as  a  fact  that 
the  50c  any-quantity  rate  from  Chicago 
was  due  to  competition,  but  the  testi- 
mony in  this  proceeding  indicates  that 
such  is  not  at  all  the  fact.  HELD,  that 
even  if  wool  might  well  be  classified 
in  the  Official  Classification  as  third 
class  it  would  still  appear  that  the  50c 
blanket  rate  was  reasonable  from  De- 
troit, but  that  since  no  competitive  con- 
ditions require  the  maintenance  of  this 
blanket  rate  nor  do  the  conditions 
under  which  eastern  wool  is  transported 
require  the  establishment  of  a  blanket 
late,  wool  rates  should  be  adiusted  east 
of  the  Mississippi  River  in  accordance 
with  the  general  scheme  of  rates  ap- 
plied between  Central  Freight  Associa- 
tion territory  and  the  Atlantic  seaboard, 
and  that  the  rate  from  Detroit  should 
not  exceed  78  per  cent  of  that  contem- 
poraneously in  effect  from  Chicago. 
Schmidt  &  Sons  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
I.   C.   C.   684,   688. 

(b)     In  considering  the  reasonableness 
of  a  blanket  rate  extending  over  a  large 


BLANKET  RATES,  §11   (bb)  — (ee) 


95 


irea,  the  Commission  must  consider  the 
)lanket  as  a  whole,  taking  the  average 
laul.  Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Exchange 
r.  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  149,  152. 

(bb)  Florida  railroads  up  to  the  Flor- 
da  base  points  were  originally  con- 
tructed  and  operated  as  independent 
ines.  The  rates  on  citrus  fruits,  pine- 
Lpples  and  vegetables  were  fixed  from 
)roducing  points  to  Jacksonville  and  in- 
reased  with  the  distance.  Later  the 
'lorida  lines  were  merged  with  lines  north 
f  the  base  points  and  extensive  markets 
vere  opened  up  in  the  middle  West. 
Citrus  fruits  came  to  the  market  at 
-bout  the  same  time  from  both  the 
lorthern  and  southern  sections  of  Flor- 
da,  and  the  higher  charge  from  the 
Qore  southern  section  was  a  disad- 
vantage to  the  south  as  compared  with 
he  north,  but  on  the  other  hand,  cli- 
aatic  conditions  rendered  productions  in 
he  south  less  hazardous  than  in  the 
Lorth.  In  case  of  vegetables  the  higher 
ransportation  rate  from  the  south  was 
ompensated  for  by  the  fact  that  vege- 
ables  grown  in  southern  Florida  came 
Qto  bearing  earlier  than  those  from 
he  north  and  had  an  exclusive  and  bet- 
er  market.  Industries  were  developed 
,nd  the  land  values  became  fixed  upon 
he  basis  of  distance  rates  from  the 
loints  of  origin  to  base  points.  JIELD, 
hat  in  consideration  of  the  history  of 
he  development  of  the  industries  and 
n  fairness  to  the  growers  in  the  north, 
ilanket  rates,  which  would  increase  the 
iharges  to  these  growers,  should  not 
>e  established.  Florida  Fruit  &  Veg. 
Ihippers  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I. 
X  C.   11,   17.  % 

(c)  Any  grouping,  whether  of  rates, 
ocalities  or  commodities,  must  not  be 
mreasonable.  Sun  Co.  v.  I.  S.  R.  R.  Co., 
!2,  I.  C.  C.  194,  197. 

(cc)  Complainant  attacked  rates  for  the 
ransportation  of  dry  hides,  $1.30  C.  L, 
md  green  hides  $1  C.  L.,  Los  Angeles  and 
jan  Francisco,  Cal.,  to  Manistique  and 
5ault  Ste.  Marie,  Mich.  The  rates  of  which 
iomplaint  was  made  were  blanketed 
)ver  a  considerable  portion  of  the  coun- 
ty east  of  the  Missouri  River  and  com- 
)lainant's  argument  was  based  on  the 
;heory  that  it  ought  not  to  be  required 
;o  pay  the  same  rate  for  the  shorter  haul 
;o  the  destinations  named  than  for  the 
onger  haul  to  points  such  as  New  York 
md  Boston.  The  distances  from  San 
F'rancisco  and  Los  Angeles  to  Sault  Ste. 


INIarie  are  2,652  and  2,853  miles,  re- 
spectively, producing  a  ton-mile  revenue 
of  7.5  mills  and  7.3  mills.  HELD,  the 
rates  complained  of  are  not  unreasonable 
or  otherwise  unlawful.  Northwestern 
Leather  Co.  v.  O.  R.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
C.  66. 

(d)  In  fixing  group  rates,  differences 
in  rates  based  upon  distance  should  'de- 
crease as  the  distance  to  points  of  desti- 
nation increases;  and  as  between  points 
embraced  within  the  same  rate  group 
the  percentage  of  distance  over  or  under 
the  average  distance  of  the  group  to 
point  of  destination  should  not  be  ex- 
cessive. In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  on 
Cement  Plaster,  21  I.  C.  C.  591,  594. 

(dd)  It  is  something  less  than  800 
miles  by  the  S.  P.  L.  A.  &  S.  L.  R.  R. 
from  southern  California  to  Utah;  via 
the  S.  P.  R.  R.  to  Sacramento  and  east 
it  would  be  some  350  miles  farther. 
From  most  deciduous  fruit  producing 
points  in  California  and  from  the  orange 
groves  in  Central  California  the  dis- 
tance to  Salt  Lake  City  does  not  ex- 
ceed from  700  to  800  miles.  A  blanket 
rate  of  $1.15  is  applied  from  southern 
California  to  all  points  east  of  Colorado 
points.  HELD,  upon  no  theory  can 
the  Commission  sanction  a  rate  of  $1.15 
per  100  lbs.  to  Salt  Lake  and  that  the 
rates  upon  •citrus  and  deciduous  fruits 
from  producing  points  in  California  to 
Utah  common  points  should  not  exceed 
$1  per  100  lbs.,  the  minimum  to  be  that 
contemporaneously  applied  to  eastern 
destinations.  Commercial  Club  of  Salt 
Lake  City  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  218,  226. 

(e)  In  every  zone  rate,  the  nearby 
point  pays  a  proportionally  higher  rate 
than  a  more  distant  point.  Schmidt  & 
Sons  V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  535, 
538. 

(ee)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
on  walnut  logs  in  carloads  from  Weiner 
and  St.  Francis,  Ark.,  and  intermediate 
points  to  East  St.  Louis,  111.  The  rate 
from  Weiner  was  17^c;  from  St.  Fran- 
cis, 16i^c.  The  defendant,  St.  L.  S.  W. 
Ry.,  extended  from  the  Texas  state 
line,  crossing  the  Mississippi  River  at 
Thebes,  111.,  and  running  thence  to 
East  St.  Louis,  the  distance  from  St. 
Francis  to  East  St.  Louis  being  214 
miles  and  from  Weiner  273  miles.  In 
East  St.  Louis  Walnut  Log  Co.  v.  M. 
P.  Ry.,  14  I.  C.  C.  553,  the  rate  on 
walnut    logs    in    excess    of    ll^/^c    from 


96 


BLANKET  RATES,  §11  (f)— §12   (a) 


Newport,  Ark.,  to  East  St.  Louis  was 
found  unreasonable.  In  East  St.  Louis 
Walnut  Log  Co.  v.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  575,  the  rate  on  walnut 
logs  in  excess  of  14i^c  from  Newport 
via  the  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  and  the  St. 
L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  to  East  St.  Louis  was 
found  unreasonable  to  the  extent  that 
it  exceeded  13c.  The  rate  in  effect  at 
the  ■  time  of  hearing  from  Newport  via 
both  routes  was  11  ^/^c.  Newport  is  a 
short  distance  east  of  Weiner.  Nothing 
indicated  that  the  conditions  of  trans- 
portation from  Weiner  and  St.  Francis 
to  East  St.  Louis  were  different  from 
those  of  traffic  from  Newport.  Defend- 
ants exacted  a  rate  of  l^c  higher  on 
shipments  to  East  St.  Louis  than  to  St. 
Louis.  Shipments  from  Newport  must 
cross  the  Mississippi  River  at  St.  Louis 
and  the  bridge  arbitrary  was  absorbed 
in  the  rate.  No  reason  was  offered  for 
the  said  l^/^c  higher  charge.  No  evi- 
dence was  submitted  as  to  the  reason- 
ableness of  rates  from  the  Missouri 
state  line  to  Thebes,  which  complainant 
attacked.  HELD,  the  rates  from  Weiner, 
St.  Francis  and  intermediate  points  were 
excessive  to  the  extent  that  they  ex- 
ceeded lli/^c  per  100  lbs.  Reparation 
awarded.  No  order  entered  with  respect 
to  rates  from  Missouri  state  line  to 
Thebes,  except  an  intimation  that  they 
should  be  adjusted.  No  ord^r  entered 
with  respect  to  the  said  li/^c  higher  rate 
to  East  St.  Louis,  except  an  intimation 
that  no  good  reason  existed  therefor. 
East  St.  Louis  Walnut  Co.  v.  St.  L. 
S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  of  Texas,  17  I.  C.  C.  582, 
583,   584. 

(f)  In  all  cases  of  blanket  or  group 
rates  there  is  of  necessity  more  or  less 
disregard  of  distance  and  varying  de- 
grees of  inequality,  but  such  inequalities 
are  not  of  necessity  unreasonable  or  un- 
just when  the  situation  is  viewed  from 
every  standpoint,  taking  into  account  all 
interests.  Reasonable  approximation  is 
the  most  that  can  be  expected  ordinarily. 
Chicago  Lumber  «&  Coal  Co.  v.  T.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  323,  334. 

(g)  Complainants  attacked  the  blanket 
rates  on  coal  from  the  Walsenburg  fields 
In  southern  Colorado  to  points  in  Kansas, 
Nebraska,  Oklahoma,  Texas  and  New 
Mexico.  They  presented  comparisons  of 
the  rates  attacked  with  those  from  other 
producing  fields  in  Kansas,  Iowa,  Mis- 
souri, Wyoming,  Illinois,  Oklahoma  and 
Arkansas,    showing    that    the    rates    at- 


tacked yielded  a  higher  revenue  per  ton 
mile.  The  rates  from  Walsenburg 
blanketed  an  extensive  territory,  and  pro- 
duced a  greater  revenue  per  ton  mile  to 
the  less  distant  points  in  the  respective 
groups  than  to  the  more  distant.  The 
per  ton  mile  revenue  ranged  from  15 
mills  for  a  haul  of  216  miles  to  4.9  mills 
for  a  haul  of  761  miles.  Some  of  the 
groups  were  235  miles  in  extent.  Com- 
plainants demanded  that  the  size  of  the 
groups  be  reduced  so  as  to  produce  lower 
rates  to  the  nearer  points  therein.  The 
Walsenburg  fields  had  little  competition, 
except  at  Canyon  City,  Colo.  The  mining 
conditions  were  very  favorable  for  eco- 
nomic operation.  The  production  under 
the  rates  attacked  had  been  gradually  in- 
creasing for  a  number  of  years.  The*  dis- 
trict was  getting  its  full  share  of  the  busi- 
ness. The  mines  in  the  district  were 
reached  by  spur  tracks  which  were  ex- 
pensive to  build;  the  grades  were  ex- 
tremely heavy,  requiring  exceptional  in- 
spection of  cars  and  the  employment  of 
extra  crews;  the  revenue  derived  had  to 
be  divided  among  several  connecting  car- 
riers. HELD,  the  rates  attacked  were 
not  shown  to  be  unreasonable.  Cedar 
Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co. 
16  I.  C.  C.  387,  393.  Colorado  Coal  Traf 
fie  Assn.  V.  C.  &  S.  Rv.  Co..  19  I.  C.  C 
478. 

(h)  The  adjustment  of  a  group  ol 
rates  as  a  whole  might  be  just  and  rea 
sonable,  even  though  each  rate  might  not 
of  itself  be  just  and  reasonable.  Monroe 
Progressive  League  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  534,  538. 

(i)  Rates  on  oranges  from  Florida 
base  points  to  territory  north  of  the 
Ohio  River  ought  not  to  be  higher  or 
the  average  than  from  California;  bul 
the  establishment  of  a  blanket  rate  ap 
plicable  to  that  territory  is  not  justi 
fied.  Florida  Fruit  &  Vegetable  Ship 
pers',  etc.,  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I 
C.   C.   476. 

(j)  Shipment  moved  soon  after  line 
had  been  opened  for  traffic  and  before 
rates  were  established.  HELD,  charges 
assessed  were  unreasonable  to  the  ex 
tent  that  they  exceeded  what  would 
have  been  collectable  under  a  rate  sub 
sequently  established.  Kennedy  &  Co 
V.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.   Op.  530. 

§12.     Reasonableness   of   Individual    Rate, 

(a)  Extravagant  rates  ought  not  to  be 
imposed  upon  90  per  cent  of  the  traffic 


BLANKET  RATES,  §12    (b)— §13    (bb) 


97 


in  a  group  upon  the  pretext  that  a  more 
favorable  rate  is  granted  to  the  other  10 
per  cent.  Southwestern  Missouri  Millers' 
Club  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
422,  425. 

(b)  In  making  a  blanket  adjustment, 
the  burden  rests  on  the  carrier  to  provide 
rates  that  shall  not  be  unreasonable  from 
any  point  of  origin.  Sawyer  &  Austin 
Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co., 
21  I.  C.  C.  464,  46G. 

(c)  Where  the  application  of  a  blanket 
rate  clearly  results  in  imposing  unjust 
and  unreasonable  transportation  charges 
at  the  nearer  point,  this  fact  cannot  be 
ignored  or  exceeded  simply  because  a  rate 
less  than  just  is  granted  at  the  more  dis- 
tant points.  Commercial  Club  of  Salt 
Lake  City  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L 
C.  C.  218,  226. 

(d)  Complainant  attacked  the  carload 
rate  of  14c  on  cypress  and  yellow  pine 
lumber  from  Woodson  and  Little  Rock, 
Ark.,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.  For  many  years 
Little  Rock  and  Woodson  were  on  the 
southern  edge  of  a  zone  taking  a  rate  of 
8c  to  Memphis.  They  were  subsequently 
transferred  to  the  northerly  edge  of  a 
zone  extending  from  the  Arkansas  River 
to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  at  approxi- 
mately the  same  time  the  rate  from  this 
southern  zone  was  increased.  The  net 
result  was  to  make  two  material  in- 
creases in  rates  in  rapid  succession  from 
Little  Rocu  and  Woodson  to  Memphis, 
the  rise  being  from  8c  to  14c.  Under 
the  rates  attacked,  the  per  ton  mile  reve- 
nue from  Little  Rock  and  Woodson,  148 
and  165  miles  distant,  respectively,  to 
Memphis,  was  19  and  17  mills,  respec- 
tively, as  compared  with  5  and  8.9  mills, 
respectively,  earned  on  lumber  from  New 
Orleans  and  Fort  Smith  to  Memphis  on 
distances  of  559  and  314  miles,  respec- 
tive. Under  the  rates  to  Memphis  from 
points  in  Arkansas,  located  about  the 
same  distance  from  Memphis  as  Wood- 
son and  Little  Rock,  the  per  ton  mile 
earnings  ranged  from  11.4  to  14.4  mills. 
Lumber  is  low-class  traffic,  requires  no 
special  equipment,  does  not  require  ra- 
pidity of  movement,  loads  heavily,  and 
incurs  little  damage  in  transit.  HELD, 
the  rates  attacked  were  unreasonable  to 
the  extent  that  they  exceeded  10c.  Fer- 
guson Saw  Mill  Co.  V.  St.  L.  L  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  391,  393. 

(e)  A  blanket  rate  must  not  be  such 
as  to  make  an  unreasonable  rate  from 
any  given  point.    Ferguson  Si      Mill  Co. 


V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
391,  393. 

V.     DISCRIMINATION. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §5  (2)    (h);  Dis- 
crimination, §9   (g),   (H. 

§13.     In  General. 

(a)  Complainant,  a  blast-furnace  op- 
erator at  Mount  Dallas  and  Saxton, 
Pa.,  attacked  the  reasonableness  of  the 
rate  of  $1.45  per  gross  ton  on  ore  han- 
dled direct  from  vessels  to  cars  from 
Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  as  compared  with  the 
same  rate  to  competitive  points  further 
distant,  namely,  Pottstown,  405  miles 
from  Buffalo;  Swedeland,  422  miles,  and 
Chester,  432  miles,  and  asked  the  same 
per-ton-per-mile  rate  to  Mount  Dallas  and 
Saxton,  distant  316  and  296  miles,  re- 
spectively, from  Buffalo,  as  the  other 
points  take.  All  these  points  are  in  the 
so-called  eastern  Pennsylvania  group  of 
which  the  average  distance  from  Buffalo 
to  all  points  taking  the  $1.45  rate  is 
about  340  miles.  This  rate  amounts  to 
4.6  mills  per  ton  mile  to  Mount  Dallas, 
4.9  mills  to  Saxton  and  about  3.45  mills 
to  Pottstown,  Swedeland  and  Chester. 
HELD,  while  complainant  pays  a  higher 
per  ton  mile  rate  than  do  the  furnaces 
at  the  extreme  limits,  this  is  always  so 
when  a  group  point  somewhat  under  the 
average  distance  is  compared  with  the 
point  farthest  removed,  and  that,  consid- 
ered solely  as  a  group,  the  area  covered  by 

the  $1.45  rate  is  not  so  extensive  as  to 
require  condemnation.  Thropp  v.  P.  R. 
R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  497,  498,  499. 

(aa)  Blanket  system  on  wool  from 
Detroit  to  Boston,  New  York  and  Phila- 
delphia not  found  unreasonable,  but 
present  rates  unduly  discriminate 
against  Detroit,  whose  rates  on  wool 
should  not  exceed  78  per  cent  of  rate 
from  Chicago.  Traugott  Schmidt  &  Sons 
V.  M.   C.  R.  R.   Co.,  23  L   C.  C.  684. 

(b)  A  group  rate  which  imposes  upon 
any  part  of  the  group  an  unreasonable  or 
discriminatory  transportation  charge 
will  not  be  upheld.  Soutnwestern  ]\Iis- 
Eouri  Millers'  Club  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co., 
22    L   C.   C.   422,   425. 

(bb)  Complainant  alleged  that  the 
defendant's  rate  of  14c  per  100  lbs. 
^or  the  transportation  of  crossties  on 
its  line  between  Houston  and  Louis- 
ville, Miss.,  to  Cairo,  111.,  was  unrea- 
sonable and  discriminatory  in  that  it 
exceeded  the  rate  of  12i^c  to  Cairo  on 
like  traffic  from  points  on  the  same  road 


98 


BLANKET  RATES,  §13    (c)  — (g) 


north  of  Houston  to  New  Albany,  a 
distance  of  43  miles,  A  14c  rate  ap- 
plied to  Cairo  from  all  points  between 
Mobile,  Ala.,  and  Houston,  a  distance 
of  282  miles.  Formerly  the  rate  had 
been  16c  from  all  points  on  the  line.  A 
121/^0  rate  from  points  between  Houston 
and  New  Albany  was  due  to  the  following 
conditions:  Defendant  establishsd  a 
10c  rate  from  New  Albany  to  Cairo  to 
meet  the  rate  put  into  effect  by  a  com- 
peting line.  It  made  the  rate  from 
points  between  Houston  and  New  Al- 
bany 121^0  in  order  that  it  might  obtain 
its  division  of  the  through  rate  which 
was  greater  from  these  stations  than 
the  mileage  rates  established  by  the 
Mississippi  Railroad  Commission.  From 
points  south  of  Houston,  combination 
rates  up  to  New  Albany  and  a  10c  rate 
from  that  point  were  equal  to  or  greater 
than  the  14c  rate,  so  that  to  them  this 
condition  did  not  apply.  While  the 
rates  of  some  competing  lines  were 
somewhat  lower  than  rates  from  points 
in  question  on  the  defendant's  line,  the 
zones  from  which  they  applied  were 
more  extensive  and  included  stations 
which  corresponded  as  to  distance 
with  the  defendant's  12i^c  zone.  De 
fendant's  line  is  new,  poorly  equipped 
and  lacks  the  density  and  variety  of 
traffic  enjoyed  by  older  lines.  HELD, 
that  the  rate  was  not  unreasonable. 
The  fact  that  the  defendant  in  the 
division  of  joint  rates  receives  a  larger 
amount  than  some  competitors  for  a 
shorter  haul  does  not  make  it  neces- 
sarily unreasonable.  The  proportions 
received  by  carriers  in  the  division  of 
joint  rates  ordinarily  affords  little  basis 
on  which  to  determine  the  reasonable- 
ness of  joint  rates.  The  Commission 
will  not  disturb  grouping  of  points 
within  reasonable  limits  for  the  purpose 
of  making  rates  in  the  absence  of  proof 
that  as  to  particular  points  in  a  zone 
the  adjustment  results  in  unreasonable 
rates  or  undue  prejudice  and  disad- 
vantage. Stiritz  v.  N.  O.  M.  &  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  578,  581. 

(c)  In  application  of  group  rates  a 
discrimination  of  necessity  arises  be- 
tween near  and  far  edge  of  group;  but 
in  most  cases  this  discrimination  is  not 
undue.  Southwestern  Missouri  Millers' 
Club  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
422,  424. 

(cc)  The  Commission  has  never  ap- 
proved of  a   group   rate   which   imposed 


upon  any  part  of  the  group  an  unjust 
and  unreasonable  or  unduly  discrimina- 
tory transportation  charge.  Southwest- 
ern Missouri  Millers'  Club  v.  M.  K.  &  T. 
Ry.    Co.,   22   I.    C.   C.   422,   425. 

(d)  In  all  group  systems  there  is  an 
inequality  of  rates  when  distance  alone 
is  considered,  as  between  points  on  one 
side  of  a  group  and  those  on  the  other 
side.  Saginaw  Board  of  irade  v.  Grand 
Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  128,  136. 

(e)  Whether  or  not  the  grouping  of 
points  of  origin  or  points  of  destination 
constitutes  undue  or  unjust  discrimina- 
tion must  be  determined  from  the  facts 
in  each  case.  Muskogee  Traffic  Bureau 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  *C.  C. 
169,  173. 

(f)  A  carrier  cannot  lawfully  so  group 
its  mines  with  respect  to  rates  as  to 
unduly  discriminate  against  any  locality. 
The  duty  imposed  by  law  is  to  give  equal 
treatment  to  all  shippers  who  are  in  po- 
sition to  demand  it,  and  this  includes  the 
right  to  reach  competitive  markets  on 
relatively  equal  terms.  Where  the  same 
carrier  serves  two  districts  which,  by 
their  location,  the  character  of  their 
output  and  distance  from  markets,  are 
in  substantially  similar  circumstances 
and  conditions,  it  cannot  lawfully  prefer 
one  to  the  other  in  any  manner  what^ 
soever.  Black  Mountain  Coal  Land 
Co.  V.  S.  Ry.   Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  286,  292. 

(ff)  Because  the  revenue  per  ton 
per  mile  yielded  by  rates  from  farther  dis- 
tant points  is  less  than  that  yielded 
by  rates  from  a  shorter  distant  point,  it 
does  not  necessarily  follow  that  the 
latter  is  subjected  to  unjust  discrimina- 
tion. Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C. 
C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  504, 
513. 

(g)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
on  lump  coal  of  $4.50  and  $3.50  per  ton 
from  Rock  Springs  and  Hannah,  Wyo.,  re- 
spectively, applying  to  all  points  be- 
tween the  Nebraska-Wyoming  line  and 
Omaha  on  the  main  line  of  defendant, 
and  from  Kearney,  Neb.,  to  Callaway, 
Neb.,  on  its  branch  line.  The  distance  from 
Rock  Springs  to  Smeed,  the  most  west- 
ern Nebraska  point,  was  341  miles  and 
to  Omaha  809  miles;  from  Hannah  to 
Smeed,  182  miles;  from  Hannah  to 
Omaha,  650  miles.  Defendant's  rate 
from  Rock  Springs  to  Cheyenne,  Wyo., 
293  miles,  and  Denver,  Colo.,  400  miles, 
and  points  between  these  two  cities  was  a 
blanket   one   of   $2.30,   voluntarily   estab- 


BLANKET  RATES,  §13   (h)— §16   (a) 


99 


lished.  The  distance  from  Cheyenne  to 
Smeed,  Neb.,  is  only  48  miles,  yet  the 
rate  from  Rock  Springs  to  Smeed  was 
$2.20  higher  than  to  Cheyenne,  the  rate 
to  Smeed  yielding  4i/^c  per  ton  mile  and 
to  Cheyenne  7.8  mills  per  ton  mile.  The 
Hannah  to  Cheyenne  rate  yielded  1.2c 
per  ton  mile,  and  the  Hannah  to  Smeed 
rate  3.9c.  From  Rock  Springs  and  Han- 
nah to  points  in  Kansas  the  average  yield 
was  something  over  5  mills  per  ton  mile. 
The  yield  from  Rock  Springs  and  Han- 
nah to  Omaha  was  5.6  and  5.4  mills  per 
ton  mile,  respectively.  Defendant  met 
the  competition  of  other  roads  at  Omaha, 
Sidney,  Kearney  and  Grand  Island,  Neb., 
but  had  no  competition  at  any  other  point 
on  the  entire  haul  through  Nebraska. 
In  the  purchase  of  the  coal  in  question, 
Nebraska  communities  competed  with 
those  in  Wyoming  and  Utah,  and  defend- 
ant used  this  situation  to  enforce  the 
rates  attacked  to  points  in  Nebraska. 
HELD,  the  rates  to  Omaha  were  not  un- 
reasonable; that  the  rates  to  points 
in  western  Nebraska  were  unreason- 
able; that  a  blanket  rate  to  all 
points  in  Nebraska  was  unjustifiable, 
and  that  said  territory  should  be  broken 
up  into  zones  and  the  lower  rates  speci- 
fied in  the  opinion  applied.  Nebraska 
State  Railway  Comm.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
13  I.  C.  C.  349,  355. 

(h)  Complainant,  operating  a  paper 
mill  at  Rhinelander,  Wis.,  attacked  the 
rates  upon  pulpwood  C.  L.,  Duluth,  Minn., 
to  Rhinelander,  and  the  rates  upon  paper 
C.  L.,  Rhinelander  to  points  east  of  the 
Mississippi  River.  Its  competitors  were 
located  in  the  Fox  River  District,  Wis,, 
the  points  there  being  100  to  150  miles 
farther  from  Duluth  and  nearer  to  Chi- 
cago than  Rhinelander.  The  rate  on  pulp 
wood  from  Duluth  to  Rhinelander  and  to 
Fox  River  points  was  8c;  on  paper,  the 
rates  from  Rhinelander  to  points  east  of 
the  Mississippi  River  were  2c  above 
those  from  Fox  River  points.  Since  the 
hearing,  defendants  established  the  rate 
of  6.95c  On  pulp  wood  from  Duluth  to 
Rhinelander,  leaving  the  rate  of  8c  to 
Fox  River  points  in  effect.  The  only  evi- 
dence offered  of  the  unreasonableness  of 
the  6.95c  rate  was  that  the  long  distance 
carrier  from  Duluth  to  Rhinelander  made 
the  same  rate.  Wisconsin  was  divided 
into  three  groups  for  rate-making  pur- 
poses, on  paper,  destined  to  points  east 
of  the  Mississippi  River.  The  Fox  River 
group  took  a  10c  rate  to  Chicago,  the 
Rhinelander  a   12c,   the  group   north   of 


Rhinelander  a  13c.  To  show  the  Rhine- 
lander rate  on  paper  unreasonable,  com- 
plainant offered  comparisons  of  ton-mile 
rates  in  other  parts  of  the  country. 
Rhinelander  was  only  40  miles  further 
from  Chicago  than  Brokaw,  a  point  in 
the  Fox  River  group,  but  the  great  bulk 
of  the  Fox  River  traffic  moved  from  points 
from  100  to  150  miles  nearer  to  Chicago 
than  was  Rhinelander.  HELD,  the  said 
6.95c  rate  on  pulp  wood  from  Duluth  to 
Rhinelander  was  not  shown  lo  be  unrea- 
sonable; that  a  comparison  with  the  rates 
in  other  parts  of  the  country,  where  dif- 
ferent physical,  competitive  and  traffic 
conditions  e;^isted,  was  insufficient  to  es- 
tablish th0  unreasonableness  of  rates; 
and,  therefore,  since  inequalities  must 
necessarily  exist  in  any  group  system,  the 
rates  on  paper  from  Rhinelander  to 
points  east  of  the  Mississippi  River  were 
not  saown  to  be  unreasonable,  or  unduly 
discriminatory.      Rhinelander    Paper    Co. 

V.  N.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  633,  634-637. 

VI.  REMEDY  FOR  UNLAWFUL  GROUP- 

ING. 

§14.     In    General. 

(a)  The  Commission  has  repeatedly 
recognized  and  approved  the  grouping  of 
points,  within  reasonable  limits,  for  the 
purpose  of  making  rates,  and  it  will  not 
disturb  such  groupings  in  the  absence  of 
proof  that  as  to  particular  points  in  the 
zone  the  adjustment  results  in  unreason- 
able rates  or  undue  prejudice  and  dis- 
advantage. Stiritz  V.  N.  O.  &  C.  R. 
R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  578,  581. 

§15.     Scope  of  Complaint. 

(a)  Where  a  graded  distance  tariff  is 
asked  for  in  a  complaint,  but  the  general 
question  of  groupings  is  little  discussed 
upon  the  hearing,  the  Commission  will 
only  recommend  the  grading  asked  for 
with  leave  to  the  complainant  to  raise 
the  point  at  a  later  time.  Corn  Belt 
Meat  Producers'  Ass'n  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry. 
Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  376,  396. 

VII.  EVIDENCE. 

§16.  Burden  of  Proof. 
See  Evidence,  I. 
(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  reason- 
ableness of  a  rate  of  85c  per  100  lbs.  on 
lima  beans  in  carloads  moving  from  cer- 
tain points  in  California  to  Omaha.  For 
nine  years  (January  18,  1900,  to  January 
1,  1909)  defendants  had  maintained  with 
some  variations  in  the  carload  minimum 


100 


BLANKET  RATES,  §16    (b)— §17   (c) 


weight  a  blanket  rate  of  75c  per  100  lbs. 
on  lima  beans  from  certain  California 
points  to  Colorado  and  Texas,  and  all 
points  East  in  practically  the  whole  of 
the  United  States  except  southeastern 
territory.  The  rate  was  then  advanced 
to  85c  for  six  months  and  then  re- 
duced to  75c  again  (June  5,  1909).  Nine 
months  later  the  rate  was  again  ad- 
vanced to  85c  (March  22,  1910).  Foreign 
lima  beans  were  imported  through  Gal- 
veston, Tex.,  as  follows:  One  ton  in 
1907,  129  tons  in  1908,  900  tons  in  1909. 
In  1908,  9,671  tons  of  California  beans 
moved  to  Texas  and  11,136  tons  in  1909. 
In  1906,  1,145  tons  moved  from  Califor- 
nia to  the  eastern  seaboard  by  water, 
758  tons  in  1907,  653  tons  in  1908,  2,990 
tons  in  1909.  A  carload  of  lima  beans, 
minimum  40,000  lbs.,  is  worth  from  $1,500 
to  $2,000,  and  the  carload  earnings  on 
the  85c  rate,  $340.  Oranges  load  to  an 
average  weight  of  27,648  lbs.  Average 
value,  $576;  earnings  under  the  blanket 
orange  rate  of  $1.15  per  100  lbs.  to  any 
point  in  the  same  territory,  about  $320. 
HELD,  beyond  the  general  ground  that 
the  earnings  of  the  defendants  were  al- 
ready yielding  an  ample  return  on  the 
investment  and  the  long  continuance  of 
the  prior  rate  of  75c,  there  was  prac- 
tically no  endeavo-r  of  record  to  show 
that  the  present  rate  of  85c  is  an  un- 
reasonable rate;  and  that  on  the  record 
before  the  Commission  no  i^round  is 
properly  presented  on  which  it  may  base 
a  finding  that  this  rate  on  lima  beans  in 
carloads  from  California  points  to  points 
in  the  extensive  territory  to  which  it  is 
applicable  is  an  excessive  rate  when 
considered  as  a  blanket  rate;  and  that 
there  are  no  grounds  upon  the  record  for 
taking  Omaha  out  of  a  blanket  territory 
with  which  it  has  long  been  associated, 
in  this  and  other  traffic,  without  protest 
from  any  quarter,  as  would  be  the  case 
on  a  finding  that  the  85c  rate  applicable 
throughout  the  territory  is  an  excessive 
rate  to  that  particular  point.  Such  a 
holding  would  require  a  readjustment  of 
the  whole  rate  structure  on  California 
products  moving  to  the  East  and  would 
not  be  to  the  real  interest  of  either  the 
producer,  consumer  or  carriers.  As  an 
average  rate  applicable  to  Omaha  and  to 
all  points  east  of  Omaha,  including  the 
Atlantic  seaboard,  the  85c  rate  is  not  con- 
sidered excessive.  Commercial  Club  of 
Omaha  v.  Southern  Pacific  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
631;  Pueblo  Commerce  Club  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.   Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  427. 


(b)  It  may  be  generally  true  that  a 
system  of  blanket  rates  from  a  produc- 
ing section  is  fair  and  just  to  all  parties 
concerned,  although  it  necessarily  in- 
volves rates  that  are  somewhat  high  for 
the  distance  from  points  on  the  edge  of 
the  blanket  nearest  the  points  of  desti- 
nation, but  in  making  such  an  adjustment 
the  burden  rests  upon  the  carrier  to  pro- 
vide rates  that  shall  not  be  unreasonable 
from  any  point  of  origin.  Ferguson  Saw 
Mill  Co.  V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co., 
18   I.   C.   C.   391,  393. 

(c)  A  group  rate  will  not  be  disturbed 
or  be  held  to  constitute  an  undue'  prefer- 
ence against  a  point  lying  a  short  dis- 
tance outside  the  group  without  proof  of 
tangible  injury  resulting  to  the  com- 
plainant. Bovaird  Supply  Co.  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  56,  66. 

§17.     Extent  of  Zone. 

(a)  Large  blanket  rates  may  be  justi- 
fied for  long  distances  which  would  not 
be  for  shorter  distances.  Mutual  Rice 
Trade  &  Devel.  Ass'n.  Houston,  v.  I.  & 
G.  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  219,  224. 

(aa)  Where  rates  in  question  are 
blanket  rates,  applying  from  producing 
points  in  California  to  all  territory  east 
of  the  Rocky  Mountains,  except  the 
southeast,  the  Commission,  in  passing 
upon  the  reasonableness  of  a  rate  to 
this  wide  territory,  must  consider  the 
average  haul,  Arlington  Heights  Fruit 
Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  149, 
152. 

(b)  In  instituting  comparison  with,  or 
in  passing  upon  the  reasonableness  of,  a 
blanket  rate  neither  extreme  of  the 
group  should  be  considered,  but  rather 
a  fair  average.  Oregon  &  Washington 
Lumber  Mfrs.  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  L 
C.  C.  389,  392. 

(bb)  Transcontinental  railroads  have 
made  a  near  approximation  to  postage- 
stamp  system  of  rate  making.  R.  R.  Com- 
mission of  Nev.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  t.  C  C. 

238,   239. 

(c)  Complainant  shippers  of  salt  at 
Muskogee,  Okla.,  attacked  the  rate  of 
22%c  on  salt  from  Kansas  producing 
points  to  Muskogee  as  compared  with 
the  rate  of  15c  to  Ft.  Smith,  Ark.  Fort 
Smith  was  84  miles  farther  distant  than 
Muskogee  from  said  points  of  origin. 
Complainant  demanded  on  this  ground 
that  the  rate  to  Muskogee  be  made  3c 
less    than    to    Fort    Smith.      Subsequent 


BLANKET  RATES,  §17   (cc)— BRANCH  LINES 


101 


to  the  filing  of  the  complaint  defendants 
established  a  rate  of  19c  from  the  points 
in  question  to  both  Muskogee  and  Fort 
Smith.  Kansas  salt  came  into  keen 
competition  with  Michigan  salt  and 
under  the  rates  attacked  could  not  com- 
pete with  such  salt  at  Muskogee.  Under 
the  new  rates  the  charge  from  Michigan 
points  to  Fort  Smith  was  29%c  and  to 
Muskogee  31c.  It  appeared  that  rates 
on  salt  in  the  Kansas  and  Arkansas  ter- 
ritory in  question  had  been  blanketed 
over  a  territory  of  234  miles  for  the 
puri>ose  of  placing  producers  on  an 
equal  competitive  footing.  HELD,  dis- 
tance and  ton  mile  comparisons,  al- 
though often  helpful  in  reaching  a  con- 
clusion in  respect  to  the  reasonableness 
of  rates,  could  not  be  made  the  sole 
test  so  as  to  deny  consideration  to 
many  other  potent  and  controlling 
forces,  and  taking  into  consideration  the 
established  grouping  of  points  in  the 
territory  in  question,  the  newly  estab- 
lished rates  should  not  be  disturbed. 
Muskogee  Traffic  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  169,  172,  173. 

(cc)  Rates  made  with  respect  to  vast 
groups,  and  adjustments  with  respect  to 
crossings,  such  as  the  Mississippi  River 
crossings,  extending  more  than  700  miles, 
cannot  be  considered  solely  from  the 
standpoint  of  mileage  from  nearest  air- 
line gateway  to  a  particular  section  of 
the  group.  Williams  Co.  v.  V.  S.  &  P. 
1  y.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  482,  484. 

§18.     Comparisons. 

See    Comparative    Rates. 

(a)  In  a  comparison  with  blanket 
rates,  neither  extreme  of  the  group 
should  be  considered,  but  rather  a  fair 
average.  Oregon  &  Washington  Lumber 
Mfrs.  Ass'n  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  1.  C.  C  389. 
392. 

(b)  Terminal  rates,  such  as  a  blanket 
■rate  from  the  Mississippi  River  to  the 
Atlantic  seaboard  to  all  Pacific  terminals, 
are  low  and  not  a  fair  measure  of  rates 
generally.  Ohio  Foundry  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C. 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  05,  67. 

(c)  Because  in  a  blanket  adjustment 
the  same  rate  is  made  to  branch-line  as 
to  main-line  points  does  not  justify  unrea- 
sonable rate  to  any  point.  Idaho  Com- 
mercial Clubs  V.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  562,  564. 

(d)  On  potatoes  in  carloads  from 
Kempton,  and  adjacent  points  comprising 
the   Harrisburg   group,   Pennsylvania,   to 


points  in  the  Hartford  groups  lying  in 
New  York  and  New  England,  complainant 
was  assessed  $3.40  per  ton.  The  rate 
from  points  in  the  New  Jersey  groups 
lying  east  of  the  Harrisburg  groups  was 
$2.80.  The  rate  on  cement  from  mills 
in  both  the  Harrisburg  and  New  Jersey 
groups  to  water  points  in  the  Hartford 
group  was  $1.45,  and  to  inland  points, 
^i.25.  Potatoes  moved  only  about  three 
months  during  the  fall  of  the  year.  Ce- 
ment moves  in  steady  volume  throughout 
the  entire  year,  and  is  a  low-grade  prod- 
uct usually  movinj  under  commodity 
rates.  Potatoes  for  20  years  have  usu- 
ally taken  fifth-class  rates  along  with 
other  coarse  food  products.  Cement  in 
the  territory  in  question  took  a  mini- 
mum of  50,000  lbs.;  potatoes,  30,000  lbs. 
A  carload  of  cement  is  worth  $125.,  and 
potatoes  $300.  Many  other  differences 
respecting  the  difficulty  in  cost  of  car- 
riage existed  between  the  two  commodi- 
ties. HELD,  since  points  lying  just 
across  the  line  dividing  adjacent  groups 
must  necessarily  take  different  rates,  and 
since  the  rates  compared  by  complainant 
were  on  commodities  utterly  dissimilar, 
the  rate  attacked  was  not  shown  to  be 
unreasonable  or  discriminatory.  An- 
thony v.  Philadelphia  &  Reading  Ry.  Co., 
14  L  C.  C.  581,  583. 

(e)  A  comparison  of  a  blanket  rate 
with  rates  in  other  parts  of  the  country 
where  different  physical,  competitive  and 
traffic  conditions  exist  is  insufficient  to 
establish  the  unreasonableness  of  the  < 
blanket  rate.  Rhinelander  Paper  Co.  v. 
N.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  633,  634,  637. 


BRANCH  LINES. 

I.     REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES. 
§1.     In  general. 

§2.     Compared  with  main  I'nes. 
§3.     As  part  of  system. 
§4.     In      competition     with     main 
lines. 
II.     DUTY  TO  ROUTE. 
§5.     In  general. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §12;  Cars  and 
Car  Supply,  §21;  Evidence,  §37,  §51 
(J);    Reparation,    §12    (f). 

I.     REASONABLENESS   OF  RATES. 

§1.     In    General. 

See  Differentials,  §6  (b);  Discrim- 
ination, §4  (e);  Long  and  Short 
Haul,  §7  (gg);  Reasonableness  of 
Rates.  §11  (e),  §20  (d).  (e).  (f), 
(g);  Switch  Tracks  c-nd  Svy^itchlng, 
§7    (b),    (c),    (1).    (m). 


,<»<.>    ^C<^»f«t 


102 


BRANCH  LINES,   §1    (a)  — (f) 


(a)  Complainant  alleged  that  there  was 
undue  discrimination  against  Reno  in 
that  the  rates  charged  from  Reno  to  the 
several  points  on  defendant's  lines  were 
higher  than  the  division  of  the  joint  rate 
from  San  Francisco  and  from  Sacramento 
received  by  defendants  for  the  same 
hauls.  The  bulk  of  the  northbound  traffic 
of  the  defendant  is  through  traflSc  orig- 
inating in  San  Francisco  and  destined  to 
a  competitive  territory  served  by  the 
Southern  Pacific  and  Western  Pacific 
railroads  as  well  as  defendant.  The 
great  part  of  defendant's  business  is 
traffic  given  it  by  the  Southern  Pacific, 
and  it  is,  therefore,  compelled  to  receive 
from  the  Southern  Pacific  whatever  pro- 
portional rates  that  road  will  give  it,  as 
otherwise  the  Southern  Pacific  could  de- 
prive it  of  the  haul.  The  Western  Pa- 
cific, recently  built,  is  also  a  very  serious 
competitor  to  defendant.  HELD,  that 
good  reasons  exist  why  the  through  rate 
may  be  less  than  the  combination  rate 
via  Reno  and  that  the  proportional  rate 
therefore  affords  no  criterion  as  to  the 
reasonableness  of  the'  local  rate,  and, 
therefore,  no  discrimination  is  shown  to 
exist.  On  account  of  the  severe  competi- 
tion of  the  Western  Pacific,  recently  com- 
pleted, and  the  fact  that  defendant  has 
from  time  to  time  appeared  to  reduce  its 
rates  to  suit  new  conditions,  any  further 
reduction  by  the  Commission  at  present 
seems  unwarranted,  especially  as  local 
rates  in  Nevada  on  other  small  roads  are 
on  an  exceptionally  high  scale.  There- 
fore, the  rates  cannot  be  held  to  be  un- 
reasonable. Railroad  Commission  of 
Nevada  v.  N.  C.  O.  Ry.  &  S.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
L  C.  C.  205. 

(b)  It  is  too  speculative  in  determining 
reasonableness  of  present  rates  to  con- 
sider as  a  factor  the  fact  that  such  part 
of  a  railroad  as  is  devoted  to  the  carriage 
of  coal  will  lose  its  earning  capacity 
through  exhaustion  of  that  commodity. 
Meeker  &  Co.  v.  L.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
C.  129,  153. 

(c)  Complainant  alleged  unjust,  un- 
reasonable and  discriminatory  rates  on 
cabbage,  potatoes  and  other  vegetables 
from  the  so-called  Charleston,  S.  C, 
"truck-growing  district"  to  Buffalo,  N.  Y., 
and  Pittsburgh,  Pa.  Reparation  asked  on 
shipments  that  moved  April  21  to  June 
10,  1911.  On  April  1,  1910,  just  prior  to 
the  opening  of  the  season  for  shipments 
from  the  Charleston  district,  rates  on 
potatoes  and  cabbages  were  advanced  ap- 


proximately lie,  and  on  vegetables  n.  o.  s. 
approximately  20c  per  100  lbs.  At  the 
close  of  the  season  about  October  1,  1910, 
the  rates  were  reduced  again  to  about 
where  they  were  before  except  on  vege- 
tables n.  o.  s.,  on  which  about  half  of  the 
advance  was  canceled.  The  reduced 
rates  were  somewhat  lower  than  the  com- 
binations on  Baltimore.  The  complaint 
suggested  the  Baltimore  combination  as 
a  measure  of  what  would  be  reasonable. 
HELD,  the  carload  rates  from  Charleston 
to  Buffalo  and  Pittsburgh  were  unreason- 
able and  unjust  to  the  extent  they  ex- 
ceeded the  combinations  on  Baltimore, 
but  that  on  account  of  the  additional  ex- 
pense incident  to  traffic  from  branch  lines 
the  following  differentials  over  Charleston 
might  be  charged,  from  Meggetts.  Wad- 
malaw  River  and  Yonges  Island,  potatoes, 
2c;  cabbages,  214c;  vegetables  n.  o.  s.,  8c ; 
from  St.  Andrews,  potatoes,  2c;  cabbages, 
2i^c;  vegetables  n.  o.  s.,  4c;  but  that  the 
rate  from  Charleston  to  Buffalo  or  Pitts- 
burgh should  not  in  any  case  exceed  the 
combinations  on  Baltimore.  Reparation 
awarded.  League  of  Commission  Mer- 
chants V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
132,  135. 

(d)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload  of 
empty  beer  bottles,  Capitan,  N.  M.,  to  El 
Paso,  Tex.,  under  a  rate  of  94c  per  100 
lbs.  for  the  haul,  165  miles.  Defendants' 
rate  on  iron,  scrap  and  junk  between  the 
points  mentioned  was  10c,  and  their  rate 
on  lumber  for  the  same  distance  was  21c, 
on  wheat  22%c;  on  hay  and  grain,  ex- 
cept wheat,  18^/4 c.  Defendants  asserted 
Capitan  was  on  a  branch  line  and  the 
volume  of  traffic  was  light.  HELD,  a 
rate  of  15c  per  100  lbs.  on  a  minimum 
weight  of  20,000  is  reasonable.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Gumm  v.  E.  P.  &  R.  I.  Ry. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  237. 

(e)  It  is  necessary  that  carriers  be 
permitted  to  charge  rates  on  branch  lines 
that  are  fully  compensatory  for  the  serv- 
ices they  perform  so  long  as  they  are  not 
unreasonable.  Morgan  Grain  Co.  v.  A.  C. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  460,  471. 

(f)  W^here  a  city  has  constructed  a 
railroad  in  order  to  reach  a  certain  mar- 
ket and  leases  the  same  to  another  rail- 
road, questions  of  reasonableness  of  rates 
stand  exactly  as  if  the  road  had  been 
built  by  private  capital.  Receivers'  & 
Shippers'  Ass'n  of  Cincinnati  v.  C.  N.  O. 
&  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  440,  464. 


BRANCH  LINES,  §1  (g)— §2  (a) 


103 


(g)  Circumstances  and  conditions  are 
different  at  main-line  points  than  at 
branch-line  points.  Board  of  Trade  of 
Winston-Salem  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C,  12,  18. 

(h)  Complainant  miners  located  in 
western  Colorado  at  Cameo  and  South 
Canon  attacked  the  rates  on  coal  from 
those  points  to  points  in  Utah,  Nevada, 
California,  Oregon,  Washington,  Idaho 
and  Montana  as  unreasonable  compared 
with  rates  from  other  producing  fields 
served  by  defendants  in  Wyoming  and 
Utah,  especially  Rock  Springs,  Wyo.,  and 
asked  for  the  establishment  of  joint 
through  rates.  Comparison  of  the  per  ton 
mile  revenue  from  the  points  in  question 
showed  that  complainants  were  charged 
higher  rates  than  their  conf^Detitors.  Spe- 
cial operating  difficulties  were  encount- 
ered by  defendants  in  hauling  coal  from 
Cameo  and  Canon  City,  not  met  with  at 
other  producing  points,  such  as  high 
grades  and  sharp  curves,  which  resulted 
in  defendants  being  forced  to  carry  a 
much  lower  tonnage  per  train  than  from 
other  producing  fields.  The  traffic  from 
Cameo  and  South  Canon  moved  from 
points  of  origin  from  264  to  324  miles 
through  desert  country,  before  reaching 
a  junction  at  which  it  might  be  delivered 
to  a  line  reaching  Nevada  or  California. 
Rock  Springs  was  most  favorably  located 
with  respect  to  the  markets  complainants 
desired  to  reach,  being  a  local  point  on 
the  U.  P.  R.  R.  The  carriers  connecting 
with  the  lines  at  Cameo  and  South  Canon 
were  in  poor  financial  condition  and  in- 
sufficiently equipped  with  cars  to  engage 
in  joint  traffic.  The  rates  attacked  were 
subsequent  to  the  hearing  substantially 
reduced,  although  not  to  the  point  6^- 
manded  by  complainants.  HELD,  on  ac 
count  of  the  difficulties  of  transportation 
encountered  at  Cameo  and  Canon  City, 
the  rates  attacked  were  not  shown  to  be 
unreasonable.  Request  for  the  establish- 
ment of  joint  rates  and  routes  denied. 
Grand  Junction  Mining  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  C. 
M.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  452,  457. 

(i)  Talmage  and  Brock,  Neb.,  located 
on  a  branch  line  of  defendants,  are  nearer 
to  St.  Louis  than  Lorton  and  Dunbar, 
located  on  the  same  branch  line.  Paul 
and  Julian,  Neb.,  are  located  on  the  main 
line  of  defendant,  a  short  distance  east 
from  Dunbar,  south.  Rates  from  Tal- 
mage and  Brock,  on  coi-n  and  wheat  in 
carloads,  to  St.  Louis  were  higher  than 
for  the  longer  haul  from  Lo-rton  and  Dun- 


bar to  St.  Louis.  They  were  also  higher 
than  rates  from  Paul  and  Julian  to  St. 
Louis.  The  lower  rate  from  Dunbar  was 
due  to  the  competition  of  another  carrier, 
which  was  subject  to  the  low  rates  pre- 
scribed by  the  Nebraska  legislature.  Tal- 
mage and  Brock  were  not  subject  to  this 
competition.  Paul  and  Julian  were  the 
same  distance  as  Brock  and  Talmage 
from  Auburn,  on  defendant's  line,  at 
which  point  all  shipments  to  St.  Louis 
were  concentrated.  HELD,  the  lower 
rates  from  Lorton  and  Dunbar  were  justi- 
fied by  competitive  conditions,  but  the 
Talmage  and  Brock  rates  should  be  re- 
duced, so  not  to  exceed  those  from  Paul 
and  Julian.  Bartling  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  494,  496. 

(j)  There  is  a  material  difference  be- 
tween a  reasonable  amount  to  be  added 
for  additional  mileage  on  a  straightaway 
long  haul  and  a  reasonable  allowance  to 
be  added  for  an  out-of-line  haul  which 
involves  two  and  probably  three  terminal 
services.  Kansas  City  Transportation 
Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
491,  495. 

(k)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
on  groceries  from  southern  points  to  An- 
thony, Kan.,  as  compared  with  those  to 
Wichita,  Winfield,  Hutchinson  and  Ar- 
kansas City,  which  points  were  more  dis- 
tant from  gulf  ports  than  Anthony  and 
took  on  rice  and  sugar  a  rate  of  some 
6c  lower  than  the  rate  to  Anthony.  From 
points  in  the  East,  Anthony  was  more 
distant  than  such  other  competitive 
points  and  the  lower  rates  to  them  were 
established  by  eastern  carriers.  Later 
the  carriers  from  th )  South  became  com- 
petitors in  hauling  the  goods  to  these 
cities.  HELD,  these  new  conditions, 
coupled  with  the  fact  that  Anthony  was 
entitled  to  the  benefit  of  its  proximity 
to  gulf  ports,  required  a  reduction  in 
differentials  from  about  6c  to  about  3c 
on  shipments  from  southern  points,  the 
latter  differential  to  be  left  in  effect  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  Anthony  was 
reached  only  by  branch  lines,  while  most 
of  the  other  points  were  reached  by  main 
lines.  Anthony  Wholesale  Grocery  Co. 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  605, 
608,  609. 

§2.     Compared  with   Main   Lines. 
See  Comparative  Rates, 
(a)     A  tap  line   carrier   charged   3l^c 
per  100  lbs.  for  a  haul  of  20  miles.  HELD, 
the  per  ton  mile  earnings  of  a  small  car- 
rier  having   only    short  hauls   and   light 


104 


BRANCH  LINES,  §2   (b)— §3   (c) 


business  may  properly  exceed  the  per  ton 
mile  earnings  of  stronger  lines  partici- 
pating in  heavier  traffic  which  moves  for 
considerable  distances.  Burton  v.  U.  V. 
R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  75. 

(b)  The  tariffs  in  effect  prior  to  April 
1  and  those  of  April  1,  1910.  named  the 
same  rates  on  vegetables  from  branch 
line  points  as  from  Charlestown  to  Buf- 
falo and  Pittsburgh,  but  the  subsequent 
tariffs  named  through  rates  from  the 
branch  line  points  higher  than  the  rates 
from  Charlestown.  Rates  from  branch 
line  points  to  the  Ohio  River  are  higher 
than  rates  from  Charlestown  to  the  Ohio 
River,  but  the  same  relative  differences 
have  not  been  observed  in  the  construc- 
tion of  the  through  rates  to  Buffalo  and 
to  Pittsburgh.  HELD,  in  consideration  of 
the  extra  service  performed  and  the  addi- 
tional expense  incident  to  traffic  from 
branch  lines,  the  Commission  does  not 
here  regard  it  as  improper  to  charge 
reasonably  haore  from  such  points  than 
from  main  line  points.  It  sees  no  reason, 
however,  for  any  higher  differentials  on 
shipments  to  Buffalo  and  Pittsburgh  than 
on  like  shipments  to  Baltimore.  League 
of  Commission  Merchants  v.  A.  C.  L.  R. 
R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  132,  134. 

(c)  Rates  on  a  branch  line  may  law- 
fully be  higher  than  on  main  lines  serv- 
ing the  well-developed  territory  where  the 
density  of  traffic  is  much  greater.  Com- 
mercial Club  of  Omaha  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  1.  C.  C.  156. 

(d)  The  Commission  does  not  feel 
justified  in  requiring  a  newly  constructed 
line  with  a  comparatively  meager  traffic 
to  join  in  the  establishment  of  rates  on 
cotton  linters  as  low  as  those  applying 
from  points  located  on  the  rails  of  car- 
riers more  firmly  established.  Du  Mee. 
Son  &  Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
L  C.  C.  575,  576. 

(e)  A  new  line  is  not  required  to  es- 
tablish as  low  a  rate  as  a  more  firmly 
established  road.  Du  Mee,  Son  &  Co.  v. 
A.  T.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  575,  576. 

(f)  Rates  on  a  branch  line,  on  traffic 
coming  in  over  another  line,  may  be 
higher  than  on  the  main  line.  Acme 
Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
18  L   C.   C.   105,   106. 

(g)  Higher  rates  may  be  made  to 
points  on  a  branch  line,  with  proper 
limitations,  than  to  main-line  points. 
Idaho  Commercial  Clubs  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  562,  564. 


(h)  When  the  co^t  of  transporting 
matter  to  and  from  a  point  on  a  branch 
line  increases,  rates  ought  to  be  some- 
what higher  for  that  reason.  Maricopa 
County  Commercial  Club  v.  Wells,  Fargo 
&  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  182,  184.  \ 

(i)  Not  all  branch  lines  having  switch' 
connections  with  a  main  line  are  enti- 
tled to  joint  rates.  Rahway  Valley  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I. 
C.  C.  191. 

§3.     As  Part  of  System. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  rates  from 
Billings,  Mont.,  to  points  in  Wyoming  on 
branch  lines  of  defendant.  HELD,  that 
these  branch  lines  traverse  a  new  coun- 
try, where  transportation  conditions  are 
difficult  and  Uie  volume  of  business  com- 
paratively small.  These  lines,  however, 
are  operated  as  part  of  a  great  and  pros- 
perous system;  they  are  feeders  to  the 
main  line  and  help  to  swell  the  revenue 
of  that  line.  A  part  of  any  great  railroad 
system  might  be  selected,  and  counting 
cost  of  operation  and  fixed  charges  such 
part  be  shown  to  be  unprofitable.  This, 
however,  would  not  truly  indicate  its 
value  and  profitableness  as  an  integral 
part  of  the  whole  property.  The  fact 
that  these  branch  lines  considered  by 
themselves  fail  to  show  large  earnings 
does  not  justify  the  charging  of  unrea- 
sonable rates.  Billings  Chamber  of 
Commerce  v.  C.  B.  «S:  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
1.  C.   C.  71,  75. 

(b)  If  the  branch  lines  of  a  railroad 
are  judiciously  planned  and  constructed 
they  should  certainly  be  taken  into  ac- 
count in  determining  the  value  of  the 
railroad,  for  although  they  may  not  earn 
a  large  return  upon  the  cost  considered 
as  an  independent  proposition,  they  do 
add  to  the  traffic  and  the  earning  power 
of  the  entire  system;  but  it  must  be  as- 
sumed that  the  new  branches  which  have 
been  constructed  are  good  investments, 
otherwise  they  would  not  have  been  built, 
and  that  they  will  add  to  the  earnings  of 
the  property  in  proportion  as  they  have 
added  to  its  cost.  No  increase  in  rate 
should  be  called  for  on  this  account. 
City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C. 
C.  162,  171. 

(c)  On  carloads  of  cement  plaster 
from  Laramie,  Wyo.,  via  the  U.  P.  R.  R. 
to  Norfolk,  Neb.,  thence  via  the  Niobrara 
branch  of  the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.,  the  rate 
to  Norfolk  was  10c,  minimum  60,000  lbs., 
and   15c,   minimum   30,000   lbs.,   on   ship- 


BRANCH  LINES,  §3  (d)— §4   (b) 


105 


ments  destined  beyond,  which  rates 
yielded  3.8  and  5.G  per  ton  mile  respect- 
ively. From  Norfolk  to  points  on  said 
Niobrara  branch,  the  rates  were  from  9c 
to  221/^c.  No  joint  rates  were  in  effect 
from  Laramie  to  said  points,  but  the  traffic 
moved  under  through  billing.  Complain- 
ant attacked  the  rates  from  Norfolk  and 
demanded  a  blanket  rate  of  7i^c.  The 
construction  of  the  Niobrara  branch  was 
expensive,  the  grades  severe,  traflSc  light, 
and  cost  of  operation  heavy.  Cement 
plaster  was  shipped  from  points  in  Iowa 
and  South  Dakota  in  competition  with 
Laramie  and  from  one  of  these  points, 
Rapid  City,  the  C  &  N.  W.  Ry.  had  the 
entire  haul.  Although,  the  rates  at- 
tacked were  established  by  the  Nebraska 
Commission,  it  had  never  passed  upon 
the  reasonableness  of  the  same.  The 
rates  attacked  were  higher  than  those 
upon  cattle,  a  trifle  lower  than  those  upon 
hogs,  and  higher  than  lumber  and  grain 
rates.  Cement  plaster  loads  readily  to 
the  marked  capacity  of  the  car  with  little 
risk  of  loss  or  damage  in  transit.  Its 
value  per  ton  at  the  mill  is  some  $2  for 
white  piaster  and  $3  for  brown  plaster. 
The  minimum  published  on  the  Niobrara 
branch  was  24,000  lbs.  upon  grain,  22,000 
lbs.  on  cattle  and  hogs,  and  30,000  lbs.  on 
lumber.  HELD,  the  complainant's  con- 
tention that  in  constructing  the  rates  in 
question  upon  said  branch  it  should  be 
considered  as  a  part  of  the  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.'s  system  and  such  rates  applied 
as  would  be  reasonable  for  the  average 
railroad  in  that  section  was  untenable, 
but  that  the  rates  attacked  were  unrea- 
sonable and  should  be  reduced.  Repara- 
tion denied.  (Harlan,  commissioner,  dis- 
senting.) Acme  Cement  Plaster  Com- 
pany V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
105,  106,  107. 

(d)  Commission  rates  are  usually  the 
same  for  all  lines,  both  main  lines  and 
branches.  It  is  fair  that  the  main  line 
should  in  a  degree  contribute  to  the  sup- 
port of  the  branch  line,  for  the  branch- 
line  business  when  it  reaches  the  main 
line  is  surplus  traffic  from  which  a  larger 
profit  is  made.  It  is  in  the  public  inter- 
est that  rates  shall  be  so  adjusted  that 
population  and  industries  may  freely 
diffuse  themselves.  In  determining  the 
reasonableness  of  rates  upon  a  main  line 
based  upon  earnings,  reference  must  be 
made  to  the  earnings  of  branch  lines 
which    contribute    to    it.      Receivers    & 


Shippers    Ass'n    of    Cincinnati    v.    C.    N. 
O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  440,  465. 

(e)  While  carriers  are  justified  within 
proper  limitations  in  making  somewhat 
higher  rates  to  branch-line  points  than  to 
main-line  points,  where  the  same  rate  is 
applied  to  all  points  both  on  the  main  and 
branch  lines,  it  is  to  be  tested  as  a  whole. 
Idaho  Commercial  Clubs  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  562,  564. 

(f)  The  fact  that  a  rate  is  made  ap- 
plicable to  certain  destinations  irrespect- 
ive of  whether  most  of  them  are  located 
on  branch  lines  does  not  justify  an  un- 
reasonable rate  to  any  of  the  destinations 
involved,  but  the  reasonableness  of  the 
rate  is  to  be  tested  as  a  whole.  League 
of  Southern  Idaho  Commercial  Clubs  v. 
O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  18.  L  C.  C.  562,  564. 

(g)  The  fact  that  rates  on  other  parts 
of  the  carrier's  system  are  forced  down 
by  competition  to  a  very  low  point,  does 
not  justify  a  higher  rate  to  a  point  lo- 
cated on  a  branch  line,  since  such  point 
is  entitled  to  the  reasonable  rate  which 
its  location  and  other  advantages  dictate 
without  taking  into  account  conditions 
which  bring  about  lower  rates  to  other 
points.  Board  of  Trade  of  Winston- 
Salem  V.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  12, 
16. 

(h)  What  might  perhaps  have  been 
proper  as  between  companies  operating 
separate  and  distinct  short  lines  may  be- 
come unreasonable  and  unjust  when  both 
are  absorbed  by  a  large  system  which 
serves  an  extensive  territory.  Black 
Mountain  Coal  Land  Co.  v.  Sou.  Ry.  Co., 
15  L  C.  C.  286. 

§4.     In  Competition  With  IVIan  Lines. 

(a)  It  is  almost  axiomatic  that  rates 
cannot  be  made  so  as  to  give  high  earn- 
ings to  a  poorly  placed,  indifferently  of>- 
erated,  or  an  isolated  road,  without  mak- 
ing rates  extortionate.  In  Re  Advances 
in  Rates— Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307, 
377. 

(b)  Complainants  attacked  class  rates  in 
both  directions  between  Chicago,  the 
Mississippi  River  and  the  Missouri  River 
upon  the  one  hand,  and  Utah  common 
points  upon  the  other;  westbound  com- 
modity rates  from  the  above-named  east- 
ern points  of  origin  to  Utah  common 
points;  eastbound  rates  on  certain  prod- 
ucts of  Utah  to  the  Missouri  River,  Mis- 
sissippi River  and  Chicago;  rates  on  de- 
ciduous and  citrus  fruits  from  points  of 


106 


BRANCH  LINES,   §4    (c)— BRIDGE  TOLLS,   I    (a) 


production  in  California  to  Utah  common 
points;  import  rates  upon  certain  com- 
modities through  Pacific  Coast  ports  to 
Salt  Lake  City;  passenger  fares  in  both 
directions  between  Utah  common  points 
upon  the  one  hand  and  Denver,  Omaha, 
Los  Angeles,  San  Francisco  and  Portland 
upon  the  other.  The  two  lines  mainly 
involved  in  the  case  are  the  U.  P.  and 
D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R's.  The  per  cent  of  re- 
turn upon  the  cost  of  the  property  of  the 
U.  P.  R.  R.,  according  to  its  own  state- 
ment, from  1899  to  1909  has  averaged 
between  6  and  7,  and  for  the  last  four 
years  from  7.41  to  8.66.  In  1909  its  ton 
mile  earnings  were  1.004c  and  its  per 
cent  of  operating  expenses  to  gross  in- 
come, 48.52c.  Its  earnings  exceed  those 
of  any  group  in  the  United  States  except 
group  No.  2,  which  it  nearly  equals.  The 
financial  showing  of  the  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R. 
is  nothing  like  as  favorable  as  that  of  the 
Union  Pacific.  It  is  situated  for  the  most 
part  among  the  mountains.  Its  cost  of 
construction  was  high,  and  the  expense 
of  operation  was  much  greater  than  that 
of  the  U.  P.  R.  R.  It  is  the  claim  of  this 
company  that  the  Commission  should  de- 
termine the  reasonableness  of  these  rates 
with  reference  to  the  cost  of  handling 
the  traffic  by  its  line,  and  with  reference 
to  its  financial  necessities,  and  not  with 
reference  to  the  U.  P.  R.  R.  The  D.  &  R. 
G.  R.  R.  was  built  for  the  purpose  of  hand- 
ling the  local  business  tributary  to  its 
line.  No  railroad  would  ever  have  been  built 
where  this  one  is  for  the  main  purpose 
of  handling  through  business  like  that 
under  consideration.  Its  branch  lines 
aggregate  2i^  times  the  mileage  of  its 
main  line  over  which  this  traffic  passes. 
The  great  bulk  of  its  tonnage  to-day  is 
from  local  business.  Its  line  is  longer 
than  that  of  the  Union  Pacific  between 
all  points.  HELD,  that  in  determining  a 
freight  rate  which  must  of  necessity  be 
charged  by  competing  lines,  the  Com- 
mission would  not  look  exclusively  to 
that  line  which  could  handle  the  busi- 
ness the  cheapest,  or  which  was  the 
strongest  financially,  but  would  consider 
as  well  the  weaker  rival.  But  that  on 
the  other  hand  it  would  not  permit  the 
maintenance  of  unreasonable  rates  sim- 
ply to  give  revenue  to  the  weakest  car- 
rier; that  from  a  consideration  of  all  the 
facts  the  class  rates  are  unreasonable 
and  should  be  reduced  as  stated  in  the 
attached  schedule;  similarly  with  respect 
to  the  commodity  rate.  The  eastbound 
rates  upon  catsup  are  reduced  to  85c  to 
the  Mississippi   River  and  Chicago,  and 


the  other  eastbound  rates  reserved  for 
future  consideration;  the  citrus  and  de- 
ciduous fruit  rate  reduced  to  $1  per  100 
lbs.;  the  proportional  import  rates  at- 
tacked are  reduced  to  those  contempo- 
raneously in  force  to  the  Missouri  River. 
The  passenger  rates  reduced,  as  stated  in 
the  schedule.  A  formal  order  will  not  be 
issued  until  an  actual  test  has  been  made. 
Commercial  Club,  Salt  Lake  City,  v.  A. 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  218. 

(c)  In  establishing  a  reasonable  rate 
the  strongest  line  should  not  alone  be 
considered;  the  necessities  of  the  weaker 
line  must  also  be  taken  into  account. 
City    of   Spokane   v.   N.    P.    Ry.    Co.,    15 

I.  C.  C.  376,  394. 

II.  DUTY  TO  ROUTE. 

§5.     In   General. 

(a)  Small  initial  lines  should  be  par- 
tially relieved  of  responsibility  for  cor- 
rect routing.  Duluth  &  Iron  Range  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  O.,  18  L  C.  C. 
485,  489. 

BREAKING  OF  RATES. 

See  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §21 
(bb);  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §28 
(a). 

BRIDGE  TOLLS. 

I.     REASONABLENESS. 

See  Evidence,  §51  (aa);  Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §11    (b),  §30  (a). 

(a)  The  argument  that  a  bridge  a 
mile  long  ought  to  be  regarded  as  sim- 
ply a  mile  of  the  carrier's  track  and 
ought  not  to  be  the  foundation  of  any 
separate  or  higher  charge  is  not  the 
generally  accepted  view.  By  reason  of 
the  great  cost  of  such  structures  a  bridge 
has  been  regarded  more  or  less  gen- 
erally as  adding  a  constructive  mileage 
to  the  carrier's  line,  for  which  an  addi- 
tional charge  may  be  exacted.  More- 
over, bridges  are  ordinarily  built  and 
operated  by  separate  companies,  although 
not  infrequently  the  bridge  companies 
are  owned  by  the  carrier  or  carriers  that 
use  the  bridge.  As  a  rule,  the  accounts 
of  the  bridge  company  are  kept  sepa- 
rately, and  the  rights  of  the  owning  car- 
rier or  carriers  to  use  the  bridge  and 
the  compensation  therefor  are  estab- 
lished and  controlled  by  formal  contract. 
The  compensation  is  ordinarily  fixed  in 
the  form  of  a  definite  toll  per  passenger, 
and   sometimes   a  more   or  less   definite 


BRIDGE  TOLLS,  I   (b)— BUSINESS  SECRETS,  I   (a) 


107 


charge  is  assessed  on  freight.  The  car- 
riers usually  lay  the  burden  upon  the 
traveling  and  shipping  public  by  adding 
the  tolls  to  their  regular  fares  and  rates, 
and  these  additional  charges  have  been 
recognized  as  valid  by  the  Commission. 
Railroad  Commissioners  of  Iowa  v.  I.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  181,  188. 

(b)  The  I.  C.  R.  R.,  one  of  the  defend- 
ants, for  all  practical  purposes  owns  the 
Dubuque  bridge  over  the  INIississippi,  con- 
necting East  Dubuque,  111.,  with  Dubuque, 
Iowa,  a  distance  of  approximately  1.6 
miles.  The  total  value  of  the  property  as 
assessed  is  $1,864,048.  The  evidence  in- 
dicates that  approximately  this  sum  has 
been  spent  on  the  bridge,  including  re- 
placements and  betterments,  and  the 
original  cost,  $589,989.92,  but  exclusive  of 
ordinary  maintenance  and  repairs.  The 
net  income  of  the  bridge  company  from 
the  carriers  which  are  its  tenants  is  ap 
proximately  $181,000  a  year.  The  actuaf 
gross  revenue,  however,  to  the  I.  C. 
R.  R.  is  from  $70,000  to  $80,000  annupUy, 
out  of  which  it  pays  its  proportion  with 
the  other  tenants  according  to  wheeJage 
of  the  cost  of  maintenance,  repairs  and 
taxes.  The  defendants  charge  an  arbi- 
trary of  25c  per  passenger  and  mileage, 
on  all  passengers  traveling  between  Il- 
linois points  west  of  Chicago  and  all  sta- 
tions in  Iowa,  including  Dubuque.  The 
Commission  finds  from  an  investigation 
of  other  bridge  tolls  that  they  range  up 
to  50c,  the  more  usual  toll  being  25c.  To 
reduce  the  Dubuque  toll  would  cause  an 
extensive  disturbance  of  the  passenger 
schedule  in  effect  in  this  region.  HELD, 
the  arbitrary  exacted  to  be  reasonable. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Railroad  Commis- 
sioners of  la.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I. 
C.  C.  181. 

(c)  The  fact  that  the  net  revenues  of 
a  carrier  from  its  ownership  of  a  bridge 
on  which  an  arbitrary  is  charged  for  pas- 
sengers and  freight  carried  across  the 
same  may  be  greater  than  the  returns  on 
ordinary  business  enterprises  is  not  suf- 
ficient in  itself  to  justify  a  holding  that 
the  bridge  tolls  are  excessive.  Bridges 
are  and  have  been  regarded  as  precarious 
property.  They  may  be  damaged  or  en- 
tirely swept  away  by  floods  and  erection 
of  other  bridges  nearby  may  draw  away 
their  tenants,  and  thus  seriously  affect 
their  earning  capacity.  The  net  revenues 
have  an  undoubted  and  also  an  impor- 
tant bearing  upon  the  question  of  the 
reasonableness  of  rates,  but  the  value 
of   the    service   to   the   shipper    and    the 


other  elements  iso  often  referred  to  as 
entering  into  the  reasonableness  of  rates 
must  also  be  taken  into  consideration. 
A  railroad  company  may  be  operated 
with  a  less  return  than  it  ought  to  en- 
joy or  even  at  a  loss,  but  neither  condi- 
tion of  affairs  would  justify  ^he  exaction 
by  it  of  rates  that  are  higher  than  they 
reasonably  should  be  for  service  per- 
formed, all  things  being  considered.  So 
also  the  fact  that  the  net  earnings  of  a 
carrier  may  be  large  does  not  of  itself 
justify  the  Commission  fixing  a  rate  at 
less  than  is  reasonable  for  the  service, 
all  other  things  being  considered.  Rail- 
road Commissioners  of  la.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C  181,  186. 

(cc)  The  reservation  by  Congress  of 
the  right  to  fix  charges  over  bridges  is 
exercised  by  a  delegation  of  authority 
to  the  Commission.  West  End  Improve- 
ment Club  V.  O.  &  C.  B.  R.  &  B.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  239,  247. 

(d)  A  bridge  tariff  on  local  business 
between  Louisville,  Ky.,  and  New  Al- 
bany, Ind.,  will  not  be  held  unreasonable 
where  no  evidence  is  introduced  >  >  show 
its  unreasonableness,  and  where  it  com- 
pares favorably  with  the  rates  at  other 
Ohio  River  crossings.  Railroad  Commis- 
sion of  Ind.  V.  K.  &  I.  B.  &  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  563,  564. 

BULK  SHIPMENTS. 

See    Forwarders,    II. 

BULKHEADS. 

See  Courts,  §11  (r);  Facilities  and 
Privileges,  §10  (w) ;  Loss  and  Dam- 
age,   §4    (i). 

BURDEN  OF  PROOF. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §3,  §5  (2)  (bb), 
§6  (3)  (a);  Blanket  Rates,  §16; 
Crimes,  §25;  Discrimination,  §14; 
Evidence,  I,  §68  (a);  Express  Com- 
panies, §11  (5)  (a).  §11  (9)  (a),  §23 
(a);  Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §12 
(1);  Loss  and  Damage,  §15;  Pro- 
portional Rates,  II  (a);  Routing  and 
IVIisrouting,  §8;  Through  Routes 
and  Joint  Rates,  §11  (2)  (c),  §15, 
§16  (I);   Undercharges,  §5. 

BUSINESS    SECRETS. 

I.     DISCLOSURE  FORBIDDEN. 

See  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  111  (a); 
Tariffs,   §14    (c). 

(a)  A  shipper  of  salt  does  not  have  to 
deliver  his  shipments  to  a  boat  line  con- 
trolled  by  a  competitor,   and  such   boat 


108 


BUSINESS  SECRETS,  I   (b)— CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,   §1    (b) 


line,  although  it  publishes  rates  on  salt 
in  cargo  lots,  cannot  be  considered  a 
common  carrier,  but  a  private  facility  of 
the  salt  company  by  which  it  is  owned. 
Colonial  Salt  Co.  v.  M.  I.  &  I.  Line,  23 
I.  C.  C.  358,  366. 

(b)  The  tariff  of  a  carrier  provided 
that  per-can  shippers  of  milk  in  case 
they  wished  refrigeration  should  deliver 
their  cans  to  competitors  operating 
leased  cars,  who  would  charge  certain 
prescribed  rates.  HELD,  the  new  provi- 
sion of  the  Act  clearly  indicates  an  intant 
upon  the  part  of  Congress  to  secure  to 
every  shipper  immunity  from  a  disclosure 
of  his  business  at  the  hands  of  a  common 
carrier,  and  the  rule  referred  to  was  un- 
lawful. Albree  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  303,  321. 

(bb)  A  tariff  is  unlawful,  under  the 
15th  section  of  the  Act,  which  compels 
a  shipper  to  load  his  milk  into  a  car 
leased  by  another  shipper  in  such  a 
way  as  to  disclose  the  secrets  of  his 
business  and  which  compels  him  to  pay 
the  transportation  rate  to  such  other 
shipper.  Albree  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 
22  L  C.  C.  303,  321. 

(c)  Arbuckle  Bros,  operate  their  own 
property  as  the  Jay  Street  terminal  of 
defendants.  Complainant  is  a  compet- 
itor of  Arbuckle  Bros.  To  meet  its 
complaint  of  unjust  discrimination  de- 
fendants offered  to  receive  the  sugar  of 
complainant  at  the  Jay  Street  terminal. 
HELD,  to  offer  the  complainant  a  re 
ceiving  station  on  the  dock  of  powerful 
competitors  where  its  shipments  would 
be  handled  and  billed  out  by  its  com- 
petitors, thus  exposing  to  them  the 
names  of  complainants'  customers,  its 
markets  and  the  course  of  its  business, 
is  a  suggestion  that  overlooks  the  duty 
of  impartial  service  by  the  defendants  to 
all  their  shipping  public,  and  violates 
the  Act  as  amended,  which  makes  it  un- 
lawful for  an  interstate  carrier  to  "dis 
close  his  1  usiness  transactions  to  com- 
petitors." Federal  Sugar  Refining  Co.  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  2C  L  C.  C.  200,  :il. 

CARS   AND   CAR   SUPPLY. 

I.     CONTROL  AND   REGULATION. 
A.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
§1.     Over  car  distribution. 
§2.     Car  regulations. 
§3.     Fuel  cars. 
§4.     Private  cars. 
§5.     Intrastate  cars. 
§6.     To  award  damages. 


II.     DUTY  TO  FURNISH  CARS. 

§7.     In  general. 

§8.     Size  ordered  by  shipper. 

§9.     Form  of  order. 
§10.     Tank  cars. 
§11.     At  transit  point. 

III.  ASSIGNMENT  AND  DISTRIBU- 

TION. 

A.  Counting  of  Cars. 
§12.     In  general. 
§13.     Private  cars. 
§14.     Foreign  cars. 

§15.     Railway  fuel  cars. 

§16.     Pooling  by  shipper. 

§17.     Tank  cars. 

§18.     Detention  of  cars. 

§19.     When  counted  for  loading. 

§20.     Car  famine. 

§21.     Reward  for  prompt  release. 

§21 1/^.  Shippers  on  branch  lines. 

B.  Rating  of  Mines. 
§22.     Coke-oven  basis. 

§23.  Commercial  plus  physical 
capacity. 

§24.     Idle-hour  system. 

§25.  Mine  capacity  plus  ship- 
ments. 

§26.  Physical  capacity  less  rail- 
way fuel. 

C.  Removal  of  Discrimination. 
§27.     Effect. 

IV.  CONTRACTS  FOR  CAR  SUPPLY. 

§28.     In  general. 

V.  DUTY  TO  TRANSPORT  CARS. 

§29.     In  general. 
§30.     Interchange  of  cars. 
§31.     Private  cars, 
§32.     Rates  on  private  cars. 
VI.     REMEDIES   AND   DAMAGES. 
§32/2-  In    general. 
§33.     Action  at  law. 
§34.     Defenses. 
§35.     Res  adjudicata. 
§36.     Evidence. 

I.     CONTROL    AND    REGULATION. 
A.     Jurisdiction    of    Commission. 
§1.     Over  Car   Distribution. 

(a)  The  Commission  under  section  15 
of  the  Act  as  amended  June  29,  1906,  has 
authority  to  prohibit  unjust  discrimina- 
tion in  the  distribution  of  cars  for  a 
period  of  two  years.  I.  C.  C.  v.  111.  Cent. 
R.  R.,  215  U.  S.,  452,  475,  30  Sup.  Ct.  155, 
54  L.  ed.,  280. 

(b)  The  equipment  of  a  railroad  com- 
pany engaged  in  interstate  commerce,  in- 
cluded in  which  are  its  coal  cars,  is  an 
Instrument  of  such   commerce   and   such 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  §1  (c)— §4   (b) 


109 


coal  cars  are  embraced  within  the  gov- 
ernmental power  of  regulation  which  ex- 
tends, in  time  of  car  shortage,  to  compel 
a  just  and  equal  distribution  and  the  pre- 
vention of  an  unjust  and  discriminatory 
one.  I.  C.  C.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.,  215  U.  S.,  452, 
474,  30  Sup.  Ct.  155.  54  L.  ed.  280. 

(c)  Under  section  15  of  the  amended 
act  of  June  29,  1906,  the  Commission  has 
jurisdiction  to  regulate  the  distribution 
of  coal  cars,  to  the  end  that  various  coal 
districts  may  receive  their  just  propor- 
tion of  available  cars,  and  in  this  way  to 
prevent  the  undue  preference  and  un- 
lawful discrimination  prohibited  under 
sections  2  and  3.  Rail  and  River  Coal 
Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  86   91. 

(d)  The  Commission  has  jurisdiction 
Df  complaints  involving  the  practices  and 
regulations  of  interstate  carriers  in  re- 
spect to  the  distribution  of  coal  cars. 
Section  15  of  the  Act  is  to  be  read  in  the 
widest  possible  sense;  it  brings  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commission  all 
the  regulations  and  practices  of  carriers 
under  which  they  offer  their  services  to 
the  shipping  public,  and  conduct  their 
transportation.  Rail  &  River  Coal  Co.  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  86. 

(e)  Where  it  appears  with  reasonable 
clearness  that  discrimination  in  the  dis- 
tribution of  coal  cars  is  likely  to  result 
unless  some  system  of  rating  and  car 
distribution  is  put  into  effect,  it  is  in- 
cumbent upon  the  Commission  to  require 
of  the  carrier  the  establishment  of  such 
a  system.  Traer  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  165,  169. 

(f)  A  railroad  company  is  not  re- 
quired to  establish  a  system  of  mine 
ratings  and  car  distribution,  unless  such 
course  is  necessary  to  avoid  discrimina- 
tion among  the  different  patrons  of  its 
line,  and  the  Commission  is  not  called 
upon  to  make  an  order  for  the  establish- 
ment of  such  a  system  until  it  fairly  ap- 
pears that  without  it  discrimination  will 
result.  Traer  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  165,  168. 

§2.     Cap  Regulations. 

(a)  It  is  doubtful,  if  the  Commission 
would,  in  the  first  instance,  prescribe  a 
set  of  rules  and  regulations  governing 
car  distribution  in  a  coal  district.  This 
Is  peculiarly  a  matter  for  action  in  the 
first  instance  on  the  part  of  the  Inter- 
ested  carriers   and   operators.     Col,9rg,dQ 


Coal  Traffic  Ass'n.  v.  D.   &  R.  G.  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  458,  404. 

(aa)     The     Commission's  jurisdiction 

over    car-distribution    rules  is    absolute. 

Hillsdale   Coal  &   Coke   Co.  v.  P.  R.  R. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  356,  359. 

(b)  A  basis  of  car  distribution  is  a 
regulation  affecting  rates  within  the 
meaning  of  section  15.  Hillsdale  Coal  & 
Coke  Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  356, 
358. 

(c)  Rules  or  regulations  prescribing 
who  shall  load  and  unload  cars  of  freight 
are  rules  or  regulations  affecting  rates, 
and  are  therefore  subject  to  the  control 
of  the  Commission  under  the  fifteenth 
section.  Wholesale  Fruit  &  Product  As- 
sociation V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  410,  421. 

§3.     Fuel  Cars. 

(a)  The  Act  delegates  to  the  Commis- 
sion authority  to  regulate  the  distribu- 
tion of  coal  fuel  cars  in  times  of  car 
shortage  as  a  means  of  prohibiting  un- 
just preferences  or  undue  discrimination. 
I.  C.  C.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.,  215  U.  S.,  452,  474, 
30  Sup.  Ct,  155,  54  L.  ed.,  280. 

(b)  The  Commission  has  jurisdiction 
to  compel  a  railroad  to  count  against  the 
shipper  the  company's  fuel  cars,  in  the 
daily  distribution  in  times  of  car  short- 
age, under  section  3  of  the  Act  prohib- 
iting preferences  and  discriminations,  I 
C.  C.  T.  I.  C.  R.  R.,  215  U.  S.,  452,  475, 
30  Sup.  Ct.,  155,  54  L.  ed.,  280. 

(c)  Fuel  cars  for  the  carrier's  own 
use  are  embraced  within  the  governmen- 
tal power  of  regulation.  Hillsdale  Coal  & 
Coke  Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  356. 

358. 

§4.     Private  Cars. 

See   Infra,  §31,  §32;   Common   Carrier, 
§6. 

(a)  The  Commission  has  power  to 
regulate  the  rates  imposed  by  carriers 
upon  the  movement  of  private  equipment, 
such  as  cars  owned  by  theatrical  com- 
panies. Chappelle  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  56,  59. 

(b)  While  the  right  to  use  private 
cars  may  doubtless  be  denied  f^o  , Rip- 
pers by  appropriate  legisla,;tion,  ;iq -thfiial^ 
sence  of  a  specific  enactment  tptl^aitoeifr 
feet  their  use  is  not ;  in  itse]f .  unjlfty^^f #. 
VV^hetjhef;  uind^p  a  givea.^jjetj.^fi.ijir^si^r 
stances  their  us^.reswitsjp  ^n.iuij^wg^ 


110 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  §5  (a)— §7  (b) 


advantage  to  their  owners,  and  in  an  un- 
lawful disadvantage  to  others,  is  a  ques- 
tion which  under  existing  legislation  is 
clearly  under  the  control  of  the  Com- 
mission, and  may  be  made  the  basis  of 
such  relief  as  the  facts  in  any  particular 
case  may  justify.  Ruttle  v.  P.  M.  R.  R. 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  179,  185. 

§5.     Intrastate  Cars. 

(a)  Where  a  large  part  of  the  busi- 
ness of  shippers  is  interstate,  but  is  con- 
ducted in  its  entirety  by  shipper  and  car- 
rier alike  as  a  unit  of  operation,  with  lit- 
tle or  no  regard  to  the  boundaries  of  the 
state  in  which  the  traffic  originates,  the 
Commission  has  power  to  prescribe  rules 
for  car  distribution  even  though  its  or- 
der in  terms  affects  cars  used  wholly  in 
intrastate  shipments.  Pennsylvania  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  193  Fed.  81,  83. 

§6.     To  Award  Damages. 

(a)  Whether  after  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  has  found  a  rule 
of  car  distribution  to  be  discriminatory, 
it  has  jurisdiction  to  assess  the  damages 
sustained  by  the  complaining  party,  or 
whether  they  are  to  be  recovered  by  an 
action  in  some  court,  without  any  pre- 
liminary assessment  by  the  Commission, 
quaere.  Morrisdale  Coal  Co.  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.,  183  Fed.  929,  938. 

(b)  Where  a  shipper  seeks  damages 
arising  from  an  alleged  improper  and  dis- 
criminatory system  of  car  distribution  ap- 
plying to  a  certain  coal  mining  region, 
and  affecting  the  interests  of  many  ship- 
pers, he  cannot  institute  an  original  suit 
for  the  same  in  a  United  States  court  un- 
der section  9  of  the  Act,  but  must  first 
file  complaint  with  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission,  even  though  at  the 
time  of  beginning  the  suit  the  system 
complained  of  may  have  been  replaced 
by  another.  Morrisdale  Coal  Co.  v.  Penn- 
sylvania R.  Co.,  176  Fed.  748,  761. 

II.     DUTY  TO  FURNISH  CARS. 
§7.     In   General. 

See  Allowances,  §14  (h);  Bills  of 
Lading,  §5;  Demurrage,  §6;  Refrig- 
eration, §3  (h);  Routing  and  Mis- 
routing,   §2    (a). 

(a)  It  is  the  plain  duty  of  carriers 
to  distribute  cars  equitably;  and  carriers 
should  hire  a  sufficient  number  of  men 
to  facilitate  the  distribution.  Colorado 
Coal  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  D.  &  R.  G  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  458,  463. 


(aa)  Out  of  a  total  of  969,965  box 
cars  in  the  United  States,  944,832  are 
40  feet  and  under  in  length.  Bruns- 
wick-Balke-Collender  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.   Ry.   Co.,   23   I.   C.   C.   395,  397. 

(b)  Complainant  attacked  the  New 
England  or  leased-car-system  rate  as 
applied  to  transportation  of  milk  to 
Boston,  Mass.  Defendant  carrier  had  in 
effect  (1)  a  per  can  rate  based  on  dis- 
tance under  which  the  milk  was  carried 
in  baggage  and  no  icing  furnished;  (2) 
a  carload  rate  of  $125  per  mile  per 
year  from  one  to  75  miles,  with  an 
addition  of  $112.50  per  mile  beyond  75 
miles  and  up  to  125  miles,  and  a  further 
addition  of  $75  per  mile  for  over  125 
miles,  the  maximum  load  being  1,050 
cans  with  an  additional  charge  for  those 
in.  excess  of  that  number;  (3)  carload 
rates  for  service  in  refrigerator  cars 
upon  its  freight  trains,  the  rate  being 
75  per  cent  of  that  for  passenger 
service  when  in  ordinary  refrigeration 
cars,  and  G5  per  cent  in  tank  cars, 
with  the  right  upon  the  part  of  the 
shipper  to  receive  milk  or  cream  at 
certain  designated  points.  Under  these 
rates  there  was  no  provision  for 
the  movement  of  milk  by  the  can 
under  ice  furnished  by  defendant  car- 
rier, but  the  tariff  permitted  any  ship- 
per to  transport  cans  on  the  leased 
cars  by  paying  directly  to  the  operator 
the  rate  of  transportation  and  i^c  per 
can  in  addition  for  icing  facilities.  The 
leased  cars  were  used  by  operators  who 
purchased  the  milk  of  the  farmers  in  a 
given  section  and  assembled  it  into 
carloads  for  shipment.  On  account  of 
the  small  output  of  the  average  dairy, 
this  assembling  of  the  milk  was  neces- 
sary in  order  to  secure  the  carload  rate. 
As  a  single  car  would  serve  a  given 
section,  only  one  operator  purchased 
in  that  section  and  gained  a  monopoly 
of  the  business,  and  the  entire  Boston 
milk  supply  was  practically  controlled 
by  two  or  three  large  concerns.  The 
leased  cars  could  be  handled  more  eco- 
nomically and  the  rate  was  lower  than 
the  per  can  rate.  The  service  under  the 
latter  rate  was  unavailable  on  account 
of  lack  of  icing  facilities.  The  leased- 
car  system  was  defended  on  the  fol- 
lowing grounds:  (1)  Benefits  derived 
from  the  caretaker  provided  by  the 
operator.  This  caretaker  came  into  daily 
contact  with  the  farmers  and  received 
suggestions  as  to  the  improvement  of 
the  service.    He  saw  that  the  milk  was 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  §7  (bb)  — (e) 


111 


properly  marked,  thereby  preventing 
friction  between  the  farmer  and  the 
contractor  or  operator.  He  rejected 
unfit  milk,  and  saw  that  the  milk  was 
loaded  in.  such  a  way  as  ,to  insure  the 
most  convenient  removal  of  cans  from 
the  car.  (2)  Heavier  loading  obtained 
under  its  leased-car  system.  The  cost 
of  icing  and  operating  of  a  car  being 
the  same  whether  it  contained  100  or 
1,000  cans,  the  handling  of  milk  by  the 
operators  in  full  carloads  made  for  econ- 
omy. (3)  The  terminal  situation.  The 
large  operators  had  provided  in  Boston 
facilities  for  receiving  and  handling  the 
milk.  The  cars  were  hauled  directly  to 
the  plants  of  the  operators,  whereas  if 
each  dealer  received  his  milk  at  the 
passenger  station  a  wagon  haul  of  sev- 
eral miles  would  be  involved,  increasing 
the  risk  of  exposing  the  milk  to  im- 
proper temperature,  (4)  The  disposi- 
tion of  surplus  milk.  Since  the  con- 
sumption of  milk  at  Boston  varied  from 
day  to  day,  it  was  necessary  to  provide 
for  the  disposition  of  the  surplus.  This 
was  done  advantageously  by  maintaining 
a  creamery  along  the  way  and  intercept- 
ing large  portions  on  its  way  to  market 
at  some  country  point  where  it  was 
manufactured  into  butter  or  condensed 
milk.  (5)  The  leased  system  had  been 
in  effect  for  some  fifty  years  and  the 
operators  had  expended  large  sums  in 
extensive  facilities.  (6)  The  regula- 
tions adopted  by  the  state  of  Massa- 
chusetts and  the  city  of  Boston  "were 
such  as  would  virtually  prohibit  the 
handling  of  milk  in  small  quantities  on 
account  of  the  strict  requirements  as 
to  cleanliness,  temperature,  delivery  in 
sealed  packages,  etc.  The  tendency  of 
the  leased-car  system  was  toward  mo- 
nopoly, and  under  it  there  was  probably 
no  competition  except  in  the  quality  of 
milk  supplied.  The  evidence  indicated 
that  to  destroy  the  system  and  to  es- 
tablish an  exclusive  i>er  can  rate  would 
increase  the  cost  to  the  consumer  some 
20  per  cent  and  would  result  in,  poorer 
sanitary  conditions.  Under  the  system 
attacked  the  price  paid  the  farmer  for 
the  milk  had  been  distinctly  higher 
than  that  paid  to  the  farmer  for  supply- 
ing any  other  city.  The  price  charged 
the  consumer  in  Boston  had  been  about 
the  average  of  that  charged  in  cities. 
In  quality  the  Boston  supply  equaled 
or  exceeded  that  of  any  great  city.  The 
evidence  indicated  that  even  if  a  per 
can    system    was    established    bo    as    to 


enable  the  farmer  to  ship  directly  to 
independent  dealers  in  Boston,  the  mo- 
nopolistic tendency  would  not  thereby 
be  checked.  HELD,  that  the  shipper 
was  entitled  to  a  per  can  rate  with 
icing  facilities,  but  that  the  defendant 
should  not  be  required  to  furnish  cars 
with  such  facilities  unless  it  was  rea- 
sonably assured  of  shipments  of  at 
least  600  cans  of  milk;  that  the  per  can 
rate  might  be  higher  than  the  leased 
car  rate,  but  must  not  be  unreasonably 
so;  and  that  the  leased-car  system  was 
not  unlawful  in  itself  except  in  so  far 
as  the  carrier  failed  to  furnish  a  per 
can  rate  with  icing  facilities  with  the 
result  that  the  shipper  was  compelled 
to  pay  transportation  to  the  operator 
instead  of  to  the  carrier  and  to  disclose 
the  secrets  of  his  business  to  the  oper- 
ator by  the  shipment  of  his  caijs  in 
the  leased  cars.  Albree  v.  B.  &  M.  R. 
R.   Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  303,  327. 

(bb)  It  is  the  primary  duty  of  a  rail- 
road to  furnish  equipment  that  is  usable, 
and  in  the  event  the  car  is  unfit  the  ship- 
per should  reject  it  and  call  for  another. 
A  shipper  is  not  to  be  put  to  the  alter- 
native of  either  not  shipping  at  all  or  of 
recovering  from  the  railroad  for  loss  of 
the  commodity  in  transit.  It  is  not  a 
compliance  with  the  requirements  of  the 
law  that  a  car  shall  be  put  at  the  ship- 
per's disposal;  the  car  provided  must  be 
one  that  will  convey  the  commodity  safe- 
ly to  its  destination  under  ordinary  cir- 
cumstances. Balfour,  Guthrie  &  Co.  v. 
O.  W.  R.  R.  &  Nav.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  539, 
540. 

(c)  Car  furnishing  is  part  of  the 
transportation.  Arlington  Heights  Fruit 
Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  106,  117. 

(cc)  Equipment  sufficient  to  meet  ac- 
tual shipments  is  all  the  law  requires  of 
carrier.  Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  P. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  1.  C.  C.  356,  361. 

(d)  No  difference  to  the  shipper 
whether  the  car  furnished  him  is  for- 
eign, leased  or  used  under  mileage  or  per 
diem  arrangement.  Peale,  Peacock  & 
Kerr  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
25,  34. 

(e)  It  is  the  duty  of  the  carrier  to 
accommodate  the  needs  and  necessities 
of  shippers  in  regard  to  supplying  cars; 
as  a  practical  matter  it  is  not  possible 
for  carriers  to  furnish  all  shippers  with 
just  such  cars  as  they  would  like  and  in 
such  numbers  and  at  such  days  and  hours 


112 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  §8  (a)  — (e) 


as  would  best  serve  their  interests.  Am- 
erican Creosoting  Works  v.  111.  Cent.  R, 
R.   Co.,   15  I.  C.  C.  160,  164. 

§8.     Size   Ordered    by  Shipper. 

See   Minimums,  §3,  §4;  Tariffs,  §3   (1) 
(b). 

(a)  So  long  as  rates  are  provided 
for  double-deck  cars,  tariffs  should  pro- 
vide definitely  that,  where  a  double- 
deck  car  is  ordered  and  two  single-deck 
cars  are  furnished,  charges  will  be  as- 
sessed upon  basis  of  double-deck  cars 
ordered.  Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  S. 
P.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  236,  237. 

(aa)  Carriers  should  amend  their  tar- 
iffs so  as  to  contain  a  rule  providing  that 
when  unable  to  furnish  a  car  of  large  di- 
mensions ordered  by  shipper,  two  smaller 
cars  may  be  furnished  and  used  on 
the  basis  of  the  minimum  fixed  for  the 
car  ordered.  Lindsay  Bros.  v.  L.  S.  & 
M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  516,  518. 

(b)  Complainant  ordered  one  50-ft. 
flat  car  for  the  transportation  of  a  ship- 
ment of  threshing  machinery  weighing 
19,770  lbs.,  from  Hopkins,  Minn.,  to  Pay- 
son,  Utah.  Defendant  being  unable  to 
furnish  a  car  of  the  size  ordered,  for- 
warded the  shipment  in  two  shorter  flat 
cars.  The  delivering  line  collected  total 
charges  of  $500,  b^sed  on  the  minimum 
weight  of  20,000  lbs.  for  each  car.  Had 
a  50-ft.  car  been  furnished,  the  charges 
would  have  been  $250,  based  upon  a  rate 
of  $1.25  per  100  lbs.,  and  a  minimum 
weight  of  20,000  lbs.  for  the  one  car.  It 
is  stated  that  the  originating  carrier  had 
but  ten  50-ft.  flat  cars  in  an  equipment 
of  something  over  100,000;  also  that 
Bome  of  the  larger  manufacturers  of 
threshing  machinery  furnish  their  own 
cars  and  are  able  to  avail  themselves  of 
the  carload  rate  on  the  entire  sbipment 
The  originating  carrier  is  a.  party  to  tar- 
iffs providing  a  minimum  of'2iQfb00  ]bs.  on 
agricultural,  machinery  applicable  to  50- 
ft.  flat  cat^V  HFT.D.  it  is  therefore  un- 
d^^  thfe  Wii<^  ^f  furnishing  cars  of.  suflfi- 
aWtf'  siS(§ "ib ■  a'ccommodate  the  shipments 
d^  otb^'stiftab!^  equipment  on  the  same 
b'dsi^  of  '  charge.  To'  hold  otherwise 
would  result  in  gross  discrimination 
against  the  ^naaUi  shipper  who  isj  unable 
tp.r  furnish'  l^Lss  aWin  cars,r  which^.-undjer 
th©4aw,  he  is -njpt  require^  to;  do,  in  favor 
olrthjese  larger  shippers  who  have  their 
qwPf.  eijiUpment^^  ^  Minneaj)olis-.^bf ashing 

machwe,:^p^,-y-,:;^.  v^.^j^gS|,^'.  j^ye  Co., 


(c)  Complainant  demanded  reparation 
on  a  shipment  of  coiled  elm  hoops  from 
Creston,  Ohio,  to  Windsor  Shades,  Va. 
Shipment  moved  on  June  18,  1909.  June 
12,  a  34-foot  car  was  ordered  of  the  rail- 
road agent  at  Creston  and,  if  furnished, 
the  shipment,  which  weighed  20,100  lbs., 
would  have  moved  subject  to  a  minimum 
of  24,000  lbs.  Shipper  could  not  secure 
the  car  ordered,  and  on  June  18th  was 
compelled  to  use  a  36-foot  car  to  which 
was  applicable  a  30,000-lb.  minimum,  A 
34-foot  car  was  received  at  Creston,  June 
19th.  Creston  is  a  small  local  station  and 
defendants  contended  that  reasonable  no- 
tice for  this  kind  of  a  car  would  be  a 
week  or  ten  days.  HELD,  that  under 
Rule  66  of  Tariff  Circular  17-A  it  is  the 
duty  of  carriers  to  promptly  furnish  cars 
on  order,  which  was  not  the  fact  in  this 
case;  that  where  carriers  cannot  prompt- 
ly furnish  equipment  of  the  capacity  or- 
dered tariff  should  provide  that  if  a  car 
of  a  different  capacity  is  furnished  such 
car  might  be  used  upon  the  basis  of  the 
minimum  fixed  for  the  car  which  was 
ordered.  Reparation  awarded.  Noble  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  72. 

(d)  On  carloads  of  sheep  from  points 
in  California  to  Tacoma,  Wash.,  com- 
plainant ordered  double-deck  cars  and 
was  furnished  single-deck  cars.  Defend- 
ant's tariff  provided  that  on  double- 
deck  cars  a  charge  of  170%  of  the  rate 
on  single-deck  cars  would  be  charged,  and 
that  'if  the  company  could  not  furnish  the 
double-deck  equipment  the  single-deck  car 
rates  would  be  charged.  Defendant,  at 
the  time  of  the  shipments  in  question, 
had  no  double-deck  cars  available  and 
the  evidence  indicated  that  on  account 
of  curves,  tunnels  and  grades  on  its  line 
the  use  of  double-deck  cars  was  not 
practicable.  Complainant  also  attacked 
the  rates  charged  as  unreasonable  and 
offered  in  evidence  comparative  rates 
on  shipments  of  sheep  westbound  into' 
Tacoma,  and  of  cattle  northbound  into 
Tacoma.  HELD,  the  provision  in  the 
tariff  relating  to  single-deck  charges  was 
not  unreasonable,  and  the  evidence  of 
comparative  rates  was  not  sufficient  to 
establish  the  unreasonableness  of  defend- 
ants' rates.  Carsten  Packing  Co.  v.  S. 
P.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  6. 

(e)  When  a  shipper  orders  a  car  of 
a  certain  capacity  the  Commission  will 
not  sanction  the  imposition  of  additional 
charges  on  the  shipment,  that  could  have 
been  loaded  into  such  car,  when  the  car- 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  §8   (f)  — (k) 


113 


ier  for  its  own  convenience  furnishes  a 
irger  car.  Kays  &  Carter  Lumber  Co. 
.  M.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  209,  211. 

(f)  On  shipments  of  lumber,  com- 
lainant  ordered  two  33-foot  cars.  De- 
?ndants  furnished  one  33i/^  and  one  34- 
)ot  car.  The  actual  weight  of  each  ship- 
lent  exceeded  the  minimum  of  the 
mailer  car  ordered,  but  was  less  than 
le  minimum  for  the  larger  car  furnished, 
omplainant  was  assessed  on  the  basis 
f  the  minimum  for  the  larger  car.  Only 
ne  of  defendants  had  a  published  tariff 
ermitting  it,  when  supplying  a  shipper 
nth  a  larger  car  than  ordered,  to  assess 
tie  charges  on  the  basis  of  the  minimum 
or  the  smaller  car.  HELD,  a  carload 
ate  and  a  minimum  weight  for  a  car  of 
lefinite  dimensions  when  lawfully  pub- 
ished  in  the  tari^^s  of  a  carrier  constitute 
n  open  offer  to  the  shipping  public  to 
love  their  merchandise  on  those  terms; 
nd  it  would  be  wholly  unsound  in  prin- 
iple  to  permit  the  carrier  to  impose  ad- 
itional  transportation  charges  on  the 
hipper  who  orders  a  car  of  a  capacity, 
Bngth  or  dimension  specified  in  its  tar- 
ffs,  simply  because  it  was  not  provided 
.'ith  cars  of  the  dimensions  ordered.  The 
bligation  to  carry  the  merchandise  of 
hippers  on  the  basis  of  the  published 
ates  and  minimum  weights,  and  to  use 
i'hatever  cars  are  available  for  that  pur- 
»ose,  ought  to  have  been  covered  in  the 
lublished  tariffs  of  the  defendants  by 
>roper  rule  to  that  effect;  which  were 
inreasonable  and  unlawful  in  not  con- 
aining  such  a  provision  at  the  time  the 
shipments  in  nuestion  were  made.  Rep- 
iration  awarded  on  the  basis  of  actual 
veight.  Kaye  &  Carter  Lumber  Co.  v. 
\l.  &  L  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  285,  287. 

(g)  On  shipments  of  cattle  from  South 
3t.  Paul  to  Hammond,  Ind.,  complainants 
)rdered  ten  36-ft.  stock  cars.  Defendant 
carriers  at  South  St.  Paul,  for  their  con- 
''enience,  furnished  seven  33-ft.  cars,  two 
44  ft.  cars,  and  one  36-ft.  car.  The  ship- 
nents  were  received  by  complainants* 
representative  at  Blue  Island,  111.,  and 
:he  cattle  were  there  unloaded  by  him 
ind  reloaded  into  the  same  cars  for 
shipment  from  Hammond,  Ind.,  to  Phila- 
ielphia.  Complainants  made  out  bills  of 
ladins^  at  South  St.  Paul  for  the  reship- 
ment  of  the  cattle  from  Hammond  to 
Philadelphia,  mailed  the  same  to  their 
representative  at  Blue  Island,  who  gave 
the  billing  instructions  to  a  representa- 
tive of  the  Indiana  Harbor  Belt  Ry.  at 


that  point,  who  in  turn  ^ave  them  to  the 
agent  of  the  Indiana  Harbor  Belt  Ry.  at 
Hammond,  who  rebilled  the  shipments  to 
Philadelphia.  Complainants'  representa- 
tive at  Blue  Island  did  not  inform  the 
Pennsylvania  Company  receiving  the 
shipments  at  Hammond  that  they  re- 
quired ten  cars  of  certain  dimensions,  and 
that  road  assessed  charges  on  the  basis 
of  260,000  lbs.,  the  minimum  for  thirteen 
cars,  instead  of  200,000  lbs.,  the  minimum 
for  ten  cars.  HELD,  complainants  hav- 
ing failed  to  notify  the  Pennsylvania 
Company  the  shipment  required  ten  cars 
were  not  entitled  to  reparation.  Slim- 
mer &  Thomas  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  Co., 
16  L   C.   C.  531,  533. 

(h)  Where  neither  the  bill  of  lading 
nor  the  waybill  bears  any  notation  indi- 
cating that  a  car  of  a  particular  size 
was  ordered  by  the  shipper,  and  neither 
the  complainant  nor  any  other  witness 
states  definitely  that  the  order  given  for 
the  shipment  required  the  defendant  car- 
rier to  furnish  a  car  of  small  capacity, 
and  where  no  other  evidence  that  such 
requirement  was  made  is  offered,  repara- 
tion will  not  be  granted  for  charges  as- 
sessed on  the  minimum  of  a  larger  car 
than  the  one  complainant  alleges  he  or- 
dered. Wheeler  Lumber,  Bridge  &  Sup- 
ply Co.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  547,  548. 

(i)  When  the  carrier  is  unable,  to 
furnish  a  car  of  the  capacity  ordered, 
charges  should  be  assessed  in  accord- 
ance with  the  carload  minimum  appli- 
cable to  the  size  of  the  car  ordered. 
Reparation  awarded,  because  the  rates 
were  charged  on  larger  cars  than  were 
ordered.  Bentley  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  181. 

(j)  Tariffs  of  defendants  should  have 
provided  that  when  cars  of  dimensions 
ordered  by  the  shipper  could  not  be 
furnished  and  cars  of  larger  dimensions 
were  furnished  for  convenience  of  car- 
riers, such  cars  might  be  used  upon 
the  basis  of  the  minimum  fixed  for  the 
cars  which  were  ordered.  Reparation 
awarded.  Lininger  Implement  Co.  v.  C. 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  414. 

(k)  Where  the  shipper  ordered  one 
large  car  and  the  carrier  furnished  two 
smaller  cars,  the  charges  should  have 
been  assessed  on  the  basis  of  the  actual 
weight  of  the  shipment.  Reparation 
awarded.  Pate  y.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.j, 
Unrep.  Op.  417,  'i 


114 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  §8   (1)— §12   (a) 


(1)  A  larger  car  was  furnished  than 
the  one  ordered  and  the  rates  exacted 
were  based  on  the  minimum  of  the  larger 
car.  HELD,  the  rates  should  have  been 
based  on  the  actual  weight  of  the  ship- 
ment, which  was  more  than  the  minimum 
of  the  car  ordered,  but  less  than  that  of 
the  car  furnished.  Reparation  awarded, 
Torrey  Cedar  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  420. 

(m)  Two  cars  were  used  for  the 
shipment  of  a  flagpole  when  the  car- 
rier had  available  equipment  for  load- 
ing on  one.  Reparation  awarded  against 
the  initial  line  without  contribution 
from  connections.  Calvi.v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.   Ry.   Co.,  Unrep.   Op.   461. 

(n)  Defendant's  tariffs  should  pro- 
vide that  when  a  car  of  a  particular 
size  is  ordered  and  for  the  convenience 
of  the  carrier  two  smaller  cars  are  fur- 
nished, the  two  cars  so  furnished  shall 
be  used  upon  the  basis  of  the  minimum 
weight  fixed  for  the  car  ordered.  Repa- 
ration awarded.  Bradford-Kennedy  Co. 
V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  455. 

(o)  A  closed  car  was  ordered  for  the 
shipment  of  cedar  fence  posts.  An  open 
car  was  furnished  which  carried  a 
higher  minimum.  Subsequently  the 
tariff  was  amended  so  that  the  open 
car  could  take  the  same  rate  as  the 
closed.  Reparation  awarded.  Northern 
Mercantile  Co.,  Ltd.,  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  581. 

§9.     Form  of  Order. 

See    Infra,    §36;    Evidence,    §39. 

(a)  When  shippers  order  cars  for  par- 
ticular movements,  in  which  dimensions 
are  important  because  of  the  graded 
minimum  weights  usually  applicable  to 
cars  of  different  lengths,  the  order  should 
be  in  writing,  or  if  not  actually  given  in 
writing,  should  be  promptly  and  definitely 
confirmed  in  writing.  Pope  Manufactur- 
ing Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co..  17  I.  C.  C. 
400,  403. 

(b)  A  request  by  a  shipper  for  a  car 
in  which  to  load  a  particular  shipment 
should  specify  the  size  of  car  desired. 
Kaye  &  Carter  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P. 
&  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  159. 

§10.     Tank  Cars. 

(a)  Whatever  the  facts  may  have 
been  which  have  led  up  to  the  present 
private  ownership  of  tank  cars,  the  fact 
remains  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  car- 


riers to  furnish  such  cars,  and  sound 
public  policy  demands  that  this  duty 
should  be  performed  in  order  that  all 
shippers  may  be  served  equally  well.  In 
the  Matter  of  Demurrage  Charges  on 
Privately  Owned  Tank  Cars,  13  L  C.  C. 
378,    381. 

(b)  Carriers  do  not  undertake  to  fur- 
nish tank  cars  for  shippers;  when  such 
equipment  is  required,  it  is  obtained 
upon  an  order  or  at  the  special  request 
of  the  shipper.  American  Milling  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
384. 

§11.     At  Transit  Point. 

(a)  The  refusal  to  furnish  cars  for 
the  outbound  movement  of  grain  milled 
in  transit  amounts  to  a  failure  to  fur- 
nish transportation  in  violation  of  sec- 
tion 1.  Brook-Rauch  Mill  &  Elevator 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C. 
651,  654. 

(b)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload  of 
corn  from  Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Little  Rock, 
Ark.,  over  the  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.,  to 
be  there  milled  and  reshipped  to  Fordyce, 
Ark.,  over  the  Cotton  Belt  R.  R.  The 
shipment  moved  under  a  tariff  naming  a 
through  rate  from  Omaha  to  Fordyce 
via  Argenta,  Ark,  to  which  the  inbound 
and  outbound  carriers  were  parties.  In 
connection  with  a  later  tariff  granting 
transit  privileges  at  Little  Rock,  a  point 
not  on  the  Cotton  Belt's  line,  its  junc- 
tion with  the  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.  being 
at  Argenta.  To  this  later  tariff  the  Cot- 
ton Belt  was  not  a  party.  Both  carriers  re- 
fused to  furnish  transportation  equip- 
ment for  the  outbound  movement  from 
Little  Rock,  each  claiming  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  other  to  do  so.  HELD,  that 
the  Cotton  Belt's  obligation  under  the 
tariff  to  which  it  was  a  party  does  not 
accrue  until  delivery  to  its  own  rails, 
and  the  duty  to  furnish  equipment  for 
outbound  movements  from  complainant's 
mill  rests  upon  the  inbound  carrier,  the 
St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.  Brook-Rauch  Mill 
&  Elevator  Co.  v.  St.  L.,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  21  L  C  C.  651,  656. 

III.     ASSIGNMENT      AND      DISTRIBU- 
TION. 

A.     Counting  of  Cars. 

§12.     In  General. 

(a)  Where  the  shipper  has  shown  in 
a  mandamus  suit  to  compel  equitable  car 
distribution,  that  the  carrier  has  not 
supplied  the  facilities  demanded,  the  bur- 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  §12   (aa)  — (f) 


115 


den  is  upon  the  carrier,  in  order  to  ex- 
onerate itself  from  the  charge  of  undue 
preference,  to  show  that  it  is  prorating 
its  cars  fairly  and  equally  among  all  th^ 
operators  who  are  similarly  situated  and 
engaged  in  transporting  freight  over  its 
lines.  (McDowell,  J.,  dissenting.)  U.  S. 
V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co..  165  Fed.  113,  125. 

(aa)  The  double  ordering  of  cars  and 
multiple  ordering  of  coal  militate 
against  the  mpst  equitable  distribution 
of  coal  cars.  Colorado  Coal  Traffic 
Ass'n  V.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.    C.    458,    464. 

(b)  The  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  delivers  empty 
cars  on  a  branch  line  to  St.  Charles 
mines  in  the  Black  Mountain  district  of 
Virginia  and  returns  loaded  cars  to  its 
own  line  without  charge  for  service 
either  way,  and  in  addition  pays  the 
Va.  &  S.  W.  R.  R.  for  trackage  rights  by 
means  of  which  it  reaches  St.  Charles. 
This  service  it  formerly  performed  for 
mines  situated  on  the  line  of  the  Inter- 
state R.  R.  Co.,  which  serves  competing 
mines  in  the  same  general  district,  where 
the  conditions  of  transportation  are  sub- 
stantially similar.  HELD,  its  failure  to 
continue  such  service  was  undue  dis- 
crimination. Stonega  Coke  &  Coal  Co. 
V.  L.  &   N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  17,  26. 

(bb)  No  discrimination  or  preference 
in  the  matter  of  furnishing  cars  can  be 
permitted  in.  favor  of  Illinois  coal  buy- 
ers as  against  Missouri  buyers  although 
one  may  be  local  to  an  Illinois  carrier 
and  the  other  may  be  on  the  line  of  a 
connecting  carrier.  Missouri  &  Illinois 
Coal  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
39,  48. 

(c)  A  shipper  is  entitled  not  only  to 
receive  a  fair  proportion  and  use  of  a 
carrier's  tequipment,  but  may  protest 
against  a  competitor  being  given  a  sup- 
ply of  cars  in  excess  of  his  just  propor- 
tion. Bulah  Coal  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  52,  54. 

(d)  Complainant  asked  reparation  for 
damages  sustained  through  discrimina- 
tion in  distributing  coal  car  equipment 
to  it.  HELD,  that  under  the  law  a  ship- 
per has  the  right  not  only  to  receive  its 
fair  and  full  proportion  and  use  of  a 
carrier's  equipment  and  facilities,  but 
may  protest  against  the  giving  to  a'  com- 
petitor of  a  supply  of  cars  in  excess  of 
its  fair  and  just  proportion,  because  the 
mine  that  has  a  larger  and  more  con- 
stant supply  of  cars  may  not  only  be 
operated    at   less   cost,   but   can    attract 


miners  from  other  mines  because  of  a 
more  constant  opportunity  to  earn  wages. 
Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  356;  Jacoby  &  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R. 
Co.^,  19 1.  C.  C.  392 ;  land  other  cases  therein 
referred  to,  reaffirmed.  Bulah  Coal  Co. 
V.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  52,  54. 

(e)  The  defendant  carrier  contended 
that  so  long  as  the  complainant  received 
all  the  cars  it  was  entitled  to  it  had  no 
right  to  complain  that  some  other  coal 
shipper,  as  the  result  of  a  high  mine 
rating  or  otherwise,  secured  an  excess- 
ive proportion  of  the  available  cars,  if 
this  preference  was  not  at  the  expense 
of  the  complainant.  HELD,  that  the 
Commission  must  reject  that  view.  The 
Act  as  amended  not  only  gives  a  shipper 
a  right  to  an  equal  or  a  justly  ratable 
use  of  the  facilities  of  an  interstate  car- 
rier, but  gives  him  the  assurance  also 
that  no  one  else  shall  fare  ratably  bet- 
ter than  he  does  at  the  hands  of  the 
carrier.  It  may  be  true  that  a  court 
would  not  allow  the  complainant  dam- 
ages for  losses  due  to  the  defendant's 
failure  to  furnish  it  cars  that  it  was  not 
entitled  to  receive,  but  the  Commission 
may  surely  require  an  interstate  carrier 
to  cease  and  desist  from  giving  a  ship- 
per's competitor  more  cars  than  he  is 
entitled  to  receive.  Hillsdale  Coal  & 
Coke  Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
356,  369. 

(f)  The  rules  for  coal  car  distribu- 
tion by  the  defendant  having  been  found 
unreasonable,  the  complainant  requested 
the  Commission  to  make  such  a  ruling 
as  will  enable  it  to  obtain  redress  for 
the  past  discrimination,  because  under 
the  condemned  ruling  the  mines  in  whose 
favor  the  discrimination  was  had  en- 
larged their  commercial  capacity.  HELD, 
that  the  Commission  could  not  grant  to 
complainant  a  temporary  preference  to 
even  up  for  the  past.  Exact  justice  is 
ordinarily  not  obtainable.  It  is  difficult 
no  less  for  the  Commission  than  far  a 
court  to  deal  with  such  a  situation  with 
mathematical  accuracy.  The  most  that 
either  may  hope  to  accomplish  in  such 
a  state  of  facts  is  to  do  substantial  jus- 
tice, and  this  is  done  as  far  as  possible 
when  the  defendant  is  required  to  adjust 
its  rules  on  a  proper  basis  for  the  fu- 
ture, and  the  complainants  are  given  an 
opportunity  to  have  their  injuries  re- 
dressed in  the  form  of  damages.  Hills- 
dale Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R,  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  356,  366. 


116 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  §12  (g)— §13  (h) 


(g)  While  the  mine  capacity  of  a 
given  shipper  of  coal  may  be  greater 
than  his  allotment  of  cars,  yet  where  this 
is  also  the  case  as  to  other  shippers  sim- 
ilarly situated  in  the  same  coal  field  it 
,  is  the  duty  of  the  carrier  when  the  car 
supply  is  inadequate  to  fairly  distribute 
the  available  number  among  all  oper- 
ators. Powhatan  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v. 
N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  G9,  81. 

(h)  It  is  the  duty  of  railroad  com- 
panies to  provide  suitable  vehicles  of 
transportation  and  to  offer  their  use  im- 
partially to  all  shippers,  and  unjust  dis- 
crimination through  car  distribution  is 
prohibited  by  the  Act.  Powhatan  Coal 
&  Coke  Co.  V.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
69,  81. 

§13.     Private  Cars. 

See  Supra,  §4;  Infra,  §31;  Demur- 
rage, §10;  Tariffs,  §7  (jj);  Trans- 
portation, §2  (h). 

(a)  In  times  of  coal  car  shortage  it 
is  the  duty  of  the  carrier  making  car  dis- 
tribution, to  charge  against  the  percent- 
age of  a  particular  shipper  the  individual 
or  privately  owned  cars  of  said  shipper, 
and  it  is  an  unjust  discrimination  under 
the  Act  as  amended  June  29,  1906,  for  a 
carrier  to  assign  to  a  shipper  his  indi- 
vidual cars,  and  in  addition  his  full  pro 
rata  of  system  cars.  (McDowell,  J.,  dis- 
senting.) U.  S.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  165 
Fed.  113,  126. 

(b)  Under  the  Act  a  carrier  engaged 
in  interstate  commerce,  in  determining 
the  distributive  share  of  cars  due  to  a 
particular  shipper,  must  count  against 
the  shipper  the  private  and  foreign  fuel 
cars  supplied  to  him,  although  such  cars 
are  used  only  in  intrastate  commerce. 
Majestic -Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  I.  C  R.  R. 
Co.,  162  Fed.  810,  811. 

(c)  It  is  discrimination  to  fail  to 
count  private  cars  and  assigned  cars 
against  distributive  share  of  mine  receiv- 
ing them.  Jacoby  &  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  392. 

(d)  Although  the  coal  mine  owning 
private  cars  to  which  company  or  foreign 
railway  fuel  cars  are  consigned  is  en- 
titled to  receive  them,  even  though  in 
excess  of  its  ratable  proportion  of  all 
available  coal  car  equipment,  nevertheless 
the  defendant  will  be  required  in  the 
future  to  count  all  such  cars  against  the 
distributive  share  of  the  mine  so  receiv- 
ing them.  Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  356,  365. 


(e)  The  practice  of  a  railroad  in  not 
charging  private  individual  cars  and 
foreign  railway  fuel  cars  against  the  per- 
centage of  the  coal  operators  receiving 
them  is  unlawful,  and  such  operators  are 
not  entitled  in  the  general  dietribution  of 
available  cars  to  receive  their  respective 
proportions  of  the  system  cars  in  addition 
to  private  and  foreign  railway  fuel  cars. 
Rail  and  River  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  86,  91. 

(f)  While  a  carrier  during  percentage 
periods  may  not  assign  private  cars  to 
operators  other  than  their  owners,  and 
may  not  assign  foreign  railway  fuel  cars 
to  any  mines  except  those  to  which  they 
have  been  manifested  by  the  foreign 
line,  it  must  nevertheless  count  all  such 
cars  against  the  distributive  s^hare  of  the 
respective  mines  to  which  the  private 
cars  belong,  or  the  foreign  railway  fuel 
cars  have  been  consigned,  and  in  case  the 
private  cars  or  foreign  railway  fuel  cars 
so  delivered  to  a  mine  do  not  fill  out  its 
distributive  share  of  available  cars, 
enough  system  cars  are  to  be  added  to 
make  up  its  share  according  to  its  rating. 
Rail  &  River  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  86,  92. 

(g)  The  mere  ownership  of  a  private 
car,  or  the  possession  of  a  foreign  rail- 
way fuel  car,  gives  to  the  owner  or  pos- 
sessor no  superior  right  to  use  the  fa- 
cilities of  the  carrier  in  transporting  it, 
or  to  have  it  attached  to  a  -locomotive  in 
preference  to  a  system  car  loaded  by  an- 
other shipper,  or  to  have  it  occupy  a  car- 
rier's siding,  or  other  tracks  as  against 
a  system  car.  Rail  and  River  Coal  Co. 
V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  86,  92. 

(h)  Complainants,  dealers  in  hay  at 
various  points  in  the  "Thumb"  district 
of  Michigan  between  Saginaw  Bay  and 
Lake  St.  Clair,  attacked  the  practice  of 
the  P.  M.  R.  R.  in  failing  to  furnish  a 
sufficient  supply  of  empty  cars  for  trans- 
porting hay  from  those  points.  Com- 
petitors of  complainant  located  at  those 
points  owned  private  cars,  which  we-re 
old  and  worn  out,  unfitted  for  interstate 
movements,  and  which,  they  used  to  ship 
hay  over  the  short  distances  to  Port 
Huron,  Toledo  and  Saginaw,  at  which 
points  the  hay  was  transferred  to  cars 
of  defendant  and  connecting  carriers,  to 
be  carried  to  destination.  These  private 
cars  were  thereupon  immediately  re- 
turned for  the  use  of  their  owners.  De- 
fendants supplied  an  utterly  inadequate 
number  of  cars  to  complainants  at  the 
original    shipping    points.      As    a    result 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  §14  (a)— §15  (c) 


117 


complainants'  competitors  owning  private 
cars  were  able  to  move  their  hay 
promptly,  and  by  being  thus  enabled  to 
pay  the  farmers  promptly  were  able  to 
buy  hay  at  lower  prices  than  complain- 
ants. Defendants  made  a  practice  of 
supplying  cars  at  the  junction  points, 
Port  Huron,  Saginaw  and  Toledo,  instead 
of  sending  same,  as  it  might  have  done, 
to  the  shipping  points  where  complain- 
ants were  located.  HELD,  such  practice 
was  unduly  discriminatory  and  defend- 
ant should  make  an  equitable  arrange- 
ment for  the  supplying  of  empty  cars. 
Ruttle  V.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  179, 
185. 

§14.     Foreign   Cars. 

(a)  Where  defendant  carrier  fur- 
nished a  shipper  his  full  quota  of  avail- 
able cars,  the  latter  cannot  complain  of 
unjust  discrimination  by  reason  of  the 
fact  that  the  cars  furnished  were  se- 
cured from  other  carriers,  while  those 
supplied  to  competitors  belonged  to  the 
defendant  itself.  Peale,  Peacock  &  Kerr 
V.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  18  I.  C.  C.  25,  34. 

(b)  All  cars  tendered  by  the  Union 
Pacific  R.  R.  for  the  movement  of  grain 
must  be  counted  as  cars  of  the  Union 
Pacific  Company.  Nebraska-Iowa  Grain 
Co.  V.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  90,  96. 

§15.     Railway   Fuel  Cars. 

(a)  A  carrier  in  times  of  coal  car 
shortage  in  making  car  distribution  must 
charge  against  the  percentage  of  a  par- 
ticular shipper  its  fuel  cars,  and  the  for- 
eign fuel  cars  assigned  to  such  shipper, 
and  a  failure  so  to  do  constitutes  undue 
discrimination  under  the  Act  as  amended 
June  29,  1906.  (McDowell,  J.,  dissent- 
ing.) U.  S.  V.  B.  &  O.  R  R.  Co.,  165 
Fed.  113,  126. 

(aa)  Private  coal  cars,  belonging  to 
shippers  and  used  by  carriers  in  the 
transportation  of  commodities,  and  the 
fuel  cars  of  foreign  railoads  must  be 
treated  as  a  part  of  the  total  equipment 
of  the  carriers  in  determining  the  per- 
centage of  cars  due  each  shipper  in  the 
matter  of  car  distribution.  Fuel  cars 
of  the  carriers,  used  only  by  themselves 
in  transporting  coal  for  their  own  use, 
are  not,  however,  to  be  treated  as  a 
part  of  their  available  car  supply  for 
purposes  of  distribution  to  shippers. 
Such  fuel  cars  are,  however,  to  be  taken 
irto  account  in  determining  the  produc- 
ing  capacity   of   a   particular   coal  mine 


and  the  coal  sold  to  a  carrier  by  a  mine 
and  shipped  to  it  in  the  carriers'  fuel 
cars  is  not  to  be  counted  in  arriving  at 
the  mine's  producing  capacity,  for  the 
purpose  of  determining  the  percentage 
of  cars  to  which  it  is  entitled.  The 
order  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission, in  13  I.  C.  C.  451,  is  modified 
in  so  far  as  it  counted  the  fuel  cars  of 
carriers  in  arriving  at  the  total  avail- 
able car  supply.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  I. 
C.  C,  173  Fed.  930,  933,  reversed,  I.  C.  C. 
V.  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  215  U.  S.  452,  30 
Sup.  Ct.  155,  54  L.  ed.  280. 

(b)  An  arbitrary  allowance  of  system 
cars  to  an  operator  for  another  reason 
than  encouraging  development  is  unlaw- 
ful discrimination  unless  justified  by 
special  conditions.  Rail  &  River  Coal 
Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  86,  93. 

(bbj  On  Jan.  1,  1906,  the  defendant 
divided  all  coal  cars  into  two  classes, 
which  it  designated  as  "assigned"  and 
"unassigned"  cars.  In  the  former  class 
were  its  own  fuel  cars,  foreign  railway 
fuel  cars  and  individual  or  private  cars 
loaded  by  their  owners  or  assigned  by 
their  owners  to  particular  mines.  The 
rule  then  made  effective  and  still  in  force 
provides  that  the  capacity  in  tons  of  any 
"assigned"  cars  shall  be  deducted  from 
the  rated  capacity  in  tons  of  the  partic- 
ular mine  receiving  such  cars,  and  that 
the  remainder  is  to  be  regarded  as  a 
rated  capacity  of  the  mine  in  the  distri- 
bution of  all  "unassigned"  or  system  cars. 
HELD,  that  a  mine  owning  individual 
cars  would  be  able  to  ship  out  more  coal 
than  its  competitor,  while  under  the  rule 
approved  by  the  Commission  (which 
treats  all  cars,  whether  individual  cars 
or  owned  by  the  carrier  or  assigned  by 
other  carriers  for  fuel,  as  available  car 
equipment  as  a  whole,  distributable  pro 
rata  to  shippers  desiring  their  use),  no 
shipper  is  discriminated  against;  and, 
therefore,  that  the  rule  of  the  defendant 
is  unlawful  and  discriminatory.  Hills- 
dale Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  356,  364. 

(c)  Complainant,  operator  of  coal 
mines  on  the  lines  of  the  defendants  in 
Illinois,  attacked  defendants'  system  of 
car  distribution.  Under  this  system  each 
mine  was  entitled  to  such  percentage  of 
cars  as  its  tonnage  rating  t)ore  to  the  total 
number  of  coal  cars  available  for  distri- 
bution for  commercial  purposes.  Defend- 
ants' fuel  cars,  foreign  railway  fuel  cars 
and     private     cars     were     not     charged 


118 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  §16  (a)— §18  (a) 


against  the  distributive  shares  of  the 
mines  to  which  they  were  assigned. 
After  the  assignment  of  such  cars  each 
mine  receiving  them  was  given  the  same 
percentage  of  the  remaining  cars  avail- 
able for  distribution  as  if  it  Lad  received 
no  cars  at  all.  This  practice  permitted 
mines  having  fuel  contracts  with  de- 
fendants to  ship  a  greater  portion  of 
their  daily  output  than  mines  having  the 
same  tonnage  rating,  or  not  having  fuel 
contracts  with  defendants  or  the  use  of 
private  or  foreign  railway  fuel  cars.  One 
of  the  defendants  had  360  hopper-bot- 
tomed gondola  cars,  which  were  used 
solely  for  its  own  fuel  and  which,  be- 
cause no  shipper  on  its  line  had  trestles 
from  which  to  unload  them,  were  im- 
practicable for  commercial  use.  When 
a  mine  having  a  fuel  contract  with  de- 
fendant was  furnished  cars  under  it  with- 
out having  its  distributive  share  of  cars 
for  commercial  shipments  reduced  there- 
by, such  mine  was  given  an  advantage 
over  its  competitor  having  no  fuel  con- 
tract, because  it  was  enabled  to  work 
its  mine  more  regularly,  to  keep  its  prop- 
erty in  a  more  efficient  condition,  to  re- 
tain its  employes  and  thus  to  operate 
more  economically  and  to  sell  its  output 
more  advantageously  in  the  commercial 
market.  HELD,  such  system  of  dis- 
tributing cars  was  unjustly  discrimi- 
natory. The  defendant  had  a  right  to  con- 
fine its  hopper-bottomed  carj  to  the  haul- 
ing of  its  fuel  supply,  but  such  cars, 
with  all  others,  must  be  used  by  the  de- 
fendants upon  their  own  lines  for  trans- 
portation of  their  own  fuel  supply  and 
should  be  counted  against  the  distribu- 
tive share  of  the  mines  to  which  given, 
except  in  cases  where  defendant  owned 
or  purchased  the  entire  output  of  a  mine 
for  its  fuel  supply.  Fuel  and  foreign 
railway  cars  must  be  counted  against  a 
mine  in  determining  its  distributive 
share.  Traer  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  13 
L  C.  C.  451,  456-459.  Sustained  in  L  C.  C. 
V.  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  215  U.  S.  452,  477, 
30  Sup.  Ct.  155,  54  L.  ed.  280,  reversing 
173  Fed.  930,  enjoining  the  Commission's 
order. 

§16.     Pooling  by  Shipper. 

(a)  Where  a  coal  company  owns  and 
operates  several  openings,  and  is  en- 
titled in  the  daily  distribution  to  a  cer- 
tain number  of  cars  for  each  mine,  it 
will  not  be  prohibited  from  grouping  or 
pooling  all  these  cars,  or  any  portion  of 
them,  at  one  mine,  instead  of  using  them 
at  each  mine   in  accordance  with   their 


respective  percentages,  in  the  absence  of 
definite  evidence  to  show  that  such  prac- 
tice results  in  fact  in  undue  and  unlawful 
discrimination.  Rail  and  River  Coal  Co. 
V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  86,  97. 

§17.     Tank    Cars. 

See  Supra,   §10. 

(a)  W^here  a  connecting  carrier  re- 
ceives carloads  of  oil  consisting  of  tank 
cars  and  carloads  made  up  of  barrel 
packages  from  the  initial  carrier,  and 
merely  joins  with  the  initial  carrier  in  a 
joint  rate  in  itself  reasonable,  it  is  not 
liable  for  the  alleged  discriminatory  acts 
of  the  initial  carrier  in  charging  for  the 
weight  of  the  barrel  package  used  in 
shipments  made  by  one  class  of  shippers 
while  at  the  same  time  making  no  charge 
for  the  weight  of  the  tank  cars  against 
a  competing  class  of  shippers  using  such 
method  of  shipment.  Penn.  Refining  Co. 
V.  W.  N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  208  U.  S. 
208,  222,  28  Sup  Ct.  268,  52  L.  ed.  456. 

(b)  Circumstances  existed  which  pre- 
vented the  economical  use  by  plaintiffs 
of  tank  cars  for  the  hauling  of  oil  and 
they,  therefore,  made  no  demand  of  de- 
fendant carriers  for  the  use  of  such  cars. 
Their  competitors  used  the  tank  cars. 
The  defendants  did  not  refuse  to  furnish 
them  to  plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs  shipped  oil 
in  barrels  and  defendants  made  a  charge, 
which  was  not  unreasonable,  for  the 
weight  of  the  barrel  package.  They 
made  no  such  charge  for  the  weight  of 
the  tank  cars.  HELD,  since  plaintiffs 
made  no  demand  for  the  tank  cars,  there 
was  no  unjust  discrimination  against 
them  in  favor  of  their  competitors. 
(Moody  and  Harlan,  JJ.,  dissenting.) 
Penn  Refining  Co.  v.  W.  N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  R. 
Co.,  208  U.  S.  208,  221,  28  Sup.  Ct.  268, 
52  L.  ed.  456. 

§18.     Detention  of  Cars. 

(a)  Under  a  complaint  charging 
shortage  of  coal  cars,  it  appeared  that 
during  the  period  complained  of  there 
were  at  the  mine  of  the  complainant 
from  day  to  day  from  one  to  twenty-five 
unbilled  cars;  that  complainant  handled 
lump  coal  and  small  coal;  that  it  found 
a  ready  market  for  the  lump  coal,  but  not 
for  the  small  coal,  and  was  obliged  to 
keep  the  latter  on  hand  for  a  longer 
time;  and  that  unbilled  cars  were  used 
for  the  storage  of  small  coal.  HELD, 
complainant  failed  to  make  out  a  case  of 
shortage  of  cars,  since  it  had  no  right 
to  require  defendant  to  furnish  cars  for 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  §19  (a)— §21  (a) 


119 


lie  storage  of  its  small  coal,  and  but  for 
hat  purpose  defendant  was  supplying 
n  abundance  of  cars.  Traer  v.  C.,  B. 
b  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  165,  168. 

19.  When   Counted   for   Loading. 

(a)  A  rule  that  a  car  placed  too  late 
or  loading  will  not  be  counted  as  avail- 
ble  for  loading  until  the  following  day, 

3  not  unlawful.  Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke 
^o.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  356,  367. 

20.  Car  Famine. 

(a)  Shortage  of  cars  does  not  mean 
iminution  in  number,  but  volume  of 
raffic  exceeds  capacity  of  equipment, 
tail  &  River  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
:o.,  14  I.  C.  C.  86,  92. 

(b)  It  may  well  happen  that  if  a  car- 
ier  can  supply  during  the  major  part 
if  the  year  all  the  cars  required  by  the 
oal  mines  located  on  its  line,  the  most 
atisfactory  basis  for  distribution  during 
hort  and  infrequent  periods  of  car  short- 
,ge  would  be  furnished  by  the  actual  re- 
ults  of  operation  during  the  time  of  full 
upply.     Traer  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.   R.  Co., 

4  I.  C.  C.  165,  169. 

(c)  Complainant,  shipper  of  hay  from 
Lfton,  Okla.,  to  St.  Louis  and  other  Mis- 
ouri  points  and  to  Arkansas  points,  al- 
eged  that  defendant  unduly  discrimi- 
lated  against  them  in  failing  to  furnish 
L  supply  of  cars  for  hay  during  October, 
906,  to  April,  1907,  while  at  the  same 
ime  supplying  cars  for  shippers  of  corn 
■t  Afton  and  for  hay  to  shippers  at 
•ther  nearby  points.  The  evidence  m- 
[icated  that  defendant  did  supply  a 
arger  proportion  to  certain  other  ship- 
pers than  to  complainants,  but  did  not 
how  the  destination  of  the  shipments  so 
aade.  At  St.  Louis  during  the  period  in 
[uestion  there  was  greater  congestion  of 
lay  cars  on  account  of  the  unwillingness 
•f  connecting  carriers  to  exchange  cars 
vith  defendant  there,  so  as  to  permit 
he  carrying  of  the  hay  to  destinations 
lastward.  This  difficulty  did  not  arise 
v'ith  respect  to  grain,  since  the  same 
ould  be  immediately  unloaded  into  ele- 
ators  at  St.  Louis  for  storage  and  sale, 
rhroughout  the  country  there  was  a  gen- 
iral  car  shortage  during  the  period  in 
[uestion.  Defendant's  traffic  in  the  vi- 
inity  of  Afton  was  suddenly  increased 
luring  the  period  in  question  by  the  de- 
velopment of  oil  fields,  which  fact  re- 
ulted  in  overcrowding  the  railroad  yards 
-t  Afton.  HELD,  the  evidence  submitted 
lid  not  show  undue  discrimination  in  dis- 


tribution of  the  car  supply.     Cox  Bros. 
V.  St.  L.  &   S.  F.  R.  R.   Co.,  14  I.  C.   C. 

464,  466. 

(d)  Complainant  charged  unjust  dis- 
crimination in  defendant's  failure  to  fur- 
nish sufficient  cars  for  carrying  ice  from 
Tobico,  Mich.,  to  Sandusky,  O.,  between 
Sept.  15,  1906,  and  Dec.  31,  1906.  For 
the  portion  of  the  year  1906  preceding 
September  15,  complainant  was  abun- 
dantly supplied  with  cars.  After  this  date 
there  was  a  general  car  famine  through- 
out the  country.  Complainant  was  ap- 
parently supplied  as  liberally  as  its  com- 
petitors, located  at  Tawas,  Mich.,  nearby, 
and  at  the  end  of  the  famine  had  about 
the  same  amount  of  unshipped  ice  on 
hand  as  competitors.  Prior  to  Septem- 
ber 15,  defendant  had  made  sufficient  ef- 
forts to  keep  its  road  supplied  with  cars 
and  used  all  reasonable  effort  after  that 
date  to  secure  its  cars  from  connections, 
but  was  unable  to  do  so.  During  the  fam- 
ine period  it  was  not  able  to  supply  cars 
for  its  other  traffic.  HELD,  no  unjust  dis- 
crimination was  shown.  Wagner,  Zagel- 
meyer  &  Co.  v.  D.  &  M.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
160,  164. 

(e)  Complainant  on  an  average 
shipped  10  per  cent  of  all  the  grain 
shipped  from  Wood  River,  Neb.  During 
the  year  1906,  prior  to  the  months  of 
November  and  December,  he  shipped 
about  5  per  cent.  In  those  months  there 
was  a  shortage  of  cars.  Complainant 
was  furnished  seven  cars  and  his  com- 
petitors the  balance  out  of  the  total 
available  supply  of  eighty-nine  cars. 
Complainant  had  no  elevator  facilities, 
but  loaded  the  cars  by  wagons  of  grain 
hauled  from  his  warehouses,  located  from 
80  to  200  feet  from  defendant's  tracks. 
Defendant's  agent  stated  that  he  dis- 
tributed cars  as  impartially  as  possible 
with  a  view  of  securing  the  promptest 
possible  loading.  HELD,  no  undue  dis- 
crimination was  shown.  MacMurray  v. 
U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  531,  533. 

§21.     Reward  for  Prompt  Release. 

(a)  Defendant  carrier,  to  encourage 
a  prompt  discharge  and  return  of  coal 
cars,  put  in  force  a  rule,  by  which  all 
coal  shippers  who  during  the  month  av- 
eraged not  more  than  five  days'  deten- 
tion of  the  cars  assigned  to  them  were 
granted  a  premium  of  50  per  cent  ad- 
ditional to  their  car  supply  for  the  next 
month.  HELD,  such  rule  constituted  an 
unjust  discrimination  in  the  matter  of 
car     distribution     under     the     Act     as 


120 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  §211/2    (a)— §23   (c) 


amended  June  29,  1906,  the  proper 
method  being  to  assess  demurrage 
charges  for  delay  in  unloading.  (Mc- 
Dowell, J.,  dissenting.)  U.  S.  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  165  Fed.  113,  128. 

§21!/2.     Shippers   on    Branch    Lines. 

See     Advanced     Rates,     §12;     Branch 
Lines;   Evidence,  §37. 

(a)  Under  section  1  of  the  Act,  coal 
shippers  located  on  branch  or  lateral 
lines  are  entitled  to  the  same  kind  of 
treatment  as  is  accorded  to  those  whose 
mines  are  located  on  the  main  line  of  the 
carrier,  and  in  the  matter  of  car  distri- 
bution the  allotment  should  be  made  to 
such  branch  o-r  lateral  lines  on  the  same 
basis  as  to  shippers  on  the  main  lines. 
(McDowell,  J.,  dissenting.)  U.  S.  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  165  Fed.  113,  131. 

in.     ASSIGNMENT      AND      DISTRIBU- 
TION. 

B.     Rating  of  Mines. 

§22.     Coke-oven  Basis. 

(a)  Complainant,  coal  operator  in  the 
Pocahontas  Flat  Top  coal  district  in 
West  Virginia,  attacked  the  "coke  oven 
basis"  method  of  car  distribution  ap- 
plied by  defendant  and  asked  for  the  in- 
stitution of  the  "capacity  basis."  In  the 
early  days  in  this  district  the  land  own- 
ers were  desirous  of  having  the  coal 
screened  and  the  slack  manufactured 
into  coke,  under  the  belief  that  they 
would  thereby  increase  the  products  of 
the  district  and  enhance  the  value  of 
their  holdings.  It  was,  therefore,  ar- 
ranged with  defendant  that  the  operators 
should  construct  a  certain  minimum  num- 
ber of  coke  ovens  on  their  holdings,  and 
that  the  available  supply  of  cars  should 
be  distributed  according  to  the  propor- 
tion which  the  number  of  ovens  erected 
by  each  operator  bore  to  the  entire 
number  of  ovens  in  the  field.  In  the 
course  of  time  the  number  of  ovens 
erected  far  exceeded  the  number  actu- 
ally needed,  and  new  ovens  were  built 
at  an  expense  of  some  $500  each  for  the 
sole  purpose  of  increasing  the  propor- 
tion of  cars  to  the  operator  building 
same.  After  the  field  developed,  certain 
portions  thereof  had  no  practical  use 
for  coke  ovens,  and  were  assigned  cars 
on  the  basis  of  imaginary  use  for  coke 
ovens,  with  the  idea  of  giving  said  por- 
tions a  supply  of  cars  according  to  the 
capacity  of  their  mines.  Under  the  sys- 
tem attacked  some  of  the  operators  were 
getting  more  cars  than  they  needed,  to 


move  their  coal,  and  others  were  getting 
less.  During  a  certain  period,  when  t)  e 
defendant  was  able  to  supply  all  the  cars 
needed  by  anyone,  operators,  who  under 
the  basis  attacked  were  entitled  to  a 
smaller  number  of  cars,  actually  made 
larger  shipments  of  coal  than  operators 
entitled  to  a  larger  number.  HELD, 
the  coke  oven  basis  should  be  discon- 
tinued and  defendant  should  arrange  for 
car  distribution  on  a  basis  which  would 
not  result  in  unlawful  discrimination  be- 
tween the  various  operators  in  the  field. 
Powhatan  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  N.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  69,  83-80. 

§23.     Commercial  Plus  Physical  Capacity. 

(a)  A  mine  rating  system  of  car  dis- 
tribution which  combines  commercial 
with  physical  capacity  is  not  unlawful. 
Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R. 
Cj.,  19  I.  C.  C.  356,  360;  Jacoby  &  Co.  v. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  392,  394. 

(b)  At  this  time  and  upon  the  present 
state  of  the  Commission's  information  and 
experience  it  cannot  accept  the  conten- 
tion that  physical  capacity  alone  is  the 
fair  and  sound  basis  for  rating  mines  for 
car  distribution.  Speaking  in  precise 
terms,  it  is  ot  no  real  concern  to  a  car- 
rier how  large  a  particular  mine  may  be, 
and  what  are  its  possibilities  in  the  way 
of  daily  output,  except  that  those  fac- 
tors may  afford  some  measure  of  what 
its  actual  shipments  will  be.  The  utmost 
obligation  that  the  law  lays  upon  the  car- 
rier is  to  equip  itself  with  sufficient 
cars,  not  to  meet  the  hopes  and  expecta- 
tions of  the  owner  of  a  mine  as  expressed 
in  its  physical  development,  but  to  meet 
his  actual  shipment.  A  mine  rating  that 
is  adjusted  to  the  expectation  of  the 
operator,  and  altogether  ignores  his  ac- 
tual requirements,  might  .  isily  result  in 
a  period  of  car  shortage  in  giving  him 
cars  for  every  ton  of  coal  that  he  can 
actually  dispose  of,  while  an  adjoining 
mine  with  a  small  development,  but  a 
larger  demand  for  its  output,  would  get 
but  a  fraction  of  the  equipment  that  it 
needs  to  meet  its  actual  contracts.  Hills- 
dale Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  356,  361. 

(c)  In  apportioning  its  coal  car  equip- 
ment the  defendant  adopts  the  following 
plan:  to  the  physical  capacity  of  the 
mine  it  adds  its  commercial  capacity  for 
one  year  only  and  divides  the  sum  by 
two.  The  commercial  capacity,  however, 
is  not  based  upon  shipments  made  from 
a   mine   during   a   substantial   period   of 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  §23    (d)— §24    (b) 


121 


free  car  supply,  but  upon  the  entire  vol- 
ume of  shipments  made  from  the  mines 
throughout  the  preceding  twelve  months. 
The  ratings  are  revised  quarterly  on  Feb- 
ruary 1,  May  1,  August  1  and  Novem- 
ber 1,  The  rating  of  any  particular 
operation  will  also  be  revised  by  the  de- 
fendant upon  request,  regardless  of  the 
quarterly  tests;  thus  the  commercial  ca- 
pacity of  each  mine  is  brought  up  to 
iate  at  each  quarterly  rating  period  by 
taking  into  consideration  its  new  ton- 
nage for  three  months  and  adding  to  it 
the  tonnage  of  the  preceding  nine 
months  previously  used  in  the  preceding 
rating.  In  this  manner  the  defendant 
endeavors  to  follow  up  as  closely  as  pos- 
sible the  fluctuations  in  the  market,  la- 
bor conditions  and  car  supplies.  By 
[combining  the  commercial  capacity  of  a 
mine  thus  ascertained  and  constantly 
brought  up  to  date  with  its  physical  ca- 
pacity the  rating  of  the  mine  and  the 
iistribution  of  coal  car  equipment  is 
ietermined.  HELD,  if  this  system  of 
^ating  is  equitably  applied  to  all  mines 
served  by  the  defendant,  the  Commission 
s  unable  so  far  as  its  investigations  to 
:he  present  time  have  informed  it  on  the 
luestion  clearly  to  see  upon  what 
grounds  it  may  be  said  to  result  in  an 
unequal,  unfair  or  discriminatory  dis- 
Tibution  of  equipment.  Hillsdale  Coal 
S:  Coke  Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C. 
556,  360. 

(d)  Defendant  established  a  percent- 
ige  basis  of  car  distribution  resting  on 
he  physical  and  commercial  capacity  of 
he  mine.  The  physical  capacity  was 
ietermined  by  the  thickness  of  the  coal 
;eam,  the  number  of  rooms  or  working 
places,  the  capacity  of  the  underground 
ram-tracks,  and  the  facilities  for  getting 
he  coal  out  of  the  mine  into  the  tipple, 
ind  from  the  tipple  into  cars.  A  fixed 
jer  diem  value  was  assigned  to  a  man's 
abor,  taking  into  consideration  the  char- 
icter  of  the  seam;  and  the  number  of 
places  in  which  a  man  could  work  was 
:aken  into  account,  regardless  of  the 
lumber  of  men  actually  employed.  The 
ictual  requirements  of  the  mine  for  cars 
vere  tested  by  shipments  made  by  the 
nine,  which  factor  was  arrived  at  by 
aking  the  volume  of  shipments  made 
3y  the  mine  during  a  period  of  free  car 
jupply,  usually  from  April  1  to  August  1, 
n  each  of  two  preceding  years.  In  fig 
iring  the  actual  shipments,  all  shipments 
vere  included  except  shipments  of  fuel 
ioal  to  defendant  carrier.  The  physical 
capacity,  the  commercial  capacity  for  the 


first  year,  and  the  commercial  capacity 
for  the  second  year  were  added  together 
and  divided  by  three.  The  result  ob- 
tained was  the  capacity  basis  for  de- 
termining the  percentage  a  particular 
mine  was  entitled  to.  HELD,  this  system 
was  not  shown  to  be  unreasonable.  Rail 
&  River  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  86,  95. 

§24.     Idle-hour   System. 

(a)  In  what  is  known  as  the  "idle- 
hour"  system  of  rating  coal  mines,  the 
number  of  days  and  hours  a  mine  has 
been  in  actual  operation  is  used  in  es- 
timating its  commercial  capacity,  instead 
of  using  the  number  of  calendar  days. 
Colorado  Coal  Traffic  Ass'n.  v.  D.  &  R.  G. 
R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  458,  462. 

(b)  Complainant  alleged  that  defend- 
ant's method  of  distributing  cars  for  the 
transportation  of  coal  from  mines  in 
Huerfano  and  Las  Animas  Counties, 
Colorado,  to  interstate  points  was  unlaw- 
ful, and  asked  for  the  establishment  of  the 
idle-hour  system.  The  testimony  showed 
that  no  definite  plan  which  might  have 
served  as  guide  and  authority  alike  for 
shippers  and  operators  had  been  in  ex- 
istence in  this  coal  district.  It  appeared 
that  when  the  operator  was  particularly 
anxious  for  cars  he  would  employ  what 
is  known  as  a  "car  rustler."  The  "car 
rustler"  is  a  ubiquitous  individual  who, 
by  means  of  good  fellowship,  free  cigars 
and  lunch  money,  prevails  upon  the  car- 
riers' employes  to  promptly  move  equip- 
ment for  the  rustler's  employer.  In  the 
case  of  congestion  the  rustler  helps  the 
engine  crew  distribute  the  cars.  It  ap- 
peared that  the  chief  dispatcher  and  con- 
ductor of  each  particular  train  is  sup- 
posed to  know  the  necessities  of  each 
mine  and  pro  rate  the  cars  accordingly. 
The  record  fairly  established  that  some 
unjust  discrimination  had  been  practiced 
in  the  past.  HELD,  that  a  "plan"  which 
rests  in  the  minds  of  two  men,  dispatcher 
and  conductor,  cannot  be  a  plan  which 
can  possibly  satisfy  many  operators  in 
rivalry  with  one  another,  no  matter  how 
conscientious  and  faithful  those  two  men 
may  be.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  carrier  to 
hire  sufficient  men  to  facilitate  the  dis- 
tribution of  cars,  and  not  the  operator. 
It  is  imperative  that  rules  and  regula- 
tions be  formulated  and  published  by 
the  carriers  at  the  earliest  practicable 
date  after  proper  conference  with  the 
operators,  and  sixty  days  is  deemed  a 
reasonable  time  in  which  to  do  this.  If 
after    such    rules    and    regulations    have 


122 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  §25  (a)— §27  (a) 


been  published  and  given  a  fair  trial, 
they  do  not  meet  the  situation  and  the 
carriers  are  unwilling  to  meet  the  views 
of  the  operators,  the  matter  may  be 
brought  to  the  attention  of  the  Com- 
mission. Colorado  Coal  Traffic  Ass'n  v. 
D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  458, 
463,  464. 

§25.     Mine    Capacity    Plus    Sliipments. 

(a)  In  determining  the  number  of 
cars  to  which  various  competing  coal 
companies  upon  its  line  were  entitled, 
defendant  based  the  percentage  on  the 
capacity  of  the  mine  and  on  previous 
shipments,  the  capacity  being  allowed 
to  count  as  1,  and  the  shipments  as  2, 
in  ascertaining  the  percentages.  HELD, 
such  system  was  improper  and  unfair 
to  the  shipper  opening  up  new  mines 
and  that  percentages  should  be  based 
solely  on  physical  capacity  of  the  mine. 
(McDowell,  J.,  dissenting.)  U.  S.  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  165  Fed.  113,  130. 

(b)  A  carrier  may  make  arbitrary  al- 
lotment of  cars  for  the  purpose  of  en- 
abling the  owner  of  a  mine  reasonably 
to  develop  it,  so  as  to  put  it  in  a  con- 
dition to  operate  and  make  shipment. 
Rail  &  River  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R  R. 
Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  86,  93. 

§26.     Physical     Capacity     Less     Railway 
Fuel. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  defendant's 
method  of  car  distribution  in  the  Coal 
Creek  district  of  Tennessee  on  shipments 
into  the  Carolinas  and  Georgia.  Under 
the  method  in  force  the  tonnage  of  the 
cars  for  defendant's  railway  fuel  sup- 
plied to  the  fuel  contract  mines  was  de- 
ducted from  the  rated  capacity  of  such 
mines,  and  the  remainder  was  considered 
the  rating  of  these  mines  on  which  they 
shared  with  purely  commercial  mines  in 
the  pro  rata  distribution  of  cars  avail- 
able for  commercial  shipments.  As  a  re- 
sult complainant's  competitors,  being 
fuel  contract  mines,  obtained  more  than 
their  percentage  of  cars  on  the  basis 
of  mine  capacity  as  compared  with  com- 
plainant and  other  purely  commercial 
operators.  Defendant  was  thereby  en- 
abled to  secure  lower  prices  for  coal 
used  by  it  in  consideration  of  furnishing 
a  larger  supply  of  cars  to  fuel  mines. 
HELD,  this  method  resulted  in  unjust 
discrimination,  and  that  where  there  was 
an  inadequate  supply  of  coal  cars  the 
only  regulation  or  practice  in  respect  to 
the  transportation  of  coal  from  the  mines 


that  was  just,  fair  and  reasonable,  was 
to  allot  to  each  mine  its  fair  and  just 
proportion  of  the  coal  cars  estimated 
upon  its  justly  ascertained  capacity  and 
without  regard  to  whether  the  mine  fur- 
nished partly  fuel  coal  and  partly  com- 
mercial coal,  or  commercial  coal  only. 
Railroads  are  entitled  and  required  by 
law  to  take  all  proper  and  just  measures 
to  assure  the  regularity  and  certainty  of 
their  fuel  supply;  but  in  securing  such 
supply  they  are  not  justified  in  beating 
dow^n  the  price  of  coal  by  means  of  plans 
of  car  distribution  or  in  penalizing  mines 
that  refuse  to  sell  fuel  coal  by  lowered 
mine  ratings  or  lessened  car  supply. 
Royal  Coal  &,  Coke  Co.  v.  r  :)uthern  Ry. 
Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  440,  444,  448. 

(b)  A  carrier  must  be  free  to  contract 
for  the  total  output  of  a  mine  if  it  so 
desires;  or  it  may  contract  for  any  part 
of  a  mine's  output  less  than  the  whole, 
and  it  is  entitled  to  get  its  fuel  coal  first, 
for  without  fuel  it  cannot  haul  even 
commercial  coal  to  its  destination,  to 
say  nothing  of  complying  with  its  obli- 
gations to  the  public  at  large;  but  in  all 
its  acts  it  must  deal  even-handed  justice 
in  the  matter  of  car  distribution.  If  a 
mine  contracts  to  furnish  only  a  part  of 
its  output  to  the  railroad  for  fuel,  and 
if  the  filling  of  its  contract  with  the  rail- 
road calls  for  its  full  pro  rata  of  cars, 
or  more,  then  it  should  not  receive  other 
cars  for  commercial  shipments.  If  such 
a  mine,  in  filling  its  contract  to  supply 
fuel  coal  to  the  railroad,  does  not  ex- 
haust its  equitable  pro  rata  of  cars,  then 
cars  should  be  given  it  for  commercial 
shipments  sufficient  to  complete  its  full 
pro  rata  share  of  all  available  cars. 
Royal  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Suthern  Ry. 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  440,  448. 

III.     ASSIGNMENT    AND    DISCRIMINA- 
TION. 

C.     Removal    of    Discrimination. 

§27.     Effect. 

(a)  Under  the  complaint  of  a  mine 
o.wne-r  at  Virden,  111.,  it  appeared  that 
defendant  supplied  sufficient  cars  and 
that  any  apparent  shortage  was  due  to 
the  practice  by  complainant  of  storing 
small  coal  in  unbilled  cars.  Defendant 
served  mines  producing  varying  qualities 
of  coal  in  five  different  states.  It  never 
established  any  rating  for  distribution 
of  the  different  mines  upon  any  part  of 
its  system.  The  evidence  showed  that, 
with  the  exception  of  the  inquiry  in  ques- 
tion,  no   complaint   had   ever  been   filed 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  §28   (a)— §30 


123 


ly  any  of  its  coal  operators  on  the 
round  of  discrimination  and  but  few 
omplaints  on  the  ground  of  insufii- 
ient  supply  of  cars.  HELD,  in  view 
f  the  fact  that  to  establish  mine 
atings  and  a  system  of  car  dis- 
ribution  for  all  the  different  collieries 
erved  by  it  would  be  a  complex  and  dif- 
icult  task,  defendant  was  not  required 

0  to  do  in  the  absence  of  a  probable 
uture  discrimination.     Traer  v.  C.  B.  & 

1  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  165,  168. 

V.     CONTRACTS  FOR  CAR  SUPPLY. 


28. 


n   General. 


(a)  A  contract  with  the  shipper  by 
i^hich  a  carrier  binds  itself  to  furnish 
,  specific  number  of  cars,  at  specific 
imes  and  places,  is  not  contrary  to  public 
olicy  so  long  as  its  provisions  do  not 
equire  the  supply  of  cars  to  the  shipper 
n  such  a  way  as  to  discriminate  against 
ither  shippers.  Oregon  R.  R.  &  Navi- 
gation Co.  V.  Dumas,  181  Fed.  781,  785. 

(b)  The  Commission  recognizes  the 
ight  of  a  railroad  company  to  contract 
I'ith  a  particular  operator  for  its  fuel 
upply;  it  recognizes  the  rights  of  a  con- 
lecting  line  also  to  do  this;  and  each 
aay  send  its  cars  to  those  mines  to  the 
sxclusion  of  other  mines.  It  also  insists 
hat  the  owner  of  private  cars  is  entitled 
o  their  exclusive  use.  But  in  each  case 
t  holds  that  all  such  cars  must  be 
:ounted  against  the  distributive  share  of 
he  mine  receiving  them.  Hillsdale  Coal 
&  Coke  Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C. 
156,  3G4. 

(c)  Defendant  applied  its  system  of 
ar  distribution  and  ratings  thereunder 
o  three  mines  not  located  on  its  lines, 
)ut  which  it  reached  through  switching 
connections  with  other  railroads,  and 
vith  which  it  had  no  fuel  contracts,  and 
it  a  time  when  it  was  unable  to  supply 
he  full  demand  for  cars  upon  its  own 
ines.  HELD,  such  practice  was  unlaw- 
ul.  The  carrier  owes  a  special  duty  to 
shippers  who  are  entirely  dependent 
ipon  it  for  transportation  facilities.  It 
nay  send  its  equipment  from  its  line  for 
he  things  that  are  necessary  and  es- 
sential for  its  own  operation,  such  right 
arising  from  considerations  of  public 
30licy,  which  recognizes  the  duty  of  a 
carrier  to  operate  its  line,  and  being 
3redicated  on  necessity  and  not  on  the 
carrier's  right  of  private  contract.  Traer 
■i.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  451,  456. 

(d)  If  a  carrier  and  a  mine  owner 
make  a  contract  for  the  fuel  supply  of 


the  carrier  which  does  violence  to  the 
Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  or  to  the  de- 
cisions of  the  courts,  or  is  opposed  to 
public  policy,  they  are  in  no  better  po- 
sition than  the  parties  to  any  other  con- 
tract which  violates  the  legal  principles 
relating  thereto.  Traer  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R. 
Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  451,  457. 

V.     DUTY  TO  TRANSPORT  CARS. 

§29.     In  General. 

See  Tariffs,   §7   (jj). 

(a)  Cars,  as  well  as  other  property, 
may  be  the  matter  of  carriage  by  a  com- 
mon carrier.  U.  S.  v.  Union  S.  &  T.  Co., 
192  Fed.,  330,  337. 

(b)  Martinsburg,  W.  Va.,  is  located  on 
the  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  and  Bakerton  and  In- 
gle are  located  short  distances  east  of 
Martinsburg  on  said  line.  The  C.  V.  R.  R. 
extends  north  and  south  through  Mar- 
tinsburg, and  Bunker  Hill,  W.  Va.,  is  lo- 
cated on  it  10  miles  south  of  Martinsburg. 
Complainant  owned  lime  quarries  at  Mar- 
tinsburg, Bakerton,  and  Ingle.  Its  com- 
petitors owned  similar  quarries  at  Bun- 
ker Hill.  For  some  years  the  C.  V.  R.  R. 
and  its  connections  had  extended  the 
same  rates  to  Martinsburg  as  to  Bunker 
Hill  on  lime  and  limestone  shipped  from 
said  points  to  points  in  New  Jersey,  New 
York,  Pennsylvania  and  West  Virginia. 
It  continued  said  rates  from  Bunker  Hill 
but  canceled  same  from  Martinsburg,  re- 
fusing to  receive  at  Martinsburg  com- 
plainant's cars  loaded  at  that  point  and 
those  coming  to  Martinsburg  by  the  B, 
&  O.  R.  R.  from  Bakerton  and  Ingle.  The 
C.  V.  R.  R.  sought  to  justify  such  course 
on  the  ground  that  Martinsburg  was  am- 
ply served  by  the  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  and  its 
connections,  which  reached  the  points  of 
destination  in  question,  and  that  defend- 
ant C.  V.  R.  R.  wished  to  develop  the  in- 
dustry at  Bunker  Hill.  HELD,  the  C.  V. 
R.  R.  and  its  connections  must  receive 
complainant's  cars  loaded  at  Martins- 
burg, and  those  loaded  at  Bakerton  and 
Ingle  tendered  to  the  C.  V.  R.  R.  at 
Martinsburg,  and  transport  them  at  the 
same  rates  accorded  to  Bunker  Hill. 
Standard  Lime  &  Stone  Co.  v.  C.  V.  R. 
R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  620,  626. 

§30.     Interchange  of  Cars. 

See  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §2  (c) ; 
Interstate  Commerce,  §4  (I),  (m), 
(n);  Switch  Tracks  and  Switching. 
§7  (d),  (o);  Terminal  Facilities,  §3 
(a);  Through  Routes  and  Joint 
Rates,  §1   (e),  §11   (1)   (s). 


124 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  S30  (a)— §32  (c) 


(a)  A  carrier  generally  has  no  right 
to  send  empty  cars  off  its  line  until  it 
has  furnished  sufficient  cars  to  mines  on 
its  lines,  Colorado  Coal  Traffic  Ass'n  v. 
D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  458,  460. 

(aa)  Carriers  are  required  to  make 
reasonable  rules  and  regulations  with 
respect  to  the  exchange,  interchange, 
and  return  of  cars  used  upon  through 
routes  and  for  the  operation  of  such 
through  routes,  and  where  they  have 
failed  in  this  respect  the  Commission  is 
empowered  to  determine  the  individual  or 
joint  regulation  or  practice  that  is  just, 
fair,  and  reasonable.  Missouri  &  Illinois 
Coal  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C  39, 
49. 

(b)  Railroads  are  required  under  the 
Act  to  serve  the  through  routes  which 
they  have  established  with  other  carriers 
without  respect  to  the  fact  that  in  ren- 
dering such  service  their  equipment  may 
be  carried  beyond  their  own  lines.  Mis- 
souri &  Illinois  Coal  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  39,  44. 

(c)  The  duty  of  the  initial  carrier  to 
furnish  equipment  for  a  shipment  which 
moves  on  to  other  lines  is  universally 
recognized,  and  in  cases  where  that  is 
impracticable  or  deemed  unwise,  the 
carrier  is  assumed  to  bear  the  burden 
of  the  transfer  from  the  equipment  of 
one  line  to  that  of  another.  Missouri 
&  Illinois  Coal  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  39,  46. 

(d)  Defendant  ca  'ier  had  suffered 
from  the  acts  of  connecting  carriers, 
which  seized  defendarVs  coal  cars  in 
time  of  shortage  and  refused  to  return 
them.  Defendant  established  an  em- 
bargo and  refused  to  supply  cars  for 
shipments  from  points  on  its  own  to 
points  on  connecting  lines  to  which  de- 
fendant had  established  through  routes 
and  joint  rates.  Defendant  took  this 
course  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  lo- 
cal traffic  on  its  own  line.  HELD,  that 
the  embargo  was  unlawful,  as  the  rt*il- 
roads  under  the  Act  were  united  into  a 
national  system,  were  required  to  estab- 
lish ard  keep  open  through  routes  and 
furnish  the  necessary  facilities  there- 
for, and  it  was  the  duty  of  defendant 
to  establish  such  rules  and  regulations 
with  other  carriers  as  would  result  in 
the  prompt  return  of  cars  to  its  own 
line.  Missouri  &  Illinois  Coal  Co.  v.  I.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  39,  47. 


§31.     Private  Cars. 

See    Supra,    §4;    Infra,    §32;    Common 
Carrier,   §6. 

(a)  A  carrier  may  no  doubt  lawfully 
refuse  to  carry  certain  classes  of  private 
equipment,  but  it  may  not  distinguish 
between  private  cars  that  are  owned  by 
negroes  and  private  cars  that  are  owneii 
by  whites,  nor  may  it  discriminate  be- 
tween private  cars  that  are  owned  by 
Armour  &  Co.  and  private  cars  of  the 
same  class  that  are  owned  by  any  other 
concern.  Rehearing  denied.  Chappelle 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  456,  457. 

§32.     Rates  on  Private  Cars. 

(a)  A  rate  on  a  "combination  car"  is 
inapplicable  to  a  private  baggage  car  con- 
taining a  stove.  Chappelle  v.  L.  &  N.  R. 
R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  56,  58. 

(b)  Minimum  rates  fixed  by  the  L. 
&  N.,  C.  of  G.,  I.  C.  and  A.  C.  L.  R.  Rs. 
of  $25  for  each  passenger  or  combination 
car,  and  $10  for  a  baggage  car  accom- 
panying a  passenger  car  of  theatrical 
troupes,  appears  to  be  reasonable  so  far 
as  it  applies  to  transportation  in  the 
South  where  rates  appear  to  be  gener- 
ally for  this  service  on  a  higher  basis 
than  in  other  sections  of  the  country. 
Chappelle  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  G.  C. 
56,  59. 

(c)  Complainant,  owner  of  a  theatri- 
cal troupe  which  gives  its  performance 
under  a  tent,  carries  the  same  with  him 
with  the  necessary  poles  and  seats.  He 
also  provides  two  cars,  one  a  Pullman 
sleeper  and  the  other  a  baggage  car,  in- 
to which  he  places  his  equipment.  Tariffs 
of  defendants  provided  that  tent,  poles, 
etc.,  used  by  circuses  and  performances 
out-of-doors  shall  be  treated  as  freight, 
while  the  tariffs  permitted  the  parapher- 
nalia of  other  theatrical  troupes  to  be 
carried  as  baggage.  HELD,  there  ap- 
pears to  be  no  difficulty  whatever  in 
loading  these  articles  into  an  ordinary 
baggage  car  and  there  is  no  transporta- 
tion reason  for  a  classification  of  theat- 
rical equipment  which  is  so  intense  that 
it  turns  upon  the  question  whether  it  is 
to  be  used  in  an  out-of  door  performance 
or  an  indoor  performance,  and  that  if 
the  paraphernalia  can  be  loaded  into  an 
ordinary  baggage  car  it  shall  be  moved 
as  part  of  the  baggage  under  the  rules 
governing  the  movement  of  private  bag- 
gage and  passenger  cars.  Chappelle  v. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  56,  58. 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  §32y2— §34   (b) 


125 


.     REMEDIES  AND  DAMAGES. 

12/2-     In   General. 

See    Reparation,   §3    (a),   §19    (t),    (u), 
§21    (d),   V. 

13.     Action  at  Law. 


See      Actions      at 
Court,   §1    (a). 


Law:      Commerce 


(a)  A  party  claiming  to  be  injured  by 
discriminatory    rule    for    the    distribu- 

)n  of  coal  cars  cannot  maintain  in  a 
urt  of  law  an  action  for  the  recovery 
damages  before  the  Interstate  Com- 
3rce  Commission  has  investigated  the 
se  and  determined  by  its  report  that 
e  rule  is  or  was  discriminatory,  and 
is  is  true  even  though  the  action  at 
^  is  not  begun  until  after  the  rule  has 
>en  canceled  by  the  carrier.  Morris- 
le  Coal  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co., 
3    Fed.    929,    934,    938. 

(b)  A  carrier  is  liable  in  an  action  at 
w  for  refusing  to  furnish  cars  for  the 
ipment  of  cross-ties  while  at  the  same 
ne  furnishing  cars  to  others  for  the 
terstate  shipment  of  other  freight, 
nerican  Tie  &  Timber  Co.  v.  K.  C.  S. 
r.  Co.,  175  Fed.  28,  31. 

(c)  It  appeared  that  at  an  expense  of 
000  complainant  had  constructed  a  tip- 
i  at  its  mine  No.  2  and  also  a  siding 
nnecting  it  with  what  is  known  as  the 
uller  Run  tracks,"  a  road  about  1  mile 
ig  extending  from  the  defendant's  line 
mines  from  which  shipments  had  been 
ide  for  a  number  of  years,  but  which 
the  time  seemed  to  have  been  closed, 
om  its  mine  No.  2  the  complainant  was 
idy  to  make  shipments  in  April,  1903, 
t  the  siding,  as  it  asserts,  was  spiked 
wn  by  the  defendant  and  kept  in  that 
idition  for  about  19  months.  Requests 
re  made  by  the  complainant  from 
ne  28  to  July  31,  1903,  for  cars  enough 

ship  100  tons  of  coal  per  day  from 
It  mine,  but  no  cars  were  furnished  by 
3  defendants  until  Jan.  17,  1905,  and 
m  only  after  mandamus  proceedings 
d  been  instituted  in  the  court.  The 
tendant's  failure  to  supply  cars  for 
It  mine  while  supplying  cars  for  other 
nes  in  the  district  was  one  of  the  dis- 
minations  alleged  in  the  complaint, 
hat  reason  it  had  for  refusing  or  fail- 
;  to  set  cars  there  was  not  satisfactorily 
plained  of  record,  but  for  some  reason 
o  not  explained  the  complainant  al- 
ved  the  matter  to  rest  in  that  condi- 
n  for  many  months  without  taking 
Y    steps    against    the     defendant    and 


without  even  renewing  its  demand  for 
cars  so  far  as  the  record  discloses. 
HELD,  it  is  not  clear  that  the  alleged 
closing  of  that*siding  by  the  defendant 
can  fairly  be  regarded  as  a  basis  for  a 
charge  of  discrimination;  it  has  more  the 
character  of  a  tort  or  a  wrongful  viola- 
tion of  the  defendant's  general  duty  to 
the  complainant  as  a  common  carrier, 
for  which  an  appropriate  action  in  the 
courts  would  doubtless  lie  to  recover  any 
damages  thus  sustained.  Hillsdale  Coal 
&  Coke  Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
35G,  3G7. 

(d)  In  an  action  against  a  carrier 
for  failing  to  furnish  cars,  founded  upon 
the  carrier's  common  law  duty,  the  suit 
is  not  one  to  enforce  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Act,  and  although  the  damages 
arise  by  the  act  of  a  carrier  engaged  in 
interstate  commerce  with  respect  to  ship- 
ments intended  to  be  interstate,  a  state 
court  has  jurisdiction.  Pittsburgh  C.  C. 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Wood  (Ind.,  1908), 
84  N.  E.  1009,  1012. 

§34.     Defenses. 

See    Courts,    §2. 

(a)  In  a  suit  for  damages  by  a  shipper 
for  the  refusal  of  defendant  carriers  to 
furnish  cars  and  transport  cross-ties,  de- 
fendants set  up  that  they  had  on  file  with 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  no 
published  rates  on  cross-ties.  Defend- 
ants' tariffs  so  on  file  did,  however,  con- 
tain interstate  rates  on  "lumber,  all 
kinds,"  of  24c.  No  specific  rate  on  cross- 
ties  was  included  in  these  tariffs.  HELD, 
the  published  rates  on  lumber  were  ap- 
plicable to  cross-ties  and  the  defense  set 
up  was  not  valid.  American  Tie  &  Tim- 
ber Co.  V.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  175  Fed.  28, 
32. 

(b)  A  carrier  cannot  give  a  shipper 
a  preference  in  car  distribution  in  order 
that  it  may  profit  thereby;  neither  can 
it  give  the  shipper  a  preference  in  order 
that  the  shipper  may  profit  thereby,  and, 
when  called  upon  by  an  individual  ship- 
per for  full  car  service,  the  only  defense 
which  the  carrier  can  interpose  is  that 
the  supply  which  it  has  furnished  is  suf- 
ficient for  normal  demands,  and  that  in 
times  of  stress  it  has  fairly  and  impartial- 
ly prorated  all  of  its  car  equipment.  (Mc- 
Dowell, J.,  dissenting.)  U.  S.  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  Co.,  165  Fed.  113,  126. 


126 


CARS  AND  CAR  SUPPLY,  §35   (a)— CLAIMS,  §1   (a) 


§35.     Res  Adjudicata. 
See   Evidence,   V. 

(a)  A  suit  to  determine  a  question  of 
car  distribution  brougWl  between  one 
shipper  and  a  carrier,  does  not  render 
the  question  res  adjudicata  with  respect 
to  other  shippers  who  were  not  parties 
to  the  proceedings,  and  had  no  oppor- 
tunity to  be  heard  therein,  and  such 
shippers  may  raise  the  same  questions  in 
a  mandamus  suit  against  the  same  car- 
rier. (McDowell,  J.,  dissenting.)  U.  S. 
V.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  165  Fed.  113,  124. 

(b)  A  certain  coal  company  instituted, 
under  section  23  of  the  Act,  proceedings 
in  a  United  States  Circuit  Court  for  the 
purpose  of  determining  whether  the  B. 
&.  O.  R.  R.  was  according  a  fair  and 
equal  distribution  of  car  service  upon  the 
Monongahela  division.  Appellant  coal 
company  appeared  at  the  hearing  with 
counsel,  but  was  not  a  party  relator  to 
the  suit,  and  did  not  agree  with  the  B. 
&  O.  R.  R.  to  make  the  suit  a  test  as 
to  questions  of  car  distribution  generally 
in  effect  in  the  territory  involved.  The 
Circuit  Court  denied  the  mandamus,  and 
the  case  was  appealed  to  and  pending  in 
the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals.  Appellant 
filed  a  complaint  with  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission,  as  to  car  distribution 
on  the  Pittsburg  divisions  of  the  B.  & 
O.  R.  R.,  covering  not  only  the  question 
of  distribution  involved  in  the  mandamus 
suit,  but  also  complaining  that  the  car 
supply  of  the  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  w)as  inadequate, 
and  that  there  was  an  unequal  distri- 
bution of  car  service  between  the  Mo- 
nongahela division  and  the  Pittsburg  di- 
vision. HELD,  the  appellant  was  not 
precluded  from  prosecuting  its  complaint 
before  the  Commission  on  the  ground 
of  res  adjudicata,  since  the  questions  in- 
volved were  not  identical,  and  since  the 
remedy  of  mandamus  afforded  by  section 
23  of  the  Act  was  cumulative  and  not 
exclusive.  Merchants'  Coal  Co.  v.  Fair- 
mont Coal  Co.,  160  Fed.  769,  778. 

§36.     Evidence. 

See  Supra,  §9;  Evidence,  §39,  §63  (a), 
(e) ;  Procedure  Before  Commission, 
§17    (d). 

(a)  Where  a  defendant  carrier  was 
shown  to  have  failed  to  supply  complain- 
ant coal  operators  their  just  proportion 
of  cars,  complainants  attempted  to  show 
that  if  they  had  been  properly  supplied, 
had  had  sufficient  laborers,  had  sold  all 
the  coal  so  mined  and  shipped  it  at  about, 
the  average  mine  price  for  the  period  in 


question,  they  would  have  made  a  pro 
on  a  certain  number  of  supposed  ton^ 
coal  equal  to  the  difference  between  tl 
said  average  price  per  ton  and  the  es 
mated  cost  of  producing  the  coal.  C 
this  evidence  complainants  sought  re 
aration.  HELD,  the  evidence  was  t 
vague  and  indefinite.  Reparation  denie 
Royal  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Southern  R 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  440,  448. 

CARTAGE. 

See  Drayage  Charges;  Demurrage, 
(e);  Tariffs,  §4  (i);  Track  Storat 
I    (b). 

(a)  Cartage  may,  of  course,  be  fi 
nished  as  an  accessorial  service  by  tl 
delivering  carrier,  and  it  may  char 
therefor  as  a  distinct  and  separate  t( 
minal  service,  but  such  cartage  presu 
poses  delivery  upon  the  team  tracks 
the  carrier  and  is  supplementary  therel 
Associated  Jobbers  of  Los  Angeles  v. 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  310,  316. 


CLAIMS. 

I.     WHEN      STATUTE      OF      LIMIT 
TIONS  RUNS. 
§1.     In  general. 
§2.     Claims  accruing  before  Av 

28,  1906. 
§3.     Date  of  delivery  of  shipmei 
§4.     Date  of  payment  of  charge 
§5.     Date  of  amending  claim. 

II.  INFORMAL   COMPLAINTS. 

§6.     Effect  of  informal  letter. 
§7.     Necessity     of     formal     coi 

plaint. 
§8.     Requisites  of  informal  coi 

plaint. 

III.  PRESENTATION     TO     CARRIER 

§  9.     Advisability. 
§10.     Regulations. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  VII;  Allc 
ances,  VI ;  Cars  and  Car  Supp 
VI;  Passenger  Fares  and  Faciiitii 
IV;    Reparation. 

I.     WHEN  STATUTE  OF  LIMITATIO> 

RUNS. 

CROSS     REFERENCES. 

See  Allowances,  §14  (e) ;  Crimes,  §i 
Overcharges,    §7;    Reparation,    §7. 

§1.     In   General. 

See  Allowances,  §14   (e). 
(a)     The  limitation  of  time  upon  claiE 
prescribed  in  section  16  of  the  Act  op€ 
ates  without  the  aid  of  pleading.    Arka 


CLAIMS,  §1  (aa)— §3  (b) 


127 


sas  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  193  Fed.  667, 
673. 

(aa)  Claims  filed  with  the  Commis- 
sion since  August  28,  1907,  must  have 
accrued  within  two  years  prior  to  the 
date  when  they  are  filed;  otherwise 
they  are  barred  by  the  statute.  Claims 
filed  on  or  before  Aug.  28,  1907,  are 
not  affected  by  the  two  years'  limita- 
tion. Rule  10,  Conf.  Rulings  Bulle- 
tin, No.  5,  adhered  to.  Fels  &  Co.  v. 
P.  R.  R.   Co.,   23  I.   C.  C.   483,  487. 

(b)  The  Commission  has  no  juris- 
diction over  claims  barred  by  section 
16.  Anaconda  Copper  Mining  Co.  v.  C. 
&   E.   R.    R.    Co.,    19   I.   C.   C.   592,   594. 

(bb)  Under  the  clause  in  the  Act  pre- 
scribing the  limitation  period,  the  word 
"damages"  refers  to  the  money  value  of 
any  loss  caused  by  any  violation  of  the 
Act.  In  re  Accrual  of  Cause  of  Action, 
15  I.  C.  C.  201. 

(c)  The  duty  of  the  carrier  is  to  charge 
and  collect  the  lawful  rate,  and  when 
more  is  collected,  the  excess  should  be 
refunded,  and  when  less,  the  deficiency 
should  be  collected.  In  re  Accrual  of 
Cause  of  Action,  15  I.  C.  C.  201,  204. 

§2.     Claims  Accruing  before  Aug.  28,  1906. 

(a)  Any  claim  accruing  before  or  af- 
ter August  28,  1906,  may  be  presented 
within  two  years  from  the  time  it  ac- 
crued,  and   claims  accruing  before  Aug. 

28,  1906,  may  be  presented  within  one 
year  from  that  date,  even  though  accru- 
ing more  than  two  years  previous  to  the 
date  named.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dick- 
erson,  191  Fed.   705,  711. 

(aa)  Where  a  complaint  is  filed 
within  one  year  from  the  passage  of 
the  Act  of  1906,  recovery  of  damages  is 
not  limited  to  causes  of  action  that 
accrued  within  two  years  prior  to 
filing  of  complaint;  but  if  complaint  is 
filed  more  than  one  year  subsequent 
to  the  passage  of  that  law,  it  is  subject 
to  the  two-year  limitation.  Meeker  & 
Co.  V.  L.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  480, 
482. 

(b)  As  to  a  claim  filed  within  one 
year  after  the  passage  of  the  law  of  June 

29,  1906,  the  claim  is  not  limited  to 
causes  of  action  which  accrue  within 
two  years  prior  to  filing  the  complaint, 
but  the  statute  of  limitations  of  the  state 
where  the  cause  of  action  accrued,  con- 
trols. Sondheimer  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  606.  610. 


(c)  Where  shipments  are  made  in  No- 
vember and  December,  1905,  freight 
charges  paid  December  26,  1905,  and  com- 
plaint filed  September  5,  1907,  the  claim 
is  not  barred  by  the  statute  of  limita- 
tions under  the  amendment  to  the  Act 
approved  June  29,  1906.  Woodward  & 
Dickerson  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.  9,  10. 

(d)  Congress  intended  to  give  one 
year  within  which  there  might  be  pre- 
sented to  the  Commission  claims  valid 
prior  to  the  approval  of  the  law,  but 
which  would  thereupon  have  been  barred 
without  notice.  Woodward  &  Dickerson 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  9,  10. 

(e)  Claims  in  which  the  cause  of  ac- 
tion accrued  prior  to  August  28,  1906, 
are  not  deprived  of  the  two  years'  privi- 
lege in  the  statute  where  filed  prior  to 
August  29,  1907.  Nollenberger  v.  M.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  595,  598. 

(f)  Under  section  16  of  the  Hepburn 
Act  any  claim,  whether  the  cause  of  ac- 
tion upon  which  it  is  based  accrued  prior 
or  subsequent  to  the  effective  date  of  the 
Act  may  be  presented  to  the  Commission 
within  two  years  from  the  date  of  the 
accrual  thereof;  and  as  to  causes  of  ac- 
tion   that    accrued    prior    to    August    28, 

1906,  the  claim  may  be  presented  at  any 
time   prior   to   midnight   of    August     28, 

1907,  although  such  cause  of  action  may 
have  accrued  more  than  two  years  prior 
thereto,  the  intent  of  the  proviso  being 
to  prevent  such  a  construction  of  the 
preceding  part  of  the  section  as  to  cut  off 
claims  upon  previously  accrued  causes 
of  action  as  to  which  the  two  years  had 
already  run,  or  so  nearly  so,  that  it 
would  be  impracticable  for  the  claimants 
to  present  their  claims  within  such 
period.  Nicola,  Stone  &  Myers  Co.  v. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  199,  206. 

§3.     Date  of  Delivery  of  Shipment. 

(a)  The  limitation  period  prescribed 
In  section  16  of  the  Act  begins  to  run  at 
the  time  of  the  delivery  of  the  shipment, 
since  the  shipper's  cause  of  action  arises 
from  the  existence  of  the  unreasonable 
rate,  not  from  the  payment  of  the  ex- 
cessive charge.  (Carland  and  Hunt,  JJ., 
dissenting.)  Arkansas  Fertilizer  Co. 
V.  U.  S.,  193  Fed.  667,  670. 

(b)  The  statute  of  limitations  runs 
against  a  claim  for  reparation  on  dis- 
criminatory freight  charges,  on  shipments 
delivered  to  complainant  more  than  two 


128 


CLAIMS,  §3  (c)— §6  (a) 


years  prior  to  the  filing  of  the  formal 
complaint  for  reparation.  St.  Louis  Blast 
Furnace  Co.  v.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  215, 
216. 

(c)  Complainant  made  shipments  of 
petroleum  in  October,  1905,  and  at  inter- 
vals thereafter  to  December,  1907.  The 
charges  originally  assessed  were  paid 
either  in  advance  or  promptly  upon  de- 
livery. Subsequently  undercharges  were 
discovered  and  the  additional  charges 
were  collected  in  July  and  August,  1908. 
The  complaint  asking  reparation  for  un- 
reasonable charges  was  filed  May  9,  1910, 
within  two  years  from  tlie  time  the  addi- 
tional charges  were  collected  but  more 
than  two  years  after  delivery  of  the  ship- 
ments were  made.  Complainant  contended 
that  the  cause  of  action  did  not  accrae 
until  the  additional  charges  were  collected 
and  therefore  that  its  petition  was  filed  in 
due  time.  HELD,  that  the  period  of  two 
years  within  which  the  Commission  has 
jurisdiction  to  entertain  claims  for  dam- 
ages runs  from  the  time  when  it  becomes 
the  legal  duty  of  the  carrier  to  collect 
and  of  the  shipper  to  pay  the  lawful 
charges,  and  that  the  obligation  rests 
upon  the  carrier  to  collect  and  upon  the 
shipper  to  pay  such  lawful  charges  from 
the  time  of  delivery  of  the  shipment. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Standard  Oil  Co. 
v.  C.  T.  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  460,  461. 

(d)  The  fact  that  additional  charges 
were  later  collected  did  not  prevent  the 
running  of  the  statute  from  the  time 
when  payment  should  have  been  required. 
Shoecraft  &  Son  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
L  C.  C.  492. 

(e)  A  reparation  claim  for  a  straight 
overcharge  is  barred  by  section  16, 
though  part  of  the  charges  have  been 
paid  within  two  years.  Shoecraft  & 
Son  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  492. 

(f)  On  shipments  delivered  by  the 
shipper  to  the  carrier  on  January  29, 
1906,  and  April  11,  1906,  a  complaint  for 
reparation  was  not  made  until  January 
6,  1909.  The  freight  charges  were  paid 
January  30,  1907.  HELD,  the  claim  was 
barred  under  section  16  of  the  Act,  since 
the  two-year  limitation  period  began  to 
run  at  the  time  when  the  shipment  was 
delivered.  Blinn  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  430,  435. 

(g)  Where  delivery  of  the  shipment 
occurred  more  than  two  years  before 
the  complaint  for  reparation  was  filed, 
it  was  barred   by   statute.     South  West 


Smelting  &  Refining  Co.  v.  E.   P.  &  1 
E.    Ry.    Co.,    Unrep.    Op.    280. 

§4.     Date  of  Payment  of  Charges. 

(a)  Where  shipments  are  made,  D 
cember,  1906,  and  the  expense  bills  pai 
on  January  12th  and  24th,  1907,  the  tw 
year  limitation  period  begins  to  run  fro] 
the  latter  dates.  Marshall  &  Michi 
Grain  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  1 

I.  C.  C.  385. 

(b)  A  cause  of  action  accrues  und( 
the  Act  on  the  date  the  freight  charge 
are  paid.  Marshall  and  Michel  Grai 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  &.  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  < 
385;  Kile  &  Morgan  Co.  v.  Deepwat( 
Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  235;  Pleasant  Hi 
Luniber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
C.  C.  532,  533;  West  Texas  Fuel  Co. 
T.  &  P.  Ry  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  443. 

(c)  In  complaints  for  the  recovery  ( 
damages  caused  by  charges  of  rates  u: 
just  or  unreasonable  or  unjustly  di 
criminatory  or  unduly  preferential  or  pre 
udicial,  the  cause  of  action  accrues  whe 
the  payment  is  made.  In  any  other  cor 
plaints  for  the  recovery  of  damages  f( 
alleged  violation  of  the  interstate  cor 
merce  laws  of  which  the  Commissic 
has  jurisdiction,  the  cause  of  action  a 
crues  when  the  carrier  does  the  unlawfi 
act  or  fails  to  do  what  the  law  require 
on,  account  of  which  damages  ai 
claimed.  In  Re  Accrual  of  Cause  i 
Action,   15   I.   C.   C.   201,   204. 

§5.     Date  of  Amending  Claim. 

(a)  Where  the  statute  of  limitatior 
is  involved,  the  date  of  filing  of  tt 
amended  claim  is  controlling.  Virgini 
Carolina  Chemical  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  I 
Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  1,  2. 

(b)  Where  a  claim  of  reparation  is  n( 
filed  with  the  original  complaint  but 
filed  at  a  later  date  by  amendment,  a 
plication  of  the  statute  of  limitations 
to  be  determined  as  of  the  date  of  filir 
such  amendment.    East  St.  Louis  Walm 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  of  Texas,  17 
C.   C.   582,  584. 

II.  INFORMAL    COMPLAINTS. 

See     Reparation,    §22. 
§6.     Effect  of  Informal   Letter. 

(a)  An  informal  complaint,  containin 
sufficient  information,  when  presented  1 
the  Commission  within  the  two  years  pr 
scribed  by  the  statute,  stops  the  runnir 
of  the   statute  of  limitations.     Beekma 


CLAIMS,  §6   (aa)  — (f) 


129 


Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
27G;  Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S. 
F.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  270,  272;  Young- 
blood  V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  5G9, 
570;  Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v.  St.  L. 
S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  67;  Fathauer 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C. 
517,  520;  Otis  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  G.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  502,  503;  Hartman 
Furniture  &  Carpet  Co.  v.  W.  C.  Ry  Co.. 
L5  L  C.  C.  530,  531;  Duluth  Log.  Co.  v. 
M.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C  627,  630. 

(aa)  Within  the  limitation  period 
complaints  were  tiled  with  the  Commis- 
sion, which  were  returned  to  complain- 
ant because  of  defects  in  form  and  sub- 
stance. After  two  years  had  elapsed 
complaint  was  again  made.  HELD, 
that  the  case  is  within  the  ruling  of  the 
Commission;  that  an  informal  complaint 
stops  the  running  of  the  statute  and 
that  the  act  of  the  secretary  of  the 
Commission  in  returning  the  papers 
with  the  suggestion  that  the  matter 
was  one  for  amicable  adjustment  ought 
not  to  operate  against  the  complainant. 
Liberty  Mills  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
L    C.    C.    182,   183. 

(b)  Within  two  years  from  the  date  of 
delivery  of  shipments  of  cattle  a  firm  of 
commission  merchants  who  were  the 
consignees  filed  with  the  Commission  an 
informal  claim  for  reparation,  on  ac- 
count of  the  collection  by  defendants  of 
a  rate  alleged  to  have  been  unreasonable. 
The  claim  was  stated  with  sufficient  par- 
ticularity to  avoid  the  operation  of  the 
limitation  provided  by  law,  showing  the 
consignor,  consignee  and  the  railroad  bill- 
ing. Upon  further  investigation  of  the 
matter  it  was  found  that  the  freight 
charges  were  actually  paid  by  the  con- 
signor, complainant  in  this  proceeding, 
whose  petition  was  not  filed  within  two 
years  from  the  time  the  cause  of  action 
accrued.  HELD,  the  action  taken  by  the 
consignees  put  defendants  upon  notice 
that  they  were  charged  with  the  collec- 
tion of  an  unreasonable  rate  and  that  the 
informal  presentation  of  the  claim  by  the 
consignee  was  sufficient  to  arrest  the 
running  of  the  statute  and  the  consignor 
is  entitled  to  consideration  of  his  com- 
plaint upon  the  merits.  Youngblood  v. 
T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  569,  570. 

(c)  On  a  carload  of  cottonseed  meal 
and  hulls  and  one  of  cottonseed  hulls, 
shipped  to  Memphis,  Tenn.,  from  Little 
Rock  and  Pine  Bluff,  Ark.,  respectively, 
complainant  was  assessed  a  rate  of  10c. 


Though  formal  complaint  was  not  filed 
until  after  the  running  of  the  statute  of 
limitations  provided  in  section  16  of  the 
Act,  a  complaint,  informal  only  in  the 
sense  that,  considered  as  a  pleading,  it 
was  altogether  inartificial,  and  showing 
date  of  shipment,  actual  weight,  and  the 
rate  collected,  coupled  with  a  claim  of  a 
4c  overcharge,  was  filed  before  said 
statute  of  limitations  had  run.  HELD, 
following  Kaye  &  Carter  Lumber  Com- 
pany V.  M.  &  L  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  285,  that 
the  informal  complaint  was  a  "complaint 
for  the  recovery  of  damages"  within  the 
meaning  of  section  16  of  the  Act,  suffi- 
cient to  stop  the  running  of  the  statute 
of  limitations.  Memphis  Freight  Bureau 
V.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C  C  67,  69. 

(d)  On  a  shipment  made  Oct.  2,  1906. 
upon   which   charges  were  paid   Oct.  18, 

1906,  complaint  was  filed  Jan.  19,  1909, 
but  the  claim  was  presented  informally 
to  the  Commission  on  Sept.  24,  1908. 
HELD,  the  claim  was  not  barred  by  the 
statute  of  limitations.  Kaye  &  Carter 
Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  &  L  Rv.  Co.,  16  L  C. 
C.  285,  286. 

(e)  On  shipments  made  in  November 
and  December,  1905,  payment  of  freight 
charges  was  made  in  December,  1905. 
September  5,  1907,  complainant  wrote  to 
the  Commission  complaining  of  the  exac- 
tion of  an  unlawful  rate  and  stated  that 
it  had  demanded  reparation  from  defend- 
ant and  its  demands  had  been  ignored. 
HELD,  the  letter  was  sufficient  to  save 
the  claim  from  the  limitation  provision 
of  section  16  of  the  Act.  Woodward  & 
Dickerson  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co..  15  L  C.  C. 
170,  172,  sustained,  187  Fed.  874,  878,  191 
Fed.  705. 

(f)  On  Jan.  23,  1906,  complainant 
shipped  clothing  from  New  York  City  to 
Janesville,  Wis.,  via  the  Erie,  the  Chica- 
go &  Erie,  and  the  C.  &  N.  W.  Rys.  No 
complaint,  formal  or  informal,  was  filed 
against  the  Erie  and  the  Erie  &  Chicago 
Rys.     until     Sept.     24,     1909.       May     1, 

1907,  complainant  filed  an  intended  for 
mal  complaint  against  the  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  alone.  The  Commission  advised  that 
the  complaint  was  faulty  and  suggested 
that  it  make  informal  complaint  to  the 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry..  which  was  immediately 
done.  March  12,  1908,  complainant  called 
the  Commission's  attention  to  the  fact 
that  no  reply  had  been  received  from  the 
C.  &.  N.  W.  Ry.  and  it  was  then  discov- 
ered that  the  original  file  of  papers  had 
been  lost.  May  15,  1908,  complainant 
furnished  duplicate  of  original  complaint, 


130 


CLAIMS,  §7  (a)— §8  (b) 


which  was  brought  to  the  attention  of 
the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  On  May  27,  1908, 
the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  responded  denying 
liability.  Complainant  was  advised  of 
this  and  filed  complaint  Sept.  24, 
1909.  HELD,  with  respect  to  the  Brie 
and  the  Chicago  &  Erie  Rys.  the  statute 
of  limitations  had  run,  but  not  so  with 
respect  to  the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Amos 
Rehberg  &  Co.  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I. 
C.  C.  508,  510. 

§7.     Necessity  of   Formal   Complaint. 
See   Reparation,   §21. 

(a)  A  complaint  stating  a  good  cause 
of  action  is  sufficient  to  stop  the  running 
of  the  statute,  though  the  amount  of 
damages  claimed  is  not  set  forth.  Fels 
&  Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  483,  487. 

(aa)  Where  a  claim  has  been  filed 
with  the  Commission  informally  within 
the  statutory  period,  it  is  not  barred  by 
reason  of  the  fact  that  the  formal  com- 
plaint is  filed  after  the  expiration  of 
said  period.  Southern  Bitulithic  Co.  v. 
I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  300. 

(b)  Claims  for  reparation  are  not 
barred  by  the  fact  that  the  formal  com- 
plaints are  filed  after  the  expiration  of 
the  limitation  period  where  informal  com- 
plaints are  filed  prior  to  the.  expiration 
of  said  period.  Larrowe  Milling  Co.  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  548,  551. 

(c)  On  a  shipment  moving  Feb. 
10,  190G,  the  freight  charges  were  paid 
Feb.  28,  1906;  an  informal  complaint 
presented  to  the  Commission,  Jan.  20, 
1908;  and  a  formal  complaint  filed  Aug. 
26,  1908.  HELD,  said  informal  presenta- 
tion was  sufficient  to  stop  the  running 
of  the  statute  and  the  claim  was  not 
barred.  Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L. 
I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  274,  275. 

(d)  Freight  charges  were  paid  July 
19,  1904.  The  claim  was  presented  in 
writing  to  the  Commission  June  13,  1907. 
Upon  advice  of  the  Commission  formal 
petition  was  filed  April  4,  1908.  HELD, 
said  claim  was  not  barred  under  the 
limitation  period  prescribed  by  section  16 
of  the  Act.  Venus  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  136^137. 

(e)  Formal  complaint  not  necessary  to 
bar  running  of  statute  of  limitations. 
Venus  V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
I.   C.  C.  136,  137. 

(f)  The  Act  does  not  specify  the  man- 
ner of  presentation  of  complaints    and  it 


is  therefore  not  essential  that  claims  i 
writing  made  to  the  Commission  shoul 
be  by  a  formal  petition,  as  prescribed  b 
the  Commission's  Rules  of  Practice,  t 
prevent  the  operation  of  the  statute  c 
limitations.  Venus  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  £ 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  136,  137. 

(g)  Where  the  complaint  was  file 
informally  May  21,  1908,  and  formal! 
April  22,  1909,  it  was  not  barred.  Pi( 
neer  Pole  «&  Shaft  Co.  v.  C.  H.  &  I 
Ry.   Co.,   Unrep.   Op.   123. 

(h)  The  complaint  was  filed  wit 
the  Commission  within  two  years  aft( 
the  cause  of  action  accrued,  but  tt 
papers  were  returned  to  the  complai] 
ant  and  the  claim  was  not  again  pr 
sented  to  the  Commission  for  over  or 
year.  Following  Youngblood  v.  T.  &  1 
Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  569,  HELD,  th£ 
the  complaint  was  not  barred.  Arizoi] 
Ry.  Comm.  v.  E.  P.  &  So.  W.  Co.,  Unre] 
Op.   526. 

§8.     Requisites  of  Informal  Complaint. 

(a)  A  letter  addressed  by  a  shipper  1 
the  Commission  setting  forth  in  sul 
stance  all  that  a  formal  complaint  won] 
contain  and  which,  while  not  asking  fc 
a  judgment  for  a  specified  sum,  does  a& 
for  relief  by  way  of  damages  for  tt 
wrongdoing  alleged  in  it,  is  a  sufficier 
petition  to  stop  the  running  of  the  statui 
of  limitations.  Dickerson  v.  L.  &  N.  R; 
Co.,  187  Fed.  874,  878. 

(b)  On  July  23,  1910,  complainant  file 
two  formal  petitions  for  reparation  o 
charges  assessed  on  certain  shipments  ( 
grain  products  milled  in  transit.  The  p 
titions  failed  to  set  out  either  the  poim 
of  origin  or  destination  and  contained  n 
description  of  the  shipments  by  date  c 
otherwise,  but  the  original  inbound  e: 
pense  bills  and  copies  of  the  outbouu 
bills  of  lading  were  attached  to  the  cor 
plaints,  and  the  amount  of  reparatio 
fully  set  forth.  The  secretary  of  tt 
Commission  under  a  misapprehension  r 
turned  the  complaints  with  informatio 
that  the  carriers  could  make  reparatio 
without  any  order  of  the  Commissio] 
Subsequently  the  complaints  were  file 
March  6,  1911,  and  the  statute  of  limit 
tions  was  pleaded,  the  shipments  havir 
moved  from  August  to  December,  190 
HELD,  the  original  filing  of  the  petitioi 
should  be  considered  such  an  inform; 
presentation  of  the  claims  as  stoppe 
the  running  of  the  statute  of  limitation 


CLAIMS,  §8  (c)— §10  (a) 


131 


Liberty  Mills  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L 
C.  C.  182,  183. 

(c)  Although  the  Commission  has 
announced  that  ordinarily  it  will  not 
award  reparation  upon  informal  proceed- 
ings unless  the  complaint  is  filed  or  the 
rate  complained  of  is  reduced  within  six 
months  after  the  traffic  moves,  that  rule 
is  only  an  expression  of  the  administra- 
tive discretion  of  the  Commission  and  is 
confined  to  informal  matters.  It  does  not 
in  any  way  modify  the  rule  heretofore 
made  that  informal  complaints  showing 
the  date  of  shipment,  its  weight,  and  the 
rate  charged  and  collected,  coupled  with 
an  allegation  that  the  rate  assessed  is 
unreasonable,  is  a  sufficient  presentation 
of  a  claim  to  come  within  the  provisions 
of  section  16  of  the  Act.  Riverside  Mills 
V.  Georgia  R.  R.,  20  I.  C.  C.  423,  424. 

(d)  A  letter  received  by  the  Commis- 
sion which  sets  forth  the  precise  nature 
of  the  claim  and  has  attached  to  it  ex- 
pense bills  showing  the  shipments  and 
the  amount  paid  stops  the  running  of 
the  statute  of  limitations.  Gamble-Rob- 
inson Commission  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  114. 

(e)  While  the  Commission  holds  that 
it  is  not  necessary  that  a  formal  petition 
be  filed  in  order  to  stop  the  running  of 
the  statute  of  limitations,  an  informal 
letter  or  other  communication  to  accom- 
plish this  result  must  contain  all  the 
elements  of  the  claim.  Fisk  &  Sons  v. 
B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  19  I.  C.  C.  299,  300. 

(f)  Where  there  is  no  joint  rate  in 
effect  and  charges  are  exacted  in  accord- 
ance with  the  separately  published  tariffs 
of  the  initial  and  intermediate  and  deliv- 
ering carrier  and  the  shipper  fails  to  file 
claim  for  reparation  within  the  statutory 
period,  an  informal  request  filed  by  the 
intermediate  carrier  for  permission  to 
refund  to  the  shipper  the  switching 
charge  exacted  by  it  will  not  serve  to 
prevent  the  claim  for  excessive  charges 
by  the  initial  and  delivering  carriers 
from  being  barred  by  the  statute  of  lim- 
itations. Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C. 
376,  377. 

(g)  An  informal  complaint  directed 
against  a  switching  charge  does  not 
operate  to  stop  the  running  of  the  statute 
against  a  claim  of  unreasonableness  of 
the  through  rate,  to  which  such  switching 
charge    was    incidental.      Acme    Cement 


Plaster  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  376. 

(h)  A  letter  from  a  shipper  to  the 
Commission,  making  inquiry  as  to 
whether  the  shipment  made  by  him  was 
interstate  or  intrastate,  and  containing 
no  complaint  as  to  charges  is  not  suf' 
ficient  to  stop  the  running  of  the  statute 
of  limitations.  George  Henley  v.  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  382,  384. 

(i)  Proof  for  reparation  should  con- 
sist of  a  verified  statement  by  complain- 
ant showing  date  and  weight  of  the 
shipments,  date  of  payment  and  the 
reparation  claimed.  Robertson  Bros.  v. 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  126. 

(j)  Proof  is  necessary  to  establish 
an  informal  claim  for  reparation.  Sun- 
derland Bros.  Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  148;  Robertson  Bros.  v. 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  126. 

III.     PRESENTATION  TO  CARRIERS 

§9.     Advisability. 

(a)  In  cases  involving  no  principle 
and  only  small  amounts,  the  shipper 
should  first  make  his  claim  upon  the 
carrier  for  reparation,  and  thereafter 
place  his  case,  if  necessary,  upon  the  in- 
formal docket.  Lindsay  Bros.  v.  L.  S. 
&  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  284,  285. 

§10.     Regulations. 

(a)  Complainant  is  unincorporated 
and  is  merely  the  business  name  adopted 
by  A.  H.  Bewsher,  its  sole  proprietor. 
Defendant  tendered  to  complainant  a 
voucher  in  the  nature  of  a  sight  draft 
in  settlement  of  a  claim.  Complainant 
signed  the  voucher,  "The  Bewsher  Co., 
by  Bewsher,"  but  payment  was  refused 
because  the  signature  did  not  comply 
with  the  rules  of  the  defendant,  in  that 
the  signature  being  in  the  style  of  a  cor- 
poration, the  party  signing  had  not  af- 
fixed his  initials  or  designated  his  title 
in  the  company.  Complainant  later  added 
the  initials,  but  refused  to  append  any 
title,  and  defendant  continued  to  refuse 
payment.  Complainant  alleged  that  the 
defendant's  rule  is  unjust  and  unreason- 
able. HELD,  the  Commission  would  have 
power  to  prohibit  the  regulation  adopted 
by  the  defendant  if  it  considered  it  un- 
reasonable, but  on  the  record  it  does  not 
so  appear.  Complaint  dismissed.  Bew- 
sher Co.  V.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C  C. 
146,  147. 


132 


CLASS  RATES  (a)— CLASSIFICATION,  §1  (b) 


CLASS  RATES. 

See  Alternative  Rates,  I  (b);  Classi- 
fication, §18  (10)  (a),  §19  (9)  (a); 
Commerce  Court,  §4  (c);  Commod- 
ity Rates,  §2,  §3  (c) ;  Procedure  Be- 
fore Commission,  §2  (bb);  Reason- 
ableness   of    Rates,    §47    (a),    §66. 

(a)  There  is  no  standard  by  which 
class  rates  can  be  exactly  measured, 
and  in  determining  what  is  reasonable 
or  unreasonable  a  considerable  latitude 
must  of  necessity  be  allowed  to  the 
carrier,  Bluefield  Shippers'  Ass'n  v. 
N.    &   W.   Ry.   Co.,   22    L   C.   C.   519,    528. 

(aa)  While  it  may  be  true  that  the 
tendency  should  be  to  eliminate  com- 
modity rates  and  work  more  nearly  to  a 
class  basis,  still  the  rates  of  this  country 
have  been  built  up  upon  a  different 
theory,  and  to  apply  that  theory  would 
be  revolutionary  and  destructive  of  many 
legitimate  business  enterprises.  United 
States  Leather  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
C.  323,  325. 

(b)  Eastbound  distributing  rates  from 
Portland,  Seattle  and  Tacoma,  con- 
structed on  a  mileage  basis,  will  result 
in  a  more  satisfactory  adjustment  than 
the  establishment  of  particular  rates  to 
representative  destinations.  Portland 
Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  O.  R.  R  &  N. 
Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  640,  643. 

(c)  The  Commission  is  disposed  to 
encourage  the  making  of  class  rates 
wherever  practicable,  because  of  their 
tendency  to  uniformity  and  stability.  It 
is  only  in  cases  where  it  clearly  appears 
that  the  inclusion  of  a  given  article  in  a 
class  results  in  unreasonable  charges 
and  a  lower  classification  will  not  meet 
the  demands  of  justice  that  commodity 
rates  are  required  to  be  established. 
Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  30,  35. 

(d)  It  is  generally  recognized  that 
class  rates  on  heavy  commodities  are 
made  to  move  the  more  or  less  limited 
shipments  from  place  to  place,  and  com- 
modity rates  to  move  large,  steady  ship- 
ments. James  &  Abbot  Co.  v.  B.  &  M. 
R.  R.,  17  I.  C.  C.  273,  275. 

CLASSIFICATION. 

I.     RIGHT  OF  CARRIER  TO  ESTAB- 
LISH. 

§1.     In  general 
§2.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 


II.     BASIS  OF  CLASSIFICATION. 

§3.     In  general. 

§4.     Bulk     or     weight     of     com- 
modity. 

§4|/2-  "Knocked       down"       ship- 
ments. 

§5.     C.  L.  and  L.  C.  L.  shipments. 

§6.     Competition. 

§7.     Mixed  carloads, 

§8.     Possibility  of  misbilling. 

§9.     Risk. 

§10.  Use  of  commodity. 

§11.  Value, 
in.     CLASSIFICATION  REGULATIONS. 

§12.  Bulk  shipments  and  owner- 
ship. 

§13.  Loading  and  unloading. 

§14.  Marking  and  addressing. 

§15.  Minimum  charges. 

§16.  Packing. 
IV.     COMPARATIVE  RATINGS. 
A.     Analogous  articles. 

§17.  In  general. 

§18.  Specific   comparisons. 

(1)  Bar  and  band  iron. 

(2)  Cocoa    butter    substi- 
tutes. 

(3)  Coffee  percolators. 

(4)  Earthenware        cruci- 
bles. 

(5)  Iron  and  steel  articles. 

(6)  Motorcycles. 

(7)  Multigraphs. 

(8)  Picture  postcards. 

(9)  Plate  glass. 

(10)  Triplex  cloth. 

(11)  Wire  coat  hooks. 
§19.  Evidence   and   procedure. 

I.     RIGHT    OF    CARRIER    TO    ESTAB- 
LISH. 

§1.     In  General. 

See  Express  Companies,  §13  (d). 

(a)  In  the  absence  of  statutory  inter- 
position and  regulation,  a  carrier  is  en- 
titled to  establish  and  promulgate  rea- 
sonable rules  and  regulations  governing 
the  manner  and  form  in  which  it  will  re- 
ceive such  articles  of  commerce  as  it  is 
bound  to  carry,  as  well  as  the  manner  in 
which  they  shall  be  packed  and  pre- 
pared for  shipment  so  that  they  may  be 
delivered  with  convenience,  safety  and 
dispatch;  and  it  has  also  the  power  to 
alter  or  modify  such  rules  from  time  to 
time,  as  it  may  deem  proper  and  expedi- 
ent, upon  reasonable  notice  to  the  public. 
U.  S.  V.  Oregon  R.  R.  &  Navigation  Co., 
159  Fed.  975,  979. 

(b)  It  is  well  settled  that  carriers  have 
the  right  to  transport  certain  commodi- 


CLASSIFICATION,  §2  (a)— §3  (d) 


133 


ties  under  reasonable  rules  and  regula- 
tions respecting  their  receipt,  carriage 
and  delivery.  National  Petroleum  Ass'n 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  473, 
476. 

§2.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

See    Courts,    §9     (m);    Facilities    and 
Privileges,   §1    (i). 

(a)  The  Commission,  under  section  1 
of  the  Act  as  amended  in  1910,  giving  it 
control  of  freight  classification,  has 
power  to  determine  the  reasonableness  of 
differences  made  between  the  rates  on 
various  kinds  of  commodities.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances on  Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C. 
604,  624. 

(aa)  The  Commission  cannot  say 
that  a  rate  shall  be  fixed  so  as  to  meet 
the  requirements  or  needs  of  any  body 
of  shippers  in  their  efforts  to  reach 
a  given  market  nor  can  it  establish 
rates  upon  any  articles  so  low  that 
they  will  not  return  out-of-pocket  cost. 
Neither  can  it  fix  an  entire  schedule  of 
rates  which  will  yield  an  inadequate 
return  upon  the  fair  value  of  the  prop- 
erty used  in  the  service  given.  There 
is,  however,  a  zone  within  which  it 
may  properly  exercise  "the  flexible  limit 
of  judgment  which  belongs  to  the  power 
to  fix  rates."  In  Re  Advances  on  Coal 
to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C.  604,  623. 

(b)  A  classification  will  not  be 
changed  by  the  Commission  in  the  ab 
sence  of  evidence  that  the  rate  is  unlaw- 
ful unless  it  fairly  appears  that  a  par- 
ticular article  is  not  rated  with  other 
articles  similar  in  value,  weight  and 
other  essential  transportation  qualities. 
W.  E.  Caldwell  Co.  v.  C.  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  412,  415. 

(c)  The  Commission  will  not  approve 
the  imposition  by  carriers  of  conditions 
which  would  benefit  one  or  a  few  ship- 
pers, and  which  might,  and  perhaps 
would,  correspondingly  injure  many 
others.  McClung  &  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
L  C.  C.  582,  584. 

(d)  "Where  the  classification  primarily 
affects  and  controls  the  rates  or  charges 
demanded,  charged  or  collected  by  any 
common  carrier  or  carriers  sibject  to 
the  provisions  of  the  Act,  loi'  the  trans- 
portation of  property  as  defined  in  tlio 
first  section  of  the  Act,  or  publishes  the 
regulations  or  practices  of  such  carriei 
or  carriers  affecting  such  lates.  the 
Commission  is  authorized  and  empowered 
to  pass  upon  such  rates,  or  charges,  or 


such  regulations  or  practices.  National 
Hay  Ass'n  v.  M.  C.  R.  K.  Co.,  19  1.  C.  C. 
34,  38. 

(e)  Any  regulation  or  practice  that 
withdraws  from  a  shipper  the  equal  op- 
portunity of  taking  advantage  of  the 
rates  offered  by  a  carrier,  is  a  regulation 
or  practice,  "affecting  rates,"  within  the 
meaning  of  that  phrase  as  used  in  section 
15.  Rail  &  River  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  86,  88. 

(f)  A  carrier  should  not  make,  and 
the  Commission  will  not  approve,  a  rule 
which  the  carrier  cannot  enforce.  Cali- 
fornia Commercial  Ass'n  v.  Wells,  Fargo 
&  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  422,  433. 

II.     BASIS  OF  CLASSIFICATION. 

§3.     In  General. 

See      Reasonableness     of      Rates,     §2 
(hh),  §84   (aa). 

(a)  Rules,  regulations  and  charges  af.- 
fecting  the  ultimate  cost  of  transporta- 
tion must  be  made  with  a  reasonable  re 
gard  for  the  nature  of  the  con- modify 
transported,  and  without  undue  discrimi- 
nation as  between  localities  or  shippers. 
Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  S.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  \l. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  259,  262. 

(aa)  The  fact  that  certain  traffic  is 
hauled  in  train  load  lots  while  complain- 
ant's traffic  moves  in  carloads  cannot 
be  made  the  basis  of  a  difference  in 
rates.  Rickards  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
23    I.    C.    C.    239,    240. 

(b)  In  all  classifications,  consideration 
must  be  given  to  what  may  be  termed 
public  policy,  the  advantage  to  the  com- 
munity of  having  some  kinds  of  freight 
carried  at  a  less  rate  than  other  kinds. 
This  is  the  true  meaning  of  the  phrase, 
"What  the  traffic  will  bear."  In  Re  Ad- 
vances on  Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C. 
604,  623. 

(c)  While  every  effort  conducive  to 
uniformity  of  classificatio  i  is  to  be  co'n- 
mended,  its  does  not  follow  that  that 
result  should  be  attained  oy  accepting? 
as  a  standard  a  classification  prescribing 
a  rate,  which,  when  applied  to  a  given 
commodity  or  territory,  becomes  unrea- 
sonable. In  Re  Advancers  in  Rates  on 
Locomotives  and  Tenders,  21  I.  C.  C.  • 
103,  107. 

(d)  In  framing  classifications  and 
rates,  no  one  consideration  is  controlling. 
Bulk,  value,  liability  to  waste  or  injury 
in  transit,  weight,  form  in  .which  ten- 
dered, etc.,  must  be  taken  into  considera- 


134 


CLASSIFICATION,  §3  (e)— §4  (c) 


tion.     Ford  Co.  v.  M.  C  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I. 
C.  C.  507,  509. 

(e)  Classification  is  not  an  exact 
science,  nor  may  the  rating  accorded  a 
particular  article  be  determined  alone 
by  the  yardstick,  the  scales  and  the  dol- 
lar. The  volume  and  desirability  of  the 
traffic,  the  hazard  of  carriage,  and  the 
possibility  or  probability  of  misrepresen- 
tation of  the  article  are  considerations 
of  prime  importance  in  classification.  At 
best  it  is  but  a  grouping,  and  when  the 
approximation  resulting  from  it  is  not 
found  to  cause  the  exaction  of  an  un- 
reasonable or  a  discriminatory  charge  it 
will  not  be  disturbed.  Forest  City 
Freight  Bureau  v.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co., 
18  I.   C.  C.  205,  206. 

(f)  Owing  to  differences  in  bulk  and 
weight,  there  must  of  necessity  be 
marked  variations  in  revenue  per  car 
produced  by  articles  in  the  same  and 
other  classes,  and  a  disparity  either  way 
is  not  conclusive  of  the  propriety  of 
an  adjustment.  Kiser  Co.  v.  C.  of  G.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  430,  439. 

(g)  Certain  conditions  govern  classi- 
fication of  freight,  including  weight  per 
cubic  foot,  value  per  cubic  foot,  risk  of 
breakage  and  volume  of  traffic.  Yawman 
&  Erbe  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  260,  262. 

(h)  Defendants  operating  north  of  the 
Ohio  River  adopted  proportional  rates 
published  in  the  Southern  Classification 
on  traffic  originating  at  points  north  of 
the  Ohio  River  and  destined  to  south- 
eastern territory.  From  this  they  ex- 
cepted certain  articles  upon  which  they 
established  a  commodity  proportional 
rate  for  the  haul  to  Ohio  River  crossings, 
from  points  of  origin  north  of  said  river, 
which  were  higher  than  the  class  pro- 
portional rates  published  in  the  South- 
ern Classification.  Complainant  at  In- 
dianapolis contended  that  such  com- 
modity proportionals  were  unreasonable 
on  the  ground  that  they  exceeded  the 
class  proportionals.  HELD,  no  other  evi- 
dence of  the  unreasonableness  of  the 
rates  being  offered,  complainant's  conten- 
tion was  not  well  founded,  since  a  par- 
tial adoption  of  a  classification  for  the 
construction  of  certain  rates  in  a  terri- 
tory where  ordinarily  a  different  classifi- 
cation obtains  is  not  improper,  and  all 
commodities  need  not  necessarily  be  in- 
cluded under  such  general  basis.  In- 
dianapolis Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  367,  369. 


(i)     Conditions    may  make    di^erent 

regulations  reasonable.  Wholesale  Fruit 

&   Produce  Ass'n  v.  A.  T.   &   S.  F.   Ry. 
Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  410. 

(j)  Because  articles  are  in  the  same 
class,  it  does  not  follow  that  commodity 
rates  should  be  alike  on  both,  when 
they  are  wholly  dissimilar.  Goodman 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  P.  B.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  362. 

§4.     Bulk  or  Weight  of  Commodity. 

See  Weights  and  Weighing,   §9    (c). 

(a)  Complainant  in  March,  1909, 
shipped  a  carload  of  brimstone  barrels 
from  New  York,  N.  Y.,  to  Minneapolis, 
and  was  charged  at  the  rate  of  35c  per 
100  lbs.  At  the  time  of  the  shipment, 
defendants  published  a  commodity  rate 
on  brimstone,  carloads,  in  mats  or  in 
bulk,  of  28c  per  100  lbs.,  but  the  tariff 
contained  a  proviso  that  brimstone  in 
bulk  would  not  be  handled  from  New 
York  City.  HELD,  the  rate  of  35c  per 
100  lbs.  is  not  unreasonable.  Shipments 
in  barrels  are  not  shipments  in  bulk,  but 
shipments  in  packages.  Package  ship- 
ments are  generally  rated  higher  than 
bulk  shipments  of  the  same  commodity. 
McLaughlin,  Gormley,  King  Co.  v.  Maine 
Steamship  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  108,  109. 

(b)  Long  and  bulky  articles  should 
be  transported  in  box  cars  in  every  case 
where  it  is  possible  to  do  so,  and  when 
so  transported  they  should  be  charged 
regular  rates  for  less-than-carload  ship- 
ments. When  shipment,  solely  because 
of  its  length  or  bulk,  is  actually  trans- 
ported on  an  open  car,  the  rule  applying 
a  higher  rate  and  minimum  may  be 
enforced.  Merchants'  &  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  of 
Baltimore  v.  A.  C  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
467,  470. 

(c)  Complainant  attacked  the  classi- 
fication on  rowboats  n.  o.  s.  of  four  times 
first-class  rates  as  unreasonable,  and  ad- 
vanced the  low  value  of  a  rowboat  and 
referred  to  rates  on  similar  articles  in 
support  of  his  complaint.  HELD,  the 
question  of  value  is  one  of  the  elements 
that  is  considered  in  fixing  rates;  how 
important  it  is  and  how  much  infiuence 
it  has  depend  upon  the  circumstances  of 
the  particular  case.  A  rowboat  occupies 
a  large  amount  of  space  in  the  car  in 
comparison  with  articles  of  similar  value 
and  weight.  Assuming  that  the  rate  on 
boats  has  been  adjusted  in  accordance 
with  all  the  various  elements  involved, 
none  plays  so  important  and  controlling 
a  part  as  the  bulk.    The  testimony  is  that 


CLASSIFICATION,  §4  (d)— §4^2   (c) 


135 


rowboats  not  only  take  up  considerable 
space  themselves,  but  nothing  can  be 
placed  on  top  of  them  and  nothing  can  be 
leaned  against  them  when  loaded  in  the 
car.  While  electric  and  gasoline 
launches  and  metallic  life  rafts  take 
double  first-class  rates,  steam  yachts  and 
racing  shells  four  times  first-class  rates, 
and  rowboats  are  lower  in  value  than  any 
of  these  articles,  yet  they  also  weigh 
much  less  in  proportion  to  size.  In  the 
Oflicial,  Western  and  Southern  classifica- 
tions, rowboats  take  four  times  first-class 
rates,  and  no  such  showing  has  been 
made  which  would  justify  an  order 
changing  this  classification  which  has 
been  in  force  many  years,  and  against 
which  little  dissatisfaction  has  been  ex- 
pressed, except  in  the  present  case. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Keller  v.  St.  L. 
S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  488,  489. 

(d)  In  making  a  classification  of  ar- 
ticles, bulk  and  similar  elements  affect- 
ing the  desirability  of  the  traffic  should 
be  considered.  Metropolitan  Paving 
Brick  Co.  V.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I. 
C.   C.   197,  203. 

(e)  A  change  in  the  size  of  articles 
should  naturally  be  followed  by  a  change 
in  the  rules  which  were  made  because  of 
smaller  equipment  in  use  at  the  time 
such  rules  were  established.  Bennett  v. 
M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  Marie  Ry.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.  C.  301,  303. 

(f)  On  camera  and  camera  stands 
from  St.  Louis  to  Denver,  complainants 
were  assessed  the  double  first-class  rate 
of  $3.70.  In  Official  Classification, 
cameras  were  rated  first  class  when  less 
than  50c  per  lb.  in  value;  otherwise,  as 
three  times  first  class.  The  great  bulk 
exceeded  the  50c  limit.  Such  articles 
are  bulky  and  liable  to  injury  in  trans- 
portation. Camera  stands  under  first- 
class  classification  took  double  first-class 
when  shipped  set  up;  one  and  one-half 
times  first  class  when  knocked-down  and 
tied  in  bundles;  and  first  class  when 
knocked  down  and  boxed  or  crated, 
HELD,  the  rates  attacked  were  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable.  Merchants' 
Traffic  Association  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  283,  284. 

§4'/2-     "Knocked-down"    Shipnnents. 

(a)  The  Western  Classification  pro- 
vided carload  ratings  on  incubators  and 
brooders  at  second  class,  crated  or  boxed, 
minimum  weight  12,000  lbs.  per  carload; 
and   when  "knocked-down,   flat,    boxed," 


fifth-class  rating,  subject  to  a  minimum 
of  30,000  lbs.  Exceptions  to  the  classifi- 
cation made  such  articles  as  furniture, 
including  desks,  sectional  bookcases,  etc., 
hand  churns,  sewing  machines,  washing 
machines,  in  carloads,  take  a  minimum 
from  12,000  to  16,000  lbs.  Many  of  these 
articles  are  of  considerably  higher  value 
yet  load  no  more  compactly  or  economi- 
cally than  incubators,  and  take  a  lower 
classification.  The  incubator  is  a  box- 
like affair  enclosed  in  which  are  various 
coils  for  conducting  hot  air;  these  coils 
are  securely  fixed  to,  and  are  a  part  of, 
the  body  of  the  machine,  which  rests  on 
legs.  On  the  outside  is  a  lamp  attached 
to  the  end;  on  the  top  a  regulating  ap- 
paratus. When  shipped,  the  outside  fix- 
tures are  removed  and  placed  within  the 
body  of  the  incubator  proper.  The  legs 
are  removed  and  enclosed  within  the 
crate  containing  the  body.  HELD,  that 
it  is  clearly  shown  that  compliance  with 
the  conditions  upon  which  the  lower  rat- 
ing is  based  is  impracticable,  and  that 
the  carload  rating  upon  straight  or  mixed 
shipments  of  brooders  and  incubators 
crated  or  boxed  ought  not  to  exceed 
fourth  class,  subject  to  a  minimum 
weight  of  24,000  lbs.  for  a  36-foot  car. 
Reparation  awarded.  Texas  Seed  & 
Floral  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
23  L  C.  C.  504. 

(b)  The  term  "knocked  down"  has  a 
definite  and  well-understood  meaning  in 
railroad  terminology;  it  involves  taking 
apart  the  article  shipped  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  to  reduce  materially  the  space 
occupied.  Merely  separating  the  article 
into  parts  and  crating  them  without  re- 
ducing the  bulk  would  not  constitute 
knocking  down  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
justify  a  reduction  in  the  rate.  Fond  du 
Lac  Church  Furnishing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  481,  482. 

(c)  Complainant  shipped  a  church 
altar,  Fond  du  Lac,  Wis.,  to  Olathe,  Colo. 
The  Western  Classification  made  no  dis- 
tinction between  altars  set  up  and 
knocked  down,  double  first-class  rate  ap- 
plying to  either.  In  it,  however,  pulpits 
and  confessional  boxes  are  rated  double 
first-class  when  set  up,  and  one  and  one- 
half  times  first  class  when  knocked  down. 
Furniture  knocked  down,  boxed  or  crated 
is  rated  first  class.  It  appeared  that  in 
certain  cases  wooden  altars  may  be 
knocked  down  and  crated  in  such  manner 
as  to  occupy  materially  less  space  than 
when  set  up.  HELD,  that  altars 
knocked  down,  boxed  or  crated  ought  not 


136 


CLASSIFICATION,  §4i/2    (d)— §5    (d) 


to  be  rated  higher  than  first  class.  Fond 
du  Lac  Church  Furnishing  Co.  v.  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  481. 

(d)  Compainant  attacked  the  charges 
of  four  times  the  first-class  rate  on  a 
rowboat  shipped  from  Clarendon,  Ark.,  to 
Willow  Springs,  111.  The  boat  was  crated 
and  the  only  parts  separated  were  the 
seats  and  oar  locks,  the  oars  packed 
separate  from  the  boat.  The  tariff  pro- 
vided for  first-class  rates  on  rowboats 
knocked  down  flat.  HELD;  the  expres- 
sion "knocked  down"  has  a  definite  and 
well-understood  meaning;  it  involves  tak- 
ing apart  the  article  shipped  in  such 
manner  that  the  several  parts  may  be 
packed  more  compactly  and  that  less 
space  may  be  occupied.  The  lower  rate 
is  applied  in  consideration  of  the  saving 
of  space.  It  cannot  be  contended  under 
the  most  liberal  construction  that  the 
removal  of  the  seats  and  oar  locks  from 
a  boat  reduces  the  space  it  occupies  in 
any  such  sense  as  that  contemplated  in 
the  tariff.  Nor  can  the  fact  that  this 
rowboat  was  crated  be  accepted  as 
justifying  a  lower  rate,  there  being  no 
separate  rate  applicable  to  rowboats 
crated.  Keller  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
21  L  C.  C.  488. 

(e)  Complainant  shipped  three  types 
of  peanut  roasters,  Peoria,  111.,  to  Port- 
land, Ore.,  and  Seattle,  Wash.  The  first 
is  constructed  entirely  of  metal.  The 
other  two  are  constructed  principally  of 
metal,  but  each  has  a  glass  case  in  a 
wood  frame.  From  one  type  the  glass 
case  is  readily  detachable,  but  from  the 
other  it  cannot  be  removed  without 
danger  of  injury  except  by  a  skilled 
mechanic.  As  shipped,  the  wheels,  axles, 
springs  and  other  detachable  parts,  in- 
cluding the  glass  case  of  the  one  type, 
in  so  far  as  would  conduce  to  economy  of 
space,  were  removed  from  the  bodies 
of  the  machines  and  the  parts  packed  and 
boxed  or  crated  separately  from  the 
body.  The  tariff  provided  for  the  first- 
class  rate  when  completely  k.  d.  (knocked 
down);  and,  if  s.  u.  (set  up),  one  and 
one-half  times  the  first-class  rate  on  the 
first  shipment,  and  by  a  supplement 
double  the  first-class  rate  on  subse- 
quent shipments.  HELD,  that  the  classi- 
fication is  ambiguous  in  not  defining 
what  is  set  up  or  knocked  down,  but 
that  the  shipment  as  made  should  have 
taken  the  first-class  rate,  and  that  the 
amounts  collected  in  excess  of  the  first- 
class  rate  are  overcharges  which  should 


be   refunded.      Pacific   Coast   Biscuit   Cc 
V.   S.  P.   &   S.  R.   R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  546 

(f)  On  a  mixed  carload  of  iron  hoops 
staves,  headings  and  one  keg  of  staves 
weighing  38,458  lbs.,  from  St.  Louis 
Mo.,  to  Denver,  Colo.,  charges  were  as 
sessed  on  30,000  lbs.  and  a  rate  of  32.5* 
for  the  staves  and  headings,  and  108  lbs 
and  a  rate  of  92c  for  the  keg  of  staples 
The  shipment  consisted  of  beer  kegs  anc 
hogsheads  knocked  down  with  necessary 
parts.  The  rate  on  beer  kegs  or  barrel! 
set  up  was  48i^c.  HELD,  the  rule  pre 
scribing  a  higher  rate  on  the  articles  ii 
question  when  knocked  down  than  whei 
set  up  was  unreasonable.  Reparatioi 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  actual  weight 
and  a  rate  of  48i/^c.  Zang  Brewing  Co 
V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  337 
339. 

§5.     C.  L.  and  L.  C.  L.  Shipments. 

See  Evidence,  §52  (d);  Differentials 
§3:  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §5( 
(a). 

(a)  The  facts  may  not  warrant  tht 
fixing  of  a  carload  rate  solely  on  the 
basis  of  any  given  percentage  of  the  less 
than-carload  rate.  In  Re  Advances  or 
Milk,  23  I.  C.  C  500,  503. 

(aa)  The  fact  that  only  one  or  a  few 
shippers  can  avail  themselves  of  a  car 
load  rate  is  no  objection  to  its  validity 
Albree  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C  C 
303,  319. 

(b)  Carload  shipper  is  entitled  to  bettei 
rate  than  he  who  can  only  present  for 
shipment  a  less  than  carload,  since  the 
cost  of  the  service  is  less,  but  that  differ 
ence  must  not  be  greater  than  circum- 
stances warrant.  Albree  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R, 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  303,  327. 

(c)  Where  the  carrier  makes  a  car 
load  rate  for  the  transportation  of  milk, 
its  rates  per  can  must  bear  a  reasonable 
relation  to  the  carload  rate,  taking  into 
consideration  the  fact  that  the  cost  of 
service  to  the  carrier  is  less  per  car  as  a 
unit  than  when  the  milk  is  offered  in 
small  quantities  in  cans  from  numerous 
stations.  Albree  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  303,  327. 

(d)  No  decision  is  rendered  on  the 
propriety  of  a  lower  10-carload  rate  than 
Dn  a  single  carload  rate,  but  the  Commis- 
sion intimates  that  the  lawfulness  of 
wholesale  rates  is  doubtful.  Carstens 
Packing  Co.  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  324,  328. 


CLASSIFICATION,  §5   (e)— §6   (d) 


137 


(e)  Because  of  the  long-continued 
practice  of  the  carriers  to  which  the  com- 
merce of  the  country  had  adjusted  itself, 
the  Commission  early  in  its  history  ac 
cepted  as  valid  and  justified  a  carload 
ratj  that  was  less  proportionately  than  a 
rate  on  a  less  than  carload  shipment  of 
the  same  commodity.  Carstens  Packing 
Co.  V.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  324, 
328. 

(f)  It  is  a  false  theory  of  transporta 
tion  which  seeks  to  force  a  shipper  to 
avail  himself  of  a  less-than-carload  serv- 
ice, which  is  more  expensive  to  render 
for  the  purpose  of  increasing  the  gross 
revenues  of  the  carrier.  The  true  object 
should  be  to  perform  the  service  in  the 
most  economical  manner  and  to  charge 
for  the  service  a  reasonable  compensa 
tion.  Florida  Fruit  &  Vegetable  Ass'n 
v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  552,  564. 

(g)  Shipments  offered  in  carload 
quantities  entitled  to  carload  rate. 
Voorhees  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
42,  43. 

(h)  Differentiation  by  the  carriers  of 
carloads  from  less  than  carloads  in  the 
application  of  rates  may  be  warranted 
under  certain  conditions.  Duncan  &  Co 
V.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  590, 
593. 

(i)  The  fact  that  shippers  load  and 
consignees  unload  carload  freight  justi 
fies  in  part  the  differences  in  rates  be 
tween  carload  and  less-than-carload  ship 
nients.  National  Wholesale  Lumber 
Dealers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  154,  162. 

(j)  The  only  discrimination  which  can 
legally  be  made  between  a  large  ship- 
ment and  a  small  one  must  be  based 
upon  the  difference  in  the  cost  of  service. 
California  Commercial  Ass'n  v.  Wells, 
Fargo  &  Co.,  14  1.  C.  C.  422,  431. 

(k)  Bulk  freight,  as  the.  term  is  used 
in  classifications  providing  that  bulk 
freight  will  not  be  received  in  less  than 
carload  lots,  means  freight  which  is  loose 
and  not  put  up  or  contained  in  any  pack- 
age. Wholesale  Fruit  &  Produce  Ass'n 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  1.  C.  C. 
410,  418. 

§6.     Competition. 

See     Competition;     Long     and     Sliort 
Hauls,    §10    (m). 

(a)  In  an  advance  in  the  rates  on 
locomotives  in  Southern  Classification 
territory,  it  was  admitted  that  locomo- 
tives   on    their    own    wheels    cannot    be 


affected  by  water  competition,  but  it  was 
argued  that  that  was  no  reason  why 
they  should  not  be  included  within  class 
rates,  which  are  partly  the  result  of 
water  competition,  for  the  reason  that  the 
same  argument  might  be  directed  against 
many  other  articles  in  the  classification 
which,  likewise,  were  not  influenced  by 
water  competition.  HELD,  that  this  line 
of  argument  is  not  meritorious.  It  is 
hardly  conclusive  to  argue  that  simply 
because  there  are  many  other  articles  in 
the  classification  not  subject  to  water 
competition,  it  is  not  objectionable  to 
place  locomotives,  which  are  admittedly 
not  subject  to  water  competition,  into 
one  of  these  classes.  Courts  and  com- 
missions have  long  recognized  the  valid- 
ity of  water  competition.  Whatever  may 
be  the  effect  of  water  competition,  it  can- 
not be  extended  theoretically  or  prac- 
tically to  articles  to  which  such  competi- 
tion does  not  apply  by  merely  classing 
them  with  other  things  to  which  it  does 
apply;  that  this  argument  with  respect 
to  the  absence  of  water  competition  on 
certain  articles  in  the  Southern  Classifi- 
cation merely  points  out  the  necessity  of 
segregating  those  which  are  affected  by 
water  competition  and  those  which  are 
not  so  affected.  It  cannot  force  loco- 
motives into  an  unnatural  class.  In  Re 
Advances  in  Rates  on  Locomotives  and 
Tenders,  21  L  C.  C.  103,  109. 

(b)  Carriers,  within  proper  limita- 
tions, may  take  competition  into  con- 
sideration in  classifying  freight.  Com- 
petition that  may  be  considered  in  proper 
cases  not  only  includes  that  between  car- 
riers, but  also  that  of  the  commodity 
produced  in  one  section  of  the  country 
with  the  same  commodity  produced  in 
another  section,  and  sometimes  competi- 
tion of  one  kind  of  traffic  with  another 
kind.  Metropolitan  Paving  Brick  Co.  v. 
Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  197,  203. 

(c)  Water  competition  may  justify  a 
difference  in  the  right  of  combining  dif- 
ferent commodities  at  the  carload  rate. 
City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.  C.  376,  389. 

(d)  Complainant  purchased  chinaware 
used  for  premiums  in  connection  with  its 
tea  business  from  importers  in  New 
York,  repacked  same  at  its  warehouse, 
and  shipped  same  to  various  interior 
points.  Defendants  charged  on  crockery 
20  per  cent  less  than  third  class  in  less 
than  carloads,  whatever  the  form  of 
package;  on  chinaware  they  charged  first 
class  in  boxes  and  second  class  in  casks. 


138 


CLASSIFICATION,  §7  (a)  — (c) 


The  chinaware  shipped  by  complainants 
was  of  little  greater  value  than  crockery. 
Both  commodities  involved  about  the 
same  risk  and  trouble  in  transit.  They 
were  competitive  articles.  The  import 
rate  which  defendants  applied  to  china 
and  crockery  from  the  port  to  the  interior 
destinations  was  the  same  irrespective 
of  the  form  of  the  package.  HELD,  the 
two  articles  ought  to  bear  somewhat  the 
same  transportation  charges  and  china- 
ware  should  therefore  be  placed  in  sec- 
ond class.  Union  Pacific  Tea  Co.  v. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  545,  547. 

§7.     Mixed  Carloads. 

See  Express  Companies,  §16;  Long 
and  Short  Hauls,  §10  (u);  Mini- 
mums,  §6;  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§84  (q);  Substitution  of  Tonnage,  §2 
(h),    (i),   (j),    (k);  Tariffs  §7   (bbb). 

(a)  Shipments  of  wine  and  brandy 
moving  in  the  same  car,  but  under  sepa- 
rate bills  of  lading,  cannot  be  treated 
as  mixed-carload  shipments  under  the 
Western  Classification,  even  though  the 
shipper  was  told  by  the  initial  carrier's 
agent  to  take  out  separate  bills  of  lading, 
as  the  shipper  was  charged  with  knowl- 
edge of  the  lawful  rate,  and  therefore 
was  bound  to  know  that  the  mixed-car- 
load rating  only  applied  to  shipments 
received  under  one  bill  of  lading,  and 
delivered  under  one  expense  bill,  to  one 
consignee.  Reno  Wholesale  Liquor  Store 
V.  S.  P.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  516. 

(aa)  Complainant  sought  in  connec- 
tion with  a  mixed  carload  shipment 
of  iron  beds  and  wire  mattresses  from 
Marion,  where  its  factory  is  located, 
to  Oakland,  Cal.,  to  have  defendants 
embody  in  their  tariffs  an  alternative 
clause  in  connection  with  the  rates  on 
mixed  carload  shipments  to  the  effect 
that  if  the  aggregate  charge  upon  the 
entire  shipment  on  the  basis  of  the 
mixed  carload  rate  exceeded  the  aggre- 
gate of  the  charge  upon  the  shipment 
on  the  basis  of  a  carload  rate  for  one 
or  more  of  the  articles  and  the  actual 
weight  of  the  less-than-carload  rate  for 
the  other  articles,  the  shipper  might 
have  the  benefit  of  the  lower  charge, 
HELD,  no  evidence  having  been  offered 
to  show  that  the  rate  upon  mixed  ship- 
ments or  the  rates  upon  articles  when 
shipped  separately  were  unreasonable 
upon  the  record  as  presented,  the  Com- 
mission is  not  convinced  that  the  de- 
fendants should  be  required  to  establish 
the    alternative    rule.      Marion    Iron    & 


Brass  Bed  Co.  v.  T.  St.  L.  &  W.  R.  I 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  272. 

(b)  On  less-than-carload  shipments  c 
boat  spikes,  shipped  with  carloads  c 
railroad  spikes  from  Richmond,  Va.,  t 
Knoxville,  Tenn.,  complainant,  engage 
in  the  hardware  business,  complained  c 
a  rate  of  37c  per  100  lbs.  There  was 
commodity  rate  of  33c  on  railroad  spikej 
which  was  embraced  in  the  list  of  article 
taking  railway-track  material  rates.  Con 
plainant  sought  the  application  to  boa 
spikes  of  the  carload  rate  applicable  t 
railroad  spikes,  and  the  privilege  o 
shipping  boat  spikes  in  mixed  carload 
with  railroad  spikes  and  other  railway 
track  material,  and  claimed  that  the  -rat 
was  conditioned  upon  the  use  to  whic^ 
the  articles  were  put.  Defendant  showe 
that  the  two  kinds  of  spikes  were  neve 
used  interchangeably,  and  no  compet 
tion  existed  between  them,  and  that  th 
mixing  of  the  articles  would  work  a  detr 
ment  to  the  other  shippers  who  handl 
l^oat  (spikes  only  in  less-than-carloac 
quantities,  and  that  there  was  no  conn 
mercial  demand  for  such  mixing.  HELI 
that  the  Commission  could  not  approv 
of  the  imposition  by  carriers  of  cond: 
tions  which  would  benefit  few  shippers 
and  which  might  injure  many  others 
Complaint  dismissed.  McClung  &  Co.  "v 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  582. 

(bb)  Complainant  shipped  from  F1 
Dodge,  la.,  to  Butte,  Mont.,  in  one  ca 
a  consignment  which  consisted  of  thre( 
different  commodities,  dry-earth  paint 
32,635  lbs.,  paint  in  oil,  165  lbs.,-  ani 
lampblack,  140  lbs.  At  the  time  o 
shipment  there  was  a  commodit; 
rate  in  effect  of  87.6c  per  100  lbs 
on  dry-earth  paint,  minimum  30,00i 
lbs.,  but  did  not  permit  the  inclusion  o 
paint  in  oil  under  the  carload  rating.  Th( 
same  tariff  contained  a  commodity  rat< 
of  $1,215  per  100  lbs.  applicable  on  mixec 
paints,  which  was  assessed  by  the  car 
riers.  HELD,  that  the  charges  assessec 
were  unreasonable  to  the  extent  the: 
exceeded  the  charges  which  would  have 
accrued  had  the  dry-earth  paint  beer 
charged  the  carload  rate  of  87.6c,  and  th( 
paint  in  oil  and  lampblack  the  L.  C.  L 
rate  applicable  to  each  commodity 
Reparation  to  be  awarded.  Iowa  Pain 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  M.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I 
C.  C.   477. 

(c)  Reparation  was  asked  on  a  rat( 
of  70c  per  100  lbs.  on  a  mixed  carloac 
of  building  paper,  deadening  felt,  dry  fell 
and    tar   felt.      The    rate    was    assessed 


CLASSIFICATION,  §7  (cc)  — (e) 


139 


under  a  tariff  wliicli  provided  for  a  rate 
on  paper,  building  and  roofing  and  felt 
other  than  wool  felt,  minimum  30,000  lbs., 
in  straight  or  mixed  carloads.  The  tar- 
iff also  carried  a  mixed  carload  rate  of 
63c  on  paper,  building  and  roofing,  and 
saturated  felt,  minimum  40,000  lbs.  Sub- 
sequent to  the  shipment,  the  tariff  was 
amended  to  carry  a  rate  of  60c  per  100 
lbs.,  minimum  40,000  lbs.,  which  would 
have  been  applicable  to  the  entire  ship- 
ment had  it  been  in  force  when  the 
shipment  moved.  It  appeared  that  neither 
dry  nor  deadening  felt  is  in  a  proper 
sense  a  wool  felt,  although  containing 
about  5  per  cent  woolen  rags,  and  prob- 
ably 99  per  cent  of  all  dry  felt  is  used 
for  roofing  purposes.  It  appeared  that 
building  and  roofing  paper  and  building 
and  roofing  felt  are  practically  the  same 
thing  in  the  trade.  HELD,  the  tariff  in 
effect  was  such  as  to  lead  to  confusion 
and  discrimination  in  the  application  of 
different  rates  to  similar  mixed  carloads, 
and  that  building  and  roofing  paper  and 
building  and  roofing  felt  other  than  wool 
felt  are  so  nearly  related  that  a  tariff  pro- 
viding more  advantageous  rates  and  com- 
binations with  other  similar  articles  in 
mixed  carloads  for  the  former  than  for 
the  latter  is  unreasonable.  Rate  of  70c 
per  100  lbs.,  minimum  30,000  lbs.,  unrea- 
sonable to  the  extent  it  exceeded  63c  per 
100  lbs.,  minimum  40,000  lbs.  Barrett 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  79. 

(cc)  The  almost  universal  rule  is 
that  where  a  package  contains  articles 
taking  different  rates  the  entire  package 
goes  at  the  rate  applicable  to  the  high- 
est rated  article.  Oak  Grove  Farm 
Creamery  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  19  I. 
C.   C.   454,   455. 

(d)  Complainant  in  shipping  pack- 
ages of  coffee  from  Louisville,  Ky.,  to 
points  in  Kentucky,  Indiana,  Tennessee, 
Virginia,  West  Virginia  and  Pennsyl- 
vania enclosed  in  the  packages  small 
toys  such  as  thimbles,  glass  bead  neck- 
laces, whistles,  card  games,  paper  flow- 
ers, tricks,  etc.,  which  if  shipped 
separately  would  take  the  first-class 
rate  under  Official  and  Southern  Classi- 
fication. These  toys  cost  i/^c  to  %c 
apiece  and  100  of  them  weigh  about 
2  lbs.  Official  Classification  tariffs 
granted  the  privilege  of  enclosing  "ad- 
vertising premiums,  i.  e.,  articles  placed 
in  packages  with  other  commodities 
for  advertising  purposes,"  and  provided 
that   the   advertising  articles   should   be 


charged  at  the  rates  applicable  to  them 
and  the  coffee  at  the  rate  applicable 
to  it.  The  Southern  Classification  con- 
tained a  similar  provision  except  the 
same  did  not  apply  from  Louisville. 
Defendants  allowed  the  privilege  in 
question  in  other  tariffs  to  which  they 
were  parties.  HELD,  the  provisions  of 
the  Official  Classification  were  broad 
enough  to  include  the  articles  shipped 
by  complainant  since  it  was  immaterial 
whether  the  articles  be  an  advertise- 
ment, advertising  premiums,  gifts  or 
prizes  so  long  as  their  purpose  was  to  in- 
duce trade;  and  the  Southern  Classifi- 
cation should  be  amended  to  include 
shipments  from  Louisville,  since  to  ex- 
clude Louisville  constituted  unjust  dis- 
crimination. Ouerbacker  Coffee  Co.  v. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  566,  571. 

(dd)  Complainant  manufactured  a 
cheap  laundry  soap  selling  at  six  bars 
for  25c.  On  each  bar  of  the  soap,  while 
it  was  still  soft  and  before  it  was 
wrapped,  a  safety  pin  was  impressed, 
weighing  five  ounces  to  the  hundred  and 
costing  9c  per  100.  Complainant  was 
assessed  first-class  rates.  Defendants' 
tariffs  provided  that  packages  contain- 
ing articles  of  more  than  one  class 
should  be  charged  at  the  less-than-car- 
load  tariff  rate  for  the  highest  classed 
article  contained  therein.  Safety  pins 
were  subject  to  first-class  rates.  The 
tariffs  further  provided  that  articles 
and  packages  containing  premiums 
should  be  charged  110  per  cent  of  the 
regular  rates.  The  purpose  of  the  pin 
was  to  enable  ignorant  persons  to  iden- 
tify complainant's  soap.  The  pin  was 
not  a  marketable  one.  To  apply  the 
first-class  rate  to  the  soap  in  question 
would  drive  it  from  the  market  on  ac- 
count of  high  competition.  HELD,  the 
pin  was  in  the  nature  of  a  trademark 
similar  to  the  tags  attached  to  plug 
tobacco  and  the  soap  should  not  be 
subject  to  the  first-class  rates  applied 
to  safety  pins  or  to  the  rates  applied 
to  articles  with  premiums,  but  should 
take  the  fourth-class  rates  applicable  to 
soap.  Iowa  Soap  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q. 
Ry.    Co.,   16   I.    C.   C.   444,.  445,   446. 

(e)  Mixing  carloads  or  whatever  privi- 
lege of  this  sort  is  accorded  to  one  lo- 
cality should  be  accorded  to  another 
served  under  the  same  circumstances. 
Water  competition,  however,  may  justify 
differences.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  376,  389. 


140 


CLASSIFICATION,  §7   (ee)— §10  (b) 


(ee)  Whether  shipments  of  petroleum 
oils  shall  be  transported  in  the  same  car 
with  general  merchandise  or  in  cars  set 
aside  for  this  particular  traffic,  the  car- 
rier must  determine  for  itself.  National 
Petroleum  Ass'n  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  473,  476. 

(f)  Under  the  rules  of  the  Western 
Classification,  complainant,  shipper  of 
beer  and  mineral  water  from  Waukesha, 
Wis.,  to  points  in  Minnesota,  Iowa  and 
North  and  South  Dakota,  was  not  per- 
mitted to  mix  mineral  water  in  cases  and 
bottles  with  beer  and  beer  products  in 
cases  and  bottles  in  order  to  secure  the 
fifth-class  carload  rate  on  the  combined 
shipment.  Under  the  classification,  beer 
and  beer  products,  and  mineral  water  in 
cases  and  bottles,  each  take  the  fifth-class 
rate  on  shipments  in  carloads  and  the 
third-class  rate  on  shipments  in  less-than- 
carload  lots.  In  Official  Classification 
territory  such  mingling  of  commodities 
was  permissible  in  order  to  secure  the 
carload  rate,  and  through  an  exception 
to  the  Western  Classification,  made  to 
place  the  Milwaukee  gateway  on  a  parity 
with  Chicago,  complainant  was  able  to 
ship  mixed  carloads  of  beer  and  mineral 
water  at  the  carload  rate  into  Illinois. 
Complainant  attacked  the  rule  forbidding 
the  mixing  of  beer  and  mineral  water  to 
make  up  carloads.  HELD,  following  Pa- 
per Mills  Co.  V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  C 
510,  the  rules  attacked  were  not  unlawful 
(Clements  and  Lane,  comm'rs,  dissent 
ing.)  Milwaukee-Waukesha  Brewing  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
28,  30. 

§8.     Possibility  of  Misbilling. 

See  Crimes,  IV;  Procedure  Before 
Commission,  §15  (b) ;  Transporta- 
tion,  §3    (b). 

(a)  Possibility  or  probability  of  mis- 
representation (.f  article  is  one  of  the 
numerous  considerations  of  prime  im- 
portance in  classification.  Forest  City 
Freight  Bureau  v.  A.  A,  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  205,  206. 

§9.     Risk. 

See    Evidence,   §52. 

(a)  Rates  on  explosives  should  vary 
according  to  the  risk  attending  the  trans- 
portation of  each  particular  kind.  Blu- 
menstein  v.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
90,    92. 

(b)  Liability  to  waste  or  injury  in 
transit   must   be   considered   in   framing 


classifications    and    rates.      Ford    Co.    v. 
M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  507,  509. 

(c)  A  charge  of  third  class  rates  on 
raw  tallow  in  barrels  or  other  packages 
with  cloth  covers  is  not  shown  to  be  un- 
reasonable, although  the  charge  for  such 
commodity  in  barrels  or  casks  with 
wooden  covers  is  fourth  class,  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  the  barrels  when  covered 
with  cloth  can  be  placed  by  the  carriers 
in  one  position  only  during  transit  and 
also  because  of  the  fact  that  on  account 
of  its  disgusting  character  it  endangers 
other  traffic  when  reshipped.  Green  Bay 
Soap  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  609,  610. 

§10.     Use  of  Commodity. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §18  (9);  Cars  and 
Car  Supply,  §32  (c) ;  Classification, 
§12;  Discrimination,  §3  (g)  (gg), 
(i),  §6;  Forwarders,  II;  Restricted 
Rates;  Tariffs,  §3  (j),  §7  (c),  §14 
(d),    (f). 

(a)  A  classification  rests  upon  an  im- 
proper basis,  which  makes  the  rate  de- 
penaent  upon  the  use  to  which  the  article 
shipped  is  to  be  devoted.  Jones  Bros. 
Co.  V.  M.  &  W.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
577,  579. 

(b)  Complainant  shipped  granite  in- 
tended for  the  construction  of  mauso- 
leums from  Barre,  Vt,  to  Paducah,  Ky., 
and  Birmingham,  Ala.,  and  was  assessed 
the  rate  applicable  to  monumental  stone, 
and  not  the  lesser  rate  on  building  stone. 
The  stone  was  hammered  to  a  horizonal 
plane  for  the  purpose  of  forming  a  joint 
on  the  outer  edges  and  at  either  end; 
on  the  sides  the  stone  was  rough.  The 
roof  stones,  gables  and  frieze  were  ham- 
mered or  machined  to  a  smooth  surface 
on  one  side;  certain  columns  were  turned 
in  a  lathe  and  finished  by  a  pneumatic 
tool,  and  the  bowls  of  two  urns  were 
polished.  HELD,  it  is  the  kind  and  value 
of  the  stone  entering  into  a  monument 
that  justifies  the  distinction  found  in  the 
classification.  A  monument  is  primarily 
ornamental  and  the  stone  that  enters  into 
its  construction  is  usually  exposed  to 
view  on  its  four  sides  and  any  fiaw  or 
blemish  that  shows  on  any  side  would 
result  in  its  rejection.  In  handling,  the 
risk  of  damage  is  increased  fourfold  by 
the  four  surfaces  that  must  be  protected. 
On  the  other  hand,  building  stone  when 
in  place  is  exposed  on  but  one  surface. 
Defects  on  the  other  surfaces  may  be 
ignored,  and  the  finishing  is  on  but  one 
face;  the  others  may  be  as  uneven  as  is 
compatible   with   a  proper  joining.     De- 


CLASSIFICATION,  §10   (c)— §11  (b) 


141 


spite  its  memorial  character,  a  mauso- 
leum is  in  reality  a  small  building  that 
differs  only  in  size  from  the  buildings 
for  which  building  stone  is  ordinarily  in- 
tended. The  stone  used  in  its  construc- 
tion in  quality  and  in  price  is  substan- 
tially the  same  as  building  stone.  There 
is  no  transportation  reason  why  it  should 
be  charged  a  higher  rate,  and  the  ship- 
ments in  question  should  have  taken  the 
rate  applicable  to  building  stone. 
Reparation  awarded.  Jones  Bros.  Co.  v. 
M.  &  W.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  577. 

(c)  Complainant,  owner  of  a  theat- 
rical troupe  which  gives  its  perform- 
ances under  a  tent,  carries  the  same  with 
him  with  the  necessary  poles  and  seats. 
He  also  provides  two  cars,  one  a  Pull- 
man sleeper  and  the  other  a  baggage  car. 
Into  which  he  places  his  equipment.  Tar- 
iffs of  defendant  provide  that  tent,  poles, 
etc.,  used  by  circuses  and  performances 
out  of  doors  shall  be  treated  as  freight, 
while  the  tariffs  permit  the  paraphernalia 
of  other  theatrical  troupes  to  be  carried 
as  baggage.  HELD,  there  appears  to  be 
no  diflaculty  whatever  in  loading  these 
articles  into  an  ordinary  baggage  car, 
and  there  is  no  transportation  reason  for 
a  classification  of  theatrical  equipment 
which  is  so  intense  that  it  turns  upon  the 
question  whether  it  is  to  be  used  in  an 
out-of-door  performance  or  an  indoor 
performance,  and  that  the  tariffs  should 
be  amended  substantially  to  provide  that 
if  the  paraphernalia  can  be  loaded  into 
an  ordinary  baggage  car  it  shall  be 
moved  as  part  of  the  baggage  under  the 
rules    governing    the    movement    of    pri- 

,vate  baggage  and  passenger  cars.  Chap- 
pelle  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C. 
56,  58. 

(cc)  A  carrier  has  no  right  to  dic- 
tate the  use  to  which  a  commodity 
shall  be  put.  American  Creosote  Works 
V.  I.  C.   R.  R.   Co.,   18   I.  C.   C.   212,  215. 

(d)  The  Commission  will  refuse  to 
sanction  a  classification  resting  upon  the 
use  to  which  a  commodity  is  put. 
Metropolitan  Paving  Brick  Co.  v.  A.  A. 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  197,  204. 

(dd)  The  use  to  which  a  commodity 
is  put  affords  no  basis  for  a  difference 
in  rates.  Sligo  Iron  Store  Co.  v.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  139,  142. 

(e)  On  metal  furniture,  knobs  or 
trimmings  from  Grand  Haven,  Mich.,  to 
Waterbury,  Conn.,  and  Rome,  N.  Y.,  to 
San  Francisco,  complainant  was  charged 
the  first-class  rate  of  $3.00,  and  in  a  few 


instances  the  second-class  rate  of  $2.60. 
At  the  time  of  shipment  a  commodity  -rate 
of  $2.00  was  in  effect  on  "brass  shelves 
and  canopies  for  gas  and  electric  lig^^t 
fixtures,  boxed."  After  the  shinments 
in  question,  defendants  established  a 
T'^te  of  $2.00  on  "brass  curtain-pole  trim- 
mings and  brass  furniture  trimmings,  n. 
o.  s."  The  articles  shipped  were  made 
of  the  same  materials  as  brass  shelves 
and  canopies  for  lighting  fixtures,  the 
only  difference  being  the  use  to  which 
they  were  put.  HELD,  the  rate  charged 
was  unreasonable,  to  the  extent  '*■  ex- 
ceeded $2.00.  Reparation  awarded.  Merle 
Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co  .  17  I.  C.  C. 
471,  472. 

(f)  A  carrier  has  no  right  to  at- 
tempt to  dictate  the  uses  to  which  com- 
modities transported  by  it  shall  be  put. 
Its  duty  is  to  transport  them  at  its 
tariff  rates  and  on  equal  conditions  for 
all.  Tariffs  naming  different  rates  on 
nitrate  of  soda  when,  destined  for  the 
manufacture  of  fertilizer  and  of  powder 
are  unlawful.  Fort  Smith  Traffic  Bu- 
reau V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I. 
C.    C.    651,    655. 

§11.     Value. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §18  (5);  Evi- 
dence,  §52  (a),  §61;  Reasonableness 
of  Rates,  §38;  Tariffs,  §7  (gg); 
Track  Storage,    II    (g). 

(a)  From  a  transportation  standpoint; 
leather  is  desirable  freight.  TI  e  loading 
from  southern  tanneries  averages  about 
35,000  lbs.  per  car.  The  liability  ^^  dam- 
age is  extremely  slight.  No  special  ex 
pedition  in  its  movement  is  required. 
The  movement  itself  is  uniform  through- 
out the  year.  The  average  cost  of  han- 
dling leather  is  probably  below  that  of 
freight  in  general.  Leather  is,  however, 
a  valuable  article.  The  invoice  price  of 
a  carload  like  those  shipped  from  the 
tanneries  of  the  complainants  ranges 
from  $7,000  to  $10,000  per  car.  In  Offi- 
cial, Western  and  Southern  Classifica- 
tions, leather  is  rated  fourth  class  in 
carloads,  second  class  in  less  than  car- 
loads, and,  considering  its  value,  it  can 
hardly  be  said  that  this  classification  is 
too  high.  United  States  Leatl.er  Co.  v. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C  323,  325. 

(b)  Ordinarily,  the  same  rate  is  ap- 
plied to  all  lumber  without  reference  to 
its  value  or  condition,  and  this  rate  fre- 
quently includes  not  only  manufactured 
lumber,  but  articles  made  from  it,  like 
doors,  sash,  blinds,  etc.  To  this  general 
rule,  exceptions  are  sometimes  made  by 


142 


CLASSIFICATION,  §11  (c)  — (g) 


the  carriers  themselves  whenever  tne 
exigencies  of  a  particular  case  require 
it,  and  without  suggesting  that  any  gen- 
eral departure  from  the  present  rule 
would  be  desirable  or  reasonable  there  is 
no  reason  why  in  particular  cases  lumber 
may  not  properly  be  subjected  to  a 
further  classification.  In  the  present 
case,  it  appearing  that  rough  green  fir 
lumber,  which  is  the  cheapest  lumber 
manufactured  and  the  value  of  a  carload 
of  which  would  not  exceed  one-half  that 
of  a  carload  of  the  better  grades  of  dry 
and  dressed  lumber  at  the  mill,  cannot 
move  from  the  mills  of  complainants  in 
the  Willamette  Valley  to  San  Francisco 
and  bay  points  unless  it  receives  a  rate 
lower  than  $5  a  ton,  while  the  higher 
grades  of  lumber  can  be  disposed  of  on 
the  San  Francisco  markets  and  other 
markets  upon  the  existing  rate,  that  there 
is,  therefore,  acco-rding  to  every  canon 
of  rate  making  substantial  reason  why 
this  lumber  should  be  classified,  and  a 
lower  rate  applied  to  the  heavier  and 
cheaper  variety  than  applies  to  the  higher 
grades  and  the  finished  product.  Oregon 
and  Washington  Lumber  M'f's'  Ass'n  v. 
S.  P.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  389,  395,  396. 

(c)  Reparation  is  asked  on  a  shipment 
of  glue  stock,  Boston,  Mass.,  to  Chicago, 
111.,  on  which  charges  were  collected 
based  on  the  fifth-class  import  rate  of 
27c  per  100  lbs.  HELD,  glue  stock  is 
a  commodity  of  very  low  grade,  con- 
sisting mainly  of  the  waste  of  hides,  the 
selling  price  not  exceeding  from  one  to 
three  cents  per  pound;  that  the  fifth- 
class  rating  which  applies  to  glue  stock 
under  the  Official  Classification  also  cov- 
ers commodities  of  much  higher  grade, 
such  as  hides,  which  have  a  value  rang- 
ing from  16c  to  20c  per  pound,  and  glue, 
the  finished  product  of  glue  stock,  which 
only  contains  10  to  15  per  cent  glue; 
that  the  rate  applied  was  unjust  and  un- 
reasonable to  the  extent  that  it  ex- 
ceeded the  sixth-class  domestic  rate  of 
24c  per  100  lbs.,  and  that  the  rate  for 
the  future  should  not  exceed  the  rate 
simultaneously  in  effect  on  "fleshings, 
tanners'  slaughter-house  offal  and  wet 
hide  trimmings  carload"  between  the 
same  points.  Reparation  awarded.  Barr 
Chemical  Works  v.  P.  &  R.  R.  R.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  77,  78. 

(d)  Value  must  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration in  framing  classification  and 
rates.  Ford  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  507,  509. 


(e)  Complainant  shipped  pressed 
brick,  in  carloads,  from  Cheltenham,  Mo., 
to  Tuscaloosa,  Ala.,  under  a  rate  of  15c 
per  100  lbs.  Contemporaneously  there 
was  in  effect  a  rate  of  12c  per  100  lbs. 
on  fire  brick,  a  more  valuable  kind  of 
brick  than  pressed  brick.  HELD,  car- 
riers can  make  no  difference  in  classifi- 
cation between  fire  brick  and  pressed 
brick,  but  must  accord  to  all  brick  the 
same  rate;  that  brick  is  a  desirable 
traffic  to  handle,  moving  in  large  quanti- 
ties, and  the  cars  can  be  loaded  to  their 
full  capacity,  and  is  not  subject  to  loss 
and  damage,  and  all  these  elements  should 
be  considered  in  the  making  of  a  rate, 
and  call  for  a  low  rate.  If  the  carriers 
have  seen  fit  to  voluntarily  establish 
the  rate  of  12c  on  fire  brick,  it  does  not 
seem  unreasonable  to  hold  that  it  is  a 
just  rate  to  be  applied  to  the  transporta- 
tion of  brick  in  general.  P  iparation 
awarded.  Hydraulic-Press  Brick  Co.  v. 
M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  530. 

(f)  Complainant  at  Cleveland  de- 
manded that  the  classification  of  horse 
blankets  in  carloads  and  less  than  car- 
loads should  be  reduced  from  lirst  class 
to  fifth  class,  and  from  first  class  to 
third  class,  respectively.  The  blankets 
were  subject  to  very  little  damage  in 
transit.  Their  value  ranged  from  $1  to 
$7  each.  A  given  bale  often  contained 
blankets  of  many  different  styles  and 
prices.  Complainant's  contention  was 
that  while  the  rate  on  high-priced 
blankets  was  not  excessive,  it  was  un- 
reasonable, taking  into  view  the  average 
value  of  the  bales.  Complainant  was 
prospering  under  the  rates  attacked,  and. 
felt  little  competition.  Under  the  classi- 
fication attacked,  horse  blankets  were  in- 
cluded under  "dry  goods,"  and  took  the 
same  -rates  as  bed  blankets,  to  which  they 
bore  a  great  resemblance  in  quality  and 
price.  HELD,  a  classification  could  not 
be  based  on  value,  since  the  number  of 
classes  would  be  too  large,  and  the  re- 
finement too  subtle  for  practical  opera- 
tion, and  on  the  evidence  presented  the 
Commission  was  not  justified  in  with- 
drawing a  particular  commodity  varying 
in  value,  density  and  dimensions  with 
each  bale,  from  the  general  class  to 
which  it  belonged.  Forest  City  Freight 
Bureau  v.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C 
205.  206. 

(g)  On  less-than-carload  shipments 
from  St.  Louis  to  Denver,  Colo.,  of 
wooden  bungs  in  barrels,  the  through 
second-class  rate  under  the  Western 
Classification    of    $1.45     was    collected. 


CLASSIFICATION,  §11  (h)  — (m) 


143 


Wooden  ax  or  mop  handles,  wooden  mop 
or  broom  handles  (with  or  without 
heads)  in  boxes  or  crates;  wood  turned, 
in  boxes;  wooden  wedges  in  boxes  and 
crates,  were  classified  fourth  class  in 
Western  Classification.  These  commodi- 
ties were  of  greater  value  than  wooden 
bungs.  The  latter  took  third-class  rates 
in  the  Official  Classification  and  fourth 
class  in  the  Southern  Classification. 
HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was  unreason- 
able, as  was  shown  by  comparison  with 
other  classifications,  and  wooden  bungs 
should  take  the  fourth-class  rate  of  92c. 
Reparation  awarded.  Zang  Brewing  Co. 
V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.  et  al.,  18  L  C.  C 
337,  338. 

(h)  The  average  value  of  theliighest 
grade  of  fire  brick  was  about  $18  per 
1,000.  The  average  value  of  other  grades 
of  brick  was  about  $10  per  1,000.  The 
highest  grade  of  fire  brick  will  move 
freely  under  a  higher  rate  than  will  per- 
mit the  free  movement  of  lower  grades. 
The  average  price  of  high-grade  fire  brick 
at  the  factory,  reduced  to  tons,  was  about 
$5.00,  building  brick  about  $4.00,  and  pav- 
ing brick  about  $3.00.  The  evidence  in- 
dicated that  no  possible  description  of 
high-grade  fire  brick  could  be  made  which 
would  reasonably  insure  that  only  that 
grade  would  be  included  in  assessing 
rates.  No  phraseology  had  been  found 
for  defining  first  grade  fire  brick  of  high 
value  which  would  not  also  describe 
and  include  brick  of  lower  grade  and 
value.  The  placing  of  high-grade  fire 
brick  in  one  class  to  take  a  higher  rate 
would  therefore  leave  too  much  to 
manipulation  by  shippers  and  carriers  to 
insure  that  equality  of  rates  between 
strictly  competitive  articles  and  articles 
of  the  same  class  which  it  is  the  purpose 
of  classification  to  secure.  HELD,  the 
conclusion  reached  in  the  Stowe-Fuller 
Case,  12  L  C.  C.  215,  to  the  effect  that 
one  rate  should  be  applied  to  fire,  build- 
ing and  paving  brick  should  be  sustained. 
Metropolitan  Paving  Brick  Co.  v.  Ann 
Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  197,  205. 

(i)  Brick  is  a  very  desirable  traffic. 
It  moves  in  large  volume,  can  be  loaded 
to  full  capacity  of  cars,  and  is  not  sub- 
ject to  loss  and  damage.  Paving  and  low- 
grade  fire  brick  move  in  any  sort  of 
freight  equipment  and  are  a  low-grade 
commodity.  These  elements  seem  to  call 
for  the  making  of  low  rates.  Metropolitan 
Paving  Brick  Co.  v.  A.  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
L  C.  C.  197,  207. 


(j)  Boots  and  shoes  are  high-grade 
traffic  and  should  accordingly  bear  their 
proportionate  share  of  general  transpor- 
tation expense.  Kiser  Co.  v.  C.  of  G.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  430,  441. 

(k)  On  a  carload  of  gum  timbers  from 
Fenter,  Ark.,  to  Woodruff,  Mo.,  complain- 
ant was  assessed  a  charge  in  excess  of 
the  rate  on  lumber,  which  was  19c,  ex- 
cept for  yellow  pine  and  woods  of  value. 
HELD,  rates  on  ties  should  not  exceed 
rates  upon  lumber  of  the  classes  and  de- 
scription of  wood  of  which  the  ties  were 
made.  Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis 
of  the  19c  rate.  Beekman  Lumber  Co. 
V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C. 
528,  529. 

(1)  Complainant  attacked  rates  on 
ground  iron  ore  from  Iron  Ridge,  Wis., 
to  various  points  in  other  states.  The 
cost  of  production  of  this  commodity  was 
from  $6.00  to  $6.50  per  ton,  and  the  aver- 
age selling  price,  f.  o.  b.  mills,  $9.50  per 
ton.  The  market  value  was  somewhat 
lower  than  that  of  pig  iron,  which  was 
rated  sixth  class  in  Official  Classification, 
and  Class  D  in  Western  Classification, 
whereas,  ground  iron  ore  took  fifth  class 
and  Class  C  rates  in  these  classifications, 
respectively.  HELD,  while  the  Commis- 
sion does  not  consider  value  as  the  sole 
test  of  the  reasonableness  of  classification 
ratings,  it  does  appear  that  ground  iron 
ore  is  such  a  low-grade  commodity  that 
it  cannot  move  unless  accorded  compara- 
tively low  rates,  and  should  be  accorded 
rates  from  Iron  Ridge  to  points  in  Cen- 
tral Freight  Association  and  Trunk  Line 
territories  not  exceeding  the  regular 
sixth-class  rates  applied  under  the  Offi- 
cial Classification  between  the  same 
points,  and  that  this  commodity  was  en- 
titled to  Class  D  rates  under  the  West- 
ern Classification  from  Iron  Ridge  to 
points  in  Western  Trunk  Line  Associa- 
tion territory.  Winters  Metallic  Paint  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  et  al.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
587,    588. 

(m)  On  an  uncrated  automobile  from 
Beatrice,  Neb.,  to  Kenosha,  Wis.,  com- 
plainant was  assessed  the  published  first- 
class  rate  of  92c  on  a  minimum  of  5,000 
lbs.,  the  automobile  weighing,  in  fact, 
725  lbs.  He  was  mistakenly  assured  *y 
defendant's  agent  at  the  point  of  origin 
that  it  would  go  at  $1.84  on  the  actual 
weight.  No  evidence  was  offered  that 
the  first  class  rate  was  unreasonable. 
The  machine  was  an  old  one,  of  small 
value.  Complainant  contended  that  a 
difference  in  rates  should  be  applied  to 


144 


CLASSIFICATION,  §11   (n)— §12   (b) 


new  and  second-hand  machines.  Automo- 
biles are  dangerous  to  handle,  and  the 
carrier  is  likely  to  incur  heavy  damages 
from  slight  accidents  thereto  in  transit. 
The  ca-r  in  question  had  to  be  transferred 
with  great  care  from  one  car  to  another 
on  three  different  occasions.  HELD, 
where  carriers  have  applied  one  rate  to 
all  automobiles,  it  is  not  possible  for 
them  to  differentiate  between  machines 
of  different  values,  and  whether  old  or 
new,  as  there  would  be  no  place  where 
a  definite  line  could  be  drawn.  Under  the 
circumstances,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the 
placing  of  old  and  new  automobiles  in 
the  same  class  is  unreasonable.  Neither 
is  the  record  sufficient  for  a  finding  that 
the  class  rate  of  92c  was  unreasonable. 
Whitcomb  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.  C.  27. 

(n)  On  a  shipment  of  old  canvas  from 
Worcester  to  Chicago  the  first-class  rate 
of  75c  was  exacted.  Said  canvas  was  of 
cotton  and  of  the  kind  used  in  making 
sales,  was  worn  out  so  as  to  be  of  no 
further  use  as  canvas,  and  was  worth  as 
junk  about  3c  per  lb.  HELD,  it  should 
have  been  assessed  the  junk  rate  of  35c. 
The  rate  exacted  found  to  be  unreason- 
able, and  reparation  awarded.  Channon 
Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
551,  552. 

(o)  Lumber  moves  in  large  quanti- 
ties, is  loaded  by  shipper  and  unloaded 
by  consignee,  is  shipped  in  both  closed 
and  open  cars,  is  loaded  to  a  high  mini- 
mum carload  weight,  does  not  require 
especial  or  expedited  movement,  is  not 
easily  injured  in  transit,  causes  few  dam- 
age claims,  is,  so  far  as  transportation 
is  concerned,  a  low-grade  commodity,  and 
it  should  move  at  low  rates,  especially 
when  the  haul  is  long,  as  it  is  in  this  case. 
Oregon  &  Washington  Lumber  Co.  v. 
U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  1.  C.  C.  1. 

(p)  The  Commission  declines  at  the 
present  time  to  establish  a  rating  upon 
basis  of  value,  but  commends  the  idea 
to  the  consideration  of  the  carriers. 
Union  Pacific  Tea  Co.  v.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  545,  546. 

(q)  Differences  of  commodities  ordi- 
narily result  in  a  substantial  difference 
im  rates.  Anthony  v.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  581,  583. 

(r)  Complainant  attacked  the  classi- 
fication first  class  on  wire  brooms  and 
brushes  as  unreasonable,  compared  with 
toilet  brushes  taking  the  same  rates. 
Wire  brushes  are  not  intended  for  toilet 


use,  and  are  a  rough,  heavy,  low-priced 
product,  made  for  the  most  part  of  un- 
finished hardwood  blocks,  brush  wire  and 
common  wire  nails  and  used  for  scrub- 
bing and  cleaning  rough  surfaces.  These 
brushes  and  brooms  are  immune  from 
damage  in  transit,  and,  packed  for  ship- 
ment, weigh  38  lbs.  per  cubic  foot;  aver- 
age value  per  cubic  foot,  $6.i5.  Toilet 
brushes  have  an  average  value  of  about 
$27.00  per  cubic  foot.  HELD,  wire  brooms 
and  brushes  should  take  a  lower  rate 
than  the  finer  class  of  brushes  and 
brooms,  and  should  be  rated  as  third 
class.  Forest  City  Freight  Bureau  v.  Ann 
Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  109,  114. 

(s)  Classification  provision  for  valua- 
tion charges  of  10  per  cent  on  declared 
valuation  of  jacks  in  excess  of  $75  for 
each  animal  found  to  be  unreasonable 
to  the  extent  that  it  exceeded  li^  per 
cent  of  the  declared  valuation.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Overly  v.  Adams  Express 
Co.,    Unrep.    Op.    360. 

ill.     CLASSIFICATION  REGULATIONS. 

§12.     "Bulk  Shipments"  and  Ownership. 
See   Forwarders,    II. 

(a)  Where  the  tariff  provides  that 
during  certain  seasons  of  the  year  refrig- 
erator cars  will  not  be  furnished  indi- 
vidual shippers  unless  loaded  to  10,000 
lbs.  minimum,  and  contains  another  rule 
that  an  unloading  charge  will  be  assessed 
against  separate  shippers  using  a  car 
for  a  consolidated  shipment,  it  is  unrea- 
sonable to  assess  an  unloading  charge 
against  that  shipper  who  orders  a  car 
and  loads  it  to  the  minimum,  even  though 
other  shippers  subsequently  from  the 
same  shipping  point  also  load  into  the 
car,  which  then  moves  as  a  consolidated 
shipment.  Davies  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  3. 

(aa)  Personality  of  consignee  affords 
no  basis  for  a  difference  in  rates.  Sligo 
Iron  Store  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
17  L  C.  C.  139,  142. 

(b)  The  only  shipper  whom  the  car- 
rier knows  is  the  one  offering  the  ship- 
ment, and  the  rate  which  this  shipper 
pays  is  the  lawful  rate.  The  law  con- 
demns the  use  of  a  device  to  evade  the 
payment  of  a  lawful  rate;  it  does  not 
forbid  the  use  of  the  rate.  And  so  long 
as  the  carrier  offers  to  transport  a  cer- 
tain weight  of  goods  at  a  fixed  rate,  the 
shipper  of  these  goods  is  certainly  not 
evading  the  law  by  paying  this  rate.    Cal- 


CLASSIFICATION,  §12  (c)— §13   (c) 


145 


ifornia  Commercial  Ass'n  v.  Wells,  Fargo 
&  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  422,  428. 

(c)  The  cost  of  carrying  a  "bulked 
shipment"  is  not  greater  than  the  cost  of 
carrying  the  same  amount  of  freight  at 
the  instance  of  an  individual  owner.  The 
charge  must  therefore  be  the  same  in 
each  case.  California  Commercial  Ass'n 
V.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  422, 
432. 

(d)  In  gathering  several  packages  of 
goods  together  and  shipping  them  under 
the  carrier's  rates  on  large  shipments,  a 
shipper  is  not  by  a  device  evading  the 
law,  but  is  legally  availing  himself  of  the 
rates  which  the  carrier  offers.  California 
Commercial  Ass'n  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  422. 

(e)  A  number  of  packages  of  mer- 
chandise, aggregating  16,000  lbs.  in 
weight,  were  assembled  in  New  York  by 
the  complainant's  agent  and  offered  to 
defendant  at  one  time  and  one  place,  con- 
signed under  one  bill  of  lading  to  the 
complainant,  a  voluntary  association  of 
San  Francisco  merchants.  Defendant's 
tariff  provided  a  rate  of  $8  per  100  lbs. 
for  shipments  of  10,000  lbs.  and  less  than 
20,000  lbs.  Applying  its  rule  as  to  "bulked 
shipments  intended  to  be  distributed 
to  the  consignee,"  defendant  charged  its 
parcel  rate  against  each  separate  pack- 
age. HELD,  that  the  rule  against 
"bulked"  shipments  is  illegal.  Reparation 
awarded.  California  Commercial  Ass'n  v. 
Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  422. 

(f)  The  law  does  not  justify  the  clas- 
sification of  shippers  with  regard  to  their 
interest  in  property  shipped.  California 
Commercial  Ass'n  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co., 
14  I.   C.   C.  422,  426. 

(g)  A  railroad  or  express  company 
has  no  fair  concern  with  the  proper 
profit  of  the  shipper  or  his  inter- 
est in  the  property  transported.  It 
may  ask  that  the  shipment  shall  be  what 
it  purports  to  be  in  character  and  in 
weight,  for  that  affects  the  rate;  it  may 
make  reasonable  rules  to  protect  itself 
against  a  multiplicity  of  claims  for  loss 
or  damage,  for  such  ultimately  affect  the 
rate  at  which  the  carrier  can  afford  to 
carry;  it  may  refuse  to  accept  the  ship- 
ment except  upon  payment  of  the 
charges,  but  it  cannot  justify  a  classifi- 
cation of  freight  according  to  ownership. 
California  Commercial  Ass'n  v.  Wells, 
Fargo  &  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  422,  426. 

(h)  The  provisions  of  the  Act  prohib- 
it a  classification  of  traffic  upon  the  basis 


of  the  nature  or  character  of  consignees 
or  consignors,  and  while  a  different  rate 
may  be  given  to  the  larger  shipment,  it 
must  be  justified  upon  transportation 
conditions,  and  such  rate  is  made  as  ap- 
plying to  the  shipment,  not  to  the  ship- 
per. California  Commercial  Ass'n  v. 
Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  422,  428. 

(i)  A  carrier  may  not  properly  look 
beyond  the  transportation  to  the  owner- 
ship of  the  shipment  as  a  basis  for  de- 
termining the  applicability  of  its  rates. 
Export  Shipping  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  437,  440. 

§13.     Loading  and  Unloading. 

See    Facilities   and    Privileges,   §10. 

(a)  In  these  days  it  is  in  the  interest 
of  both  railroad  and  shipper  to  secure 
the  heaviest  possible  loading  and  thereby 
the  most  economical  movement  of  the 
commodity.  In  Re  Transportation  of 
Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151, 
167. 

(b)  On  steel  girders  shipped  from 
Baltimore  to  points  in  North  Carolina 
and  South  Carolina,  charges  were  as- 
sessed in  accordance  with  Rule  26-B  of 
the  Southern  Classification,  which  pro- 
vided that  articles  too  long  to  be  loaded 
in  a  36-ft.  box  car,  through  a  side  door 
of  the  ordinary  size,  should  be  charged 
for  at  the  actual  weight  and  class  rate 
for  each  article.  Part  of  the  girders 
were  put  through  windows  in  a  box  car, 
and  some  shorter  ones  were  put  on  flat 
cars.  Complainant  attacked  the  reason- 
ableness of  the  rule.  The  revenue  re- 
ceived under  the  rule  on  each  of  the 
shipments  was  $31.20.  The  same  com- 
modity in  carload  quantities  between  the 
same  points  would  yield  $84.  HELD,  the 
car  revenue  is  an  important  element  in 
determining  the  reasoiiableness  of  a  rate. 
Here,  the  girders  could  not  be  reason- 
ably put  in  box  cars.  Rule,  as  later 
amended,  not  limiting  the  size  of  the  car 
to  36-ft.,  held  reasonable.  Reparation 
denied.  Merchants  &  Mfrs.  Ass'n  v.  A. 
C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  467. 

(c)  Complainant  attacked  defendant's 
practice  of  requiring  perishable  produce 
to  move  from  point  of  origin  at  "ship- 
per's load  and  count."  HELD,  perishable 
articles  such  as  complainant  shipped 
must  be  handled  by  the  carrier  with  all 
nossible  dispatch  in  order  to  be  proper- 
ly marketed.  To  require  the  carrier  in 
a  traffic  of  this  description  to  count  the 
packages  tendered  for  transportation 
would  in  many  instances  retard  the  ship- 


146 


Classification,  §13  (d)— §14  (a) 


ment,  and  impose  an  additional  burden 
upon  already  overburdened  station 
agents  without  resulting  in  a  compensat- 
ing advantage  to  the  shipper.  Where 
the  shipments  are  in  straight  or  mixed 
carloads  which  constitute  a  large  major- 
ity of  complainant's  shipments,  the  cars 
are  sealed  at  points  of  origin,  and  should 
go  to  destination  with  seals  unbroken. 
Upon  the  record  the  Co-mmission  cannot 
say  this  practice  is  unreasonable,  or  that 
it  results  in  defeating  the  published 
rates.  Ponchatoula  Farmers'  Ass'n  v.  I. 
C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  513,  521. 

(d)  A  rule  is  not  unreasonable  which 
compels  shippers  to  count  packages  of 
perishable  freight.  Ponchatoula  Farmers' 
Ass'n  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  513, 
521. 

(e)  In  a  specific  complaint  for  repa- 
ration against  only  the  carriers  involved 
in  the  transportation,  the  Commission 
cannot  order  a  change  of  rules  in  the 
Western  Classification  respecting  charges 
on  articles  too  large  to  be  loaded  in  box 
cars,  and  will  only  enter  an  order  award- 
ing reparation,  and  requiring  defendants 
to  desist  from  assessing  the  charge  com- 
plained of.  Brunswick-Balke-Collender 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
165,  166. 

(f)  It  is  impracticable  in  shipping 
cans  of  milk  from  different  destinations 
to  require  an  exact  number  of  cans  to  be 
placed  upon  a  car  short  of  the  absolute 
limit  of  the  capacity,  and  while  a  num- 
ber of  cans  may  be  specified  as  an  ap- 
proximate load  for  the  purpose  of  apply- 
ing, a  certain  rate  to  that  number,  pro- 
vision, however,  must  be  made  for  a 
variable  number.  Hood  &  Sons  v.  Del. 
&  Hud.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  15,  19. 

(g)  It  is  in  the  interest  of  economical 
transportation  that  cars  containing  light 
and  bulky  articles  should  be  loaded  as 
heavily  as  possible,  and  it  is  equally  plain 
that  a  carrier  can  afford,  to  an  extent, 
to  decrease  its  rates  in  proportion  as  the 
loading  increases.  Montague  &  Co.  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  72,  75. 

(h)  The  Oflicial  Classification  pro- 
vided that  articles  too  long  to  be  loaded 
in  a  36-ft.  box  car  through  the  side  door 
should  be  charged  at  not  less  than  for 
4,000  lbs.  at  first-class  rates.  Western 
and  Southern  Classifications  permitted 
loading  through  end  doors  and  the  as- 
sessment of  charges  on  actual  weight. 
On  a  less-than-carload  shipment  of  900 
lbs.  of  ladders  the  Official  Classification 


rule  made  rates  that  were  prohibitive 
and  were  many  times  higher  than  would 
result  under  Southern  and  Western  Clas- 
sifications. The  permitting  of  loading 
through  end  doors  and  the  assessing  of 
rates  at  actual  weight  resulted  in  dis-- 
crimination  on  account  of  non-availabili- 
ty of  end-door  cars,  and  the  impossibility 
of  loading  through  end  doors  under  cer- 
tain circumstances.  HELD,  the  Official 
Classification  rule  wa&  unreasonable  in 
that  it  restricted  the  free  movement  of 
traffic,  and  the  minimum  should  be  fixed 
at  1,800  lbs.  to  meet  the  requirements  of 
the  usual  less-than-carload  shipments  of 
ladders.  A  rate  or  rule  cannot  be  main- 
tained for  the  purpose  of  restricting  the 
movement  of  a  certain  class  of  traffic 
because  it  is  unattractive  to  carriers. 
Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C. 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  370,  373. 

(i)  Rules  or  regulations  prescribing 
who  shall  load  and  unload  cars  of  freight 
are  rules  or  regulations  affecting  rates, 
and  are  therefore  subject  to  the  control 
of  the  Commission  under  section  15  of 
the  Act.  Wholesale  Fruit  &  Produce 
Ass'n  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C 
410. 

(j)  Loading  by  the  consignor  is  a 
long-recognized  rule  of  carload  trans- 
portation. National  Wholesale  Lumber 
Co.  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  1.  C.  C.  154, 
160. 

(k)  It  cannot  be  stated  as  a  matter 
of  law  that  it  is  the  absolute  duty  of  car- 
riers to  unload  carloads  of  package 
freight,  nor  that  this  duty  rests  upon  the 
shipper,  as  there  is  no  hard  and  fast 
rule  of  law  upon  the  subject.  It  is 
rather  a  question  with  respect  to  each 
commodity  of  what,  under  the  circum- 
stances, is  just  and  reasonable,  and  per- 
haps also  what  has  been  the  practice") 
Wholesale  Fruit  &  Produce  Ass'n  v.  A. 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  410,  416. 

(1)  Reparation  awarded  because  of 
exaction  of  unreasonable  charge  on  an 
article  too  long  to  be  loaded  in  a 
standard  36-foot  box  car  through  the  side 
door  thereof.  Brunswick-Balke-Collen- 
der Co.  V.  G.  T.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
334. 

§14.     Marking  and  Addressing. 

See   Evidence,  §12   (30),    (a);   Repara- 
tion,  §2   (jj). 

(a)  A  commodity  rate  on  cotton  piece 
goods  was  applicable  only  when  a  cer- 
tificate signed  by  the  shipper  was  sten- 


CLASSIFICATION,  §14   (b)— (g) 


147 


ciled  on  the  packages  to  the  effect  that 
the  packages  contained  "only  cotton 
piece  goods  as  per  commodity  descrip- 
tion." A  shipment  of  cotton  duck  enti- 
tled to  the  commodity  rate  was  made  in 
packages  which  were  not  so  marked,  but 
which  were  examined  by  the  carrier  afld 
found  to  contain  only  goods  entitled  to 
the  commodity  rate.  On  account  of  non- 
compliance with  the  rule  the  shipment 
was  charged  the  higher  first  class  rate. 
HELD,  reasonable  and  pertinent  rules 
are  as  essentially  a  part  of  the  tariff  as 
the  rates  which  are  governed  or  limited 
by  their  pplication.  The  rule  described 
was  an  unjust  and  unreasonable  require- 
ment, and  the  charges  assessed  were  un- 
reasonable to  the  extent  they  exceeded 
the  commodity  rate.  Reparation  awarded. 
Colorado  Tent  &  Awning  Co.  v.  B.  &  M. 
R.  R.,  21  I.  C.  C.  565,  566. 

(b)  All  questions  as  to  marking  pack- 
ages ought  to  be  settled  before  the  car- 
rier accepts  the  -goods,  reasonable  rules 
as  to  marking  and  packing  being  proper, 
C.  H.  Algert  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.. 
20  I.  C.  C.  93,  94. 

(c)  Complainant  shipped  from  Farm- 
ington,  N.  M.,  to  Chicago,  three  less-than- 
carload  shipments  of  goat  and  sheep 
skins  consigned  to  "Diamond  A  (letter 
A  surrounded  by  a  rectangle),  Chicago, 
111.  Notify  John  Miller  &  Co..  Chicago, 
111."  The  Western  Classification  at  the 
time  of  shipment  contained  a  rule  pro- 
viding that  less-than-carload  shipments 
consisting  of  separate  packages  should 
be  rated  one  class  higher  when  each 
bundle,  package  or  piece  was  not  plainly 
and  indelibly  marked  with  the  name  of 
consignee  and  the  name  of  the  station, 
town  or  city  and  the  state  to  which  des- 
tined. HELD,  the  Commission  can  find 
no  lawful  authority  for  a  tariff  provision 
the  effect  of  which  is  to  establish  two 
rates  for  the  same  transportation  service 
and  the  same  liability  in  connection 
therewith.  The  higher  rate  of  defend- 
ants on  packages  not  properly  marked 
was  in  the  nature  of  a  penalty,  and 
would  result  in  discrimination,  in  that 
the  higher  rate  would  be  applied  in  some 
cases  and  the  lower  in  others,  due  to  the 
fact  that  there  could  be  no  uniformity 
in  the  determination  by  the  various 
agents  of  the  question  of  fact  whether 
or  not  particular  packages  were  properly 
marked.  Reparation  awarded.  C.  H.  Al- 
gert Co.  V.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
C.  93,  94.    . 


(d)  Complainant  had  shipped  to  it 
cotton  fabrics  from  Memphis,  Tenn.,  to 
Junction  City,  Ark.,  under  a  rate  of  $1.02 
per  100  lbs.  A  tariff  in  effect  provided 
for  a  commodity  rate  of  58c  per  100  lbs. 
on  cotton  factory  products  when  specific 
names  of  articles  are  plainly  marked  on 
packages  and  stated  in  shipping  receipt 
of  the  bill  of  lading  (marking  packages 
as  containing  "cotton  factory  products" 
not  sufllcient).  This  commodity  -rate, 
however,  was  intended  only  to  apply  to 
coarser  and  cheaper  cotton  factory  prod- 
ucts. HELD,  the  requirement  that  the 
package  should  show  on  the  outside  the 
specific  contents,  by  naming  the  article 
under  the  general  designation  named  in 
the  tariff,  was  proper  for  the  protection 
of  the  carrier,  and  was  not  unreasonable. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Muse  Bros.  Co.  v. 
C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  235. 

(e)  A  rule  is  neither  unreasonable 
nor  discriminatory  which  requires  low- 
priced  cotton  factory  products  to  be 
plainly  marked  on  outside  of  package 
and  stated  in  bill  of  lading  in  order  to 
secure  lower  rate  dependent  upon  value. 
Muse  Bros.  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  235,  236. 

(f)  On  two  bundles  of  axles  and  four 
bundles  of  vehicle  wheels,  less-than-car- 
loads,  on  which  ordinary  durable  tags 
were  used  to  indicate  the  name  of  the 
consignee  and  the  point  of  destination, 
defendants  assessed  charges  of  li/^  times 
the  first  class  rate,  whereas  the  first 
class  rate  would  have  been  applicable 
if  the  shipment  had  been  marked  as  re- 
quired by  defendants'  tariffs,  that  pasted 
labels  or  securely  fastened  cloth-lined, 
metal,  or  leather  tags  must  be  used,  or 
the  freight  plainly  and  indelibly  marked. 
Subsequent  to  the  shipment  defendants 
amended  the  tariff  so  as  to  permit  the 
use  of  the  tags  employed  by  complain- 
ant. HELD,  the  tariff  regulations  in 
force  at  time  of  shipment  were  unreason- 
able. Reparation  awarded.  Racine-Satt- 
ley  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I. 
C.  C.  142. 

(g)  Cases  of  eggs,  consigned  to  the 
Henningsen  Produce  Company,  Butte, 
Mont.,  were  marked  "H.  Prod.  Co.  Butte, 
Montana."  Defendants'  rule  provided 
that  each  bundle  or  piece  must  be  plainly 
and  indelibly  marked,  showing  the  name 
of  the  consignee,  the  station,  town  or 
city,  and  the  state,  and  that  if  not  so 
marked  the  shipment  should  take  a  rate 
one  class  higher  than  the  published  rate. 
Subsequent  to  the  shipment  the  rule  was 


148 


CLASSIFICATION,  §14  (h)— §15  (b) 


modified  and  provided  that  unless  pack- 
ages were  plainly  and  indelibly  marked 
so  as  to  show  the  name  of  the  consignee 
and  the  details  of  destination,  they  would 
not  be  received  for  transportation. 
HELD,  it  is  the  undoubted  right  of  a 
carrier  to  decline  to  receive  for  trans 
portation  any  merchandise  not  plainly 
marked,  but  the  rule  under  which  the 
shipments  moved  was  of  doubtful  validi- 
ty; the  rule  as  modified  was  a  proper 
one;  and  that  even  under  the  rule  in 
effect  at  the  time  of  shipments  the  mark- 
ing in  question  was  sufficient.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Ellsworth  Produce  Co,  v. 
U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  182,  183. 

(h)  Reparation  ordered  for  an  excess 
charge  made  because  of  unreasonable 
requirements  as  to  marking  shipments. 
Kessler  &  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  12. 

(i)  The  rule  that  higher  rate  should 
be  assessed  when  less-than-carload  ship- 
ments consisting  of  separate  packages 
are  not  plainly  and  indelibly  marked 
with  the  name  of  the  consignee, 
etc.,  found  unreasonable  and  reparation 
awarded.  Algert  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R. 
R.  Co.,  Unrep,  Op.  379. 

§15.     Minimum  Charges. 

See     Interstate     Commerce     Commis- 
sion,   §9    (aa). 

(a)  The  Western  Classification  rule 
providing  for  a  minimum  charge  on  5,000 
lbs.  at  the  first  class  rate  upon  an  article 
too  large  to  be  loaded  through  the  side 
door,  or  too  long  to  be  loaded  through 
the  end  window  of  a  36-foot  box  or  stock 
car,  is  unreasonable,  and  unjustly  dis- 
criminatory. A  rule  prescribed  similar 
(except  as  to  minimum  weight)  to  that 
in  effect  in  Official  Classification  terri- 
tory providing  that  when  articles  are 
loaded  on  open  cars  on  account  of  being 
too  large  or  too  long  to  be  loaded  through 
the  side  door  of  a  closed  car  they  shall 
be  charged  a  minimum  of  5,000  lbs,  at 
the  first-class  rate.  Brunswick-Balke- 
Collender  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
23  L  C.  C.  395. 

(aa)  Complainant  challenged  the  rea- 
sonableness of  Rule  15  of  the  Official 
Classification,  which  provided  that  "no 
single  shipment  or  small  lot  of  freight 
of  one  class  will  be  taken  at  less  than 
100  lbs.  at  first-class  rate;  and  in  no 
case  will  the  charge  for  a  single  con- 
signment be  less  than  25c."  Issue  arose 
upon  the  shipment  of  canned  okra  from 


New  Orleans,  La.,  to  Pittsburgh,  Pa., 
shipment  weighing  45  lbs.  The  defend- 
ant's tariff  named  a  through  rate  of 
60c  on  canned  goods  in  less  than  car- 
loads. Under  the  authority  of  the  rule 
the  charge  was  increased  to  $1.10. 
HELD,  that  as  the  record  did  not  afford 
an  adequate  basis  upon  which  to  deal 
with  the  matter  as  one  of  classification, 
and  there  was  no  evidence  as  to  the 
inherent  reasonableness  of  the  rate 
charged,  complaint  should  be  dismissed. 
Kleibacker  v.  L.  &  N,  R.  R.  Co.,  22 
I.   C.   C.   420. 

(b)  Complainant  shipped  iron  bridge 
material,  Clinton,  la.,  to  St.  Marys,  la., 
at  a  rate  of  56.5c  under  rule  17-A  of 
Western  Classification  that  shipments 
loaded  on  open  cars  are  subject  to  a  min- 
imum charge  equal  to  that  for  5,000  lbs. 
at  first  class  rate  for  each  car  used. 
Complainant  contended  that  fourth  class 
rates  should  have  been  assessed  upon 
actual  weight,  upon  the  theory  that  the 
first  class  rate  exacted  applies  in  case 
the  articles  are  too  large  to  be  loaded 
through  the  side  door  of  the  36-foot  box 
car  or  too  long  to  be  loaded  through  the 
end  window  thereof.  The  shipment 
could  have  been  loaded  into  the  side  door 
of  a  40-foot  car  or  the  end  window  of  a 
36-foot  car,  had  the  shipments  been  de- 
livered to  defendants  for  loading.  De- 
fendant presented  its  daily  order  book  of 
its  local  agent  at  Clinton  which  showed 
complainant  had  ordered  a  34-foot  flat 
car.  Complainant  presented  affidavits  by 
its  secretary  that  he  believed  he  did  not 
order  a  flat  car  and  that  to  the  best  of 
his  knowledge  and  belief  neither  did  any 
other  employe  or  officer  of  complainant. 
It  did  not  appear  it  was  his  duty  to  do 
this  or  that  he  customarily  had  knowl- 
edge of  such  orders  when  made.  The 
witness  for  complainant  was  not  one  of 
its  employes  and  had  only  hearsay 
knov.iedge  of  the  facts.  HELD,  the  testi- 
mony of  the  secretary  was  not  of  much 
value  as  evidence  of  what  was  actually 
done,  and  the  hearsay  evidence  of  its 
only  witness  unpersuasive,  approving 
Lambros  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  un- 
reported opinion  No,  315;  that  on  the 
evidence  it  stands  admitted  complainant 
ordered  a  flat  car  and  considering  the 
equipment  and  the  route  traversed,  305 
miles,  the  charge  was  not  in  itself  un- 
reasonable. Clinton  Bridge  &  Iron 
Works  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
C.    416. 


CLASSIFICATION,  §15  (c)  — (g) 


149 


(c)  Where  the  tariff  provides  that 
(luring  certain  seasons  of  the  year  re- 
frigerator cars  will  not  be  furnished 
individual  shippers  unless  loaded  to 
10,000  lbs.  minimum,  and  contains  anoth- 
er rule  that  an  unloading  charge  will  be 
assessed  against  separate  shippers  using 
a  car  for  a  consolidated  shipment,  it  is 
unreasonable  to  assess  an  unloading 
charge  against  that  shipper  who  orders 
a  car  and  loads  it  to  the  minimum,  even 
though  other  shippers  subsequently  from 
the  same  shipping  point  also  load  into 
the  car  which  then  moves  as  a  consoli- 
dated shipment.  Davies  v.  I.  C.  R  R. 
Co.,  19,  I.  C.  C.  3. 

(d)  On  a  less-than-carload  shipment 
consisting  of  two  pieces  of  smokestack, 
each  piece  25  ft.  long  and  22  in.  in  di- 
ameter, transported  from  Chattanooga, 
Tenn.,  to  Huntsville,  Ala.,  charges  were 
assessed  upon  the  basis  of  4,000  lbs. 
weight,  at  a  44c  rate,  the  actual  weight 
of  shipment  being  1,016  lbs.  Defendant's 
rule  provided  that  articles  too  long  or  too 
bulky  to  be  loaded  in  a  36-foot  box  car 
through  a  side  door  of  the  ordinary  size 
should  be  charged  at  the  actual  weight 
and  class  rate  for  each  article  except 
that  the  minimum  should  be  4,000  lbs.  at 
the  first  class  rate.  The  shipment  in 
question  could  not  have  been  loaded 
through  the  side  door  of  a  box  car  less 
than  about  50  feet  in  length,  and  was  in 
fact  loaded  upon  an  open  car.  HELD, 
the  rule  was  unreasonable  inasmuch  as 
articles  too  long  to  be  loaded  in  a  36-foot 
box  car  might  in  fact  be  loaded  into  a 
box  car  of  greater  length  than  36  feet, 
thereby  excluding  the  necessity  of  using 
an  open  car;  that  the  Official  Classifica- 
tion rule  providing  for  the  assessment 
of  extra  charges  only  when  the  shipment 
is  necessarily  transported  on  an  open 
car  is  the  more  reasonable  rule;  and  that 
defendant  should  change  its  rule  so  as 
to  make  it  apply  when  the  articles  are 
too  long  to  be  loaded  in  a  box  car  of  not 
less  than  40  feet  6  inches.  Reparation 
denied,  since  the  shipment  in  question 
was  too  long  to  be  loaded  through  the 
side  door  of  an  ordinary  or  available  box 
car.  Jones  v.  Southern  Ry./Co.,  18  I.  C. 
C.  150,  153. 

(e)  On  crates  of  partitions,  a  crated 
refrigerator,  and  two  boxes  of  glass  from 
Chicago  to  Chisholm,  Minn.,  and  return, 
the  actual  weight  of  shipment  being 
1,986  lbs.,  charges  were  assessed  on  the 
minimum  of  5,000  lbs.  in  accordance  with 
Rule  17  of  Western  Classification  which 


provided  that  an  article  too  large  to  be 
loaded  through  the  side  door  of  a  36-foot 
box  car  or  stock  car  or  too  long  to  be 
loaded  through  the  end  window  should 
be  charged  the  actual  weight  and  class 
rate  except  that  the  minimum  should  be 
for  5,000  lbs.  first  class  rate.  The  ship- 
ment in  question  could  not  be  loaded  into 
a  36-foot  box  car  but  was  loaded  into  a 
41-foot  car.  HELD,  following  Bennett  v. 
M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C 
C.  301,  the  said  rule  was  unreasonable. 
Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis  of  ac- 
tual weight.  On  shipments  of  partitions, 
marble  slabs,  and  plate  glass  from  Chi- 
cago to  Marquette,  Mich.,  the  same  hold- 
ing was  made.  Brunswick-Balke-Collen- 
der  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  165,  166. 

(f)  A  signboard  shipped  from  Chicago 
to  Wabash,  Ind.,  was  too  large  to  go  in 
the  side  door  of  a  36-foot  car  but  was  in 
fact  loaded  in  a  40-foot  box  car.  Under 
Rule  7-C,  Official  Classification,  charges 
were  exacted  on  a  basis  of  a  minimum 
of  4,000  lbs.  at  first  class  rates,  the  actual 
weight  being  400  lbs.  Later,  the  rule 
was  amended  applying  said  minimum 
and  rate  only  where  the  article  was  in 
fact  loaded  on  a  flat  car  or  a  gondola 
car  on  account  of  being  too  long  to  be 
loaded  in  a  box  car.  HELD,  the  original 
rule  was  unreasonable.  Reparation 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  actual  weight. 
Knox  V.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
185,   186. 

(g)  On  6  pieces  of  structural  steel,  41 
feet  3^^  inches  long,  weighing  1,301  lbs., 
from  Chicago  to  Houston,  Tex.,  complain- 
ant was  -charged  the  first  class  rate  of 
$1.67  per  100  lbs.  on  a  minimum  of  5,000 
lbs.,  under  a  rule  applying  this  rate 
and  minimum  on  articles  too  large  to  be 
loaded  through  the  side  door  of  a  36-foot 
car,  or  too  long  to  be  loaded  through  the 
end  window.  The  articles  were  in  fact 
too  large  and  too  long  for  a  36-foot  car 
but  were  loaded  in  a  45-foot  furniture  car. 
HELD,  the  rule  attacked  was  unreason- 
able, and  defendants  should  desist  from 
the  maintenance  of  the  same,  but  in  the 
future  might  provide  that  when  articles 
are  actually  carried  upon  open  cars,  be- 
cause too  bulky  or  too  long  to  be  loaded 
through  the  side  door  of  a  box  car  not 
less  than  40  ft.  6  inches  in  length,  the 
first  class  rate  upon  a  minimum  of  4,000 
lbs.  might  be  imposed.  Reparation 
awarded  on  the  actual  weight.  Houston 
Structural  Steel  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  1.  C.  C.  208,  209. 


150 


CLASSIFICATION,  §15  (h)— §16   (g) 


(h)  Defendant's  less-than-carload  rate 
on  gunpowder  in  quantities  of  less  than 
10,000  pounds  was  twice  the  first  class 
rate,  while  on  shipments  exceeding 
10,000  pounds  the  single  first  class  rate 
applied.  HELD,  that  a  charge  on  com- 
plainant's shipments  of  less  than  6,000 
lbs.  that  exceeds  the  charges  assessable 
on  a  less-than-carload  shipment  of  the 
same  commodity  of  10,000  lbs.  is  unrea- 
sonable. Aetna  Powder  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  165. 

(i)  Rule  providing  for  the  assess- 
ment of  freight  charges  on  the  basis 
of  a  minimum  weight  of  5,000  lbs.  on 
packages  of  plate  glass  loaded  into  box 
cars  found  unreasonable.  Reparation 
awarded.  Bamble  Bros.  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.   Co.,   Unrep.   Op.   173. 

§16.     Packing. 

See     Reasonableness     of     Rates,     §2 

(a)  Charges  may  properly  be  made 
somewhat  higher  for  transportation  of 
showcases  in  crates  than  in  boxes.  Wa- 
dell  Show  Case  &  Cabinet  Co.  v.  M.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  106,  107. 

(b)  The  Official  Express  Classifica- 
tion contains  certain  specifications  con- 
cerning shipments  of  liquor  and  provides 
that  they  shall  be  packed  into  certain 
kinds  of  corrugated  paper  cartons. 
HELD,  that  on  account  of  the  percentage 
of  breakage  in  the  transportation  of  liq- 
uor the  present  paper  cartons  in  use 
are  altogether  too  light  and  have  placed 
an  unnecessary  burden  upon  both  ship- 
pers and  express  companies,  and  that 
the  proposed  new  rule  be  adopted  as  rea- 
sonable. In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  for 
Transportation  of  Liquor,  21  L  C.  C.  199. 

(c)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  of 
44c  per  100  lbs.  on  manila  wrapping  pa- 
per, C.  L.  Bellows  Falls,  Vt.,  to  Chatta- 
nooga, Tenn.  The  tariff  provided  that 
paper  folded  flat  could  take  the  sixth 
class  rate  of  36c.  The  paper  shipped  was 
flat  but  not  folded.  HELD,  that  no  dis- 
tinction could  properly  be  made  between 
wrapping  paper  shipped  flat  and  wrapping 
paper  when  folded;  that  the  shipment 
in  question  consisted  of  a  paper  known 
as  railroad  manila  which  is  used  for  the 
manufacture  of  bills  of  lading,  waybills 
and  similar  articles,  and  was  entitled  to 
the  sixth  class  rate.  Reparation  award- 
ed. Robertson  Paper  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R. 
R.,  21  L  C.  C.  254. 

(d)  Complainant  shipped  one  two- 
horse  freight  wagon  without  sides,  hav- 


ing in  their  place  fixed  stakes  about  3 
feet  6  inches  high  attached  permanently 
to  the  body,  and  which,  including  the 
seat,  together  with  the  pole,  was  packed 
in  one  crate,  the  gears  packed  in  another 
crate  and  the  wheels  shipped  loose  un- 
crated,  under  Western  Classification, 
New  Orleans,  La.,  to  San  Antonio,  Tex., 
rate  assessed  3i/^  times  first  class.  The 
classification  provided  that  a  wagon 
boxed  or  crated,  except  as  to  shafts  or 
poles,  is  subject  to  a  rate  of  one  and  one- 
half  times  first  class,  while  a  wagon 
with  fixed  stakes  or  standing  tops  crated 
takes  double  first  class,  but  in  the  case 
of  a  wagon  not  crated,  three  and  one-half 
times  first  class.  This  latter  rate  was 
assessed  evidently  because  the  wheels 
were  not  crated.  HELD,  the  rate  was 
unreasonable  in  so  far  as  it  exceeded 
double  first  class.  Reparation  awarded. 
Oster  Bros.  v.  M.  L.  &  T.  R.  R.  &  S.  S. 
Co.,  21  1.  C.  C.  511,  512. 

(e)  Complainant  had  shipped  from 
Brackenridge,  Pa.,  to  Chattanooga,  Tenn., 
a  less-than-carload  shipment  of  loose 
steel  sheets,  less  than  one-sixteenth  of 
an  inch  in  thickness,  under  the  joint  sec- 
ond class  rate  of  $1  per  100  lbs.  Had 
the  sheets  been  shipped  in  crates  or 
bundles  the  joint  sixth  class  rate  of  42c 
per  100  lbs.  would  have  applied.  The 
edges  of  these  sheets  are  very  sharp  and 
the  handling  thereof  is  difficult  and  dan- 
gerous, and  only  light  articles  may  be 
placed  on  top  of  them,  thus  curtailing 
the  possible  loading  space.  HELD,  these 
facts  justify  a  higher  charge  on  th^ 
sheets  when  shipped  loose  than  when 
shipped  in  bundles  or  crates,  but  that  the 
difference  of  four  classes  between  the 
ratings  on  sheet  steel  when  loose  and 
when  in  bundles  is  excessive.  The  rate 
was  unreasonable  so  far  as  it  exceeded 
the  joint  fourth  class  rate  of  65c;  pre- 
scribed for  the  future.  Reparation 
awarded.  Southern  Queen  Range  Co.  v. 
C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  1.  C.  C.  608, 
609. 

(f)  It  is  clearly  within  the  power  and 
authority  of  carriers  to  establish  reason- 
able and  just  regulations  requiring  prop- 
er packing  and  marking  of  consignment, 
before  acceptance  by  them  for  trans- 
portation, which  will  amply  protect  them 
from  negligence  by  shippers  in  this  re- 
spect. C.  H.  Algert  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R. 
R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  93,  94. 

(g)  A  carrier  may  refuse  to  accept 
shipments  in  improper  containers;  it  is 
reasonable  to  discourage  unsafe  shipping 


CLASSIFICATION,  §16   (h)— §17   (b) 


ISI 


methods  and  unsafe  cases.  Millinery 
Jobbers'  Ass'n  v.  American  Express  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  498,  502. 

(h)  Defendant  established  certain 
classification  regulations  concerning  the 
carriage  of  millinery  when  shipped  in 
pulp  Or  corrugated  paper  cartons  ex- 
ceeding certain  dimensions,  or  when 
shipped  in  strawboard  or  pasteboard 
boxes  and  enclosed  in  crates  exceeding 
certain  dimensions.  Shipments  in  the 
ordinary  pasteboard  and  strawboard 
boxes  are  peculiarly  liable  to  damage  in 
transit.  The  testimony  offered  by  defend- 
ants indicated  that  the  risk  involved  in 
the  carriage  of  millinery  traffic  relates 
chiefiy  to  shipments  in  pasteboard  or 
strawboard  boxes.  The  Commission 
finds,  however,  that  pulp  cartons  or  co-r- 
rugated  paper  are  excellent  containers 
for  ordinary  shipments  of  merchandise 
without  the  protection  of  a  crate.  HELD, 
that  as  damage  claims  increase  the  ex- 
pense of  carriage  and  thus  affect  the 
rates,  it  is  reasonable  in  the  interests  of 
the  general  shipping  public,  as  well  as  in 
the  interest  of  the  carriers  themselves, 
to  discourage  by  reasonable  rules  in  the 
classification  the  use  of  shipping  methods 
and  shipping  cases  that  are  lacking  in 
safety;  that,  therefore,  defendants'  rules 
applying  nainimum  weights  to  millinery 
shipments  in  pasteboard  and  strawboard 
boxes  are  reasonable;  but  that  their 
rules  requiring  corrugated  paper  or  pulp 
cartons  to  be  crated  is  unreasonable; 
and  that  shipments  inclosed  in  such  a 
container  should  move  under  actual 
weight.  Millinery  Jobbers'  Ass'n  v.  Am- 
erican Express  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  498. 

(i)  Form  in  which  goods  are  pre- 
sented for  shipment  must  be  considered 
in  framing  classifications  and  rates. 
Ford  Co.  V.  C.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.   C.  C. 

507,  509. 

(j)  Classification  is  sometimes  made 
with  respect  to  the  manner  of  packing 
of  articles.  Metropolitan  Paving  Brick 
Co.  V.  A.  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  197,  201. 

(k)  There  is  no  good  reason  why 
package  freight,  which  is  loaded  and  un- 
loaded upon  the  team  track  or  at  private 
siding,  should  not  be  handled  into  and 
out  of  the  car  by  the  shipper  in  the  same 
manner  that  bulk  freight  is.  Wholesale 
Fruit  &  Produce  Ass'n  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  596,  600. 

(1)  Charges  assessed  for  the  trans- 
portation of  a  soda  water  fountain  based 
upon  a  rate  applicable  to  the  shipment 


when  crated,  instead  of  basing  rate  upon 
shipment  when  boxed.  Overcharge  to 
be  refunded.  Imperial  Candy  Co.  v. 
C.   B.   &   Q.   R.  R.   Co.,  Unrep.  Op.   412. 

(m)  There  is  no  apparent  reason  why 
the  same  rating  on  pine  cones  should 
not  be  applied  when  shipped  in  barrels 
and  sacks.  Hill  Nursery  Co.  v.  M.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  524. 

(n)  Lower  rate  applied  to  baskets 
nested  with  handles  removed  by  rea- 
son of  space  saved.  Wells-Higman  Co. 
V.  T.   &  P.  Ry.  Co.,"  Unrep.  Op.  527. 

(o)  Rule  of  bundling  and  tagging 
empty  malt  sacks  in  order  to  obtain 
lower  rates  not  found  unreasonable. 
Kruth  &  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  539. 

IV.     COMPARATIVE   RATINGS. 

See    Comparative    Rates. 

A.     Analogous  Articles. 

See  Commodity  Rates,  II;  Courts, 
§11  (t);  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§2  (nnn). 

§17.     In  General. 

See  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §47 
(g),  §50  (a),  §105. 

(a)  Articles  which  are  food  com- 
pounds should  not  be  classified  higher 
than  other  articles  with  which  they  com- 
pete, and  for  which  they  may  be  substi- 
tuted in  use,  regardless  of  the  value  of 
the  base  from  which  such  food  com- 
pounds are  manufactured.  Nucoa  But- 
ter Co.  v.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  174. 

(b)  Complainants  shipped  wooden 
tank  material,  Louisville,  Ky.,  to  Elkhorn, 
W.  Va.,  and  also  carloads  to  Potsdam, 
N.  Y.  Rate  collected  was  on  the  basis 
of  fifth  class.  Reparation  asked  on  the 
basis  of  the  sixth  class  rates  contempo- 
raneously in  effect.  Complainant  com- 
pared commodity  shipped  with  others  in 
sixth  class,  such  as  lumber  in  the 
rough,  whisky  barrel  staves,  and  beer 
kegs.  Wooden  tank  material  consists  of 
staves  planed  and  grooved  with  neces- 
sary iron  hoops  so  that  the  only  labor 
necessary  to  erect  the  tank  was  to  fit 
the  staves  together  and  attach  the  iron 
bands.  HELD,  so  long  as  the  thousands 
of  articles  offered  for  transportation  are 
divided  into  a  comparatively  small  num- 
ber of  classes  for  rate-making  purposes, 
it  is  obvious  that  minute  variations  in 
value  of  different  articles  or  dissimilar 
values  of  the  same  article  cannot  be  pre- 
cisely reflected  in  the  classification.    In 


152 


CLASSIFICATION,  §17   (c)  — (h) 


the  absence  of  evidence  that  the  rate 
resulting  from  the  classification  is  un- 
reasonable, or  otherwise  unlawful,  it 
must  fairly  appear  that  a  particular  ar- 
ticle is  ^ot  rated  with  other  articles, 
similar  in  value,  weight,  and  other  es- 
sential transportation  qualities  before 
the  Commission  will  require  a  change  of 
classification.  Upon  the  facts  presented 
the  application  of  fifth  class  rates  to 
wooden  tank  material  in  Official  Classi- 
fication territory  is  not  unreasonable. 
Caldwell  Co.  v.  C.  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
C.  412,  415. 

(c)  If  a  simple  commodity  is  given 
a  trade  name  which  does  not  disclose  its 
real  nature,  and  is  shipped  and  sold  in 
connection  with  other  compounds  in- 
tended for  and  put  to  the  same  uses,  it 
should  be  rated  the  same  as  those  other 
compounds,  but  in  order  to  be  entitled  to 
a  lower  rating  it  should  be  shipped 
openly  as  the  simple  commodity  which 
it  in  fact  is.  Ford  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  507,  510. 

(d)  In  making  a  classification,  bulk, 
value,  liability  to  loss  and  damage,  and 
similar  elements  affecting  the  desirability 
of  the  trafllc  should  be  considered,  and 
articles  which  are  analogous  in  charac- 
ter should  ordinarily  be  placed  in  the 
same  class.  Metropolitan  Paving  Brick 
Co.  V.  A.  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  197,  203. 

(e)  Competition  between  the  different 
grades  of  brick  is  of  such  a  character 
that  no  scheme  of  classification  is  pos 
sible  which  will  not  permit,  if  it  does  not 
encourage,  the  misbilling  of  the  product 
in  order  to  secure  lower  rates  Under 
these  circumstances,  as  well  as  the 
other  facts  of  record,  fire,  building,  and 
paving  brick  should  be  similarly  classi 
fied.  Metropolitan  Paving  Brick  Co.  v 
A.  A.   R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  197,  204. 

(f)  Complainants  were  manufacturers- 
of  cheap  cotton  garments  like  overalls, 
jackets,  shirts  of  low  grades,  play  suits 
for  children,  etc.,  such  garments  being 
made  from  denims  and  ginghams.  The 
garments  were  shipped  in  boxes  and 
bales  weighing  17  lbs.  per  cubic  foot. 
The  raw  material  was  shipped  in  like 
manner  and  weighed  19  lbs.  per  cubic 
foot.  The  value  of  the  raw  material 
was  $27.00  per  hundred  lbs.;  of  the  manu- 
factured product,  75  per  cent  more.  The 
garments  were  classified  as  first  class. 
Cotton  pie<;e  goods  were  rated  in  Official 
Classification  as  15  per  cent  less  than 
second   class;    in  Western  Classification, 


as  first  class,  but  generally  moved  un- 
der commodity  rates  equivalent  to  third 
class;  in  Southern  Classification  they 
were  rated  from  first  to  fourth  class. 
Woolen  cloths  and  woolen  garments  manu- 
factured therefrom  were  rated  as  first 
class.  The  average  value  of  woolen  gar- 
ments is  much  greater  than  that  of  cot- 
ton garments.  On  account  of  their  larger 
bulk,  it  was  conceded,  cotton  garments 
should  be  rated  somewhat  higher  than 
cotton  piece  goods.  The  price  of  complain- 
ant's garments  ranged  from  50c  to  $2,  be- 
ing designed  to  be  worn  by  the  poorer 
classes.  It  appeared  that  under  the 
classification  attacked,  the  poor  laborer 
was  charged  the  same  freight  rate  upon 
cheap  clothing  as  his  wealthy  employer 
was  upon  higher  priced  woolen  clothing. 
To  rate  complainants'  garments  second 
class  would  involve  a  general  revision 
of  classification  on  all  cotton  garments, 
which  were  sold  at  great  variations  in 
price  and  a  division  of  these  garments, 
to  enable  those  producing  a  low  price 
to  be  classified  as  second  class,  appeared 
to  be  impracticable.  It  appeared  im- 
practicable to  assess  rates  on  the  basis 
of  value,  on  account  of  the  practical  dif- 
ficulty experienced  by  carriers  in  deter- 
mining values.  It  appeared  that  com- 
plainants did  not  need  relief  in  rates 
in  order  to  meet  competitive  conditions, 
and  that  the  only  effect  of  reduction 
would  be  to  enable  complainants  to  make 
a  larger  profit.  On  the  other  hand  de- 
fendant carriers  had  been  compelled  to 
rate  cotton  materials  as  second  class,  to 
meet  competitive  conditions,  and  had, 
therefore,  reduced  their  revenues  to  a 
low  point.  HELD,  since  complainant  did 
not  labor  under  any  form  of  discrimina- 
tion which  was  apparent,  and  the  rates 
were  not  so  high  as  to  unduly  burden  the 
traflac,  but  it  moved  with  the  greatest 
freedom,  and  the  only  result  of  the  ac- 
tion asked  would  be  to  somewhat  reduce 
the  rate,  the  Commission  cannot  feel 
justified  in  changing  the  classification 
so  as  to  effect  such  a  reduction  in  rates. 
Union  Made  Garment  Mfrs.  Assn.  v.  C. 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  405,  407-409. 

(g)  Rate  on  windmill  towers  should 
not  exceed  that  on  windmills.  Stover 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  114. 

(h)  Rate  on  empty  mineral-water 
bottles,  returned,  should  not  exceed  the 
rate  applicable  on  empty  beer  bottles, 
returned.     Reparation  awarded.     Sheboy- 


CLASSIFICATION,  §17   (i)— §18   (2)    (a) 


153 


gaa  Mineral  Water  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  116. 

(i)  Rates  on  gum  olibanum  from 
New  York  City  to  Minneapolis,  Minn., 
should  not  exceed  that  applicable  on 
third-class  traffic.  Schulz  Chemical  Co. 
V.  M.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
137. 

(j)  Rate  charged  on  shipment  of 
tank  blocks  from  Steubenville,  O.,  to 
I^s  Angeles,  Cal.,  found  unreasonable 
and  the  subsequently  established  lower 
rate  prescribed  for  the  future.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Quartz  Glass  &  Mfg.  Co. 
V.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
140. 

(k)  No  greater  charge  should  be 
exacted  for  the  transportation  of  kraut 
and  kraut  brine  than  is  exacted  for  the 
carriage  of  kraut  in  straight  carloads. 
Reparation  awarded.  Heinz  Co.  v.  C.  M. 
&   St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  170. 

(1)  Rate  on  wild  mustard  seed  should 
not  exceed  that  in  effect  on  grain  and 
its  products.  Kulm  Mill  Co.  v.  M.  St. 
P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  305. 

(m)  Fibroid  hand  trucks  should  take 
no  higher  rate  than  warehouse  trucks, 
n.  o.  s.  Bollman  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  318. 

(n)  Glass  tobacco  jars  should  not 
take  higher  rates  than  glass  jars, 
n.  o.  s.,  in  packages.  Federal  Cigar 
Co.   V.   I.   T.  R.   R.   Co.,   Unrep.   Op.   322. 

(o)  News  printing  paper  and  blank 
wall  paper  are  not  competitive  articles, 
and  the  existence  of  a  lower  rate 
on  the  former  commodity  did  not  prej- 
udice complainants  in  the  sale  of  blank 
wall  paper.  Complaint  dismissed.  St. 
Regis  Paper  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 
R.   Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  368. 

(p)  Common  cotton  towels  should 
take  no  higher  rate  than  cotton  factory 
products,  such  as  calico,  cambric  shirt- 
ing, gingham  and  ticking.  Reparation 
awarded.  Cannon  Mfg.  Co.  v.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,    Unrep.    Op.    387. 

(q)  No  specific  rating  on  cobalt- 
nickel  hydrate  in  carloads  and  less  than 
carloads.  Rates  applicable  to  supposed 
analogous  articles  assessed.  Subse- 
quently commodity  given  specific  rating 
lower  than  that  assessed  and  reparation 
awarded.  Orford  Copper  Co.  v.  P.  &  R. 
Ry.   Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  468. 


(r)  Complainant's  contention  that  the 
term  "laboratory  supplies,  n.  o.  s.," 
should  be  stricken  from  the  Western 
Classification  not  sustained.  The  classi- 
fication should,  however,  be  amended  so 
as  to  show  specifically  what  articles  are 
included  thereunder.  Heil  Chemical  Co. 
V.  U.   P.  R.   R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  471. 

(s)  Double  first-class  rate  applied 
under  the  Western  Classification  to  less- 
than-carload  shipment  of  autocycle  lamps 
from  Chicago,  111.,  to  Denver,  Colo., 
found  unreasonable  in  so  far  as  it  ex- 
ceeded the  first-class  rate.  Reparation 
awarded.  Mead  Auto  Cycle  Co.  v.  C.  B. 
&  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  474. 

(t)  There  is  no  apparent  reason  why 
the  same  rating  on  pine  cones  should 
not  be  applied  when  shipped  in  barrels 
or  sacks.  Hill  Nursery  Co.  v.  M.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  524. 

(u)  Manheads  for  use  on  boilers 
not  entitled  to  rating  applicable  to  iron 
manhole  covers.  Walsh  &  Weidner 
Boiler  Co.  v,  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.    560. 

(v)  Near  beer  is  an  article  that  is 
said  to  resemble  beer,  yet  contains  an 
averred  percentage  of  alcohol  low  enough 
not  to  come  within  the  prohibition  laws. 
Portner  Brewing  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.   361. 

18.     Specific  Comparisons. 
See  Comparative   Rates. 

§18.      (1)      Bar  and  Band  Iron. 

(a)  Pieces  of  new  iron  ZV2  to  12 
inches  wide,  one-eighth  of  an  inch  thick, 
and  6  to  10  feet  long,  that  could  be  used 
in  the  manufacture  of  wrought-iron  wash- 
ers, stove  scrapers,  stove  appliances,  and 
novelties,  is  correctly  classified  as  "bar 
and  band  iron"  and  not  as  "scraps  and 
pieces  of  iron  and  steel  which  have  value 
for  remelting  purposes  only."  American 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
483. 

§18.     (2)     Cocoa   Butter  Substitutes. 

(a)  Complainant  refines  vegetable  oil. 
Its  chief  products  made  from  crude  co- 
coanut  oil  are  a  pure  cocoanut  oleine, 
known  as  Nucoline  and  a  pure  cocoanut 
stearin  known  as  Nucoa  butter.  The 
5lfect  of  the  evidence  is  clearly  to  show 
hat  Nucoline  is  used  as  a  substitute  for 
'ard.  Its  price  is  almost  substantially 
the  same.     Nucoa  butter  in  value  varies 


154 


CLASSIFICATION,  §18    (3)    (a)— §18    (6)    (a) 


from  170  to  over  200  per  cent,  the  price 
of  cocoanut  oil.  HELD,  that  Nucoline 
and  similar  products  should  not  be  clas- 
sified higher  than  lard  and  lard  com- 
pounds, and  that  Nucoa  butter  is  correct- 
ly classified  as  "cocoa  butter  substi- 
tutes," and  not  entitled  to  have  a  lower 
rating  than  the  cocoa  butter  with  which 
it  competes.  Nucoa  Butter  Co.  v.  E.  R. 
R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  174. 

§18.     (3)     Coffee  Percolators. 

(a)  Percolaters  manufactured  by 
complainant  were  coffeepots  with  the 
percolator  apparatus  placed  inside,  which 
consisted  of  the  receptacle  for  the  coffee, 
the  glass  dome  and  the  tube,  and  was 
made  of  aluminum,  with  the  exception 
of  the  glass  top.  They  had  the  appear- 
ance of  ordinary  coffeepots  and  were 
used  upon  the  kitchen  stove  like  the 
everyday  coffeepot.  The  retail  price  to 
the  consumer  was  from  $3  to  $5.  The 
additional  cost  of  applying  the  percolator 
apparatus  did  not  exceed  50  cents.  Six 
of  them  could  be  packed  in  a  wooden 
box  of  from  3  to  4  cubic  feet  in  capacity, 
and  24,000  lbs.  in  weight  could  be  loaded 
in  a  standard  car  of  36  feet.  The  cost 
and  selling  price  of  said  percolators  did 
not  greatly  exceed  that  of  coffeepots  of 
the  same  material.  HELD,  the  charge 
of  double  first  class  rates  on  said  article 
was  unreasonable  and  should  not  exceed 
the  first  class  merchandise  rates  under 
Western  Classification  in  shipments  from 
New  Britain,  Conn.,  to  Chicago,  Omaha, 
and  other  western  points.  Landers, 
Frary  &  Clark  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  511,  512,  513. 

§18.     (4)     Earthenware  Crucibles. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  classifi- 
cation of  earthenware  crucibles  under 
the  Official  Classification  at  third  class 
in  less  than  carloads,  and  fourth  class  in 
carloads,  as  unreasonable.  It  appeared 
that  this  commodity  is  worth  from  $3  to 
$6.50  per  100  lbs.  Official  Classification 
places  earthenware  fiower  pots  1.  c.  1. 
at  20  per  cent  less  than  third  class,  but 
not  lower  than  fourth  class,  and  c.  1. 
at  fifth  class.  And  the  same  classifica- 
tion is  given  to  crockery  and  earthen- 
ware, not  otherwise  specified.  HELD, 
that  the  present  classification  of  earthen- 
ware crucibles  is  unjust  and  unreason- 
able in  so  far  as  it  exceeds  20  per  cent 
less  than  third  class,  but  not  less  than 
fourth  class  1.  c.  1.  and  fifth  class  c.  1.  Heil 


Chemical   Co.  v.  Wabash   R.   R.   Co.,   21 
I.  C.  C.  518. 

§18.     (5)     Iron  and  Steel  Articles. 

(a)  The  petition  attacked  a  rate  of 
45c  per  100  lbs.  on  a  carload  of  sheet  iron 
shipped  from  Youngstown,  O.,  to  Monroe, 
N.  C,  and  a  rate  of  48c  per  100  lbs.  on 
less-than-carload  lots  of  iron  wire  fenc- 
ing shipped  from  Monessen,  Pa.,  to 
Lawrenceville,  Va.  It  was  contended 
that  the  Southern  Classification  ratings 
should  apply  to  the  shipments  in  ques- 
tion and  that  rates  on  sheet  iron  in 
excess  of  41c  from  Youngstown  to  Mon- 
roe, and  on  iron  wire  fencing  in  excess 
of  40c  from  Monessen  to  Lawrenceville 
were  unreasonable.  It  was  also  con- 
tended that  the  rates  charged  exceeded 
the  commodity  rates  applicable  to  iron 
and  steel  articles  specifically  enumerated 
in  defendant's  tariff.  HELD,  the  rates 
charged  were  not  unreasonable,  dis- 
criminatory or  prejudicial.  Through 
rates  on  iron  and  steel  articles  have 
never  been  based  upon  the  Southern 
Classification,  and  there  is  not  sufficient 
analogy  between  the  specifically  enumer- 
ated iron  and  steel  articles  and  the 
articles  in  complainant's  shipments  to 
warrant  grouping  the  latter  with  the 
former.  Heath  Hardware  Co.  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  223,  225. 

(b)  Ironworking  machine  parts  should 
take  no  higher  rate  than  the  ironwork- 
ing machine.  Gisholt  Machine  Co.  v. 
C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
290. 

§18.     (6)     Motorcycles. 

(a)  A  -rate  was  assessed  on  bicycles 
of  one  and  one-half  times  first  class  on 
a  shipment  from  St.  Louis  to  Denver. 
Motorcycles  took  three  and  one-half 
times  the  first-class  rate,  or  $6.47 1/^. 
Motorcycles  occupy,  when  crated,  a  space 
8  ft.  long  by  3  ft.  high  and  about  10  in. 
wide,  weigh  from  175  to  200  lbs.,  and  are 
valued  at  about  $150.00.  Bicycles  occupy 
about  the  same  space  except  as  to  width, 
weigh  from  40  to  50  lbs.,  and  are  worth 
about  $30.00.  Motorcycles  load  much 
more  heavily  than  bicycles  and  are  more 
desirable  freight.  HELD,  the  rate  on 
motorcycles  was  excessive  and  should 
not  exceed  that  imposed  upon  bicycles, 
one  and  one-half  times  first  class  in  less 
than  carloads,  and  first  class  in  carloads. 
Merchants'  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  13  1.  C.  C.  283,  285. 


CLASSIFICATION,  §18  (7)    (a)— §18  (11)    (a) 


155 


18.     (7)      Multigraphs. 

(a)  The  multigraph  is  a  miniature 
rinting  press,  printing  from  a  cylinder 
nd  not  from  a  bed.  It  is  ordinarily 
perated  by  hand,  but  may  be  run  by 
lectric  motor.  It  is  used  in  connection 
^ith  any  business  in  striking  off  compara- 
ively  small  numbers  of  cards,  circular 
itters,  etc.  It  sells  for  $250.00  to  the 
iistomer  and  $150.00  to  the  dealer  from 
le  manufacturer.  The  outside  measure- 
lents  of  the  shipping  package  contain 
bout  314  cubic  feet,  and  the  weight  is 
)0  lbs.  When  properly  packed  it  is 
ot  liable  to  damage.  It  was  classed 
ith  the  mimeograph,  and  the  neostyle, 
3  double  first  class.  HELD,  the  rate 
as  unreasonable.  It  should  be  classed 
ot  with  printing  presses,  but  with 
'■pewriters,  cash  registers  and  adding 
lachines,  and  with  them  be  assessed 
le  and  one-half  times  first  class  in  the 
/"estern  Classification.  Forest  City 
reight  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
I  L   C.  C.  295,  297. 

18.     (8)      Picture  Postcards. 

(a)  A  shipment  of  paper  postcards  on 
hich  are  printed  colored  views  repro- 
uced  from  photographs,  takes  the  tar- 
f  reading,  "holiday  cards  (including 
hristmas  and  Easter  cards)  and  other 
irds  of  similar  character,  also  art  cal- 
ndars  and  valentines  boxed,"  and  not 
le  tariff  reading,  "paper,  photographic 
irds  and  cardboards,"  under  testimony 
lowing  that  the  term  "photographio 
ird"  is  employed  to  describe  pasteboard 
ird  mounts  to  which  photographs  are  to 
B  attached,  and  that  it  does  not  include 
hotographs.  Crocker  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S. 
.   Ry.  Co.,  14  L   C.   C.   588,   589. 

18.     (9)      Plate  Glass. 

(a)  Complainants,  situated  at  Mem- 
lis,  attacked  the  rate  on  plate  glass  C.  L. 
:  45c  from  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  and  neigh- 
H'ing  points  and  the  rate  on  rough 
bbed  glass  C.  L.  of  30c.  In  the  South- 
•n  Classification  plate  glass  C.  L.  is 
ited  third  class,  while  rough  ribbed 
ass  is  rated  fifth  class.  In  the  West- 
•n  Classification  and  in  the  Official 
lassification  plate  glass  is  rated  fourth 
ass  C.  L.  and  rough  and  ribbed  glass 
:th  class.  HELD,  the  class  rates  in  the 
jveral  territories  are  assumed  to  be 
Ijusted  according  to  the  transportation 
)nditions  of  the  country  through  which 
le  roads  operate,  the  general  scale  of 
ass    rates    in     Southern    and   Western 


Classification  territories  being  relatively 
higher  than  Official  Classification  terri- 
tory; that  rates  are  relatively  higher  in 
Southern  than  in  Ofl!icial  Classification 
territory  and,  assuming  that  the  fifth 
class  rate  affords  defendants  fair  re- 
muneration for  the  carriage  of  window 
glass  and  similar  kinds  of  glass,  there 
is  no  such  difference  in  transportation 
conditions  as  would  warrant  a  rate  50 
per  cent  higher  on  plate  glass.  The  lat- 
ter commodity  loads  heavily,  the  average 
weight  of  complainant's  shipments  be- 
ing 54,000  lbs.  It  is  seldom  damaged 
in  transit  and  it  is  therefore  found  that 
defendants'  rates  for  the  carriage  of 
plate  glass  C.  L.  from  St.  Louis,  Valley 
Park  and  Crystal  City,  Mo.,  to  Mem- 
phis, Tenn.,  are  unreasonable  so  far  as 
they  exceed  defendants'  fourth  class 
rate.  Reparation  denied.  Memphis 
Freight  Bureau  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  113. 

§18.     (10)     Triplex   Cloth. 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload 
of  triplex  cloth.  Ft.  Wayne,  Ind.,  to 
Beloit,  Wis.,  billed  as  "cotton  piece 
goods,"  under  the  through  first  class  rate 
of  76c  per  100  lbs.  applicable  under  the 
Official  Classification  on  dry  goods  n.  o. 
s.  Triplex  cloth  is  frequently  made  up 
of  woolen  or  silk  material,  or  partly  of 
wool  and  partly  of  cotton.  This  partic- 
ular cloth  consisted  of  a  fabric  made 
up  of  a  layer  of  cotton  goods  and  a  layer 
of  cotton  shoddy  lining  held  firmly  to- 
gether by  means  of  an  intermediate 
layer  of  reclaimed  rubber.  The  through 
rate  exacted  was  greater  than  the  sum 
of  the  intermediate  rates.  HELD,  that 
triplex  cloth,  generally  speaking,  need 
not  take  the  same  rate  as  applied  on 
cotton  piece  goods,  but  may  properly 
take  the  rate  applied  to  other  dry  goods 
n.  o.  s.  Reparation  awarded  to  the  ex- 
tent that  the  charges  exacted  exceeded 
the  combination  of  the  intermediate 
rates.  The  Commission  again  suggests 
that  the  through  class  rates  of  the  de- 
fendant in  this  general  territory  stand 
in  need  of  revision,  because  in  many 
instances  they  exceed  the  Chicago  com- 
bination. Rosenblatt  &  Sons  v.  C.  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  447. 

§18.     (11)     Wire   Coat   Hooks. 

(a)  Complainant  demanded  that  wire 
coat  hooks  packed  in  cases  when  shipped 
in  less  than  carload  lots  should  take 
fourth  class   rates  instead  of  being  in- 


156 


CLASSIFICATION,  §19— COMMERCE  COURT,  §2  (b) 


eluded  as  hardware  specialties  and  rated 
third  class.  The  hooks  were  made  of 
wire  and  were  the  ordinary  wardrobe 
coat  hooks  of  commerce.  Some  were 
unfinished  and  others  received  a  ja- 
panned, copper,  brass  or  nickel  finish. 
The  wire  from  which  the  coat  hooks 
were  manufactured  took  fourth  class 
rates.  Cast-iron  coat  hooks  performing 
the  same  function  as  the  wire  coat 
hooks  were  somewhat  heavier  and  took 
third  class  rates.  Other  articles  of  less 
value  than  the  wire  hooks,  such  as  bush- 
ing, bungs,  cast-iron  clamps,  iron  corners 
for  trunks,  stove  cover  lifters,  can  open- 
ers, stove  plates,  clock  weights,  etc.,  took 
third  class  rates.  HELD,  the  hooks  in 
question  were  properly  rated  third 
class.  Complaint  dismissed.  Forest  City 
Freight  Bureau  v.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co., 
13  L  C.  C.  118,  121. 

§19.     Evidence   and    Procedure. 

See  Evidence,  §40  (c) ;  Overcharges, 
§5  (d),  (e) ;  Procedure  Before 
Commission,  §13  (a),  (e),  (p) ;  Rea- 
sonableness  of  Rates,  §16  (q),  §33 
(a). 

COMMERCE  COURT. 

I.     JURISDICTION. 
A.     Review  of  Commission's  Orders. 

§1.     Car  distribution, 

§2.     Denying    affirmative    relief. 

§3.     Granting  affirmative  relief. 

§4.     Fixing  rates. 

§5.     Reparation  orders. 

§6.     Questions  of  law  and  fact. 
IL     PROCEDURE. 

§7.     Examination   of  record. 

§8.     Judicial  notice. 

I.     JURISDICTION. 

A.     Review  of  Commission's  Orders. 

§1.     Car  Distribution. 

(a)  Defendant  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co. 
owned  a  short  line  of  railway,  known  as 
the  Middlesboro  R.  R.,  extending  from 
Middlesboro,  Ky.,  some  10  or  11  miles 
to  the  coal  mines  of  the  petitioners.  De- 
fendant Southern  Ry.  Co.  had  the  right 
by  contract  to  use  this  short  line.  The 
defendants  published  joint  rates  and 
through  routes  from  petitioners'  mines, 
over  the  Middlesboro  Ry.,  to  Middles- 
boro, and  thence  via  the  Southern  Ry., 
to  points  in  southeastern  territory.  The 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  refused  to  supply  cars 
for  the   petitioner's   coal   on   the  ground 


that  it  was  merely  performing  a  switch- 
ing service.  The  Southern  Ry.  refused 
to  supply  same  on  the  ground  that  it 
was  not  the  initial  carrier.  At  the  same 
time  defendants  supplied  cars  to  other 
shippers  in  the  same  district.  HELD, 
while  the  Commerce  Court  had  no  juris- 
diction to  consider  the  question  of  car 
distribution  in  advance  of  some  action 
by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion, or  to  determine  how  many  cars  the 
Southern  Ry.  should  furnish  or  how 
many  the  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  should  furnish 
for  the  transportation  of  the  coal,  the 
Court  did  have  jurisdiction  under  the 
Act  that  created  it  and  under  section  23 
of  the  Act  as  amended  by  section  10 
of  the  Act  of  March  2,  1889,  to  issue  a 
writ  of  mandamus  commanding  defend- 
ants that,  so  long  as  they  established 
and  maintained  through  routes  and  joint 
rates  to  southeastern  territory,  they 
should  move  and  transport  the  coal  of 
the  petitioners  when  tendered  in  such 
reasonable  quantities  as  might  be  deter- 
mined either  by  an  agreement  with  the 
carriers  or  by  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission.  (Archbald  and  Mack,  J.  J., 
dissenting).  U.  S.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
195  Fed.  88,  92. 

§2.     Denying  Affirmative  Relief. 

(a)  Under  the  Act  of  June  18,  1910, 
creating  the  Commerce  Court,  such  court 
has  jurisdiction  only  to  relieve  from 
affirmative  orders  of  the  Commission, 
and  has  no  authority,  where  that  body 
has  dismissed  a  complaint  attacking  the 
demurrage  rules  of  a  carrier,  to  reverse 
such  decision  and  grant  relief  to  the 
complainant  shipner.  Proctor  &  Gamble 
Co.  V.  U.  S.,  225  U.  S.  282,  292,  32  Sup.  Ct. 
761,  765,  56  L.  ed.  1091,  reversing  188 
Fed.  221,  226,  227. 

(b)  The  petitioner  filed  a  complaint 
before  the  Commission  attacking  that 
part  of  the  "Uniform  Demurrage  Code" 
which  permitted  railroads  to  make  a  de- 
murrage charge  against  the  private  cars 
of  a  shipper  after  they  had  been  deliv- 
ered to  him  and  were  standing  on  his 
own  private  tracks.  The  Commission 
considered  the  complaint  on  its  merits 
and  dismissed  it.  HELD,  the  Commerce 
Court  had  jurisdiction  to  entertain  a  pe- 
tition of  complainant  to  set  aside  the 
order  of  the  Commission,  and  asking  the 
annulment  of  the  demurrage  rule.  Proc- 
tor &  Gamble  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  188  Fed.  221, 
226,  227.  Reversed  225  U.  S.  282,  32 
Sup.  Ct.  761,  56  L.  ed.  1091. 


COMMERCE  COURT,  §3   (a)— §5   (b) 


15.7 


.     Granting  Affirnnative   Relief. 

(a)  Where  the  Commission  orders 
rriers  to  desist  from  according  differ- 
it  rates   to  coal  intended   fom  the   use 

railroads  as  fuel,  than  to  commercial 
>al,  and  the  facts,  circumstances  and 
mditions  upon  which  it  bases  its  orders 
e  undisputed,  and  the  question  involved 

the  construction  of  sections  2  and  3  of 
e  Act,  to  determine  whether  the  differ- 
it  charges  constitute  violations  of  those 
ctions,  the  order  is  not  merely  adminis- 
ative  and  is  open  to  review  by  the 
Dmmerce  Court.  I.  C.  C.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
).,  225  U.  S.  326,  340,  32  Sup.  Ct.  742, 
6,  56  L.  ed.  1107. 

(b)  The  provision  of  the  section  of 
e    Act    creating    the    Commerce    Court 

the  effect  that,  in  allowing  a  tempo- 
ry    stay    or    suspension    of    an    order 

the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission, 
e  court  shall  make  a  specific  finding 
Lsed  upon  evidence  identified  by  ref- 
ence  thereto,  applies  only  to  a  tem- 
>rary  restraining  order  staying  the 
der  of  the  Commission  not  more  than 

days,  and  in  the  granting  of  a  pre- 
ninary  injunction  pendente  lite,  it  is 
)t  necessary  that  the  court  state  the 
idence  on  which  it  bases  its  order. 
.  S.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  225  U.  S. 
6,  56  L.  ed.  1100,  32  Sup.  Ct.  817,  820. 

(c)  Under  section  3  of  the  Act  creat- 
g  the  Commerce  Court,  such  court  has 
)wer  to  allow  a  preliminary  injunction 
jainst  an  order  of  the  Commission  for- 
dding  carriers  to  pay  certain  alleged 
lowances  to  sugar  refiners  for  floatage, 
;hterage  and  terminal  services.     U.  S. 

B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  225  U.  S.  306,  320, 
:  Sup.  Ct.  817,  819,  56  L.  ed.  1100. 

k     Fixing   Rates. 

(a)  The  Commerce  Court  cannot  dis- 
irb  the  order  of  the  Commission  on  the 
leory  that  it  fixed  rates  so  high  as  to 
5  violative  of  the  5th  amendment  to 
le  Constitution,  unless  it  shall  clearly 
3pear  that  the  constitutional  rights  of 
le  shippers  were  invaded  thereby.  The 
sing  of  a  schedule  of  rates  by  the  Com- 
ission  is  a  legislative  act.     Hooker  v. 

C.  C,  188  Fed.  242,  252;  Eagle  White 
ead  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  256. 

(b)  All  rates  established  in  accord- 
ice  with  law  are  presumed  to  be 
ist  and  reasonable.  It  is  for  this  reason 
lat  the  rates  for  the  transportation  of 
eight  of  other  carriers  in  the  same  terri- 
)ry  may  be  looked  into  as  evidence  of 


what  should  be  a  just  and  reasonable 
rate,  providing  conditions  are  similar. 
The  Commerce  Court,  not  being  vested 
with  the  power  to  fix  rates,  cannot  say, 
beyond  question,  that  such  elements, 
taken  into  consideration  by  the  Commis- 
sion in  fixing  rates,  are  improper  for 
the  Commission  to  consider,  (Archbald 
and  Mack,  JJ..  dissenting.)  Hooker  v. 
I.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  242,  252;  Eagle  White 
Lead  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  256. 

(c)'  Where  the  Commission  has  en- 
tered an  order  to  the  effect  that  carriers 
shall  not  establish  class  rates  exceeding 
certain  amounts  and  a  shipper  brings 
the  matter  before  the  Commerce  Court, 
the  court  in  case  it  finds  the  maximum 
rates  prescribed  and  adopted  by  the  car- 
riers to  be  confiscatory,  can  only  set 
aside  the  order  of  the  Commission 
thereby  restoring  the  rates  in  effect  be- 
fore the  entering  of  the  order  by  the 
Commission.  The  court  cannot  order  the 
establishment  of  lower  rates.  Hooker  v. 
I.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  242,  247;  Eagle  White 
Lead  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  256. 

(d)  The  power  to  establish  reason- 
able and  just  rates  for  the  transportation 
of  freight  by  a  common  carrier  is  vested 
by  law  in  the  Commission,  and  no  part 
thereof  is  vested  in  the  Commerce  Court, 
and  that  court  may  not  disturb  an  order 
of  the  Commission  fixing  rates  unless 
it  can  be  clearly  found  that  it  conflicts 
with  the  provisions  of  the  5th  amend- 
ment to  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  provided  the  power  conferred  has 
been  regularly  exercised.  Hooker  v.  I. 
C.  C,  188  Fed.  242,  246;  Eagle  White 
Lead  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  256. 

§5.     Reparation    Orders. 

(a)  The  Commerce  Court,  having 
jurisdiction  to  set  aside  an  order  of  the 
Commission  awarding  reparation,  has 
also  jurisdiction  to  set  aside  an  order 
denying  reparation.  Arkansas  Fertilizer 
Co.  V.  U.  S.,  193  Fed.  667,  669. 

(b)  The  Commerce  Court  has  juris- 
diction to  enjoin,  annul  or  suspend  an  or- 
der against  a  carrier  to  pay  reparation, 
entered  by  the  Commission  in  a  case 
where,  prior  to  the  passage  of  the  Act 
creating  such  court,  the  carrier  might 
have  repaired  to  the  Circuit  Court  for 
relief,  since  the  clause  in  such  Act  with- 
holding power  from  the  Commerce  Court 
to  review  orders  for  the  payment  of 
money  applies  only  to  cases  where  the 
right  to  a  jury  trial  cannot  be  denied. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  193  Fed.  664, 


158 


COMMERCE  COURT,  §6   (a)— §8   (a) 


666;  Arkansas  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  193 
Fed.   667,   669. 

§6.     Questions   of   Law  and   Fact. 

See     Interstate     Commerce     Commis- 
sion,  §3   (d). 

(a)  Whether  or  not  there  Is  at  the 
close  of  a  hearing  as  to  rates  before 
the  Commission  any  evidence  to  sustain 
a  finding  of  fact  by  it  as  to  the  reason- 
ableness of  the  rates!  in  question,  is  a 
question  of  law,  which  the  Commerce 
Court  has  jurisdiction  to  pass  upon.  A.  C. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  194  Fed.  449,  458. 

(b)  The  word  "discretion,"  used  in 
section  3  of  the  Act  creating  the  Com- 
merce Court  means  a  legal  discretion, 
discretion  controlled  and  limited  by 
sound  principles  of  law  applied  to  the 
facts  in  each  particular  case.  Nashville 
Grain  Exch.  v.  U.  S.,  191  Fed.  37,  39. 

(c)  An  order  of  the  Commission  that 
the  charge  of  $2.50  per  car  exacted  by  the 
petitioning  railroads  for  delivering  and 
receiving  carload  freight  to  ^^nd  from  in- 
dustries located  upon  spurs  and  side- 
tracks within  their  respective  limits  at 
Los  Angeles,  Cal.,  when  such  carload 
freight  is  moving  in  interstate  commerce 
incidentally  to  a  system-line  haul,  is  in 
violation  of  the  Act,  and  is  a  conclusion 
of  law  open  to  inquiry  in  the  Commerce 
Court.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C, 
188  Fed.  229,  237;  S.  P.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C, 
188  Fed.  241. 

(d)  In  18  I.  C.  C.  310,  the  Commission 
prohibited  a  charge  of  $2.50  for  switch- 
ing cars  to  industries  located  on  indus 
trial  tracks  and  based  its  decisions  upon 
two  findings:  first,  that  the  industrial 
track  upon  which  the  service  was  ren- 
dered was  a  terminal  facility  of  the  rail- 
road and  not  a  plant  facility  of  the  in- 
dustry to  which  it  led;  and,  second,  that 
the  service  for  which  the  charge  was 
made  was  the  same  service  as  that  which 
was  performed  by  the  carrier  in  deliver- 
ing freight  at  its  depot  or  team  tracks. 
Defendant  in  that  suit  filed  a  petition 
before  the  Commerce  Court  to  enjoin 
said  order.  HELD,  the  finding  of  +^« 
Commission  that  the  industrial  track 
service  was  the  same  as  the  team  track 
or  depot  service  was  not  one  precluding 
the  Commerce  Court  from  coming  to  a 
different  conclusion.  In  cases  where 
there  is  substantial  conflict  in  the  evi- 
dence or  testimony  upon  which  a  finding 
of  the  Commission  is  based,  the  Comerce 
Court  is  bound  by  the  finding  unless 
clearly  and  palpably  against  the  weight 


of  the  testimony;  but  it  is  not  concluded 
by  a  finding  of  the  Commission  based 
upon  admitted  facts,  which  in  no  wise 
tend  to  sustain  the  conclusion  reached. 
The  Commission  cannot,  by  an  ultimate 
finding,  based  upon  the  undisputed  facts, 
preclude  the  Commerce  Court  from 
reaching  a  conclusion  of  its  own  on 
such  undisputed  and^  admitted  facts. 
Where  the  facts  are  undisputed  there  is 
no  occasion  for  facts  to  be  found,  and 
the  ultimate  conclusion  of  the  Commis- 
sion is  a  mixed  question  of  law  and  fact 
which  is  not  conclusive  upon  the  Com- 
merce Court.  (Mack,  J.,  dissenting.) 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  188  Fed. 
229,  239;  S.  P.  Co.  v.  L  C.  C,  188  Fed.  241. 

II.     PROCEDURE. 

§7.     Examination  of  Record. 

(a)  Where  an  order  of  the  Commis- 
sion condemns  a  switching  charge  as 
in  violation  of  the  Act,  but  does  not 
specify  the  particular  section  violated, 
and  the  report  of  the  Commission  is 
made  a  part  of  the  order,  which  order  is 
included  in  the  petition  of  the  railroad 
to  the  Commerce  Court,  that  court  is  at 
liberty  to  examine  the  report  to  ascer- 
tain the  views  of  the  Commission  as  to 
what  particular  provision  of  the  Act  the 
practice  or  charge  of  petitioner  violates. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  L  C  C,  188  Fed. 
229,  237;  S.  P.  Co.  v.  L  C.  C,  188  Fed. 
241. 

(b)  The  Commerce  Court,  in  a  peti- 
tion including  the  report  or  opinion  of 
the  Commission,  is  limited  to  examining 
the  report  or  opinion  of  the  majority  ol 
the  Commission,  and  the  views  of  the 
minority  are  not  open  to  consideration. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  L  C.  C,  188  Fed. 
229,  237;  S.  P.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  241. 

§8.     Judicial  Notice. 

See  Evidence,  III. 
(a)  The  Commerce  Court  may  take 
judicial  notice  of  the  fact  that  the  inter- 
state rates  prescribed  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  freight  by  a  common  carrier  must 
necessarily  be  more  or  less  interdepend- 
ent or  at  least  be  so  related  to  each  other 
that  the  rate-making  power  will  not,  sim- 
ply because  it  has  the  power,  fix  a  rate 
upon  a  single  line  of  railroads  which  will 
necessarily  disorganize  established  and 
reasonable  rates  on  other  railroads  in 
the  same  territory.  Hooker  v.  I.  C.  C, 
188  Fed.  242,  251;  Eagle  White  Lead  Co. 
V.  L  C.  C,  188  Fed.  256. 


COMMODITY  RATES,  §1  (a)— §3  (c) 


159 


COMMODITY  RATES. 


I.     CREATION  AND   PURPOSE. 
§1.    Nature  in  general, 
§2.     Relation  to   class  rates. 
[I.     APPLICATION     AND     CONSTRUC- 
TION. 
§3.     Specific  commodity  rating. 
§4.    Creation   subsequent  to   ship- 
ment. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 

See  Class   Rates,   Special   Rates,  Tar- 
iffs. 

I.     CREATION    AND    PURPOSE. 
5I.     Nature  in  General. 

(a)  The  differences  in  transportation 
3onditions  may  justify  a  lower  commod- 
ty  rate,  mile  for  mile,  east  than  west  of 
he  Mississippi  River.  R.  R.  Commis- 
sioners of  Kansas  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
::'o.,  22  I.  C.  C.  407,  415. 

(aa)  Commodity  rates  are  ordinarily 
issued  to  provide  for  the  movement  of 
LrafRc  believed  to  require  a  lower  rate 
han  is  provided  by  classification, 
joerres  Cooperage  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  5,  6. 

(b)  Commodity  rates  are  always  in 
;he  nature  of  preference.  United  States 
Leather  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
}23,   325. 

(c)  Commodity  rates  are  in  essence 
exceptions  to  the  classification  based 
ipon  a  belief  in  the  economic  expediency 
)f  such  course.  R.  R.  Commission  of 
STev.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  329,  332. 

(d)  Eastbound  distributing  rates  from 
Portland,  Seattle  and  Tacoma,  con- 
structed on  a  mileage  basis,  will  result 
n  a  more  satisfactory  adjustment  than 
he  establishment  of  particular  rates  to 
•epresentative  destinations.  Portland 
:^hamber  of  Commerce  v.  O.  R.  R.  &  N. 
:o.,  21  I.  C.  C.  640,  643. 


}2. 


Relation  to  Class  Rates. 
See  Class   Rates. 


(a)  There  is  no  reason  why  a  rate 
should  be  relatively  higher  in  the  case 
)f  an  article  generally  given  the  com- 
nodity  rate  than  in  the  case  of  articles 
carried  at  class  rates.  Scheuing  v.  L. 
&  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  550,  552. 

(b)  General  policy  is  to  make  lower 
:han  class  rates  the  rates  on  commodities 
:he  movement  of  which  is  deemed  neces- 
sary to  development  of  mercantile  inter- 


ests and  industries.     R.  R.  Commission 
of  Nev.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  238,  255. 

(c)  A  commodity  rate  higher  than  the 
class  rate  is  not  of  itself  unlawful. 
Wheeling  Corrugating  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R. 
R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  125,  126. 

(d)  While  a  commodity  rate  may  be  a 
different  rate  from  a  class  rate,  it  does 
not  necessarily  follow  that  it  must  be  a 
lower  rate,  nor  is  it  obligato-ry  upon  the 
carrier  to  thereby  establish  a  lower  rate. 
Wheeling  corrugating  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R. 
R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  125,  126. 

(e)  Class  rates  on  heavy  commodities 
are  made  to  move  the  mo-re  or  less 
limited  shipments  from  place  to  place, 
and  commodity  rates  to  move  large, 
steady  shipments.  James  &  Abbot  Co.  v. 
B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  17  I.  C.  C.  273,  275. 

(f)  Commodity  rates  are  almost  in- 
variably lower  than  class  rates,  being 
special  rates  presumably  established  on 
account  of  peculiar  circumstances  and 
conditions.  Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau 
V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
367,  369. 

II.     APPLICATION     AND     CONSTRUC- 
TION. 
See   Tariffs,   §7. 

§3.     Specific  Commodity  Rating. 
See  Tariffs,  §7   (000). 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  new  beer 
kegs  C.  L.  Milwaukee,  Wis.,  to  Sacra- 
mento, Cal.,  under  a  specific  commodity 
rate  of  $1.35  per  100  lbs.  At  the  same 
time  there  was  a  class  rate  applicable 
of  $1.00  per  100  lbs.  HELD,  that  where 
a  commodity  rate  is  named  in  a  tariff 
for  movement  of  an  article  between  spec- 
ified points,  such  commodity  rate  is  the 
lawful  rate  and  the  only  one  that  may  be 
used  with  relation  to  that  traffic  between 
those  points,  even  though  a  class  rate 
or  some  combination  may  make  lower. 
However,  upon  authority  of  R.  R.  Comm. 
v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  238,  rate  held  un- 
reasonable to  the  extent  it  exceeded  $1.00 
per  100  lbs.  Reparation  awarded. 
Goerres  Cooperage  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  5. 

(b)  A  shipment  moving  under  a  com- 
modity tariff  is  not  subject  to  any  regu- 
lation not  contained  in  that  specific  car- 
riage. Wheeler  Lumber  Bridge  &  Sup- 
ply Co.  V.  Astoria  &  Columbia  River  R. 
R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  10. 

(c)  The  Commission's  tariff  regula- 
tions have  continuously  contained  a  rule 


160 


COMMODITY  RATES,  §3  (d)  — (i) 


that  the  naming  of  a  commodity  rate  on 
any  article  takes  that  article  out  of  the 
class  rates  between  the  same  points. 
This  rule,  however,  does  not  prevent  the 
alternative  offering  and  use  of  class  and 
commodity  rates  contained  in  the  same 
tarilT.  Wheeler  &  Motter  Mercantile 
Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
141,  145. 

(d)  In  the  Burnham,  Hanna,  Munger 
case,  14  I.  C.  C.  299,  the  Commission 
found  the  through  class  rates  from  At- 
lantic Seaboard  territory  to  the  Missouri 
River,  made  in  combination  on  the  Mis- 
sissippi River,  applicable  on  the  first  five 
classes  to  be  unreasonable,  because  the 
portions  applicable  west  of  the  Missis- 
sippi were  unreasonable,  and  those 
portions  were  reduced.  The  issue  tried, 
determined  and  covered  by  the  Commis- 
sion's order  was  the  application  of  the 
class  rates  on  the  first  five  classes  to  the 
traffic  subject  thereto.  The  Commission's 
order  reducing  the  rates  was  entered 
to  become  effective  Nov.  10,  1908,  but  was 
enjoined  and  did  not  become  effective 
until  Oct.  26,  1910.  At  the  time  of  the 
entry  of  the  original  order  of  the  Com- 
mission, and  continuously  since  then,  an 
exception  sheet  took  cotton  piece  goods 
from  the  first  class  and  rated  them  as 
third  class,  and  there  was  also  in  effect 
contemporaneously  a  commodity  rate  on 
cotton  piece  goods  the  same  as  the  third- 
class  rate.  The  tariff  contained  an  alter- 
native rule  for  the  application  of  class 
or  commodity  rates,  as  shown  in  the  tar- 
iff, whichever  resulted  in  a  lower  charge. 
Under  the  Commission's  final  order  the 
proportional  class  rates  were  put  into 
effect  without  being  made  subject  to  the 
alternative  use  of  class  or  commodity 
rates.  It  was  not  suggested  that  leav- 
ing this  rule  out  was  not  a  compliance 
with  the  order.  The  complaint,  in  the 
Burnham,  Hanna,  Munger  case,  did  not 
include  the  commodity  rate  on  cotton 
piece  goods.  HELD,  that  the  rates  es- 
tablished by  defendants  under  the  de- 
cision of  the  Commission  in  the  Burnham, 
Hanna,  Munger  case  did  not  apply  to 
cotton  piece  goods,  as  this  commodity 
took,  and  does  still  take,  a  specific  com- 
n  odity  rate.  Wheeler  &  Motter  Mer- 
cantile Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co..  20  I. 
C.  C.  141,  147. 

(e)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload  of 
plows,  Evansville,  Ind.,  to  Huntsville, 
Ala.  Freight  charges  based  on  the  sixth- 
class  rate  of  30c  per  100  lbs.  was  as- 
sessed.     The    shipment    contained    1,600 


lbs.  of  plow  handles  and  33,400  lbs.  of 
steel  beam  plows  set  up,  except  that  the 
handles  and  braces  were  removed.  The 
tariff  provided  rates  on  agricultural  im- 
plements, sixth  class,  C.  L.  30c;  plow  han- 
dles, L.  C.  L.,  fourth  class,  47c;  "special 
iron,"  special  rate  23c,  C.  L.  minimum 
24,000  lbs.;  plow  bases  defined  as  special 
iron.  The  tariff  also  provided  that  when 
parts  constituting  complete  articles  are 
shipped  they  will  be  rated  as  provided 
for  the  complete  article,  except  when 
rated  separately  in  the  classification. 
Subsequent  to  shipment  the  classifica- 
tion has  been  amended  to  provide  that 
plow  bases  with  beams  attached,  L.  C.  L., 
will  take  fourth-class  rates,  while  plow 
bases  will  take  the  special  iron  rate. 
No  evidence  was  offered  concerning  the 
unreasonableness  per  se  of  the  charges 
assessed.  HELD,  had  the  beams  been 
detached  the  fourth-class  47c  L.  C.  L.  rate 
could  have  been  assessed  on  the  han- 
dles and  beams  and  the  sp-eciai  iron 
rate  C.  L.  to  the  bases,  but  inasmuch 
as  there  was  no  separate  rating  for 
bases  with  beams  attached,  the  agricul- 
tural implement  rate  was  properly  ap- 
plicable, and  the  rate  assessed  'v«s  not 
unreasonable.  Reparation  denied.  Thomp- 
son V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
161,  163. 

(f)  Where  a  specific  rate  is  estab- 
lished on  wax  paper,  such  rate  must  be 
applied  to  all  grades  and  qualities  of  wax 
paper  regardless  of  the  use  to  which  it 
is  put.  Pacific  Coast  Biscuit  Co.  v.  O. 
R.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  178,  180. 

(g)  Publication  of  commodity  rate 
takes  commodity  out  of  classification.  In- 
dianapolis Freight  Bureau  v.  C,  C,  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  50,  70. 

(h)  Commodity  rates  established  by 
the  Transcontinental  Freight  Bureau  are 
not  to  be  construed  by  the  Western  Clas- 
sification in  the  absence  of  proper  tariff 
nrovision.  Newton  Gum  Co.  v.  C.  B.  & 
Q.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  341,  347. 

(i)  In  every  instance  where  a  com- 
modity rate  is  named  in  a  tariff  upon 
a  commodity  and  between  specified 
points,  such  commodity  rate  is  the 
lawful  rate  and  the  only  rate  that  can 
be  used  with  relation  to  that  traffic  be- 
tween those  points  even  though  a  class 
rate  or  some  combination  may  make 
lower.  The  naming  of  a  commodity  rate 
on  any  article  or  character  of  traffic 
takes  such  articles  or  traffic  entirely  out 
of  the  classification  and  out  of  the  class 


COMMODITY  RATES,  §4  (a)— COMMODITIES  CLAUSE,  §1  (f) 


161 


ites  between  the  points  to  wlxich  such 
Dmmodity  rate  applies.  Porter  v.  St. 
.   &   S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.   C.   C.   1,  5. 

4-.     Creation  Subsequent  to  Shipment. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  second- 
lass  rate  of  $2.60  per  100  lbs.  L.  C.  L. 
Q  rubber-covered  iron  or  steel  paper  mill 
)lls  from  Boston  to  Portland  and  Albina, 
re.,  as  part  of  the  total  through-rate  of 
2.70  to  Oregon  City  Locks,  Ore.  At  the 
me  of  shipment  a  special  commodity 
ite  of  $1.75  applied  on  "iron  and  steel 
)lls  for  flour,  paper  and  rubber  mills, 
3xed."  Subsequently,  after  the  ship- 
lents  in  question,  the  commodity  rate 
as  amended  so  as  to  specifically  apply 
>  rubber-covered  rolls.  HELD,  that  the 
ibber-covered  iron  paper  mill  rolls  on 
hich  freight  had  been  paid  were  paper 
ill  rolls  within  the  meaning  and  intent  of 
le  commodity  rate,  although  technically 
3t  within  its  description.  The  coating 
:  rubber  does  not  make  them  any  the 
ss  paper  mill  rolls.  The  long-continued 
36  of  the  commodity  rate,  and  the  im- 
ediate  amendment  of  the  tariff  by  the 
irriers  when  their  attention  was  di- 
jcted  to  it,  so  as  to  specifically  include 
ibber-covered  rolls,  fairly  indicate  the 
itended  application  of  that  rate.  Rep- 
-ation  awarded.  Willamette  Pulp  &  Pa- 
3r  Co.  V.  B.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
JS. 

(b)  On  carloads  of  hay  from  Amster- 
im  and  Merwin,  Mo.,  to  Memphis  over 
le  K.  C.  S.  R.  R.  via  Howe  Okla.,  and 
lence  over  the  Rock  Island,  complain- 
it  was  assessed  the  through  class  rate 
'  33c.  At  the  time  of  shipment,  a  spe- 
al  commodity  rate  of  20c  was  in  effect 
a  the  same  route.  This  special  com- 
odity  rate  was  not  canceled  until  after 
le  shipment  in  question,  through  some 
advertence  on  the  part  of  defendant. 
ELD,  the  rate  charged  was  unreason- 
3le.     Reparation  awarded.     Jones  v.  K. 

,  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  468,  469. 


COMMODITIES  CLAUSE. 

.     CONSTITUTIONALITY. 

§1.     In  general. 
.     CONSTRUCTION. 

CONSTITUTIONALITY. 

I.     In  General. 

(a)  The  commodities  clause  of  the 
epbum  Act  is  not  void  because  of  the 
[ception  contained  therein  as  to  timber 


and  the  manufactured  products  thereof, 
since  no  constitutional  limitation  requires 
that  such  a  regulation  when  adopted 
should  be  applied  to  all  commodities 
alike.  U.  S.  v.  Del.  &  Hudson  Co.,  213 
U.  S.  366,  416,  29  Sup  Ct.  527,  53  L.  ed 
836. 

(b)  The  commodities  clause  of  the 
Hepburn  Act  is  not  unconstitutional  as 
depriving  railroads  of  property  without 
due  process  of  law,  contrary  to  the  fifth 
amendment,  since  the  contentions  to  the 
contrary  proceed  upon  the  mistaken  con- 
ception that  inconvenience,  not  power, 
is  the  criterion  by  which  to  test  the  con- 
stitutionality of  legislation.  U.  S.  v.  D. 
&  H.  Co.,  213  U.  S.  366,  416,  29  Sup.  Ct. 
527,  53  L.  ed.  836. 

(c)  The  commodities  clause  of  the 
Hepburn  Act  is  not  void  as  resulting  in 
discrimination  between  carriers.  U.  S. 
V.  D.  &  H.  Co.,  213  U.  S.  366,  417,  29  Sup. 
Ct.   527,  53  L.  ed.  836. 

(d)  The  commodities  clause  of  the 
Hepburn  Act  is  not  void  because  of  the 
nature  and  character  of  the  penalties 
which  it  imposes  for  violations  of  its 
provisions,  since  the  question  of  the 
constitutionality  of  the  clause  relating  to 
penalties  is  wholly  separable  from  the 
remainder  of  the  clause.  U.  S.  v.  D.  & 
H.  Co.,  213  U.  S.  366,  417,  29  Sup.  Ct., 
527,  53  L.  €d.  836. 

(e)  The  commodities  clause  in  the 
Hepburn  Act  is  inherently  within  the 
power  of  Congress  to  enact  as  a  regula- 
tion of  commerce,  and  constituted  a  regu- 
lation to  which  all  pre-existing  rates  of 
the  railroad  companies  were  subordi- 
nated. U.  S.  V.  D.  &  H.  Co.,  213  U.  S. 
366,  415,  29  Sup.  Ct.  527,  53  L.  ed.  836. 

(f)  The  provisions  of  section  1  of  the 
Act,  as  amended  June  29,  1906,  making 
it  unlawful  for  a  railroad  to  transport 
in  interstate  commerce  any  article  or 
commodity,  other  than  timber  and  the 
manufactured  products  thereof,  manufac- 
tured, mined  or  produced  by  it,  or  under 
its  authority,  or  which  it  may  own  in 
whole  or  in  part,  or  in  which  it  may  have 
any  interest,  direct  or  indirect,  except 
such  articles  or  commodities  as  may  be 
necessary  and  intended  for  its  use  in 
the  conduct  of  its  business  as  a  common 
carrier,  is  in  violation  of  the  fifth  amend- 
ment of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  forbidding  the  deprivation  of  pri- 
vate property  without  due  process  of 
law,  since  the  provision  is  not  a  com- 
petent  and    efficient  regulation  of   com- 


162 


COMMODITIES  CLAUSE,  II  (a)  — (h) 


merce,  directly  dealing  with  the  evil  of 
the  situation,  but  is  destructive  of  prop- 
erty interests,  which  only  indirectly  affect 
interstate  commerce,  and  a  bill  by  the 
United  States  to  enjoin  carriers  who  have 
owned  coal  lands  for  many  years  from 
violating  the  provision  should  be  denied. 
(Buffington,  J.,  dissenting.)  U.  S.  v.  D. 
&  H.  Co.,  164  Fed.  215,  245,  reversed,  213 
U.  S.  366,  29  Sup.  Ct.  527,  53  L.  ed.  836. 

N.     CONSTRUCTION. 

•  (a)  While  under  the  commodities 
clause  of  the  Hepburn  Act  the  right  of  a 
railroad  campany  as  a  stockholder  in  a 
coal  company  to  use  its  stock  ownership 
for  the  purpose  of  a  bona  fide  separate 
administration  of  the  affairs  of  the  coal 
corporation  may  not  be  denied,  the  use  of 
such  stock  ownership  for  the  purpose  of 
destroying  the  entity  of  the  producing 
corporation  and  of  commingling  its  affairs 
in  administration  with  the  affairs  of  the 
railroad  company,  so  as  to  make  the  two 
corporations  virtually  one,  brings  the 
railroad  company  within  the  prohibition 
of  the  commodities  clause.  U.  S.  v.  L.  V. 
R.  R.  Co.,  220  U.  S.  257,  274,  31  Sup.  Ct. 
387,  55  L.  ed.  458. 

(b)  By  the  operation  and  effect  of  the 
commodities  clause  of  the  Hepburn  Act, 
a  duty  is  cast  upon  a  railroad  company 
proposing  to  carry  in  interstate  commerce 
the  products  of  a  producing  corporation 
in  which  it  has  a  stock  interest,  not  to 
abuse  such  power  so  as  virtuallv  to  do 
by  indirection  that  which  the  commodity 
clause  prohibits,  a  duty  which  plainly 
would  be  violated  by  the  unnecessary 
commingling  of  the  affairs  of  the  produc- 
ing company  with  its  own  so  as  to  cause 
them  to  be  one  and  inseparable.  U.  S.  v. 
L.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  220  U.  S.  257,  274,  31  Sup. 
Ct.   387,   55  L.  -ed.   458. 

(c)  The  commodities  clause  in  the 
Hepburn  Act  prohibits  a  railroad  com- 
pany engaged  in  interstate  commerce 
from  transporting  in  such  commerce  ar- 
ticles or  commodities:  (a)  when  the  arti- 
cle or  commodity  has  been  manufactured, 
mined,  or  produced  by  a  carrier  or  under 
its  authority,  and  at  the  time,  of  trans- 
portation the  carrier  has  not  in  good 
faith  before  the  act  of  transportation  dis- 
associated itself  from  such  article  or 
commodity;  (b)  when  the  carrier  owns 
the  article  or  commodity  to  be  trans- 
ported in  whole  or  in  part;   (c)  when  the 


carrier  at  the  time  of  transportation  has 
an  interest,  direct  or  indirect,  in  a  legal 
or  equitable  sense  in  the  article  or  com- 
modity, not  including,  therefore,  articles 
or  commodities  manufactured,  mined, 
produced  or  owned,  etc.,  by  a  bona  fide 
corporation  in  which  the  railroad  com- 
pany is  a  stockholder.  U.  S.  v.  D.  &  H. 
Co.,  213  U.  S.  366,  415,  29  Sup.  Ct.  527, 
53  L.  ed.  836. 

(d)  Under  the  commodities  clause  of 
the  Hepburn  Act  forbidding  a  railroad 
to  transport  articles  or  commodities  "in 
which  it  may  have  any  interest  direct  cr 
Indirect,"  the  prohibition  does  not  apply 
to  commodities  owned  by  separate  cor- 
porations in  which  the  carrier  owns 
stock.  (Harlan,  J.,  dissenting.)  U.  >.  v. 
D.  &  H.  Co.,  213  U.  S.  366,  414  29  Sup. 
Ct.  527,  53  L.  ed.  836. 

(e)  Under  the  commodities  clause  of 
the  Hepburn  Act,  making  it  unlawful  for 
any  railroad  company  to  transport  any 
article  or  commodity,  other  than  timber 
and  the  manufactured  products  thereof, 
manufactured,  mined  or  produced  by  it, 
or  under  its  authority,  or  which  it  may 
own  in  whole  or  in  part,  or  in  which  it 
may  have  any  interest,  direct  or  indirect, 
etc.,  the  prohibition  applies  only  to  arti- 
cles manufactured,  mined  or  produced  by 
the  railroad  which  are  at  the  time  of 
transportation  owned  by  it  and  does  not 
apply  to  such  articles  when  the  same  have 
become,  prior  to  the  time  of  transporta- 
tion, the  property  of  someone  else.  U. 
S.  V.  D.  &  H.  Co.,  213  U.  S.  366,  412,  29 
Sup.  Ct.  527,  53  L.  ed.  836.  ' 

(f)  Identity  of  ownership  of  terminal 
and  adjoining  refinery  is  a  relationship 
which  should  be  subjected  to  the  closest 
scrutiny.  Federal  Sugar  Refining  Co.  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  40,  47. 

(g)  So  long  as  there  is  identity  of 
ownership,  in  the  agency  of  transporta- 
tion and  the  thing  transported,  it  is  ex- 
tremely difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to 
prevent  discrimination  between  shippers. 
Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C,  73,  78. 

(h)  The  ownership  of  a  rail  line  by 
a  shipper  which  serves  that  shipper  calls 
for  closest  scrutiny  to  ascertain  whether, 
through  divisions  or  allowances,  rebates 
are  made  to  the  shipping  owner.  Crane 
R.  R.  V.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  248, 
253. 


COMMON  CARRIER,  §1  (a)— §3  (a) 


163 


COMMON  CARRIER. 

I.     TEST  OF  STATUS. 

§1.     Incorporation. 
§2.     Lease  of  line. 
§3.     Public  offer  to  carry. 
§4.     Refusal  to  publish  tariffs. 
§5.     Stock  ownership. 
§6.     Transportation     of     private 
cars. 
[I.     DETERMINATION  OF  STATUS. 

§7.     Question  of  fact. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 

See  Divisions,  §1  (d);  Forwarders,  I 
(h);  Tap  Lines,  §3  (2),  (a),  (b),  §4, 
§6;  Terminal  Facilities.  §7  (c) ; 
Transportation,    I    (a),    (b). 

I.     TEST  OF  STATUS. 

See  Tap   Lines.   §3,  §3   (2). 
5I.     Incorporation. 

(a)  The  Act  specifically  applies  "to 
my  corporation  or  any  person  or  per- 
sons" engaged  in  the  transportation  of 
passengers  or  property  by  rail  from  a 
point  in  one  state  to  a  point  in  another 
state.  So  far  as  interstate  transportation 
s  concerned  incorporation  is  not  a  con- 
lition  precedent  to  the  right  to  be  a 
common  carrier  by  rail.  The  Tap-line 
:ase,  23  I.  C.  C.  277,  291. 

(aa)  Common  ownership  of  an  in- 
lustry  and  of  a  railroad  that  is  held 
)ut  as  a  common  carrier  and  has  some 
ictual  traffic  for  the  public  for  hire 
s  not  in  itself  sufficient  to  divest  the 
•ailroad  of  its  status  as  a  common  car- 
■ier.  Nor  does  the  fact  that  the  rails, 
ocomotives  and  cars  of  an  industry 
lave  been  turned  over  to  an  incorpo- 
ated  railroad  company,  owned  and 
tperated  by  the  industry  or  in  its  in- 
erest,  divest  those  appliances  of  their 
iharacter  as  a  plant  facility  if  such  in 
act  is  the  case.  Tap-line  Case,  23  I. 
^.   C.  277,   292. 

(b)  The  purpose  of  the  Act  can- 
lot  be  nullified  by  the  creation  of  a  cor- 
lorate  entity  that  is  disassociated  in 
orm  but  nevertheless  responsive  to  the 
ame  general  policy,  and  subserves  the 
ame  general  investment  as  its  proprie- 
ary  comi  any.  In  Re  Wharfage  Charges 
,t  Galveston,   23   I.   C.  C.   535,   544. 

(bb)  The  Higgins  Oil  &  Fuel  Co.,  a 
rexas  oil  corporation,  organized  the  Gulf 
'oast  Navigation  Co.,  whose  entire  capi- 
al  stock  it  owned  and  transferred  for 
he  stock  to  the  navigation  company  its 


tow  boat  and  barges.  The  navigation 
company  sought  to  compel  defendants  to 
join  with  it  in  the  establishment  of 
through  routes  and  joint  rates  on  crude 
petroleum  oil  from  producing  points  in 
the  Caddo  oil  field  of  northern  Louisiana 
to  various  landings  on  the  Neches  and 
Sabine  rivers  in  Texas  and  from  the 
same  points  to  Morgan  City,  La.  The 
navigation  company  carries  very  little 
public  traffic,  its  principal  business  being 
transportation  for  the  oil  company,  and 
it  runs  no  regular  schedule  for  the  ac- 
commodation of  the  public.  HELD,  the 
mere  fact  that  the  tow  boat  and  barges 
of  the  oil  company  have  been  turned  over 
to  a  corporation  owned  by  it,  and  pur- 
porting to  be  a  common  carrier,  and 
which  is  able  to  pick  up  some  actual 
transportation  for  other  interests,  over 
other  waters,  is  not  conclusive  of  its 
right  to  compel  defendants  to  contribute 
to  the  expense  of  distributing  its  oil, 
and  similar  products,  at  private  landings, 
and  thus  to  impair  their  own  earnings. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Gulf  Coast  Navi- 
gation Co.  V.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
544. 

§2.     Lease  of  Line. 

(a)  Although  a  stock  yards  company 
by  charter  has  the  power  to  operate  a 
railroad,  and  for  a  period  of  time  does 
do  so,  it  ceases  to  be  a  common  carrier 
subject  to  the  Act  after  it  has  leased  its 
tracks  to  an  independent  railroad  cor- 
poration, discontinues  operating  the 
same,  and  retains  a  mere  reversionary 
interest  in  the  railroad  property,  and  this 
despite  the  fact  that  an  investment  com- 
pany through  stock  ownership  controls 
both  the  stock  yards  and  the  lessee  rail- 
road corporation.  U.  S.  v.  Union  S.  &  T. 
Co.,  192  Fed.  330,  341. 

§3.     Public  Offer  to  Carry. 

See    Act    to    Regulate    Commerce,    II 
(q). 

(a)  Defendant  stock  yards  company 
was  a  corporation  engaged  solely  in 
maintaining  a  stock  yards  at  Chicago. 
It  was  not  a  dealer  in  live  i.tock  but  sim- 
ply maintained  a  public  market  for  buy- 
ing and  selling.  It  leased  its  railway 
tracks,  extending  from  the  stock  yards 
a  distance  of  some  two  miles  to  the  lake 
front,  to  defendant  junction  company,  an 
independent  corporation,  and  except  as 
lessor  was  not  engaged  in  the  railroad 
business.  Defendant  investment  com- 
pany through  stock  ownership  controlled 
both  the   stock  yards  company  and   the 


164 


COMMON  CARRIER,  §3  (b)  — (dd) 


junction  company.  The  junction  com- 
pany was  engaged  solely  in  transporting 
carloads  of  live  stock  between  the  termi- 
nals of  various  railroads  and  the  stock 
yards.  It  published  tariffs  offering  to 
perform  this  service  to  anyone  tendering 
carloads  of  stock.  It  charged  a  distinct 
switching  charge  for  this  service  re- 
gardless of  the  commodity  or  character 
of  the  freight  in  the  car,  its  origin,  des- 
tination, or  the  through  freight  charge 
of  the  trunk  line  carriers.  It  in  fact 
served  only  the  railroads  and  the  stock 
yards  company.  It  performed  this  ser- 
vice as  a  part  of  a  continuous  carriage 
and  without  the  intervention  of  the  ship- 
per or  consignee.  It  was  organized  un- 
der the  railroad  law  of  Illinois.  HELD, 
the  junction  company  was  a  common  car- 
rier, since  it  offered  its  services  to  all 
the  public  who  were  in  a  position  to 
avail  themselves  thereof,  and  the  fact 
that  the  class  actually  using  it  was  lim- 
ited did  not  render  it  any  the  less  a 
common  carrier.  U.  S.  v.  Union  S.  &  T. 
Co.,  192  Fed.  330,  336. 

(b)  Defendant  junction  company  op- 
erated a  line  of  railroad  some  two  miles 
in  length,  extending  from  the  lake  front 
at  Chicago  to  the  stock  yards.  It  re- 
ceived carloads  of  live  stock  from  the 
terminals  of  the  railroads  entering  Chi- 
cago and  transported  the  same  to  the 
stock  yards,  there  to  be  unloaded  or  to 
be  turned  over  to  other  railroads.  The 
junction  company,  while  holding  itself 
out  in  its  tariffs  as  ready  to  serve  all  the 
public,  in  fact  received  carloads  of  live 
stock  only  from  railroads  and  made  its 
shipments  without  the  intervention  of  the 
shipper  or  consignee.  HELD,  on  ship- 
ments moving  from  one  state  into  anoth- 
er which  the  junction  company  partici- 
pated in,  it  was  a  common  carrier,  en- 
gaged in  interstate  commerce,  within 
section  1  of  the  Act,  and  as  such  sub- 
ject to  the  requirements  of  sections  6 
and  20  requiring  the  filing  of  tariffs 
with  the  Commission  and  the  making 
of  reports.  U.  S.  v.  Union  S.  &  T.  Co., 
192  Fed.  330,  340. 

(c)  Complainants  are  engaged  in 
mining  coal  and  manufacturing  coke  in 
Wise  and  Lee  counties,  Va.,  at  points  on 
the  lines  of  the  Interstate  R.  R.  Co.  and 
the  Va.  S.  W.  R.  Co.  Complainants'  coal 
and  coke  are  shipped  to  Appalachia  and 
there  delivered  to  the  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co. 
for  destination  points.  For  transporta- 
tion service  to  Appalachia  originating 
carriers  are  paid  a  local  rate  of  10c  per 


ton  and  the  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  is  paid 
Appalachia  rates  thence  to  destination. 
Complainants  are  charged  10c  per  ton 
more  to  reach  same  markets  than  are 
their  competitors  at  Appalachia,  Norton 
and  St.  Charles,  and  asked  that  through 
routes  and  joint  rates  be  established 
from  their  mines  and  coking  plants  to 
points  in  Kentucky  and  Ohio.  Defend- 
ants contended  that  the  Interstate  R.  R. 
Co.,  a  small  originating  carrier,  was  not 
a  common  carrier  but  merely  a  plant 
facility.  It  files  tariffs  with  and  makes  re- 
ports to  the  Commission,  as  required  by 
the  Act,  and  is  engaged  in  carrying  in- 
terstate traffic,  both  passenger  and 
freight.  It  maintains  through  routes  and 
joint  rates  with  various  other  carriers, 
and,  except  on  coal  and  coke,  with  the 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  It  was  originally  organ- 
ized to  enable  persons  interested  in  the 
Virginia  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  to  develop  their 
properties,  but  since  1903  gives  general 
freight  and  passenger  service,  and  serves 
industries  not  connected  with  the  Vir- 
ginia Coal  &  Iron  Co.  HELD,  the  fact 
that  most  of  the  freight  it  carries  is  for 
complainant  does  not  determine  its 
character  to  be  that  of  plant  facility. 
It  is  immaterial  by  whom  a  road  is  owned 
or  for  what  purpose  organized.  Since 
it  holds  itself  out  to  be,  on  the  facts  of 
record  it  must  be  deemed  a  common  car- 
rier. Stonega  Coke  &  Coal  Co.  v.  L.  & 
N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  17,  23. 

(cc)  A  railroad  which  holds  itself 
out  as  a  common  carrier,  files  tariffs, 
makes  reports  and  engages  in  interstate 
transportation,  is  a  common  carrier  sub- 
ject to  the  Act.  Stonega  Coke  &  Coal 
Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  17, 
22. 

(d)  The  character  of  service  which 
a  railroad  renders  or  holds  itself  out 
as  willing  to  render  is  controlling  in 
determining  whether  it  is  a  common 
carrier.  Stonega  Coke  &  Coal  Co.  v. 
L.   &   N.   R.   R.   Co.,   23  I.   C.   C.   17. 

(dd)  If  there  is  a  holding  out  as  a 
common  carrier  for  hire,  and  if  there  is 
an  ostensible  and  actual  movement  of 
traffic  for  the  public  for  hire,  the  status 
of  a  common  carrier  exists,  whether  the 
holding  out  is  by  a  company  or  by  an  in- 
dividual. But  such  a  holding  out  and 
the  existence  of  an  actual  traffic  is  not 
conclusive  in  all  cases.  Where  the  hold- 
ing out  is  in  furtherance  of  a  plan  to  se- 
cure unlawful  advantages  and  the  alleged 
carrier  is  able  to  pick  up  some  traffic 
that   is   incidental      to   that   purpose,   it 


COMMON  CARRIER,  §3   (e)  — (f) 


165 


must  be  regarded  simply  as  a  cloak  or 
device  to  effect  unlawful  results.  The 
Tap-line  Case,  23  I.   C.  C.  277,  292. 

(e)  The  Act,  limiting  its  application  as 
it  does  to  common  carriers,  was  passed 
in  full  view  and  recognition  of  the 
common  law  under  which  the  attitude 
and  actions  of  the  person  whether  natu- 
ral or  artificial  determine  whether  or  not 
he  or  it  is  in  law  a  common  carrier. 
Speaking  in  general  terms,  a  carrier 
could  become  a  common  carrier  by  offer- 
ing its  services  as  such  to  the  public  up- 
on first  complying  with  the  statutory  or 
police  requirement  demanded  of  it  by 
charter  or  otherwise.  The  test  to  be  ap- 
plied in  determining  whether  a  person 
is  a  common  carrier,  really  is  whether 
he  holds  out  either  expressly  or  by  a 
course  of  conduct  that  he  will  as  long  as 
he  has  room  carry  for  hire  the  goods  of 
every  person  indifferently  who  will 
bring  goods  to  him  to  be  carried.  Mfrs. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21 
I.  C.  C.  304,  312. 

(f)  The  Manufacturers  Railway  Com- 
pany of  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  and  a  number  of 
shippers  located  on  its  lines,  asked  that 
through  routes  be  established  to  and 
from  points  on  its  lines  of  railway  in  St. 
Louis,  Mo.,  from  and  to  points  on  the 
lines  of  each  of  the  defendant  railway 
companies  and  points  beyond;  also  for 
the  fixing  of  reasonable  divisions  or  ab- 
sorptions out  of  the  St.  Louis  rates  to  be 
paid  to  the  Manufacturers  Railway 
Company  for  terminal  services  rendered 
by  it  and  for  reparation.  This  company 
was  incorporated  in  1887  to  furnish  ter- 
minal facilities  for  the  southern  section 
of  industrial  St.  Louis,  which,  owing  to 
the  physical  conditions  existing  there, 
seem  both  reasonable  and  necessary. 
The  Terminal  Railroad  Association  domi- 
nates entirely  the  terminal  facilities  of 
St.  Louis  and  the  stock  of  this  company 
is  owned  equally  by  the  fourteen  car- 
riers running  into  that  city.  The  only 
terminal  facilities  in  the  southern  section 
were  furnished  by  the  Manufacturers 
Railway  and  by  the  lines  of  the  St.  L.  I. 
M.  &  S.  R.  R.  The  latter's  tracks,  how- 
ever,  follow  the  bank  of  the  Mississippi 
river  and  reach  such  industries  as  are 
adjacent  thereto.  For  a  considerable  dis- 
tance along  the  river  there  is  a  steep 
grade  to  be  overcome  in  reaching  indus- 
tries back  from  the  river  and  it  was  to 
afford  service  to  these  that  the  Manu- 
facturers Railway  was  constructed.  The 
Manufacturers  Railway  leased  its  tracks 


to  the  St.  L.  L  M.  &  S.  R.  R.  until  1908, 
since  when  it  was  operated  independent- 
ly. The  majority  of  its  stock  is  owned 
by  the  Anheuser-Busch  Brewing  Ass'n. 
For  the  year  ending  April  30,  1910,  it 
handled  42,970  cars,  of  which  37,546  cars 
were  handled  for  the  brewing  association, 
and  5,424  cars  were  handled  for  some 
87  other  industries  or  patrons,  of  which 
35  shipped  or  received  10  cars  or  more. 
The  traffic  of  the  brewing  association 
constitutes  one-thirtieth  of  the  total  traf- 
fic of  St.  Louis.  The  complainant  oper- 
ates about  20  miles  of  track,  of  which 
21^:  miles  are  classed  as  main  track,  and 
the  remainder  as  side  track,  switches 
and  yard  track.  Of  this  total  six  miles 
are  leased  from  the  brewing  association, 
and  are  used  in  part  both  for  the  services 
of  the  brewery  and  the  public.  The  only 
physical  connection  other  than  that  with 
the  St.  L.  L  M.  ^  S.  R.  R.  is  with  the 
St.  Louis  Transfer  Co.,  one  of  the  con- 
stituent properties  of  the  Terminal  Rail- 
road Association.  Two-thirds  of  the 
tracks  of  the  Manufacturers  Railway  has 
been  constructed  solely  for  the  purpose 
of  serving  the  public,  while  the  remain- 
ing one-third  is  used  in  serving  both  the 
brewery  and  the  public.  Prior  to  March 
1,  1910,  there  existed  through  routes  and 
joint  rates  over  the  lines  of  defendant 
carriers  and  complainant  carriers  to  and 
from  points  on  the  line  of  the  complain- 
ant company.  Since  that  date  the  de- 
fendants declined  to  absorb  the  charges 
for  the  services  of  the  Manufacturers 
Railway.  While  the  Manufacturers  Rail- 
way was  operated  by  the  St.  L.  L  M.  & 
S.  R.  R.  during  23  years  and  also  when 
operated  under  the  tariffs  which  permit- 
ted an  allowance  to  the  Manufacturers 
Railway  itself  in  1909  until  March  1, 
1910,  delivery  was  made  to  the  public 
served  by  it  at  the  St.  Louis  rates. 
HELD,  in  view  of  all  the  facts,  circum- 
stances and  conditions  bearing  upon 
the  question  there  is  no  doubt  that  the 
Manufacturers  Railway  Company  is  in 
fact  a  common  carrier  at  common  law, 
notwithstanding  any  modification  there- 
of, and  therefore  within  the  provisions 
of  the  first  section  of  the  Act  to  regulate 
commerce,  and  that  the  payment  to  it 
of  a  reasonable  and  just  portion  of  the 
St.  Louis  rates  for  the  terminal  services 
rendered  by  it  is  not  unlawful,  and  that 
it  is  not  a  mere  plant  facility.  FUR- 
THER HELD,  that  the  action  of  defend- 
ants in  cancelling  the  division  and  ab- 
sorptions with  the  Manufacturers  Rail- 
way  which   have   been   for   many  years 


166 


COMMON  CARRIER,  §3   (ff)— COMMUTATION  FARES    (c) 


Included  in  the  St.  Louis  rates,  has  sub- 
jected complainant  shippers  and  a  con- 
siderable portion  of  the  public  of  south 
St.  Louis  to  the  payment  of  unjust  and 
unreasonable  transportation  charges, 
and  to  undue  discriminations  and  disad- 
vantage. Question  of  what  are  reason- 
able divisions  and  the  reparation  to  be 
awarded  reserved  for  further  investiga- 
tion. (Lane,  Comm'r,  filed  a  concurring 
opinion,  Harlan,  Comm'r,  a  dissenting 
one.)  M'f'rs  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.   C.  304. 

(ff)  Defendant  truckman  received 
goods  in  New  York  City  to  be  carried  to 
the  wharf  and  thence  to  be  transported 
by  ocean  carrier  to  Boston.  Defendant's 
duty  was  simply  to  cart  same  from  the 
store  to  the  dock  as  an  independent 
employment.  HELD,  he  was  not  a 
common  carrier  engaged  in  the  trans- 
portation of  property  "ivholly  by  railroad 
(or  partly  by  railroad  and  partly  by 
water  under  a  common  control,  man- 
agement, or  arrangement)"  within  the 
meaning  of  section  1  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act,  so  as  to  make  him 
liable  under  the  Carmack  amendment 
for  loss  caused  by  the  ocean  carrier. 
Hirsch  v.  New  England  Nav.  Co.,  129 
App.  Div.  178,  181,  113  N.  Y.  Supp. 
395. 

§4.     Refusal  to  Publish  Tariffs. 
See   Tariffs,    §1. 

(a)  Commission  cannot  recognize  as 
common  carriers  lines  that  do  not  pub- 
lish tariffs  in  lawful  form  or  concur  prop- 
erly in  lawful  tariffs  of  other  lines  or  that 
do  not  in  all  other  respects  comply  with 
the  law.  Star  Grain  &  Lumber  Co.  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  338, 
343. 

§5.     Stock  Ownership. 

See   Allowances,   §10    (c),    (d). 

(a)  An  investment  company  control- 
ling through  stock  ownership  a  stock- 
yards company  not  engaged  in  railroad- 
ing except  as  a  lessor  and  an  independ- 
ent railroad  operating  a  junction  line 
is  not  a  common  carrier  within  section 
1  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  or 
section  3  of  the  Elkins  Act.  U.  S.  v. 
Union  S.  &  T.  Co.,  192  Fed.  330,  342. 

(b)  The  mere  fact  that  complainant's 
road  is  owned  by  a  corporation  which 
also  owns  the  stock  of  the  largest  ship- 
per over  it,  and  that  it  was  originally 
organized  and  built  for  the  purpose  of 
doing  the  work   of  that   shipper,  is   not 


controlling  against  its  being  held  a  com- 
mon carrier.  Crane  R.  R.  Co.  v.  P.  & 
R.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  248,  252. 

§6.     Transportation  of  Private  Cars. 

See  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §4,  §31, 
§32;    Transportation,    §2. 

(a)  No  railroad  transporting  private 
cars  of  theatrical  companies  has  been 
held  a  private  carrier  since  the  Act  took 
effect.  Chappelle  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
19  L  C.  C.  456. 

II.     DETERMINATION   OF   STATUS. 
§7.     Question  of  Fact. 

See  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  II 
(w). 

(a)  •  Whether  a  company  or  person 
claiming  to  be  a  common  carrier  is  a 
common  carrier  at  all  and  for  all  pur- 
poses is  a  question  of  fact,  and  whether 
the  service  performed  for  a  particular 
person  is  a  service  of  transportation  or 
an  industrial  service  is  also  a  question 
of  fact.  The  Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C. 
277,  292. 

COMMUTATION   FARES. 

See  Electric  Lines,  IV  (d) ;  Passen- 
ger Fares  and  Facilities,  §1  (b), 
§3  (a),  §5;  Through  Routes  and 
Joint    Rates,    §22    (I). 

(a)  In  order  that  unjust  discrimina- 
tion may  be  avoided  it  is  necessary,  to 
the  end  that  excursion,  commutation,  or 
mileage*  tickets  may  be  made  available 
for  the  purposes  specified  and  in  the 
manner  indicated,  that  definite  and  speci- 
fic provision  therefor  be  contained  in 
established  tariff  schedules  which  are 
filed  with  the  Commission,  and  also  in 
the  tariff  schedules  that  contain  the  fares 
that  are  to  be  so  used.  When  tariffs 
contain  such  provisions  the  combination 
so  authorized  may  be  used  in  lieu  of  the 
regular  joint  or  local  fares  between  the 
points  covered  by  the  combination.  In 
Re  Mileage,  Excursion  and  Commutation 
Tickets,  23  L  C.  C.  95.  97. 

(b)  Carriers  are  permitted  but  not 
.compelled  by  the  Act  to  establish  ex- 
cursion, commutation  and  mileage  tick- 
ets, the  latter  usually  being  designated 
mileage  books.  In  Re  Mileage,  Excur- 
sion and  Commutation  Tickets,  23  I.  C.  C. 
95,  90. 

(c)  It  is  lawful  for  a  carrier  or  car- 
riers, having  duly  established  in  the  man- 
ner required  or  authorized  by  law  any 
form  of  excursion,  commutation  or  mile- 


COMPARATIVE  RATES— COMPRESS  COMPANIES,  II  (a) 


167 


ige  fares,  to  provide  in  their  schedules 
'or  the  use  of  any  of  said  fares  as  basing 
'ares,  thus  enabling  other  carriers  to 
ise  the  same,  in  connection  with  their 
Dwn  duly  established  fares,  for  the 
hrough  transportation  of  passengers,  on 
iny  physical  line  of  connecting  carriers, 
jpon  a  combination  of  tickets  over  all  of 
he  component  parts  of  such  through  line, 
md  for  the  carriers  composing  or  operat- 
ng  such  through  line  to  afford  through 
Jleeping  car,  baggage  checking,  and 
)ther  through  accommodations  in  the 
>ame  manner  as  in  case  of  through  tick- 
its  over  the  entire  line,  provided  the 
)assenger  demanding  such  through  trans- 
portation and  through  accommodation 
jhall  present  to  the  initial  carrier  at  the 
)oint  of  starting  the  lawfully  authorized 
ickets  covering  the  lines  necessary  for 
he  entire  through  journey.  It,  however, 
s  not  deemed  lawful  for  a  carrier  to 
;heck  a  passenger's  baggage  beyond  the 
)oint  to  which  he  presents  tickets  at  the 
)oint  of  starting,  upon  the  mere  declara- 
ion  of  intention  to  go  farther  upon 
mother  ticket  to  be  thereafter  pur- 
;hased  or  otherwise.  In  Re  Mileage, 
Excursion  and  Commutation  Tickets,  23 
.  C.  C.  95,  96. 

COMPARATIVE    RATES. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §8  (1)  (f),  §18 
(7);  Branch  Lines,  §2;  Blanket 
Rates,  §13  (h),  §17  (b),  §18;  Com- 
merce  Court,  §4  (b);  Classification, 
§3  (h)  IV,  §18;  Equalization  of 
Rates,  §2  (kk) ;  Evidence.  §11. 
§12,  §13,  §14  (1)  (o).  (D),  §14  (5), 
(c),  (h),  (n),  (q).  (r),  §29  (n),  §30, 
§47,  §58,  §59,  §63  (n),  §66  (p);  Ex- 
press Companies,  §7  (c),  §11,  §20, 
§23;  Import  Traffic,  II  (c),  (d); 
Minimum,  §7  (f ) ;  Long  and  Short 
Haul,  §7  (aa),  §12  (2)  (e) ;  Pas- 
senger Fares  and  Facilities,  §2  (J); 
Precooling,  III  (c) ;  Proportional 
Rates,  IV  (c),  (h);  Rates  via  Com- 
peting Line;  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,  §2  (jj),  (qq),  §3  (c),  (g),  (q), 
(r),  (t),  §6  (g),  §8  (p),  (q),  (r),  §8 
(4)  (d),  (g),  §28  (j),  (o),  (t),  (dd), 
§37  (e).  (f),  §40  (h),  §56  (a),  §66 
(c),  §75  (c).  §84  (q).  §117  (c).  §141 
(a);  Relative  Rates;  Through 
Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §13  (b), 
(m),   §14    (e),    §15. 

COMPETITION. 

See  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  II 
(a);  Advanced  Rates,  §7  (4);  Class- 
ification, §6,  §7  (e);  Demurrage, 
§15  (f);  Differentials,  §1  (d);  Dis- 
crimination, §3  (f),  §8,  §8  (2),  §8 
(4),  §9  (e);  Equalization  of  Rates, 
§4;  Evidence.  §14,  §20  (a),  §29  (a), 
§64  (f ) ;  Express  Companies,  §20 
(b),  (c),  §21;  Interstate  Com- 
merce   Commission,    §1    (dd);    Long 


and  Short  Haul,  §4  (b),  IV,  §12  (2) 
(a);  Proportional  Rates,  IV  (e); 
Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §2  (ii), 
§8,  §8  (1)  (o),  §10  (d),  §16  (b),  (h), 
§63  (a),  §75  (c),  §76  (a),  §118 
(e);  Reparation,  §6  (x),  §16  (Mi), 
(kkk),  (mmm),  (zzz),  (rrr); 
Special  Contract,  §2  (k);  Through 
Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (ii), 
(mmmm),  (oo) ;  Track  Storage,  11 
(i). 

COMPRESS  COMPANIES  AND 
CHARGES. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 
II.     REASONABLENESS  OF  CHARGES. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 

See  Allowances,  §8  (1);  Facilities  and 
Privileges,   §3. 

I.  CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

See  Allowances,  §7  (d):  Facilities  and 
Privileges,   §2    (ee). 

(a)  Compress  companies  engaged  in 
compressing  cotton  at  a  concentration 
point  and  compensated  therefor  by  the 
carriers  are  amenable  to  control  by  the 
laws  of  the  land.  Anderson,  Clayton  & 
Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
340,  350. 

(b)  Compression  is  a  service  which 
the  carrier  procures  for  its  own  con- 
venience, and  when  that  service  is  per- 
formed in  such  manner  as  not  to  prej- 
udice, or  prefer,  a  particular  shipper,  or 
community,  the  Act  does  not  limit  tne 
freedom  of  the  carrier  to  make  contracts 
in  respect  thereto.  Merchants  Cotton 
Press  &  Storage  Co.  v.  I.  C  R.  R.  Co., 
17  L  C.  C.  98,  104. 

(c)  Section  15  in  regard  to  allow- 
ances is  not  applicable  where  an  allow- 
ance is  made  to  a  compress  company  not 
the  owner  of  the  cotton.  If  a  violation 
of  the  Act  results  from  more  favorable 
contracts  with  the  warehouse  company 
than  to  complainants,  it  must  be  be- 
cause of  discrimination  under  section  3. 
Merchants  Cotton  Press  &  Storage  Co. 
V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  98,  105. 

(d)  No  violation  of  the  statute  results 
from  a  preference,  though  found  to  exist, 
to  a  corporation  engaged  solely  in  the 
compression  of  cotton  in-  which  it  has 
no  interest.  Merchants  Cotton  Press  & 
Storage  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
98,  104. 

II.  REASONABLENESS  OF  CHARGES. 

See     Allowances,     §13     (a);     Substitu- 
tion   of    Tonnage,    §2    (b). 

(a)  Complainant  shippers  of  cotton, 
with  offices  at  Oklahoma  City,  Okla.,  and 


168 


COMPRESS  COMPANIES,  II  (b)  — (c) 


Shreveport,  La.,  attacked  a  storage 
charge  of  Ic  per  bale  per  day,  for  the 
first  15  days  after  the  expiration  of  fif- 
teen days'  free  time,  on  cotton  allowed  by 
shippers  to  remain  at  the  compress,  at 
the  concentration  point,  and  a  charge  of 
3c  per  bale  for  putting  patches  on  the/ 
cotton.  These  charges  were  imposed  by 
the  compress  companies  designated  by 
defendant  carriers.  Under  defendant's 
rules  and  tariffs,  a  shipper  was  allowed 
to  ship  cotton  under  a  Jocal  bill  of  lad- 
ing, from  a  point  of  origin  to  the  desig- 
nated point  of  cencentration  and  com- 
pression. Upon  arrival  at  the  compres- 
sion point,  the  carrier  delivered  the  cot- 
ton to  the  compression  company,  and  re- 
ceived therefor  a  receipt  which  it  turned 
over  to  the  shipper.  When  the  shipper 
had  determined  the  destination,  he  ob- 
tained the  binder  from  the  compress 
company,  took  it  to  the  carrier  and  re- 
ceived a  new  bill  of  lading.  The  cotton 
was  then  compressed  and  shipped  out, 
the  shipper  receiving  the  benefit  of  the 
through  rate  from  point  of  origin  to  des- 
tination. The  storage  charge  attacked 
applied  only  for  the  interval  between 
the  time  when  the  compression  com- 
pany's receipt  was  turned  over  by  the 
carrier  to  the  shipper,  and  the  time  when 
the  shipper  delivered  the  compression 
company's  binder  to  the  carrier.  During 
that  interval  the  cotton  was  under  the 
complete  control  of  the  shipper,  and  he 
could  order  the  compressing  company  to 
weigh,  sample,  grade,  assort  and  per- 
form other  services  without  interference 
from  the  carrier,  and  had  the  right  to 
determine  the  sale  and  destination  of 
the  cotton.  The  carrier  paid  the  com- 
pression charge  of  10c  per  bale  by  in- 
cluding the  same  in  its  through  rate. 
Nothing  in  the  evidence  indicated  that 
the  carriers  had  anything  to  do  with  im- 
posing the  charges  in  question,  but  that 
the  same  were  exacted  solely  by  the  ac- 
tion of  the  compress  companies.  The 
complainants  contended  that  these 
charges  could  not  be  exacted  without  be- 
ing published  in  the  tariffs  of  the  car- 
riers. The  complainant  did  not  specify 
the  exact  relief  sought.  HELD,  the  evi- 
dence did  not  justify  the  Commission  in 
making  any  order  against  the  defendants. 
While,  however,  the  carriers  had  a  right 
to  provide  for  the  concentration  and 
compression  of  cotton  in  the  manner 
stated,  the  charges  of  the  compress  com- 
panies and  the  carriers  must  be  just 
and  reasonable,  since  they  were  per- 
forming   a    public     service.      Anderson, 


Clayton  &  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
18  L  C.  C.  340,  350. 

(b)  Cotton  shipped  into  Memphis 
was  drayed  back  and  forth  by  defendant 
carriers  to  compressing  plants  located 
in  that  city,  to  be  compressed,  and  then 
carried  from  Memphis  to  destination 
points  at  the  through  rate.  Defendants 
paid  the  expense  of  drayage  and  com- 
pression to  private  companies,  allowing 
llMiC  and  50c  per  bale  for  drayage  and 
compression  respectively.  Complainant 
was  a  compressor  of  cotton  at  Memphis 
but  not  a  shipper  thereof.  Defendant 
warehouse  company  established  a  com- 
pressing plant  at  South  Memphis,  some 
two  miles  from  the  municipal  line.  The 
stock  in  the  company  was  principally 
owned  by  dealers  and  shippers  of  cotton. 
The  company  connected  its  plant  with 
the  lines  of  defendants  by  a  system  of 
switching  tracks.  On  cotton  compressed 
by  the  defendant  warehouse  the  defend- 
ant carriers  allowed  10c  per  bale  for 
switching  the  same  to  and  from  its  ware- 
house and  50c  per  bale  for  compression. 
Defendant  carriers  charged  a  rate  of 
20c  a  bale  for  hauling  cotton  from 
Memphis  to  South  Memphis.  Complain- 
ant alleged  that  the  stockholders  of 
defendant  warehouse  company  at  South 
Memphis  being  themselves  shippers 
obtained  lower  rates  through  the  divi- 
dends derived  by  them  from  the  profits 
of  their  warehouse  company.  Complain- 
ant introduced  no  evidence  to  show  that 
the  defendant  warehouse  company  made 
any  profit  on  cotton  compressed  by  it 
at  the  10c  switching  charge  and  50c 
compressing  charge.  HELD,  complain- 
ants, not  being  themselves  shippers  of 
cotton,  and  failing  to  show  that  defend- 
ant warehouse  company  was  making 
any  profits  at  the  10c  and  50c  charges, 
failed  to  establish  a  case  of  unjust  dis- 
crimination between  shippers,  as  it  was 
perfectly  lawful  for  carriers  to  make 
special  contracts  with  private  companies 
which  were  not  shippers  on  their  lines. 
(Clements  and  Lane,  Comm'rs,  dissent- 
ing.) Merchants  Cotton  Press  &  Stor- 
age Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
98,  104,  106. 

(c)  If  there  is  a  recognized  custom 
or  usage  with  reference  to  the  payment 
by  a  railway  company  of  the  charges  for 
compressing  cotton,  such  charges  being 
covered  or  included  by  the  rate  for 
transporting  by  the  carrier  of  the  com- 
pressed cotton,  there  being  a  question 
as    to    the    particular    meaning    of    the 


COMPRESS  COMPANIES,  II    (d)— CONCURRENCES 


169 


voids  "uncompressed  cotton,  any  qiian- 
ity,"  and  "compressed  cotton,  any  quan- 
ity,"  such  custom  is  permissible  to  be 
)roved  as  a  matter  of  explanation  of 
he  meaning  of  these  words  as  such  in 
he  tariff  sheet.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co. 
r.  Dodson  &  Williams,  25  Okla.  822,  832, 
14    P.    673,    107    P.    921. 

(d)  Where  the  terms  "compressed 
lOtton,  any  quantity,"  and  "uncompressed 
;otton,  any  quantity,"  are  used  in  a  tar- 
ff  sheet  without  further  amplifying 
v^ords,  the  contemporaneous,  practical 
;onstruction  placed  on  said  terms  by  the 
ailroad  company,  through  its  agents  in 
;harge  and  the  shippers,  as  to  baled 
otton,  delivered  to  the  railroad  com- 
pany, in  an  uncompressed  state  with 
he  understanding  that  it  was  to  be 
ompressed,  and  then  from  the  place  of 
nitial  delivery  transported  to  the  place 
if  original  consignment,  when  there 
k^as  no  other  promulgated  tariff  rate 
•etween  the  designated  points  concern- 
ng  cotton  shipments,  is  competent  for 
onsideration  in  determining  the  mean- 
ng  of  such  terms.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co. 
.  Dodson  &  Williams,  25  Okla.  822,  829, 
4   P.   673,   107   P.   921. 

:ONCENTRATING  RATES  AND 
PRIVILEGES. 

See  Compress  Companies  and 
Charges,  §2  (a);  Evidence,  §13  (6) 
(i),  §47  (g);  Export  Rates  and  Fa- 
cilities, III  (d);  Facilities  and  Priv- 
ileges, §4,  §17  (k),  §20  (e),  §21  (d); 
Proportional  Rates,  IV  (f ) ;  Reason- 
ableness of  Rates,  §3  (i);  Repara- 
tion, §8  (e),  (dd);  Substitution  of 
Tonnage,  §2  (b);  Tariffs,  §4  (g). 

(a)  It  is  unjustly  discriminatory  for 
arriers  to  assess  on  interstate  or  ex- 
port traffic  concentration  charges  at 
ompetitive  points  different  from  or 
reater  than  those  which  they  contem- 
oraneously  assess  at  noncompetitive 
oints.  Red  River  Oil  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry. 
:o.,  23  I.  C.  C.  438,  447. 

(aa)  Manufacturers  of  cottonseed 
roducts  at  Alexandria  and  Natchito- 
hes.  La.,  attacked  the  concentration 
harges  exacted  on  shipments  of  cotton- 
eed  from  Louisiana  points  to  Alex- 
ndria  and  Natchitoches  of  3c  per  100 
3S.  added  to  the  local  rates  governing 
tie  cottonseed  from  points  of  origin  to 
le  mill.  When  the  outbound  shipments 
re  not  tendered  to  the  same  carrier 
aat  hauled  the  raw  product  in,  the  con- 


centration charge  of  3c  is  forfeited, 
but  if  the  product  is  reshipped  over 
the  line  of  the  originating  carrier  the 
concentration  charge  is  refunded.  Many 
points  at  which  there  is  market  for 
products  are  located  on  lines  from 
which  no  seed  is  obtained.  The  con- 
centration charge  is  not  assessed  at 
points  where  there  is  absence  of  compe- 
tition between  carriers.  HELD,  the 
Commission  does  not  condemn  reason- 
able, nondiscriminatory  and  properly  ap- 
plied transit  rates  and  privileges,  or  a 
reasonable  and  nondiscriminatory  charge 
for  the  additional  service  performed  in 
connection  with  a  transit  privilege,  but  it 
is  unreasonable  for  defendants  to  add  to 
their  reasonable  local  rates  any  sum 
as  a  penalty  to  be  forfeited  if  the  out- 
bound shipment  does  not  move  over  the 
same  line  which  hauled  the  inbound 
shipment,  and  it  is  also  unjustly  dis- 
criminatory to  assess  on  interstate  or 
export  traffic  concentration  charges  at 
points  where  there  is  competition  be- 
tween carriers  different  from  or  greater 
than  those  which  they  contemporane- 
ously assess  at  noncompetitive  points. 
Red  River  Oil  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
23  L  C.  C.  438,  447. 

(b)  It  is  unjustly  discriminatory  to 
exact  of  southern  Illinois  shippers  a 
transit  penalty,  while  competitors  at 
St.  Louis  are  charged  nothing.  Reason- 
able penalty  suggested  for  both  points. 
Southern  Illinois  Millers'  Ass'n  v.  L.  & 
N.  R.  R.   Co.,   23  I.  C.  C.  673,  677. 

(bb)  Carriers  may  grant  the  privilege 
of  concentration  and  protect  through 
rates.  Anderson,  Clayton  &  Co.  v.  C.  R. 
I.  &  P.  Ry  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  340,  350. 

(c)  Concentration  of  less-than-carload 
shipments  of  boots  and  shoes  at  the  ports 
is  not  feasible  in  the  legal  sense  that 
rates  must  be  free  from  conditions  and 
burdens  in  their  application.  Kiser  Co. 
V.  C.  of  K.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  430,  439. 

(d)  Concentrating  rates  by  increasing 
the  size  and  regularity  of  shipments 
seems  to  be  of  advantage  to  carriers  as 
well  as  shippers.  Railroad  Commission 
of  Wisconsin  v.  C.  &.  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  85,  90. 

CONCURRENCES. 


See      Through 
Rates,  §2. 


Routes      and      Joint 


170 


CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW— COURTS,  §1   (d) 


CONSTITUTIONAL   LAW. 

See  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  I; 
Commodities  Clause,  I;  Crimes,  §1, 
§33  (a);  Employment,  §1  (b); 
Equalization  of  Rates,  §1  (p); 
Express  Companies,  §6  (b);  Inter- 
state Commerce,  §4,  §5;  Long  and 
Short  Haul,  §1,  §3,  §4  (k) ;  Loss 
and  Damage,  §1;  Reasonableness 
of  Rates,  §1  (d)  (j) ;  Special  Con- 
tract, §1;  Tariffs,  §2  (a);  Track 
Storage,   §1    (b). 

CONSTRUCTION. 

Of  Bill  of  Lading:  See  Bill  of  Lad- 
ing, III.  Of  Carmack  Amendment: 
See  Loss  and  Damage,  §2.  Of 
Demurrage  Rules:  See  Demurrage, 
§12.  Of  Elkins  Act;  See  Crimes, 
§2.  Of  Released  Rates:  See  Re- 
leased Rates,  II.  Of  Tariff:  See  Al- 
lowances, §6;  Express  Companies, 
§13;  Reconsignment,  §5;  Tariffs, 
IV. 

CONTRACTS. 

See  Exclusive  Contracts;  Cars  and 
Car   Supply,    IV;   Special    Contracts. 

CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

See  Absorption  of  Charges,  111;  Ad- 
vanced Rates,  I;  Allowances,  1; 
Baggage  Transfer,  I;  Bills  of  Lad- 
ing, J;  Blanket  Rates,  I;  Cars  and 
Car  Supply,  I;  Compress  Compa- 
nies and  Charges,  I;  Demurrage,  I; 
Discrimination,  I;  Divisions,  I; 
Electric  Lines,  1;  Equalization  of 
Rates,  I;  Export  Rates  and  Facili- 
ties, I;  Express  Companies,  I;  For- 
eign Commerce,  I;  Interstate  Com- 
merce, §3  (i),  II;  Lighterage,  I; 
Long  and  Short  Hauls,  I;  Over- 
charges, I;  Passenger  Fares  and 
Facilities,  I;  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,  I;  Reduced  Rates,  I;  Re- 
frigeration, I;  Released  Rates,  I; 
Routing  and  Misrouting,  I;  Spe- 
cial Contracts,  I;  Substitution  of 
Tonnage,  I;  Switch  Tracks  and 
Switching,  I;  Tap  Lines,  1;  Tariffs, 
I;  Terminal  Facilities,  I;  Through 
Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  I;  Track 
Storage,  I;  Transportation,  III; 
Undercharges,  I;  Water  Carriers, 
I;    Weights   and    Weighing,    I. 


COUNTER  CLAIM. 

See      Through       Routes       and       Joint 
Rates,    §16    (I)    (m). 

COURTS. 

L     ACTIONS. 

§1.     In  general. 
§2.     Defenses. 
§3.     Mandamus. 
§4.     New    trial. 

§5.     Suits   against   Commission. 
II.     APPEAL. 

§6.     In    general. 


III.  UNITED  STATES  COURTS. 

§7.     Concurrent    jurisdiction. 
88.     Exclusive    jurisdiction. 
§9.     Original    jurisdiction. 

IV.  UNITED    STATES    SUPREME 

COURT. 
§10.     In  general. 

V.  STATE    COURTS. 

§11.     In   general. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 

See  Cars  and   Car  Supply,   §33;   Com- 
merce Court. 

I.     ACTIONS. 
§1.     In    General. 

See    Actions    at    Law;    Weights    and 
Weighing,   §1    (b). 

(a)  Where  carriers  are  not  made 
party  defendants  to  a  complaint  before 
the  Commission,  but  the  order  of  the 
Commission  reducing  rates  will  inev- 
itably require  reductions  by  such  car- 
riers in  large  amounts  from  the  fact 
that  they  are  largely  engaged  in  the 
transportation  affected  by  such  order, 
they  have  a  sufficient  interest  to  entitle 
them  to  join  in  a  petition  to  the  Com- 
merce Court  to  enjoin  said  order.  A. 
C.  L.  V.  I.  C.  C,  194  Fed.  449,  451. 

(b)  While  it  is  entirely  proper  for 
parties,  against  whom  an  order  of  the 
Commission  has  been  made  reducing 
rates,  to  apply  to  the  Commission  for 
a  rehearing,  such  application  is  not  a 
condition  precedent  to  the  bringing  of 
a  suit  in  the  Commerce  Court  for  the 
purpose  of  setting  aside  such  an  order. 
A.   C.  L.  V.  I.  C.  C,  194  Fed.  449,  452. 

(c)  A  petition  to  the  Commerce 
Court  to  enjoin  an  order  of  the  Commis- 
sion reducing  rates  is  not  an  appeal 
or  writ  of  error  requiring  all  parties 
against  whom  the  order  of  the  Commis- 
sion was  rendered  to  join,  but  is  a 
plenary  suit  in  equity  and  may  be 
brought  by  one  carrier  without  joining 
the  other  i>arties  to  the  order.  A.  C.  L. 
V.   L   C.    C,    194   Fed.   449,   452. 

(d)  A  paragraph  of  a  bill  by  car- 
riers to  enjoin  an  order  of  the  Com- 
mission reducing  rates,  on  the  ground 
that  the  lower  rates  prescribed  are  con- 
fiscatory, is  bad  on  demurrer,  where  it 
fails  to  show  the  amount  of  revenue 
necessary  and  sufficient  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  petitioners  as  common 
carriers,  in  the  discharge  of  their  du- 
ties to  the  public,  and  to  what  extent 
such  revenue   would  be  affected  by  the 


COURTS,  §1   (e)— §2   (a) 


171 


•ates  prescribed  in  the  order  complained 
)f.  A.  C.  L.  V.  I.  C.  C,  194  Fed.  449, 
[53. 

(e)  Railroads  may  complain  of  rates 
)rescribed  by  the  Commission  as  to 
:heir  effect  upon  their  revenue,  but  not 
is  to  their  effect  upon  shippers  and 
)laces.  A.  C.  L.  v.  I.  C.  C,  194  Fed. 
t49,    453. 

(f)  In  a  petition  by  carriers  to  en- 
oin  an  order  of  the  Commission  reducing 
■ates  on  the  ground  that  it  is  confis- 
:atory,  a  demurrer  will  be  sustained 
vhere  the  bill  merely  charges  in  gen- 
!ral  terms  that  the  rates  prescribed  are 
lot  reasonably  compensatory  and  do 
lot  yield  a  reasonable  profit,  as  it  is 
he  duty  of  the  carriers,  having,  as  they 
lo,  largely  in  their  possession  the  means 
»f  information,  to  set  out  the  revenue 
lerived,  the  cost  of  service,  and  other 
acts  showing  confiscation.  A.  C.  L.  v. 
.   C.   C,   194  Fed.   449,   455. 

(g)  Defendant  received  coal  from  the 
:ompetitors  of  plaintiffs  at  the  Clear- 
ield  region  and  transported  the  same 
sntirely  over  its  own  line  to  New  York 
larbor.  Plaintiff's  coal  originated  on  an 
ndependent  connecting  line,  by  which 
t  was  carried  some  30  miles  to  de- 
endant's  line.  Defendant  then  hauled 
ilaintiff's  coal  to  New  York  harbor 
loints.  Defendant  had  filed  a  tariff 
or  the  shipment  of  coal  and  had  in- 
luded  the  plaintiffs  and  their  compet- 
tors  in  the  same  group.  The  tariff 
ncluded  the  haul  over  the  connecting 
ine.  It  published  the  same  charges 
rom  points  in  this  group  to  similar 
estinations,  and  the  initial  points  were 
11  placed  together  in  the  tariff  as  one 
nitial  point  covering  the  Clearfield  re- 
ion.  The  plaintiffs  had  nothing  to  do 
/ith  the  connecting  line  so  far  as 
he  contract  of  carriage  or  the  pay- 
aent  of  the  freight  rate  was  concerned. 
lELD,  the  finding  of  the  jury  that  the 
ransportation  service  was  under  sub- 
tantiaily  similar  circumstances  and  con- 
itions  so  as  to  make  defendant  liable 
n  a  suit  in  the  courts  for  damages  for 
ranting  secret  allowances  to  plaintiffs' 
ompetitors  was  sustainable  as  a  mat- 
er of  law.  Langdon  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
^o.,  194  Fed.  486,  494. 

(h)  The  liability  under  section.  9  of 
he  Act  for  unjust  discrimination  in 
laking  secret  allowances  to  favored 
hippers   is   not   strictly   a  penalty   in   a 


suit  in  the  court  for  damages,  but  Is  a 
cause  of  action  which  survives  and  may. 
be  prosecuted  by  executors.  Langdon 
v.    Penn.    R.    R.    Co.,    194    Fed.    486,    495. 

(i)  Under  section  8  of  the  Act  mak- 
ing a  carrier  liable  for  damages  result- 
ing to  a  shipper  from  the  carrier's 
violation  of  the  Act,  a  shipper  may, 
for  the  carrier's  failure  to  post  and 
keep  open  for  inspection  its  established 
rates,  whereby  the  shipper  is  compelled 
to  pay  a  higher  rate  than  that  in  effect 
over  a  competing  line,  recover  the  dif- 
ference between  the  rate  paid  and  the 
competitive  rate,  and  this  despite  the 
fact  that  the  shipper  would  thereby  be 
charged  less  than  the  defendant's  pub- 
lished charge.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Lewellen    Bros.,    192    Fed.    540,    542. 

(j)  In  a  suit  in  a  United  States 
court  to  recover  damages  for  the  ex- 
action of  excessive  and  unreasonable 
rates,  the  declaration  must  allege  spe- 
cifically that  the  rates  complained  of 
have  been  declared  excessive  or  unrea- 
sonable by  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission,  since  under  the  Act  as 
amended  June  29,  1906,  recovery  cannot 
be  had  in  the  courts  until  the  Commis- 
sion has  passed  upon,  the  rates,  and  an 
allegation  merely  that  "plaintiffs  have 
been  obliged  to  pay  excessive  and  unrea- 
sonable rates"  is  not  sufficient.  Meeker 
v.  Lehigh  Valley  Co.,  162  Fed.  354,  362. 

(k)  Where  the  Commission  orders 
carriers  to  desist  from  according  dif- 
ferent rates  to  coal  intended  for  the 
use  of  railroads  as  fuel  than  to  com- 
mercial coal,  and  the  facts,  circum- 
stances and  conditions  upon  which  it 
bases  its  orders  are  undisputed,  and  the 
question  involved  is  the  construction, 
of  sections  2  and  3  of  the  Act  to  deter- 
mine whether  the  different  charges  con- 
stitute violations  of  those  sections,  the 
order  is  not  merely  administrative  and 
is  open  to  review  by  the  Commerce 
Court.  I.  C.  C.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
225  U.  S.  326,  32  Sup.  Ct.  742,  746,  56  L. 
ed.  1107. 

§2.     Defenses. 

See  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §34; 
Crimes,  VIII;  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission,  §3;  Special  Contracts, 
§6;   Undercharges,  §3. 

(a)  In  determining  the  validity  of  a 
decision  of  the  Commission  its  order 
cannot  be  considered  by  itself  alone, 
but   must   be    read   in   the   light   of   the 


172 


COURTS,  §2  (b)— §6  (c) 


entire  record.  I.  C.  C.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R., 
222  U.  S.  541,  551,  32  Sup.  Ct.  108,  56 
L.  ed.  308. 

(b)  In  determining  the  mixed  ques- 
tions of  law  and  facts  involved  in  the 
decisions  of  the  Commission,  the  court 
confines  itself  to  the  ultimate  question 
as  to  whether  the  Commission,  acts 
within  its  powers,  and  it  will  not  con- 
sider the  expediency  or  the  wisdom  of 
the  order,  or  whether,  on  like  testi- 
mony, it  would  have  made  a  similar 
ruling.  I.  C.  C.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.,  222  U. 
S.  541,  547,  32  Sup.  Ct.  108,  56  L.  ed. 
308. 

(c)  Where  the  complaint  in  a  suit  by 
a  shipper  to  recover  the  excess  exacted 
above  the  quoted  rate  does  not  reveal 
on  its  face  that  the  quoted  rate  was 
less  than  the  schedule  rate  filed  with 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission, 
the  defendant  carrier  cannot  prove  such 
fact  as  a  defense  under  a  plea  of  the 
general  issue.  Baldwin  Land  Co.  v. 
Columbia  Ry.  Co.,  58  Or.  285,  291,  114 
P.  469. 

§3.     Mandamus. 

See    Reports,    I    (c). 

(a)  Although  mandamus  will  not  lie 
so  as  to  interfere  with  the  exercise  of 
its  discretion  by  the  Commission,  it 
will  lie  to  compel  the  Commission  to 
take  jurisdiction  over  carriers  operating 
between  Alaska  and  the  States  and  be- 
tween Alaska  and  adjacent  foreign 
countries,  where  the  Commission  has 
refused  to  do  so  pursuant  to  its  belief 
that  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  has 
conveyed  upon  it  no  authority  over 
such  carriers.  I.  C.  C.  v.  H.  S.  S.  Co., 
224  U.  S.  474,  484,  32  Sup.  Ct.  556,  56 
L.  ed.  849. 

(b)  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia  will  issue  a  writ  of 
mandamus  to  compel  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  to  entertain  a 
petition  by  a  steamship  company  to 
compel  the  filing  with  the  Commission 
of  rates  and  the  establishment  of  through 
routes  and  joint  rates  on  traffic  mov- 
ing between  Alaska  and  adjacent  for- 
eign countries,  and  Alaska  and  the  state 
of  Washington.  Humboldt  S.  S.  Co.  v. 
I.  C.  C,  37  App.  Cas.  D.  C.  266,  275. 

§4.     New  Trial. 

(a)  Where  the  defendant  carrier  in 
a   suit   by   a    shipper   for   unlawful   dis- 1 


crimination  produces  all  the  books  re- 
quired to  enable  plaintiff  to  prove  his 
case  as  to  payment  of  rebates  to  com- 
petitors, plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  a 
new  trial  by  reason  of  defendant's  fail- 
ure to  produce  the  whole  list  of  docu- 
ments called  for  by  him  at  the  trial.  In- 
ternational Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Penn. 
R.  R;  Co.,  162  Fed.  996,  997. 

§5.     Suits    against    Commission. 

See  Procedure  Before  Commission, 
§12;  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §1 
(g),   (I). 

(a)  Under  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act  the  parties  who  may  maintain  suits 
in  the  courts  to  enjoin,  set  aside,  an- 
nul or  suspend  an  order  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  are  not 
limited  to  those  who  were  parties  to  the 
proceeding  before  it  upon  which  the 
order  was  based.  The  proceeding  in 
the.  courts  is  not  an  appeal;  it  is  a 
plenary  suit  in  equity.  The  determina- 
tion of  the  question  as  to  what  parties 
may  maintain  such  suits  is  left  by  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  to  the  general 
rules  and  practices  in  equity,  and  under 
them  any  party  whose  rights  of  property 
are  in  danger  of  irreparable  injury  from 
an  unauthorized  order  of  the  Commis- 
sion may  appeal  to  a  Federal  Court 
of  equity  for  relief.  Peavey  &  Co.  v. 
U.  P.   R.   R.   Co.,   176   Fed.   409,   417. 

II.     APPEAL. 
§6.     In    General. 

(a)  The  primary  jurisdiction  over 
unjust  discrimination  by  carriers  is  with 
the  Commission,  the  power  of  the  courts 
being  that  of  review  and  is  confined  in 
that  review  to  questions  of  constitu- 
tional power  and  all  pertinent  questions 
as  to  whether  the  action  of  the  Commis- 
sion is  within  the  scope  of  the  delegated 
authority  under  which  it  purports  to 
have  been  taken.  I.  C.  C.  v.  C.  R.  I. 
&  P.  Ry.,  218  U.  S.  88,  110,  30  Sup.  Ct. 
651,   54   L.   ed.  946. 

(b)  A  railroad  cannot  complain  of 
an  order  of  the  Commission  where  the 
grievance  is  one  not  against  it  but 
against  the  shipper.  I.  C.  C.  v.  C.  R. 
L  &  P.  Ry.,  218  U.  S.  88,  109,  30  Sup.  Ct. 
651,   54   L.   ed.   946. 

(c)  The  Supreme  Court  may  not, 
under  the  guise  of  exerting  judical 
power,  usurp  merely  administrative  func- 
tions by  setting  aside  a  lawful  order 
upon   its   conception   as   to   whether   the 


COURTS,  §6  (d)— §7  (a) 


173 


idministrative  power  has  been  wisely 
exercised.  I.  C.  C.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.,  215 
J.  S.  452,  470,  30  Sup.  Ct.  155,  54  L. 
3d.  280.  I.  C.  C.  V.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 
!15  U.  S.  479,  30  Sup.  Ct.  163,  54  L.  ed. 
191. 

(d)  In  determining  whether  an  order 
)f  the  Commission  shall  be  suspended 
)r  set  aside,  the  Supreme  Court  must 
;onsider  (a)  all  relevant  questions  of 
!onstitutional  power  or  right;  (b)  all 
)ertinent  questions  as  to  whether  the 
idministrative  order  is  within  the  scope 
)f  the  delegated  authority  under  which 
t  purports  to  have  been  made;  and 
c)  whether,  even  although  the  order 
)e  in  form  within  the  delegated  power, 
levertheless,  it  must  be  treated  as 
lot  embraced  therein  because  its  au- 
hority  has  been  manifested  in  such  an 
inreasonable  manner  as  to  cause  it  to 
)e  within  the  elementary  rule  that  the 
jubstance,  and  not  the  shadow,  deter- 
nines  the  validity  of  the  exercise  of 
he  power.  I.  C.  C.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.,  215 
J.  S.  452,  470,  30  Sup.  Ct.  155,  54  L.  ed. 
!80.  I.  C.  C.  V.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  215 
J.  S.  479,  30  Sup.  Ct.  163,  54  L.  ed. 
191. 

(e)  In  a  petition  to  a  Circuit  Court, 
inder  section  16  of  the  Act,  to  enforce 
m  order  of  reparation  it  is  not  neces- 
sary that  the  order  of  the  Commission 
)ffered  as  evidence  state  the  cause  of 
iction  involved  where  the  petition  and 
he  record  show  that  the  cause  of  ac- 
ion  before  the  Circuit  Court  is  the 
same  as  that  before  the  Commission. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Feintuch, 
L91  Fed.  482,  486. 

(f)  In  a  petition  to  the  Circuit  Court 
;o  enforce  an  order  of  the  Commission 
)efore  the  judge  sitting  without  a  jury, 
he  full  report  of  the  Commission,  con- 
aining  a  commingled  statement  of  opin- 
on  drawn  from  the  facts  and  of  con- 
clusions of  law,  as  well  as  of  the  facts 
:hemselves,  was  admitted  in.  evidence, 
complainant  stating  to  the  court  the 
lature  of  said  report  and  offering  it  in 
evidence  in.  so  far  as  the  facts  therein 
contained  were  material  or  competent. 
tlELD,  the  admission  of  said  report 
was  not  prejudicial  on  the  ground  that 
t  included  the  extraneous  opinions  and 
conclusions  of  the  Commission.  Chi- 
cago, B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Feintuch, 
L91    Fed.    482,    487. 

(g)  Where  it  is  not  contended  that  the 
Commission    acted    unlawfully   or   other- 


wise improperly  in  fixing  rates,  except 
that  it  failed  to  give  weight,  or  not 
sufficient  weight  to  this  or  that  con- 
sideration, which  the  carrier  thinks 
ought  to  have  been  weighed,  and,  if 
weighed,  should  have  produced  a  aif- 
ferent  opinion,  the  United  States  Cir- 
cuit Court  cannot  review  the  discretion 
of  the  Commission  so  acting  in  its 
legislative  capacity.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  I.  C.  C,  184  Fed.  118,  124. 

(h)  The  courts  will  not  review  the 
discretion  of  the  Commission  in  selecting 
the  element  to  be  considered  in  fixing 
reasonable  rates  or  in  determining  the 
weight  to  be  given  to  particular  ele- 
ments. L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  V.  I.  C.  C, 
184  Fed.  118,  124. 

(i)  Where  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  exceeds  the  authority  con- 
ferred upon  it  by  the  statute,  the 
courts  may  review  and  enjoin  its  deci- 
sion. C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C, 
171    Fed.    680,    688. 

(j)  Under  the  Act  as  amended  June 
29,  1906,  a  suit  in  the  courts  to  enjoin 
an  order  of  the  Commission  fixing  ter- 
minal charges  is  not  confined  to  an 
ascertainment  of  what  was  determined 
by  the  Commission  and  to  a  considera-. 
tion  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  facts  as 
determined  by  it  to  sustain  the  order, 
but  on  the  contrary  the  hearing  may 
be  de  novo  and  may  include  the  taking 
and  consideration  of  evidence  other 
than  that  before  the  Commission.  M. 
K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  164  Fed.  645, 
649. 

(k)  In  a  suit  in  equity  to  enjoin  an 
order  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission fixing  terminal  charges  the 
court  should  start  with  the  presumption 
that  the  order  is  valid,  and  the  burden 
of  showing  that  the  facts  are  such  as 
to  render  the  order  invalid  rests  upon 
the  carrier  assailing  it,  and  unless  the 
case  made  on  behalf  of  the  carrier  is 
a  clear  one  the  order  ought  to  be 
upheld.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C, 
164   Fed.  645,   650. 

III.     UNITED   STATES   COURTS. 
See    Overcharges,    §4. 

§7.     Concurrent  Jurisdiction. 

See     Interstate     Commerce     Commis- 
sion,   §2. 

(a)  In  cases  of  the  exaction  of  a 
rate  higher  than  that  in  the  published 
tariff,    the    shipper    may    go    into    court 


174 


COURTS,  §8  (a)— §9  (f) 


In  the  first  instance,  but  the  Act  also 
appears  to  give  the  Commission  and 
courts  concurrent  jurisdiction  in  this 
respect.  Laning-Harris  Coal  &  Grain 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.  C.  37,  39. 

§8.     Exclusive    Jurisdiction. 

(a)  The  jurisdiction  of  all  actions 
brought  under  the  remedial  sections 
of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  to  en- 
force its  provisions,  lies  exclusively  in 
the  United  States  Courts.  Pittsburgh, 
C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wood  (Ind., 
1908),  84  N.  E.  1009,  1012. 

(b)  The  United  States  courts  and 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
have  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  actions 
based  upon  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act,  or  brought  to  enforce  a  right  cre- 
ated by  the  Act.  Hardaway  v.  South- 
ern Ry.  Co.  (S.  C,  1912),  73  S.  E.  1020, 
1023. 

(c)  The  exclusive  jurisdiction  con- 
ferred upon  the  United  States  courts  in 
all  actions  for  violation  of  the  inter- 
state commerce  law  does  not  apply  to 
an  action  to  recover  overcharges  paid 
upon  shipments  made  under  a  contract 
which  was  not  made  in  violation  of  that 
Act.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Albers  Comm. 
Co.,  79  Kan.  59,  60,  99   P.  819. 

§9.     Original    Jurisdiction. 
See  Allowances,  §2  (b). 

(a)  The  conclusion  of  the  Commis- 
sion is  subject  to  review,  but  when 
supported  by  evidence  is  accepted  as 
final;  not  that  its  decision,  involving 
as  it  does  so  many  and  such  vast  pub- 
lic interests,  can  be  supported  by  a 
mere  scintilla  of  proof,  but  the  court 
will  not  examine  the  facts  further  than 
to  determine  whether  there  was  sub- 
stantial evidence  to  sustain  the  order. 
I.  C.  C.  V.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  222  U.  S. 
541,  547,  32  Sup.  Ct.  108,  56  L.  ed.  308. 

(b)  On  February  22,  1911,  plaintiff 
sued  in  a  state  court  of  Tennessee  to 
recover  the  excess  exacted  above  the 
lawfully  published  rate  on  lumber.  The 
suit  was  removed  to  a  United  States 
Circuit  Court  on  the  ground  of  diversity 
of  citizenship.  The  claim  was  never 
presented  to  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission.  HELD,  under  sections  9 
and  16  of  the  Act  as  amended  June  18, 
1910,  the  state  court  had  no  jurisdic- 
tion to  entertain  the  suit  and  therefore 


the  federal  court  could  not  acquire 
jurisdiction  by  the  removal  proceedings. 
Darnell  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  190  Fed.  656, 
658. 

(c)  By  the  amendments  of  1906  the 
original  jurisdiction  of  a  United  States 
court  under  section  9  of  the  Act  has 
not  been  entirely  destroyed,  but  it  still 
may  redress  "such  wrongs  as  can, 
consistently  with  the  context  of  the  Act, 
be  redressed  by  courts  without  previous 
action  by  the  Commission,"  and,  when- 
ever a  complainant  comes  into  the 
courts  to  redress  a  wrong  which  he  al- 
leges has  resulted  from  some  discrim- 
inatory act  of  a  common  carrier,  it 
will  always  be  necessary  in  the  first 
instance  to  determine  whether  or  not 
it  is  a  wrong  which  can  be  redressed 
by  the  courts.  Langdon  v.  Pennsylvania 
R.  R.   Co.,  186  Fed.  237,  240. 

(d)  Upon  the  question  whether  a 
suit  by  a  shipper  charging  discrimina- 
tory practices  and  payments  should 
first  be  brought  before  the  Commission, 
the  court,  upon  motion  of  defendant  to 
dismiss  on  the  ground  that  a  United 
States  Circuit  Court  had  no  jurisdiction, 
denied  the  motion  and  refused  to  pass 
upon  the  question  of  jurisdiction  until 
the  jury  should  determine  whether  the 
payments  and  practices  involved  were 
made  generally  to  all  owners  of  lateral 
roads  or  were  made  simply  to  partic- 
ular shippers.  Langdon  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,    186    Fed.    237,    241. 

(e)  Where  the  Commission  has  pri- 
mary jurisdiction  over  a  practice  affect- 
ing rates,  original  jurisdiction  cannot 
be  conferred  on  a  United  States  Circuit 
Court  to  hear  the  case  by  stipulation  of 
the  parties.  Mitchell  Coal  &  Coke  Co. 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  183  Fed.  908,  909. 

(f)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission is  an  administrative  tribunal 
and  the  wisdom  and  expediency  of  the 
lawful  exercise  of  the  discretion  dele- 
gated to  it  under  the  Constitution  and 
the  statutes  is  not  reviewable  by  the 
courts.  But  the  power  is  vested  in  and  the 
duty  is  imposed  upon  the  United  States 
Circuit  Courts  to  relieve  from  orders  of 
the  Commission  which  deprive  complain- 
ants of  their  property  without  due  proc- 
ess of  law  or  take  it  without  just  com- 
pensation, in  violation  of  the  fifth 
amendment  to  the  Constitution,  from 
orders  which  are  beyond  the  limits  of 
the  power  delegated  to  the  Commission 


COURTS,  §9  (g)— §10  (a) 


175 


ind  from  orders  which,  though  in  form 
vithin  its  delegated  power,  evidence  so 
mreasonable  an  exercise  of  it  that  they 
ire  in  substance  beyond  it.  Peavey  & 
:o.  V.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  176  Fed.  409,  418. 

(g)  Where  the  reasonableness  or  un- 
easonableness  of  demurrage  rules  is 
lot  involved  and  the  question  is  one 
)f  interpretation  as  to  what  the  sched- 
jle  of  rates  in  regard  to  the  charges 
'or  demurrage  actually  is,  a  United 
States  Circuit  Court  has  original  juris- 
iiction  without  prior  application  to  the 
[nterstate  Commerce  Commission.  Hite 
V.  Central  R.  of  N.  J.,  171  Fed.  370,  372. 

(h)  Under  section  9  of  the  Act  the 
courts  have  jurisdiction  to  entertain  an 
original  suit  at  law  by  a  shipper  against 
a  carrier  where  the  latter  has  extended 
free  time  to  plaintiff's  competitors  for 
peddling  goods  from  its  cars  after  the 
expiration  of  the  free  time  period  al- 
lowed in  its  published  tariffs  and  has 
denied  the  same  privilege  to  plaintiff, 
and  it  is  not  necessary  first  to  resort  to 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
since  no  question  of  the  reasonableness 
of  the  published  regulation  is  involved. 
Lyne  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  170  Fed. 
847,    849. 

(i)  United  States  courts  may,  in 
their  discretion,  permit  the  parties  to 
any  complaint  in  the  matter  involved 
before  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission to  intervene  as  defendants  in 
a  suit  to  enjoin  the  order  of  the  Com- 
mission, where  such  intervention  does 
not  delay  the   progress  of  the  suit.     D. 

894^  ^*  ^'  ^'  ^'''  ^-  ^'  ^'  ^•'  ^^^  ^^^^ 


I.    C.    C,    164    Fed. 


PirPnit  n  '/^^  ^^*  ^  ^°^t«^  States 
Circuit  Court  has  original  jurisdiction 
m  a  suit  by  a  carrier  for  demurrage 
charges,  where  the  reasonableness  of 
such  charges  is  not  involved  and  where 
the  question  in  dispute  is  the  meaning 
of  rules  filed  with  the  Interstate  Com 
merce  Commission,  and  a  prior  proceed- 
ing before  the  Commission  is  not  nec- 
essary. Central  R.  R.  Co.  of  N  J  v 
Hite,   166  Fed.   976,  978. 

9q^^iQn?'''lt''  ^^^  ^""^  ""^  amended  June 
^»,  1906,  the  courts  have  jurisdiction 
to  enjoin  an  order  of  the  Interstate 
commerce  Commission  reducing  ter- 
minal charges  where  the  order  results 
from  a  misconception  and  misapplication 
or   the   law   to   conceded   or  undisputed 


facts.      Stickney    v. 
638,    644. 

(1)  Under  the  Act  as  amended  June 
29,  1906,  United  States  courts  have  juris- 
diction to  enjoin  the  putting  into  effect 
of  interstate  rates,  made  by  an  unlawful 
combination  of  carriers  in  restraint  of 
commerce,  prior  to  the  institution  of  a 
proceeding  before  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  to  test  the  reason- 
ableness of  such  rates  where  the  evi- 
dence indicates  that  the  same  are  un- 
reasonable and  confiscatory.  Macon 
Grocery  »jo.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  163 
Fed.    738,   753. 

(m)  United  States  courts  under  the 
Act  as  amended  June  29,  1906,  have 
no  jurisdiction  to  award  damages  for 
freight  charges  collected  on  cross-ties 
under  duly  published  tariffs  prior  to 
the  testing  of  the  reasonableness  of 
such  rates  by  a  complaint  before  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  al- 
though the  question  involved  is  one  of 
the  relative  reasonableness  of  rates  and 
the  Commission  has  passed  upon  the 
same  relative  classification  in  a  pro- 
ceeding between  other  parties,  and  has 
held  that  the  rates  on  cross-ties  should 
not,  as  in  the  case  in  question,  ex- 
ceed the  rate  on  lumber.  Howard 
Supply  Co.  V.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  162  Fed. 
188,   191. 

(n)  A  United  States  Circuit  Court 
has  no  jurisdiction  to  enjoin  the  putting 
into  effect  of  a  schedule  of  interstate 
rates  without  prior  application  to  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  \yhich 
body  is  vested  with  exclusive  jurisdic- 
tion over  questions  of  the  reasonable- 
ness of  interstate  rates  under  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act  as  amended  June 
1906.      A.    T.    &    S.    F.    Ry.       "     " 


29 


Co.    V. 
FosterLumber  Co.   (Okla.,  1911).  122  P. 
139. 
,V.     UNITED         STATES         SUPREME 

COURT. 
§10.     In   General. 

(a)  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  will  not  on  appeal  reverse  an 
order  of  preliminary  injunction  granted 
by  the  Commerce  Court  to  restrain  an 
nrdei  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mtslon'forbidding  carriers  to  make  ce. 
tain  allowances,  except  where  there  Has 
been  anibuse  of  discretion  by  the  Com- 
merce Court,  and  where  it  plainly  ap- 
^ars  tbat  the  preliminary  order  was  m 


176 


COURTS,  §10   (b)— §11  (e) 


effect  a  decision  by  the  Commerce 
Court  of  the  whole  controversy  on  its 
merits  or  where  it  is  demonstrable  that 
grave  detriment  to  the  public  interests 
will  result  from  a  failure  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  finally  to  dispose  of  the 
controversy  without  remanding  the  case. 
U.  S.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  225  U.  S. 
306,  32  Sup.  Ct.  817,  821,  56  L.  ed.  1100. 

(b)  Where  in  a  suit  in  a  state  court 
to  recover  an  overcharge  the  interpre- 
tation of  the  Act  is  involved  to  deter- 
mine what  were  the  legally  applicable 
rates  on  the  shipments  in  question, 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
has  jurisdiction  to  review  the  decision 
of  the  state  courts.  Kansas  City  So. 
Ry.  V.  Albers  Comm.  Co.,  223  U.  S.  573, 
591,  32  Sup-.  Ct.  316,  56  L.  ed.  516. 

(c)  The  question  of  the  legality  of 
an  order  of  the  Commission  reducing 
rates  does  not  become  moot  on  appeal 
to  the  United  States  Supreme  Court 
merely  because  the  period  to  which  the 
order  applied  the  new  rates  prescribed 
has  expired,  in  view  of  the  public  in- 
terests involved  and  in  view  of  possible 
claims  for  reparation.  S.  P.  Co.  v.  I. 
C.  C,  219  U.  S.  433,  452,  31  Sup.  Ct.  288, 
55    L.   ed.   283. 

(d)  The  Commission  ordered  defend- 
ant carrier  to  desist  for  a  period  of 
two  years  from  Nov.  15,  1908,  from  grant- 
ing to  a  shipper  a  certain  unduly  pref- 
erential wharfage  privilege.  The  bill  in 
equity  to  enjoin  the  order  was  argued 
Dec.  9,  1910,  in  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States.  HELD,  in  view  of 
the  public  character  of  the  questions 
involved  and  the  fact  that  orders  of  the 
Commission  are  continuing,  the  appeal 
should  not  be  dismissed  on  the  ground 
that,  the  order  of  the  Commission  hav- 
ing expired,  the  case  had  thereby  be- 
come moot.  So.  Pac.  Terminal  Co.  v.  I. 
C.  C,  219  U.  S.  498,  515,  31  Sup.  Ct.  279, 
55  L.   ed.   310. 

V.     STATE  COURTS. 

See  Discrimination,  §1  (q),  §16;  In- 
terstate Commerce  Commission, 
§2;  Loss  and  Damage,  §5;  Over- 
charges,  §3;   Tariffs,   §6    (m),    (n). 

§11.     In    General. 

(a)  An  action  cannot  be  maintained 
against  a  carrier  in  a  state  court  under 
sections  9  and  22  of  the  Act  to  recover 
reparation  for  unjust  discrimination  in 
charging  a  published  rate  of  50c  higher 


per  ton  for  coal  loaded  from  wagons 
than  the  published  rate  when  the  coal 
is  loaded  from  tipples,  where  no  prior 
application  has  been  made  to  the  Com- 
mission for  relief.  Robinson  v.  B.  & 
O.  R.  R.  Co.,  222  U.  S.  506,  509,  32 
Sup.  Ct.  774,  56  L.  ed.  288. 

(b)  In  a  suit  in  a  state  court  to 
recover  reparation  for  unjust  discrim- 
ination, the  court  is  not  required  by  sec- 
tion 14  of  the  Act,  in  order  to  make  the 
reports  of  the  Commission  comi>etent  evi- 
dence, to  take  judicial  notice  of  the  de- 
cisions of  the  Commission  where  they 
are  not  mentioned  in  the  pleadings  or 
in  the  agreed  statement  of  facts.  This 
provision  makes  the  decisions  of  the 
Commission  as  published  admissible  in 
evidence  without  other  proof  of  their 
genuineness,  but  does  not  relieve  liti- 
gants from  the  necessity  of  offering 
them  in  evidence.  Robinson  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  222  U.  S.  506,  512,  32  Sup. 
Ct.   114,   56  L.   ed.  288. 

(c)  A  state  court  has  jurisdiction  to 
compel  by  mandamus  an  interstate  car- 
rier to  switch  a  car  from  a  shipper's 
mill  located  on  a  spur  track  to  its 
main  track,  thence  a  short  distance  on 
its  main  track,  thence  by  a  connecting 
switch  to  an  intersecting  interstate  car- 
rier, although  the  car  is  destined  to 
another  state,  the  purpose  of  such  order 
being  to  prevent  discrimination  among 
shippers  in  local  switching  service.  Mis- 
souri Pacific  Ry.  v.  Larabee  Mills,  211 
U.  S.  612,  623,  29  Sup.  Ct.  214,  53  L.  ed. 
352. 

(d)  Where  a  carrier  of  an  interstate 
shipment  erroneously  collects  a  sum  in 
excess  of  the  published  charge,  a 
state  court  has  jurisdiction  to  entertain 
a  suit  to  recover  the  excess,  since  the 
case  is  not  one  involving  the  reason- 
ableness of  rates,  and,  therefore,  it  is 
not  necessary  for  the  shipper  first  to 
resort  to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission for  relief.  Kansas  City  S.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Tonn  (Ark.,  1912),  143  S.  W.  577, 
580. 

(e)  Where  a  carrier  has  by  mis- 
take collected  charges  in  excess  of  its 
published  interstate  rates,  a  state  court 
is  not  deprived  by  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Act  of  jurisdiction  over  an  ac- 
tion by  the  shipper  to  recover  the  ex- 
cess. C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co,  V.  Lena 
Lumber  Co.  (Ark.,  1911),  137  S.  W.  562, 
562. 


COURTS,  §11  (f)  — (n) 


177 


(f)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment 
to  th«  Hepburn  Act  making  the  initial 
carrier  liable  for  loss  or  damage  caused 
by  connecting  carriers,  a  state  court 
has  jurisdiction  to  entertain  an  action 
against  an  initial  carrier  for  damages 
caused  by  a  connecting  carrier  in  fail- 
ing to  carry  an  interstate  shipment  of 
peaches  with  reasonable  dispatch  and  to 
keep  the  same  properly  iced.  St.  L. 
&  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Heyser  (Ark.,  1910), 
130   S.   W.  562,  564. 

(g)  A  state  court  has  jurisdiction  to 
entertain  a  suit  by  a  carrier  to  recover 
the  balance  of  its  published  interstate 
rate,  since  the  indebtedness  sued  on 
grows  out  of  a  contract  which  is  only 
an  incident  of  an  interstate  shipment, 
and  is  not  a  liability  created  by  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act;  nor  does  the 
right  to  collect  arise  from  sections  8 
and  9  of  such  Act,  which  declare  a 
liability  only  against  the  carrier  for 
violation  of  the  Act.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Gramling,  97  Ark.  353,  357,  133 
S.   W.   1129. 

(h)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission is  not  vested  with  jurisdiction 
over  suits  to  recover  damages  for  de- 
lay in  the  delivery  of  an  interstate  ship- 
ment, so  as  to  prevent  the  state  courts 
from  entertaining  such  actions.  Pitts- 
burgh, C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Knox 
(Ind.,    1912),    98   N.    E.    295,   299. 

(i)  Under  the  Act  as  amended  in 
1906,  a  state  court  has  no  jurisdiction 
to  determine  whether  an  express  com- 
pany shall,  as  to  interstate  shipments, 
deliver  packages  to  the  residences  and 
places  of  business  of  consignees,  since 
there  has  been  an  assumption  of  exclu- 
sive jurisdiction  by  Congress  over  such 
shipments  down  to  the  point  where  the 
transit  is  entirely  at  an  end.  State  v. 
Adams  Express  Co.,  171  Ind.  138,  144, 
85  N.  E.  337,  966. 

(j)  The  provision  of  the  Act  as 
amended  June  29,  1906,  and  April  13, 
1908,  relating  to  attorney's  fees  do  not 
give  the  right  to  recover  such  fees  in  a 
state  court  in  a  suit  for  loss  or  damage 
in  transit.  Blair  &  Jackson  v.  Wells- 
Fargo  Co.  (la.,  1912),  135  N.  W.  615,  620. 

(k)  A  state  court  has  jurisdiction  to 
enforce  the  Carmack  amendment  to  the 
Hepburn  law,  making  the  initial  carrier 
liable  for  loss  occurring  on  the  lines  of 
connecting  carriers.     L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co. 


V.  Warfield,  6  Ga.  App.  550,  551,  65  S.  B. 
308. 

(1)  A  carrier  filed  an  interstate  rate 
with  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion, but  failed  to  post  the  same  in  the 
depot  at  the  point  of  origin  in  question, 
as  required  by  section  6  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act  as  amended  June 
29,  1906.  Plaintiff  shipper  and  the  car- 
rier's agent  searched  the  tariff  files  of 
the  depot  for  a  possible  increase  in  rates, 
and  the  agent  made  further  inquiries  of 
the  officers  of  the  carriers.  Plaintiff  pur- 
chased grain  in  reliance  on  a  10c  rate 
posted  at  the  depot.  A  13i^c  rate  had, 
in  fact,  been  previously  filed  with  the 
Commission  and  gone  into  effect,  and 
plaintiff  was  compelled  to  pay  same. 
HELD,  plaintiff  could  recover  in  an  action 
In  a  state  court  for  damages  for  the 
failure  of  the  carrier  to  post  its  rates 
at  the  depot,  and  his  right  so  to  recover 
was  not  defeated  by  the  contention  that 
to  permit  recovery  would  render  nuga- 
tory the  provisions  of  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Act  requiring  carriers  to  charge 
the  schedule  rates.  I.  C.  R,  R.  Co.  v. 
Henderson  Elevator  Co.,  138  Ky.  220, 
227,    127    S.    W.    779. 

(m)  Where  the  plaintiff,  in  a  suit  for 
excessive  charges,  resulting  in  unjust 
discrimination,  does  not  rely  upon  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act,  but  bases  his 
claim  on  common  law  principles,  an 
action  for  such  recovery  may  be  brought 
in  a  state  court,  although  the  shipments 
involved  were  made  across  state  lines. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  The  New 
Era  Milling  Co.,  79  Kans.  435,  448,  100 
P.  273. 

(n)  A  carrier  failed  to  post  an  inter- 
state rate  in  the  depot  at  the  point  of 
origin,  as  required  by  section  6  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  as  amended 
June  29,  1906.  A  shipper  purchased  grain 
and  relied  on  the  lower  rate  previously 
in  effect  and  on  file  at  the  depot.  He 
was  compelled  to  pay  the  higher  rate,  un- 
posted, but  filed  with  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission.  HELD,  a  state  court 
had  jurisdiction  to  entertain  an  action 
for  damages  for  a  failure  to  post  the 
rate,  under  section  22  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act,  providing  that  "nothing 
in  this  Act  contained  shall  in  any  way 
abridge  or  alter  the  remedies  now  exist- 
ing at  common  law  or  by  statute,  but 
the  provisions  of  this  Act  are  in  addition 
to  such  remedies."  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Henderson  Elevator  Co.,  138  Ky.  220, 
229,  127  S.  W.  779. 


178 


COURTS,  §11   (o)  — (x) 


(o)  Since  an  action  against  an  initial 
carrier  to  recover  for  damage  to  an  inter- 
state shipment  caused  by  connecting  car- 
rier, though  brought  under  the  Carmack 
amendment  to  the  Hepburn  law,  is  not 
an  action  based  on  a  violation  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act,  but  is  an 
action  based  on  the  injury  to  the  prop- 
erty, the  state  courts  have  jurisdiction, 
especially  in  view  of  the  provision  "that 
nothing  in  this  section  shall  deprive  any 
holder  of  such  receipt  or  bill  of  lading 
of  any  remedy  or  right  of  action  which 
he  has  under  existing  law."  L.  &  N.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Scott,  133  Ky.  724,  729,  118  S.  W. 
990. 

(p)  Under  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act  as  amended  a  shipper  cannot  sue 
in  a  state  court  to  recover  excessive 
demurrage  charges  exacted  of  him  on  an 
interstate  shipment,  but  must  first  resort 
to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission, 
which  has  exclusive  original  jurisdiction 
over  such  shipment.  Starks  Co.  v.  Grand 
Rapids  &  I.  Ry.  Co.  (Mich.,  1911),  131 
N.  W.  143,  145. 

(q)  The  construction  of  the  Hepburn 
Act  as  amended  by  the  Carmack  amend- 
ment, and  the  scope  of  its  operation, 
raise  a  federal  question,  and  as  to  such 
question  the  state  courts  will  follow  and 
are  bound  by  the  decisions  of  the  Fed- 
eral courts.  But  contracts  for  reduced 
rates  not  being  affected '  by  such  law, 
no  federal  question  arises  and  no  federal 
right  is  involved,  and  hence  the  state 
courts  are  free  to  apply  their  own  rules 
to  their  construction.  McElvain  v.  Rail- 
road, 151  Mo.  App.  126,  146,  131  S.  W.  736. 

(r)  An  interstate  carrier  owes  a  com- 
mon law  duty  to  furnish  bulkheads  with 
its  cars  for  the  transportation  of  grain, 
and  for  a  failure  so  to  do  a  shipper  may 
recover  the  expense  incurred  in  supply- 
ing such  bulkheads  in  an  action  in  the 
state  court,  and  since  the  duty  of  the 
carrier  does  not  arise  by  force  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act,  the  shipper  is 
not  precluded  from  suing  in  such  court 
by  section  9  of  the  Act,  which  provides 
that  any  person  claiming  to  be  damaged 
by  a  carrier  subject  to  the  Act  may  sue 
in  the  district  or  circuit  court  of  the 
United  States  or  make  complaint  to  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  (Kruse 
and  Spring.  JJ.,  dissenting.)  Loomis  v. 
Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  Co.  (N.  Y.,  1910), 
132   N.  Y.   Sup.   138,   140. 

(s)  Although  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission    mistakenly    calculates    the 


number  of  miles  between  points  in  differ- 
ent states  and  thereby  approves  an  er- 
roneous passenger  rate  filed  with  it,  a 
state  court  has  no  jurisdiction  to  alter 
the  rate  adopted.  Lipman  v.  A.  C.  L. 
R.  Co.   (S.  C,  1912),  73  S.  E.  1026,  1027. 

(t)  In  a  suit  in  a  state  court  lo  re- 
cover an  excess  collected  on  interstate 
shipments  over  and  above  the  published 
rates,  evidence  that  the  carrier  in  the 
past  carried  the  material  in  question  as 
lumber  is  admissible  on  the  question  as 
to  what  classification  applies,  where  the 
jury  is  instructed  that  no  device  or 
agreement  or  custom  of  dealing  can  avail 
to  make  the  shipment  other  than  what 
it  really  is,  and  that  they  must  determine 
its  real  character.  Hardaway  v.  Southern 
Ry.  Co.  (S.  C,  1912),  73  S.  E.  1020,  1025. 

(u)  A  state  court  has  jurisdiction 
under  section  22  of  the  Act,  providing 
that  nothing  therein  shall  abridge  or  alter 
existing  remedies  at  common  law,  to 
entertain  a  suit  to  recover  the  excess 
collected  by  a  carrier  over  and  above 
the  interstate  rates  published  and  filed 
with  the  Commission,  since  the  cause  of 
action  arises  at  common  law.  Hardaway 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (S.  C,  1912),  73  S. 
E.  1020,  1022. 

(v)  A  state  court  has  jurisdiction,  in 
a  suit  by  a  carrier  to  collect  a  greater 
charge  for  a  shorter  than  for  a  longer 
haul,  to  entertain  a  defense  by  the  ship- 
per that  the  carrier  had  no  permission 
from  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion to  make  such  charge  and  was  not 
authorized  to  do  it  on  account  of  dis- 
similar circumstances  and  conditions. 
(Haney,  J.,  dissenting.)  Great  North- 
ern Ry.  Co.  V.  Loonan  Lumber  Co.  (S. 
D.,    1910),   125   N.   W.   644,   646. 

(w)  A  suit  brought  against  an  initial 
carrier  to  recover  for  loss  or  damage  to 
an  interstate  shipment  caused  by  a  con- 
necting carrier,  under  the  provision  of 
the  Carmack  amendment,  is  not  a  suit 
for  the  violation  of  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Act  and  one  required  by  section 
8  of  such  Act  to  be  brought  in  the  Fed- 
eral courts  or  before  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission,  but  is  a  suit  for  the 
value  of  property,  and  the  state  courts 
have  jurisdiction,  therefore,  to  entertain 
the  same.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Piper  Co.,  52  Tex.  Civ.  App.  568,  572, 
115  S.  W.  107. 

(x)  A  state  court  has  jurisdiction  of 
an  action  brought  under  the  Carmack 
amendment  against  an  initial  carrier  for 


COURTS,  §11  (y)— CREDIT  ACCOUNT,  §2   (a) 


179 


nondelivery  of  interstate  freight  by  the 
connecting  carriers.  Galveston,  H.  &  S. 
A,  Ry.  Co.  V.  Crow  (Tex.,  1909),  117  S. 
W.   170,    170. 

(y)  A  state  equity  court  has  no  juris- 
diction to  enjoin  the  filing  of  a  schedule 
of  increased  interstate  rates  with  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  as  by 
the  Act  the  Commission  has  exclusive 
original  jurisdiction  to  determine  the 
reasonableness  of  such  rates.  Thacker 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 
67  W.  Va.  448,   454,   68   S.   E.   107. 

(z)  Where  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  has  held  a  published  rate 
to  be  excessive,  a  state  court  has  juris- 
diction under  section  22  of  the  Act  to 
entertain  an  action  by  a  shipper  to  re- 
cover the  excess  exacted  over  and 
above  the  reasonable  rate  prescribed. 
Robinson  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  64  W. 
Va.   406,   411,   63    S.   E.  323. 

(aa)  In  an  action  in  a  state  court  for 
unjust  discrimination,  the  complaint  does 
not  state  a  cause  of  action  where  it 
neither  alleges  that  the  carrier  has  not 
complied  with  the  requirements  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  with  reference 
to  filing  of  rates  nor  alleges  that  by  the 
rate  charged  it  exceeded  the  rate  shown 
in  the  schedule.  Lilly  Co.  v.  Northern 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (Wash.,  1911),  117  P.  401, 
402. 

(bb)  The  common  law  gives  a  shipper 
a  right  of  action  against  a  common  car- 
rier for  a  discrimination  in  freight  rates 
between  the  shipper  and  another  simi- 
larly situated  whenever  the  effect  of  the 
discrimination  is  to  injure  the  shipper 
in  his  trade  or  business.  Lilly  Co.  v. 
Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (Wash.,  1911),  117 
P.  401,  402. 

(cc)  Where  a  carrier  represents  that 
it  is  collecting  of  all  shippers  switch- 
ing charges  on  interstate  shipments 
levied  by  a  connecting  carrier  and  is,  in 
fact,  absorbing  such  charges  for  favored 
shippers,  a  state  court  has  jurisdiction 
in  an  action  for  damages  for  discrimina- 
tion, since,  under  sections  9  and  22  of 
the  Act,  the  state  courts  are  not  deprived 
of  jurisdiction  over  actions  for  breaches 
of  duty  by  the  carriers  which  would  give 
rise  to  causes  of  action  at  common  law 
or  under  a  state  statute.  Lilly  Co.  v. 
Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (Wash.,  1911),  117 
P.  401.  402. 


CREDIT  ACCOUNT. 

I.  EXTENSION   OF   CREDIT   FOR 
CHARGES. 

§1.    Right   to   extend   credit. 
§2.    Right  to  discriminate. 
§3.     Criminal  liability. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 
See    Evidence,    §19. 

I.  EXTENSION   OF   CREDIT   FOR 
CHARGES. 

§1.     Right  to    Extend   Credit. 

(a)  If  there  is  any  risk  in  carrying 
a  shipment  without  payment  of  charges 
the  carrier  must  in  fulfillment  of  its  own 
duty  under  the  law  resolve  that  risk 
against  the  consignor  and  collect  in  ad- 
vance. Boise  Commercial  Club  v.  Adams 
Express  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  115,  121. 

(b)  It  is  a  carrier's  right  to  demand 
prepayment  on  all  shipments,  and  it  may 
not  distinguish  between  persons  who 
pay  in  advance  and  those  who  do  not. 
Boise  Commercial  Club  v.  Adams  Ex- 
press Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  115,  121. 

(c)  To  accept  shipment  without  pre- 
payment is  no  more  than  to  extend  credit 
to  the  consignor,  and  this  within  reason- 
able and  nondiscriminatory  limits  the 
carrier  may  do.  Boise  Commercial  Club 
V.  Adams  Express  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  115, 
121. 

(d)  Carriers  may  not  lawfully  make 
a  difference  in  rates  based  upon  the 
time  of  payment  of  charges.  Boise  Com- 
mercial Club  V.  Adams  Express  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  115,  121. 

§2.     Right   to    Discriminate. 

(a)  The  requirement  of  the  prepay- 
ment of  charges  from  one  shipper  by  a 
carrier  for  the  transportation  of  freight, 
while  no  requirement  is  made  of  other 
shippers  similarly  situated,  at  a  time 
when  there  existed  a  custom  or  usage 
for  the  carrier  to  advance  the  charges  of 
connecting  carriers,  to  deliver  the 
freight  to  the  consignees,  to  hold  bills 
for  freight  until  claims  arising  out  of 
errors  in  transporting  were  adjusted,  and 
then  to  collect  them,  does  not  subject  the 
shipper  denied  such  credit  to  undue  prej- 
udice or  discrimination  within  the  mean- 
ing of  section  3  of  the  Act.  (Hook,  J., 
dissenting.)  Gamble-Robinson  Commis- 
sion Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  168  Fed. 
161,    17L 


180 


CREDIT  ACCOUNT,   §2    (b)— CRIMES 


(b)  Where  a  new  tariff  requiring 
prepayment  of  charges  has  become  ef- 
fective prior  to  a  shipment,  the  carrier 
is  not  bound  to  reconsign  without  pre- 
payment of  charges  a  car  belonging  to 
a  shipper  to  whom  it  has  been  accus- 
tomed to  extend  credit.  Sage  &  Co.  v. 
I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  195,  196. 

(c)  A  shipment  of  lumber  consigned 
to  East  St  Louis,  111.,  arrived  at  Bixby, 
111.,  1:45  P.  M.,  Aug.  31,  1907.  On  the 
night  of  Aug.  31  complainant  mailed  a 
written  order  from  Kansas  City  direct- 
ing delivery  to  G-ranite  City,  111.  This 
order  was  not  received  until  Monday, 
Sept.  2.  Under  the  published  tariff  the 
free  time  allowed  for  reconsignment  was 
24  hours  from  the  first  7  A.  M.  interven- 
ing after  arrival  of  the  shipment,  Sun- 
days and  legal  holidays  excluded.  Sept. 
2  was  Labor  Day.  Delivery  was  not 
effected  at  Granite  City  until  8:30  A.  M., 
Sept.  5,  and  delay  in  reconsigning  the 
car  after  receipt  of  order  was  due  to 
the  fact  that  the  consignee  was  not  on 
the  credit  list  of  the  defendant  carrier, 
and  it  was  necessary  to  take  up  with 
consignee  the  question  of  payment  of 
freight  charges.  Defendant  company 
assessed  a  car  service  charge  of  $1  per 
day  for  Sept.  4  and  5.  HELD,  such  car 
service  charge  was  improperly  collected 
and  should  be  refunded.  Beekman  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C. 
C.  532,  534,   535. 

§3.     Criminal   Liability. 
See   Crimes,    §3. 

(a)  Defendant  railroad  in  a  certain  coal 
district  was  accustomed  to  collect  at  the 
end  of  the  month  for  shipments  of  coal 
made  during  the  month.  In  pursuance 
of  a  previous  arrangement  it  accepted 
promissory  notes  from  one  shipper  in 
part  payment  of  the  freight  charges  for 
the  month  on  shipments  sent  as  pre- 
paid, while  at  the  same  time  exacting, 
cash  payments  from  other  competing 
shippers  in  the  same  district.  The  notes 
given  by  the  favored  coal  company  were 
later  merged  into  bonds  of  that  com- 
pany. HELD,  defendant  was  criminally 
liable  under  the  Elkins  Act  as  amended 
June  29,  190G,  for  a  "discrimination  in 
respect  to  transportation."  U.  S.  v. 
Sunday  Creek  Co.,  194  Fed.  252,  254. 

(b)  A  carrier,  under  the  Act  as 
amended  in  1906,  practices  a  discrimina- 
tion in  respect  to  transportation  in  favor 
of  one  shipper  and  against  others  of  the 
same  class,  shipping  the  same  commodi- 


ty, from  the  same  points  and  under  sub- 
stantially the  same  conditions,  by  the 
device  of  extending  credit  to  such  fa- 
vored shipper  for  the  freight  charges  on 
such  shipments  by  it  while  exacting  and 
collecting  cash  compensation  for  sub- 
stantially similar  shipments  from  the 
other  shippers  in  question.  U.  S.  v. 
Hocking  Valley  Ry.  Co.,  194  Fed.  234,  246. 

(c)  Where  an  indictment  for  violation 
of  section  6  of  the  Act  as  amended  in 
1906  charges  that  defendant  carrier  col- 
lected a  portion  of  the  freight  charges 
from  a  favored  shipper  and  extended 
credit  for  the  balance,  it  is  not  insuffi- 
cient by  reason  of  the  failure  specifically 
to  rebutt  the  possibility  that  the  portion 
collected  represented  the  full  amount 
due  the  carrier  under  its  published  rates 
for  its  part  of  the  haul.  U.  S.  v.  Hocking 
Valley  Ry.  Co.,  194  Fed.  234,  246. 

(d)  Defendant  railroad  in  a  given  coal 
district  was  accustomed  to  collect  at  the 
end  of  the  month  for  shipments  of  coal 
made  during  the  month.  In  pursuance 
of  a  previous  arrangement  it  accepted 
promissory  notes  from  one  shipper  in 
part  payment  of  the  freight  charges  for 
the  month  on  shipments  sent  as  prepaid 
while  at  the  same  time  exacting  cash 
payments  from  other  competing  shippers 
in  the  same  district.  The  notes  given  by 
the  favored  coal  company  were  later 
merged  into  bonds  of  that  company. 
HELD,  defendant  was  criminally  liable 
under  section  6  of  the  Act,  as  amended 
in  1906,  for  a  wilful  failure  to  observe 
its  tariffs  on  the  ground  of  both  accept- 
ing a  "less  or  different  compensation" 
and  of  extending  "privileges  or  facili- 
ties" not  specified  in  its  tariffs.  U.  S. 
V.  Hocking  Valley  Ry.  Co.,  194  Fed.  234. 
241. 

CROSS   REFERENCES  IN 
TARIFF. 

See    Reconsignment,    §4    (e). 

CUSTOM. 

See    Blanket  Rates,   §5. 

CRIMES. 

I.     THE  ELKINS  ACT. 

§1.     Constitutionality. 

§2.     Construction. 
II.     DISCRIMINATION. 

§3.     Credit  account, 
in.     FREE   TRANSPORTATION. 

§4.     In  general. 


CRIMES,  §1  (a)  — (d) 


181 


ly.     MISBILLING. 

§5.  In  general. 
V.     OVERCHARGES. 

§6.  In  general. 
VI.     REBATING. 

A.  Elements  of  offense. 
§7.     In  general. 

§8.     Intent    and   knowledge. 

§9.     Payment. 
§10.     Posting  of  tariff. 
§11.     Route     and     "common    ar- 
rangement." 
§12.     Transportation. 

B.  Number  of  offenses, 
§13.     Payment. 

§14.     Shipments. 

C.  Liability. 

§15.    Act  of  agent. 
§16.     Connecting  carrier. 
VII.     INDICTMENT. 

A.  Charging  elements  of  offense. 
§17.    In  general. 

§18.     Concession  or  rebate. 
§19.     Description   of  device. 
§20.     Language  of  statute. 
§21.     Payment. 
§22.     Posting  of  tariff. 
§23.     Route. 

B.  Joinder  of  defendants. 
§24.     Principal  and  agents. 

C.  Proof  and  variance. 
§25.     In  general. 

D.  Venue. 

§26.     In  general. 
/III.     DEFENSES. 

§27.     Former  jeopardy. 

§28.     Statute  of  limitations. 
IX.     PROCEDURE. 

§29.     Province  of  court. 

§30.     Province  of  jury. 

§31.     Extent  of  verdict. 
X.     PENALTIES. 

§32.     Excessive  fine. 
XI.     STATE  REGULATION. 

§33.     In  general. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 

See  Advertising,  II;  Allowances,  iV, 
VII,  VIM,  §8  (7):  Credit  Account, 
§3;  Demurrage,  §11  (a),  (b);  Divi- 
sions, IV;  Overciiarges,  III;  Spe- 
cial Contract,  §3;  Through  Routes 
and  Joint  Rates,  §2  (b);  Transpor- 
tation,  §3  (b);  Undercharges,  §2 
(d). 

.     THE  ELKINS  ACT. 

1.     Consltitutionality. 

See    Constitutional    Law. 

(a)  The  clause  in  the  Elkins  Act  to 
lie  effect  that  in  construing  and  enforc- 
ig   the   criminal   provisions    against   re- 


bating, the  act,  the  omission,  or  failure 
of  any  officer,  agent,  or  other  person 
acting  for  or  employed  by  any  common 
carrier,  acting  within  the  scope  of  his 
employment,  shall  in  every  case  be  also 
deemed  to  be  the  act,  omission,  or  fail- 
ure of  such  carrier,  as  well  as  of  that 
person,  is  not  unconstitutional  as  imput- 
ing to  an  individual  engaged  as  a  carrier 
criminal  acts  of  his  agent  or  as  imputing 
to  a  corporation  the  commission  of  crim- 
inal offenses,  or  as  punishing  its  inno- 
cent stockholders  without  due  process 
of  law.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  v.  U.  S., 
212  U.  S.  481,  495,  496,  29  Sup.  Ct.  304, 
53  L.  ed.  613;  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R. 
V.  U.  S.,  212  U.  S.  500,  29  Sup.  Ct.  309, 
53  L.  ed.  624. 

(b)  The  provision  of  the  Elkins  Act 
making  it  a  crime  for  a  shipper  to  re- 
ceive a  rebate  whereby  property  is  trans- 
ported at  less  than  the  published  rates, 
which  provision  applies  to  a  shipment 
under  a  through  bill  of  lading  from  an 
interior  port  of  the  United  States  via 
rail  and  an  ocean  carrier  to  a  European 
port,  is  not  in  violation  of  Article  I,  Sec. 
tion  9,  Paragraph  5,  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  forbidding  the  lay- 
ing of  a  tax  or  duty  on  exports,  or  as  the 
giving  of  preference  by  a  regulation  of 
commerce  or  revenue  to  the  ports  of 
one  state  over  those  of  another.  Armour 
Packing  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  56,  79, 
80,  28  S.  Ct.  428,  52  L.  ed.  681;  C.  B.  & 
Q.  Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  90,  28 
S.  Ct.  439,  52  L.  ed.  698. 

(c)  The  provision  of  the  Elkins  Act 
authorizing  the  prosecution  against  a 
shipper  for  receiving  a  rebate  or  con- 
cession in  any  district  through  which  the 
transportation  may  have  been  continuous 
is  not  in  violation  of  the  sixth  amendment 
of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
requiring  crimes  to  be  prosecuted  and 
punished  in  the.  state  or  district  where 
the  same  are  committed,  since  this  con- 
stitutional provision  does  not  require 
the  prosecution  of  the  defendant  in  the 
district  where  he  resides  at  the  time  of 
the  commission  of  the  offense,  or  where 
he  may  happen  to  be  at  that  time,  but 
only  requires  that  he  be  prosecuted 
where  the  offense  is  committed.  Armour 
Packing  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  56,  76,  28 
S.  Ct.  428,  52  L.  ed.  681;  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  90,  28  S.  Ct.  439, 
52  L.   ed.   698. 

(d)  The  Elkins  Act,  which  provides 
that  a  shipper  guilty  of  receiving  a  con- 


1S2 


CRIMES,  §1  (e)— §3  (b) 


cession  from  a  rate  published  and  filed, 
as  required  by  the  Act,  is  guilty  of  a  mis- 
demeanor, is  not  unconstitutional,  upon 
the  ground  that  it  does  not  permit  the 
shipper,  when  prosecuted,  to  prove  the 
unreasonableness  of  the  established  rate, 
and  the  reasonableness  of  the  rate  paid. 
U.  S.  V.  Vacuum  Oil  Co.,  158  Fed.  536,  539. 

(e)  The  Elkins  Act  is  not  unconsti- 
tutional as  an  ex  post  facto  law  on  the 
ground  that  it  makes  criminal  the  pay- 
ment of  rebates  at  a  date  after  the  date 
of  its  passage,  in  pursuance  of  an  agree- 
ment to  pay  such  rebates  entered  into 
prior  to  the  date  of  its  passage.  U.  S. 
V.  G.  N.  R.  Co.,  157  Fed.  288,  290. 

(f)  The  Act  as  amended  by  the  El- 
kins Act  is  not  unconstitutional  on  the 
ground  that  inasmuch  as  the  common 
law  right  to  enforce  a  reasonable  rate  of 
carriage,  by  a  legal  proceeding,  is  taken 
away,  so  that  not  only  the  regulation 
of  carriers  but  of  shippers  is  vested  in 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission, 
the  statutes  constitute  a  deprivation  of 
property  rights  without  due  process  of 
law.  U.  S.  V.  G.  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  157  Fed. 
288,  291. 

§2.     Construction. 

(a)  The  Elkins  Act  proceeded  upon 
broad  lines  and  was  evidently  intended 
to  effectuate  the  purpose  of  Congress  to 
require  that  all  shippers  should  be  treat- 
ed alike,  and  that  the  only  rate  charged 
to  any  shipper  for  the  same  service 
under  the  same  conditions  should  be 
the  one  established,  published  and  posted 
as  required  by  law.  It  is  not  so  much 
the  particular  form  by  which,  or  the 
motive  for  which,  this  purpose  was  ac- 
complished, but  the  intention  was  to 
prohibit  any  and  all  means  that  might 
be  resorted  to  to  obtain  or  receive  con- 
cessions and  rebates.  Armour  Packing 
Co.  V.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  56,  72,  28  Sup. 
Ct.  428,  52  L.  ed.  681;  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  90,  28  Sup.  Ct. 
439,  52  L.  ed.  698. 

(b)  The  Elkins  Act  is  not  only  to  be 
read  in  the  light  of  previous  legislation, 
but  the  purpose  which  Congress  evi- 
dently had  in  mind  in  the  passage  of 
the  law  is  also  to  be  considered.  Ar- 
mour Packing  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  56, 
72,  28  Sup.  Ct.  428,  52  L.  ed.  681;  C.  B. 
&  Q.  Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  90,  28 
Sup.  Ct.  439,  52  L.  ed.  698. 


(c)  A  criminal  charge  under  the  El- 
kins Act  against  a  shipper  for  receiving 
a  rebate  whereby  property  is  transported 
from  Kansas  City  to  New  York  City  at 
less  than  the  published  rates  involves  a 
single  continuous  offense,  not  a  series  1 
of  offenses,  although  it  is  continuously! 
committed  in  each  district  through  which 
the  transportation  is  received  at  the  pro- 
hibited rate.  Armour  Packing  Co.  v. 
U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  56,  77,  28  Sup.  Ct.  428, 
52  L.  ed.  681;  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  90,  28  Sup.  Ct.  439,  52 
L.  ed.  698. 

(d)  The  provision  of  the  Elkins  Act 
making  it  criminal  for  a  shipper  to  re- 
ceive any  rebate  whereby  property  is 
transported  at  less  than  the  published 
rate  applies  to  a  shipment  on  a  through 
bill  of  lading  from  Kansas  City,  Kan.,  via 
New  York  City,  and  thence  by  ocean 
carrier  to  a  European  port.  Armour 
Packing  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  56,  78,  28 
Sup.  Ct.  428,  52  L.  ed.  681;  C.  B.  &  Q. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  90,  28  Sup. 
Ct.  439,  52  L.  ed.  698. 

(e)  Under  the  Elkins  Act  of  Feb.  19, 
1903,  three  distinct  offenses  are  created; 
first,  the  soliciting  of  a  rebate,  conces- 
sion or  discrimination  in  respect  of  the 
transportation  of  property  in  interstate 
or  foreign  commerce;  second,  the  ac- 
ceptance of  any  such  rebate,  concession 
or  discrimination;  third,  the  receipt  of 
any  such  rebate,  concession  or  discrim- 
ination.   U.  S.  V.  Bunch,  165  Fed.  736,  739. 

II.     DISCRIMINATION. 
§3.     Credit  Account. 

(a)  A  carrier,  under  the  Act  as 
amended  in  1906,  practices  a  discrimina- 
tion in  respect  to  transportation  in  favor 
of  one  shipper  and  against  others  of  the 
same  class,  shipping  the  same  commod- 
ity from  the  same  points  and  under  sub- 
stantially the  same  conditions,  by  the  de- 
vice of  extending  credit  to  such  favored 
shipper  for  the  freight  charges  on  such 
shipments  by  it,  while  exacting  and  col- 
lecting cash  compensation  for  substan- 
tially similar  shipments  from  the  other 
shippers  in  question.  U.  S.  v.  Hocking 
Valley  Ry.  Co.,  194  Fed.  234,  246. 

(b)  Defendant  railroad  in  a  certain 
coal  district  was  accustomed  to  collect 
at  the  end  of  the  month  for  shipments 
of  coal  made  during  the  month.  In  pur- 
suance of  a  previous  arrangement  it  ac- 
cepted promissory  notes  from  one  ship- 


CRIMES,  §3  (c)— §5  (a) 


183 


er  in  part  payment  of  the  freight 
harges  for  the  month  on  shipments 
ent  as  prepaid,  while  at  the  same  time 
xacting  cash  payments  from  other  com- 
>eting  shippers  in  the  same  district, 
^he  notes  given  by  the  favored  coal 
ompany  were  later  merged  into  bonds 
f  that  company.  HELD,  defendant  was 
riminally  liable  under  section  6  of  the 
k.ct,  as  amended  in  1906,  for  a  wilful 
allure  to  observe  its  tariffs  on  the 
Tound  of  both  accepting  a  "less  or  dif- 
erent  compensation"  and  of  extending 
privileges  or  facilities"  not  specified  in 
ts  tariffs.  U.  S.  v.  Hocking  Valley  Ry. 
:;o.,  194  Fed.  234,  241. 

(c)  The  word  "discrimination"  as 
ised  in  the  Elkins  Act  is  employed  in 
ts  common  sense,  as  well  as  with  what- 
ever enlarged  or  more  definite  meaning 
he  context  of  the  amendment  of  1906 
fives  to  it.  Thus  a  shipper  who  is  per- 
mitted to  settle  his  charges  by  paying  a 
'less  or  different  compensation"  to  the 
carrier  is  accepting  or  receiving  a  "dis- 
Timination."  U.  S.  v.  Sunday  Creek  Co., 
.94  Fed.  252,  254. 

(d)  Defendant  railroad  in  a  given  coal 
listrict  was  accustomed  to  collect  at  the 
3nd  of  the  month  for  shipments  of  coal 
made  during  the  month.  In  pursuance 
3f  a  previous  arrangement  it  accepted 
promissory  notes  from  one  shipper  in 
part  payment  of  the  freight  charges  for 
the  month  on  shipments  sent  as  pre- 
paid, while  at  the  same  time  exacting 
cash  payments  from  other  competing 
shippers  in  the  same  district.  The  notes 
given  by  the  favored  coal  company  were 
later  merged  into  bonds  of  that  com- 
pany. HELD,  defendant  was  criminally 
liable  under  the  Elkins  Act  as  amended 
June  29,  1906,  for  a  "discrimination  in 
respect  to  transportation."  U.  S.  v.  Sun- 
day Creek  Co.,  194  Fed.  252,  254. 

(e)  The  Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  Co.  car- 
ries among  its  assets  $10,537,000  non-in- 
terest bearing  certificates  of  indebted- 
ness of  the  Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.     At 

5  per  cent  per  annum  the  interest  on  these 
certificates  would  be  $526,850.  HELD,  the 
latter  sum  is  in  all  substantial  respects  a 
rebate  to  the  Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.,  giv- 
ing it  to  that  extent  an  unlawful  advan- 
tage over  independent  dealers.     Me.eker 

6  Co.  V.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  21  J. 
C.  C.  129,  161. 


III.     FREE   TRANSPORTATION. 

See  Express  Companies,  §5;  Special 
Contract,  §1  (a),  §2  (a),  (zz), 
(aaa),    (bbb);   Tap    Lines,   §8. 

§4.     In    General. 

(a)  Where  a  defendant  obtains  a  free 
ticket  from  the  person  to  whom  it  is 
rightfully  issued  by  the  carrier,  transfers 
it  to  one  who  he  knows  has  no  lawful 
right  to  use  it,  for  the  purpose  of  violat- 
ing the  law,  and  such  person  actually 
uses  the  same,  defendant  is  guilty  of 
violating  section  1  of  the  Act  as  amend- 
ed June  26,  1909,  and  April  13,  1908,  mak- 
ing any  person  not  within  the  list  of  ex- 
ceptions liable  to  a  penalty  who  "uses 
any  such  free  ticket."  U.  S.  v.  Martin, 
176  Fed.  110,  113. 

(b)  Defendant,  an  employe  of  a  rail- 
road company,  and  entitled  to  receive 
a  pass,  delivered  his  pass  to  one  Pounds, 
who  was  not  an  employe  and  not  en- 
titled to  use  or  receive  the  same,  but 
did  use  it  in  an  interstate  journey.  De- 
fendant was  prosecuted  under  section  1 
of  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  prohibiting 
the  use  of  free  transportation  by  any- 
one except  certain  persons  enumerated 
in  the  Act.  HELD,  under  this  section, 
the  statute  intended  •  that  all  persons 
making  use  of  any  interstate  free  pass 
should  be  liable  to  the  penalty  prescribed 
by  the  statute,  unless  they  are  excepted 
by  the  terms  thereof,  and  that  Pounds 
not  being  so  excepted,  defendant  was 
liable  for  aiding  and  abetting  an  act  in 
violation  of  the  statute.  U.  S.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 159  Fed.,  310,  313. 

IV.     MISBILLING. 

See   Classification,    §8. 

§5.     In  General. 

(a)  Defendant  railroad  extended  from 
Montpelier,  Vt.,  to  Wells  River,  Vt.,  39 
miles.  The  carriers  connecting  Echo, 
Pa.,  with  Montpelier  established  a  joint 
tariff  on  coal  to  that  point  of  $3.55,  and 
to  Wells  River,  and  intermediate  stations 
on  defendant's  line,  of  $3.80.  The  tariff 
provided  that  to  any  point  of  destination 
named,  the  rate  would  be  the  same  as  to 
the  next  more  distant  point  that  was 
named.  Defendant's  division  of  the 
through  rate  of  $3.80  was  75c.  Defend- 
ant had  its  coal  billed  to  Wells  River. 
It  was  transported  only  to  Montpelier 
and  was  unloaded  at  defendant's  coal 
pocket,  which  were  some  6-10  of  a  mile 
from  the  point  in  Montpelier  at  which 
defendant    received    the    coal   from    the 


184 


CRIMES,  §5  (b)— VI 


delivering  carrier  and  were  within  the 
limits  of  Montpelier.  East  Montpelier 
was  the  "next  more  distant"  point  named 
in  the  tariff.  Defendant  by  this  process 
subtracted  its  share  of  75c  from  the  $3.80 
charge  to  Wells  River  and  thus  secured 
a  rate  to  Montpelier  of  $3.50.  HELD, 
defendant  was  not  criminally  liable  un- 
der the  Elkins  Act  for  obtaining  trans- 
portation at  less  than  the  legal  rate  by 
means  of  false  billing.  Montpelier  &  W. 
R.  R.  R.  V.  U.  S.,  187  Fed.  271,  272. 

(b)  The  fact  that  the  testimony  in  a 
reparation  case  showed  complainant  had 
knowingly  misbilled  a  shipment  of  junk 
as  scrap  iron  will  form  the  subject  of 
further  inquiry  under  the  criminal  pro- 
visions of  the  Act  Radinsky  v.  O.  S.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  243,  245. 

(c)  The  local  haul  to  a  junction  joint 
is  a  different  service  from  that  performed 
to  the  same  point  as  part  of  a  through 
haul  to  a  destination  beyond,  and  the 
fact  that  fictitious  billing  may  be  resort- 
ed to  to  secure  the  unlawful  application 
of  the  division  of  a  joint  rate  for  that 
service  is  no  reason  for  condemning  the 
lawful  practice  of  billing  bona  fide 
through  shipments  to  ultimate  destina- 
tion at  the  through  rate.  False  or  ficti- 
tious billing  of  company  material  with 
intent  tq  defeat  the  application  of  the 
lawful  rate  for  the  service  actually  per- 
formed, like  other  fraudulent  practices 
with  like  intent,  would  subject  the  guilty 
party  to  the  penalties  of  the  law  for  of- 
fenses of  this  sort  in  general.  Beekman 
Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  Ry.  &  N.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
C.  280,  282. 

(d)  Incorrect  dating  of  bills  of  lading 
by  a  carrier  is  unlawful.  Ford  Co.  v. 
M.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  507,  510. 

(e)  Dealers  in  grain  and  packing 
house  products  at  Richmond,  Va.,  to- 
gether with  defendant  railroad  company, 
and  its  agents,  are  found  to  have  par- 
ticipated in  an  unlawful  practice  of  is- 
suing transfer  slips  which  falsely  con- 
veyed to  connecting  lines  the  statement 
that  shipments  had  originated  at  points 
beyond  Richmond  and  were  entitled  to 
move  from  Richmond  to  destination  in 
the  Carolinas  at  a  division  of  a  through 
rate,  and  these  matters  being  criminal 
in  their  nature  are  referred  to  the 
United  States  District  Attorney  at  Rich- 
mond with  the  request  that  prosecution 
be  instituted  against  the  parties  involved. 
In  Re  Rates,  Practices,  Accounts  and 
Revenues  of  Carriers,  13  I.  C.  C.  212. 


(f)     The  law  places  the  same  obliga- 
tion upon  the  shipper  as  upon  the  car- 
rier to  observe  lawful  tariff  provisions. 
Any  wilfully  false  representation  of  the 
contents  of  a  package  on  the  part  of  the  ■ 
shipper  is  prohibited  by  the  law,  denomi-  i 
nated  as  a  fraud,  and  declared  to  be  a  ■ 
misdemeanor  by  the  Act,  and  the  ship- 
per convicted  thereof  is  subject  to  fine 
or  imprisonment,  or  both,  in  the  discre- 
tion of  the  court.     Bannon  v.  Southern 
Express  Co.,  13  1.  C.  C.  516,  519. 

V.     OVERCHARGES. 


§6. 


In  General. 


(a)  The  Act  provides:  "nor  shall  any 
carrier  charge,  or  demand,  or  collect,  or 
receive  a  greater  or  less  or  different 
compensation  for  such  transportation  of 
passengers  or  property,  or  for  any  ser- 
vice in  connection  therewith,  between 
the  points  named  in  such  tariffs  than  the 
rates,  fares,  and  charges  which  are  speci- 
fied in  the  tariff  filed  and  in  effect  at 
the  time."  HELD,  a  railroad  is  crimi- 
nally liable  for  merely  demanding  stor- 
age charges  in  excess  of  those  lawfully 
applicable.  U.  S.  v.  T.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
185  Fed.  820,  822,  824. 

(b)  Within  the  meaning  of  the  pro- 
vision in  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce 
making  a  carrier  criminally  liable  for 
exacting  greater  or  less  compensation 
than  the  legally  published  rates,  the  car- 
rier is  only  entitled  to  collect  storage 
charges  when  its  duty  as  a  carrier  ceases 
and  it  becomes  a  warehouseman,  and  that 
means  (where  it  is  its  duty  to  unload 
the  shipment)  when  it  unloads  the 
freight  into  a  freight  warehouse  and  it 
remains  there  after  the  owner  has  given 
the  consignee  reasonable  time  to  remove 
the  goods.  United  States  v.  Texas  & 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  185  Fed.  820,  823. 

(c)  Where  a  carrier  willfully  and 
knowingly  demands  and  receives  storage 
charges  against  a  shipper  for  cars  de- 
tained at  a  point  other  than  the  cus- 
tomary and  usual  place  of  delivery  or 
point  of  destination,  it  is  criminally  liable 
under  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce, 
although  notice  of  the  arrival  of  the  car 
at  point  of  detention  was  given  by  the 
carrier  to  the  shipper.  United  States  v. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  185  Fed.  820,  824. 

VI.     REBATING. 

.  See  Advertising,  M;  Allowances,  VM; 
Crimes,  §18;  Courts,  §4  (a);  Dis- 
crimination, §2  (e),  §15  (a);  Divi- 
sions, §1    (b),  §4  (b),   (c),   (d);   Evi- 


CRIMES,  §7  (a)  — (e) 


185 


dence,  §25  (b),  (d),  §48;  Export 
Rates  and  Facilities,  V  (d);  Facili- 
ties and  Privileges,  §19  (h);  Over- 
charges, §10  (a);  Reparation,  §4 
(a);  Special  Contract,  §2  (f ) ;  Tap 
Lines,  §3  (2)  (b),  §9  (j);  Through 
Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §2  (b);  §14 
(c) ;   Water  Carriers,    II. 

A.     Elements  of  Offense. 
§7.     In  General. 

(a)  A  carrier  cannot  depart  to  any 
extent  from  its  published  schedules  of 
rates  for  interstate  transportation  on 
file  without  incurring  the  penalties  of 
the  statutes.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  ,v.  Mottley, 
219  U.  S.  467,  477,  31  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  265, 
55  L.  ed.  297. 

(b)  The  fact  that  a  state  statute 
under  which  a  railroad  is  organized  per- 
mits it  to  issue  transportation  to  pub- 
lishers in  exchange  for  advertising  does 
not  prevent  such  an  arrangement  be- 
tween the  carrier  and  publishers  from 
being  in  violation  of  the  provisions  of 
the  Act  forbidding  the  carrier  to  accept 
rates  "less  than  and  different"  from  the 
rates  exacted  from  the  general  public. 
Chi.  Ind.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S.  219  V.  S. 
486,  497,  31  Sup.  Ct.  272,  55  L.  ed.  305. 

(bb)  A  contract  by  which  a  carrier 
agrees  to  furnish  transportation  to  a  pub- 
lisher and  his  employes  in  exchange  for 
advertising  space  at  the  regular  adver- 
tising rates  of  the  publisher  violates  the 
provisions  of  the  Act  forbidding  the  fur- 
Qishing  of  transportation  at  rates  "less 
than  and  different"  from  those  exacted 
from  the  general  public.  Chi.  Ind.  &  L. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  219  U.  S.  486,  494,  31 
Sup.  Ct.  272,  55  L.  ed.  305. 

(c)  Under  the  Act  a  passenger  has  no 
right  to  buy  tickets  with  services,  adver- 
tising, releases  or  property,  nor  can  the 
railroad  company  buy  services,  adver- 
tising, releases  or  property  with  trans- 
portation. The  statute  manifestly  means 
that  the  purchase  of  a  transportation 
ticket  by  a  passenger  and  its  sale  by  the 
company  shall  be  consummated  only  by 
the  former  paying  cash  and  by  the  latter 
receiving  cash  of  the  amount  specified 
in  the  published  tariffs.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
V.  Mottley,  219  U.  S.  467,  477,  31  Sup.  Ct. 
265,  55  L.  ed.  297. 

(cc)  Under  the  Elkins  Act  as  amended 
by  the  Hepburn  Law,  the  intention  of 
Congress  was,  in  the  absence  of  express 
exceptions,  to  prevent  a  departure  from 
the  published  schedules  in  all  manner  of 
carriages,   whether   gratuitous   or   other- 


wise. American  Express  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  212 
U.  S.  522,  532,  29  Sup.  Ct.  315,  53  L.  ed. 
635. 

(d)  The  Elkins  Act  relating  to  crime 
committed  by  shippers  in  receiving  re- 
bates is  read  into  contracts  for  rates  made 
between  shippers  and  carriers  and  be- 
comes a  part  of  such  contracts.  Armour 
Packing  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  56,  82, 
28  Sup.  Ct.  428,  52  L.  ed.  681;  C.  B.  &  Q. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  90,  28  Sup.  Ct. 
439,  52  L.  ed.  698. 

(dd)  Defendant  shipper  made  a  con- 
tract with  a  carrier  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  goods  for  export  from  Kansas 
City  to  New  York  City  at  the  published 
rate.  Shortly  thereafter  the  carrier 
raised  its  rates,  and  subsequent  to  this 
raise  the  shipper  transported  the  goods 
to  New  York  City  and  at  .the  rate  con- 
tracted for.  HELD,  the'  shipper  was 
guilty,  under  the  Elkins  Act,  of  the  crime 
of  receiving  a  rebate  whereby  property 
was  transported  at  less  than  the  pub- 
lished rate.  If  the  shipper  sees  fit  to 
make  a  contract  covering  a  definite 
period  for  a  rate  in  force  at  the  time, 
he  must  be  taken  to  have  done  so  sub- 
ject to  the  possible  change  of  the  pub- 
lished rate  in  the  manner  fixed  by  the 
statute,  to  which  he  must  conform  or 
suffer  the  penalty  fixed  by  law.  (Brew- 
er, J.,  dissenting.)  Armour  Packing  Co. 
V.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  56,  82,  28  S.  Ct.  428, 
V.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  56,  82,  28  Sup.  Ct.  428, 
S.,  209.  U.  S.  90,  28  Sup.  Ct.  439,  52  L. 
ed.  698. 

(e)  The  Standard  Oil  Co.  of  Ken- 
tucky purchased  oil  of  defendant  Stan- 
dard Oil  Co.  of  Indiana.  Defendant  In- 
diana company,  at  the  direction  of  the 
Kentucky  company,  shipped  the  oil  from 
Whiting,  Ind.,  via  Evansville,  Ind.,  via 
Grand  Junction,  Tenn.,  to  Birmingham, 
Ala.  The  lawful  rate  from  Evansville. 
Ind.,  to  Birmingham  was  33c,  and 
the  lawful  division  of  this  rate  for  the 
haul  from  Grand  Junction  to  Birmingham 
was  16^^c,  which  division  defendant  paid 
to  the  delivering  carrier.  The  lawful 
rate  from  Whiting  to  Grand  Junction, 
for  beyond,  was  13c  and  the  lawful  divi- 
sion for  the  haul  from  Evansville  to 
Grand  Junction  was  7c,  which  division 
defendant  paid.  In  this  way  defendant 
secured  the  haul  from  Evansville  to 
Birmingham,  Ala.,  for  23i^c  as  compared 
with  the  published  rate  of  33c  between 
those  points.  HELD,  the  defendant  In- 
diana Co.  was  not  guilty  under  the  El- 
kins  Act   of  securing   transportation   at 


186 


CRIMES,  §7   (f)— §8   (c) 


less  than  the  published  rates,  since  the 
charges  paid  by  it  for  the  portions  of 
the  haul  between  E'vansville  and  Grand 
Junction  and  G-rand  Junction  to  destina- 
tion were  the  lawfully  published  divisions 
of  the  legal  rate  from  Whiting  to  Bir- 
mingham. U.  S.  V.  Standard  Oil  Co.  of 
Indiana,  183  Fed.  223,  226. 

(f)  It  is  not  essential  to  the  commis- 
sion of  the  offense  under  the  Elkins  Act 
of  giving  a,  concession  from  a  through 
rate  over  connecting  lines  of  a  railroad 
that  the  rate  be  a  joint  one  established 
by  all  the  carriers  and  published  and 
filed  with  the  Commission.  If  the  initial 
carrier  accepts  traffic  for  transporta- 
tion and  issues  its  bill  of  lading  over  a 
route  made  up  of  connecting  roads  for 
which  no  joint  through  rate  has  been 
published  and  filed  with  the  Commission, 
the  lawful  rate  to  be  charged  is  the  sum 
of  the  established  local  rates  published 
and  filed  by  the  individual  roads;  or  if 
there  is  a  local  rate  over  one  road  and 
a  joint  rate  over  the  others  for  the  re- 
mainder of  the  route,  all  published  and 
filed  with  the  Commission,  the  lawful 
through  rate  to  be  charged  is  the  sum 
of  the  local  and  joint  rates.  C.  B.  &  Q. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  157  Fed.  830,  833. 

(g)  A  tap-line  allowance  may  be  a 
concession.  Tap-line  Case  23  I.  C.  C. 
277,  281. 

(h)  A  subsidy  paid  by  terminal  line 
to  ocean  carriers  to  enable  them  to  offer 
shippers  a  lower  ocean  rate  from  Texas 
City  than  from  Galveston  is  an  unlaw- 
ful rebate.  In  Re  Wharfage  Charges  at 
Galveston,  23  I.  C.  C.  535,  545. 

(i)  A  rebate  may  be  affected  by  what 
is  equivalent  to  cash  just  as  successfully 
as  when  paid  in  cash.  In  either  form 
it  is  unlawful.  In  Re  Wharfage  Charges 
at  Galveston,  23  I.  C.  C.  535,  545. 

(j)  Commissions  paid  by  a  terminal 
line  to  a  broker  for  routing  cotton  for 
export  through  Texas  City  is  an  unlawful 
concession  from  the  rate.  In  Re  Wharf- 
age Charges  at  Galveston,  23  I.  C.  C. 
535,   542. 

(k)  Where  a  purely  local  concession 
is  made,  even  though  it  may  be  beyond 
jurisdiction  of  Commission,  it  may  be 
punishable  as  a  rebate  under  the  Act 
when  made  to  secure  interstate  traffic. 
Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  549,  550. 

(1)  Where  a  carrier  agrees  to  make 
a  lower  rate,  lowers  the  rate  after  the 


movement  begins  and  then  cancels  it 
after  the  movement  discontinues,  the 
lower  rate  established  is  on  its  face  in 
the  form  of  a  rebate  giving  special  privi- 
leges to  a  certain  shipper  who  has 
special  knowledge  of  the  lowering  of  the 
rate.  Alphons  Custodis  Chimney  Con- 
struction Co.  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  IG  I^  C.  C. 
584,   58G. 

(m)  It  makes  no  difference  whether  the 
unlawful  result  is  accomplished  by  pref- 
erential rates  on  port-to-port  traffic,  on 
intrastate  traffic,  by  a  free  pass  or  by 
actual  payment  of  money;  in  either  case 
there  is  a  violation  of  law  for  which  a 
penalty  is  provided.  In  Re  Jurisdiction 
Over  Water  Carriers,  15  I.  C.  C.  205,  210. 

(n)  Where  a  private  contract  with  the 
carrier  provides  for  refund  to  the  ship- 
per of  a  portion  of  a  published  interstate 
rate,  the  contract  is  in  violation  of  sec- 
tion 6  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act 
as  amended  June  29,  1906,  forbidding  the 
acceptance  by  the  carrier  of  a  greater  or 
less  or  different  compensation  than  that 
provided  in  the  published  schedules  and 
prohibiting  refunds,  and  such  contract 
cannot  be  enforced,  even  though  the  ship- 
per may  not  have  known  that  he  was 
violating  the  law.  Louisville  &  N.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Coquillard  Wagon  Works,  As- 
signees (Ky.,  1912),  144  S    W.  1080,  1082. 

§8.     Intent  and   Knowledge. 

(a)  Under  the  Elkins  Act  making  it 
criminal  for  a  shipper  by  any  device 
whatever  to  secure  the  transportation  of 
property  at  a  less  rate  than  that  named 
in  the  tariffs  published  and  filed  by  the 
carrier,  it  is  not  necessary  to  support  a 
conviction  that  the  preference  be  ob- 
tained by  fraudulent  schemes  or  devices, 
or  by  dishonest,  underhanded  methods, 
since  the  term  "device"  includes  any- 
thing which  works  a  plan  or  contrivance. 
Armour  Packing  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S. 
56,  71,  28  Sup.  Ct.  428,  52  L.  ed.  681;  C. 
B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  V.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S. 
90,   28   Sup.   Ct.   439,   52   L.   ed.   698. 

(b)  Where  a  shipper  knowingly  trans- 
ports goods  at  less  than  the  published 
rate  he  is  liable  to  conviction  under  the 
Elkins  Act,  despite  the  fact  that  his  con- 
duct does  not  involve  turpitude  or  moral 
wrong.  Armour  Packing  Co.  v.  U.  S., 
209  U.  S.  56,  85,  28  Sup.  Ct.  428,  52  L.  ed. 
681;  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  v.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S. 
90,  28  Sup.  Ct.  439,  52  L.  ed.  698. 

(c)  A  carrier  in  a  criminal  prosecu- 
tion under  the  Act  as  amended  June  29, 


CRIMES,  §8  (d)— §10  (b) 


187 


906,  cannot  be  heard  to  deny  that  it 
lid  not  know  of  a  rate  which  it  itself  had 
tstablished  in  accordance  with  the  law, 
iS  a  justification  for  its  departure  there- 
rom,  where  the  evidence  indicates  that 
t  charged  the  lower  rate  at  the  insistent 
[emand  of  the  shipper.  U.  S.  v.  Mer- 
hants'  &  Miners'  Transp.  Co.,  187  Fed. 
63,  366. 

(d)  To  make  a  carrier  criminally  li- 
ble  under  section  10  of  the  Act  the 
mission  or  act  complained  of  must  be 
I'illful;  an  accidental  mistake  is  not 
le  basis  of  prosecution;  but  willful 
oes  not  mean  with  malice  or  bad  pur- 
ose  but  simply  with  knowledge.  U.  S. 
.  T.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  185  Fed.  820,  821,  824. 

(e)  Defendant  carrier  was  indicted 
nder  the  Elkins  Act  for  making  a  con- 
ession  under  its  published  rates  on 
ime.  The  published  rate  was  $3.50  per 
on  in  carload  lots  of  not  less  than  40,- 

00  lbs.  and  when  the  shipment  exceeded 
0,000  lbs.  the  charge  was  to  he  $3.50  at 
he  actual  weight.  The  evidence  indi- 
ated  that  defendant  received  less  than 
his  published  rate  on  the  weight  of  lime 
ctually  delivered  by  the  shipper  to  de- 
endant  at  the  point  of  origin.  Defend- 
nt  offered  to  show  that  the  shipper  had 

1  all  cases  delivered  at  least  40,000 
t)s.  for  each  car,  but  that  at  destination 
:  was  found  the  weight  was  less  than 
[),000  lbs.;  that  the  shipper  claimed  a 
art  of  the  lime  had  been  lost  in  transit; 
hat  the  defendant  and  shipper  reached 
n  agreement  whereby  the  former  was 
)  charge  only  for  the  actual  weight  at 
he  rate  of  $3.50  and  the  latter  was  to 
elinquish  his  claim  for  loss  of  the  lime, 
he  value  of  the  lime  at  point  of  origin 
eing  $3.50  per  ton.  HELD,  to  make 
efendant  guilty,  the  concession  granted 
lust  have  been  made  willfully  and  it  was 
rror  to  exclude  the  evidence  offered  as 
earing  upon  the  intention  of  the  de- 
Bndant.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S., 
70  Fed.  250,  255,  256. 

(f)  Whether  defendant  shipper  in  a 
rosecution  under  the  Elkins  Act  for  ac- 
epting  a  concession  regarded  the  pub- 
shed  rate  as  applicable  to  the  route 
ver  which  the  shipment,  with  its  knowl- 
dge,  was  made  and  knowingly  accepted 

concession  from  such  rate,  or  whether 
:  did  not  so  regard  the  published  rate, 
f  the  filing  of  the  rate  and  the  entire 
ourse  of  dealing  between  the  defendant 
arriers  amounted  merely  to  a  device  to 
ircumvent  the  law,  to  mislead  other 
hippers  and  to  discriminate  in  favor  of 


the  defendant,  the  published  rate  was 
nevertheless  the  lawful  rate  and  the  con- 
cession therefrom  a  concession  in  viola- 
tion of  the  statute.  Standard  Oil  Co.  of 
N.  Y.  v.  United  States,  179  Fed.  614,  625. 

(g)  In  an  indictment  against  a  ship- 
per under  the  Elkins  Act  for  accepting 
and  receiving  a  concession,  it  is  error 
to  exclude  evidence  offered  on  the  part 
of  defendant  to  show  that  it  had  no 
knowledge  of  the  lawfully  published 
rate,  especially  where  the  tariffs  setting 
out  such  rate  were  involved  and  some- 
what ambiguous.  Standard  Oil  Co.  of 
Indiana  v.  U.  S.,  164  Fed,  376,  382. 

§9.     Payment. 

(a)  To  warrant  a  conviction  under  the 
Elkins  Act  of  Feb.  19,  1903,  on  a  charge 
of  accepting  a  rebate,  concession,  or  re- 
bate, it  is  unnecessary  to  charge  or  prove 
the  payment  or  receipt  thereof.  It  is 
suflficient  if  it  is  shown  that  the  conces- 
sion was  offered  by  the  carrier,  or  his 
agent,  and  by  the  shipper  accepted.  The 
fact  that  the  carrier,  after  the  offer  had 
been  made  by  it  and  accepted  by  the 
shipper  refused  to  make  payment  of  the 
rebates,  did  not  prevent  a  conviction 
under  an  indictment  charging  the  ship- 
per with  the  acceptance  of  such  an  of- 
fer, the  acceptance  of  the  offer  being 
the  gist  of  the  offense.  U.  S.  v.  Bunch, 
165  Fed.  736,  738. 

§10.     Posting  of  Tariff. 

(a)  To  a  criminal  prosecution  under 
the  Act  as  amended  June  29,  1906, 
against  railroads  for  accepting  from  a 
shipper  less  than  the  published  rate  filed 
with  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion, it  is  no  defense  that  defendants 
had  spread  broadcast  among  the  ship- 
pers of  the  country  an  announcement  of 
the  lower  rate  accepted,  when  in  fact 
such  rate  had  not  been  filed  and  pub- 
lished as  required  by  the  Act,  and  the 
higher  rate  was  the  only  one  lawfully  in 
effect.  U-  S.  V.  Merchants'  &  Miners' 
Transp.  Co.,  187  Fed.  363,  365. 

(b)  In  an  indictment  under  the  El- 
kins Act  against  a  shipper  for  accepting 
concessions,  it  is  sufficient  for  the  gov- 
ernment to  prove  posting  and  publishing 
of  the  tariff  at  the  station  where  the 
freight  is  received  for  transportation, 
and  it  is  not  required  to  prove  that  the 
carrier  had  posted  and  published  the 
same  at  every  station  on  its  line.  U.  S. 
V.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  170  Fed.  988,  1002. 


188 


CRIMES,  §10  (c)— §11  (b) 


(c)  In  an  indictment  against  a  ship- 
per under  the  Elkins  Act  for  accepting 
concessions  on  shipments  from  Whiting, 
111.,  to  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  it  is  not  sufficient 
proof  of  posting  to  show  that  the  estab- 
lished rates  were  posted  at  Chicago  and 
not  at  Whiting.  U.  S.  v.  Standard  Oil 
Co.,  170  Fed.  988,  1007. 

(d)  A  terminal  railroad  extended 
from  East  St.  Louis,  111.,  a  distance  of 
sixteen  miles,  but  was  engaged  in  the 
transportation  of  property  moving  wholly 
by  railroad  from  one  state  to  another, 
and  joined  in  the  transportation  of  a 
shipment  from  a  point  in  Indiana  to 
Alton,  111.,  without  first  filing  a  schedule 
of  rates  applicable  to  the  shipment  with 
the  Commission.  HELD,  under  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Act  as  amended  by 
the  Elkins  Act  and  the  Hepburn  Act  de- 
fendant was  criminally  liable.  U.  S.  v. 
I.  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  168  Fed.  546,  549. 

(e)  Section  1.  of  the  Elkins  Act  pro- 
viding that  whenever  an  offense  is  be- 
gun in  one  jurisdiction  and  completed  in 
another  it  may  be  punished  in  either  ju- 
risdiction, does  not  apply  to  the  failure 
of  a  carrier  to  file  tariff  schedules  with 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis^on. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  166 
Fed.  267,  270. 

(f)  Defendant  shipper  made  a  con- 
tract with  a  steamship  company  operat- 
ing on  the  Great  Lakes  from  Buffalo  and 
Fairport  to  West  Superior  for  the  car- 
riage of  property  from  points  in  New 
Jersey  and  Pennsylvania  to  Winnipeg, 
Canada,  at  a  rate  of  45c.  The  property  was 
transported  by  railroads  from  the  points 
of  origin  to  Fairport  and  Buffalo,  thence 
by  the  steamship  line  to  West  Superior 
and  thence  by  railroads  to  Winnipeg. 
The  rate  published  by  the  initial  carrier 
of  the  railroads  was  49i^c  and  this  was 
paid  to  them  by  defendant,  which  was  re- 
imbursed for  the  excess  over  45c  by  the 
steamship  line.  The  shipment  moved 
on  a  through  bill  of  lading.  The  steam- 
ship line  did  not,  however,  file  or  pub- 
lish the  49i^c  rate.  HELD,  in  an  in- 
dictment under  the  Elkins  Act  for  ac- 
cepting less  than  the  published  rates  de- 
fendant was  not  liable  since  the  steam- 
ship line  from  which  defendant  accepted 
the  rebate  had  not  in  fact  published  the 
491/^c  rate.  Camden  Iron  Works  v.  U.  S., 
158  Fed.  561.  564. 

(g)  It  is  unlawful  to  be  engaged  In 
Interstate  commerce  by  carriage  of  traf- 


fic in  respect  of  which  no  rate  has  been 
published  and  filed.  Maxwell  v.  W.  F. 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  197,  198. 

(h)  It  is  unlawful  not  to  file  a  tariff 
stating  storage  charges  and  privileges. 
Goldenberg  v.  Clyde  S.  S.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
527,  529. 

§11.    Route  and  "Common  Arrangement." 

See      Through       Routes      and      Joint 
Rates,    §2. 

(a)  A  tariff  filed  with  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  by  the  Penn.  R. 
R.  and  concurred  in  by  the  N.  Y.  C.  & 
H.  R.  R.  R.  fixed  the  rate  on  petroleum 
and  its  products  from  Olean,  N.  Y.,  to 
Norwood,  N.  Y.,  at  26i^c,  and  stated  that 
"the  route  should  be  in  accordance  with 
agreed  percentages  and  as  designated 
within."  It  did  not,  however,  designate 
the  route,  and  no  percentage  sheets  were 
filed  with  the  Commission.  HELD,  that 
the  route  to  which  the  tariff  applied  was 
the  natural  and  direct  route  from  Olean 
to  Norwood  by  way  of  Rochester,  and 
not  the  roundabout  route  by  Buffalo, 
and  that  the  tariff  was  therefore  suffi- 
ciently definite  to  establish  the  rate  spec- 
ified over  the  former  route,  in  a  criminal 
prosecution  under  the  Elkins  Act  for  ac- 
cepting a  concession.  Standard  Oil  Co. 
of  N.  Y.  V.  U.  S.,  179  Fed.    614,  623. 

(b)  On  carloads  of  petroleum  con- 
signed to  defendant  and  shipped  from 
Olean,  N.  Y.,  to  Rutland,  Vt.,  the  bill 
of  lading  acknowledged  the  receipt  of 
the  oil  by  the  initial  carrier  at  Olean 
and  contained  its  agreement  to  deliver 
to  the  connecting  carrier.  It  provided 
that  to  each  carrier  on  the  route  the 
service  was  to  be  performed  in  accord- 
ance with  the  conditions  stated  therein. 
The  route  was  by  the  Pennsylvania  to 
Rochester,  by  the  New  York  Central  to 
Norwood  and  by  the  Rutland  road  to 
destination.  The  oil  was  hauled  in  the 
condition  in  which  it  was  when  delivered 
to  the  initial  carrier  to  the  point  of 
destination  continuously  and  without  any 
unnecessary  delay.  The  shipments  were 
"blind-billed,"  no  rate  being  designated 
by  the  Penn.  R.  R.  from  Olean  to  Roch- 
ester. The  charges  of  the  New  York 
Central  were  marked  "prepaid"  when 
they  were  not  in  fact  prepaid.  In  this 
way  the  freight  charges  were  marked 
for  settlement  through  the  general  offices 
of  the  railroad.  The  Rutland  rate  on  oil 
was  a  commodity  rate  and  the  shipments 
of   the   consignor   in   question   were   the 


CRIMES,  §12  (a)— §13  (g) 


189 


•nly  ones  likely  to  take  it.  Other  evi- 
ence  was  presented  of  concerted  action 
n  the  part  of  the  carriers.  HELD,  in 
criminal  prosecution  under  the  Elkins 
Lct  against  a  shipper  for  accepting  less 
ban  the  published  rates,  the  evideace 
^as  sufficient  to  show  a  "common  ar- 
a.ngement"  between  the  carriers  in  ques- 
on  within  the  meaning  of  the  Act. 
tandard  Oil  Co.  of  New  York  v.  U  S 
79  Fed.  614,  622.  '      ' 


12.     Transportation. 

(a)  In  a  prosecution  .under  the  Elkins 
ct  for  receiving  a  rebate  whereby  prop- 
^ty  is  transported  at  a  less  than  the 
Liblished  rate,  the  transportation  is  an 
ssential  element  of  the  offense  and 
lually  takes  place  over  any  and  all  of 
le  route  traveled  and  during  transpor- 
tion  the  crime  is  being  continuously 
)mmitted.  Armour  Packing  Co.  v.  U.  S., 
)9  U.  S.  56.  76,  28  Sup.  Ct.  428,  52  L.  ed. 
II;  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  V.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S. 
I,  28  Sup.  Ct.  439,  52  L.  ed.  698. 

(b)  Where  a  shipper  secures  a  rebate 
om  the  lawfully  published  rates  for  the 
ansportation  of  property,  the  trans- 
•rtation  is  of  the  essence  of  the  offense 
id  the  crime  is  committed  in  each  dis- 
ict,  for  the  purposes  of  prosecution, 
rough  which  the  shipment  passes.  Ar- 
our  Packing  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  56, 
,  28  Sup.  Ct.  428,  52  L.  ed.  681;  C.  B   & 

R.  R.  V.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  90,  28  Sup.  Ct. 
9,  52  L.  ed.  «98. 

(c)  The  provision  of  section  15  of 
e  Act,  to  the  effect  that  shippers  may 

made  an  allowance  by  carriers  for 
rvices  rendered  by  them  in  connection 
th  the  transportation,  relates  only  to 
rvices  which  the  carrier  has  scheduled 
its  tariff  rates,  and  published  in  ac- 
rdance  with  section  6  of  the  Act,  and 
3h  section  affords  no  defense  to  a  car- 
r  under  criminal  indictment  for  paying 
ivet  allowances  to  favored  shippers, 
ngdon  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  194  Fed 
;,  496. 

REBATING. 

Number  of  Offenses. 

t.     Payments. 

a)  Where  a  shipper  makes  a  number 
shipments  and  pays  the  full  legal  rate 
each,  and  the  carrier  remits  by  vari- 
5  checks  a  portion  of  this  rate,  the 
3nse  is  complete  when  the  carrier 
lits   a   single  check,  and  each  remit- 


tance constitutes  a  separate  offense.  N 
Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  V.  U.  S.,  212  U.  S. 
481,  498,  29  Sup.  Ct.  304,  53  L.  ed.  613. 

(b)  In  an  indictment  under  the  Elkins 
Act  against  a  shipper  for  receiving  con- 
cessions, the  settlement  between  the  car- 
rier and  the  shipper  of  the  difference 
between  the  concession  and  the  legal 
rate  is  an  essential  part  of  the  offense, 
and  the  number  of  offenses  cannot  there- 
fore exceed  the  number  of  payments 
made  by  the  carrier.  U.  S.  v.  Standard 
Oil  Co.,  170  Fed.  988,  997. 

(c)  An  indictment  for  accepting  re- 
bates alleged  that  the  lawful  rate  was 
lie  and  that  defendant  shipper  knew  it; 
that  the  lawful  rate  of  lie  was  charged 
to  and  collected .  from  the  consignee  in 
the  form  of  a  freight  rate  of  7c  plus  a 
fictitious  advance  charge  of  4c;  that 
later,  and  at  the  end  of  the  month,  the 
fictitious  charge  of  4c  was  returned  to 
defendant  as  a  rebate,  and  that  thereby 
defendant  accepted  and  received,  at  the 
date  of  the  payment  of  said  rebate,  a 
concession,  rebate,  and  discrimination  of 
4c.  There  were  twenty  shipments  in 
number,  but  only  six  payments.  HELD, 
under  the  indictments  framed  and  the 
admitted  facts,  defendant  was  guilty  of 
only  six,  and  not  of  twenty,  violations 
of  the  Act.  U.  S.  V.  Stearns  Salt  &  Lum- 
ber Co.,  165  Fed.  735,  736. 

(d)  Under  the  Elkins  Act  of  Feb.  19, 
1903,  for  a  shipper  to  ask  for  a  conces- 
sion or  rebate,  although  it  may  not  be 
granted  by  the  carrier,  constitutes  the 
offense  of  soliciting.  U.  S.  v.  Bunch,  165 
Fed.  736,  738. 

(e)  Under  the  Elkins  Act  of  Feb.  19, 
1903,  with  respect  to  the  offense  of  re- 
ceiving a  rebate  or  concession,  it  is 
wholly  imm'aterial  whether  the  rebate 
was  paid  in  pursuance  of  a  former  agree- 
ment or  without  such  understanding. 
The  offense  is  completed  when  the  ship- 
per receives  a  rebate  or  concession  from 
the  published  rates.  U.  S.  v.  Bunch,  165 
Fed.  736,  739. 

(f)  Where  an  indictment  under  the 
Elkins  Act  of  Feb.  19,  1903,  charges  the 
acceptance  and  receipt  of  money  paid 
as  a  rebate,  and  not  the  acceptance  of  a 
concession,  there  can  be  no  violation  of 
the  Act  until  it  is  shown  that  the  money 
intended  as  a  rebate  was  actually  paid. 
U.  S.  V.  Bunch,  165  Fed.  736,  740. 

(g)  Where  an  indictment  under  the 
Elkins  Act  charges   the  acceptance   and 


190 


CRIMES,  §13   (h)— §17   (a) 


receipt  of  money  paid  as  a  rebate,  and 
the  defendant  is  shown  to  have  received 
only  two  rebate  checks  from  the  carrier, 
only  two  offenses  are  committed  under 
the  indictment  as  framed.  U.  S.  v. 
Bunch,  165  Fed.  736,  741. 

(h)  In  an  indictment  against  a  ship- 
per under  the  Elkins  Act  for  accepting 
and  receiving  a  concession,  proof  that  a 
shipper  has  agreed  to  accept  a  conces- 
sion— stopping  there — whether  the  proof 
be  embodied  in  waybills,  or  book  entries, 
or  formal  contracts,  will  not  support  an 
indictment  for  accepting  a  concession 
until  the  intended  wrong  becomes  an 
accepted  fact  by  the  actual  payment  of 
the  lower  rate,  or  by  some  book  transac- 
tion resulting  in  the  offsetting  of  mutual 
accounts.  Standard  Oil  Co.  of  Indiana  v. 
U.  S.,  164  Fed.  376,  386. 

(i)  Under  the  Elkins  Act  of  Feb.  19, 
1903,  the  acceptance  by  a  carrier  of  a 
less  sum  of  money  than  that  named  in 
its  tariff  for  the  transportation  of  prop- 
erty is  a  departure  from  the  legal  rate, 
and  it  is  no  defense  against  a  criminal 
prosecution  that  the  carrier  does  so  in 
compromise  of  claims  for  loss  of  property 
in  transit.  U.  S.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
163  Fed.  Ill,  113. 

(j)  Where  in  a  prosecution  under  the 
Elkins  Act  the  payment  and  acceptance 
of  rebates  is  the  substantial  offense  set 
out  in  the  indictment,  each  substantial 
payment  is  properly  the  subject  of  a  sep- 
arate indictment  or  count,  despite  the 
fact  that  all  shipments  and  payments 
were  made  pursuant  to  one  agreement  for 
rebates  entered  into  with  respect  to  the 
entire  property  transported.  U.  S.  v. 
Gt.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  157  Fed.  288,  290. 

(k)  In  an  indictment  under  the  Elkins 
Act  for  giving  rebates,  where  there  has 
been  but  one  payment  in  settlement  of 
many  different  shipments,  only  one  of- 
fense has  been  committed.  U.  S.  v. 
Central  Vt.  Ry.,  157  Fed.  291,  293. 

§14.     Shipments. 

(a)  Defendant  was  indicted  under  the 
Elkins  Act  for  accepting  and  receiving  a 
concession.  The  shipments  in  question 
were  carried  in  1,462  carloads  and  were 
settled  for,  and  the  charges  thereon  paid, 
upon  36  distinct  days  within  the  period 
in  question.  In  the  regular  course  of 
business,  whenever  an  order  came  to  de- 
fendant from  a  buyer  (the  order  being 
in  gallons  or  barrels,  not  cars),  the  order 


was  translated  by  defendant's  clerks 
into  carloads  according  to  the  capacity 
of  the  cars,  running  all  the  way  from 
30,000  to  80,000  lbs.  The  oil  was  then 
loaded  upon  the  cars,  some  single  orders 
filling  six  or  eight  cars.  The  trial  court, 
in  imposing  a  fine,  counted  each  single 
carload  as  a  separate  offense.  HELD, 
such  a  method  of  computation  of  offenses 
was  erroneous,  since  the  offense  charged 
was  not  committed  until  payment  was 
made  and  the  number  of  offenses  should 
correspond  with  the  number  of  settle- 
ments made.    Standard  Oil  Co.  of  Indiana 

V.  U.  S.,  164  Fed.'  376,  386. 

(b)  Where  an  indictment,  under  the 
Elkins  Act,  charges  as  separate  and  dis- 
tinct offenses,  the  acceptance  of  conces- 
sions, by  a  shipper  on  different  days, 
each  shipment  constitutes  a  separate 
offense.  U.  S.  v.  Vacuum  Oil  Co.  158 
Fed.  536,  539. 

VI.  REBATING. 
C.     Liability. 

§15.     Act  of  Agent. 

(a)  The  corporation  which  profits  by 
the  transaction  of  rebating,  may  be  held 
punishable  by  fine,  because  of  the  knowl- 
edge and  intent  of  its  agents  to  whom 
it  has  intrusted  authority  to  act  in  the 
subject  matter  of  making  and  fixing  rates 
of  transportation,  and  whose  knowledge 
and  purposes  may  well  be  attributed  to 
the  corporation  for  which  the  agents  act. 
N.  Y.  Central  v.  U.  S.,  212  U.  S.  481,  495, 
29  Sup.  Ct.  304,  53  L.  ed.  613. 

§16.     Connecting  Carrier. 

(a)  The  concluding  part  of  section  1 
of  the  Elkins  Act  brings  all  the  carriers 
who  have  participated  in  any  rate  filed 
or  published  within  the  terms  of  the  Act, 
as  much  so  as  if  the  tariff  had  been 
actually  published  and  filed  by  such  par- 
ticipating carrier,  so  that  a  connecting 
carrier  may  be  convicted  of  rebating  for 
accepting  a  lower  rate  than  the  one  filed 
with  the  Commission  by  the  initial  car- 
rier. U.  S.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co., 
212  U.  S.  509,  515,  29  Sup.  Ct.  313,  53  L 
ed.  629. 

VII.     INDICTMENT. 

A.     Charging   Elements  of  Offense. 

§17.     In    General. 

(a)     An  indictment  for  rebating,  under 
the  Elkins  Act,  describes  the  offense  with 


CRIMES,  §18  (a)— §22  (b) 


191 


sufficient  particularity  where  it  specific- 
ally states  the  elements  of  the  offense 
so  as  to  fully  advise  the  defendant  of  the 
crime  charged  and  to  enable  a  convic- 
tion, if  had,  to  be  pleaded  in  bar  of  any 
subsequent  prosecution  for  the  same 
offense.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  v.  U.  S., 
212  U.  S.  481,  497;  29  Sup.  Ct.  304,  53 
L.  ed.  613. 

§18.     Concession  or  Rebate. 

(a)  An  indictment  under  the  Elkins 
Act  which  alleges  the  lawful  rate  to  be 
$70  per  car,  and  that  defendant  carrier 
charged  and  received  only  $64.75  a  car, 
sufficiently  charges  a  "concession,"  al- 
though the  word  "concession"  is  not  men- 
tioned in  the  count.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  U.  S.,  170  Fed.  250,  256. 

§19.     Description  of  Device. 

(a)  An  indictment  under  the  Elkins 
Act  for  granting  or  giving  of  a  rebate  is 
sufficient  which  alleges  such  granting  or 
giving  from  the  published  and  filed  rates 
for  the  transportation  of  property  by  a 
carrier  engaged  in  interstate  commerce, 
and  which  points  out  the  kind  of  prop- 
erty transpo'rted,  the  time  and  place 
/vhen  shipped,  the  consignee  to  whom 
shipped,  the  existing  legal  tariff  or  rate 
tor  such  shipment,  the  payment  thereof 
].y  the  shipper  to  the  carrier,  the  sub- 
sequent payment  of  the  rebate  or  con- 
cession by  the  carrier  to  the  shipper,  the 
time  when  it  was  paid,  and  the  amount 
tnereof,  and  it  is  not  necessary  that  the 
indictment  particularly  describe  the  de- 
vice resorted  to  by  the  carrier  to  accept 
the  unlawful  transportation.  C.  St.  P. 
M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  162  Fed.  835,  838. 

(b)  An  indictment  against  a  shipper, 
under  the  Elkins  Act,  for  receiving  a  re- 
bate, whereby  property  is  transported  at 
less  than  the  published  rate,  is  not  in- 
sufficient on  the  ground  of  failing  to  set 
out  the  kind  of  device  by  which  traffic 
was  obtained,  and  of  what  the  concession 
consisted,  and  how  it  was  granted,  where 
it  distinctly  and  clearly  charges  each  and 
every  element  of  the  offense,  advises  the 
defendant  of  what  he  is  to  meet  at  the 
trial,  and  where  no  objection  is  made 
to  the  indictment  until  after  verdict  by 
a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment.  Armour 
Packing  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  56,  83.  84; 
28  Sup.  Ct.  428,  52  L.  ed.  681;  C.  B.  &  Q. 
R.  R.  V.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  90,  28  Sup.  Ct. 
439.  52  L.  ed.  698. 


§20.     Language  of  Statute. 

(a)  While  in  pleading  a  criminal  of- 
fense under  the  Elkins  Act,  as  amei-de.l 
June  29,  1906,  it  is  safe  to  employ  the 
words  of  the  statute,  such  action  is  not 
obligatory,  and  any  language  which  is 
seen  to  be  capable  of  apprising  one  of 
ordinary  intelligence  of  the  several  es- 
sential ingredients  of  the  crime  meets 
every  requirement.  U.  S.  v.  Sunday 
Creek  Co.,  194  Fed.  252,  254. 

§21.     Payment. 

(a)  In  an  indictment  under  section  1 
of  the  Elkins  Act  against  a  shipper  charg- 
ing the  acceptance  of  a  concession,  it  is 
not  necessary  to  aver  that  payment  of 
the  unlawful  rate  was  made,  since  the 
charge  being  an  acceptance  of  a  con- 
cession, proof  of  payment  is  evidence  not 
necessary  to  be  pleaded.  Standard  Oil 
Co.  of  N.  Y.  v.  U.  S.,  179  Fed.  614,  619. 

(b)  An  indictment  against  a  shipper 
for  accepting  a  concession  below  the  pub- 
lished rate  under  the  Elkins  Act  is  not 
bad  on  demurrer  for  failure  to  allege 
the  payment  by  the  defendant  to  the  car- 
rier of  the  alleged  unlawful  rate.  U.  S. 
V.  Vacuum  Oil  Co.,  158  Fed.  536,  538. 

(c)  In  a  prosecution  against  a  carrier 
for  giving  rebates  under  the  Elkins  Act, 
an  indictment  is  not  bad  on  demurrer 
for  alleging  for  greater  ease  of  proof  as 
many  payments  as  there  were  separate 
shipments,  although  the  evidence  may 
show  that  all  the  shipments  were  rebated 
for  in  one  payment  by  the  carrier,  and 
that  therefore  only  one  offense  was  com- 
mitted. U.  S.  V.  Central  Vt.  Ry.,  157  Fed.. 
291,  293. 

§22.     Posting   of  Tariff. 

(a)  Where  an  indictment  against  a 
shipper  for  obtaining  rates  lower  than 
the  lawfully  published  rate  fails  to  allege 
that  the  published  rates  were  posted  for 
public  inspection,  as  required  by  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Act  as  amended  June 
29,  1906,  a  demurrer  to  such  indictment 
must  be  sustained.  U.  S.  v.  Miller,  187 
Fed.   375,   377. 

(b)  An  indictment  under  the  Elkins 
Act  for  granting  a  rebate  is  demurrable 
which  alleges  that  the  initial  carrier 
published  the  rate  departed  from,  but 
fails  to  allege  that  the  defendant  deliver- 
ing carrier  published  or  joined  in  the 
publication  of  such  rate,  since,  under  the 
language  in  section  1  making  it  a  crime 
for  the  carrier  to  transport  the  shipment 


192 


CRIMES,  §22  (c)— §26  (a) 


"at  a  less  rate  than  that  named  in  the 
tariffs  published  and  filed  by  such  car- 
rier," the  words  "such  carrier"  refer  to 
the  carrier  criminally  proceeded  against. 
U.  S.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  157 
Fed.  293,  294. 

(c)  An  indictment  against  a  carrier 
for  giving  a  rebate  contrary  to  the  El- 
kins  Act  is  not  defective  in  failing  to 
show  upon  its  face  the  tariff  rate  alleged 
to  be  violated,  where  the  various  car- 
rying- lines  over  which  the  shipment 
passed  accepted  and  acted  upon  the 
through  bill  of  lading  to  point  of  destina- 
tion, openly  charging  the  aggregate  of  the 
published  tariffs  as  charged  in  the  indict- 
ment, since  they  thereby  created  a 
through  route  and  accepted  the  published 
aggregates  as  the  lawful  and  only  through 
charge.  U.  S.  v.  Gt.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  157  Fed. 
288,  290. 

§23.     Route. 

(a)  An  indictment  against  a  shipper, 
under  the  Elkins  Act,  for  accepting  a  con- 
cession below  the  published  rate  is 
not  bad  on  the  ground  that  the  con- 
cession related  merely  to  intrastate  ship- 
ments, where  it  alleges  that  the  trans- 
portation was  pursuant  to  a  common 
arrangement,  for  a  continuous  shipment 
from  Clean,  N.  Y.,  to  Burlington,  Vt.,  and 
that  the  concession  complained  of  was 
over  that  portion  of  the  route  from  Glean 
to  Norwood,  N.  Y.,  and  not  from  the  ag- 
gregate rate  for  the  interstate  trans- 
portation, since  it  is  not  necessary  to  the 
offense  that  all  connecting  carriers 
should  join  in  giving  the  concession. 
U.  S.  vs.  Vacuum  Oil  Co.,  158  Fed.  536,  538. 

(b)  An  indictment  charging  a  shipper 
with  accepting  a  concession  below  the 
published  rates  under  the  Elkins  Act  is 
not  bad  on  demurrer  for  failure  to  specify 
the  route  on  which  the  established  rate 
applied,  and  that  over  which  the  freight 
was  transported,  despite  the  existence  of 
another  possible  route,  where  such  lat- 
ter route  was  not  Ihe  natural  and  usual 
one  for  the  shipment  to  take.  U.  S.  v. 
Vacuum  Oil  Co.,  158  Fed.  536,  537. 

(c)  An  indictment  against  a  carrier 
under  the  Elkins  Act  specifically  charged 
that  a  concession  was  given  whereby  a 
shipper  secured  a  transportation  of  its 
property  from  Kansas  City  to  New  York 
at  a  rate  12c  less  than  the  lawful  rate, 
and  definitely  pointed  out  that  the  con- 
cession was  given  and  received  in  respect 
to  that  part  of  the  through  route  lying 


east  of  the  Mississippi  River,  the  lawful 
rate  therefor  being  specified  and  also  the 
amount  of  the  concession.  HELD,  the 
indictment  was  sufficiently  definite  de- 
spite its  failure  to  specify  the  through 
rate  from  Kansas  City  to  New  York.  C. 
B.  &.  Q.  Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  157  Fed.  830, 
834. 

VII.     INDICTMENT. 

B.  Joinder  of   Defendants. 

§24.     Principal   and  Agents. 

(a)  In  indictments  for  rebating  under 
the  Elkins  Act,  a  corporation  and  its 
agents  may  be  legally  joined  as  defend- 
ants in  one  indictment.  N.  Y.  C.  & 
H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  U  S.,  212  U.  S.  481, 
497,  29  Sup.  Ct.  304,  53  L.  ed.  613. 

VII.     INDICTMENT. 

C.  Proof  and   Variance. 

See  Evidence,  I. 


§25. 


In   General. 


(a)  Where  in  a  prosecution  under  the 
Elkins  Act  the  indictment  avers  that  the 
defendant  carrier  over  whose  line  the 
shipment  was  made  had  established  and 
published  rate  over  its  line  of  19i/^c, 
and  the  proof  shows  that  the  tariffs  and 
schedules  filed  specify  18c  over  the  de- 
fendant's route,  and  show  that  the  19^/^0 
rate  is  made  up  by  adding  to  the  18c  rate 
the  11/^  c  rate  of  another  independent  car- 
rier, there  is  a  fatal,  variance  between 
the  allegations  and  the  proof.  U.  S.  v. 
Standard  Oil  Co.,  170  Fed.  988,  1002. 

(b)  Where  an  indictment  alleges  that 
the  published  rate  on  lime  is  $70  a  car- 
load, the  allegation  is  not  sustained  by 
a  showing  from  the  published  tariffs  that 
the  rate  was  $3.50  per  ton  in  carloads  of 
at  least  40,000  lbs.,  the  charges  to  be 
assessed  at  $3.50  per  ton  on  actual  weight 
on  shipments  exceeding  40,000  lbs.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  170  Fed.  250,  254. 

VII.     INDICTMENT. 

D.     Venue. 

§26.     In  General. 

(a)  Where  a  shipper  in  sending  prod- 
ucts from  Kansas  City,  Kan.,  to  New 
York  City,  N.  Y.,  the  course  of  trans- 
portation being  through  the  Western  Dis- 
trict of  Missouri,  secures  concessions 
from  the  lawfully  published  rate,  it  may 
be  prosecuted  in  the  Western  District  of 


CRIMES,  §26   (b)— §30   (c) 


193 


Missouri  under  the  provision  of  the  El- 
kins  Act  conferring  jurisdiction  to  prose- 
cute in  any  criminal  court  in  the  United 
States  in  the  district  through  which  the 
transportation  may  have  been  conducted. 
Armour  Packing  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S. 
56,  74,  28  Sup.  Ct.  428,  52  L.  ed.  681; 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  v.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  90, 
28   Sup.   Ct.   439,  52  L.   ed.   698. 

(b)  Under  the  Elkins  Act,  standing 
alone,  a  prosecution  for  failure  to  file 
tariff  schedules  with  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  could  be  instituted 
only  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  but 
since  the  passage  of  the  Hepburn  Act 
such  prosecution  may  be  instituted  in 
any  district  through  which  the  trans- 
portation passes.  U.  S.  v.  111.  Term.  R.  R. 
Co.,  108  Fed.  546,  548. 

(c)  Under  the  Elkins  Act,  and  before 
the  passage  of  the  Hepburn  Act,  a  crim- 
inal prosecution  for  failure  to  file  tariff 
schedules  with  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  could  be  instituted  only  in 
the  District  of  Columbia.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H. 
R.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  160  Fed.  267,  269. 

VIII.     DEFENSES. 

See    Courts,    §2. 
§27.     Former  Jeopardy. 

(a)  Defendant  shipper  was  formerly 
indicted  and  convicted  for  accepting  con- 
cessions on  shipments  of  petroleum  from 
Glean,  N.  Y.,  to  Bellows  Falls,  and  to 
Rutland,  Vt.  Defendant  was  again  in- 
dicted for  accepting  concessions  on  ship- 
ments transported  under  separate  bills 
cf  lading  and  shipping  orders  from  Glean, 
N.  Y.,  to  Burlington,  Vt.,  upon  different 
days,  over  three  railroads  involved  in  the 
haul  of  the  shipments  covered  by  the 
former  indictment,  and  also  over  another 
carrier.  The  same  tariff  rate  on  the 
shipment  specified  in  both  indictments 
was  paid  by  the  defendant  monthly,  upon 
bills  rendered  by  the  carrier  covering 
all  the  transportations  of  petroleum  dur- 
ing the  preceding  month,  and  such  pay- 
ments and  settlements  included,  not  only 
the  transportations  contained  in  the  in- 
dictment upon  which  the  defendant  was 
formerly  convicted,  but  also  the  specific 
transportations  included  in  the  second 
indictment.  HELD,  the  second  indict- 
ment covered  offenses  separate  and  dis- 
tinct from  those  included  in  the  first  in- 
dictment, and  defendant's  plea  of  a  for- 
mer conviction  should  be  denied,  since, 
although  the  payment  of  charges  by  the 
shipper  was  essential  to  the  completion 


of  the  offense,  the  separate  shipments, 
nevertheless,  constituted  separate  of- 
fenses. U.  S.  v.  Standard  Gil  Co.  of  New 
York,  192  Fed.  438,  440. 

§28.     Statute  of  Limitations. 

(a)  Section  1044,  Rev.  St.  U.  S.,  fixing 
the  period  of  limitation  for  crimes,  ap- 
plies to  misdemeanors  for  rebating,  un- 
der the  Elkins  Act,  and  the  period  of 
limitation  is  not  governed  by  section  721 
of  the  Rev.  St.  U.  S.,  making  the  period 
of  limitation  fixed  by  the  laws  of  the 
states  determinative  in  certain  instances. 
U.  S.  V.  Central  Vt.  Ry.,  157  Fed.  291,  292. 

(b)  Defendant  carrier  in  1902  agreed 
with  a  shipper  to  transport  sugar  at  less 
than  the  published  rate.  The  transporta- 
tion was  made  and  the  rebates  were  paid 
by  defendant  in  May,  1904.  The  indict- 
ment was  found  in  February,  1907,  charg- 
ing defendant  with  the  acceptance  of 
rebates  in  violation  of  the  Elkins  Act. 
HELD,  the  rebate  was  not  given  or  ac- 
cepted until  the  amount  thereof  was  paid, 
and  defendant  was  liable  under  the  Elkins 
Act,  despite  the  fact  that  the  indictment 
was  found  after  the  effective  date  of  the 
Hepburn  Act  of  June  29,  1906.  U.  S.  v. 
Gt.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  157  Fed.  288,  289. 

IX.     PRGCEDURE. 

§29.     Province  of  Court. 

(a)  In  a  prosecution  under  the  Elkins 
Act  against  a  shipper  for  the  acceptance 
of  a  concession,  it  is  for  the  court,  and 
not  for  the  jury,  to  determine  whether 
documents  filed  with  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  are  sufficiently  defi- 
nite to  establish  the  rate  in  question 
between  the  points  in  question.  Standard 
Oil  Co.  of  New  York  v.  U.  S.,  179  Fed. 
614,  624. 

§30.     Province  of  Jury. 

(abc)  In  a  prosecution  under  the  Elkins 
Act  against  a  railroad  company  for  grant- 
ing concessions,  it  is  for  the  jury  to  ae- 
termine  upon  the  evidence  whether  a 
settlement  of  demurrage  charges  was 
made  during  the  period  covered  In  the 
indictment,  and  whether  a  cancelation 
of  demurrage  charges  by  defendant  was 
a  valid  settlement  of  a  disputed  claim  or 
was  a  cancellation  made  for  the  purpose 
of  extending  a  concession  to  a  favored 
shipper.  U.  S.  v.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  184 
Fed.  543,  545;  U.  S.  v.  Bethlehem  Steel 
Co.,  184  Fed.  546;  U.  S.  v.  Lehigh  Valley 
Ry.  Co.,  184  Fed.  546. 


194 


CRIMES,  §31   (a)_DAMAGES,  §1   (c) 


§31.     Extent  of  Verdict. 

(a)  In  a  prosecution  under  the  Elkins 
Act  against  a  carrier  for  making  con- 
cessions to  a  shipper,  each  count  of  an 
indictment  consisting  of  many  counts 
charged  that  defendant  had  made  a  con- 
cession as  to  the  carload  shipment  men- 
tioned in  the  count.  The  evidence  indi- 
cated that  the  concession  had  been  made 
on  all  the  shipments  during  the  period 
In  question  by  one  settlement,  made  by 
defendant,  in  which  it  simply  canceled 
all  the  demurrage  charges  standing 
against  the  shipper,  and  that  the  amount 
of  charges  so  canceled  was  large  enough 
to  cover  the  sum  total  of  all  the  con- 
cessions alleged  to  have  been  made  on 
all  of  the  cars  mentioned  in  the  different 
counts.  HELD,  a  verdict  finding  defend- 
ant guilty  on  all  the  counts  should  be 
sustained.  U.  S.  v.  Phil.  &  R.  Ry.  Co., 
184  Fed.  543,  545;  U.  S.  v.  Bethlehem 
Steel  Co.,  184  Fed.  546;  U.  S.  v.  Lehigh 
Valley  Ry.  Co.,  184  Fed.  546. 

X.  PENALTIES. 

§32.     Excessive  Fine. 

(a)  In  an  indictment  under  the  Elkins 
Act  against  the  Standard  Oil  Co.  of  Indi- 
ana for  accepting  and  receiving  a  con- 
cession, a  fine  of  $29,240,000,  imposed  by 
the  trial  court  on  the  basis  of  one  offense 
for  every  carload  shipped,  is  excessive, 
where  the  defendant  had  not  before  been 
convicted  of  the  same  offense,  where  its 
assets  were  not  in  excess  of  $1,000,000, 
and  where  the  trial  court  considered  the 
Standard  Oil  Co.  of  New  Jersey  the  real 
offender  in  imposing  the  sentence. 
Standard  Oil  Co.  of  Indiana  v.  U.  S.,  164 
Fed.  376,  386. 

XI.  STATE  REGULATION. 

See   Interstate  Commerce,   §4. 
§33.     In  general. 

(a)  A  state  statute,  practically  iden- 
tical in  language  with  the  provision  of 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  making 
it  a  crime  for  a  person  to  knowingly  and 
wilfully  secure  transportation  at  less 
than  the  published  rates  by  false  repre- 
sentation of  the  contents  of  the  package, 
false  weights,  etc.,  is  not  unconstitu- 
tional as  coming  into  conflict  with  the 
Federal  Act.  Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Char- 
lottesville Woolen  Mills  (Va.,  1908),  63 
S.  E.  8,  9. 


DAMAGES.  , 

See    Reparation. 
See   Tariffs,   §12. 

DEMURRAGE. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
II.     RIGHT  TO  ASSESS. 

§2.     In  general. 

§3.     Discrimination. 

§4.     Failure   of  consignee   to    ac- 
cept. 

§5.     Fault  of  shipper. 

§6.     One  shipment  in  two  cars. 

§7.     Order-notify  shipments. 

§8.     Pending  dispute. 

§9.     Prior  to  actual  delivery. 

§10.  Private  cars. 
IIL     PUBLICATION  AND  TARIFFS. 

§11.     Obligation  to  file. 
IV.     DEMURRAGE  RULES. 

§12.     Construction  in  general. 

§13.    Average  demurrage  plan. 

§14.     Bunching. 

§15.    Free  time. 

§16.     Placement  or  arrival-notices. 

§17.     Railroad     errors     or     omis- 
sions. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

See  Commerce  Court,  §2  (a),  (b) ; 
Courts,  §9  (g),  (h),  (j).  §11  (p);  In- 
terstate Commerce,'  §4  (s),  (t), 
(m);  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission, §2  (h);  Procedure  Before 
Commission,  §2  (bb),  §13  (s) ;  Rep- 
aration, §21  (e) ;  Tracl<  Storage,  1 
(b). 

(a)  On  the  question  of  reasonableness 
of  demurrage  rules  the  Commission  must 
first  be  applied  to,  before  the  power  of 
a  United  States  circuit  court  may  be 
invoked.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.  v.  Hite, 
166  Fed.  976,  979. 

(b)  It  is  not  the  duty  of  the  carrier 
to  furnish  storage  beyond  a  reasonable 
time  necessary  to  unload,  and  the  Com- 
mission has  no  authority  by  the  Act, 
where  a  carrier  has  not  held  itself  out  as 
granting  storage,  to  order  it  furnished, 
but  if  it  is  furnished  and  charged  for, 
storage  becomes  an  incident  in  connec- 
tion with  transportation,  and  the  legality 
of  the  rule  becomes  a  proper  matter  for 
consideration  by  the  Commission.  Peale, 
Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J., 
18  I.  C.  C.  25,  35. 

(c)  The  Commission  has  no  power  to 
enjoin  pendente  lite  the  collection  of  pub- 


DAMAGES,  §1  (d)— §2  (j) 


195 


lished   demurrage   charges.     Peale,   Pea- 
cock &  Kerr  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  18 

I.  C.  C.  25,  33. 

(d)  The  duty  of  regulating  demurrage 
Is  lodged  with  the  Commission.  Peale, 
Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J., 
18  I.  C.  C.  25,  33. 

(e)  Since  cartage  charges  may  be  re- 
garded as  a  proper  subject  for  national 
regulation,  federal  authority  over  de- 
murrage and  track  storage  charges  in 
connection  with  interstate  commerce  can- 
not be  challenged  and  is  exclusive. 
Wilson  Produce  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  170,  174. 

(f)  In  an  action  in  a  state  court  by 
a  carrier  to  recover  demurrage  based 
on  a  schedule  of  demurrage  charges  duly 
published  and  filed  with  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission,  the  court  has  no 
jurisdiction  to  determine  the  reasonable- 
ness of  the  charges,  as  original  jurisdic- 
tion with  respect  thereto  is  vested  in  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission.  Erie 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Wanaque  Lumber  Co.,  75  N. 
J.  L.  878,  881,  69  A.  168. 

II.  RIGHT  OF  CARRIER  TO  CHARGE. 

§2.     In  General. 

See  Credit  Account.  §2  (c) ;  Crimes, 
§30  (a),  §31  (a);  Narrow  Gauge 
Railroad,  I  (c);  Reparation,  §3 
(p);  Special  Contracts,  §2  (p); 
Track  Storage,    II    (a). 

(a)  There  is  no  legal  right  in  a  con- 
signee of  freight  to  use  a  car  as  a  ware- 
house, and  no  right  to  use  a  car  or  track 
as  a  trading  place  to  the  embarassment 
of  the  carrier.  Vllson  Produce  Co.  v. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  116,  121. 

(b)  It  is  in  the  interest  of  both  ship- 
per and  carrier  to  promptly  release  cars. 
Peale,  Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of 
N.  J.,  18  I.  C.  C.  25,  35. 

(c)  The  business  of  a  railroad  is 
transportation,  not  storage.  The  service 
of  a  railroad  cannot  be  efficient  unless 
Its  cars  are  promptly  released.  If  a  car 
is  detained  by  a  particular  shipper  for 
a  longer  period  than  is  necessary  for 
loading,  or  unloading,  the  efficiency  of 
a  railroad  is  to  that  extent  diminished, 
and  every  other  shipper  is  to  the  sama 
extent  prejudiced.  The  shippers  of  New 
England  should  make  an  effort  to  operate 
under  the  uniform  demurrage  code.  In 
Re  Demurrage  Investigation,  19  I.  C.  C. 
496,  498. 

(d)  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  one 
of  the  primary  reasons  for  demurrage  is 


to  release  equipment,  and  again  place  It 
in  transportation  service,  an  equally  im- 
portant end  sought  is  the  use  of  the 
carrier's  tracks  and  terminals  for  all  of 
its  patrons.  Lynah  &  Read  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C,  38,  44. 

(e)  A  shipper  is  not  relieved  from 
published  demurrage  charges  on  coal  by 
reason  of  the  fact  that  he  is  not  engaged 
in  speculative  dealing  in  that  commodity. 
Peale,  Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of 
N.  J.,  18  I.  C.  C,  25,  33. 

(f)  A  carrier  may  assess  reasonable 
demurrage  charge;  if  coercive  measures 
are  necessary,  they  will  be  viewed  with 
favor.  Peale,  Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.  of  N.  J.,  18  I.  C.  C.  25,  35. 

(g)  After  allowing  reasonable  time  to 
unload,  carriers  may  impose  such 
charges  for  further  detention  as  will  lead 
to  speedy  release  of  its  equipment.  Wil- 
son Produce  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  116,  122. 

(h)  It  is  desirable  that  demurrage 
charges  shall  be  the  same  at  all  places 
and  upon  all  commodities,  but  it  is  con- 
ceivable that  there  may  be  cases  where 
a  particular  commodity  or  a  particular 
locality  should  be  made  an  exception  to 
the  general  rule,  and  in  such  cases  there 
Is  no  reason  why  every  locality  and  every 
commodity  should  bear  the  added  burden. 
N.  Y.  Hay  Exchange  Ass'n  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  178,  187. 

(i)  Demurrage  charges  and  charges 
of  a  kindred  nature  are  imposed  as  com- 
pensation to  a  carrier  for  an  additional 
service.  The  rate  of  freight  includes  a 
delivery  of  the  property;  it  does  not  in- 
clude the  storage  of  the  property  after  a 
reasonable  opportunity  has  been  afforded 
the  consignee  to  receive  it.  When,  there- 
fore, the  carrier  through  failure  of  the 
consignee  to  promptly  remove  the  prop- 
erty is  obliged  to  store  the  same  either 
in  its  cars  or  its  warehouses,  it  performs 
a  service  not  embraced  in  the  rate  and 
for  which  additional  compensation  may 
properly  be  exacted.  N.  Y.  Hay  Ex- 
change V.  Penn.  R.  R.,  14  I.  C.  C.  178,  184. 

(j)  Shipment  forwarded  to  lake  port 
with  instruction  to  forward  all  rail  if 
navigation  closed.  No  demurrage  should 
accrue  for  detention  at  lake  port  be- 
fore forwarding  via  all  rail  line,  because 
during  the  time  the  car  was  held  at  such 
port  it  was  in  the  custody  of  the  car- 
riers awaiting  acceptance  by  the  water 
line.  Follmer  &  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  458. 


196 


DAMAGES,  §2  (k)— §4  (c) 


(k)  A  carrier  of  interstate  shipments 
is  entitled  to  collect  demurrage  charges 
according  to  the  free  time  and  conditions 
contained  in  the  schedules  filed  with  and 
approved  by  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission.  Nebraska  Transfer  Co.  v. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  (Neb.,  1912),  134 
N.  W.  163,  166. 

§3.     Discrimination. 

(a)  The  circumstances  and  conditions 
surrounding  transportation  at  one  port 
may  be,  and  necessarily  are,  essentially 
dissimilar  from  those  obtaining  at  an- 
other, and  the  promptness  with  which  a 
Bhipp€r  releases  equipment  at  one  yard, 
where  the  facilities  are  ample,  cannot 
reasonably  be  taken  as  conclusive  in  de- 
termining what  would  constitute  prompt- 
ness at  another  port.  Lynah  &  Read  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  38,  44. 

(b)  Carriers,  including  defendant,  in 
the  state  of  Ohio,  determined  to  combat 
the  right  of  the  Railroad  Commission  of 
Ohio  to  prescribe  demurrage  rules  on  in- 
terstate traffic  and  to  act  in  unison  in 
the  matter.  Defendant  by  oversight 
eliminated  the  average  plan  of  demur- 
rage prescribed  '  y  the  state  commission 
before  the  other  carriers  took  action,  the 
result  being  that  during  the  period  of 
time  in  question  the  other  carriers  were 
according  to  competitors  of  complainant, 
located  on  their  lines,  the  average  sys- 
tem of  demurrage  charges,  while  defend- 
ant was  exacting  the  straight  plan  of  de- 
murrage from  complainant.  Defendant's 
line  did  not.  however,  reach  complainant's 
competitors.  HELD,  the  defendant  was 
not  guilty  of  unjust  discrimination 
aeainst  complainant  and  in  favor  of  .  om- 
plainant's  competitors,  since  a  carrier 
cannot  be  charged  with  giving  preference 
or  advantage  to  points  which  it  does  not 
serve.  Friend  Paper  Co.  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  178,  179. 

§4.     Failure  of  Consignee  to  Accept. 

(a)  Complainant  asked  reparation  of 
demurrage  charges  assessed  on  carloads 
of  coal  sold  by  it  to  the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry. 
at  Chicago,  and  which  that  carrier  re- 
fused to  accept  because  it  was  at  that 
time  elevating  its  tracks  in  Chicago  and 
had  placed  an  embara:o  against  traffic 
from  connections.  HELD,  th?  charges 
did  not  accrue  because  of  any  act  or  de- 
fault of  the  carrying  road  or  its  inability 
to  perform  service  from  point  of  ship- 
ment to  point  of  delivery.  A  railroad 
stands  like  any  other  shipper,  and  it  is 


therefore  unlawful  to  apply  one  rule 
when  a  shipment  is  for  a  railroad,  and  a 
different  rule  when  for  a  private  indi- 
vidual, if  the  traffic  is  like  in  kind  and 
the  circumstances  and  conditions  of 
transportation  are  substantiully  similar. 
The  consignee  having  been  in  fault  and 
not  having  participated  in  the  transporta- 
tion, reparation  must  be  denied.  Crescent 
Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  81. 

(aa)  Demurrage  on  coal  consigned  to 
a  railroad  consignee,  which  accrued  on 
account  of  that  carrier's  embargo,  is  not 
necessarily  unlawful.  Crescent  Coal  & 
Mining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C. 
C.  81. 

(b)  Complainant  is  a  manufacturer 
and  seller  of  cotton  waste,  with  its  fac- 
tory at  Augusta,  Ga.  Aug.  25  to  Sept.  29, 
1908,  Augusta  was  visited  by  a  flool  of 
such  proportion  that  for  a  time  all  in- 
dustries along  the  water  front  were 
paralyzed.  Complainant's  side  track  was 
partially  destroyed.  The  track  was  re- 
paired about  Sept.  2.  From  the  time  de- 
fendants were  able  to  make  delivery,  they 
assessed  demurrage  against  complainant 
of  $1.00  per  day  a  car  after  the  expiration 
of  the  free  time.  Complain^^nt  could  not 
take  delivery  on  account  of  the  condition 
in  which  the  flood  left  its  mill  and  be- 
cause labor  to  make  repairs  was  scarce. 
The  demurrage  rule  in  effect  provided 
that  no  charge  should  be  collected  when 
the  condition  of  the  weather  during  the 
time  prescribed  for  unlo^  ling  was  such 
as  to  render  it  impossible  to  remove 
freight  without  serious  damage.  Defend- 
ant had  to  pay  a  per  diem  charge  of  25c 
a  car  to  the  foreign  lines  owning  the 
equipment.  HELD,  that  the  reason  com- 
plainant could  not  take  delivery  was  ow- 
ing to  conditions  inside  the  mill  itself, 
and  had  complainant  unloaded  the  cars 
it  would  have  had  to  pay  storage  room  to 
=!omeone  else;  under  the  Circumstances 
the  use  of  defendant's  equipment  was  ad- 
vantageous to  it.  Reparation  denied. 
Riverside  Mills  v.  C.  &  W.  C.  Ry.  Co., 
20  L  C.  C.  153,  155. 

(c)  Complainants  are  railroad  con- 
tractors and  having  finished  some  con- 
struction work  for  the  Penn.  R.  R.  near 
Mexico,  Pa.,  were  awarded  a  contract  for 
the  construction  of  section  6  of  a  cut-off 
on  the  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  near  Vails,  N.  J. 
They  started  shipping  their  extensive 
equipment  from  Pennsylvania  to  Vails, 
but  did  not  notify  the  defendant  until 
about  the  day  they  commenced  shipping. 


DAMAGES,  §4  (d)— §5  (b) 


197 


The  defendant's  unloading  facilities  at 
Vails  consisted  of  a  team  track  which 
had  always  been  ample  for  the  needs  of 
that  community,  but  were  not  suf- 
ficient to  meet  the  demands  of  the 
complainants.  They  needed  two  private 
tracks  which  they  proposed  to  extend  to 
the  place  where  their  new  work  was  to 
be  done.  Within  thirty  days  from  the 
time  defendant  was  notified  it  examined 
the  site,  prepared  blue  prints,  etc.,  and 
constructed  the  desired  facilities.  In  the 
meantime  complainant's  equipment  had 
arrived  and  demurrage  to  the  extent  of 
$1,067  accrued.  HELD,  that  the  proposi- 
tion that  an  interstate  carrier  is  required 
by  law  to  enlarge  its  facilities  in  order 
to  meet  the  special  needs  of  a  single 
shipper  on  a  given  occasion  is  one  that 
is  obviously  untenable;  and  that  on  the 
record  it  does  not  appear  that  there  was 
any  such  undue  delay  on  the  part  of  the 
defendant  in  furnishing  additional  fa- 
cilities as  to  make  it  legally  responsible 
in  damages  to  the  complainants.  Com- 
plaint dismissed.  Reiter,  Curtis  &  Hild 
v.  N.  Y.,  S.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
29J,  292. 

(d)  Complainant  shipped  coal  in  large 
quantities  each  month  from  the  Fairmont 
district,  West  Virginia,  to  St.  George, 
Staten  Island,  N.  Y.,  complainant's  ven- 
dee being  the  N.  Y.,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.  Under  defendant's  tariffs  it  was  the 
duty  of  complainant  to  furnish  barges  at 
St.  George  and  the  duty  of  defendants 
to  load  the  coal  into  them  there.  Under 
the  tariffs  complainant  was  entitled  to  an 
average  of  five  free  days  on  all  cars 
shipped  before  demurrage  charges  should 
begin.  The  demurrage  charges  com- 
plained of  were  assessed  on  shipments 
made  in  February,  in  extremely  cold 
weather,  when  it  was  doubtful  whether 
the  defendant  carriers  could  operate  their 
unloading  plant  at  St.  George  on  account 
of  the  extreme  cold.  Complainant's 
vendee  failed  to  furnish  barges  to  receive 
the  coal  at  St.  George,  and  the  demurrage 
charges  in  question  thereby  accrued. 
Under  the  rules  the  charges  'vould  not 
have  accrued  had  barges  been  tendered 
to  defendants  to  receive  the  coal,  irre- 
spective of  whether  defendants  would 
have  been  able  to  operate  their  unload- 
ing plant  at  St.  George.  It  appeared  that 
complainant's  vendee  failed  to  furnish 
such  barges  on  account  of  the  congested 
condition  of  traffic  at  its  terminals  in 
New  York.  HELD,  the  peculiar  condi- 
tions recited  did  not  relieve  complainant 
from   the    obligation    to   pay    demurrage 


charges.  Reparation  denied.  Hutchison- 
McCandlish  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.   16  I.  C.  C.  360,  362. 

(e)  Reparation  denied  for  the  accrual 
of  demurrage  because  consignees  refused 
to  accept  the  shipment.  Caddell  &  Sons 
v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  177. 

§5.     Fault  of  Shipper. 

(a)  Complainant  operates  a  logging 
railroad  nine  miles  long,  connecting  with 
the  line  of  defendant  near  Drummond, 
Wis.  In  April,  1909.  defendant  deliv- 
ered to  complainant  twenty  cars  to  be 
loaded  with  logs  by  the  Tozer  Lumber 
Co.  at  points  on  complainant's  railroad. 
Contemporaneous  with  the  completion  of 
the  loading  of  the  cars  heavy  rains  be- 
^an  to  fall  and  the  ground  to  thaw,  the 
two  combining  to  make  it  impossible  to 
haul  the  loaded  cars  over  the  line  of 
complainant,  whose  road  "is  not  con- 
structed as  and  for  a  permanent  road- 
bed," and  is  not  used  for  general  rail- 
road purposes,  being  laid  with  light  rails 
and  in  the  main  on  the  surface  of  the 
ground.  The  tracks  continued  in  an  un- 
safe condition  until  July,  1909,  when  the 
cars  were  moved  to  the  junction  with 
defendant's  line  and  tendered  for  for- 
warding. Thereupon  defendant  demand- 
ed and  complainant  paid  demurrage  at 
the  rate  of  $1  per  day,  amounting  to 
$2,136.  The  tariff  under  which  the 
charges  were  assessed  provided  that  the 
free  time  for  loading  cars  shall  be  forty- 
eight  hours,  except  that  when  cars  are 
interchanged  with  minor  railroads  or  in- 
dustrial plants  an  additional  twenty-four 
hours  will  be  allowed  for  switching,  after 
that  the  charges  of  $1  per  day  to  be 
assessed.  HELD,  the  charges  complained 
of  were  collected  in  accordance  with 
tariff  authority  and,  therefore,  were  law- 
ful, and  there  is  no  justification  under 
the  circumstances  for  granting  the  relief 
prayed  for.  Complaint  dismissed.  Drum- 
mond &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  V.  C,  St.  h.  M.  & 
O.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  567,  568. 

(b)  Nov.  12,  1907,  a  carload  of  coal 
was  consigned  via  the  Southern  Indiana 
R.  R.  from  Linton,  Ind.,  to  complainant 
at  Chicago.  November  13  complainant 
gave  a  reconsigning  order  to  the  South- 
ern Indiana  R.  R.,  directing  the  car  to  be 
forwarded  to  a  fictitious  person  at  Bur- 
lington, 111.,  via  the  I.  C.  R.  R.  On  the 
same  day  complainant  wrote  a  letter  to 
the  I.  C.  R.  R.  at  Chicago,  directing  a 
change  of  billing  and  consignment  from 
Chicago  to  Charles  City,  la.     The  I.  C. 


Ids 


DAMAGES,  §5  (c)— §8  (b) 


R.  R.  did  not  receive  the  order.  Novem- 
ber 25  complainant  traced  the  car  to  Bur- 
lington and  gave  instructions  to  defend- 
ant to  forward  it  to  Charles  City.  De- 
fendant exacted  $2  reconsigning  charge 
and  $5  demurrage  charge.  HELD,  the 
I.  C.  R.  R.,  having  failed  to  receive  the 
reconsigning  order  of  November  13,  had 
acted  v^rith  due  diligence  and  the  demur- 
rage charges  were  rightfully  collected. 
Sage  &  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
195,  196. 

(c)  There  should  be  no  demurrage 
assessed  on  a  shipment  held  in  transit 
because  consigned  to  a  prepay  station 
on  a  connecting  line  on  which  charges 
were  not  prepaid.  Tioga  Coal  Co.  v. 
C,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  414,  415. 

§6.     One  Shipment  in  Two  Cars. 

See  AHowances,  §14  (h);  Bill  of 
Lading,  §5;  Cars  and  Car  Supply, 
§7;    Refrigeration,   §3   (h). 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  demurrage 
and  switching  charges  on  a  carload  of 
wheat,  Ogden  to  Durango,  Colo.,  for 
services  at  Durango.  At  Montrose,  Colo., 
the  shipment  was  transferred  into  two 
cars,  the  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  being  a  nar- 
row-gauge line  from  that  point.  De- 
fendant's tariffs  of  class  rates  from  Grand 
Junction  to  Durango  made  specific  pro- 
vision for  the  application  of  minimum 
weights  through  to  destination,  notwith- 
standing the  fact  that  a  carload  shipment 
is  transferred  into  two  narrow-gauge  cars 
en  route,  and  it  appeared  that  in  connec- 
tion with  this  particular  shipment  these 
rules  were  applied.  HELD,  that  the  de- 
murrage and  switching  charges  assessed 
on  this  shipment  were  unreasonable  to 
the  extent  they  exceeded  the  charges  ap- 
plicable upon  it  as  a  one  car  shipment 
at  destination.  Reparation  awarded.  Kay 
Co.  V.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  239. 

(b)  Under  a  tariff  rule  which  pro- 
vides for  the  carload  rate  on  any  ship- 
ment which  is  more  than  one  carload 
and  less  than  two,  under  certain  condi- 
tions, if  the  shipment  is  sent  forward  in 
two  cars  under  a  single  bill  of  lading 
and  it  should  happen  that  one  car  should 
be  delayed  so  that  it  might  be  held  for 
some  time  at  destination  awaiting  the  ar- 
rival of  the  other,  demurrage  charges 
will  not  accrue  until  the  entire  shipment 
covered  by  the  bill  of  lading  is  delivered. 
Scudder  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C. 
60,  61,  62. 

(c)  A  larger  consignment  shipped  on 
one  day  to  one  consignee  than  could  be 


loaded  in  one  car;  balance,  if  loaded  in 
box  car,  carried  at  the  carload  rate  on 
the  actual  weight.  HELD,  complainant 
not  entitled  to  reparation  by  failure  to 
load  balance  in  box  car  as  tariff  rule  re- 
quired. Hartford  Canning  Co.  v.  C,  M. 
&   St.   P.  Ry.   Co.,  Unrep.   Op.  288. 

§7.     Order-notify  Shipments. 

(a)  The  placing  of  a  car  containing 
an  order-notify  shipment  on  a  team  track 
and  the  giving  of  notice  to  the  consignee 
amounts  to  a  discharge  of  the  carrier's 
obligation  in  the  matter  of  delivery,  at 
least  until  the  bill  of  lading  is  sur- 
rendered. Roden  Grocery  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S. 
R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  469,  471. 

(b)  Complainant  had  shipped  to  it 
canned  tomatoes  in  carloads  from  Trout- 
ville,  Va.,  to  Birmingham,  Ala.,  under  an 
"order-notify"  bill  of  lading  containing 
the  provision  that  "the  surrender  of  this 
original  order  bill  of  lading,  properly  in- 
dorsed, shall  be  required  before  the  de- 
livery of  the  property."  Upon  arrival 
at  destination  consignee  was  given  no- 
tice, but  did  not  surrender  the  bill  of 
lading  for  four  days.  Demurrage  tariffs 
contained  a  provision  that  forty-eight 
hours'  free  time  "when  cars  are  held  for 
loading  or  unloading,  and  but  twenty-four 
hours  free  time  "when  cars  are  held  for 
reconsignment  or  switching  orders." 
HELD,  demurrage  was  collectible  after 
the  expiration  of  twenty-four  hours,  be- 
cause the  free  time  for  unloading  was 
still  allowable  after  the  car  had  been 
placed  in  position  for  unloading  at  com- 
plainant's warehouse.  Roden  Grocery 
Co.  V.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I   C.  C.  469. 

§8.     Pending    Dispute. 

See   Reparation,  §15  (a). 

(a)  Pending  a  dispute  as  to  the  law- 
ful charges  to  apply  to  a  shipment  to 
which  there  was  no  lawfully  applicable 
rate  and  on  which  the  carrier  eventually 
exacted  a  rate  subsequently  found  un- 
reasonable by  the  Commission,  demur- 
rage charges  accrued  and  were  collected 
by  the  carrier.  HELD,  the  demurrage 
charges  should  be  refunded.  Wheeler- 
Holden  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L 
C.  C.  237,  238. 

(b)  Reparation  will  be  awarded  for 
demurrage  charges  assessed  and  col- 
lected by  a  carrier  which  accrued  during 
a  dispute  concerning  an  unreasonable 
freight  rate  exacted  by  it.  Jones  Bros. 
Co.  V.  M.  &  W.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C. 
577,  580. 


DAMAGES,  §8  (c)— (h) 


199 


(c)  Complainants  ship.-e:  chip  board, 
Milwaukee,  Wis.,  to  Spokane,  Wash. 
Tariff  provided  for  binders'  board,  wood 
pulp  board,  box  board  and  various  similar 
kinds  of  board,  including  wood  pulp 
cartons,  but  did  not  specifically  mention 
chip  board.  At  destination  delivering 
carrier  reclassified  shipment  and  collect- 
ed rate  on  the  so-called  chip  board  under 
tariffs  providing  for  rates  on  boxes, 
paper  or  paste  board,  foldinp:  egg  cartons, 
etc.,  and  printed  chip  board  cut  and 
shaped  for  shirt  fronts.  Chip  board  is 
a  product  similar  to  wood  pulp  board, 
but  of  less  value,  and  in  nowise  similar 
to  those  articles  which  took  the  higher 
rate  which  the  delivering  carrier  exacted 
before  it  would  deliver  the  shipment. 
Consignee  had  unloaded  part  of  the  ship- 
ment and  was  compelled  to  cart  it  back 
to  the  car.  During  the  controversy  about 
the  additional  freight  charges  demurrage 
charges  accrued,  which  consignee  was 
finally  obliged  to  pay.  HELD,  the  in- 
creased rate  exacted  was  unreasonable, 
as  the  shipment  was  correctly  classified 
in  the  first  place;  that  the,  demurrage 
was  exacted  through  the  fault  of  the  car- 
rier, and  the  expenditure  due  to  remov- 
ing and  restoring  a  part  of  the  carload 
the  direct  consequence  of  t'le  unlawful 
act  of  the  delivering  carriers  in  declining 
to  deliver  the  carload  until  the  increased 
charges  due  to  reclassification  were  paid. 
Reparation  awarded  for  the  Increased 
rate,  demurrage  and  cartage.  Schulz  Co. 
V.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  403. 

(d)  Defendant  assessed  demurrage 
under  lawful  tariff  authority  pending  a 
controversy  concerning  the  payment  of 
freight  charges  owing  to  cancelation  of 
complainant's  credit  account.  HELD,  re- 
gardless of  the  carrier's  reasons  for  can- 
celing a  credit  account  it  is  undoubted 
that  it  may  demand  its  legal  charges 
before  delivering  freight,  and  demurrage 
accruing  during  a  controversy  as  to  such 
payment  cannot  be  refunded  on  that 
ground  alone,  but  it  must  be  shown  that 
the  charges  are  unreasonable  or  unjustly 
discriminatory.  Fisk  &  Sons  v.  B.  &  M. 
R.  R.,  19  I.  C.  C.  299.  300. 

(e)  Demurrage  and  storage  charges 
collected  as  the  result  of  carriers  de- 
manding rates  in  excess  of  those  in  their 
legally  filed  tariffs  must  be  refunded, 
and  this  principle  applies  to  cases  in 
which  charges  are  demanded  on  ship- 
ments as  to  which  no  rates  are  pub- 
lished, but  on  which  the  carrier  attempts 
to   exact  an  unreasonable  rate,  precipi- 


tating a  controversy  during  which  de- 
murrage accrues.  Northern  Lumber  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  54,  55. 

(f)  The  consignee  is  released  from 
obligation  to  pay  demurrage  accruing 
during  pendency  of  a  dispute  when  the 
delivering  carrier  demands  more  than  the 
lawful  rate.  Porter  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  1,  5. 

(ff)  On  a  shipment  of  an  emigrant's 
outfit  from  Fletcher,  Okla.,  to  Bovina, 
Tex.,  the  delivering  carrier  demanded  a 
charge  of  68c,  the  lawful  rate  being  62c. 
The  shipper  refused  to  pay  more  than 
37c,  which  rate  was  quoted  to  him  by 
the  initial  carrier.  On  account  of  this 
refusal,  demurrage  charges  accrued  and 
the  property  was  sold  to  pay  the  freight. 
HELD,  the  shipper  was  not  subject  to 
the  demurrage  charges.  When  the  de- 
livering carrier  demands  more  than  the 
lawful  rate,  the  consignee  is  released 
from  the  obligation  to  pay  demurrage 
charges  accruing  during  the  pendency  of 
the  dispute  as  to  the  lawful  rate.  Porter 
V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  1,  5. 

(g)  Where  a  carrier  demands  its  reg- 
gularly  published  charge  and  the  shipper 
delays  unloading,  on  the  ground  that  the 
same  is  unreasonable,  the  shipper  is 
liable  for  demurrage  charges  and  cannot 
recover  the  charges,  although  the  Com- 
mission holds  the  rate  exacted  to  be  un- 
reasonable and  awards  reparation  for  the 
excess  charged.  Coomes  v.  C,  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  192,  195. 

(h)  A  shipment  of  lumber  consigned 
to  East  St.  Louis,  111.,  arrived  at  Bixby 
at  1:45  p.  m.  Aug.  31,  1907.  On  the 
night  of  August  31  complainant  mailed 
a  written  order  from  Kansas  City,  direct- 
ing delivery  to  Granite  City,  111.  This 
order  was  not  received  until  Monday, 
September  2.  Under  the  published  tariff 
the  free  time  allowed  for  reconsignment 
was  twenty-four  hours  from  the  first 
7  a.  m.  intervening  after  arrival  of  the 
shipment,  Sundays  and  legal  holidays  ex- 
cluded. September  2  was  Labor  day. 
Delivery  was  not  effected  at  Granite  City 
until  8:30  a.  m.  September  5,  and  delay 
in  reconsigning  the  car  after  receipt  of 
order  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  con- 
signee was  not  on  the  credit  list  of  the 
defendant  carrier,  and  it  was  necessary 
to  take  up  with  consignee  the  question 
of  payment  of  freight  charges.  Defend- 
ant company  assessed  a  car  service 
charge  of  $1  per  day  for  September  4 
and  5.     HELD,  such  car  service  charge 


200 


DAMAGES,  §8    (i)— §9   (d) 


was  improperly  collected  and  should  be 
refunded.  Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  St. 
L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  532,  584-535. 

(1)  Where  a  carrier  provides  in  its 
tariff  for  reconsignment,  without  any  re- 
quirement for  prepayment  of  freight  or 
guaranty  of  the  same,  it  may  not  law- 
fully charge  demurrage  for  time  during 
which  it  holds  the  shipment  while  parley- 
ing with  its  connections  as  to  advance 
ment  of  its  freight  charges.  Beekman 
Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
L  C.  C.  532,  534. 

(j)  Consignee  refused  to  accept  ship- 
ment pending  dispute  over  rates;  car- 
rier willing  to  deliver.  Charges  cannot 
be  waived.  Dodds  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  R. 
I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  14. 

§9.     Prior  to  Actual  Delivery. 

(a)  Under  a  rule  providing  that  de- 
murrage on  cars  of  coal  destined  for 
transshipment  by  water  shall  be  com- 
puted between  the  date  of  arrival  of  each 
car  and  the  date  released,  the  "date  of 
arrival"  means  the  day  the  car  reaches 
the  yards,  and  not  the  day  the  shipper 
receives  notice  from  the  carrier  of  such 
arrival,  and  the  "date  released"  means 
the  day  upon  which  the  car  again  be- 
comes available  for  transportation  by  be- 
ing -relieved  from  one  service  and  free 
to  enter  upon  another,  and  not  the  day  a 
vessel  is  tendered  for  loading  by  the 
shipper,  where  no  evidence  is  introduced 
to  show  that  by  custom  the  terms  have 
come  to  have  another  meaning.  Central 
R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.  V.  Hite,  166  Fed.  976, 
978,  979. 

(b)  Complainant  refused  to  accept 
from  defendant  bales  of  cotton  shipped 
from  Vicksburg,  Miss.,  to  complainant  at 
New  Bedford,  Miss.,  for  upon  inspection 
it  appeared  that  the  marks  of  identifica- 
tion had  been,  by  rough  handling,  so 
obliterated  and  removed  that  it  was  im- 
possible to  tell  whether  the  cotton  was 
for  complainant  or  not.  Complainant 
sought  reparation  for  payment  of  storage 
charges  on  the  shipment.  HELD,  stor- 
age charges  cannot  begin  to  accrue  until 
freight  has  been  tendered  under  such 
circumstances  that  consignee  is  legally 
obliged  to  receive  the  same.  If  marks 
on  shipment  are  so  obliterated  through 
negligence  of  carrier  that  property  could 
not  be  identified,  the  shipper  is  under 
no  obligation  to  take  what  might  not  be 
his  property.     Reparation  awarded.     Kil- 


burn  Mills  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  21,  22. 

(c)  Defendant  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  and  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  were  parties  to  a  tariff 
which  provided  that  coal  billed  flat  to 
Chicago  could  be  reconsigned  free  within 
24  hours  to  points  in  the  Chicago  switch- 
ing district  and  that  the  switching  charges 
would  be  absorbed  by  the  line  carrier. 
The  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  issued  a  so- 
called  regulating  embargo  under  which 
it  refused  to  accept  cars  of  the  com- 
plainant, who  was  located  on  its  line,  at 
various  intervals  owing  to  congestion  of 
its  terminals.  Complainant  reconsigned 
its  cars  according  to  the  tariff,  but  was 
compelled  to  pay  demurrage  to  the  B. 
&.  O.  R.  R.  owing  to  the  refusal  of  the 
C.  M.  &  S.  P.  R.  R.  to  receive  cars  from 
the  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  under  the  regulating 
embargo.  HELD,  that  demurrage  may 
not  be  assessed  except  for,  or  because  of, 
failure  on  part  of  shipper  or  consignee 
to  comply  with  his  obligations  and  that 
where  a  switching  service  is  yet  to  be 
performed  delivery  has  not  been  effect- 
ed; that  consignee  having  done  every- 
thing it  could  and  being  able  to  receive 
its  cars  was  not  required  to  pay  demur- 
rage simply  because  it  was  located  on 
the  C.  M.  &  St  P.  R.  R.  and  that  carrier 
refused  to  accept  its  cars;   and  that  the 

B.  &  O.  R.  R.  not  being  a  party  to  the 
tariff  could  not  lawfully  assess  the  de- 
murrage. Reparation  awarded.  Crescent 
Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
20  L  C.  C.  559. 

(d)  A  carload  of  ashes  from  Bay 
City,  Mich.,  consigned  to  Williamson's 
siding,  Norfolk,  Va.,  on  its  arrival  at 
Norfolk  was  not  turned  over  immediate- 
ly by  the  N.  &  W.  R.  R.  to  the  N.  &  S. 
R.  R.  to  be  delivered  at  said  siding,  for 
the  reason  that  Williamson's  siding  was 
a  prepaid  point  and  the  charges  to  Nor- 
folk had  to  be  paid  before  delivery  could 
be  made  to  such  siding,  which  was  just 
outside  the  switching  district  of  Norfolk. 
Complainant  was  assessed  demurrage 
charges  for  the  time  the  car  was  delayed 
at  Norfolk.  HELD,  such  charges  were 
improper.  Demurrage  as  a  general  rule 
is  assessable  against  a  carload  shipment 
only  at  point  of  origin  or  destination,  or 
at  the  reconsigning  or  transit  point,  ex- 
cept where  the  tariffs  clearly  specify  that 
they  may  be  assessed  otherwise.  Rep- 
aration awarded.     Munroe  &  Sons  v.  M. 

C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  27,  28. 


DAMAGES,  §9  (e)— §10  (e) 


201 


(e)  Where  a  rate  on  coal  to  tide-water 
ports  destined  for  transshipment  is  not 
a  part  of  a  through  rate,  and  95  per  cent 
of  the  coal  is  either  for  vessel  bunker 
use  or  is  consumed  in  the  immediate 
neighborhood  of  such  ports,  the  coal  upon 
arrival  at  the  piers  is  at  destination  so 
as  to  allow  the  imposition  of  demurrage 
charges  for  delays  in  unloading  into  ves- 
sels. Peale,  Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  Central 
R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  18  I.  C.  C.  25,  30. 

(f)  Where  a  carrier  attempts  to  place 
cars  moving  in  interstate  commerce  for 
unloading  on  a  team  track  immediately 
upon  arrival,  and  is  prevented  from  do- 
ing so  by  the  fact  that  the  track  is  full 
of  other  cars  waiting  to  be  unloaded  by 
the  consignee,  and  thereafter  places  the 
cars  on  the  team  track  as  rapidly  as  the 
consignee  is  able  to  take  care  of  them, 
it  cannot  be  defeated  in  its  right  to 
recover  demurrage  charges  by  the  fact 
that  it  did  not  at  once  place  all  the  cars 
on  the  team  track.  Nebraska  Transfer 
Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  (Neb.,  1912), 
134  N.  W.  163,  166. 

(g)  A  railroad  provided  no  public  track 
for  the  unloading  of  freight  cars  at  plain- 
tiff consignee's  station  and  was  ac- 
customed to  switch  same  to  plaintiff's 
private  siding  for  unloading.  In  the  in- 
stance in  question  it  failed  to  switch  the 
cars  to  such  siding,  but  left  them  on 
a  side  storage  track  between  plaintiff's 
station  and  another  station  and  some 
3,000  or  4,000  feet  from  plaintiff's  plant. 
On  such  storage  track  the  cars  had  never, 
therefore,  reached  their  final  destination 
and  still  required  the  intervention  of  a 
switching  engine  and  crew.  HELD,  there 
was  no  constructive  delivery  of  the  cars, 
such  as  to  entitle  defendant  carrier  to 
collect  demurrage  charges  filed  with  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  and  as- 
sessable for  failure  of  a  shipper  to  un- 
load the  cars  after  notice  and  while  the 
same  were  standing  on  storage  tracks. 
Carrizzo  v.  N.  Y.  S.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  66 
Misc.  243,  248,  123  N.  Y.  Sup.  173. 

§10.     Private  Cars. 

(a)  The  provision  in  the  "Uniform 
Demurrage  Code"  permitting  a  railroad 
to  make  a  demurrage  charge  against  the 
private  cars  of  the  shipper  after  they  have 
been  delivered  to  him  and  are  standing 
on  his  private  tracks,  is  sustainable  as 
a  reasonable  regulation  to  prevent  a 
shipper  from  withdrawing  such  cars  from 
service   and   thereby   disturbing  the   car 


supply  of  the  carriers,  which  have  relied 
upon  the  private  cars  as  a  part  of  their 
equipment.  Proctor  &  Gamble  Co.  v 
U.  S.,  188  Fed.  221,  228,  sustaining  19 
I.  C.  C.  556;  reversed  on  other  grounds, 
225  U.  S.  282,  32  Sup.  Ct.  761,  56  L. 
ed.  1091.  Hooker  Knapp,  225  U.  S.  302, 
32  Sup.  A.  769,  56  L.  ed.  1099. 

(b)  Empty  privately  owned  cars, 
while  remaining  on  privately  owned 
tracks,  and  not  "placed  for  loading"  by 
the  carrier,  are  not  subject  to  demurrage 
charges  under  tariffs  of  defendants.  Rep- 
aration awarded  for  demurrage  charges 
collected  under  such  circumstances. 
Central  Commercial  Co.  v.  G.  &  S.  I.  R. 
R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  532. 

(c)  The  rule  of  defendants  providing 
for  the  assessment  of  demurrage  on  pri- 
vate cars  while  standing  on  private 
tracks,  and  that  if  private  cars  are  re- 
turned under  load  railroad  service  is 
not  at  an  end  until  the  lading  is  removed, 
held  to  be  reasonable,  as  the  law  does 
not  impose  upon  defendants  the  obli- 
gation of  hauling  complainant's  private 
cars,  and  if  used  it  must  be  under  an  ar 
rangement  subscribed  to  by  both  and 
stated  definitely  in  defendant's  tariffs; 
and  defendants  are  within  their  lawful 
rights  in  imposing  the  foregoing  condi- 
tion. Proctor  &  Gamble  v.  C.  H.  &  D. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  556;  sustained,  188 
Fed.  221,  228;  reversed  on  other  grounds, 
225  U.  S.  282,  32  Sup.  Ct.  761,  56  L. 
ed.  1091. 

(d)  Following  the  ruling  of  June  2, 
1908.  to  the  effect  that  the  decision  in 
In  The  Matter  of  Demurrage  Charges 
on  Privately  Owned  Tank  Cars,  13  I.  C. 
C.  378,  would  not  be  given  retroactive 
effect  with  respect  to  reparation  for  de- 
murrage charges,  reparation  Is  denied 
for  such  charges  paid  under  protest  sub- 
sequent to  said  decision  for  the  delay  of 
cars  owned  by  private  lines  on  complain- 
ants' private  tracks  occurring  prior  to 
said  decision.  Cambria  Steel  Co.  v.  B.  & 
O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  484,  485. 

(e)  Private  cars  owned  by  shippers 
and  hired  to  carriers  upon  a  mileage  ba- 
sis are  subject  to  demurrage  when  such 
cars  stand  upon  the  tracks  of  the  car- 
rier, either  at  the  point  of  origin  or  des- 
^ination  of  shipment,  but  arc  not  so  sub- 
ject when  upon  either  the  private  tracks 
of  the  owner  of  the  car  or  the  private 
tracks  of  the  consignee.  The  carrier 
must    charge    demurrage    In    all    cases 


202 


DAMAGES,  §11  (a)— (k) 


where  such  demurrage  is  imposed  by 
tariff  provision  upon  its  own  equipment, 
except  when  a  privately  owned  car  is 
upon  a  privately  owned  siding  or  track, 
and  the  carrier  is  paying,  or  is  responsi- 
ble for  no  rental  or  other  charge  upon 
such  car;  and  a  privately  owned  car  in 
the  sense  in  which  that  expression  is 
here  used,  is  a  car  owned  and  used  by  an 
individual,  firm  or  corporation  for  the 
transportation  of  the  commodities  which 
they  produce  or  in  which  they  deal.  In 
Re  Demurrage  Charges  on  Privately 
Owned  Tank  Cars,  13  I.  C.  C.  378,  381. 

III.     PUBLICATION  AND  TARIFF. 
See  Tariffs. 

§11.     Obligation    to    File. 

(a)  Where  demurrage  charges  have 
been  duly  filed  and  published  with  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  the 
carrier  and  the  shipper  can  not  by  agree- 
ment between  themselves  cancel  such 
charges  on  the  ground  that  the  carriers' 
tracks  were  torn  up  and  the  shippers' 
tracks  were  in  bad  condition,  thereby 
causing  delays,  or  on  the  ground  that 
such  charges  were  discriminatory  be- 
tween competing  shippers,  and  where  the 
carrier  and  shipper  knowing  the  publish- 
ed demurrage  charges  cancel  the  same, 
they  are  criminally  liable  under  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Act  as  amended  by 
the  Elkins  Act  of  February  19,  1903,  and 
the  Hepburn  Act  of  June  29,  1906.  Le- 
high Valley  R.  R.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  188  Fed. 
879,  887. 

(b)  Terminal  charges  being  part  of 
transportation  and  demurrage  charges 
being  included  in  the  term  "terminal 
charges,"  the  failure  by  a  carrier  to  ob- 
served demurrage  tariffs  filed  and  pub- 
ished  by  it  and  the  soliciting  and  receiv- 
ing of  concessions  with  respect  to  demur- 
rage charges  are  misdemeanors  for 
which  a  prosecution  will  lie  under  the 
Elkins  Act  of  February  19,  1903,  and  the 
Hepburn  Act  of  June  29,  1906.  Lehigh 
Valley  R.  R.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  188  Fed.  879, 
886. 

(c)  Demurrage  is  a  terminal  charge 
for  transportation  within  the  meaning  of 
section  6  of  the  Act  of  1887,  as  amended 
by  the  Act  of  1889,  and  of  the  Act  of  1906, 
which  requires  the  filing  with  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  and  print- 
ing and  keeping  open  for  public  inspec- 
tion of  schedules  showing  all  the  rates, 
fares,   and    charges    for    transportation. 


Lehigh   Valley   R.   R.   Co.   v.   U.   S.,   188 
Fed.  879,   885. 

(d)  It  has  been  uniformly  held  by 
the  Commission  that  a  shipper  or  con- 
signee may  not  be  required  to  pay  a  de- 
murrage charge,  unless  the  carrier's  tar- 
iffs provide  for  the  same  in  clear  and 
specific  form  and  manner.  Crescent 
Coal  &  Mining  Co,  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
20  I.   C.  C.  559,  569. 

(e)  A  carrier  which  has  no  tariff 
provision  authorizing  a  demurrage 
charge  under  the  circumstances  of  the 
particular  case  should  refund  demurrage 
which  has  been  collected.  Beekman 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Louisiana  Ry.  &  N.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  343,  347. 

(fg)  Where  the  tariffs  of  a  carrier  do 
not  contain  any  provisions  authorizing 
the  collection  of  demurrage,  on  a  car- 
load shipment  held  in  transit  because 
consigned  to  a  prepay  station  on  a  con- 
necting line  on  which  freight  charges  are 
not  prepaid  by  the  shipper,  the  exaction 
of  demurrage  is  unlawful.  Tioga  Coal 
Co.  V.  G.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
414,  415. 

(h)  The  fact  that  a  shipper  is  not 
given  personal  notice  of  the  promulga- 
tion of  a  carrier's  demurrage  regulations 
neither  vitiates  the  latter's  right  nor 
lessens  its  duty  to  impose  demurrage 
charge  incurred  under  the  rules  contain- 
ed in  its  lawful  tariff.  Peale,  Peacock  & 
Kerr  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  of  New  Jersey, 
18  I.  C.  C.  25,  33. 

(i)  The  requirements  of  the  Act  with 
respect  to  the  publication,  posting,  and 
filing  of  "  all  terminal  charges,  storage 
charges,  icing  charges,  and  all  other 
charges  which  the  Commission  may  re- 
quire," remove  from  the  carrier  and 
from  the  shipper  the  right  which  existed 
under  the  common  law  to  contract  in  re- 
ference to  demurrage  charges,  on  any  ba- 
sis other  than  that  specifically  set  forth 
in  the  carrier's  published  tariffs,  Peale, 
Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  of 
New  Jersey,  18  I.   C.  C.  25,   33, 

(j)  Where  demurrage  charges  are  im- 
posed for  detention  of  cars  at  a  point 
other  than  that  specified  in  the  bill  of 
lading,  there  must  be  definite  tariff 
authority  therefor.  U.  S.  v.  D.  &  R.  G. 
R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  7,  9. 

(k)  On  cars  of  cement  billed  from 
Independence,  Kan.,  to  complainant  at 
"Mile   Post   679,"   a   switch   built   at  ex- 


DAMAGES,  §11  (D— §14  (d) 


203 


pense  of  complainant  and  defendant, 
the  sole  property  of  defendant,  near  This- 
tle Junction,  Utah,  and  retained  at  This- 
tle Junction,  there  accrued  demurrage 
of  $440.  Defendant's  tariff  provided  for 
demurrage  on  such  cars  as  were  not  de- 
livered for  reasons  beyond  control  of  the 
carrier.  At  no  time  was  the  switch  filled 
with  cars  consigned  to  complainant,  but 
at  the  request  of  complainant  the  defend- 
ent  delivered  only  a  limited  number  of 
cars  per  day.  HELD,  that  the  act  of  de- 
fendant in  retaining  cars  at  Thistle  Junc- 
tion at  request  of  complainant  was  not 
Induced  by  a  reason  beyond  its  control, 
and  as  demurrage  charges  were  not  as- 
sessed in  accordance  with  any  provision 
In  defendant's  tariff  they  did  not  consti- 
tute a  valid  claim  against  complainant. 
(Prouty,  Comm'r,  dissenting.)  U.  S.  v.  D. 
&  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  7,  9. 

(1)  Demurrage  assessed  without  tar- 
iff authority  on  car  detained  at  interme- 
diate point  through  no  fault  of  shipper, 
wrongfully  imposed.     Germain  Co.  v.  N. 

0.  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  22;  Mon- 
roe &  Sons  V.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I. 
C.  C.  27. 

(m)  Where  a  "carrier  provides  in  its 
tariff  for  reconsigment  without  any  re- 
quirement for  prepayment  of  freight  or 
guaranty  of  the  same,  it  may  not  lawful- 
ly charge  demurrage  for  time  during 
which  it  holds  the  shipment  while  parley- 
ing with  its  connections  as  to  advance- 
ment of  its  freight  charges.  Beekman 
Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14 

1.  C.  C.  532,  534. 

IV.     DEMURRAGE  RULES. 
§12.     Construction  In  General. 

(a)  In  the  framing  of  demurrage  reg- 
ulations the  object  sought  is  the  prompt 
release  of  cars.  It  is  not  intended  that 
they  should  be  so  liberal  as  to  defeat  the 
end  sought  to  be  attained,  but  their  pur- 
pose is  to  stimulate  a  shipper  to  aid  the 
carrier  in  serving  all  shippers.  Peale, 
Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N  J., 
18  I.  C.  C.  25,  36. 

(b)  The  primary  object  of  demurrage 
regulations  is  to  release  cars  after  a  cer- 
tain period,  not  to  reward  a  shipper  for 
releasing  them  in  less  than  that  period. 
Peale,  Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of 
N.  J.,  18  L  C.  C.  25,  32. 

§13.     Average   Demurrage  Plan. 

(a)  Complainant  engaged  in  milling 
grain   in   Louisville,   Ky.,   complained   of 


demurrage  charges  collected  by  defend- 
ant in  the  sum  of  $145,  and  claimed  they 
should  have  been  assessed  upon  the  aver- 
age demurrage  plan  in  the  sum  of  $73. 
Defendant  allowed  shippers  the  average 
demurrage  plan  upon  the  receipt  of  a 
bond  of  a  specified  form  signed  by  the 
shipper  and  a  surety,  which  bond  waived 
notice  by  surety  of  default.  Complain- 
ant's surety  at  first  refused  to  sign  such 
a  bond.  Meantime,  charges  were  made 
that  are  attacked.  HELD,  that  the  rule 
prescribed  by  the  defendant  was  not  un- 
reasonable. Complaint  dismissed.  Wash- 
burn-Crosby Milling  Co.  v.  Sou.  Ry.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  465. 

§14.     Bunching. 

(a)  The  fact  that  two  carloads  are 
shipped  on  one  day  and  one  the  next 
from  the  same  point  of  shipment  to  the 
same  destination,  and  one  car  arrives  on 
one  day  and  two  on  a  subsequent  day, 
does  not  constitute  bunching  within  the 
meaning  of  the  demurrage  rules.  North- 
ern Wisconsin  Produce  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  & 
St.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  197,  198. 

(b)  Complainant,  shipper  of  creosoted 
lumber  at  New  Orleans,  ordered  200  cars 
of  defendant  to  be  delivered  at  the  rate 
of  four  a  day.  Defendant  sometimes  sup- 
plied more  and  sometimes  less  than  this 
number.  On  certain  days  it  furnished  as 
many  as  21  cars.  Complainant  made  no 
protest  when  said  large  numbers  were 
supplied,  and  one  time  informed  defendant 
it  was  ready  to  load  50  cars  if  it  could 
get  them.  Demurrage  charges  accumu- 
lated on  the  cars  irrespective  of  the  num- 
ber per  day  furnished,  said  charges  often 
being  the  fewest  when  the  largest  num- 
ber of  cars  was  being  furnished.  Com- 
plainant also  loaded  the  cars  without  at- 
tention to  the  order  in  which  they  were 
received.  HELD,  complainant  was  not 
entitled  to  escape  demurrage  charges  on 
account  of  the  manner  in  which  the  cars 
were  supplied  to  it.  American  Creosot- 
ing  Works  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C. 
160,  163. 

(c)  If  it  were  shown  that  complainant 
protested  against  the  setting  in  of  too 
many  cars  at  one  time,  and  its  voice  and 
protest  had  been  ignored,  there  might  be 
room  to  find  that  the  demurrage  charges 
resulting  were  unreasonable.  American 
Creosoting  Works  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.  C.  160. 

(d)  There  is  nothing  unreasonable  or 
unlawful  about  a  tariff  rule  which  pro- 


204 


DAMAGES,  §14  (e)— §15  (f) 


vides  that  in  the  event  of  the  carrier's 
bunching  a  shipper's  cars  and  delivering 
them  in  excess  of  the  shipper's  facilities 
and  ability  to  load  or  unload,  demurrage 
will  not  accrue.  American  Creosoting 
Works  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  160, 
164. 

(e)  Unreasonable  delays  in  transpor- 
tation should  not  cause  demurrage  to  ac- 
crue. Lynah  &  Read  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  38,  46. 

(f)  Large  number  of  cars  held  outside 
private  sidetrack  awaiting  delivery,  due 
to  complainant  having  more  business 
than  facilities  to  handle  it,  does  not  con- 
stitute a  "bunching  in  transit"  by  the 
delivering  line.  Brooklyn  Cooperage  Co. 
v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  358. 

(g)  Complainant,  manufacturer  of  bar- 
rels at  New  Orleans,  La.,  alleged  that  cer- 
tain demurrage  charges  collected  by  de- 
fendants were  unreasonable.  It  has  a 
plant  reached  by  a  sWitig  able  to  accom- 
modate eight  cars.  The  I.  C.  R.  R.  re- 
fused to  accept  cars  to  deliver  to  this  sid- 
ing from  the  connecting  carriers,  at 
times,  because  of  inability  to  get  on  the 
siding,  for  which  delays  the  carriers  ex- 
acted demurrage  charges.  Complainant 
claimed  the  I.  C.  R.  R.  was  negligent  in 
placing  cars  on  the  switch.  HELD,  that 
delay  was  due  to  lack  of  switch  capacity. 
Reparation  denied.  Brooklyn  Cooperage 
Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  358. 

(h)  Unreasonable  delays  incident  to 
the  railroad  transportation  of  coal  to  tide- 
water are  within  the  power  of  the  car- 
rier to  prevent,  and  they  should  not  be 
permitted  to  be  the  cause  of  demurrage 
against  consignees.  Lynah  &  Read  v.  B. 
&  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  38,  46. 

(i)  The  tariff  may  provide  for  a 
waiver  of  demurrage  charges  when  cars 
are  bunched  in  transit.  American  Creo- 
soting Works  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  160,  164. 

§15.     Free  Time. 

(a)  The  public  is  entitled  to  a  reason- 
able time  in  which  to  load  or  unload, 
which  should  not  be  shortened  because  of 
adverse  weather  conditions.  Murphy 
Bros.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
C.  176,  177. 

(b)  The  application  of  the  uniform 
demurrage  code  in  such  manner  as  not  to 
exclude  Saturday  afternoon  in  the  com- 
putation of  free  time  allowance  does  not 


operate  in  an  unreasonable  or  unlawful 
manner  in  Philadelphia  territory,  and 
ought  not  to  be  modified,  so  as  to  allow 
it  to  apply  in  that  territory  in  any  dif- 
ferent manner  from  that  in  which  it  ap- 
plies elsewhere.  Commercial  Exchange 
of  Philadelphia  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
C.  1,  4. 

(c)  No  objections  exist  to  providing 
in  a  tariff  that  when  a  consignee  has  neg- 
lected to  unload  a  carload  shipment 
within  the  free  time  provided  in  the  car- 
rier's demurrage  rule,  the  carrier  may 
unload  it,  and  that  when  this  is  done  a 
charge  will  be  assessed  therefor.  If, 
however,  the  demurrage  charge  per  day 
should  be  more  than  the  charge  for  un- 
loading a  car,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
provide  that  such  shipments  must  be  un- 
loaded by  the  carrier,  as  otherwise 
favoritism  might  be  practiced.  Schultz- 
Hansen  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C  234. 
237. 

(d)  Consignee's  delay  in  furnishing 
vessel  should  not  be  included  in  free  time 
allowed.  Lynah  &  Read  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  38. 

(e)  Free  time  allowance  does  not  fol- 
low car  on  sold  or  reconsigned  shipments 
if  original  consignee  is  operating  under 
average  plan;  not  so  when  under  straight 
demurrage.  Lynah  &  Read  v.  B.  &  O.  R. 
R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  38,  45. 

(f)  Complainant  attacked  the  demur- 
rage regulations  of  defendant,  B.  &  O.  R. 
R.  Co.  and  its  subsidiary,  in  allowing  at 
Locust  Point  and  at  Curtis  Bay,  Md.,  five 
days'  free  time  on  tide-water  coal  for 
transshipment,  computing  on  the  average 
monthly  and  12  days'  straight  time,  and 
alleged  the  same  to  be  unreasonable  per  se 
and  discriminatory,  as  compared  with  the 
seven  days'  average  time  and  the  15  days' 
straight  time  allowed  by  defendant  at 
Jackson  street,  Philadelphia,  and  at  St. 
George.  The  tariffs  of  other  carriers  pro- 
vided at  Wilmington,  Del.,  Philadelphia, 
Pa.,  and  Port  Reading,  N.  J.,  seven  days' 
average  and  15  days'  straight  free  time; 
at  South  Amboy,  N.  J.,  Harsimus  Cove 
(Jersey  City),  N.  J.,  and  Baltimore,  Md., 
five  and  12  days;  at  Norfolk  and  Lambert 
Point,  Va.,  seven  days'  average,  no 
straight    time,    and    at    Newport    News, 

even  days'  average,  no  straight  time.  The 
average  net  detention  for  a  period  of  two 
years  was  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases 
at  Locust  Point,  Curtis  Bay,  Jackson  St. 
and  St.  George,  less  than  the  free  time 


DAMAGES,  §15  (g) 


205 


allowed.     The  average  for  the  whole  pe- 
riod at  Locust  Point  and  Curtis  Bay  was 
3.1  and  3.30  days,  respectively.    The  aver- 
age time  used  month  by  month  at  all  of 
these  ports  was,  generally  speaking,  con- 
siderably   less    than    the    free    time    ac- 
corded.     Some   of   the   largest   shippers, 
however,  furnished  their  own  boats  and 
this  served  to  make  the  average  delivery 
at  the  low  figures  given.     The  rate  on 
which   the  coal  moved  to  tide-water  in- 
cluded the  service  by  defendant  of  dump- 
ing into  the  vessels.     The  line  or  local 
shipper  furnished  his  own  storage  facili- 
ties and  was  accorded  only  48  hours'  free 
time,    whereas    complainant    and    others 
transhipping  coal   used   defendant's   cars 
for  storage  facilities.     Although   defend- 
ant was  at  Philadelphia  and  New  York 
subjected  to  the  competition  of  other  car- 
riers, the  competition  was  not  sufficiently 
open    to   require    defendant's   competitor 
to  grant  Philadelphia,  Baltimore  or  Jer- 
sey City  more  than  five  days'  average  and 
12  days'  straight  free  time.    Defendant's 
contention  that  it  was  compelled  to  allow 
longer  free  time  at  Philadelphia  in  order 
to  prevent  the  diversion  of  coal  from  its 
line  at  Martinsburg  or  Cherry  Run,  Va., 
with  a  consequent  loss  of  revenue  to  an- 
other carrier,   which   would   dump   same 
over  its  piers,  was  not  sustained,  since 
defendant  must  necessarily  be  a  volun- 
tary party  to  any  arrangement  leading  to 
such    diversion.      Coal   moving  over   the 
piers  at  Locust  Point  and  Curtis  Bay  was 
actively   in    competition   with   tide-water 
coal  transported  by  defendant  and  mov- 
ing   over   the    piers    at    Jackson    street, 
Philadelphia.      The    regulations   attacked 
provided  that  free  time  should  begin  to 
run  at  the  date  of  arrival  of  the  car  at  the 
yards.      Complainant    further    demanded 
that  free  time  should  follow  a  car  when 
the  consignee  or  destination  of  the  same 
was   changed.      HELD,    that   the    regulci- 
tions  as  to  free  time  attacked  were  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable  per  se;    that 
on  account  of  competitive  conditions  at 
St.   George   the   circumstances   were  not 
Bo   similar   as   to   make    it   unjustly   dis- 
criminatory to  grant  longer  free  time  at 
St.    George    than    at   Locust    Point    and 
Curtis  Bay;  that  the  conditions  at  Jack- 
son street,  Philadelphia,  were,  however, 
30  similar  to  those  at  Locust  Point  and 
Curtis    Bay    that    complainant   was    sub- 
jected  to  undue  prejudice  in   not  being 
accorded  the  same  free  time  at  Locust 
Point    and    Curtis    Bay    as    at    Jackson 
street,  and  reparation  should  be  awarded; 


that  following  Peale,  Peacock  &  Kerr  v. 
C.  R.  R.  of  N.  J.,  18  I.  C.  C.  25,  complain- 
ant's demand  that  demurrage  should  be 
computed  on  the  average  plan  yearly, 
instead  of  monthly,  should  be  denied,  but 
that  free  time  should  begin  to  run  at  7 
a.  m.  of  the  day  following  the  day  of  ar- 
rival at  the  yards  and  the  sending  of 
notice  by  defendant;  that  complainant's 
demand  to  have  the  average  computed  on 
the  average  delay  at  all  of  defendant's 
tide-water  points  should  be  denied,  since 
so  to  do  would  result  in  congestion  of 
terminal  facilities  at  particular  ports; 
and  that  where  a  car  was  transferred  be- 
fore the  expiration  of  free  time,  the 
transferee  should  have  the  benefit  of  the 
unexpired  straight  free  time,  but  should 
not  be  accorded  this  privilege  where  the 
original  consignee  was  operating  under 
the  average  monthly  plan.  Lynah  & 
Read  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  38, 
44-47. 

(g)  Complainants  attacked  the  demur- 
rage regulations  of  defendant  on  coal  and 
coke  for  transshipment  at  the  tide-water 
ports  of  Elizabeth,  Port  Johnson,  Port 
Liberty,  Communipaw  Pier  and  Communi- 
paw  Dump,  as  unreasonable  per  se  and 
discriminatory  in  favor  of  large  shippers, 
of  lake  ports,  where  no  demurrage  regu- 
lations were  in  effect,  of  southern  ports 
and  New  York  harbor  points  where  the 
free  time  was  greater  and  rules  more 
liberal,  and  in  favor  of  competitors  in 
bituminous  coal  markets  shipping  over 
railroads  operating  under  embargo  and 
under  unenforced  demurrage  regulations. 
The  rule  attacked  provided  that  after  five 
days,  upon  the  average  computed  for  the 
calendar  month,  demurrage  at  the  rate  of 
$1  per  car  per  day  should  be  charged; 
and  that  monthly  statements  should  in- 
clude only  cars  released  during  the 
month.  Complainants  demanded  that 
average  demurrage  time  be  computed  by 
the  year  instead  of  monthly.  Under  the 
rates  attacked  defendant  furnished  the 
service  of  unloading  the  cars  into  vessels 
at  the  piers.  These  piers  were  amply 
able  to  deliver  the  traffic  offered  and  the 
delays  resulting  in  demurrage  charges 
arose  from  the  chartering  of  vessels  and 
bringing  them  to  the  piers  for  loading. 
Defendant  had  no  control  over  these  ves- 
sels. The  evidence  failed  to  show  that 
the  large  shippers  escaped  demurrage, 
but  rather  showed  the  reverse.  On  local 
shipments  to  New  York  the  rate  was 
higher,   with   48   hours'  free   time  or  24 


206 


DAMAGES,  §15   (h)— (k) 


hours  on  the  average  plan  for  unloading. 
The  local  shipper  provided  storage  facili- 
ties at  the  ports,  whereas  complainants 
furnished  none.  The  coal  market  was 
active  from  October  1  to  March  15,  and 
dull  the  remainder  of  the  season.  Dur- 
ing the  active  market  the  cars  could  be 
promptly  unloaded  and  the  purpose  of 
complainants'  demand  for  demurrage 
computed  on  a  yearly  average  was  to  en- 
able them  to  retain  the  coal  in  defend- 
ant's cars  during  the  dull  season  without 
Incurring  demurrage  charges.  Under 
the  rules  attacked  complainants'  cars  in- 
curred demurrage  only  in  11  months  out 
of  a  period  of  27  months.  While  more 
liberal  demurrage  rules  obtained  at  other 
tide-water  points  such  as  Norfolk,  Lam- 
bert Point,  Newport  News,  Sewall's 
Point,  St.  George  and  Port  Reading,  these 
points  were  some  distance  from  the  cen- 
ter of  distribution  in  Manhattan,  were 
less  desirable  as  piers,  and  the  competi- 
tion with  them  was  negligible.  HELD, 
the  rules  attacked  were  not  unreasonable 
per  se,  since  it  was  the  duty  of  defendant 
to  expedite  the  release  of  its  cars  and 
since  the  delays  in  unloading  resulting  in 
demurrage  arose  from  the  uncertainties 
of  water  craft  over  which  defendant  had 
no  control;  that  since  the  rules  applied 
to  all  of  defendant's  ports  and  were  uni- 
form, they  were  not  unduly  discrimina- 
tory in  favor  of  other  ports  served  by 
other  carriers;  that  an  extension  to  a 
year  of  the  computation  period  would  be 
an  unjust  nullification  of  defendant's  de- 
murrage regulations;  and  that  in  compu<^- 
ing  free  time  the  day  of  arrival  should 
be  excluded  and  the  first  day  counted 
from  7  a.  m.  on  the  day  succeeding  the 
day  of  arrival,  although  the  day  of  re- 
lease should  be  included  in  such  compu- 
tation. Peale,  Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  C.  R. 
R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  18  I.  C.  C.  25,  36. 

(h)  A  carrier  should  grant  a  reason- 
able time  for  unloading.  Peale,  Peacock 
&  Kerr  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
25,  35. 

(i)  Fact  that  free  time  might  be  easily 
extended,  no  reason  that  it  must  be. 
Peale,  Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of 
N.  J.,  18  I.  C.  C.  25,  35. 

(j)  Unlimited  free  time  at  New  Or- 
leans on  through  export  shipments  of 
forest  products,  no  discrimination  against 
local  shipments  "for  export"  on  which 
free  time  is  limited.  New  Orleans  Board 
of  Trade  v.  I.   C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 


496,  502. 


M, 


(k)  Shippers  of  forest  products  to 
New  Orleans  on  local  bills  of  lading  for 
export  were  assessed  after  the  expiration 
of  10  days'  free  time,  demurrage  charges 
of  $1  per  day  and  storage  charges  of  Ic 
per  100  lbs.  for  the  first  10  days  or  frac- 
tion thereof,  after  the  free  time,  and  for 
each  additional  10  days  or  fraction  there- 
of, %c  per  100  lbs.,  with  the  provision, 
however,  that  the  storage  charge  should 
not  exceed  the  demurrage  charge  for  the 
same  time.  Shippers  on  through  export 
bills  of  lading  were  assessed  no  demur- 
rage or  storage  charges  at  New  Orleans. 
Complainant  attacked  said  charges  and 
demanded  that  on  local  bills  of  lading 
for  export  the  shipper  should  have  five 
days  at  New  Orleans  within  which  to 
name  vessel  and  ship  line  and  15  days 
thereafter  free  time.  Shippers  on  local 
bills  for  export  enjoyed  certain  advan- 
tages over  shippers  on  through  bills  for 
export.  The  former  were  able  to  control 
the  shipment  at  New  Orleans  and  often 
able  to  secure  steamer  space  at  reduced 
rates,  where  the  steamer  took  on  their 
products  in  order  to  make  up  a  cargo. 
On  a  through  export  bill  forest  products 
might  be  inspected  at  New  Orleans,  but 
not  rejected.  On  a  local  bill  for  export 
they  might  be  both  inspected  and  re- 
jected. On  a  through  export  bill  the  mill 
was  informed  of  the  destination  and  ulti- 
mate purchaser  in  Europe  and  such  pur- 
chaser learned  the  name  of  the  seller  and 
the  point  of  origin.  Traffic  under  through 
bills  was  under  the  control  of  the  car- 
riers and  was  often  delayed  in  transport 
to  New  Orleans  when  the  carriers  knew 
it  would  meet  with  congestion  at  that 
point,  whereas,  under  local  bills  for  ex- 
port, the  carrier  was  obliged  to  move  the 
shipment  promptly  to  New  Orleans,  be- 
ing unaware  of  what  steamship  arrange- 
ments the  shipper  might  have  made.  As 
a  result,  shipments  on  local  bills  for  ex- 
port moved  in  times  of  congestion  more 
quickly  than  those  on  through  export 
bills.  Formerly  the  carriers  allowed  20 
days'  free  time  on  shipments  under  local 
bills  for  export.  The  reducing  of  said 
time  to  10  days  resulted  in  materially 
lessening  the  time  cars  were  detained  for 
unloading  at  New  Orleans,  and  the  ex- 
perience under  the  new  rule  indicated 
that,  on  an  average,  shippers  did  not  de- 
tain cars  but  little  over  10  days.  The 
new  rule  materially  reduced  congestion 
at  New  Orleans.  The  10  days'  free  time 
allowed  was  greater  than  at  any  other 
port   south    of    Norfolk.      The    domestic 


DAMAGES,  §15  (1)— §17  (b) 


207 


shipper  to  New  Orleans  was  allowed  only 
48  hours'  free  time  and  paid  the  same  rate 
as  the  export  shipper.  The  rule  attacked 
applied  to  all  commodities.  HELD,  the 
rule  attacked  was  not  unreasonable,  but 
designed  to  prevent  congestion  and  to  re- 
lease the  cars  of  the  carriers  so  as  to  en- 
able them  properly  to  serve  the  public. 
New  Orleans  Board  of  Trade  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  496.  502. 

-  (1)  Defendant's  rules  provided  that  48 
hours'  free  time  should  be  allowed  ship- 
pers for  unloading  cars,  computing  from 
the  first  7  a.  m.  after  the  same  were 
placed  for  unloading,  and  prompt  notice 
should  be  given  to  consignees.  HELD,  on 
cars  at  Melrose  Station,  New  York  City, 
and  Yonkers,  N.  Y.,  the  48  hours  of  free 
time  should  begin  to  run  from  the  first  7 
a.  m.  after  the  time  notices  of  the  arrival 
of  cars  were  sent  to  the  consignees  and 
not  from  the  first  7  a.  m.  after  notices 
were  received,  such  construction  being  in 
accord  with  the  rules  framed  by  the  Na- 
tional Association  of  Railway  Commis- 
sioners, of  which  a  member  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  was  chair- 
man. Murphy  Bros.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R. 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  457,  460. 

§16.     Placement  or  Arrival  Notices. 

(a)  Notice  of  arrival  does  not  consti- 
tute constructive  placement  where  the 
car  is  not  held  by  the  carrier  on  account 
of  the  consignee's  inability  to  receive  it. 
Northern  Wisconsin  Produce  Co.  v.  M.  St. 
P.  &  St.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  197, 
198. 

(b)  Complainant's  sidetrack  can  ac- 
commodate two  cars,  but  it  can  unload 
into  its  warehouse  but  one  car  at  a  time. 
While  there  was  but  one  car  on  the  side- 
track defendant  issued  notice  of  construc- 
tive placement  on  a  newly  arrived  car, 
but  refused  to  place  the  same  until  the 
other  one  was  unloaded.  HELD,  that  de- 
murrage was  wrongfully  assessed.  North- 
ern Wisconsin  Produce  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  & 
St.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  197. 

(c)  In  claims  for  reparation  for  de- 
murrage charges  alleged  to  be  wrongfully 
assessed  and  involving  the  question  as  to 
the  expiration  of  free  time  for  unloading, 
and  the  giving  of  due  notice  by  the  car- 
riers, the  claimant  must  offer  exact  proof 
as  to  the  time  notices  of  the  arrival  of 
cars  were  sent  to  him  by  carriers.  Mur- 
phy Bros.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co., 
17  L  C.  C.  457.  459. 


(d)  Complainant  operated  an  iron 
mine  about  one  mile  north  of  Keene's,  N. 
Y.,  from  which  it  was  reached  by  a  spur 
track.  Coal  used  by  the  complainant  was 
unloaded  upon  a  trestle,  and  cars  were 
treated  as  placed  for  unloading  when  put 
by  the  defendant  upon  this  trestle.  Upon 
the  arrival  at  Keene's,  of  the  cars 
of  coal  in  question  consigned  to  complain- 
ant, complainant  was  not  notified  by  de- 
fendant and  was  assessed  demurrage 
charges.  HELD,  defendant  having  failed 
to  give  notice  must  refund  the  demurrage 
charges  exacted.  Rossie  Iron  Ore  Co.  v. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  392. 

(e)  Demurrage  charges  on  coal  held 
to  have  been  unlawfully  assessed,  under 
the  tariff,  for  the  reason  that  defendant 
failed  to  notify  consignee  of  arrival  of 
cars.  Rossie  Iron  Ore  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  & 
H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  392. 

(f)  Complainant  shipped  lumber  con- 
signed to  itself  from  Salem,  S.  C,  to 
Washington,  D.  C,  notifying  defendant 
carrier  at  Washington  to  deliver  the  cars 
upon  payment  of  freight  charges  to  one, 
Riley,  a  lumber  dealer  at  that  place. 
Riley  delayed  unloading  the  cars,  and 
after  they  had  stood  for  some  three 
weeks  defendant  notified  complainant  of 
the  situation.  Some  two  weeks  later 
complainant  sent  a  personal  representa- 
tive to  Washington  who  unloaded  same 
and  paid  the  demurrage  charges.  HELD, 
complainant  was  not  entitled  to  have  said 
charges  refunded  on  the  ground  that  de- 
fendant should  have  notified  it  within  a 
reasonable  time  of  the  failure  of  Riley 
to  unload  the  cars,  the  practice  of  defend- 
ant being  to  notify  the  consignor  when 
the  consignee  refuses  absolutely  to  ac- 
cept a  shipment,  but  not  to  do  so  when 
the  consignee  merely  delays  the  unload- 
ing, because  of  the  objections  that  con- 
signees have  to  the  latter  practice.  Ger- 
main Co.  V.  P.  B.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C. 
C.  96,  97.. 

§17.     Railroad  Errors  or  Omissions. 
See   Reconsignment,   §3   (s). 

(a)  Demurrage  is  improperly  assessed 
on  a  car  which  the  carrier  refuses  to 
place,  although  the  consignee  is  prepared 
to  accept  delivery  on  its  private  side- 
track. Northern  Wisconsin  Produce  Co. 
V.  M.  St.  P.  &  St.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I. 
C.  C.  197,  198. 

(b)  Whether  tariff  authority  or  not, 
it  is  unreasonable  to  assess  demurrage 


208 


DAMAGES,  §17  (c)— DIFFERENTIALS,  §1  (b) 


against  the  shipper  because  of  delivering 
line's  refusal  to  accept  the  shipment. 
Crescent  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  559,  570. 

(c)  Reparation  was  awarded,  demur- 
rage having  accrued  as  a  result  of  a  con- 
necting carrier's  refusal  to  accept  ship- 
ment within  free  time  allowed  for  recon- 
signment.  Crescent  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  559,  570. 

(d)  Reparation  awarded  where  demur- 
rage accrued  as  result  of  defendant's  fail- 
ure to  reconsign  according  to  instruc- 
tions. Hanley  Milling  Co.  v.  P.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  475. 

(e)  Complainant  at  Pittsburgh  ship- 
ped a  carload  of  lumber  from  Ellisville, 
Miss.,  and  received  a  bill  of  lading  pro- 
viding for  its  carriage  to  Greenville,  Pa., 
and  delivery  there  to  complainant  on  the 
tracks  of  the  B.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  The  car 
was  received  at  Cincinnati  by  the  Erie 
R.  R.  and  hauled  thence  to  Shenango, 
Pa.,  a  junction  point  of  the  Erie  and  the 
B.  &  L.  E.  R.  Rs.,  about  two  miles  from 
Greenville.  There  was  no  physical  con- 
nection between  these  carriers  at  Green- 
ville. Upon  arrival  of  the  car  at  Shenan- 
go, the  local  Erie  agent  notified  the  local 
B.  &  L.  E.  agent.  Complainant  had  sold 
the  lumber  to  the  B.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  and 
had  undertaken  to  make  delivery  at 
Greenville  and  to  pay  all  charges  to  that 
point.  Two  days  after  the  shipments 
moved  from  Ellisville,  complainant  for- 
warded to  the  B.  &  L.  E.  agent  at  Green- 
ville an  order  authorizing  delivery  to 
the  chief  engineer  of  that  road.  The  car 
remained  at  Shenango  some  forty  days 
and  was  finally  turned  over  to  the  B.  & 
L.  E.  R.  R.  at  the  direction  of  complain- 
ant, whom  the  carriers  had  been  attempt- 
ing to  reach  by  correspondence.  After 
the  car  had  been  at  Shenango  about  30 
days,  the  Erie  R.  R.  transferred  the  lum- 
ber to  one  of  its  own  cars  and  complain- 
ant was  assessed  $9.00  for  the  cost  of 
the  transfer.  He  was  assessed  $31.00  for 
car  service  by  the  Erie,  for  the  deten- 
tion of  the  car  on  its  tracks  at  Shenango. 
In  addition  he  was  assessed  $13.86  as 
the  charge  from  Shenango  to  Greenville. 
The  joint  through  rate  of  the  carriers 
participating  in  the  movement  from  El- 
lisville to  Greenville  was  32c,  but  they 
had  agreed  on  no  division  of  that  rate. 
Complainant  gave  no  routing  instructions 
and  the  car  might  have  been  moved  over 
several  lines  from  Cincinnati  to  junction 


points  of  the  B.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  HELD, 
complainant  was  entitled  to  the  joint 
through  rate  of  32c;  that  the  B.  &  L.  E. 
R.  R.  was  at  fault  in  not  accepting  the 
car  at  Shenango;  and  the  extra  charges 
of  $13.86  were  unlawful.  Germain  Co.  v. 
N.  O.  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  22,  25. 

DEPOSITIONS. 

See     Procedure     Before     Commission, 
§5  (o). 

DEPOTS. 

See    Terminal     Facilities,    §1     (c),    §6 
(a). 

DIFFERENTIALS. 

I.    ESTABLISHMENT  AND  CONTROL. 
§1.     In  general. 
§2.    Relation  of  classification. 
II.     APPLICATION. 

§3.     C.  L.  and  L.  C.  L.  shipments. 
§4.     Through  shipments. 
III.     PURPOSE. 

§5.     To  equalize  conditions. 

§6.     To       equalize       consuming 

points. 
§7.     To        equalize        producing 
points. 


CROSS-REFERENCES. 

See    Advanced    Rates,    §10; 
Rates. 


Relative 


I.     ESTABLISHMENT   AND    CONTROL. 

See     Interstate     Commerce     Commis- 
sion,  §9   (mm). 

§1.     In  General. 

See    Evidence,    §31    (b);    Reasonable- 
ness of   Rates,   §17   (a). 

(a)  The  principle  of  graded  rates  may 
be  applied  to  differentials.  Indianapolis 
Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.   C.  195,  198. 

(aa)  Rate  construction  on  a  ton  mile 
basis  would  give  to  distance  an  exagger- 
ated influence,  resulting  in  relatively  pro- 
hibitive rates  beyond  certain  distances, 
and  the  elimination  of  competition.  Dif- 
ferentials cannot  be  computed  at  a  fixed 
rate  per  mile.  Alabama  Coal  Operators 
Ass'n  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  230, 
233,  234. 

(b)  Where  differentials  from  different 
competing  coal  fields  have  been  estab- 
lished as  the  outgrowth  of  years  of  ex- 
periment, they  ought  not  to  be  disturbed 
by  the   Commission  unless  it  is  certain 


DIFFERENTIALS,  §1  (c)— §3  (a) 


209 


that  justice   requires    it.     Andy's   Ridge 
Coal  Co.  V.  S.  Ry.  Co..  18  I.  C.  C.  405,  410. 

(c)  In  determining  the  proper  differ- 
entials to  be  established  on  the  rates 
from  competing  coal  fields  to  a  common 
consuming  point,  the  interest  of  the  con- 
sumer must  be  considered,  as  well  as 
how  the  rates  should  be  adjusted  so  as 
to  permit  the  widest  possible  competi- 
tion. The  consumer  should  be  given  the 
privilege  of  buying  at  all  of  the  compet- 
ing fields  if  that  can  fairly  be  done.  An- 
dy's Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I. 
C.  C.  405,  410. 

(de)  Differentials  between  competing 
coal  mines  to  various  markets  of  con- 
sumption cannot  be  established  upon  dis- 
tance alone;  nor  can  one  case  be  safely 
made  the  precedent  for  another.  Much 
depends  upon  competitive  conditions,  and 
each  situation  must  be  considered  and 
disposed  of  by  itself.  Andy's  Ridge  Co. 
V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  405,  407. 

(f)  Discrimination,  though  found  to 
exist,  not  removed  because  it  would  in- 
volve establishment  of  differential  state 
rate  under  interstate  rate,  the  Commis- 
sion having  no  jurisdiction  over  state 
rates.  Andy's  Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  So.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  405,  407. 

(g)  Nothing  is  more  certain  concern- 
ing transportation  in  this  country,  either 
as  to  cost  of  service  to  the  carrier,  or 
value  of  service  to  the  shipper,  than  that 
as  the  mileage  increases  the  total  cost 
increases,  but  the  cost  per  ton  per  mile 
decreases.  It  follows,  and  with  particu- 
lar force  as  applied  to  grouped  points 
of  origin  and  grouped  points  of  destina- 
tion, that  differentials  either  above  or 
below  the  rates  from  any  given  point 
become  less  and  less  important  as  dis- 
tance of  ultimate  destination  increases. 
Stated  in  other  words,  differentials  di- 
minish with  increasing  distance  and 
vanish  when  the  mileage  on  which  the 
differential  is  based  becomes  inconsid- 
erable in  proportion  to  the  total  mileage 
from  basing  point  to  destination.  Wil- 
liams Co.  V.  V.  S.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
C.  482,  487. 

(h)  It  is  a  rule  of  well  nigh  universal 
application  that  as  distance  increases 
difference  in  distance  becomes  relatively 
less  important.  Black  Mountain  Coal 
Land  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  286, 
296. 


§2.     Relation  of  Classification. 
See    Relative    Rates. 

(a)  It  would  not  be  possible  to  estab- 
lish differentials  from  Indianapolis  to  the 
Mississippi  river  which  would  equalize 
the  charges  under  the  differentials  from 
Chicago  unless  both  lines  of  differentials 
were  governed  by  the  same  classification. 
Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  195,  202. 

(b)  Complainants  contend  that  dif- 
ferentials should  be  established  from  In- 
dianapolis to  the  Mississippi  river,  which, 
added  to  the  differentials  west  of  that 
river,  would  make  rates  from  Indianapolis 
to  the  Missouri  river  not  more  than  5c 
per  100  lbs.  higher  on  first  class  than 
from  Chicago.  The  Commission  in  In- 
dianapolis Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  56,  and  in  In- 
vestigation and  Suspension  Docket  No. 
24,  and  Warnock  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry., 
21  I.  C.  C.  546,  decided  the  issues  present- 
ed and  prescribed  a  schedule  of  rates. 
To  give  the  relief  prayed  the  Western 
Classification  would  have  to  be  brought 
over  to  Indianapolis  or  the  OflBcial  Clas- 
sification carried  through  to  the  Missouri 
river.  To  do  this  would  involve  wide- 
spread reductions  and  adjustments  of 
rates.  HELD,  the  rate  adjustment  in  ef- 
fect is  one  under  which  the  territory  has 
been  built  up  and  to  disturb  it  as  prayed 
might  compel  an  equalization  of  rates 
from  all  the  territory  between  Buffalo 
and  Chicago  to  the  Mississippi  river. 
Furthermore,  the  issues  presented  have 
been  carefully  and  exhaustively '  consid- 
ered in  the  prior  proceedings.  Defend- 
ants have  complied  with  the  previous  or- 
ders of  the  Commission  and  its  recom- 
mendations in  those  proceedings,  and 
have  established  an  adjustment  some- 
what more  favorable  to  Indianapolis  than 
that  which,  in  the  original  Indianapolis 
case,  was  found  to  be  reasonable,  and  on 
further  full  consideration  of  the  situa- 
tion it  is  evident  that  substantial  justice 
has  been  done,  and  that  the  former  con- 
clusions should  be  adhered  to.  Com- 
plaints dismissed.  Indianapolis  Freight 
Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  23 

I.  C.  C.  195. 

II.  APPLICATION. 

§3.     C.  L.  and   L.  C.  L.  Shipments. 

See     Classification,     §5;     Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §56  (a). 

(a)     Complainant    jobbers    at    Atlanta 
and    other    Georgia    cities    attacked    the 


210 


DIFFERENTIALS,  §4  (a)— §5  (b) 


rates  on  grain  products  and  hay  on  ship- 
ments from  Ohio  a«d  Mississippi  river 
crossings  and  beyond  to  points  in  south- 
eastern territory,  on  the  ground  that  the 
practice  of  extending  the  same  rates  to 
less-than-carload  as  to  carload  shipments 
was  unreasonable  in  view  of  the  larger 
expense  to  the  carrier  of  delivering  the 
less-than-carload  traffic.  Under  the  rates 
attacked  the  consumers  and  small  deal- 
ers at  Georgia  and  surrounding  points 
were  able  to  procure  these  commodities 
from  Ohio  and  Mississippi  river  crossings 
and  from  Nashville,  as  cheaply  as  the 
larger  jobbers  who  brought  in  carload 
shipments.  To  establish  less-than-car- 
load rates  higher  than  carload  rates 
would  have  the  effect  of  compelling  con- 
sumers and  small  dealers  at  Georgia  and 
southeastern  points  to  purchase  from, 
and  pay  middle  men's  profits  to  the  large 
Georgia  and  southeastern  jobbers,  instead 
of  obtaining  directly  their  supplies  at 
lower  rates  from  Mississippi  and  Ohio 
river  crossings  and  from  Nashville. 
HELD,  that  a  railroad  could  not  be  per- 
mitted to  adopt  a  system  of  rate  making 
which  enabled  a  large  dealer  to  drive  a 
email  dealer  out  of  the  market;  that  the 
Commission  could  not  act  on  the  theory 
that  the  trade  of  a  particular  communi- 
ty was  a  vested  right  belonging  to  any 
particular  class  in  that  community, 
especially  when  so  to  do  would  result 
in  the  enjoyment  of  a  privilege  by  that 
class  at  the  expense  of  the  community 
at  large;  and  that  since  the  effect  of  an 
order  prescribing  differentials  on  less- 
than-carload  quantities  would  be  to  place 
a  tax  on  retailers  and  consumers  in  order 
that  jobbers  in  southeastern  territory 
might  realize  a  profit  in  competition  with 
Nashville  jobbers  and  at  the  expense  of 
the  community,  such  an  order  should  be 
refused.  Duncan  &  Co.  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  590,  595. 

§4.     Through  Shipments. 

(a)  Defendants'  tariffs  provided  that 
from  points  north,  west  and  south  of  De- 
troit 2c  should  be  added  to  the  Detroit 
rate  to  make  the  through  rate  to  Wind- 
sor, Canada.  HELD,  such  arbitrary  was 
available,  not  only  in  constructing  joint 
through  tariffs,  but  also  in  making  the 
rates  on  through  shipments  where  no 
joint  through  rate  applied.  Windsor 
Turned  Goods  Co.  v.  C.  &.  O.  Ry.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  162,  163. 


III.     PURPOSE.  , 

§5.     To  Equalize  Conditions.  I 

See  Advanced    Rates,   §5   (2),   (bb),  §7 
(1),    (d);   Equalization  of   Rates,   §2. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  of        J 
80c   per   100   lbs.   for   the  transportation        I 
of  cartridges  from  Bridgeport,  Conn.,  to 
Alexandria,    La.,    via    New    Orleans,    as 
compared  with  a  rate  to  Lake  Charles  of 
60c,  and  to  Baton  Rouge  of  41c.     Alex- 
andria is  184  miles  from  New  Orleans; 
Baton  Rouge  80  miles,  and  Lake  Charles        | 
218  miles.     A  comparison  with  the  rates        i 
on  groceries  to  these  points  from  eastern 
seaboard    territory    disclosed    a    smaller 
differential  than  on  ammunition.     HELD, 

the  rate  exacted  was  unreasonable  to 
the  extent  it  exceeded  65c.  Reparation 
awarded.  Neilson  Co.  v.  La.  Ry.  &  Nav. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  254. 

(b)  Complainant  is  engaged  in   ship- 
ping  of  live   stock   and    packing    house 
products  at  Tacoma  and  Seattle,  Wash. 
It  purchases  live  stock  at  Portland  and 
ships  them  to  Tacoma  for  slaughter.    In 
1903,  the  rate  on  fresh  meat  in  carloads        i 
was   30c   per   100   lbs.,    Portland    to   Ta-        j 
coma,  and  23c,  Tacoma  to  Portland.     On        ' 
live  stock  the  rate  was  $40.60  from  Port- 
land to  Tacoma.     In  1907  this  rate  was 
reduced  to  $35  per  car,  and  the  rate  on 
fresh    meat    from    Tacoma    to    Portland 
raised  to  30c  per  100  lbs.    Later  the  rate 

on  fresh  meat  from  Portland  to  Tacoma 
was  reduced  to  15c  per  100  lbs.,  with  a 
minimum  weight  of  30,000  lbs.  The  in- 
trinsic reasonableness  of  the  rates  was 
not  attacked ;  but  they  were  only  attacked 
in  their  relation  to  the  rate  on  the  fin- 
ished product  in  the  same  direction.  Tes- 
timony was  offered  to  show  that  in  order 
for  complainant  to  secure  as  much  fresh 
meat  from  the  live  animals  at  Tacoma  as 
a  shipper  at  Portland  would  ship  in  one 
car  to  Tacoma  it  would  have  to  ship  two 
cars  of  live  stock  at  a  cost  of  $70,  while 
shippers  of  dressed  meat  from  Portland 
to  Tacoma  would  have  to  pay  only  $50  for 
the  same  quantity.  When  the  live  stock 
rate  from  Portland  to  Tacoma  was  $40 
per  car  and  the  fresh  meat  rate  $60,  the 
difference  per  car  was  32.3  per  cent  and 
there  was  no  complaint.  At  the  rates  of 
$35  for  live  stock  and  $50  for  fresh  meats 
the  difference  per  car  was  30  per  cent. 
It  was  shown  that  live  stock  was  cheap- 
er in  Portland  than  in  Tacoma;  the  con- 
suming territory  tributary  to  Tacoma  was 
larger  than  in  the  neighborhood  of  Port- 
land and  Portland  was  compelled  to  pay 


DIFFERENTIALS,  §5  (c)— (d) 


211 


more  than  Tacoma  for  transportation  of 
cattle  from  points  on  the  Northern  Pa- 
cific and  the  Great  Northern  R.  Rs.  HELD 
that  from  the  whole  record  it  appears 
that  complainant  is  seeking  to  have  the 
Commission  equalize  Tacoma  with  Port- 
land as  a  slaughtering  center.  Port- 
land has  advantages  as  a  live  stock 
market  due  to  natural  conditions.  As 
they  are  not  shown  to  be  due  to  un- 
just arrangement  of  rates,  the  Commis- 
sion cannot  equalize  conditions.  In  fix- 
ing rates  on  competitive  articles,  the  re- 
lation between  rates  on  live  stock  and 
on  fresh  meat  should  be  the  difference  in 
cost  of  transportation  of  such  articles. 
Cost  of  transportation  of  live  stock  and 
,its  products  is  approximately  the  same. 
The  present  rates  for  100  lbs.  on  live 
stock  from  Portland  to  Tacoma  are  lower 
at  the  per  car  rate  than  the  rates  on 
fresh  meat.  Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  O. 
&  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  77,  81. 

(c)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates  on 
coal  from  points  in  Missouri  (west  of  the 
Missouri  river),  Kansas,  Arkansas  and 
Oklahoma,  referred  to  as  the  southern 
field,  and  the  rates  on  lump  coal  from 
certain  Wyoming  and  Colorado  mines, 
known  as  the  western  field,  to  Fremont, 
Neb.,  as  unreasonable  and  unduly  pref- 
erential to  Omaha  and  Lincoln,  Neb. 
From  the  southern  field  the  rates  on 
lump  coal  to  Fremont  from  certain  points 
were  $1.89 1/^  as  against  a  rate  of  $1.30  to 
Omaha,  and  from  other  points  $2.19 ^^  as 
against  $1.60  to  Omaha,  while  the  rates 
on  nut,  pea  or  slack  were  $1.60  from  al- 
most all  of  the  points  as  against  a  rate 
to  Omaha  of  from  $1.06  to  $1.35.  It  ap- 
peared that  from  the  southern  field  the 
Lincoln  differential  over  Omaha  is  15c 
on  all  coal,  while  the  Fremont  differen- 
tial is  59 1/2 c  on  lump  and  from  25  to  59i/^c 
on  nut,  pea  and  slack.  The  rates  on  nut, 
pea  and  slack  were  joint  through  rates, 
while  the  lump  rates  were  combinations 
on  Omaha,  but  in  this  proceeding  are 
treated  as  joint  rates.  The  Fremont  dif- 
ferential on  lump  coal  from  the  western 
fields  is  35c  over  Lincoln  and  Omaha, 
which  take  the  same  rate.  Fremont  is  37 
miles  west  of  Omaha,  with  a  population 
of  10,000  to  12,000  inhabitants,  and  for 
the  year  ended  June  30,  1910,  consumed 
about  35,500  tons  of  coal.  Complainant 
contended  that  the  Lincoln  differential 
shall  be  applied  on  all  coal  to  Fremont 
from  the  southern  field,  and  that  Fremont 
should  have  the  same  rate  as  Lincoln  and 


Omaha  from  the  west.  HELD,  that  by 
reason  of  competitive  and  natural  ad* 
vantages,  Lincoln  and  Omaha  are  en- 
titled to  a  reasonable  differential  against 
Fremont,  but  that  there  is  no  justification 
for  variations  in  the  Fremont  differential 
on  different  coals,  when  a  uniform  dif- 
ferential on  all  coal  applies  to  Lincoln; 
and  that  the  present  differentials  are  un- 
reasonable and  unduly  prejudicial  to  Fre- 
mont in  so  far  as  they  are  more  than  10c 
per  net  ton  in  excess  of  the  rates  to  Lin- 
coln from  the.  southern  field.  FURTHER 
HELD,  that  the  rates  from  the  western 
field  to  Fremont,  which  make  the  Fre- 
mont rate  35c  over  Omaha  and  Lincoln, 
cannot  be  justified  and  should  be  reduced 
so  as  not  to  exceed  the  rates  to  Lincoln 
by  more  than  10c  per  net  ton.  Repara- 
tion denied.  Fremont  Commercial  Club 
V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C  C.  74. 

(d)  The  joint  rail  and  ocean  rates 
prior  to  Dec.  27,  1909,  on  rice  from 
Orange,  Beaumont  an*d  Houston,  Tex.,  to 
the  North  Atlantic  seaboard  were  attacked. 
Rice  from  the  localities  where  complain- 
ants are  located  is  taken  by  rail  to  Gal- 
veston and  thence  by  water  to  the  point 
of  consumption.  The  New  York  rate  was 
considered  as  the  vital  one.  The  rates 
from  Houston  to  New  York  have  been 
28c  L.  C.  L.,  23c  C.  L.,  and  from  Beaumont 
and  Orange  41c  L.  C.  L.,  and  30c  C.  L. 
Houston  is  53  miles  from  Galveston, 
Beaumont  76  miles  and  Orange  97  miles. 
On  Feb.  7,  1911,  the  rates  C.  L.  were 
changed,  making  them  from  Houston  23c, 
and  from  Beaumont  and  Orange  28c. 
From'  Dec.  27,  1909,  to  the  last  change  in 
1911  several  changes  took  place  in  the 
tariff,  the  principal  one  of  which  created 
a  discrimination  of  4c  in  favor  of  Beau- 
mont against  Orange.  It  seemed  the  rates 
from  the  east  were  the  same  from  Beau- 
mont as  from  Orange  and  both  the  local 
rates  to  Galveston  and  the  rail  and  ocean 
rates  from  North  Atlantic  ports  to  Gal- 
veston have  generally  been  the  same. 
On  account  of  the  fact  that  these  towns 
draw  their  rice  from  the  same  territory 
the  freight  rate  is  of  great  importance. 
Upon  the  present  adjustment  of  rates 
the  rice  miller  at  Houston  can  and  does 
go  almost  to  the  doors  of  Beaumont  in 
the  purchase  of  rough  rice.  Under  the 
23c  rate  from  Houston  the  rail  carrier 
receives  as  its  division  4.6c  or  1.73c  per 
ton  mile,  and  under  the  26c  rate  from 
Beaumont  the  rail  line  receives  8.7c  or 
2.29c  per  ton  mile.     Of  the  proposed  28c 


212 


DIFFERENTIALS,  §5    (e)— (g) 


rate  the  rail  division  would  be  9.3c  or 
2.44c  per  ton  mile.  HELD,  that  the  rates 
from  Orange  and  Beaumont  via  Galveston 
to  North  Atlantic  ports  should  be  iden- 
tical both  on  carloads  and  less  than  car 
loads.  That  on  account  of  certain  com- 
petitive conditions  existing  at  Houston 
it  should  attain  a  slight  advantage  over 
Beaumont  and  Orange,  but  that  the  dif- 
ference ought  not  to  exceed  3c.  There 
is  no  good  reason  why  rates  from  Hous- 
ton to  markets  of  consumption  should  be 
BO  adjusted  as  to  prevent  the  milling  of 
rice  at  Beaumont  when  the  distance  over 
which  the  transportation  is  conducted 
and  the  cost  of  the  transportation  itself 
is  in  favor  of  Beaumont.  The  tendency 
of  such  a  rate  adjustment  is  to  artificially 
increase  the  advantages  of  larger  com- 
munities at  the  expense  of  smaller  towns, 
thus  concentrating  instead  of  diffusing 
business  operations,  and  therefore  the 
rates  on  rice  and  rice  products  from 
Orange  and  Beaumont  via  Galveston  by 
rail  and  ocean  to  I^orth  Atlantic  ports, 
C.  L.,  should  not  exceed  the  correspond- 
ing rates  from  Houston  by  more  than  3c 
per  100  lbs.,  and  the  difference  on  traffic, 
L.  C.  L.,  ought  not  to  exceed  10c.  In  Re 
Transportation  of  Rice  and  Rice  Prod- 
ucts, 21  L  C.  C.  124. 

(e)  The  Lexington  division  of  the 
C.  &  O.  R.  R.  extends  from  the  main 
line  at  Ashland,  Ky.,  to  Lexington,  Ky. 
Morehead,  Farmer  and  Salt  Lick  are 
stations  on  this  division,  located,  re- 
spectively, 57,  62  and  71  miles  from 
Ashland.  The  Big  Sandy  Division  of 
the  C.  &  O.  R.  R.  extends  from  Ashland 
south  to  Elkhorn  City,  and  Meek  is  a 
station  upon  that  division,  60  miles  from 
Ashland.  Up  to  Oct.  1,  1909,  the  rate 
from  these  points  had  been  based 
upon  the  rate  from  Ashland,  on  the 
Lexington  division,  5c  per  100  lbs.  above 
that  rate,  and  on  the  Big  Sandy  divi- 
sion 6c  above  it.  Complainants  shipped 
lumber  from  these  points  to  various 
places  in  Central  Freight  Association 
territory  and  other  parts  of  the  U.  S., 
their  shipments  moving  through  Ash- 
land. In  the  spring  and  summer  of 
1909  a  large  lumber  mill  was  con- 
structed at  Meek  by  a  competitor,  and 
on  Oct.  1,  1909,  the  rate  from  Meek 
was  reduced  to  3c  per  100  lbs.  over  the 
Ashland  rate.  After  objections  by  com- 
plainant, the  principal  defendant  re- 
duced its  rates  by  applying  a  3c  arbi- 
trary   above    Ashland    at    Morehead,    a 


4c  arbitrary  at  Farmer  and  Salt  Lick, 
and  5c  for  the  balance  of  the  Lexington 
ton  division.  Upon  the  Big  Sandy  divi- 
sion the  3c  arbitrary  applied  to  and 
including  Meek,  while  beyond  there 
was  a  gradual  advance  corresponding 
roughly  with  the  rates  established  upon 
the  Lexington  division.  These  rates 
took  effect  April  10,  1911,  and  com- 
plainants prayed  reparation  with  respect 
to  all  shipments  from  Morehead,  Farmer 
and  Salt  Lick  subsequent  to  Oct.  1, 
1909,  when  the  reduced  rate  became 
effective  at  Meek.  They  did  not  attack 
the  rates  established  in  1910.  The 
lower  rate  from  Meek  seemed  to  have 
been  established  pursuant  to  some  un- 
derstanding between  complainant's  com- 
petitor and  the  C.  &  O.  R.  R.  HELD, 
the  action  of  the  defendant  in  having 
readjusted  its  rates  so  as  to  make  the 
arbitrary  the  same  in  case  of  More- 
head  and  Meek  is  a  practical  admis- 
sion upon  its  part  that  this  relation  is 
a  fair  one.  If  the  defendant  had  not 
voluntarily  established  the  relation  in 
rates  which  is  now  in  effect  the  Com- 
mission must,  upon  a  consideration  of 
this  complaint,  have  done  so.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Clearfield  Lumber  Co.  v. 
C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  21  1.  C.  C.  211. 

(f)  Where  rates  from  various  fields 
in  a  coal  belt  are  so  correlated  that  to 
change  one  may  disturb  the  entire  ad- 
justment, the  Commission  cannot  under- 
take to  pass  upon  the  reasonableness 
of  one  of  the  rates  involved  without 
considering  its  relation  to  the  rates 
from  the  other  coal  fields.  Victor  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  222,  226. 

(g)  Complainant  is  an  association  of 
coal  operators  in  what  is  known  as  the 
Birmingham  district,  Ala.  They  ship  to 
coal  markets  located  in  Georgia,  South 
Carolina  and  Florida.  Mines  in  the  Coal 
Creek  district,  Tenn.,  whose  cost  of  pro- 
duction is  5  cents  a  ton  greater,  ship  to 
these  markets,  taking  differentials  vary- 
ing from  15c  to  70c  per  ton  over  the  Ala- 
bama mines.  Complainant  sought  to  have 
these  differentials  increased,  alleging 
that  the  present  adjustment  discrimi- 
nates against  it  in  favor  of  Coal  Creek, 
and  that  it  is  losing  a  vast  volume  of 
business.  Complainant  admitted  that  the 
70c  differential  was  more  than  was  neces- 
sary to  enable  it  successfully  to  compete 
in  that  territory  with  the  Coal  Creek 
mines.  It  also  admitted  that  the  adjust- 
ment obtaining  under  the  45c  differential 
was  reasonable,  and  the  complaint  was 


DIFFERENTIALS,  §5   (h)— (J) 


21S 


therefore  narrowed  to  an  attack  upon  the 
adjustment  existing  in  the  15c  and  25c 
differential  zones.  In  other  proceedings 
it  had  been  shown  that  the  mines  in  Vir- 
ginia competed  strongly  in  South  Caro- 
lina and  Georgia,  and  had  virtually  taken 
the  former  market  from  Tennessee, 
while  to  Atlanta  and  other  Georgia 
points  they  shipped  two  tons  of  coal 
to  every  ton  shipped  by  Tennessee, 
although  to  Atlanta  the  differential 
against  them  is  35c,  as  compared  with 
Coal  Creek,  and  50c  as  compared  with 
Birmingham.  On  the  whole  record,  it 
did  not  appear  that  the  Alabama  oper- 
ators have  suffered  any  damage  on  ac- 
count of  the  present  differential  ad- 
justment. They  admitted  that  they  can 
practically  monopolize  the  market  in 
the  70c  and  45c  differential  territories, 
but  to  those  points  their  shipments  have 
decreased  in  about  the  same  propor- 
tion a-s  their  shipments  to  points  in 
Georgia  in  the  15c  and  25c  zones.  De- 
spite the  alleged  loss  of  Georgia  terri- 
tory, the  entire  output  of  the  Alabama 
mines  is  finding  a  ready  market,  one 
company  stating  that  its  supply  had 
been  sold,  and  it  was  now  purchasing 
coal  with  which  to  fill  its  contract.  *  The 
concentrated  movement  of  coal  into 
Georgia  from  not  only  Birmingham  and 
Coal  Creek,  but  also  from  the  mines 
in  Tennessee,  on  the  C.  N.  O.  &  T. 
P.,  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  and  Tenn.  Central 
railroads,  results  in  intense  competition 
and  the  diminution  of  profits  in  min- 
ing. In  this  situation  it  was  apparent 
that  other  markets  may  be  consider- 
ably more  desirable  to  Birmingham, 
and  that  Georgia  markets  are  sought 
only  when  other  channels  are  ob- 
structed. HELD,  under  all  the  circum- 
stances, the  differential  adjustment  com- 
plained of  is  not  shown  to  be  unrea- 
sonable or  unjustly  discriminatory. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Alabama  Coal 
Operators'  Ass'n  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
C.   230,   235,   236. 

(h)  Lumbermen  of  one  territory  asked 
for  differential  rates  over  those  of  an- 
other, on  the  ground  that  their  lumber 
was  inferior  to  that  produced  by  their 
competitors;  that  the  standing  timber 
was  smaller,  more  knotty  and  required 
greater  care  and  cost  to  mill  and  mar- 
ket than  that  of  their  competitors, 
and  that  their  finished  product  being 
93  per  cent  common  lumber,  they  were 
unable  for  said  reasons  to  meet  com- 
petition.    HELD,   while   these   economic 


considerations  might  justify  the  car- 
riers in  granting  to  complainants  lower 
rates  than  to  their  competitors,  they 
did  not  afford  sufficient  ground  for 
compelling  the  carriers  so  to  do.  Pot- 
latch  Lumber  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  41,  46;  rehearing  denied,  16  I.  C. 
C.  465,  468. 

(i)  The  quality  of  small  vein  coal 
from  the  George's  Creek,  Md.,  the 
Pennsylvania  and  the  West  Virginia 
coal  fields  was  substantially  of  the 
same  quality.  The  rate  on  coal  from 
these  fields  over  defendants'  lines  to 
tidewater  points  was  the  same,  but 
when  coal  was  carried  by  water  bevond 
those  points  it  was  found  necessary  to 
shrink  the  rate  in  order  to  meet  the 
water-borne  coal  carried  by  roads  from 
other  districts.  In  such  case  there 
was  a  differential  against  the  George's 
Creek  coal  of  10c  a  ton  to  competitive 
points  inside  the  Chesapeake  and  Dela- 
ware Capes,  as  compared  with  the  rates 
from  the  Pennsylvania  and  West  Vir- 
ginia fields,  and  a  differential  of  15c 
a  ton  when  destined  to  points  outside 
of  the  Capes.  When  rates  were  estab- 
lished, some  years  back,  the  George's 
Creek  district  was  producing  only  big 
vein  coal,  and  this  coal  found  no  diffi- 
culty in  taking  a  higher  rate.  The 
big  vein  coal  being  exhausted,  and  it 
becoming  necessary  to  mine  at  George's 
Creek  small  vein  coal,  it  was  found 
impossible  to  ship  the  small  vein  coal 
at  the  aforesaid  differential.  HELD, 
the  rates  on  water-borne  coal  from 
George's  Creek  should  be  so  readjusted 
as  to  enable  the  small  vein  coal  to 
move  on  a  parity  with  the  coals  from 
the  Pennsylvania  and  West  Virginia 
districts.  George's  Creek  Basin  Coal 
Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
127,  131. 

(j)  The  rate  on  coal,  in  carloads, 
from  mines  on  the  Clinch  Valley  divi- 
sion of  the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  was  $1.60  per 
ton  to  eastern  markets,  and  from  the 
Pocahontas  and  Tug  River  fields,  on 
the  Pocahontas  division  of  the  line, 
$1.50.  Complainant  operators  at  Upper 
Clinch  Valley  attacked  the  rates  as 
unduly  discriminatory  in  favor  of  mines 
in  the  Pocahontas  and  Tug  River  fields. 
These  two  divisions  of  defendant  joined 
at  Graham,  W.  Va..  the  Clinch  Valley 
branch  extending  from  Graham  in  a 
southwesterly  direction  and  the  Poca- 
hontas branch  in  a  northwesterly  direc- 
tion   from    Graham.      From    Graham    to 


214 


DIFFERENTIALS,  §6   (a)— (c) 


the  most  westerly  point  of  the  Poca- 
hontas group  was  54  miles;  from  these 
points  to  Williamson,  the  most  westerly 
point  in  the  next  group,  the  Thacker 
district,  was  48  miles.  The  Thacker 
group  took  a  rate  of  $1.60.  On  the 
Clinch  Valley  division  the  distance 
from  Graham  to  Norton,  the  most  west- 
erly point  in  the  Clinch  Valley  group, 
was  100  miles.  In  the  Upper  Clinch 
Valley,  the  more  easterly  field,  the 
nearest  mine  was  35  miles  west  of 
Graham  and  the  farthest  was  Raven, 
43  miles  from  Graham.  Complainant 
contended  that  the  8-mile  field  in  the 
Upper  Clinch  Valley  group  should  be 
separated  from  the  most  westerly,  or 
Lower  Clinch  Valley,  group  and  should 
take  the  same  rate,  $1.50,  as  the  Poca- 
hontas group,  since  in  the  distance  of 
100  miles  from  Graham,  on  the  Poca- 
hontas line,  the  defendant  divided  the 
territory  into  two  fields,  making  a 
rate  of  10c  less  to  the  nearer,  or  Poca- 
hontas, groups  than  to  the  farther,  or 
Thacker,  group.  The  difference  in  qual- 
ity in  the  coal  mined  in  the  Upper  and 
the  Lower  Clinch  Valley  was  about 
the  same  as  the  difference  between 
that  mined  in  the  Pocahontas  and  the 
Thacker  groups.  Allowing  a  proper 
credit  to  the  Clinch  Valley  division 
and  its  earnings  in  the  way  of  originat- 
ing traffic,  it  appeared  that  the  cost 
of  operation  was  not  substantially 
greater  on  said  line  than  on  the  Poca- 
hontas division.  The  Commission  re- 
jected defendant's  contention  that  coal, 
being  a  special  commodity  of  large 
tonnage,  should  bear  the  alleged  in- 
creased cost  of  operation  on  the  Clinch 
Valley  line,  on  the  ground  that  such 
a  principle  was  not  applied  in  making 
rates  on  the  Pocahontas  division.  From 
1894  to  1897  the  charge  from  both 
competing  fields  in  question  on  said 
divisions  was  the  same.  Later  the 
defendant  Norfolk  &  Western  Ry.  pur- 
chased the  stock  of  the  corporation 
owning  the  coal  fields  in  the  Poca- 
hontas field  and  put  into  effect  the 
rates  attacked,  for  the  apparent  pur- 
pose of  favoring  the  Pocahontas  over 
the  Clinch  Valley  group.  HELD,  the 
Clinch  Valley  group  should  be  divided 
into  two  groups  in  a  manner  similar 
to  the  division  into  groups  of  the  ter- 
ritory on  the  Pocahontas  division,  the 
first  group  to  extend  from  Graham  to 
a  point  17  miles  west  of  Raven,  and  to 
take  a  $1.50  rate,  and  the  second  to 
extend   from   that  point   to   Norton   and 


take  a  $1.60  rate.  Reparation  denied. 
Raven  Red  Ash  Coal  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  230,  231,  237. 

§6.     To  Equalize  Consuming  Points. 

See  Blanket  Rates,  §8  (c) ;  Branch 
Lines,  §1  (k);  Equalization  of 
Rates,    §3. 

(a)  Prior  to  1903  defendants'  cotton- 
seed rates  from  various  points  in  Mis- 
souri, Arkansas  and  Louisiana  gave 
Memphis  a  differential  over  East  St. 
Louis  of  about  5c  per  100  lbs.  Subse- 
quently the  rates  to  East  St.  Louis  were 
reduced  lower  than  those  to  Memphis. 
Other  lines  maintain  a  substantial  dif- 
ferential in  favor  of  Memphis  as  against 
St.  Louis.  On  other  commodities  hauled 
by  defendants  Memphis  is  given  a  differ- 
ential. Defendants  contended  the  haul  to 
Memphis  was  a  two-line  haul,  whereas 
it  has  a  one-line  movement  into  East 
St.  Louis.  HELD,  the  rates  to  East  St. 
Louis  were  discriminatory  as  against  Mem- 
phis. Rates  to  Memphis  found  unreason- 
able and  reasonable  rates  prescribed  for 
the  future.  Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v. 
St.  L.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  33. 

(b^  The  tariffs  in  effect  prior  to  April 
1,  and  those  of  April  1,  1910,  named  the 
same  rates  on  vegetables  from  branch 
line  points  as  from  Charlestown  to  Buf- 
falo and  Pittsburgh,  but  the  subsequent 
tariffs  named  through  rates  from  the 
branch  line  points  higher  than  the  rates 
from  Charlestown.  Rates  from  branch 
line  points  to  the  Ohio  River  are  higher 
than  rates  from  Charlestown  to  the  Ohio 
River,  but  the  same  relative  differences 
have  not  been  observed  in  the  construc- 
tion of  the  through  rates  to  Buffalo 
and  to  Pittsburgh.  HELD,  in  considera- 
tion of  the  extra  service  performed  and 
the  additional  expense  incident  to  traffic 
from  branch  lines  the  Commission  does 
not  here  regard  it  as  improper  to  charge 
reasonably  more  from  such  points  than 
from  main  line  points.  It  sees  no  reason, 
however,  for  any  higher  differentials  on 
shipments  to  puffalo  and  Pittsburgh  than 
on  like  shipments  to  Baltimore.  League 
of  Commission  Merchants  v.  A.  C.  L.  R. 
R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  132,  134. 

(c)  On  cottonseed  hulls  from  Fayette- 
ville,  N.  C,  to  Cartersville,  Ga.,  shipped 
Jan.  18,  1908,  complainant  was  charged 
the  sixth  class  rate  of  $7.60  per  ton.  A 
combination  of  rates  of  $3.30  per  ton 
based  on  Atlanta  was  in  effect.  Defend- 
ants    admitted     reparation     should     be 


DIFFERENTIALS,  §6    (d)— (f) 


215 


awarded  on  that  basis.  After  shipments 
moved,  a  blanket  rate  of  $2.50  was  estab- 
lished over  other  lines  than  those  of  de- 
fendants from  Fayetteville  and  North 
Carolina  territory  to  Atlanta,  Cartersville 
and  other  Georgia  points,  which  remained 
in  effect  until  October,  1909,  and  which 
took  a  longer  route  than  the  shipment  in 
question.  For  many  years  the  rates  on 
cottonseed  hulls  from  North  Carolina 
points  had  been  grouped,  the  charge  be- 
ing $2.50  to  Atlanta.  Defendants  con- 
tended this  rate  was  low  and  was  put 
into  effect  to  induce  traffic.  In  1909  the 
Atlanta  rate  was  made  $3  and  the  Car- 
tersville $3.40.  The  $3.40  rate  to  Carters- 
ville produced  a  higher  rate  per  ton  mile 
■return  for  the  longer  haul  to  Cartersville 
than  to  Atlanta.  Complainant  contended 
that  the  $2.50  rate  in  effect  over  other 
lines  was  reasonable.  HELD,  that  a  rate 
of  $3.20  should  be  established,  making  the 
differential  of  20c  to  Cartersville  over  the 
Atlanta  rate  in  line  with  the  differential 
formerly  applicable,  but  that  complainant 
failed  to  show  $2.50  to  be  a  reasonable 
rate,  since  lower  rates  via  another  route 
are  not  necessarily  reasonable  rates  via 
the  route  taken  by  shipments  in  a  partic- 
ular case.  Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  $3.20.  Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co. 
V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  275  276. 

(d)  Astoria,  Ore.,  with  15,000  popula- 
tion, is  located  near  the  mouth  of  the 
Columbia  River,  about  10  miles  from  the 
ocean,  and  is  about  100  miles  west  of 
Portland,  which  also  lies  on  the  same 
river.  On  commodities  generally  shipped 
from  points  lying  east  of  a  line  drawn 
from  Winnipeg  to  Denver,  Astoria  was 
granted  the  same  rates  as  applied  to 
Portland,  Seattle  and  Tacoma.  On  wheat 
from  Washington,  Oregon  and  Idaho,  As- 
toria was  charged  a  local  rate  of  10c  per 
100  lbs.  from  Portland  to  Astoria  in  addi- 
tion to  the  rate  from  the  wheat  fields  to 
Portland.  Astoria  was  reached  from 
Portland  by  the  Astoria  &  Columbia  River 
Railroad,  which  was  controlled  by  defend- 
ants, N.  P.  and  Gt.  Nor.  railroads.  Com- 
plainant farmers  and  grain  dealers  at 
Astoria  attacked  the  rates  on  wheat  from 
such  fields  to  Astoria  as  unreasonable 
per  se  and  as  compared  with  the  rates  to 
Portland,  claiming  that  they  should  be 
the  same  as  to  Portland.  No  railroad 
reached  Astoria  except  the  A.  &  C.  R.  R., 
and  no  grain  could  reach  that  point  all- 
rail,  except  by  passing  through  Portland. 
Portland  was  built  up  by  the  defendants 


as  an  important  grain  exporting  port  be- 
fore any  railroad  reached  Astoria.  Facili- 
ties such  as  tracks,  warehouses  and 
wharves  which  existed  at  Portland  were 
not  available  at  Astoria,  and  if  the  de- 
fendants were  to  arrange  to  haul  large 
quantities  of  export  grain  to  Astoria  it 
would  be  necessary  to  construct  such 
facilities  for  handling  it.  The  grain 
rates  to  Portland,  Seattle  and  Tacoma 
from  the  points  in  question  were  the 
same  on  account  of  competition  between 
those  cities.  The  city  of  Portland  had 
spent  great  sums  of  money  in  improving 
the  conditions  of  navigation  between 
Portland  and  Astoria.  The  rates  on  grain 
to  Bellingham,  Wash.,  were  only  2^^c 
higher  than  to  Seattle,  Tacoma  and  Port- 
land. The  local  rate  of  10c  per  100  lbs. 
from  Portland  to  Astoria  yielded  2c  per 
ton  mile.  HELD,  defendants  were  under 
no  obligation  to  establish  at  Astoria  the 
same  facilities  for  handling  grain  as  they 
had  established  at  Portland,  Seattle  and 
Tacoma  and  were  not  obliged,  therefore, 
to  give  to  Astoria  as  a  port  the  same  rates 
on  grain  from  the  points  in  question  as 
they  gave  to  these  other  cities;  but  the 
local  rate  of  10c  from  Portland  to  Astoria 
was  unreasonable  and  should  be  so  re- 
duced as  to  make  the  rates  from  the 
grain  fields  in  question  to  Astoria  not  to 
exceed  the  rates  to  Portland  by  more 
than  4i^c.  Farmers'  Co-operative  &  Edu- 
cational Union  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.  406,  410-412. 

(e)  Following  Toledo  Produce  Ex- 
change V.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  5  I.  C.  C. 
166,  3  I.  C.  C.  830,  the  arbitrary  rate  of 
2c  on  grain  and  grain  products  which  is 
added  to  the  New  York  rate  in  deter- 
mining the  New  England  rate  is  sus- 
tained. Banner  Milling  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  & 
H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  31,  33. 

(f)  Minneapolis  and  Buffalo  are 
strongly  competitive  points  in  the  milling 
of  spring  wheat,  the  products  from  which 
are  destined  to  points  east  of  Buffalo. 
The  rates  on  flour  from  Buffalo  to  Phila- 
delphia and  Baltimore  were  i/^c  lower 
than  to  New  York;  from  Minneapolis  to 
Philadelphia  and  Baltimore  they  were  2c 
and  3o  lower  than  to  New  York.  The 
milling  business  was  conducted  on  a 
profit  of  some  3c  per  barrel.  The  advan- 
tage in  rates  from  Minneapolis  was  4c  a 
barrel  to  Philadelphia  and  6c  a  barrel  to 
Baltimore.  This  advantage  was  pro- 
hibitive against  complainant  at  Buffalo 
in  selling  flour  to  those  cities.  These  dif- 
ferentials had,  however,  been  long  in  ef- 


216 


DIFFERENTIALS,   §6    (g)— §7    (aa) 


feet,  and  the  milling  business  had  grown 
up  under  them.  Defendant,  Penn.  R.  R., 
had  lower  rates  from  Minneapolis  and 
Baltimore,  but  these  were  compelled  by 
competition  of  other  carriers,  although 
the  shipments  might  have  passed  through 
Buffalo.  HELD,  these  differentials  were 
not  unjustly  discriminatory  against  Buf- 
falo. Washburn-Crosby  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R. 
Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  40,  42. 

(g)  Upon  a  petition  for  rehearing,  the 
former  order  lowering  the  rates  on  grain 
and  its  products  between  St.  Louis  and 
Little  Rock  is  altered  so  as  to  make  the 
differential  between  Kansas  City  and  St. 
Louis  into  said'  territory  Ic  less  than  the 
former  order  contemplated,  namely,  so 
as  to  establish  proportional  rates,  12c  on 
coarse  grains  and  their  products  and  14c 
on  wheat  and  its  products,  this  change 
being  made  with  due  precaution  against 
a  possible  cut  in  ratri  by  the  K.  C.  S. 
Ry.  to  Texarkana,  Ark.,  and  correspond- 
ing points,  which  would  result  in  a  wide- 
spread reduction  of  grain  rates  into  the 
South  and  the  Southwest.  The  Traffic 
Bureau  of  St.  Louis  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13 
I.  C.  C.  105,  108. 

(h)  The  diiferential  bases  from  Chi- 
cago, Indianapolis  and  Cincinnati  were 
the  same  to  pomts  in  Louisiana  along  the 
T.  &  P.  Ry.  and  the  L.  R.  &  N.  Co.  from 
Shreveport  to  Alexandria,  thence  east  to 
the  Mississippi  River  and  south  as  far 
as  Cheneyville,  and  along  the  K.  C.  S.  Ry. 
from  Shreveport  to  Lake  Charles,  and 
the  L.  &  A.  Ry.  running  north  and  south 
and  crossing  the  V.  S.  &  P.  R.  R.  To  other 
points  located  in  the  same  part  of  Louisi- 
ana, but  not  along  said  lines,  and  also  to 
points  on  the  T.  &  P.  Ry.  and  S.  P.  R.  R. 
to  the  south  and  east  of  the  territory 
above  described,  lower  differentials  ap- 
plied from  Cincinnati  than  from  Indian- 
apolis. To  the  latter  points  the  dis- 
tances are  much  less  from  Indianapolis 
than  from  Chicago  and  Cincinnati.  To  ter- 
ritory lying  on  three  sides  of  this  Louisi- 
ana territory  taking  lower  differentials 
from  Cincinnati  than  from  Indianapolis 
and  to  many  interior  points  in  Louisiana, 
the  same  rates  applied  from  Indianapolis 
and  Cincinnati.  Basic  rates  for  the  en- 
tire territory  embraced  in  Texas,  Okla- 
homa, Arkansas  and  Louisiana  were  made 
primarily  from  St.  Louis  to  Texas  com- 
mon points.  The  Chicago  rates  were 
then  made  fixed  differentials  over  the 
rates  from  St.  Louis,  and  these  differ- 
entials applied  generally  from  the 
Chicago-Cincinnati-Indianapolis    territory. 


The  lower  rates  from  Cincinnati  to  the 
interior  Louisiana  points  in  question 
could  not  be  ascribed  to  Mississippi  River 
water  competition,  since  for  many  years 
the  same  rates  were  voluntarily  applied 
from  Indianapolis  and  Cincinnati  to 
Memphis,  Vicksburg,  Natchez,  Baton 
Rouge  and  New  Orleans,  located  directly 
on  the  Mississippi.  HELD,  the  rates 
from  Indianapolis  to  the  points  in 
Louisiana  in  question  should  not  exceed 
those  in  effect  from  Cincinnati.  Indian- 
apolis Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  254,  274-275. 

§7.     To   Equalize  Producing   Points. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §13  (m).  §17  (e), 
§18  (1),  (c);  Blanket  Rates.  §6  (b), 
§8  (d);  Eaualization  of  Rates.  §3; 
Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 
§11    (2),    (j). 

(a)  The  advanced  differential  of  5c 
over  Galveston  on  through  rail  and  water 
rates  on  rice  and  rice  products  from  Hous- 
ton, Tex.,  to  New  York,  Boston,  Balti- 
more, Philadelphia  and  Providence,  via 
Galveston,  is  not  discriminatory  when 
compared  with  corresponding  rates  from 
New  Orleans,  Galveston  or  other  Texas 
points,  or  as  compared  with  correspond- 
ing rates  on  other  commodities  from 
Houston,  the  Commission  finding  that 
this  differential  is  a  low  rate  made  in  an 
effort  to  comply  with  an  order  of  the 
Commission,  and  with  the  bona  fide  pur- 
pose of  correcting  a  dis3rimination  in  the 
manner  best  calculated  to  put  the  rates 
from  all  Texas  milling  cities  in  fair  rela- 
tion to  each  other.  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce of  Houston,  Tex.,  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A. 
Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  214. 

(aa)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  of 
88c  per  net  ton  on  bituminous  coal  in 
carloads  from  the  Pittsburgh,  Pa.,  district 
to  Ashtabula  Harbor,  Ohio,  for  trans- 
shipment by  vessel  on  the  Great  Lakes 
to  points  beyond.  The  coal  moving  over 
the  New  York  Central  lines  from  the 
Pittsburgh  district  to  Ashtabula  was  car- 
ried in  solid  trains  averaging  65  cars 
each  of  42  to  44  tons  per  car.  That 
moving  via  the  Pennsylvania  lines  moved 
in  trainloads  of  40  cars,  averaging  from 
40  to  44  tons  each.  The  weighted  aver- 
age distance  from  Pittsburgh  district  to 
Ashtabula  is  148  miles.  From  1901  to 
1911  the  rate  was  increased  from  73c 
to  88c.  From  1887  to  1900  the  rate  fluc- 
tuated from  70c  to  $1.  Defendant  car- 
rier in  transporting  the  coal  in  question 
received  the  benefit  of  using  the  empty 
cars   engaged   in   hauling  iron   ore  from 


DIFFERENTIALS,  §7    (b)— (c) 


217 


ake  points  east,  thereby  removing  the 
sxpense  of  any  back  haul  of  empty  cars. 
Complainants  contended  that  the  rates 
ittacked  were  unjust  as  compared  with 
hose  from  the  West  Virginia  coal  fields, 
rhe  distance  from  the  Pittsburgh  district 
md  from  West  Virginia  districts  of  Po- 
ahontas,  Kanawa  and  Fairmont  to  Ash- 
abula  were  160,  434,  400  and  248  miles, 
espectively,  yielding  ton-mile  revenues  of 
1.5,  2.6,  2.4  aand  3.9  mills,  respectively, 
n  fixing  the  rates  from  these  competing 
Qining  districts  defendants  had  practi- 
ally  disregarded  distance  as  well  as  the 
act  that  the  rail  competition  from  the 
Pittsburgh  district  to  Lake  Erie  was  much 
;reater  than  that  from  any  of  the  West 
Virginia  fields.  For  ten  years  prior  to 
larch  1,  1912,  the  differentials  between 
hese  competing  fields  were  unchanged, 
,nd  under  this  relation  of  rates  the  coal 
onnage  from  the  West  Virginia  mines  to 
he  lake  ports  increased  some  885  per 
ent,  while  that  from  the  Pittsburgh  dis- 
rict  increased  only  277  per  cent.  The 
ost  of  mining  coal  in  the  Pittsburgh  dis- 
rict  was  more  than  in  the  competing 
Vest  Virginia  districts,  being  from  80c 
o  $1  per  ton  in  the  former  and  from 
Oc  to  60c  in  the  latter.  Defendants  did 
lot  equalize  this  advantage  in  rates  in 
ts  charges  on  coal  shipped  to  the  At- 
antic  seaboard  for  transshipment,  but  on 
uch  coal  accorded  an  average  in  rates 
0  the  West  Virginia  mines.  The  rate 
f  88c  complained  of  afforded  a  ton- 
Qile  revenue  of  5.94  mills  under  the 
weighted  average  distance  of  148  miles, 
,nd  approximately  5.87  mills,  straight 
verage  mile.  The  larger  and  more  pros- 
lerous  carriers  engaged  in  transporting 
he  coal  under  the  rates  in  question  were 
;ranted  dividends  between  the  years  1907 
,nd  1911  ranging  from  6  per  cent  to  18 
ler  cent.  The  operating  expenses  of  trans- 
lorting  Pittsburgh  coal  to  Ashtabula  was 
irobably  less  than  one-half  of  the  rate 
f  88c.  The  evidence  indicated  that  the 
ate  complained  of  was  raised,  step  by 
tep,  not  to  bring  it  up  to  a  level  which 
he  carriers  might  have  regarded  and 
[efended  as  reasonable,  but  in  order  to 
et  certain  competing  coal  fields  into 
he  trade.  HELD,  that  the  rate  com- 
plained of  was  unreasonable  and  unjust 
,nd  should  not  exceed  78c.  Boileau  v. 
'.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  640. 

(b)  Complainant  attacked  the  carload 
ate  of  26^c  on  lumber  and  forest  prod- 
icts,  from  Arkansas,  Louisiana,  Missis- 
;ippi    and   Texas   to    Omaha   and    South 


Omaha,  Neb.,  and  Council  Bluffs,  la. 
Prior  to  Dec.  15,  1899,  the  rate  to  Omaha 
was  22c.  It  was  then  advanced  to,  and 
remained  at,  23c  until  June  1,  1908.  when, 
pursuant  to  the  decision  in  Lincoln  Com- 
mercial Club  V.   C.  R.  I.   &   P.  Ry.  Co., 

13  I.  C.  C.  319,  holding  that  the  rate  to 
Lincoln,  Neb.,  should  not  exceed  that  to 
Omaha,  defendants  advanced  the  OmaLa 
rate  from  23c  to  25c,  and  the  Lincoln  ra'e 
from  24c  to  25c.  On  Aug.  25,  1908,  pur- 
suant to  the  decision  in  Greater  Des 
Moines  Committee  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

14  I.  C.  C.  294,  holding  that  the  rate  to 
Des  Moines  should  not  exceed  the  rate 
to  Omaha,  defendants  again  advanced 
the  rates  to  Omaha  and  Lincoln  to  the 
26  %c  rate  complained  of  and  reduced 
the  rate  to  Des  Moines  from  27*^0  to 
26^0.  In  order  to  hold  up  through 
rates  resulting  from  this  advance,  de- 
fendants had  to  increase  the  local  fac- 
tors in  the  St.  Louis  combination,  so 
that  the  combination  would  be  as  high 
as  the  through  rate.  The  rate  at- 
tacked applied  from  all  points  in  the 
territory,  some  450  by  600  miles  in 
extent.  By  reducing  the  same  to  25c, 
the  per  ton  mile,  based  on  an  average 
distance,  would  be  only  slightly  affected. 
HELD,  the  rate  attacked  should  be  re- 
duced to  25c;  the  Des  Moines  rate 
should  not  exceed  the  Omaha  rate,  and 
the  relation  established  by  the  Com- 
mission in  the  cases  mentioned  should 
not  be  disturbed.  Defendants  were  obvi- 
ously satisfied  with  the  23c  rate  to 
Omaha  and  Lincoln,  and  only  raised 
these  rates  in  order  to  escape  reducing 
the  rates  to  Des  Moines  and  Lincoln. 
Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  Ander- 
son &  Saline  River  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
532,   536,   537. 

(c)  Complainant  attacked  the  rela- 
tive rates  from  the  Coal  Creek  field, 
Tennessee,  against  the  Apalachia  field, 
Virginia,  via  Morristown  to  Carolina  ter- 
ritory. The  distance  from  the  Apa- 
lachia field  to  Morristown  is  171  miles, 
from  the  Coal  Creek  field  78  miles.  In 
Black  Mountain  Coal  &  Land  Co.  v. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  R.  286, 
the  Commission  established  the  differ- 
ential to  this  territory  in  favor  of  Coal 
Creek  field  of  25c  per  ton.  Since  that 
decision  certain  transportation  charges 
have  occurred  which  materially  modified 
the  situation.  One  of  the  carriers  from 
Apalachia  has  constructed  a  cut-off 
which  shortens  the  haul  to  Morristown 
60  miles  and  avoids  some  of  the  sever- 


218 


DIFFERENTIALS,  §7  (d)— (e) 


est  grades  and  curves,  so  that  Apalachia 
is  only  now  33  miles  further  from 
Carolina  territory  than  Coal  Creek.  A 
competing  carrier  has  been  constructed 
from  the  Dante  field,  which  is  adjacent 
to  the  Apalachia  field,  which,  with  its 
connections  into  Carolina  territory, 
make  a  haul  from  Dante  less  than 
from  Coal  Creek.  The  coal  in  the 
Dante  region  is,  if  anything,  somewhat 
superior  to  that  of  the  Apalachia  field, 
which  is  of  about  the  same  quality  as 
that  in  Coal  Creek.  The  competing 
carrier,  the  Carolina,  Clinchfield  &  Ohio 
R.  R.,  was  extremely  modern  in  con- 
struction and  of  a  most  substantial 
character.  Complainants  showed  that 
the  sales  in  the  Carolina  territory  have 
largely  diminished,  and  asked  for  an 
Increase  in  the  differential  through  Mor- 
ristown.  HELD,  that  it  is  evident  the 
Apalachia  must  have  the  same  rate 
Into  Carolina  territory  as  the  Dante 
field,  although  that  territory  is  not  to  be 
occupied  by.  the  latter  field  on  account 
of  the  changes  in  transportation  condi- 
tions. The  Commission  cannot,  by  rea- 
son of  distance  or  cost  of  service,  in- 
crease the  differential  which  was  estab- 
lished in  the  Black  Mountain  case,  and 
therefore  the  prayer  in  that  respect  for 
an  increase  must  be  denied.  Andy's 
Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
405. 

(d)  Complainant  coal  operators  at- 
tacked the  relative  rates  on  coal  from 
Coal  Creek  field,  Tennessee,  as  com- 
pared with  the  Apalachia  field,  Vir- 
ginia, to  Georgia  and  Florida  territory, 
via  Knoxville.  The  present  distance 
from  the  Apalachia  field  is  213  miles; 
on  a  proposed  cut-off  in  operation  this 
will  be  reduced  to  155  miles.  The  rate 
is  $1.40.  The  distance  from  Coal  Creek 
to  Atlanta,  a  typical  point,  is  259  miles, 
with  a  rate  of  $1.35;  from  the  Apa- 
lachia, 378  miles,  the  rate  is  $1.60,  or 
a  differential  of  25c.  A  competing  car- 
rier maintains  from  the  Dante  field,  a 
competing  coal  field  adjacent  to  the 
Apalachia  field,  a  rate  of  $1.60,  distance 
being  461  miles.  HELD,  the  present 
differential  between  Coal  Creek  and 
the  Apalachia  is  somewhat  too  small; 
and  that  the  difference  between  the  rate 
from  the  Apalachia  field  and  the  Coal 
Creek  field  ought  not  to  be  less  than 
35c,  but  it  cannot  be  assumed  that  the 
carrier  serving  the  Dante  field  will 
reduce  its  rate  of  $1.60  to  defeat  the 
Commission's  order;   that  the  advent  of 


this  carrier,  which  has  been  recently 
built,  changes  the  distance  from  some 
points  in  Georgia  and  Florida,  and  may 
require  a  regrouping  of  that  territory. 
The  order,  therefore,  will  be  confined 
to  Atlanta,  relying  upon  the  defendants 
to  make  such  adjustments,  if  any  are 
required,  in  the  Georgia  and  Florida 
territory.  Andy's  Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  405,  411. 

(e)  Complainant  coal  miners  in  the 
Walsenburg  district  in  southern  Colorado, 
located  on  the  line  of  the  Colorado  & 
Southern,  asked  for  the  establishment  of 
through  routes  and  joint  rates  via  the 
Fort  Worth  &  Denver  City  Railway  to 
points  in  the  Panhandle  of  Texas  and 
eastern  New  Mexico,  along  the  lines  of 
the  Southern  Kansas  Railway  of  Texas, 
Pecos  &  Northern  Texas  Railway,  East- 
ern Railway  Company  of  New  Mexico  and 
the  Pecos  River  R.  R.,  these  lines  being 
known  as  the  Pecos  Lines  and  owned 
by  the  Santa  Fe.  Dealers  located  on  the 
Pecos  Lines  in  Texas  could  only  get  Wal- 
senburg coal  by  maintaining  an  agent  at 
Amarillo,  Tex.,  to  receive  the  coal  and 
rebill  same  to  Texas  points.  Dealers 
on  the  Pecos  Lines  in  New  Mexico  were 
entirely  cut  off  from  Walsenburg  coal  on 
account  of  the  prohibitive  interstate  dis- 
tance tariffs  purposely  put  into  effect  by 
the  Santa  Fe  to  prevent  such  movements. 
Complainants  also  sought  through  routes 
and  joint  rates  via  Pueblo  to  points  on 
the  Santa  Fe  in  Kansas,  and  via  Trinidad 
to  points  on  the  line  of  the  Santa  Fe  and 
on  the  Eastern  Railway  of  New  Mexico, 
in  New  Mexico  and  Texas.  The  only  way 
traffic  could  move  was  by  billing  locally 
to  Trinidad  and  rebilling  at  the  local  rate 
from  Trinidad  to  point  of  destination. 
Through  routes  and  joint  rates  were  for- 
merly in  effect  from  the  Walsenburg  dis- 
tricts to  such  Texas  and  New  Mexico 
points,  but  were  withdrawn  by  the  Santa 
Fe  to  enable  that  line  to  supply  this  ter- 
ritory with  coal  from  Trinidad  and  Canon 
City,  Colo.,  and  Gallup,  New  Mexico,  from 
which  points  the  Santa  Fe  was  able  to  se- 
cure a  longer  haul  and  thereby  enhance 
its  revenues.  Traffic  from  the  Walsen- 
burg mines  actually  moved  into  the  Texas 
territory  via  Amarillo,  from  which  point 
it  took  the  low  Texas  commission  rates, 
and  the  total  charge  by  this  arrangement 
to  any  point  on  the  lines  in  Texas  was  ex- 
actly the  same  as  that  from  Canon  City, 
plus  the  rebilling  charge  at  Amarillo  to 
shipper's  agent.    This  movement  was  not 


DIFFERENTIALS,   %1    (f) 


219 


possible  to  points  in  New  Mexico,  because 
the  Texas  commission  rates  did  not  ap- 
ply, and  the  rates  which  did  apply  were 
prohibitive.  Complainants  asked  for 
rates  to  points  on  the  Pecos  Lines,  south 
of  Amarillo,  equal  to  the  rates  in  effect 
to  those  points  from  the  Gallup  mines; 
and  for  rates  to  points  on  the  Southern 
Kansas  Railway,  north  of  Amarillo,  equal 
to  the  rates  in  effect  from  the  southern 
Kansas  mines  to  such  points,  on  the  ground 
that  the  Walsenburg  mines  being  nearer 
than  the  other  districts,  the  rate  re- 
quested would  be  reasonable.  The  rates 
asked  for  were  lower  than  those  from 
the  Canon  City  district  and  were  de- 
manded on  the  ground  that  the  traffic 
from  Canon  City  moved  by  way  of  Hutch- 
inson, Kan.,  over  a  route  twice  as  long 
as  the  haul  from  the  Walsenburg  district 
via  Amarillo.  Walsenburg  and  Canon 
City  coals  were  about  on  a  par  in  quality 
and  for  competitive  reasons  it  was  nec- 
essary that  they  take  the  same  rates. 
The  long  haul  from  Canon  City  via  Hutch 
inson  was  voluntarily  established  by  the 
carrier  in  order  to  enable  it  to  participate 
in  the  traffic.  The  initial  carriers  in  the 
Walsenburg  district  encountered  great 
difficulties  in  handling  the  traffic  from 
the  mines  in  said  district.  The  lower 
rate  on  coal  from  Gallup  to  the  points  in 
question  was  influenced  by  the  movement 
of  empty  cars  eastward  from  California 
and  by  the  fact  that  a  down-grade  existed 
from  Gallup.  HELD,  joint  through  routes 
should  be  established  from  the  Walsen- 
burg district  to  the  points  as  requested; 
that  joint  rates  should  be  accorded  on 
coal  from  the  Walsenburg  district  to 
points  on  the  Santa  Fe  lines  in  Kansas; 
and  those  points  in  Texas,  east  of  but 
not  including  Joel,  which  should  not  ex- 
ceed the  rates  in  effect  between  Canon 
City,  Colo.,  and  those  points;  that  to 
points  in  Texas  and  New  Mexico,  north 
of  and  including  Joel,  Tex.,  but  not  in- 
cluding points  in  New  Mexico  on  the  line 
running  north  of  Belen,  the  rates  should 
not  exceed  the  rates  in  effect  from  Trini- 
dad, plus  a  differential  of  30c  per  ton; 
and  that  to  points  north  of  Belen  the 
•rates  should  not  exceed  the  rates  in  effect 
to  such  points  from  Trinidad,  plus  a  dif- 
ferential of  25c  per  ton.  Request  for  a 
differential  on  slack  from  the  Walsenburg 
mines  refused  for  lack  of  sufficient  data 
in  the  record.  Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke 
Co.  V.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  479,  481, 
485. 


(f)  Complainant  lumber  miller  in  the 
Missoula  District,  Mont.,  attacked  the 
rates  on  lumber  to  North  Dakota  and 
Missouri  River  territory.  Up  to  Oct.  15, 
1908,  the  Missoula  District,  being  located 
in  the  Montana-Oregon  group  territory, 
had  always  been  granted  a  differential 
rate  on  lumber  under  both  Spokane  and 
coast  groups  to  points  in  North  Dakota 
and  the  Missouri  River  territory.  These 
differentials  were  voluntarily  established 
by  the  carriers  and  ranged  in  amounts 
from  3c  to  9c  under  the  Spokane  rates  in 
the  North  Dakota  territory  and  from  5c 
to  10c  in  the  Missouri  River  territory.  To 
points  in  North  Dakota,  however,  timber- 
producing  sections  east  of  the  city  of 
Spokane  to  the  end  of  the  timber  belt 
did  not  take  the  same  rate  but  there 
existed  a  graded  differential  increasing 
in  amount  eastwardly.  In  compliance 
with  the  order  of  the  commission  in  Pot- 
latch  Lumber  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I. 
C.  C.  41,  consolidating  the  Spokane  and 
the  Montana-Oregon  groups,  the  rates 
complained  of  were  established,  resulting 
in  the  destruction  of  the  differential  there- 
tofore in  effect  in  favor  of  the  Montana- 
Oregon  group.  The  lumber-producing 
sections  involved  in  the  Kalispell  Case, 
16  I.  C.  C.  164,  located  on  the  Great 
Northern  Ry.,  and  the  Missoula  District, 
located  on  the  N.  P.  Ry.,  are  both  east 
of  the  city  of  Spokane,  the  latter  district 
lying  directly  south  of  the  former. 
HELD,  that  from  lumber-producing  points 
on  the  N.  P.  Ry.  between  Evaro  and 
Huson  on  the  west,  and  Garrison  on  the 
east,  including  those  points  and  also  in- 
cluding points  on  branch  lines  intersect- 
ing the  main  line  at  points  intermediate 
Huson  to  Garrison,  there  should  be  dif- 
ferential rates  on  lumber  and  other  forest 
products  to  points  on  the  Pembina-Port 
Arthur  line  as  defined  in  the  Potlatch 
case  and  points  west  thereof  to  and  in- 
cluding Medora,  N.  D.,  on  the  N.  P.  Ry., 
and  Edgemont,  S.  D.,  on  the  C.  B.  &  Q. 
R.  R.,  at  least  2c  per  100  lbs.  under 
Spokane  group  rates,  as  defined  in  the 
Potlatch  case,  to  points  on  said  Pembina- 
Port  Arthur  line,  and  graded  up  west- 
wardly  to  at  least  4c  per  100  lbs.  under 
Spokane  group  rates  at  Medora,  N.  D.,  on 
the  N.  P.  Ry.,  and  at  Edgemont,  S.  D.,  on 
the  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.;  that  from  points 
on  the  N.  P.  in  Montana  east  of  Garrison, 
including  branch  lines,  the  differentials 
should  be  3c  per  100  lbs.  under  Spokane 
group  rates  to  points  on  said  Pembina- 
Port  Arthur  line,   and   graded   up   west- 


220 


DIFFERENTIALS,  §7  (ff) 


wardly  to  5c  per  100  lbs.,  under  Spokane 
group  rates  at  Medora,  N.  D.,  on  the  N.  P. 
Ry.,  and  at  Edgemont,  S.  D.,  on  the  C.  B. 
&  Q.  R.  R.,  and  that  from  points  on  the 
C.  M.  &  P.  S.  Ry.  in  the  Missoula  District 
like  differentials  of  not  less  than  2c  and 
3c  respectively,  under  Spokane  rate 
groups,  should  be  established  to  points  on 
said  Pembina-Port  Arthur  line  and  be 
graded  up  westwardly  to  not  less  than  4c 
and  5c,  respectively,  under  Spokane 
group  rates  at  Marmarth,  N.  D.  Big 
Blackfoot  Milling  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  173,  175. 

(ff)  Complainant  coal  miners  in  the 
Black  Mountain  district,  in  Southwestern 
Virginia,  attacked  the  rates  on  coal  to 
Carolina  territory,  by  which  the  rate  from 
Black  Mountain  was  10c  higher  than  that 
from  the  adjoining  Appalachia  districts, 
and  also  attacked  the  adjustment  of  rates 
from  the  Jellico  and  Coal  Creek  districts 
in  Tennessee  to  Carolina  territory  as  un- 
justly discriminatory  in  favor  of  these 
Tennessee  fields.  The  Appalachia  and 
Black  Mountain  districts  are  situated 
near  the  Virginia-Kentucky  line  and  are 
about  20  and  17  miles  in  extent,  respect- 
ively. The  Black  Mountain  district  ad- 
joins the  Appalachia  district  on  the 
west.  Coal  from  the  Black  Mountain 
district  was  carried  over  the  Black 
Mountain,  the  Va.  &  S.  W.,  the  L.  &  N. 
R.  Rs.  and  the  S.  Ry.  through  Interment,  a 
point  lying  near  the  south  end  of  the 
Appalachia  district,  via  Morristown, 
Tenn.,  to  the  Carolina  territory  in  ques- 
tion. These  railroads  were  controlled 
by  defendant  S.  Ry.  Co.  From  Intermont 
defendant  S.  Ry.  carried  coal  produced 
in  the  Appalachia  fields  over  the  same 
route  to  the  Carolina  territory.  Over  its 
lines  north  from  Knoxville,  Tenn.,  the 
S.  Ry.  reached  the  Jellico  and  Coal  Creek 
districts  and  carried  coal  from  these 
fields  to  the  Carolina  points  in  question 
via  Morristown.  The  rates  to  Morris- 
town  were,  from  Jellico,  90c;  Coal  Creek, 
90c;  Black  Mountain,  $1.30;  Appalachia, 
$1.20  per  ton;  and  the  per  ton  mile  rev- 
enue 8,  12,  7.6  and  7.5  mills  respectively. 
The  rates  from  Black  Mountoin  and  Coal 
Creek  to  a  typical  Carolina  point  were 
$2.15  and  $1.85,  respectively,  yielding  6.39 
and  8  mills,  respectively.  To  one  group 
of  Carolina  points  the  rates  were  from 
the  Coal  Creek  district,  $2.35  to  $2.50; 
from  the  Appalachia  district,  $2.65;  from 
the  Black  Mountain  district,  $2.75.  To 
another  group  the  rates  from  Coal  Creek 
were  some  35c  per  ton  lower  than  from 


Appalachia  and  Black  Mountain.  To  a 
third  group  of  Carolina  points,  the  Ap- 
palachia rate  was  some  25c  over  the 
Coal  Creek  rate.  When  the  differential 
of  10c  from  Black  Mountain  above  the 
rate  from  Appalachia  was  instituted  the 
Black  Mountain  district  was  reached  by 
different  independent  carriers,  which 
afterwards  were  merged  in  the  system 
of  defendant  S.  Ry.  The  Black  Moun- 
tain R.  R.,  leading  from  the  Black  Moun- 
tain district  to  Intermont,  was  only  about 
25  miles  long.  When  these  railroads  were 
separate  and  independent,  the  differential 
of  10c  against  Black  Mountain  applied  to 
the  haul  of  only  170  miles  to  Morristown, 
whereas  after  the  acquisition  of  these 
roads  by  the  S.  Ry.  the  10c  differential 
was  being  exacted  on  a  haul  of  from  250 
to  500  miles,  made  entirely  over  the  sys- 
tem of  the  S.  Ry.  The  Black  Mountain 
and  Appalachia  coal  was  of  practically 
the  same  character  and  must  find  a  sale 
at  the  same  points  at  about  the  same 
rates.  The  coal  from  the  mines  of  the 
Appalachia  district  was  delivered  at 
Intermont  by  the  Interstate  R.  R.,  a  sep- 
arate corporation,  for  which  service  10c 
per  ton  was  paid  by  the  S.  Rys.,  and  the 
Appalachia  operator  paid  the  Intermont 
rate  for  all  shipments  to  the  destina- 
tions in  question.  With  respect  to  the 
relative  rates  from  Black  Mountain  and 
the  Appalachia,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
Jellico  and  Coal  reek  fields  on  the  other, 
it  appeared  that  after  the  coal  from 
either  of  the  groups  in  question  reached 
Morristown,  the  transportation  conditions 
from  that  point  to  destination  were 
exactly  similar.  The  coal  from  these 
competing  Virginia  and  Tennessee  fields 
was  of  the  same  general  character,  of 
practically  the  same  value,  used  for  the 
same  purpose  and  sold  at  the  same  mar- 
kets. The  average  distance  from  Appa- 
lachia and  Black  Mountain  to  Morristown 
was  164  miles,  which  was  about  90  miles 
greater  than  from  Coal  Creek.  Under 
the  adjustment  attacked,  the  rate  from 
Appalachia  to  INIorristown  was  30c  per 
ton  more  than  from  Coal  Creek.  The 
distance  from  Intermont  to  Bristol,  Tenn., 
on  the  line  to  Morristown,  is  about  70 
miles.  An  engine  had  to  make  about 
10  miles  to  cover  the  distance,  three 
trips  being  necessary  to  take  the  train 
over  Walker  Mountain.  The  maximum 
grade  was  170  feet  to  the  mile,  with 
numerous  sharp  and  reverse  curves.  The 
maximum  grade  from  Coal  Creek  to  Mor- 
ristown was  114  feet  to  the  mile.  The 
expense  of  assembling  coal  at  Intermont 


DIFFERENTIALS.  §7  (g)— DISCRIMINATION 


221 


was  very  great,  and  similar  expense  was 
not  shown  to  exist  at  Coal  Creek.  HELD, 
that  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  same 
carrier  served  both  the  Black  Mountain 
and  Appalachia  districts,  which,  by  their 
location,  the  character  of  their  output  and 
the  distance  from  markets,  were  in  sub- 
stantially similar  circumstances  and  con- 
ditions, the  differential  of  10c  in  favor 
of  Appalachia  was  unjustly  discrimi- 
natory against  Black  Mountain;  and  that 
taking  into  account  the  greater  average 
distance  from  the  Appalachia  and  Black 
Mountain  mines  to  Morristown,  as  com- 
pared with  the  distance  from  Coal  Creek 
to  the  same  point,  and  the  higher  oper- 
ating expenses  in  originating  the  traffic 
than  those  involved  in  the  haul  from 
Intermont  to  Morristown,  together  with 
the  relation  that  the  Appalachia  and 
Black  Mountain  districts  bore  to  Coal 
Creek  and  other  districts  competing  in 
the  same  consuming  markets,  the  rate 
from  Appalachia  and  Black  Mountain  to 
the  destination  ppints  in  question  might 
be  materially  higher  than  from  Coal 
Creek,  but  that  the  differential  should  be 
reduced  5c,  so  that  the  rate  at  Appalachia 
and  Black  Mountain  should  not  exceed  by 
more  than  25c  the  rate  from  Coal  Creek. 
Black  Mountain  Coal  Land  Co.  v.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  286. 

(g)  Bunker  Hill  and  Martinsburg,  W. 
Va.,  were  rivals  in  the  production  of 
furnace  limestone.  On  shipments  to 
points  in  Pennsylvania  and  Ohio,  de- 
fendants charged  much  higher  rates  from 
Bunker  Hill  than  from  Martinsburg,  and 
the  rate  to  Canton,  for  example,  from 
Martinsburg,  a  distance  of  375  miles,  was 
80c  a  ton  more  than  from  Bunker  Hill,  a 
distance  of  385  miles.  It  appeared  that 
one  concern  controlled  substantially  all 
the  crude  limestone  in  this  territory, 
with  the  exception  of  the  quarries  at 
Bunker  Hill.  HELD,  the  rates  charged 
from  Bunker  Hill  were  excessive  and 
should  be  reduced  so  as  not  to  exceed  by 
five  cents  per  ton  the  rates  from  Mar- 
tinsburg. Baker  v.  Cumberland  Valley 
R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  568,  569,  570. 

(h)  Complainant,  manufacturers  and 
shippers  of  lumber  and  forest  products  in 
Washington,  Oregon  and  Idaho  east  of 
the  Cascade  Mountains,  attacked  the  gen- 
eral increase  in  lumber  rates  put  into 
effect  Nov.  1,  1907,  demanded  that  the 
former  rates  be  restored  and  that  they 
be  given  a  differential  of  at  least  10c 
over  the  former  rates,  as  against  ship- 
ments from  coast  group  points.    Spokane 


was  distant  from  the  Pacific  Coast  some 
400  miles.  The  haul  from  the  coast  in 
most  instances  necessitated  the  crossing 
of  the  Cascade  range.  For  some  200 
miles  east  of  the  Cascades,  the  country 
was  a  treeless  farming  region  until  the 
immediate  vicinity  of  Spokane  was 
reached.  Defendants,  prior  to  the  filing 
of  the  complaint,  had  established  differ- 
entials in  favor  of  points  in  the  territory 
occupied  by  complainants  to  various 
destinations  eastward  against  the  rates 
from  coast  points  to  these  destinations, 
and  had  thereby  admitted  that  complain- 
ants were  entitled  to  lower  rates  than 
the  shippers  from  coast  points.  HELD, 
in  connection  with  the  decisions  in  Ore. 
and  Wash.  L.  M.  A.  v.  N.  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
and  P.  C.  L.  M.  A.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  1  and  23,  rates  from  the  terri- 
tory occupied  by  complainants  should  be 
lower  than  the  newly  prescribed  rates  in 
these  opinions  applying  from  coast  group 
points;  that  the  differential  should  be  as 
per  schedule  specified  in  the  opinion 
from  points  in  the  territory  extending 
from  the  summit  of  the  Cascade  Moun- 
tains eastward  to  a  designated  boundary 
marking  off  said  territory  from  the  Spo- 
kane-Sand Point  district;  and  that  the 
Spokane-Sand  Point  district  should  enjoy 
a  greater  differential  over  the  rates  from 
coast  group  points  than  the  above-men- 
tioned Cascade  groups,  the  new  rate  to 
be  to  various  destinations  as  prescribed 
in  the  opinion.  (Knapp  and  Harlan, 
Comm'rs,  dissenting.)  Potlatch  Lumber 
Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  41,  48; 
rehearing  denied,  16  I.  C.  C.  465,  468. 

DISCRIMINATION. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Construction  of  the  Act. 
§2.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
IL     DETERMINATION    OF    DISCRIMI- 
NATION. 
§3.     In  general. 
§4.     Similar  conditions. 
§5.     Test  of  discrimination. 
III.     JUSTIFICATION. 

§6.     Carrier    as    shipper    or    con- 
signee. 
§7.    Carrier    not    serving    preju 

diced    point. 
§8.     Competition. 

(1)  In  general. 

(2)  Artificial   competition. 

(3)  Railroads  in  general. 

(4)  Short-line  carriers. 

(5)  Water  carriers. 
§9.     Disadvantage  of  location. 


222 


DISCRIMINATION,  §1  (a)— (ff) 


§10.  Encouragement  of  own  terri- 
tory. 
§11.  Low  state  rate. 

IV.  REMOVAL    OF   DISCRIMINATION. 

§12.     Reduction  of  rates. 
§13.     Disturbance    of    settled    ad- 
justment. 

V.  PROCEDURE    AND    EVIDENCE. 

§14.     Burden  of  proof. 
§15.     Showing  of  damage. 
§16.    Actions  in  state  courts. 
§17.     Reparation. 

CROSS-REFERENCES. 

See  Absorption  of  Charges,  11;  Ad- 
vanced Rates,  V;  Allowances,  III, 
§7,  §8  (1)  (d),  §8  (3)  (a),  (aa);  §8 
(4)  (a),  (b),  §8  (a)  (a);  Blanket 
Rates,  V;  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  III 
§12  (c),  (d),  (e).  (f).  (h),  §13  (a),  (c). 
(h),  §17  (a),  (b),  §21  (a),  §26  (a), 
§28  (a);  Classification,  §3  (a),  §7 
(d),  §14  (c) ;  Commutation  Fares, 
(a);  Credit  Account,  §1  (c),  (d), 
§2;  Crimes,  II;  Demurrage,  §3,  §15 
(g),  (j);  Differentials,  §5  (c), 
(g),  §6  (f),  §7  (a);  Equalization 
of  Rates,  §3  (nn);  Export  Rates 
and  Facilities,  III;  Express  Com- 
panies, III;  Facilities  and  Privi- 
leges, §4  (a),  §10  (b),  §19  (]).  §20 
(h),  IV;  Import  Traffic,  II;  Lighter- 
age, §3;  Passenger  Fares  and  Fa- 
cilities, II,  §6  (a),  (g),  §10;  Pre- 
cooling,  II  (h);  Proportional  Rates, 
II;  Reconsignment,  II,  §6  (d) ;  Re- 
stricted Rates,  I  (d),  (j),  (n). 
Special  Contracts,  §2  (h),  (m), 
§5  (Switch  Tracks  and  Switch- 
ing, III;  Tap  Lines,  §7;  Tele- 
phone Companies,  I;  Terminal 
Facilities,  §7  (c) ;  Through  Routes 
and  Joint  Rates,  §4  (b),  §12  (a), 
§19  (f);  Track  Storage,  II  (k) ;  Wa- 
ter Carriers,  II;  Weights  and 
Weighing,    III. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Construction  of  the  Act. 

See  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  II, 
(j).  (cc),  (II);  Compress  Comoanies 
and  Charges,  §1  (b),  (c),  (d) ;  In- 
terstate Commerce  Commission, 
§14  (j);  Passenger  Fares  and  Facil- 
ities, §6  (L);  Tariffs,  §3  (cc),  §4  (b), 
§5  (a),  §14  (d);  Through  Routes 
and  Joint   Rates,   §1    (q). 

(a)  The  Act  was  intended  to  be  an  ef- 
fective means  for  redressing  wrongs  re- 
sulting from  unjust  discrimination  and  un- 
due preference,  and  this  must  be  so, 
whether  persons  or  places  suffer.  I.  C.  C. 
V.  C.  R.  1.  &  P.  Ry..  218  U.  S.  88  110,  80 
Sup.  Ct.  651,  54  L.  ed.  946. 

(b)  Under  section  2  of  the  Act  provid- 
ing for  the  recovery  of  damages  by  a 
shipper  against  whom  a  carrier  has  dis- 
criminated in  rates  for  shipments  made 
during  a  "contemporaneous  service,"  the 
word  "contemporaneous"  means  "at  the 


same  time  with  the  offending  rates,"  and 
as  long  as  these  rates  remain  in  force 
the  services  rendered  to  a  complaining 
and  to  a  favored  shipper  are  "contempo- 
raneous" within  the  meaning  of  the  stat- 
ute. Mitchell  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.,  181  Fed.  403,  411. 

(c)  LTnder  section  2  of  the  Act  forbid- 
ding carriers  to  discriminate  between 
shippers  in  compensation  for  transporta- 
tion "under  substantially  similar  circum- 
stances and  conditions,"  a  carrier  may 
not  grant  to  one  shipper  a  lower  rate 
by  reason  of  the  fact  that  he  contracted 
to  sell  coal,  while  former  and  lower  rates 
were  in  effect,  while  the  complaining 
shipper  in  the  same  district  is  not  so 
obligated,  since  the  "circumstances  and 
conditions"  intended  do  not  include  in- 
dividual elements  affecting  individual 
shippers.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  International 
Coal  Mining  Co.,  173  Fed.  1,  4. 

(d)  The  use  in  section  1  of  the  Elkins 
Act  of  the  word  "discrimination,"  with 
the  qualifying  adjective  "unjust,"  was  not 
intended  to  broaden  the  prohibitions  of 
the  original  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce 
in  that  respect.  U.  S.  v.  Wells,  Fargo 
Express  Co.,  161  Fed.  606,  610. 

(e)  The  duty  of  a  carrier  under  the 
Act  to  refrain  from  giving  preference 
or  advantages  to  one  shipper  over  an- 
other is  applicable  only  where  the  same 
or  similar  conditions  are  prevalent.  U.  S. 
V.  O.  R.  &  Nav.  Co..  159  Fed.  975,  978. 

(ee)  Section  3  prohibits  undue  dis- 
crimination against  interstate  traffic  in 
favqr  of  state  traffic;  and  the  carrier  is 
not  relieved  by  the  fact  that  the  state 
rates  were  established  by  a  state  com- 
mission. R.  R.  Com.  of  La.  v.  St.  L.  S. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  31,  41. 

(f)  The  fundamental  principle  of  the 
Act  is  one  of  fair  play.  A  railroad  may 
not  control  the  character  of  the  indus- 
tries along  its  line  by  giving  preferential 
rates  as  between  commodities,  nor  dis- 
criminate as  between  one  shipper  and 
another,  even  though  by  following  such 
procedure  it  can  develop  the  greatest 
amount  of  traffic  for  itself.  Mobile 
Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  417,  426. 

(ff)  The  proviso  in  section  1  that 
the  Act  shall  not  apply  to  commerce 
wholly  within  a  state,  construed,  and 
HELD,  that  it  does  not  authorize  an  in- 
terstate carrier  in  discriminating  between 
state    and    interstate    commerce.     R.   R. 


DISCRIMINATION,  §1   (g)— §2   (a) 


223 


:om.  of  La.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
.  C.  C.  31,  42. 

(g)  Competition  which  compels  lower 
ates  to  one  city  than  to  another  city 
imilarly  situated  may  justify  such  rate 
idjustment,  but  the  mere  fact  of  compe- 
ition,  regardless  of  its  character,  does 
lot  relieve  carriers  from  the  limitations 
if  section  3.  Chamber  of  Commerce  of 
^^ewport  News  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
45,  353. 

(gg)  Natural  or  acquired  advantages 
re  to  be  considered  In  determining 
i^hether  a  rate  adjustment  between 
ocalities  is  in  violation  of  section  3. 
'hamber  of  Commerce  of  Newport  News 
.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  345,  352. 

(h)  The  prohibition  of  the  law  is 
Lgalnst  charging  differently  for  a  like  and 
ontemporaneous  service  in  the  trans- 
lortation  of  a  like  kind  of  traffic  under 
ubstantially  similar  circumstances  and 
onditions.  In  Re  Carriers  Operating 
Jetween  the  Mississippi  and  Missouri 
livers,  21  I.  C.  C.  546,  552. 

(hh)  The  prohibition  of  inequalities 
mong  shippers  is,  perhaps,  more  funda- 
nental  and  vital  than  any  other  feature 
f  the  Act.  Federal  Sugar  Refining  Co. 
.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.    200,  214. 

(i)  The  difference  in  transportation 
onditions  must  be  substantial  in  order 
0  remove  the  application  of  section  2. 
n  Re  Restricted  Rates,  20  I.  C.  C.  426, 
35. 

(j)  Section  2  of  the  Act  prohibits  re- 
eiving  directly  or  indirectly  by  any  device 
/^hatsoever  a  greater  or  less  compensa- 
ion  for  transportation  for  one  person' 
ban  for  another  person  for  "a  like  and 
ontemporaneous  service  in  the  trans- 
ortation  of  a  like  kind  of  traffic  under 
ubstantially  similar  circumstances  and 
onditions."  The  courts  have  repeatedly 
eld  that  the  words  "substantially  simi- 
ir  circumstances  and  conditions"  relate 
olely  to  questions  of  transportation  or 
aulage.  In  Re  Restricted  Rates,  20  I. 
!.  C.  426,  433. 

(k)  The  Act  does  not  prohibit  all  dis- 
rimination,  but  only  that  which  is  un- 
ue.  Herbeck-Demer  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
)o.,  17  I.  C.  C.  88:  Loch  Lynn  Construc- 
lon  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
96. 

(1)  One  purpose  of  the  Act  is  to  pre- 
erve  competitive  conditions  between 
ommon  carriers,  but  it  is  another  pur- 


pose   to    prevent    undue    discrimination. 
Railroad    Commission    of    Tennessee    v. 

A.  A.  R.  R.  Co..  17  I.  C.  C.  418,  421. 

(m)  The  Act  was  intended  to  prohibit 
undue  discrimination  against  localities  as 
well  as  persons.  Railroad  Commissioners 
of  Florida  v.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  16  I.  C.  C.  1,  2. 

(n)  The  statute  requires  carriers  to 
publish  their  tariffs  and  to  adhere  to 
those  tariffs.  In  no  other  way  could  dis- 
criminations which  have  existed  be  pre- 
vented. In  enforcement  of  that  statute 
the  Commission  has  no  discretion.  Ames 
Brooks  Co.  v.  Rutland  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
C.  479,  481. 

(o)  The  fundamental  principle  of  the 
Act  is  like  treatment  to  all  alike  under 
the  circumstances.    Cambria  Steel  Co.  v. 

B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  484,  486. 

(p)  Equal  treatment  is  nowhere  more 
clearly  intended  by  the  Act  than  in  sec- 
tions 2  and  3.  Rail  &  River  Coal  Co.  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  86,  88. 

(q)  Where  a  carrier  represents  that 
it  is  collecting  of  all  shippers  switching 
charges  on  interstate  shipments  levied 
by  a  connecting  carrier,  and  is,  in  fact, 
absorbing  such  charges  for  favored  ship- 
pers, a  state  court  has  jurisdiction  in 
an  action  for  damages  for  discrimination, 
since,  under  sections  9  and  22  of  the  Act, 
the  state  courts  are  not  deprived  of  jur- 
isdiction over  actions  for  breaches  of 
duty  by  the  carriers  which  would  give 
rise  to  causes  of  action  at  common  law 
or  under  a  state  statute.  Lilly  Co.  v. 
Northern  Pac.  Ry.  (Wash.,  1911),  117 
P.  401,  402. 

§2.     Jurisdiction    of   Commission. 

See  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  II 
(c);  Advanced  Rates,  §1  (2)  (a); 
Claims,  §3  (b),  §4  (c);  Commerce 
Court,  §3  (a);  Courts,  §9  (d);  Dif- 
ferentials, §1  (f);  Divisions,  §1  (b); 
Facilities  and  Privileges,  §1  (e), 
(f),  (h),  (o),  §19  (b);  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission.  §9  (j);  Rea- 
sonableness  of  Rates,   §28   (r). 

(a)  The  primary  jurisdiction  over  un- 
just discrimination  by  carriers  is  with 
the  Commission,  the  power  of  the  courts 
being  that  of  review,  and  is  confined  in 
that  review  to  questions  of  constitutional 
power,  and  all  pertinent  questions  as  to 
whether  the  action  of  the  Commission  is 
within  the  scope  of  the  delegated 
authority  under  which  it  purports  to  have 
been  made.  I.  C.  C.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry., 
218  U.  S.  88,  110,  30  Sup.  Ct.  651,  54  L. 
ed.  946. 


224 


DISCRIMINATION,  §2   (b)— (i) 


(b)  Defendant  railroad  secretly  and  in 
violation  of  its  published  rate  to  New 
York  and  Nev^  England  points  made 
certain  allowances  to  plaintiffs'  competi- 
tor in  the  shipment  of  coal.  In  shipments 
to  New  York  harbor,  one  favored  shipper 
was  selected,  and  a  pier  built  for  it  20 
miles  nearer  t'^e  market,  to  which  point 
it  was  permitted  to  ship  its  coal,  and  at 
the  same  time  it  received  an  allowance 
of  from  7c  to  15c  for  an  alleged  service 
of  unloading  coal,  whereas  plaintiffs  were 
compelled  to  go  to  South  Amboy,  20  miles 
further  south.  Defendant  also  made  se- 
cret allowances  to  certain  competing 
shippers  on  short  lateral  roads,  HELD, 
notwithstanding  the  powers  conferred  on 
the  Commission  by  section  15  of  the  Act, 
as  amended  June  26,  190G,  the  federal 
courts  had  jurisdiction  und^r  section  9 
over  the  subject  matter  in  a  suit  for 
damages  for  unjust  discrimination,  and 
it  was  not  necessary  first  to  resort  to  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission.  Lang- 
don  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  194  Fed.  486,  491. 

*  (bb)  On  cattle  from  Texas  points, 
Fort  Worth,  Tex.,  paid  Texas  state 
commission  rates,  while  Oklahoma  City 
paid  higher  interstate  mileage  rates. 
The  state  rates  were  not  made  with  the 
intent  to  discriminate  in  favor  of  Texas 
industry,  but  were  part  of  a  general  rate 
schedule.  Oklahoma  City,  however,  suf- 
fered a  disadvantage.  HELD,  that  the 
discrimination  is  not  undue  and  that  the 
Commission  cannot  deal  with  the  situ- 
ation. In  Re  Advances  on  Meats  and 
Packing-house  Products,  23  I.  C.  C.  656, 
664. 

(c)  If  rates  complained  of  are  shown 
by  the  record  to  be  unreasonable  or  dis- 
criminatory, it  is  the  duty  of  Comm's- 
sion  to  so  find,  even  though  such  finding 
may  not  give  relief  to  the  full  extent  de- 
sired by  complainants.  Chatlanooga  Feed 
Co.  V.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  1.  C.  C. 
480,  485. 

(d)  Wherever  a  like  kind  ff  traffic  i& 
transported  from  two  difeerent  points  by 
different  railroads  and  the  commodity 
may  be  delivered  without  the  interven- 
tion of  the  other  road,  the  Commission 
is  powerless  to  declare  an  unequal  rate 
discriminatory,  and  fix  the  reasonable 
charge.  Ashland  Fire  Brick  Co.  v.  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  115,  120. 

(e)  A  carrier  may  doubtless  wrong- 
fully give  a  great  shipper  substantial  ad- 


vantage by  buying  or  renting  his  ware- 
house adjoining  his  factory  and  making 
it  a  public  receiving  station,  and  possi- 
bly, under  the  present  Act,  the  Commis- 
sion would  be  powerless  to  redress  the 
wrong,  if  the  public  made  actual  use  of 
the  station,  unless  the  price  paid  or  the 
rent  reserved  was  excessive  and  the 
transaction  was  therefore  intended  as  an 
unlawful  rebate.  Federal  Sugar  Refining 
Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  200, 
208. 

(f)  The  courts  look  upon  the  Commis- 
sion as  qualified  by  experience  and  from 
the  nature  of  its  duties  to  speak  as  ex- 
perts with  respect  to  the  rates  and  prac- 
tices of  carriers  and  ascribe  to  its  find- 
ings the  weight  and  conclusiveness  that 
are  ordinarily  attached  to  expert  opinion. 
Shippers  may  resort  to  the  Commission 
for  the  redress  of  injuries  arising  out 
of  the  exaction  by  carriers  of  unlawful 
rates,  for  the  correction  of  unlawful  and 
discriminatory  regulations  and  practices 
affecting  rates.  But  the  Commission  was 
not  created  for  the  purpose  of  taking 
the  place  of  the  courts  in  the  disposition 
of  the  vast  number  of  litigated  cases  in 
which  shippers  demand  of  carriers  dam- 
ages of  a  general  nature  arising  from 
unlawful  practices.  Joynes  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17   1.  C.  C.  361,  364,  365. 

(g)  The  Commission  cannot  indulge 
n  speculation  as  to  the  motives  which 
ctuated  carriers  in  fixing  an  adjustment 

of  freight  rates  as  between  various  points 
if  origin,  but  can  only  determine  upon 
:he  facts  and  conditions  wh'^ther  or  not 
the  rates  in  question  are  unreasonable 
or  unjustly  discriminatory.  Grand  Junc- 
tion Mining  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  C.  M.  Ry.  Co., 
16  L  C.  C.  452,  456. 

(h)  Any  regulation  or  practice  that 
withdraws  from  a  shipper  the  equal  op- 
portunity of  using  and  taking  advantage 
of  the  rates  offered  by  a  carrier  to  the 
public  is  clearly  a  regulation  or  practice 
affecting  rates  in  the  sense  in  which  that 
phrase  is  used  in  the  amended  Act  of 
Tune  29,  1906,  section  15.  Rail  and 
River  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  II.  Co.,  14 
I.   C.   C.    86,    89. 

(i)  In  any  case  where  the  published 
rate  is  unjustly  discriminatory,  the  Com- 
mission has  jurisdiction  to  order  repara- 
tion to  shippers  injured  thereby.  Minne- 
apolis Threshing  Machine  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I- 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  128,  130. 


DISCRIMINATION,  §3   (a)— (dd) 


225 


II.     DETERMINATION     OF     DISCRIMI- 
NATION. 

§3.     In  General. 

See  Evidence,  §53  (a);  Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §2  (kkk);  Through 
Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §17  (b) ; 
Transportation,    §12    (b). 

(a)  Manufacturers  of  sash,  doors  and 
blinds  in  Southeastern  and  Mississippi 
Valley  Freight  Association  territories  at- 
tacked the  reasonableness  of  the  rate 
charged  them  on  window  glass  in  car- 
loads shipped  from  Pittsburgh,  and  sought 
to  have  applied  thereon  the  rate  appli- 
cable on  glazed  sash  from  Chicago  to  the 
same  destinations,  Atlanta  and  Chicago 
were  taken  as  representative  southeast- 
ern and  western  points,  respectively;  both 
obtain  their  glass  from  Pittsburgh,  Chi- 
cago paying  18c  for  a  haul  of  4C8  miles 
and  Atlanta  TGc  for  783  miles.  Glazed 
sash  takes  a  rate  of  38c  from  Chicago  to 
Atlanta.  The  southern  manufacturer 
uses  yellow  pine  in  the  manufacture  of 
sash,  doors  and  blinds,  and  the  western 
manufacturer  uses  white  pine,  neither 
wood  having  any  trade  suf^eriority  over 
the  other.  WlJle  the  western  manu- 
facturer formerly  used  to  dominate 
the  southern  markets,  for  the  past  ten 
years  his  sales  have  not  increased,  while 
the  southern  manufacturer's  have  grown 
enormously.  The  western  manufacturer 
in  Chicago  has  to  buy  his  lumber  on  the 
Pacific  coast,  and  this  constitutes  40  per 
cent  of  the  weight  of  the  sash.  The  south- 
ern manufacturer  gets  yellow  pine  at  the 
door  of  the  factory  at  a  negligible  ex- 
pense, and  this  lumber  constitutes  55 
per  cent  of  his  sash.  Taking  into  con- 
sideration the  cost  of  the  raw  material, 
the  southern  manufacturer  has  an  ad- 
vantage of  not  less  than  41c  iu  the  cost 
of  his  glazed  sash  on  the  Atlanta  mar- 
ket. So  far  as  the  rate  on  glass  per  se 
is  concerned,  it  is  lower  than  many 
articles  taking  the  fifth-class  rate — iron 
and  steel,  marble  and  granite,  paint, 
steam  radiators,  asbestos,  stoves  and 
ranges,  glass  battery  jars,  etc.  The  18c 
rate  on  glass  from  Pittsburgh  to  Chicago 
Is  the  fifth-class  rate  between  those 
points.  HELD,  in  determining  whether 
or  not  one  section  has  an  advantage  over 
another  in  marketing  its  products  in  a 
common  territory,  if  more  than  the 
transportation  cost  of  the  finished  article 
be  considered,  the  assembling  cost  of 
only  one  of  the  raw  materials  cannot  be 
taken  and  that  of  another  equally  as  im- 
portant be  ignored,  that  so  far  as  the 
aggregate    relative    transportation    costs 


are  concerned,  the  southern  manufac- 
turer is  at .  no  disadvantage  compared 
with  his  western  competitor  and  no  dis- 
crimination can  be  found  to  result  from 
the  present  rate  adjustment;  neither  can 
it  be  said  that  the  rate  on  window  glass 
from  Pittsburg  is  unreasonable.  Com- 
print d-smissed.  Massee  &  Felton  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  110. 

(aa)  A  railroad  stands  like  every 
other  shipper,  and  it  is  unlawful  to  ap- 
ply one  rule  when  a  shipment  is  for  a 
carrier  and  a  different  rule  when  for  a 
private  individual.  Crescent  Coal  & 
Mining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.  C.  81,  83. 

(b)  Denying  at  Sioux  City  a  back- 
haul privilege  permitted  at  Omaha  does 
not  subject  Sioux  City  to  undue  preju- 
dice, transportation  conditions  not  being 
similar.  Sioux  City  Terminal  Elevator 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
98,  109. 

(bb)  Only  a  difference  in  transporta- 
tion conditions  can  justify  granting  one 
locality  an  advantage  over  another.  R. 
R.  Com.  of  La.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
23  L  C.  C.  31,  41. 

(c)  Because  a  given  town  can  do  a 
comparatively  small  amount  of  business 
is  no  justification  for  excluding  it  from 
the  opportunity  to  get  what  it  can. 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Ashburn  v. 
G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  140,  147. 

(cc)  All  rules,  regulations  and 
charges  affecting  the  ultimate  cost  of 
transportation  must  be  made  with  reason- 
able regard  for  the  nature  of  the  com- 
modity transported  and  without  undue 
discrimination  as  between  localities  or 
shippers,  though  it  has  been  held  that 
the  minimum  cannot  be  fixed  with  re- 
gard to  the  needs  and  desires  of  pur- 
chasers of  products.  Sunderland  Bros. 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
259,  262. 

(d)  Cases  of  alleged  undue  prefer- 
ence or  prejudice  must  be  adjudged  upon 
their  respective  merits,  and  seldom,  if 
ever,  may  such  cases  be  controlled  by 
results  of  other  controversies  supposed 
to  be  of  like  nature.  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce of  Newport  News  v.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
23  L  C.  C.  345,  356. 

(dd)  The  Commission  has  no  power 
to  compel  an  advance  in  rates  in  order 
to    remove    discrimination.      In    Re    Ad- 


226 


DISCRIMINATION,  §3   (e)_(il) 


vances    on    Fresh    Meats    and    Packing- 
house Products,  23  I.  C.  C.  652,  655. 

(e)  Under  specific  rates  in  force, 
grain  from  some  quarters  pays  a  less 
charge  than  it  should,  while  grain  from 
other  quarters  pays  more  than  it  should. 
On  the  whole,  no  material  hardship  re- 
sults, and  in  view  of  the  greater  general 
good,  these  incidental  discriminations 
are  not  undue.  Southern  Illinois  Millers' 
Ass'n  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
672,  676. 

(ee)  The  fact  that  defendant  operates 
a  circuitous  route  is  no  defense  to  a 
charge  of  undue  prejudice  against  mills 
on  its  line,  when  defendant  is  party  to 
through  transportation  from  another 
point  where  a  milling-in-transit  privilege 
is"  accorded  free  of  charge.  Southern 
Illinois  Millers'  Ass'n  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  672,  678. 

(f)  Carriers  may  not  select  certain 
points  of  production  on  their  lines  and 
give  to  them  the  benef/.  of  rates  that 
permit  meeting  competition  of  producers 
located  upon  other  lines,  and  deny  similar 
treatment  to  other  producing  points  upon 
their  lines  that  are  similarly  situated  and 
as  to  which  the  same  and  long-estab- 
lished general  basis  of  rates  applies.  Mil- 
burn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  93,  100. 

(ff)  To  hold  that  a  carrier  may  not 
withdraw  a  rate  found  by  the  Commis- 
sion in  another  case  to  be  unreasonably 
low,  merely  because  that  rate  was  volun- 
tarily established  in  the  first  place,  would 
amount  to  requiring  unjust  preference, 
and  to  setting  aside  the  fundamental 
principle  that  rates  must  be  uniform  un- 
der similar  conditions.  Fairmont  Cream- 
ery Co.  V.  C.  B.  &"Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
252,  254. 

(g)  It  is  unjust  discrimination  to  base 
a  rate  upon  the  use  to  which  the  com- 
modity transported  is  to  be  devoted.  Vir- 
ginia-Carolina Chemical  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  394,  397. 

(gg)  A  rate  cannot  be  confined  in  its 
terms  or  application  to  an  individual  or 
a  class,  Virginia-Carolina  Chemical  Co. 
V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  394,  397. 

(h)  A  preference  or  advantage  which 
Is  bestowed  upon  a  city  by  the  mere 
policy  of  the  carrier  and  not  by  reason 
of  actual  difference  in  condition  is  undue. 
In  Re  Application  of  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
366,  376. 


(hh)  A  railroad  is  justified,  under  the 
law,  in  discriminating  in  favor  of  one 
city  as  against  another,  if  they  are  so 
differently  circumstanced  that  at  one 
point  transportation  forces  are  brought 
into  play  which  are  not  or  cannot  be  ex- 
ercised at  another  point;  but  a  carrier 
is  not  justified  in  deliberately  adopting 
a  policy  of  preference  toward  one  city 
as  against  another.  Only  the  preference 
or  advantage  that  is  due  is  justifiable, 
and  that  advantage  which  is  bestowed 
upon  a  city  by  the  mere  policy  of  the 
carrier  and  not  by  reason  of  actual  differ- 
ence in  conditions  is  undue.  In  Re  Ap- 
plication of  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  366,  375. 

(i)  Complainant  operates  white  lead 
factories  at  Omaha,  Neb.,  and  West  Pull- 
man, 111.,  and  alleged  unjust  discrimination 
in  rates  upon  coke  from  the  Pocahontas 
district,  W.  Va.,  to  Chicago  rate  points, 
of  $2.35  per  ton  "when  for  use  in  blast 
furnaces  for  smelting  iron  from  the  ores," 
and  $2.65  per  ton  when  for  other  uses. 
No  allegation  was  made  that  the  rate  of 
$2.35  per  ton  was  unreasonable  per  se, 
and  it  was  admitted  that  methods  used 
in  manufacturing  white  lead  and  in 
smelting  iron  from  the  ores  were  entirely 
different,  that  there  was  no  competition 
between  manufacturers  of  white  lead  and 
manufacturers  of  pig  iron,  and  that  the 
real  complaint  was  the  defendants  per- 
form identically  the  same  transportation 
service  in  bringing  to  Chicago  a  carload 
of  coke  whether  it  be  used  in  making 
white  lead  or  in  smelting  iron  ores. 
HELD,  that  it  is  unlawful  for  defendants 
to  maintain  different  rates  on  coke,  the 
application  of  which  depends  upon  the 
use  to  which  the  coke  is  put.  No  show- 
ing being  made  that  the  $2.65  rate  is  un- 
reasonable per  se,  reparation  is  denied, 
but  the  defendants  required  to  desist 
from  maintaining  rates  on  coke  based  or 
dependent  upon  the  uses  to  which  the 
coke  is  put.  Carter  White  Lead  Co.  v. 
N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  41. 

(ii)  The  Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  Co.  paid 
to  coal  operators  who  had  sold  their  out- 
put to  the  Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.,  which 
it  owned,  large  sums  of  money  on  ship- 
ments which  such  operators  had  made 
between  Nov.  1,  1900,  and  Aug.  1,  1901, 
on  account  of  a  readjustment  of  freight 
rates  pending  during  that  period  and 
finally  consummated  at  the  end  of  that 
year.  Such  refunds  were  not  made  to 
complainants  who  were  shippers  of  coal 
from  the  same  district.  HEnL<D,  that  as 
complainants  had  paid  higher  rates  than 


DISCRIMINATION,   §3    (J)— (t) 


227 


other  coal  shippers  similarly  situated, 
they  were  unjustly  discriminated  against 
and  damaged,  for  which  reparation  will 
be  awarded.  Meeker  &  Co.  v.  Lehigh 
Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  129,  137. 

(j)  Discrimination  would  result  from 
granting  a  lower  rate  to  a  large  shipper 
providing  facilities  for  prompt  unloading 
than  accorded  a  smaller  competitor  unable 
to  provide  such  facilities.  In  Re  Re- 
stricted Rates.  20  I.  C.  C.  426,  435. 

(jj)  Good  faith  will  not  save  a  trans- 
action from  condemnation  if  it  involves 
unjust  preferences.  .Federal  Sugar  Re- 
fining Co.  V.  h.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
200,   215. 

(k)  Contention  that  complaining  lo- 
cality has  advantage  in  other  territory 
naturally  tributary  to  it  is  no  answer  to  a 
claim  of  inequitable  rate  from  other  lo- 
calities. Sioux  City  Commercial  Club  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  110,  113. 

(kk)  If  complainants  are  entitled  to  a 
particular  rate,  relief  should  not  be 
denied  upon  ground  that  certain  other 
communities  have  been  benefited  or  that 
the  rates  which  they  themselves  enjoy 
to  other  points  have  been  reduced. 
Douglas  Shoe  Co.  v.  Adams  Express  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  539,  541. 

(I)  If  the  basing  i)oint  system  is 
adopted,  it  must  be  applied  alike  to  all 
places  where  real  dissimilarity  of  cir- 
cumstances or  controlling  competition  do 
not  exist.  Columbia  Grocery  Co.  v.  L. 
&  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  502,  505. 

(II)  Where  one  railroad  is  owned  by 
another,  although  operated  entirely 
Feparately,  the  Commission  is  supposed 
to  regard  the  two  railroads  as  one  in 
determining  whether  the  rates  estab- 
lished by  them  unduly  discriminate  be- 
tween different  sections.  Receivers'  & 
Shippers'  Ass'n  of  Cincinnati  v.  C.  N.  O. 
&  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  440,  457. 

(m)  It  is  not  for  the  Commission,  in  a 
search  for  justification  of  an  award  con- 
sented to  by  the  carrier,  to  inquire  in 
respect  to  every  such  transaction  as  to 
whether  or  not  actual  preference  or  prej- 
udice has  resulted  in  harm  to  any  par- 
ticular person.  It  would  be  a  vain  at- 
tempt in  many  cases  to  undertake  to 
ascertain  with  reasonable  certainty  just 
what  has  resulted,  and  who  has  been  in- 
jured by  transactions  of  the  kind.  The 
lawmakers,  assuming  that  such  practice 
would  naturally  result  in  many  instances 
in    favoritism    and    irreparable    wrong, 


have  enacted  the  law  which  adjudges  the 
practice  itself  to  be  wrong  and  forbids  it. 
Armour  Car  Lines  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
461,  463. 

(mm)  Whether  or  not  discrimination 
Is  undue,  is  a  fact  to  be  found,  not  a 
matter  of  law.  Merchants'  Cotton  Press 
&  Storage  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C 
98,  105. 

(n)  Neither  shippers  nor  carriers  can 
evade  the  law  by  means  of  paper  or- 
ganization, nor  would  utmost  good  faith 
justify  a  relation  which  actually  works 
out  a  violation  of  the  law.  Merchants' 
Cotton  Press  &  Storage  Co.  v.  I  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  98,  105. 

(o)  Carriers  might  establish  same 
rates  from  Moundsville  as  from  eastern 
Ohio  district,  and  would  not  be  obliged 
to  give  same  weight  to  every  diJBference 
in  circumstance  and  condition  as  between 
the  two  fields  which  Commission  must 
give  when  called  upon  to  determine 
whether  alleged  discrimination  is  or  is 
not  unjust  or  undue.  Hitchman  Coal  & 
Coke  Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C. 
512,   521. 

(p)  It  is  diflicult  to  determine  that 
one  theory  is  reasonable  and  right  for 
one  manufacturer  or  shipper  and  another 
theory  is  reasonable  and  right  for  an- 
other manufacturer  or  shipper  under  sub- 
stantially similar  circumstances  and  con- 
ditions. Douglas  &  Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  232,  242. 

(q)  Where  an  emergency  condition  re- 
sults in  the  violation  of  general  non-dis- 
criminatory practices  and  rules,  a  case  of 
unjust  discrimination  does  not  arise 
therefrom.  Cozart  v.  S.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.   C.  C.  226,  229. 

(r)  Carriers  are  common  servants  of 
all  shippers  and  are  bound  to  serve  them 
all  reasonably  and  without  undue  prej- 
udice. Avery  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  20,  24. 

(s)  It  is  the  duty  of  a  common  carrier 
to  receive  and  carry  upon  reasonable 
terms,  all  goods  tendered  in  suitable  con- 
dition, and  it  cannot  lawfully  discrimi- 
nate in  favor  of  any  person,  product  or 
locality.  Standard  Lime  &  Stone  Co.  v. 
Cumberland  Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C 
620. 

(t)  It  is  the  duty  of  the  carrier  to 
transport  for  all  without  undue  discrimi- 
nation or  preference.  National  Petro- 
leum Ass'n  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R,  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  473,  476. 


228 


DISCRIMINATION,   §3    (u)— §4    (b) 


(u)  Rates  which  discriminate  against 
one  locality  on  a  particular  road  cannot 
be  justified  on  the  ground  that  they  are 
part  of  a  general  scheme  adopted  by  sev- 
eral roads  entering  the  same  territory. 
Black  Mountain  Coal  Land  Co.  v.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  286,  294. 

(uu)  A  carrier  cannot  lawfully  so 
group  its  mines  with  respect  of  rates  as 
to  unduly  discriminate  against  any  local- 
ity. The  duty  imposed  by  law  is  to  give 
equal  treatment  to  all  shippers  who  are 
in  a  position  to  demand  it,  and  this  in- 
cludes the  right  to  reach  competitive 
markets  on  relatively  equal  terms.  Where 
the  same  carrier  serves  two  districts 
which  by  their  location,  the  character  of 
their  output,  and  distance  from  markets, 
are  in  substantially  similar  circum- 
stances and  conditions,  it  cannot  law- 
fully prefer  one  to  the  other  in  any  man- 
ner whatsoever.  Black  Mountain  Coal 
Land  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  286, 
292. 

(v)  The  effect  upon  any  party,  either 
the  railway  or  the  shipper  cannot  justify 
what  would  otherwise  be  an  unlawful 
rate.  If  an  application  of  rates  to  actual 
conditions  works  a  discrimination  against 
a  local  creamery  in  favor  of  a  centralizer, 
the  rates  are  for  that  reason  unlawful 
and  should  not  be  maintained,  no  matter 
what  the  effect  upon  the  business  or  the 
property  rights  of  the  centralizer  may  be. 
Beatrice  Creamery  Co.  v.  1.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  109,  128. 

(w)  The  public  has  the  right  to  re- 
quire equal  and  uniform  treatment  within 
the  bounds  of  reason.  Darling  &  Co.  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  79,  87. 

(x)  Under  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act,  differential  and  discriminative  rates 
are  allowable  so  long  as  they  are  not 
unjust  and  do  not  operate  unfairly,  and 
the  essence  of  the  Act  is  that,  whatever 
the  rate,  it  shall  be  the  same  to  all  per- 
sons similarly  situated.  Pittsburgh,  etc., 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Mitchell  (Ind.,  1910),  91  N.  E. 
735,  740. 

(y)  What  is  an  undue  or  unreasonable 
preference  or  advantage  under  section  3 
of  the  Act  is  a  question  of  fact,  but,  sub- 
ject to  militating  circumstances,  rates 
ought  to  be  relatively  equal  and  reason- 
able, and  the  carrier  has  no  right  to 
make  rates  so  as  to  overcome  the  natural 
advantages  of  one  place  oyer  another, 
or  so  as  to  build  up  one  place  or  section 
at    the    expense    of    another.      State    v. 


Adams   Express    Co.,    171   Ind.    138,   143, 
85  N.  E.  337  and  966. 

(z)  Independent  of  any  statute — as  a 
part  of  its  common-law  obligation — a  rail- 
road company  is  required  to  treat  its 
patrons  impartially  and  to  avoid  unjust 
discrimination.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  The  New  Era  Milling  Co.,  79  Kan. 
435,  444,  100  P.  273. 

(aa)  An  action  was  brought  to  re- 
cover for  the  amount  paid  defendant  for 
switching  cars  to  plaintiff's  elevator  on 
the  alleged  ground  that  the  exaction 
thereof  was  a  discrimination.  Upon  the 
facts  found  the  trial  court  ordered  judg- 
ment for  $1.  HELD,  a  carrier  is  bound 
to  treat  all  shippers  with  equality  and 
without  discrimination.  It  Is  also  bound, 
unless  there  be  custom  or  contract  to  the 
contrary,  when  it  receives  shipments  in 
carload  lots,  to  make  delivery  at  the  con- 
signee's place  of  business  when  located 
on  its  industrial  tracks,  or  to  connecting 
carriers,  and  switching  roads,  when  the 
consignee's  business  is  located  thereon. 
It  is  not,  however,  bound,  at  its  own 
charge,  to  make  such  delivery  beyond  its 
own  or  leased  tracks.  Banner  Grain  Co. 
V.  Great  N.  Ry.  Co.  (Minn.,  1912),  137 
N.  W.  161,  161. 

§4.     Similar  Conditions. 

See  Allowances,  §8  (3)  (f),  (ff ) ;  Blan- 
Rates,  §8  (aa) ;  Facilities  and  Priv- 
ileges, §2  (a);  Long  and  Short 
Haul,  §12  (2)  (b);  Minlmums,  §7 
(tt),  §8  (h);  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,   §42    (a). 

(a)  Under  section  2  of  the  Act  forbid- 
ding a  discrimination  in  rates  between 
shippers  for  a  haul  under  "like  circum- 
stances and  conditions,"  the  circum- 
stances and  conditions  meant  are  those 
which  arise  within  the  field  of  haulage, 
and  not  those  which  exist  outside.  Penn. 
R  R.  Co.  V.  International  Coal  Mining 
Co.,  173  Fed.  1,  5. 

(aa)  It  is  undue  prejudice  for  a  car- 
rier to  deny  to  points  on  its  line  a  transit 
privilege  at  Chicago  while  participating 
in  through  rates  under  which  other  car- 
riers grant  such  privilege  to  complain- 
ant's competitors  on  their  lines.  Van 
Natta  Bros.  v.  C.  C  C.  v.  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  1,  5. 

(b)  Because  of  additional  expense,  a 
higher  rate  for  delivery  in  one  part  of 
town  than  in  another  may  not  be  unlaw- 
ful. Pierce  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
L  C.  C.  89,  90. 


DISCRIMINATION,  §4  (bb)— (dd) 


229 


(bb)  Where  a  railroad  company  par- 
ticipates in  the  carrying  trade  of  a  cer- 
tain city  and  controls  the  rates  applied 
to  that  trade,  it  is  no  defense  to  a  charge 
of  undue  prejudice  in  rates  to  that  city 
to  say  that  its  rails  do  not  extend  to  such 
city.  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Newport 
News  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  345,  353. 

(c)  The  fact  that  defendant  operates 
a  circuitous  route  is  no  defense  to  a 
charge  of  undue  prejudice  against  mills 
on  its  line  when  defendant  is  party  to 
through  transportation  from  another 
point  where  a  milling-in-transit  privilege 
is  accorded  free  of  charge.  Southern 
Illinois  Millers'  Ass'n  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  672,  678. 

(cc)  The  through  charge  on  coarse 
grains  from  Omaha,  Neb.,  as  a  typical 
point,  to  Atlanta,  Ga.,  as  a  typical  point, 
via  Memphis,  the  shortest  line  and  there- 
for the  one  controlling  the  rate,  was  34c, 
made  up  of  a  proportional  rate  of  I4c 
to  Memphis  and  20c  beyond.  To  enable 
the  Ohio  River  crossings  of  Cairo  and 
Evansville  to  participate  in  the  move- 
ment of  coarse  grains  to  the  Southeast,  it 
was  necessary  to  establish  a  proportional 
rate  of  10c  from  point  of  origin  to  these 
cities,-  as  the  carriers  south  of  the  Ohio 
River  crossings  refused  to  take  less  than 
24c  as  their  .portion  for  the  haul  to  At- 
lanta. Of  this  10c  proportional,  the  car- 
rier from  Ohio  to  St.  Louis  received  8c 
and  those  from  St.  Louis  to  Cairo  and 
Evansville  2c.  In  order  to  enable  the  upper 
Ohio  River  crossings  of  Louisvillo  and 
Cincinnati  to  participate  in  the  traffic, 
the  carriers  south  of  the  Ohio  River 
shrunk  their  proportional  to  22c,  thereby 
giving  the  carriers  between  St.  Louis  and 
Louisville  and  Cincinnati  a  division  of 
4c.  Defendant  carriers  south  of  the  Ohio 
River,  however,  refused  to  shrink  the 
rate  to  22c  on  any  grain  coming  through 
Chicago  or  Cook  county.  Complainants 
attacked  this  provision  as  unjustly  dis- 
criminatory against  Chicago.  Defendants 
had  no  lines  north  of  the  Ohio  River 
crossings  and  received  the  same  com- 
pensation on  grain  moving  through  Cin- 
cinnati and  Louisville  whether  or  not 
such  grain  moved  via  Chicago  or  Cook 
county.  It  is  true  that  defendant  South- 
ern Ry.  and  the  L.  &  N.  Ry.,  in  conjunc- 
tion with  its  lines,  hauled  grain  rorth 
of  the  Ohio  River  from  St.  Louis  to  Louis- 
ville, thence  via  Lexington  to  Cincinnati, 
and  back  over  the  same  rails  from  Cincin- 
nati,   through   Lexington   to    the    South, 


under  the  shrinkage  rate  of  22c  from  Cin- 
cinnati, but  there  was  no  transportation 
reason  justifying  these  out  of  line  and 
back  hauls.  HELD,  the  restriction 
against  Chicago  and  Cook  county  com 
plained  of  was  unjustly  discriminatory 
against  Chicago  and  Cook  county  ship- 
pers and  against  the  carriers  north  of 
the  Ohio  River  participating  in  the  haul 
through  Chicago.  On  the  same  trafflc, 
between  the  same  point  of  origin  and  des- 
tination, a  carrier  may  not  demand  on 
shipments  coming  to  it  from  connecting 
lines  a  rate  that  is  higher  than  it  de- 
mands for  its  haul  between  the  same 
points  over  the  same  rails  on  shipments 
coming  to  it  from  the  same  connecting 
lines,  because  such  connecting  lines  have 
in  the  one  instance  hauled  in  shipments 
via  a  particular  junction  point  on  their 
own  lines,  the  rate  to  the  point  at  which 
it  receives  the  shipments  being  the  same 
via  the  several  routes  and  junction 
points.  (Clements,  Chairman,  and  Har- 
lan, Comm'r,  dissenting.)  Rosenbaum 
Bros.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
62,  65. 

(d)  Rates  from  Chicago  on  vehicles  to  a 
considerable  part  of  the  South  and  South- 
east were  made  and  largely  controlled 
by  the  direct  line  of  the  I.  C.  R.  R.,  the 
short-line  carrier.  Defendants  elected  to 
meet,  via  their  lines  and  the  various  Ohio 
River  and  Virginia  cities  gateways,  the 
rates  so  made  from  Chicago  and  to  ac- 
cord somewhat  similarly  favorable  rate 
adjustments  to  other  points  east  of  Chi- 
cago. They  refused  to  accord  these  rates 
to  traffic  from  Toledo  to  Ohio  River 
crossings  and  to  Virginia  cities  destined 
beyond  these  basing  points  to  the  South 
and  Southeast.  HELD,  that  carriers  may 
not  select  certain  points  of  production 
on  their  lines,  and  give  to  them  the  bene- 
fit of  rates  that  permit  meeting  the  com- 
petition of  producers  Ibcated  upon  other 
lines,  and  deny  similar  treatment  to  other 
producing  lines  upon  their  lines  that  are 
similarly  situated,  and  as  to  which  the 
same  long-established  basis  of  rates  ap- 
plies, and  that  the  practice  indulged  in 
resulted  in  unjust  discrimination.  Mil- 
burn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
22  L  C.  C.  93,  100,  101. 

(dd)  Complainant  attacked  the  class 
rates  and  the  classification  on  spring 
freight  vehicles  and  farm  wagons  and 
carts  from  Toledo  to  Ohio  River  crossings 
and  to  Virginia  cities  on  traffic  destined 
to  the  South  and  Southeast  as  being  un- 
reasonable per  se  and  as  subjecting  To- 


230 


DISCRIMINATION,   §4    (dd) 


ledo  to  unjust  discrimination  in  favor  of 
Chicago  and  Milwaukee,  and  also  as  vio- 
lating the  fourth  and  fifth  sections  of  the 
Act.  Official  Classification  ratings  were 
formerly  applied  from  both  Chicago  and 
Toledo.  There  were  no  proportional  rates 
in  effect  from  either  point  to  Ohio  River 
crossings  or  to  Virginia  cities.  Toledo  was 
accorded  a  rate  to  Cincinnati  85  per  cent 
of  the  Chicago-Cincinnati  rate  and  was 
accorded  to  Virginia  cities  a  rate  of  78  per 
cent  of  the  Chicago- Virginia  cities  rates.  In 
1897  Southern  Classification  rating  was 
applied  from  Chicago  to  Ohio  River 
crossings  and  to  Virginia  cities  upon  the 
commodities  in  question,  but  a  corre- 
sponding change  was  not  made  from 
Toledo.  Subsequently,  the  class  rates 
on  this  trafllc  from  Chicago  to  Ohio  River 
crossings  and  to  Virginia  cities  were  re- 
duced by  the  establishment  of  propor- 
tional rates  governed  by  Southern 
Classification.  Those  proportional  rates 
to  Ohio  River  crossings  were  applicable 
on  shipments  to  points  south  of  the 
states  of  Kentucky  and  Virginia  and  east 
of  the  Illinois  Central  Railroad,  Cairo  to 
Jackson,  and  of  the  Mobile  &  Ohio  Rail- 
road, Jackson  to  Mobile.  Those  to  Vir- 
ginia cities  were  applicable  on  traffic 
destined  to  certain  named  points  in  the 
states  of  Georgia,  North  Carolina,  South 
Carolina  and  Virginia.  Upon  complain- 
ant's demand  proportional  rates  on  farm 
wagons  and  carts,  carloads  and  less  t-^an 
carloads,  were  established  from  Toledo  to 
Cincinnati,  applicable  on  shipments  des- 
tined south  of  Kentucky,  etc.,  those  rates 
being  on  carloads,  12c,  and  on  '^-^  than 
carloads,  17c.  In  1905,  Toledo  was  given 
the  Chicago  basis  to  Ohio  River  cross- 
ings on  farm  wagons  and  carts,  except 
that  the  proportional  rates  from  Chicago 
to  Ohio  River  crossings  were  applicable 
on  shipments  to  points  within  the  state  of 
Mississippi,  while  that  state  was  ex- 
cluded from  the  Toledo  rates.  In  1906, 
Toledo  was  given  the  Chicago  propor- 
tional rate  to  Virginia  cities  on  farm 
wagons  in  carloads.  On  May  1  and  June 
15,  1911,  the  proportional  class  rates  from 
Toledo  and  Ohio  River  crossings  on  farm 
wagons  and  carts  were  withdrawn,  and 
the  class  rates  governed  by  Official  Clas- 
sification were  applied.  The  withdrawal 
of  the  proportional  rates  from  Toledo  to 
Virginia  cities  on  farm  wagons  of  20c  re- 
sulted in  the  application  of  the  Official 
Classification  fifth-class  rate  of  20i/^c. 
The  rates  complained  of  were  in  many  in- 
stances almost  twice  as  high  from  To- 


ledo as  those  in  effect  from  Chicago,  al- 
though the  distance  from  Toledo  was 
much  less.  Complainant  had  severe  com- 
petition with  Chicago  and  other  points  in 
Chicago  territory  in  shipments  to  the 
destinations  in  question  and  sometimes 
lost  its  entire  profit  in  the  effor:  to  over- 
come the  difference  in  rates.  Defendants 
contended  that  the  lower  rates  from  Chi- 
cago to  the  southern  and  southeastern 
territory  in  question  were  established  by 
the  direct  lines,  such  as  the  Illinois  Cen- 
tral R.  R.,  and  that  they  were  merely 
meeting  its  rates.  The  evidence  indi- 
cated, however,  that  defendants  had  not 
only  met  this  competition  as  to  ship- 
ments from  Chicago,  but  as  to  shipments 
from  many  cities  east  of  Chicago  located 
similarly  to  Toledo.  Defendants  ad- 
mitted that  the  adjustment  complained 
of  was  unreasonable  and  worked  a  dis- 
crimination against  Toledo,  but  stated 
they  did  not  wish  to  lower  the  rate  from 
Toledo  until  after  questions  of  differ- 
ences with  southern  carriers  had  been 
settled.  They  further  objected  to  a  low- 
ering of  the  rate  from  Toledo  on  the 
ground  that  they  feared  complaints  might 
arise  from  other  points  in  Central 
Freight  Association  territory  if  Toledo 
were  placed  on  an  equality  with  Chicago. 
HELD,  that  defendants,  since  they  ad- 
mitted the  adjustment  complained  of  to 
be  unreasonable  and  discriminatory,  could 
not  refuse  reasonable  rates  to  Toledo  on 
the  ground  that  other  points  would  de- 
mand like  reductions,  or  on  the  ground 
of  their  inability  to  agree  upon  divisions 
with  southern  carriers;  that  they  were 
not  entitled  to  meet  the  competition  of 
the  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  with  respect  to 
shipments  from  Chicago  and  from  points 
located  in  the  same  territory  as  Toledo, 
and  to  refuse  to  extend  the  lower  com- 
petitive rates  to  Toledo;  that  defendants 
should  establish  rates  from  Toledo  to 
Cincinnati,  Jeffersonville  and  New  Al- 
bany, upon  spring  freight  vehicles,  farm 
wagons  and  carts  destined  to  the  South 
and  Southeast,  which  should  be  no  higher 
than  those  in  effect  from  Chicago  to  these 
stations,  and  that  the  rates  from  To- 
ledo to  Joppa,  Brookport,  Thebes  and 
Cairo,  and  from  Toledo  to  Virginia  cities, 
on  such  traffic  should  not  exceed  the  re- 
duced rates  specified  in  the  opinion.  Evi- 
dence attacking  the  classification  of  the 
commodities  in  question  reviewed,  but  the 
question  left  open  for  decision  in  other 
proceedings  pending  before  the  Commis- 
sion.      Reparation     awarded.       Milburn 


msCRIMINATION,  §4  (e)— (ee) 


231 


Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  93. 

(e)  The  rates  on  cottonseed  on  the 
St.  L.  S.  W.  R.  R.  as  far  north  as  Illmo, 
Mo.,  and  on  the  Cairo  and  New  Madrid 
branches  and  the  Paragould  Southeastern 
and  Pine  Bluff  Arkansas  River  Railways, 
were  complained  of  as  unreasonable  and 
discriminatory  in  favor  of  St.  Louis  and 
East  St.  Louis  against  Memphis.  In  20 
1.  C.  C.  33,  the  Commission  condemned 
rates  on  cottonseed  to  Memphis  from 
Missouri,  Louisiana  and  Arkansas  points. 
The  points  here  involved  were  not  before 
the  Commission  on  account  of  a  mistake 
of  the  complainant.  It  was  conceded  that 
complainant  is  not  interested  in  the  rates 
north  of  Bernie,  Mo.  The  rates  as  far 
north  as  Maiden,  Mo.,  were  before  the 
Commission  before.  The  rates  north  of 
Maiden  to  Illmo  were  10c  per  100  lbs. 
to  St.  Louis  and  15c  to  Memphis.  From 
Bernie  and  from  all  points  on  the  Cairo 
and  New  Madrid  branches  the  distance 
to  St.  Louis  and  Memphis  is  the  same. 
Defendant  St.  L.  S.  W.  R.  R.  did  not 
seriously  object  to  extending  the  rate 
fixed  by  the  Commission  for  Maiden  to 
Bernie.  The  Paragould  Southeastern 
Ry.  extends  from  its  connection  with  the 
St.  L.  S.  W.  R.  R.  at  Paragould  38  miles 
into  Arkansas.  The  Pine  Bluff  Arkansas 
River  Ry.  connects  with  the  St.  L.  S.  W. 
R.  R.  at  Rob  Roy,  Ark.,  and  extends  24 
miles  into  Arkansas.  Both  roads  are 
controlled  by  the  St.  L.  S.  W.  R.  R.  All 
points  on  them  are  nearer  Memphis  than 
St.  Louis.  In  the  former  proceeding  the 
rate  from  Paragould  was  fixed  not  to  ex- 
ceed 12i^c,  with  a  Ic  raise  for  branch 
line  points.  The  reasonable  rate  from 
Roy  Roy  was  fixed  at  121/20.  HELD,  the 
rate  from  points  north  of  Maiden  should 
not  exceed  12i/^c  for  main  line  and  13i/^c 
for  branch  line  points.  The  rates  from 
branch  line  points  on  the  Paragould  and 
the  Pine  Bluff  Arkansas  River  Railway 
should  not  exceed  13i/4c.  Reparation 
denied.  Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v.  St. 
L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  537. 

(ee)  The  rates  on  cottonseed  from 
various  points  on  defendants'  lines  in 
Missouri  and  Oklahoma  and  Louisiana  to 
Memphis,  Tenn.,  were  attacked  as  unrea- 
sonable per  se,  and  as  discriminatory  in 
favor  of  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  and  East  St. 
Louis,  111.,  and  various  mill  points  in  Ar- 
kansas, Louisiana  and  Oklahoma.  Com- 
plainants contended  that  these  rates 
should  be  established  on  a  distance  basis 


using  the  rates  of  the  "Arkansas  court 
tariff."  Several  years  ago  the  Arkansas 
intrastate  rates  were  fixed  in  accordance 
with  a  suggestion  of  the  federal  court  as 
a  compromise  rate.  All  of  the  roads 
except  the  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  and  the 
St.  L.  S.  W,  R.  R.  agreed  to  try  these 
rates  for  one  year.  At  the  expiration  of 
the  year  the  carriers  asked  for  a  rein- 
statement of  their  former  cases  and  they 
are  now  in  litigation.  The  Merchants' 
Freight  Bureau  of  Arkansas  and  the  Ar- 
kansas Cottonseed  Association  intervened, 
resisting  especially  the  petition  to  have 
the  Arkansas  court  tariff  taken  as  a  basis 
for  interstate  rates.  It  appeared  that  more 
cottonseed  is  crushed  at  Memphis  than  any 
other  point,  due  to  its  central  location.  It 
appeared  the  strongest  competition  the 
Memphis  dealers  met  in  the  purchase  of 
cottonseed  was  that  of  St.  Louis  and  East 
St.  Louis  mills,  especially  at  points  on 
the  Frisco  lines.  The  competition  at  sta- 
tions on  the  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  was 
principally  from  local  mills.  Shipments 
on  the  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  were  made 
on  commodity  rates  lower  than  the  class 
rates  in  effect  to  Memphis.  The  St.  L. 
I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  explained  this  by  saying 
that  Memphis  was  provided  with  a  full 
line  of  commodity  rates  from  Arkansas, 
Louisiana  and  Oklahoma  points.  Its 
main  supply  was  obtained  at  low  rates 
from  Arkansas,  whereas  St.  Louis  was 
limited  to  southeastern  Missouri  and 
northern  Arkansas.  Rates  to  Arkansas 
local  points  were  fixed  by  the  court  tariff, 
while  rates  to  Memphis  were  the  higher 
ones  voluntarily  established  under  inter- 
state rates.  Rates  to  St.  Louis  are  much 
lower  per  mile  than  to  Memphis.  De- 
fendants admitted  that  St.  Louis  rates 
were  "absurdly"  low.  The  St.  L.  I.  M. 
&  S.  Ry.  declared  it  was  prevented  from 
raising  St.  Louis  rates  by  complaints 
from  St.  Louis.  The  Frisco  lines  de- 
fended their  rates  as  competitive  only. 
No  cottonseed  moved  to  Kansas  City 
now  via  the  Frisco  lines.  Mills  located 
at  Kansas  City  or  St.  Louis  are  so  far 
from  cotton  territory  that  they  cannot 
survive  on  reasonable  rates.  St.  Louis 
mills  were  established  when  the  industry 
was  young  and  not  strongly  competitive. 
A  statement  of  movement  of  cars  of  cot- 
tonseed on  the  Frisco  lines  from  Missouri 
points  for  the  year  1910-1911  showed  41 
to  Memphis,  121  to  Bast  St.  Louis,  and  61 
to  St.  Louis,  at  an  average  distance  of 
112,  213  and  214  miles,  respectively. 
I  Many   rates   complained   of   were   estab- 


232 


DISCRIMINATION,   §4    (f)— (g) 


lished  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  local 
mills.  The  Frisco  lines  alleged  that  the 
rates  were  not  higher  than  the  Texas 
commission  rates  on  the  interstate  Okla- 
homa, Arkansas,  Missouri  rates.  Rates 
are  shown  to  be  higher  to  Memphis  than 
rates  on  lines  east  of  Memphis.  By  the 
Commission's  statistics  of  railways  it  ap- 
peared that  the  average  rate  per  ton 
mile  east  of  Memphis  is  8.15  mills,  while 
the  Frisco  lines  get  9.79  mills;  that  the 
average  density  of  traffic  on  the  east 
side  is  817,839,  while  that  of  the  Frisco 
lines  are  513,085  tons.  Similarly  group  5, 
embracing  the  east  side,  shows  an  8.24- 
mill  rate  and  a  629,050  tonnage  density, 
as  compared  with  group  8,  embracing 
the  west  side  roads,  showing  a  rate  of 
9.81  mills  and  a  density  of  508,557  tons. 
Prior  to  1900  the  voluntary  rate  to  Mem- 
phis was  lower.  Milling  points  and 
points  to  which  the  seed  and  its  prod- 
ucts go  are  largely  controlled  by  the  own- 
ership of  the  gins  and  mills  irrespective 
of  slightly  higher  freight  rates.  The  ca- 
pacity of  mills  greatly  exceeded  the  sup- 
ply. Mills  operate  only  five  months  of  the 
year.  Other  mills  are  being  erected  by 
manufacturers  who  use  the  products.  A 
bridge  arbitrary  of  l^/^c  per  100  lbs.  is 
imposed  on  defendants.  Rates  from 
southeastern  Missouri  to  St.  Louis  are 
state  rates,  not  fixed  by  state  authorities. 
HELD,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  Ar- 
kansas rate  is  still  in  litigation  and  the 
St.  Louis  mills  must  necessarily  go 
further  for  their  supply,  neither  the  Ar- 
kansas nor  Missouri  rates  should  apply. 
The  rates  to  Memphis  now  in  force  on 
the  Iron  Mountain  lines  are  unreasonable 
in  so  far  as  they  exceed  the  rates  in  the 
table  incorporated  in  the  opinion,  and  it 
is  further  found  that  the  rates  on  the 
Iron  Mountain  to  Memphis  points  from 
points  on  its  Oklahoma  division,  Green- 
wood Junction  to  Seminole,  inclusive, 
are  discriminatory  in  favor  of  St.  Louis, 
and  that  the  rates  on  the  Frisco  to 
Memphis  are  unreasonable  and  discrimi- 
natory in  so  far  as  they  exceed  the  rates 
prescribed  in  the  opinion.  Reparation 
denied.  Memphis  Freight  Bureau  vs.  St. 
L.  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co..  22  I.  C.  C.  548,  555. 
(f)  On  carloads  of  ties  treated  by  the 
creosote  process  at  Southport,  La.,  a 
point  within  the  switching  limits  of  New 
Orleans,  complainant  was  assessed  from 
New  Orleans  to  East  St.  Louis  a  yellow 
pine  lumber  rate  of  20c  per  100  lbs., 
amounting  to  36c  per  tie.  Complainant's 
competitor  obtained  the  crude  ties  from 


New  Orleans,  treated  them  with  a  "rup- 
ing"  process  at  Carbondale,  111.,  under  a 
transit  privilege  and  shipping  the  same 
to  East  St.  Louis  was  accorded  a  rate  of 
14c  for  the  entire  haul.  The  cost  of  the 
haul  of  the  ties  to  the  carrier  was  60 
per  cent  less  than  for  a  similar  haul  of 
lumber,  68  per  cent  of  the  ties  moving 
northward  in  coal  cars.  A  tie  treated 
with  the  processes  applied  by  complain- 
ant was  increased  in  weight  approxi- 
mately 30  lbs.,  so  as  to  make  the  aver- 
age weight  180  lbs.  The  distance  via 
Carbondale  was  substantially  the  same 
as  that  by  the  route  over  which  the  ship- 
ments of  complainant  moved,  but  defend- 
ant accorded  the  14c  rate  only  where 
the  shipments  from  New  Orleans  to  East 
St.  Louis  moved  into  and  out  of  Car- 
bondale. HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was 
unjustly  discriminatory  and  unreasonable 
to  the  extent  it  exceeded  16.8c  per  tie. 
Reparation  awarded.  American  Creosote 
Works  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C. 
212. 

(ff )  Complainant,  manufacturer  of  rail- 
road ties  at  New  Orleans,  La.,  had  a  com- 
petitor located  at  Granada,  Miss.,  a  point 
300  miles  from  New  Orleans  and  100 
miles  south  of  Memphis,  Tenn.  Defend- 
ants put  into  effect  a  rate  of  lie  per  tie 
from  New  Orleans  to  Memphis  for  the 
special  benefit  of  complainant's  com- 
petitor. Complainant  entered  into  con- 
tracts to  deliver  ties  while  the  lie  rate 
was  in  effect,  and  defendants  withdrew 
said  rate,  leaving  a  rate  of- 13c  applicable 
from  New  Orleans  to  Memphis.  They 
thereafter  accorded  to  complainant's  com- 
petitor at  Granada  a  rate  of  10c  per  tie 
and  extended  this  rate  as  far  south  as 
Montgomery,  Miss.,  a  point  133  miles 
from  New  Orleans.  Complainant  was 
obliged  to  cancel  its  contract  of  sale  and 
suffered  large  damages  from  loss  of  busi- 
ness. HELD,  defendants  were  guilty  of 
unjust  discrimination.  The  Commission 
cannot  sanction  any  theory  of  rate  mak- 
ing on  which  a  rate  is  published  with  the 
intention  of  having  it  used  only  by  one 
shipper,  or  only  for  articles  to  be  em- 
ployed in  a  special  undertaking,  and  can- 
celing it  when  it  is  discovered  that  the 
rate  is  to  be  shipped  under  by  others. 
American  Creosote  Works  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  212,  215. 

(g)  Difference  in  rates  in  both  direc- 
tions is  not  controlling  of  reasonableness 
nor  of  necessity  a  discrimination.  Littel 
V.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  187,  189. 


DISCRIMINATION,  §4   (gg)— (k) 


233 


(gg)  On  nails,  barbed  wire,  staples, 
wire,  syrup  and  sugar  from  San  Fran- 
cisco to  Alturas,  Cal.,  and  on  roofing  and 
roofing  coating  from  Paraffin,  Cal.,  to 
Alturas,  complainant  was  assessed  $34.40 
per  ton.  Defendants,  at  the  time  ship- 
ments moved,  charged  a  proportional  rate 
of  only  $31.40  for  traffic  destined  to  points 
beyond  Alturas  and  carried  to  said 
points  by  wagon.  Shortly  after  the  ship- 
ments in  question,  defendants  canceled 
said  proportional  rates,  and  established 
a  rate  of  $33.00  from  said  California 
points  to  Alturas,  to  conform  to  a  rule 
of  the  Commission  that  rail  carriers  sub- 
ject to  the  Act  should  not  carry  lower 
rates  to  a  railway  point  in  connection 
with  a  transportation  company  not  sub- 
ject to  the  Act  than  to  the  same  point 
for  delivery  there.  The  $34.40  rate  com- 
plained of  was  not  attacked  as  unreason- 
able. HELD,  the  reparation  demanded 
to  the  extent  of  $3.00  per  ton  should  be 
denied,  since  the  rate  attacked  was  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable,  and  since  the 
dealers  at  points  beyond  Alturas,  being 
required  to  pay  for  a  team  haul  of  from 
20  to  40  miles,  had  no  undue  advantage 
over  Alturas  merchants.  Lauer  &  Son  v. 
S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  109,  111. 

(h)  Complainant  attacked  the  local 
rates  of  the  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  from  Chi- 
cago to  Des  Moines  as  being  unreason- 
able and  unduly  preferential  to  Minneap- 
olis and  St.  Paul.  The  second  and  third 
class  rates  to  Des  Moines  were  the  same 
as  to  St.  Paul  and  the  Class  E  rate  was 
lower.  HELD,  the  rates  in  themselves 
were  not  unreasonable  except  as  to  first 
class,  which  should  be  reduced  from  68c 
to  60c.  Greater  Des  Moines  Committee 
V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  57. 

(hh)  The  Santa  Fe  allowed  a  rate  of  10c 
on  barbed  wire,  wire  nails,  wire  staples 
and  wire  fencing,  in  carloads,  from  El 
Paso,  Tex.,  to  Las  Cruces,  N.  M.,  when 
brought  into  El  Paso  over  its  lines,  but 
charged  a  rate  of  30c  when  brought  into 
El  Paso  over  the  lines  of  other  carriers. 
To  take  advantage  of  the  10c  rate,  the 
shipper  might  keep  the  goods  at  El  Paso 
as  long  as  he  desired,  and  the  rate  would 
be  accorded  to  him  upon  shipment  of  the 
same  to  Las  Cruces,  provided  only  the 
goods  were  originally  shipped  into  El 
Paso  over  defendant's  lines.  HELD,  such 
a  rate  was  not  in  any  sense  a  proportional 
rate,  could  not  be  sanctioned  as  a  transit, 
reconsignment  or  diversion  privilege,  and 
was  unlawful,  being  merely  a  device  to 
compel  shippers  to  send  their  goods  into 


El  Paso  over  defendant's  road.  Bascom 
Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
354,  357. 

(i)  When  discrimination  is  alleged 
to  exist  between  two  localities,  market 
competition  at  the  favored  point,  and 
failure  of  competitive  relationship  be- 
tween the  two  points  in  respect  of  the 
commodity  involved  may  justify  different 
rates.  Southern  Bitulithic  Co.  v.  I.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  300. 

(ii)  Dissimilarity  of  circumstances 
and  conditions  may  justify  a  discriminar 
tion  which  is  not  undue.  Sondheimer 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  60,  64. 

(j)  Carrier  must  accord  to  points  on 
its  own  line  which  are  entitled  to  similar 
treatment  equal  facilities  of  shipment 
and  relatively  equal  rates.  Sondheimer 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  60,  64. 

(jj)  On  two  cars  of  bran  from  Salina, 
Kan.,  via  Holdenville,  to  Hugo,  Okla., 
complainant  was  charged  34c.  The  rate 
via  Wister  was  17c  from  Salina  to  Wister, 
plus  71/^c  from  Wister  to  Hugo.  The  17c 
rate  from  Salina  to  Wister  was  the  maxi- 
mum rate,  and  the  distance  tariff  be- 
tween those  points  was  23c.  The  rate 
from  Salina  to  Forney,  Okla.,  the  latter 
point  being  6  miles  from  Hugo  and  on  de- 
fendant's line,  was  23c.  The  24^c  rate 
from  Salina  to  Hugo  yielded  8  mills  per 
ton  mile.  HELD,  complainant  was  en- 
titled to  the  17c  rate  from  Salina  to 
Wister,  plus  the  7i/^c  rate  thence  to 
Hugo.  Reparation  awarded.  Lee-Warren 
Milling  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  422,  423. 

(k)  Complainant,  coal  operator  at 
Louisville,  Colo.,  on  the  C.  &  S.  Ry.,  20 
miles  northwest  of  Denver,  attacked  the 
rates  on  lignite  coal  from  Louisville, 
Colo.,  to  points  on  the  Rock  Island  in  Kan- 
sas, Nebraska,  Missouri,  Iowa  and  Okla- 
homa as  being  unduly  preferential  to 
operators  at  Roswell,  Colo.,  and  unduly 
discriminatory  against  Lou'sville.  The 
Rock  Island-  branch  from  Roswell  joins 
the  main  line  from  Denver  at  Limon, 
which  is  76  miles  from  Roswell  and  109 
miles  from  Denver.  On  coal  from  Louis- 
ville to  Council  Bluffs,  la.,  for  example, 
604  miles,  the  rate  was  $3.30,  80c  of  which 
rate  was  charged  by  the  C.  &  S.  Ry. 
for  the  20-mile  haul  from  Louisville  to 
Denver.  The  rates  from  Roswell  and 
Denver  were  the  same,  so  that  the  Louis- 
ville rate  exceeded  the  Roswell  rates  by 
80c.  The  rates  from  the  Walsenburg  dis- 
trict on  coal  of  a  higher  grade  than  the 


234 


DISCRIMINATION,  §4    (1)— (m) 


Louisville  coal  were  lower  to  most  of 
the  points  in  question  than  those  from 
Louisville.  The  evidence  indicated  that 
Louisville  was  unable  to  move  its  coal 
at  the  rates  attacked.  HELD,  the  80c 
rate  from  Louisville  to  Denver  was  un- 
reasonable in  view  of  the  shortness  of 
the  haul,  in  proportion  to  the  total  haul, 
and  that  the  rate  from  Louisville  should 
not  exceed  that  from  Denver  and  Ros- 
well  by  more  than  40c,  rates  on  mine- 
run  and  slack  coal  to  be  adjusted  on  a 
similar  basis.  Northern  Coal  &  Coke 
Co.  V.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  369, 
372,  373. 

(1)  Complainants,  Indianapolis  ship- 
pers, attacked  defendant's  rates  to  Okla- 
homa points  as  unduly  discriminatory  in 
favor  of  Chicago.  The  rate  from  Chicago 
to  Oklahoma  points  was  constructed  by 
adding  to  the  St.  Louis  rate  to  these 
points  an  arbitrary  Chicago  to  St.  Louis 
differential,  the  rates  from  St.  Louis  to 
Oklahoma  points  being  based  on  dis- 
tances. In  the  division  of  the  through 
rate  from  Chicago,  however,  the  roads 
performing  the  haul  to  St.  Louis  received 
a  greater  proportion  than  was  expressed 
by  the  differential.  The  average  short- 
line  distance  from  Indianapolis  to  Okla- 
homa points  was  somewhat  less  than 
from  Chicago.  Several  through  lines 
reached  Oklahoma  from  Chicago,  while 
from  Indianapolis  the  service  was  per- 
formed by  two  or  more  connecting  car- 
riers. Chicago  enjoyed  through  rates 
constructed  on  the  differential  basis  to 
Kansas,  as  well  as  to  Texas  points, 
whereas  from  Indianapolis  the  through 
rates  from  Kansas  were  made  up  of  the 
combination  of  locals  via  Mississippi 
River  crossings,  resulting  in  the  appli- 
cation of  somewhat  higher  aggregate 
charges  than  from  Chicago.  To  Texas 
points  the  rates  from  Indianapolis  were 
the  same  as  from  Chicago.  It  appeared 
that  to  points  in  northern  Oklahoma 
there  was  a  tendency  to  preserve  the  dif- 
ferences between  Chicago  and  Indian- 
apolis rates  which  existed  4n  the  rates 
from  Chicago  and  Indianapolis  to  Kan- 
sas points,  on  account  of  the  proximity 
of  northern  Oklahoma  to  Kansas.  The 
tendency  as  to  southern  Oklahoma 
points  was  to  equalize  the  rates  from 
Chicago  and  Indianapolis  on  account  of 
the  equality  of  rates  from  Chicago  and 
Indianapolis  to  Texas  points.  Indianap- 
olis had  a  differential  basis  to  Texas, 
Arkansas  and  Louisiana  points.  HELD, 
the  class  rates  from  Indianapolis,  since 
exceeding    substantially   the   rates   from 


Chicago  to  Vinita,  Muskogee,  Wagoner, 
Claremore,  McAlester,  Newkirk,  Pawnee 
and  group  points  of  said  cities,  should  be 
reduced  by  specified  figures;  that  the 
class  rates  from  Indianapolis  to  Chandler, 
Guthrie  and  Oklahoma  City  should  not 
be  disturbed,  and  that  commodity  carload 
rates  on  roasted  coffee,  furniture,  kitchen 
safes,  iron  and  steel  articles,  stoves  and 
woodenware  from  Indianapolis  to  group 
points  in  Oklahoma  should  not  exceed  the 
Chicago  rates  by  more  than  5c,  4c,  Ic,  4c, 
4c  and  5c,  respectively,  and  that  rates  on 
similar  articles,  including  machinery  for 
coal  mines,  from  Indianapolis  to  Mus- 
kogee should  not  exceed  those  from  Cin- 
cinnati. Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v. 
C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  254, 
264,  266,  269,  270. 

(m)  Complainants,  shippers  of  Indian- 
apolis, attacked  the  class  rates  from  In- 
dianapolis to  Missouri  River  points,  viz., 
Kansas  City,  St,  Joseph,  Mo.,  Leaven- 
worth, Atchison,  Kan.,  and  Omaha,  Neb., 
per  se,  and  as  compared  with  rates  from 
Chicago  to  same  destinations.  Rates 
from  Indianapolis  to  Missouri  River 
points  were  made  by  using  the  Missis- 
sippi River  as  a  basing  line  and  adding  the 
Indianapolis  to  East  St.  Louis,  111.,  local 
rates  to  the  local  rates  beyond,  the  rates 
to  East  St.  Louis  being  used  as  bases  in 
making  up  the  through  rate  to  be  ap- 
plied via  any  Mississippi  River  crossing 
between  East  St.  Louis  and  Dubuque,  la. 
Local  rates  from  Indianapolis  to  East  St. 
Louis  were  38c,  32i^c,  24c,  le^^c,  W^c 
for  classes  1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  respectively. 
Through  rates  from  Chicago  to  Missouri 
River  points  were  constructed  by  adding 
arbitrary  differentials  to  the  local  rates 
from  Mississippi  River  crossings  to  Mis- 
souri River  points.  These  differentials 
were  20c,  20c,  10c,  5c,  5c,  for  classes  1, 
2,  3,  4,  5,  respectively.  The  local  rates 
from  Mississippi  River  crossings  to  Mis- 
souri River  crossings  were  60c.  45c,  35c, 
27c,  22c,  for  classes  1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  respec- 
tively. The  local  rates  from  Chicago  to 
various  Mississippi  River  crossings  were 
greatly  in  excess  of  the  Chicago  differ- 
entials. The  division  of  the  rate  from 
Chicago  to  the  Missouri  River  via  East 
St.  Louis  was  45  per  cent  to  lines  east 
of  that  crossing  and  55  per  cent  to  lines 
west  thereof,  thereby  giving  the  lines 
east  a  proportion  greater  than  the  afore- 
said Chicago  differential  as  to  lines  west 
of  the  Mississippi  River  less  than  their 
local  rates.  On  traffic  from  Indianapolis 
the  connecting  roads  west  of  the  river 
received  their  full  local  rates.    The  short 


DISCRIMINATION,   §4    (mm)— (oo) 


236 


line  distance  from  Chicago  to  the  Mis- 
sissippi River  was  135  miles,  and  from 
Indianapolis  242  miles.  The  rates  at- 
tacked yielded  a  revenue  per  ton  mile 
on  the  average  short  line  haul  of  524 
miles  from  Indianapolis  to  Missouri  River 
points  of  3.74c,  first  class;  2.96c  second 
class;  2.25c,  third  class;  1.66c,  fourth 
class;  1.35c,  fifth  class.  The  Chicago  to 
Missouri  River  points  rates,  an  average 
haul  of  484  miles,  yielded  per  ton  mile 
3.3c,  first  class;  2.68c,  second  class; 
1.8Gc,  third  class;  1.32c,  fourth  class; 
1.12c,  fifth  class.  The  lines  east  of  the 
Mississippi  River  from  Indianapolis  were 
in  a  position  to  compel  the  lines  west  of 
the  river  to  concede  them  a  portion  of 
their  local  rates  on  the  through  haul, 
but  did  not  do  so,  since  they  themselves 
were  receiving  full  local  rates.  The  lines 
west  of  the  Mississippi  River  on  traflBc 
originating  at  Chicago  and  destined  to 
many  western  and  southwestern  points 
abandoned  the  Mississippi  River  as  a 
basing  line  and  did  not  charge  full  local 
rates  for  the  haul  west  of  said  river. 
HELD,  the  rates  attacked  were  unrea- 
sonably high  and  prejudicial  to  Indian- 
apolis in  favor  of  Chicago;  that  the  por- 
tion of  the  through  rate  between  the 
Mississippi  River  and  Missouri  River  on 
traffic  from  Indianapolis  to  Missouri 
River  points  should  not  exceed  55c.  41c, 
32c,  25c,  20c  for  first,  second,  third, 
fourth  and  fifth  class,  respectively;  and 
that  the  Indianapolis  to  Missouri  River 
rates  should  not  exceed  the  Chicago  to 
Missouri  River  rates  by  more  than  13c, 
12c,  lie,  10c  and  7c  for  classes  1,  2,  3, 
4  and  5,  respectively.  (Prouty,  Comm'r, 
dissenting  as  to  class  rates.)  Indianap- 
olis Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  56,  63,  64,  65. 

(mm)  A  water  port  is  entitled  to  what- 
ever advantage  it  can  obtain  through 
transportation  by  water,  but  its  location 
does  not  entitle  it  to  lower  rates  by 
rail,  and  although  such  preference  may 
lawfully  be  accorded  by  a  carrier  in  the 
protection  of  its  own  interests,  it  should 
not  be  required,  except  in  cases  where 
manifest  wrong  would  otherwise  result. 
Darling  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.  C.  79,  87. 

(n)  Where  the  same  carrier  serves 
two  districts  which  are  in  substantially 
similar  circumstances  and  condition,  the 
serving  carrier  cannot  lawfully  prefer 
one  in  any  manner  whatsoever.  Black 
Mountain  Coal  Land  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
15  L  C.  C.  286,  293. 


(nn)  Every  locality  competing  in  a 
common  market  is  entitled  to  rates 
which  are  relatively  reasonable  and  Just 
in  comparison  with  rates  from  other  lo- 
calities served  by  the  same  carrier. 
Black  Mountain  Coal  Land  Co.  v.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,   15   I.   C.   C.   286,   294. 

(o)  Complainant,  manufacturer  of 
burlap  bags  at  New  York  City  and  vi- 
cinity, attacked  the  application  of  fourth 
class  and  third  class  rates  to  burlap 
bags  in  carloads  and  less  than  carloads, 
respectively,  from  New  York  to  Chicago 
and  points  in  Central  Freight  Association 
territory.  Said  rates  amounted  to  35c 
and  48c.  carloads  and  less  than  carloads, 
respectively,  from  New  York  to  Chicago. 
Burlaps  were  imported  and  tne  inland 
portion  of  the  import  rate  from  New  York 
to  Chicago  was  18c.  The  rates  had  been 
in  effect  for  many  years.  Cotton  bagging 
was  about  twice  the  value  of  burlap  and 
moved  under  second  class  rates.  The 
value  of  a  car  of  burlap  bags  was  about 
$2,300  and  the  freight  thereon  under  the 
30,000  pounds  minimum  was  $105.  The 
process  of  manufacture  added  only  5  per 
cent  to  the  value  of  the  raw  material 
and  the  profit  was  about  2  per  cent, 
making  it  impossible  for  complainants 
to  sell  in  the  middle  west  in  competi- 
tion with  manufacturers  in  said  terri- 
tory. The  import  rate  on  burlaps  to 
Chicago  was  12c  from  New  Orleans,  15c 
from  Montreal  and  16c  from  Boston.  The 
said  18c  import  rate  from  New  York  to 
Chicago  was,  therefore,  compelled  by 
competition.  HELD,  that  the  35c  rate 
attacked  was  not  unreasonable  or  un- 
justly discriminatory  against  complain- 
ants. Percy  Kent  Co,  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  439,  440,  441. 

(oo)  Complainant  manufacturer  of 
fertilizer  attacked  the  rates  on  phosphate 
rock  from  the  mines  in  the  Centerville 
and  Mount  Pleasant  districts  in  Ten- 
nessee, to  Chicago,  111.;  Indianapolis,  Ind.; 
Dayton,  Columbus,  Cleveland,  Canton 
and  Sandusky,  O.;  Detroit.  Mich.;  Buf- 
falo, N.  Y.,  and  Pittsburgh,  Pa.  Prior 
to  November,  1907,  the  rates  from  Mt. 
Pleasant  to  these  cities  were  $3.40,  $3, 
$2.95.  $3.20,  $3.32,  $3.55,  $3.27,  $3.32, 
$3.92  and  $4.10,  respectively.  Under  the 
advances  complained  of  the  rates  were 
$3.95,  $3.50,  $3.30,  $3.65,  $4.05,  $4.10,  $4.05. 
$4.10,  $4.50  and  4.45,  respectively.  These 
rates,  in  effect  prior  to  Nevember,  1907, 
had  been  in  force  for  eight  years.  De- 
fendant contended  that  the  former  rates 


DISCRIMINATION.  §4  (oo) 


were  unreasonably  low  and  were  made 
for  the  purpose  of  inducing  the  7nove- 
ment  of  phosphate  rock  from  the  Ten- 
nessee fields  in  competition  with  fields 
in  Florida  and  North  Carolina.  The  same 
rates  were  necessary  at  the  time  of  the 
hearing,  however,  to  move  the  commodity 
in  competition  with  Florida  and  North 
Carolina,  and  defendants  were  not  war- 
ranted in  putting  in  a  rate  materially 
lower  at  the  outset  than  Ihey  intended 
to  maintain  subsequently.  The  value  of 
the  rock  was  greater  at  the  time  of  the 
hearing  than  at  the  time  of  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  old  rates.  Tne  openin^ 
of  the  Tennessee  mines  under  these  old 
rates  made  it  possible  to  transport  rock 
Into  the  middle  West  and  led  to  the  es- 
tablishment of  the  complainants'  fertilizer 
plants  at  the  destinations  in  questici. 
Fertilizer  sold  at  from  $15  to  $20  per 
ton,  so  that  the  advance  attacked  did  not 
80  add  to  the  cost  of  manufacture  as  to 
imperil  or  seriously  affect  the  business  of 
complainants.  The  Florida  rock,  on  ac- 
count of  ocean  transportation,  occupied 
all  the  territory  east  of  the  Buffalo-Pitts- 
burgh line  to  the  almost  complete  exclu- 
sion of  other  phosphate  rock.  At  Cleve- 
land, Sandusky  and  Detroit  it  was  also 
used  in  very  large  quantities.  Inasmuch 
as  the  complainants  were  in  many  in- 
stances the  owners  of  Tennessee  mines, 
the  advances  in  rates  to  Pittsburgh,  Buf- 
falo and  other  lake  ports  seriously  af- 
fected their  ability  to  sell  in  those  mar- 
kets. Complainants  made  comparisons 
with  the  rates  on  commodities  some- 
what similar  to  phosphate  rock,  but  did 
not  show  that  the  rates  used  as  com- 
parisons were  themselves  reasonably 
high.  Under  the  old  rates  the  per-ton- 
mile  yield  was  from  4  mills  to  6.5  mills 
north  of  the  Ohio  River,  and  from  6 
to  10  mills  south  of  that  river.  Under 
the  rates  attacked,  the  per  ton  mile 
equaled  or  exceeded  the  average  rate  per 
ton  mile  from  all  the  business  of  the 
railways  transporting  the  traffic.  Phos- 
phate rock  is  desirable  freight.  Its  value 
was  from  $4  to  $5  per  ton  mile,  at  the 
mine.  It  loads  readily  to  the  full  capacity 
of  the  car,  and  the  risk  of  damage  is 
practically  nothing.  The  haul  to  the  des- 
tinations in  question  averaged  about  500 
miles.  The  rock  did  not  require  expe- 
dited service.  Defendants,  while  advanc- 
ing the  rates  on  shipments  to  the  north, 
did  not  do  so  on  shipments  to  the  south 
from  the  Tennessee  fields  in  question  on 
account    of    the    competition    from    the 


Florida  and  North  Carolina  fields.  There 
was,  however,  no  competition  between 
the  fertilizer  mills  of  the  South  and  the 
mills  of  complainants.  The  rates  from 
the  Mt.  Pleasant  district  to  the  destina- 
tions in  question  were  joint  through 
rates;  those  from  the  Centerville  district 
were  usually  made  up  by  combining  the 
rate  to  the  Ohio  River  to  the  rate  north  of 
that  river.  Prior  to  the  advances  at- 
tacked, the  rates  up  to  the  river  on  ship- 
ments destined  beyond  were  always  less 
than  the  rate  for  consumption  at  the 
river.  The  local  rate  was,  for  example, 
from  the  Centerville  district  to  Cincin- 
nati, $2.50;  to  Louisville,  $2.25;  to  Evans- 
ville,  $2.50,  while  the  proportional  rates 
were  to  Cincinnati,  $2.15;  to  Louisville, 
$1.90;  to  Evansville,  $2.  Under  the  in- 
creased rates  the  only  proportional  rate 
which  was  lower  than  the  local  rate  was 
that  to  Evansville.  For  the  purpose  of 
meeting  the  competition  of  Florida  rock, 
the  lines  south  of  the  Ohio  River  shrunk 
their  divisions  23c  per  ton  to  Buffalo, 
Cleveland,  Sandusky  and  Detroit.  The 
advances  south  of  the  river  were  35c  to 
all  the  points  involved,  except  the  four 
last  named,  and  were  58c  to  each  of 
these.  Lines  north  of  the  Ohio  River 
advanced  their  proportionals  when  from 
the  Centerville  district  and  their  divisions 
when  from  the  Mt.  Pleasant  district  as 
follows:  Chicago,  Canton,  Sandusky,  In- 
dianapolis, Columbus,  Cleveland,  Dayton, 
Pittsburgh,  Detroit  and  Buffalo,  20c,  20c, 
20c,  15c,  10c,  15c,  Oc,  Oc,  20c  and  Oc,  re- 
spectively. Under  the  old  proportional 
rates  of  $2,  2.15,  $2  and  $1.90  from  the 
Centerville  district  to  Cairo,  Cinci'inati, 
Evansville  and  Louisville,  respectively. 
the  per-ton-mile  revenue  was  8.5,  6,  9.3 
and  8.1  mills,  respectively.  Under  the 
new  rates  of  $2.35,  $2.50,  $2.35,  $2.25,  re- 
spectively, the  per-ton-mile  revenue  was 
9.1,  6.9,  10.9  and  9.6  mills,  respectivelv. 
Under  the  old  rates  from  the  Center- 
ville district  to  Cairo,  Cincinnati,  Evans- 
ville and  Louisville  on  traffic  destined  be- 
yond, the  per-ton-mile  revenue  was  8.5, 
6,  9.3  and  8.1  mills,  respectively,  and 
under  the  new  rates  9.1,  6.9,  l0.9,  9.6 
mills,  respectively.  Under  the  old  rates 
to  Chicago,  Indianapolis,  Canton,  San- 
dusky, Columbus,  Dayton,  Pittsburgh, 
Detroit,  Buffalo  and  Cleveland,  the  per- 
ton-mile  revenue  was  4.66,  9.25,  5.6,  6.36, 
9.05,  14.28,  6.35,  5.16,  4.68,  5.73  mills,  re- 
spectively, while  under  the  new  rates 
it  was  5.33,  10.64,  6.4,  7.31,  9.91,  14.28, 
6.35,    5.9,    4.68,    6.35    mills,    respectively. 


DISCRIMINATION,  §4    (p)— (q) 


237 


The  average  ton-mile  receipts  from  the 
Mt.  Pleasant  district  to  the  Ohio  River 
crossings  under  the  old  rates  exceeded 
the  ton-mile  earnings  of  defendant  L. 
&  N.  Ry.  from  all  sources.  These 
facts  indicated  that  the  old  rates  were 
not  abnormally  low.  Under  the  old  rates 
the  lines  south  of  the  Ohio  River  shrunk 
their  rates  or  divisions  23c  per  ton  in 
shipments  to  Detroit,  Sandusky,  Cleve- 
land and  Buffalo.  Under  the  new  tar- 
iff no  distinction  was  made  in  favor  of 
these  lake  points,  the  reason  advanced 
being  that  competition  at  these  points 
no  longer  existed.  Such  was,  however, 
not  the  fact,  as  more  than  one-half  of 
the  phosphate  rock  used  at  Buffalo  came 
from  Florida  and  the  Florida  rock  moved 
freely  to  the  other  three  lake  points  men- 
tioned. HELD,  that  the  course  of  de- 
fendant in  increasing  the  rate  from  the 
Tennessee  fields  to  northern  destinations, 
while  failing  to  advance  the  same  to 
southern  mills,  did  not  result  in  any  un- 
due discrimination  against  the  northern 
mills  in  question,  since  the  northern  and 
southern  mills  were  not  in  competition; 
that  the  old  rates  were  not  shown  to 
have  been  abnormally  low;  that  while  the 
proportional  rates  up  to  the  river  should 
be  less  than  the  local  rates,  the  difference 
of  35c  was  larger  than  was  required  of 
the  carriers  and  they  might  advance  the 
proportional  rates  so  as  to  make  the  dif- 
ference only  25c;  that  the  old  propor- 
tions received  by  the  carriers  north  of 
the  river  were  low  and  might  be  some- 
what advanced  as  to  Chicago,  Canton, 
Sandusky,  Columbus  and  Cleveland;  that 
defendants  were  not  required  to  continue 
rates  preferential  to  Buffalo,  rieveland, 
Sandusky  and  Detroit,  since  tLey  were 
not  obliged  to  meet  water  competition, 
and  that  the  same  proportional  rate  up 
to  the  Ohio  River  might  be  used  from  the 
Centerville  district  as  to  other  destina- 
tions, and  the  through  rates  from  the  Mt. 
Pleasant  district  might  be  constructed 
on  the  basis  of  the  same  division  to  the 
carrier  south  of  the  river  as  upon  ship- 
ments to  the  northern  points  in  question; 
that  the  rates  complained  of  from  the 
Mt.  Pleasant  district  were  unreasonable 
and  should  not  exceed  to  Chicago  $3.70 
per  ton  of  2,240  lbs.;  to  Canton,  $3.85; 
to  Sandusky,  $3.70;  to  Indianapolis.  $3.10; 
to  Columbus,  $3.40;  to  Cleveland,  $3.80; 
to  Dayton,  $3.05;  to  Pittsburgh,  $4.20;  to 
Detroit,  $3.85;  to  Buffalo,  $4.25;  that 
rates  on  tons  of  2,240  lbs.  from  the  Cen- 
terville district  should  be  applied  as  pro- 


portionals on  business  for  beyond,  as 
follows:  to  Cincinnati,  $2.25;  to  Louis- 
ville, $2;  to  Evansville,  $2.10,  and  that 
the  rates  from  Cincinnati  to  Canton,  San- 
dusky, Columbus,  Cleveland,  Dayton, 
Pittsburgh,  Detroit  and  Buffalo  should  not 
exceed  $1.60,  $1.45,  $1.15,  $1.55,  80c,  $1.95, 
$1.60  and  $2,  respectively;  those  from 
Evansville  to  Chicago,  $1.60;  and  those 
from  Louisville  to  Indianapolis,  $1.10. 
Darling  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  79. 

(p)  When  unjust  discrimination 
against  one  point  and  undue  preference 
in  favor  of  another  are  alleged,  because 
of  lower  rates  to  the  latter,  and  equality 
of  rates  is  demanded  as  a  cure  for  such 
unjust  discrimination  against  the  former, 
it  must  be  shown  that  the  circumstances 
and  conditions  at  each  of  the  points  are 
substantially  similar,  and  that  the  lower 
rates  at  the  one  point  were  the  result  of 
the  voluntary  action  of  the  carriers  at  that 
point.  Bainbridge  Board  of  Trade  v.  L. 
H.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  586,  593. 

(q)  Complainant  alleged  unjust  dis- 
crimination against  Indianapolis,  in  that 
the  long-established  relationship  of  rates 
between  Indianapolis  on  the  one  hand  and 
St.  Louis  and  the  Ohio  River  crossings 
on  the  other  hand  had  been  departed 
from  in  adjusting  rates  on  sugar  and  on 
coffee  from  New  Orleans  and  from  Atlan- 
tic seaboard  points  to  Indianapolis  and 
to  St.  Louis  crossings.  On  August  1, 
1908,  defendants  advanced  the  carload 
rates  on  coffee  3c  per  100  lbs.;  on  sugar, 
2c  per  100  lbs.,  from  Atlantic  seaboard 
points  to  Chicago  and  to  points  in  Cen- 
tral Freight  Association  territory  lying 
west  of  an  imaginary  line  drawn  from 
Michigan  City,  Ind.,  southeasterly  to  a 
point  near  Louisville,  Ky.,  including  In- 
dianapolis and  East  St.  Louis,  Cairo, 
Evansville,  Cincinnati,  Louisville  and 
other  Ohio  River  crossings.  This  was  a 
departure  from  the  long-established  re- 
lationship of  rates  in  Central  Freight  As- 
sociation territory  and  was  one  of  the  sub- 
jects of  complaint.  It  resulted  in  an  ad- 
vance in  the  rates  on  coffee  from  At- 
lantic seaboard  territory  to  Indianapolis 
from  25c  to  28c,  and  on  sugar  from  24c 
to  26c.  Effective  July  15,  1908,  defend- 
ants increased  the  carload  rate  on  sugar 
2c  per  100  lbs.,  and  on  coffee  3c  per  100 
lbs.,  from  New  Orleans  to  Chicago  and 
to  points  in  Central  Freight  Association 
territory  lying  west  of  an  imaginary  line 
from  Michigan  City  to  Louisville,  except 


238 


DISCRIMINATION,  §4    (qq) 


St.  Louis  and  the  Ohio  River  crossings, 
to  which  points  the  rate  on  coffee  was 
increased  2c  per  100  lbs.,  while  the  rate 
on  sugar  remained  unchanged.  This 
raised  the  rates  on  coffee  from  New  Or- 
leans to  Indianapolis  from  22c  to  25c  per 
100  lbs.,  and  on  sugar  from  23c  to  25c 
per  100  lbs.  On  October  1,  1908,  defend- 
ants made  advances  in  the  rates  on  coffee 
and  sugar  from  the  Atlantic  seaboard  to 
all  points  in  Central  Freight  Association 
territory  lying  east  of  said  imaginary  line, 
still  excepting  St.  Louis  and  the  Ohio 
River  crossings,  so  that  the  relationship 
between  points  in  the  Central  Freight 
Association  territory  from  the  Atlantic  sea- 
board was  re-established  except  as  to  St. 
Louis  and  Ohio  River  crossings.  The  rates 
on  coffee  were  advanced  2c  per  100  lbs. 
to  the  Ohio  River  crossings,  while  the 
rates  to  those  points  on  sugar  remained 
unchanged.  No  change  was  made  in  the 
rates  to  St.  Louis  on  either  coffee  or 
sugar.  Effective  October  15,  1908,  de- 
fendants increased  the  rates  on  coffee 
and  sugar  from  New  Orleans  to  points  in 
Central  Freight  Association  territory  ly- 
ing east  of  the  imaginary  line  from  Michi- 
gan City  to  Louisville,  excepting  the  Ohio 
River  crossings,  and  thus  the  former  re- 
lationship of  rates  on  coffee  and  sugar 
from  New  Orleans  to  points  in  Central 
Freight  Association  territory  was  re- 
stored, excepting  as  to  St.  Louis  and  the 
Ohio  River  crossings.  At  the  time  of 
the  hearing  the  relationship  of  rates  on 
coffee  and  sugar  to  points  in  Central 
Freight  Association  territory,  from  both 
Atlantic  seaboard  and  New  Orleans,  had 
been  restored  except  as  to  St.  Louis  and 
the  Ohio  River  crossings,  and  the  cases 
were  therefore  heard  on  the  understand- 
ing that  the  question  brought  in  issue 
and  to  be  determined  was  the  alleged  dis- 
crimination against  Indianapolis  created 
by  the  change  in  the  relationship  of  rates 
on  sugar  and  coffee  from  the  Atlantic 
seaboard  and  from  New  Orleans  as  be- 
tween Indianapolis  on  the  one  hand  and 
St.  Louis  and  the  Ohio  River  crossings 
on  the  other  hand.  It  appeared  that  po- 
tential water  competition  controlled  the 
sugar  rates  from  New  Orleans  to  St. 
Louis  and  the  Ohio  River  crossings,  but 
that  such  competition  did  not  appear  as 
to  coffee.  It  also  appeared  that  the 
sugar  rates  from  the  Atlantic  seaboard 
to  St.  Louis  and  the  Ohio  River  crossings 
were  controlled  by  the  rates  from  New 
Orleans,  but  did  not  appear  as  to  the 
rates  on  coffee.    It  also  appeared  that  for 


the  purpose  of  making  rates  from  the 
Atlantic  seaboard  to  Central  Freight  As- 
sociation, this  territory  had  been  divided 
into  zones,  each  taking  a  certain  per- 
centage of  the  New  York-Chicago  rates, 
in  the  fixing  of  which  percentage  consid- 
eration is  given  to  the  distance  from  New 
York.  Out  of  this  system  of  rate  adjustment 
have  grown  well-established  rates  be- 
tween the  different  cities  and  in  the  Cen- 
tral Freight  Association  Territory.  HELD, 
that  departure  from  the  former  relation- 
ship of  rates  on  sugar  from  New  Orleans 
and  Indianapolis  and  St.  Louis  and  the 
Ohio  River  crossings  is  not  unjustly  dis- 
criminatory against  Indianapolis,  because 
the  rates  on  sugar  from  New  Orleans  to 
St.  Louis  and  to  the  Ohio  River  crossings 
are  controlled  by  potential  water  com- 
petition, but  that  it  is  unjustly  discrimi- 
natory against  Indianapolis  to  depart 
from  the  former  relationship  of  rates  on 
coffee  as  between  Indianapolis  and  St. 
Louis  and  the  Ohio  River  crossings,  be- 
cause such  rates  on  coffee  are  not  con- 
trolled by  water  competition.  That  rates 
on  sugar  from  Atlantic  seaboard  points  to 
St.  Louis  and  the  Ohio  River  crossings 
are  controlled  by  the  water-controlled 
rates  from  New  Orleans  and  that  it  is  not 
unjustly  discriminatory  against  Indianap- 
olis to  depart  from  the  former  relation- 
ship of  rates  on  coffee  as  between  In- 
dianapolis and  St.  Louis  and  Ohio  River 
crossings,  which  are  not  so  controlled  by 
water  competition.  Indianapolis  Freight 
Bureau  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
567. 

(qq)  Complainant's  members  were  en- 
gaged in  shipping  oil  from  points  in  Ohio 
to  Omaha,  Neb.  The  combination 
through  rate  on  carload  lots  from  Cleve- 
land to  Omaha,  based  upon  Chicago,  was 
composed  of  the  IS^^c  rate  east  of  Chi- 
cago, plus  defendants'  27c  rate  west  of 
Chicago,  making  a  total  of  40i^c.  Com- 
plainant attacked  the  Chicago  to  Omah? 
rate  and  asked  for  its  reduction  without 
making  the  carriers  east  of  Chicago 
parties  defendant.  Consumers  at  Omaha 
were  able  to  obtain  oil  at  a  much  lower 
freight  rate  from  standard  refineries  in 
the  vicinity  of  Kansas  City,  namely,  a 
rate  of  13c  per  100  lbs.;  although  the  dis- 
tance from  Chicago  to  Omaha  is  493 
miles,  and  that  from  Chicago  to  Kansas 
City  458  miles,  the  rate  between  the 
latter  points  was  only  22c.  It  appeared 
that  the  rates  from  Chicago  to  Kansas 
City  were  fixed  at  a  differential  of  5c 
above  the  rate  from  St.  Louis  to  Kansas 


DISCRIMINATION,  §4  (r)— (rr) 


239 


City;  that  on  account  of  a  decision  of 
the  Missouri  State  Commission  the  rate 
from  Kansas  City  to  St.  Louis  was  fixed 
at  17c;  and  that  defendants  placed  the 
Chicago  to  Kansas  City  rate  at  22c  in 
order  to  preserve  this  differential.  The 
rate  from  Chicago  to  Omaha  on  beer, 
acid,  crude  glycerine  and  linseed  oil 
ranged  from  15c  to  20c,  while  canned 
goods,  coffee,  sugar  and  similar  articles 
took  the  same  rate  as  petroleum,  namely, 
the  fifth  class  rate  of  27c.  HELD,  the 
Chicago  to  Omaha  rate  on  petroleum  was 
excessive  and  should  not  for  the  future 
exceed  90  per  cent  of  fifth  class,  or 
24.3c  per  100  lbs.,  which  rate  would 
give  the  carriers  the  same  revenue  per 
ton  mile  as  accrued  to  them  from  the 
20c  Chicago  to  St.  Paul  petroleum  rate 
voluntarily  established  by  them.  Na- 
tional Petroleum  Ass'n  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  287,  289,  290. 

(r)  The  rate  on  canned  goods,  fifth 
class,  from  Irving,  N.  Y.,  to  Burlington, 
Vt.,  should  not  exceed  the  rate  from  Irv- 
ing to  Boston.  Erie  Preserving  Co.  v. 
L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  118. 

(rr)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
on  coal,  lumber,  cement,  paving  brick, 
glass  and  glassware,  salt,  egg-case  fillers, 
rice  and  sugar  from  points  south  and 
west  of  Kansas  City  and  lying  west  and 
southwest  of  the  Mississippi  and  Mis- 
souri rivers  to  Lincoln  and  Omaha  as 
unjustly  discriminatory  in  favor  of 
Omaha.  This  traflftc  might  move  via  Kan- 
sas City  or  via  some  interior  Kansas  junc- 
tion point  to  Omaha  and  Lincoln.  The 
short  line  distance  from  Kansas  City  to 
Omaha  was  205  miles  and  to  Lincoln  208 
miles,  and  moved  over  the  same  line,  the 
M.  P.  Ry.,  for  the  first  150  miles  out  of 
Kansas  City.  Over  the  other  short  line 
route,  the  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.,  the  dis- 
tances from  Kansas  City  to  Omaha  and 
Lincoln  were  the  same.  The  cost  of  de- 
livering trafllc  from  Kansas  City  to  the 
two  points  was  the  same.  (1)  Coal. 
Fields  in  Iowa,  Illinois,  Missouri  and 
Kansas  competed  in  the  sale  of  coal  to 
Omaha.  On  Iowa  coal  the  same  rate 
from  fields  varying  from  130  to  200 
miles  from  Omaha  was  extended  to 
Omaha  as  to  its  competitor,  Council 
Bluffs,  the  rates  being  very  low  as  fixed 
by  the  Iowa  Commission.  The  rates  from 
the  Illinois,  Kansas  and  Missouri  fields 
were  controlled  by  Iowa  rates.  Lincoln 
took  rates  from  all  these  fields  at  15c  a 
ton  higher  than  Omaha,  Lincoln  rates  be- 
ing $1.75  for  lump  and  $1.50  for  slack  over 


a  typical  distance  of  350  miles.  HELD, 
Omaha  was  entitled  to  its  strategic  po- 
sition in  connection  with  the  Iowa  fields 
and  the  low  Iowa  Commission  rates  and 
the  rates  assessed  to  Lincoln  not  being 
unreasonable    per    se    were    not    unduly 
discriminatory.      (2)     Cement.      Cement 
was  originally  obtained  both  at  Omaha 
and  Lincoln  from  the  east,  the  rate  to 
Lincoln  being  3c  higher.     The  source  of 
supply  shipped  and  the  cement  used  at 
Lincoln    came    mainly    from    Hannibal, 
Mo.,  and  from  lola  and  other  points  in 
the  Gas  Belt  of  Kansas,  and  from  both 
sources  the  distance  to  Omaha  and  Lin- 
coln was  about  the  same.    Omaha,  how- 
ever, had  a  source  of  supply  from  Mason 
City,  la.,  130  miles  east,  and  at  Mankato, 
Minn.,    175    miles    distant.      HELD,    the 
rate   of    10c   to    Omaha   from    Hannibal 
and  lola  being  made  under  stress  of  com- 
petition with  the  Omaha  rate  from  the 
latter's  source  of  supply,  Omaha  was  en- 
titled to  a  somewhat  lower  rate,  but  such 
differential   should  not  exceed   l^^c  per 
100  lbs.    (3)     Paving  Brick.  Paving  brick 
shipped  to  Lincoln  came  principally  from 
Galesburg,  111.,  and  to  some  extent  from 
Coffeyville,    Kan.,    and    other    southern 
points.     The   rate   from   both  Galesburg 
and  Coffeyville  to  Omaha  was  7%c  and 
to    Lincoln    lO^c,    the   idistance    f^om 
Galesburg  to  Omaha  being  333  and  388 
miles,  respectively;    from   Coffeyville   to 
both    Omaha    and    Lincoln,    364    miles. 
HELD,  for  the  same  reasons  applying  to 
cement  Omaha  was  entitled  to  a  some- 
what   lower    rate,    but    the    differential 
should  not  exceed   l^^c.      (4)     J-umber. 
The    differential    upon    lumber    against 
Lincoln  and  in  favor  of  Omaha  was  Ic. 
The  supply  came  80  per  cent  from  the 
south,  15  per  cent  from  the  Pacific  coast 
and  5  per  cent  from  the  northwest.    The 
cost  of  the  haul  from  the  south  was  the 
same  to  Lincoln  as  to  Omaha.     HELD, 
Lincoln  should  enjoy  the  same  rates  as 
Omaha.     (5)     Rice.    Rice  formerly  came 
from  the  Orient  and  South  Carolina,  but 
at    present    came    from    Louisiana    and 
Texas  and  reached  Lincoln  by  the  same 
distance  and  at  the  same  cO£>t  as  Omaha. 
HELD,  the  rates  should  be  the  same  to 
the  two  points.     (6)     Glass.     Glass  orig- 
inally   came    from    the    east,    taking    a 
rate  3c  higher  to  Lincoln  than  to  Omaha. 
At   present  its   source   was   in   the   Gas 
Belt    of    Kansas.      HELD,    the    rates    to 
Lincoln  and  Omaha  should  be  the  same. 
(7)     Salt.      Salt    originally    came    from 
Michigan.      At    present    it    came    from 
Hutchinson  and  other  Kansas  points,  the 


240 


DISCRIMINATION,  §4   (s)_§5   (d) 


element  of  distance  being  in  favor  of 
Lincoln.  HELD,  the  rates  should  be  the 
same.  (8)  Egg-case  Fillers.  Egg-case 
fillers  shipped  into  Omaha  and  Lincoln 
for  concentration  were  then  shipped  out 
in  various  directions,  the  fillers  being  ob- 
tained in  the  Gas  Belt  of  Kansas.  The 
rate  to  Lincoln  was  3c  higher  than  to 
Omaha  and  on  shipments  of  eggs  east 
Omaha  obtained  a  rate  3c  less  than  Lin- 
coln. HELD,  the  rates  on  fillers  should 
be  the  same  to  the  two  points.  (9) 
Sugar.  The  rates  on  sugar  from  west- 
ern points  were  the  same  to  Lincoln  and 
Omaha.  Sugar  was  produced  at  points 
in  Louisiana  west  of  the  Mississippi 
River.  HELD,  the  rates  to  Lincoln  and 
Omaha  from  these  points  should  be  the 
same.  Lincoln  Commercial  Club  v.  C. 
R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  319, 
322-328. 

(s)  Grain  originating  on  the  Illinois 
River  was  carried  via  packet  lines  to 
Pekin,  111.,  then  forwarded  to  Indianap- 
olis, where  milled  under  through  rate 
to  the  East.  One  of  the  packet  lines 
omitted  the  privilege  from  the  tariff 
through  error,  HELD,  discrimination, 
and  reparation  awarded  on  shipments 
moving  via  such  packet  line.  Evans 
Milling  Co.  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  351. 

§5.     Test  of  Discrimination. 

See  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §14  (a),  §15 
(a),  §27   (a). 

(a)  When  one  shipping  center 
through  an  adjustment  of  rates  is  placed 
at  a  disadvantage  to  another  the  question 
to  be  determined  is  whether  such  dis- 
advantage is  the  result  of  unjust  dis- 
crimination or  undue  or  unreasonable 
prejudice,  due  to  the  rate  adjustment. 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Newport  News 
V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  345,  351. 

(b)  When  general  rate  adjustments 
in  and  between  large  territories,  which 
contemplate  substantial  justice  between 
all  shippers  generally,  result  in  individ- 
ual instances  of  disproportionate  in- 
equality, they  fail  in  their  purpose  to  that 
extent,  and  their  strict  observance  in 
such  cases  upon  no  other  ground  than 
the  arbitrary  theory  of  their  existence 
should  yield  to  the  extent  necessary  to 
prevent  gross  injustice,  just  as  many 
other  general  rules  are  necessarily  sub- 
ject to  exceptions.  Alpha  Portland  Ce- 
ment Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I. 
C.  0.  446,  449. 


(c)  Mills  of  complainants  are  situ- 
ated at  an  average  distance  of  150  miles 
from  Detroit.  Complainants  alleged  that 
freight  rates  on  carload  shipments  of 
cement  from  manufacturing  points  lo- 
cated in  the  Lehigh  Valley  district  are 
so  low  when  compared  with  rates  from 
the  plants  of  the  complainants  to  con- 
suming points  in  Central  Freight  Asso- 
ciation territory  as  to  constitute  undue 
preference.  Complainants  cannot  ship 
to  most  points  of  Central  Freight  Asso- 
ciation territory,  nor  to  the  east  for  any 
great  distance,  without  meeting  compe- 
tition from  Lehigh  Valley  shippers. 
HELD,  that  merely  because  a  greater 
distance  point  has  lower  rate  per  ton 
mile  than  a  shorter  distance  point,  dis- 
crimination does  not  necessarily  result. 
But  rates  must  not  only  be  reasonable 
in  and  of  themselves,  but  also  relatively 
reasonable.  The  rates  complained  of  are 
on  a  lower  basis  than  those  from  Detroit 
and  vicinity  to  competitive  points,  dis- 
tance considered.  The  fact  that  the  ag- 
gregate charges  from  the  Lehigh  Valley 
district  are  higher  in  every  instance  is 
immaterial.  Elk  Cement  and  Lime  Co. 
V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  84,  88. 

(d)  Complainant  attacked  the  ex-lake 
rate  on  grain  from  Buffalo  to  Boston  of 
13.3c  per  100  lbs.,  as  compared  with  the 
all-rail  rate  from  Chicago  to  Boston  of 
18c  per  100  lbs.  The  ton  mile  revenue  was 
from  5  mills  to  6^^  mills.  Complainant 
contended  that  the  ex-lake  rate  from  Buf- 
falo was  part  of  a  through  transportation 
from  Chicago,  and  that  the  line  east 
from  Buffalo  had  no  right  to  impose  upon 
the  through  traffic  which  came  by  water 
a  higher  rate  than  was  imposed  upon 
similar  traffic  which  came  to  Buffalo  by 
rail;  and  that  the  ex-lake  rate,  Buffalo 
to  Boston,  ought  not  to  exceed  the  pro- 
portional rate  of  7.9c  on  the  Chicago  to 
Boston  haul.  HELD,  that  the  all-rail 
rate  from  Chicago  east  competes  with 
the  lake-and-rail  rate,  and  that  the  di- 
vision of  the  line  east  of  Buffalo  cannot 
be  made  the  standard  by  which  to  fix 
a  reasonable  rate  from  Buffalo;  that  the 
division  of  a  through  rate  was  not  a  mat- 
ter of  concern  to  the  public,  and  that 
while  it  might  be  looked  to  for  certain 
purposes  it  should  not  ordinarily  be  made 
the  standard  of  reasonableness  or  the 
measure  of  discrimination;  that  the  ex- 
lake  rate  from  Buffalo  east  was  reason- 
able of  itself.  Complaint  dismissed. 
Board  of  Trade  of  Chicago  v.  A.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  504. 


DISCRIMINATION,  §5   (e)— §6  (b) 


241 


(e)  Complainant,  merchants  and  man- 
ufacturers of  Des  Moines,  attacked  rates 
generally  from  Des  Moines  to  the  west- 
ern portion  of  Minnesota  and  the  states 
of  North  and  South  Dakota  and  the  ter- 
ritory west  thereof  as  unduly  discrim- 
inatory, compared  with  rates  from  Chi- 
cago, 111.,  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  and  Dubuque, 
Davenport,  Clinton,  Muscatine  and  Bur- 
lington, la.  The  complaint  attacked 
the  whole  rate  structure  and  demanded 
that  the  rates  from  Des  Moines  should 
bear  the  same  relation  to  distances  in- 
volved as  those  from  Chicago.  Under 
the  rate  structure  attacked  the  rates 
from  Chicago  and  St.  Louis  were  rela- 
tively lower  than  those  from  Des  Moines 
on  account  of  the  competition  of  the  car- 
riers serving  the  points  of  destination 
in  question  through  the  gateways  of 
Duluth,  Chicago  and  St.  Louis.  The 
rates  from  Chicago  to  these  points  were 
generally  the  same  as  those  from  St. 
Paul  and  Minneapolis.  The  low  rate 
from  St.  Louis  to  St.  Paul  influenced  th« 
rates  from  all  points  on  the  Mississippi 
River  as  far  north  as  Dubuque,  la.  HELD, 
that  while  distance  was  a  factor  in  the 
determination  of  rates,  the  Commission 
was  not  justified  in  adopting  it  as  the 
sole  basis,  in  ignoring  the  difference  in 
circumstances  and  conditions  between 
Des  Moines  and  the  other  points  of  origin 
in  question,  and  in  destroying  the  present 
rate  adjustment.  Complaint  dismissed. 
(Lane,  Comm'r,  dissenting.)  Greater 
Des  Moines  Committee  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  73,  79. 

(f)  Any  discrimination  which  exists 
must  not  exceed  that  which  is  warranted 
by  the  differences  in  circumstances  and 
conditions.  Sondheimer  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  60,  64. 

(g)  Whether  or  not  a  discrimination 
shall  be  removed  is  not  measured  by  its 
amount,  whether  large  or  small,  but  by 
a  determination  of  whether  or  not  it  is 
undue.  Fort  Dodge  Commercial  Club  v. 
I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  572,  581. 

(h)  The  freight  is  so  small  an  item 
In  the  cost  to  the  retail  dealer  or  the 
consumer  of  both  woolen  and  cotton  gar- 
ments that  this  does  not  seem  to  pro- 
duce any  practicable  effect.  While  in 
fact  the  discrimination  exists,  it  is  not 
sufficient  to  become  obvious.  Associa- 
tion of  Union-Made  Garment  Manufac- 
turers V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
405,  408. 

(i)  Lower  proportionals  from  points 
served  by  foreign  carriers  afford  no  basis 


for  charge  of  discrimination  against  com- 
plaining point  served  by  other  carriers. 
Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C. 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  56,  66. 

(J)  Not  all  discriminations  are  un- 
lawful, but  only  such  as  are  undue  or 
unreasonable;  if  based  on  reason  and 
good  cause,  discriminations  cannot  be 
condemned  as  unreasonable.  The  evi- 
dence and  effectiveness  of  competition 
between  carriers,  whether  by  rail  or 
water,  whether  subject  to  the  Act  or  not, 
and  competitions  of  markets,  or  the  ab- 
sence of  such  competition,  are,  among 
other  things,  pertinent  to  the  question 
of  similarity  of  circumstances  and  con- 
ditions involved  in  the  ultimate  ques- 
tion of  fact  under  sections  3  and  4,  and 
as  to  whether  the  discrimination  com- 
plained of  is  or  is  not  undue  or  unreason- 
able. Discriminations  in  sections  3  and 
4  of  the  Act,  in  so  far  as  they  result 
from  the  bona  fide  action  of  a  carrier 
in  meeting  circumstances  and  conditions 
not  of  its  own  creation,  and  which  are 
reasonably  necessary,  do  not  of  neces- 
sity fall  under  the  condemnation  of  the 
law.  Pittsburgh  Plate  Glass  Co.  v.  P. 
C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  87,  99. 

III.     JUSTIFICATION. 

See  Advanced   Rates,  §5  (2)    (g),   (h). 

§6.     Carrier  as  Shipper  or  Consignee. 

See  Evidence,  §46;  Forwarders,  II; 
Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §23;  Re- 
stricted  Rates. 

(a)  The  fact  that  a  railroad  in  fuel 
coal  does  not  come  into  competition  with 
commercial  coal  and  is  in  competition 
with  coals  coming  upon  the  line  of  the 
consuming  railroad,  at  other  points,  does 
not  constitute  such  a  difference  in  cir- 
cumstances as  to  warrant  the  carriers 
under  sections  2  and  3  of  the  Act  in  ac- 
cording a  different  rate  to  fuel  coal  than 
to  commercial  coal,  and  the  practice  of 
extending  such  a  difference  in  -rates 
amounts  to  unjust  discrimination  under 
said  sections  of  the  Act.  I.  C.  C.  v.  B.  & 
O.  R.  R.  Co.,  225  U.  S.  326,  32  Sup  Ct. 
742,  747;   56  L.  ed.  1107. 

(b)  A  carrier  as  a  shipper  over  the 
lines  of  another  carrier  may  not  have 
any  preference  in  the  application  of 
transportation  rates  and  charges.  Con- 
versely, it  may  have  the  same  privileges 
under  the  tariffs  as  any  other  shipper. 
In  Re  Transportation  of  Company  Ma- 
terial, 22  L  C.  C.  439.  440. 


242 


DISCRIMINATION,  §6    (c)— (h) 


(c)  Carriers  buying  what  will  ulti- 
mately become  company  material  con- 
tract with  shippers  located  off  their  lines, 
and  agree  that  if  the  vendor  will  bill 
the  shipment  beyond  a  designated  junc- 
tion point,  at  which  their  own  lines  and 
the  lines  of  the  initial  carriers  meet,  the 
purchasing  carrier  will  absorb  its  own 
division  of  the  joint  through  rate  and  the 
shipper  assume  only  that  portion  of  the 
joint  through  rate  which  accrues  to  the 
initial  carriers  'as  their  division  of  the 
rate  up  to  the  junction  point  designated 
in  the  billing.  HELD,  this  practice  re- 
sults in  the  application  of  a  portion  of  a 
joint  rate  from  the  point  of  origin  to  the 
junction  point  for  the  benefit  of  a  par- 
ticular shipper,  which  is  not  published 
for  the  public  at  large  nor  filed  with  the 
Commission  under  section  6  of  the  Act. 
Nor  is  it  material  whether  the  contractor 
for  a  carrier,  or  the  purchasing  carrier 
itself,  is  the  consignor.  In  either  case 
the  shipment  should  be  billed  and  con- 
tinuously transported  from  point  of  ori- 
gin through  the  junction  point  of  the 
purchasing  carrier  and  to  the  point  of 
final  destination  on  the  purchasing  car- 
rier's line.  The  purchasing  carrier  is 
there  clearly  entitled  to  its  division  of 
the  joint»  rate  and  the  charge  which  it 
must  pay  on  its  shipment  of  material  to 
the  junction  point  is  the  division  of  the 
rate  accruing  to  the  initial  carrier  and 
connections,  if  any,  up  to  the  junction 
point  in  question.  If  the  shipment  is 
billed,  or  is  actually  carried,  only  to  the 
junction  point  of  the  purchasing  carrier, 
whether  the  carrier  or  its  contractor  or 
other  private  party  acts  as  consignor,  the 
division  of  a  joint  rate  cannot  apply  un- 
less this  division  has  been  lawfully  pub- 
lished as  applicable  to  movements  to 
such  junction  point  for  shipment  beyond. 
The  Act  gives  no  indication  that  either 
carriers  or  contractors  who  furnish  com- 
pany materials  and  supplies  are  to  bo 
preferred  over  other  individuals  so  far 
as  rates  are  concerned.  The  published 
rate  is  the  only  lawful  rate  and  is  ap- 
plicable to  all  alike  without  distinction. 
If  one  shipper  is  to  have  the  advantage 
of  such  a  division  of  a  through  rate  then 
all  other  shippers  should  have  the  same 
advantage,  and  the  only  way  to  secure 
this  advantage  to  one  is  to  publish  it 
available  for  all.  A  carrier  acting  in  the 
capacity  of  shipper  or  consignor  stands, 
upon  a  footing  of  absolute  equality  with 
every  other  shipper  with  respect  to  the 
application    of   published   rates    to    such 


shipments,  except  in  regard  to  that  part 
of  a  joint  rate  which  accrues  upon  the 
purchasing  carrier's  own  line.  Practice 
condemned  and  complaint  dismissed. 
Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  P. 
R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  270.  272,  273,  275. 

(d)  If  a  railroad  is  entitled  to  a  low 
rate  because  of  its  facilities,  any  ship- 
per providing  like  facilities  must  be 
awarded  the  same  rate.  In  Re  Restricted 
Rates,  20  I.  C.  C.  426,  435. 

(e)  On  shipments  of  coal  for  railway 
use  from  the  district  near  Wheeling,  W. 
Va.,  defendant  carriers  extended  much 
lower  rates  than  when  the  coal  was  to  be 
used  for  other  purposes.  HELD,  such  prac- 
tices on  the  part  of  the  carriers  ought  to 
be  stopped  as  resulting  in  unjust  dis- 
crimination in  favor  of  producers  hav- 
ing contracts  for  the  sale  of  coal  to  car-  I 
riers.  There  is  no  warrant  in  the  com-  1 
mon  law  or  the  Act  for  the  theory  that  a 
carrier  as  a  shipper  over  the  lines  of 
other  carriers  may  be  given  a  preferred 
rate.  The  practice  cannot  be  upheld 
without  removing  the  very  cornerstone  of 
the  Act  designed  to  prevent  unjust  dis- 
crimination and  practices.  If  carriers  in- 
sist upon  making  or  maintaining  such 
preferential  rates  they  may  confidently 
expect  that  such  voluntary  action  on 
their  part  will  be  accepted  in  any  fur- 
ther proceedings  in  this  or  any  similar 
cases  as  evidence  of  the  unreasonable- 
ness of  higher  rates  which  they  may  un- 
dertake to  enforce  against  other  ship- 
pers.    Hitchman  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  B. 

&  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  512,  517,  518. 

(f)  A  carrier  as  shipper  over  lines  of 
another  carrier  may  not  lawfully  be  given 
any  preference  in  application  of  tariff 
rates  on  interstate  shipments.  Hitchman 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
16  L  C.  C.  512,  517. 

(g)  Character  of  the  consignee  or  the 
use  made  of  the  coal  is  not  a  proper  or 
lawful  basis  for  a  difference  in  rates  on 
coal  of  the  same  kind.  Board  of  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  v.  V.  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
L  C.  C.  453,  456. 

(h)  So  long  as  there  is  identity  of 
ownership  in  the  agency  of  transporta- 
tion and  the  thing  transported,  it  is  ex- 
tremely difllcult,  if  not  impossible,  to 
prevent  discrimination  between  shippers. 
Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v,  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  73.  78. 


DISCRIMINATION,  §7   (a)— (d) 


243 


§7.     Carrier      Not      Serving      Prejudiced 
Point. 

See  Evidence,  §23;  Facilities  and 
Privileges,  §21  (kk) ;  Procedure  Be- 
fore Commission,  §2  (rr);  Through 
Routes   and   Joint    Rates,   §2    (k). 

(a)  The  fact  that  carriers  serving  a 
certain  milling  center  but  not  serving  a 
competitive  center  establish  transit  privi- 
leges at  the  former  and  thus  compel  a 
carrier  serving  both  milling  centers  to 
similarly  establish  such  privilege  at  the 
one,  but  not  at  the  other,  where  no  com- 
petition between  carriers  exist,  does  not 
in  law  render  the  carriers  not  serving 
the  competitive  milling  center  guilty  of 
subjecting  it  to  undue  prejudice  or  dis- 
advantage. Blodgett  Milling  Co.  v.  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  448,  449. 

(aa)  A  railroad  cannot  be  said  to  dis- 
criminate against  a  town  which  it  does 
not  reach  and  in  whose  carrying  trade  it 
does  not  participate.  Blodgett  Milling 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
448,  449;  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Ash- 
burn  V.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
140,  149;  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  New- 
port News  V.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C. 
C.  345,  352. 

(b)  Complainant  mills  rye  and  buck- 
wheat into  flour  at  Janesville,  Wis.,  and 
alleged  that  defendants'  tariffs,  which 
provided  that  rough  grains  might  be 
milled  or  otherwise  treated  in  transit  at 
Minneapolis,  St.  Paul  and  Minnesota 
Transfer,  gave  undue  preference  and  ad- 
vantage to  those  points,  and  subjected 
Janesville,  Wis.,  to  undue  prejudice  and 
disadvantage.  Janesville  is  served  by  only 
one  of  the  defendants,  the  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.,  and  the  other  defendants  serve  the 
Twin  Cities,  but  do  not  reach  Janesville. 
On  shipments  to  the  Pacific  coast  and  re- 
lated points  there  were  privileges  accord- 
ed by  all  the  defendants  at  the  Twin 
Cities,  but  which  the  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
had  not  extended  to  Janesville.  The  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  was  forced  to  extend  this 
privilege  at  the  Twin  Cities  because  the 
other  defendants  who  did  not  serve 
Janesville  had  done  so.  HELD,  the 
roads  named  as  defendants  which  serve 
the  Twin  Cities  but  do  not  reach  Janesville 
cannot  in  law  be  guilty  of  subjecting 
the  complainant  or  the  city  of  Janesville 
to  undue  prejudice  or  disadvantage;  that 
the  action  of  the  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  was 
clearly  forced  upon  it  by  competition  be- 
tween carriers,  and  the  conditions  sur- 
rounding   the    transportation    of    grain 


products  from  the  Twin  Cities  to  Pacific 
coast  points  and  from  Janesville  to  the 
same  destinations  are  not  so  nearly  alike 
as  to  constrain  the  Commission  to  order 
the  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  either  to  cease 
and  desist  from  acco-rding  the  present 
transit  privileges  at  the  Twin  Cities  or 
to  establish  similar  privileges  at  Janes- 
ville. Complaint  dismissed.  Blodgett 
Milling  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  448,  449,  453. 

(c)  The  fact  that  the  rails  of  certain 
carriers  do  not  actually  extend  to  a  ship- 
ping center  which  is  discriminated 
against  cannot  relieve  such  carriers  from 
responsibility  for  the  effect  of  rates, 
which  create  such  discrimination,  which 
they  control  and  in  which  they  partici- 
pate. Chamber  of  Commerce  of  New- 
port News  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  346, 
353. 

(d)  Under  an  arrangement  between 
defendants  in  force  for  a  number  of  years 
prior  to  July  31,  1899,  Newport  News 
and  Norfolk,  Va.,  took  equal  freight 
rates  to  and  from  common  points  in  As- 
sociated Railways  territory  and  in  South- 
eastern Freight  Association  territory. 
Because  of  a  disagreement  as  to  divisions 
of  the  joint  rates  the  southern  lines  with- 
drew  from  the  arrangement,  and  since 
that  time  Newport  News  rates  to  and 
from  such  common  points  have  been  on 
a  higher  basis  than  Norfolk  rates  to  and 
from  the  same  points.  As  compared  with 
Norfolk,  Newport  News  was  placed  in  a 
position  of  material  disadvantage.  As 
to  natural  advantages,  Newport  News 
and  Norfolk  are  practically  on  the  same 
footing.  The  southern  lines  do  not  ex- 
tend to  Newport  News;  but  by  means  of 
their  connection  with  other  defendant 
lines,  they  participate  in  Newpart  News 
traffic  to  and  from  the  south,  maintain 
through  routes  for  the  movement  of  such 
traffic,  and  in  effect  control  the  rates  ap- 
plicable thereto.  HELD,  that  the  present 
rate  situation  is  unjustly  discriminatory 
against  and  unduly  prejudicial  to  New- 
port News;  that  the  southern  carriers 
cannot  escape  responsibility  for  such  dis- 
crimination merely  because  their  rails 
do  not  extend  to  Newport  News;  that 
Newport  News  is  entitled  to  the  same 
rates  as  Norfolk  to  and  from  common 
points  on  defendants'  lines  in  the  terri- 
tories referred  to,  not  within  150  miles 
of  Norfolk.  Chamber  of  Commerce  of 
Newport  News  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
345. 


244 


DISCRIMINATION,  §7   (e)— (j) 


(e)  In  the  application  of  rates  on  coal 
from  the  Walsenburg  district  in  Colorado 
to  numerous  points  in  Nebraska,  defend- 
ants provide  a  rate  of  $3.50  per  net  ton 
to  one  group  of  stations  and  a  rate  of 
$3.75  to  a  second  group.  The  complain- 
ant in  substance  asked  that  certain  points 
not  taking  the  $3.75  rate  be  included 
within  the  $3.50  rate  group  and  that  cer- 
tain points  taking  the  $3.50  rate  be 
divided  into  two  new  groups  to  which 
shall  apply  rates  of  $3  and  $3.25,  respec- 
tively. A  point  known  as  Minden  on  the 
main  line  of  the  Burlington  took  the 
$3.50  rate,  while  a  station  known  as  Min- 
den "K"  on  a  subsidiary  line  of  the  Bur- 
lington system,  which  also  passes 
through  Minden,  took  the  $3.75  rate,  al- 
though it  is  only  a  few  blocks  from  Min- 
den; but  there  is  no  physical  connection 
between  these  two  lines.  The  rates  in» 
volved  have  been  considered  in  the  Cedar 
Hill  Coal  Case,  16  I.  C.  C.  387,  the  Colo- 
rado Coal  Traffic  Ass'n  Case,  19  I.  C.  C. 
478,  and  Nebraska  State  Comm.  Case,  13 
I.  C.  C.  349.  HELD,  the  lack  of  switch 
connection  between  the  lines  of  the  Bur- 
lington system  at  Minden  and  Minden 
"K"  should  not  be  allowed  to  prejudice 
the  latter  station,  and  that  Minden  "K" 
should  take  the  same  rate  as  Minden, 
and  under  the  readjustment  required  by 
this  finding  the  r^te  to  Minden  "K" 
should  not  be  exceeded  at  the  inter- 
mediate stations  of  Keene,  Wilcox,  Ra- 
gan,  Huntley,  Alma,  Orleans,  Carter  and 
Sacramento,  Neb.  Nebraska  State  Ry. 
Commission  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  121. 

(f)  A  line  not  serving  a  particular 
point  cannot  be  said  to  discriminate 
against  such  point  in  any  rate  adjust- 
ment where  such  adjustment  is  created 
by  circumstances  beyond  the  carrier's 
control,  though  it,  as  a  connecting  line, 
may  participate  in  the  rates  imposed. 
R.  R.  Com.  of  Kans.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  407,  416. 

(g)  If  the  same  carrier  serving  both 
Kansas  and  Detroit  salt  fields  names  a 
lower  rate  to  St.  Louis  for  substantially 
the  same  distance  from  Detroit  than  from 
Kansas,  it  must  be  prepared  to  justify 
that  discrimination,  but  if  carrier  A 
serves  St.  Louis  from  the  Kansas  field, 
while  carrier  B  serves  that  market  from 
the  Detroit  field,  then  carrier  A  is  not 
guilty  of  discrimination  because  it  de- 
clines to  meet  the  rate  established  by 
carrier  B.    R.  R,  Commissioners  of  Kan- 


sas V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  T.  C.  C. 
407,  413. 

(h)  Carrier  cannot  be  said  to  dis- 
criminate against  a  point  served  by  It 
because  other  carriers  give  lower  rates 
to  the  same  character  of  traffic  from 
points  on  their  own  lines  to  the  common 
destination.  Sunflower  Glass  Co.  v.  M. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C  C.  391,  392. 

(i)  To  find  a  carrier  guilty  of  dis- 
crimination as  between  competing  points 
of  origin,  it  must  appear  that  such  car- 
rier participates  at  least  in  each  of  the 
movements  between  the  two  points  of 
origin  and  the  destination.  Maricopa 
County  Commercial  Club  v.  P.  &  E.  R. 
R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  218,  220. 

(j)  Fire  brick  manufacturers  attacked 
the  rates  of  14 1^  to  16c  per  100  lbs.  .on 
fire  brick  from  the  Ashland-Olive  Hill 
district,  Kentucky,  and  Portsmouth-Oak 
Hill  district,  Ohio,  to  Birmingham,  Atlan- 
ta, and  other  southern  i>oints,  as  unrea- 
sonable and  discriminatory  in  favor  of 
St.  Louis,  Mo.  The  rate  from  St.  Louis 
to  Birmingham  was  14c,  3c  of  which  was 
absorbed  as  switching  and  bridge  charges, 
thus  giving  a  lower  ton  mile  rate  to  St. 
Louis.  Fire  brick  is  one  of  the  cheapest 
commodities  transported.  Shipments  are 
often  made  in  trainloads,  and  a  car  of 
brick  is  only  wo-rth  $150.  The  St.  Louis 
rate  was  not  made  by  any  of  the  defendant 
carriers,  and  they  have  repeatedly  tried 
to  get  it  raised.  The  per  cent  of  brick 
furnished  by  St.  Louis  has  increased 
from  1  6-10  per  cent  to  9V2  per  cent  of  all 
brick  furnished  in  the  past  year.  Com- 
plainants were  satisfied  with  the  rate 
when  the  St.  Louis  rate  was  the  same, 
although  they  first  sought  to  have  that 
rate  raised.  The  object  of  the  St.  Louis 
rate  is  to  foster  the  industry  in  St.  Louis 
and  benefit  the  St.  Louis  carriers.  The 
Cincinnati-Birmingham  rate  was  12c. 
Cincinnati  is  the  basing  point  of  the  traf- 
fic. Two-thirds  of  the  brick  shipped  to 
Birmingham  comes  from  south  of  the 
Ohio  river  with  no  bridge  charge.  Cin- 
cinnati is  484  miles  from  Birmingham. 
Ashland  is  523  miles.  Three  of  the 
largest  plants,  producing  64  per  cent  of 
the  brick  sent  to  Birmingham,  are  on  the 
Chesapeake  &  Ohio,  75  miles  from  Lex- 
ington. Lexington  is  84  miles  south  of 
Cincinnati,  but  takes  the  Cincinnati 
rate.  HELD,  the  rate  cannot  be  held 
discriminatory  as  the  same  carriers  do 
not    serve    the    complainants    and    St. 


DISCRIMINATION,  §7  (k)— (n) 


246 


Louis,  nor  is  the  traffic  necessarily 
transported  over  part  of  the  way  by  the 
same  carriers.  However,  dealing  with 
the  Ashland  rate  from  the  standpoint  of 
the  Cincinnati  rate  on  brick  as  contrast- 
ed with  the  rates  on  other  commodities, 
is  a  misconception,  as  the  commodity 
does  not  originate  in  Cincinnati,  and  the 
greater  part  does  not  pass  through  that 
point.  The  rates  from  the  main  produc- 
ing points,  75  miles  from  Lexington,  are 
unreasonable  and  should  be  fixed  at  Ic 
less  per  100  lbs.  The  Ashland  and  Tay- 
lor rate  is  also  unreasonable  to  the  same 
extent.  Ashland  Fire  Brick  Co.  v.  So. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  115,  121. 

(k)  Where  certain  carriers  from  a 
producing  point  and  serving  a  consum- 
ing point  are  also  parties  to  joint  through 
rates  to  the  consuming  locality,  but 
from  other  producing  points,  they  may  be 
held  liable  for  undue  preference,  though 
their  lines  do  not  directly  reach  such 
other  producing  points.  Elk  Cement  & 
Lime  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C. 
84,  89. 

(1)  A  carrier  cannot  be  charged  with 
giving  preference  or  advantage  to  a 
community  which  it  does  not  serve,  nor 
be  charged  with  subjecting  such  com- 
munity to  prejudice  or  disadvantage. 
Johnson  &  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
21  L  C.  C.  637,  639;  Roberts  Cotton  Oil 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  248,  250. 

(m)  Complainant  alleged  that  de- 
fendants' rate  of  15c  per  100  lbs.  on  cot- 
tonseed oil,  carload,  from  Cairo  to  Chi- 
cago, 111.,  was  discriminatory  because  of 
a  rate  of  8i^c  from  East  St.  Louis,  111.,  to 
Chicago.  It  further  alleged  that  de- 
fendants' rate  of  14c  from  Cairo  to 
Louisville,  Ky.,  and  Cincinnati,  O.,  was 
unreasonable  and  discriminatory  to  the 
extent  of  2c  per  100  lbs.  by  reason  of  a 
rate  of  10c  from  East  St.  Louis  to  the 
same  destinations.  The  short  line  dis- 
tance from  Cairo  to  Chicago  is  365  miles 
via  the  I.  C.  R.  R.  and  from  East  St. 
Louis  to  Chicago  is  282  miles,  and  the 
earnings  under  the  8^-cent  rate  amount 
to  6.03  mills  per  ton  mile  as  compared 
with  7.71  mills  under  the  15-cent  rate  from 
Cairo.  It  appeared  that  the  low  rate  from 
East  St.  Louis  to  Chicago  is  made  by 
carriers  which  do  not  reach  Cairo,  and 
that  the  circumstances  and  conditions 
affecting  the  transportation  from  Cairo 
to  Chicago  and  from  East  St.  Louis  to 
Chicago  are  substantially  dissimilar. 
Complainants    specifically   admitted   that 


the  15-cent  rate  is  reasonable  and  the 
only  question  involved  was  that  of  dis- 
crimination against  Cairo.  From  the  record 
it  appeared  that  much  the  same  situation 
is  disclosed  with  respect  to  the  adjustment 
of  rates  from  Cairo  and  East  St.  Louis 
to  Louisville  and  Cincinnati.  HELD, 
that  if  the  rates  from  Cairo  were  reduced 
the  carriers  which  reach  that  point 
would  be  required  to  accept  less  than  a 
reasonable  compensation  by  reason  of 
conditions  for  which  they  are  not  re- 
sponsible and  which  they  cannot  con- 
trol; that  the  lines  between  St.  Louis  and 
Chicago  which  do  not  reach  Cairo  are 
not  bound  to  consider  the  interests  of 
that  point;  that  by  reason  of  the  dissim- 
ilarity of  circumstances  and  conditions 
respecting  the  transportation  of  cotton- 
seed oil  from  East  St.  Louis  to  Chicago 
and  from  Cairo  to  Chicago,  and  from 
East  St.  Louis  to  Louisville  and  Cincin- 
nati, and  from  Cairo  to  the  same  points, 
the  defendants  are  not  guilty  of  undue 
prejudice  against  Cairo  within  the  mean- 
ing of  section  3  of  the  Act.  Complaint 
dismissed.  Roberts  Cotton  Oil  v.  L  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  248. 

(n)  Complainant,  engaged  in  the  pro- 
duction of  pig  iron,  has  a  blast  furnace 
at  Carondelet,  Mo.,  and  used  coke  in  car- 
loads from  Page,  W.  Va.  Contempo- 
raneous with  the  rates  which  were  paid, 
carriers  not  parties  to  the  complaint 
maintained  dual  rates  on  coke  to  various 
lake  ports.  These  dual  rates  to  Chica- 
go, for  instance,  were  an  open  rate  of 
$2.65  per  net  ton,  and  a  rate  of  $2.35  per 
net  ton  "for  use  in  blast  furnaces,  for 
smelting  iron  from  the  ores."  Only  one 
defendant,  the  C.  &  O.  R.  R.,  participated 
in  coke  traffic  to  the  lake  ports  and  could 
be  held  to  have  the  burden  of  justifying 
the  maintenance  of  the  dual  rates  at  the 
lake  ports  concurrently  with  the  main- 
tenance of  the  single  rates  at  St.  Louis. 
This  carrier  has  no  line  north  of  the 
Ohio  river,  and  while  it  did  publish  the 
dual  rates  for  the  lake  ports,  and  the 
single  rate  to  St.  Louis,  it  did  so  only 
with  the  concurrence  of  other  lines  not 
parties  to  the  complaint.  HELD,  had 
the  complainant  been  located  at  Chi- 
cago, or  any  other  lake  port  where  dual 
rates  were  maintained  it  would  have 
been  entitled  to  the  lower  or  furnace 
rate  on  coke.  This  not  being  the  case, 
complainant  could  not  obtain  reparation 
on  the  ground  of  discrimination,  but  was 
entitled  to  reparation  to  the  extent  that 


246 


DISCRIMINATION.  §7  (o)— §8  (1)   (b) 


the  joint  rates  exacted  exceeded  the 
Bum  of  the  intermediate  rates.  St.  Louis 
Blast  Furnace  Co.  v.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I,  C. 
C.  215. 

(o)  It  is  no  violation  of  the  Act  to 
maintain  joint  rail-lake-and-rail  rates 
higher  than  rail-and-lake  rates  to  farther- 
distance  point,  where  lake  boats  did  not 
stop  at  the  complaining  point.  City  of 
Ashland  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  3. 

(p)  Where  carriers  granted  a  transit 
privilege  at  Omahaand  denied  such  privi- 
lege at  Detroit,  but  the  carriers  that 
served  Omaha  were  not  the  same  that 
served  Detroit,  petition  asking  establish- 
ment of  privilege  at  Detroit  was  dis- 
missed. Schmidt  &  Sons  v.  M.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  535,  537. 

(q)  Where  two  carriers  serve  same 
destination  from  two  different  points  of 
origin,  neither  can  be  held  to  discrimi- 
nate against  mills  at  that  destination  be- 
cause it  sees  fit  to  make  or  refuse  a  rate 
lower  than  is  inherently  reasonable. 
Saginaw  &  Manistee  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  119,  125. 

(rs)  Coffeyville,  Kan.,  is  not  unjustly 
discriminated  against  by  rates  on  petro- 
leum to  Memphis,  higher  than  those 
from  Whiting,  Ind.,  and  Illinois  points  to 
Memphis,  where  the  carriers  serving 
Coffeyville  are  not  those  serving  Whit- 
ing and  the  Illinois  points.  National 
Petroleum  Ass'n  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I. 
C  C.  593,  594. 

(t)  No  discrimination  can  be  found 
in  favor  of  a  point  to  which  commodity 
involved  never  moved.  Consumers'  Ice 
Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C 
277. 

(u)  A  carrier  cannot  be  guilty  of  dis- 
crimination against  a  locality  which  It 
does  not  serve.  Utica  Traffic  Bureau  v. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C. 
271.   272. 

(v)  A  carrier  cannot  discriminate 
against  a  point  not  located  on  its  own 
line.  Friend  Paper  Co.  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  178. 

(w)  A  carrier  serving  one  point  may 
be  guilty  of  discrimination  against 
another  point  not  on  its  own  line,  where 
the  separate  carriers  unite  in  joint 
through  rates  with  common  connecting 
lines  to  destination.  Indiana-Steel  & 
Wire    Case,    16    L    C.    C     155,    followed. 


Railroad    Commission    of    Tennessee    v. 
A.  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  418,  421. 

(xy)  A  carrier  cannot  discriminate 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute  except 
as  between  those  whom  it  serves  or  whom 
it  may  lawfully  be  required  to  serve.  It  is 
not  guilty  of  discrimination  merely  be- 
cause it  does  not  afford  as  favorable 
rates  as  others  served  in  different  ter- 
ritory, though  the  products  carried  by 
each  are  brought  to  the  same  market. 
The  law  does  not  deal  in  these  matters 
with  all  carriers  collectively  as  a  single 
unit  or  system,  but  its  commands  are 
directed  to  each  with  respect  to  the  ser- 
vice which  it  is  required  to  perform. 
Chicago  Lumber  &  Coal  Co.  v.  T.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  323,  332. 

(z)  If  a  particular  line  alone  delivers 
at  a  point,  participating  in  through 
routes  and  joint  rates  thereto  from  two 
points  of  production  not  directly  served 
by  its  own  lines,  it  may  not  be  a  party 
to  a  preferential  joint  or  proportional 
rate  from  either  point  of  production. 
The  test  of  the  discrimination  is  the 
ability  of  one  of  the  carriers  participat- 
ing in  the  two  through  routes  from  the 
two  points  of  origin  to  the  same  point 
of  destination  to  put  an  end  to  the  dis- 
crimination by  its  own  act.  Ashland 
Fire  Brick  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
115,  120. 

§8.     Competition. 

§8.     (1)   In  General. 

See  Competition;  Concentrating 
Rates  and  Privileges,  (a),  (aa), 
(b);  Evidence,  §13  (1)  (h),  §14  (1) 
(a),  (b),  (c),  (d),  (g),  (m),  (n); 
Long  and  Short  Haul,  §7  (h),  §9  (h). 

(a)  Competition  of  controlling  force 
cannot  be  ignored  by  the  Commission  in 
determining  whether  an  advantage  in 
rate  at  the  competitive  point  is  undue, 
or  is  one  not  chargeable  to  the  carriers 
defendant  because  involuntarily  made. 
Sioux  City  Terminal  Elevator  Co.  v.  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  98,  107. 

(aa)  Competition  which  compels 
lower  rates  to  one  city  than  to  another 
city  similarly  situated  may  justify  such 
rate  adjustment,  but  the  mere  fact  of 
competition,  regardless  of  its  character, 
does  not  relieve  carriers  from  the  limita- 
tions of  section  3.  Chamber  of  Commerce 
of  Newport  News  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C 
C.   345.  353. 

(b)  The  public  interest  may  demand 
that  a   carrier   shall  not  avail   itself  of 


DISCRIMINATION,  §8  (1)    (bb)— §8  (2)   (b) 


247 


competitive  conditions  to  produce  dis- 
crimination. Chamber  of  Commerce, 
Ashburn,  Ga.,  v.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  140,  150. 

(bb)  The  fact  that  a  carrier  may 
voluntarily  accept  lower  rates  than  it 
can  be  required  to  accept,  and  that 
whether  or  not  a  carrier  will  meet  com- 
petitive conditions  at  a  particular  point 
rests  primarily  with  the  carrier,  does  not 
relieve  the  carrier  by  meeting  competitive 
conditions  at  one  point  and  refusing  to 
meet  them  at  a  neighboring  point. 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Newport  News 
V.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  140,  149. 

(c)  It  is  well  settled  that  distance  is 
always  a  factor  to  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration in  determining  either  the  rea-^ 
sonableness  of  a  rate  by  itself  or  In  con- 
sidering its  relation  to  rates  to  other 
points,  but  it  is  equally  well  settled  that 
distance  alone  Is  not  controlling.  Com- 
petition is  an  important  element  and 
there  are  various  other  considerations, 
all  of  which  must  be  taken  into  account 
In  determining  the  fact  whether  a  par- 
ticular rate  or  a  system  is  entitled  as 
a  matter  of  law  to  rates  that  are  reason- 
able and  that  do  not  operate  to  unduly 
discriminate  against  them.  Corporation 
Commission  of  North  Carolina  v.  N.  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  303,  309. 

(d)  The  suggestion  that  actual  com- 
petition is  necessary  in  order  to  produce 
undue  discrimination  in  rates  overlooks 
the  requirements  of  section  1  that  all 
rates  shall  be  reasonable.  Penn  Tobacco 
Co.  V.  Old  Dominion  S.  S.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C 
197,  200. 

(e)  A  charge  of  undue  discrimination 
may  not  be  predicated  on  lower  rates  on 
different  commodities  which  are  not  com- 
petitive. Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v. 
L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  30,  36. 

(f)  If  a  particular  point  Is  discrimi- 
nated against  the  fact  that  the  removal 
of  discrimination  would  disturb  rates  at 
other  points  is  of  little  weight;  but  when 
a  change  would  be  followed  by  changes 
at  competitive  points  which  would 
restore  the  same  relationship,  and  exist- 
ing rates  are  not  shown  excessive,  a  jus- 
tification for  a  change  is  not  found. 
Montgomery  Freight  Bureau  v.  L.  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  521,  529. 

(g)  While  competition  at  a  given 
point  may  render  the  circumstances  sub- 
stantially  dissimilar,    and   justify   a   dis- 


crimination against  points  where  such 
competition  is  not  controlling,  such  dis- 
similarity of  circumstances  does  not  re- 
lieve the  carrier  altogether  from  the  re- 
straint of  section  3  of  the  Act,  and  the 
amount  of  discrimination  must  not  be 
greater  than  the  dissimilarity  of  circum- 
stances demands.  Planters'  Gin  &  Com- 
press Co.  V.  Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.  C.  131,  133. 

(h)  The  carrier  cannot  be  permitted 
to  compete  at  one  point  and  decline  to 
compete  at  another,  where  all  conditions 
are  the  same.  Darling  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  79,  87. 

(i)  The  fact  that  there  is  competition 
between  communities  for  the  purchase 
of  a  commodity  does  not  justify  the  car- 
rier transporting  .the  same  to  levy  an  un- 
reasonable rate  on  one  community. 
Nebraska  State  Railway  Commission  v. 
U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  349,  355. 

§8.     (2)     Artificial   Competition. 

(a)  Where  carriers  through  discrim- 
inatory rates  produce  competitive  con- 
ditions at  one  point  they  cannot  set  up 
such  conditions  as  a  reason  for  maintain- 
ing discriminatory  rates  at  a  neighboring 
point.  Chamber  of  Commerce,  Ashburn, 
Ga.,  V.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
140,  150. 

(b)  Complainant  alleged  that  the 
rates  to  and  from  eastern  cities,  Ohio 
and  Mississippi  river  crossings,  and  the 
west,  on  both  classes  and  commodities, 
were  unreasonable  and  unjustly  discrim- 
inatory against  Ashburn,  Ga.,  In  favor 
of  Cordele,  TIfton,  Fitzgerald,  Albany 
and  other  south  Georgia  points.  Ash- 
burn is  located  about  the  center  of  an 
Irregular  square,  the  corners  of  which  are 
occupied  by  Cordele,  Albany,  TIfton  and 
Fitzgerald.  Ashburn  is  twenty  miles 
north  of  TIfton,  thirty-six  miles  west  of 
Fitzgerald,  twenty  miles  south  of  Cor- 
dele and  thirty-seven  miles  east  of  Al- 
bany by  rail.  It  is  but  six  miles  more 
distant  from  Savannah  than  is  Cordele 
or  TIfton  and  not  more  than  twenty  miles 
farther  than  those  cities  from  such  Im- 
portant points  and  gateways  as  Atlanta, 
Birmingham,  Montgomery,  Savannah, 
Brunswick  and  Jacksonville  (from  the 
latter  It  Is  177  miles  northwest).  The 
class  rates  from  New  York  to  Cordele, 
Albany,  Fitzgerald  and  TIfton  range 
from  $1.17  first  class  to  88c  for  class  F, 
while  the  rates  to  Ashburn  range  from 
$1.42  to  74c.     The  class  rates  from  the 


DISCRIMINATION,  §8  (3)    (a)— (c) 


Ohio  river  crossings  to  Cordele  and  Al- 
bany range  from  $1.23  first  class  to  58c 
class  F;  to  Fitzgerald  and  Tifton,  from 
$1.43  to  62c,  but  to  Ashburn  from  $1.48 
to  72c.  From  the  Mississippi  river  cross- 
ing, St.  Louis,  the  class  rates  to  Cordele 
and  Albany  range  from  $1.46  for  first 
class  to  72c  class  F;  to  Fitzgerald  and 
Tifton,  from  $1.66  to  76c,  and  to  Ashburn 
from  $1.71  to  86c.  From  the  eastern 
cities  the  ratps  to  Cordele  and  Tifton  are 
the  same  and  are  lower  than  to  Ashburn, 
as  a  result  of  which  traffic  moves  through 
Tifton  and  Ashburn  to  Cordele,  or 
through  Cordele  and  Ashburn  to  Tifton 
at  lower  rates  than  apply  at  Ashburn. 
In  the  application  of  rates  from  the  Ohio 
and  Mississippi  river  crossings  the  so- 
called  basing  points  in  southern  Georgia 
are  divided  into  two  groups.  Cordele, 
Albany,  Americus  and  Dawson  are  in- 
cluded in  group  A  and  take  the  same 
rates;  Tifton,  Fitzgerald,  Moultrie,  Val- 
dosta,  Thomasville  and  Bainbridge  are 
In  group  B  and  take  the  same  rate.  Ash- 
burn is  a  thriving  place  with  a  popula- 
tion of  something  over  2,200,  practically 
the  same  as  Tifton.  It  has  no  wholesale 
or  jobbing  business  because  under  ex- 
isting rate  adjustments  dealers  at  Cor- 
dele can  bring  in  goods  from  the  east  or 
west  and  pay  the  local  rates  to  Ashburn 
at  the  same  freight  cost  that  the  Ash- 
burn merchant  would  have  to  pay  on 
through  shipments.  A  similar  discrim- 
ination existed  against  Ashburn  and  In 
favor  of  Cordele  and  Tifton  as  to  the 
state  rates  and  that  discrimination  was 
found  to  be  undue,  and  the  same  rates 
were  aocorded  to  Ashburn  as  to  Cordele 
and  Tifton  in  an  order  of  the  Georgia 
Railroad  Commission  of  Sept.  1,  1911. 
On  outbound  shipments  of  commodities 
whioh  that  territory  produces,  such  as 
lumber,  cotton  and  cottonseed,  defend- 
ants and  their  connections  give  to  Ash- 
burn rates  to  Charleston  and  Jackson- 
ville substantially  the  same  as  to  Tifton, 
Cordele  and  Albany,  and  on  cottonseed 
products  Ashburn  has  the  same  rates 
to  the  south  Atlantic  ports  as  have  Cor- 
dele, Albany  and  Fitzsrerald.  The  higher 
rates  at  Ashburn  than  at  Cordele  or 
Tifton  to  which  Ashburn  Is  dlrectlv  inter- 
mediate contribute  to  the  discrimination 
of  which  Ashburn  complains.  More  In- 
terstate railroads  serve  Cordele  than 
Ashburn,  and  hence  certain  competitive 
conditions  exist  there.  The  present 
rates  to  Cordele  and  Tifton  have  been  in 
effect  since  1905,  except  that  during  that 
period  the  rates  on  grain  and  grain  prod- 


ucts and  hay  from  the  west  have  been 
increased.  HELD,  the  competitive  con- 
ditions existing  at  Cordele  and  Tifton 
are  the  direct  result  of  the  act  of  the 
carriers  in  preferring  those  points  by 
such  rates  as  have  produced  this  result. 
It  is  not  so  much  a  question  of  whether 
or  not  railroads  compete  at  one  point 
and  decline  to  compete  at  another  point, 
but  is  whether  or  not  by  so  doing  they 
create  or  maintain  unjust  discrimination 
or  undue  preference.  The  fact  that  if 
Ashburn  had  an  equitable  rate  adjust- 
ment it  would  be  enabled  to  do  but  a 
comparatively  small  business  on  account 
of  the  competition  at  the  other  points 
so  near  to  it  is  no  reason  why  Ashburn 
may  be  wholly  excluded  from  opportunity 
to  get  what  it  can.  The  present  rate  ad- 
justment is  unjustly  discriminatory 
against  Ashburn  and  unduly  preferential 
to  Tifton  and  defendants  are  required  to 
include  Ashburn  in  the  same  class  with 
Tifton  under  class  and  commodity  rates 
from  and  to  the  points  and  territories 
complained  of.  Chamber  of  Commerce 
of  Ashburn,  Ga.,  v.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  140. 

§8.     (3)     Railroads   in    General. 

(a)  The  making  of  higher  rates  on 
dressed  meats  and  packing  house  prod- 
ucts from  Missouri  river  points  to  Chi- 
cago than  upon  live  stock  between  the 
same  points  is  found  not  to  be  unjustly 
discriminatory,  where  the  rate  results 
from  genuine  competition  between  car- 
riers and  where  the  result  of  the  rate 
complained  of  has  not  been  to  change  the 
volume  of  traffic  going  to  Chicago  or  ma- 
terially affect  the  business  of  the  com- 
plainant. I.  C.  C.  V.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
209  U.  S.  108,  122,  28  Sup.  Ct.  493,  52  L. 
ed.  705;   affirming  141  Fed.  1003. 

(b)  No  unjust  discrimination  resulted 
from  the  maintenance  of  a  lower  com- 
modity rate  from  a  neighboring  point  be- 
cause of  competition.  American  Cigar 
Co.  V.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  81,  82. 

(c)  The  rate  on  wrought  iron  pipe, 
Youngstown,  O.,  to  Liberal,  Kan.,  as 
compared  to  Texola,  Okla.,  the  distance 
being  substantially  the  same  and  the 
physical  cost  of  handling  the  traffic  about 
the  same,  is  not  unreasonable,  nor  In 
violation  of  section  3  of  the  Act,  It  ap- 
pearing that  competition  at  certain  Texas 
points  reflects  itself  to  these  Oklahoma 
points,  and  that  to  sustain  the  position 
of  the  complainant  would  subvert  the 
entire  structure  in  that  section.     Blake 


DISCRIMINATION,   §8    (3)    (d)— (f) 


249 


&  Son  Hardware  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C,  139. 

(d)  Complainants  attacked  the  first  six 
class  rates  in  the  Southern  Classification 
and  commodity  rates  on  grain  and  grain 
products,  hay  and  packing  house  prod- 
ucts, carload,  from  Chicago,  111.,  East  St. 
Louis,  111.,  Louisville,  Ky.,  Columbus  and 
Cincinnati,  O.,  to  Durham  and  Winston- 
Salem,  N.  C.  (known  as  the  Carolina 
Cities),  and  on  lumber  west,  as  unrea- 
sonable compared  with  rates  on  the  same 
class  of  shipments  from  the  same  points 
to  the  "Virginia  Cities."  The  first  class 
rate  from  Cincinnati  to  Roanoke,  Lynch- 
burg, Richmond  and  Norfolk,  Va.,  was 
62c,  the  short  line  distances  being  456, 
472,  580  and  667  miles,  respectively;  rates 
on  flour  being  13^c,  grain  13^c,  hay 
23c  and  packing  house  products  23c.  Cin- 
cinnati, Louisville,  East  St.  Louis  and 
Chicago  are  588,  5G5,  836  and  863  miles, 
respectively,  from  Winston-Salem,  and 
578,  640,  971  and  873  miles,  respectively, 
from  Durham.  The  first  class  rates  to 
these  points  were  from  Cincinnati  and 
Louisville,  93c;  East  St.  Louis,  $1.26; 
Chicago,  $1.28.  On  flour,  carload,  29i^c, 
381^0  and  35c,  respectively;  grain  28i^c, 
Z5y2C  and  34c,  respectively;  hay,  29c, 
36c  and  44c,  respectively;  packing  house 
products,  37c,  49c  and  49c,  respectively. 
The  Carolina  Cities  have  each  a  popula- 
tion of  about  25,000.  They  are  nearer 
Cincinnati  and  all  points  west  thereof 
than  most  of  the  cities  taking  the  Vir- 
ginia Cities  rates.  It  appeared  that  de- 
fendant's rates  to  the  Virginia  Cities  were 
made  under  competitive  conditions  which 
did  not  exist  at  the  Carolina  Cities.  These 
cities  are  less  than  125  miles  from  the 
nearest  of  Virginia  Cities  on  the  line  of 
the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  which  reaches  Cincinnati. 
HELD,  while  it  is  true  that  transporta- 
tion conditions  are  to  some  extent  dif- 
ferent on  the  lines  extending  south  from 
Roanoke  and  Lynchburg  than  obtain  on 
the  main  line  from  Roanoke  and  Norfolk, 
yet  the  difference  by  no  means  warrant 
rates  to  Winston-Salem  and  Durham  on 
through  traflSc  that  are  so  much  higher 
than  are  maintained  to  main  line  points. 
Competition  has,  no  doubt,  affected  rates 
to  points  on  the  main  line  of  the  N.  &  W. 
Ry.,  but  this  competition  has  to  no  con- 
siderable extent  been  reflected  to  points 
south.  There  is  no  justification  to  be 
found  for  the  charges  made  on  shipments 
to  Winston-Salem  and  Durham  on 
through  traflic  from  the  western  points 
involved.     First  class  rates  from  Cincin- 


nati were  reduced  to  84c,  with  other  class 
rates  proportionately,  and  carriers  left 
to  adjust  the  class  rates  from  the  other 
western  points.  Commodity  rates  on 
flour,  grain,  hay  and  packing  house  prod- 
ucts eastbound  in  carloads  and  on  lumber 
westbound  in  carloads  not  found  unrea- 
sonable. Corporation  Commission  of 
North  Carolina  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  303;  decision  of  Commission 
sustained,  N,  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S., 
195    Fed.    953. 

(e)  Complainant  alleged  that  defend- 
ant's rates,  carload,  on  wall  plaster  from 
Syracuse,  N.  Y.,  to  Boston,  Mass.,  350 
miles,  of  $2  per  net  ton,  minimum  40,000 
lbs.,  and  $1.75  from  Syracuse  to  New 
York,  N.  Y.,  290  miles,  were  unreasonable 
and  discriminatory,  compared  with  a  rate 
of  $2  to  Boston  from  Oakfield,  N.  Y., 
455  miles,  and  from  Garbutt  and  Wheat- 
land, N.  Y.,  a  distance  of  445  and  iM 
miles,  respectively,  and  the  rate  of  $2 
to  New  York  City  from  Garbutt,  Wheat- 
land and  Oakfield,  distances  of  375,  377 
and  395  miles,  respectively.  Wall  plaster 
is  made  of  raw  material,  substantially  65 
per  cent  sand  and  35  per  cent  plaster, 
the  latter  being  purchased  at  points  other 
than  Syracuse,  including  Oakfield  and 
Garbutt,  where  it  is  shipped  to  com- 
plainant in  Syracuse.  Complainant  in- 
sisted it  ought  to  have  a  lower  rate  from 
Syracuse  on  wall  plaster  because  the  car- 
riers have  a  haul  on  the  raw  material  in. 
The  rate  from  Syracuse  to  New  Yofk 
yields  about  6  mills  per  ton  mile;  from 
Oakfield  and  Garbutt,  5.3  mills;  the  rate 
from  Syracuse  to  Boston  yields  5.7  mills, 
whereas  the  rate  from  Oakfield  or  Gar- 
butt and  Wheatland  to  Boston  yields 
about  4.4  mills;  but  defendants  insisted 
that  the  rate  from  the  latter  named  point 
was  due  to  the  competition  of  other  car- 
riers having  a  shorter  line  mileage  in 
connection  with  the  B.  R.  &  P.  R.  R. 
HELD,  the  facts  appearing  fail  to  con- 
vince the  Commission  that  the  rates 
complained  of  are,  under  all  the  circum- 
stances, unreasonably  high  or  unduly  dis- 
criminatory. Complaint  dismissed.  Par- 
agon Plaster  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  480. 

(f)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates  on 
coal  from  the  Walsenburg  mines  in  south- 
ern Colorado  to  points  on  the  line  of  the 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  in  Nebraska  between 
Chadron  and  Stuart,  Neb.,  and  to  Belle 
Fourche,  S.  D.  Rock  Springs  is  located 
in  southwestern  Wyoming,  Crawford 
and  Dakota  Junction  in  northwestern  Ne- 


m 


DISCRIMINATION,  §8   (3)    (g) 


braska,  Lead  and  Deadwood  in  the  Black 
Hills  region,  north  of  Crawford  and  in 
western  South  Dakota,  and  Belle  Fourche 
east  of  Lead  and  Deadwood.  Rock 
Springs  and  Walsenburg  are  equally  dis- 
tant from  Crawford;  Hannah,  Wyo.,  lies 
some  159  miles  east  of  Rock  Springs. 
The  C,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  applied  from  the 
Wyoming  mines  served  by  it  to  Crawford 
and  to  Lead  and  Deadwood  the  same  rate 
as  that  applied  by  its  competitor,  the  C. 
&  N.  W.  Ry.,  and  its  connections  from 
Hannah  to  Crawford,  The  C,  B.  &  Q. 
K.  R.  and  its  connections  then  applied 
from  Walsenburg  to  Crawford  the  rate 
made  by  the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  from  Han- 
nah to  Crawford.  The  C,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
and  the  C.  &  N.  W.  were  not  in  com- 
petition with  respect  to  the  rate  from 
Rock  Springs  to  Crawford,  the  latter 
line  controlling  the  coal  produced  at 
Rock  Springs.  As  a  result  Walsenburg 
had  a  rate  of  75c  less  per  ton  to  Craw- 
ford and  Dakota  Junction  than  Rock 
Springs,  although  the  distances  were  the 
same.  Ghadron  and  Stuart  lie  east  of 
Crawford  on  the  line  of  the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry. 
and  are  not  reached  by  the  C.  B.  &  Q. 
R.  R.,  nor  are  the  rates  of  the  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry,  to  these  points  influenced  by  the 
competition  of  that  carrier.  Consequently 
the  rates  from  Rock  Springs  and  Walsen- 
burg to  these  points,  being  based  on 
equal  distances,  were  the  same,  and  Wal- 
senburg did  not  enjoy,  as  it  did  to  Craw- 
ford, a  lower  rate  than  Rock  Springs, 
The  rates  to  Belle  Fourche  were  also 
uninfluenced  by  the  competition  of  the 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  and,  therefore,  Walsen- 
burg enjoyed  no  advantage  over  Rock 
Springs.  No  evidence  of  the  unreason- 
ableness per  se  of  the  rates  attacked 
was  given,  except  comparisons  with  the 
rates  in  territory  lying  east  of  the  Mis- 
souri and  Mississippi  rivers  and  nothing 
was  offered  to  show  the  conditions  to  be 
similar.  The  rates  complained  of  were 
not  out  of  line  generally  with  those 
found  by  the  Commission  heretofore  to 
be  unreasonable  in  the  territory  in  ques- 
tion. The  territory  surrounding  the  des- 
tinations in  question  was  unproductive. 
The  rates  attacked  yielded  little  over  7 
mills  per  ton  1  mile.  HELD,  defendants 
did  not  unjustly  discriminate.against  Wal- 
senburg in  favor  of  Rock  Springs  in  fail- 
ing to  give  a  lower  rate  from  Walsenburg 
to  points  in  Nebraska  and  South  Dakota 
east  and  north  of  Crawford  and  Dakota 
Junction,  since  the  lower  rate  accorded 
Walsenburg  to  Dakota  Junction  was 
compelled  by  competition;   and  that  the 


evidence  was  not  sufficient  to  show  the 
rates  attacked  to  be  unreasonable  per  se. 
Colorado  Coal  Traffic  Ass'n  v,  C,  &  S.  Ry. 
Co,,  18  I.  C.  C,  572,  576. 

(g)  Prior  to  Aug.  13,  1907,  the  through 
class  rates  of  defendant  from  New  Or- 
leans via  Mobile  to  Montgomery,  Selma 
and  Prattville,  Ala.,  were  in  excess  of 
the  combination  of  locals  on  Mobile  and 
the  same  was  true  of  the  through  rates 
from  New  Orleans  to  said  points  via 
Pensacola.  On  Aug.  13,  1907,  defendant 
raised  the  local  rates  from  New  Orleans 
to  Mobile  and  from  Mobile  to  Pensacola 
so  as  to  make  the  combinations  of  lo- 
cals equal  to  the  through  rates  from 
New  Orleans  to  Montgomery,  Selma  and 
Prattville,  but  did  not  disturb  the  local 
rates  from  Mobile  and  Pensacola  to  such 
points  or  the  through  rates  from  New 
Orleans  to  them.  Complainant  shippers 
at  New  Orleans  attacked  the  increase 
and  also  the  through  rates  to  them  from 
New  Orleans  via  Mobile  and  via  Pensa- 
cola. The  local  rates  from  New  Orleans 
to  Mobile  and  Pensacola  had  been  in 
effect  for  many  years  prior  to  the  in- 
crease and  had  been  determined  by  water 
competition  which  had  ceased  to  be 
practicably  operative.  New  Orleans  was 
engaged  in  shipping  staple  goods  to  Mo- 
bile and  adjacent  territory  and  was  keen- 
ly affected  by  the  rise  in  rates.  The 
rates  from  New  Orleans  to  Mobile  and 
Pensacola  had  been  in  effect  for  over 
twenty  years  and  there  was  no  evidence 
that  they  were  not  compensatory.  They 
exceeded  the  rates  from  New  Orleans 
to  other  transportation  points,  e.  g„ 
Natchez,  Vicksburg,  Greenville  and  Mem- 
phis, where  the  distances  were  much 
greater,  and  also  exceeded  the  rates 
from  Nashville,  Memphis,  Cincinnati  and 
Louisville  to  points  where  the  distances 
were  approximately  the  same.  Prior  to 
the  advance  the  rates  between  New  Or- 
leans and  Mobile  and  New  Orleans  and 
Pensacola  were  identical  in  both  direc- 
tions. Under  the  advance  the  rates  were 
in  many  cases  greater  from  New  Orleans 
to  Mobile  and  from  New  Orleans  to  Pen- 
sacola than  the  rates  between  such 
points  in  the  opposite  direction.  Be- 
tween New  Orleans  and  Memphis,  New 
Orleans  and  Greenville,  New  Orleans  and 
Natchez  and  New  Orleans  and  Vicks- 
burg, the  rates  were  the  same  in  both 
directions.  Ihe  rates  from  New  Orleans 
to  Montgomery,  Selma  and  Prattville 
were  higher  on  all  classes  than  the  rates 


DISCRIMINATION,  §8    (3)    (h)_(j) 


251 


to  them  from  other  points  typical  of  the 
situation  in  the  southeast,  from  where 
the  distances  are  greater,  e.  g.,  Bruns- 
wick, Ga.,  Savannah,  Ga.,  Charleston,  S. 
C,  Wilmington,  N.  C,  and  Nashville, 
Tenn.  From  some  of  'the  Virginia  cities 
to  Montgomery  and  Selma  the  rates  were 
less  than  from  New  Orleans  to  Mont- 
gomery and  Selma,  although  more  than 
twice  the  distance.  The  rates  per  ton 
mile  were  much  greater  from  New  Or- 
leans to  Montgomery,  Selma  and  Pratt- 
ville  than  they  were  from  Memphis,  St. 
Louis  and  Louisville.  HELD,  the  in- 
crease in  the  local  rates  from  New  Or- 
leans to  Mobile  and  from  New  Orleans 
to  Pensacola  was  unreasonable,  and 
should  not  exceed  those  in  effect  prior  to 
the  advance;  and  that  the  through  rates 
from  New  Orleans  to  Montgomery,  Sel- 
ma and  Prattville  were  unreasonable  and 
should  not  exceed  the  combination  of 
locals  based  on  Mobile  and  Pensacola  as 
such  locals  stood  prior  to  the  increase 
attacked.  New  Orleans  Board  of  Trade 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  231,  237; 
decision  of  Commission  sustained,  184 
Fed.  118,  but  order  subsequently  enjoined, 
Mack,  J.,  dissenting,  195  Fed.  541. 

(h)  The  rates  on  grain  and  grain 
products  from  Kansas  City  or  Omaha 
to  points  east  of  the  Mississippi  river 
and  north  of  the  Ohio  river  are  the  same 
via  all  lines  and  crossings.  These  rates 
were  established  in  order  to  provide  an 
equality  in  competitive  conditions  be- 
tween grain  dealers  and  carriers  at  the 
various  Missouri  river  crossings.  The 
rates  on  grain  originating  west  of  the 
Missouri  river  and  passing  through 
Omaha  or  Kansas  City  to  St.  Louis, 
thence  to  Cairo,  Carolina  territories, 
Memphis,  New  Orleans,  Galveston,  and 
other  Gulf  ports  for  export,  are  one  cent 
higher  from  Omaha  than  from  Kansas 
City,  the  proportionals  from  Kansas  City 
and  Omaha  to  St.  Louis  being  equal. 
Complainant  grain  dealers  at  Kansas  City 
attacked  the  rates  as  unduly  discrimi- 
natory in  favor  of  Omaha,  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  Kansas  City  is  137  miles 
nearer  to  St.  Louis  and  194  miles  nearer 
to  Memphis,  New  Orleans  and  Galves- 
ton than  is  Omaha.  Complainants  asked 
for  the  establishment  of  differentials 
from  Omaha  to  St.  Louis  2i^c  above 
Kansas  City  to  St.  Louis,  and  from  Oma- 
ha to  Cairo  and  other  southern  points  of 
SV^c  above  Kansas  City.  It  appeared 
that  the  adoption  of  these  differentials 


would  result  in  a  clear  division  of  the 
producing  territory  between  Kansas  City 
and  Omaha  and  would  be  destructive  of 
competition  in  most  of  that  territory, 
destroying  the  long  established  adjust- 
ment which  placed  Missouri  river  cross- 
ings substantially  on  a  parity  on  both 
inbound  and  outbound  rates  on  traffic 
generally.  Kansas  City  would  thereby 
gain  a  monopoly  of  territory  in  which 
Omaha  now  freely  competed,  and  the  ap- 
plication of  the  same  rule  to  Omaha 
would  give  it  exclusive  purchasing  pow- 
er in  territory  in  which  Kansas  City  now 
competed  with  Omaha  on  equal  terms. 
To  grant  complainants'  demand  would 
also  upset  the  delicate  adjustment  of 
grain  rates  on  shipments  from  Missouri 
river  crossings  to  points  in  eastern  ter- 
ritory. HELD,  following  Traffic  Bureau, 
Merchants'  Exchange  of  St.  Louis  v.  M. 
P.  Ry.,  13  L  C.  C.  11,  in  view  of  these 
competitive  conditions  the  element  of 
distance  should  not  be  made  controlling 
in  fixing  rates  from  Omaha  and  Kansas 
City  to  the  southern  territory  in  ques- 
tion. Complaint  dismissed.  Kansas  City 
Transportation  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  195,  203-7. 

(i)  Complainant,  the  City  of  Bristol, 
attacked  the  rate  of  $1.20  per  ton  on  coal 
from  Middlesboro,  Ky.,  to  Bristol,  Tenn., 
200  miles,  as  compared  with  the  rate  of 
80c  from  Middlesboro  to  Chattanooga, 
180  miles.  Bristol  was  supplied  from 
the  Appalachia  coal  fields,  which  were 
only  70- miles  distant  from  Bristol.  Produc- 
ers at  Middlesboro  found  this  competition 
prohibitive  and  did  not  attempt  to  reach 
Bristol  with  their  product.  Mines  served 
by  other  roads  were  located  from  5  to 
21  miles  away  from  Chattanooga  and 
defendant  established  the  said  Middles- 
boro to  Chattanooga  rate  in  competition 
with  the  rates  from  said  mines.  No  evi- 
dence of  the  unreasonableness  per  se 
of  the  rate  attacked  was  offered.  HELD, 
on  account  of  dissimilarity  in  conditions, 
the  rate  to  Bristol  was  not  unjustly  dis- 
criminatory against  complainant  as  com- 
pared with  the  rate  to  Chattanooga. 
Board  of  City  of  Bristol,  Tenn.,  v.  So. 
Ry.   Co.,  15   L  C.   C.   487,   490. 

(j)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
from  Indianapolis  to  St.  Louis  on  Iron 
beds  of  24c,  furniture  of  32i^c,  iron  and 
steel  of  13.5c,  ladders  of  24c,  chairs  of 
32%c,  castings  of  13.5c,  and  bags  of  16.5c, 
as  compared  with  the  rates  on  these 
commodities    respectively    of    16.6c,    22c, 


252 


DISCRIMINATION,  §8   (3)    (k)— (m) 


9c,  16.6c,  22c,  lie  and  10c  respectively 
from  Chicago  to  East  St.  Louis.  On  ac- 
count of  the  disparity  in  rates  on  iron 
and  steel,  Indianapolis  was  unable  to 
compete  with  Chicago  in  the  St.  Louis 
market.  Under  the  Indianapolis  mini- 
mum of  18,000  lbs.  on  furniture  for  a 
50-foot  car,  as  compared  with  the  Chi- 
cago 10,000  lbs.  minimum  for  any  length 
of  car,  the  Indianapolis  shipper  on  a 
fully  loaded  car  suffered  disadvantage  in 
rates  of  $32.10.  The  rates  from  Chicago 
to  Mississippi  river  crossings  were  made 
low  by  western  lines  and  the  same  rates 
applied  irrespective  of  the  difference  in 
distances  to  various  crossings,  upon  the 
theory  that  the  line  hauling  the  traffic 
to  the  Mississippi  river  would  probably 
•receive  the  outbound  haul  and  also  with 
the  idea  of  building  up  the  river  cross- 
ings located  upon  their  rails.  HELD, 
despite  the  existence  of  competitive  con- 
ditions at  Chicago  making  it  necessary 
for  the  lines  serving  both  Indianapolis 
and  Chicago  to  make  lower  rates  from 
Chicago,  the  disparities  in  the  rates 
from  Indianapolis  and  Chicago  were  too 
great,  and  the  rates  on  iron  and  steel 
articles,  including  castings,  and  on  bur- 
lap and  gunny  bags  from  Indianapolis 
should  not  exceed  rates  from  Chicago 
by  more  than  2i^c;  on  furniture  and 
chairs  by  more  than  7c;  on  iron  beds 
and  wooden  ladders  by  more  than  4c. 
Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  504,  516. 

(k)  On  grain  originating  west  of  the 
Missouri  river  and  destined  to  Little 
Rock  and  Arkansas  points  via  St.  Louis, 
local  rates  were  charged  up  to  the  Mis- 
souri river;  proportional  rates  of  9c  on 
wheat  and  8c  on  coarse  grains  from  the 
Missouri  river  to  St.  Louis;  and  local 
rates  of  18c  on  wheat  and  15c  on  coarse 
grains  from  St.  Louis  to  Little  Rock.  On 
grain  from  the  points  of  origin  in  ques- 
tion, via  Kansas  City  to  the  points  of 
destination  in  question,  the  rates  were 
the  locals  to  Kansas  City  plus  propor- 
tional rates  to  Little  Rock,  equal  to  the 
local  rates  from  St.  Louis  to  Little  Rock. 
The  average  distances  from  Kansas  City 
and  St.  Louis  to  the  Arkansas  destina- 
tions in  question  were  480  and  277  miles 
respectively.  Under  the  rates  attacked 
St.  Louis  dealers  were  unable  to  sell 
grain  from  the  points  of  origin  to  the 
points  of  destination  in  question.  HELD, 
both  on  account  of  the  difference  in  dis- 
tance and  of  competitive  conditions,  St. 


Louis  dealers  were  entitled  to  a  lower 
rate  from  St.  Louis  to  said  Arkansas 
points  than  the  rate  from  Kansas  City; 
that  the  18c  wheat  and  the  15c  coarse 
grains  rates  from  St.  Louis  to  said  points 
of  destination  were  unreasonable  per  se 
and  unduly  discriminatory  in  favor  of 
Kansas  City,  and  that  proportional  rates 
from  St.  Louis  of  13c  on  wheat  and  lie 
on  coarse  grains  should  be  established. 
The  Traffic  Bureau,  St.  Louis,  v.  M.  P. 
Ry.  13  I.  C.  C.  11,  13,  14. 

(1)  Defendants  charged  26i/4c  on  wal- 
nut lumber  from  Oklahoma  City  to  Gal- 
veston, a  distance  of  552  miles,  destined 
for  export,  and  18c  from  Kansas  City  to 
that  port,  a  distance  of  962  miles.  Com- 
plainant attacked  this  rate  as  unduly 
discriminatory  in  favor  of  its  competitors 
at  Kansas  City.  Complainant  obtained 
its  logs  to  the  east  and  northeast  of 
Oklahoma  City,  to  which  they  were 
brought  by  rail,  and  the  lumber  there 
manufactured  from  them.  When  the 
lumber  was  manufactured  at  Kansas 
City  the  logs  were  hauled  north  and  east 
and  then  the  lumber  going  by  the  lines 
of  defendants  was  hauled  back  over  sub- 
stantially the  same  route,  whereas  when 
manufactured  at  Oklahoma  City  the  logs 
moved  southerly  and  the  lumber  con- 
tinued in  the  same  course  to  Galveston. 
There  were  more  competing  carriers^ 
from  Kansas  City  to  Galveston  than 
from  Oklahoma  City  to  that  port.  Since 
the  hearing  defendants  filed  a  tariff  of 
21  %c  from  Kansas  City.  HELD,  the 
rates  from  Oklahoma  City  were  unrea- 
sonable and  should  not  exceed  21  %c. 
Miller  Walnut  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  43,  45. 

(m)  Prior  to  1906  complainant,  furni- 
ture manufacturer  at  New  Albany,  Miss., 
shipped  most  of  its  products  to  Missis- 
sippi and  Texas.  It  operated  in  com- 
petition with  factories  at  Greenwood, 
Miss.,  and  High  Point,  Mount  Airy  and 
Winston-Salem,  N.  C.  The  latter  three 
cities  shipped  furniture  to  the  eastern 
and  New  England  trade.  The  rate  from 
North  Carolina  points  was  49c  to  New 
York,  and  from  New  Albany  to  New 
York  $1.09.  Complainant,  after  long 
negotiations,  secured  from  defendants 
rates  from  New  Albany  of  55,  58,  58  and 
56c  respectively  to  Baltimore,  Boston, 
New  York  and  Philadelphia,  which  left 
a  differential  in  favor  of  the  North  Caro- 
lina points  of  10,  5,  9  and  7c  to  those 
cities   respectively.     In   reliance   on   the 


DISCRIMINATION,  §8    (4)    (a)— (b) 


253 


new  rates  complainant  abandoned  Its 
southwestern  business,  changed  its  pat- 
terns, and  began  to  sell  to  eastern  and 
New  England  markets.  After  a  short 
period  defendants  raised  the  rates  from 
New  Albany  to  63,  71,  66  and  64c  to  said 
cities  respectively.  Complainant  at- 
tacked the  increase  as  unreasonable. 
The  increased  rates  were  the  same  as 
those  applying  from  Memphis  and  Green- 
wood, New  Albany  being  located  some 
80  miles  southeast  of  the  former.  The 
advance  practically  absorbed  complain- 
ant's entire  profit.  The  Memphis  rates 
were  not  fixed  by  water  competition, 
since  it  was  impracticable  to  ship  the 
kinds  of  furniture  involved  by  water.  Un- 
der the  canceled  rates  the  per  ton  mile 
revenue  was  11,  10,  9  and  9  mills  re- 
spectively to  Baltimore,  Philadelphia, 
New  York  and  Boston.  From  said  North 
Carolina  points  under  the  former  rates 
therefrom,  which  were  not  disturbed, 
the  per  ton  mile  earnings  were  materi- 
ally higher  to  eastern  destinations  than 
those  under  the'  canceled  New  Albany 
rates.  The  differential  of  the  canceled 
New  Albany  to  New  York  rate  over  the 
Winston-Salem  to  New  York  rate  was 
the  same  as  the  differential  of  the  Win- 
ston-Salem rate  to  points  the  same  dis- 
tance in  western  territory  over  the  New 
Albany  rate  to  such  western  points.  De- 
fendants put  into  effect  the  increase 
attacked  upon  the  threat  by  other  car- 
riers to  reduce  the  rates  from  Green- 
wood, although  defendants  did  not  reach 
Greenwood.  The  distance  from  New 
Albany  to  the  eastern  markets  in  ques- 
tion was  much  greater  than  from  said 
North  Carolina  points.  HELD,  the  rates 
attacked  were  unreasonable  and  should 
be  reduced  on  a  carload  minimum  of 
12,000  lbs.  to  58,  59,  61  and  63c  to  Bal- 
timore, Philadelphia,  New  York  and  Bos- 
ton, respectively.  New  Albany  Furni 
ture  Co.  V.  M.  J.  &  K.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  13 
I.  C.  C.  594,  599. 

§8.     (4)    Short-Line  Carrier. 

(a)  Point  Pleasant,  N.  J.,  is  2i^  miles 
south  of  Seagirt,  N.  J.  Manasquan  lies 
between  Seagirt  and  Point  Pleasant. 
Bay  Head  lies  one  mile  south  of  Point 
Pleasant.  The  Penn.  R.  R.  approaching 
from  the  south  reaches  all  these  towns. 
On  coal  from  Pennsylvania  mines  it 
charged  $2.05  to  Bay  Head  and  Point 
Pleasant  and  only  $1.90  to  Manasquan 
and  Seagirt.     The  lower  rate  to  Seagirt 


and  Manasquan  was  compelled  by  the 
competition  of  the  Central  R.  R.  of  N. 
J.,  which  was  the  short  line  route  reach- 
ing Seagirt  and  Manasquan,  but  which 
did  not  reach  Point  Pleasant.  To  lower 
the  Point  Pleasant  rate  would  have  the 
effect  of  disturbing  the  rate  to  points 
in  the  south  grouped  by  the  Penn.  R.  R. 
with  Point  Pleasant.  No  evidence  was 
offered  of  the  unreasonableness  per  se 
of  the  Point  Pleasant  rate.  HELD,  such 
rate  was  not  unduly  discriminatory 
against  coal  dealers  at  Point  Pleasant. 
Ocean  County  Coal  Co.  v.  Central  R.  R. 
of  N.  J.,  17  I.  C.  C.  383,  384. 

(b)  Complainant  attacked  the  com- 
modity rates  on  various  articles  from 
Chicago  to  Ft.  Dodge,  la.,  as  compared 
with  similar  rates  from  Chicago  to  Des 

Moines  and  Albert  Lea,  Minn.,  these 
rates    being    about    lo    lower    to    Des 

Moines,  and  from  i^c  to  6i/^c  lower  to 
Albert  Lea  than  to  Fort  Dodge.  These 
three  cities  were  substantially  the  same 
distance  from  Chicago.  In  a  great  por- 
tion of  northwestern  Iowa  Ft.  Dodge 
could  successfully  compete  in  manufac- 
turing and  jobbing  with  the  other  cities. 
The  per  car  mile  rates  from  Chicago  to 
Ft.  Dodge  were  somewhat  higher  than 
those  from  Milwaukee  to  East  St.  Louis, 
Chicago  to  Kansas  City,  and  Duluth  to 
Des  Moines.  The  low  rates  to  Des 
Moines  were  forced  by  the  rates  estab- 
lished by  the  Rock  Island,  the  short  line 
from  Chicago,  and  Chicago  roads  had  to 
meet  St.  Louis  competition.  The  lower 
rates  to  Albert  Lea  were  influenced  by 
the  Chicago  to  St.  Paul  rates  on  account 
pf  the  supposed  application  of  the  long 
and  short  haul  clause  of  the  Act.  Ft. 
Dodge  jobbers  were  able  successfully  to 
sell  drygoods  in  Nebraska,  North  Da- 
kota, South  Dakota,  Iowa  and  Minnesota, 
and  clay  products  were  successfully  sold 
from  Ft.  Dodge  into  northern,  southwest- 
ern and  southeastern  Minnesota,  Wiscon- 
sin, Michigan,  Illinois  and  North  Dako- 
ta. The  class  rates  from  St.  Louis  to 
Des  Moines  were  materially  less  than 
from  Chicago  to  Des  Moines,  while  the 
class  rates  to  Ft.  Dodge  from  both  St. 
Louis  and  Chicago  were  the  same,  show- 
ing that  the  competition  of  St.  Louis 
was  more  potent  at  Des  Moines  than  at 
Ft.  Dodge.  HELD,  on  account  of  the 
difference  in  conditions  at  Ft.  Dodge  and 
Albert  Lea,  the  higher  commodity  rates 
to  Ft.  Dodge  were  not  unduly  discrimina- 
tory.     Fort   Dodge   Commercial   Club    v. 


254 


DISCRIMINATION,  §8  (4)   (c)— §8  (5)   (c) 


I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  572,  578,  579, 
581,  583. 

(c)  Petersburg  and  Richmond,  Va., 
lying  20  miles  apart,  are  connected  by 
the  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  and  the  S.  A.  L.  Ry. 
The  rates  on  lumber  to  Columbus  and 
defined  Ohio  territory  were  16c.  Ches- 
ter, Va.,  is  reached  by  both  lines  and  lies 
intermediate  between  Petersburg  and 
Richmond.  The  rates  from  Chester  to 
the  same  destinations  were  18.3c.  The 
N.  &  W.  Ry.,  extending  from  Petersburg 
to  Columbus,  published  a  rate  of  16c. 
The  C.  &  O.  R.  R.,  extending  from  Rich- 
mond to  Columbus,  had  in  effect  a  rate 
of  16c  from  Richmond.  To  meet  the 
competition  of  the  N.  &  W.  Ry.,  the 
S.  A.  L.  Ry.  was  obliged  to  make  a  16c 
rate  from  Petersburg.  HELD,  the  rate 
from  Chester  might  properly  exceed 
that  from  Richmond  and  Petersburg,  but 
should  not  exceed  said  rates,  as  under 
the  rate  complained  of,  by  the  full  local 
from  Chester  to  Richmond  of  2.3c,  since 
It  cost  the  S.  A.  L.  Ry.  and  C.  &  O,  R.  R. 
less  to  transport  lumber  on  a  through 
haul  from  Chester  than  on  a  local  haul 
into  and  local  haul  out  from  Richmond, 
and  that  the  proper  rate  from  Chester 
would  be  IT^c.  Randolph  Lumber  Co. 
V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
601,  603. 

§8.     (5)  Water  Carriers. 

See   Evidence,   §14   (5)    (b),    (z) ;   Long 
and  Short  Haul,  §10  (i),   (dd). 

(a)  Wholesale  fruit  and  produce  mer- 
chants of  Columbia,  S.  C,  alleged  they 
were  unjustly  discriminated  against  in 
favor  of  Augusta,  Ga.,  in  the  carload 
rates  on  apples,  potatoes,  cabbages  and 
onions  from  Rochester,  Albion  and  Ap- 
pleton,  New  York.  To  Columbia  the  6th 
class  rate  of  42c  applied,  while  to  Augus- 
ta a  commodity  rate  of  34c  was  effective. 
Augusta  is  situated  on  the  Savannah 
river  and  Columbia  on  the  Santee  river 
and  cargoes  are  transported  on  both 
rivers.  The  brief  of  defendants  an- 
nounced their  intention  to  place  Augusta 
and  Columbia  substantially  on  a  parity. 
HELD,  no  dissimilarity  of  conditions 
exist  which  justifies  a  higher  rate  to 
Columbia  than  to  Augusta  on  the  com- 
modities and  from  the  points  of  origin 
involved,  and  that  the  rates  for  the  fu- 
ture to  Columbia  should  not  exceed  those 
contemporaneously  applied  to  Augusta. 
Reparation  awarded  on  shipments  move- 
ment  since  the  filing  of  the   complaint. 


DuPre   Co.    v.    B.    R.    &    P.    Ry.    Co.,   23 
I.  C.  C.  226. 

(b)  Complainant  admitted  the  reason- 
ableness of  the  carload  rate  of  10c  per 
100  lbs.  on  coarse  salt  in  bulk  to  Chicago 
from  Retsof,  Cuylerville,  N.  Y.,  and  other 
salt  producing  points  in  that  vicinity, 
and  asked  that  the  rate  be  scaled  to  other 
destinations  in  Central  Freight  Associa- 
tion territory  in  accordance  with  the  per- 
centage system  of  rates.  The  dock  facili- 
ties for  handling  and  storing  water  borne 
salt  at  Chicago  are  entirely  controlled 
by  complainants  and  the  boat  line  that 
handles  practically  all  the  salt  from  Buf- 
falo to  Chicago  is  likewise  owned  by 
complainant.  About  one-half  of  com- 
plainant's tonnage  to  Chicago  moves  by 
water.  HELD,  that  the  rate  to  Chica- 
go is  a  compelled  rate  by  water  com- 
petition and  that  such  competitive  com- 
petition does  not  exist  at  intermediate 
points.  Complaint  dismissed.  Interna- 
tional Salt  Co.  V.  G.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I. 
C.  C.  530. 

(c)  Complainant  jobber  at  Columbia, 
Tenn.,  attacked  the  rate  of  31c  on  sugar 
in  carloads  from  New  Orleans  and  Col- 
umbia as  unreasonable  per  se  and  as 
discriminatory  as  compared  with  the 
rate  to  Nashville  of  15c,  Decatur,  Ala., 
24c,  and  Clarksville,  Tenn.,  15c.  Colum- 
bia is  located  76  miles  north  of  Decatur, 
45  miles  south  of  Nashville,  on  the  main 
line  of  the  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  It  is  not  on 
or  near  any  navigable  water  course. 
The  rate  attacked  was  made  by  combina- 
tion on  Nashville.  The  aggregate  on 
the  in-and-out  rates  made  less  from  Nash- 
ville and  Decatur  than  from  Columbia, 
and  dealers  could  ship  into  and  beyond 
Columbia,  down  to  within  a  few  miles 
of  Decatur,  and  Decatur  dealers  could 
ship  to  a  point  near  Columbia  on  a  par- 
ity with  Columbia  dealers;  so  that  under 
the  adjustment  of  rates  attacked,  Col- 
umbia was  on  a  parity  with  Nashville 
only  in  a  restricted  area  in  its  immediate 
vicinity  and  had  no  advantage  even  In 
Columbia.  Decatur  is  located  on  the 
Tennessee  river  and  is  reached  by 
another  carrier  beside  defendant. 
Clarksville  is  on  the  Cumberland  river 
and 'is  reached  by  another  carrier  beside 
defendant.  No  evidence  was  offered  to 
show  the  rate  attacked  unreasonable 
per  se  and  it  was  lower  than  other 
rates  in  the  same  territory  for  similar 
distances  based  on  the  local  distance 
scale,      HELD,    the    rates    at    Nashville, 


DISCRIMINATION,  §8   (5)    (d) 


255 


Decatur  and  Clarksville  being  controlled 
or  influenced  by  water  competition, 
those  towns  were  entitled  to  their  nat- 
ural advantage  and  the  charging  of  a 
higher  rate  to  Columbia,  a  point  inter- 
mediate to  New  Orleans  and  Nashville, 
did  not  constitute  unjust  discrimination. 
Columbia  Grocery  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  502,  506. 

(d)  Complainant  shippers  at  Cincin- 
nati and  Chicago  attacked  as  unreason- 
able per  se  the  numbered  rates  from 
these  cities  to  Chattanooga  and  as  com- 
pared with  those  from  Baltimore,  New 
York,  and  other  eastern  cities  to  Chat- 
tanooga. The  defendants  were  the  C.  N. 
O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.  and  the  Southern  Ry. 
Co.,  which  controls  the  former  railroad. 
These  two  railroads  as  a  system  reached 
both  the  points  north  of  the  Ohio  river 
in  question  and  the  eastern  points  in 
question,  although  the  rates  specifically 
attacked  were  from  Chicago  and  Cincin- 
nati to  Chattanooga.  Those  considered 
by  the  Commission  involved  the  rates 
from  Cincinnati  to  southern  cities  gen- 
erally. The  rates  attacked  from  Cincin- 
nati to  Chattanooga  were  76c,  65c,  57c, 
47c,  40c  and  30c,  and  from  Chicago  to 
Chattanooga,  $1.11,  95c,  79c,  62c,  53c  and 
40c,  as  compared  with  those  from  New 
York  to  Chattanooga  of  $1.05,  93c,  83c, 
68c,  56c  and  44c,  and  from  Baltimore  to 
Chattanooga  of  98c,  87c,  78c,  63c,  52c  and 
41c  for  classes  1,  2,  3,  4,  5  and  6,  re- 
specively.  •  In  6  I.  C.  C.  195  (1894)  the 
Commission  ordered  the  reduction  of  the 
rates  then  in  effect  from  Cincinnati  to 
Chattanooga  on  the  assumption  that  the 
carriers  serving  the  eastern  points,  and 
those  serving  points  north  of  the  Ohio 
River,  in  dividing  up  the  territory  by  the 
Toronto  -  Buffalo  -  Pittsburgh  -  Huntington 
Line  and  in  fixing  rates  so  that  all  traffic 
moving  into  the  south  from  northern 
points  west  of  that  line  should  be  carried 
by  lines  running  via  the  Ohio  River  cross- 
ings, and  that  all  traffic  originating  east 
of  this  line  should  be  carried  by  eastern 
carriers,  arbitrarily  arranged  that  the 
eastern  cities  should  enjoy  lower  rates  on 
the  numbered  classes  covering  manu- 
factured products  than  the  cities  north  of 
the  Ohio  River.  In  the  present  case  tho 
Commission  found  as  a  fact  that  no  such 
arbitrary  division  was  made  and  that  the 
carriers  intended  no  discrimination  cal- 
culated to  give  eastern  cities  the  ascend- 
ency in  manufactured  products  shipped 
Into  the  south.    Under  the  rates  attacked 


the  distance  from  Chicago  to  Chattanooga 
was  70  per  cent  of  that  from  New  York  to 
Chattanooga,  while  the  first  class  rate  was 
106  per  cent.  The  distance  from  Cincinnati 
was  but  40  per  cent,  while  the  first  class 
rate  was  72  per  cent.  The  lower  eastern 
rates  were,  however,  forced  by  water 
competition,  and  although  the  distance 
from  New  York  to  Chattanooga  Is  greater 
from  the  northern  points  in  question,  the 
low  divisions  which  the  ocean  carriers 
accepted  offset  this  division,  the  traffic 
moving  from  New  York  to  Savannah  as 
typical  points  and  thence  by  rail  to 
Chattanooga.  The  ocean  carriers,  for  ex- 
ample, on  traffic  from  New  York  to  Sa- 
vannah en  route  for  Atlanta,  moving 
about  750  miles  by  water,  accepted  their 
division  of  the  through  rate  on  the  basis 
of  a  carriage  of  250  miles.  Constructing 
distances  from  New  York  to  typical 
southern  points  on  the  basis  of  the  mile- 
age charged  for  by  the  ocean  carriers 
the  average  distance  from  Cincinnati  was 
507  miles,  average  rate  69.6c,  the  average 
rate  per  ton  mile,  .0274c.  The  average 
distance  from  Chicago  was  765  miles,  the 
average  rate  91.4c,  the  average  rate  per 
ton  mile,  .0239c.  Chattanooga  and  other 
points  were  first  reached  and  served  by 
the  eastern  rail  and  ocean  carriers  and 
were  developed  mainly  by  eastern  com- 
petition. Upon  the  advent  of  the  western 
railroads  into  the  south  the  eastern  car- 
riers adopted  a  fixed  policy  of  keeping 
rates  lower  than  those  from  points  north 
of  the  Ohio,  over  western  lines.  From 
the  fact  that  the  various  eastern  carriers 
served  exclusively  certain  cities  in  the 
south,  the  rates  from  the  east  were  low- 
ered by  competition  between  these  east- 
ern carriers  in  developing  the  particular 
southern  cities  served  by  them.  The  Nor- 
folk &  Western  Ry.,  for  example,  served 
Chattanooga  but  not  Atlanta,  and  insisted 
on  maintaining  the  same  rate  from  the 
east  to  Chattanooga  as  was  established 
by  other  carriers  to  Atlanta.  Under  the 
rates  attacked  neither  the  east  nor  the 
west  had  obtained  in  actual  experience 
any  abnormal  advantage  in  the  amount 
of  traffic  actually  moving  thereunder  from 
either  section.  On  the  point  of  the  rea- 
sonableness per  se  of  the  rates  attacked 
it  appeared  that  the  C.  S.  R.  R.  was  built 
by  the  city  of  Cincinnati  and  leased  to  the 
defendant,  C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  on 
a  rental  yielding  on  the  original  lease 
some  6  per  cent  upon  the  cost  of  con- 
struction   and    under    the   present   leas^ 


DISCRIMINATION,  §8  (5)    (e)— (f) 


some  5  per  cent.  Since  1899  defendant 
lessee  had -paid  the  stipulated  rental  and 
made  handsome  profits,  the  gross  earn- 
ings per  mile  of  the  C.  S.  R.  R.  connect- 
ing Cincinnati  and  Chattanooga  for  a 
typical  year  being  $26,000,  which  was 
more  than  the  average  gross  earnings  of 
the  railroads  in  any  group  in  the  United 
States,  and  despite  heavy  grades  and  high 
cost  of  operation  the  net  earnings  were 
some  $7,000  per  mile.  Taking,  however, 
the  railroad  system  to  which  the  C.  S. 
R.  R.  belonged,  as  a  whole,  the  gross 
earnings  per  mile  would  not  he  more  than 
those  of  other  carriers  in  the  same  terri- 
tory. The  rates  from  Cincinnati  in  all 
directions,  except  to  points  south  of  the 
Ohio  River,  for  distances  similar  to  the 
distance  from  Cincinnati  to  Chattanooga 
in  no  case  exceeded  60c  first  class  and 
were  often  as  low  as  40c.  The  rates  from 
Cincinnati  to  Chattanooga  could  not  be 
reduced  without  disturbing  the  rates  from 
Louisville  and  Memphis  to  Chattanooga. 
The  lowering  of  the  rate  from  Memphis 
to  Chattanooga  would  result  in  the  lower- 
ing of  the  rate  to  Birmingham,  and  this 
in  turn  would  compel  a  reduction  of  the 
rates  from  northern  points  to  Atlanta, 
End  would  upset  an  adjustment  of  rates 
from  northern  points  in  1905  between 
Birmingham,  Montgomery  and  Atlanta 
and  re-open  that  contest.  The  rates  at- 
tacked were  lower  than  similar  rates  pre- 
scribed by  the  railroad  commissions  of 
most  states  in  the  south,  and  were  as 
low  and  usually  lower  than  the  interstate 
rates  made  by  southern  railroads  for  simi- 
lar distances.  The  rates  attacked  were 
higher  than  those  from  Cincinnati  to 
Nashville,  but  the  latter  rates  were  in- 
fluenced by  water  competition.  They 
were  higher  per  ton  mile  than  the  rates 
from  Virginia  cities  to  Atlanta,  but  the 
latter  were  exacted  by  water  competition 
and  the  distances  involved  greater.  The 
rates  from  Virginia  cities  south  for  dis- 
tances of  from  300  to  350  miles  equaled 
or  exceeded  the  rates  from  Cincinnati 
to  Chattanooga.  The  increase  in  defend- 
ants, traffc  was  offset  by  increased  cost 
of  operation.  HELD,  the  rates  attacked 
were  not  unduly  discriminatory  against 
the  territory  north  of  the  Ohio  River,  and 
I  in  favor  of  the  east,  on  account  of  the 
difference  in  conditions  mentioned;  that 
the  rates  were  not  so  clearly  excessive  as 
to  require  a  widespread  and  far-reaching 
reduction;  but  that  they  were  neverthe- 
less unreasonable  and  should  be  reduced 


to  70c,  60c,  53c,  44c,  38c  and  29c  from 
Cincinnati  to  Chattanooga  on  the  num- 
bered classes  respectively,  with  no  reduc- 
tion in  rates  from  Chicago.  (Clements, 
Commissioner,  concurring,  but  holding  the 
reductions  ordered  in  the  majority  report 
not  sufficient.)  Receivers'  and  Shippers' 
Ass'n  of  Cincinnati  v.  C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  440,  466;  decision  sus- 
tained, Hooker  v.  I.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  242. 

(e)  Defendant's  rate  on  hemp  from 
Pacific  coast  terminals  to  Bismarck,  N. 
D.,  was  50c;  to  Stillwater,  Minn.,  and 
Chicago,  55c.  From  Seattle  to  Bismarck 
was  1,468  miles;  to  Chicago,  through 
Bismarck,  2,375  miles.  When  defendant 
handled  hemp  from  Seattle  to  Chicago  it 
hauled  same  to  Minnesota  Transfer  and 
there  made  delivery  to  its  connection, 
receiving  less  than  50c  per  100  lbs.  for 
the  haul  to  Minnesota  Transfer.  Hemp 
from  the  Philippines  was  brought  both 
to  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coast  ports  and  to 
Pacific  ports,  the  cost  to  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  ports  being  substantially  the 
same.  The  distance  to  Chicago  from  Gulf 
and  Atlantic  ports  was  about  1,000  miles. 
The  evidence  did  not  indicate  that  the 
haul  to  Chicago  from  the  Pacific  coast 
was  unremunerative.  HELD,  in  view  of 
these  competitive  conditions  the  rate 
to  Bismarck  was  not  unduly  discrimina- 
tory as  compared  with  the  rates  to  Still- 
water and  Chicago.  Hellstrom  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  580. 

(f)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
from  Ohio  and  Mississippi  river  crossings 
and  points  north  and  west  thereof  to 
Montgomery,  Ala.,  as  compared  with 
rates  from  said  points  to  Birmingham, 
Ala..  Mobile,  Ala.,  and  Pensacola.  Fla. 
Montgomery  is  located  on  the  Alabama 
River,  ninety-five  miles  farther  than  Bir- 
mingham from  the  points  of  origin  in 
question.  It  is  nearer  to  said  points  than 
Mobile  and  Pensacola.  The  rates  at  New 
Orleans  were  determined  by  water  com- 
Detition  via  the  gulf  and  the  Mississippi 
river,  and  rates  at  that  point  from  the 
points  of  origin  in  question  were  general- 
ly lower  than  to  cities  located  some  dis- 
tances north  of  New  Orleans  and  not 
subject  to  such  competition.  For  this 
reason  the  rates  from  the  points  of  origin 
in  question  were  less  to  Mobile  and  Pen- 
sacola than  to  Montgomery.  The  rates 
to  Pensacola  and  Mobile  were  governed 
by  the  rates  to  New  Orleans  on  account 
of  competition  between  said  cities.  The 
Alabama  river  was  navigable  to  Mont- 
gomery.   While  the  rates  from  the  points 


IDISCRIMINATION,  §8  (5)    (g)— (k) 


257 


in  question  to  Birmingham  were  lower 
than  to  Montgomery,  the  rates  from  At- 
lantic seaboard  points  to  Birmingham 
wer€  higher  than  to  Montgomery.  Fur- 
thermore, the  rates  to  Birmingham  from 
St.  Louis  were  controlled  by  the  Frisco 
R.  R.,  which  reached  Birmingham,  but 
did  not  reach  Montgomery.  "  It  appeared 
that  to  make  the  rates  to  Montgomery 
equal  to  those  at  Birmingham  would 
disturb  the  whole  rate  adjustment  in  the 
southeast.  HELD,  Pensacola  and  Mo- 
bile were  entitled  to  lower  rates  than 
Montgomery  on  account  of  their  location 
as  gulf  ports  and  the  adjustment  of  water 
competition,  but  that  the  rates  to  Mont- 
gomery must  not  exceed  the  combination 
rates  from  the  points  of  origin  in  ques- 
tion to  Mobile  thence  to  Montgomery; 
and  that  on  account  of  the  greater  dis- 
tance to  Montgomery  the  influence  of 
the  Frisco  R.  R.  in  determining  rates  to 
Birmingham,  the  advantage  of  Mont- 
gomery over  Birmingham  in  shipments 
from  the  east,  and  the  fact  that  a  change 
of  the  Montgomery  rates  would  result 
in  a  general  readjustment  leaving  Mont- 
gomery in  the  same  relative  position 
with  Birmingham  as  before,  the  demand 
that  the  rates  to  Montgomery  be  made 
equal  to  those  to  Birmingham  should  be 
denied.  Montgomery  Freight  Bureau  v. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  521,  530,  531. 

(g)  Water  competition  at  given  point 
may  render  circumstances  and  conditions 
dissimilar  and  justify  discrimination 
against  points  where  such  competition  is 
not  controlling.  Planters  Gin  and  Com- 
press Co.  v.  Y.  6c  M.  V.  L.  R.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  131,  133. 

(h)  Possibility  of  actual  competition 
developing  on  a  river  justifies  a  slight 
difference  in  rates  between  a  river  point 
and  one  not  so  situated.  Planters  Gin 
and  Compress  Co.  v.  Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  R. 
Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  131,  133. 

(i)  It  is  not  unduly  discriminatory  to 
haul  traffic  to  and  from  Gulf  ports  at 
lower  rates  than  to  and  from  Hatties- 
burg,  Miss.  The  controlling  effect  of  th^ 
Mississippi  river  and  Gulf  justify  that 
adjustment.  Commercial  Club  of  Hat- 
tiesburg  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
534,  545. 

(j)  Green  Bay,  Wis.,  took  107  per  cent 
of  the  New  York  to  Chicago  rate.  Com- 
plainant demanded  that  it  be  accorded 
100  per  cent  of  sa'd  New  York-Chicago 
rate,  and  complained  that  it  was  unduly 
discriminated  against  as  compared  with 


Milwaukee,  Sheboygan,  Manitowoc,  Ke- 
waunee and  Menomonie,  Wis.,  all  of  which 
took  100  per  cent.  Green  Bay  could  be 
reached  by  lake  steamers  only  by  going 
to  the  outlet  of  Green  Bay,  some  100 
miles  north  of  Kewaunee.  Carloads  were 
brought  by  rail  to  Muskegon  and  Luding- 
ton,  100  per  cent  points  on  the  eastern 
shore  of  Lake  Michigan,  and  the  cars 
were  then  floated  across  to  Milwaukee, 
Manitowoc  and  Kewaunee  and  also 
through  a  canal  connecting  Green  Bay 
and  Lake  Michigan  to  Menomonie,  which 
is  situted  some  fifty  miles  Korth  of  tie 
city  of  Green  Bay,  on  the  west  shore  of 
Green  Bay.  On  account  of  this  ferry  serv- 
ice said  four  cities  were  given  the  100 
per  cent  rate.  Sheboygan,  although  not 
reached  by  ferry,  was  accorded  said  100 
per  cent  rate  on  account  of  its  inter- 
mediate position  to  Milwaukee  and 
Manitowoc,  ijuring  the  season  of  open 
navigation,  some  seven  months.  Green 
Bay  enjoyed  lower  watjr  rates  than  said 
other  four  competing  cities.  For  some 
twelve  years  preceding  1902^  some  of  de- 
fendant rail  carriers  had  extended  the  100 
per  cent  rate  to  Green  Bay  on  account 
of  competition  with  the  Can.  Pac.  R.  R., 
which  first  applied  said  rate  through 
Pembine,  Wis.,  in  connection  with  the 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  It  did  not  appear, 
however,  that  complainants  had  founded 
their  industries  at  Green  Bay  in  reliance 
upon  the  100  per  cent  rate  or  that  said 
industries  were  imperiled  by  its  with- 
drawal. HELD,  the  100  per  cent  rate  to 
said  cities  competing  with  Green  Bay  be- 
ing applied  as  the  result  of  conditions  not 
applicable  at  Green  Bay,  complainants 
were  not  entitled  to  the  relief  prayed  for. 
Green  Bay  Busness  Men's  Ass'n  v.  B.  & 
O.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  59,  62-64. 

(k)  Carriers  may,  for  the  purpose  of 
meeting  water  competition,  make  rates 
lower  than  would  otherwise  be  justifiable, 
even  to  the  extent  of  charging  a  less  rate 
to  the  more  distant  point.  The  carrier 
may  determine  for  itself  whether  it  will 
or  will  not  meet  such  water  competition. 
While,  however,  the  carrier  may  in  the 
first  instance  settle  its  policy  in  this  re- 
spect, it  must  act  under  certain  limita- 
tions. It  cannot  be  permitted  to  compete 
at  one  point  and  decline  to  compete  at 
another,  where  all  conditions  are  the 
same;  nor  should  it,  ordinarily,  be  al- 
lowed to  compete  one  day  and  decline 
to  compete  the  next.  The  public  has  the 
right  to  require  equal  and  uniform  treat- 
ment within  the  bounds  of  reason.    Cases 


268 


DISCRIMINATION,  §8  (5)   (D— (m) 


might  therefore  arise  where  the  Com- 
mission would  require  the  continuance  of 
a  rate  established  to  meet  such  competi- 
tion. Darling  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  I.   C.  C.  79,  87. 

(1)  Bainbridge  lies  on  the  Flint  River 
in  southwestern  Georgia,  a  short  distance 
northeast  of  the  junctions  of  the  Flint 
and  the  Chattahoochee  rivers.  Eufaula, 
Ala.,  lies  on  the  Chattahoochee  River 
about  135  miles  northwest  of  the  junc- 
tions of  said  rivers  and  approximately 
the  same  distance  northwest  of  Bain- 
bridge. Albany,  Ga.,  lies  on  the  Flint 
River  some  80  miles  northeast  of  Bain- 
bridge. The  class  rates,  taking  the  first 
six  classes  as  typical,  from  St.  Louis  to 
Bainbridge  and  Eufaula  were  as  follows: 

Class    1         2         3        4       5       6 

Bainbridge  ....155  131  115  94  78  G3 
Eufaula    126     109       98     77     64     51 

The  through  class  rates  from  St.  Louis 
to  Bainbridge  were  less  than  the  com- 
bination on  Montgomery  by  37c,'36c,  33c, 
29c,  25c  and  23c  for  the  first  six  classes 
respectively.  The  rates  from  St.  Louis 
to  Albany  were  146c,  126c,  113c,  90c,  75c 
and  60c  for  the  first  six  classes,  re- 
spectively. Complainant  wholesalers  at 
Bainbridge  attacked  this  adjustment,  and 
a  like  adjustment  of  commodity  rates, 
as  unreasonable  per  se  and  unjustly  dis- 
criminatory against  Bainbridge  and  in 
favor  of  Eufaula.  At  the  present  time 
Bainbridge  is  reached  from  St.  Louis  by 
two  routes:  (1)  the  L.  &  N.  Ry.  to  Mont- 
gomery and  the  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  from  Mont- 
gomery to  Bainbridge;  (2)  the  L.  &  N. 
Ry.  to  Montgomery,  the  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.  tc 
Cuthbert,  Ga.,  and  the  G.  F.  &  A.  Ry.  tc 
Montgomery.  Eufaula  is  reached  from 
St.  Louis  by  the  L.  &  N.  Ry.  to  Mont- 
gomery and  the  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.  from  that 
point  to  Eufaula.  The  rates  to  Albany  from 
the  West  were  adjusted  witli  respect  to 
Atlanta,  Augusta  and  Macon,  Ga.  The 
rates  to  Augusta  and  Macon  were  made 
differentials  higher  than  the  rates  to  At- 
lanta based  on  a  distance  of  90  miles  to 
Macon.  Just  south  of  that  group  was  the 
Albany  and  Dawson  group,  which  took 
another  set  of  differential  rates  higher 
than  those  to  Macon.  The  basis  for  mak- 
ing rates  from  the  west  to  Albany  was 
established  long  before  the  construction 
of  the  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  from  Montgomery  to 
Bainbridge,  and  long  before  there  was 
an  all-rail  route  from  St.  Louis  direct  to 
Bainbridge.  Prior  to  the  establishment 
of   this   direct   route  from   St.   Louis   to 


Bainbridge,  shipments  were  made  to  Al- 
bany and  thence  by  back  haul  to  Bain- 
bridge.    When  the  direct  route  from  St. 
Louis   to   Bainbridge   was   completed   by 
the   construction   of  the  A.   C.   L.   R.  R. 
from  Montgomery  to  Bainbridge,  the  A. 
C.  L.  R.  R.,  on  shipments  to  Albany  via 
Bainbridge,  simply  met  the  rate  in  effect 
from  St.  Louis  to  Albany  via  the  L.  &  N. 
Ry.  and  the  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.     The  rates  to 
Eufaula  were  established  on  the  basis  of 
the  rates  to  Macon,  as  a  result  of  com- 
plaints that  the  Eufaula  rates  were  too 
high,  as  compared  with  those  to  Macon 
on   the  east  and  to  Montgomery  on  the 
west.     They  were  also  the  result  of  the 
competition   of   boat   lines   on    the   Chat- 
tachoochee  River.  When  the  Macon  basis 
of  rates  was  established  at  Eufaula,  there 
was  a  direct  line  of  railway  from  St.  Louis 
to  Eufaula,  but  there  was  no  way  to  reach 
Bainbridge     except    through    Albany    or 
from  other  eastern  junction  points.    Both 
Eufaula  and  Bainbridge  were  served  by 
river   steamers,   which   charged   package 
rates    irrespective    of   distance.      On   ac- 
count of  this  blanket  rate,  Eufaula  was 
able  to  ship  goods  by  rail  from  St.  Louis 
to  Eufaula  and  thence  by  river  to  Bain- 
bridge   at   lower   rates   than    Bainbridge 
merchants  could  make  the  shipments  all- 
rail.     Defendant  carriers  had  no  connec- 
tion with  these  river  boat  lines  and  could 
exercise   no   control  over   them.     Under 
the  adjustment  attacked,  it  appeared  that 
the  territory  between  Eufaula  was  fairly 
and  equitably  divided  between  these  two 
points  as  jobbing  centers,  Bainbridge  be- 
ing able  to  reach  at  lower  rates  the  re- 
tailers at  points  located  half  way  up  to- 
ward Eufaula.    HELD,  that  the  rates  at- 
tacked were  not  shown  to  be  unreason- 
able per  se;  and  that  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  the  lines  reaching  Eufaula  and  Bain- 
bridge were  not  the  same,  and  the  lines 
at  Bainbridge   were   not  responsible  for 
the  rate  adjustment  at  Eufaula,  and  no 
line  reaching  either  place  was  responsible 
Tor  the  water  rates  from  Eufaula  to  Bain- 
bridge,  and  in  view  of  the  further  rule 
that   rail   carriers    were   not   obliged    to 
meet  water  competition,  the  adjustment 
attacked  was  not  unjustly  discriminatory 
against  Bainbridge  in  favor  of  Eufaula. 
Bainbridge   Board   of   Trade  v.   L.   H.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  586,  593. 

(m)  A  rule  that  whenever  all-rail  car- 
riers establish  rates  to  a  given  point  they 
must  take  notice  of  the  independent 
water  rates  from  that  point  and  of  the 
territory  that  can  be  reached  thereunder, 


DISCRIMINATION,  §9   (a)— (c) 


259 


and  must  make  such  adjustment  as  will 
prevent  the  use  of  the  water  rates  from 
that  point  to  another  point  resulting  in 
discrimination  against  that  other  point  by- 
reason  of  its  all-rail  rate  adjustment,  has 
no  support  in  law,  in  public  policy,  or  in 
sound  transportation  principles.  Bain- 
bridge  Board  of  Trade  v.  L.  H.  &  St.  L. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  586,  590. 

§9.     Disadvantage   of    Location. 

See    Blanket   Rates,   §7   (f ) ;   Equaliza- 
tion  of   Rates,    §3. 

(a)  Complainant,  a  manufacturer  of 
sugar  mill  and  sawmill  machinery  at 
New  Orleans,  La.,  attacked  the  rate  of 
$3  per  gross  ton  on  pig  iron  from  Bir- 
mingham, Ala.,  to  New  Orleans,  Com- 
plainant appeared  to  be  at  a  disadvan- 
tage in  marketing  that  part  of  its  fin- 
ished products,  which  it  sells  east  of 
the  Mississippi  River,  but  its  disadvan- 
tage in  this  respect  appeared  to  be  one 
of  location.  HELD,  comparing  the  rate 
to  New  Orleans  with  rates  from  Bir- 
mingham to  cities  similarly  situated, 
with  respect  to  basing  lines,  such  as 
Memphis,  St.  Louis,  Louisville  and  Cin- 
cinnati, to  the  last  three  of  which  cer- 
tain of  the  defendants  make  or  influence 
the  rate,  the  Commission  cannot  find 
that  the  New  Orleans  rate  is  unreason- 
ably high.  Complaint  dismissed.  New 
Orleans  Board  of  Trade  v.  L.  &  N.  R. 
R.   Co.,   23   I.   C.   C.   429,   431. 

(aa)  Advantages  of  location  are  to 
be  considered  in  determining  whether  a 
rate  adjustment  between  localities  is  in 
violation  of  section  3.  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce of  Newport  News  v.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
23  L  C.  C.  345,  352. 

(b)  The  petition  sought  to  have  ac 
corded  to  Laredo,  Tex.,  the  same  rates 
as  applied  to  Texas  common  points  on 
traffic  principally  originating  in  "de- 
fined territories,"  alleging  the  differ- 
entials to  be  prejudicial  to  Laredo  in 
its  competition  with  San  Antonio  and 
Corpus  Christi.  The  defined  territories 
extended  from  the  eastern  seaboard 
to  the  Colorado-Kansas  line.  From 
points  between  this  line  and  the  Pa- 
cific coast  territory  the  rate  adjustment 
was  the  same.  The  extreme  point  on 
the  I.  &  G.  N.  R.  R.  to  which  com- 
mon point  rates  applied  was  Devine, 
Tex.,  32  miles  southwest  of  San  An- 
tonio, 120  miles  northeast  of  Laredo. 
Laredo  is  161  miles  west  of  Corpus 
Christi,  and  is  the  southern  terminus 
of   I.    &    G.   N.   R.    R.    and  the   northern 


terminus  of  the  National  Ry.  of  Mex- 
ico. It  is  also  reached  by  the  Texas- 
Mexican  Ry.  and  Rio  Grande  &  Eagle 
Pass  Ry.  Its  population  was  14,855. 
Some  10  per  cent  of  the  area  surround- 
ing it  was  under  cultivation.  The  chief 
crop  was  onions,  upon  which  no  differ- 
ential applied.  The  tonnage  from  and 
to  Taylor-Devine  common  point  terri- 
tory was,  respectively,  31  and  570  per 
cent  greater  on  interstate  and  186  and 
440  per  cent  greater  on  intrastate  traf- 
fic than  in  the  Devine-Laredo  territory. 
The  Taylor-Devine  territory  had  com- 
petition. The  Devine-Laredo  territory 
had  not.  Laredo  was  a  common  point 
in  the  application  of  rail-and-water 
rates  from  the  eastern  seaboard  via 
Galveston,  and  of  rates  from  Pacific 
coast  points  and  from  defined  territory 
as  to  grain.  The  benefit  of  common 
point  rates  was  extended  to  Laredo 
for  one  month  in  1905.  An  admission 
of  a  former  officer  of  I.  &  G.  N.  R.  R. 
that  Laredo  should  be  on  equal  foot- 
ing with  Corpus  Christi  was  in  evi- 
dence. Texas  common  point  rates  via 
Galveston  were  lower  on  account  of 
severe  competition  between  Chicago,  St. 
Louis  and  Texas  railways  and  owing 
to  ocean-and-rail  competition.  The  cir- 
cumstances and  conditions  of  traffic  at 
Laredo,  Corpus  Christi  and  San  An- 
tonio were  not  the  same  as  to  area 
of  cultivation,  tonnage  and  revenue. 
The  population  of  San  Antonio  was 
100,000.  There  was  water  competition 
at  Corpus  Christi,  but  no  competition 
existed  between  these  cities.  The  vol- 
ume of  business  affected  by  the  differ- 
ential was  very  small.  HELD,  the  ad- 
justment complained  of  did  not  unduly 
prejudice  complainant.  Complaint  dis- 
missed. Board  of  Trade  of  Laredo, 
Tex.,  V.  I.  &.  G.  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C. 
C.   28. 

(c)  The  rates  for  transportation  of 
merchandise  from  Sioux  City,  la.,  to 
southwestern  Minnesota  were  attacked 
as  discriminatory  against  Sioux  City  in 
favor  of  Minneapolis  and  St.  Paul.  The 
class  rates  from  the  Twin  Cities  were 
lower  than  the  class  rates  from  Sioux 
City  to  stations  equidistant  from  the 
respective  points  of  origin.  The  greater 
portion  of  traffic  involved  moved  under 
fourth-class  rates,  and  inbound  rates 
thereon  to  Sioux  City  were  materially 
higher  than  rates  to  the  Twin  Cities. 
There  exists  keen  competition  between 
jobbers  of  these  cities.     Defendants  con- 


260 


DISCRIMINATION,   §9    (cc)— (d) 


tended  that  Sioux  City  has  advantage  in 
other  territory;  that  transportation 
north  from  Sioux  City  is  a  back  haul; 
that  tonnage  southward  from  Twin 
Cities  is  much  greater,  and  that  any 
change  will  necessitate  adjustment  else- 
where. HELD,  that  the  advantages  in 
other  territory  will  not  justify  a  preju- 
dicial rate;  that  the  theory  of  back 
haul  is  equally  applicable  to  the  Twin 
Cities;  that  the  shipments  might  be 
considered  as  originating  in  both  points; 
that  the  greater  tonnage  will  not  justify 
the  lesser  rate  here;  that  no  sufficient 
reason  exists  for  the  difference  in 
rates,  and  that  the  rates  from  Sioux 
City  are  unreasonable  and  discrimina- 
tory, in  so  far  as  they  exceed  the  rates 
from  the  Twin  Cities.  Sioux  City  Com- 
mercial Club  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
I.   C.    C.   110. 

(cc)  Where  the  location  of  a  slaugh- 
ter plant  is  such  that  the  haul  upon  the 
live  animals  is  longer  than  to  a  compet- 
ing place,  while  the  haul  upon  the  manu- 
factured product  is  the  same,  the  former 
packing-house  rests  under  a  natural  dis- 
ability which  ought  not  to  be  equalized  in 
the  rate.  Each  packing-house  is  entitled 
to  a  reasonable  rate  upon  its  product  to 
various  markets  of  consumption,  and 
these  rates  should  be  fairly  adjusted  with 
reference  to  one  another.  Any  locality 
which  remains  at  a  disadvantage  after 
this  has  been  done  must  sustain  that 
burden  which  is  due  to  its  location.  In- 
vestigation of  Alleged  Unreasonable 
Rates  on  Meats,  22  I.  C.  C.  160,  163. 

(d)  Complainant,  engaged  in  the  pack- 
ing-house business  at  Cedar  Rapids,  la., 
alleged  that  it  was  subjected  to  unjust 
and  undue  discrimination  in  favor  of  its 
competitors  in  the  adjustment  of  the 
through  rates  on  live  hogs  from  Iowa 
points  to  Boston  and  New  York,  as  com- 
pared with  the  rates  on  hogs  from  Iowa 
points  to  Cedar  Rapids,  plus  the  rates 
on  products  from  Cedar  Rapids  to  Boston 
and  New  York.  It  was  alleged  that  pack- 
ers at  Chicago  and  the  East  can  get  their 
live  hogs  under  such  a  low  freight  rate 
that,  although  complainant  is  situated 
right  in  the  producing  section,  the  rates 
on  its  finished  product  to  eastern  destina- 
tions are  so  high  it  is  placed  at  a  disad- 
vantage with  its  eastern  competitors. 
Cedar  Rapids  was  subject  to  an  average 
rate  on  live  hogs  from  Iowa  points  of 
lie,  while  the  rates  on  its  products 
to  Boston  were:  fresh  meats,  57c; 
cured  meats,  boxed,  42c;  cured  meats,  in 


bulk,  49c;  total  rate  of  68c,  5.3c  and  60c, 
respectively,  while  the  rates  to  New  York 
were:  fresh  meats,  57c;  cured  meats, 
boxed,  39c;  cured  meats,  in  bulk,  45c;  to- 
tal rate,  68c,  50c  and  56c,  respectively.  The 
average  live-hog  rate  from  K  "a  points 
to  Boston  and  New  York  was  50c.  made 
up  of  l^c  to  the  east  bank  of  the  Missis- 
sippi River  and  35c  beyond.  The  Chicago 
packers  had  rates  to  New  York  of  35c 
on  packing-house  products  and  45c  on 
fresh  meats;  to  Boston,  39c  on  packing- 
house products,  and  45c  on  fresh  meats. 
Rates  on  live  hogs  west  of  the  river  and 
west  of  Chicago  were,  as  a  rule,  the  same 
as,  or  higher  than,  the  product  rates. 
Prom  Cedar  Rapids  to  Chicago,  hogs  took 
18.5c,  while  the  products  moved  under  a 
13.5c  rate.  From  St.  Paul,  Minn.,  to  Chi- 
cago the  rate  on  live  hogs  was  27c,  an'l 
on  fresh  meat  and  packinghouse  products 
20c.  The  defense  of  the  rates  east  of 
the  Mississippi  River  and  east  of  Chicago 
was  that  the  present  adjustment  main- 
ta  ned  commercial  equality  between  com- 
plainants and  the  New  York  and  Boston 
packers.  From  the  record  it  appeared 
that  for  the  Missouri  River  packer  the 
rates  to  Boston  on  cured  meats  in  bulk  and 
on  cured  meats  in  bags  or  crates  were 
6c  higher  than  the  rate  on  cured  meat., 
in  boxes,  and  that  the  rate  on  fresh  meat-^ 
was  12c  higher  than  the  rate  on  cured 
meats  in  boxes;  that  for  the  Chicago 
packer  the  differences  were  also  6c  and, 
12c,  respectively,  to  Boston,  and  that  for 
the  Cedar  Rapids  packer  the  differences 
were  7c  and  15c,  respectively,  to  Boston. 
For  the  Missouri  River  and  the  Chicago 
packers  the  rates  on  cured  meats  in 
bulk  or  in  bags  or  crates  and  on  fresh 
meats  to  New  York  exceeded  the  rates  on 
cured  meats  boxed,  respectively,  by  5c 
and  15c,  and  for  the  Cedar  Rapids  packer 
the  differences  to  New  York  were  6c  and 
18c,  respectively.  HELD,  that  in  the  pur- 
chase of  live  animals,  as  well  as  in  mar- 
keting the  several  products,  there  is 
active,  actual  and  keen  competition  be- 
tween the  packers  at  the  Missouri  River 
points  and  those  at  Chicago,  and  com- 
plainant. That  it  is  unjustly  and  unduly 
discriminatory  against  complainant  for 
defendants  to  maintain  a  greater  spread 
between  the  rates  on  cured  meats  in 
boxes  and  cured  meats  in  bulk,  bags  or 
crates,  or  between  cured  meats  in  boxes 
and  fresh  meats  from  Cedar  Rapids  to 
New  York  and  New  York  rate  points,  or 
from  Cedar  Rapids  to  Boston  and  Bos- 
ton rate  points  than  they  contempo- 
raneously   maintain    in    the    rates    from 


DISCRIMINATION,    §9    (e)— (i) 


261 


Missouri  River  points,  or  from  Chicago 
to  New  York  and  New  York  rate  points  or 
to  Boston  and  Boston  rate  points.  It  is 
not  expected  that  the  present  spreads  in 
the  Cedar  Rapids  rates  will  be  narrowed 
by  increasing  the  rates  on  cured  meats  or 
other  products  boxed,  Sinclair  &  Co.  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  490, 
492,  498,  505,  506,  509,  510. 

(e)  Complainant  questioned  the  rea- 
sonableness of  rates  on  cottonseed  in 
carloads  from  points  of  origin  in  Okla- 
homa, Arkansas,  Mississippi,  Tennessee 
and  Missouri  to  East  St.  Louis,  111.,  and 
also  alleged  unjust  discrimination  in 
the  relationship  of  such  rates  as  com- 
pared with  rates  on  cottonseed  products 
from  points  in  the  same  cotton-producing 
territory  at  which  cottonseed  oil  mills 
are  located  to  East  St.  Louis  and  to 
points  beyond,  principally  in  Illinois.  In- 
diana, Ohio,  Michigan  and  Wisconsin; 
that  the  present  rate  adjustment  discrimi- 
nated against  the  cottonseed  oil  mill  at 
East  St.  Louis  in  favor  of  those  mills 
near  to  points  of  origin.  HELD,  it  is  not 
the  duty  of  the  Commission  to  equalize 
the  profit  and  loss  results  of  competing 
operations  in  different  localities  by  over- 
coming natural  and  commercial  condi- 
tions with  rate  adjustments,  and  that 
charges  on  cottonseed  products  do  not 
afford  a  strict  measure  for  the  reason- 
ableness of  the  rate  on  cottonseed.  Com- 
plaint dismissed.  E.  St.  Louis  Cotton 
Oil  Co.  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
f.  C.  C.  37. 

(f)  Truck  growers  in  the  Charleston 
district,  S.  C,  complained  that  the  rates 
exacted  by  defendants  on  cabbage,  po- 
tatoes, beans,  peas  and  cucumbers  from 
shipping  points  in  that  district  to  points 
in  Virginia,  Maryland,  Pennsylvania,  New 
Jersey,  New  York,  Massachusetts  and  the 
District  of  Columbia  were  discriminatory, 
compared  to  rates  from  shipping  points 
in  Florida  and  from  Norfolk,  Va.  The  ev- 
idence showed  that  the  rate  per  ton  mile 
for  the  longer  Florida  haul  was  higher 
than  for  the  shorter  Charleston  haul. 
The  rate  per  ton  mile  from  the  shorter 
Norfolk  haul  was  less  than  the  rate  per 
ton  mile  from  the  Charleston  haul, 
owing,  however,  to  the  extremely  keen 
water  competition,  which  controls  the 
rail  rates  from  Norfolk.  The  profits 
per  acre  to  the  truck  growers  of 
Charleston  seem  to  vary  from  $3  to  |52, 
while  the  freight  paid  on  the  produce 
appears  to  average  about  $60  an  acre. 
HELD,    that    while    the    risk    and    hard- 


ship of  the  grower  are  matters  worthy 
of  consideration,  they  are  by  no  means 
controlling;  that  the  Florida  growers 
have  natural  advantages  in  climatic 
and  other  conditions;  the  Norfolk 
growers  possess  such  conditions  and 
also  extremely  satisfactory  water  serv- 
ice, which  the  Charleston  growers  do 
not  have,  and  under  the  circumstances 
the  rates  attacked  appear  to  be  rea- 
sonable. Truck  Growers'  Ass'n  v.  A. 
C.  L.   R.  R.   Co.,  20  I.   C.   C.  190. 

(g)  Because  carriers  have  con- 
structed a  system  of  rates  on  a  zone 
or  blanket  system  is  not  sufficient  rea- 
son to  justify  the  collection  of  unrea- 
sonable charges  to  any  point.  Every 
city  is  entitled  to  the  advantage  of  its 
location,  and  may  not  lawfully  be  sub- 
jected to  high  freight  charges  merely 
because  carriers  for  reasons  of  con- 
venience or  otherwise  include  it  with  a 
number  of  other  points  in  surrounding 
territory,  which  latter  points  are  not 
similarly  situated.  Corporation  Com- 
mission of  North  Carolina  v.  N.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  303,  309;  decision  of 
Commission  sustained,  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  U.  S.,  195  Fed.  953. 

(h)  Complainants,  refiners  at  New 
Orleans,  La.,  attacked  the  rate  on  crude 
petroleum,  in  tank  cars,  of  17 ^c  per 
100  lbs.,  Muskogee,  Okla.,  to  New  Or- 
leans, La.,  634  miles,  via  the  shortest 
route.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  a  competitor, 
has  a  refinery  at  Baton  Rouge,  La., 
which  takes  a  rate  of  15  cents  from 
Muskogee  and  a  rate  from  thence  of  3c 
on  the  refined  oil  to  New  Orleans.  The 
rate  per  ton  mile  to  New  Orleans  at 
the  nV2C  rate  is  5.52  mills,  and  under 
the  15c  rate  to  Baton  Rouge,  5.41  mills. 
HELD,  that  on  the  record  it  did  not 
appear  complainants  are  subject  to  any 
undue  disadvantage.  Record  Oil  Re- 
fining Co.  V.  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.  132. 

(i)  The  all-rail  rates  from  the  East 
to  San  Pedro,  Cal.,  are  based  upon  the 
through  rates  to  Los  Angeles  plus  the 
local  rates  from  thence  to  San  Pedro. 
Complainant  prayed  that  San  Pedro  might 
be  designated  a  Pacific  coast  terminal 
and  accorded  the  same  rates  in  effect 
to  Los  Angeles,  San  Diego,  San  Fran- 
cisco and  other  Pacific  coast  terminals. 
San  Pedro  Bay  is  about  125  miles  north 
of  San  Diego  and  500  miles  south  of 
San  Francisco.  T^s  Angeles  is  22  miles 
inland  from  the  bay.     A  portion  of  the 


262 


DISCRIMINATION,   §9    (j)— (n) 


harbor  at  San  Pedro  is  commonly  re- 
ferred to  as  the  inner,  and  another  part 
as  the  outer,  harbor.  The  city  of  San 
Pedro,  with  a  population  of  6,000  or 
7,000  inhabitants,  lies  partly  on  the  outer 
harbor  and  partly  on  the  inner  harbor.  Ad- 
jacent to  it  is  East  San  Pedro,  with  a  small 
population,  but  rather  extensive  lumber 
interests,  and  close  to  it  is  the  village 
of  Wilmington.  These  three  towns  now 
form  a  part  of  the  city  of  Los  Angeles. 
The  physical  connection  between  the 
several  communities  has  been  accom- 
plished by  including  within  the  enlarged 
municipal  limit  a  string  of  land  about 
one-half  a  mile  wide  and  locally  known 
as  "the  shOQ  string,"  that  extends  from 
Los  Angeles  proper  to  San  Pedro  bay 
and  harbor.  Many  millions  of  dollars 
are  being  spent  in  harbor  development 
to  take  care  of  the  commerce  that  is 
expected  to  flow  through  the  Panama 
Canal.  General  merchandise  originating 
at  the  Atlantic  seaboard  moves  through 
the  harbor  at  San  Pedro  to  Los  An- 
geles, and  this  tonnage,  which  is  at 
times  considerable,  reaches  destination 
in  competition  with  the  all-rail  rates. 
HELD,  that  the  Commission  sees  no 
explanation  for  the  failure  of  the  de- 
fendants to  make  San  Pedro  a  ter- 
minal rate  point,  unless  it  be  that  Los 
Angeles  is  a  place  of  large  and  growing 
commercial  importance,  while  San 
Pedro  itself,  as  a  commercial  commu- 
nity, is  as  yet  practically  undeveloped 
and  therefore  of  small  importance.  The 
difference,  however,  in  the  importance 
of  the  two  communities  cannot  in  law 
be  accepted  as  a  justification  for  an 
undue  discrimination  in  rates,  and  that 
San  Pedro  should  be  designated  as  a 
Pacific  coast  terminal  and  take  the  ter- 
minal rates.  Harbor  City  Wholesale 
Co.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  323,  331. 

(j)  The  mere  fact  that  a  sugar  fac- 
tory has  the  better  of  its  competitors  by 
reason  of  its  proximity  to  the  beet  fields, 
and  low  rates  which  it  consequently  en- 
joys for  the  transportation  of  its  raw 
material  do  not  affect  its  rights  to  reason- 
able and  undiscriminatory  rates  and 
proper  routing  arrangements  for  the 
movement  of  its  finished  product.  Cali- 
fornia Sugar  Co.  v.  S.  P.  L.  /..  &  S.  L. 
R.  R.*,  19  I.  C.  C.  6,  9. 

(k)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  of 
lie  on  rock  salt  from  Cuylerville,  N.  Y., 
to  Detroit,  Mich.  The  rate  from  Cuyler- 
ville to  Chicago  was  10c.  Detroit  ordi- 
narily takes  78  per  cent  of  the  New  York 


to  Chicago  rate,  and  the  rate  on  evapo- 
rated salt  to  Detroit  was  adjusted  on  that 
basis.  For  a  period  of  one  year  the  rate 
on  rock  salt  to  Detroit  was  made  on 
such  basis,  and  was  afterwards  with- 
drawn, leaving  in  effect  the  vate  at- 
tacked. Defendant  alleged  greater  com- 
petition at  Chicago  as  justifying  the 
lower  rate  to  Chicago.  HELD,  in  view 
of  the  well-established  method  of  making 
rates  in  Central  Freight  Association  terri- 
tory, Detroit  was  entitled  to  78  per  cent 
of  the  Chicago  rate,  or  7.8c.  Reparation 
awarded.  Delray  Salt  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  259,  ?o0. 

(1)  The  fact  th-tt  goods  could  have 
been  purchased  at  a  different  point  from 
which  a  lower  rate  applied  is  no  reason 
for  the  maintenf.nce  of  an  unreasonable 
rate  from  that  particular  point.  Willa- 
mette Pulp  &  Paper  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  388. 

(m)  On  r.pples  in  carloads  from  Farm- 
ington,  Pullman  and  Zumwalt,  Wash., 
to  Kenmave,  N.  D.,  and  from  Pullman, 
Wash.,  to  Valley  City,  N.  D.,  a  rate  of 
75c  was  exacted.  Some  months  prior  to 
the  shipments,  the  defendants  agreed  on 
a  60c  rate  between  the  points  in  question, 
but,  o'a  account  of  lining  up  the  rates,  the 
GOc  rate  was  not  made  effective  before 
the  shipments  in  question  moved.  De- 
fen'iants  admitted  the  exaction  of  the 
rate  charged  constituted  unlawful  dis- 
crimination, and  offered  to  make  repara- 
tion on  the  basis  of  GOc.  The  GOc  rate 
was  in  effect  at  the  time  of  the  shipments 
from  other  points  in  the  apple  section  in 
question  to  similar  destinations  in  North 
Dakota.  No  evidence  was  offered  of  the 
unreasonableness  per  se  of  the  rate 
exacted.  HELD,  without  holding  the  rate 
unreasonable,  the  Commission  found  the 
same  unjustly  discriminatory.  Reparation 
awarded.  Stacy  Mercantile  Co.  v.  M.  St. 
P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  550, 
551. 

(n)  Complainant,  miller  at  Detroit, 
Mich.,  attacked  the  rate  on  flour  from 
Detroit  to  New  York  and  New  York 
points  of  16c,  and  from  Detroit  to  New 
England  points  of  18c,  in  view  of  the  ex- 
lake  rate  on  wheat  from  Detroit,  Port 
Huron  and  similar  points  of  12i^c.  Com- 
plainant's competitors  were  able  to  bring 
in  wheat  from  Duluth  to  Detroit  and 
ship  the  same  at  the  12i^c  rate  from  De- 
troit to  the  East  with  a  milling-in-transit 
privilege  requiring  the  payment  of  VzC 
penalty,  and  could  secure  the  transporta- 
tion of  their  product  for  3c  per  100  lbs. 


DISCRIMINATION,  §9    (o)— (p) 


263 


less    than    complainant    to    New    York 
points  and  for  5c  less  to  New  England 
points.     About  one-half  of  complainant's 
supply  was  winter  wheat  obtained  from 
Michigan,  Ohio,  Indiana  and  points  west 
of  Chicago,  and  reaching  his  mill  by  rail. 
The  other  half  was  spring  wheat  brought 
by  water  from  Duluth.    He  sold  one-third 
of  his  flour  locally  at  Detroit,  one-third 
to  southern  destinations,  and  the  remain- 
ing one-third  to  New  York  and  New  Eng- 
land points.     The  rate  on  flour  from  Chi- 
cago  to   New  England  points  was   18.7c 
and  complainant  availed  himself  of  this 
rate  by  paying  a  milling-in-transit  penalty 
at  Detroit.     The  local  rate  fro.u  Chicago 
to  Detroit  was  Cc,  and  on  flour  made  from 
Chicago  wheat  complainant  therefore  ob- 
tained   from    Detroit    to    New    England 
points  a  rate  of  12.7c.     Complainant  was 
able    also    to    substitute    at    Detroit    the 
flour  made  from  water-borne  wheat  from 
Ddluth,   and   to   send   the   same   forward 
from  Detroit  to  New  England  at  the  rate 
of  12.7c.    Out  of  348  cars  of  flour  shipped 
by  complainant,  some  263  were  forwarded 
at  the  rate  of  12.7c  under  transit  billing. 
The   ex-lake   rate   on   wheat  of   12.56   in 
question  was  the  same  as  that  from  Buf- 
falo to  New  York  on  ex-lake  grain,  the 
latter   being  established   by   competition 
between  the  rail  and  water  carriers  on 
shipments    from    Buffalo    to    New    York 
This  12.5c  rate  was  applied  by  the  car- 
riers from  Detroit  in  order  to  induce  the 
unloading  of  grain  at  Detroit  instead  of 
Buffalo.     The   rates   on   flour   and   grain 
from  Buffalo  to  New  York  were  identical 
and    to    withdraw    this    12.5    rate   would 
simply  result  in  eastern  millers  getting 
their   wheat   by   way    of   Buffalo.     Ordi- 
narily, Detroit  takes  a  rate  78  per  cent 
of  that  from  Chicago.    Under  the  specific 
in-and-out  rates  in  effect  on  wheat  milled 
at  Chicago,  the  flour  rate  to  New  England 
was  18.7c,  and  the  wheat  rate  18c.    Com- 
plainant  demanded   that   Detroit   be   ac- 
corded a  rate  equal  to  78  per  cent  of  this 
Chicago  rate.    In  view  of  the  substitution 
privileges  enjoyed  by  complainant  at  De- 
troit, however,  the  granting  of  this  de- 
mand   by    complainant   would    not    have 
substantially  lowered  the  Detroit  to  New 
England   rate    actually   enjoyed   by   him. 
HELD,  complainant  was  not  unduly  dis- 
criminated against  under  the  adjustment 
attacked,    in    view   of   the    privileges    of 
mingl'ng      water-borne      and      rail-borne 
wheat,    and    of    substituting   flour   made 
from    water-borne    wheat    i  id    shipping 
same  out  at  the  balance  of  the  Chicago 
to    New    England    through    rate.      David 


Stott  V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  582, 
587. 

(o)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
on  bar,  boiler,  band  and  rod  iron  and 
steel  from  Terre  Haute,  Ind.,  to  Louis- 
ville, Ky.,  and  to  Cincinnati  and  Day- 
ton, O.,  as  unreasonable  per  se  and  as 
compared  with  the  rates  from  Pitts- 
burgh, Cleveland,  Chicago  and  St.  Louis, 
Knoxville,  Tenn.,  and  New  Albany,  Ind. 
In  1901  iron  and  steel  products  took 
the  sixth-class  rate  from  Pittsburgh, 
Cleveland,  Youngstown  and  Chicago.  In 
1903  the  rate  from  these  cities  was 
advanced  10  per  cent  above  sixth  class, 
[n  1907  they  were  given  a  fifth-class 
rate.  Up  to  1907  Terre  Haute  enjoyed 
the  same  rates  as  these  competing 
cities,  but  in  that  year  the  rates  from 
Terre  Haute  were  advanced  to  fifth 
class  for  a  short  period  and  then  re- 
stored to  10  per  cent  above  sixth  class. 
Thus,    from    June    1,    1907,    to    August, 

1909,  Terre  Haute  enjoyed  an  advan- 
tage in  rates  to  the  points  in  question 
as  compared  with  the  other  competing 
cities,  the  rates  being  from  Terre  Haute 
to  Louisville  9^c,  to  Cincinnati  9c  and 
to  Dayton  10c.  In  August,  1909,  the 
rate  from  Terre  Haute  to  Louisville 
was  advanced  to  12i^c,  to  Cincinnati 
lli^c    and    to    Dayton    12c.      In    March, 

1910,  these  rates  were  voluntarily  re- 
duced to  the  fifth-class  scale  uniformly 
in  effect  from  all  points  of  production, 
and  were  from  Terre  Haute  to  Louis- 
ville lie,  and  to  Cincinnati  and  Day- 
ton lli/^c.  HELD,  the  present  rates 
were  not  discriminatory  against  Terre 
Haute,  and  while  the  maintenance  of 
lower  rates  out  of  Terre  Haute  for 
some  years  raised  a  presumption  of  the 
unreasonableness  of  the  rates  attacked, 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  "^uch  lower 
rates  did  not  benefit  the  Terre  Haute 
industries  until  the  complainant  had  an 
advantage  over  its  competitors  in  1907, 
in  reaching  the  markets  in  question, 
they  were  not  shown  to  be  unreason- 
able. Highland  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v. 
Vandalia  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  601,  603. 

(p)  The  distances  from  Alachua, 
Gainesville  and  Hawthorne,  Fla.,  to 
Savannah,  over  the  S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  are, 
respectively,  207.9,  207.3  and  207.9  miles. 
Over  the  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  these  distances 
are  234,  249  and  238  miles,  respectively. 
The  rates  charged  by  both  defendants 
on  sea  island  cotton  from  these  points 
to  Savannah  were,  respectively,  39c,  40c 
and    45c.      HELD,    the    rates    over    the 


264 


DISCRIMINATION,    §9    (q)  — (s) 


Seaboard  Air  Line  were  unjustly  dis- 
criminatory against  Gainesville  and 
Hawthorne,  and  these  points  should 
take  the  Alachua  rate  of  39c,  which  is 
declared  to  be  a  reasonable  rate  for 
the  future;  that  with  respect  to  ship- 
ments over  the  Atlantic  Coast  Line 
the  40c  rate  from  Gainesville,  as  com- 
pared with  the  39c  rate  from  Alachua, 
was  justifiable  on  account  of  the  longer 
haul,  but  that  shipments  from  Haw- 
thorne should  apparently  not  take  a 
higher  rate  than  those  from  Gaines- 
ville, no  order  being  entered,  however, 
with  respect  to  that  rate.  Railroad 
Commissioners  of  Florida  v.  S.  A,  L. 
Ry.,  16   I.  C.  C.   1,  4,  5. 

(q)  Complainants,  manufacturers  of 
wire  nails,  woven  wire  fences  and  other 
wire  products  at  Muncie  and  Kokomo, 
Ind.,  attacked  the  rates  on  these  prod- 
ucts from  there  to  Arkansas  common 
points.  Prior  to  1907  defendants  had 
established  the  Chicago-Cincinnati  ter- 
ritory, and  from  there,  including  INIun- 
cie  and  Kokomo,  for  many  years  had 
maintained  the  same  rate  to  Arkansas 
common  points.  Complainants  estab- 
lished their  plant  while  such  rates  were 
in  effect  and  in  reliance  upon  them. 
In  1907  defendants  split  their  territory 
and  charged  4c  more  from  points  east 
of  the  Illinois-Indiana  line  than  from 
points  west  of  it.  Defendants  also  al- 
lowed in  the  territory  west  carload  rates 
on  less-than-carloads,  in  excess  of  car- 
loads. This  privilege  was  denied  to 
complainants.  Complainants'  competi- 
tors located  at  Joliet,  De  Kalb,  Lock- 
port  and  Waukegan,  111.,  were  thereby 
given  an  advantage.  The  initial  roads 
from  the  Indiana  points  in  question 
were  not  the  same  as  the  initial  roads 
from  the  Chicago  points  in  question, 
but  both  groups  of  roads  united  with 
the  lines  leading  from  St.  Louis  in  mak- 
ing rates  to  Arkansas  points  from  all 
the  points  in  question.  Defendants 
contended  that  there  could  be  no  un- 
just discrimination,  because  the  same 
roads  did  not  serve  the  same  points. 
HELD,  the  rates  and  practices  com- 
plained of  were  unduly  discriminatory 
and  should  be  corrected,  and  that  un- 
just discrimination  would  arise  despite 
the  fact  that  the  same  initial  carriers 
did  not  serve  the  same  competing 
points,  in  view  of  the  agreements  made 
between  all  these  carriers  prior  and 
subsequent  to  1907.  (Knapp,  Comm'r, 
(Jissenting.)     Indiana   Steel   &   Wire  Co. 


V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  155, 
160,  161. 

(r)  Galva,  .Canton,  Springfield  and 
Peoria,  111.,  formerly  all  took  the  Peoria 
group  rate  on  agricultural  implements 
to  Missouri  River  points,  the  average 
distances  of  these  cities  from  those 
points  being  approximately  the  same. 
The  first  three  cities  were  later  placed 
in  the  Mississippi  River  group,  which 
took  a  rate  of  3%c  less  than  the  Peoria 
rate.  Complainants,  manufacturers  at 
Peoria,  attacked  that  adjustment  as  un- 
duly discriminatory  against  Peoria.  It 
appeared  that  Peoria  enjoyed  a  rate 
on  steel  and  iron  of  2c  and  on  lumber 
of  Ic  less  than  the  other  three  points 
were  obliged  to  pay,  when  shipped  in 
to  be  used  in  the  manufacture  of  agri- 
cultural implements,  and  that  Peoria 
had  a  general  advantage  in  rates  on 
raw  material,  and  also  on  shipments 
of  agricultural  implements  to  points 
east.  HELD,  the  rates  complained  of 
were  not  unduly  discriminatory.  Avery 
Mfg.    Co.   V.   A.   T.    &   S.   F.   Ry.   Co.,   16 

1.  C.  C.  20,  24. 

(s)  Complainants,  Indianapolis  ship- 
pers, attacked  the  class  and  commodity 
rates  from  Indianapolis  to  St.  Paul  and 
Winona,  Minn.,  group  points  as  excessive 
when  compared  with  rates  from  St.  Louis 
to  these  points  and  as  being  unreason- 
able per  se.  The  class  rates  from  In- 
dianapolis to  St.  Paul  were  81c,  69c,  51c. 
35c   and  29c,  respectively,  for  classes  1, 

2,  3,  4  and  5,  and  from  Indianapolis  to 
Winona  were  76c,  65c,  48c,  32c  and  26c 
for  those  classes,  respectively.  The  class 
rates  from  St.  Louis  to  St.  Paul  were  63c, 
52i^c,  42c,  26c  and  21c  for  said  classes, 
respectively,  and  from  St.  Louis  to  Win- 
ona, 50c,  42c,  33c,  23c  and  18c,  respect- 
ively. St.  Louis  took  105  per  cent  of  the 
Chicago-St.  Paul  rates.  From  St.  Louis 
and  Chicago  to  Winona  the  same  rates 
applied.  Complainants  claimed  that  In- 
dianapolis should  take  115  per  cent  of 
the  Chicago  rates  to  St.  Paul  and  Winona, 
making  the  first  class  rate  from  Indiana- 
polis to  St.  Paul  69c,  as  against  the  Chi- 
cago rate  of  60c,  and  the  St.  Louis  rate  of 
63c,  and  from  Indianapolis  to  Winona, 
5714c,  as  against  50c  from  both  Chicago 
and  St.  Louis.  From  Chicago  to  St.  Paul 
is  409  miles,  from  St.  Louis  584  miles,  and 
from  Indianapolis  to  St.  Paul  592  miles. 
Under  the  first  class  rate  attacked  the 
per  ton  mile  revenue  from  Indianapolis 
to   St.  Paul  was  2.74c,  from   Chicago  to 


DISCRIMINATION.  §9  (t)— §10  (d) 


265 


St.  Paul  2.93c,  and  from  St.  Louis  2.16c. 
To  enable  carriers  running  from  Illinois 
points  into  Chicago  to  secure  traffic  des- 
tined to  St.  Paul  and  Winona  in  competi- 
tion with  the  direct  St.  Louis  to  St.  Paul 
and  Winona  roads,  it  was  necessary  for 
the  former  carriers  to  meet  the  St.  Louis 
rate  on  shipments  originating  at  many- 
southern  and  eastern  Illinois  points.  If 
the  St.  Louis-St.  Paul  rates  were  raised, 
traffic  would  be  diverted  to  the  Missis- 
sippi River  route  and  to  the  steamer  lines 
operating  on  the  lakes  from  Chicago. 
3n  account  of  competition  afforded  by  the 
lake  lines  from  Chicago,  it  was  necessary 
to  protect  St.  Paul  and  Minneapolis  as 
jobbing  centers,  that  they  be  placed  on  ii 
parity  of  rates  with  Duluth.  Rates  from 
St.  Louis  to  St.  Paul  were  also  subject  to 
competition  from  the  Atlantic  seaboard 
by  rail-and-water  and  all-rail  routes.  No 
lines  ran  from  Indianapolis  to  Chicago 
and  beyond  via  their  own  rails  to  St.  Paul 
and  Winona.  Several  through  lines  op- 
erated via  their  own  rails  from  Chicago 
and  St.  Louis,  respectively,  to  St.  Paul 
and  Winona.  While  the  class  rates  from 
Indianapolis  to  St.  Paul  exceeded  those 
from  St.  Louis  by  about  30  per  cent,  the 
rates  on  many  commodities  greatly  ex- 
ceeded that  percentage.  HELD,  the  class 
rates  attacked  should  not  be  disturbed, 
but  defendants  should  make  a  general 
reduction  on  commodity  rates  from  In- 
dianapolis to  the  points  in  question  so 
they  would  not  exceed  by  more  than 
about  30  per  cent  the  commodity  rates 
from  St.  Louis.  Indianapolis  Freight  Bu- 
reau V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  IG  I.  C. 
C.  276,  280,  281,  282,  284. 

(t)  For  some  10  years  prior  to  1907, 
the  rate  on  the  products  of  wheat  milled 
at  Buffalo  from  Buffalo  to  New  York  did 
not  exceed  10c,  except  during  the  sum- 
mer of  1903,  when  it  was  lOi/^c.  During 
four  of  the  seasons  of  this  period  it  was 
9c.  In  1907  the  rate  was  advanced  to  lie. 
Boston  and  New  England  points  took  a 
rate  of  2c  in  excess  of  the  Buffalo  to  New 
York  rate,  making  the  advanced  rate  from 
Buffalo  to  these  points  13c.  At  the  time 
of  said  advance  the  rate  from  Minne- 
apolis to  New  York  of  25c  was  not  dis- 
turbed. Minneapolis  and  Buffalo  are 
strong  competitors  in  the  milling  of 
spring  wheat.  Milling  operations  were 
at  times  conducted  upon  a  margin  of 
profit  not  exceeding  3c  per  barrel.  Mills 
were  established  at  Buffalo  in  reliance 
on    the   comparative    rates    from    Buffalo 


and  Minneapolis  in  effect  before  the  ad- 
vance. HELD,  the  advance  unduly  dis- 
criminated against  Buffalo  in  favor  of 
Minneapolis  and  the  Buffalo  to  New 
York  rate  should  not  exceed  10c,  and  the 
rate  to  Boston  and  New  England  points 
12c.  Banner  Milling  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H. 
R.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  31,  34. 

§10.     Encouragement  of  Own  Territory. 

See  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  II 
(j);  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §12  (bb). 
§29  (b),  §30  (d);  Discrimination,  §4 
(d);  Equalization  of  Rates,  §6  (j) ; 
Facilities  and  Privileges,  §4  (b), 
(d),  §21  (b),  (d);  Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §2  (rr),  §16  (L); 
Routing  and  Misrouting,  §4  (ggg), 
§6  (b);  Through  Routes  and  Joint 
Rates,  §7  (a),  §9,  §11  (a)  (n),  (x) ; 
Transportation,  §2  (d),  §12  (a). 

(a)  No  undue  preference  results  from 
the  fact  that  a  carrier  maintains  lower 
rates  from  points  on  its  own  line  than 
other  carriers  maintain  on  the  same 
traffic  from  nearby  points  on  their  lines. 
Stonega  Coke  &  Coal  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R. 
R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  17,  24. 

(aa)  Market  competition  is  a  euphem- 
ism for  railroad  policy.  The  desire  of  a 
number  of  shippers  to  reach  a  market  is 
a  force  to  which  the  carrier  may  not 
yield  unless  it  can  establish  clearly  that 
the  adoption  of  such  a  policy  will  not  un- 
fairly discriminate  against  one  commun- 
ity  in  favor  of  another,  and  will  not  pro- 
duce those  results  which  the  law  was  in- 
tended to  destroy.  Railroad  Commission 
of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  329, 
367. 

(b)  Within  certain  limits  a  railroad 
company  is  bound  to  protect  its  territory, 
and  within  those  limits  the  Commission 
may  consider  rates  and  their  effect  upon 
movement  of  traffic.  Receivers'  and 
Shippers'  Ass'n  of  Cincinnati  v.  C.  N.  O. 
&  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  440,  458. 

(c)  A  carrier  may  not  by  reason  of 
conducting  a  market  place  in  Pittsburgh 
use  its  power  as  a  common  carrier  to  dis- 
criminate against  or  in  favor  of  Pitts- 
burgh or  any  other  community  which  it 
serves.  Wilson  Produce  Co.  v.  Pa.  R.  R. 
Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  116,  122. 

(d)  Complainants,  jobbers  at  Atlanta 
and  other  Georgia  cities,  attacked  the 
rates  on  grain  products  and  hay  on  ship- 
ments from  Ohio  and  Mississippi  River 
crossings  and  beyond  to  points  in  south- 
eastern territory,  on  the  ground  that  the 
practice  of  extending  the  same  rates  to 


266 


DISCRIMINATION,  §10   (e)— (k) 


less-than-carload  as  to  carload  shipments 
was  unreasonable  in  view  of  the  larger 
expense  to  the  carrier  of  delivering  the 
less-than-carload  traffic.  Under  the  rates 
attacked,  the  consumers  and  small  deal- 
ers at  Georgia  and  surrounding  points 
were  able  to  procure  these  commodities 
from  Ohio  and  Mississippi  River  cross- 
ings and  from  Nashville  as  cheaply  as 
the  larger  jobbers  who  brought  in  car- 
load shipments.  To  establish  less-than- 
carload  rates  higher  than  carload  rates 
would  have  the  effect  of  compelling  con- 
sumers and  small  dealers  at  Georgia  and 
southeastern  points  to  purchase  from 
and  pay  the  middlemen's  profits  to  the 
large  Georgia  and  southeastern  jobbers, 
instead  of  obtaining  directly  their  sup- 
plies at  lower  rates  from  Mississippi  and 
Ohio  River  crossings  and  from  Nashville. 
HKLD,  that  a  railroad  could  not  be  per- 
mitted to  adopt  a  system  of  rate  making 
which  enabled  a  large  dealer  to  drive  a 
small  dealer  out  of  the  market;  that  the 
Commission  could  not  act  on  the  theory 
that  the  trade  of  a  particular  community 
was  a  vested  right  belonging  to  any  par- 
ticular class  in  that  community,  espe- 
cially when  so  to  do  would  result  in  the 
enjoyment  of  a  privilege  by  that  class  at 
the  expense  of  the  community  at  large, 
and  that  since  the  effect  of  an  order  pre- 
scribing differentials  on  less-than-carload 
quantities  would  be  to  place  a  tax  on  re- 
tailers and  consumers  in  order  that  job- 
bers in  southeastern  territory  might 
realize  a  profit  in  competition  with  Nash- 
ville jobbers  and  at  the  expense  of  that 
community,  such  an  order  should  be  re- 
fused. Duncan  &  Co.  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  590,  595. 

(e)  Formerly  a  through  rate  on  salt 
was  in  effect  from  Washburn.  Ws.,  to 
points  on  the  Soo  Line,  west  of  Minne- 
sota Transfer,  which  placed  Washburn 
and  Duluth  on  an  equal  footing  in  com- 
peting for  business.  The  Soo  Line  can- 
celed the  through  rate  from  Washburn, 
while  maintaining  the  same  rates  from 
Duluth,  and  admitted  that  it  did  so  be- 
cause it  was  unwilling  to  participate  in 
traffic  from  Washburn,  in  competition 
with  traffic  which- it  might  originate  on 
its  own  line,  the  purpose  of  the  cancela- 
tion of  the  joint  rate  from  Washburn 
being  to  encourage  traffic  from  Duluth. 
The  reasonableness  of  the  former  rate 
was  not  disputed.  Complainant  ex- 
pended large  sums  in  establishing  his 
salt  plant  at  Washburn,  at  the  time  when 
the  joint  rate  from  there  was  in  effect. 
HELD,  the  Soo  Line  was  unduly  discrimi- 


nating against  Washburn  and  should  re- 
establish the  former  rates.  Delray  Salt 
Co.  V.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C. 
507,  511. 

(f)  Railroads  should  not  be  allowed  to 
so  divide  and  diversify  themselves  by 
contract  and  traffic  agreements  as  to 
work  a  practical  discrimination.  Cedar 
Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  15   L  C.  C.  73,  77. 

(g)  A  common  carrier  in  order  to 
build  up  and  foster  industries  on  its  own 
lines  cannot  lawfully  refuse  to  carry  the 
products  of  like  industries  located  on 
connecting  lines.  Standard  Lime  &  Stone 
Co.  V.  Cumberland  Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
L  C.  C.  620,  625. 

(h)  A  higher  rate  on  lumber  shipped 
from  southern  territory  to  Des  Moines 
over  that  shipped  to  Omaha  and  Council 
Bluffs  cannot  be  justified  on  the  ground 
that  Omaha  is  "an  important  dumping 
ground"  for  lumber,  where  it  appears 
that  such  dumping  ground  results  from 
the  difference  in  rates  complained  of. 
Greater  Des  Moines  Committee  v.  C.  Gt. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  294,  297. 

(i)  A  carrier  has  no  right  to  prefer 
one  locality  over  another  without  some 
justifying  reason.  Corn  Belt  Meat  Pro- 
ducers' Ass'n  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.    C.    C.    376,   386. 

(j)  Defendant's  tariff  provided  a  local 
rate  on  cottonseed  into  Fort  Smith,  Ark., 
with  a  provision  that  in  case  the  ship- 
per employed  defendant's  road  in  haul- 
ing the  manufactured  product  out,  he 
should  be  entitled  to  a  refund  of  a  part 
of  the  rate  into  Fort  Smith.  HELD,  such 
provision  was  unlawfully  discriminatory. 
Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v.  Ft.  S.  &  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  1,  4. 

(k)  Most  mills  in  South  Carolina, 
Georgia  and  Alabama  wove  cotton  cloth 
from  undyed  yarns.  The  cloths  were 
subsequently  treated  at  dye  works.  Com- 
plainant's dye  works  were  located  at 
Covington,  Ky.,  but  for  the  purpose  of 
the  decision  treated  as  located  at  Cin- 
cinnati. Its  competitors  were  located 
at  Clearwater,  S.  C,  and  Lanette,  Ala. 
The  rate  on  cotton  piece  goods  from 
all  Georgia  and  Alabama  points  to  Chi- 
cago was  55c,  to  Cincinnati  49c.  From 
South  Carolina  mills  the  rate  to  Chi- 
cago was  65c,  to  Cincinnati  59c.  The 
local  rate  from  Cincinnati  to  Chicago 
was  25c.  Clearwater,  located  near  the 
Georgia   line,   took   the   Georgia   rate  to 


DISCRIMINATION.  §10   (I)— §11   (b) 


267 


Chicago.  The  rate  from  South  Caro- 
lina mill  points  to  Clearwater  was  17c, 
and  from  milling  points  to  Lanette, 
Ala.,  8c,  which  rates,  added  to  the  rates 
to  Chicago  from  these  dyeing  points, 
gave  complainant's  competitors  at  Clear- 
water an  advantage  of  12c  and  at 
Lanette  of  lie  over  the  rates  from  mill- 
ing points  to  Cincinnati,  plus  the  local 
from  Cincinnati  to  Chicago.  Complain- 
ant attacked  this  adjustment  of  rates 
as  unjustly  discriminatory  in  favor  of 
Clearwater  and  Lanette.  The  rates  to 
Chicago  attacked  were  established  upon 
a  base  rate  to  the  Ohio  River  of  35c 
from  Georgia  and  Alabama  and  45c  from 
South  Carolina.  The  rate  from  the 
Ohio  River  was  shrunk  5c,  being  25c 
when  the  shipment  was  local,  20c  when 
it  was  through.  The  lines  leading  up 
to  the  Ohio  River  received  35c  for 
their  through  haul,  and  the  lines  from 
the  Ohio  River  20c,  while  on  local  busi- 
ness the  lines  to  the  river  received 
49c  and  those  from  the  river  25c.  The 
through  rates  to  Chicago  from  southern 
mills  were  forced  by  competition  with 
New  England  mills.  The  rates  to  Cin- 
cinnati were  somewhat  determined  also 
by  competition  with  New  England  mills. 
The  lower  rates  to  Chicago  from  points 
in  question  resulted  in  part  from  the 
lower  rates  prescribed  from  milling 
points  to  Clearwater  and  Lanette.  De 
fendants,  to  encourage  the  establish- 
ment of  dyeing  works  in  the  South,  and 
to  prevent  the  cloth  from  going  to  New 
England  to  be  dyed,  made  rates  from 
the  mills  to  Clearwater  and  Lanette 
lower  than  the  ordinary  class  rates. 
Despite  the  advantage  in  rates,  com- 
plainant's competitors  at  Clearwater 
and  Lanette  did  not  appear  to  be  espe- 
cially prosperous.  HELD,  defendants 
had  the  right  to  make  rates  so  as  to 
foster  enterprises  upon  their  own  sys- 
tems, even  though  the  result  was  to 
discriminate  against  other  enterprises 
of  a  similar  nature  elsewhere,  provided 
such  discrimination  was  on  the  whole, 
as  in  the  present  case,  not  undue.  Com- 
plaint dismissed.  Reliance  Textile  & 
Dye  Works  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
48,    54. 

(1)  Tobico  was  constructed  by  com- 
plainant as  an  icing  station  some  690  ft. 
from  the  line  of  the  Detroit  &  Mackinac 
Ry.  Co.,  and  was  reached  by  a  switch 
specially  constructed  for  the  purpose  by 
that  company,  cars  being  sent  out  for 
the  use  of  complainant  a  distance  of  7 


miles  from  Bay  City  by  switch  engines 
from  there.  Tawas  was  some  54  miles 
north  of  Tobico  on  this  line.  The  rate 
on  ice  from  Bay  City  to  Toledo  o/er  the 
arand  Trunk  R.  R.  and  the  Michigan 
Central  R.  R.  was  80c  C.  L.,  and  $1.10  per 
ton  from  Bay  City  to  Cleveland.  The  dis- 
tance from  Bay  City  to  Toledo  was  148 
miles  and  to  Cleveland  261.  From  Tawas 
and  Tobico  to  Toledo  the  rate  was  $1.10 
and  to  Cleveland  $1.50.  Complainant's 
competitors  were  located  at  Tawas  and 
it  a  point  three  miles  south  of  Tobico. 
On  shipments  from  the  latter  competing 
point,  complainant's  competitor  was 
charged  80c  to  Toledo,  provided  the  ship- 
ment moved  from  Bay  City  over  the 
Grand  Trunk  R.  R.,  otherwise  a  switching 
charge  of  $5  per  car  was  assessed.  No 
switching  charge  was  made  for  service  at 
Tobico.  Complainant  attacked  this  ad- 
justment of  rates  as  unduly  discrimi- 
natory in  favor  of  its  competitors.  Com- 
plainant's industry  at  Tobico  was  the  only 
one  located  at  that  point,  whereas  Tawas 
was  a  community  of  some  importance. 
HELD,  the  rates  complained  of  were  not 
shown  to  be  unduly  discriminatory.  Wag- 
ner, Zagelmeyer  &  Co.  v.  Detroit  &  Mac- 
kinac Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  160,  165. 

§11.     Low  State   Rate. 

See    Equalization   of   Rates,   §5. 

(a)  Section  3  of  the  act  forbidding 
undue  discrimination  in  favor  of  or 
against  any  person  or  locality  applies 
to  discrimination  against  interstate 
traffic,  and  the  fact  that  a  carrier's 
rates  on  interstate  shipments  are  estab- 
lished by  a  state  commission  does  not 
relieve  that  carrier  of  the  duty  to  so 
adjust  its  rates  that,  as  to  interstate 
traffic,  justice  will  be  done  between 
communities,  regardless  of  state  lines. 
Meredith  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C. 
C.    31,   41,    45. 

(b)  The  present  relation  of  rates 
gives  an  undue  preference  to  Texas 
cities,  and  effects  an  unlawful  dis- 
crimination against  Shreveport,  and  the 
carriers  should  cease  and  desist  from 
charging  higher  rates  on  any  commod- 
ity from  Shreveport  to  Dallas  or  Hous- 
ton or  points  intermediate  thereto  than 
are  contemporaneously  charged  by 
them  for  the  carriage  of  such  commod- 
ity to  equidistant  points  from  Houston 
or  Dallas  toward  Shreveport.  Meredith 
V.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C. 
31,    47. 


268 


DISCRIMINATION,   §11    (bb)— (k) 


(bb)  The  fact  that  the  Texas  State 
Commission  has  established  such  low 
rates  on  live  stock  from  Texas  points  of 
origin  to  Fort  Worth,  Tex.,  that  Fort 
Worth  thereby  gains  an  advantage  as 
against  the  rates  established  from  the 
same  points  of  origin  to  Oklahoma  City, 
Okla.,  by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission, which  rates  are  higher  than  the 
low  mileage  scale  prescribed  by  the  Texas 
Commission,  is  not  such  undue  discrimini- 
tion  nor  such  a  situation  with  which  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  can 
properly  deal.  In  Re  Investigation  of  Un- 
reasonable Rates  on  Meats,  23  I.  C.  C. 
656,  664. 

(c)  On  cattle  from  Texas  points,  Fort 
Worth,  Tex.,  pays  the  Texas  State  Com- 
mission rates,  while  Oklahoma  City, 
Okla.,  pays  higher  interstate  mileage 
rates.  The  state  rates  were  not  made 
with  intent  to  discriminate  in  favor  of 
the  Texas  industry,  but  are  part  of  a  gen- 
eral schedule.  Oklahoma  City,  however, 
suffers  a  disadvantage.  HELD,  that  the 
discrimination  is  not  undue  and  that  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  has  no 
power  to  deal  with  the  situation,  though 
it  would  be  desirable  if  the  same  scale 
applied  to  both  points.  In  Re  Advances 
on  Meats  and  Packinghouse  Products, 
23   I.  C.  C.   656,   664. 

(cc)  Shippers  from  Atlantic  seaboard 
territory  are  entitled  to  reasonable 
rates,  and  if  the  establishment  of  such 
reasonable  rates  by  the  Commission  de- 
velops unjust  discrimination  or  unreason- 
able rates  from  intermediate  or  related 
points,  the  law  casts  upon  the  carriers 
the  obligation  of  providing  reasonable 
and  non-discriminatory  rates  from  such 
intermediate  or  related  points.  In  Re 
Advances  by  Carriers  Operating  Be- 
tween the  Mississippi  and  Missouri 
Rivers,  21  I.  C.  C.  546,  549. 

(d)  In  a  proceeding  attacking  a 
rate  adjustment  between  various  cod- 
petitive  coal  fields  to  a  large  number 
of  consuming  centers,  if  a  purely  state 
rate  is  involved  to  such  centers,  it  is 
proper  for  the  Commission  to  note  tlmt 
discrimination  exists,  but  it  has  no 
jurisdiction  to  enter  an  affirmative 
order.  Andy's  Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  Soutn- 
ern  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  405,  407. 

(e)  Complainants  attacked  the  rela- 
tive rates  on  coal  from  the  Coal  Creek 
field,  Tennessee,  as  against  the  Appala- 
chia  fields,  Virginia,  to  Nashville,  Tenn. 
From  the  Appalachia   field   to  Nashville 


the  distance  was  431  miles,  and  the  rate 
$1.45.  On  coal  from  Coal  Creek  to  Nash- 
ville— distance,  208  miles — the  rate  was 
$1.25.  The  rate  used  by  complainants  is 
a  state  rate  with  a  movement  from  Coal 
Creek  to  Nashville,  being  entirely  within 
the  state  of  Tennessee.  HELD,  the  pres- 
ent adjustment  of  rates  is  discriminatory, 
an'd  that  no  rate  should  be  maintained 
from  Coal  Creek  to  Nashville  which  is 
not  at  least  45c  less  than  the  rate  main- 
tained from  the  Appalachia,  but  that 
while  it  is  proper  to  note  the  discrimina- 
tion that  exists,  the  Commission  has  no 
jurisdiction  to  require  its  removal  in- 
asmuch as  an  intrastate  rate  is  involved. 
Andy's  Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  405,  407. 

(f)  The  Commission  cannot  remove 
discrimination  by  reducing  state  rates, 
Andy's  Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  405,  407. 

(g)  There  is  no  discrimination  where 
a  lower  state  rate  is  forced  by  a  state 
commission  and  appears  to  be  unrea- 
sonably low.  Saunders  &  Co.  v.  South- 
ern Express  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  415,  422. 

(h)  Whether  legislation  should  be  en- 
acted to  prevent  discrimination  through 
the  undue  lowering  of  rates  by  state  com- 
missions is  a  question  for  the  legislature 
and  not  for  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission.  E.  E.  Saunders  &  Co.  v. 
Southern  Express  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  415,  424. 

(i)  Where  a  carrier  serves  two  com- 
munities, similarly  situated,  by  hauling 
the  same  traffic  under  similar  conditions 
from  a  point  of  origin  to  destinations  in 
the  same  state  and  also  to  the  same 
destinations  from  an  interstate  point  of 
origin  it  is  not  altogether  clear  that  exist- 
ing legislation  affords  redress  against  a 
discrimination,  as  between  the  two 
points,  when  resulting  from  an  order  by 
a  state  commission.  Saunders  &  Co. 
V.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  415,  422. 

(j)  The  Commission  should  exercise 
care  to  prevent  undue  discrimination  as 
the  result  of  any  conclusion  reached  with 
respect  of  rates  to  any  particular  point. 
Board  of  Trade  of  Winston-Salem  v.  N. 
&  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  12,  18. 

(k)  Defendants'  rate  on  bituminous 
coal  from  the  Appalachia  district,  Vir- 
ginia, to  Bristol,  Tenn.,  was  85c  when 
destined  either  for  steam  or  domestic 
use  for  a  haul  of  G9l^  miles.  Defendant's 
rate  from  Middlesboro  to  Knoxville  was 
50c  and  70c,  respectively,  on  steam  and 


DISCRBIINATION,  §12   (a)— §13   (a) 


269 


domestic  coal.  The  rate  from  Middles- 
boro  to  Knoxville  was  controlled  by  the 
competition  of  coal  mines  at  Coal  Creek, 
31  miles  distant  from  Knoxville,  from 
which  the  state  commission  had  fixed 
rates  to  Knoxville  of  40c  and  60c,  re- 
spectively, on  steam  and  domestic  coal. 
HELD,  said  facts  did  not  show  un- 
just discrimination  against  Middlesboro. 
Board  of  Bristol,  Tenn.,  v.  V.  &  S.  W.  Rv. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  453,  455. 

IV.     REMOVAL   OF   DISCRIMINATION. 

See  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  III  C; 
Switch  Tracks  and  Switching,  §3 
(d). 

§12.      Reduction   of   Rates. 

See  Equalization  of  Rates,  §8  (d), 
(dd);  Evidence,  §66  (b);  Long  and 
Short  Hauls,  §5  (ff ) ;  Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates.  §2  (zz),  §16  (dd),  §25 
(a);  Tap  Lines,  §9  (k);  Through 
Routes   and  Joint   Rates,   §15   (nnn). 

(a)  Relief  against  discrimination  due 
to  a  rate  adjustment  cannot  be  denied 
on  the  ground  that  other  points  simi- 
larly situated  might  thereby  le  induced 
to  ask  for  like  relief.  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce of  Newport  News  v.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  345,  356. 

(b)  The  Commission  would  not  hesi- 
tate to  reduce  rates  because  of  the  threat 
of  a  reduction  from  carriers  serving  com- 
peting localities  if  unreasonableness  and 
discrimination  were  established.  Bitumi- 
nous Coal  Operators  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  385,  391. 

(c)  The  fact  that  reduction  of  an 
unreasonable  rate  or  the  correction  of  an 
unjust  discrimination  will  require  reduc- 
tions or  corrections  at  other  points  can- 
not be  accepted  as  a  valid  defense  of 
an  unreasonable  rate  or  an  unjust  dis- 
crimination. Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L. 
S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  93,  101. 

(d)  Interveners  insisted  that  to  make 
order  prayed  for  would  make  a  discrimi- 
nation against  them.  The  matter  of  ad- 
justing rates  relatively  to  meet  conditions 
that  will  arise  after  the  reduction  herein- 
ordered  is  made  rests  primarily  with  the 
defendants.  Baer  Bros.  Mercantile  Co.  v. 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  225,  229.         » 

(e)  If  in  this  case  the  complainant 
labored  under  some  form  of  discrimina- 
tion, the  effect  of  which  v.as  apparent, 
or  if  these  rates  were  so  high  as  to  un- 
duly burden  the  movement  of  this  traffic, 
it  would  be  the  Commission's  duty  to  in- 
terfere, even  though  that  did  involve  a 
reduction  of  rates,  but  where,  as  in  this 


proceeding,  the  effect  of  no  discrimina- 
tion is  pointed  out,  where  the  traffic 
moves  with  the  greatest  freedom,  where 
the  only  result  of  the  acticn  asked  for 
would  be  to  somewhat  reduce  the  rate 
paid  by  the  complainant,  the  application 
must  be  denied.  Union-Made  Garment 
Mfrs'.  Ass'n  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  IG 
l.  C.  C.  405,  409. 

(f)  It  is  not  within  the  authority  or 
power  of  the  Commission  to  remove  dis- 
crimination except  through  a  reduction 
in  rates,  which  necessarily  operates  to 
reduce  revenues.  Kindel  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H. 
&  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  555,  560. 

(g)  Where  the  Commission  orders  a 
reduction  of  the  rate  on  petroleum  from 
Chicago  to  Omaha,  it  will  order  no  re- 
ductions to  points  in  the  neighborhooi 
of  Omaha,  no  evidence  being  submitted 
as  to  those  points,  but  the  Comm'ssion 
will  indicate  that  defendants  should  ad- 
just their  rates  to  those  points  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  new  Chicago  to  Omaha 
rate,  and  upon  their  failure  so  to  do, 
complainant  may  file  a  new  complaint. 
National  Petroleum  Ass'n  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  287,  290. 

§13.     Disturbance  of  Settled  Adjustment. 

See  Equalization  of  Rates,  §8  (d), 
(dd) ;  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §106 
(c). 

(a)  Complainant  asked  that  the  present 
rates  on  rough  rice  from  Texas  points  to 
New  Orleans  be  reduced  so  that  they 
would  be  lower  than  the  clean  rice  rates, 
to  enable  New  Orleans  millers  to  com- 
pete with  Texas  millers  in  the  purchase 
of  rough  rice  from  Texas  producers.  It 
was  alleged  that  discrimination  exists  as 
against  the  New  Orleans  millers  by  mak- 
ing the  rough  rice  rates  to  New  Orleans 
as  high  as  the  clean  rice  rates.  It  ap- 
peared that  rough  rice  was  only  about 
two-thirds  as  valuable  as  clean  rice;  that 
there  is  little  loss  of  damage  in  trans- 
portation, and  that  as  to  all  rates  from 
Louisiana  points  to  Louisiana  mills  and 
from  almost  all  Louisiana  points  to  Texas 
mills,  and  Arkansas  points  to  Louisiana 
and  Texas  mills,  the  rough  rice  rates  are 
lower  than  those  on  clean  rice.  On  the 
other  hand,  defendant  showed  that  the 
rough  rice  rates  are  reasonable  per  se 
in  that  these  rates  are  generally  higher 
than  on  sugar.  Yet  the  rates  in  question 
are  actually  lower  than  the  correspond- 
ing rates  on  sugar.  Furthermore,  it  was 
shown  that  whereas  the  clean  rice  rate 
from    Houston    and    Texas    points    east 


270 


DISCRIMINATION,  §13    (b)— (d) 


thereof  to  New  Orleans  (from  257  to  359 
miles)  is  15c,  the  rate  on  clean  rice  fixed 
by  the  Louisiana  commission  for  points 
over  125  miles  to  New  Orleans  (as  are 
practically  all  Louisiana  points)  is  14c. 
Thus  Houston,  Tex.,  359  miles  from  New 
Orleans,  paid  a  15c  rate  or  8.3  mills  per 
ton  mile,  while  Crowley,  La.,  167  miles 
from  New  Orleans  paid  a  14c  rate  or  16.7 
mills  per  ton  mile.  It  appeared  that  in 
1910  there  were  shipped  from  Texas 
points  to  New  Orleans  176,874  bags  of 
rough  rice  and  128,976  bags  of  clean  rice, 
and  that  about  180,000  bags  of  rough  rice 
are  shipped  annually  from  Arkansas  to 
New  Orleans,  although  the  rate  is  20c. 
HELD,  the  rates  complained  of  are  part 
of  a  rate  adjustment  which  has  been  ar- 
rived at  after  years  of  competition  be- 
tween markets,  and  that  any  change  in 
the  present  rate  would  disturb  the  whole 
rate  situation;  that  in  view  of  all  the  facts 
and  circumstances  the  rates  complained 
of  are  not  unduly  discriminatory.  Com- 
plaint dismissed.  New  Orleans  Board  of 
Trade  Ltd.  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
L  C.  C.  210. 

(b)  Complainant  attacked  all  rates 
from  Vickburg,  Miss.,  to  points  in  north- 
eastern Texas,  as  being  unduly  dis- 
criminatory compared  with  rates  to  such 
points  from  St.  Louis,  Memphis,  New 
Orleans  and  Galveston.  Interveners  at 
Memphis  asked  that  the  rates  from  Mem- 
phis be  lowered.  Complainant  was  prin- 
cipally interested,  as  a  Vicksburg  jobber, 
in  the  sale  of  bagging  and  cottonbale  ties 
to  Texas  points.  Cotton  bagging  came 
from  the  Atlantic  seaboard  via  St.  Louis, 
or  from  foreign  ports  via  New  Orleans 
and  Galveston,  and  the  rates  to  Missis- 
sippi River  crossings  and  beyond  were 
influenced  by  this  water  competition. 
Cottonbale  ties  came  mostly  from  Pitts- 
burgh and  the  selling  price  was  the  Pitts- 
burgh price,  plus  the  through  rate  to  the 
point  of  consumption.  Complainant 
wished  to  obtain  rates  out  of  Vicksburg 
that  would  enable  it  to  compete  in  north- 
eastern Texas  after  stopping  the  ties  in 
Vicksburg.  The  rates  from  Vicksburg 
v/ere  materially  higher  per  ton  mile  than 
from  St.  Louis,  Memphis  or  Galveston. 
The  rates  to  Texas  points  generally  were 
adjusted  with  respect  to  Mississippi  River 
crossings  extending  north  and  south  more 
than  700  miles,  and  could  not  be  consid- 
ered solely  from  the  standpoint  of  mile- 
age. New  Orleans,  Memphis  and  St. 
Louis  each  had  several  competing  direct 


lines  to  Texas,  whereas  Vicksburg  had 
only  one  line  extending  in  that  direction. 
The  interveners  at  Memphis  sought  a  re- 
duction of  rates  on  the  same  general 
theory  as  complainant.  HELD,  to  grant 
the  demands  of  the  complainant  or  the 
interveners  would  be  to  disrupt  the  group- 
ing of  Texas  common  points,  or  to  re- 
arrange the  whole  fabric  of  rates  from 
the  Mississippi  River.  Complaint  dis- 
missed. Williams  Co.  v.  V.  S.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  482,  485,  487. 

(bb)  While  it  is  proper  to  consider 
the  effect  of  a  decision  upon  the  general 
rate  adjustment  applying  over  a  wide 
scope  of  territory,  rates  which  discrimi- 
nate against  one  locality  on  a  particular 
road  cannot  be  justified  on  the  ground 
that  they  are  part  of  a  general  scir3me 
adopted  by  several  roads  entering  the 
same  territory  and  supplying  coal  from 
different  and  unassociated  districts. 
Black  Mountain  Coal  Land  Co.  v.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  286,  294. 

(c)  Unreasonable  rates  or  undue  and 
unjust  discrimination  should  be  corrected 
even  if  long-standing  adjustments  must 
be  disturbed,  but  where  no  rate  is  alleged 
to  be  unreasonable,  and  the  discrimina- 
tion alleged  and  complained  of  is  between 
an  intermediate  or  primary  market  which 
naturally  wishes  to  handle  grain  and  for- 
ward it  for  export  or  to  the  consuming 
territory,  and  direct  shipment  of  the  grain 
from  points  where  it  is  grown  to  export 
points  and  consuming  territory  under 
lower  transportation  charges,  undue  or 
unjust  discrimination  cannot  be  held  to 
arise.  Kansas  City  Transportation  Bu- 
reau V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C  C. 
491,  498. 

(d)  Complainant  attacked  the  class 
rates  of  25c,  22c,  19i^c,  12y2C,  9i^c  and  8c, 
from  Indianapolis  to  Cincinnati,  Jeffer- 
sonville  and  other  Ohio  River  points  and 
those  of  311^0,  27c,  2iy2C,  14c,  llVgC  and 
9c  from  Indianapolis  to  Chicago  on 
classes  1,  2,  3,  4,  5  and  6,  respectively. 
The  class  rates  between  Chicago  and  the 
Ohio  River  points  in  question  were  40c, 
34c,  25c,  17c.  15c  and  12c,  respectively. 
The  distance  between  Indianapolis  and 
Ohio  River  points  is  approximately  40  per 
cent,  and  between  Indianapolis  and  Chi- 
cago 60  per  cent  of  the  average  distance 
of  300  miles  between  Chicago  apd  the 
Ohio  River  points.  Complainant  de- 
manded that  the  rates  from  Indianapolis 
to  Ohio  River  points  be  made  50  per  cent, 


DISCRIMINATION,  §13   (e)— §14  (a) 


271 


and  from  Indianapolis  to  Chicago  70  per 
cent  of  the  Chicago  to  Ohio  River  points 
rates,  10  per  cent  being  added  in  each 
case  to  the  percentage  which  the  Indiana- 
polis mileage  in  either  direction  is  of  the 
total  distance  between  the  termini.  Un- 
der the  rates  attacked  the  percentage  in 
the  differences  between  the  Chicago  and 
the  Indianapolis  to  Ohio  River  rates 
varied  with  the  different  classes,  whereas 
the  rates  on  all  classes  from  a  point  in- 
termediate to  Chicago  and  New  York  to 
Chicago  on  New  York  bore  a  uniform  per- 
centage to  the  Chicago  and*  New  York 
rate.  The  class  rates  between  Chicago 
and  New  York,  912  miles,  yielded  a  per 
ton  mile  revenue  of  1.64c,  1.42c,  1.1c  and 
7.7,  6.6  and  5.5  mills;  between  Pittsburgh 
and  New  York,  444  miles,  2c,  1.76c,  1.35c 
and  9.5,  8.1  and  6.8  mills;  between  Buf- 
falo and  New  York,  410  miles,  1.9c,  1.6c, 
1.36c  and  9.2,  7.8  and  6.3  mills  for  the 
first  six  classes  respectively.  The  rates 
attacked  between  Indianapolis  and  Cin- 
cinnati-Jeffersonville,  110  miles,  yielded 
4.54c,  4c,  3.54c,  2.27c,  1.72c  and  1.45c;  be- 
tween Indianapolis  and  Chicago,  180 
miles,  3.5c,  3c,  2.4c,  1.55c,  1.28c,  and 
Ic,  and  between  Chicago  and  Cincin- 
nati-Jeffersonville,  300  miles,  2.66c,  2.26c, 
1.67c,  1.13c,  Ic  and  8  mills  for  the  six 
classes  respectively.  The  rates  attacked 
were  constructed  as  nearly  in  accordance 
with  the  Central  Freight  Association  dis- 
tance scale  as  possible,  giving  considera- 
tion to  the  fact  that  on  the  small  lines  of 
which  defendants  were  composed  it  was 
necessary  to  recognize  to  some  extent 
the  influences  of  the  rates  formerly  exist- 
ing on  these  lines.  HELD,  while  an  align- 
ment on  a  universal  percentage  basis  be- 
tween the  classes  might  bring  about  more 
logical  and  consistent  adjustment,  the 
adjustment  attacked  being  the  outgrowth 
of  actual  conditions  and  the  result  of  a 
gradual  development  was  not  unjustly 
discriminatory,  nor  was  it  shown  to 
yield  unreasonable  earnings.  Indianapolis 
Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  504,  509. 

(e)  Pauls  Valley  and  Ardmore,  Okla., 
and  Gainesville,  Tex.,  are  on  defend- 
ant's line,  Gainesville  lying  south  of 
the  others.  Defendant  permitted  col- 
ton  originating  north  of  Pauls  Valley 
and  Ardmore  to  pass  through  these  cities 
to  Gainesville  for  compression,  but  did 
not  permit  cotton,  originating  south  of 
Gainesville  to  move  through  it  to  Pauls 
Valley    and    Ardmore    for    compression. 


Complainant  compressors  at  Pauls  Val- 
lay  and  Ardmore  attacked  this  rule  as 
unjustly  discriminatory  in  favor  of 
Gainesville.  Practically  all  the  cotton 
produced  in  the  territory  in  question 
moved  to  the  gulf  ports.  For  the  Com- 
mission to  correct  the  rule  complained 
of  would  not  assist  complainants  unless 
it  ordered  that  cotton  originating  at 
points  south  of  Gainesville  and  com- 
pressed at  Pauls  Valley  and  Ardmore 
should  be  allowed  to  take  the  rate  in 
effect  from  said  points  of  origin  to  the 
gulf  points,  instead  of  the  rate  from 
Pauls  Valley  and  Ardmore  to  these 
ports.  To  allow  this  would  result  in 
violating  the  almost  invariable  rule  of 
carriers  that,  where  there  is  a  back 
haul  to  the  compression  point  from 
which  there  is  a  higher  rate  to  final 
destination  than  from  point  of  origin, 
the  higher  rate  should  apply.  On  ship- 
ments to  gulf  ports,  Ardmore  and  Pauls 
Valley  took  higher  rates  from  Gaines- 
ville and  points  south  thereof.  HELD, 
no  unjust  discrimination  was  shown. 
Chickasaw  Compress  Co.  v.  G.  C.  &  S. 
F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  187,  190. 

(f)  Where  an  industry  has  been  re- 
quired to  pay  for  a  long  period  of  time 
rates  of  freight  on  raw  material  which 
bear  certain  relations  to  rates  charged 
to  competitors  at  other  points,  a  marked 
change  in  such  relations  of  rates  in 
favor  of  competing  industries  cannot 
be  made  without  an  attendant  presump- 
tion of  undue  discrimination.  Detroit 
Chemical  Works  v.  N.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I. 
C.  C.  357,  362. 

V.     PROCEDURE  AND  EVIDENCE. 

See  Procedure  Before  Commission, 
§2  (m),  §11  (t),  §13  (m);  Repara- 
tion, §23  (a),   (d). 

§14.     Burden    of    Proof. 

See  Commodities  Clause,  II  (g);  Evi- 
dence. I;  Ligliterage,  §4  (a);  Long 
and  Short  Haul,  §12   (2)    (g). 

(a)  In  the  purchase  of  grain  in  the 
states  of  South  Dakota,  Nebraska,  Min- 
nesota and  Iowa,  Sioux  City  comes  in 
direct  competition  with  Omaha,  Kansas 
City  and  Minneapolis,  but  principally 
with  Omaha.  These  competitive  mar- 
kets pay  the  local  rate  inbound  from 
point  of  production,  and  proportional 
rate  out  to  the  various  markets  of  dis- 
tribution, including  priacipslly  Minne- 
apolis on  wheat  and  Chicago  and  south- 
eastern territory  on  coarse  grains.  Sioux 
City,  however,  has  no  proportional  rate 
south   bound   to   the   same   destinations. 


272 


DISCRIMINATION,   §14    (b) 


and  because  of  the  high  level  of  its 
local  rates  in  and  out  is  restricted  to 
the  use  of  joint  rates  from  points  of 
production  to  ultimate  destination,  with 
the  privilege  of  stopping  the  grain  at 
Sioux  City  for  the  purpose  of  cleaning, 
milling  or  otherwise  treating.  Omaha 
has  a  back  haul  privilege  to  the  extent 
that  it  can  reach  out  in  competition 
with  Sioux  City  and  other  markets  in 
the  direct  line  of  flow  of  the  grain 
from  point  of  production  to  ultimate 
destination.  This  privilege,  however, 
applies  to  but  a  small  tonnage.  The 
rates  at  Kansas  City  and  Omaha  have 
been  established  through  competition, 
which  has  not  been  asserted  at  Sioux 
City.  Complainants  asked  the  establish- 
ment of  reasonable  local  rates  from 
the  states  named  to  Sioux  City,  and 
of  proportional  rates  out  with  reason- 
able relation  to  the  proportional  from 
Omaha  to  the  markets  named.  The 
suggested  local  rates  and  proportionals 
out  would  in  many  instances  aggregate 
higher  through  charges  on  South  Da- 
kota grain  than  the  present  joint  rates 
with  Sioux  City  transit.  Sioux  City 
desires  the  proportional  rate  in  order 
to  become  a  primary  grain  market, 
i.  e.,  the  privilege  of  accumulating  grain 
in  large  quantities  from  nearby  territory 
in  advance  of  actual  sales  and  knowl- 
edge of  ultimate  destination.  The  joint 
rates  for  transit  were  not  complained  of 
as  such,  the  proportional  rates  being 
asked  for  in  aridlrion.  HE.LD,  it  should 
clearly  appear  that  Sioux  City  labors 
under  an  unreasonable  rate  disadvan- 
tage in  comparison  with  Omaha,  as 
well  as  that  the  conditions  of  trans- 
portation are  substantially  similar  at 
the  respective  markets,  before  rate  con- 
ditions over  a  large  territory  can  be 
seriously  disturbed,  as  would  be  the 
case  if  the  prayer  of  the  petition  were 
granted.  Competition  of  controlling 
force  cannot  be  ignored  by  the  Com- 
mission in  determining  whether  an  ad- 
vantage in  rate  at  the  competitive  point 
is  undue  or  is  one  not  chargeable  to 
the  carrier  because  involuntarily  made. 
Omaha's  natural  advantage  of  location, 
with  respect  to  the  Southeast,  cannot 
be  controlled  by  any  lawful  order  of 
the  Commission,  any  more  than  Sioux 
City's  similar  advantage  with  respect 
to  South  Dakota  grain  can  be  equalized 
with  Omaha.  The  only  substantial  ad- 
vantage to  Omaha  established  by  the 
record  is  the  back  haul  privilege,  but 
this    applies    to    such    a    small    tonnage 


that  it  cannot  be  made  the  basis  for 
relief.  Sioux  City  by  transfer  of  tran- 
sit balances  has  the  same  choice  of 
markets  as  Omaha  on  all  grain  that 
does  not  involve  a  back  haul,  and  this 
does  not  subject  Sioux  City  to  such 
general  disadvantage  as  to  warrant  an 
order  in  disturbance  of  the  whole  west- 
ern fabric  of  rates  on  grain,  with  sub- 
stantial loss  of  revenue  to  the  carriers, 
for  the  purpose,  not  of  correcting  any 
present  substantial  injustice  on  the 
great  bulk  of  contiguous  Sioux  City 
grain,  but  of  upbuilding  the  Sioux  City 
market,  to  the  extent  that  proportional 
rates  might  accomplish  that  result; 
however,  the  local  rates  in  issue  to 
Sioux  City  are  unreasonable  and  un- 
justly discriminatory.  Certain  of  the 
carriers  admit  that  these  rates  are  too 
high  and  should  be  readjusted.  The 
respective  parties  should  promptly  sub- 
mit a  proposed  schedule  to  the  Com- 
mission for  its  consideration  and  ap- 
proval by  June  15,  1912.  Sioux  City 
Terminal  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.   Ry.   Co.,   23   I.   C.   C.   98,  107,   109. 

(b)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate 
on  bituminous  coal  from  the  Clearfield 
district  of  Pennsylvania  to  South  Am- 
boy,  N.  J.,  of  $1.55  per  gross  ton.  The 
Latrobe  district,  which  adjoins  the  Clear- 
field district  on  the  west,  was  given  the 
same  rate,  and  the  Greensburg  district, 
which  lies  immediately  west  of  the 
Latrobe  district,  took  a  rate  10c  higher 
,than  the  Clearfield  district.  From  the 
tonnage  center  of  the  Clearfield  district 
to  South  Amboy  is  345  miles;  from  the 
Greensburg  district  395  miles.  The  La- 
trobe district  is  from  339  to  374  miles  from 
South  Amboy.  The  complainant  (Associa- 
tion of  Clearfield  Operators)  demanded 
that  the  territory  designated  as  the  "La- 
trobe subdistrict"  be  incorporated  in  the 
Greensburg  rate  zone,  and  that  the 
Clearfield  district  be  given  a  rate  per 
ton  mile  to  South  Amboy  not  higher 
than  that  now  extended  from  the 
Greensburg  district.  This  would  result 
in  a  reduction  in  the  Clearfield  rate, 
complainant  contended,  of  lie  per  ton. 
No  evidence  was  given  as  to  the  rea- 
sonableness per  se  of  any  rates  except- 
ing by  way  of  comparison,  the  defend- 
ant contending  that  a  reduction  would 
not  benefit  Clearfield,  while  the  com- 
plainant alleged  that  it  could  not  oper- 
ate at  a  profit  under  the  present  rates 
because  of  the  low  cost  of  production 
of  coal  in   Maryland  and  West  Virginia 


DISCRIMINATION,   §14    (c)— §15    (b) 


273 


fields,  with  which  it  competed,  and  that 
Its  freight  rate  must  be  such  that  it 
could  sell  its  coal  in  the  available  mar- 
kets in  competition  with  other  coals 
reaching  such  markets.  It  appeared  that 
competition  with  Latrobe  and  Greens- 
burg  is  almost  negligible,  owing  to  the 
great  dissimilarity  between  these  coals 
and  that  of  Clearfield,  and  the  small 
output  from  those  districts.  It  appeared 
that  if  the  rates  to  tidewater  from  the 
Clearfield  district  were  reduced  carriers 
serving  southern  districts  would  reduce 
their  rates  to  the  same  destinations, 
and  that  the  result  of  this  adjustment 
would  be  that  the  Clearfield  operators 
would  not  be  benefited,  but  th^t  the 
Latrobe  and  Greensburg  operators  would 
be  driven  from  the  eastern  markets  by 
competition  from  the  South.  HELD,  it 
is  not  the  function  of  the  Commission 
nor  that  of  the  carrier  to  equalize 
economic  conditions.  It  fairly  appears 
that  the  profits  made  by  the  Clearfield 
operators  upon  tidewater  coal  are  flight, 
and  if  rate-  should  be  made  so  as  to  sustain 
an  industry  which,  because  of  intense 
competition  within  itself,  or  becajse  of 
local  disadvantages,  yields  but  slight 
profit,  the  present  rate  should  bo  re- 
duced, but  the  law  does  not  permit  the 
Commission  to  fix  a  reasonable  rate 
solely  upon  this  ground.  The  Commis- 
sion would  not  hesitate  to  reduce  Uiese 
rates  because  of  the  threat  of  a  reduc- 
tion from  competing  fields  by  other  car- 
riers if  unreasonableness  were  estab- 
lished and  if  the  case  had  been  pre- 
sented upon  the  ground  of  a  discrimina- 
tion between  competing  fields  upon  the 
line  of  the  carrier  defendant.  But  no 
showing  has  been  made  as  to  the  rea- 
sonableness of  the  rates  themselves, 
and  the  Commission  cannot  take  from 
the  defendant  lie  a  ton  and  give  it  to 
the  operators  as  a  profit  upon  their 
coal  without  a  showing  that  the  railroad 
whose  rates  they  attack  is  responsible 
either  for  the  adjustment  which  exists 
between  the  Clearfield  rates  and  the 
rates  from  competing  localities  in  West 
Virginia,  or  that  it  is  imposing  an  un- 
reasonable charge  for  the  Clearfield 
service,  •  Complaint  dismissed.  Bitu- 
minous Coal  Operators  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
23  L  C.   C.  385,  391,   392. 

(c)  Complainant  merchants  and 
manufacturers  of  Des  Moines,  la.,  at- 
tacked the  rates  from  Des  Moines  to 
points  to  the  south  &nd  west  lying  in 
territory   on   the    east    and    west   of   the 


Missouri  River  as  unreasonable  and  dis- 
criminatory, as  compared  with  the  rates 
accorded  to  St.  Paul  and  St,  Louis  and 
cities  lying  intermediate  on  the  Missis- 
sippi River,  and  as  compared  with  rates 
from  St.  Joseph  and  Kansas  City,  taken 
as  typical  competing  points.  The  sta- 
tistics submitted  by  complainants  were 
not  set  out  in  full  in  the  opinion.  Com- 
plainants took  the  tariffs  of  most  of 
the  carriers  whose  lines  run  east 
and  west  and  north  and  south  through 
the  territory  between  St.  Paul  and 
Chicago  on  the  north  and  St.  Louis 
and  St.  Joseph  on  the  south.  Regard- 
less of  any  direct  connection  of  the 
lines  with  Des  Moines,  they  selected 
rates  and  distances  between  certain 
points,  and  made  comparisons  with  the 
rates  attacked.  In  making  their  com- 
parisons they  assumed  that  the  trans- 
portation was  made  under  substantially 
similar  circumstances  and  conditions, 
and  ignored  the  existence  of  competi- 
tion of  rail  and  water  carriers  and  of 
water  transportation.  They  demanded 
that  the  rates  from  Des  Moines  to  the 
Missouri  River,  used  in  making  up  the 
rates  to  the  destinations  in  question,  be 
about  60  per  cent  of  the  rates  from 
the  Mississippi  to  the  Missouri  River. 
HELD,  the  evidence  submitted  was  in- 
definite and  not  sufficient  to  warrant 
the  Commission  in  ordering  a  reduc- 
tion. The  complainant  must  prove  by 
competent  evidence  that  the  rates  at- 
tacked are  unjust,  unreasonable  or  dis- 
criminatory, or  present  to  the  Commis- 
sion facts  sufficiently  clear  and  strong 
to  justify  the  Commission  in  making  an 
investigation  of  its  own  motion  in  the 
public  interest.  Greater  Des  Moines 
Committee  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C. 
C.   98,   104. 

§15.     Showing    of    Damage. 

(a)  Where  the  payment  of  rebates 
to  a  competing  shipper  in  another  terri- 
tory does  in  fact  do  plaintiff  no  harm, 
he  cannot  recover  damages  based  on 
such  payments  in  a  suit  for  unjust  dis- 
crimination against  the  carrier.  Mit- 
chell Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,    181   Fed.   403,   411. 

(b)  Discrimination  can  only  injure 
a  complaining  shipper  if  his  rival  has 
been  given  an  unfair  advantage  in  the 
same  market,  although  different  points 
of  destination  may  belong  to  the  same 
market.  Mitchell  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v. 
Penn.  R.  R.   Co.,   181  Fed.  403,  411,  412. 


274 


DISCRIMINATION.  §15   (c)— §16   (c) 


(c)  Where  a  shipper  has  himself 
enjoyed  an  unlawful  rate,  he  cannot  re- 
cover for  unjust  discrimination  against 
a  carrier  for  giving  a  competitor  on  like 
shipments  a  lower  rate.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  International  Coal  Mining  Co., 
173  Fed.  1,  9. 

(cc)  Damages  may  be  awarded  for  the 
difference  between  the  rate  paid  by  com- 
plainant and  the  lower  rate  charged  a 
favored  shipper.  Meeker  &  Co.  v.  L.  V. 
R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  480,  481. 

(d)  Complainant  asked  reparation  on 
a  rate  of  lie  per  100  lbs.  for  coarse 
salt  in  bulk  in  carloads  from  Retsof, 
N.  Y.,  to  Detroit,  Mich.,  to  the  extent 
that  it  exceeded  the  present  rate  of 
7.8c  per  100  lbs.  Complainant  rested 
its  case  on  the  decision  of  the  Commis- 
sion in  Delray  Salt  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  259,  where  the  Commission 
held  that  the  rate  on  coarse  salt  in 
bulk  from  this  district  to  Chicago  should 
be  scaled  to  Detroit  on  the  78  per  cent 
basis,  which  defendants  did,  establish- 
ing the  present  rate.  In  the  Delray 
case  the  complainant  there  complained 
of  the  10c  rate  to  Chicago  granted  to 
this  complainant,  which  kept  it  from 
competition  in  markets  beyond  Chicago. 
Complainant  in  this  case  only  competed 
in  Detroit  with  salt  moving  from  Cuy- 
lerville,  N.  Y.,  which  takes  the  same 
rate  as  complainant's  salt  from  Retsof, 
N.  Y.  HELD,  that  complainant  was 
not  injured  under  the  circumstances 
by  the  Detroit  rate,  as  its  competitors 
were  paying  the  same.  No  opinion 
expressed  as  to  the  reasonableness  of  the 
rate  to  Detroit  per  se.  Complaint  dis- 
missed. International  Salt  Co.  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  539. 

(e)  Complainant,  manufacturer  of 
threshing  machines  and  engines,  was  lo- 
cated at  Hopkins,  Minn.,  a  point  three 
miles  south  of  the  city  limits  of  Minne- 
apolis and  about  eight  or  nine  miles  from 
the  Minneapolis  yards  of  the  defendant 
carriers.  For  some  five  years  defendants 
extended  to  complainant  the  Minne- 
apolis rate  on  shipments  from  Hop- 
kins, thereby  absorbing  the  switching 
charge  from  Hopkins  to  Minneapolis. 
Defendants  canceled  this  arrangement 
with  respect  to  shipments  on  their 
lines  to  non-competitive  points.  Com- 
plainant asked  that  defendants  be  com- 
pelled to  restore  the  arrangement  for- 
merly in  effect.  Other  competitors  of 
complainant     located     in     Minneapolis 


were  assessed  switching  charges  of 
from  $1.50  to  $3,  according  to  the  dis- 
tance of  their  plants  from  the  yards 
of  defendants.  The  switching  ehar'.?e 
of  $5  assessed  against  complainant  cov- 
ered a  haul  of  two  cars  to  and  from 
Hopkins  and  appeared  to  be  a  reason- 
able charge,  judged  by  switching 
charges  generally.  HELD,  complainant's 
demand  should  be  denied,  since  to  grant 
the  same  would  result  in  discrimina- 
tion against  complainants'  said  competi- 
tors. Minneapolis  Threshing  Machine 
Co.  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co..  17 
I.  C.  C.   189,  190. 

(f)  In  cases  of  damages  for  decay  and 
other  loss  resulting  from  discrimination, 
for  delaying  fruit  in  transit,  the  Com- 
mission may  ascertain  whether  the  dis- 
crimination alleged  actually  occurred. 
Joynes  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
361,  367. 

5I6.     Actions   in   State   Courts. 

See  Supra,  §1  (q);  Cars  and  Car 
Supply,  §16  (a);  Courts,  §1  (h),  V, 
§11    (a),    (m),    (aa),    (bb). 

(a)  Where  the  plaintiff,  in  a  suit  for 
excessive  charges  resulting  in  unjust  dis- 
crimination, does  not  rely  upon  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Act,  but  bases  his 
claim  on  common  law  principles,  an  ac- 
tion for  such  recovery  may  be  brought  in 
a  state  court,  although  the  shipments  in- 
volved were  made  across  state  lines. 
M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  The  New  Era 
Milling  Co.,  79  Kan.  435,  448,  100  P.  273. 

(b)  In  an  action  in  a  state  court  for 
unjust  discrimination,  a  complaint  alleg- 
ing that  the  carrier  under  like  circum- 
stances and  conditions  hauled  freight  for 
certain  other  persons  at  its  scheduled 
rate  and  falsely  and  fraudulently  repre- 
sented the  contrary  to  plaintiff  does  not 
state  a  cause  of  action  either  at  common 
law  or  under  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act,  for  in  both  cases  it  must  be  shown 
t^hat  the  unjust  discrimination  injured  the 
shipper  in  his  trade  or  business.  Lilly 
Co.  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Wash.,  1911),  117 
P.  401,  403. 

(c)  In  an  action  in  a  state  court  for 
unjust  discrimination,  the  complaint  does 
not  state  a  cause  of  action  where  it 
neither  alleges  that  the  carrier  has  not 
'complied  with  the  requirements  of  the 
fnterstate  Commerce  Act  with  reference 
to  filing  of  rates  nor  alleges  that  by  the 
rate  charged  it  exceeded  the  rate  shown 
In  the  schedule.  Lilly  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.  (Wash.,  1911),  117  P.  401.  402. 


DISCRIMINATION,  §16    (d)— DIVISIONS,   §1    (rt) 


275 


(d)  The  common  law  gives  a  shipper 
a  right  of  action  against  a  common  car- 
rier for  a  discrimination  in  freight  rates 
between  the  shipper  and  another  simi- 
larly situated,  whenever  the  effect  of  th-c 
discrimination  is  to  injure  the  shipper  in 
his  trade  or  business.  Lilly  Co.  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.  (Wash.,  1911),  117  P.  401,  402. 

§17.     Reparation. 

See  Reparation.  §2  (f),  (m),  (n), 
(00),  (w),  (bb),  §12  (a),  §14  (b), 
§16   (eee),  §18    (c).    (d). 

DISTANCE  TARIFF. 

See    Tariffs,    §7    (bbbb),    §14    (k). 

DIVISIONS. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
II.     PUBLICATION   AND   TARIFFS. 

§2.     Obligation  to  file. 
in.     AGREEMENTS  FOR  DIVISIONS. 
§3.     Computation. 
§4.     Inability  to  agree. 
§5.     Reductions. 
§6.     Right  to  divisions. 
§7.     As    evidence. 
IV.     LEGALITY. 
V.     REASONABLENESS. 

CROSS-REFERENCES. 
See  Advanced   Rates,  §18   (10):  Allow- 
ances, §12  (2)    (cc) ;  Through  Routes 
and  Joint   Rates.  §14. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

See  Allowances,  §14  (i);  Special 
Contract,  §4  (1)   (m);  Tap  Lines,  §2. 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload  of 
syrup  from  St.  Paul,  Minn.,  to  Reno, 
Nev.,  and  alleged  that  the  division  re- 
ceived by  the  defendant  of  the  joint  rate 
was  unjust  and  unreasonable.  Other 
carriers  than  defendant  participated  in 
the  movement,  and  were  not  made  par- 
ties defendant.  HELD,  the  division  of 
a  joint  rate  is  a  matter  for  agreement 
among  the  participating  carriers,  and  is 
not  subject  to  review  by  the  Commission 
upon  complaint  of  the  shipper.  It  may, 
under  the  discretion  of  the  Commission. 
be  considered  as  evidence  bearing  upon 
the  reasonableness  of  the  rate.  If  the 
joint  rate  is  attacked,  there  is  a  non- 
joinder of  the  proper  parties  defendant. 
If  the  division  itself  is  attacked,  the  issue 
raised  is  not  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Commission.  Complaint  dismissed. 
Reno  Grocery  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  23  1.  C.  C. 
400. 


(aa)  It  is  not  clear  that  the  Commis- 
sion has  jurisdiction  to  deal  with  divi- 
sions under  a  rate  not  fixed  by  the 
Commission,  but  that  question  is  not 
decided.  In  Re  Wharfage  Charges  at 
Galveston,  23  I.  C.  C.  535,  546. 

(b)  It  has  often  been  said  by  the 
Commission  that  the  law  has  no  con- 
cern with  division  of  rates  which  carriers 
make  by  agreement  with  each  other,  but 
this  principle  has  very  decided  limita- 
tions. If  a  railroad  is  a  shipper,  or  is 
owned  by  a  shipper,  or  is  so  linked  up 
with  a  shipper  that  a  division  of  a  rate 
means  a  rebate  or  a  discrimination  in 
favor  of  or  an  advantage  to  shipper,  the 
Commission  may  properly  look  into  the 
nature  of  the  service  which  the  carrier 
gives  and  the  division  which  it  receives. 
In  Re  Divisions  of  Joint  Rates  on  Coal, 
22  L  C.  C.  51,  53. 

(c)  The  practice  of  carriers  allow- 
ng  to  shippers  furnishing  them  with  com- 
pany material  their  unpublished  and  un- 
filed divisions  of  joint  rates  beyond  a 
given  junction  point  is  condemned. 
Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
21   L   C.   C.   276,   278. 

(d)  With  respect  to  the  transporta- 
tion of  persons  and  property  by  ra'l,  the 
Act  has  not  undertaken  to  specify  in 
terms  what  shall  for  the  purpose  of  that 
statute  be  considered  to  be  a  common 
carrier,  but  has  proceeded  upon  the 
foundation  of  the  common  law  as  to  pub- 
lic callings.  It  is  not  therefore  within 
the  authority  of  the  Commission  to  pro- 
nounce any  carrier  by  rail  not  to  be  in 
fact  or  in  law  a  common  carrier,  if  by  the 
tests  and  principles  of  the  common  law, 
coupled  with  such  requirements  as  may 
have  been  imposed  by  constitutional  or 
legislative  authority,  it  would  be  held  to 
be  such.  The  right  of  such  a  carrier  to 
participate  in  through  routes  and  joint 
rates  and  share  in  the  earnings  of  such 
rates  with  others  is  a  wholly  different 
question,  and  one  clearly  within  the  pur- 
view of  the  statute  and  under  the  juris- 
diction and  control  of  the  Commission  as 
expressly  provided  in  the  Act.  The  pur- 
pose of  the  Act  in  this  respect  must  be 
fulfilled  by  action  appropriate  to  the  end 

n  view  and  at  the  same  time  effective  to 
prevent  unjust  discrimination  in  any 
form,  enforcing  reasonable  requirements 
and  limitations  in  respect  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  through  routes  and  joint 
rates  and  the  sharing  of  the  earnings 
thereunder  consistently  with  all  other 
provisions   of  the   statute   in   such  man- 


276 


DIVISIONS,   §1    (e)— §3    (e) 


ner  as  will  result  in  substantial  justice 
to  all  the  parties  in  interest  and  the 
observance  of  the  standards  of  the  law 
in  the  public  interest.  Mfrs.'  Ry.  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
304,  312,  313. 

(e)  The  Commission  will  determine 
amount  of  divisions  in  case  of  failure  of 
defendants  to  agree  among  themselves. 
Germain  Co.  v.  N.  O.  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  22,  25. 

(f)  If  defendants  are  unable  to  agree 
upon  the  manner  of  constructing  the 
rates  herein  ordered,  or  upon  the  divi- 
sions of  such  rates,  the  Commission  will 
enter  such  supplementary  order  as  may 
be  necessary.  Farmers'  Co-operative 
and  Educational  Union  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  406,  412. 

(g)  The  fact  that  the  Rock  Island 
system  reaches  other  primary  grain 
markets  may  fairly  be  said  to  give  it  cer- 
tain equities  in  the  adjustment  of  the 
divisions  of  any  through  rates  that  it 
may  establish  under  an  order  of  the  Com- 
mission. Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Mil- 
waukee V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.   460,  467. 

II.     PUBLICATION  AND  TARIFFS. 
§2.     Obligation  to  File. 

(a)  Where  a  division  of  a  rate  is  to 
be  imposed  upon  an  incoming  transit 
shipment,  and  the  balance  of  the  rate  is 
to  be  imposed  upon  a  different  outgoing 
weight,  the  divisions  should  be  plainly 
published  in  the  tariff  containing  such 
transit  application.  Beeknmn  Lumber  Co. 
V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  270,  279. 

(b)  Divisions  of  a  joint  rate  are  sub- 
ject of  agreement  between  the  parties 
thereto,  but  each  is  bound  by  law  to  col- 
lect and  retain  neither  more  nor  less  nor 
different  compensation  than  its  estab- 
lished divisions.  In  Re  Restricted  Rates, 
20  L  C.  C.  426,  429. 

(c)  Divisions  of  joint  rates  are  ordi- 
narily not  published  and  are  subject  to 
change  by  the  mutual  agreement  of  car- 
riers. In  Re  Restricted  Rates,  20  I.  C.  C. 
426,  429. 

(d)  The  Commission  can  always  re- 
quire the  tiling  of  divisions,  and  a  joint 
rate  under  agreed  divisions  definitely 
fixes  the  lawful  earnings  of  parties  to 
that  rate.  In  Re  Restricted  Rates,  20 
I.  C.  C.  426,  432. 


III.     AGREEMENTS     FOR     DIVISIONS. 

§3.     Computation. 

See  Passenger  Fares  and  Facilities, 
§14  (h);  Reparation,  §19  (f),  (h); 
Routing    and    Misrouting,   §10   (n). 

(a)  In  the  adjustment  of  interline 
accounts  between  carriers  an  expen- 
sive bridge  is  ordinarily  considered  as 
constructive  mileage,  and  the  division 
of  joint  rates  made  upon  that  basis. 
Norman  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
22   I.   C.   C.   239,   247. 

(b)  Upon  a  dispute  between  carriers 
as  to  the  proper  divisions  of  joint 
through  rates.  HELD,  a  mileage  pro  rata 
basis  of  divisions  would  divide  the 
earnings  according  to  the  service  actu- 
ally performed  by  each  carrier.  This 
method  inferentially  approved,  rather 
than  an  arbitrary  basis  of  division 
which  would  ignore  differences  in  the 
length  of  the  haul.  Stacy  &  Sons  v. 
O.   S.  L.   R.   R.   Co..   20  I.  C.   C.   136,  139. 

(c)  In  fixing  a  division  between  car- 
riers of  joint  rates  ordered  to  be  estab- 
lished, section  15  of  the  Act  implies 
that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Commission 
to  take  into  consideration  all  the  cir- 
cumstances and  equities  fairly  affecting 
their  several  interests,  and  precludes 
the  idea  that  the  divisions  must  be  ad- 
justed on  a  mileage  or  any  other  fixed 
basis.  Star  Grain  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  A. 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  364. 

(d)  Where  a  carrier  not  only  fur- 
nishes local  markets  reached  by  no 
other  road,  but  also  serves  a  produc- 
ing territory  ample  to  supply  the  needs 
of  those  markets,  no  division  can  in 
justice  be  made  that  does  not  fully 
protect  its  revenues  so  far  as  that  can 
be  done  reasonably  and  without  alto- 
gether overlooking  the  earnings  of  its 
connections,  or  withdrawing  from  pro- 
ducing shippers  or  consumers  their 
right  to  the  transportation  service  at 
reasonable  rates.  Star  Grain  &  Lumber 
Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.    364. 

(e)  Complainant,  a  short  line  rail- 
road, carried  traffic  between  La  Salle, 
111.,  and  La  Salle  Junction,  111.,  &V2 
miles,  making  connections  at  the  lat- 
ter point  with  defendant.  Nov.  1,  1906, 
defendant  informed  complainant  that 
it  would  not  pay  complainant  the  al- 
lowances previously  in  effect,  except  on 
traffic  on  which  complainant  named 
through  rates  to  or  from  La  Salle.     No 


DIVISIONS,  §4  (a)— IV  (b) 


277 


provision  for  allowances  to  complainant 
was  made  in  defendant's  tariffs.  Com- 
plainant asked  an  order  compelling  de- 
fendant to  pay  it  for  traffic  hauled  be- 
tween such  points  upon  which  no  joint 
through  rates  were  established,  and 
asked  that  allowances  be  made  to  it  on 
the  basis  of  the  agreed  compensation 
in  effect  prior  to  Nov.  1,  1906.  HELD, 
the  power  of  the  Commission  to  award 
reparation  does  not  extend  to  the  divi- 
sion of  rates  between  connecting  car- 
riers. Claims  ex  contractu  are  not  rec- 
ognized by  the  Commission;  it  cannot 
order  the  payment  of  money  for  serv- 
ices performed,  nor  for  a  debt  due  one 
carrier  from  another  on  account  of 
joint  rates  for  a  joint  service.  Repara- 
tion denied.  La  Salle  and  Bureau  County 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  13 
I.    C.   C.   610,   612. 

§4.     Inability    to    Agree. 

See  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §2  (ii); 
Routing  and  Misrouting,  §4  (dd) ; 
Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 
§5,    §15    (ff). 

(a)  Shippers  may  not  be  compelled 
to  wait  indefinitely  for  reasonable  rates 
which  are  withheld  because  of  the  in- 
ability of  carriers  to  agree  as  to  how 
they  will  divide  the  earnings.  Milburn 
Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
I.   C.   C.   93,   100. 

(aa)  A  carrier  is  not  entitled  to 
withhold  reasonable  rates  from  a  city 
on  the  ground  that  it  is  unable  to  agree 
upon  divisions  with  connecting  carriers. 
Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  93,  100. 

(b)  Before  shipping  print  paper  from 
Sartells,  Minn.,  to  Los  Angeles,  Oakland 
and  San  Francisco,  Cal.,  complainant 
was  assured  by  defendant's  agent  that 
the  rate  of  75c  applying  from  points 
surroundirg  Sartells  applied  to  Sartells. 
The  legal  rate  was,  in  fact,  80c.  Subse- 
quent to  the  shipment  the  75c  rate  was 
put  into  effect  from  Sartells,  and  de- 
fendants did  not  at  the  hearing  ques- 
tion its  reasonableness.  HELD,  com- 
plainant should  not  suffer  because  of 
delay  on  the  part  of  defendants  in 
agreeing  on  proper  divisions,  and  in 
publishing  the  lower  rate.  The  rate  at- 
tacked was  found  to  be  unreasonable. 
Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis  of  75c. 
Williamette  Pulp  &  Paper  Co.  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.   Co.,   18  I.   C.  C.  388,  388. 

(c)  The  fact  that  carriers,  by  whom 
a  rate  has  been   lawfully  published  and 


advertised  to  the  shipping  world  as  the 
cost  between  two  given  points  over  all 
reasonably  available  routes,  have  neg- 
lected or  failed  to  agree  upon  divi- 
sions of  the  rate  over  one  of  the  routes, 
cannot  be  accepted  by  the  Commission 
as  equivalent  to  a  nullification  of  the 
published  through  rate  over  that  route. 
Divisions  are  matters  of  private  agree- 
ment, and  for  that  reason,  generally 
speaking,  are  of  no  special  concern  to 
shippers,  nor  are  they  essential  to  legal- 
ize a  published  through  rate.  Germain 
Co.  V.  N.  O.  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I. 
C.    C.    22,    24. 

§5.     Reductions. 

(a)  No  reason  to  say  that  joint  race 
to  Buffalo,  long  effective  and  practically 
admitted  to  be  reasonable,  should  now 
be  increased  because  of  loss  of  revenue 
to  one  of  the  carriers  not  on  traffic  to 
that  point,  but  by  reason  of  interline 
division  of  a  joint  rate  when  used  as  a 
factor  in  constructing  a  combination  to 
New  York.  In  Re  Advance  in  Class 
Rates,  22  I.  C.  C.  338,  340. 

§6.     Right  to   Divisions. 

See  Common  Carrier,  §3  (f ) ;  Tap 
Lines,   §9. 

§7.     As  Evidence. 

See  Evidence,  §13  (2),  §13  (3);  Long 
and  Short  Haul,  §12  (2)  (a); 
Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 
§4    (k),    §13    (c). 

IV.     LEGALITY. 

See  Allowances,  §10  (b) ;  Tap  Lines, 
§7. 

(a)  Allowances  and  divisions  to  tap 
lines  recognized  by  the  Commission  as 
common  carriers  must  have  a  proper  re- 
lation to  the  service  performed  and  be 
such  in  amount  as  not  to  effect  a  rebate 
to  the  industry.  The  Tap-line  Case,  23 
L  C.  C.  277,  295. 

(b)  A  boat  line  incorporated  as  a  com- 
mon carrier  obtained  its  facilities  from 
a  salt  company  by  which  it  is  owned  and 
in  whose  interest  it  is  operated; 
it  published  no  rates  except  upon  sail 
in  cargo  lots;  rates  were  manipulated 
for  the  benefit  of  the  salt  company,  and 
it  used  as  terminal  facilities  the  docks 
and  warehouses  of  the  salt  company  by 
whose  agents  and  employes  all  shipments 
must  be  handled.  HELD,  that  the  boat 
line  was  a  mere  device  to  defraud  the 
law,  and  payments  made  to  it  by  con- 
necting rail  carriers  in  the  guise  of  divi- 


278 


DIVISIONS,  IV  (c)— V  (b) 


sions  are  rebates.     Colonial  Salt  Co.  v. 
M.  I.  &  I.  Line,  23  I.  C.  C.  358. 

(c)  Whenever  an  abnormal  division 
is  allowed  to  a  railroad  which  is  tied 
up  with  an  industry,  there  results  an 
indirect  and  hidden  rebate  to  a  shipper 
because  of  his  ownership  of  the  rail- 
road. In  Re  Divisions  of  Joint  Rates 
on  Coal,  22  I.   C.  C.   51,  55. 

(d)  On  complaint  of  coal  dealers  at 
Durham,  N.  C,  that  one  Mason  was  sell- 
ing coal  at  $5  per  ton,  while  the  others 
were  compelled  to  sell  it  at  $G  to  make  a 
profit,  the  Commission  instituted  this 
investigation  sua  sponte.  Mason's  coal 
was  delivered  at  East  Durham,  one  mile 
east  of  Durham,  on  the  D.  &  S.  C.  R.  R. 
This  road  was  owned  by  a  lumber  com- 
pany which  owned  the  stock  in  another 
lumber  company  having  yards  at  East 
Durham.  Mason  had  his  yard  on  the 
premises  of  this  lumber  company.  The 
coal  was  hauled  from  the  mines,  221 
miles,  over  the  C.  &  O.  R.  R.,  for  81c, 
116  miles  over  the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  for  77c, 
one  mile  over  the  D.  &  S.  C.  R.  R.  for 
62c.  The  rate  was  the  same  to  Durham 
as  to  East  Durham.  No  evidence  was 
found  of  a  departure  from  published 
rates  or  of  refund  to  Mason.  Mason  ad- 
mitted that  he  had  gone  into  the  coal 
business  at  the  solicitation  of  the  D.  & 
S.  C.  R.  R.  He  paid  the  same  price  for 
coal,  the  same  freight,  and  50c  per  ton 
for  team  delivery  in  Durham,  making 
a  profit  of  about  50c  per  ton.  His  office 
force  and  other  help  was  much  less.  No 
identity  of  interest  was  found  between 
Mason  and  the  D.  &  S.  C.  R.  R.  or  the 
lumber  company.  The  tonnage  of  the  D. 
&  S.  C.  R.  R.  was  largely  increased  by 
the  enterprise  of  Mason  at  East  Durham. 
The  D.  &  S.  C.  R.  R.  owned  no  track  in 
Durham.  It  used  the  track  of  the  S.  A. 
L.  Ry.  to  East  Durham  and  the  D.  &  S. 
R.  R.'s  line  from  East  Durham,  li/^  miles, 
to  its  own  line,  running  from  thence 
through  a  forest  and  terminating  at  Bon- 
sal  on  the  S.  A.  L.  Ry.  The  D.  &  S. 
R.  R.  also  used  the  S.  A.  D.  Ry.  from 
Durham  to  East  Durham.  The  D.  &  S.  C. 
R.  R.  connects  with  the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  at 
Durham.  HELD,  the  matter  does  not 
smack  of  good  faith.  The  D.  &  S.  C.  R. 
R.,  being  owned  by  a  corporation  which 
owns  the  main  industry  on  that  line, 
makes  this  division  of  rate  in  effect  a 
rebate.  An  order  will  issue  against  the 
N.  &  W.  Ry.  to  show  cause  why  its  rates 
on  coal  into  Durham  should  not  be  re- 


duced.    In  Re  Divisions  of  Joint  Rates 
on  Coal,  22  I.  C.  C.  51,  57. 

(e)  What  the  public  is  primarily  in- 
terested in  is  the  charge  for  the  trans- 
portation service  rendered,  irrespective 
of  the  divisions  of  the  rate,  and  if  the 
rate  itself  is  reasonable  and  just,  the  fact 
that  it  is  unequally  divided  between  the 
participating  lines  is  not  a  basis  for  re- 
duction. There  may  be  many  reasons 
why  a  particular  carrier  would  be  willing 
to  accept  a  very  small  proportion  of  a 
joint  rate  in  order  to  secure  business, 
and  it  is  within  its  rights  in  bargaining 
with  its  connections  for  tonnage  so  long 
as  it  does  not  undertake  to  haul  one  class 
of  freight  at  rates  so  low  as  to  thereby 
burden  other  traffic.  Florida  Mercantile 
Agency  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
85,  87. 

V.     REASONABLENESS. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §18  (10). 

(a)  What  is  a  fair  division  between 
carriers  is  to  be  determined  in  each 
case  upon  the  merits  of  that  particular 
case.  In  Re  Investigation  of  Alleged 
Unreasonable  Rates  on  Meats,  23  I.  C. 
C.  656,  662. 

(b)  The  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  connects 
at  Fort  Worth,  Tex.,  with  the  Cotton 
Belt  Line,  which  latter  road  extends  to 
yellow  pine  mills  in  southern  Arkansas, 
northern  Louisiana  and  eastern  Texas. 
The  average  haul  on  the  Cotton  Belt 
Line  from  the  mills  to  Fort  Worth  is 
310  miles.  Lumber  received  from  the 
Cotton  Belt  Line  by  the  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  was  carried  to  points  in  Oklahoma, 
Missouri,  Kansas  and  Colorado,  varying 
in  distance  from  87  to  772  miles.  The 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  at  great  expense  had 
extended  its  line  into  eastern  Texas 
and  western  Louisiara  for  the  purpose 
of  reaching  yellow  pine  forests  in  that 
section,  and  this  extension  tapped  terri- 
tory close  to  the  district  reached  by 
the  Cotton  Belt  Line.  Lumber  received 
by  the  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  i^rom  the  Cot- 
ton Belt  Line  at  Fort  Worth  was  carried 
by  the  former  to  points  not  reached  b.V' 
the  latter  road.  The  joint  rates  in- 
volved varied  from  23c  to  34c  per  100 
lbs.  on  hauls  to  certral  Missouri  points 
and  to  Denver,  Pueblo  and  Trinidad,  ■ 
Colo.  An  allowance  of  10c  per  100  lbs. 
to  the  Cotton  Belt  Line  of  the  joint 
rate  would  enable  it  to  earn  6.6  mills 
per  ton  mile,  which  exce3ded  its  revenue 
on     lumber    from    various    other    hauls. 


DOMESTIC  RATES— ELECTRIC  LINES,  I   (a) 


279 


HELD,  on  account  of  the  extension  of 
its  line,  the  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  had 
strong  natural  equities  in  its  favor,  and 
a  rate  of  10c  to  the  Cotton  Belt  Line 
represented  the  latter's  fair  proportion 
of  the  joint  rate.  Star  Grain  &  Lumber 
Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
364,  370,  371. 

DOMESTIC  RATES. 

See    Import   Traffic,    II    (a),    (c),    (e), 

(g). 
DRAYAGE  CHARGES. 


»e     Cartage;     Demurrage,     §1 
Reparation,    §19    (c). 


(e); 


(a)  Initial  carrier  misrouted  the  ship- 
ment and  in  order  to  obtain  possession 
of  the  same,  consignee  had  to  pay  dray- 
age  for  carrying  the  shipment  to  its  plant. 
HELD,  that  recognizing  the  injustice  and 
inevitable  hardship  to  innocent  shippers, 
if  in  proper  cases  they  may  not  recover 
for  actual  damages  sustained,  as  well  as 
the  opportunity  for  discrimination  in  the 
adjustment  of  damage  claims  of  this  na- 
ture, the  Commission  upon  further  con- 
sideration has  reached  the  conclusion 
that  the  ends  of  justice  require  modifica- 
tion of  its  prior  rulings  in  respect  of 
claims  of  this  character,  to  the  extent 
that  where,  as  in  this  case,  by  default 
or  misconduct  of  a  carrier  in  failing  or 
refusing  to  take  appropriate  routing  steps 
to  secure  a  specific  delivery,  lawful  under 
the  established  tariffs  and  specified  by 
the  shipper  in  writing  at  the  proper  time, 
and  without  collusion  or  connivance  on 
the  part  of  the  shipper,  the  consignee  is 
put  under  the  necessity  of  transferring 
his  freight  at  the  point  of  destination  in 
completion  of  the  delivery  to  which  he  is 
lawfully  entitled  under  the  tariffs  and 
routing  instructions,  the  shipper  or  con- 
signee is  entitled  to  recover  of  the  car- 
rier in  fault  damages  in  the  sum  of  actual 
cost  to  him  of  such  transfer,  but  not  in 
excess  of  reasonable  rates  of  charge 
therefor.  Under  the  provisions  of  sec- 
tion 15  of  the  amended  Act,  the  Commis- 
sion is  directed  to  limit  and  prescribe 
the  amount  that  a  carrier  may  pay  a 
shipper  for  the  performance  by  him  of  a 
part  of  the  carrier's  duty  of  service  in 
connect'on  with  the  transportation  of 
his  freight.  As  above  indicated,  the  Com- 
mission does  not  sanction  the  adjustment 
of  claims  of  the  kind  here  under  con- 
sideration without  reference  of  the  same 
to  it.  Carriers  admitting  the  justice  of 
claims  of  this  sort  may  hereafter  make 


application  to  the  Commission  for  au- 
thority to  pay  the  same,  each  applica- 
tion to  admit  responsibility  for  the  mis- 
routing  and  be  supported  by  affidavit  of 
the  agent  of  the  carrier  cognizant  of  the^ 
facts  relied  upon  to  justify  the  payment,' 
as  well  as  of  a  responsible  accounting 
officer  of  the  carrier.  Shippers  may 
present  such  claims  in  the  usual  manner 
of  presenting  formal  complaints.  All 
claims  of  this  kind  now  pending  before, 
or  that  have  been  refused  by,  the  Com- 
mission will  be  considered,  or  reconsid- 
ered, in  accordance  with  this  modified 
ruling.  Sterling  &  Son  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R. 
R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  451,  454. 

(b)  A  consignee  taking  delivery  of  a 
shipment  at  freight  house  which  should 
have  been  delivered  at  the  warehouse 
is  not  entitled  to  a  refund  of  drayage 
charges.  Crosby  &  Meyers  v.  Goodrich 
Transit  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  175. 

(c)  The  Commission  has  no  right  to 
authorize  a  carrier  to  pay  consignees 
cost  of  drayage  on  shipments  accepted 
at  points  other  than  regular  delivery 
points  because  of  congestion.  Crosby  & 
Meyers  v.  Goodrich  Transit  Co.,  17  L  C. 
C.  175.  177. 

ELECTRIC  LINES. 

I.  CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 
II.  THROUGH    ROUTES    WITH 
STEAM  ROADS. 

III.  RIGHT  TO  FUEL  RATE. 

IV.  TRANSFERS  AND  RATES. 

I.     CONTROL  AND   REGULATION. 

CROSS-REFERENCES. 
See    Association,    I    (c);    Evidence,   §1 
(dd);    Tlirough     Routes    and    Joint 
Rates,  §1   (h),  (s). 

(a)  A  bridge  company,  an  Iowa  cor- 
poration, constructed  under  authority  of 
an  act  of  Congress  a  bridge  over  the 
Missouri  River  at  Omaha,  Neb.,  and 
Council  Bluffs,  la.,  and  owned  a  railway 
beginning  at  the  west  end  of  the  bridge 
in  Omaha  and  extending  across  same  to 
Council  Bluffs.  It  owned,  also,  the  stocks 
and  bonds  of  a  railway  line  in  Council 
Bluffs  and  leased  for  a  period  of  years 
a  street  railway  in  Omaha.  All  of  these 
Mnes  were  operated  as  one  system.  The 
street  railway  in  Omaha  was  created 
nnder  the  street  railway  act  of  Nebraska. 
It  did  not,  and  was  not  empowered  to, 
carry  freight,  and  had  no  right  of  emi- 
nent domain.  It  carried  mail  and  served 
two    cities    and    several    towns,    villages 


280 


ELECTRIC  LINES,  I   (aa)— II   (a) 


and  resorts.  HELD,  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  had  jurisdiction  over 
said  system  of  railways  to  determine 
the  reasonableness  of  fares  exacted  be- 
tween Omaha  and  Council  Bluffs.  (17  I. 
'C.  C.  239,  sustained.)  O.  &  C.  B.  St. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  191  Fed.  40,  43. 

(aa)  Complainant  assailed  as  unjust 
the  fare  charged  by  defendants  for  the 
transportation  of  passengers  between 
Somerset,  Md.,  and  points  in  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia.  Two  of  the  rail- 
ways operate  cars  only  in  the  District, 
while  the  third  operates  a  line  from  the 
state  to  the  District.  No  railway  station 
nor  interruption  of  tracks  existed  at 
the  District  line.  Passengers  were  carried 
from  the  District  to  points  in  Maryland 
and  vice  versa  over  lines  of  each  of 
the  railroads  operating  only  in  the  Dis- 
trict, without  change  of  cars  at  the  Dis- 
trict line,  and  the  cars  of  each  are  oper- 
ated over  lines  of  each  of  the  others. 
Though  operated  as  separate  and  dis- 
tinct corporations,  they  have  the  same 
general  officers  and  boards  of  directors 
composed  almost  entirely  of  the  same 
persons.  In  a  contract  between  two  of 
the  defendants  it  is  recited  that  they 
are  and  have  been  engaged  in  jointly 
operating  a  through  electric  railway 
service  between  points  in  Maryland  and 
points  in  the  District.  HELD,  that  elec- 
tric street  railways  are  common  car- 
riers by  railroad,  and  when  engaged 
In  the  interstate  transportation  of  pas- 
sengers or  property  are  amenable  to 
provisions  regulating  interstate  com- 
merce. Citizens  of  Somerset  v.  Wash- 
ington Ry.  &  Elec.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  187, 
189. 

(b)  Electric  railways  are  common 
carriers  by  railroad  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  Act,  and  when  engaged  in 
Interstate  commerce  are  subject  to  the 
Jurisdiction  of  the  Commission.  Citi- 
zens of  Somerset  v.  Washington  Ry. 
&  Elec.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  187,  189. 

(c)  An  electric  line  operating  be- 
tween Washington,  D.  C,  and  Virginia 
points  is  subject  to  Act.  Beall  v.  W. 
A.  &  M.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  406,  409. 

(d)  Street  railroads  when  engaged 
in  interstate  commerce  are  subject  to 
the  Act.  West  End  Improvement  Club 
V.  O.  &  C.  B.  Ry.  &  B.  Co.,  17  1.  C.  C. 
239. 

(e)  Defendant  street  railway  leased 
the  bridge  over  the  Missouri  River  con- 


necting Omaha  and  Council  Bluffs  and 
operated  its  cars  over  it  between  those 
cities.  Defendant  railway  operated  136 
single-track  miles  of  road;  the  rails 
were  not  all  laid  on  public  streets  and 
highways,  but  for  some  distance  ran 
over  a  private  right  of  way,  and  be- 
sides operating  over  the  bridge  oper- 
ated through  sparsely  settled  sections, 
over  expensive  culverts  not  conforming 
to  the  level  of  the  streets  or  roads,  and 
carried  the  United  States  mails  and 
served  the  needs  of  two  cities  and  sev- 
eral towns,  villages  and  resorts.  Under 
the  charter  of  defendant  bridge  com- 
pany, Congress  reserved  the  right  to 
regulate  by  appropriate  legislation  the 
charges  for  freight  and  passengers  over 
the  bridge.  HELD,  defendant  street 
railway  was  in  fact  an  interurban  rail- 
way and  the  rate  charged  by  it  for 
the  haul  between  Omaha  and  Council 
Bluffs  over  said  bridge  was  subject  to 
the  jurisdiction  and  regulation  of  the 
Commission.  West  End  Improvement 
Club   V.    O.    &    C.    B.   Ry.    &   B.    Co.,    17 

I.  C.  C.  239,  244-247;  order  of  Commission 
sustained.  Omaha  &  C.  B.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
L  C.  C,  191  Fed.  40,  reversing  179  Fed. 
243,  where  the  Commission's  order  was 
temporarily   enjoined. 

II.  THROUGH  ROUTES  WITH  STEAM 

ROADS. 

See  Switch  Tracks  and  Switching, 
§7  (f),  (g);  Through  Routes  and 
Joint  Rates,  §1   (h),  §11   (2)    (f),  (u). 

(a)  Complainant,  an  electric  inter- 
urban railroad,  extending  from  Norwood, 
a  suburb  of  Cincinnati,  to  Hillsboro, 
entirely  within  the  state  of  Ohio,  a  dis- 
tance of  53  miles,  prayed  for  an  order 
requiring  the  defendants  to  establish 
connections  and  joint  rates  for  the  in- 
terchange of  interstate  traffic.  Under 
the  local  law  it  could  not  have  com- 
pelled this  connection.  Subsequent  to 
the  hearing  the  petitioner  filed  with  the 
Commission  two  letters  addressed  to 
the  complainant  from  shippers  on  its 
line  giving  it  authority  to  use  their 
names  as  co-plaintiffs.  The  line  of 
complainant  parallels  the  lines  of  de- 
fendants at  several  points,  and  many 
of  the  towns  served  by  complainant 
are  within  a  short  and  reasonably  con- 
venient distance  of  stations  on  one  or 
the  other  of  defendant  lines.  Defendants 
claimed  that  complainant's  equipment 
was  old  and  that  it  could  not  handle 
the  modern  cars  of  defendants.  HELD, 
that   the   local    law    could   not   bar  com- 


ELECTRIC  LINES,  II    (b)— III   (a) 


281 


plainant's  right  to  a  connection  under 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act;  that  the 
general  practice  of  the  Commission  is 
not  to  take  a  technical  view  of  the 
record,  but  to  get  at  the  substance  of 
things  when  possible,  and  that  there- 
fore the  proper  parties  were  before  it; 
that  defendants  would  not  be  required 
to  make  a  connection  with  complain- 
ant at  points  served  reasonably  by  the 
defendants,  but  that  defendants  be  re- 
quired to  join  with  the  complainant  in 
opening  through  routes  and  establish- 
ing Joint  rates  between  interstate  points 
and  certain  towns  on  line  of  complain- 
ant that  are  from  5  to  10  miles,  by 
the  country  roads,  from  any  station  on 
the  defendants'  lines,  and  that  the  Com- 
mission finds  that  complainant  will  be 
able  to  handle  the  equipment  of  the 
defendants,  and  assumes  it  will  make 
improvements  should  any  be  found  nec- 
essary. C.  &  C.  Traction  Co.  v.  B.  & 
O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  486;  order 
of  commission  enjoined,  195  Fed.  962. 

(b)  Complainant  located  its  sugar 
factory  at  New  Delhi,  Cal.,  on  the  line 
of  the  Pacific  Electric  R.  R.,  owing  to  lo- 
cal interests  subscribing  to  its  stock, 
giving  it  land  for  a  factory  site,  and  cer- 
tain natural  advantages  of  location  which 
existed.  The  S.  P.  R.  R.  and  the  Santa 
Fe  run  within  a  short  distance  of  the 
factory.  These  roads  do  not  connect  with 
the  tracks  of  the  electric  railroad  at  that 
point.  Both  roads  have  offered  to  run 
spurs  to  the  factory,  and  the  S.  P.  Co.  has 
offered  to  construct  an  interchange  track 
with  the  electric  railway.  Complainant's 
sugar  is  carried  by  the  electric  railroad 
to  Los  Angeles  and  there  delivered  for 
shipment.  The  establishment  of  through 
routes  and  joint  rates  with  the  electric 
railroad  is  prayed.  HELD,  the  power  of 
the  Commission  to  establish  through 
routes  cannot  be  invoked  unless  it  ap- 
pears that  the  transportation  point  at 
which  the  complainant  is  located  is  not 
reasonably  served  by  through  rates  now 
existing.  The  statute  does  not  contem- 
plate that  a  shipiTer  who  enjoys  spur  track 
service  from  one  carrier  shall  be 
entitled  to  say  that  the  service  ac- 
corded him  by  other  lines  in  the 
immediate  vicinity  is  inadequate.  There 
Is  no  escape  from  the  conclusion  that  the 
S.  P.  R.  R.  and  its  connections  form  what 
is  in  contemplation  of  the  law  a  satis- 
factory through  route  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  sugar  from  New  Delhi.  Complaint 
dismissed.  California  Sugar  Co.  v.  S.  P. 
L.  A.  &  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  6. 


(c)  Complainant,  Cedar  Rapids  and 
Iowa  City  Railway  and  Light  Co.,  is  an 
electric  line  of  standard  gage  and  suffi- 
ciently substantial  construction  for  car- 
rying freight,  running  from  Cedar  Rapids, 
la.,  southward  to  Iowa  City,  la.,  a  dis- 
tance of  27^  miles.  It  had  six  freight  cars 
with  standard  couplers  and  automatic  air 
brakes,  and  one  electric  motor  of  suffi- 
cient power  to  haul  from  6  to  10  loaded 
freight  cars.  It  demanded  the  establish- 
ment of  through  routes  and  joint  rates 
from  points  on  its  line  over  the  C.  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  It  duly  published  its  local  rate, 
making  the  same  applicable  to  interstate 
movements.  At  points  on  complainant's 
line  were  located  important  cities  main- 
taining grain  elevators  and  coal,  lumber 
and  live  stock  yards,  and  general  stores. 
The  area  reached  by  complainant  was  ca- 
pable of  originating  and  consuming  some 
5,000  carloads  of  freight  yearly,  of  which 
some  75  per  cent  would  involve  interstate 
movement,  and  complainant  had  actually 
hauled  during  one  year  some  423  car- 
loads of  live  stock,  of  which  170  were  con- 
signed to  points  outside  the  state,  and 
had  moved  during  one  year  a  total  of 
some  930  carloads  of  freight  of  all  kinds. 
Complainant  served  a  section  of  the  coun- 
try of  considerable  area  lying  between 
the  tracks  of  the  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.,  the 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.,  and  the  defendant, 
C.  &  N.  Ry.  The  points  on  its  line  were 
several  miles  from  the  lines  of  the  other 
carriers,  in  some  cases  being  as  far  as 
seven  miles  away.  These  distances  made 
a  long  drive  for  live  stock  and  a  long 
wagon  haul  for  grain  and  other  farm 
products.  Complainant  did  not  parallel 
any  of  the  other  lines.  HELD,  that  ship- 
pers did  not  enjoy  the  benefit  of  any 
reasonable  or  satisfactory  through  routes 
from  and  to  Chicago  and  other  points 
served  by  defendant;  that  there  was  suffi- 
cient trade  offered  for  through  movement 
to  justify  the  ordering  of  through  routes 
and  joint  rates,  and  that  such  routes  and 
rates  should  be  established  from  and  to 
Coralville  and  the  intermediate  points 
to  the  north  on  the  line  of  complainant  to 
and  from  Chicago  and  other  points  on 
the  line  of  the  defendant  via  the  junc- 
tion points  of  the  complainant  and  de- 
fendant, C.  &  N.  Ry.  at  Cedar  Rapids. 
Cedar  Rapids  and  Iowa  City  Ry.  &  Light 
Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
250,  254. 

III.     RIGHT  TO  FUEL  RATE. 

(a)  Discrimination  cannot  well  be 
avoided  if  competing  electric  line  is  n'^t 


282 


ELECTRIC  LINES.  IV  (a)— (d) 


given  the  same  fuel  rate  as  is  accorded 
to  a  steam^  railroad.  In  Re  Restricted 
Rates,  20  I.  C.  C.  426,  431. 

IV.     TRANSFERS  AND  RATES. 

(a)  A  complaint  before  the  Commis- 
sion stated  that  the  street  railways  in 
Omaha,  Neb.,  and  Council  Bluffs,  la., 
and  the  bridge  road  connecting  said  cities 
were  controlled  by  defendant  railway  and 
bridge  company  and  were  operated  as 
one  system;  that  from  all  points  in  Coun- 
cil Bluffs,  except  Cortland  Beach,  across 
said  bridge  to  all  points  in  Omaha,  a 
single  fare  of  10c  was  charged,  and  from 
points  in  the  loop  district  in  Omaha 
across  the  bridge  to  all  points  in  Coun- 
cil Bluffs  the  same  fare  was  charged; 
and  that  from  points  outside  the  loop 
in  Omaha  across  the  bridge  to  Council 
Bluffs  an  additional  fare  of  5c  was 
exacted.  The  complaint  attacked  the  10c 
fare  as  unreasonable  and  prayed  that 
defendant  be  required  to  establish  a 
fare  from  Council  Bluffs  to  Omaha,  and 
reverse,  which  should  not  exceed  5c  per 
passenger,  or  such  charge  as  the  Com- 
mission should  find  reasonable,  and 
prayed  that  no  extra  charge  be  made 
when  in  the  course  of  interstate  trans- 
portation passengers  were  carried  over 
the  said  bridge.  HELD,  the  Commis- 
sion did  not  go  beyond  the  issues  raised 
in  the  complaint  by  eliminating  the 
loop  boundary  for  the  10c  fare  and 
making  the  same  apply  from  all  points  in 
Omaha  across  the  bridge  to  Council 
Bluffs.  (17  I.  C.  C.  239,  sustained.) 
Omaha  &  C.  B.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C, 
191  Fed.  40,  43. 

(b)  Defendant  interurban  railway  con- 
nected Council  Bluffs  and  Omaha  across 
the  Missouri  River,  the  bridge  used  being 
leased  from  a  bridge  company.  The  toll 
for  foot  passengers  over  the  bridge  was 
5c.  The  fare  charged  by  defendant  be- 
tween the  two  cities  over  the  bridge  was 
10c,  which  included  the  bridge  toll.  For 
this  10c  fare  a  passenger  could  ride  only 
from  a  point  in  a  small  loop  made  in 
Omaha  by  defendant's  line  to  points  in 
Council  Bluffs;  he  could  not  by  means 
of  a  transfer  ride  from  a  point  outside 
of  the  loop  in  Omaha  across  the  bridge 
to  points  in  Council  Bluffs  for  10c,  but 
must  pay  extra  fare.  The  same  situation  ex- 
isted on  a  trip  from  points  in  Council 
Bluffs  across  the  bridge  into  Omaha,  the 
end  of  the  trip  on  the  lOc  fare  being  at 
points  within  the  loop.     Defendant  sold 


commutation  tickets  for  this  haul,  30 
rides  for  $1.50.  The  profits  under  the 
10c  rate  were  large,  but  there  was  evi- 
dence that  the  haul  in  question  could 
not  be  made  profitably  for  5c.  HELD, 
the  demand  for  reduction  of  the  rate  to 
5c  should  be  denied,  but  defendant 
should  institute  a  transfer  system  under 
which  the  fare  from  Council  Bluffs,  not 
including  Cortland  Beach,  to  any  point 
in  Omaha,  or  from  any  point  in  Omaha  to 
Council  Bluffs,  not  including  Cortland 
Beach,  should  not  exceed  10c.  West  End 
Improvement  Club  v.  O.  &  C.  B.  Ry.  & 
Bridge  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  239,  248,  249; 
arder  temporarily  enjoined  on  ground 
the  Act  does  not  apply  to  street  railways, 
O.  &  C.  B.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  179  Fed. 
243,  240;  order  of  Commission  sustained, 
however,  in  O.  &  C.  B.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I. 
C.  C,  191  Fed.   40. 

(c)  The  street  railway  lines  in  Omaha, 
Neb.,  and  Council  Bluffs,  la.,  and  the 
line  across  the  bridge  were  controlled 
and  operated  as  one  system  by  defend- 
ants. The  fare  from  the  loop  district 
In  Omaha  across  the  bridge  to  Council 
Bluffs  was  10c,  with  an  additional  fare  of 
5c  from  points  outside  said  loop  district. 
In  the  latter  case,  however,  the  pas- 
senger paid  but  a  single  fare  within  the 
city  of  Omaha,  receiving  the  necessary 
transfers  at  junction  points  to  and  from 
the  loop.  HELD,  the  reasonableness  of 
said  charges  were  questions  of  interstate 
rates  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Com- 
mission. (17  I.  C.  C.  239  sustained.) 
Omaha  &  C.  B.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C, 
191  Fed.   40,  43. 

(d)  Defendants'  electric  lines  run 
continuously  from  Washington,  D.  C,  to 
Laurel,  Md.,  a  total  of  18.9  miles.  Peti- 
tioners prayed  for  a  lengthening  of  the 
fare  zones  in  Maryland,  a  reduction  in 
commutation  fares,  and  an  increase  in 
the  number  of  trips  allowed  on  commuta- 
tion tickets  within  a  month.  The  line  of 
the  defendants  beyond  the  city  limits  is 
parallel  to  the  tracks  of  ihe  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
between  Hyattsville  and  Laurel,  Md.  For 
single  or  round  trips  the  electric  line 
charged  less  than  the  steam  road,  and 
the  monthly  commutation  tickets  of  the 
electric  line  were  likewise  cheaper.  The 
steam  road  lands  its  passengers  within 
a  short  distance  of  the  government  build- 
ings in  Washington,  whereas  the  electric 
line  takes  its  passengers  by  transfer  to 
nearly  every  portion  of  the  District  of 
Columbia.     HELD,  the  fares  on  the  elec- 


ELECTRIC  LINES,  IV  (e)— EMPLOYMENT,  I   fa) 


283 


trie  line  are  not  unreasonable  or  unjust. 
Silvester  v.  City  &  Suburban  Ry.  of 
Wash.,  22  I.  C.  C.  201,  204. 

(e)  The  passenger  fare  of  15c,  Wash- 
ington, D.  C,  to  Four  Mile  Run,  St.  Elmo, 
St.  Asaph.  Mt.  Ida  and  Del  Ray,  Va.,  an 
average  distance  of  5  miles,  was  attacked 
as  discriminatory  in  favor  of  Alexandria, 
about  seven  miles  from  Washington. 
Other  suburban  lines  entering  Washing- 
ton charged  generally  10c  for  a  trip  of 
about  five  miles  and  sometimes  even 
more.  The  Virginia  points,  it  was  con- 
tended by  defendant,  gave  it  only  a  small 
traffic.  HELD,  it  ought  not  to  be  ex- 
pected that  communities  should  bear  an 
undue  portion  of  the  cost  of  a  transpor- 
tation service  designed  and  for  the  most 
part  used  to  meet  the  requirements  of 
other  and  larger  communities,  nor  doe? 
the  fact  that  defendants  in  order  to  fur- 
nish adequate  service  to  the  large  cities 
at  its  termini  operate  to  these  towns 
many  more  trains  than  are  necessary  to 
their  needs  warrant  the  exaction  of  a 
charge  in  proportion  to  the  frequency  of 
the  service  incidentally  furnished.  Any 
additional  traffic  secured  from  the  inter- 
mediate points  is  in  the  nature  of  a  net 
gain  to  the  carrier.  Rate  reduced  to 
10c.  Beall  v.  W.  A.  &  M.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  406.  408. 


ELEVATION.     — 

See  Allowances,  §2  (a),  §8  (3).  §12  (1) 
(d);  Tariffs,  §4  (TT,  (k);  Transit; 
Transportation,  §11  (c);  Weights 
and   Weighing,    §1    (b). 


ELKINS  ACT. 

See   Crimes,    I. 

EMBARGO. 

See    Cars    and    Car    Supply,    §30    (d); 
Demurrage,  §4  (a). 

(a)  An  embargo  may  be  justifiable  be- 
cause of  the  physical  inability  of  the  car- 
rier for  some  reason  to  deal  with  traffic 
which  overwhelms  it,  but  an  embargo 
placed  against  connecting  carriers  be- 
cause of  their  failure  to  promptly  return 
cars  is  not  consonant  with  the  service 
which  carreers  constituting  through  routes 
are  required  by  law  to  give.  Mo.  &  111. 
Coal  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C. 
C.  39,  47.  i 

(aa)     Defendant    carrier    had    suffered  i 
from    the    acts    of    connecting    carriers 
which    seized    defendant's    coal    cars    in 
time   of  shortage  and  refused  to  return 


them.  Defendant  established  an  embargo 
and  refused  to  supply  cars  for  shipments 
from  points  on  its  own  to  points  on  con- 
nfcting  lines  to  which  defendant  had 
established  through  routes  and  joint 
rates.  Defendant  took  inis  course  for 
the  purpose  of  protecting  local  traffic 
on  its  own  line.  HELD,  that  the  em- 
bargo was  unlawful,  as  railroads  under 
the  Act  were  united  into  a  national 
system,  were  required  to  establish  and 
keep  open  through  routes  and  to  fur- 
nish the  necessary  facilities  therefor, 
and  it  was  the  duty  of  defendant  to 
establish  such  rules  and  regulations 
with  other  carriers  as  would  result  in 
the  prompt  return  of  cars  to  its  own 
line.  Mo.  &  111.  Coal  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,   22  I.   C.  C.   39,  47. 

(b)  Temporary  confiscation  by  car- 
riers of  cars  belonging  to  other  railroads 
and  the  placing  of  embargoes  against 
cars  being  sent  off  the  lines  of  the  car- 
riers who  own  them  are  alike  unlawful. 
Mo.  &  111.  Coal  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22 
L  C.  C.  39. 

(c)  It  is  not  wthin  the  power  of  the 
Commission  to  order  a  carrier  to  inter- 
dict a  particular  shipper  from  engaging 
in  interstate  transportation.  The  only 
ground  upon  which  the  Commission  can 
give  consideration  to  the  quest'on  of  em- 
bargoes would  be  on  an  allegation  that 
an  embargo  or  series  of  embargoes  re- 
suited  in  undue  discrimination.  Peale, 
Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J., 
18  I.  C.  C.  25,  34. 

(d)  An  embargo  is  a  war  measure  or 
extraordinary  remedy.  Primarily,  it  is 
not  intended  as  an  incentive  to  promptly 
release  equipment,  but  to  prevent  further 
movement  until  such  time  as  measures 
can  be  taken  to  remove  accumulation  of 
cars.  Peale,  Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.  of  N.  J.,  18  I.   C.  C.  25,  34. 

employment! 

I.     HOURS    OF    SERVICE    ACT. 

(a)  The  restrictions  in  section  2  of 
the  Act  relating  to  the  hours  of  serv- 
ice of  eranloyes  are  not  invalid  by 
reason  of  the  fact  that  in  applying  to 
employes  engaged  in  interstate  com- 
merce they  also  incidentally  apply  to 
the  same  employes  with  respect  to  their 
duties  in  handling  intrastate  traffic.  B. 
&  O.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  221  U.  S. 
612,  619,  31  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  621,  55  L. 
ed.   878. 


284 


EMPLOYMENT,  I  (b)— EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES 


(b)  The  provisions  in  section  2  of 
the  Act  limiting  the  hours  of  service 
"except  in  case  of  emergency"  are  not 
Invalid  on  the  ground  of  uncertainty  by 
reason  of  the  use  of  generic  description, 
"except  in  case  of  emergency."  B.  & 
O.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  L  C.  C.  221  U.  S.  612, 
620,  31  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  621,  55  L.  ed.  878. 

(c)  Complainant  railroad  applied  to 
the  Commission  to  be  relieved  from  the 
operation  of  the  Act  of  March  4,  1907, 
with  respect  to  the  provision  that  em- 
ployes of  railroads  handling  train  or- 
ders by  telegraph  or  telephone  should 
not  be  permitted  to  be  on  duty  more 
than  nine  hours  in  offices  operated  day 
and  night,  or  more  than  13  hours  at 
offices  operated  only  during  the  day- 
time. Complainant  asked  that  the 
agents  at  certain  stations  after  hand- 
ling train  orders  for  nine  hours  or  less 
might  be  required  to  work  a  sufficient 
number  of  hours  as  clerks  or  other- 
wise to  complete  12  hours  of  service, 
and  that  agents  at  certain  stations  who 
handled  very  few  train  orders  or  mes- 
sages might  be  required  to  remain  on 
duty  from  13  to  15  hours.  Complainant 
simply  alleged  that  the  work  was  very 
light,  easily  performed  without  the  em- 
ployment of  additional  men,  and  alleged 
the  needless  expense  of  increasing  the 
number.  There  was  no  allegation  that 
the  company  was  unable  to  obtain  an 
additional  force  of  telegraphers  or  that 
it  made  any  effort  to  do  so,  or  that 
the  company  had  insufficient  funds  to 
pay  such  an  increased  force  as  might 
be  necessary  to  keep  the  offices  open 
and  comply  with  the  limitation  upon 
hours  of  labor  imposed  by  the  Act. 
HELD,  that  the  authority  of  the  Com- 
mission to  grant  relief  from  the  Act 
was  limited  to  instances  of  special  and 
unforeseen  conditions,  and  it  was  not 
contemplated  that  conditions  which  are 
common  and  well  known  and  are  fre- 
quently found  in  every  railway  should 
be  regarded  as  a  sufficient  basis  for  the 
relief  prayed.  Petition  denied.  In  Re 
the  Application  of  the  Georgia  South- 
ern &  Florida  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  134, 
136. 

(d)  Complainant  carriers  after  Feb. 
7,  1908,  filed  petitions  asking  the  Com- 
mission to  extend  the  time  of  the  go- 
ing into  effect  of  the  Act  of  March  4, 
1907,  relating  to  the  hours  of  employ- 
ment of  railroad  agents  engaged  in 
duties  connected  with  the  movement 
of    trains,    which    by    its   terms    was    to 


go  into  effect  March  4,  1908.  The 
principal  purpose  of  petitioners  was  to 
gain  relief  from  the  provision  limiting 
the  hours  of  service  of  employes  to 
nine  hours  in  stations  operating  con- 
tinuously day  and  night.  The  petitions 
were  directed  to  particular  stations  oper- 
ating under  peculiar  conditions,  but  in 
effect  asked  that  two-thirds  of  all  day 
and  night  stations  on  the  lines  of  peti- 
tioners should  be  exempted  from  the 
operation  of  the  Act  for  a  period  to 
be  extended  by  the  Commission.  The 
grounds  alleged  were  the  impossibility 
of  securing  the  additional  employes,  the 
existence  of  which  ground  was  not 
established  as  a  fact,  and  the  financial 
hardship.  At  the  time  of  the  hearing 
the  railroads  generally  were  in  consid- 
erable financial  distress.  HELD,  under 
the  proviso  of  the  second  paragraph  of 
the  Act,  the  Commission  had  authority 
to  extend  the  period  of  operation  of 
the  Act  only  to  particular  stations  oper- 
ating under  peculiar  circumstances,  and 
could  not  apply  such  extension  to  sta- 
tions generally,  so  as  practically  to 
nullify  the  statute.  Petitions  denied.  In 
Re  Petitions  for  Extension  Under 
Hours  of  Service  Law,  13  I.  C.  C.  140, 
146. 

(e)  The  Act  of  March  4,  1907,  limit- 
ing the  hours  of  service  of  railroad 
agents  connected  in  their  duties  with 
the  moving  of  trains,  was  passed  in 
the  interest  of  the  public  and  intended 
to  lessen  the  hazard  of  railway  opera- 
tions by  preventing  mistakes  in  the  giv- 
ing of  orders  and  of  sending  of  dis- 
patches occasioned  by  the  fatigue  and 
overwork  of  employes.  In  Re  Petitions 
for  Extension  Under  Hours  of  Service 
Law,  13  I.  C.  C.  140,  142. 

EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 
§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
II.     CIRCUMSTANCES      AND      CONDI- 
TIONS. 
§2.     In  general. 
§3.     Commercial    advantages   and 

disabilities. 
§4.     Competition. 

(1)  In  general. 

(2)  Railroad. 

(3)  Rail-and-water. 

(4)  Water.- 
§5.     Low  state  rate. 

§6.     Preference  of  markets, 
§7.     Size   of   community. 


EQUALIZATION   OF  RATES,   §1    (a)— (h) 


285 


III.     EFFECT  OF  EQUALIZATION. 

§8.     Adjustment  of  related  rates. 

CROSS-REFERENCES. 

See   Advanced    Rates,   §5    (2);    Rela- 
tive Rates. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
See   Discrimination,   §14   (b). 

(a)  In  19  I.  C.  C.  148,  involving  the 
rates  on  oranges  and  lemons  from  south- 
ern California  points  to  the  East,  the 
Commission  refused  to  disturb  the  $1.15 
rate  on  oranges,  but  ordered  that  the 
rate  on  lemons  should  not  exceed  $1  per 
100  lbs.  The  only  transportation  con- 
sideration stated  by  the  Commission  jus- 
tifying their  orders  was  that  the  average 
length  of  haul,  and,  therefore,  the  aver- 
age cost,  was  less  for  lemons  than  for 
oranges,  and  that  lemons  were  ordinarily 
carried  under  ventilation,  while  or- 
anges were  ordinarily  carried  under 
the  more  expensive  refrigeration.  The 
minimum  carload  weight  prescribed  for 
oranges  was  higher  than  for  lemons. 
An  additional  cost  for  oranges  due 
to  refrigeration  was  the  subject  of 
a  special  refrigeration  charge.  While 
the  average  haul  for  lemons  -was  500 
miles  less  than  for  oranges,  the  report 
of  the  Commission  indicated  that  this 
was  but  a  small  factor  in  the  case, 
especially  as  the  increase  of  50  per  cent 
in  the  protective  tariff  on  lemons  was  ex- 
pected to  widen  the  market  for  the 
California  lemon  growers  and  thus  to  in- 
crease the  average  length  of  the  lemon 
haul.  The  principal  ground  on  which  the 
Commission  based  its  order  was  the  need 
in  the  lemon  industry  of  a  high  protective 
tariff  against  Sicily,  and  the  order  was 
entered  to  compensate  for  the  insuffi- 
ciency of  the  protective  tariff  in  effect. 
HELD,  the  order  should  be  permanently 
enjoined.  Whatever  the  rights  of  carriers 
may  be  to  give  reduced  rates  for  the  pur- 
pose of  fosteriHg  a  new  or  an  established 
industry  or  for  granting  to  it  a  higher 
measure  of  protection  against  foreign 
competition  than  Congress  through  the 
revenue  laws  has  given  it,  no  such  power 
can  lawfully  be  exercised  by  the  Com- 
mission. A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  1.  C.  C, 
190  Fed.  591,  594,  596. 

(b)  It  is  no  part  of  the  Commission's 
duty  or  right  to  equalize  the  markets, 
except  as  that  result  may  be  incident  to 
the  correction  of  a  substantial  injustice 
in  rates,  in  whatever  form  published  at 
the  respective  competitive  points.    Sioux 


City  Terminal  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  23   I.   C.  C.  98,  109. 

(bb)  The  Commission  has  no  juris- 
diction to  reduce  rates  for  purpose  of 
increasing  profits  of  shipper  or  to  equal- 
ize economic  conditions.  Bituminous 
Coal  Operators  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C. 
C.  385,  391. 

(c)  The  Commission  cannot  under- 
take to  establish  freight  rates  which  will 
insure  production  at  a  profit.  Florida 
Fruit  &  Vegetable  Shippers'  Protective 
Ass'n  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  22  L  C.  C. 
11,  14. 

(d)  The  Commission  is  not  empow- 
ered to  remedy  commercial  disadvan- 
tages under  the  law.  In  so  far  only  as 
any  undue  discrimination  in  the  freight 
rate  adjustment  may  have  aided  to 
bring  about  the  condition  complained 
of  has  the  Commission  any  regulating 
authority.  Elk  Cement  &  Lime  Co.  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.*84,  86.  Vz 

(e)  The  principle  that  where  joint 
or  proportional  rates  were  made  by  all 
carriers  leading  to  certain  points  of  des- 
tination, it  was  within  the  Commission's 
power  to  end  discrimination  as  between 
points  of  origin  by  a  reduction  in  the 
rate  from  the  point  discriminated 
against,  only  has  application  where  the 
traffic  from  both  groups  of  origin  is  nec- 
essarily transported  to  destination  by 
the  same  connecting  carrier  or  carriers, 
and  where  it  is  possible  for  the  deliver- 
ing carriers  to  put  an  end  to  the  dis- 
crimination b/  the  exercise  of  their 
power  to  refuse  to  enter  into  preferential 
joint  or  proportional  rates.  Ashland  Fire 
Brick  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  115, 
120. 

(f)  Power  has  not  been  lodged  with 
the  Commission  to  equalize  economic  ad- 
vantages, to  place  one  market  in  com- 
petition with  another,  or  to  treat  all  rail- 
roads as  a  part  of  one  great  whole,  ap- 
portion to  each  a  certain  territory,  or  re- 
quire all  to  meet  upon  a  common  basis 
at  all  points.  Ashland  Fire  Brick  Co.  v. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  115,  121. 

(g)  The  Commission  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion to  correct  tariff  insufiiciencies  by 
the  freight  rate,  nor  to  protect  in  that 
way  American  against  foreign  producers. 
Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  . 
P.   Co.,   22  I.   C.  C.   149,  151. 

(h)  The  Commission  cannot  equalize 
actual  commercial  disparities  or  advan- 
tages by  an  adjustment  of  freight  rates. 


286 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES,  §1   (i)— (s) 


In  Re  Investigation  of  Rates  on  Meats, 
22  I.  C.  C.  160,  163;  Carstens  Packing  Co. 
V.  O.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  77,  81. 

(i)  The  additional  cost  of  operation 
of  a  factory  situated  in  one  part  of  the 
country  over  its  competitors  situated  in 
another  part,  in  addition  to  its  high-^  r 
cost  of  construction,  and  other  commercial 
conditions,  are  questions  which,  under  the 
statute,  the  Commission  has  no  authority 
to  consider.  Empson  Packing  Co.  v.  C. 
M.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  268,  270. 

(J)  Upon  an  application  that  the  Sac- 
ramento gateway  be  reopened  to  traffic 
from  eastern  states  to  Oregon,  the  follow- 
ing facts  developed:  Prior  to  1902  the 
U.  P.  R.  R.  and  the  O.  S.  Line  were  in 
competition  with  the  S.  P.  Co.,  via  Sacra- 
mento, the  route  of  the  S.  P.  Co.  being 
476  miles  longer  between  Ogden  and 
Portland.  The  transcontinental  rates 
via  Sacramento  were  withdrawn  by  Har- 
riman.  The  O.  S.  Line  traflEic  follows 
a  more  direct  line  to  Portland  than 
that  via  the  Willamette  Valley.  The 
line  from  Ogden  via  Sacramento  to  Port- 
land was  chartered  to  be  operated  as  a 
continuous  line,  and  the  Willamette  Val- 
ley was  built  up  under  this  understand- 
ing. Reasonable  rates  and  prompt  serv- 
ice are  now  obtained  over  the  O.  S.  Line. 
HELD,  the  Commission's  power  is  limited 
to  establishing  reasonable  rates  and 
eliminating  discrimination.  It  does  not 
have  the  power  to  make  the  rate  over  a 
line  476  miles  longer  the  same  as  over 
the  shorter  route,  nor  can  it  sever  the 

0.  S.  Line  from  the  S.  P.  Co.  Complaint 
dismissed.  Gile  &  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  22 
L  C.  C.  298. 

(k)  In  adjusting  interstate  rates  on 
milk,  the  Commission  has  no  jurisdiction 
to  say  what  shall  be  done  as  a  matter 
of  public  policy,  except  in  so  far  as  the 
public  weal  must  always  be  considered 
in  exercising  authority  under  the  Act. 
The  duty  of  the  Commission  is  only  to 
ascertain  whether  rates  are  in  accordance 
with  the  Act.    Albree  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  22 

1.  C.  C.  303,  319. 

(1)  Where  a  carrier  extends  a  low 
rate  in  favor  of  one  locality  it  may  be 
required  to  accord  similar  treatment  to 
another  locality.  Railroad  Commission 
of  Kansas  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co..  22  L 
C.  C.  407,  411. 

(m)  While  carriers  have  in  the  past 
often  adopted  the  policy  of  giving  great 
consideration  to  commercial  conditions, 
and    the    Commission    might    under    the 


same  circumstances  require  those  rates 
to  be  maintained  when  once  voluntarily 
established,  it  will  not  Initiate  rates  upon 
this  theory.  International  Agricultural 
Corporation  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C. 
C.   488,   494. 

(n)  It  is  not  within  the  power  of  the 
Commission  to  equalize  economic  condi- 
tions, or  to  place  one  market  in  a  posi- 
tion to  compete  on  equal  terms  with  an- 
other as  against  natural  advantages.  Nor 
has  it  power  to  require  railroads,  in  the 
face  of  varying  trade  conditions,  to  ad- 
just their  rates  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
insure  to  a  market  the  continuance  of  a 
trade  it  has  once  enjoyed.  Baltimore 
Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  596,  603. 

(o)  It  is  not  the  function  of  the  Com 
mission  to  equalize  commercial  condi- 
tions or  to  establish  zones  of  trade  or 
bring  markets  into  competition  with  eacli 
other.  In  Re  Advances  on  Coal  to  Lake 
Ports,  22  L  C.  C.  604,  613. 

(p)  Congress  could  itself  have  under- 
taken to  make  rates,  and  to  establish  re- 
lationships between  communities  and 
commodities.  Railroad  Commission  of 
Nevada  v>  S.  P.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  329,  336. 

(q)  The  Commission  is  not  invested 
with  authority  to  make  the  commercial 
needs  of  the  shipper  the  foundation  of  a 
finding  that  any  rate  is  unreasonable. 
Douglas  &  Co.  V.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
21  L  C.  C.  541,  543. 

(r)  The  Commission  cannot  overcome 
by  an  adjustment  of  freight  rates  natural 
advantages,  such  as  water  competition 
and  climatic  conditions,  which  one  com- 
peting locality  has  over  another.  Truck 
Gkowers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
L  C.  C.  190. 

(s)  The  Commission  cannot  lawfully 
base  rates  upon  the  profits  derived  in  a 
particular  business.  It  might  be  that  in 
a  favorable  season  the  truck  farmers  ot 
Ponchatoula  would  receive  large  and  gen- 
erous returns  from  their  labors,  but  this 
fact  would  not  justify  the  carriers  in 
charging  for  transporting  the  vegetables 
for  market  more  than  a  reasonable  rate 
for  the  service  performed.  In  another 
season  the  market  prices  might  be  such 
that  there  would  be  little  or  no  profit  in 
the  business,  yet  such  fact  would  not 
justify  the  Commission  in  requiring  car- 
riers to  transport  the  produce  at  a  less 
rate   than  would   be   reasonable   for   the 


EQUALIZATION  OP  RATES,  §1  (t)— (bb) 


287 


service  performed.  The  law  does  npt  re- 
quire the  carriers  to  regulate  the  price  of 
transportation  upon  the  basis  of  profits 
to  the  shipper,  and  in  authorizing  the 
Commission  to  fix  reasonable  rates  the 
law  presumes  that  the  measure  of  reason- 
ableness will  be  based  upon  all  the  many 
elements  of  the  particular  traflSc  involved. 
Ponchatoula  Farmers'  Ass'n  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  513,  515,  516. 

(t)  It  is  improper  for  the  Commission 
to  equalize  disadvantages  of  location  and 
other  conditions.  Saginaw  Board  of 
Trade  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
128,  137. 

(u)  The  Commission  cannot  order  a 
reduction  in  rates  to  enable  certain  fac- 
tories to  overcome  natural  advantages  en- 
joyed by  competitive  producing  points. 
Virginia-Carolina  Chemical  Co.  v.  St.  L. 
S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I,  C.  C.  49,  52. 

(v)  Complainant,  manufacturer  of 
fertilizer  at  Shreveport,  La.,  attacked 
the  rates  from  there  to  Arkansas  desti- 
nations on  the  line  of  the  St.  Louis 
Southwestern  R.  R.  as  unreasonable  per 
se  and  unduly  discriminatory  in  favor 
of  Memphis.  Factories  at  Memphis,  New 
Orleans  and  other  cities,  located  nearer 
the  Atlantic  or  Gulf  ports  than  Shreve- 
port, had  an  advantage  over  it  in  the 
manufacture  of  fertilizer,  on  account  of 
the  nearness  to  the  supply  of  pyrites  and 
phosphate  rock,  the  cost  of  manufacture 
at  Memphis  being  87c  per  ton  less  than 
at  Shreveport.  In  shipments  from  Mem- 
phis to  the  points  in  question  an  arbi- 
trary of  30c  per  ton  was  paid  by  defend- 
ant for  the  use  of  a  bridge  over  the  Mis- 
sissippi River  and  60c  per  ton  was  paid 
by  it  to  carriers  reaching  Memphis.  For 
several  years  prior  to  1906,  defendant 
had  established  rates  lower  than  the 
rates  attacked  from  Shreveport  to  the 
points  in  question  in  order  to  build  up 
a  demand  for  fertilizer  among  the  farm- 
ers along  its  line.  Defendant's  rates  per 
ton  mile  were  higher  than  those  of  other 
carriers  reaching  Arkansas  points  equal- 
ly distant  from  Shreveport.  HELD,  the 
Commission  could  not  reduce  defendant's 
rates  from  Sheveport  on  the  basis  of  the 
rentals  paid  by  ifc  on  its  shipments  from 
Memphis;  nor  could  it  reduce  those  rates 
to  enable  Shreveport  to  overcome  the 
natural  advantages  enjoyed  by  competi- 
tive producing  points;  but  that  defend- 
ant's rates  were  unreasonable  and  should 
be  reduced  to  a  point  lower  than  the  rates 


attacked,  but  not  so  low  as  those  in  effect 
from  Shreveport  to  the  points  in  ques- 
tion prior  to  1906.  Reparation  awarded. 
Virginia-Carolina  Chemical  Co.  v.  St.  L. 
S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  49,  52-54. 

(w)  The  Commission  will  not  take 
from  a  locality  advantages  which  on  ac- 
count of  its  location  naturally  belong  to 
it.  Valley  Flour  Mills  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  73,  76. 

(x)  It  is  one  thing  for  a  carrier  to 
voluntarily  reduce  rates  not  excessive, 
for  the  service  performed,  solely  to  meet 
competitive  and  commercial  conditions, 
but  it  is  a  different  thing  for  the  Com- 
mission to  compel  such  reductions  re- 
gardless of  transportation  conditions. 
Chicago  Lumber  &  Coal  Co.  v.  Tioga 
Southeastern  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  323,  334. 

(y)  The  Commission  cannot  permit 
itself  to  be  made  an  agency  through 
which  the  rates  of  competing  carriers 
are  equalized  by  adjustments  made  sub- 
sequent to  the  performance  of  the  ser- 
vice, simply  because  the  rates  of  one  or 
the  other  were  at  the  time  "out  of  line" 
with  those  of  its  competitors.  The  ship- 
per should  give  his  shipment  to  the  car- 
rier that  has  at  that  time  the  lowest  law- 
fully published  applicable  rate,  and  fail- 
ing to  do  this,  he  should  not  expect  the 
Commission  later  to  authorize  refund  for 
the  purpose  of  equalizing  the  rate  of  the 
line  to  which  he  gave  his  business  with 
the  lower  lawful  rate  of  a  competing  line 
which  he  might  have  used.  Swift  &  Co. 
V.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  426,  429. 

(z)  It  seems  plain  that  the  duty  of 
this  Commission  is  to  establish  just  and 
fair  transportation  charges  in  so  far  as 
it  can  be  done  and  allow  rival  creamery 
methods  to  operate  under  those  charges. 
The  Commission  should  not  establish  a 
scale  of  rates  with  a  view  and  for  the 
purpose  of  fostering  or  discouraging 
either  form  of  this  industry.  Beatrice 
Creamery  Co.  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  109. 

(aa)  In  determining  the  reasonable- 
ness of  rates  on  chinaware,  the  Commis- 
sion cannot  decline  to  reduce  the  rates 
on  imported  china  on  the  ground  that  to 
do  so  would  give  an  advantage  to  foreign 
manufacturers  on  account  of  inadequate 
tariff  duties.  Union  Pacific  Tea  Co.  v. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  545,  548. 

(bb)  In  determining  the  justification 
for  a  different  rate  on  the  same  commodi- 


288 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES,  §1   (cc)— §2   (b) 


ty  to  nearby  consuming  points,  the  Com- 
mission has  nothing  to  do  with  the  prices 
paid  for  said  commodity  by  dealers  in 
or  consumers  of  it.  Bovaird  Supply  Co. 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  56,  66. 

(cc)  Complainant  attacked  as  unjust- 
ly discriminatory  the  rates  on  domestic 
plate  glass  as  compared  with  those  on 
plate  glass  imported  from  foreign  coun- 
tries, in  that  third  class  rates  applied 
on  domestic  shipments,  and  fourth  and 
fifth  class  rates  on  shipments  from  Ant- 
werp and  other  foreign  producing  points 
via  ocean  steamship  lines  to  ports  of 
entry  and  thence  by  rail  to  ultimate  in- 
terior points  of  destination  in  this 
country.  Since  the  hearing  defendants 
increased  the  rates  on  imported  glass  so 
as  to  materially  diminish  the  disparity, 
still  leaving  the  rate  for  the  entire  haul 
from  foreign  points  less  than  those  upon 
traffic  originating  in  this  country.  It 
appeared  that  defendants  were  forced  to 
compete  with  one  another  for  the  traf- 
fic coming  to  Canadian,  Atlantic  and 
Gulf  ports  by  steamship  from  foreign 
ports  and  each  carrier  was  compelled  by 
the  steamship  lines  to  name  low  rates 
for  the  haul  from  these  ports  in  order  to 
participate  in  the  traffic.  Each  railroad 
sought  to  encourage  the  bringing  of  ships 
to  its  piers  that  there  might  be  facili- 
ties for  handling  the  exports  of  this 
country.  The  ocean  carriers  demanded 
the  carriage  of  a  share  of  the  imports 
and  would  land  at  piers  where  they  could 
unload  and  load  the  greatest  quantity 
The  railroads  were  forced  to  make  cheap 
carriage  of  imports  to  inland  distances  in 
order  to  sustain  the  movement  of  traffic 
from  abroad  and  incidentally  to  main- 
tain their  own  export  and  import  trans- 
portation. On  account  of  the  lower  rates 
on  imported  glass,  foreign  producers 
were  able  to  produce  and  sell  at  points 
in  the  United  States  at  a  smaller  price 
than  were  domestic  manufacturers.  The 
import  and  domestic  traffic  did  not  take 
the  same  routes  in  the  same  direction. 
The  domestic  rates  were  for  carriage 
from  inland  distributing  points  to  other 
Inland  points  and  to  the  seaboard,  while 
the  import  rate  was  exclusively  from 
seaboard  to  inland  points.  Rail  trans- 
portation was  preferable  to  water  on  ac- 
count of  better  facilities  for  handling  and 
stowing  away  and  because  of  less  break- 
age. Domestic  glass  was  loaded  and  un- 
loaded by  the  consignor  and  consignee, 
while  the  railroads  were  at  the  expense 


of  loading  the  import  glass  at  the  sea- 
board. The  carriers  reaching  the  gulf 
ports  were  glad  to  accept  foreign  traffic 
at  low  rates  in  order  to  fill  their  empty 
cars  returning  from  these  ports.  No 
evidence  other  than  the  difference  in 
rates  complained  of  was  offered  to  show 
the  domestic  rates  unreasonable  per  se. 
HELD,  the  rates  complained  of  were  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable  or  discrimina- 
tory under  sections  1,  2,  3  and  4  of  the 
Act.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  Commiss'on  to 
look  to  the  circumstances  and  conditions 
affecting  the  rates  involved,  not  only  in 
this  country,  but  in  the  entire  field  of 
commerce  here  and  abroad.  Whatever 
would  be  regarded  by  common  carriers, 
apart  from  the  operation  of  the  statute, 
as  matters  which  warranted  differences 
in  charges  ought  to  be  considered  in 
forming  a  judgment  whether  differences 
in  import  and  domestic  rates  are  just 
or  unjust,  and  the  circumstance  of  com- 
petition by  ocean  carriers  at  the  differ* 
ent  ports  is  a  fact  meriting  consideration 
in  passing  upon  the  reasonableness  of 
an  inland  rate  applicable  from  the  sea- 
board on  domestic  traffic  when  the  rea- 
sonableness of  such  rate  is  called  in 
question  by  comparison  with  a  lower  rate 
applying  from  the  port  of  entry  on  traf- 
fic shipped  from  a  foreign  country.  Com- 
plaint dismissed  without  prejudice. 
Pittsburg  Plate  Glass  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  87,  99-102. 

II.     CIRCUMSTANCES      AND       CONDI- 
DITIONS. 

§2.     In   General. 

See    Differentials,    §2    (a),    §5. 

(a)  It  does  not  so  follow  as  a  matter 
of  law  that  rates  should  be  the  same 
for  the  same  distance  over  two  different 
roads.  I.  C.  C.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.,  222  U.  S. 
541,   549,   32   Sup.  Ct.   108,   56  L.  ed.   308. 

(aa)  It  would  not  be  possible  to  estab- 
lish differentials  from  Indianapolis  to 
the  Mississippi  River  which  would  equal- 
ize the  charges  under  the  differentials 
fiom  Chicago  unless  both  lines  of  differ- 
entials were  governed  by  the  same  classi- 
fication. Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v. 
C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  195, 
202. 

(b)  Complete  equalization  of  rates  be- 
tween localities  cannot  be  effected  except 
by  a  full  consideration  of  the  length  of 
haul  and  the  rates  on  raw  materials  and 
manufactured  products  respectively.     In- 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES,  §2    (c)— (p) 


289 


dianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  195,  205. 

(c)  It  is  not  the  function  of  the  Com- 
mission nor  that  of  the  carrier  to  equal- 
ize economic  conditions.  The  law  does 
not  permit  a  reasonable  rate  to  be  fixed 
solely  upon  that  ground.  Bituminous 
Coal  Operators  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.  C.  385,  391. 

(d)  Neither  the  carriers  nor  the  Com- 
mission can  lawfully  so  adjust  rates  as 
to  equalize  commercial  advantages  and 
disabilities.  Red  River  Oil  Co.  v.  T.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  438,  442. 

(dd)  It  is  not  enough  to  show  that 
in  miles  the  distance  is  less  from  a 
producing  center  via  one  gateway  to  a 
consuming  center  in  order  to  equalize 
the  rate  between  the  same  points  via 
another  gateway.  It  must  be  shown  that 
the  cost  of  transportation  is  less,  or 
rather  that  the  combination  of  rates  is 
less  as  estimated  by  the  general  level  of 
rates  in  the  territory  through  which'  the 
transportation  is  conducted.  In  Re  In- 
vestigation of  Unreasonable  Rates  on. 
Meats,  23  I.  C.  C.  656,  669. 

(e)  Carriers  may  not  haul  a  particular 
class  of  traffic  or  trafllc  for  a  particular 
community  at  less  than  the  cost  of  the 
service  and  recoup  themselves  from  the 
charges  levied  against  other  charges.  In 
Re  Rates  for  Single  Packages,  etc.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  328,  335. 

(f)  Carriers  are  not  required  to  estab- 
lish rates  that  will  guarantee  a  profit  to 
shippers.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Kans,  v.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  407,  410. 

(g)  Rates  should  be  so  adjusted  as 
to  permit  widest  possible  market  com- 
petition. Andy's  Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  So. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  405,  410. 

(h)  The  interest  of  the  consumer 
must  be  considered,  as  well  as  that  of  the 
producer.  Andy's  Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  So. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  405,  510. 

(i)  It  does  not  follow  that  if  a  joint 
through  rate  is  effective  via  one  route 
It  must  necessarily  be  made  effective  via 
another.  Males  Co.  v.  L.  &  H.  R.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.   C.  C.  280,  282. 

(j)  A  rate  is  not  unreasonable  simply 
because  a  lo^wer  rate  is  in  effect  via  lines 
of  other  carriers.  South  Canon  Coal  Co. 
V.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  286. 


(k)  The  Commission  cannot  permit  a 
refund  applicable  to  a  particular  ship- 
ment for  the  sole  purpose  of  enabling 
carriers  to  make  good  a  rate  not  in  ef- 
fect when  the  shipment  moved,  but  which 
they  had  agreed  to  protect.  Such  a  prac- 
tice would  do  away  with  the  published 
tariff  altogether  if  generally  applied. 
Crowell  &  Spencer  Lumber  Co.  v.  T.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  333. 

(kk)  Before  the  Commission  can  con- 
clude that  a  rate  on  a  given  commodity 
is  too  high,  because  it  is  higher  than 
some  other  rate  named,  it  must  know 
that  the  rate  selected  as  the  standard 
for  a  comparison  is  a  reasonable  and  a 
fair  one.  Darling  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  79,  83. 

(1)  In  determining  what  is  the  "pub- 
lic interest"  the  Commission  should  have 
regard  to  the  carrier  as  well  as  the  ship- 
per, and  should  not  permit  the  whim  of 
one  to  offset  the  substantial  advantage 
the  other.  Chamber  of  Commerce  of 
Milwaukee  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
L   C.   C.   460,   467. 

(m)  It  is  not  possible  to  have  a  rate 
adjustment  which  places  all  towns  and 
cities  upon  an  exact  equality.  Kindel  v. 
N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C  C. 
555,   561. 

(n)  The  opportunity  to  buy  in  a  wide- 
ly extended  market  is  a  valuable  one  to 
merchants  in  that  it  presents  a  larger 
field  for  competition  and  ordinarily  offers 
the  best  quality  at  the  lowest  price;  and 
a  carrier  has  no  right,  by  refusing 
through  routes  and  reasonable  joint 
rates,  to  restrict  or  circumscribe  this 
opportunity.  It  is  the  duty  of  common 
carriers  to  haul  the  traffic  that  is  offered 
and  to  make  the  necessary  arrangements 
and  furnish  facilities  and  establish  rea- 
sonable rates  therefor;  and  a  carrier  is 
not  justified  in  refusing  traffic  from 
points  on  other  lines  on  the  ground  that 
such  traffic  would  displace  in  the  mar- 
kets traffic  from  points  on  its  own  lines 
and  thus  adversely  affect  its  revenues. 
Star  Grain  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.   Co.,  14  L  C.   C.  364,  367. 

(o)  Higher  rate  in  effect  to  Powers- 
ville.  Mo.,  than  to  other  points  taking 
Missouri  River  rate;  tariff  corrected. 
Reparation  awarded.  Val  Blatz  Brewing 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  184. 

(p)  The  rate  on  apples  from  Belling- 
ham.  Wash.,   to   Denver,   Colo.,  was   dis- 


2% 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES,  §2  (q)— §3  (bb) 


criminatory  in  favor  of  Missouri  River 
points.  Reparation  awarded.  Lawrence- 
Hensley  Fruit  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.    Op.    189. 

(q)  Discriminatory  rates  were  charged 
to  Brokaw  and  Tomahawk,  Wis.,  against 
Merrill,  Wis.  Reparation  awarded.  Lin- 
dauer  Pulp  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  D.  R.  L.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  251. 

(r)  The  rate  to  Rock  Island,  111., 
should  not  exceed  that  in  effect  to  Daven- 
port, la.,  from  Hartford,  Mich.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Lagomarcini-Grupe  Co.  v. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  269. 

(s)  Rates  on  lubricating  oil  from  Fay- 
ette, Ky.,  to  Superior,  Wis.,  should  not 
exceed  those  in  effect  to  Duluth,  Minn. 
Reparation  awarded.  Buffalo  Oil  Co.  v. 
C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  289. 

(t)  Allegation  that  the  rating  of  live 
and  dressed  poultry  alike  results  in  pref- 
erence in  favor  of  live  poultry  dealers, 
not  sustained  by  the  facts.  Rosebrough 
V.  P.   Exp.   Co.,   Unrep.   Op.  438. 

(u)  No  reason  why  the  rate  to  Minne- 
apolis should  have  been  higher  from 
Arkansas  points  than  from  points  in 
Texas  from  which  the  distance  is  greater. 
Gamble-Robinson  Commission  Co.  v.  St, 
L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  506. 

(v)  South  Hammond,  Ind.,  is  not  en- 
titled to  the  same  rate  as  Hammond, 
Ind.  Anguish  v.  C.  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Un- 
rep. Op.  580. 

(w)  The  rate  on  corn  from  Fairview, 
Mo.,  to  Terrell,  Tex.,  was  unreasonable 
to  the  extent  that  it  exceeded  the  con- 
temporaneous rate  from  from  Pittsburg, 
Kan.  Reinhardt  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  &  N. 
A.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  591. 

§3.     Commercial     Advantages     and     Dis- 
abilities. 

See  Absorption  of  Charges,  §2  (f ) ; 
Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  II  (a); 
Blanket  Rates,  §7;  Differentials,  §5 
(h),  §6,  §7;  Discrimination,  §9  (e), 
(f),  (J):  Evidence,  §2,  §14  (5)  (v); 
Express   Companies,   §19. 

(a)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Act  as 
amended  does  not  attempt  to  equalize 
fortune,  opportunities  or  abilities.  On 
the  contrary,  it  in  turn  contemplates 
that  if  a  carrier  receives  services  from 
an  owner  of  property  transported  or 
uses  instrumentalities  furnished  by  the 
latter,  he  shall  pay  for  them,  the  only 
restriction  being  that  he  shall  pay  no 
more   than   is  reasonable,   and   the  only 


permissive  element  being  that  the  Com- 
mission determine  the  maximum  in  case 
there  is  complaint  or  upon  its  own  mo- 
tion. I.  C.  C.  V.  Diffenbaugh,  222  U.  S. 
42,  46,  32  Sup.  Ct.  22,  56  I.,  ed.  83. 

(aa)  In  Western  Oregon  L.  M.  A.  v. 
S.  P.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  61,  the  Commission 
ordered  a  reduction  of  the  rate  of  $5  per 
ton  upon  rough  green  fir  lumber  and 
laths  from  points  in  the  Willamette  Val- 
ley to  San  Francisco  to  $3.40.  The  opin- 
ion of  the  Commission  indicates  that 
the  carriers  formerly  maintained  a  lower 
rate;  that  the  lumber  industry  had  been 
built  up  upon  those  rates,  and  that  it 
was  inequitable  to  the  shippers  for  car- 
riers, in  view  of  these  facts,  to  raise  the 
rate  to  $5,  It  did  not  find,  however,  that 
the  rate  was  unreasonable,  but  bas6d  Its 
decisions  on  the  above-mentioned  con- 
siderations. HELD,  the  Commission  ex- 
ceeded its  jurisdiction  in  assuming  that 
it  had  power  to  substitute  a  new  rate 
for  a  just  and  reasonable  rate  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  a  wise  policy  to  do 
so  or  that  the  railroad  had  so  conducted 
itself  as  to  be  estopped  in  the  future  from 
being  entitled  to  receive  a  just  and  rea- 
sonable compensation  for  the  service 
rendered.  S.  P.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Comm., 
219  U.  S.  433,  443,  31  Sup.  Ct.  288,  55 
L.  ed.  283. 

(b)  Where  a  shipper  is  located  in  a 
district  to  which  a  uniform  rate  has  been 
applied,  he  is  entitled  to  the  same  rates 
as  any  other  shipper  in  the  district,  al- 
though his  shipments  may  be  originated 
by  a  different  railroad  than  that  serving 
the  other  shippers.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
International  Coal  Mining  Co.,  173  Fed. 
1,     6. 

(bb)  Complainant  charged  that  defend- 
ant made  rates  out  of  Dallas  and  other 
Texas  points  into  eastern  Texas  which 
were  much  lower  than  those  which  they 
extended  into  Texas  from  Shreveport, 
La.,  in  the  ?ame  line  of  business,  for  the 
same  distances.  Shreveport  enjoyed 
lower  carload  rates  from  northern  and 
eastern  points  than  Texas  jobbing  points. 
This  gave  Shreveport  an  advantage  over 
Texas  jobbers  and  to  offset  this  the 
Texas  Commission  reduced  rates  on  in- 
trastate shipments  of  less  than  carload 
lots  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  its  job- 
bers and  manufacturers.  HELD,  that  car- 
riers cannot  impose  an  unreasonably 
high  local  rate  out  of  a  city  because  of 
advantage  it  properly  enjoys  for  secur- 
ing low  inbound  rates  by  reason  of  its 


EQUALIZATION  OP  RATES,  §S    (c)— (h) 


291 


location.     Meredith  v.  St.   T..   S.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  31,  34. 

(c)  Complainant  is  a  manufacturer  of 
glucose  syrup  at  St.  Joseph,  Mo.,  and 
demanded  a  rate  to  the  Pacific  coast 
which  would  enable  it  to  compete  with 
competitors  situated  at  Chicago.  It  was 
not  contended  that  the  rate  of  75c  per 
100  lbs.  from  St.  Joseph  to  California 
terminals  was  unreasonable  per  se,  but 
the  contention  was  made  that  because 
the  complainant  had  to  pay  23^c  per 
100  lbs.  more  for  its  glucose,  which  is  Its 
raw  material,  than  Chicago  manufactur- 
ers, it  is  discriminated  against.  This 
discrimination  arose  because  its  compet- 
itors located  in  Chicago  buy  their  raw 
material  at  that  point,  whereas  complain- 
ant must  pay  the  Chicago  price  plus  the 
freight  rate  to  St.  Joseph.  HELD,  com- 
plainant's trouble  did  not  arise  out  of 
the  freight,  but  grew  out  of  the  price  that 
it  was  required  to  pay  for  its  raw  ma- 
terial. Complaint  dismissed.  National 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
L  C.  C.  86. 

(cc)  Competition  between  widely  sep- 
arated factories  in  common  markets  is 
to  be  encouraged  so  long  as  rates  are 
not  unlawful.  A  manufacturer  is  en- 
titled to  a  reasonable  rate  regardless  of 
any  material  advantage  he  may  enjoy. 
Massee  &  Felton  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,   23  L  C.   C.   110,  111,   113. 

(d)  No  reason  why  a  city  should  not 
be  accorded  the  benefit  of  market  com- 
petition obtaining  at  nearby  points. 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Ashburn  v.  G. 
S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  140,  145. 

(dd)  The  fact  that  one  set  of  railroads 
terminates  at  the  Mississippi  River,  while 
a  new  set  begins  there,  is  sometimes 
said  to  be  a  "natural"  advantage  pos- 
sessed by  towns  located  along  that  so- 
called  basing  line;  but  that  argument 
cannot  be  invoked  as  against  Omaha. 
The  Union  Pacific  System,  which  orig- 
inates more  wool  than  any  trans-conti- 
nental line,  terminates  at  the  Missouri 
River,  Omaha  and  Kansas  City.  If  that 
system  named  a  rate  simply  to  the  end 
of  its  line,  Missouri  River  cities  would 
enjoy  the  same  transit  privileges  with 
St.  Louis  and  Chicago;  but  because  it 
sees  fit  to  construct  a  joint  rate  to  the 
Mississippi  River  and  Chicago,  the  towns 
served  by  it  upon  the  Missouri  River 
are  excluded  from  the  wool  business  by 
being  deprived  of  the  transit  privileges. 
The   mere   statement   of  the   fact   shows 


that  this  form  of  discrimination  is  with- 
out justification  and  should  not  be  per- 
mitted. In  Re  Transportation  of  Wool, 
Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151,  170. 

(e)  The  Commission  cannot  reduce  a 
ra-te  for  purpose  of  increasing  profits  of 
shippers.  Equalization  of  economic  con- 
ditions is  no  function  of  the  Commission. 
Bituminous  Coal  Operators  v.  P.  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  385,  391. 

(ee)  Neither  carriers  nor  the  Com- 
mission can  lawfully  adjust  rates  to 
equalize  commercial  advantages.  Red 
River  Oil  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  438,  442. 

(f)  It  is  not  the  province  of  the  Com- 
mission to  take  away  advantages  due  to 
location.  Blodgett  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  448,  451. 

(ff)  Live  stock  rates  inio  Oklahoma 
City  and  from  that  point  to  Kansas  City 
generally  are  and  generally  should  be 
higher  than  live  stock  rates  to  Kansas 
City,  since  the  direct  line  from  point  of 
origin  to  Kansas  City  seldom  is  through 
the  Oklahoma  market.  In  Re  Advances 
on  Meats  and  Packing-house  Products, 
23  L  C.  C.  65G,  664. 

(g)  A  city  is  entitled  to  the  advan- 
tages of  its  location.  Sioux  City  Term. 
El.  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C. 
C.  98,  107.  Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  O. 
&  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  77,  81. 

(gg)  Carriers  are  not  required  by  law, 
and  could  not  in  justice  be  required  to 
equalize  natural  disadvantages,  such  as 
location,  cost  of  production  and  the  like, 
but  they  may  not  in  any  manner  what- 
soever unduly  prefer  one  set  of  shippers 
entitled  to  equal  treatment  over  an- 
other, or  one  locality  over  another.  Elk 
Cement  and  Lime  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  84,  88. 

(h)  Rates  from  Chicago  on  vehicles 
to  a  considerable  part  of  the  South  and 
Southeast  were  made  and  largely  con- 
trolled by  the  direct  line,  the  I.  C.  R.  R., 
the  short  line  carrier.  Defendants  elected 
to  meet,  via  their  lines  and  the  various 
Ohio  River  and  Virginia  cities  gateways, 
the  rates  so  made  from  Chicago  and  to 
accord  somewhat  similarly  favorable  rate 
adjustments  to  other  points  east  of  Chi- 
cago. They  refused  to  accord  these  rates 
to  traflSc  from  Toledo  to  Ohio  River 
crossings  and  to  Virginia  cities  destined 
beyond  these  basing  points  to  the  South 
and  Southeast.  HELD,  that  carriers  may 
not   select   certain   points   of   production 


292 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES,  §3   (hh)— (k) 


on  their  own  lines  and  give  to  them  the 
benefit  of  rates  to  permit  meeting  com- 
petition of  producers  located  on  other 
lines,  and  deny  similar  treatment  to 
other  producing  centers  on  their  lines 
that  are  similarly  situated,  and  to  which 
the  same  long-established  basis  of  rates 
applies,  and  that  the  practice  indulged 
in  resulted  in  unjust  discrimination.  Mil- 
burn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  93,  100,  101. 

(hh)  Each  community  is  entitled  to  a 
reasonable  rate,  wh  ch  should  in  addition 
be  fairly  adjusted  with  reference  to  one 
another.  Any  locality  which  remains 
at  a  disadvantage  after  this  must  sustain 
that  burden,  which  is  due  to  its  location 
with  respect  to  the  business.  In  Re  In- 
vestigation of  Rates  on  Meats,  22  I.  C.  C. 
IGO,  1G3. 

(i)  Complainants  attacked  the  rates 
upon  hard  wood  lumber  from  pomts  in 
southern  territory  to  Louisville,  Ky., 
on  the  grounds  that  the  rates  to  Mem- 
phis discriminated  against  Louisville.  It 
appeared  that  at  Memphis  the  dealers 
could  take  an  advantage  of  the  transit 
privilege  by  paying  the  full  local  rate  from 
point  of  origin  to  Memphis  and  upon 
reshipment  of  the  lumber  to  a  point 
north  of  the  Ohio  River  could  pay  Ic 
per  100  lbs.  less  than  the  rate  from 
Memphis  to  point  of  ultimate  destina- 
tion. Louisville  being  an  Ohio  River 
crossing,  pays  the  full  rate  up  to  the 
river  and  the  rate  from  the  river  to  the 
point  of  destination,  because  the  rates 
break  at  the  river.  Complainants'  con- 
tention was  really  upon  three  grounds. 
First,  that  from  points  on  the  defend- 
ant's lines  the  rates  to  Cairo  and  to 
Louisville  ought  to  be  the  same  where 
the  distance  is  substantially  the  same. 
Second,  the  present  rate  from  Memphis 
to  Louisville  is  12c  per  100  lbs.,  and 
the  rate  to  Cairo  10c  per  100  lbs.  From 
certain  points  south  of  Memphis  on  the 
I.  C.  and  the  Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.  the 
differential  between  Cairo  and  Louisville 
is  greater  than  2c,  and  complainants 
contended  that  from  all  such  points  the 
differential  in  favor  of  Cairo  ought  not 
to  exceed  2c.  Third,  complainants  were 
subjected  to  undue  disadvantage  because 
a  bridge  toll  of  Ic  per  100  lbs.  is  added 
to  the  rate  from  the  north  bank  of  the 
Ohio  River  to  make  the  rate  from  Louis- 
ville, while  the  other  Ohio  River  cross- 
ings, Cairo,  Evansville  and  Cincinnati, 
being  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Ohio 
River,   pay  no   bridge   toll   on   outbound 


shipments,  and  on  inbound  shipment  no 
bridge  toll  is  added  to  their  rates  by 
the  southern  lines.  HELD,  that  from 
points  on  defendant's  lines  which  are 
equidistant,  or  substantially  so,  from 
Cairo  and  Louisville,  the  rates  to  Louis- 
ville ought  not  to  exceed  the  rates  to 
Cairo,  and  that  from  other  points  of 
origin  the  difference  in  rates  to  Cairo 
and  Louisville  should  be  proportionate 
with  the  difference  in  distance;  and  that 
the  present  relation  of  rates  from  points 
south  of  Memphis  on  the  I.  G.  R.  R.  and 
on  the  Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  was  not  shown 
to  be  discriminatory.  Norman  Lumber 
Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  239. 

(ii)  Carriers  may  not  haul  a  partic- 
ular class  of  traffic  or  traffic  for  a  par- 
ticular community  at  less  than  the  rates 
of  the  service,  and  recoup  themselves 
from  the  charges  levied  against  other 
traffic.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  for  the 
Transportation  of  Freight  in  Single 
Packages  and  Small  Lots,  22  I.  C.  C. 
328,  335. 

(j)  It  is  not  the  function  of  the  Com- 
mission to  equalize  commercial  condi- 
tions or  to  establish  zones  of  trade  or 
bring  markets  into  competition  one  with 
another.  If  a  coal  miner  in  a  particular 
field  needs  to  rely  upon  the  sympathy  of 
his  serving  carrier  or  upon  its  policy 
with  respect  to  the  wisdom  of  making  a 
low  rate  in  order  to  secure  his  traffic  or 
develop  his  mines  or  serve  a  distant 
territory,  his  appeal  must  be  to  such 
carrier  and  not  to  the  Commission.  The 
Commission  has  no  jurisdiction  to  sub- 
stitute its  judgment  as  to  the  wisdom 
of  a  certain  policy  of  rate-making  for 
that  of  traffic  officials  of  railroads.  In 
Re  Advances  on  Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22 
L  C.  C.  604,  613. 

(jj)  The  fact  that  lack  of  prosperity 
among  shippers  is  due  to  excessive  com- 
petition among  them  does  not  justify 
the  imposition  of  excessive  charges,  and 
they  are  entitled  to  a  reasonable  rate, 
whether  it  brings  the  expected  result 
or  not,  and  irrespective  of  the  specific 
channels  into  which  the  amount  of  the 
reduction  will  flow.  Boileau  v  P.  & 
L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  640,  654. 

(k)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  of 
88c  per  net  ton  on  bituminous  coal  in 
carloads  from  the  Pittsburgh,  Pa.,  district 
to  Ashtabula  Harbor,  O.,  for  transship- 
ment by  vessel  on  the  Great  Lakes  to 
points  beyond.  The  coal  moving  over  the 
New  York  Central  lines  from  the  Pitts- 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES,  §3  (kk)— (mm) 


293 


burgh  district  to  Ashtabula  was  carried 
in  solid  trains  averaging  G5  cars  each  of 
42  to  44  tons  per  car.  That  moving  via 
the  Pennsylvania  lines  moved  in  train 
loads  of  40  cars,  averaging  from  40  to 
4  4  tons  each.  The  weighted  average  dis- 
tance from  Pittsburgh  district  to  Ash- 
tabula is  148  miles.  From  1901  to  1911 
the  rate  was  increased  from  73c  to  88c. 
From  1887  to  1900  the  rate  fluctuated 
from  70c  to  $1.  Defendant  carrier  in 
transporting  the  coal  in  question  received 
the  benefit  of  using  the  empty  cars  en- 
gaged in  hauling  iron  ore  from  lake 
points  east,  thereby  removing  tTie  ex- 
pense of  any  back  haul  of  empty  cars. 
Complainant  contended  that  the  rates 
attacked  were  unjust,  as  compared  with 
those  from  the  West  Virginia  coal  fields. 
The  distance  from  the  Pittsburgh  district 
and  from  West  Virginia  districts  of  Poca- 
hontas, Kanawa  and  Fairmont  to  Ash- 
tabula were  160,  434.  400  and  248  miles, 
respectively,  yielding  ton-mile  revenues 
of  5.5,  2.G,  2.4  and  3.9  mills  respectively. 
In  fixing  the  rates  from  these  competing 
mining  districts,  defendants  had  prac- 
tically disregarded  distance  as  well  as 
the  fact  that  the  rail  competition  from 
the  Pittsburgh  district  to  Lake  Erie  was 
much  greater  than  that  from  any  of  the 
West  Virginia  fields.  For  ten  years  prior 
to  March  1,  1912,  the  differentials  be- 
tween these  competing  field§  were  un- 
changed and  under  this  relation  of  rates 
the  coal  tonnage  from  the  West  Virginia 
mines  to  the  lake  ports  increased  some 
885  per  cent,  while  that  from  the  Pitts- 
burgh district  increased  only  277  per  cent. 
The  cost  of  mining  coal  in  the  Pittsburgh 
district  was  more  than  in  the  competing 
West  Virginia  districts,  being  from  80c 
to  $1  per  ton  in  the  former  and  from 
50c  to  60c  in  the  latter.  Defendants  did 
not  equalize  this  advantage  in  rates  in 
its  charges  on  coal  shipped  to  the  At- 
lantic seaboard  for  transshipment,  but  on 
such  coal  accorded  an  advantage  in  rates 
to  the  West  Virginia  mines.  The  rate 
of  88c  complained  of  afforded  a  ton-mile 
revenue  of  5.94  mills  under  the  weighted 
average  distance  of  148  miles  and  ap- 
proximately 5.87  mills  under  straight 
average  mileage.  The  larger  and  more 
prosperous  carriers  engaged  in  transport- 
ing the  coal  under  the  rates  in  question 
were  granted  dividends  between  the  years 
1907  and  1911,  ranging  from  6  to  18  per 
cent.  The  operating  expense  of  trans- 
porting Pittsburgh  coal  to  Ashtabula  was 
probably  less  than  one-half  of  the  rate 
of  88c.    The  evidence  indicated  that  the 


rate  complained  of  was  raised,  step  by 
step,  not  to  bring  it  up  to  a  level  which 
the  carriers  might  have  regarded  and 
defended  as  reasonable,  but  in  order  to 
let  certain  competing  coal  fields  into  the 
trade.  HELD,  that  the  rate  complained 
of  was  unreasonable  and  unjust  and 
should  not  exceed  78c.  Boileau  v.  P.  & 
L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  640. 

(kk)  The  confer tion  that  there  exists 
no  power  anywhere  to  let  a  shipper  into 
a  market  by  advancing  the  rate  to  an- 
other shipper  does  not  appear  to  be 
sound.  Boileau  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co., 
22  I.  C.   C.   640,   654. 

(I)  Complainant,  packing  company 
located  at  Cedar  Rapids,  la.,  at  the  pro- 
ducing points  for  live  hogs,  contended 
that  the  live  hog  rates  to  eastern  desti- 
nations were  made  so  as  to  give  eastern 
packers  not  located  at  the  producing 
points  commercial  equality  with  com- 
plainant, tbus  depriving  it  of  its  natural 
advantages  in  location.  HELD,  a  shipper 
is  entitled  to  a  fair,  reasonable  and  non- 
discriminatory rate  on  any  commodity 
to  any  point  to  which  he  des'res  to  ship 
that  commodity,  and  that  there  should 
be  a  definite  relationship  between  rates 
based  upon  transportation  considerations 
and  not  upon  commercial  equality.  Sin- 
clair &  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
21  1.  C.  C.  490,  507,  508. 

(II)  ^  Commercial  conditions  are  not  to 
be  overcome  by  rate  adjustments.  East 
St.  F.ouis  Cotton  0  1  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F. 
R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  37,  41. 

(m)  The  assertion  that  the  Baltimore 
combinations  of  rates  on  vegetables  from 
the  Charleston,  S.  C,  truck-growing  dis- 
trict are  too  high,  as  they  are  approxi- 
mately the  same  as  the  rates  from  Jack- 
sonville, Fla.,  on  traffic  from  beyond, 
while  Charleston  is  about  250  miles 
nearer  the  points  of  destination,  is  not 
correct,  as  the  rates  from  Jacksonville 
from  beyond  are  substantially  the  same 
as  or  greater  than  the  Baltimore  com- 
binations from  Charleston,  the  Jack- 
sonville rate  being  the  basing  point  and 
simply  a  haulage  charge,  the  gathering 
charge  being  included  in  the  rates  up 
to  the  base  point.  League  of  Commis- 
sion Merchants  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  132,  133. 

(mm)  Truck  growers  in  the  Charleston 
district,  S.  C,  complained  that  the  rates 
exacted  by  defendants  on  cabbages,  po- 
tatoes, beans,  peas  and  cucumbers  from 
shipping  points  in  that  district  to  points 


294 


EQUALIZATION   OP  RATES,   §3    (n)— (x) 


in  Virginia,  Maryland,  Pennsylvania, 
New  Jersey,  New  York,  Massachusetts 
and  the  District  of  Columbia  were  dis- 
criminatory, compared  to  rates  from 
shipping  points  in  Florida  and  from  Nor- 
folk, Va.  The  evidence  showed  that  the 
rate  per  ton  mile  for  the  longer  Florida 
haul  was  higher  than  for  the  shorter 
Charleston  haul.  The  rate  per  ton  mile 
from  the  shorter  Norfolk  haul  was 
less  than  the  rate  per  ton  mile 
from  the  Charleston  haul,  owing,  how- 
ever, to  the  extremely  keen  water  com- 
petition, which  controls  the  rail  rates 
from  Norfolk.  The  profits  per  acre  to 
the  truck  growers  of  Charleston  seem 
to  vary  from  $3  to  $52,  while  the  freight 
paid  on  the  produce  appears  to  average 
about  $G0  an  acre.  HELD,  that  while 
the  risk  and  hardship  of  the  grower  are 
matters  worthy  of  consideration,  they 
are  by  no  means  controlling;  that  the 
Florida  growers  have  natural  advantages 
in  climatic  and  other  conditions;  the 
Norfolk  growers  possess  such  conditions 
and  also  extremely  satisfactory  water 
service,  which  the  Charleston  growers 
do  not  have,  and  under  the  circum- 
stances the  rates  attacked  appear  to  be 
reasonable.  Truck  Growers'  Ass'n  v. 
A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  190. 

(n)  The  exhaustion  of  the  supply  of 
raw  material  near  at  hand,  compelling 
a  manufacturer  to  go  farther  afield  for 
his  supply,  imposes  no  legal  obligation 
upon  the  carrier  to  counteract  this  re- 
sult of  natural  conditions  by  a  reduction 
of  its  freight  rates.  National  Refining 
Co.  V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co..  20 
I.  C.  C.  649. 

(o)  The  mere  fact  that  a  sugar  fac- 
tory has  the  better  of  its  competitors  by 
reason  of  its  proximity  to  the  beet  fields 
and  low  rates,  which  it  consequently  en- 
joys for  the  transportation  of  its  raw  ma- 
terial, does  not  affect  its  rights  to  rea- 
sonable and  non-discriminatory  rates 
and  proper  routing  arrangements  for  the 
movement  of  its  finished  product.  Cali- 
forn'a  Sugar  Co.  v.  S.  P.  L.  A.  &  S.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  G,  9. 

(p)  The  Commission  is  of  opinion 
that  justice  cannot  be  done  to  Nevada 
unless  Nevada  points  are  put  on  a  prac- 
tical parity  with  points  in  eastern  Wash- 
ington and  eastern  Oregon.  Railroad 
Commission  of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  238,  256. 

(q)  The  carriers  should  extend  to 
Phoenix    and    other    points    in    Arizona 


commodity  rates  adapted  to  the  needs 
of  that  territory,  and  in  substantial  con- 
formity with  the  rates  made  on  the  same 
commodities  to  other  intermountain 
points  on  lines  to  the  north.  Maricopa 
County  Commercial  Club  v.  S.  F.  P,  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  257,  258. 

(r)  Because  carriers  have  constructed 
a  system  of  rates  on  a  zone  or  blanket 
system  is  not  sufficient  reason  to  justify 
the  collection  of  unreasonable  charges 
to  any  point.  Every  city  is  entitled  to 
the  advantage  of  its  location  and  may  not 
lawfully  be  subjected  to  high  freight 
charges  merely  because  carriers  for  rea- 
sons of  convenience  or  otherwise  in- 
clude it  with  a  number  of  other  points  in 
surrounding  territory,  which  latter  points 
are  not  similiarly  situated.  Corporation 
Commission  of  North  Carolina  v.  N.  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  303,  309. 

(s)  The  cities  of  San  Pedro  and  Wil- 
mington, situated  on  the  harbor  of  San 
Pedro,  are  about  twenty-two  miles  dis- 
tant from  Los  Angeles,  which  is  inland. 
These  communities  were  merged  into 
the  city  of  Los  Angeles  and  connected 
therewith  by  a  narrow  strip  of  land  half 
a  mile  in  width,  locally  known  as  "the 
shoestring."  HELD,  while  these  com- 
munities have  been  merged  into  one  mu- 
nicipality for  the  purposes  of  civil  gov- 
ernment and.  administration,  this  does 
not  necessarily  merge  the  two  into  one 
community  from  a  transportation  point 
of  view.  Harbor  City  Wholesale  Co.  v. 
S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  323,  331. 

(t)  To  adjust  rates  to  correspond- 
ingly fluctuate  with  values  of  products 
and  resultant  fluctuations  of  carrier's 
risk  is  impossible.  Ponchatoula  Farm- 
ers' Ass'n  V.  I.  X.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
513,  516. 

(u)  Vicissitudes  of  competition  among 
shippers  cannot  be  compensated  for  in 
the  freight  rate.  Ponchatoula  Farmers' 
Ass'n  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
513,  516. 

(vw)  Carriers  are  not  required  to 
equalize  by  rate  adjustments  the  ad- 
vantages enjoyed  by  one  coal  producing 
point  over  another  in  the  matter  of  cost 
of  production  and  salability  of  products. 
Colorado  Coal  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  C.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C  572,  576. 

(x)  Geographical  disadvantages  can- 
not well  be  overcome  by  any  proper  ad- 
justment of  transportation  charges. 
Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co  v.  L.  S.  & 
M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  30,  33. 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES,  §3   (y)— (gg) 


295 


(y)  Proximity  of  Detroit  and  Toledo 
to  the  great  channels  of  through  trans- 
portation and  their  location  on  direct 
through  routes,  where  density  of  traffic 
is  very  great  and  general  operating  and 
traffic  conditions  are  favorable,  are  ele- 
ments that  cannot  be  ignored  by  the  rate 
maker,  and  must  necessarily  tend  to 
lower  rates  than  can  be  accorded  to 
communities  that  are  removed  from  these 
great  streams  of  traffic.  Saginaw  Board 
of  Trade  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  128,  135. 

(z)  A  carrier  in  establishing  rates  is 
not  bound  to  make  good  to  the  shipper 
the  result  of  his  own  folly  or  misfortune 
in  producing  a  supply  in  excess  of  the 
demand.  Florida  Fruit  and  Vegetable 
Ass'n  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.,  17  I.  C.  C.  552,  5C1. 

(aa)  A  point  is  entitled  to  the  rate 
which  its  location  and  other  advantages 
dictate,  without  taking  into  account  con- 
ditions which  bring  about  lower  rates  to 
other  points.  Board  of  Trade  of  Winston- 
Salem  V.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
12.   16. 

(aaa)  A  basing  point  is  established 
that  all  roads  might  share  in  the  business 
and  all  shippers  be  given  opportunity  to 
compete  in  common  markets.  Avery 
Manufacturing  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  20,  23. 

(bb)  Carriers  should  keep  in  close 
touch  with  commercial  conditions  per- 
taining to  sales  of  commodities  and  the 
needs  of  communities,  and  adjust  their 
charges,  when  practicable,  within  rea- 
sonable limitations  to  meet  those  con- 
ditions and  encourage  sales  and  the 
movement  of  freight;  yet  it  cannot  be 
held  to  be  a  duty  of  the  carrier,  in  ad- 
justing charges,  to  equalize  the  value  of 
commodities  in  their  final  distribution. 
Chicago  Lumber  &  Coal  Co.  v.  T.  S. 
Hy.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  323,  331. 

(cc)  When  a  carrier  has  established 
a  reasonable  rate  for  transportation  of 
a  given  commodity  it  cannot  be  required 
to  change  that  rate  to  accord  with  the 
differing  values  of  the  same  commodity 
produced  by  different  shippers;  in  other 
words,  to  equalize  natural  business  con- 
ditions. Hafey  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.,   15  I.   C.   C.  245,   246. 

(dd)  Carriers  are  not  required  by 
law  and  could  not  in  justice  be  required 
to  equalize  natural  disadvantages,  such 
as  location,  cost  of  production  and  the 
like.  Black  Mountain  Coal  Land  Co.  v. 
So.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  286,  293. 


(ddd)  A  carrier  cannot  lawfully  so 
group  its  mines  with  respect  of  rates  as 
to  unduly  discriminate  against  any  lo- 
cality. The  duty  imposed  by  law  is  to 
give  equal  treatment  to  all  shippers  who 
are  in  a  position  to  demand  it,  and  this 
includes  the  right  to  reach  competitive 
markets  on  relatively  equal  terms.  Where 
the  same  carrier  serves  two  districts, 
which,  by  their  location,  the  character 
of  their  output  and  distance  from  mar- 
kets, are  in  substantially  similar  cir- 
cumstances and  conditions,  it  cannot 
lawfully  prefer  one  to  the  other  in  any 
manner  whatsoever.  Black  Mountain 
Coal  Land  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C 
286,  292. 

(ee)  The  manufactured  product  com- 
monly takes  a  higher  rate  than  the  raw 
material.  But  the  maintenance  of  a 
parity  of  rates  on  wheat  and  flour  tends 
to  equalize  conditions  at  all  points  at 
vvh'ch  flour-milling  industries  exist,  and 
seems  to  be  a  sound  rate  policy.  Bulte 
Milling  Co.  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  351,  364. 

(ff)  Seattle  can  command  a  better 
rate  from  eastern  territory  than  Spo- 
kane. This  is  a  disadvantage  of  loca- 
tion under  which  the  city  of  Spokane 
rests,  and  of  which  it  cannot  justly  com- 
plain. City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  376,  419. 

(gg)  In  Farmers,  Merchants  and 
Shippers'  Club  of  Kansas  v.  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.  Ry.  Co.  et  al.,  12  I.  C.  C.  351,  the 
Commission  held  that  rates  on  grain 
from  points  in  southern  Kansas  should 
by  a  direct  route  to  Galveston  and  other 
gulf  ports  take  lower  rates  than  the 
combination  based  on  Kansas  City.  De- 
fendants established  such  lower  rates 
and  applied  them  as  well  to  points  in 
northern  Kansas.  The  distance  from  all 
said  Kansas  points  by  the  direct  line  was 
considerably  shorter  than  via  Kansas 
City.  In  order  for  the  Santa  Fe  to  take 
grain  over  its  own  lines  to  Texas  or 
the  gulf  via  Kansas  City  it  would  have 
to  haul  it  nearly  300  miles  out  of  line. 
The  Rock  Island,  in  order  to  do  the 
same  thing,  would  have  to  haul  out  of 
line  about  200  miles.  Complainant  grain 
dealers  at  Kansas  City  complained  of 
said  adjustments  as  unduly  discrimi- 
natory against  them  and  demanded  that 
the  rates  via  Kansas  City  and  via  the 
direct  route  should  be  the  same.  No 
evidence  of  the  unreasonableness  of  the 
rates  into  and  out  of  Kansas  City  was 
offered.      HELD,    the    direct    route    was 


296 


EQUALIZATION   OF   RATES,    §3    (hh)— (mm) 


more  economical  and  naturally  resulted 
in  lower  rates;  Kansas  shippers  were 
entitled  to  the  benefit  of  their  proximity 
(o  the  gulf,  and  the  decision  in  said 
former  case  should  not  be  disturbed. 
Kansas  City  Transportation  Bureau  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  491,  498. 

(hh)  Consideration  must  be  given  to 
advantages  of  natural  location  and  de- 
velopment in  readjusting  rates.  Kindel 
V.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  555,  561. 

(ii)  Until  recent  years  only  big  vein 
coal  was  mined  in  the  George's  Creek 
Maryland  district.  This  coal  becoming 
exhausted,  an  attempt  was  made  to  mine 
small  vein  coal  found  in  the  district,  and 
a  readjustment  of  rates  was  required 
and  asked  by  complainant,  located  at 
George's  Creek,  in  order  to  enable  it  to 
compete  with  small  vein  coal  from  the 
Pennsylvania  and  West  Virginia  dis- 
tricts. Complainant  asked  for  no  adjust- 
ment of  the  rating  on  big  vein  coal. 
HELD,  that  for  experimental  purposes 
defendants  should  segregate  the  small 
vein  mines  from  the  big  vein  mines,  and 
that  different  rates  should  be  allowed 
for  the  big  and  the  small  vein  coal  com- 
ing from  the  George's  Creek  district,  the 
big  vein  rate  to  remain  the  same,  the 
small  vein  rate  to  be  so  adjusted  as  to 
place  small  vein  coal  on  a  parity  with 
that  coming  from  the  Pennsylvania  and 
West  Virginia  districts,  rates  to  be  later 
revised  if  actual  experience  should  prove 
that  fraud  resulted  over  the  segregation 
of  the  small  vein  from  the  big  vein  coal. 
(Prouty  and  Lane,  Comm'rs,  dissenting.) 
George's  Creek  Basin  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  127,  133. 

(jj)  A  rate  of  27.5c  on  yellow  pine 
lumber  was  charged  by  defendant  car- 
riers from  Little  Rock,  Fordyce,  Rob 
Roy  and  Texarkana,  Ark.,  and  other 
points  in  Arkansas,  Louisiana  and  Texas 
to  Des  Moines,  la.,  as  against  a  rate  of 
23c  from  that  territory  to  Council  Bluffs, 
la.,  and  Omaha,  Neb.  For  twenty  years 
prior  to  1900  defendants  charged  a  rate 
of  22c  from  that  territory  to  Des  Moines. 
During  the  last  ten  years  there  was 
heavy  competition  at  Des  Moines  be- 
tween lumber  from  southern  territory 
and  the  northwest,  making  on  the  whole 
the  competition  at  Des  Moines  as  great 
as  that  at  Omaha  and  Council  Bluffs. 
Omaha  and  Council  Bluffs  are  both  a 
greater  distance  from  southern  territory 
than  Des  Moines.  Both  Omaha  and  Des 
Moines  have  the  rails  of  one  carrier  ex- 


tending directly  into  the  southern  terri- 
tory in  question.  The  competition  be> 
tween  western  and  southern  lumber  had 
resulted  in  raising  the  rate  on  southern 
lumber  to  Omaha  only  Ic,  whereas  de- 
fendants had  advanced  the  rate  to  Des 
Moines  5.5c.  HELD,  the  rates  in  question 
to  Des  Moines  should  be  reduced  to  cor- 
respond with  those  to  Omaha  and  Coun- 
cil Bluffs.  Greater  Des  Moines  Commit- 
tee V.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I,  C.  C.  294. 
297,  298. 

(kk)  It  is  not  possible  to  place  all 
commercial  centers  on  equality  in  the 
cost  of  transportation,  and  certain  cen- 
ters must  have  certain  natural  advan- 
tages in  this  respect  if  the  cost  of  the 
service  and  the  distance  which  goods 
are  transported  are  to  be  given  any  con- 
sideration in  determining  transportation 
rates.  Burnham,  Hanna,  Munger  Co.  v. 
C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C  C.  299,  303. 

(11)  Where  a  New  York  milling  com- 
pany enjoys  from  the  existence  of  the 
Erie  Canal  a  natural  advantage  in  water 
rates  inherent  in  the  location  of  its 
mill  such  fact  does  not  militate  against 
its  right  to  demand  equal  rail  rates  with 
western  millers  on  grain  shipped  by  it 
from  the  west  to  be  ground  in  New  York 
and  exported.  Hecker- Jones- Jewell  Mill- 
ing Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  1.  C.  C. 
356,   359. 

(mm)  Defendants  allowed  on  corn 
shipped  from  the  middle  western  states 
to  Lewiston  and  Bangor,  Me.,  milling  in 
transit,  under  which  the  millers  might 
ship  the  manufactured  product  to  points 
in  Washington  County,  Maine,  at  the 
through  rate.  Complainant  millers  in 
Washington  County,  which  lay  on  the 
eastern  border  of  Maine,  adjoining  New 
Brunswick,  had  no  market  to  the  east 
for  their  products.  They  were  com- 
pelled to  pay  the  through  rate  from 
points  of  origin  to  their  mills  plus  the 
local  rate  from  their  mills  back  to  con- 
sumption points  west  thereof.  As  a  re- 
sult their  market  was  limited  to  the  im- 
mediate vicinity  of  their  mills.  They  at- 
tacked the  milling-in-transit  privilege  as 
unduly  preferential  to  competitors  at 
Bangor  and  Lewiston.  HELD,  the  dis- 
advantage under  which  complainants 
rested  was  due  to  their  unfavorable  lo- 
cation and  the  Commission  would  not 
overcome  that  by  an  adjustment  of  rates. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Quimby  v.  Maine 
Central  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C  246,  248. 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES,  §3    (nn)— §4   (1)    (d) 


297 


(nn)  The  rate  on  rope  from  San 
Francisco  to  Independence,  Mo.,  was 
75c.  From  San  Francisco  to  Missouri 
River  points,  including  Kansas  City, 
Carthage  and  Joplin,  Mo.,  and  Fort 
Smith,  Ark.,  and  to  Mississippi  River 
common  points,  Chicago  and  common 
points,  the  rate  was  60c.*  Independence  is 
located  in  southeastern  Kansas,  and  is 
2,041  miles  from  San  Francisco;  Kan- 
sas City  is  2.012  miles;  Joplin,  2,12G 
miles;  Fort  Scott,  2,111  miles,  and  Fort 
Smith,  2,298  miles.  The  only  shipments 
that  might  move  from  San  Francisco 
through  Independence  were  those  to  Jop- 
lin and  Fort  Smith,  but  no  rope  was  in 
fact  shipped  to  these  points.  The  60c  rate 
was  established  to  place  San  Francisco 
as  a  producing  point  on  an  equality  with 
New  York  in  the  sale  of  rope  in  the  ter- 
ritory to  which  the  60c  rate  applied.  Prior 
to  the  establishment  of  the  60c  rate  from 
San  Francisco  the  rate  from  the  east  to 
the  selling  territory  was  lower  than 
from  the  coast.  Independence  ^  as  not 
included  in  Missouri  River  common 
points  territory.  In  like  manner,  prior 
to  the  establishment  of  the  75c  rate  at- 
tacked at  Independence  the  rate  from  east- 
ern producing  points  to  Independence  was 
lower  than  that  from  the  coast  and  the 
75c  rate  was  established  to  enable  San 
Francisco,  as  a  producing  point,  to  com- 
pete with  eastern  producing  points  in 
the  sale  of  rope  at  Independence.  This 
60c  rate,  plus  the  local  rates  from  points 
to  which  it  applied  to  Independence,  was 
in  excess  of  the  75c  rate,  so  that  com- 
plainant dealer  at  Independence  suffered 
no  competition  in  his  territory  from 
points  taking  the  60c  rate.  The  per  ton 
mile  revenue  on  the  rate  attacked  was 
7.34  mills,  which  was  lower  than  the 
average  earnings  of  the  leading  western 
lines.  HELD,  that  the  rate  attacked  was 
not  shown  to  be  unreasonable  per  se; 
that  it  was  not  in  violation  of  the  long 
and  short  haul  clause  of  section  4;  and 
that  it  was  not  unduly  discriminatory 
against  Independence.  Bovaird  Supply 
Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C. 
56,  64. 

(oo)  Complainant  shipped  lumber  via 
an  indirect  route  with  class  rate.  This 
rate  was  subsequently  reduced  to  meet 
a  commodity  rate  in  effect  via  direct 
route.  Reparation  cannot  be  predicated 
upon  reduction  of  the  rate  via  the  in- 
direct route  to  meet  the  rate  via  the 
short  line.  Willson  Bros.  Lumber  Co.  v 
P.   S.  &  N.   R.  R.   Co.,  Unrep.   Op.  375. 


(pp)  It  is  not  incumbent  upon  carrier 
to  equalize  the  disadvantage  of  location 
and  two-line  haul  by  the  absorption  of 
the  foreign  line's  entire  rate  to  the  junc- 
tion. Great  Western  Portland  Cement 
Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
454. 

§4.     Competition. 

See  Competition. 

§4.     (1)     In  General. 

(a)  A  carrier  may  voluntarily  accept 
lower  rates  than  it  can  be  required  to 
accept,  and  whether  or  not  a  carrier 
will  meet  competitive  conditions  at  a 
particular  point  rests  primarily  with  it. 
But  this  principle  does  not  relieve  the 
carrier  from  the  obligation  to  remove  un- 
lust  discrimination  created  by  meeting 
competitive  conditions  at  one  point  and 
refus'ng  to  meet  them  at  a  neighboring 
noint.  Chamber  of  Commerce,  Ashburn. 
Ga.,  V.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C. 
140,  149. 

(b)  Competitive  influences  may  bring 
about  an  equalization  of  rates  on  traffic 
to  a  certain  defined  territory  which  is 
not  accorded  as  to  any  other  territory; 
^nd  unless  unjust  discrimination  results 
the  carriers  are  w'thin  their  rights  in 
maintaining  such  an  adjustment.  In- 
dianapolis Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  23  1.  C.  C.  195,  207. 

(c)  Strictly  speaking  there  is  no  such 
thing  as  market  competition  which  is 
iistinct  from  compet'tion  between  the 
lines  of  transportation  serving  the  mar- 
ket. A  market  can  only  compete  through 
the  agency  which  transports  for  it.  The 
carrier  makes  a  rate  from  a  given  mar- 
ket not  out  of  favor  to  that  locality,  but 
because  it  desires  to  obtain  traffic  which 
will  not  otherwise  come  to  it.  There 
would  seem,  therefore,  to  be  little  distinc- 
tion between  the  competition  of  markets 
and  the  competition  of  rival  railroads. 
City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21 
T.  C.  C.  400,  414. 

(cc)  It  is  unjust  to  fix  rates  so  as  to 
destroy  the  business  of  one  concern  and 
create  a  monopoly  in  favor  of  other  con- 
cerns, though  it  be  merely  incidental 
to  meeting  competitive  rate.  Spiegle  & 
Co.  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  522,  525. 

(d)  A  carrier  may  for  competitive 
reasons  establish  a  rate  lower  than  it 
could  justly  be  compelled  by  the  Com- 
mission to  establish.  Breese-Trenton 
Mining  Co.  v.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
398,  600. 


298 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES,  §4  (1)   (e)— §4  (2)   (b) 


(e)  The  principle  that  there  should 
be  substantial  parity  between  rates  on 
wheat  and  on  flour  all-rail  should  be  ap- 
plied to  lake-and-rail  rates  as  well.    Jen- 

nison  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.   Co.,  18  I.   C.   C. 
113,  124. 

(f)  What  a  carrier  may  do  to  meet 
competition  is  one  thing  and  what  it 
ought  to  be  compelled  to  do  is  another 
thing.  Frederich  &  Kempe  Co.  v.  N.  Y. 
N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  481,  484. 

(g)  Because  on  account  of  competi- 
tion the  same  rates  are  accorded  com- 
peting localities  to  particular  points  no 
reason  exists  why  they  should  have  the 
same  rates  to  other  points  where  compe- 
tition is  not  a  factor.  Colorado  Coal 
Traffic  Ass'n  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I. 
C.  C.  572. 

(h)  The  Commission  cannot  order 
rates  from  Coffeyville,  Kan.,  to  Memphis 
to  meet  those  voluntarily  established  by 
other  carriers  from  points  east  of  the 
Mississippi  to  Memphis,  National  Pe- 
troleum Ass'n  V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
593,  595. 

(1)  Competition  that  may  be  consid- 
ered in  proper  cases  not  only  includes 
competition  of  carriers,  but  also  that  of 
the  commodity  produced  in  another  sec- 
tion and  sometimes  competition  of  one 
kind  of  traffic  with  another  kind.  Met- 
ropolitan Paving  Brick  Co.  v.  A.  A.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  197,  203. 

(j)  It  is  the  duty  of  railroads  to  es- 
tablish reasonable  transportation  charges 
and  in  so  doing  competitive  conditions 
must  be  considered,  but  it  is  not  their 
duty  to  make  good  to  the  producer  the 
result  of  his  own  folly  or  misfortune. 
Florida  Fruit  &  Vegetable  Ass'n  v.  A.  C. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  552,  561. 

(k)  The  Commission  should  not  be 
understood  as  holding  that  a  railroad 
must  under  all  circumstances  meet  the 
rate  of  it^  competitor.  North  Bros.  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  70,  71. 

(kk)  A  carrier  may  voluntarily  make, 
under  the  force  of  controlling  competi- 
tion, rates  which  it  might  not  be  required 
to  make.  Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  567,  576. 

(1)  Competition  in  commodities  alone 
is  not  a  circumstance  that  will  entitle 
a  selling  point  to  have  an  already  low 
rate  made  still  lower  to  equal  one  at  a 
more  distant  point,  which  was  made  to 
meet  competition  of  carriers  and  of  rates 


as  well  as  of  markets  and  products.  Bo- 
vaird  Supply  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  56,  64. 

§4.     (2)      Railroad  Competition. 

See  Evidence,  §47;  Rate  via  Compet- 
ing Line;  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§2  (a).      ^ 

(a)     Complainants  shipped  carloads  of 
scrap    iron    from    Walcottville,    Ind.,    via 
Montpelier,    O.,    to    Ft.    Wayne,    Ind.,    a 
distance  of  89  miles,  under  a  rate  of  $1.25 
per  gross  ton.    At  the  same  time,  via  an 
equally  available  route  by  a  competing 
line  which  had  a  haul  of  only  35  miles, 
a  ratio  of  85c  per  gross  ton  was  in  effect, 
which  defendant  subsequently  reduced  its 
rate  to  meet.  No  evidence  was  submitted 
of  the  unreasonableness  of  the  rate  per  se. 
Complainants  submitted  testimony  tend- 
ing to  show  that  before  shipments  were 
made  defendant  quoted  to   complainants 
the  same  rate  as  that  of  the  competing 
line.     HELD,   if  the  shipper  desires  the 
benefit  of  a  rate  published   by  a  partic- 
ular carrier  it  is  incumbent  upon  him  to 
tender   his   traffic    to    such    carrier,    and 
failing   to    do    so   he    cannot   expect   the 
Commission  to  award  reparation  merely 
for   the   purpose    of   equalizing   the   rate 
he  was  compelled  to  pay  with  the  lower 
rate    of    the    competing    line,    which    he 
might  have  used.     The  fact  complainant 
was  quoted  an  equalized  rate  can  afford 
no  relief  inasmuch  as  the  rate  shown  by 
the  tariff  in  force  at  the  time  was  the 
only  rate  that  coujd  be  lawfully  applied. 
The  fact  that  there  was  at  the  time  the 
shipment  moved  a  lower  rate  via  a  com- 
peting line  is  not  of  itself  proof  that  the 
rate  charged  was  unreasonable,  nor  can 
the   fact  that  after   the   shipments  were 
made  the  defendant  reduced  its  rates  to 
the  level  of  the  rate  via  the  competing 
line  be  accepted  as  sufficient  ground  for 
an   award   of  reparation.     The   mere  re- 
duction of  a  rate  by  a  carrier,  especially 
when  induced  by  competition,  as  seems 
to  have  been  the  case  here,  is  not  of  itself 
evidence   that  the   former  rate   was   un- 
reasonable.    Complaint  dismissed.  Simon 
Cook  V.   Wabash  R.   R.   Co.,  21   I.   C.   C. 
503,  564. 

(b)  Complainant  shipped  cement  from 
Tola.  Tex.,  to  Comanche,  Hasse,  Brady 
and  Stephensville,  Tex.  Shipments  moved 
over  the  M.  K.  &  T.  R.  R.  and  F.  W.  & 
R.  G.  R.  R.  Lawful  combinations  were 
assessed.  At  the  same  time  there  was 
a  through  route  via;  the  Santa  Fe  and 
the  F.  W.  &  R.  G.  R.  Rs.,  with  a  joint 
rate  less  than  the  combination  charged. 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES,  §4    (2)    (c)— (h) 


299 


The  joint  rate  was  known  to  complainant. 
No  evidence  was  offered  that  the  rate 
assessed  was  unreasonable  and  the  only- 
reason  suggested  for  giving  the  traflBc 
to  the  M.  K.  &  T.  R.  R.  was  an  alleged  as- 
sumption that  the  latter  road  would  be 
able  to  "protect"  the  rate  published  over 
another  route.  HELD,  it  to  be  obvious 
that  such  a  state  of  facts  cannot  be  made 
the  basis  of  an  award  of  reparation 
under  the  Act,  as  such  a  result  would 
be  in  substance  an  entire  perversion  of 
the  fundamental  provision  of  the  statute 
In. respect  to  the  publication  of  rates  and 
adherence  thereto.  lola  Portland  Cement 
Co.  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
C.  91. 

(c)  Complainants  shipped  three  car- 
loads of  brick,  Augusta,  Ga.,  to  Calhoun 
Falls,  S.  C,  which  had  to  move  via 
Southern  R.  R.  to  Greenwood,  S.  C, 
tnence  Seaboard  Air  Line  to  Calhoun 
Falls,  a  total  haul  of  195  miles,  under  a 
rate  of  $2.40  per  1,000  brick.  Subse- 
quently this  rate  was  reduced  to  $1.40. 
At  time  of  shipment  a  rate  of  $1.40  was 
in  effect  between  the  same  points  via 
the  Charleston  &  Western  Carolina  R. 
R.,  a  distance  of  sixty-eight  miles.  Rep- 
aration is  asked  of  $1.00  per  1,000  brick. 
HELD,  that  a  carrier  with  a  long  route 
is  not  obliged,  as  a  matter  of  law,  to 
meet  the  rate  of  its  short  line  com- 
petitors, and  the  reduction  of  a  rate  ap- 
plicable via  a  long  route  to  meet  the  rate 
in  effect  via  a  shorter  and  more  direct 
one  is  not  of  itself  conclusive  evidence  of 
the  unreasonableness  of  the  higher  rate. 
Reparation  denied.  Georgia-Carolina 
Brick  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  148, 149. 

(d)  Complainant  attacked  as  unjust 
and  unreasonable  of  themselves  defend- 
ant's rates  on  grain  from  certain  points 
on  their  respective  lines  in  South  Da- 
kota, Minnesota  and  Iowa  to  Omaha  and 
South  Omaha,  Neb.,  and  Council  Bluffs, 
la.,  as  compared  with  rates  from  the 
same  points  of  origin  to  other  grain  mar- 
kets of  which  Minneapolis  was  the  most 
important.  The  real  and  important 
question  was  whether  or  not  defendants 
should  be  required  to  establish  rates  in 
the  territory  in  question  to  Omaha  on  a 
basis  of  like  rates  to  like  distances  as 
compared  with  their  rates  from  same 
points  to  Minneapolis.  The  desire  of 
Omaha  dealers  was  to  have  grain  shipped 
to  Omaha,  not  particularly  for  milling  or 
consumption  at  that  point,  but  for  re- 
shipment  to  eastern  and  southern  points. 
HELD,  that  the  rates  to  Minneipolis  are 


strongly  influenced  or  controlled  by  com- 
petitive conditions,  which  do  not  like- 
wise affect  the  rates  to  Omaha.  The  in- 
terests of  the  Minneapolis  lines  which  do 
not  also  reach  Omaha,  as  well  as  the 
demands  of  the  milling  interests  at  Min- 
neapolis, create  conditions  which  as  to 
the  rates  and  transportation  to  Min- 
neapolis are  substantially  dissimiliar 
from  those  which  apply  to  the  rates  and 
the  transportation  to  Omaha.  Omaha 
Grain  Exchange  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  424,  433. 

(e)  The  rate  on  agricultural  implements 
from  Springfield,  HI.,  via  Peoria  to  Mis- 
souri River  points  may  be  lower  than 
from  Peoria  to  those  points  where  the 
Peoria  carriers  meet  the  Springfield  rate 
established  by  the  short  line  carrier 
from  Springfield  in  order  to  secure  a 
share  of  the  business.  Avery  Mfg.  Co. 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  20,  2=^. 

(f)  Because  the  delivering  carrier 
sees  fit  to  state  that  it  will  protect  a 
rate  made  by  its  competitor,  but  fails 
to  do  so,  the  Commission  cannot  hold 
such  lower  rate  is  necessarily  reason- 
able. DeCamp  Bros.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  144,  145. 

(g)  The  Commission  cannot  order  a 
reduction  of  rates  on  paper  stock  in 
order  to  enable  defendant  carrier  to 
meet  competition,  as  railroads  are  au- 
thorized to  meet  or  not  to  meet  com- 
petition as  to  them  seems  to  their  in- 
terest. La  Salle  Paper  Co.  v.  M.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  149,  150. 

(h)  On  two  shipments  of  cotton,  100 
bales  each,  from  Marshall,  Tex.,  to  Bid- 
deford.  Me.,  complainant  was  assessed 
the  combination  class  rate  of  $1.72,  made 
up  of  $1.37  from  Marshall  to  East  St. 
Louis,  and  35c  thence  to  Biddeford.  The 
bills  of  lading  issued  by  the  initial  car- 
rier specified  a  rate  of  95c  and  were 
marked  "Rates  guaranteed."  Commodity 
rates  were  at  the  time  of  shipments  in 
effect  via  another  route.  Subsequent  to 
the  time  of  movement,  defendant,  initial 
carrier,  joined  in  tariffs,  fixing  rates  be- 
tween the  points  in  question  at  97c,  all- 
rail,  and  95c  via  the  gulf  ports.  HELD, 
the  rate  charged  was  unreasonable  with 
respect  to  the  haul  from  East  St.  Louis 
to  Biddeford,  and  the  rate  for  this  por- 
tion of  the  entire  haul  should  not  have 
exceeded  60c.  Reparation  awarded  on 
the  basis  of  95c.  Pepperell  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
T.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  353,  355. 


300 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES,  §4    (2)    (i)— (n) 


(i)  On  a  shipment  of  pickles  in  car- 
loads from  Ottumwa,  la.,  to  Kansas  City, 
Mo.,  defendant  assessed  its  lawfully  ap- 
plicable fifth  class  rate  of  22c.  At  the 
same  time  a  commodity  rate  of  14i^c  was 
In  effect  over  another  line.  Shortly  after 
the  shipment  in  question  defendants  met 
this  14i^c  commodity  rate.  HELD,  the 
rate  charged  was  unreasonable.  Repara- 
tion awarded  on  the  basis  of  14i^c.  Ot- 
tumwa Pickle  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  3G8. 

(j)  The  Commission  cannot  accept 
the  theory  that  one  carrier's  rate  is  un- 
reasonable simply  and  solely  because 
another  carrier  had  at  the  time  a  lower 
rate.  What  is  reasonable  for  one  carrier 
may  not  be  reasonable  for  another. 
Swift  &  Co.  V.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  426,  429. 

(k)  The  carrier  whose  lawful  tariff 
rate  is  higher  than  that  of  a  competing 
line  has  no  right  to  solicit  or  accept  ship- 
ment with  the  understanding  or  expecta- 
tion that  an  order  of  reparation  will  be 
sought  at  the  hands  of  the  Commission 
for  the  purpose  of  equalizing  to  the  ship- 
per a  rate  which  he  could  have  se- 
cured by  giving  his  shipment  to  another 
carrier.  Swift  •..  Co.  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  426,  430. 

(1)  On  ground  iron  o-re  in  carloads 
from  Iron  Ridge,  Wis.,  to  Michigan  City, 
Ind.,  and  from  Iron  Ridge  to  Louisville, 
Ky.,  the  rate  via  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R. 
from  Iron  Ridge  to  Milwaukee  was  5c 
and  from  Milwaukee  to  Michigan  City 
via  the  P.  M.  R.  R.  8l^c  and  from  Mil- 
waukee to  Louisville  15c,  making  the 
Milwaukee  combination  to  Michigan 
City  13l^c  and  to  Louisville  20c. 
The  joint  through  rate  from  Iron 
Ridge  to  Michigan  City  via  Mil- 
waukee and  the  P.  M.  R.  R.  was  21i/^c, 
and  to  Louisville  25 1/4  c.  The  rate  from 
Iron  Ridge  to  Michigan  City  via  Chicago 
by  the  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  and  the  Mo- 
non  Ry.  was  the  same  as  via  Milwaukee, 
211/^c,  but  the  combination  via  Chicago 
was  18c.  Complainant  delivered  a  ship- 
ment to  the  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  without 
routing  instructions  except  verbal  direc 
tions  to  forward  by  the  cheapest  route. 
The  agent  forwarded  same  via  Chicago 
and  the  Monon.  At  the  time  of  hearing 
the  only  rate  in  effect  to  Michigan  City 
was  the  combination  rate  of  iSi^c  via 
Milwaukee,  and  IGV2C  via  Chicago, 
HELD,  since  the  lowest  rate  lawfully 
applicable  from  Iron  Ridge  to  Michigan 


City  was  that  via  the  route  over  which 
the  shipments  actually  moved,  repara- 
tion must  be  awarded  upon  the  rate 
deemed  by  the  Commission  reasonable 
via  that  route,  and  the  carriers  should 
not  be  forced  to  meet  the  lower  rate  cov- 
ering the  shorter  haul  via  the  P.  M.  R. 
R.  Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis  of 
the  161/^0  rate  in  effect  at  the  time  of 
the  hearing,  via  Chicago.  On  the  ship- 
ment to  Louisville  reparation  awarded 
on  the  rate  in  effect  at  the  time  of  the 
hearing  made  on  Milwaukee  combination, 
viz.,  14.82c.  Winters  Metallic  Paint  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  562, 
563. 

(m)  Complainants  delivered  to  the 
M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  at  Tupelo,  Okla.,  one 
carload  of  corn  without  routing  instruc- 

j  tions,  destined  to  Forest  City.  Ark. 
There  was  via  the  O.  C.  Ry.  in  connec- 

I  tion  with  the  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  a  joint 
rate  of  17i/^c  between  these  points  that 
would  have  applied  if  the  shipment  had 
been  delivered  to  the  O.  C.  Ry.  at  Tupe- 
lo. The  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  routed  the  ship- 
ment via  McAlester  instead  of  via  Le- 
high, a  nearer  point  on  its  line  from  the 
point  of  origin,  and  subjected  the  ship- 
ment thereby  to  a  higher  rate  than  via 
Lehigh.  HELD,  complainants  were  not 
entitled  to  reparation  on  the  basis  of  the 
nVzC  rate,  since  where  there  are  two  o-r 
more  lines  with  different  rates  between 
two  points  a  shipper  is  not  entitled  to 
secure  the  application  of  the  lowest  rate 
by  either  of  such  lines  regardless  of 
which  one  he  uses,  but  the  law  requires 
each  carrier  to  adhere  to  its  own  estab- 
lished rate.  Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  the  rate  via  Lehigh.  Hill  & 
Webb  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C 
569. 

(n)  On  bituminous  coal  in  carloads 
ihipped  in  Nov^ember,  1906.  from  Grafton, 
W.  Va.,  to  Kalamazoo,  Mich.,  via  the 
B.  &  O.  and  the  M.  C.  R.  Rs.,  a  rate  of 
$1.90  per  net  ton  was  collected.  For 
several  years  prior  to  June  25,  1906,  the 
rate  from  Grafton  to  Krlamazoo  on  all 
routes  in  connection  with  the  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  was  $1.90.  The  distance  via  Wil- 
low Creek,  Ind.,  the  route  over  which 
the  shipments  in  question  moved,  was 
640  miles.  Over  other  routes  in  con- 
nection with  the  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  the  dis- 
tance varied  from  500  to  550  miles.  In 
June  and  July,  1906,  the  $1.90  rate  was 
reduced  to  $1.85  via  all  of  the  routes 
except  those  via  Willow  Creek,  Ind.,  and 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES,   §4    (2)    (o)— (s) 


301 


Sherwood,  O.  On  Jan.  11,  1907,  the 
$1.85  rate  was  applied  to  these  two 
routes.  The  above  reductions  were  made 
to  meet  the  competition  of  ex-river  coal 
brought  down  the  Ohio  River.  The  $1.90 
rate  a£tacked  produced  over  the  640  miles 
route  less  than  3  mills  per  ton  mile.  No 
other  evidence  of  the  unreasonableness 
of  the  charge  collected  was  offered. 
HELD,  the  $1.90  rate  collected  was  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable.  The  volun- 
tary reduction  of  a  rate  does  not  carry 
with  it  a  conclusive  presumption  that  the 
prior  rate  was  unjust  or  unreasonable. 
A  carrier  with  a  long  route  is  not  obUged 
as  a  matter  of  law  to  meet  the  rate 'of  a 
shorter  competitor.  Neither  is  a  carrier 
via  a  long  route  obliged  as  a  matter  of 
law  to  reduce  its  rate  because  its  short 
line  competitor  reduces  a  rate  which  has 
been  the  same  via  both  routes.  Com- 
mercial Coal  Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  11,  14. 

(o)  Whatever  may  have  been  the 
practice  in  the  past  of  "meeting  the 
rate,"  tariffs  must  now  be  adhered  to. 
Menefee  Lumber  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  49,  51. 

(p)  Defendant  exacted  on  carloads  of 
canned  peaches  from  Atlanta,  Tex.,  to 
Chicago  and  Kansa::  City  the  class  rates 
of  82c  and  75c,  respectively.  Prior  to 
the  shipment  complainant  intended  to 
ship  via  another  initial  carrier  and 
another  route  taking  rates  of  61c  and 
58c,  respectively.  Upon  representation 
of  defendant's  agent  that  his  road  would 
extend  the  same  rate,  complainant  ship- 
ped over  said  road.  Shortly  after  t}\e 
shipment  moved  defendant  established 
commodity  rates  on  the  articles  in  ques- 
tion of  58c  and  51c  to  Chicago  and  Kan- 
sas City.  Complainant  attacked  said  re- 
duced rates  as  unreasonable  and  demand- 
ed reparation  on  the  basis  of  54c  and 
50c.  No  proof  was  offered  except  a  ref- 
erence to  rates  on  canned  goods  in  other 
quarters  of  the  country  where  the  traf 
fie  conditions  were  not  the  same  and  to 
rates  in  other  territories  on  potatoes, 
lumber,  salt,  molasses,  soap,  paint  and 
other  products.  Ignoring  the  group  sys- 
tem of  rates  from  Texas  common  points, 
complainant  pointed  out  that  said  58c 
and  51c  rates  were  applied  from  points 
in  Texas  400  miles  more  distant  than 
Atlanta  to  the  destinations  in  question. 
HELD,  said  58c  and  51c  rates  were  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable;  that  the  rates 
exacted    were    unreasonable;    and    that 


reparation  should  be  awarded  on  the  basis 
of  58c  and  51c.  Godfrey  &  Son  v.  T.  A. 
&  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  65,  67. 

(q)  Complainants'  elevator  at  Celina. 
Ohio,  was  situated  on  the  C.  &  N.  R.  R. 
and  corn  was  usually  routed  via  that  line 
and  its  connections  from  Celina  to  Johns- 
town, Pa.  The  shipment  in  question  was 
tendered  to  the  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  at  Ce- 
lina and  carried  at  the  legally  published 
rate  of  14c.  The  rate  over  the  other  two 
lines  serving  Celina  was  12c.  No  evi- 
dence of  the  unreasonableness  of  the  14c 
rate  was  offered  except  this  fact  and  the 
fact  that  at  various  other  dates  the  L.  E. 
&  W.  R.  R.  had  lower  rates  in  effect 
than  14c,  but  it  appeared  that  except  in 
emergencies  little  grain  was  shipped  be- 
tween the  points  in  question  over  the  L. 
E.  &  W.  R.  R.  HELD,  the  rate  charged 
was  not  shown  to  be  unreasonable. 
Palmer  &  Miller  v.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
15    I.   C.   C.    107,   108. 

(r)  For  seven  years  defendant  bad 
maintained  a  rate  of  12c  per  100  lbs.  on 
uncompressed  cotton  from  Vincent,  Ark., 
15  miles  from  Memphis,  to  Memphis,  out 
of  which  rate  it  paid  a  bridge  arbitrary 
of  2c  and  drayed  the  cotton  from  its 
Memphis  terminals  to  its  sheds  at  an 
expense  of  3c.  Defendant  increased  the 
rate  to  25c  and  continued  to  absorb  the 
bridge  arbitrary  but  not  the  cost  of  dray- 
age.  Other  carriers  for  similar  distances 
were  maintaining  rates  to  Memphis 
about  as  low  as  the  old  12c  rate  from 
Vincent,  but  said  rates  were  the  result 
of  wagon  competition  which  did  not  ap- 
ply at  Vincent.  Defendant  was  obliged 
to  carry  insurance  on  the  cotton;  was 
subjected  to  large  claims  for  damages; 
and  carried  a  risk  of  injury  to  the  cot- 
ton by  dampness.  Defendant  received 
only  a  small  portion  of  the  outbound  haul 
of  said  cotton.  HELD,  said  25c  rate  was 
unreasonable  and  should  be  reduced  to 
15c  to  correspond  with  rates  from  other 
points  of  origin  similar  distances  from 
Memphis  west  of  the  river.  Reparation 
awarded.  Barton,  Reisinger,  Davis  Co. 
v  St.  L.  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
222,   225. 

(s)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  on 
stone  in  carloads  of  $1.60  from  East 
Branch,  N.  Y.,  to  Weehawken,  N.  J.,  a 
distance  of  150  miles.  For  ten  years 
prior  to  Oct.  22,  1907,  defendant  N.  Y. 
O.  &  W.  Ry.  maintained  a  rate  of  $1.40, 
which  was  raised  on  that  date  to  $1.60. 


302 


EQUALIZATION   OF  RATES,   §4    (2)    (t)— (v) 


The  L.  V.  R.  R.  at  the  time  of  the  hear- 
ing maintained  a  rate  of  $1.35  on  stone 
to  Jersey  City  terminals  from  points  on 
its  line  250  or  more  miles  distant,  and 
the  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  maintained  a  rate 
ot  from  $1.25  to  $1.35  to  the  same  desti- 
nations from  points  on  its  line  from  166 
to  179  miles  distant.  The  Erie  R.  R. 
maintained  rates  of  $1.40  from  points  on 
its  line  from  141  to  154  miles  distant. 
The  quarries  reached  by  these  different 
lines  were  in  the  same  general  territory 
and  were  in  competition  with  complain- 
ant. The  only  defense  for  the  increased 
rate  in  question  offered  by  defendant  was 
the  increased  cost  of  labor  and  material, 
but  defendant  failed  to  show  that  such 
increase  was  not  offset  by  other  econo- 
mies, better  management,  and  larger 
traffic.  The  rate  complained  of  yielded 
over  Ic  per  ton  mile,  whereas  the  former 
rate  yielded  9.33  mills.  HELD,  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  defendant  voluntarily 
maintained  the  $1.40  rate  for  a  number 
of  years  and  that  lines  in  the  same  gen- 
eral district  voluntarily  maintained  at 
the  time  of  the  hearing  lower  rates  for 
longer  hauls,  the  $1.60  rate  complained 
of  was  unreasonable  to  the  extent  that 
it  exceeded  $1.40.  Shippers'  &  Receivers' 
Bureau  of  Newark  v.  N.  Y.  O.  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.   C.  264,  268. 

(t)  Defendants'  rate  from  Montgom- 
ery to  Meridian  on  fertilizer  was  $1.40 
per  ton,  and  to  this  was  added  an  arbi 
trary  of  $1.00  from  Meridian  to  stations 
located  on  the  line  leading  to  Vicksburg 
and  New  Orleans.  A  blanket  rate  was 
thus  established  for  the  first  sixty  miles 
from  Meridian.  The  local  rates  estab- 
lished by  the  Mississippi  Railroad  Com- 
mission from  Meridian  to  points  on  the 
line  leading  from  Meridian  to  Vicksburg 
and  New  Orleans  added  to  the  $1.40  rate 
from  Montgomery  to  Meridian  were  less 
than  the  through  rate  of  $2.40  from  Mont- 
gomery. HELD,  the  through  rate  of 
$2.40  was  unreasonable  as  exceeding  the 
combination  of  local  rates,  and  through 
rates  from  each  fertilizer  plant  should 
be  established  to  various  points  which 
should  be  inherently  reasonable  without 
special  reference  to  competitive  condi- 
tions. Montgomery  Freight  Bureau  v. 
W.  Ry.  of  Ala.,  14  L  C.  C.  150,  152. 

(u)  The  owners  of  mines  in  com- 
plainant association  operate  in  a  field  ex- 
tending from  Fort  Smith,  Ark.,  to  Coal- 
gate,  Okla.,  and  ship  coal  from  that  field 
to  various  points  in  Texas  and  Louisiana 


over  the  four  defendant  railroads  inter- 
secting the  coal  field.  With  few  excep- 
tions, the  rate  complained  of  to  each  of 
78  destinations  in  Texas  and  Louisiana 
was  the  same  from  all  points  in  the  field 
without  respect  to  the  route  or  distance 
covered  by  each  of  defendant  carriers. 
The  rate  to  Denison,  Tex.,  was,  for  ex- 
ample, $1.50  per  ton  over  all  roads, 
though  the  distance  varied  from  87  to 
254  miles.  The  average  earnings  to 
said  points  vere  six  mills  per  ton  on 
lump  coal  and  5.77  mills  on  slack  coal. 
A  lower  rate  per  ton  mile  was  charged 
by  some  of  defendants  from  said  Okla- 
homa-Arkansas coal  field  to  points  in 
Kansas,  Nebraska  and  other  states,  and 
from  Kansas  and  Iowa  coal  fields  to 
points  in  Kansas,  Nebraska  and  Okla- 
homa. Some  of  the  defendants  partici- 
pated in  the  carriage  of  coal  from 
Illinois  fields  to  pomts  in  Iowa,  Il- 
linois, Minnesota  and  Missouri,  and 
from  Alabama  fields  to  points  in 
many  states.  On  such  shipments 
the  average  rate  per  ton  mile  was 
lower  than  the  rate  to  the  Texas  and 
Louisiana  points  in  question.  It  appeared, 
however,  that  the  rates  to  all  north- 
ern coal  fields  were  the  result  of 
sharp  competition.  Said  Oklahoma-Ar- 
kansas coal  mines  had  a  practical  mo- 
nopoly of  the  Texas  coal  trade  and  de- 
fendants a  virtual  monopoly  of  the 
transportation.  After  the  filing  of  the 
complaint  defendants  voluntarily  reduced 
their  rates  so  as  to  reduce  the  average 
rate  per  ton  of  coal  from  $2.82  to  $2.44. 
The  revenue  derived  by  defendants  from 
coal  under  the  rates  attacked  exceeded 
that  derived  by  them  on  cotton  in  the 
same  territory.  HELD,  the  rates  at- 
tacked were  too  high  and  should  be  re- 
duced to  a  schedule  based  by  the  Com- 
mission on  the  rates  charged  by  the  de- 
fendant railroads  having  the  shortest 
hauls  between  given  points.  Okla.  & 
Ark.  Coal  Traffic  Bureau  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  216,  220,  221. 

(v)  The  distance  from  Jacksonport, 
Ark.,  to  East  St.  Louis,  111.,  is  some  425 
miles  over  the  Rock  Island  line,  and 
some  265  miles  ove/  the  Iron  Mountain 
line.  A  former  rate  over  both  lines  on 
walnut  logs  in  carloads  was  lli/^c.  Later 
the  rate  was  raised  to  17i^c.  In  another 
proceeding  against  the  Iron  Mountain 
thi«  rate  was  held  unreasonable  and  the 
lli/^c  rate  prescribed.  When  complain- 
ant established  its  business  at  Jackson- 
port the  former  lll^c  rate  was  in  force. 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES,  §4  (2)   (w)— §4  (4)   (h) 


303 


HELD,  defendant  Rock  Island  line  would 
not  be  ordered  to  maintain  the  lli/^crate 
of  the  Iron  Mountain  on  account  of  the 
longer  haul,  but  should  be  ordered  to 
maintain  a  I4i/^c  rate  to  East  St.  Louis. 
East  St.  Louis  Walnut  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  & 
P.  Ry  Co.,  14  L  C.   C.  575,  576. 

(w)  It  does  not  follow  that  because 
one  railroad,  as  a  matter  of  policy,  ex- 
tends a  low  rate  for  a  special  service, 
all  its  connections  must  be  held  to  an 
extension  of  the  same  policy  and  rate. 
Topeka  Banana  Dealers'  Ass'n  v.  St.  L. 
&  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  620,  631. 

§4.     (3)      Rall-and-Water   Competition. 

(a)  The  Commission  is  hardly  pre- 
pared to  find  that  discrimination  neces- 
sarily results  from  the  fact  that  an  all- 
rail  carrier  meets  the  rate  of  a  compet- 
ing lake-and-rail  rate.  Board  of  Trade 
of  Chicago  v.  A.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
504,  509. 

(b)  Water  and  rail  competition  may 
justify  lower  charges  to  one  point  than 
to  another.  Columbia  Grocery  Co.  v.  L. 
&  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  502,  507. 

§4.     (4)     Water   Competition. 

See  Competition;  Evidence,  §14  (5). 

(a)  A  shipper  cannot  compel  a  rail 
carrier  to  meet  the  rate  of  a  competing 
water  line.  Cohen  &  Co.  v.  Mallory 
Steamship  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  374,  377. 

(aa)  If  one  city  is  on  the  water  and 
can  operate  boats  to  another  city,  it  has 
an  advantage  which  the  rail  carriers  be- 
tween the  same  points  may  recognize 
without  violating  the  prohibition  against 
undue  preference  against  intermediate 
cities.  So  if  the  water  points  at  one 
end  of  the  line  are  grouped,  the  water 
points  at  the  other  end  of  the  line  should 
be  likewise  grouped  or  the  influence  of 
the  water  recognized.  In  Re  Application 
of  the  Southern  Pacific  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
366,  375. 

(b)  That  carriers  are  at  liberty  to 
meet  water  competition  in  whatever  way 
and  at  whatever  point  and  to  whatever 
extent  they  see  fit  cannot  be  admitted. 
City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.  162,   168. 

(c)  Carriers  need  not  wait  until  ac- 
tual water  competition  becomes  formid- 
able before  they  may  safely  adjust  their 
rates  to  meet  it.  Kentucky  Wagon  M'f'g 
Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  360,  363. 


(d)  Rail  carriers  from  Grand  Rapids 
ought  not  to  be  required  to  make  rates 
to  meet  water  competition  or  to  equal- 
ize for  complainant  advantages  of  a 
business  rival  which  moves  its  products 
to  Chicago  by  its  own  water  line.  Ac- 
me Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  30. 

(e)  The  location  of  a  water  point 
does  not  entitle  it  to  lower  rates  by  rail, 
although  such  preference  may  lawfully 
be  accorded  by  a  carrier  in  the  protec- 
tion of  its  own  interests.  Darling  &  Co. 
v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  79,  87. 

(f)  A  water  port  is  entitled  to  what- 
ever advantage  it  can  obtain  through 
transportation  by  water,  but  its  location 
does  not  entitle  it  to  lower  rates  by  rail. 
Darling  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  79,  87. 

(ff)  Carriers  may,  for  the  purpose  of 
meeting  water  competition,  make  rates 
lower  than  would  otherwise  be  justifiable, 
even  to  the  extent  of  charging  a  less 
rate  to  the  more  distant  point.  The  car- 
rier may  determine  for  itself  whether  it 
will  or  will  not  meet  such  water  competi- 
tion. While,  however,  the  carrier  may 
in  the  first  instance  settle  its  policy  in 
this  respect,  it  must  act  under  certain 
limitations.  It  cannot  be  permitted  to 
compete  at  one  point  and  decline  to 
compete  at  another,  where  all  conditions 
are  the  same;  nor  should  it,  ordinarily, 
be  allowed  to  compete  one  day  and  de- 
cline to  compete  the  next.  The  public 
has  the  right  to  require  equal  and  uni- 
form treatment  within  the  bounds  of 
reason.  Cases  might  therefore  arise 
where  the  Commission  would  require  the 
continuance  of  a  rate  established  to  meet 
such  competition.  Darling  &  Co.  v.  B. 
&  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  79,  87. 

(g)  Railroad  cannot  set  up  any  imagi- 
nary water  competition.  But  where  a 
water  competition  exists  that  could 
readily  take  all  the  tonnage  offered,  no 
reason  why  rail  line  may  not  meet  the 
competition.  Bulte  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  & 
A.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  351,  359. 

(h)  The  first  class  rate  per  hundred 
pounds  from  Atlantic  seaboard  territory 
over  defendants'  lines  to  Missouri  River 
cities  was  $1.47,  while  the  first  class  rate 
to  the  Twin  Cities  (St.  Paul  and  Minne- 
apolis), via  Chicago,  was  $1.15.  The 
other  class  rates  were  in  proportion. 
The  distances  from  the  seaboard  to  the 
Twin  Cities  and  to  Missouri  River  cross- 


304 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES    §4   (4)    (i)— (k) 


iiigs  were  substantially  the  same.  Com- 
plainants, jobbers  principally  in  drygoods 
In  Missouri  River  cities,  claimed  these 
rates  were  unjustly  discriminatory 
against  themselves  and  in  favor  of  Twin 
City  jobbers.  The  rates  from  the  sea- 
board to  Missouri  River  cities  were  made 
up  by  taking  the  Mississippi  River  as  a 
basing  line,  adding  to  the  through  rate 
to  Mississippi  River  cities  the  local  rate 
from  Mississippi  River  crossings  to  the 
Missouri  River  crossings.  For  example, 
the  first  class  rate  to  Missouri  River 
cities  was  made  up  by  adding  the  87c 
rate  to  Mississippi  River  cities  to  the 
local  60c  rate  from  thence  to  Mis- 
souri River  cities.  The  87c  first 
class  rate  from  the  seaboard  to 
Mississippi  River  cities  was  proportioned 
as  follows:  From  New  York  to  Chicago 
72.3c,  from  Chicago  to  Mississippi  River 
cities  14.7c.  The  local  rate  from  New 
York  to  Chicago  was  75c.  The  $1.15  rate 
from  New  York  to  the  Twin  Cities  was 
made  up  by  adding  the  75c  local  rate 
from  New  York  to  Chicago  to  a  40c  ratfe 
from  Chicago  to  the  Twin  Cities.  The 
local  rate  from  Chicago  to  the  Twin 
Cities  was  60c.  The  traffic  from  New 
York  via  Chicago  to  Twin  Cities  was 
subject  to  the  severe  competition  of 
Canadian  railways  and  of  water  trans- 
portation, and  experience  showed  that 
the  carriers  were  unable  to  maintain  a 
higher  proportional  rate  from  Chicago 
to  Twin  Cities  than  40c.  In  traffic  from 
Chicago  to  Texas  points  the  carriers  be- 
tween Chicago  and  Kansas  City  received 
47.1c  out  of  the  total  charge  of  $1.57.  On 
traffic  from  the  Atlantic  seaboard  to  Pa 
cific  Coast  terminals  the  carriers  west 
of  Chicago  received  as  their  division  of 
the  class  rates  for  the  haul  between  Chi- 
cago and  Missouri  River  crossings  33c. 
It  appeared  that  the  Twin  Cities  had  a 
natural  competitive  advantage  with  re- 
spect to  freight  rates  in  Minnesota,  North 
Dakota,  northeastern  South  Dakota  and 
Canadian  territory,  while  the  Missouri 
River  cities  had  similar  advantage  in 
Complainants  insisted  that  the  Mississip- 
territory  to  the  west  and  southwest, 
pi  River  should  no  longer  be  used  as  a 
basing  line  in  fixing  rates,  and  that  the 
territory  between  the  Mississippi  and 
Missouri  rivers  had  so  developed  as  to 
•require  it  to  be  treated  in  the  matter  of 
rates  in  the  same  manner  as  that  lying 
east  of  the  Mississippi  River.  They  fur- 
ther asked  that  the  rates  from  the  sea- 
board   to    Missouri    River    crossings    be 


lowered  to  equal  the  rates  to  the  Twin 
Cities.  HELD,  the  seaboard  rates  to 
Missouri  River  crossings  should  not  be 
lowered  to  equal  the  rates  to  the  Twin 
Cities  on  account  of  water  competition 
at  the  latter  point;  that  on  account  of 
the  difference  in  development  in  popula- 
tion between  territory  east  of  the  Missis- 
sippi River  and  west  of  the  same,  the 
Mississippi  basing  line  should  be 
preserved;  but  that  the  local  rates  from 
the  Mississippi  River  Jo  the  Missouri 
River  were  excessive,  when  added  to  the 
rate  from  the  seaboard  to  the  Mississip- 
pi River,  in  fixing  the  joint  rate  from 
the  seaboard  to  Missouri  River  towns, 
and  these  rates  should  be  reduced  with 
respect  to  first  class  from  60c  to  51c.  and 
other  class  rates  in  proportion.  Burn 
ham,  Hanna,  Munger  Dry  Goods  Co.  v. 
C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  299,  311- 
313;  sustained,  L  C.  C.  v.  C.  R.  L  &  P. 
Ry.,  218  U.  S.  88,  30  Sup.  Ct.  651,  54  L. 
ed.  946,  holding  the  Commission's  order 
not  invalid,  as  alleged,  as  being  confis- 
catory, as  attempting  to  create  artificial 
zones  tributary  to  certain  trade  centers, 
or  as  destroying  the  system  of  rates  long 
sxisting,  overturning  the  equality  of  op- 
r»ortunity  in  competition,  and  substitut- 
ing an  artificial  system  resulting  in 
special  advantages  in  rates  to  special 
sections,  reversing  171  Fed.  680,  683,  en- 
joining the  Commission's  order. 

(i)  Carriers  cannot  be  compelled,  as 
a  matter  of  law,  to  meet  water  competi- 
tion; they  do  it  of  their  own  volition,  or 
whenever  the  same  is  potent  enough  to 
compel  them  to  do  so  in  order  to  secure 
the  traffic.  In  each  instance  the  car- 
rier determines  for  itself  whether  such 
water  competition  has  sufficient  influence 
on  the  traffic  to  make  it  reduce  its  rates. 
Bainbridge  Board  of  Trade  v.  L.  H.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  586,  594. 

(j)  There  may  be  water  competition 
at  each  of  two  points,  and  yet  a  differ- 
ence in  rates  to  those  points  may  be 
justified.  Bainbridge  Board  of  Trade  v. 
L.  H.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  586, 
594. 

(k)  Complainant  jobbers  at  Gallatin, 
Tenn.,  attacked  the  rate  of  31c  on  sugar 
in  carloads,  New  Orleans,  La.,  to  Galla- 
tin, as  compared  with  the  rate  of  15c  to 
Nashville,  Tenn.,  20c  to  Bowling  Green, 
Ky.,  and  17c  to  Louisville.  All  four 
points  are  located  on  the  main  line  of 
the  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Gallatin  is  31/2  mile3 
from   the   Cumberland    River;    Nashville 


EQUALIZATION   OP  RATES,   §5    (a)— (c) 


305 


being  on  it;  Bowling  Green  is  one  mile 
from  the  Barren  River,  which  reaches 
the  Ohio  River  via  the  Green  River; 
Louisville  is  on  the  Ohio  River.  The  popu- 
lation of  Gallatin  is  2,500;  Bowling  Green, 
8,500;  Nashville,  85,000;  and  Louisville, 
250,000.  From  New  Orleans,  Nashville 
is  626  miles;  Gallatin,  052  miles;  Bowling 
Green,  697  miles;  Louisville,  811  miles. 
Shortly  before  the  hearing  the  rate  to 
Bowling  Green  was  reduced  from  25c  to 
20c  to  meet  water  competition.  The 
rates  at  Louisville  were  controlled  by 
competition  with  St.  Louis  and  sugar 
producing  points  on  the  '  Atlantic  sea- 
board. The  water  competition  at  Nash- 
ville was  potential  rather  than  actual, 
and  the  15c  rate  was  much  lower  than 
that  at  which  sugar  could  be  carried  by 
water  at  a  profit.  The  rates  from  Gal- 
latin to  points  on  the  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  be- 
tween Nashville  and  Bowling  Green  were 
the  same  for  similar  distances  as  from 
Nashville,  but  the  combination  rates 
based  on  Nashville  from  New  Orleans 
to  points  which  were  naturally  tribu- 
tary to  Gallatin,  on  account  of  their 
closer  proximity  to  that  place,  were  ma- 
terially less  than  the  combination  rates 
from  New  Orleans  to  the  same  points 
based  on  Gallatin.  Under  the  rate  at- 
tacked Bowling  Green  jobbers  could  suc- 
cessfully compete  in  territory  contigu- 
ous and  naturally  tributary  to  Gallatin. 
The  rate  of  16c  from  Nashville  to  Gal 
latin  was  available  to  Nashville  jobbers 
on  less-than-carloads,  so  that  the  Nash- 
ville dealer  could  retail  sugar  in  Galla- 
tin at  the  same  freight  rates  at  which  the 
Gallatin  dealer  received  his  supply  in 
carload  quantities.  HELD,  the  former 
25c  rate  to  Bowling  Green,  not  being 
forced  by  water  competition,  should  be 
applied  to  Gallatin  so  as  to  enable  the 
wholesale  dealer  at  Gallatin  to  reach  ad- 
jacent towns  on  an  approximate  basis  of 
equality.  Reparation  awarded.  Payne- 
Gardner  Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I. 
C.  C.  638,  643. 

§5.     Low  State  Rate. 

See  Discrimination,  §1  (ee),  §11;  Evi- 
dence, §13  (6)  (a),  (c);  Express 
Companies,  §1  (g);  Long  and 
Short  Haul.  §9  (m);  Procedure  Be- 
fore Commission,  §11  (h);  Reason- 
ableness of  Rates,  §3  (a),  (e>.  (i); 
Througin  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 
§15   (aaaa). 

(a)  Where  state  rates  have  been  fixed 
at  an  unduly  or  unreasonably  low  figure, 
there  is  a  forum  in  wjiicli  to  test  that 


question,  and  until  such  test  has  been  in- 
voked, it  cannot  be  recognized  as  proper 
to  "neutralize"  the  reduction  in  state 
rates  by  increases  in  interstate  rates. 
Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  Anderson 
&  Saline  River  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  532, 
536. 

(b)  On  a  carload  of  cedar  insulator 
pins  from  Marble  Falls,  Tex.,  via  McNeil 
and  Denison,  Tex.,  to  St.  Louis,  a  rate 
of  46c  was  assessed.  Had  the  shipment 
moved  to  McNeil,  Tex.,  and  thence  over 
another  line  than  the  one  employed,  the 
through  rate  would  have  been  the  same, 
but  by  said  latter  route  the  intrastate 
rate  from  the  point  of  origin  to  McNeil 
was  12c,  fixed  by  the  Texas  Railroad 
Commission,  and  the  interstate  rate 
from  McNeil  to  St.  Louis  was  23c,  mak- 
ing a  total  of  35c.  No  routing  instruc- 
tions were  given.  The  carriers  by  the 
latter  route  had  not  entered  into  any 
joint  route  and  had  agreed  on  no  division 
of  rates.  No  other  evidence  of  the  un- 
reasonableness of  the  rate  attacked  was 
offered.  HELD,  said  rate  of  46c  was  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable.  Marble  Falls 
Insulator  Pin  Co.  v.  H.  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  L  C.  C.  167,  169. 

(c)  Complainant  asked  for  a  reduc- 
tion of  rates  on  petroleum  and  its  prod- 
uts  from  Mason  City,  la.,  to  Worthing- 
ton.  Wells  and  Taopi,  Minn.,  and  to  Led- 
yard,  la.  (shipments  to  the  last  men- 
tioned point  traversing  Iowa  and  Minne- 
sota). Such  reduction  was  asked  on  the 
ground  that  the  state  commissions  of 
Iowa,  Minnesota  and  Nebraska  had  pre- 
scribed fourth  class  rates  to  apply  on 
less-than-carload  shipments  of  oil  be- 
tween intrastate  points,  whereas  defend- 
ants were  charging  on  intrastate  ship- 
ments the  third  class  rate.  It  appeared 
these  state  commissions  established  the 
fourth  class  rate  for  the  purpose  of  meet- 
ing competition  with  the  Standard  Oil 
Company  and  did  not  declare  the  third 
class  rate  unreasonable;  and  that  the 
third  class  rate  was  in  force  in  the  terri- 
tory covered  by  the  Official  and  Southern 
classifications.  About  25  per  cent  of  the 
oil  out  of  Mason  City  went  north  and 
most  of  it  was  unloaded  before  reaching 
the  Minnesota  line.  Complainant  offered 
no  evidence  to  show  that  the  third  class 
rates  on  petroleum  and  its  products  in 
Western  Classification  territory  generally 
were  unreasonable  and  none  to  show  the 
peculiar  conditions  respecting  shipments 
between  the  points  in  question.     HELD, 


306 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES,  §6   (a)— (i) 


the  complaint  should  be  dismissed.  Mar- 
shall Oil  Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  210,  213-214. 

§6.     Preference  of  Markets. 

See    Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §12'/2. 

(a)  A  carrier  has  no  right  to  deprive 
the  shipper  of  any  market  that  other- 
wise would  be  open  to  him.  Van  Natta 
Bros.  V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C,  1,  5. 

(aa)  Complainant  may  not  be  ex- 
cluded from  selling  in  a  particular  mar- 
ket because  some  other  carrier  has  a 
through  line  to  that  market  from 
another  and  competing  point  of  produc- 
tion. Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  93,  100. 

(b)  While  commercial  and  industrial 
considerations  often  enter  into  the  de- 
termination of  a  reasonable  transporta- 
tion charge,  it  is  no  part  of  the  Commis- 
sion's duty  to  so  adjust  rates  that  busi- 
ness will  or  will  not  be  done  at  a  par- 
ticular point,  and  that  is  especially  true 
where  no  natural  advantages  are  pos- 
sessed by  any  locality.  In  Re  Investiga- 
tion of  Rates  on  Meats,  22  I.  C.  C.  160, 
163. 

(c)  Neither  carriers  nor  the  Commis- 
sion is  to  dictate  where  business  is  to 
be  transacted.  Suffern  Grain  Co.  v.  I.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  178,  181. 

(cc)  It  is  not  the  duty  of  a  carrier 
to  place  all  of  its  shippers  in  a  position 
to  meet  the  markets  which  they  may 
desire  to  supply.  In  Re  Advances  on 
Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C.  604,  625. 

(d)  Mileages  cannot  be  computed  by 
airlines,  nor  can  consuming  territory  be 
apportioned  by  straight  lines.  That  Bir- 
mingham is  entitled  to  compete  in  the 
widest  markets  cannot  be  questioned, 
and  a  theory  cannot  be  accepted  which 
limits  the  realms  of  commercial  activity 
of  a  producing  point  to  a  definite  radius, 
and  excludes  from  that  territory  all 
other  producers.  Alabama  Coal  Opera- 
tors' Ass'n  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  230, 
232. 

(e)  All  markets  cannot  be  opened  to 
every  producing  point.  In  Re  Advances 
in  Rates— Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307. 
354. 

(f)  Each  market  has  a  right  to  insist 
upon  a  rate  adjustment  that  is  fair. 
Board  of  Trade  of  Chicago  v.  A.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  504,  507. 


(g)  No  jobbing  point  is  entitled  be- 
cause of  unfair  adjustment  of  rates  to 
exclusive  possession  of,  or  complete  su- 
premacy in,  a  particular  consuming  terri- 
tory. A  carrier  may  not  by  the  estab- 
lishment and  maintenance  of  unreason- 
able rates  give  possession  of  a  consum- 
ing territory  to  the  jobbers  at  a  point 
selected  or  favored  by  the  carriers.  Job- 
bers are  shippers  and  every  shipper  is 
entitled  to  reasonable  rates.  Every  lo- 
cality is  entitled  to  reasonable  and  non- 
discriminatory rates,  and  the  dealers  at 
any  point  are  entitled  to  trade  wherever 
and  as  far  as  reasonable  rates  v/ill  per- 
mit. Billings  Chamber  of  Commerce  v. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  71,  75. 

(h)  There  is  no  good  reason  why  de- 
fendant's rates  on  lumber  from  Omaha 
to  certain  points  in  Colorado,  Kansas, 
South  Dakota  and  Wyoming  should  be  so 
adjusted  that  the  Omaha  dealers  may 
merchandise,  sort  and  mix  lumber  at 
Omaha  and  dispose  of  it  in  all  this  tierri- 
tory  on  combination  rates  that  are  no 
higher  than  joint  through  rates  from 
points  of  production  to  the  same  points 
of  consumption.  If  Omaha  is  entitled  to 
such  a  rate  adjustment  it  follows  that 
other  places  would  have  the  same  right, 
and  such  a  general  adjustment  would 
apparently  be  possible  only  on  the  appli- 
cation of  the  postage  stamp  theory  of 
rates.  Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  C. 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co..  19  I.  C.  C.  156,  159. 

(i)  The  present  rates  from  the  east 
to  Spokane  are  the  result  of  a  deliberate 
attempt  to  carve  out  a  certain  territory 
in  which  the  jobber  of  Spokane  should 
have  the  advantage  in  rates  over  his 
competitors  upon  the  coast  or  elsewhere. 
While  it  is  of  great  importance  to  Spo- 
kane as  a  commercial  center  that  it  shall 
control  the  wholesaling  business  into 
surrounding  territory,  and  while  there  is 
great  force  in  its  claim  that  no  schedule 
of  rates  can  be  right  which  permits  mer- 
chandise to  be  hauled  from  the  east  over 
the  Cascade  Mountains  to  Seattle  and 
back  again  to  the  consumer  upon  the 
east  of  that  mountain  range,  the  right  of 
Spokane  to  control  this  territory  should 
depend  upon  a  reasonable  adjustment  of 
rates,  which  is  open  to  Spokane  and  to 
all  corresponding  territory,  and  not  upon 
a  special  arrangement  peculiar  to  that 
locality.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.   162,   167. 


EQUALIZATION   OF  RATES,   §6    (j)— (m) 


307 


(j)  It  is  doubtful  whether  rates  may 
be  constructed  for  the  express  purpose 
of  compelling  the  manufacture  or  mer- 
chandising of  a  commodity  at  particular 
points.  City  of  Spqkane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  162,  168. 

(k)  While  general  commercial  condi- 
tions should  be  considered,  and  while  de- 
fendants might  properly  decline  to  ap- 
ply the  same  rate  to  the  longer  haul 
from  New  York  to  Spokane  which  they 
apply  to  the  shorter  haul  from  Chicago, 
It  may  be  doubted  whether  they  should 
be  permitted  to  construct  a  tariff  for  the 
express  purpose  of  compelling  the  manu- 
facture or  the  merchandising  of  a  given 
commodity  at  Chicago  or  upon  the  Mis- 
souri River  or  at  the  Atlantic  seaboard. 
Some  system  of  rates  which  on  the 
whole  seem  just  and  reasonable  should 
be  established,  and  these  different  com- 
munities should  be  permitted  to  do  what- 
ever business  they  can  under  that  rate 
system.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  162,  168. 

(1)  Complainant  manufactured  cement 
plaster  at  Laramie,  Wyo.,  and  at  Gypsum, 
la.,  being  in  competition  at  the  latter 
point  with  other  manufacturers,  and  also 
with  manufacturers  at  Rapid  City,  S.  D. 
Complainant  attacked  the  reasonableness 
of  the  rates  from  Gypsum  to  destina- 
tions upon  the  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  in  South 
Dakota  and  North  Dakota  and  of  the, 
rates  from  Council  Bluffs,  la.,  to  the  sania 
points,  and  alleged  discrimination  in  favoT 
of  Gypsum  as  against  Council  Bluffs,  and 
in  favor  of  Rapid  City  as  compared  with 
both  Council  Bluffs  and  Gypsum.  Cement 
plaster  manufactured  at  Gypsum  sold 
f.  o.  b.  that  point  at  $3  per  ton.  It  loads 
easily  to  the  marked  capacity  and  suf- 
fers no  damage  in  transit.  It  is  in  uni- 
versal use  for  building  purposes.  The 
per  ton  mile  yield  on  the  rates  from  Gyp- 
sum attacked  ranged  from  10  to  15  mills 
over  distances  ranging  from  150  to  550 
miles.  Charges  from  Gypsum  were  ma- 
terially less  than  those  applying  to  lum- 
ber, somewhat  less  than  those  on  wheat, 
but  little  in  excess  of  rates  on  brick, 
and  about  one-half  the  rate  on  cattle. 
While  higher  than  the  rates  on  the  same 
commodity  in  other  territory,  the  rates 
from  Gy])sum  were  not,  with  some  ex- 
ceptions, in  excess  of  the  general  level 
of  rates  in  the  territory  involved.  The 
rate  to  Council  Bluffs  on  the  plaster 
manufactured  at  Laramie  was  not  com- 
plained of.    No  joint  rates  were  in  effec* 


to  the  destinations  in  question  from 
Laramie  via  Council  Bluffs.  Defendant 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  claimed  the  right  to 
protect  the  mills  which  it  served  at 
Gypsum  and  Rapid  City,  upon  its 
own  line,  by  imposing  higher  charges 
than  would  otherwise  be  proper,  from 
Council  Bluffs.  The  rates  attacked  from 
Council  Bluffs  exceeded  the  rates  on  lum- 
ber, were  materially  higher  than  those 
upon  wheat  and  brick,  and  were  only 
slightly  lower  than  those  upon  cattle. 
While  cement  plaster  loads  easily  to  a 
minimum  of  50,000  or  60,000  lbs.,  the 
white  plaster  manufactured  at  Gypsum 
and  Rapid  City  would  deteriorate  in  the 
hands  of  the  dealer  before  carloads  with 
such  a  minimum  could  be  disposed  of, 
'hereas  the  brown  plaster  made  at  Lara- 
mie improved  with  age.  The  states  of 
Iowa,  Minnesota  and  South  Dakota  estab- 
lished a  minimum  of  30,000  lbs.  on  cement 
plaster.  The  minimum  of  defendants  on 
lumber  was  30,000  lbs.,  on  cattle  22,000 
lbs.,  on  brick  and  wheat  40,000  lbs.  To 
certain  of  the  destinations  in  question  a 
lower  rate  was  accorded  to  Gypsum  up- 
on condition  that  a  60,000-lb.  minimum 
be  loaded,  while  no  similar  concession 
was  made  to  Council  Bluffs.  HELD,  the 
rates  attacked  from  Gypsum  were  not 
greatly  out  of  line  with  the  rates  gener- 
ally prevailing  in  the  territo-ry  in  ques- 
tion and  were  not  unreasonable  except 
in  certain  instances.  Schedules  of  lower 
rates  prescribed  in  these  instances.  De- 
fendant had  no  right  to  impose  unreason- 
able rates  from  Council  Bluffs  in  order 
to  protect  the  mills  served  by  it  at  Gyp- 
sum and  Rapid  City.  Schedules  of  lower 
rates  from  Council  Bluffs  prescribed  to 
correspond  with  the  general  level  of 
rates  in  the  territory  involved.  A  mini- 
mum of  30,000  lbs.  should  be  put  into 
effect  from  all  the  points  of  origin  In 
question,  and  wherever  a  lower  rate  was 
accorded  to  Gypsum  on  a  minimum  of 
60,000  lbs.,  the  same  reduction  should  be 
given  to  Council  Bluffs.  Reparation  de- 
nied, since  it  was  not  made  to  appear 
that  the  rates  attacked  were  unreason- 
able at  the  time  shipments  were  made. 
Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  C  G.  W  Ry 
Co.,  18   I.  C.  C.  19,  20-24. 

(m)  A  carrier, may  not,  in  order  to 
protect  mills  located  on  its  line,  exact 
unreasonable  rates  on  traffic  originating 
at  mills  located  upon  other  lines.  Acme 
Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.. 
18  L  C.  C.  19,  20-24. 


308 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES,   §6    (n)— (r) 


(n)  Complainant,  flour  millers  in 
Minnesota,  North  Dakota,  South  Dakota 
and  Wisconsin,  attacked  the  rail-lake-and- 
rail  rate  on  flour  of  23c  from  Minneapolis 
as  a  typical  point  to  New  York  via  Du- 
luth  as  discriminatory  in  favor  of  millers 
at  Buffalo,  as  compared  with  the  rate  of 
about  10c  on  wheat  from  Minneapolis  to 
Buffalo,  and  of  10c  on  flour  from  Buffalo 
to  New  York,  and  as  compared  with  the 
rate  of  20.83c  on  wheat  from  Minneapolis 
to  New  York,  under  the  existing  ex-lake 
rate  from  Buffalo  of  10.83c,  which  in- 
cluded cost  of  elevation.  From  Minne- 
apolis to  Duluth  the  rates  on  wheat,  5c, 
and  on  flour,  5.8c,  were  substantially  on 
a  parity  and  likewise  from  Buffalo  to 
New  York  the  local  rate  on  flour  was 
10c,  the  local  rate  on  wheat,  10.83c.  From 
Duluth  to  Buffalo,  however,  the  rates  on 
flour  and  wheat  were  not  on  a  parity, 
that  on  flour  being  7.6c  and  on  wheat 
3.5c.  The  Buffalo  miller  was,  therefore, 
given  an  advantage  over  the  Minneapolis 
miller  of  some  3c  per  lOOf  lbs.  For  a 
number  of  years  prior  to  1898  the  regular 
or  package  lines  of  boats  on  the  lakes 
were  independent  of  the  railroads  and  a 
differential  of  5c  under  the  all-rail  rate 
existed  via  rail-lake-and-rail.  The  rail- 
roads gradually  absorbed  the  lake  lines 
and  in  1898  increased  the  rail-lake-and- 
rail  rate  on  flour  2c  per  100  lbs.,  and  in 
1902  increased  it  another  Ic.  At  some 
seasons  of  the  year  the  rate  on  wheat 
was  made  by  the  tramp  boats  and  at 
other  seasons  by  the  regular  line  boats 
controlled  by  defendants.  The  3.5c  rate 
on  wheat  by  water  from  Duluth  to  Buf- 
falo was  admitted  to  be  profitable.  It 
cost  2c  less  to  carry  wheat  than  to  carry 
flour  on  the  lake.  The  independent  boats 
were  unable  to  secure  the  flour  business 
because  defendants  controlled  the  ter- 
minals and  wharves  and  refused  to  per- 
mit them  to  load  or  unload  thereat  and 
refused  to  receive  packages  from  inde- 
pendent boats.  Subsequent  to  the  in- 
crease in  rail-lake-and-rail  rates  in  1898 
and  in  1902,  and  prior  to  Aug.  28,  1906, 
the  actual  rate  paid  on  flour  from  Minne- 
apolis to  New  York  rail-lake-and-rail  did 
not  exceed  20c  per  100  lbs.  The  addi- 
tional costs  to  the  Buffalo  miller  for 
handling  wheat  at  Buffalo  were  offset 
by  similar  costs  to  the  Minneapolis 
miller.  Under  the  schedule  of  rates  at- 
tacked the  Buffalo  millers  were  steadily 
gaining  in  the  output  and  the  Minne- 
apolis millers  steadily  losing.  HELD, 
the  rates  on  wheat  and  flour  should  be 
on  a  parity  along  a  given  line  of  trans- 


portation, so  as  to  enable  millers  to  dis- 
tribute their  mills  at  points  along  the 
line  and  still  remain  on  equal  terms  with 
respect  to  competition;  that  the  rate  on 
flour  should  be  fixed  above  that  on  wheat 
only  to  the  extent  of  the  additional  cost 
of  transportation;  and  that  the  rail-lake- 
and-rail  rate  on  flour  from  Minneapolis, 
as  a  typical  point,  to  New  York  should 
not  exceed  21i/^c.  Jennison  Co.  v.  G.  N. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  113,  123. 

(o)  The  difference  in  profits  and 
ability  to  sell  in  common  markets  as  be- 
tween Buffalo  and  Minneapolis  millers 
is  a  purely  commercial  question  in  so  far 
as  it  goes  beyond  the  question  of  trans- 
portation costs  and  cannot  enter  into  the 
determination  of  rates.  Jennison  Co.  v. 
G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  113,  123. 

(p)  The  Commission,  in  determining 
whether  a  carrier  and  its  connections 
unduly  discriminate  in  their  transporta- 
tion charges  from  competing  coal  mines 
to  a  common  market  cannot  undertake 
to  equalize  differences  in  the  cost  of 
production,  whether  natural  or  artificial. 
Andy's  Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  405,  409. 

(q)  Neither  the  east  nor  the  west  has 
any  vested  right  to  sell  a  certain  amount 
of  goods  in  southern  territory.  Each 
section  is  entitled  to  a  reasonable  rate 
and  to  do  what  business  it  can  under 
that  rate.  Receivers  and  Shippers'  Ass'n 
of  Cincinnati  v.  C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  440,  459. 

(r)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  of 
23c  on  petroleum  and  its  products  from 
Coffeyville,  Kan.,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.,  469 
miles,  and  of  22c  from  Coffeyville,  Kan., 
to  Omaha,  Neb.,  362  miles.  The  rate 
from  Coffeyville  to  St.  Louis,  418  miles, 
was  17c.  The  Memphis  rate  of  23c  was 
based  upon  the  rate  to  St.  Louis  plus  a 
6c  rate  down  the  river,  although  the  traf- 
fic from  Coffeyville  to  Memphis  moved 
by  direct  route  and  not  by  St.  Louis. 
The  rate  from  Coffeyville  to  Omaha  was 
based  upon  Kansas  City,  the  differential 
over  the  Kansas  City  rate  being  9c.  The 
Standard  Oil  Co.  of  Sugar  Creek,  near 
Kansas  City,  was  given  to  Omaha  a  rate 
of  13c,  distance  205  miles.  HELD,  since 
Sugar  Creek  was  given  the  advantage  of 
her  proximity  to  the  markets  of  Omaha 
on  the  north,  Coffeyville  should  be  given 
the  advantage  of  her  proximity  to  the 
markets  of  Memphis  in  the  south,  and 
the  rate  to  Memphis  should  not  exceed 
19c    and    to    Omaha    17c.     National   Pe- 


EQUALIZATION  OP  RATES,  §6   (s)— (bb) 


309 


troleum  Ass'n  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
593,  595. 

(s)  Complainant  was  charged  $1.85 
per  gross  ton  on  crushed  stone  from 
Cedar  Bluff,  Ky.,  to  Baton  Rouge,  La., 
said  rate  yielding  2.84  mills  per  ton.  The 
rate  from  Cedar  Bluff  to  New  Orleans 
was  $1.50.  Cedar  Blufe  was  580  miles 
from  Baton  Rouge  and  599  miles  from 
New  Orleans.  The  rate  to  New  Orleans 
was  established  to  permit  the  sale  of 
stone  from  Cedar  Bluff  in  competition 
with  stone  quarried  in  Alabama.  HELD, 
the  rate  attacked  was  not  unreasonable 
per  se,  or  unduly  discriminatory,  as  com- 
pared with  that  to  New  Orleans.  South- 
prn  Bitulithic  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  300. 

(t)  The  Commission  cannot  compel 
rail  carriers  from  Florida  to  markets  for 
pineapples  to  reduce  their  rates  to  meet 
the  lower  and  cheaper  water  charges 
from  Cuba.  Florida  Fruit  &  Vegetable 
Ass'n  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
552,  562. 

(u)  Complainant  jobbers  at  Atlanta 
and  other  Georgia  cities  attacked  the 
rates  on  grain  products  and  hay  on  ship- 
ments from  Ohio  and  Mississippi  River 
crossings  and  beyond  to  points  in  south- 
eastern territory,  on  the  ground  that  the 
practice  of  extending  the  same  rates  to 
less-than-carload  as  to  carload  shipments 
was  unreasonable,  in  view  of  the  larger 
expense  to  the  carrier  of  delivering  the 
less-than-carload  traffic.  Under  the  rates 
attacked  the  consumers  and  small  deal- 
ers at  Georgia  and  surrounding  points 
were  able  to  procure  these  commodities 
from  Ohio  and  Mississippi  River  cross- 
ings and  from  Nashville  as  cheaply  as 
the  larger  jobbers  who  brought  in  car- 
load shipments.  To  establish  less-than- 
carload  rates  higher  than  carload  rates 
would  have  the  effect  of  compelling  con- 
sumers and  small  dealers  at  Georgia  and 
southeastern  points  to  purchase  from  and 
pay  middlemen's  profits  to  the  large 
Georgia  and  southeastern  jobbers,  in- 
stead of  obtaining  directly  their  supplies 
at  lower  rates  from  Mississippi  and  Ohio 
River  crossings  and  from  Nashville. 
HELD,  that  a  railroad  could  not  be  per- 
mitted to  adopt  a  system  of  rate  making 
which  enabled  a  large  dealer  to  drive 
a  small  dealer  out  of  the  market;  that 
the  Commission  could  not  act  on  the 
theory  that  the  trade  of  a  particular  com- 
munity was  a  vested  right,  belonging  to 
any  particular  class  in  that  community, 
especially   when   so   to   do   would   result 


in  the  enjoyment  of  a  privilege  by  that 
class  at  the  expense  of  the  community 
at  large;  and  that  since  the  effect  of  an 
order  prescribing  differentials  on  less- 
than-carload  quantities  would  be  to  place 
a  tax  on  retailers  and  consumers  in  order 
that  jobbers  in  southeastern  territory 
might  realize  a  profit  in  competition  with 
Nashville  jobbers  and  at  the  expense  of 
the  community,  such  an  order  should  be 
refused.  Duncan  &  Co.  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L. 
Ry.  Co.,  IG  I.  C.  C.  590,  595. 

(v)  While  a  carrier  ought  not  and 
should  not  be  required  to  equalize  ac- 
cess to  markets  for  all  engaged  in  a  com- 
mon business,  if  the  shippers  are  differ- 
ently situated  and  are  not  entitled  to  the 
same  rates,  it  may  be  perfectly  lawful 
for  it  to  give  equal  access  to  markets  to 
localities  of  dissimilar  distances,  where 
such  distances  involve  no  material  in- 
crease in  the  transportation  expense. 
Avery  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  20,  24. 

(w)  No  locality,  manufacturer  or 
shipper  has  an  exclusive  right  to  supply 
a  market.  Avery  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  20,  24. 

(x)  Carriers  may  not  by  arbitrary 
adjustment  of  rates  dictate  or  determine 
where  wheat  shall  be  milled  or  fiour 
'^hall  be  marketed.  Valley  Flour  Mills 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co..  16  I.  C.  C. 
73,  78. 

(y)  Under  no  law,  common  or  statute, 
is  a  jobber  entitled  to  distribute  cora- 
modit'es  under  as  low  or  lower  total 
freight  rates  as  the  through  rates  from 
point  of  origin  to  point  of  consumption. 
Williams  Co.  v.  V.  S.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
T.  C.  C.  482,  486. 

(z)  Every  locality  competing  in  a 
common  market  is  entitled  to  rates  which 
are  relatively  reasonable  and  just  in 
compar'son  with  rates  from  other  local- 
ities served  by  the  same  carrier.  Black 
Mountain  Coal  Land  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.   C.  C.  286,   294. 

(aa)  The  duty  imposed  by  law  is  to 
?ive  equal  treatment  to  all  shippers  who 
are  in  a  position  to  demand  it,  and  this 
includes  the  right  to  reach  competitive 
markets  on  relat'vely  equal  terms.  Black 
M  untain  Coal  Land  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co., 
15  L  C.  C.  286,  292. 

(bb)  The  Commission  has  no  author- 
ity to  order  the  same  rates  on  flour  for 
export  as  on  wheat  for  export  for  the 
purpose  of  placing  the  American  miller 


310 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES,   §6    (cc)— §8    (a) 


on  competitive  equality  with  the  foreign 
miller,  in  the  absence  of  legislation  by 
Congress  adopting  such  a  national  policy. 
Bulte  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  351,  364. 

(cc)  In  claiming  that  as  Chicago  af- 
fords as  good  a  market  for  grain  as 
does  Milwaukee,  the  defendant  may, 
therefore,  lawfully  so  adjust  its  rates  to 
force  the  grain  to  Chicago,  it  overlooks 
the  right  of  the  shipper  to  choose  his 
own  market  and  to  do  business  where  he 
prefers.  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Mil- 
waukee V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  15 
I.  C.  C.  460,  464. 

(dd)  Where  plants  producing  fertil- 
izer and  located  at  different  points  in 
one  state  are  shipping  to  different  points 
on  a  line  in  another  state,  a  1  ^anket 
rate  from  such  producing  points  to  the 
selling  points  should  not  be  adopted 
with  a  view  to  equalize  rates  between 
competing  plants,  but  the  fair  way  is 
to  establish  from  each  plant  r..tes  to 
selling  points  which  are  inherently  rea- 
sonable, without  special  reference  to 
competitive  conditions,  and  to  allow 
plants  to  sell  in  whatever  territory  their 
location  and  a  reasonable  rate  will  per- 
mit. Montgomery  Fre'ght  Bureau  v. 
Western  Ry.  of  Ala,  14  I.  C.  C.  150,  151. 

(ee)  No  shipper  is  obliged  to  confine 
himself  to  the  nearest  markets,  but  the 
markets  of  the  country  are  and  should  be 
open  to  anyone  who  can  reach  thr  \ 
under  just  and  reasonable  rates.  It  is 
not  possible  to  adjust  rates  so  that  every 
town  may  be  a  jobbing  and  distributing 
point  and  be  on  an  equality  with  all  job- 
bers or  manufacturers  at  other  points. 
Certain  natural  advantages  of  location 
must  be  recognized,  and  often  they  are, 
of  necessity,  controlling.  Competitive 
conditions  between  carriers,  between 
producing  points,  and  in  common  mar- 
kets, must  be  given  due  weight.  Dis- 
tance, while  in  no  sense  controlling, 
must  be  taken  into  consideration.  New 
Albany  Furniture  Co.  v.  M.  J.  &  K.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  594,  600. 

§7.     Size  of  Community. 

See  Evidence,  §33,  §53, 
(a)  A  community  is  not  entitled  to 
advantages  in  the  adjustment  of  freight 
rates  simply  because  it  is  larger  than 
some  neighboring  community.  If  a  lo- 
cality has  natural  advantages,  it  should 
be  allowed  to  enjoy  them,  but  it  ought 
not  to  be  given  the  additional  artificial 


advantage  which  arises  from  a  discrimi- 
nating railway  tariff.  Suffern  Grain  Co. 
V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  178,  182; 
Harbor  City  Wholesale  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
19  I.   C.   C.  323,  331. 

(b)  Function  of  carrier  not  to  pro- 
mote growth  of  large  shippers  at  ex- 
pense of  small.  California  Commercial 
Ass'n  V.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  14  1.  C  C. 
422,    432. 

(c)  Advantages  of  location,  such  as 
proximity  to  a  navigable  stream  or 
strong  competition  between  carriers, 
naturally  result  in  lower  rates  to  a  town 
so  situated,  and  it  is  not  the  province 
of  the  Commission  to  disturb  the  result- 
ing rate  relations  unless  the  discrepancy 
is  so  great  as  to  effect  an  unjust  dis- 
crimination against  the  non-competitive 
points.  But  the  mere  fact  that  a  given 
town  has  been  recognized  as  a  trade 
center  and  is  enabled  by  its  more  favor- 
able rate  adjustment  to  distribute  in  a 
certain  territory,  cannot,  justify  the  con- 
tinuance of  relative  rates  which  result 
in  undue  preference.  The  law  contem- 
plates relatively  fair  rates  as  between 
different  places,  and  the  dealer  located 
In  a  small  town  is  entitled  to  a  reason- 
able adjustment  which  will  enable  him 
to  compete  on  an  equitable  basis  with 
dealers  at  trade  centers  enjoying  the 
benefit  of  competitive  rates.  Payne- 
Gardner  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I. 
C.  C.  638,  643 

III.     EFFECT    OF    EQUALIZATION. 

§8.     Adjustment  of   Related    Rates. 

See  Relative  Rates, 
(a)  Ordinarily,  rates  not  involved  in 
an  inquiry  before  the  Commission  will 
adjust  themselves  to  the  conditions 
brought  about  by  the  order  of  the  Com- 
mission, but  even  though  the  assumption 
that  they  will  adjust  themselves  is  er- 
roneous, and  the  basis  for  the  assump- 
tion involves  a  mistaken  factor  as  to 
such  other  rates,  still  it  does  not  neces- 
sarily lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
regulation  of  the  rate  directly  involved 
in  the  order  is  invalid,  or  that  the  order 
fixing  such  a  rate  should  be  annulled  by 
judicial  authority,  provided  always  the 
rate  so  directly  involved  is  reasonable 
and  just  for  shippers  and  carriers,  with 
relation  to  the  particular  destinations 
concerned.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S.  195 
B^ed.  953,  959. 


EQUALIZATION   OF  RATES,  §8    (b)— (h) 


311 


(b)  The  Commission  is  not  prevented 
from  reducing  an  unreasonably  high  rate 
between  certain  points  by  the  fact  that 
through  competitive  conditions  some 
other  rate  will  have  to  be  made  unrea- 
sonably low.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S., 
195  Fed.  953,  960. 

(c)  "Where  it  appears  obvious  that  to 
^rmt  the  prayer  of  a  complaint  to  re- 
duce the  rates  from  Indianapolis  to  the 
Mississippi  River  would  involve  the 
equalization  of  rates  in  all  the  territory 
between  Chicago  and  Buffalo,  it  must  be 
assumed  that  the  effect  of  such  wide- 
spread reductions  would  be  not  only 
great  but  injurious  and  perhaps  confis- 
catory upon  the  revenues  of  the  carriers. 
Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C. 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  195,  208. 

(d)  Relief  against  discrimination  due 
to  a  rate  adjustment  cannot  be  denied  on 
the  ground  that  other  points  similarly 
situated  might  thereby  be  induced  to  ask 
for  like  relief.  Chamber  of  Commerce 
of  Newport  News  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C. 
C.   345,   356. 

(dd)  The  fact  that  a  reduction  of  an 
unreasonable  rate  or  the  correction  of  an 
unjust  discrimination  will  require  reduc- 
tions or  corrections  at  other  points  can- 
not be  accepted  as  a  valid  defense  of 
an  unreasonable  rate  or*  an  unjust  dis- 
crimination. Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L. 
S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  93,  101. 

(e)  A  change  in  one  of  a  series  of 
related  rates  changes  the  relation  among 
all  of  them.  Boileau  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  640,  654. 

(ee)  Shippers  from  Atlantic  seaboard 
territory  are  entitled  to  reasonable  rates, 
and  if  the  establishment  of  such  reason- 
able rates  by  the  Commission  develops 
unjust  discrimination  or  unreasonable 
rates  from  intermediate  or  related  points, 
the  law  casts  upon  the  carriers  the  obli- 
gation of  providing  reasonable  and  non- 
discriminatory rates  from  such  inter- 
mediate or  related  points.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances in  Rates  by  Carriers  Operating 
Between  the  Mississippi  and  Missouri 
Rivers,  21  I.  C.  C.  546,  549. 

(f)  North,  S.  C,  is  located  on  defend- 
ant S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  247 1^  miles  from  Wil- 
mington, N.  C;  while  Olar,  S.  C,  is 
2781/2  miles.  From  Sept.  12,  1900,  to 
Oct.  15,  1908,  defendant's  rate  on  cotton 
from  North  was  36c  and  from  Olar  32c. 
On  Oct.  15,  1908,  defendant  raised  the 
rates  to   45c  from   North   and   51c  from 


Olar,  in  order  that  its  through  rates 
might  not  exceed  the  sum  of  its  local 
rates.  Dec.  4,  1908,  the  old  rates  were 
restored.  In  the  interval  complainant 
shipped  cotton  from  North  and  Olar  and 
was  charged  the  increased  rates  of  45c 
and  51c,  respectively.  The  old  rates,  re- 
stored Dec.  4,  1908,  remained  in  effect 
until  Sept.  17, 1909,  at  which  time  the  rate 
^rom  North  was  advanced  to  40c  and 
from  Olar  to  37c.  These  rates,  how- 
ever, included  compression  and  yielded 
the  net  rate  from  North  of  32i^c  and 
from  Olar  of  29i/^c.  A  lower  rate  from 
the  more  distant  point,  Olar,  had  been 
accorded  in  the  past  on  account  of  compe- 
tition with  the  Atlantic  Coast  Line,  which 
had  ceased  to  be  potent.  Interposition 
of  the  higher  rates  during  the  short  pe- 
riod during  which  the  shipments  moved 
was  admitted  to  be  a  mistake  by  the  de- 
fendant, the  rates  being  experimental 
and  quickly  withdrawn.  Defendant  ad- 
mitted that  reparation  on  the  shipments 
from  North  should  be  on  the  basis  of  the 
old  rate  of  36c,  but  contended  that  Olar 
should  ta,ke  a  higher  rate  than  North  and 
that,  therefore,  reparation  on  the  ship- 
ments from  Olar  should  not  be  accorded 
on  the  32c  basis.  HELD,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  the  relation  of  rates  between 
North  and  Olar  had  existed  for  seven  or 
eight  years  and  was  promptly  restored 
after  it  had  been  briefly  disturbed  and 
remained  in  effect  for  nearly  a  year, 
complainants  were  entitled  to  reparation 
on  the  shipments  from  North  on  the 
basis  of  36c  and  from  Olar  on  tne  basis 
of  32c,  but  no  order  should  be  entered 
requiring  defendant  for  the  future  to 
maintain  a  lower  rate  from  Olar  than 
from  North.  Alexander  Sprunt  &  Son  v. 
S.  A.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  251,  254. 

(g)  Where  a  rate  is  unreasonable  or 
unjustly  discriminatory  the  Commission 
will  not  refuse  to  order  the  same  changed 
on  the  ground  that  the  rate  adjustment  in 
the  surrounding  territory  will  be  dis- 
turbed. Columbia  Grocery  Co.  v.  L.  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  502,  505. 

(h)  Complainant  attacked  the  carU.aa 
rates  on  gypsum  rock  products  from 
Grand  Rapids,  Mich.,  to  all  points  in  Offi- 
cial and  Southern  Classification  territory, 
the  state  of  Wisconsin,  and  that  part  of 
Illinois  lying  in  Western  Classification 
territory.  The  Grand  Rapids  rate  to 
Trunk  Line  territory  was  96  per  cent 
of  the  Chicago-New  York  basing  rate, 
which  was  25c  at  the  time  of  the  filing 
of    the    complaint,    such    25c    rate    being 


312 


EQUALIZATION   OF  RATES,   §8    (i)— (j) 


21/^c  higher  than  that  previously  in  ef- 
fect for  a  long  period.  Since  the  filing 
of  the  complaint  the  basing  25c  rate  was 
reduced  to  22i/^c.  Complainant  con- 
tended that  the  rate  from  Grand  Rapids 
to  New  York  should  not  exceed  18c  in 
order  to  enable  Grand  Rapids  to  compete 
at  eastern  consuming  points  with  New 
York  and  Ohio  products.  The  rates  from 
Grand  Rapids  to  Trunk  Line  points  and 
Virginia  cities  conformed  to  the  mileage 
scale  which  had  long  been  applied  to 
practically  all  commodities  from  Central 
Freight  Association  territory.  Complain- 
ant urged  that  the  deposits  of  gypsum  in 
Official  Classification  territory  were  few 
in  number  and  so  located  that  commodity 
rates  made  to  meet  the  conditions  exist- 
ing at  each  manufacturing  point  would 
result  in  justice  to  each  and  permit  from 
each  a  reasonably  wide  distribution.  It 
appeared  that  a  reduction  of  the  Grand 
Rapids  rate  would  be  followed  by  corre- 
sponding reductions  from  other  compet- 
ing points.  The  ton  mile  revenue  on  the 
Grand  Rapids  rate  to  Trunk  Line  and 
Virginia  cities  was  higher  than  the  ton- 
mile  revenue  under  western  rates.  No 
disclosure  of  the  circumstances  was  of- 
fered under  which  the  western  rates 
were  made  or  the  reasons  which  induced 
the  western  carriers  to  accord  them.  The 
defendants  accepted  15c  for  the  haul 
from  St.  Louis  to  Baltimore  as  their 
proportion  of  the  through  rate  on  traffic 
originating  west  of  the  Mississippi.  This 
amount  scaled  to  Grand  Rapids  would 
give  that  point  a  12i^c  rate  to  New  York, 
The  rate  in  effect  at  the  time  of  the 
hearing,  22i^c,  yielded  5.2  mills  per  ton 
mile,  which  was  less  than  the  average 
ton-mile  rate  on  all  traffic  between  Central 
Freight  Association  points  and  Trunk 
Line  points.  With  respect  to  the  rate 
on  wall  plaster  from  Grand  Rapids  to 
Central  Freight  Association  territory,  it 
appeared  that  said  rates  were  83  1-3  per 
cent  of  sixth  class.  Prior  to  1904,  they 
had  been  73  1-3  per  cent  of  sixth  class. 
Complainant  contended  that  it  should  be 
accorded  special  commodity  rates,  which 
would  enable  complainant  to  meet  com- 
petition from  Fort  Dodge,  la.  Wall 
plaster  had  been  produced  at  and  shipp^  i 
from  Grand  Rapids  for  fifty  years,  and 
had  always  been  carried  under  sixth- 
class  rates  or  under  commodity  rates 
which  were  a  uniform  percentage  of  that 
class,  and  the  business  had  become  ad- 
Justed  on  said  basis  of  rates.  The  rates 
In  the  territory  in  question  on  cement 
were  73  1-3  per  cent  of  sixth  class.    Wall 


plaster  and  cement  were  not,  however, 
competitive  commodities.  The  volume 
of  traffic  in  cement  was  very  much  larger 
than  in  wall  plaster,  and  the  inbound 
shipments  of  coal  and  other  commodities 
to  cement  mills  were  much  greater  than 
to  wall  plaster  plants.  The  rate  from 
Fort  Dodge  to  Chicago,  a  distance  of  374 
miles,  was  8c,  as  compared  with  the  rate 
of  TY2C  from  Grand  Rapids  to  Chicago, 
a  distance  of  175  miles.  Said  8c  rate, 
however,  applied  on  a  60,000-lb.  minimum; 
a  12i^c  rate  applied  on  a  lower  mini- 
mum. The  Grand  Rapids  minimum  was 
40,000  lbs.  One  of  complainant's  com- 
petitors, located  at  Alabaster,  Mich., 
shipped  its  products  upon  its  own  line  of 
boats  to  Chicago,  and  this  fact  appeared 
to  account  for  the  failure  of  complainant 
to  make  sales  at  Chicago.  Under  the 
existing  rates,  complainant's  business 
was  steadily  increasing.  The  Grand 
Rapids  to  Chicago  rate  yielded  8.4  mills 
per  ton  mile,  which  was  greater  than  the 
average  revenue  received  from  all  freight 
in  the  territory  in  question  for  about 
the  same  haul.  At  the  minimum  loading, 
the  earnings  per  car  under  the  rate  in 
question  were  only  $30.00.  To  disturb 
the  wall-plaster  rate  between  Grand  Rap- 
ids and  Chicago  would  result  in  con- 
demning the  rates  on  all  commodities  in 
the  sixth  class.  HELD,  first,  with  re- 
spect to  the  rates  from  Grand  Rapids  to 
Trunk  Line  territory  and  Virginia  cities, 
the  Chicago  to  New  York  basing  rate 
of  25c  in  effect  at  the  time  of  filing 
the  complaint  was  unduly  high,  but  the 
said  basing  rate  of  22i^c  put  into  effect 
since  the  filing  of  the  compla'nt  was  not 
unreasonable,  and  that  reparation  should 
be  awarded  on  shipments  made  under 
the  25c  basing  rate;  second,  with  respect 
to  the  rates  from  Grand  Rapids  to  Cen- 
tral Freight  Association  territory,  the 
rates  attacked  were  not  shown  to  be 
unreasonable.  Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co. 
V.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  80, 
34,  39. 

(i)  The  matter  of  adjusting  rates  rela- 
tively to  meet  conditions  that  will  arise 
after  the  reduction  herein  ordered  is 
made  rests  primarily  with  the  defend- 
ants. Baer  Bros.  Mercantile  Co.  v.  M.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  225,  229. 

(j)  Justice  cannot  be  done  by  pre- 
scribing an  adjustment  which  might 
serve  to  satisfy  complainant  in  this  case 
if  effect  of  it  Is  to  impose  upon  some 
other  person  or  localities  the  burden 
that     is     lifted     from     the     complainant 


EQUALIZATION  OF  RATES,   §8    (k)— EVIDENCE 


313 


herein.     Kindel  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H   <&  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  555,  560. 

(k)  It  is  the  duty  of  the  Commission 
to  determine  a  question  of  relative  rates 
on  coal  as  between  competing  producing 
districts  upon  a  basis  which  will  permit 
them  to  compete  in  common  markets  and 
under  circumstances  to  which  their  lo- 
cation and  conditions  of  production  fairly 
entitle  them,  with  respect  of  their  rela- 
tion one  to  another.  Black  Mountain 
Coal  Land  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
286,   295. 

(1)  Every  locality  competing  in  a 
common  market  is  entitled  to  rates  which 
are  relatively  reasonable  and  just  in  com- 
parison with  rates  from  other  localities 
served  by  the  same  carrier.  Black 
Mountain  Coal  Land  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
15  1.  C.  C.  286,  294. 

EQUIPMENT. 

See  Cars  and  Car  Supply;  Evidence, 
§22,  §51  (d);  Facilities  and  Privi- 
leges, §21  (a);  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,  §13. 

ERIE  CANAL. 

See  Export  Rates  and  Facilitiec,  V 
(d). 

EVIDENCE. 

I.     BURDEN    OF    PROOF. 

§1.     In    general. 
II.     CIRCUMSTANCES     AND     CONDI- 
TIONS OF  PROBATIVE  VALUE. 
§2.     Advantage    of    location. 
§3.    Agreed     facts,     admissions 

and  agreements. 
§4.    Averages. 
§5.     Basing    point    system. 
§6.     Bona-fide  investment. 
§7.     Capitalization, 
§8.     Car-mile  or  train-mile  reve- 
nue. 
§9.     Change     in     conditions     or 

service. 
§10.     Combinations    to    fix    rates. 
§11.     Comparison      of      classifica- 
tions. 
§12.     Comparisons     of     commodi- 
ties. 

(1)  In   general. 

(2)  Anthracite   and   bitu- 
minous   coal. 

(3)  Bicycles     and     vehi 
cles. 

(4)  Blacksmith   coal   and 
other  coal. 

(5)  Brick, 


(6)  Cement  and  pota- 
toes. 

(7)  Copper    and    lumber. 

(8)  Cottonseed  meal  and 
hulls. 

(9)  Cross-ties  and  lum- 
ber. 

(10)  Fertilizer. 

(11)  Flaxseed    and    grain. 

(12)  Flour  and  grain. 

(13)  Grain    and    products. 

(14)  Ice. 

(15)  Junk  and  scrap  iron. 

(16)  Lumber  and  prod- 
ucts. 

(17)  Malt   and   barley. 

(18)  Motorcycles  and  bi- 
cycles. 

(19)  Oil. 

(20)  Pulpwood  and  lum- 
ber. 

(21)  Letter  copiers  and 
presses. 

(22)  Perishable  produce 
and  dairy  products. 

(23)  Posts  and  poles  and 
sawed  lumber. 

(24)  Sash,  doors  and 
blinds,    and    lumber. 

(25)  Staves  and  head- 
ings, and  hardwood 
lumber. 

(26)  Sulphuric  acid,  and 
fertilizer. 

(27)  Wool  and  hops. 

(28)  Wool   and   sheep. 

(29)  Wheat  and  barley, 
and  corn,  rye  and 
oats. 

(30)  "Wyandotte  Clean- 
ser," and  soda  ash. 

§13.     Comparisons  of  rates. 

(1)  In   general. 

(2)  Divisions  and  joint 
rates. 

(3)  Divisio.ns  and  local 
rates. 

(4)  Import  and  domestic 
rate. 

(5)  Proportional  and  lo- 
cal rates. 

(6)  State  and  interstate 
rates. 

§14.     Competition. 

(1)  In  general. 

(2)  Potential. 

(3)  Railroad. 

(4)  Rail    and   water. 

(5)  Water. 

§15.     Contract   relying   on    rate. 


314 


EVIDENCE,  §1   (a)_(aa) 


§16.     Cost  of  production. 

§17.     Cost  of  operation. 

§18.     Cost  of  service. 

§19.     Credit. 

§19/2-  Custom. 

§20.     Distance  of  haul. 

§21.     Dividends. 

§22.     Equipment  furnished. 

§22^.  Expert  evidence. 

§23.  Failure  to  serve  prejudiced 
locality. 

§24.     Fixed   charges. 

§25.     Governmental    regulation. 

§26.     Import  duty. 

§27.     Investment  relying  on  rate. 

§28.  Local  rates  and  combina- 
tions. 

§29.  Long  continuance  of  vol- 
untary rates. 

§30.  Low  rate  in  opposite  direc- 
tion. 

§31.     Manufactured   product. 

§32.     Market   competition. 

§33.     Merger  of  terminals. 

§34.  Mineral  lands  owned  by 
carrier. 

§35.     Municipal  charter. 

§36.    Need  for  revenue. 

§37.     New  lines. 

§38.     New   rates. 

§39.     Notice. 

§40.     Oral  testimony. 

§41.     Original  cost  of  road. 

§42.     Panama  canal. 

§42^.  Practical  construction. 

§43.     Past  rates. 

§431/2-  Permanent  improvements. 

§44.  Previous  haul  on  raw  ma- 
terial. 

§45.     Profit   of   shipper. 

§46.     Rate  to  carrier  as   shipper. 

§47.     Rate  via  competing  carrier. 

§48.     Rebates. 

§49.     Reproduction  value  of  road. 

§50.  Return  on  investment  in 
road. 

§51.     Revenue  of  railroad. 

§52.     Risk  of  loss  or  damage. 

§53.     Size  of  community. 

§54.     Size  of  road. 

§55.     Standard  of  lines. 

§56.     Standard  of  rates. 

§57.     Surplus. 

§58.     Ton-mile  revenue. 

§59.     Two-line  haul. 

§59^.  Unearned   increment. 

§60.     Unpublished    rate. 

§61.    Value  of  commodity. 

§62.    Value  of  service. 

§63.     Volume   of  traffic. 


§64.  Voluntary  or  subsequent  re- 
duction of  rate. 

§64!/2.  Wages. 

§65.     Weight    of    shipment. 

§66.  Widespread  rate  adjust- 
ment. 

III.  JUDICIAL   NOTICE. 

§67.     In  general. 

IV.  PRESUMPTIONS. 

§68.     In  general. 
V.     STARE  DECISIS. 
§69.     In  general. 

CROSS     REFERENCES. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  III;  Blanket 
Rates,  VII;  Cars  and  Car  Supply, 
III,  §36;  Equalization  of  Rates,  II; 
Express  Companies,  VII;  Long  and 
Short  Hauls,  §12;  Loss  and  Dam- 
age, III;  Overcharges,  §5;  Pas- 
senger Fares  and  Facilities,  II; 
Procedure  Before  Commission, 
VIII;    Undercharges,    III. 

I.     BURDEN   OF   PROOF. 

See  Absorption  of  Charges,  §4  (a); 
Advanced  Rates,  §3,  §5  (2)  (bb),  §6 
(3)  (a);  Blanket  Rates,  §16;  Classi- 
fication, §15  (b):  Courts.  §6  (e); 
Crimes,  §25;  Discrimination,  §14; 
Evidence,  I.  §68  (a);  Express  Com- 
panies, §11  (5)  (a),  §11  (9)  (a),  §23 
(a);  Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §12  (1); 
Loss  and  Damage,  §15;  Propor- 
tional Rates,  II  (a);  Routing  and 
Misrouting,  §8;  Through  Routes 
and  Joint  Rates,  §11  (2)  (c),  (u), 
§15,  §16   (I):    Undercharges,   §5. 

§1.     In   General. 

(a)  Defendants  advanced  the  rate  on 
candles  from  Helena,  Mont.,  to  points  in 
the  Coeur  d'Alene  district  about  20c 
per  100  lbs.,  raising  the  former  rates 
of  about  55c.  No  evidence  was  offered 
to  show  that  the  cost  of  the  service  had 
increased  or  that  the  carriage  of  this 
particular  article  was  not  profitable  to 
the  defendants.  These  rates  had  been 
in  effect  for  a  period  of  years.  Com- 
plainant established  a  business  under 
them  and  has  no  means  of  reaching  the 
market  other  than  via  defendants'  line. 
HELD,  defendants  have  not  sustained 
the  burden  placed  upon  them  by  the 
statute  to  show  that  the  new  rates  are 
just  and  reasonable;  and  they  should 
establish  for  the  future  rates  not  in  ex- 
cess of  those  in  effect  previous  to  the 
advance  in  question.  Reparation  award- 
ed. Perry  &  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.   C.  C.  247. 

(aa)  A  carrier  cannot  be  permitted 
to  advance  its  rate  to  the  level  of 
rates  on  the  same  article  on  other  lines, 
where  the  proposed  restored  rate  is  pro- 


EVIDENCE,  §1   (b)— (gg) 


315 


hibitive  and  the  carrier  fails  to  sustain 
the  burden  of  proof.  In  Re  Advances 
on  Staves,  23  I.  C.  C.  382. 

(b)  An  admission  of  reasonableness 
relieves  the  carrier  of  the  burden  of 
justifying  the  advance.  Wisconsin  State 
Millers'  Ass'n  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
23   I.    C.    C.   494,   495. 

(bb)  The  withdrawal  of  through 
rates,  leaving  higher  combination  in 
effect,  casts  burden  upon  carriers.  In 
Re  Advances  on  Coal,  23  I.  C.  C.  518, 
519. 

(c)  The  withdrawal  of  proportional 
rates,  leaving  higher  local  rates  in  ef- 
fect, casts  the  burden  of  justifying  upon 
the  carriers.  Wisconsin  State  Millers' 
Ass'n  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.    C.    494,    495. 

(cc)  That  the  sheep  industry  should 
be  treated  as  a  whole  and  the  rates 
accorded  to  that  industry  passed  upon 
as  a  whole;  that  the  unreasonably  low 
live-stock  rate  should  be  offset  against 
the  wool  rate  should  that  appear  some- 
what high,  is  a  doctrine  that  should 
be  applied  with  extreme  caution.  In  Re 
Tracsportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and 
Pelts,   23   I.   C.    C.   151,   159. 

(d)  Complainants  sought  to  reduce 
rates  on  live  stock,  carloads,  from  Ida- 
ho and  eastern  Oregon  points  through 
Wallula,  Wash.,  to  Tacoma,  Wash.,  to 
the  same  basis  as  in  effect  from  the 
above  points  through  Portland,  Ore.,  to 
Tacoma.  The  Wallula  route  is  43  miles 
shorter  than  the  Portland  route.  The 
difference  in  rates  ranges  from  nothing 
to  $15  per  car.  HELD,  in  the  absence 
of  any  showing  as  to  the  unreasonable- 
ness of  the  rates  via  Wallula,  the  mere 
fact  a  lower  rate  existed  via  a  longer 
route  was  no  measure  of  the  reasonable- 
ness of  the  rate  attacked.  Complaint 
dismissed.  Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  IT. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  8,  10. 

(dd)  After  Jan.  1,  1910,  under  the  fif- 
teenth section  of  the  Act,  the  burden  of 
proof  to  show  that  the  increased  fare 
is  just  and  reasonable  rests  with  the  car- 
rier. Citizens  of  Somerset  v.  Washing- 
ton Ry.  &  Elec.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  187,  188. 

(e)  An  allegation  that  a  rate  is  un- 
reasonable puts  the  burden  of  showing 
such  unreasonableness  on  the  complain- 
ant. Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Augusta, 
Ga.,  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
233,  234. 


(e€)  The  Commission  does  not  hold 
that  rates  beyond  a  common  junction 
point  from  different  points  of  origin  must 
in  every  case  increase  in  equal  ratio, 
regardless  of  relative  distances  and  other 
possible  material  considerations,  but  a 
substantial  disparity  in  this  regard  im- 
poses upon  carriers  the  burden  of  justi- 
fication by  showing  a  dissimilarity  of 
conditions  from  the  favored  section. 
Alpha  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  446,  450. 

(f)  A  group  of  carriers  cannot  be 
permitted  to  cast  the  responsibility  of 
justifying  a  proposed  increase  in  rates 
upon  a  single  carrier  and  claim  the 
benefit  of  the  case  made  by  such  car- 
rier, where  several  roads  lead  between 
two  points,  since  the  carriers  might 
place  the  burden  of  upholding  the 
burden  of  increase  upon  that  railroad 
which  could  make  the  best  showing, 
having  the  longest  route,  most  incom- 
petent management,  the  lowest  volume 
of  traffic  and  the  greatest  need  of  addi- 
tional revenue.  In  Re  Advances  on 
Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C.  604,  611. 

(ff)  If,  contrary  to  general  impres- 
sion and  logical  expectation,  a  more 
highly  developed  and  better  equipped 
railway  cannot  do  business  on  as  low  a 
basis  per  unit  of  traffic  as  a  railway 
less  developed  and  with  poorer  equip- 
ment, that  conclusion  should  be  clearly 
and  unmistakably  demonstrated  and 
proven,  and  should  not  be  accepted  on 
vague  impressions  or  general  allegations 
before  consequential  action  iS  taken 
based  upon  it.  Boileau  v.  P.  &  L.  E. 
R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  640,  651. 

(g)  Under  the  Act  of  1910  the  burden 
is  on  the  carrier  to  prove  the  reason- 
ableness of  advanced  rates.  In  Re 
Advances  on  Cattle  and  Sheep,  23  I. 
C.  C.  7,  12;  In  Re  Advances  on  Lemons, 
23  I.  C.  C.  27,  28;  In  Re  Investi- 
gation of  Advances  in  Rates  on 
Grain,  21  I.  C.  C.  22,  35;  In  Re  Ad- 
vances in  Rates  on  Locomotives  and 
Tenders,  21  I.  C.  C.  103,  111;  In  Re  In- 
vestigation and  Suspension  Docket  14, 
21  L  C.  C.  546,  555;  Ohio  Allied  Milk 
Product  Shippers  v.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  21 
I.  C.  C.  522,  528;  United  States  Leather 
Co.  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  323,  325; 
Victor  Mfg.  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C. 
222,  226. 

(gg)  Where  the  cancellation  of  joint 
through  rates  increases  the  total  rate 
from  point  of  origin  to  destination  the 


316 


EVIDENCE,   §1    (h)— (n) 


burden  is  on  the  carrier  to  prove  the 
reasonableness  of  the  increased  rates. 
In  Re  Advances  on  Lumber  and  Other 
Forest  Products,   21  I.  C.   C.  455,  456. 

(h)  An  award  of  the  Commission  in 
reparation  of  damages  resulting  from  a 
violation  of  the  Act  is  not  enforceable 
as  such,  but  in  a  suit  in  court,  for  such 
damages,  the  findings  and  order  of  the 
Commission  are  prima  facie  evidence  in 
support  thereof.  It  follows  that  the 
Commission  is  not  justified  in  awarding 
damages  in  any  case  except  on  a  basis  as 
certain  and  definite  in  law  and  in  fact 
as  is  essential  to  the  support  of  a  final 
judgment  or  decree  requiring  the  pay- 
ment of  a  definite  sum  of  money  by  one 
party  to  another.  Anadarko  Cotton  Oil 
Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C  C. 
43,  49. 

(i)  The  burden  of  proof  of  the  unrea- 
sonableness of  a  rate  is  on  the  complain- 
ant. Loftus  V.  Pullman  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
102,  103. 

(j)  Complainant  shipped  compo-board 
and  at  the  hearing  produced  no  evidence 
in  support  of  his  complaint  that  the  rate 
was  unreasonable,  except  producing  the 
expense  bills  and  a  sample  of  the  compo- 
board.  HELD,  such  evidence  is  not  the 
presentation  of  facts,  circumstances  and 
conditions  necessary  to  an  intelligent 
and  proper  determination  of  the  matters 
in  question.  While  it  is  the  duty  and 
practice  of  the  Commission  to  exhaust 
its  activities  in  developing  the  pertinent 
facts  necessary  to  the  full  investigation 
and  hearing  of  complaints  before  it,  it 
is  but  reasonable  that  a  party  com- 
plainant should  also  take  such  action  as 
may  be  within  his  power  to  aid  the 
Commission  by  presenting  such  evidence 
as  will  show  the  pertinent  facts,  circum- 
stances and  conditions  bearing  upon  the 
questions  involved.  Quammen  &  Austad 
Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
19  L  C.  C.  110,  111. 

(k)  On  carloads  of  empty  beer  pack- 
ages from  Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Milwaukee, 
Wis.,  and  from  Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to 
Milwaukee,  complainant  was  assessed 
16c,  or  one-half  of  the  fourth  class  rate. 
Shortly  prior  to  the  shipment  a  rate  of 
lie  was  in  effect.  Shortly  after  the  ship- 
ment it  was  restored.  Defendants  ad- 
mitted the  rate  charged  to  be  unreason- 
able and  joined  in  asking  reparation  on 
the  basis  of  lie.  Under  the  lie  rate 
the  earnings  per  carload  ranged  from 
$16.50  to  $33.00.     Under  the  16c  rate  it 


ranged  from  $24.00  to  $48.00.  The  dis- 
tance was  500  miles.  HELD,  that  an 
award  of  reparation  can  be  predicated 
only  upon  an  affirmative  finding  that 
the  rate  exacted  was  in  fact  excessive, 
and  not  merely  upon  a  showing  that  the 
carrier  is  willing  to  honor  the  claim; 
that  the  fact  that  the  defendants  found 
it  impracticable  to  maintain  the  increased 
charge  did  not  demonstrate  its  inherent 
unreasonableness;  and  the  IGc  charge 
could  not  be  held  to  be  excessive.  Rep- 
aration denied.  Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  359,  360. 

(1)  Where  there  is  a  conflict  in  tes- 
timony as  to  the  date  of  a  movement, 
the  rate  that  was  lawfully  in  effect,  the 
route  taken,  the  size  of  the  car  actually 
used,  or  the  weight  of  the  shipment,  of- 
ficial records  of  the  carrier  may  be  re- 
sorted to  in  arriving  at  a  correct  con- 
clusion; but  where  a  shipper  claims  that 
he  ordered  a  car  of  a  certain  size  for  a 
particular  shipment  and  this  is  denied 
by  the  carrier,  and  it  is  not  pretended 
that  the  order  was  in  writing,  the  con- 
flict can  be  resolved  only  by  considering 
all  the  evidence  and  ascertaining  on 
which  side  the  preponderance  of  the  tes- 
timony may  lie.  Wheeler  Lumber, 
Bridge    &    Supply    Co.    v.    S.    P.    Co.,    16 

I.  C.  C.  547,  548. 

(m)  Where  the  complainant  sought  to 
disturb  a  rate  adjustment  of  long  stand- 
ing he  should  take  upon  himself  the 
burden  of  establishing  clearly  the  ne- 
cessity for  an  investigation  and  the  rea- 
sonableness of  its  demand.  Taylor  v. 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  165,  166. 

(n)  Among  the  considerations  to  be 
weighed  in  determining  what  is  a  rea- 
sonable and  just  rate  are  included  the 
general  financial  and  physical  conditions 
of  the  carrier,  the  character  of  the  com- 
modity in  question,  whether  it  constitutes 
a  large  or  small  part  of  the  business  of 
the  carrier,  whether  it  is  economical  or 
expensive  to  handle,  how  it  compares 
with  other  commodities  hauled,  and,  as 
evidencing  the  railroad's  own  judgment, 
whether  a  different  rate  has  been  in 
effect  on  this  commodity  at  some  time  or 
other.  Thompson  Lumber  Co.  v.  I.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  657,  664. 

II.  CIRCUMSTANCES      AND      CONDI- 

TIONS OF  PROBATIVE  VALUE. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §18;  Equaliza- 
tion of  Rates,  II;  Long  and  Sliort 
Hauls,  §12  (2);  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,    II;   Reparation,    III. 


EVIDENCE,  §2  (a)— §5  (a) 


^17 


§2.     Advantage    of    Location. 

See    Equalization    of    Rates,    §3;    Tar- 
iffs,  §7   (fff). 

(a)  Every  city  is  entitled  to  the  com- 
mercial advantages  of  its  location.  Mere- 
dith V.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  31, 
34;  Massee  &  Felton  Lumber  Co.  v.  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  110,  111,  113;  Chamber 
of  Commerce  of  Ashburn  v.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  140,  145;  Bituminous  Coal 
Operators  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  385, 
391;  Red  River  Oil  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  438,  442;  Blodgett  Milling 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
448,  451;  Sioux  City  Term.  El.  Co.  v.  C 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  98,  107; 
Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  O.  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  77,  81;  Elk  Cement  and 
Lime  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
84,  88;  In  Re  Investigation  of  Rates  on 
Meats,  22  I.  C.  C.  160,  163;  In  Re  Ad- 
vances on  Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C. 
604,  613;  Boileau  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  640,  654;  Sinclair  &  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  490, 
507,  508;  East  St.  Louis  Cotton  Oil  Co. 
V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  37, 
41;  Truck  Growers'  Assn.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R. 
R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  190;  National  Refining 
Co.  V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
649;  Corporation  Commission  of  North 
Carolina  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
303,  309;  Ponchatoula  Farmers'  Assn.  v. 
I.  C.  R.  R.  Co..  19  L  C.  C.  513,  516;  Col- 
orado Coal  Traffic  Assn.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  572,  576;  Acme  Cement 
Plaster  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  30,  33;  Saginaw  Board  of  Trade 
V.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  128, 
135;  Florida  Fruit  &  Vegetable  Assn.  v. 
A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  552,  561; 
Board  of  Trade  of  Winston-Salem  v.  N. 
&  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  12,  16;  Chicago 
Lumber  &  Coal  Co.  v.  T.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  323,  331;  Hafey  v.  St.  L  &  S.  F. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  245,  246;  Black 
Mountain  Coal  Land  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  286,  293;  City  of  Spokane  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  419;  Kan- 
sas City  Transportation  Bureau  v.  A.  T. 

S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  491,  498;  Kin- 
del  V.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  555,  561;  Burnham,  Hanna,  Munger 
Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  299, 
303;  Quimby  v.  Maine  Central  R.  R.  Co., 
13  I.  C.  C.  246,  248. 

(aa)  Commercial  conditions  should  be 
considered  in  fixing  rates.  City  of  Spo- 
kane V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  162,  168. 

(b)  Because  carriers  have  con- 
structed  a   system   of   rates    on   a    zone 


or  blanket  system  is  not  sufficient  reason 
to  justify  the  collection  of  unreason- 
able charges  to  any  point.  Every  city  is 
entitled  to  the  advantage  of  its  location 
and  may  not  lawfully  be  subjected  to 
high  freight  charges  merely  because  car- 
riers for  reasons  of  convenience  or  other- 
wise include  it  with  a  number  of  other 
points  in  surrounding  territory,  which 
latter  points  are  not  similarly  situated. 
Corporation  Commission  of  North  Caro- 
line V.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
303.  309. 

(c)  Where,  from  a  geographical 
standpoint,  two  rate  groups  are  corre- 
sponding timber  producing  sections  they 
should  take  the  same  rates.  Big  Black- 
foot  Milling  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.  C.  173,  175. 

(d)  Every  locality  competing  in  a 
common  market  is  entitled  to  rates 
which  are  relatively  reasocable  and  just 
in  comparison  with  rates  from  other  lo- 
calities served  by  the  same  carrier. 
Black  Mountain  Coal  Land  Co.  v.  S. 
Ry.   Co.,   15   I.   C.  C.   286,  294. 

(e)  Carriers  are  not  required  by  law 
to  equalize  natural , advantages,  such  as 
location,  cost  of  production  and  the  like. 
Black  Mountain  Coal  I>and  Co.  v.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,   15    I.   C.   C.   286,   293. 

I  §3.     Agreed       Facts,       Admissions       and 
Agreements, 

See  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §19  (f ) ; 
Overcharges,  §4  (b);  Reparation, 
§17;    Special    Contract,    §4    (1)    (fg), 

(a)  While  a  stipulation  is  ordinarily 
accepted  by  the  Commission  as  con- 
clusive, inasmuch  as  the  Commission  is 
charged  with  the  enforcement  of  lawful 
rates,  it  cannot  at  all  times  accept  the 
views  of  the  parties  as  to  what  in  fact  is 
the  lawful  rate  between  given  points  on 
a  specified  commodity.  Germain  Co  v. 
N.  O.  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.-  C  C. 
22,   24. 

§4.     Averages. 

See    Infra,   §12    (14)    (a);    §20    (ff). 

(a)  Averages  are  often  helpful  in  de- 
termining the  proper  relationship  of 
rates  or  the  proper  basis  for  their  con- 
struction, but  dissimilarity  of  conditions 
may  affect  the  force  of  these  factors. 
Victor  Mfg.  Co.  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C. 
222,  229. 

§5.     Basing   Point  System. 

(a)  A  rapid  increase  of  rates  as  the 
point    of    production    is    removed    from 


!18 


EVIDENCE,   §5    (b)— §8    (d) 


base  points  presents  an  anomaly  in  rate 
making  which  calls  for  explanation. 
Florida  Fruit  &  Vegetable  Shippers' 
Protective  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
22   I.   C.    C.    11,   17. 

(b)  Where  a  rate  adjustment  is  built 
and  maintained  upon  the  bas'ng-point 
system  it  should  be  applied  alike  to  all 
places  where  dissimilarity  of  circum- 
stances or  controlling  competition  does 
not  exist.  Columbia  Grocery  Co.  v.  L.  & 
N.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  502,  505. 

§6.     Bona-fide    Investment. 

See  Infra,  §41  (a),  §49  (aa);  Ad- 
vanced   Rates,   §6,   §6    (4)    (b). 

(a)  Were  it  possible  to  determine  the 
exact  amount  of  money  which  has  been 
put  into  the  railroad  properties  in  Official 
Classification  territory,  the  amount  of 
return  which  has  been  paid  to  the  pres- 
ent time,  the  degree  of  prudence  with 
which  the  property  has  been  constructed 
and  operated,  investment  would  furni  h 
a  very  satisfactory  basis  in  arriving  at 
an  equitable  return.  Advances  in  Rates 
—Eastern  Case,  20  I.  ^.  C.  243,  258. 

(b)  The  nearest  approximation  to  the 
fair  standard  of  rate  regulation  is  that 
of  bona-fide  investment — the  sacrifice 
made  by  the  owners  of  the  property — 
considering  as  part  of  the  investment 
any  shortage  of  return  that  there  may 
be  in  the  early  years  of  the  enterprise. 
Upon  this,  taking  a  life  history  of  the 
road  through  a  number  of  years,  its  pro- 
moters are  entitled  to  a  reasonable  re- 
turn. This,  however,  is  limited;  for  a 
return  should  not  be  given  upon  waste- 
fulness, mismanagement,  or  poor  judg- 
ment, and  always  there  is  present  the 
restriction  that  no  more  than  a  reason- 
able rate  shall  be  charged.  Advances  in 
Rates— Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307,  347. 

§7.     Capitalization. 

See  Express  Companies,  §24;  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission,  §7; 
Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §5. 

(a)  The  market  value  of  stock  should 
be  considered  in  fixing  rates,  but  such 
rates  cannot  be  allowed  as  will  guarantee 
the  prices  at  which  the  stock  was 
bought.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — 
Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  260. 

(b)  It  is  almost  axiomatic  that  the 
investment  in  an  American  railroad  is 
not  represented  by  its  capitalization.  The 
Commission  cannot  accept  capitalization 
as     representing     either     investment     or 


value.       Advances     in     Rates — Western 
Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307,  320. 

(c)  There  is  no  relation  between  cap- 
ital and  value  and  there  is  no  relation 
between  stocks  representing  value  and 
bonds  representing  value.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances in  Rates — Western  Case,  20  I.  C. 
C.  307,  335. 

(d)  The  Great  Northern  Railway 
Company  has  in  the  past  distributed  its 
stock  issues  among  its  stockholders  at 
pa-r  from  time  to  time,  although  the  mar- 
ket value  of  the  stock  was  often  much 
above  par.  Without  expressing  any  opin- 
ion upon  the  legality  or  propriety  of  this 
practice,  it  is  held  that  this  fact,  at  this 
time,  can  have  no  bearing  upon  the  earn- 
ings to  which  that  company  is  entitled. 
City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.   C  376. 

(e)  The  fact  that  a  carrier  has  issued 
watered  stock  cannot  be  urged  on  a  ques- 
tion of  reasonableness  of  rates  to  deny 
the  right  of  present  holders  of  said 
stock  to  receive  reasonable  dividends 
thereon.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  410. 

(f)  The  fact  that  a  carrier's  stock 
originally  sold  at  less  than  par  cannot 
be  urged  on  a  question  of  reasonableness 
of  rates  to  deny  the  present  holders 
thereof  fair  dividends  therefrom.  City 
of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
376,  411. 

§8.     Car-mile  or  Train-mile   Revenue. 

See    Minlmums,   $1    (bb) ;    Reasonable- 
ness of   Rates,  §6. 

(a)  There  are  greater  car  earnings 
under  a  lower  rate  with  a  higher  mini- 
mum than  under  a  higher  rate  with  a 
lower  minimum.  In  Re  Transportation 
of  Wool,  Hides  ard  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C. 
151,    167. 

(aa)  Car  revenue  is  an  important  ele- 
ment in  determining  the  reasonableness 
of  a  rate.  Merchants  &  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v. 
A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  467,  469. 

(b)  The  fairest  test  of  the  reasonable- 
ness of  rates  is  earnings  per  car-mile 
and  per  train-mile.  In  Re  Advances  on 
Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C.  604,  620. 

(c)  The  rate  per  car  per  mile  en- 
titled to  be  considered  as  a  relative  test 
in  rate  making.  National  Hay  Ass'n  v. 
M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  34,  47. 

(d)  Car  earnings  of  $44  on  a  40-ton 
car  for  a  one-line  haul  of  113  miles  and 


EVIDENCE,  §8  (e)— §12  (2)   (a) 


319 


for  a  50-ton  car  of  $55  seems  excessive 
for  a  commodity  like  coal,  which  can 
move  in  almost  any  kind  of  a  car.  Rainey 
&  Rodgers  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  88,  90. 

(e)  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  earnings 
of  from  $24  to  $48  per  car  for  a  haul 
of  some  500,  miles  can  be  held  an  ex- 
cessive return  for  the  service  rendered. 
Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  359,  360. 

(f)  The  most  satisfactory  comparison 
to  ascertain  whether  relative  injustice 
is  being  done  one  section  against  an- 
other is  through  the  earnings  per  car. 
Ozark  Fruit  Growers'  Ass'n  v.  St.  L 
&  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  106,  114. 

§9.     Change  In  Conditions  or  Service. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §7;  Facilities 
and  Privileges,  §15  (I);  Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §7,  §28  (q). 

(a)  Where  a  carrier  voluntarily 
changes  its  method  of  gathering  certain 
milk  shipments  in  order  to  expedite  its 
service  and  save  itself  expense  in  hand- 
ling other  shipments  of  milk,  it  cannot 
contend  that  its  changed  method  of  gath- 
ering has  increased  its  cost  of  service  to 
such  an  extent  that  the  milk  shipments 
first  referred  to  should  pay  an  increased 
rate.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  for  the 
Transportation  of  Fluid  Milk,  23  I.  C  C 
500,    501,    502. 

§10.  Combination  to  Fix  Rates. 
See  Advanced  Rates,  §9,  §16. 
(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  cement 
rate  from  Martins  Creek,  Pa.,  in  the  Le- 
high district  to  Philadelphia.  The  de- 
fendant offered  evidence  to  show  that 
the  producers  of  cement  in  the  Lehigh 
district  adjusted  their  prices  in  the  va- 
rious markets  to  meet  competition  from 
other  points,  and  argued  that  any  reduc- 
tion of  the  rate  to  Philadelphia  would 
mure  to  the  benefit  of  the  producers  of 
cement  at  Martins  Creek,  not  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  purchasers  at  Philadel- 
phia. HELD,  whatever  the  fact  may  be 
in  this  respect  the  duty  of  the  Commis- 
sion is  to  deal  with  the  rates  themselves. 
If  there  is  a  combination  in  restraint  of 
trade  which  controls  the  price  of  this 
commodity  without  regard  to  the  ordi- 
nary laws  of  production  and  distribution 
that  fact  does  not  constitute  an  excuse 
for  the  maintenance  of  an  unreasonable 
rate.  Maritime  Exchange  v  P  R  R 
Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  81,  84.  ... 

(b)     While    evidence    of    an    unlawful 
combination    of   carriers   in   fixing   rates 


is  admissible  as  a  part  of  the  history  of 
the  rate  of  which  complaint  is  made 
and  may  often  throw  light  upon  the 
question  of  its  reasonableness,  the  un- 
lawful combination,  standing  by  itself 
without  proof  also  of  the  unreasonable- 
ness of  the  rate,  is  not  a  sufficient 
ground  for  an  order  to  reduce  the  rate. 
Board  of  Bristol,  Tenn.,  v.  V  &  S  W 
Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  453,  454. 

(c)  While  the  action  of  carriers  in 
fixmg  rates  by  agreement  leads  the 
L^ommission  to  scrutinize  more  carefully 
such  rates,  with  a  view  to  ascertaining 
whether  or  not  such  action  has  resulted 
in  the  maintenance  of  unreasonable 
transportation  charges,  and  evidence 
thereof  is  admissible  for  that  purpose, 
that  fact  alone  is  not  conclusive  of  the 
unreasonableness  of  said  rates.  Rail- 
road Commission  of  Kentucky  v  L  &  N 
R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  300,  309.  " 

§11.     Comparison    of  Classification. 
See    Comparative    Rates, 
(a)     A   comparison   of   the   ratings   in 
the    different    classifications    is    not    a 
guide     to     the     relative     transportation 
charges     thereunder,     unless     the     class 
rates  under  the  several  classifications  are 
also  considered.     Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v 
L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  1.  C.  C.  93,  102. 

§12.     Comparisons  of  Commodities. 

See    Comparative    Rates. 
§12.     (1)     In    General. 

(a)  The  contention  that  the  rate  on 
one  commodity  should  not  exceed  the 
rate  on  an  analogous  one  may  have 
force,  but  in  the  absence  of  a  showing 
of  the  unreasonableness  of  the  rates  on 
the  analogous  one  the  Commission  would 
not  be  justified  in  requiring  a  reduction 
of  the  rates  on  the  other.  By  merely 
showing  that  the  articles  are  similar  the 
order  would  be  limited  to  prescribe  rates 
on  one  commodity  not  in  excess  of  rates 
on  the  other,  which  might  be  obeyed  by 
increasing  the  lower  rate.  Paducah 
Cooperage  Co.  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co , 
22  I.  C.  C.  226,  232. 

§12.     (2)     Anthracite      and      Bituminous 
Coal. 

(a)  The  conditions  relating  to  the 
transportation  of  anthracite  and  bitumi- 
nous coal  have  not  been  shown  to  be  sim- 
ilar to  such  a  degree  that  the  existence 
of  a  lower  rate  on  bituminous  would  war- 
rant a  conclusion  that  a  higher  rate  on 
anthracite  on  a  different  road  is  unrea- 


320 


EVIDENCE,  §12  (2)    (b)— §12  (8)    (a) 


sonable.     Meeker  &   Co.   v.  Lehigh  Val- 
ley R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  129,  150. 

(b)  Coal  is  a  low-grade  freight,  mov- 
ing in  vast  quantities;  it  is  a  natural 
product  and  the  commercial  conditions 
surrounding  its  production,  the  competi- 
tive conditions  under  which  it  moves  and 
its  varying  cost  in  different  fields  must 
be  taken  into  consideration  in  fixing 
•rates.  Fort  Dodge  Commercial  Club  v. 
I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  572,  582. 

§12.     (3)     Bicycles  and  Vehicles. 

(a)  On  carloads  of  bicycles  from  Day- 
ton, O.,  to  Chicago,  111.,  complainant  was 
charged  in  1910  first  class  rates,  whereas 
before  July  1  of  that  year  it  had  paid 
second  class  rates,  the  rates  being  re- 
spectively 38i^c  and  33c.  Other  vehicles 
were  rated  less  than  second  class.  The 
minimum  carload  weight  on  other  ve- 
hicles was  11,000  lbs.;  on  bicycles,  10,000. 
Defendant  did  not  present  any  evidence 
to  justify  the  increase  of  the  rate,  except 
that  car  earnings  were  small  compared 
with  articles  of  iron  and  steel.  HELD, 
that  the  proper  comparison  for  the  pur- 
poses of  testing  the  reasonableness  of 
the  rate  was  with  other  vehicles,  and 
that  rate  charged  was  unreasonable,  and 
that  the  original  second  class  rate  should 
stand.  Reparation  granted.  Davis  Sew- 
ing Machine  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  291. 

§12.     (4)     Blacksmith     Coal     and     Other 
Coal. 

(a)  While  the  use  to  which  a  com 
modify  is  put  affords  no  basis  for  a  dif- 
ference in  rates,  such  a  substantial  dif- 
ference exists  between  blacksmith  coal 
and  ordinary  bituminous  coal  as  to  war- 
rant a  special  smithing-coal  rate.  Sligo 
Iron  Store  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
17  L  C.  C.  139,  142. 

(b)  Blacksmith  coal  is  superior  to 
ordinary  coal  and  it  is  lawful  for  car- 
riers to  collect  a  higher  rate  thereon. 
Sligo  Iron  Store  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  139,  142. 

§12.     (5)      Brick. 

(a)  There  is  no  transportation  rea- 
son for  making  different  rates  on  differ- 
ent grades  of  fire,  building,  and  paving 
brick.  Metropolitan  Paving  Brick  Co. 
V.  A.  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  197,  205. 

.(b)  Brick  is  a  very  desirable  traffic 
possessing  elements  which  seem  to  call 
for  the  making  of  low  rates.     Metropoli- 


tan Paving  Brick  Co.  v.  A.  A.  R.  R.  Co., 
17  L  C.  C.  197,  207. 

(c)  Common  brick  are  made  in  al- 
most every  section  of  the  country,  and 
a  rate  made  to  move  such  a  low-priced 
commodity  as  this  should  not  be  taken 
as  the  basis  for  fixing  the  rate  on  other 
classes  of  brick.  James  &  Abbot  Co. 
v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  17  I.   C.  C.  273,  274. 

§12.     (6)     Cement  and   Potatoes. 

(a)  The  difference  in  the  value  of 
two  commodities,  in  the  volume  of  the 
traffic,  in  the  conditions  under  which 
they  move,  and  in  the  risk  and  cost  of 
handling  them  ordinarily  results  in  a 
substantial  difference  in  the  rates  under 
which  they  are  carried,  and  therefore  a 
comparison  of  the  rates  on  cement  with 
the  rates  on  potatoes  is  of  little  value 
in  support  of  an  allegation  that  there 
is  a  discrimination  in  rates  in  favor  of 
cement  as  against  potatoes,  the  two 
commodities  being  wholly  non-competi- 
tive. Anthony  v.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I  C. 
C.  581. 

(b)  Potatoes,  being  in  the  fifth  class, 
take  a  17c  rate  from  one  Pennsylvania 
rate  group  and  a  14c  rate  from  an  ad- 
joining New  Jersey  group  to  certain 
New  England  points.  Cement  moves  to 
the  same  points  under  a  blanket  com- 
modity rate  from  all  mills  within  the 
radius  of  the  two  groups.  HELD,  that 
complainant's  contention  that  potatoes 
ought,  for  that  reason,  to  enjoy  one 
rate,  viz.,  the  14c  rate,  from  all  points 
within  the  same  radius  is  without  merit, 
and  the  complaint  is  therefore  dis- 
missed. Anthony  v.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  581. 

§12.     (7)     Copper   and    Lumber. 

(a)  A  copper  rate  based  on  a  limited 
risk  is  no  guide  to  lumber  rates.  Ore- 
gon &  Washington  Lumber  v.  U.  P.  R. 
R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  1,  13. 

§12.     (8)     Cottonseed   Meal   and    Hulls. 

(a)  On  cottonseed  meal  and  cotton- 
seed hulls  defendants  published  joint 
rates  to  Jacksonville,  Fla.,  from  local 
mill  points  on  the  line  of  the  Central  of 
Georgia  R.  R.  that  were  on  a  level  with 
the  rates  on  those  commodities  from  com- 
petitive points  in  the  same  territory. 
Coming  into  competition  with  other  feed- 
ing materials  as  well  as  with  the  meal 
and  hulls  of  other  mills  the  defendants 


EVIDENCE,  §12  (9)   (a)— §12  (18)   (a) 


321 


asserted  that  competitive  rates  are  essen- 
tial to  insure  their  free  movement. 
HELD,  these  considerations  are  entitled 
to  proper  weight  in  considering  any  rela- 
tion of  rates  on  cottonseed  and  cotton- 
seed products.  Florida  Cotton  Oil  Co. 
V.  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  336,  339. 

§12.     (9)     Cross-ties  and   Lumber. 

(a)  The  rates  on  cross-ties  should 
not  exceed  the  rates  on  rough  lumber  of 
the  same  description,  Switzer  Lumber 
Co.  V.  A.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  471,  475. 

(b)  The  rates  on  ties  should  not  ex- 
ceed the  rates  upon  lumber  of  the  class 
and  description  of  wood  of  which  the 
ties  are  made.  Continental  Lumber  & 
Tie  Co.  V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
129,  131. 

§12.     (10)      Dairy    Products. 

(a)  Dairy  products  rate  may  proper- 
ly be  compared  with  rates  on  such  prod- 
ucts throughout  the  country,  especially 
where  circumstances  are  similar.  Com- 
mercial Club  of  Omaha  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  19  I.   C.  C.  397,  402. 

§12.     (10)      Fertilizer. 

(a)  Fertilizer  is  a  low-grade  traffic, 
subject  to  no  great  risk  in  transit  and 
requiring  no  special  service  for  its  trans- 
portation. Its  free  movement  and  use 
is  an  auxiliary  tending  to  produce  and 
furnish  a  larger  volume  of  traffic  and 
thus  promote  the  prosperity  of  carriers 
and  their  patrons,  so  that  considering 
both  commercial  and  transportation  con- 
ditions it  is  entitled  to  comparatively 
low  rates.  Virginia-Carolina  Chemical 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  49, 
52. 

(b)  Fertilizer  is  a  commodity  which 
should  ordinarily  be  accorded  a  low  rate 
of  transportation.  Montgomery  Freight 
Bureau  v.  W.  Ry.  of  Ala.,  14  I.  C.  C.  150, 
152. 

§12.     (11)      Flaxseed   and   Grain. 

(a)  There  is  no  good  reason  why 
rates  upon  flaxseed  should  of  necessity 
be  the  same  as  corresponding  rates  upon 
grain,  but  they  may  somewhat  exceed 
those  rates.  There  is  no  commercial 
connection  between  flaxseed  and  othei 
kinds  of  grain  and  there  is,  therefore, 
no  commercial  reason  why  carriers 
should  be  required  to  transport  this  ar- 
ticle for  an  abnormally  low  rate  such  as 
that  upon  grain  and  grain  products  from 


the  point  of  its  production  in  Canada 
to  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances in  Rates  for  the  Transportation 
of  Flaxseed  in  Carloads,  23  I.  C.  C.  272, 
275,  276. 

§12.     (12)      Flour  and   Grain. 

(a)  It  is  difficult  -to  see  how  the 
Commission  would  permit  a  rate  upon 
grain  from  Buffalo  materially  lower 
than  the  rate  upon  flour  manufactured 
from  that  grain.  Board  of  Trade  of 
Chicago  V.  A.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
504,    510. 

§12.     (13)     Grain    and    Products. 

(a)  Grain  products  are  transported 
at  grain  rates,  or  certain  close  relation- 
ships are  observed.  Douglas  &  Co.  v. 
C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  232,  243. 

§12.     (14)     Ice. 

(a)  Other  conditions  being  equal,  the 
rate  per  ton-mile  from  ice  trafllic  ought 
not  to  equal  the  average  from  all 
sources.  Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D.  L.  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  305,  320. 

§12.     (15)     Junk  and  Scrap  Iron. 

(a)  Junk  rates  are  ordinarily  higher 
than  rates  on  scrap  iron.  Radinsky  v. 
O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  243,  244. 

§12.     (16)     Lumber  and   Products. 

(a)  While  products  of  lumber  logic- 
ally might  take  somewhat  higher  rates 
than  lumber,  carriers  treat  the  matter 
differently  aiDd  it  is  fair  to  assume  that 
the  result  reached  is  justified  by  con- 
sideration of  all  the  elements  entering 
into  the  adjustment  of  rate^  on  such 
articles.  Lovelace  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  & 
N.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  585,  586. 

(b)  Comparisons  of  lumber  rates  are 
not  conclusive  nor  greatly  profitable, 
since  operating  conditions  are  seldom 
the  same,  much  less  traffic  and  commer- 
cial conditions.  Western  Oregon  Lum- 
ber, etc.,  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  61. 

§12.     (17)      Malt  and  Barley. 

(a)  The  rate  on  malt  may  properly 
be  higher  thin  the  raT:e  on  'die  barley 
from  which  it  is  manufactured.  Texas 
Brewing  Co.  v.  A.  T  &  S.  F.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
C.  171,  174. 

§12.     (18)      Motorcycles  and  Bicycles. 

(a)  There  is  no  transportation  rea- 
son  for    maintaining   a   less  than-carload 


322 


EVIDENCE,   §12    (19)    (a)— §12    (28)    (a) 


rate  on  motorcycles  in  excess  of  that  on 
bicycles.  Rose  v.  B.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  427,  429. 

§12.     (19)     Oil. 

(a)  Oil  in  less  than  carload  ship- 
ments is  not  a  desirable  class  of  traffic; 
there  is  more  or  *  less  leakage,  giving 
rise  to  damage  claims  on  account  of 
other  commodities  shipped  in  the  same 
car  which  may  be  injured  both  by  direct 
contact  with  the  oil  and  by  the  odor 
therefrom;  and  it  is,  therefore,  neces- 
sary to  handle  small,  less  than  carload 
lots,  in  separate  cars,  and  on  account 
of  its  inflammable  nature  extreme  care 
must  be  exercised  in  its  movement. 
Marshall  Oil  Co.  v.  C.  &  N  W.  Ry.  Co., 

14  I.  C.  C.  210,  212. 

§12.     (20)     Pulp  Wood  and   Lumber. 

(a)  A  low-grade  traffic  such  as  pulp 
wood  should  ordinarily  take  a  lower  rate 
than  lumber,  but  where  a  lumber  rate  is 
competitive,  the  rate  on  pulp  wood  may 
be  the  same.  Wisconsin  Pulp  Wood  Co. 
V.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  594,  595. 

§12.     (21)     Letter    Copiers    and    Presses. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  charge 
of  one  and  one-half  times  first  class  rates 
on  rapid  roller  letter  copiers  from  Roch- 
ester, N.  Y.,  to  Western  Classification 
territory,  as  unduly  discriminatory  in 
favor  of  ordinary  letter  presses  which 
took  2d  class  rates.  The  rapid  roller  let- 
ter copier,  though  put  to  the  same  use 
as  the  ordinary  letter  press,  was  com- 
posed of  29  parts  and  was  much  more 
complicated,  was  more  liable  to  breakage, 
occupied  nearly  twice  as  much  space  as 
th€  old  style  press  of  the  same  weight, 
and  was  worth  nearly  four  times  as 
much.  The  volume  of  traffic  to  the  des- 
tinations in  question  was  small.  HELD, 
the  rate  attacked  was  not  unjustly  dis- 
criminatory or  unreasonable.  Yawman 
&  Erbe  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 

15  I.  C.  C.  260. 

§12.  (22)  Perishable  Produce  and  Dairy 
Products, 
(a)  Perishable  products  afford  no 
proper  comparison  with  dairy  products. 
Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  B.  &  O.  R. 
R.   Co.,  19  I.  C.   C.  397,   402. 

§12.     (23)     Posts   and    Poles,  and   Sawed 
Lumber. 

(a)  The  rule  that  a  transportation 
charge  for  posts  and  poles  shall  not  ex- 


ceed that  applied  to  sawed  lumber  seems 
to  grow  out  of  the  character  of  the  com- 
modities themselves.  But  there  is  no 
competitive  reason  why  rate  upon  the 
two  commodities  should  be  the  same. 
Partridge  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  276,  278. 

§12.     (24)     Sash,   Doors  and    Blinds,  and 
Lumber. 

(a)  Ordinarily  the  same  rate  is  ap- 
plied to  all  lumber  without  reference  to 
its  value  or  condition,  and  this  rate  fre- 
quently includes  not  only  manufactured 
lumber,  but  articles  made  from  it,  like 
doors,  sash,  blinds,  etc.  Oregon  &  Wash- 
ington Lumber  Mfrs.  Assn.  v.  S.  P  Co., 
21  L  C.   C.   389,  395. 

§12.     (25)     Staves     and     Headings,     and 
Hardwood   Lumber. 

(a)  Whatever  may  be  true  when 
staves  are  compared  with  lumber  of  a 
lower  grade  there  is  no  reason  why 
staves  and  headings  should  not  be  ac- 
corded as  low  a  rate  as  is  applied  to  the 
hardwood  lumber  involved  in  this  pro- 
ceeding. In  Re  Rates  on  Hardwood  Lum- 
ber, 21  I.  C.  C.  397,  399. 

§12.     (26)     Sulphuric  Acid,  and  Fertilizer. 

(a)  Sulphuric  acid  is  strictly  a  raw 
material  in  the  manufacture  of  fertilizer, 
and  distinctly  lower  rates  should  be  ap- 
plied to  its  transportation  than  upon  the 
manufactured  fertilizer.  International 
Agricultural  Corporation  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  L.  C.  C.  488,  493. 

§12.     (27)     Wool,    Hops   and   Oranges. 

(a)  If  no  competitive  conditions  inter- 
vene it  would  be  difficult  to  sustain  a 
higher  rate  upon  wool  than  upon  hops. 
In  Re  Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides 
and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151,  160. 

(b)  While  the  rate  on  wool  prob- 
ably ought  to  be  higher  than  the  rate 
on  oranges,  it  is  difficult  to  sustain  a 
rate  on  wool  which  is  almost  twice 
as  high  for  a  shorter  haul.  In  Re 
Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and 
Pelts,   23   I.   C.   C.   151,   161. 

§12.     (28)     Wool   and   Sheep. 

(a)  The  fact  that  rates  on  sheep  may 
be  unreasonably  low  while  rates  on  wool 
are  high  cannot  justify  the  higher  rate 
on  wool,  because  different  persons,  -and 
localities  are  interested  in  them.     In  Re 


EVIDENCE,  §12  (28)   (b)— §13  (1)   (g) 


323 


Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts, 
23  I.  C.  C.  151,  159. 

(b)  Lower  rates  on  wool  in  bales 
than  on  wool  in  sacks  should  be  es- 
tablished from  far  western  points  to 
the  east.  In  Re  Transportation  of  Wool, 
Hides  and   Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151,  168. 

(bb)  The  fact  that  the  value  of  wool 
is  much  greater  than  that  of  sheep  and 
the  rate  is  a  thing  of  less  relative  con- 
sequence to  the  producer  might  justify 
a  somewhat  higher  rate  on  the  wool  than 
on  the  live  animal.  In  Re  Transporta- 
tion of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C. 
151,  159. 

§12.     (29)      Wheat  and   Barley,  and  Corn, 
Rye  and   Oats. 

(a)  Having  voluntarily  made  a  com- 
mon rate  on  wheat  and  barley  to  Milwau- 
kee and  Chicago,  the  Commission  cannot 
disregard  the  force  of  that  action  as  evi- 
dence by  which  to  measure  the  justice 
of  the  complainant's  proposal  that  com- 
mon rates  should  also  be  made  to  those 
points  on  corn,  rye,  and  oats.  Chamber 
of  Commerce  of  Milwaukee  v.  C.  R.  I.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  460. 

§12.     (30)     "Wyandotte    Cleanser,"    and 
Soda  Ash. 

(a)  Complainant  manufactured  "Wy- 
andotte Cleaner  and  Cleanser,"  a  house- 
hold washing  and  cleansing  compound. 
Defendants  rated  this  commodity  in  the 
Official  Classification  as  fifth  class.  De- 
fendant contended  that  it  is  mainly  com- 
posed of  particular  standard  grades  of 
soda  ash,  of  low  alkali  test,  and  that  it 
should  be  rated  the  same  as  soda  ash. 
Complainant  objected  to  placing  on  its 
packages  "soda  ash  (trade  name  Wyan- 
dotte Cleaner  and  Cleanser),"  although 
willing  to  have  the  same  appear  on  the 
bill  of  lading.  HELD,  that  unless  com- 
plainant marked  its  package  as  soda  ash, 
it  would  not  be  entitled  to  the  soda  ash 
rating,  as  complainant  may  not  demand 
or  be  accorded  the  soda  ash  rate  except 
upon  shipments  of  soda  ash  designated 
as  such  when  tendered  for  shipment  and 
so  marked  if  marked  at  all;  that  there 
would  be  no  objection  to  adding  the 
trade  name  to  the  description  of  the 
commodity  and  marking  packages  ten- 
dered for  shipment,  such  as  "soda  ash 
(trade  name,  Wyandotte  Cleaner  and 
Cleanser)"  or  "Wyandotte  soda  ash,"  and 
there  would  be  no  reason  for  increasing 
the    transportation    charges    because    of 


such  marking.     Ford  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  507,  511. 

§13.     Comparisons  of  Rates. 

See  Branch  Lines,  §2;  Comparative 
Rates;  Proportional  Rates,  IV  (h); 
Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §2  (jj), 
§3  (h);  Relative  Rates. 

§13.     (1)      In     General. 

(a)  Rate  comparisons  to  be  persua- 
sive should  show  that  conditions  are 
similar.  Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v. 
C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  195, 
201. 

(aa)  All  the  fa"Cts  and  circumstances 
which  bear  upon  the  relation  of  rates 
are  to  be  considered.  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce of  Newport  News  v.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
23   L   C.   C.   345,   352. 

(b)  When  rate  comparisons  are  used 
as  evidence  it  should  appear  that  operat- 
ing conditions  are  similar.  Thropp  v. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  497,  499. 

(c)  When  reference  is  made  to  rate 
comparisons  it  must  be  shown  that  trans- 
portation conditions  are  similar  to  those 
involved  in  the  proceeding  in  which  they 
are  to  be  used  as  evidence.  Otherwise 
they  are  not  of  material  consequence. 
Rates  in  nearby  territory  furnish  a 
more  reliable  basis  of  comparison.  In 
Re  Advances  in  Rates  for  the  Transporta- 
tion of  Fluid  Milk,  23  L  C.  C.  500,  502, 
503. 

(d)  When  it  appears  that  a  carrier 
gives  to  one  point  substantially  lower 
rates  for  substantially  the  same  service 
than  it  accords  to  a  competing  point, 
those  comparisons  are  forceful,  and  in 
the  absence  of  modifying  conditions 
might  well  be  considered  conclusive. 
Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v.  St.  L.  I.  M. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  548,  555. 

(e)  Comparisons  of  different  kinds  of 
rates  are  not  proper  in  determining  con- 
troversies under  section  4  of  the  Act. 
Baltimore  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  B. 
&  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  596,  601. 

(f)  Comparisons  of  different  kinds  of 
rates  are  not  controlling  in  determining 
the  reasonableness  of  rates  under  section 
1  of  the  Act.  Baltimore  Chamber  of 
Commerce  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C. 
C.    596,    602. 

(g)  Comparisons  with  rates  over 
other  lines  and  between  other  points  for 
similar  distances  and  under  similar  con- 
ditions are  persuasive  in  determining  the 


324 


EVIDENCE,  §13  (1)   (h)— (u) 


reasonableness  of  the  rate.     Victor  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  222,  228. 

(h)  Where  comparative  statements  of 
mileage  and  per  ton  mile  earnings  are 
submitted  by  complainants  as  evidence 
of  alleged  discrimination  in  favor  of  com- 
petitive points  the  exhibits  are  a  more 
potent  argument  if  the  defendants  were 
the  only  ones  serving  the  competitive 
points.  Anadarko  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  A. 
T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  43,  45. 

(i)  Traffic  demanding  special  service 
in  point  of  train  speed  cannot  justly  be 
compared  with  traffic  which  is  not  given 
such  consideration  Waco  Freight  Bu- 
reau V.  H.  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
22,  26. 

(j)  No  reason  why  rates  should  great- 
ly exceed  similar  rates  upon  other  roads 
in  other  portions  of  the  country  where 
density  of  traffic  and  conditions  of  op- 
eration are  analogous.  Commercial  Club 
of  Salt  Lake  City  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  218,  223. 

(k)  Rates  to  competitive  pointrf  are 
not  fair  standards  of  reasonableness  of 
rates  to  non-competitive  points.  Corpora- 
tion Commission  of  North  Carolina  v.  N. 
&  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  303,  308. 

(1)  Dissimilarity  of  location  and  com- 
petitive conditions  at  two  points  prevent 
the  proper  measuring  of  the  rate  at  one 
by  that  at  the  other.  Florida  Cotton  Oil 
Co.  V.  C.  of  G.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  836, 
339. 

(m)  Comparison  with  rates  through- 
out the  country  on  the  commodity  in- 
volved is  proper,  especially  where  simi- 
lar traffic  conditions  obtain.  Commercial 
Club  of  Omaha  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  397,  402. 

(n)  Combination  via  one  line  cannot 
be  applied  to  shipment  moving  via  an- 
other. Webster  Grocer  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  493,  495. 

(o)  It  is  not  possible  to  compare  the 
ton-mile  charge  in  the  territory  com- 
plained of  with  the  charge  in  other  terri- 
tory where  traffic  is  more  dense  and 
the  cost  of  operation  is  less.  Acme 
Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  19,  20. 

(p)  It  is  not  sufficient  to  prove  the 
rate  via  New  Orleans  or  New  York  from 
Pennsylvania  to  California  unreasonable 
by  merely  showing  the  rate  via  Chicago 
and  the  rates  from  other  coke  producing 


points  to  Los  Angeles.  Spreckels  Broth- 
ers Commercial  Co.  v.  Monongahela  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  190,  191. 

(q)  The  unreasonableness  of  a  rate 
cannot  be  established  by  comparing  it 
with  the  rate  to  a  point  situated  at  the 
farther  edge  of  territory  taking  a  blan- 
ket rate,  when  the  purpose  of  the  com- 
parison is  to  show  the  rates  charged  with 
respect  to  distances  involved.  Bash  Fer- 
tilizer Co.  V.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C. 
C.  522,  523. 

(qq)  Freight  rates  are  controlled  by 
various  and  varying  conditions,  and 
therefore  rates  in  one  section  furnish 
no  reliable  standard  by  which  to  meas- 
ure the  reasonableness  of  rates  in  an- 
other section  where  dissimilar  conditions 
prevail.  Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v. 
L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co..  17  I.  C.  C.  30,  34. 

(r)  Comparison  of  rates  with  those 
in  other  sections  fail  when  defendant 
operates  at  extremely  high  cost.  Sunny- 
side  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  540. 

(rr)  Before  the  Commission  can  con- 
clude that  a  rate  on  a  given  commodity 
is  too  high,  because  it  is  higher  than 
some  other  rate  named,  it  must  know 
that  the  rate  selected  as  the  standard 
of  comparison  is  a  reasonable  and  a 
fair  one.  Darling  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R. 
R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  79,  83. 

(s)  One  of  the  most  satisfactory  tests 
of  the  reasonableness  of  the  rates  of 
one  carrier  is  a  comparison  with  the 
rates  of  other  carriers  operating  in  the 
same  territory  under  the  same  general  con- 
ditions. Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Mil- 
cvaukee  v.  C.  R.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  460,  466. 

(ss)  Where  a  rate  on  some  other 
commodity  is  quoted  to  prove  that  the 
rate  complained  of  is  unreasonable, 
the  mere  fact  that  such  other  rate 
is  in  effect  or  has  been  for  a  long 
time  in  effect  does  not  indicate  that  it 
is  a  reasonably  high  rate  and  a  proper 
rate  to  be  used  as  a  standard  of  com- 
parison. Darling  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R. 
R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  79,  83. 

(t)  The  courts  and  the  Commission 
have  said  one  of  the  most  certain  means 
of  measuring  rates  is  by  comparison. 
Kansas  City  Cotton  Mills  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I. 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  468,  473. 

(u)  The  unreasonableness  of  a  rate 
cannot    be    established    by    comparison 


EVIDENCE,  §13   (1)    (v)_§13   (2)    (i) 


325 


with  rates  on  other  lines  operating  in 
different  territory,  where  no  evidence  is 
offered  to  explain  the  conditions  under 
which  such  rates  were  established,  or  to 
compare  the  circumstances  of  carriage 
in  such  other  territory  with  the  move- 
ment between  the  points  in  question. 
Crutchfield  &  Woolfolk  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  558,  559. 

(v)  The  erroneous  application  of  a 
rate  lower  than  the  lawfully  published 
rate  to  a  given  point  is  not  evidence  that 
a  higher  lawful  rate  to  the  same  point 
is  unjust  or  unreasonable.  Bovaird  Sup- 
ply Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C. 
C.    56,   61. 

(w)  A  comparison  with  rates  in  other 
parts  of  the  country  where  physical,  com- 
petitive and  traffic  conditions  exist  is 
insufficient  to  establish  the  unreasonable- 
ness of  rates.  Rhinelander  Paper  Co.  v. 
Northern  Pacific  Railroad  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
633,   634-637. 

§13.     (2)     Divisions  and   Joint   Rates. 

See    Divisions,    §7;    Througln     Routes 
and   Joint   Rates,   §14. 

(a)  The  division  of  a  joint  rate  is 
a  matter  for  agreement  among  the  par- 
ticipating carriers,  and  is  not  subject 
to  review  by  the  Commission  upon 
complaint  by  a  shipper.  It  may  be  con- 
sidered as  evidence  bearing  upon  the 
reasonableness  of  a  rate,  however.  Reno 
Grocery  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
400,    401. 

(aa)  Comparisons  of  divisions  re- 
ceived by  carriers  may  be  considered  in 
connection  with  other  evidence  in  deter- 
mining the  reasonableness  of  a  par- 
ticular rate.  Lindsay  Bros.  v.  L.  S.  &  M. 
S.  Ry.   Co.,   22   1.   C.  C.  516,   517. 

(b)  The  proportions  received  by  car- 
riers in  the  division  of  joint  rates  ordi- 
narily affords  little  basis  upon  which  to 
determine  the  reasonableness-  of  the 
joint  rates.  Stiritz  v.  N.  O.  M.  &  C.  R. 
R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  578,  581. 

(c)  The  Commission  investigated  the 
advance  in  the  rates  on  cattle  from  Kan- 
sas City  to  the  Mississippi  River  from 
14%c  to  17c  per  100  lbs.,  on  hogs  from 
161/^c  to  181/^c  and  on  sheep  from  17i/^c 
to  20c.  It  was  contended  by  defendants 
that  one  of  the  chief  reasons  for  the  ad- 
vance was  for  the  purpose  of  equalizing 
conditions  between  markets  by  advanc- 
ing Kansas  City  rates  while  making  no 
advance  from  Omaha.     HELD,  the  pro- 


portion of  a  through  rate  that  a  carrier 
receives  is  not  necessarily  the  measure 
of  reasonableness  for  a  rate  between  two 
specific  points.  In  Re  Advance  of  Rates 
on  Live  Stock,  21  I.  C.  C.  119,  122. 

(d)  The  mere  fact  that  one  road  is 
willing  to  accept  a  given  division  is  not 
suflacient  reason  for  establishing  a  given 
rate.  Bott  Bros.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R, 
R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  136,  137. 

(e)  The  Commission  does  not  regard 
the  divisions  of  rates  as  in  anywise  con- 
clusive as  to  the  reasonableness  of  rates 
between  certain  points,  but  such  divi- 
sions are  sometimes  of  significance. 
Railroad  Commission  of  Nevada  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,  19  L   C.   C.  238,  252. 

(f)  The  reasonableness  of  a  rate  can- 
not solely  be  tested  by  comparison  with 
the  division  of  a  joint  rate  which  the  car- 
rier sees  fit  to  accept,  unless  upon  a 
showing  that  the  division  of  the  joint 
rate  is  less  than  the  cost  of  the  service. 
Jennison  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
113,  121. 

(g)  Although  proportional  rates  and 
divisions  of  rates  are  not  taken  as  con- 
clusive in  determining  the  reasonable- 
ness of  either  local  or  joint  through  rates, 
they  may  be  highly  illustrative  and  em- 
phasize the  conclusion  reached  by  other 
tests.  Jennison  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  113,  124. 

(h)  Divisions  may  be  considered  in 
determining  legality  of  total  joint 
through  rate  complained  of.  Copper 
Queen  Consolidated  Mining  Co.  v.  B.  & 
O.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  154,  157. 

(i)  Defendants'  rate  on  bituminous 
coal  in  carloads  from  Duluth  and  Su- 
perior to  St.  Paul  and  Minneapolis  was 
90c  per  ton  and  on  anthracite  coal  was 
$1.25  per  ton,  the  haul  being  155  miles. 
Such  rates  compared  favorably  with 
those  for  similar  hauls  prescribed  by  the 
State  Commissions  of  other  states.  Com- 
plainant sought  to  prove  the  rates  un- 
reasonable by  showing  the  compensation 
received  by  defendants  as  their  propor- 
tion on  through  hauls.  HELD,  the  evi- 
dence was  insufficient  to  show  the  rates 
attacked  unreasonable.  The  division  of 
through  rates  which  a  carrier  accepts 
as  its  proportion  is  not  the  measure  of 
the  reasonableness  of  its  separately  es- 
tablished rates.  Manahan  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  95,  97. 


326 


EVIDENCE,  §13   (2)    (jk)— §13  (3)    (e) 


(jk)  While  a  division  of  a  tlirough 
rate  long  accepted  by  a  carrier  may  often 
be  pertinent  evidence,  it  is  not  a  sound 
final  test  of  the  reasonableness  of  the 
through  rate  itself.  Nor  is  the  rate  per 
ton  mile  the  generally  accepted  basis  in 
this  country  for  making  up  interstate 
rates.  Bulte  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  &  A  R.  R 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  351,  362. 

(1)  For  the  purpose  of  showing  that 
the  divisions  received  by  carriers  on  do- 
mestic and  export  flour  from  Missouri 
River  points  to  New  York  for  the  haul 
from  the  points  of  origin  to  the  Missis- 
sippi River  and  to  Chicago  were  unrea- 
sonable per  se,  complainants  took  the 
per  ton  mile  revenue  received  by  the 
carriers  for  the  portion  of  the  haul  be- 
tween St.  Louis  and  Chicago  and  showed 
that  the  divisions  complained  of  were 
higher  than  they  would  be  if  based  on 
mileage  and  on  the  per  ton  mile  revenue 
received  for  the  St.  Louis  to  Chicago 
haul.  HELD,  while  a  division  of  a 
through  rate  long  accepted  by  a  carrier 
may  often  be  pertinent  as  evidence,  it 
is  n-t  a  sound  final  test  of  the  reason- 
ableness of  the  through  rate  itself  Bulte 
Milling  Co.  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I  C 
C.  351,  362. 

(m)  An  admission  that  a  division  of  a 
through  rate  for  a  longer  distance  yields 
a  profit  raises  a  presumption  that  a  high- 
er local  rate  for  a  less  distance  would 
yield  a  reasonable  pront.  Board  of  Mayor 
&  Aldermen  v.  V.  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  453,  458. 

(n)  A  carrier  by  electing  to  accept  a 
low  division  of  a  through  rate  for  a  long 
haul  rather  than  to  stay  out  of  the  busi- 
ness cannot  be  held  to  have  thereby 
committed  itself  to  that  division  as  a 
measure  of  the  reasonableness  of  its 
other  rates  for  transportation  between 
the  same  points,  on  business  from  or  to 
different  distances,  or  of  a  different  char- 
acter. Burnham,  Hanna,  Munger  Co  v 
C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  299,  310.' 

(o)  Ordinarily,  in  considering  the  rea- 
sonableness of  a  through  rate  the  divi- 
sions received  by  different  lines  are  not 
considered,  but  where  the  question  is 
upon  the  inherent  reasonablenes  of  the 
charge  and  where  a  considerable  portion 
of  the  whole  service  is  in  a  territory  not 
affected  by  competitive  conditions,  the 
Commission  may  properly  inquire  what 
division  each  line  receives  and  whether 
these  divisions  can  properly  be  reduced. 


Florida  Fruit  &  Vegetable  Shippers'  Pro- 
tective Ass'n  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I  C 
C.  476,  487. 

(p)  The  reasonableness  or  the  unrea- 
sonableness of  a  through  rate  is  not  to 
be  determined  by  the  divisions  thereof. 
New  Albany  Furniture  Co.  v.  M  J  &  K 
C.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  594,  599. 

§13.      (3)      Divisions  and   Local   Rates. 
See    Divisions,   §7. 

(a)  Millers  in  southern  Illinois  attacked 
the  rates  on  flour  and  other  grain  prod- 
ucts of  24.7c  per  100  lbs.  from  their  mills 
to  Boston  as  violating  the  fourth  section 
when    compared   with    the   rates  of   21.7 
mills    from    St.    Louis,    a    more    distant 
point.     The  rates  from  St.  Louis  apply  on 
grain  or  grain  products  originating  west 
of   that   market   and   often   west   of  the 
Missouri  River.  The  grain  in  its  progress 
from    the    field    where    it    grows    to    the 
point    of    final    consumption    mav    pass 
through  several  grain  markets  like  Kan- 
sas City,   St.  Louis,   Chicago  and  others. 
Rates  are  so  adjusted  that  the  grain  can 
move  at  the  same  charge  through  several 
of  these  markets,  the  rate  from  market 
to  market  being  a  stated  amount.    HELD, 
following    Baltimore    Chamber    of    Com- 
merce V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  596, 
that  the  specific  rates  from  St.  Louis  are 
really  divisions   of  a   through   rate   and, 
therefore,  cannot  be  compared  with  the 
local  rates  paid  by  complainants,  and  from 
this  it  follows  that  the  fourth  section  is 
not  violated.      Southern   Illinois   Millers' 
Ass'n  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23   I.  C.   C. 
672,  674. 

(b)  The  division  of  a  joint  rate  which 
a  carrier  accepts  is  not  a  fair  measure 
of  its  local  rate.  Jennison  Co.  v  G.  N. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  113,  119. 

(c)  The  divisions  of  a  joint  through 
rate  accepted  by  a  carrier  cannot  be 
taken  as  the  measure  of  the  reasonable- 
ness of  its  separately  established  rates. 
Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M  S 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  30,  34;  Manahan  v. 
N.   P.   Ry.   Co.,   17   I.   C.   C.   95,   97. 

(d)  Divisions  of  through  rate  fur- 
nish no  just  or  fair  criterion  by  which  to 
measure  intermediate  local  rates  on  the 
same  line  of  transportation.  Board  of 
Trade  of  Winston-Salem  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  12,  16. 


(e)  A  local  rate  is  not  necessarily  the 
measure  of  a  division.  In  Re  Through 
Passenger  Routes,  16  I.  C.  C   300,  310. 


EVIDENCE,  §13    (3)    (f)— §13   (6)    (f) 


327 


(f)  The  Commission  is  unwilling  or- 
dinarily to  accept  a  division  of  a  through 
rate  as  a  basis  upon  which  to  test  the 
reasonableness  of  a  local  rate.  Moise 
Bros.  Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
r.  C.  C.  550,  554. 

§13.     (4)      Import  and  Domestic  Rates. 

(a.)  Comparisons  are  of  little  value 
when  the  rate  on  one  article  is  com- 
pared with  articles  of  a  much  lower 
grade  and  the  rates  on  which  latter 
articles  are  generally  import  rates 
made  under  the  stress  of  acute  competi- 
tion. In  Re  Transportation  of  Wool, 
Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151,  161. 

(aa)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  on 
spruce  lath  and  lumber  from  Boston, 
Mass.,  to  Toledo,  O.,  under  the  domestic 
class  rate  of  19c,  as  compared  with  the 
14c  import  rate  on  mahogany  logs  from 
and  to  the  same  points.  HELD,  that 
there  is  a  fundamental  dissimilarity  of 
conditions  under  which  import  and  do- 
mestic rates  are  constructed,  and 
one  affords  no  just  criterion  for  the 
other;  that  on  the  evidence  the  rate  is 
not  shown  to  be  unreasonable.  Com- 
plaint dismissed.  Furnace  Run  Saw  Mill 
&  Lumber  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  586. 

§13.     (5)      Proportional  and   Local   Rates. 
See  Proportional   Rates,   IV. 

(a)  While  local  and  proportional  rates 
are  not  ordinarily  comparable,  comparis- 
ons of  such  rates  may  be  considered  in 
connection  with  other  evidence  in  deter- 
mining the  reasonableness  of  a  particular 
rate.  Lindsay  Bros.  v.  L.  S.  &  M  S  Ry. 
Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  516,  517. 

(b)  The  Commission  investigated  an 
advance  in  rates  on  cattle  from  Kansas 
City  to  the  Mississippi  River  from  14%c 
to  17c  per  100  lbs.,  on  hogs  from  16i^c 
to  ISi/^c  and  on  sheep  from  17i^c  to 
20c.  It  was  contended  by  defendants 
that  one  of  the  chief  reasons  for  the 
advance  was  for  the  purpose  of  equaliz- 
ing conditions  between  markets  by  ad- 
vancing Kansas  City  rates  while  making 
no  advance  from  Omaha.  HELD,  the 
proportion  of  a  through  rate  that  a  car- 
rier receives  is  not  necessarily  tne 
measure  of  reasonableness  for  a  rate 
between  two  specific  points.  In  Re  Ad- 
vance of  Rates  on  Live  Stock,  21  I.  C. 
C.   119,   122. 

(bb)  A  proportional  rate  cannot  be  ac- 
cepted   as    the    standard    of    comparison 


with  local  rates.  Baltimore  Chamber  of 
Commerce  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C. 
596,  602. 

§13.     (6)     State   and   Interstate   Rates. 
See  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §3  (c). 

(a)  In  fixing  the  interstate  rate  for 
Oklahoma  City  the  Commission  cannot 
be  governed  by  the  state  tariff  unless,  in 
its  opinion,  it  is  just  and  reasonable.  In 
Re  Investigation  of  Rates  on  Meats,  22 
I.  C.  C.  160,  164. 

(b)  State  rates  afford  standards  of 
comparison  of  greater  or  less  value,  ac- 
cording as  they  appear  reasonable,  espe- 
cially so  when  acquiesced  in  by  the  car- 
riers; but  when  a  state  rate  is  under 
protest  and  being  contested,  and  appears 
unreasonably  low,  it  is  not  valuable  as 
a  comparison.  Willman  &  Co.  v.  St.  L. 
I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  405. 

(c)  In  attacking  rates  on  cross-ties 
from  southeastern  Georgia  points  to 
Jacksonville,  Fla.,  attention  was  called 
to  the  fact  that  the  interstate  rates  to 
Jacksonville  are  in  excess  of  the  Georgia 
intrastate  rates  on  cross-ties  orginating 
in  the  same  territory;  but  defendant 
showed  it  had  several  times  protested 
to  the  Georgia  Commission  and  sought 
permission  to  raise  its  intrastate  rates  to 
correspond  with  the  interstate  rates,  but 
that  Commission  withheld  its  consent. 
HELD,  while  state  rates  are  valuable  for 
comparative  purposes  in  fixing  a  reason- 
able charge  for  a  transportation  service, 
the  assumption  of  complainant  that  the 
action  of  the  defendant  in  maintaining 
higher  transportation  rates  on  interstate 
than  upon  intrastate  traffic  amounts  to 
unlawful  discrimination,  is  not  sound, 
for  it  is  shown  that  the  condition  is  one 
over  which  the  carrier  has  no  control. 
Baxter  &  Co.  v.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  21 
I.  C.  C.  647,  648. 

(d)  A  state  policy  is  not  respected 
where  it  interferes  with  the  application 
of  reasonable  rates  for  interstate  service. 
Cobb  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  100, 103. 

(e)  A  rate  established  by  a  State 
Commission  affords  little  value  for  com- 
parative purposes.  Waco  Freight  Bu- 
reau V.  H.  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 

22,  26. 

(f)  While  upon  general  principles  of 
comity  the  action  of  a  State  Commission 
in  fixing  a  rate  on  state  traffic  must  be 
treated  with  all  due  respect,  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  has  never 
felt  itself  bound  to  accept  a  state-made 


328 


EVIDENCE,  §13  (6)    (g)— §14  (1)   (b) 


rate  as  a  necessary  measure  of  an  inter- 
state rate.  Saunders  &  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  415,  421. 

(g)  The  Commission  is  not  controlled 
by  the  rates  established  by  State  Com- 
missions, unless  they  seem  to  be  reason- 
able when  applied  to  interstate  move- 
ments. Bartles  Oil  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  146,  148. 

(h)  The  Commission  will  always  give 
all  due  and  respectful  consideration  to 
decisions  of  state  commissions.  Railroad 
Commission  of  Wisconsin  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  85,  89. 

(i)  A  low  state  concentration  rate 
not  being  competitive  with  an  interstate 
rate  complained  of,  it  cannot  be  said 
that  the  one  compels  the  other.  Railroad 
Commission  of  Wisconsin  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  85,  91. 

(j)  A  low  state  rate  is  no  reason  for 
exacting  unreasonable  interstate  rates. 
Fort  Dodge  Commercial  Club  v.  I.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  572,  579. 

(k)  No  greater  sanctity  can  be  P're- 
sumed  in  respect  of  rates  established  by 
a  state  railroad  commission  than  those 
voluntarily  established  by  carriers.  Paola 
Refining  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  29,  31. 

(1)  The  rates  established  by  a  state 
commission  cannot  be  taken  as  conclu- 
sive of  the  unreasonableness  of  higher 
interstate  rates  between  the  same  points, 
since  the  rates  voluntarily  established  by 
a  carrier  are  entitled  to  the  same  pre- 
sumption of  reasonableness  as  that  at- 
taching to  rates  prescribed  by  a  state 
commission.  Paola  Refining  Co.  v.  M.  K. 
&  T.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  29,  31,  32. 

(m)  The  reasonableness  of  a  through 
rate  cannot  be  determined  by  a  compari- 
son with  a  local  intrastate  rate,  plus  an 
independent  interstate  rate.  Marble 
Falls  Insulator  Pin  Co.  v.  H.  &  T.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  167. 

(n)  Although  rates  established  by 
state  authority  may  be  valuable  for  the 
purpose  of  comparison,  they  are  not  con- 
clusive of  the  unreasonableness  of  a  rel- 
atively higher  interstate  rate.  Hafey  v. 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
245,  246. 

(o)  The  fact  that  a  rate  does  not 
cross  a  state  line  is  no  reason  why  it 
may  not  be  considered  when  an  inter- 
state rate  over  the  same  line  and  for 
substantially  the  same  distance  is  under 


examination.  Board  of  Mayor  and  Alder- 
men V.  V.  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  453,  459. 

(p)  In  determining  the  reasonable- 
ness of  an  interstate  rate,  the  decisions 
of  the  several  state  railroad  commissions 
are  worthy  of  consideration,  but  the 
Commission  is  not  justified  in  accepting 
a  comparison  of  lower  intrastate  rates 
prescribed  by  the  state  authorities  with 
those  applying  on  interstate  traffic  as 
conclusive  of  the  unreasonableness  of  the 
interstate  rates.  Marshall  Oil  Co.  v.  C. 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  210,  213. 

(q)  There  are  many  reasons  why 
state  and  interstate  rates  should  be  es- 
tablished in  harmony  with  one  another. 
When  the  Commission  is  asked  to  ex- 
amine the  reasonableness  of  an  inter- 
state rate,  similar  rates  established  by 
state  authority  in  that  territory  must 
have  great  influence,  especially  where 
they  have  been  long  acquiesced  in  by  the 
carriers.  Still,  these  state  rates  have  no 
binding  force  upon  the  Commission. 
They  are  standards  of  comparison  of 
greater  or  less  value,  according  as  they 
appear  to  be  just  and  reasonable.  Corn 
Belt  Meat  Producers^  Ass'n  v.  C.  B.  &  Q. 
Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  376,  385. 

(r)  While  in  determining  interstate 
rates  similar  rates  established  by  state 
authority  must  have  great  influence,  espe- 
cially where  they  have  been  long  ac- 
quiesced in  by  the  carriers;  still  sucn 
rates  have  no  binding  force  upon  the 
Commission,  and  where  the  Commission 
finds  state  rates  unreasonable,  a  through 
interstate  rate  may  be  established  by  it 
higher  than  the  sum  of  the  state  locals. 
Corn  Belt  Meat  Producers'  Ass'n  v.  C.  B. 
&  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  376,  385. 

§14.     Competition. 

See   Competition. 
§14.     (1)     In   General. 

(a)  Competition  of  controlling  force 
cannot  be  ignored  by  the  Commission  in 
determining  whether  an  advantage  in 
rate  at  the  competitive  point  is  undue 
or  is  one  not  chargeable  to  the  carriers 
defendant  becaiise  involuntarily  made. 
Sioux  City  Terminal  Elevator  Co.  v.  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  98,  107. 

(b)  A  carrier  may  voluntarily  accept 
rates  lower  than  it  can  be  required  to 
accept  and  whether  or  not  a  carrier  will 
meet  competitive  conditions  at  a  partic- 
ular point  rests  primarily  with  it.  But 
this  principle  does  not  relieve  the  cu,r- 


EVIDENCE,  §14   (1)    (c)  — (pp) 


329 


rier  from  the  oblit?ation  to  remove  unjust 
discrimination  created  by  n.eeting  com- 
petitive conditions  at  one  point  and  re- 
fusing to  meet  them  at  a  neighboring 
point.  Chamber  of  Commerce,  Ashbu:n, 
Ga.,  V.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
140,  149. 

(c)  Where  carriers,  through  discrimi- 
natory rates,  produce  competitive  con- 
ditions at  one  point  they  cannot  set  up 
such  conditions  as  a  reason  for  main- 
taining discriminatory  rates  at  a  neigh- 
boring point.  Chamber  of  Commerce, 
Ashburn,  Ga.,  v.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  140,  150. 

(d)  The  public  interest  may  demand 
that  a  carrier  shall  not  avail  itself  of 
competitive  con.itions  to  produce  dis- 
crimination. Chamber  of  Commerce, 
Ashburn,  Ga.,  v.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  140,  150. 

(e)  If  no  competitive  conditions  in- 
tervene it  would  be  difficult  to  sustain  a 
higher  rate  upon  wool  than  upon  hops. 
In  Re  Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides 
and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151,  160. 

(f)  In  establishing  reasonable  rates 
distance  is  a  factor  always  to  be  consid- 
ered, and  is  sometimes  controlling,  but 
established  commercial  conditions,  com- 
petition of  water  carriers  and  competi- 
tion between  railroads  with  termini  at 
different  points  may  make  it  impracticable 
to  consider  a  situation  from  the  stand- 
point of  distance  alone.  Indianapolis 
Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  195,  205. 

(ff)  Rates  governing  movement  of 
grain  and  grain  products  from  the  Mis- 
souri Kiver  to  the  Atlantic  seaboard 
are  of  a  competitive  nature.  Wisconsin 
State  Millers'  Ass'n  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  494,  495. 

(g)  When  competitive  conditions  are 
sufficiently  potent  to  compel  lower  rates 
to  one  locality  than  are  maintained  by 
the  same  carriers  to  another  locality 
similarly  situated  such  competition  may 
be  accepted  in  justification  of  a  resulting 
preference  to  the  favored  locality,  which, 
but  for  such  competition,  might  be  con- 
demned as  undue  or  unreasonable.  But 
the  mere  fact  of  competition,  regardless 
of  its  character,  will  not  relieve  car- 
riers from  the  limitations  of  section  3. 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Newport  News 
V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  345,  353. 

(gg)  A  shipper  is  not  privileged  to 
demand   a    less    than    the    normal    rates 


because  of  the  existence  of  competition 
which  the  carrier  does  not  choose  to 
meet.  Cohen  &  Co.  v.  Mallory  S.  S. 
Co.,   23   I.   C.   C.   374,   377. 

(h)  A  competitive  rate  to  one  point 
is  not  a  measure  of  the  rate  to  a  non- 
competitive point.  Georgetown  Ry.  & 
Light  Co.  V.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C. 
C.  144. 

(i)  If  carriers  attempt  to  rely  upon 
competition  as  a  justification  for  a  dis- 
criminatory adjustment  of  rates  they 
must  show  not  only  the  fact  but  the  rea- 
son for  it.  If  there  is  no  reason  outside 
the  mere  whim  of  their  traffic  managers 
then  the  roads  must  bear  the  burden  of 
the  poor  company  in  which  they  find 
themselves  at  competitive  points.  Suf- 
fern  Grain  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  178,  181. 

(j)  Where  a  railroad  relies  on  com- 
petition to  justify  a  rate  it  must  show 
that  such  competition  is  justified  by  cir- 
cumstances other  than  the  mere  whim 
of  a  traffic  manager.  Suffern  Grain  Co. 
V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  17G,  181. 

(k)  A  less-distant  junction  point 
served  by  an  additional  carrier  seems 
entitled  to  a  lower  rate.  Gamble-Robin- 
son Commission  Co.  v.  St.  L  &  S.  F. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  114,  115. 

(1)  Competition  is  an  important  ele- 
ment in  determining  reasonableness  of 
rate.  Corpo-ration  Commission  of  N.  C. 
V.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  303,  309.- 

(m)  An  apparent  discrimination  may 
not  be  unjust,  because  of  competitive 
conditions.  Corporation  Commission  of 
N.  C.  V.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
303,  309. 

(n)  Carriers  substantially  at  their 
pleasure  may  or  may  not  adjust  their 
rates  to  competitive  conditions  so  long 
as  no  undue  discrimination  or  unlawful 
preference  results.  Harbor  City  Whole- 
sale Co.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  323,  329. 

(o)  The  reasonableness  of  a  rate  from 
a  non-competitive  point  is  not  measured 
by  a  rate  from  competitive  points.  Flor- 
ida Cotton  Oil  Co.  V.  C.  of  G.  Ry.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  336,  339. 

(p)  Rates  to  local  points  must  be  de- 
termined independent  of  comparisons 
with  competitive  point3.  Rainey  &  Rog- 
ers V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
88,  89. 

(pp)  Interests  of  competing  lines 
must  be  considered  in  fixing  rates,  and 


330 


EVIDENCE,  §14   (1)    (q)— §14  (4)    (a) 


not  merely  that  line  which  could  handle 
the  business  the  cheapest.  Receivers' 
&  Shippers'  Ass'n  of  Cincinnati  v.  C. 
N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  440, 
464. 

(q)  Competition  has  a  more  or  less 
definite  relation  to  the  rate  that  carrier 
may  reasonably  demand.  Memphis  Cft- 
ton  Oil  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
313,  318. 

(r)  While  a  carrier  may  establish  a 
lower  rate  to  meet  competitive  conditions 
and  the  Commission  takes  into  account 
such  conditions  in  passing  upon  the  rea- 
sonableness of  the  rate  adjustment,  it 
does  not  follow  that  in  a  particular  in- 
stance the  Commission  will  condemn  an 
advance  of  a  rate  which  was  fo-rmerly 
maintained  to  meet  competition  between 
different  producing  points.  Florida 
Fruit  &  Vegetable  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  552,  558. 

(rr)  A  carrier  may  voluntarily  make, 
under  the  force  of  controlling  competi- 
tion, rates  which  it  might  not  be  re- 
quired to  make.  Indianapolis  Freight 
Bureau  v.  Penn  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
567,   576. 

(s)  The  rate  to  Nashville  is  forc""' 
by  competitive  conditions  not  existing  at 
Gallatin,  and  cannot  be  taken  as  star  '- 
ard  by  which  to  measure  the  Gallatin 
rate.  Flint  &  Walling  Mfg.  Co.  v.  G.  R. 
&  I.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  520. 

(t)  Where,  owing  to  competition,  a 
rate  is  unnecessarily  low  it  affords  no 
basis  for  comparison.  Flint  &  Walling 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  520. 

(u)  A  reduction  due  to  competitive 
conditions  precludes  a  finding  that 
the  rate  actually  charged  was  unrea- 
sonable. Reparation  denied.  Advance 
Thresher  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  TJnrep. 
Op.  283;  Western  States  Portland  Ce- 
ment Co.  V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
363. 

(v)  Lower  rate  is  in  effect  from  Al- 
toona.  Pa.,  than  from  Burnham,  Pa., 
due  to  competitive  conditions.  Goodman 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  570. 

§14.     (2)      Potential   Competition. 

(a)  Without  a  ship  upon  it  the  ocean 
has  the  power  to  restrain  the  upward 
tendency  of  rail  rates.  Railroad  Com- 
mission of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
C.  329,  352. 


(b)  It  is  not  the  amount  of  the  move- 
ment by  water,  but  the  ever-present  pos- 
sibility of  that  movement,  that  is  sig- 
nificant. City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Rv. 
Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  400,  418. 

(c)  Potential  competition  is  consid- 
ered in  fixing  rates.  Audley  Hill  &  Co. 
V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  225,  226. 

(d)  The  competitive  influence  of  the 
Erie  Canal  has  to  a  considerable  extent 
disappeared,  but  it  still  produces  pro- 
found effect  upon  grain  rates  from  Chi- 
cago to  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  Board  of 
Trade  of  Chicago  v.  A.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  504,  507. 

(e)  The  potential  competition  through 
the  Tehuantepec  route  justifies  low  rates 
to  the  Pacific  coast.  Kentucky  Wagon 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
360,  362. 

(f)  So  long  as  there  was  actual  or 
potential  competition,  Memphis  could 
properly  have  an  advantage,  but  when 
that  competition  disappeared  no  reason 
existed  to  continue  such  advantage. 
Memphis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  313,  320. 

§14.     (3)      Railroad   Competition. 

See  Discrimination,  §8  (3);  Equaliza- 
tion of  Rates,  §4  (2);  Facilities  and 
Privileges,  §21  (ee) ;  Long  and 
Short  Hauls,  §9;  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,    §8    (2). 

(a)  Most  of  the  great  systems  in  Of- 
ficial Classification  territory  have  existed 
in  substantially  their  present  form  for 
the  past  twenty-five  years.  Originally 
there  was  the  most  active  competition 
in  the  rate  of  transportation  by  rail,  and 
the  tariffs  in  Official  Classification  terri- 
tory are  largely  the  product  of  that  com- 
petition. There  is  a  strong  presumption 
that  rates  so  arrived  at  are  reasonable 
rates.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — Eastern 
Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  259. 

(b)  Rate  wars  were  unreasonable 
and  their  results  cannot  be  used  as  meas- 
ure of  reasonableness.  Morgan  Grain  Co. 
V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  460,  463. 

§14.     (4)      Rall-and-Water  Competition. 

See  Equalization  of  Rates,  §4  (3); 
Reasonableness  of   Rates,   §8   (3). 

(a)  Where  at  one  point  water  and 
rail  competition  exists  to  an  extent  not 
present  at  another  point  the  conditions 
are  so  dissimilar  that  the  rates  to  the 
former  are  not  necessarily  a  measure  of 
a  reasonable  rate  to  the  latter.    George- 


EVIDENCE,  §14   (4)    (b)— §14   (5)    (j) 


331 


town  Railway  &  Light  Co.  v.  N.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  144. 

(b)  The  rates  upon  grain  and  grain 
products  between  points  of  production  in 
the  west  and  the  Atlantic  seaboard  are 
low  in  proportion  to  other  commodities. 
A  rate  of  16c  per  100  lbs.  from  Chicago 
to  New  York  yields  a  ton  mile  revenue 
of  about  3.5  mills.  These  low  rates  are 
due  partly  to  water  competition  and 
partly  to  severe  rail  competition  in  the 
past  which  has  produced  a  low  level  of 
rates.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  for  the 
Transportation  of  Flaxseed  in  Carloads, 
23,  I.  C.  C.  27h,  275. 

§14.     (5)     Water  Competition. 

See  Equalization  of  Rates,  §4  (4); 
Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  111 
(eee) ;  Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §10; 
Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §8   (4). 

(a)  The  fact  that  there  is  a  water 
route  from  a  given  point  to  a  certain 
destination,  affording  a  low  and  reason- 
able rate,  does  not  justify  the  Commis- 
sion in  permitting  the  ■  il  carriers  to 
charge  a  high  and  unreasonable  rate  on 
traffic  between  these  points,  S,  P.  Co. 
V.  I.  C.  C,  219  U.  S.  433,  451,  31  Sup.  Ct. 
288,  55  L.  ed.  283. 

(aa)  Water  competition  has  an  effect 
upon  transcontinental  rates  from  west 
to  the  east.  In  Re  Transportation  of 
Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151, 
160. 

(b)  Ocean  competition,  as  well  as 
circumstances  and  conditions  beyond 
the  seaboard,  are  to  be  considered  in 
determining  whether  differences  in  rates 
as  between  foreign  and  domestic  traffic 
are  unreasonable  or  unduly  discrimina- 
tory. Chamber  of  Commerce  of  New- 
port News  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
345,  355. 

(c)  A  rate  forced  by  water  com- 
petition cannot  be  used  as  a  standard 
of  reasonableness.  In  Re  Transporta- 
tion of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C. 
C.  151,  163. 

(cc)  While  water  competition  may 
be  availed  of  by  a  carrier  as  a  justifica- 
tion for  rates  that  are  lower  than 
would  otherwise  be  lawful,  the  existence 
of  such  competition  is  not  in  itself 
ground  upon  which  shippers  may  de- 
mand a  lower  rate.  Cohen  &  Co.  v.  Mal- 
lory.  S.   S.   Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  374,  376. 

(d)  A  carrier  may  in  its  own  interest 
meet  water  competition,  but  it  is  not  the 
privilege   of   a   shipper   to   demand   less 


than  normal  rates  because  of  the  exist- 
ence of  a  competition  which  the  carrier 
in  its  own  behalf  does  not  ch  ose  to 
meet.  Cohen  &  Co.  v.  Mallory  S.  S.  Co  , 
23  I.  C.  C.  374,  377. 

(dd)  A  water  compelled  rate  is  not 
a  measure  of  a  normal  all-rail  rate. 
Cohen  &  Co.  v.  Mallory  S.  S.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  374,  377;  In  Re  Transportation 
of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C. 
151,   163. 

(e)  Lower  rates  which  are  forced  by 
water  competition  cannot  be  accepted  as 
a  measure  of  reasonableness  of  rates 
from  points  where  such  competition  does 
not  exist.  South  Atlantic  Waste  Co.  v. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  293,  296. 

(f)  It  is  fairly  established  that  the  in- 
fluence  of  water  competition  does  not 
cease  at  the  Pittsburg-Buffalo  line,  but 
extends  westward  as  to  certain  partic- 
ular commodities,  and  doubtless  for 
some  distance  west  of  Pittsburg  the  car- 
riers may  properly  make  rates  which  will 
prevent  the  movement  eastward  to  the 
seaboard,  instead  of  westward  over  their 
line,  but  the  records  of  the  Commission 
for  twenty  years  fail  to  disclose  any 
but  the  most  fragmentary  evidence  that 
sea  competition  extends  to  Chicago.  Rail- 
road Commission  of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
21  L  C.  C.  329,  355. 

(g)  It  is  well  known  that  rates  in  the 
territory  adjacent  to  the  Mississippi 
River  are  influenced  by  water  competi- 
tion, and  as  the  distance  from  the  river 
increases  the  influence  of  the  competi- 
tion diminishes.  Anadarko  Cotton  Oil 
Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  1.  0.  C. 
43,  45. 

(h)  Rates  are  not  properly  compar- 
able where  water  competition  controls. 
Truck  Growers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R,  R. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  190,  194. 

(i)  Terminal  rates  such  as  a  blanket 
rate  from  the  Mississippi  River  to  the 
Atlantic  seaboard  to  all  Pacific  terminals 
are  low  and  not  a  fair  measure  of  rates 
generally.  Ohio  Foundry  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C. 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  65,  67. 

(j)  There  is  great  force  in  Spokane's 
claim  that  no  schedule  can  be  right 
which  permits  merchandise  to  be  hauled 
from  the  east  over  the  Cascade  Moun- 
tains to  Seattle  and  back  again  to  con- 
sumer upon  east  side  of  that  mountain 
range.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.,  19 
L  C.  C.  162,  167. 


EVIDENCE,  §14  (5)   (k)— (v) 


(k)  That  carriers  may  meet  water 
competition  at  whatever  point  and  to 
whatever  extent  they  see  fit  cannot  be 
admitted.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  162,  168. 

(1)  Under  the  Supreme  Court  deci- 
sions, the  Seattle  rate  cannot  he  used  as 
a  standard  by  which  to  measure  the  Spo- 
kane rate.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  162,  174. 

(m)  There  has  been  little  difficulty 
experienced  from  time  to  time  by  the 
rail  carriers  in  raising  rates  to  the  Pa- 
cific coast;  the  only  live  water  competi- 
tor on  the  Pacific  to-day  is  a  line  which 
bases  its  rates  on  the  rail  tariffs,  and  the 
rates  of  both  the  rail  and  the  wnter 
lines  change  simultaneously.  Ways  can 
be  found,  and  have  been  found,  by  which 
the  presence  of  the  ocean  as  a  control- 
ling or  even  greatly  meddlesome  factor 
in  the  fixing  of  railroad  rates  can  be 
nullified.  There  is  no  doubt  but  that 
rail  rates  have  been  influenced  at  times 
to  all  the  Pacific  ports  by  water  carriers, 
and  of  course  there  is  a  possibility  that 
at  any  time  this  water  competition  may 
become  seriously  aggressive  and  potent. 
The  United  States  is  not  a  maritime  na 
tion  at  present  and  her  great  coast  line 
on  the  Pacific  side  is  served  in  great  part 
by  such  water  carriers  as  the  railroads 
permit  to  live.  Railroad  Commission  of 
Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  0.  C.  238,  250. 

(n)  The  mere  fact  of  water  competi- 
tion is  not  proof  that  rail  rates  are  so  low 
as  to  deprive  a  carrier  of  a  reasonable 
return.  R.  R.  Commission  of  Nev.  v.  S. 
P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  238,  250. 

(o)  Competitive  conditions,  when 
shown  to  exist,  may  justify  the  fixing  of 
rates  which  are  not  in  line  with  the  rates 
to  points  where  such  compatltion  does 
not  obtain.  Rainey  &  Rogers  v.  St.  b.  & 
S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  T.  C.  C.  88,  89. 

(p)  Pacific  coast  terminal  rates  are 
compelled  by  water  competition.  Ken 
tucky  Wagon  Mnfg.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  360,  363. 

(q)  Rates  from  the  Atlantic  coast  to 
southern  points  are  fixed  by  the  water 
routes,  and  no  comparison  can  be  made 
with  all-rail  rates  from  interior  points  to 
the  same  destinations.  Recoivers  &  Ship- 
pers' Asso.  of  Cincinnati  v.  C.  N.  O.  oc 
T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  440,  453. 

(r)  For  many  years  prior  to  Jan. 
1,  1909,  the  rate  on  oil  in  barrels  from 


New  York,  Cleveland  and  Minneapolis  to 
San  Francisco  and  Seattle  was  90  cents 
per  100  lbs.  From  Jan.  1  to  June  1, 
1909,  when  the  shipments  in  question 
moved,  defendants  had  in  effect  a  rate 
of  $1.00.  After  June  1,  1909,  the  90c 
rate  was  restored.  The  evidence  indicat- 
ed that  the  90c  rate  was  forced  by  water 
competition.  HELD,  that  a  compelled 
rate  could  not  be  taken  as  the  standard 
by  which  to  measure  the  reasonableness 
of  a  voluntary  rate  and  that  therefore  the 
maintenance  of  the  90c  rate  did  not  prove 
the  unreasonableness  of  the  $1  rate. 
Reparation  denied.  Fuller  &  Co.,  v.  P. 
C.  &  Y.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  594,  595. 

(s)  While  water  competition  may  be 
availed  of  by  a  carrier  as  its  justification 
and  excuse  for  rates  that  are  lower  than 
would  otherwise  be  lawful,  the  existence 
of  such  competition  is  not  in  itself  a 
ground  upon  which  a  shipper  may  de- 
mand a  lower  rate.    Lindsay  Brothers  v. 

B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  6,  8. 

(t)  A  factor  to  be  considered  in  mak- 
ing rates  from  Chicago  and  St.  Louis  to 
St,  Paul  is  the  competition  of  lake  lines 
from  Chicago.  Indianapolis  Freight  Bu- 
reau V.  C.  C.  C.  &   St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I. 

C.  C.  276,  281. 

(u)  Carriers  may,  for  the  purpose  of 
meeting  water  competition,  make  rates 
lower  than  would  otherwise  be  justi- 
fiable, even  to  the  extent  of  charging 
a  less  rate  to  the  more  distant  point. 
The  carrier  may  determine  for  itself 
whether  it  will  or  will  not  meet  such 
water  competition.  While,  however,  the 
carrier  may  in  the  first  instance  settle 
its  policy  in  this  respect,  it  must  act 
under  certain  limitations.  It  cannot  be 
permitted  to  compete  at  one  point  and 
decline  to  compete  at  another,  where  all 
conditions  are  the  same;  nor  should 
it,  ordinarily,  be  allowed  to  compete 
one  day  and  decline  to  compete  the 
next.  The  public  has  the  right  to  require 
equal  and  uniform  treatment  within  the 
bounds  of  reason.  Cases  might  there- 
fore arise  where  the  Commission  would 
require  the  continuance  of  a  rate  es- 
tablished to  meet  such  competition. 
Darling  &  Co,  v,  B,  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
I.    C.    C.    79,    87. 

(v)  A  water  port  is  entitled  to  what- 
ever advantage  it  can  obtain  through 
transportation  by  water,  but  its  location 
does  not  entitle  it  to  lower  rates  by 
rail,   and  although  such  preference  may 


EVIDENCE,  §14  (5)    (w)— §17  (d) 


333 


lawfully  be  accorded  by  a  carrier  in 
the  protection  of  its  own  interests,  it 
should  not  be  required;  except  in  cases 
where  manifest  wrong  would  otherwise 
result.  Darling  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  xt. 
R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  79,  87. 

(w)  The  Commission  does  not  favor 
the  existence  of  lower  rates  at  ports 
put  into  effect  by  rail  carriers  to  meet 
water  competition.  Darling  &  Co.  v.  B. 
&  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  79,  87. 

(x)  Carriers  cannot  be  compelled, 
as  a  matter  of  law,  to  meet  water 
competition;  they  do  it  of  their  own 
volition,  or  whenever  the  same  is 
potent  enough  to  compel  them  to  do 
so  in  order  to  secure  the  traffic.  In 
each  instance  the  carrier  determines 
for  itself  whether  such  water  competi- 
tion has  sufficient  influence  on  the  traffic 
to  make  it  reduce  its  rates.  Baicbridge 
Board  of  Trade  v.  L.  H.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,   15   I.   C.   C.   586,  594. 

(y)  There  may  be  water  competition 
at  each  of  two  points,  and  yet  a  differ- 
ence in  rates  to  those  points  may  be 
justified.  Bainbridge  Board  of  Trade 
V.  L.  H.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
586,   594. 

(z)  A  rule  that  whenever  all-rail  car- 
riers establish  rates  to  a  given  point 
they  must  take  notice  of  the  independ- 
ent water  rates  from  that  point  and  of 
the  territory  that  can  be  reached  there- 
under and  must  make  such  adjustment 
as  will  prevent  the  use  of  the  water 
rates  from  that  point  to  another  point, 
resulting  in  discrimination  against  that 
other  point  by  reason  of  its  all-rail  rate 
adjustment,  has  no  support  in  law,  in 
public  policy  or  in  sound  transportation 
principles.  Bainbridge  Board  of  Trade 
V.  L.  H.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
586,    590. 

§15.     Contract    Relying   on    Rate. 

See  Infra,  §27  (a);  Branch  Lines,  §1 
(J);  Minimums,  §7  (i);  Through 
Routes   and   Joint    Rates,    §22    (c). 

(a)  A  contract  based  on  a  lower  rate 
existing  before  an  advance  is  no  ground 
alone  for  condemning  such  advance.  Bar- 
num  Iron  Works  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  94;  American  Creosote 
Works  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  212. 

§16.     Cost  of  Production. 

(a)  The  fact  that  the  cost  of  produc- 
ing wool  has  increased  while  its  market 


price  has  fallen  is  no  reason  why  le^s 
than  a  reasonable  freight  rate  should  be 
established  for  its  transportation.  In  Re 
Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts, 
2o  I.  C.  C.  151,   U)G 

§17.     Cost  of  Operation. 

See    Advanced     Rates,     §7     (2),     §11; 
Transportation,  §14. 

(a)  A  definite  and  universal  allot- 
ment of  funds  from  the  charge  imposed 
for  the  movement  of  each  character  of 
traffic  to  provide  for  interest,  dividends 
and  surplus  is  not  proper  or  justifiable, 
for  the  plain  reason  that  it  entirely 
abrogates  all  classification.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances on  Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C. 
C.   604,   625. 

(aa)  It  is  unfair  to  take  from  the 
carrier  whatever  of  profit  it  may  secure 
by  reason  of  improvement  in  its  plant 
and  adoption  of  the  most  modern  meth- 
ods. If  our  railroad  systems  are  to 
remain  in  private  hands,  stimulus  must 
be  given  to  the  initiative  and  imagina- 
tion of  railroad  operators.  The  com- 
munity may  not  take  with  justice  what- 
ever comes  by  the  labor  or  time  saving 
devices  adopted  by  those  who  serve  the 
public,  nor  may  the  carriers  absorb  the 
profits  of  the  shipper  resulting  from 
similar  efforts.  In  Re  Advances  on  Coal 
to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C.  604,  625. 

(b)  Certain  portions  of  a  system  of 
railroad  cannot  be  segregated  from  the 
whole  and  the  expenses  and  earnings 
charged  and  credited  to  such  portions  on 
a  mileage  pro  rata  basis.  In  Re  Investi- 
gation of  Advances  in  Rates  on  Grain,  21 
I.  C.  C.  22,  25. 

(bb)  Lack  of  through  tonnage  in  South 
Dakota  affects  the  volume  of  traffic,  de- 
creases the  average  trainload,  Increases 
operating  expenses  and  is  therefore  re- 
flected in  net  earnings.  In  Re  Investiga- 
tion of  Advances  in  Rates  on  Grain,  21 
I.  C.   C.   22,  34. 

(c)  A  consideration  which  makes 
against  a  comparison  of  rates  from  South 
Dakota  with  those  from  other  s*^tes  is 
Ihe  fact  that  fuel  for  locomotive  use  in 
South  Dakota  must  be  hauled  'ong  dis- 
tances, thus  increasing  its  cost.  In  Re 
Investigation  of  Advances  in  Rates  on 
Grain,  21  I.  C.  C.  22,  35. 

(d)  Where  a  rate  of  $1.35  per  ton  on 
cement  from  Martin's  Creek,  Pa.,  to 
Philadelphia,  Pa.,  90  miles,  is  defended  as 
against   a  rate   from  Martins   Creek  to 


334 


EVIDENCE,  §17   (e)  — (1) 


Jersey  City,  114  miles,  of  $1.10  per  ton,  on 
the  ground  that  at  Jersey  City  the  defend- 
ant has  two  public  team  tracks  where  car- 
load freight  is  delivered,  while  at  Phila^ 
delphia  it  has  about  60  team  tracks,  dis- 
tributed  about  the  city  within  a  track 
mileage  of  about  400  miles.  HELD,  ter- 
minal facilities  such  as  these  are  entitled 
to  weigh  in  the  consideration  of  the  rea- 
sonableness of  the  rate,  and  where  the 
commoiiiy  is  of  the  T^<'ii:hi  and  bulk  of 
cement  such  facilities  broadly  distributed 
are  of  value  to  the  consignees,  in  that  the 
amount  of  cartage  is  not  nearly  so  great 
as  if  deliveries  were  confined  to  one  or 
two  points.  Rate  to  Philadelphia  is  un- 
reasonable to  the  extent  it  exceeds  $1.10 
per  ton.  Maritime  Exchange  v.  P.  R.  R. 
Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  81,  84. 

(e)  Increased  density  of  traffic,  ma- 
terial decrease  of  the  ratio  of  operating 
expenses  to  income,  elimination  of 
grades,  increased  trainloads,  and  car 
capacity  are  factors  that  ought  to  make 
fo"  lower  rates.  Meeker  &  Co.  v.  L.  V.  R. 
R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  129,  162. 

(f)  In  determining  reasonable  rates  to 
be  charged  by  the  carrier,  the  fact  that 
the  cost  of  operation  has  increased  and 
will  increase  in  proportion  to  gross  op- 
erating revenue  is  not  important,  because 
even  though  the  percentage  of  net  to 
gross  is  less,  still  the  total  net  may  be 
more,  and  the  percentag-^  of  net  to  value 
may  also  be  more.  The  quDsUon  to  be 
determined  is  whether  the  net  return 
upon  the  value  of  the  property  devoted 
to  the  public  service  i.-?  sufficient.  In  Re 
Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I. 
C.   C.   243,   275. 

(g)  The  public  is  demanding  a  better 
and  safer  railroad.  In  Re  Advances  in 
Rates— Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  276. 

(h)  In  combating  a  general  advance 
in  rates  in  Official  Classification  terri- 
tory the  shippers  contended  that  by  the 
use  of  "scientific  management"  $300,000,- 
000  annually  could  be  saved  by  the  prop- 
er application  of  these  methods  to  the 
business  of  railroading  in  the  United 
States.  The  witness  who  testified  to 
this  stated  that  such  methods  were  not 
in  actual  operation  in  over  1-lOth  of  1 
per  cent  of  all  the  manufacturing  estab- 
lishments in  this  country.  HELD,  the 
system  is  everywhere  in  an  experimental 
stage  and  the  Commission  cannot  find 
that  the  defendants  could  make  good  any 
part  of  their  actual   advances  in  wages 


by  the  introduction  of  scientific  manage- 
ment. In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — East- 
ern Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  279. 

(i)  Railroad  material  and  supplies, 
with  the  exception  of  fuel  and  ties,  cost 
les^,  on  the  average  than  in  any  of  the 
past  ten  years.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates 
—Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307,  368. 

(j)  The  cost  of  operation  is  somewhat 
more,  and  corresponding  rates  may  prop- 
erly be  somewhat  higher  in  intermoun- 
tain  territory  than  east  of  the  Missouri 
River.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  162,  173. 

(k)  The  Commission  does  not  recog- 
nize the  right  of  a  carrier  to  single  out 
a  piece  of  expensive  road  and  make  the 
local  traffic  thereon  bear  an  undue  por- 
tion of  the  expense  of  its  maintenance 
or  of  its  construction.  A  road  is  built 
and  operated  as  a  whole  and  local  rates 
are  not  to  be  made  with  respect  to  the 
difficulties  of  each  particular  portion 
charging  the  cost  of  a  bridge  to  the  traf- 
fic of  one  section  or  the  cost  of  a  tunnel 
to  traffic  between  its  two  mouths.  Upon 
the  S.  P.  Co.  millions  of  dollars  have 
been  expended  in  building  the  Lucin  cut- 
off just  west  of  Ogden,  a  monumental 
bit  of  construction  which  traverses  the 
Great  Salt  Lake.  If  rates  from  one  side 
of  the  lake  to  the  other  were  based  upon 
the  cost  of  this  cut-off  they  would  be 
unconscionable.  If  the  position  of  the 
defendant  were  followed  by  the  carriers 
generally  (which  it  is  not,  nor  even  by 
itself)  it  would  result  in  rates  that  would 
vary  from  mile  to  mile  as  the  cost  of 
road  per  mile  varies.  Traffic  Bureau  of 
Merchants  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.  259,  261. 

(1)  The  operating  officials  of  the  Cen- 
tral Pacific  Railroad  testified  that  the 
road  was  now  doing  the  maximum  busi- 
ness which  could  be  done  economically. 
In  other  words  that  an  increase  in  busi- 
ness would  add  to  the  expense  per  unit 
of  operation.  Not  being  in  a  position  to 
urge  that  a  reduction  in  rates  was  un- 
justifiable because  of  the  lightness  of 
its  traffic,  the  defendant  here  contends 
that  the  Commission  would  not  be  justi- 
fied in  reducing  the  rate  because  business 
would  increase  and  the  expense  of  per- 
forming the  service  would  increase.  The 
contention  seems  to  be  that  the  Commis- 
sion must  not  reduce  the  rate  when  the 
traffic  is  light,  and  when  the  traffic  is 
heavy  it  must   not  reduce  the   rate  be- 


EVIDENCE,  §17   (m)— §18  (f) 


335 


cause  it  will  increase  the  cost  of  operation. 
Traffic  Bureau  of  Merchants  Exchange  v. 
S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  259,  263. 

(m)  The  difficult  operation  of  roads 
should  be  passed  upon  in  considering  the 
reasonableness  of  the  rates  involved.  Ce- 
dar Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Colo.  &  So. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  387,  391. 

(n)  There  is  no  standard  by  which 
either  the  cost  of  the  service  or  the  rea- 
sonableness of  creamery  rates  can  be  fixed 
with  ar^y  certainty.  Beatrice  Creamery 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  109,  132. 

(o)  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  ter- 
minal expenses  in  a  great  center  like 
Kansas  City  are  greater  than  in  a  small- 
er place  where  terminal  work  can  be 
done  more  expeditiously  and  economic- 
ally. Kansas  City  Transp.  Bureau  v.  A. 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  491,  493. 

(p)  Everything  else  remaining  the 
same,  an  increase  in  cost  of  operation 
would  justify  an  advance  in  rates.  Other 
things  remaining  the  same,  increase  in 
traffic  requires  a  decrease  in  rates.  It 
may,  therefore,  happen  that  the  increase 
of  traffic  will  more  than  offset  the  in- 
crease in  operating  expense.  Cattle 
Raisers'  Ass'n  of  Texas  v.  M.  K.  &  T. 
Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  418,  430. 

(q)  The  expense  incident  to  the 
maintenance  of  through  service  may 
not  be  justified  by  the  amount  of  traffic 
secured.  Hamilton  v.  American  Express 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  355. 

§18.     Cost  of  Service. 

See  Express  Companies,  §24  (a),  (b); 
Minimums.  §1  (b);  Reasonableness 
of  Rates,  §9. 

(a)  The  revenue  per-ton-mile  in  itself 
Is  not  a  sufficient  basis  for  a  judgment 
regarding  the  reasonableness  of  the  rate 
which  yields  that  revenue.  Inquiry  must 
be  made  regarding  the  expense  incurred 
In  doing  the  business.  Nebraska  State 
Ry.  Commission  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R  R.  Co , 
23  I.  C.   C.   121,  125. 

(aa)  There  must  finally  be  an  inti- 
mate relation  between  the  actual  cost 
of  transportation  and  the  rate  paid  by 
the  public.  The  cost  of  carriage  is  de- 
creased in  proportion  as  the  car  load- 
ing can  be  increased.  In  Re  Transpor- 
tation of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23 
I.    C.    C.    151,    166. 

(b)  Cost  of  service  is  not  to  be  ig- 
nored   in    determining    the    reasonable- 


ness   of    a    rate.      In    Re    Advances    on 
Cotton,  23  I.  C.  C.  404,  408. 

(bb)  In  fixing  rates  on  competitive  ar- 
ticles relation  should  be  determined  on 
the  basis  of  the  difference  in  the  cost  of 
the  service,  and  many  of  the  other  con- 
siderations entering  into  the  establish- 
ment of  rates  upon  independent  or  iso- 
lated articles  should  be  in  a  large  part 
eliminated.  Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  O. 
&  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  77,  81. 

(c)  In  the  end  there  must  be  some 
relation  between  the  cost  of  service  and 
the  rate.  Albree  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  303,  316. 

(cc)  Cost  is  generally  an  important 
element  in  arriving  at  a  judgment  with 
respect  to  a  rate.  Boileau  v.  P.  &  L. 
E.   R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.   C.   C.  640,  652. 

(d)  It  is  not  beyond  the  range  of  pos- 
sibility to  approximate  the  cost  of  carry- 
ing freight  as  distinguished  from  passen- 
gers over  a  certain  division  or  even  the 
carrying  of  a  certain  kind  of  freight  when 
this  constitutes  a  large  portion  of  a  car- 
rier's traffic  over  such  division.  Certain- 
1>,  for  purposes  of  comparison,  such  cost 
figures  could  be  ascertained  upon  any 
road  by  the  settling  of  a  few  questions 
by  this  Commission,  or  between  the  car- 
riers themselves.  In  Re  Advances  on 
Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C.  604,  615. 

(dd)  Cost  of  service  is  ascertainable 
with  much  more  precision  and  capable 
of  more  tangible  expression  than  the 
value  of  the  service.  Nevertheless  both 
cost  and  value  must  be  considered  as 
well  as  all  other  elements  entering  into 
a  rate.  Boileau  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  640,  652. 

(e)  A  definite  and  uniform  allotment 
of  funds  from  the  charge  imposed  for  the 
movement  of  each  character  of  traffic 
to  provide  for  interest,  dividends  and 
surplus  is  not  proper  or  justifiable,  for 
the  plain  reason  that  it  entirely  abro- 
gates all  classification.  In  Re  Advances 
on  Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C.  604, 
625. 

(ee)  The  rate  made  by  the  carrier 
must  be  just  and  reasonable  for  the 
service  which  it  gives  and  should  have 
relation  to  the  cost  of  that  service  and 
the  character  of  the  commodity  trans- 
ported. In  Re  Advances  on  Coal  to 
Lake   Ports,   22   I.   C.   C.   604,   625. 

(f)  What  weight  is  to  be  given  to 
costs  is  to  be  determined  in  each  case. 


336 


EVIDENCE,  §18    (g)— §20    (b) 


It  is  generally  an  important  element. 
Boileau  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
640,  652. 

(g)  Rates  are  not  fixed  solely  with 
reference  to  a  weaker  competing  line;  but 
the  cost  of  handling  traffic  over  a  short 
and  easy  line  must  largely  influence  the 
rate.  Commercial  Club  of  Salt  Lake  City 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  218, 
222. 

(h)  It  is  more  expensive  to  handle 
less-than-carload  freight.  Commercial 
Club  of  Omaha  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  397.  401. 

(i)  To  divide  a  railroad  system  into 
its  constituent  elements  and  to  require 
that  each  shall  show  a  surplus  commen- 
surate with  that  yielded  by  the  business 
of  the  system  as  a  whole  in  justification 
of  a  particular  rate  on  one  commodity, 
is  not  the  proper  basis  upon  which  to 
measure  the  justness  of  such  rate.  Board 
of  Trade  of  Winston-Salem  v.  N.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  12,  17. 

(j)  The  comparative  cost  of  service 
to  carriers  cannot  be  made  the  sole  basis 
of  rate  making.  Duncan  &  Co.  v.  N.  C. 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  590,  593. 

(k)  To  show  the  cost  of  moving  a 
loaded  freight  car  one  mile,  defendants 
took  the  total  mileage  of  loaded  freight 
cars  and  divided  the  total  operating  ex- 
penses and  taxes  by  same.  There  was 
nothing  to  show  the  cost  of  the  passen- 
ger service,  nor  how  much  for  mainte- 
nance and  equipment  was  embraced  in  the 
total  expense.  HELD,  such  a  basis  of 
estimating  was  unreliable.  Oregon  & 
Washington  Lumber  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v  U.  P. 
R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  1,  9. 

(1)  The  cost  of  moving  a  ton  of 
freight  one  mile  arrived  at  by  assuming 
that  said  cost  is  equal  to  that  of  moving 
a  passenger  one  mile  is  unreliable,  since 
such  assumption  is  based  largely  on 
guesswork.  Oregon  &  Washington  Lum- 
ber Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  U  P.  R.  R.  Co.  14  I. 
C.  C.  1,  10. 

(m)  It  is  seldom  proper  to  measure 
the  reasonableness  of  a  freight  charge  by 
what  it  would  cost  the  shipper  to  j>er- 
form  the  service  himself  by  other  means; 
for  railroads  have  become  a  part  of  a 
commercial  and  industrial  haul  and  must 
be  recognized  as  such  in  considering 
what  may  be  properly  charged  for  their 
services.  American  Asphalt  Ass'n  v. 
Uintah  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  196,  204. 


§19.     Credit. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §7  (3);  Credit 
Account. 

(a)  It  was  urged  as  a  reason  for  per- 
mitting an  advance  in  freight  rates  in 
Ofllcial  Classification  territory  that  the 
increase  was  necessary  to  maintain  the 
credit  of  American  railroads.  It  ap- 
peared that  in  1895  the  average  rate  paid 
by  all  the  railroads  of  the  country  was 
4.69  per  cent.  In  1909  this  figure  had 
been  reduced  to  3.9  per  cent  and  the  sav- 
ing computed  upon  the  indebtedness  of 
1909,  represented  by  this  decrease  in  the 
rate  of  interest,  would  have  amounted  to 
$7/,000,000.  HELD,  the  credit  of  Ameri- 
can railroads  has  gained  rather  than  lost 
in  ten  years,  and  if  the  credit  of  Ameri- 
can railways  is  still  sound  either  at  home 
or  in  foreign  money  markets  it  is  not 
because  of,  but  in  spite  of,  the  declara- 
tions of  railroad  operators.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C. 
C.  243,  251,  252. 

%^9%.     Custom. 

See  Compress  Companies  and 
Cliarges,   il    (c);  Courts,  §11    (t). 

§20.     Distance  of  Haul. 

See  BIanl<et  Rates,  §2  (d),  §1?  (a); 
Differentials  §1  (aa),  (de),  (g),  (h); 
Discrimination,  §5  (e),  §8  (1)  (c), 
§8  (3)  (h):  Evidence,  §14  (1)  (f), 
§38  (b),  §58;  Export  Rates  and  Fa- 
cilities, V  (a);  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,  §8  (1)  (b),  §10,  §41  (b).  §81 
(c),  §84  (d);  Througli  Routes  and 
Joint  Rates,  §13  (p):  Tariffs,  §7 
(iii),    (Jjj),    (PPP). 

(a)  In  establishing  reasonable  rates 
distance  is  a  factor  always  to  be  consid- 
ered and  is  sometimes  controlling,  but 
established  commercial  conditions,  com- 
petition of  water  carriers  and  competi- 
tion between  railroads  with  termini  at 
different  points  may  make  it  impractica- 
ble to  consider  a  situation  from  the  stand- 
point of  distance  alone.  Indianapolis 
Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  195,  205. 

(aa)  The  diiTerence  in  the  average 
length  of  haul  is  a  factor  to  be  consid- 
ered in  passing  upon  the  reasonable- 
ness of  rates.  In  Re  Advances  on 
Lemons,   23   I.    C.   C.    27,   28. 

(b)  Where  the  Commission  has  es- 
tablished, from  Missouri  River  to  Utah 
common  points,  a  rate  of  $1.90  first 
class  for  1,150  miles,  it  cannot  hold, 
upon  the  score  of  distance,  that  a  higher 
rate  would  be  reasonable  for  942  miles 
to     Grand     Junction,     an     intermediate 


EVIDENCE,  §20   (bb)_(j) 


337 


point.  Grand  Junction  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce V.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.   C.   115,   118. 

(bb)  Distance  of  the  haul  is  not 
controlling  in  passing  upon  the  reason- 
ableness of  a  rate.  Merchants  &  Mfrs. 
Ass'n  of  Baltimore  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,   23   I.   C.    C.    129. 

(c)  In  long-distance  transportation  a 
rate  ought  not  to  increase,  mile  for  mile, 
as  rapidly  as  in  shorter  distances.  In 
Re  Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and 
Pelts,   23  I.   C.   C.   151,   165. 

(d)  The  rate  on  cotton  for  export 
from  Houston  to  Galveston,  a  distance  of 
48  miles,  is  6c.  The  distance  from  Hous- 
ton to  New  Orleans  is  362  miles  and  the 
rate  is  18c.  HELD,  from  Houston  to  New 
Orleans  is  nearly  eight  times  the  dis- 
tance from  Houston  to  Galveston,  and 
the  rate  is  about  three  times  as  much. 
Manifestly  the  carriers  cannot  be  re- 
quired to  transport  cotton  from  Houston 
to  New  Orleans  at  the  same  rate  as  from 
Houston  to  Galveston.  In  Re  Advances 
in  Rates  for  the  Transportation  of  Cotton 
and  Cotton  Linters,  23  I.  C.  C.  404,  408. 

(dd)  It  is  a  general  principle  that 
rates  should  be  relatively  lower  for 
longer  distances.  Huntingdon  Lumber 
Co.  V.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  507, 
509. 

(e)  It  is  not  enough  to  show  that  in 
miles  the  distance  is  less  from  a  produc- 
ing center  via  one  gateway  to  a  consum- 
ing center  in  order  to  equalize  the  rate 
between  the  same  points  via  another  gate- 
way. It  must  be  shown  that  the  cost  of 
transportation  is  less,  or  rather  that  the 
combination  of  rates  is  less  as  estimated 
by  the  general  level  of  rates  in  the  ter- 
ritory through  which  the  transportation 
Is  conducted.  In  Re  Investigation  of  Un- 
reasonable Rates  on  Meats,  23  I.  C.  C. 
656,  669. 

(ee)  Distance  may  be  an  important 
element  to  be  considered.  Transpor- 
tation Bureau  of  Wichita  v.  St.  L.  &  S. 
F.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  679,  680. 

(f)  Equal  rates  should  be  applied  for 
equal  distances  under  similar  operating 
conditions,  and  the  fact  that  the  tonnage 
out  of  one  point  may  be  somewhat  heav- 
ier than  out  of  another  does  not  justify 
a  difference  in  the  rates  where  the  other 
conditions  are  similar.  Sioux  City  Com- 
mercial Club  V.  C.  <&  N.  W.  Ry.,  22  I. 
C.  C.  110,  114, 


(ff)  The  average  haul  of  lemons  from 
California  producing  points  is  one  of  the 
most  important  transportation  considera- 
tions entering  into  the  reasonableness 
of  this  rate  when  compared  with  the  av- 
erage haul  of  oranges.  Arlington  Heights 
Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
149,  152. 

(g)  When  long  distances  are  under 
consideration,  it  often  and  perhaps  us- 
ually happens  that  a  considerable  dif- 
ference in  mileage  may  be  disregarded 
in  fixing  the  total  through  charge,  but 
where  different  packing-houses  pay 
freight  upon  the  animals  which  they 
slaughter  in  proportion  to  distance,  the 
element  of  distance  ought  to  be  con- 
sidered in  fixing  the  proper  relation  in 
rates  upon  the  product  out.  Investiga- 
tion of  Alleged  Unreasonable  Rates  on 
Meats,   22   I.   C.   C.   160,   168. 

(gg)  Distance  cannot  be  held  to  be  a 
controlling  element.  In  Re  Advance  in 
Rates  on  Rice  and  Rice  Products,  21  I. 
C.  C.  124,  127;  In  Re  Investigation  of 
Advances  in  Rates  on  Grain,  21  I.  C.  C. 
22,  34. 

(h)  In  passing  upon  the  reasonable- 
ness of  a  blanket  rate,  the  rate  to  the 
nearest  point  must  be  offset  against  that 
to  the  more  distant  point.  Commercial 
Club  of  Salt  Lake  City  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  218,  226. 

(hh)  It  is  well  settled  that  distance  is 
always  a  factor  to  be  taken  into  consid- 
eration in  determining  either  the  rea- 
sonableness of  a  rate  by  itself  or  in  con- 
sidering its  relation  to  rates  to  other 
points,  but  it  is  equally  well  settled  that 
distance  alone  is  not  controlling.  Com- 
petition is  an  important  element  and 
there  are  various  other  considerations, 
all  of  which  must  be  taken  into  account 
in  determining  the  fact  whether  a  partic- 
ular rate  or  a  system  of  rates  is  or  is 
not  reasonable.  Shippers  and  receivers 
of  freight  are  entitled  as  a  matter  of  law 
to  rates  that  are  reasonable  and  that  do 
not  operate  to  unduly  discriminate 
against  them.  Corporation  Commission 
of  North  Carolina  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  303,  309. 

(i)  The  fact  that  the  commodity  does 
not  ordinarily  move  to  any  great  dis- 
tance from  the  mill  is  entitled  to  proper 
weight.  Florida  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  C.  of 
G.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  336,  339. 

(j)  Distance  is  an  element  in  rate  ad- 
justment   and    all    other     things     being 


338 


EVIDENCE,  §20  (k)— §23   (a) 


equal  it  perhaps  is  a  controlling  element, 
buc  can  hardly  control  where  other 
substantial  considerations  are  material- 
ly different.  Omaha  Grain  Exchange  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  424,  431. 

(k)  Distance  upon  the  water  is  less  a 
factor  than  upon  land.  Receivers  &  Ship- 
pers' Asso.  of  Cincinnati  v.  C.  N.  O.  & 
T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  440,  455. 

(1)  Distance  is  an  important,  but  not 
necessarily  a  controlling,  factor  in  rate 
questions.  Whether  or  not  it  is  conclu- 
sive depends  upon  the  facts  in  the  case. 
Muskogee  Traffic  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  169,  172. 

(m)  Length  of  haul  and  other  trans- 
IKjrtation  factors  have  a  more  or  less 
definite  relation  to  the  rate  that  a  carrier 
may  reasonably  demand  for  a  transporta- 
tion service.  Memphis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v. 
I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  313,  318. 

(n)  So  small  a  difference  as  0.6  mile 
in  distance  is  disregarded  in  a  haul  of 
207  miles  and  should  be  deemed  a  negli- 
gible quantity  in  fixing  rates.  Railroad 
Commissioners  of  Florida  v.  S.  A.  L.  Ry., 
16  I.  C.  C.  1,  2. 

(o)  A  road  operating  a  direct  through 
line  has  a  more  controlling  voice  in  fix- 
ing rates  between  two  points  than  an- 
other route  made  up  of  two  or  more  sep- 
arate roads.  Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau 
v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
56,   60. 

(p)  Unquestionably  mileage  is  a  fac- 
tor in  the  determination  of  the  reason- 
ableness of  rates,  but  how  important,  or 
what  effect  it  should  have  in  judging 
the  fairness  of  a  challenged  rate  is  a 
question  which  must  be  answered  in  the 
light  of  all  the  facts  surrounding  the 
exaction  of  the  rate.  The  Commission 
will  not  compel  the  establishment  of 
rates  solely  according  to  mileage;  the 
public  benefits,  the  greater  volume  of 
business  of  carriers  warranting  lower 
rates  to  all,  the  force  of  competition  and 
many  other  potent  considerations  may 
far  outweigh  a  claim  of  right  founded 
only  on  geographic  location.  Fort  Dodge 
Commercial  Club  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.  C.  572,  581. 

(q)  Rates  are  not  made  with  respect 
of  distance  alone.  Differences  in  cost 
of  service  to  the  carrier,  the  value  of 
service  to  the  shipper  and  questions  of 
competition  in  the  selling  market  should 
also  be  taken  into  consideration.    Black 


Mountain   Coal   Land   Co.   v.   S.   Ry.   Co., 
15    I.    C.    C.   286,    295. 

(r)  It  is  a  rule  of  well  Eigh  uni- 
versal application  that  as  distance  in- 
creases, difference  in  distance  becomes 
relatively  less  important.  Black  Moun- 
tain Coal  Land  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.   C.  286,   ^96. 

§21.     Dividends. 

(a)  Whether  a  carrier  earns  divi- 
dends or  not  sheds  little  light  on  the 
question  as  to  whether  the  rate  on  a  par- 
ticular article  is  reasonable.  For,  if  the 
carrier's  total  income  enables  it  to  de- 
clare a  dividend,  that  does  not  justify 
an  order  requiring  it  to  haul  one  class 
of  goods  for  nothing,  or  for  less  than  a 
reasonable  rate.  I.  C.  C.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R., 
222  U.  S.  541,  549,  32  Sup.  Ct.  108,  56  L. 
ed.  308. 

(b)  Dividends  are  of  little  importance 
apart  from  an  understanding  of  the  value 
of  the  investment.  Railroad  Commission 
of  Tex.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
C.  403,  483. 

§22.     Equipment  Furnished. 
See    Equipment. 

(a)  The  fact  that  sawmill  logs  are 
moved  on  logging  cars  does  not  justify 
a  higher  rate  on  mine-prop  logs.  Rick- 
ards  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
239,    240. 

(aa)  An  advance  in  rates  is  not  justi- 
fied because  of  acquiring  new  equipment 
where  the  former  equipment  was  suf- 
ficient. City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  162,  171. 

(b)  While  the  Commission  frequently 
considers  in  determining  reasonableness 
of  rates  the  character  of  equipment  nec- 
essary for  the  transportation  of  various 
commodities,  it  cannot  go  into  the  matter 
of  subordinate  grades  of  equipment  used 
in  transportation.  Bash  Fertilizer  Co.  v. 
Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C  522,  524. 

§2214.     Expert  Evidence. 

See   Supra,    §40;    Undercharges,   §4. 

§23.     Failure    to    Serve     Prejudiced     Lo- 
cality. 

See    Discrimination,    §7. 

(a)  When  one  shipping  center  through 
"•n  adjustment  of  rates  is  placed  at  a  dis- 
advantage to  another  the  question  to  be 
determined  is  whether  such  disadvan- 
tage is  the  result  of  unjust  discrimina- 
tion or  undue  or  unreasonable  prejudice 


EVIDENCE,  §23   (b)— §27   (c) 


339 


due  to  the  rate  adjustment.  Chamber  of 
Commerce  of  Newport  News  v.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  345,  351. 

(b)  The  fact  that  the  rails  of  certain 
carriers  do  not  actually  extend  to  a  ship- 
ping center  which  is  discriminated 
against  cannot  relieve  such  carriers  from 
responsibility  for  the  effect  of  rates, 
which  create  such  discrimination,  which 
they  control  and  in  which  they  partici- 
pate. Chamber  of  Commerce  of  New- 
port News  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I  C  C 
345,  353. 

§24.     Fixed  Charges. 

See  Transportation,  §14  (a), 
(a)  The  fixed  charges  of  a  railroad 
sometimes  represent  the  entire  value  of 
the  property.  Instances  could  easily  be 
cited  where  a  railroad  ought  not  to 
earn  in  excess  of  its  fixed  charges.  Moun- 
tain Ice  Co.  V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  15 
I.  C.  C.  305,  319. 

§25.     Governmental    Regulation. 

(a)  No  increase  in  revenue  can  be 
hoped  for  in  the  future  from  a  more 
thorough  maintenance  of  the  published 
rate,  since  that  rate  is  now  maintained. 
In  Re  Advances  in  Rates— Eastern  Case 
20  I.  C.  C.  243,  285. 

(b)  Revenues  were  increased  as  a  re- 
sult of  the  prohibition  of  rebates.  In  Re 
Advances  in  Rates— Western  Case  20 
I.  C.  C.  307,  353;  Shoemaker  v.  C.  &  P. 
Tel.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  614,  618. 

(c)  Government  regulation,  in  some 
respect,  has  largely  increased  carriers' 
revenues.  Shoemaker  v.  C.  &  P.  Tel. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  614,  618. 

(d)  Cessation  of  rebating  and  diminu- 
tion of  free  transportation  resulted  in 
important  increases  in  revenue.  (Dis- 
senting opinion.)  Morgan  Grain  Co.  v. 
A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  460,  472. 

§26.     Import    Duty. 

See  Advanced   Rates.  §18   (6);   Import 
Traffic,    II    (f). 

(a)  When  establishing  rates  and  priv- 
ileges to  the  United  States  from  Cuba 
in  comparison  with  those  from  Florida, 
the  carriers  have  no  right  to  count  the 
import  duty  as  a  part  of  the  transporta- 
tion charge.  Florida  Fruit  &  VegetabU 
Ass'n  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C  C. 
552.  561. 


s27.     Investment  Relying  on   Rate. 

See  Infra,  §66  (i) ;  Advanced  Rates, 
§8  (1)  (ii):  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,   §14,   §16    (o),    (p),   §145   (c). 

(a)  Where  money  has  been  expended 
upon  the  strength  of  a  given  rate  ad- 
justment, neither  the  carrier  nor  the 
Commission  should  change  that  adjust- 
ment without  considering  the  effect  upon 
such  investment.  But  an  unlawful  rate 
does  not  become  lawful  simply  because 
to  declare  it  unlawful  will  work  de- 
struction to  property  interests  which 
have  developed  under  the  maintenance 
of  the  unlawful  rate;  nor  should  car- 
riers or  the  Commission  refrain  from  a 
change  in  rates  simply  because  it  de- 
stroys property  interests.  Albree  v. 
B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  303,  315. 

(aa)  The  Commission  has  never  under- 
stood that  it  could  dictate  the  policy  of 
a  carrier  in  the  making  of  its  rates  in  so 
far  as  there  was  just  room  for  the  ex- 
ercise of  a  policy.  It  has  several  times 
explicitly  so  declared.  It  has,  however, 
believed  that  it  might  consider  what  the 
policy  of  a  carrier  had  been  in  deter- 
mining whether  the  rates  resulting  from 
a  change  in  that  policy  were  just  and 
reasonable.  It  often  happens  that  the 
very  existence  of  an  industry  depends 
upon  the  rate  accorded  to  it.  If,  now,  a 
carrier  has  established  a  particular  rate 
for  the  express  purpose  of  enabling  an 
industry  to  exist,  and  if  upon  the 
strength  of  that  rate  money  has  been 
invested  which  must  be  destroyed  if  the 
rate  is  withdrawn,  this  fact  might  prop- 
erly be  considered  in  passing  upon  the 
reasonableness  of  the  proposed  change 
in  the  rate.  Such  fact  is  not  control- 
ling, but  is  one  of  the  circumstances 
which  may  properly  be  kept  in  view. 
The  Commission  might  in  a  proper  case 
order  the  continued  maintenance  of  a 
rate  upon  which  the  investment  of  money 
had  been  induced,  even  though  it  would 
not  in  the  first  instance  as  an  o-riginal 
proposition  have  directed  the  establish- 
ment of  that  rate.  Oregon  &  Washing- 
ton Lumber  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
21  I.  C.  C.  389,  394. 

(b)  Under  the  particular  facts  in  this 
case,  where  a  business  has  been  built  up 
and  maintained  under  a  certain  rate,  that 
rate  should  not  be  disturbed.  Corpora- 
tion Commission  of  N.  C.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  303,  308. 

(c)  Where  plant  has  been  established 
and  money  invested  on  faith  of  certain 
rates    and    conditions,    the    carrier    may 


340 


EVIDENCE,  §28   (a)— §29   (bb) 


not  increase  those  rates  to  the  serious 
disadvantage  of  such  investment  without 
good  cause  or  reason.  Douglas  &  Co. 
V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
232,  237. 

§28.     Local    Rates   and   Combinations. 

See      Through       Routes      and      Joint 
Rates,    §15. 

(a)  Where  the  spread  between  the 
local  rates  and  the  divisions  of  through 
rates  between  the  same  points  is  large 
the  local  rates  should  be  carefully  scru- 
tinized. R.  R.  Com.  of  Nev.  v.  N.  C.  O. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  205,  210. 

(b)  The  combination  and  through  rate 
should  not  be  equal.  El  Dorado,  etc.,  Co. 
v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
286,  287. 

(c)  A  joint  through  rate  is  unreason- 
able so  far  as  it  exceeds  the  combination 
of  locals.  St.  Louis  Blast  Furnace  Co. 
V.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  215;  Webster 
Grocer  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21 
I.  C.  C.  20. 

(d)  The  charges  collected  on  ship- 
ments of  coke  under  joint  rate  of  $2.90 
per  net  ton  and  $2.80  per  net  ton  from 
Deepwater,  W.  Va.,  to  St.  Louis  or  Car- 
ondelet.  Mo.,  were  unreasonable  in  and 
to  the  extent  that  they  exceeded  the 
charges  that  would  have  been  imposed 
had  such  joint  rates  not  exceeded  the 
aggregate  of  the  intermediate  rates  be- 
tween the  same  points,  or  $2.60  per  net 
ton.  Reparation  awarded.  St.  Louis 
Blast  Furnace  Co.  v.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 

-C.  215,  220. 

(e)  Existence  of  lower  combination 
over  another  route  does  not  present  a 
combination  lower  than  the  through  rate 
on  which  the  presumption  obtains  such 
through  rate  is  unreasonable.  Lull  Car- 
riage Co.  v.  C.  K.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.   15,  17. 

(f)  Complainant  shipped,  all  rail,  a 
carload  of  cutters,  Kalamazoo,  Mich.,  to 
Fond  du  Lac,  Wis.,  under  the  through 
joint  class  rate  of  55c  per  100  lbs.  via 
Chicago.  Contemporaneously  there  was 
via  Milwaukee  a  rate  of  24% c  via  the 
"across  lake  route"  (Lake  Michigan). 
HELD,  this  case  does  not  present  a  com- 
bination of  locals  lower  than  the  through 
rate  on  which  the  presumption  obtains 
that  the  through  rate  was  unreasonable. 
Reparation  denied.  Lull  Carriage  Co.  v. 
C.  K.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  15,  17. 

(g)  Complainant  shipped  fruit  bas- 
kets,  carload,    Traverse   City,    Mich.,    to 


Balcom,  111.,  under  a  joint  rate  of  26c  per 
100  lbs.,  which  was  greater  than  the  sum 
of  the  locals.  HELD,  that  a  joint  rate 
between  two  points  that  exceeds  the  sum 
of  the  separately  established  rates  be- 
tween the  same  points  is  prima  facie  un- 
reasonable, and  there  being  no  evidence  to 
rebut  this  presumption,  the  rate  charged 
was  unreasonable  and  excessive  to  the 
extent  that  it  exceeded  the  combination 
in  effect  at  the  time  the  shipments 
moved.  Wells-Higman  Co.  v.  G.  R.  &  I. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  487,  488. 

(h)  A  joint  rate  in  excess  of  the  sums 
of  the  locals  is  unreasonable.  Webster 
Grocery  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  493,  495. 

(i)  On  shipments  in  each  direction 
between  Albuquerque,  N.  M.,  and  El 
Paso,  Tex.,  in  less-than-carloads,  com- 
plainants were  assessed  first,  second, 
third  and  fourth  through  class  rates, 
which  exceeded  the  combination  local 
class  rates  via  Las  Cruces  by  39c,  34c, 
33c  and  30c,  respectively.  On  agreement 
of  defendant  to  file  new  tariffs  of  through 
rates  from  Albuquerque  to  El  Paso  equal 
to  the  local  combination  rates  and 
through  rates  from  El  Paso  to  Albu- 
querque, making  material  reduction  in 
New  Mexico  and  to  make  reparation  on 
the  basis  of  the  new  schedules,  it  was 
HELD,  that  the  complaint  be  dismissed 
and  that  authority  be  given  defendant  to 
settle  the  overcharges  on  the  informal 
docket.  Crombie  &  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  57,  59. 

(j)  Where  the  combination  of  local 
rates  is  less  than  the  through  rates  the 
adjustment  is  prima  facie  unreasonable. 
Greater  Des  Moines  Committee  v.  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  73,  80. 

§29.     Long     Continuance     of     Voluntary 
Rate. 

See  Infra,  §43;  Advanced  Rates,  §3 
(f),  §5  (4)  (a),  §8  (1)  (J);  Express 
Companies,  §22;  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,   §16,   §25,   §84   (i),   §145   (c). 

(a)  A  voluntary  rate,  established  to 
meet  competition,  is  not  to  be  taken  as 
the  measure  of  what  is  reasonable.  L.  & 
N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  195  Fed.  541,  558. 

(b)  The  maintenance  of  a  rate  for 
eight  years  is  a  strong  admission  against 
the  carriers  that  a  higher  rate  would  be 
unreasonable,  unless  explained.  Arling- 
ton Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  149,  151. 

(bb)  A  carrier  having  voluntarily 
put    in    a    rate    relatively    low    is    not 


EVIDENCE,  §29  (c)— (k) 


341 


bound  to  maintain  that  rate  indefinitely, 
but  may  withdraw  a  rate  found  by  the 
Commission  to  be  unreasonably  low. 
Fairmont  Creamery  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q. 
R.    R.    Co.,   22'  I.    C.   C.   252,   254. 

(c)  The  fact  that  rates  have  been  in 
effect  without  material  change  for  many 
years  is  of  weight  in  favor  of  the  view 
that  they  are  reasonable.  Chattanooga 
Feed  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
480,  484. 

(d)  The  presumption,  from  long  main- 
tenance, that  a  rate  was  sufficiently  high 
may  be  weakened  by  showing  that  the 
past  rate  was  induced  by  competition. 
Audley  Hill  &  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  0. 
C.  225,  226;  Commercial  Club  of  Omaha 
V.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  631,  636. 

(e)  The  fact  that  a  lower  rate  has 
been  in  effect  immediately  prior  and  sub- 
sequent to  a  certain  period  is  valuable 
as  evidence  only  in  case  it  appears  that 
the  lower  rate  affords  reasonable  revenue 
to  the  carrier.  Winterbotham  &  Sons  v. 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  266,  269. 

(f)  Complainants  shipped  bananas  in 
carloads,  Charleston,  S.  C,  to  Augusta, 
Ga.,  under  a  rate  of  20c  per  100  lbs. 
These  shipments  moved  between  May  4, 
1909,  and  Jan.  9,  1910.  To  May  3,  1909, 
and  since  Feb.  18,  1910,  bananas  moved 
under  a  rate  of  15c  per  100  lbs.,  which, 
with  the  above  exception,  had  been  con- 
tinuously in  effect  for  more  than  nine 
years.  The  15c  rate  was  established  to 
meet  competitive  conditions  on  the  haul 
from  Augusta  to  Savannah,  Ga.,  and 
territory  intermediate  to  Augusta, 
Ga.,  and  Columbia,  S.  C.  HELD,  that 
although  the  long  existence  and  use  of 
a  rate  is  an  important  fact  tending  to 
show  that  it  is  sufficiently  high  and 
properly  requires  the  carriers  to  explain 
or  justify  an  increase  thereof,  the  evi- 
dential force  of  such  a  showing  is  weak- 
ened when  the  rate  has  been  established 
on  account  of  competitive  conditions 
which  the  carrier  in  the  exercise  of  its 
discretion  might  lawfully  meet,  but 
which  it  might  not  be  required  to  meet. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Audley  Hill  &  Co. 
V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  225. 

(g)  Long  maintenance  of  a  subse- 
quently restored  rate  is  in  the  nature  of 
an  admission  of  its  fairness.  Millar  v. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  78. 

(h)  Complainant  shipped  apples,  C. 
L.,  from  Seymour  and  Cedar  Gap,  Mo.,  to 
Minneapolis  and  St.  Paul,   Minn.,  a  dis- 


tance of  about  840  miles.  Prior  to  Sept. 
6,  1906,  the  rate  from  Seymour  was  34c 
and  from  Cedar  Gap  34%c.  On  that  date 
and  to  Aug.  6,  1909,  the  rates  were  41c 
and  42c,  respectively,  and  on  Aug.  6,  1909, 
reduced  to  31c.  HELD,  the  presumption 
that  34c  and  34i^c  were  reasonable  arises 
from  the  voluntary  act  of  the  carriers  in 
keeping  them  in  effect  for  a  long  period 
of  time,  rendered  stronger  by  the  fact 
that  these  rates  were  voluntarily  re- 
duced to  31c.  Reparation  awarded  for 
charges  exacted  in  excess  of  34c  and 
34i^c.  Gamble-Robinson  Commission  Co. 
V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  114. 

(i)  The  maintenance  of  a  voluntary 
rate  imposes  the  duty  on  the  carrier  to 
give  good  reason  for  an  advance.  Mor- 
gan Grain  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  460,  468. 

(j)  Complainants  attacked  the  rate  on 
beer  from  Milwaukee,  Wis.,  to  certain  Pa- 
cific coast  and  far  western  points.  Com- 
plainants rested  their  case  solely  upon 
the  fact  that  the  rates  on  beer  from  Mil- 
waukee to  the  various  points  of  destina- 
tion set  forth  in  the  petition  were  ad- 
vanced by  from  5c  to  10c  per  100  lbs. 
prior  to  the  movement  of  these  ship- 
ments,  and  subsequently  restored  to  the 
pre-existing  basis.  HELD,  these  facts 
are  entitled  to  their  proper  weight,  but 
do  not  demonstrate  the  illegality  of  the 
higher  charges.  The  complainant's  rep- 
resentatives testified  at  the  hearing  that 
they  are  subjected  to  severe  competition 
in  the  marketing  of  their  products,  and 
that  the  carriers  have  found  it  necessary 
to  place  rates  on  a  low  basis  in  order  to 
enable  the  complainant  to  meet  this  local 
market  competition  with  success.  This 
circumstance  tends  to  rebut  any  pre- 
sumption of  unreasonableness  which  may 
arise  from  the  history  of  a  rate.  It  argues 
strongly  in  favor  of  the  carrier's  conten- 
tion that  the  lower  standard  was  re- 
established because  of  competitive  condi- 
tions, and  not  because  of  a  conviction 
that  the  increased  rates  were  excessive. 
Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  584,  586,  587. 

(k)  In  attacking  the  carload  rate  of 
$2  per  net  ton  on  soft  coal  originating  in 
Illinois  from  East  St,  Louis,  111.,  to 
Omaha,  Neb.,  complainants  relied  on  the 
long  maintenance  of  a  rate  of  $1.80  per 
net  ton  as  proof  that  the  newly  estab- 
lished rate  of  $2  was  excessive.  HELD, 
that  the  rate  from  East  St.  Louis  to 
Omaha  on  Illinois  coal  has  at  all  times 
had  reference  to  competitive  conditions, 


342 


EVIDENCE,  §29   (1)— §30   (a) 


including  those  affecting  rates  to  East 
St.  Louis,  and  since  it  has  often  been 
held  that  a  carrier  may  establish  rates 
of  this  kind  for  competitive  reasons  lower 
than  it  could  justly  be  compelled  to  es- 
tablish, it  does  not  seem  that  the  long 
existence  of  a  rate  established  and 
maintained  under  former  and  different 
conditions  (not  altered  by  an^'  illegal 
act  of  its  own)  than  those  now  existing 
should  have  the  same  weight  and  force 
as  proof  in  the  nature  of  an  admission 
of  reasonableness  of  the  former  rate,  and 
such  as  would  ordinarily  attach  to  the 
long  continuance  of  a  rate  voluntarily 
established  and  maintained  under  other 
conditions.  Breese-Trenton  Mining  Co.  v. 
Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  598,  600. 

(1)  The  long  maintenance  of  a  compet- 
itive rate  was  not,  upon  advance  of  the 
•rate,  an  admission  that  the  former  rate 
was  reasonable.  Breese-Trenton  Mining 
Co.  V.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  598,  600. 

(m)  Though  a  lower  rate  is  estab- 
lished through  an  error  in  the  carrier's 
tariff,  the  fact  that  it  is  voluntarily  main- 
tained for  a  period  of  two  years  is  evi- 
dence of  its  reasonableness  in  a  claim 
for  reparation  for  charges  exacted  under 
the  rate  which  it  succeeded.  Clark  Co. 
V.  Buffalo  &  Susquehanna  Ry.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  380,  381. 

(mm)  Where  two  rates  are  in  effect, 
the  shipper  is  justified  in  demanding 
the  lower,  and  the  carrier  may  not 
lawfully  collect  more.  The  Commission 
is  likewise  justified  in  holding  that  the 
lower  rate  is  reasonable,  or  at  least  not 
unreasonably  low,  because  it  is  the  vol- 
untary rate  of  the  carrier.  Boise  Com- 
mercial Club  V.  Adams  Express  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  115,  121. 

(n)  The  extensive  application  volun- 
tarily by  other  carriers  than  defendant  of 
fourth-class  rates  on  oils  is  evidence  of 
the  unreasonableness  of  higner  rates  in 
the  same  general  territory.  Bartles  Oil 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C  C. 
146,  148. 

(o)  The  long-continued  maintenance 
of  a  lower  rate  raises  no  presumption  of 
law  that  a  newly  established  higher  rate 
is  unreasonable.  Memphis  Cotton  Oil  Co. 
V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  313,  318. 

(p)  The  long  maintenance  of  a  par- 
ticular rating  cannot  negative  the  right 
of  shippers  to  such  a  lower  adjustment  as 
circumstances    and    conditions    may    de- 


mand.    Kiser  Co.  v.  C.  of  G.  Ry.  Co.,  17 
[.  C.  C.  430,  440. 

(q)  Where  carriers  voluntarily  main- 
tain a  rate  between  certain  points  for  a 
long  period  of  time  the  presumption  is 
that  such  rate  is  reasonable.  Sunderland 
Bros.  Co.  V.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
450,  451. 

(r)  The  Commission  has  often  held 
that  the  long  maintenance  of  a  given  rate 
is  an  admission  of  the  reasonableness  of 
that  rate.  Green  Bay  Business  Men's 
Ass'n  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  59, 
63. 

(s)  The  mere  fact  that  a  rate  is  found 
in  effect  or  even  that  it  has  continued  in 
effect  for  a  considerable  leut^th  of  time, 
is  not  conclusive  of  its  reasonableness. 
Darling  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.  C.  79,  83. 

(t)  It  has  often  been  said  by  the  Com- 
mission that  the  voluntary  maintenance 
of  a  rate  for  a  considerable  period  was 
In  the  nature  of  an  admission  that  the 
rate  was  reasonable,  which  must  be  given 
great  weight  in  determining  that  ques- 
tion unless  explained.  Darling  &  Co.  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  79,  80. 

(u)  Where  a  rate  is  voluntarily  es- 
tablished and  maintained  for  a  consid- 
erable period,  this  fact,  although  not  con- 
clusive, is  strong  evidence  of  the 
reasonableness  of  the  rate.  The  force 
of  this  presumption  is  greatly  weakened 
and  may  be  altogether  destroyed  by  the 
circumstances  under  which  the  rate  was 
established  and  maintained,  but  if  no 
particular  reason  is  shown  for  the  put- 
ting in  of  the  rate,  if  no  commercial  or 
competitive  condition  prevents  the  main- 
tenance of  a  higher  rate,  if  the  main- 
tenance of  this  rate  has  been  voluntary 
upon  the  part  of  the  carrier,  the  force 
of  the  admission  becomes  exceedingly 
strong.  Burgess  v.  Transcontinental 
Freight  Bureau,  13  I.  C.  C.  668,  677. 

(v)  Where  carriers  voluntarily  main- 
tain a  rate  for  a  long  period  of  time 
the  presumption  is  that  such  rate  is 
reasonable.  Chaflin  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  & 
O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  585. 

§30.     Low  Rate  in  Opposite  Direction. 

See  Comparative  Rates;  Discrimina- 
tion, §4  (g) ;  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,   §116   (d). 

(a)  The  mere  fact  that  a  rate  is 
higher  one  way  between  the  same  points 
than  it  is  the  other  does  not  prove  that 
the  higher  rate  is  unreasonable,  and  this 


EVIDENCE,  §30  (aa)— §33   (a) 


343 


is  particularly  true  where  there  is  a 
preponderance  of  empty  cars  moving  in 
the  one  direction.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
I.  C.  C,  195  Fed.  541,  559. 

(aa)  Rates  on  bottles  of  wine  in 
cases  from  Galveston  to  New  Orleans 
found  unreasonable  to  the  extent  that  it 
exceeds  the  rate  in  the  opposite  direc- 
tion. Galveston  Commercial  Ass'n  v. 
G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
512. 

(b)  The  fact  that  the  eastbound  rate 
is  lower  than  the  westbound  rate  on  the 
same  route  does  no":  prove  that  the  latter 
is  unreasonable.  Wilburine  Oil  Works  v. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  548. 

(c)  Comparisons  of  rates  in  opposite 
directions  are  never  conclusive.  Patten 
V.  Wis.  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  189. 

(d)  Rate  higher  in  the  reverse  di- 
rection. HELD,  unreasonable  and  repa- 
ration awarded.  La  Crosse  Implement 
Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.    220. 

(e)  Rate  higher  from  Columbia,  S. 
C,  to  Jacksonville,  Fla.,  than  in  oppo- 
site direction.  Reparation  awarded  and 
maintenance  of  lower  rate  ordered. 
Pons  V.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  Unrep.  Op.  330. 

(f)  Rates  higher  on  corn  in  the 
shuck  from  Louisiana  points  to  points 
in  Texas  than  from  Texas  to  points 
in  Louisiana.  Reparation  awarded.  Hill 
&  Webb  V.  I.  &  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
333. 

(g)  Rates  higher  west  bound  than 
east  bound.  Not  found  unreasonable 
and  complaint  dismissed.  Hill  &  Webb 
V.   T.   &   P.   Ry.   Co.,   Unrep.  Op.   451. 

§31.     Manufactured  Product. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §13  (e) ;  Dif- 
ferentials, §5  (b);  Evidence,  §12 
(1)  (a),  §12  (12)  (a).  §12  (16)  (a), 
§12  (24)  (a),  §12  (26)  (a).  §17  (a), 
§31,  §44;  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§17,   §54   (a),   §106    (a).   §138    (a). 

(a)  If  rates. on  manufactured  articles 
are  to  be  constructed  with  reference  to 
the  assembling  cost  at  the  point  of 
manufacture,  all  of  the  raw  materials 
must  be  considered.  Massee  &  Felton 
Lumber  Co.  v.  &.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
110,  112. 

(b)  A  carrier  may  make  a  reasonable 
differential  between  rates  on  raw  ma- 
terial and  articles  manufactured  there- 
from. Electric  Malting  Co.  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  378,  380. 


(c)  The  general  rule  is  that  manufac- 
tured products  bear  higher  rates  of  trans- 
portation than  does  raw  material,  and  is 
founded  in  reason,  because  ordinarily 
there  is  a  substantial  difference  between 
the  value  of  the  one  and  that  of  the 
other,  and  frequently  there  is  a  greater 
degree  of  risk  incident  to  the  transporta- 
tion and  care  of  the  manufactured  prod- 
uct than  of  the  raw  material.  The  prac- 
tice, however,  is  not  universal,  and  if 
departed  from  in  some  instances  because 
the  reasons  for  the  distinction  are  lack- 
ing and  in  other  cases  because  of  counter- 
vailing commercial  and  market  condi- 
tions and  considerations.  Within  the 
last  main  class  of  exceptions  would 
fall  the  case  of  grain  and  grain  products, 
which  are  generally  carried  at  the  same 
rate.  The  rule,  however,  more  nearly 
universally  applies  with  respect  to  the 
primary  or  principal  product  or  products 
than  to  the  secondary  products  or  by- 
products from  the  same  raw  material. 
East  St.  Louis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  St.  L.  & 
S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  37,  40,  41. 

(d)  Rates  on  manufactured  products 
ought  generally  to  be  higher  than  the 
rates  on  the  raw  materials  from  which 
they  are  made.  Bulte  Milling  Co.  v. 
C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  351,  364. 

§32.     Market   Competition. 

See  Discrimination,  §10  (a);  Equali- 
zation of  Rates,  §6  (a);  Long  and 
Short    Hauls,    §8. 

(a)  The  fact  that  complainant  at  Mil- 
waukee cannot  compete  for  certain  trade 
to  the  Pacific  coast  under  existing  rates 
does  not  prove  that  such  rates  are  un- 
reasonable. Goerres  Cooperage  Co.  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  5,  6. 

(b)  Garments  of  cotton  and  wool 
come  into  competition  with  one  another, 
and  since  the  freight  rate  affects  in  a 
degree  the  price  at  which  the  garment 
can  be  sold,  it  follows  that  the  rate  must 
in  a  measure  determine  the  ability  of  the 
complainant  to  sell  its  product.  Associa- 
tion of  Union-Made  Garment  Manufac- 
turers V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C 
405,  408. 

§33.     Merger  of  Terminals. 

(a)  The  cities  of  San  Pedro  and  Wil- 
mington, situated  on  the  harbor  of  San 
Pedro,  are  about  twenty-two  miles  dis- 
tant from  Los  Angeles,  which  is  inland. 
These  communities  were  merged  into  the 
city  of  Los  Angeles  and  connected  there- 
with by  a  narrow   strip  of  land  half  a 


344 


EVIDENCE,  §34  (a)— §37  (e) 


mile  in  width,  locally  known  as  "the ' 
shoestring."  HELD,  while  these  com- 
munities have  been  merged  into  one  mu- 
nicipality for  the  purposes  of  civil  gov- 
ernment and  administration  this  does  not 
necessarily  merge  the  two  into  one  com- 
munity from  a  transportation  point  of 
view.  Harbor  City  Wholesale  Co.  v.  S. 
P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  323,  331. 

§34.     Mineral  Lands  Owned  by  Carrier. 
See   Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §18. 

(a)  Where  the  coal  lands  owned  by  a 
carrier  are  leased  to  an  independent 
company,  which  makes  a  profit  out  of 
their  operation,  the  carrier  should  not 
be  permitted  to  use  the  value  of  such 
property  for  the  purpose  of  swelling  the 
amount  upon  which  it  may  demand  an 
Income  from  rates  to  be  paid  by  the 
public.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  376,  407. 

(b)  Ore  properties  belonging  to  de- 
fendant carrier  were  transferred  to  an 
independent  company  in  exchange  for 
certificates  entitling  the  holders  thereof 
to  participate  in  the  profits  of  said  com- 
pany. These  certificates  were  turned 
over  gratis  to  the  shareholders  of  defend- 
ant. HELD,  upon  a  question  of  reason- 
ableness of  rates  said  fact  could  not  be 
urged  to  deny  the  right  of  said  share- 
holders to  receive  a  reasonable  income 
on  their  stock.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  376,  408.  • 

§35.     Municipal  Charter. 

(a)  A  municipal  charter  is  not  deter- 
minative of  the  relations  which  a  com- 
munity bears  to  a  railroad  which  gives 
it  service.  Enterprise  Fuel  Co.  v.  Pa. 
R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  219,  223. 

§36.     Need  for   Revenue. 

See    Infra,    §50,   §51,    §58;    Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,   §20,  §30,   §36. 

(a)  In  considering  the  reasonableness 
of  a  whole  schedule  of  rates  the  Com- 
mission may  well  at  the  outset  make  in- 
quiry as  to  the  general  financial  con- 
dition of  the  defendant  railroad.  R.  R. 
Com.  of  Nev.  v.  N.  C.  O.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I. 
C.  C.  205,  210. 

(b)  The  necessitous  circumstances  in 
which  defendant  finds  itself  as  a  result 
of  events  not  connected  with  the  Pitts- 
burgh lake-coal  traffic  cannot  be  ac- 
cepted as  the  measure  of  reasonableness 
of  a  rate  to  be  imposed  upon  that  traffic. 
Boileau  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
640,  655. 


(c)  The  fact  that  a  road  may  be  op- 
erated at  a  loss  Qoes  not  justiiy  rateif 
unreasonably   high   for   the   service   pei 
formed.    Railroad  Commissioners  of  lowt. 
V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  18i,  186. 

(d)  The  Commission  is  bound  to 
consider  whether  any  contemplated 
readjustment  will  result  in  serious  im- 
pairment of  business  interests  or  un- 
due depreciation  in  the  revenue  of  the 
carrier.  Black  Mountain  Coal  Land  Co. 
V.   S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  286,  295. 

§37.     New  Lines. 

See  Advanced   Rates,  §12   (2);    Branch 
Lines,   §2;   Cars  and   Car  Supply. 

(a)  There  is  but  little  danger  of  com- 
petition to  be  apprehended  from  the  con- 
struction of  new  lines.  In  Re  Advances 
in  Rates— Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243, 
264. 

(b)  Complainant  attacked  rates  from 
Billings,  Mont,  to  points  in  Wyoming  on 
branch  lines  of  defendant.  HELD,  that 
these  branch  lines  traverse  a  new  coun- 
try, where  transportation  conditions  a-re 
difllcult  and  the  volume  of  business  com- 
paratively small.  These  lines,  however, 
are  operated  as  part  of  a  great  and  pros- 
perous system;  they  are  feeders  to  the 
main  line  and  help  to  swell  the  revenue 
of  that  line.  A  part  of  any  great  railroad 
system  might  be  selected  and  counting 
cost  of  operation  and  fixed  charges  such 
part  be  shown  to  be  unprofitable.  This, 
however,  would  not  truly  indicate  its 
value  and  profitableness  as  an  integral 
part  of  the  whole  property.  The  fact 
that  these  branch  lines  considered  by 
themselves  fail  to  show  large  earnings 
does  not  justify  the  charging  of  unrea- 
sonable rates.  Billings  Chamber  of 
Commerce  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  71,  75. 

(c)  Rates  on  a  branch  line  may  law- 
fully be  higher  than  on  main  lines 
through  well-developed  territory  where 
the  density  of  trafl5c  is  much  greater. 
Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  C.  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  156,  159. 

(d)  A  new  line  ought  to  be  worth 
what  it  cost  and  ought  to  earn  a  return 
upon  that  amount.  City  of  Spokane  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  162,  171. 

(e)  If  the  branch  lines  of  a  railroad 
are  judiciously  planned  and  constructed 
they  should  certainly  be  taken  into  ac- 
count in  determining  the  value  of  the 
railroad,  for  although  they  may  not  earn 
a  large  return  upon  the  cost  considered 


EVIDENCE,  §38  (a)— §41  (a) 


345 


as  an  independent  proposition,  they  do 
add  to  the  traffic  and  the  earning  power 
of  the  entire  system;  but  it  must  be  as- 
sumed that  the  new  branches  which 
have  been  constructed  are  good  invest- 
ments, otherwise  they  would  not  have 
been  built,  and  that  they  will  add  to  the 
earnings  of  the  property  in  proportion 
as  they  have  added  to  its  cost.  No  in- 
crease in  rate  should  be  called  for  on 
this  account.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  162,  171. 

§38.      New   Rates. 

(a)  Complainants  shipped  a  carload 
of  house  blocking  from  Burkburnett,  Tex., 
to  Devol,  Okla.,  a  distance  of  7.4  miles, 
under  a  rate  of  G^/^c  per  100  lbs.,  ap- 
plied under  the  "analogous  article"  rule 
in  the  classification  in  the  absence  of 
a  specific  rate.  This  commodity  con- 
sists of  posts  of  short  lengths  used  as 
pillars  to  support  small  frame  houses.  A 
specific  commodity  rate  of  3l^c  was 
shortly  after  established.  HELD,  it  is 
fair  to  assume  that  a  new  rate  estab- 
lished and  maintained  affords  just  com- 
pensation to  the  carrier.  Rate  collecfted 
found  unreasonable  so  far  a^  it  ex- 
ceeded 31/^c.  Reparation  awarded.  Max- 
well v.  W.  F.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
C.  197. 

(b)  Where  a  new  short  line  meets  a 
rate  voluntarily  established  and  long 
maiL.tained  by  a  long  line,  it  must  be  as- 
sumed that  if  the  rate  is  compensatory 
for  the  long  line  it  is  compensatory  for 
a  materially  shorter  line.  Railroad  Com- 
missioners of  Florida  v.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  1,  5. 

§39.     Notice. 

See  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §9;  Notice, 
(a)  While  a  long  course  of  dealing 
between  the  shipper  and  the  carrier  in- 
volving daily  or  frequent  shipments  of 
automobiles  from  a  definite  station  might 
so  familiarize  the  carrier's  agents  at  that 
point  with  the  requirements  of  the  ship- 
per in  the  way  of  equipment,  as  to  justify 
a  holding  that  an  order  for  a  car  for 
three  automobiles  was  sufficient  to 
charge  the  carrier  with  notice  that  a 
36-foot  car  was  wanted,  such  a  relation- 
ship between  shipper  and  carrier  must 
be  clearly  made  out  before  reparation 
can  be  awarded  on  that  basis  for  the 
exaction  by  the  carrier  of  the  minimum 
for  a  larger  car  than  the  one  alleged  to 
be  ordered.  Pope  Mfg  Co.  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.^R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  400,  403. 


§40.     Oral  Testimony. 

(a)  Although  the  oral  testimony  of 
witnesses  as  to  the  existence  of  a  lawful 
rate  is  not  the  best  evidence,  still  such 
evidence  cannot  be  disregarded  where  it 
is  admitted  without  objection.  Kansas 
City  So.  Ry.  v.  Albers;  Comm.  Co.,  223 
U.  S.  573,  595,  32  Sup.  Ct.  316,  56  L.  ed. 
556. 

(b)  The  reasonableness  of  rates  can- 
not be  proved  by  categorical  answers  by 
which  the  witness  testifies  that  the  goods 
are  worth  so  much  per  pound  or  the 
services  worth  so  much  a  day.  I.  C.  C. 
V.  U.  P.  R.  R.,  222  U.  S.  541,  549,  32  S. 
Ct.  108,  56  L.  ed.  308. 

(c)  The  issue  raised  by  the  pleadings 
was  whether  defendant  properly  applied 
to  shipments  of  tools  its  first  class  rates 
under  the  descriptions  contained  in  the 
Western  Classification.  At  the  hearing 
the  witness  produced  for  complainant 
was  not  one  of  its  ofllcers  or  employes 
and  had  not  seen  the  shipments  on  which 
the  complaint  was  founded,  nor  did  any 
witness  appear  for  complainant  who  had 
seen  the  shipments  or  who  possessed 
first  hand  knowledge  of  their  nature,  or 
other  matters  relevant  and  necessary  to 
determination  of  a  question  of  classifica- 
tion. HELD,  it  is  well  understood  that 
the  Commission  does  not  enforce  in  pro- 
ceedings before  it  the  strict  rules  of 
evidence  which  obtain  in  courts  of  law, 
but  it  is  obvious  that  in  order  to  de- 
termine questions  of  this  kind  the  Com- 
mission must  have  before  it  information 
of  such  definite  character  as  will  war- 
rant a  finding  in  respect  of  disputed 
questions  of  fact,  and  ordinarily  this 
requires  the  testimony  of  a  witness  who 
Is  acquainted  with  the  facts  which,  from 
a  transportation  standpoint,  are  material 
to  the  proceeding.  No  such  testimony, 
either  oral  or  documentary,  being  sub- 
mitted in  this  case,  the  complaint  must 
be  dismissed.  Brown  Bros.  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  513,  514. 

(d)  All  must  concede  weight  and  force 
to  be  attached  to  explanations  given  by 
railroad  ofllcials  for  fixing  particular 
rates.  Penn  Tobacco  Co.  v.  Old  Do- 
minion S.  S.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  197,  199. 

§41.     Original   Cost  of   Road. 
See    Infra,    §49    (aa). 

(a)  The  original  cost  of  a  carrier's 
property  devoted  to  the  public  use  is 
an  element  to  be  considered  in  deter- 
mining the  reasonableness  of  rates.  Port- 


346 


EVIDENCE,  §42  (a)— §45  (bb) 


land  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  O.  R.  R. 
&  N.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  265,  280. 

§42.     Panama   Canal. 

(a)  Competition,  especially  in  view 
of  the  approaching  completion  of  the 
Panama  Canal,  must  be  a  dominant  factor 
in  determining  both  the  present  rates 
and  the  future  policy  of  transcontinental 
lines.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  376,  387. 

§42!/2-     Practical    Construction. 

See        Compress        Companies        and 
Charges,    II    (d). 

§43.     Past   Rates. 

See  Supra,  §29. 

(a)  The  Commission  must  be  largely 
influenced  in  many  instances  in  passing 
upon  the  reasonableness  of  a  given  rate 
by  the  adjustment  which  has  grown  up 
in  the  particular  locality  under  consid- 
eration. In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  for  the 
Transportation  of  Fresh  Meats,  2*5  I.  C. 
C,  652,  655. 

(aa)  The  fact  that  rates  were  not 
complained  of  in  the  past  is  not  decisive 
that  they  are  reasonable.  In  Re  Trans- 
portation of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23 
I.  C.  C.  151,  157. 

(b)  While  existence  of  a  wrong  can- 
not, of  itself,  justify  its  continuance,  still, 
in  determining  what  under  all  the  cir- 
cumstances is  just  and  reasonable,  in 
pursuance  of  the  authority  delegated  to 
the  Commission,  it  must  be  to  some  ex- 
tent guided  by  conditions  as  it  finds 
them.  Bluefield  Shippers'  Ass'n  v.  N.  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  519,  525. 

(c)  Existence  of  a  lower  rate  in  the 
past  is  of  strong  evidentiary  value,  but 
raises  no  presumption  of  law  that  a 
newly  established  higher  rate  is  unrea- 
sonable. Memphis  Cotton  Oil  Co  v.  I.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  313,  318. 

(d)  While  it  is  always  persuasive, 
yet  it  is  not  conclusive  that  because 
rates  were  lower  at  one  time  the  pres- 
ent rates  are  unreasonable.  Lagomar- 
cino-Grup  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
C.  151,  152. 

(e)  Past  rates  voluntarily  established 
many  years  ago  are  presumed  to  have 
been  remunerative.  Board  of  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  v.  V.  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  453  (458). 

(f)  Development  of  new  territory  un- 
der a  given  rate  adjustment  is  not  con- 


clusive as  to  the  reasonableness  of  such 
rate  adjustment  at  the  present  time. 
Burnham,  Hanna,  Munger  Dry  Goods  Co. 
V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  229, 
312. 

43i<^.     Permanent  Improvements. 

See    Passenger    Fares    and    Facilities, 
§5    (g);   Transportation,    §14    (b). 

§44.     Previous   Haul   on    Raw   Material. 

(a)  The  fact  that  freight  has  been 
shipped  once  and  paid  one  rate  cannot 
be  taken  into  consideration  in  fixing 
charges  for  a  subsequent  transaction. 
In  Re  Reduced  Rates  on  Returned  Ship- 
ments, 19  I.  C.  C  409,  416. 

(b)  Where  an  existing  rate  was 
neither  unreasonable  nor  discriminatory 
the  Commission  declined  to  lower  the 
rate  merely  because  the  carrier  had  a 
previous  haul  on  the  raw  material.  Para- 
gon Plaster  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  480. 

§45.     Profit  of  Shipper. 

See    Infra,    §62;    Advanced    Rates,    §6 

(6),  §7  (1)  (a),  (cc),  §18  (1)  (a); 
Classification,  §3  (b):  Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §27;  Reparation,  §6 
(z),    (aa). 

(a)  A  railway  may  not  impose  un- 
reasonable rates  merely  because  the  busi- 
ness of  the  shipper  is  so  profitable  he 
can  pay  it.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Kans.  v.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  407,  410. 

(aa)  Tne  mere  fact  that  industries 
are  less  flourishing  than  formerly  does 
not  afford  a  reason  for  ordering  the 
reduction  of  rates,  as  the  Commission, 
cannot  undertake  to  establish  freight 
rates  which  will  insure  the  production 
of  commodities  at  a  profit.  Florida 
Fruit  &  Veg.  Shippers  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  11,  14. 

(b)  The  effect  of  a  rate  upon  com- 
mercial conditions,  whether  an  industry 
can  exist  under  particular  rates  or  par- 
ticular adjustment  of  rates,  are  matters 
of  consequence,  and  facts  tending  to 
show  these  circumstances  and  conditions 
are  always  pertinent.  But  they  are  only 
a  single  factor  in  determining  the  funda- 
mental questions.  A  narrowing  market, 
increased  cost  of  production,  overpro- 
duction and  many  other  considerations 
may  render  an  industry  unprofitable 
without  showing  the  freight  rate  to  be 
unreasonable.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Kans.  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  407,  410. 

(bb)  A  railroad  may  not  impose  an 
unreasonable        transportation        charge 


EVIDENCE,  §45   (c)— §47  (e) 


347 


merely  because  the  business  of  the  ship- 
per is  so  profitable  that  he  can  pay  it; 
nor,  conversely,  can  the  shipper  demand 
that  an  unreasonably  low  charge  shall 
be  accorded  him  simply  because  the 
profits  of  his  business  have  shrunk  to 
a  point  where  they  are  no  longer  suffi- 
cient. R.  R.  Commissioners  of  Kansas 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
407.   410. 

(c)  It  has  never  been  the  view  of  the 
Commission  that  the  prosperity  of  a  ship- 
per, a  locality  or  a  state  was  a  reason- 
able excuse  for  the  imposition  of  rates 
conditioned  on  such  prosperity,  but  when 
coincident  with  very  substantial  reduc- 
tions in  rates  the  price  of  a  commodity 
has  nearly  doubled  in  value  and  claims 
for  loss  and  damage  have  materially  in- 
creased, two  of  the  essential  factors  of 
a  reasonable  rate,  value  and  risk,  have 
been  changed  in  favor  of  the  carrier's 
contention  that  proposed  advances  in 
rates  should  be  allowed.  In  Re  Investi- 
gation of  Advances  in  Rates  on  Grain, 
21  I.  C.  C.  22,  35. 

(d)  While  the  risk  and  hardship  of 
the  grower  of  perishable  produce  are 
matters  worthy  of  consideration,  thry 
are  by  no  means  controlling,  and  the 
Commission  cannot  equalize  the  natural 
advantages  of  climatic  and  other  condi- 
tions of  one  locality  over  another  by  an 
adjustment  of  freight  rates.  Truck 
Growers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  190,  195. 

(e)  The  cost  of  reproduction  may  be 
considered  in  determining  the  reasonable- 
ness of  a  rate.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  162,  170;  Portland 
Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  O.  R.  R.  &  N. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  265,  280. 

(f)  The  theory  is  rejected  that 
rates  may  be  increased  by  progressive 
advances  as  long  as  traffic  moves  freely. 
Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  A.  &  S. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  419,  421. 

(g)  In  comparing  the  transportation 
charges  on  wheat  and  on  flour  from  Min- 
neapolis to  New  York  in  a  controversy 
between  Minneapolis  and  Buffalo  millers 
the  commercial  profits  of  the  parties  are 
neither  controlling  nor  important.  Jen- 
nison  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  18  T.  C.  C. 
113,  121. 

(h)  The  rates  necessary  to  permit 
growers  to  market  their  product  at  a 
reasonable  profit  are  not  the  test  of  the 
justness  of  a  transportation  charge.  Flor- 


ida Fruit  &  Vegetable  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  552,  560. 

(i)  The  fact  that  complainant  has 
been  prosperous,  although  a  matter  to 
be  considered,  does  not  conclusively  show 
that  rates  are  not  discriminatory.  Hitch- 
man  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  B.  &  O  R.  R. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  512,  519. 

(j)  Cement  is  sold  on  a  small  margin 
of  profit,  and  a  very  slight  difference 
defiects  the  tonnage.  Great  Western 
Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.   Co.,  T^nrep.  Op.  454. 

§46.     Carrier  as  Shipper  or  Consignee. 
See    Discrimination,    §6. 

(a)  If  carriers  insist  upon  making 
preferential  rates  to  each  other  they 
may  confidently  expect  such  voluntary 
action  on  their  part  will  be  accepted  and 
taken  as  evidence  of  unreasonableness 
of  higher  rates  which  they  may  under- 
take to  enforce  against  other  shippers. 
Hitchman  Cual  &  Coke  Co.  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  512. 

§47.     Rate  via   Competing   Carrier. 

See  Comparative  Rates;  Equalization 
of  Rates,  §4  (2);  Rate  via  Compet- 
ing  Line;  Special  Contracts,  §2  (l<). 

(a)  A  lower  rate  via  a  longer  route 
is  no  measure  of  reasonableness,  in  ab- 
sence of  other  evidence,  of  higher  rate 
via  shorter  route.  Carstens  Packing  Co. 
v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  8,  10. 

(be)  The  fact  that  a  certain  rate  is 
in  effect  via  lines  of  one  carrier  is  not 
of  itself  proof  of  the  unreasonableness 
of  a  higher  rate  via  a  competing  line. 
McLean  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
22  L  C.  C.  349,  352. 

(d)  The  rate  of  one  competing  line 
is  not  necessarily  the  measure  of  reason- 
ableness of  the  rate  of  another  compet- 
ing line.  Ryland  &  Brooks  Lumber  Co. 
V.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  520,  521; 
Simon  Cook  Co.  v.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I. 
C.  C.  563,  564. 

(e)  Complainant  shipped  cement  from 
lola,  Tex.,  to  Comanche,  Hasse,  Brady 
and  Stephensville,  Tex.  Shipments  moved 
over  the  M.  K.  &  T.  R.  R.  and  F.  W.  & 
R.  G.  R.  R.  Lawful  combinations  were 
assessed.  At  the  sanie  time  there  was  a 
through  route  via  the  Santa  Fe  and  the 
F.  W.  &  R.  G.  R.  Rs.,  with  a  joint  rate 
less  than  the  combination  charged.  Joint 
rate  was  known  to  complainant.  No  evi- 
dence was  offered  that  the  rates  assessed 
were  unreasonable  and  the  only  reason 


348 


EVIDENCE,  §47   (f)— (p) 


suggested  for  giving  the  traffic  to  the 
M.  K.  &  T.  R.  R.  was  an  alleged  assump- 
tion that  the  latter  road  would  be  able 
to  "protect"  the  rate  published  over  an- 
other route.  HELD,  it  to  be  obvious  that 
such  a  state  of  facts  cannot  be  made  the 
basis  of  an  award  of  reparation  under 
the  Act,  as  such  a  result  would  be  in 
substance  an  entire  perversion  of  the 
fundamental  provision  of  the  statute  in 
respect  to  the  publication  of  rates  and 
adherence  thereto.  lola  Portland  Cement 
Co.  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  91. 

(f)  Complainants  shipped  three  car- 
loads of  brick  from  Augusta,  Ga.,  to  Cal- 
houn Falls,  S.  C,  which  had  to  move 
over  Southern  Ry.  to  Greenwood,  S.  C, 
thence  Seaboard  Air  Line  to  Calhorn 
Falls,  a  total  haul  of  195  miles,  under 
a  rate  of  $2.40  per  1,000  briCiv.  Subse- 
quently this  rate  was  reduced  to  $1.40. 
At  the  time  of  shipment  a  rate  of  $1.40 
was  in  effect  between  the  same  points 
via  the  Charleston  and  Western  Caro- 
lina R.  R.,  a  distance  of  sixty-eight  miles. 
Reparation  was  asked  of  $1  per  1,000 
brick.  HELD,  that  a  carrier  with  a  long 
route  is  not  obliged  as  a  matter  of  law  to 
meet  the  rate  of  its  short  line  competi- 
tors, and  the  reduction  of  a  rate  applic- 
able via  a  long  route  to  meet  the  rate  in 
effect  via  a  shorter  and  more  direct  one 
is  not  of  itself  conclusive  evidence  of  the 
unreasonableness  of  the  higher  rate. 
Reparation  denied.  Georgia-Carolina 
Brick  Co.  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  148, 
149. 

(g)  The  fact  that  from  seven  to  twen- 
ty-seven months  after  shipments  moved 
defendants  published  a  through  commod- 
ity rate  on  cheese  equal  to  the  concen- 
tration rate  between  the  same  point, 
which  rate  was  only  effective  via 
the  lines  of  one  of  the  defendants,  is 
not  of  itself  sufficient  ground  to  base  a 
finding  that  at  the  time  shipments  moved 
such  a  charge  would  have  been  rea- 
sonable and  just  via  the  line  of  any  of 
the  defendants.  Webster  Grocery  Co.  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  493,  495. 

(h)  A  lower  rate  in  effect  via  a  com- 
peting line  is  no  measure  of  the  rate  com- 
plained of.  Delray  Salt  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  247. 

(i)  Lower  rates  via  another  route  are 
not  necessarily  reasonable  via  the  route 
taken  by  shipments  in  a  particular  case. 
Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  275,  276;   Colorado  Bed- 


ding Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C. 
C.  403,  404. 

(j)  The  unreasonableness  of  the  rate 
is  not  established  by  evidence  merely 
showing  that  a  lower  rate  is  in  effect 
over  another  route.  Ohio  Iron  and  Metal 
Co.  V.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  299, 
300;  Pankey  &  Holmes  v.  C.  N.  E.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  578. 

(k)  On  cotton  linters  from  Memphis, 
Tenn.,  to  Pueblo,  Colo.,  via  the  I.  C,  IT.  P. 
and  C.  &  S.  R.  Rs.,  a  rate  of  $1.25  was  col- 
lected. A  lower  combination  rate  was  in 
effect  through  Wynne,  Ark.,  via  the  St. 
L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.  and  M.  P.  Ry.,  a  com- 
peting and  entirely  different  route  some 
500  miles  shorter  than  that  over  which 
the  shipments  moved.  No  other  evi- 
dence was  submitted  to  show  the  rate 
charged  to  be  excessive.  No  routing  in- 
structions were  given  by  complainant. 
HELD,  the  rate  attacked  was  not  shown 
to  be  unreasonable,  since  the  exist- 
ence of  a  lower  rate  via  a  competing 
route  does  not  of  itself  establish  the  un- 
reasonableness of  the  rate  actually 
charged.  Colorado  Bedding  Co.  v.  C.  B. 
&  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  403,  404. 

(1)  A  lower  rate  via  a  one-line  haul 
than  via  the  route  taken,  consisting  of  a 
two-line  haul,  affords  no  measure  of  the 
reasonableness  of  the  two-line  route 
standing  alone.  Snyder-Malone-Donahue 
Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  498; 
Menefee  Lumber  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  49,  50. 

(m)  A  rate  is  not  unreasonable  sim- 
ply because  a  lower  rate  is  in  effect  via 
lines  of  other  carriers.  South  Canon 
Coal  Co.  V.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
286. 

(n)  Because  the  delivering  carrier 
sees  fit  to  state  that  it  will  protect  a  rate 
made  by  its  competitor,  but  fails  to  do 
so,  the  Commission  cannot  hold  that  such 
lower  rate  is  necessarily  reasonable. 
DeCamp  Bros.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
144. 

(o)  A  lower  rate  in  effect  via  one 
line  than  via  another  line  is  not  conclu- 
sive evidence  of  the  unreasonableness  of 
the  higher  rate.  Menefee  Lumber  Co. 
V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  49,  51. 

(p)  A  lower  rate  between  the  same 
points  via  a  different  route  is  not  alone 
sufficient  to  establish  that  the  rate  in 
Question  is  unreasonable.  Palmer  & 
Miller  v.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C 
C.  107. 


EVIDENCE,  §47  (q)— §51  (aa) 


349 


(q)  The  mere  fact  that  a  rate  exists 
by  one  route  is  not  necessarily  a  reason 
why  it  should  be  established  by  a  com- 
peting route.  Olive-Sternenberg  Lumber 
Co.  V.  T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  2. 

(r)  A  lower  rate  in  effect  via  a 
competing  line  is  not  conclusive  evi- 
dence of  the  unreasonableness  of  a 
higher  rate  via  the  line  over  which  the 
shipment  moves.  Ketchum  &  Gaston 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.    28. 

(s)  A  lower  rate  in  effect  via  a 
competing  line  is  not  conclusive  evi- 
dence of  unreasonableness  of  the  rate 
charged.  Hammond  Packing  Co.  v.  A. 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  120. 

(t)  The  reasonableness  of  a  rate 
over  one  route  is  not  necessarily  meas- 
ured by  rates  in  effect  over  other 
routes  between  the  same  points.  Ameri- 
can Milling  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste. 
M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  282. 

(u)  It  is  well  settled  that  a  lower 
rate  via  competing  route  does  not  es- 
tablish the  unreasonableness  of  a  higher 
rate  via  another  route;  particularly  is 
this  true  when  the  lawer  rate  applies 
via  the  line  of  a  single  carrier.  Amer- 
ican Milling  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry, 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  384. 

(v)  The  fact  that  a  competing  car- 
rier maintains  a  lower  rate  is  not  in 
itself  proof  that  defendants'  rate  is  un- 
reasonable. Sallisaw  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
484. 

(w)  The  Commission  cannot  measure 
the  reasonableness  of  the  rate  via  one 
line  by  the  rate  over  an  entirely  differ- 
ent route.  Paragould  Lumber  Co.  v. 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  485. 

(x)  The  Commission  has  many  times 
held  that  the  existence  of  a  lower  rate 
by  one  route  does  not  necessarily  indi- 
cate the  unreasonableness  of  a  rate  over 
another  route.  Chattanooga  Medicine 
Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  546. 

(y)  The  rate  on  one  line  is  not  nec- 
essarily the  measure  of  the  reasonable- 
ness of  a  rate  via  another  line,  and 
therefore  the  fact  that  there  was  at 
the  time  the  shipment  moved  a  lower 
rate  in  effect  via  a  competing  line  is 
not  of  itself  proof  that  the  charges 
collected  were  unreasonable.  Central 
Commercial  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.   Op.  571. 


§48.     Rebates. 

(a)  The  fact  that  rebates  were 
granted  has  no  very  direct  bearing  upon 
the  reasonableness  of  the  rate.  In  Re 
Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and 
Pelts,   23   I.   C.   C.   151,   163. 

(b)  The  granting  of  a  rebate  does  not 
raise  a  presumption  that  the  lawfully  es- 
tablished rate  is  unreasonable  by  the 
amount  of  the  concession.  Indianapolis 
Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  370,  373. 

§49.     Reproduction  Value  of  Road. 

See    Advanced    Rates,    §15    (c) ;    Rea- 
sonableness   of    Rates,    §29. 

(a)  The  Commission  has  for  many 
years  felt  the  necessity  of  having  in- 
formation regarding  the  value  of  th« 
physical  properties  of  the  carriers  In 
the  United  States  as  an  element  in  th« 
valuation  of  their  entire  propertiei. 
Boileau  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L 
C.   C.   640,   652. 

(aa)  If  any  importance  whatever  is  to 
be  attached  to  the  cost  of  reproduction 
in  the  establishment  of  railway  rates,  the 
valuation  must  be  undertaken  by  the 
Government  itself.  City  of  Spokane  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  403. 

(b)  In  passing  upon  a  question  of  rea- 
sonableness of  rates  the  present  value 
of  the  carrier's  right  of  way  is  to  be  con- 
sidered, despite  the  fact  that  its  original 
cost  may  have  been  slight  and  its  pres- 
ent value  be  great.  City  of  Spokane  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  415. 

§50.     Return   on    Investment. 
See   Supra,   §36. 

(a)  Whether  the  result  of  a  proposed 
rate  adjustment  will  deprive  carriers  of 
a  fair  return  on  their  property  must  be 
considered  before  making  any  reduction. 
City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L 
C.  C.  162,  173. 

§51.     Revenue  of  Railroad. 

See    Supra,     §36;     Reasonableness    of 
Rates,  §11,   §30   (a),  §36. 

(a)  Unjustifiable  charges  should  be 
reduced  notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
the  carrier's  revenue  will  be  diminished. 
In  Re  Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides 
and  Pelts,  23  1.  C.  C.  151,  164. 

(aa)  The  fact  that  the  net  revenues  of 
a  carrier  from  its  ownership  of  a  bridge 
on  which  an  arbitrary  is  charged  for  pas- 
sengers and  freight  carried  across  the 
same  may  be  greater  than  the  returns  on 


350 


EVIDENCE,  §51   (b)— §52  (e) 


ordinary  business  enterprises  is  not  suf- 
ficient in  itself  to  justify  a  holding  that 
the  bridge  tolls  are  excessive.  Bridges 
are  and  have  been  regarded  as  precarious 
property.  They  may  be  damaged  or  en- 
tirely swept  away  by  floods  and  erection 
of  other  bridges  nearby  may  draw  away 
their  tenants,  and  thus  seriously  affect 
their  earning  capacity.  The  net  reve- 
nues have  an  undoubted  and  also  an  im- 
portant bearing  upon  the  question  of  the 
reasonableness  of  rates,  but  the  value  of 
the  service  to  the  shipper  and  the  other 
elements  so  often  referred  to  as  enter- 
ing into  the  reasonableness  of  rates  must 
also  be  taken  into  consideration.  A  rail- 
road company  may  be  operated  with  a 
less  return  than  it  ought  to  enjoy,  or 
even  at  a  loss,  but  neither  condition  of 
affairs  would  justify  the  exaction  by  it 
of  rates  that  are  higher  than  they  rea- 
sonably should  be  for  service  performed, 
all  things  being  considered.  So  also  the 
fact  that  the  net  earnings  of  a  carrier 
may  be  large  does  not  of  itself  justify 
the  Commission  fixing  a  rate  at  less  than 
is  reasonable  for  the  service,  all  other 
things  being  considered.  Railroad  Com- 
missioners of  Iowa  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co,, 
20  I.  C.  C.  181,  186. 

(b)  Strictly  speaking,  there  is  no  ju- 
risdiction to  say  defendants  are  justified 
in  advancing  rates  for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  greater  net  revenues.  In  Re 
Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I. 
C.  C.  243,  247. 

(c)  The  question  of  revenue  must  play 
a  not  inconsiderable  part  in  determining 
reasonableness  of  rates.  In  Re  Advances 
in  Rates— Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307, 
315. 

(d)  The  ultimate  test  of  reasonable- 
ness of  rates  with  the  carrier  itself  is 
the  return  for  the  use  of  its  equipment 
and  facilities.  National  Hay  Ass'n  v. 
M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  34,  48. 

(e)  Unreasonable  rates  cannot  be  per- 
mitted simply  because  the  entire  result 
of  the  railroad's  operations  might  not  be 
as  favorable  as  would  otherwise  be 
proper.  Commercial  Club  of  Salt  Lake 
City  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
218,  222. 

(f)  On  an  attack  of  rates  upon  agri- 
cultural implements  from  Hopkins,  Minn., 
to  various  points,  HELD,  such  rates  could 
not  be  declared  to  be  unreasonable 
merely  upon  evidence  showing  that  de- 
fendants might  reduce  the  same  without 
seriously  impairing  their  revenue,  where 


the  complainant  offered  no  evidence  as 
to  the  circumstances  surrounding  the 
traffic  and  the  conditions  surrounding 
shipments  from  other  competitive  points. 
Minneapolis  Threshing  Machine  Co.  v. 
C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
189,  192. 

(g)  The  fact  that  the  rate  on  a  par- 
ticular commodity  could  be  reduced 
without  impairing  seriously  the  revenues 
of  the  carrier,  standing  alone,  has  little 
value  and  forms  no  basis  upon  which  to 
determine  reasonableness  of  rates.  Min- 
neapolis Threshing  Machine  Co.  v.  C.  St. 
P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  189,  192. 

(h)  Because  the  revenues  of  a  carrier 
are  high  during  a  period  of  general  pros- 
perity, rates  should  not  be  reduced;  the 
periods  when  it  operated  almost  at  a 
loss  should  be  considered.  Florida  Fruit 
&  Vegetable  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
17  L  C.  C.  552,  564. 

(i)  Any  change  in  classification  af- 
fects revenues.  Association  of  Union- 
made  Garment  Manufacturers  v.  C.  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  405,  409. 

(j)  What  may  be  a  proper  rate  as 
between  separate  railroads  may  become 
unreasonable  and  unjust  when  these 
railroads  are  absorbed  by  a  large  sys- 
tem serving  an  extensive  territory. 
Black  Mountain  Coal  Land  Co.  v.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  286,  292. 

§52.     Risk  of  Loss  or  Damage. 

See   Classification,   §9,   §16    (h). 

(a)  Increasing  value  of  grain,  with  a 
consequent  increase  in  the  amount  paid 
for  loss  and  damage,  is  an  element  of 
cost  of  operation  and  justly  reflected  in 
the  rate  structure.  In  Re  Investigation  of 
Advances  in  Rates  on  Grain,  21  I.  C.  C. 
22,  30. 

(b)  The  fragility  of  a  commodity  is 
an  element  to  be  considered  in  deter- 
mining the  reasonableness  of  a  rate.  In 
Re  Advances  in  Rates — Western  Case, 
20  I.  C.  C.  307,  355. 

(c)  Rates  cannot  be  made  solely  with' 
reference  to  loss  and  damage  claims  aris- 
ing from   transportation.     National   Hay 
Ass'n  V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  34,  47. 

(d)  There  are  more  claims  relatively 
from  less-than-carload  than  from  carload 
freight.  Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  397,  400. 

(e)  Loss  and  damage  claims  on 
"time"   freight  under  normal   conditions 


EVIDENCE,  §52   (f)— §56  (a) 


351 


are  greater  than  the  average  of  such 
claims  of  all  commodities.  Morgan  drain 
Co.  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C 
460,  469. 

(f)  The  method  of  packing  sodium 
peroxide  in  use  reduces  hazard.  Gold- 
field  Consolidated  Mines  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
Unrep.   Op.   593. 

§53.     Size  of  Community. 

(a)  San  Pedro,  a  city  of  6,000  or  7,000 
population,  situated  on  the  harbor  of 
San  Pedro,  pays  a  rate  from  tht  east  of 
the  through  rate  to  Los  Angeles,  which 
is  twenty-two  miles  inland,  plus  the  local 
rate  from  Los  Angeles  to  San  Pedro.  Los 
Angeles  has  a  population  of  about  300,000. 
HELD,  the  difference  in  the  irapor lance 
of  the  two  communities  cannot  in  lav/  be 
accepted  as  a  justification  for  an  undue 
discrimination  in  rate.  Harbor  City 
Wholesale  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  1.  C.  C. 
323,  331. 

§54.     Size  of  Load. 

(a)  The  fact  that  certain  traffic  is 
hauled  in  trainioad  lots,  while  complain- 
ant's traffic  moves  in  carloads,  cannot  be 
made  the  basis  of  a  difference  in  rates. 
Rickards  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C  C 
239,  240. 

(b)  Whatever  may  be  the  cost  of 
service,  giving  greater  consideration  to 
trainioad  than  to  carload  traffic  would 
prejudice  the  small  shipper  and  the  pub- 
lic. Anaconda  Copper  Mining  Co.  v.  C 
&  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  592,  596. 

(c)  Fertilizer  is  a  commodity  which 
ought  to  move  in  carloads  at  a  low  rate, 
and  in  sections  where  its  use  has  not 
become  extensive  and  there  is  consider- 
able movement  in  less-than-carload  lots 
the  difference  in  rates  between  carload 
and  less-than-carload  shipments  should 
not  be  too  wide.  Virginia-Carolina  Chem- 
ical Co.  V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  1. 

(d)  So  long  as  carriers  publish  a  rea- 
sonable any-quantity  rate  the  mere  fact 
that  they  publish  a  lower  rate  in  car- 
loads on  other  commodities  does  not  jus- 
tify the  Commission  in  ordering  a  carload 
rate  on  the  article  in  question.  Bentley 
&  Olmstead  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  56. 

§55.     Standard  of  Lines. 

(a)  In  determining  a  freight  rate 
which  must  of  necessity  be  charged  by 
competing  lines  the  Commission  would 
not  look  exclusively  to  that  line  which 


could  handle  the  business  the  cheapest, 
or  which  was  the  strongest  financially, 
but  would  consider  as  well  the  weaker 
rival.  It  has  never  intimated  that  the 
rate  should  be  fixed  solely  with  reference 
to  the  weakest  line  and  it  would  certainly 
be  most  unjust  to  the  public  in  estab- 
lishing rates  to  Utah  common  points  to 
consider  merely  the  expensive  and  cir- 
cuitous route  via  the  D,  &  R.  G.  R.  R. 
The  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  handles  about  40 
per  cent  of  the  Utah  business  from  the 
east  at  the  present  time.  It  will  con- 
tinue to  handle  a  considerable  part  of 
it  and  must  accept  a  rate  established  by 
the  Commission.  This  the  Commission 
must  and  does  take  into  account  in  the 
fixing  of  that  rate,  but  it  must  be  largely 
influenced  by  the  cost  of  handling  that 
business  over  the  short;  and  easy  line, 
the  U.  P.  R.  R.  While  this  traffic  is  im- 
portant to  the  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.,  its  reve- 
nue from  this  source  is  but  a  small  part 
of  its  entire  income  and  the  Commission 
could  not  permit  the  maintenance  of  un- 
reasonable rates  simply  because  the  en- 
tire result  of  the  operations  of  this  com- 
pany might  not  be  as  favorable  as  would 
otherwise  be  proper.  Commercial  Club 
of  Salt  Lake  City  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  218,  222. 

(b)  In  determining  the  reasonable- 
ness of  rates  from  the  west  to  southern 
territory  the  interests  of  all  competing 
lines  must  be  considered  and  not  merely 
that  line  which  can  handle  the  business 
cheapest.  Receivers  &  Shippers'  Ass'n 
of  Cincinnati  v.  C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
18  L  C.  C.  440,  464. 

(aa)  While  the  course  of  the  N.  & 
W.  Ry.  is,  during  a  greater  part  of  its 
extent,  through  southern  territory,  the 
road  itself  as  a  system  is  much  more 
comparable  with  those  in  Trunk  Line 
and  Central  Freight  Association  terri- 
tory. Bluefield  Shippers'  Ass'n  v.  N.  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  519,  528. 

(c)  In  determining  rates  between  two 
points,  neither  that  railroad  which  can 
afford  to  handle  traffic  at  the  lowest  rate 
nor  that  whose  necessities  might  justify 
the  highest  rate  should  be  exclusively 
considered.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  376,  415. 

§56.'  Standard   of   Rate. 

See  Supra,  §14  (1)  (pp),  §18  (p),  §55; 
Advanced  Rates,  §15;  Branch 
Lines,  §4;  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§32. 

(a)  Under  the  Western  Classification 
petroleum  oil  and  its  products  are  rated 


S52 


EVIDENCE,  §56  (aa)— §5g  (j) 


fifth  class,  but  it  has  been  the  practice 
of  carriers  in  this  territory  to  fix  com- 
modity rates  lower  than  the  class  rates 
between  points  where  there  is  any  con- 
siderable movement  of  petroleum  oil  and 
these  commodity  rates  have  come  to  be 
the  normal  rates  in  comparison  with 
which  other  rates  for  the  transportation 
of  petroleum  oil  and  its  products  in 
this  territory  are  to  be  measured.  Na- 
tional Refining  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  527,  528. 

(aa)  No  particular  factor  should  ex- 
clude others  unless  of  controlling  force. 
In  Re  Advances  on  Cattle  and  Sheep, 
23  I.   C.   C.  7,   12. 

(b)  Rates  can  seldom  be  tested,  even 
as  to  their  reasonableness,  strictly  by 
themselves,  but  must  be  considered,  to 
an  extent,  in  reference  to  their  environ- 
ment. Southwestern  Missouri  Millers' 
Club  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
422,  427. 

§57.     Surplus. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §6  (4);  Express 
Companies,  §25;  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,   §33. 

(a)  Carriers  in  Official  Classification 
territory  increased  all  class  rates  and 
about  half  their  commodity  rates.  They 
contended  they  should  be  allowed  to  in- 
vest in  improvements  and  additions  to 
the  property  an  amount  equal  to  that 
paid  by  way  of  dividends  to  stockholders. 
In  the  year  1910  railroad  dividends  ag- 
gregated $405,131,650.  HELD,  that  inas- 
much as  every  dollar  thus  added  to  the 
value  of  the  property  justifies,  according 
to  the  claim  of  the  defendants,  an  added 
net  return,  the  Commission  cannot  prop- 
erly permit  an  advance  in  rates  with  the 
intent  to  produce  an  accumulation  of  sur- 
plus for  this  purpose,  until  the  status 
of  the  surplus  is  determined  by  legis- 
lative actions  or  judicial  interpretation. 
In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case, 
20  I.  C.  C.  243,  270. 

§58.     Ton-mile  Revenue. 

See  Supra,  §20,  §36;  Advanced  Rates, 
§18  (1)  Comparative  Rates;  Mileage 
Scale. 

(a)  The  revenue  per  ton-mile  in  it- 
self is  not  a  sufficient  ba3is  for  a  judg- 
ment regarding  tie  reasonableness  of 
the  rate  which  yields  that  revenue.  In- 
quiry must  be  made  regarding  the  ex- 
pense incurred  in  doing  the  business. 
Nebraska  State  Ry.  Commission  v.  C.  B. 
&  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  121,  126. 


(aa)  Per-ton-mile  revenues  of  less 
than  5  mills  is  not  excessive  for  trans- 
porting flour  and  other  grain  products 
from  southern  Illicois  to  Atlantic  sea- 
board. Southern  Illinois  Millers'  Ass'n 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  072,  673. 

(b)  The  rate  per  ton  mile  is  but 
one  of  many  influences.  Ashgrove  Ce- 
ment Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.   C.  C.  519,  524. 

(bb)  It  is  a  rule  too  well  settled  to 
need  discussion  that  a  •  distance  in- 
creases the  rate  per  ton  per  mile  de- 
creases, and  merely  because  a  greater 
distance  point  has  a  ]ower  i^ate  per  ton 
per  mile  than  a  shorter  distance  point 
discrimination  does  not  necessarily  re- 
sult. Elk  Cement  and  Lime  Co.  v.  B.  & 
O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  84,  88. 

(c)  It  is  fallacious  to  place  reliance 
upon  ton-mile  earnings  as  a  basis  of  rate- 
making.  Much  profitable  freight  is  car- 
ried which  yields  the  lowest  rates  per  ton 
per  mile.  In  Re  Advances  en  Coal  to 
Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C.  604,  620. 

(d)  On  no  traffic,  except  it  be  lum- 
ber, are  per  ton-mile  earnings  more  help- 
ful in  the  determination  of  a  reasonable 
rate  than  on  grain.  In  Re  Investigation 
of  Advances  in  Rates  on  Grain,  21  I.  C.  C. 
22,  33. 

(e)  Earnings  are  not  the  same  on  all 
roads  from  a  given  competitive  point, 
though  the  rates  may  be  the  same.  In 
Re  Investigation  of  Advances  in  Rates 
on  Grain,  21  L  C.  C.  22,  34. 

(f)  Ton  per  mile  revenue  is  far  from 
conclusive  evidence  of  the  reasonable- 
ness of  a  rate.  Danville  Brick  Co.  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  239,  241. 

(g)  The  rate  per  ton  per  mile  is  en- 
titled to  be  considered  as  a  relative  test 
in  rate-making.  National  Hay  Ass'n  v. 
M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  34,  47. 

(h)  Ton  per  mile  revenue  on  coal 
equal  to  that  on  all  freight  is  too  high 
for  such  a  low-grade  commodity.  Rainey 
&  Rogers  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
r.  C.  C.  88,  90. 

(i)  The  ton-mile  revenue  is  permitted 
to  be  higher  relatively  for  a  short  than 
for  a  long  haul.  Rainey  &  Rogers  v. 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  U  I.  C.  C.  88,  90. 

(j)     A  readjustment  of  rates  cannot  be 
made  solely  on  the  basis  of  distance  or 
on-mile    revenues.      Delray    Salt    Co.    v. 
M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  268   270. 


EVIDENCE,  §58  (k)— §59  (g) 


35^ 


(k)  Ordinarily  a  long-distance  rate 
should  be  less  per  ton  per  mile  than  the 
rate  for  a  short  distance.  Receivers  & 
Shippers'  Ass'n  of  Cincinnati  v.  C.  N.  O. 
&  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  440   466. 

(1)  Per-ton-per-mile  comparisons  are 
often  helpful  in  reaching  a  conclusicn  in 
respect  to  th^  reasonableness  of  rates, 
but  to  take  that  as  the  sole  test  would 
be  a  scrutiny  from  the  narrowest  view- 
point, which  would  deny  consideration 
to  many  othe.  potent  and  frc  lu^ntly  con- 
trolling forces  which  must  be  given  due 
weight  in  a  proper  determination.  Mus- 
kogee 'Irahic  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ky.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  169,  173. 

(m)  A  rate  yielding  9  mills  per  ton 
per  mile  is  comparatively  high  lor  any 
low  grade  trathc.  Board  of  Trade  ot 
\vinbLoii-oalem  v.  N.  He  W.  Ry.  Co.,  It 
I.  C.  C.  12,  16. 

(n)  The  rate  per  ton-mile  rule  brings 
rates  down  to  the  narrowest  point  Oj 
scrutiny,  and  for  that  purpose  is  valu 
able;  but  it  excludes  consideration  of 
other  circumscances  and  conditions 
which  enter  into  the  making  of  rates,  no 
matter  how  compulsory  or  imperious 
they  may  be,  and  it  cannot,  therefore, 
be  accepted  as  controlling  in  determin- 
ing the  reasonableness  of  rates.  Cedar 
Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  387,  393. 

(o)  A  mere  comparison  of  revenue 
per  ton  per  mile,  even  when  showing 
higher  from  complainant's  ain^s,  is  nci 
conclusive  as  applied  in  a  country  where 
nature  has  interposed  such  obstacles  as 
to  make  operating  conditions  so  dis- 
similar. Grand  Junction  Mining  &  Fuel 
Co.  V.  Colo.  Mid.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
452,  457. 

(p)  In  comparing  the  rate  per  ton- 
mile,  length  of  haul  is  a  vital  element. 
Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  305,  320.  . 

(q)  The  rate  per  ton-mile  is  not  the 
generally  accepted  basis  for  making  up 
rates,  so  far  at  least  as  interstate  move- 
ments are  concerned.  Bulte  Milling  Co. 
v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  351,  362. 

(r)  The  ton-mile  rate  is  an  ele- 
ment considered  in  determining  the 
reasonableness  of  a  rate.  Wisconsin 
Bridge  &  Iron  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Lo.,  Unrep.  Op.  582. 


§59.     Two-line  Haul. 

See  Comparative  Rates;  Mileage 
Scale;  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§37. 

(a)  A  mileage  scale  of  rates  ordina- 
rily yields  a  much  higher  rate  in  propor- 
tion for  a  short  haul  than  for  the  long 
one;  and  when  two  short  hauls  are  com- 
bined it  is  usually  unjust  to  require  the 
two  carriers  to  accept  compensation  at 
the  rate  per  mile  applied  for  the  entire 
long  haul.  To  a  degree  thev  are  en- 
titled to  a  higher  rate  in  consideration 
of  the  fact  that  their  individual  hauls 
are  short.  In  Re  Investigation  of  Al- 
leged Unreasonable  Rates  on  Meats,  23 
I.  C.  C.  656,  661. 

(aa)  Where  two  lines  are  part  of 
the  same  system  there  should  be  no 
addition  to  the  mileage  rate  because 
carriers  unite  in  a  two-line  haul.  In 
Re  Advances  on  Meats  and  Packing- 
house Products,  23  I.  C,  C.  656,  661. 

(b)  A  rate  for  a  two-line  haul  from 
producing  points  of  live  stock  to  packing 
houses  may  properly  be  2%c  per  100  lbs. 
higher  than  for  a  one-line  haul.  In  Re 
Investigation  of  Rates  on  Meats,  22  I. 
C.   C.   160,   165. 

(c)  The  Commission  has  often  rec- 
ognized that  rates  over  a  two-line  haul 
may  properly  exceed  what  would  be  rea- 
sonable rates  for  same  distance  and 
under  same  conditions  over  a  one-line 
haul.  Maricopa  County  Commercial  Club 
V.  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  429,  431. 

(d)  The  fact  that  transportation  in- 
volves a  two-line  haul  is  of  itself  a  rea- 
son for  a  somewhat  higher  charge  than 
if  the  service  v/ere  entirely  over  a  single 
line.  Ontario  Iron  Ore  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C. 
&  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  204,  206. 

(e)  A  commodity  rate  to  one  point 
over  one  line  affords  no  basis  of  compari- 
son with  a  higher  class  rate  to  a  longer 
distance  point  over  two  lines.  Wells- 
Higman  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  175,  176. 

(f)  A  one-line  haul  rate  is  no  meas- 
ure of  reasonableness,  standing  alone,  of 
a  higher  rate  over  the  route  taken  con- 
sisting of  two  lines.  Snyder-Malone-Don- 
ahue  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I. 
C.  C.  498. 

(g)  On  carloads  of  stock  cattle  from 
South  Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Cushman,  Mont., 
a  rate  of  43c  was  exacted  by  the  C.  B. 
&  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  and  the  G.  N.  R.  R.  The 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  had  in  effect  a  rate 


354 


EVIDENCE,  §59  (h)— §61  (j) 


of  30 %c  from  South  Omaha  to  Lavina, 
Mont,  a  point  six  miles  from  Cushman, 
and  not  reached  by  the  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
or  the  G.  N.  R.  R.  The  lower  rate  to 
Lavina  was  a  one-line  rate  for  a  one-line 
haul,  whereas  the  rate  attacked  was  di- 
vided between  two  carriers.  No  other 
evidence  was  offered  to  show  the  rate 
complained  of  to  be  unreasonable.  HELD, 
evidence  that  there  is  a  lower  rate  to  a 
nearby  point  via  another  line  is  not  suf- 
ficient to  establish  the  unreasonableness 
of  the  rate  in  question.  Snyder-Malone- 
Donahue  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  498,  499. 

(h)  If  one  carrier  voluntarily  gives  a 
very  low  rate  per  ton  per  mile  over  a 
long  and  circuitous  route  in  order  to 
handle  traffic  entirely  over  its  own  lines 
this  affords  no  standard  of  the  reason- 
ableness of  a  rate  on  other  trafiic  which 
passes  over  two  or  more  separately 
owned  lines  of  railroad.  Cedar  Hill  Coal 
&  Coke  Co.  V.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C 
479,  485. 

§591/^.     Unearned  Increment. 

See  Advanced   Rates,  §6   (2). 

§60.     Unpublished  Rate. 

See  Allowances,  §9  (dd);  Crimes,  §10 
(a);  Evidence,  §60;  Facilities  and 
Privileges,  §4  (e) ;  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission,  §9  (r),  §13; 
Reparation,  §15;  Tariffs,  §4  (g),  (j), 
(s),  (t),  (u),  (V),  (w),  (X),  §7 
(ddd),  (qq):  Tiirough  Routes  and 
Joint  Rates,  §17  (d),  (e),  (f),  (g), 
§22  (a);  Water  Carriers,  §4  (a). 

(a)  Rates  of  a  water  carrier  not  filed 
with  the  Commission  are  not  lawful  fac- 
tors to  be  considered  by  the  Commission 
in  determining  the  reasonableness  of  a 
joint  rate  to  which  such  water  carrier  is 
a  part.  Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  & 
M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  144,  146. 

§61.     Value  of  Commodity. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §18  (4);  Classifi- 
cation, §4  (c);  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,  §60   (a),  §81   (c). 

(a)  The  fact  that  the  value  of  wool  is 
much  greater  than  that  of  sheep  and  the 
rate  is  a  thing  of  less  relative  conse- 
quence to  the  producer  might  justify  a 
somewhat  higher  rate  on  the  wool  than 
on  the  live  animal.  In  Re  Transportation 
of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C. 
151,  159. 

(aa)  Rules,  rates  and  charges  must 
have  regard  for  the  nature  of  the  com- 
modity. Sunderland  Bros.  v.  St.  L.  & 
S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  259,  262. 


(b)  The  Commission  is  not  prepared 
to  lay  down  the  principle  that  value 
is  the  controlling  element  in  making 
rates.  Minneapolis  Traflic  Ass'n  v.  C. 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  432,  437. 

(bb)  Salt  is  very  desirable  traffic  from 
a  transportation  standpoint.  It  loads 
heavily,  is  not  liable  to  loss  or  damage 
in  transit,  can  be  handled  at  the  con- 
venience of  the  carrier,  and  affords  a 
uniform  business.  Its  value  is  compara- 
tively little,  being  from  $1.:')  to  $2  per 
ton  at  the  point  of  production.  All  these 
considerations  call  for  a  low  rate  of 
transportation.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Kan.  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  22  L  C.  C.  407,  410. 

(c)  Value  is  an  essential  factor  of  a 
reasonable  rate.  In  Re  Investigation  of 
Advances  in  Rates  on  Grain,  21  I.  C.  C. 
22,  35. 

(d)  Cement  is  a  commodity  which  un- 
der every  consideration  is  entitled  to  a 
low  rate.  It  loads  easily  to  the  marked 
capacity  of  the  car  and  is  liable  to  but 
little  loss  or  damage  in  transit.  Mari- 
time Exchange  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
C.  81,  85. 

(e)  The  ad  valorem  principle  of  rate- 
making  can  never  be  departed  from.  In 
Re  Advances  in  Rates — Western  Case, 
20  I.  C.  C.  307,  355. 

(f)  Rates  cannot  be  made  solely  with 
reference  to  the  value  of  the  article 
transported.  National  Hay  Ass'n  v.  M. 
C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  34,  47. 

(g)  It  is  axiomatic  that  rates  depend 
largely  upon  value,  and  hence,  there  is 
no  objection  to  a  special  rate  for  dam- 
aged or  defective  goods,  based  upon  the 
low  value  of  the  freight.  In  Re  Reduced 
Rates  on  Returned  Shipments,  19  I.  C.  C. 
409,  418. 

(h)  Coal  is  a  low-grade  com  \odity 
and  ordinarily  moves  at  much  lower 
rates  than  the  average  commodity. 
League  of  Southern  Idaho  Commercial 
Clubs  V.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
562,  564. 

(i)  The  Commission  has  never  held 
that  face  brick,  valued  at  from  $18  to 
$24,  and  generally  packed  in  straw,  should 
be  carried  at  the  same  rate  as  ordinary, 
common  brick,  the  rates  on  which  must 
of  necessity  be  made  extremely  low  in 
order  to  permit  their  movement  at  all. 
James  &  Abbot  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  273,  274. 

(j)  The  increase  in  value  of  the  com- 
modity   transported    is    a    circumstance 


EVIDENCE,  §61  (k)— §63  (h) 


355 


which  should  be  considered  in  determin- 
ing the  reasonableness  of  the  rate.  Dar- 
ling &  Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  79,  81. 

(k)  Can  it  be  said  that  every  ton  of 
Ice  shall  pay  as  much  toward  a  return 
to  the  holders  of  the  property  as  does  a 
ton  of  silk?  The  tariffs  of  this  defend- 
ant are  constructed,  and  ought  to  be  con- 
structed, upon  an  entirely  different 
theory.  Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  305,  319. 

(I)  Considering  the  small  value  of 
ice.  In  connection  with  the  manner  in 
which  It  is  handled,  the  rates  for  this 
business  should  be  among  the  very  lo,/- 
est.  Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D  L.  &  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  305. 

(m)  No  impropriety  exists  in  a  grad- 
uation of  rates  in  accordance  with  the 
actual  values  of  specified  commodities. 
Household  goods,  for  example,  differ 
widely  in  value,  and  it  is  fair  to  all  that 
the  man  who  ships  goods  of  low  value 
should  receive  the  benefit  of  a  lower 
rate  than  the  man  who  ships  more  ex- 
pensive goods.  In  the  Matter  of  Re- 
leased Rates,  13  I.  C.  C.  550,  564. 

(n)  Gypsum  rock  is  a  low-grade  com- 
modity from  a  traffic  standpoint  and 
should  take  a  low  rate  in  comparison 
with  commodities  generally.  Acme  Ce- 
ment Plaster  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.    Op.   345. 

(o)"  Sugar  butter  is  made  principally 
of  cane  sugar,  some  vegetable  matter 
being  added  for  coloring.  It  is  used  for 
culinary  purposes;  value  at  factory  is 
8%c  a  lb.,  and  is  shipped  in  tin  cans 
packed  in  cases.  Post  Co.  v.  D.  L.  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  425. 

(p)  Sand  is  very  inexpensive  to 
handle  as  an  article  of  traffic.  Coal  is 
of  much  greater  value,  but  it  is  carried 
at  rates  producing  ton-mile  earnings 
much  less  than  on  sand.  Sunderland 
Bros.  Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.    445. 

§62.     Value  of  Service. 
See   Supra,   §45. 

(a)  Doctrine  of  charging  what  traffic 
will  bear  is  not  accepted  by  the  Com- 
mission. In  Re  Transportation  of  Wool, 
Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151,  156. 

(b)  The  value  of  the  service  ren- 
dered may  be  considered  in  fixing  rates. 


Bituminous   Coal   Operators  v.   P.   R.   R. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  385,  389. 

(c)  The  value  of  the  service  is  en- 
titled to  be  considered  in  rate  making. 
National  Hay  Ass'n  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  34,  47. 

(d)  The  value  of  the  service  has  a 
more  or  less  definite  relation  to  the  rate. 
Memphis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  313,  318. 

§63.     Volume  of  Traffic. 

See  Passenger  Fares  and  Facilities, 
§5  (e),  §6  (aa);  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,  §40,  §112  (a);  Reparation, 
§16    (dddd),    (eeee). 

(a)  The  difference  in  loading  of  two 
commodities  may  justify  a  difference  in 
rates.  In  Re  Advances  on  Lemons,  23 
I.   C.   C.  27,  28. 

(b)  Volume  of  traflBLc  is  considered  in 
fixing  passenger  fares.  Merchants  & 
Mfrs.  Ass'n  of  Baltimore  v.  A.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  129. 

(c)  Not  much  importance  can  be 
attached  to  the  fact  that  the  volume 
of  a  single  item  of  traffic  has  increased; 
the  fact  that  the  traffic  of  carriers  as 
a  whole  has  enormously  increased  is  a 
circumstance  of  much  more  significance. 
In  Re  Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides 
and  Pelts,  23   I.   C.   C.  151,  157. 

(d)  Cost  of  carriage  is  decreased  in 
proportion  as  the  car  loading  can  be 
increased;  and  ordinarily  shippers 
should  be  required  to  load  as  heavily 
as  can  be  practicably  done.  In  Re  Trans- 
portation of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23 
I.  C.  C.  151,  166. 

(e)  Increased  loading,  which  results 
in  decreased  cost  of  transportation,  may 
well  justify  a  lower  rate  for  higher 
minimum.  In  Re  Transportation  of 
Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151, 
167. 

(f)  An  increase  in  the  carrier's  busi- 
ness up  to  a  certain  point,  at  least, 
makes  for  reduction  in  rate.  In  Re 
Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and 
Pelts,    23    I.    C.    C.    151,    157. 

(g)  The  fact  that  certain  traffic  is 
hauled  in  trainload  lots  while  complain- 
ant's traffic  moves  in  carloads  cannot 
be  made  basis  for  difference  in  rates. 
Rickards  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.    C.    239,    240. 

(h)  Rates  upon  grain  and  grain 
products    between    points    of    production 


356 


EVmENCE,  §63   (i)— §64  (a) 


in  the  West  and  the  Atlantic  seaboard 
are  low  in  proportion  to  other  commod- 
ities. These  low  rates  are  due  to  water 
and  railroad  competition.  But  they 
ought  to  be  low,  for  they  move  an  im- 
mense volume  of  traffic.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances on  Flaxseed,  23  I.  C.  C.  272, 
275. 

(i)  Low  rates  ought  to  result  from 
immense  volume  of  traffic.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances on  Flaxseed,  23  I.  C.  C.  272, 
275. 

(j)  The  Commission  must  carefully 
consider  the  results  of  its  orders  upon 
the  established  business.  Duncan  & 
Co.  V.  N.  C.  &  St.  U  Ry.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
186,    193. 

(k)  The  volume  of  traffic  is  an  ele- 
ment of  rate  making.  National  Hay 
Ass'n   V.    M.    C.    R.    R.    Co.,    19    I.    C.    C. 

34,  47. 

(1)  An  increased  revenue  results 
from  increased  tonnage.  Commercial 
Club  of  Salt  Lake  City  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  218,  223. 

(m)  If  a  rate  remains  the  same  and 
the  cost  of  service  continues  the  same, 
an  increase  in  tonnage  must  produce  in- 
creased revenue.  Commercial  Club  of 
Salt  Lake  City  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  218,  223. 

(n)  In  attempting  to  establish  its  con- 
tention that  the  rates  on  butter,  eggs  and 
poultry  from  Omaha  to  points  in  Cen- 
tral Freight  Association  territory  and 
the  Atlantic  seaboard  complainant  com- 
pared these  rates  with  those  in  effect  on 
packing  house  products  and  fruits  and 
vegetables.  HELD,  that  fresh  meats 
move  from  the  Missouri  Ri^-er  in  enor- 
mous volume— thus  in  1909,  29,000 
carloads,  as  against  790  of  dairy 
products  and  poultry — that  in  view 
of  the  history  of  the  rate  as  well  as 
the  tonnage,  the  Commission  is  not  per- 
suaded that  the  rate  on  fresh  meats  can 
be  fairly  used  as  a  standard  of  rea.on- 
ableness;  that  such  perishable  products 
as  fruits  and  vegetables  likewise  afford 
no  proper  comparison  with  the  traffic 
under  consideration,  for  they  differ  from 
dairy  products  so  materially  in  character 
and  value,  as  well  as  in  the  conditions 
under  which  they  are  transported.  A 
comparison,  however,  between  rates  on 
butter,  eggs  and  poultry  throughout  the 
country  generally,  especially  in  sections 
where  the  traffic  conditions  are  essen- 
tially similar,  is  of  recognized  evidentiary 


value.      Commercial    Club    of    Omaha   v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  1.  C.  C.  397,  402. 

(o)  Tire  fact  that  brick  moves  in  larg© 
quantities  should  be  considered  in  mak- 
ing the  rate.  Hydraulic-Press  Brick  Co. 
V.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  530,  531. 

(p)  In  a  proceeding  attacking  the 
rates  from  Cincinnati  to  Chattanooga  as 
discriminatory,  compared  with  the  rates 
from  New  York  to  Chattanooga,  the  traf- 
fic moving  into  coast  cities,  such  as  Sa- 
vannah, by  water  and  thence  by  local 
rates  to  points  in  the  south,  should  not 
be  considered  in  determining  the  volume 
of  traffic  in  controversy,  since  the  Com- 
mission has  no  jurisdiction  over  such 
traffic  and  the  rates  under  which  it  moves 
are  not  in  controversy.  Receivers  & 
Shippers'  Ass'n  of  Cincinnati  v.  C.  N.  O. 
&  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  440,  458. 

(q)  Cheese  tonnage  from  southwest- 
ern Wisconsin  is  extraordinarily  dense, 
which,  all  other  elements  being  equal, 
should  cause  the  rates  to  be  lower.  Rail- 
road Commission  of  Wisconsin  v.  C.  & 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  85,  90. 

(r)  Since  traffic  into  Oklahoma  and 
Texas  is  increasing  at  a  rate  not  ex- 
ceeded in  any  other  section  of  the  coun- 
try, some  reduction  should  be  made  in 
the  rates.  Ozark  Fruit  r rowers'  Ass'n 
V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
134,   139. 

(s)  The  greater  density  of  population 
is  on  the  east  side  of  the  Mississippi  River 
and  the  development  is  such  that  the 
volume  of  traffic  exceeds  that  on  the  wrst 
side.  This  fact  greatly  contributes  to  the 
ability  of  the  lines  to  handle  business 
with  greater  advantage  and  profit.  Chi- 
cago Lumber  &  Coal  Co.  v.  Tioga  South- 
eastern Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  323,  328. 

(t)  Density  of  traffic  is  always  re- 
garded as  factor  entering  into  reductions 
of  rates.  Oregon  &  Washington  Lumber 
Co.  V.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  18. 

§64.     Voluntary  or  Subsequent  Reduction 
of  Rate. 

See  Absorption  of  Charges,  §2  (b); 
Advanced  Rates,  §7  (1)  (g);  Rea- 
sonableness of  Rates,  §84  (h); 
Reparation,  §16;  Special  Contracts, 
§2  (k);  Voluntary   Rates. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  of 
$2.53  per  ton  on  limestone  shipped  from 
Martinsburg,  W.  Va.,  to  Portsmouth,  O., 
a  distance  of  407  miles.  At  the  request 
of  complainant,  defendants  filed  a  tariff, 
effective  Dec.  23,  1910,  naming  a  rate  of 


EVIDENCE,    §64    (aa)— (h) 


357 


$1.85  per  gross  ton,  which  rate  is  still 
effective.  The  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  maintains 
a  rate  of  65c  per  gross  ton  from  Martins- 
burg  to  Munhall,  Pa.,  a  point  near  Pitts- 
burg, a  distance  of  221  miles,  and  $1.40 
per  gross  ton  to  Cleveland,  389  miles. 
But  these  rates,  it  appeared,  were  put  in 
to  meet  competition  with  the  Penn.  R.  R. 
on  limestone  from  the  Tyrone  district, 
130  miles  east  of  Pittsburg.  It  appeared 
that  the  cost  of  the  stone  at  Martinsburg 
was  only  65c  per  ton.  The  rate  of  $2.53 
produced  a  revenue  of  6.2  mills  per  ton 
mile  and  that  of  $1.85,  4  mills  per  gross 
ton  and  4.5  mills  per  net  ton.  HELD, 
the  reduction  in  the  rate  from  Martins- 
burg to  Portsmouth  was  voluntarily 
made  by  the  defendants  for  the  sole  pur- 
pose of  stimulating  movement.  Com- 
plainant now  has  the  benefit  of  the  lower 
rate,  and  reparation  could  not  be  awarded 
on  shipments  that  moved  prior  to  the 
date  when  the  lower  rate  became  ef- 
fective, in  the  absence  of  a  showing  that 
the  rate  charged  was  excessive  or  un- 
justly discriminatory,  of  which  fact  no 
showing  has  been  made.  Complaint  dis- 
missed. Portsmouth  Steel  Co.  v.  B.  &  O 
R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  510. 

(aa)  A  rate  established  in  compli- 
ance with  an  order  of  a  state  commis- 
sion is  not  a  voluntary  rate.  Chamber 
of  Commerce  of  Houston  v.  G.  H.  &  S. 
A.    Ry.    Co.,    23    I.    C.    C.    214,    217. 

(bb)  A  voluntary  reduction  in  rates 
not  satisfactory  proof  of  the  unreason- 
ableness of  the  prior  rate.  National  Re- 
fining Co.  V.  M.  K.  &  T,  Ry.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.  C.  527,  530;  Pierce  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R., 
23  I.  C.  C.  89,  91. 

(b)  A  voluntary  reduction  in  rates 
for  the  purpose  of  stimulating  business, 
made  immediately  after  shipments 
moved,  is  not  sufl[icient  proof  of  the  un- 
reasonableness of  the  prior  rates.  Ports- 
mouth Steel  Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  510,  511. 

(c)  The  unreasonableness  of  a  class 
•rate  was  clearly  indicated  by  the  fact 
that  a  few  months  after  shipment  moved 
a  commodity  rate,  less  than  one-half 
of  the  class  rate,  was  established  via 
one  of  the  routes.  National  Refining 
Co.  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
527,   530. 

(cc)  Ordinarily  the  advance  of  a 
rate  for  a  short  period  followed  by  the 
restoration  and  maintenance  of  a  lower 
rate  formerly  in  force  tends  to  raise  a 


presumption  of  fact  that  the  advanced 
rate  was  unreasonable.  This  rule  may 
be  modified  where  a  special  rate,  not 
compensatory,  is  put  in  in  order  to 
"scalp"  business  on  competitive  traffic. 
Fairmont  Creamery  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q. 
R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  252,  253. 

(d)  The  fact  that  a  rate  is  voluntarily 
reduced  by  a  carrier  or  is  reduced  1  y 
order  of  the  Commission  does  not  of  it- 
self entitle  shippers  to  reparation.  Car- 
ter White  Lead  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 
21  L  C.  C.  41,  44. 

(dd)  Complainants  shipped  numerous 
carloads  of  ice  from  ice  plants  in  the 
Pocono  Mountains  upon  the  line  of  the 
D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  to  various  points  of 
consumption  upon  the  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R. 
in  New  Jersey.  In  previous  proceedings, 
'he  Commission  found  the  rate  to  the 
terminal  points  unreasonable  (±5  I  C.  C 
305;  17  L  C.  C.  447).  Carriers  reduced 
^he  rates  to  the  terminal  points,  but  did 
not  reduce  the  rates  to  intermediate 
points,  although  the  Commission  fourd 
he  rate  to  be  unreasonable  to  the  ter- 
minal points.  HELD,  there  is  no  reason 
why  the  Commission  must  not  also  have 
found  the  same  rate  unreasonable  to  the 
intermediate  point  upon  the  direct  line 
of  transportation  since  it  found  the  rate 
to  be  unreasonable  to  the  terminal  point. 
Rates  to  the  terminal  points  reduced  and 
reparation  awarded.  Mountain  Ice  Co.  v. 
D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  45. 

(e)  Where  a  reduction  is  made  to 
comply  with  an  order  of  the  Commission, 
such  reduction  cannot  be  regarded  as  an 
absolute  admission  that  the  former  rate 
was  unreasonable.  Victor  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  222,  226. 

(f)  A  rate  established  as  a  result  of 
competitive  conditions  cannot  be  held  to 
be  the  voluntary  act  of  the  defendants. 
Roberts  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  248,  251. 

(g)  The  fact  that  a  carrier  has  for- 
warded to  the  Commission  for  filing  a 
tariff  containing  a  lower  rLte  than  the 
previous  one  is  certainly  to  be  consid- 
ered in  the  determination  of  whether  or 
lot  the  higher  rate  was  unreasonable. 
Steinfeld  &  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I. 
C.   C.   12,   14. 

(h)  There  is  no  presumption  of  law 
that  a  rate,  condemned  as  unreasonable 
or  reduced  by  carrier,  was  unreasonable 
for  any  particular  period  in  the  past. 
Anadarko  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 


358 


EVIDENCE,  §64   (hh)— (r) 


Ry.    Co.,   20   I.    C.    C.    43,    50;    Riverside 
Mills  V.  G.  R.  R.,  20  I.  C.  C.  423,  425. 

(hh)  It  would  be  a  manifestly  harsh 
rule  that  would  assume  a  rate  now 
condemned  as  unreasonable  to  have 
been  so  for  a  pferiod  of  two  years,  or 
that  of  the  statute  of  limitations  in  the 
past  as  a  basis  for  the  payment  of 
money  by  the  carriers  on  past  shipments, 
especially  when  no  complaint  had  been 
made  against  them  in  that  period.  The 
law  establishes  no  such  presumption  nor 
is  it  a  necessary  sequence  that  the  rate 
has  been  unreasonable  for  any  period 
in  the  past.  Neither  does  it  seem  that 
the  bona  fide  action  of  the  carriers  in 
the  necessary  exercise  of  their  judg- 
ment within  reasonable  limits  should 
always  be  at  their  peril  of  liability  for 
reparation  for  the  difference  between 
rates  initiated  upon  their  judgment  and 
later  changed  upon  the  judgment  of 
the  Commission.  The  awarding  of  repa- 
ration by  no  means  necessarily  follows 
the  reduction  of  a  rate  whether  by  the 
voluntary  action  of  the  carriers  or  by 
order  of  the  Commission.  Whatever 
may  be  the  nature  of  the  facts,  cir- 
cumstances and  conditions  appearing  in 
a  particular  case  where  reparation  is 
involved,  whether  on  account  of  excess- 
ive rates  or  unjust  discrimination,  there 
must  be  that  degree  of  certainty  and 
satisfactory  conviction  in  the  mind  and 
judgment  of  the  Commission  as  would 
be  deemed  necessary  under  the  well-es- 
tablished principles  of  law  as  a  basis 
for  a  judgment  in  court,  Anadarko  Cot- 
ton Oil  Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co., 
20  I.   C.   C.  43,  50,   51. 

(i)  The  reduction  of  a  rate  nearly  two 
years  after  the  movements  does  not  raise 
the  presumption  of  unreasonableness.  In- 
dependent Supply  Co.  V.  C.  &  P.  R.  R. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  66,  67. 

(j)  A  '''oluntary  reduction  over  an- 
other route,  caused  by  competition,  is 
not  an  admission  of  unreasonableness. 
American  Cigar  Co.  v.  P.  &  R  Ry.  Co., 
20   I.   C.   C.   81,  82. 

(k)  The  voluntary  reduction  of  rates 
does  not  of  itself  constitute  proof  that 
former  rates  were  excessive.  Carstens 
Packing  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  65, 
166. 

(1)  The  voluntary  reduction  of  a  rate 
is  not  of  itself  evidence  of  the  unreason- 
ableness of  the  rate  so  changed.  When, 
however,  a  shipment  for  which  no  specific 


rate  is  in  force  moves  under  the  so-called 
analogous  article  rule  of  the  classifica- 
tion and  as  soon  as  practicable,  after  the 
defect  is  brought  to  the  attention  of  the 
carrier,  it  establishes  a  lower  rate  than 
charged  on  such  shipment,  it  is  fair  to 
assume  that  the  rate  so  established  and 
maintained  affords  just  compensation  to 
the  Carrier.  Maxwell  v.  W.  F,  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  197,  198. 

(m)  Complainant  shipped  cotton 
waste  from  Augusta,  Ga.,  to  Tonopah, 
Nev.,  under  a  combination  rate  of  $3,695 
per  100  lbs.  in  1906.  In  1909  the  Com- 
mission reduced  one  of  the  intermediate 
rates.  HELD,  an  award  of  reparation 
by  no  means  necessarily  follows  the  re- 
duction of  a  rate  whether  by  the  volun- 
tary action  of  the  carriers  or  by  order  of 
the  Commission;  that  the  Commission  is 
not  satisfied  the  rate  was  unreasonable 
when  charged.  Reparation  denied. 
Riverside  Mills  v.  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I. 
C.  C.  423. 

(n)  It  does  not  follow  that,  because 
the  Commission  has  found  a  rate  unrea- 
sonable and  established  a  lower  rate  for 
the  future,  the  former  rate  was  unreason- 
able at  all  times  in  the  past.  Ullraan 
V.  American  Express  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  354, 
355. 

(o)  The  mere  restoration  of  a  lower 
rate  is  not  proof  of  the  unreasonableness 
of  the  higher  rate  charged.  Pabst  Brew- 
ing Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I. 
C.  C.  584,  586. 

(p)  The  voluntary  reduction  of  a  rate 
does  not  of  itself,  and  without  other  sup- 
porting facts  and  circumstances,  warrant 
the  inference  that  the  rate  was  unreason- 
able, and  this  principle  applies  although 
the  carrier  is  willing  to  refund  to  the  com- 
plaining shipper,  but  does  not  admit  that 
the  rate  was  unreasonable.  Wabash 
Coating  Mills  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I. 
C.  C.  91. 

(q)  Voluntary  reduction  of  a  rate 
standing  alone  is  no  evidence  of  the  un- 
reasonableness of  the  higher  rate.  Penn 
Tobacco  Co.  v.  Old  Dominion  S.  S.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  197,  199. 

(r)  A  rate  of  48c  on  grapes  in  car- 
loads from  South  Haven,  Mich.,  to  La 
Crosse,  Wis.,  was  exacted.  The  combina- 
tion at  the  time  of  shipment  based  on 
Chicago  was  50c.  Subsequently  the  com- 
bination of  45c  was  made  by  reducing  the 
factor  from  Chicago  to  La  Crosse.     One 


EVIDENCE,  §64   (rr)— (aa) 


359 


defendant  admitted  and  the  other  denied 
the  unreasonableness  of  the  rate  charged. 
HELD,  the  rate  attacked  was  not  shown 
to  be  unreasonable,  since  a  mere  volun- 
tary reduction  of  a  rate  is  not  of  itself 
sufficient  to  establish  its  unreasonable- 
ness. Lamb  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  279. 

(rr)  The  voluntary  reduction  of  a 
rate  does  not  of  itself  establish  that 
the  preexisting  rate  was  unreasonable 
or  otherwise  unlawful.  Coors  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,   18   I.    C.   C.   352,  353. 

(s)  Where  a  rate  long  in  effect  is  ad- 
vanced and  subsequently  reduced  to  meet 
competitive  conditions,  no  reparation 
awarded  on  these  facts  alone.  Kentucky 
Wagon  Manufacturing  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  360,  363. 

(t)  On  a  carload  of  cottonseed  cake 
from  Bartlett,  Tex.,  to  Winchester,  Kan., 
a  rate  of  31c  was  assessed,  made  up  of 
the  combinations  of  locals  based  on  Kan- 
sas City,  and  on  another  carload  from 
Bartlett,  Tex.,  to  Onaga,  Kan.,  a  rate  of 
331/4C  was  assessed  similarly  made  upon 
the  combinations  of  locals.  Since  the 
shipments  moved  defendants  named 
through  rates  of  25c  and  29c,  respect- 
ively, between  the  points  in  question.  No 
evidence  of  the  unreasonableness  of  the 
rates  charged  was  offered,  except  the 
voluntary  reductions  made  by  defendants. 
HELD,  this  was  insufficient  to  establish 
unreasonableness.  Reparation  denied. 
Stockyards  Cotton  &  Linseed  Meal  Co.  v. 
M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  295,  296. 

(u)  The  voluntary  reduction  of  a  rate 
by  a  carrier  will  not,  without  proof  that 
the  rate  was  unreasonable,  furnish  a 
basis  for  reparation.  Foster  Lumber  Co. 
V.  G.  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  385. 

(v)  On  carloads  of  coal  from  Hunting- 
ton and  Bonanza,  Ark.,  to  Fostoria,  Tex., 
complainant  was  assessed  $3.10  per  ton. 
The  rate  to  Cleveland,  Tex.,  a  point  on 
the  same  line  six  miles  more  distant  than 
Fostoria,  was  $2.60.  The  rate  to  Cleve- 
land had  been  established  by  the  short 
line  carrier  from  the  coal  fields  in  ques- 
tion which  defendants  had  simply  met, 
but  no  shipments  had  in  fact  ever  moved 
over  defendants'  lines  to  Cleveland,  from 
these  points.  Shortly  after  the  shipments 
moved,  defendants  at  the  request  of  com- 
plainant put  into  effect  the  $2.60  rate  at 
Fostoria.  The  $3.10  rate  complained  of 
yielded  a  revenue  of  4.8  mills  on  588 
miles  per  ton  mile.    HELD,  the  voluntary 


reduction  of  the  rate  by  defendants  did 
not  prove  the  former  rate  unreasonable. 
Foster  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  C.  &  S  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  1.  C.  C.  385,  386. 

(w)  The  Commission  declines  to 
award  reparation*  upon  shipments  moving 
under  a  published  rate  with  a  private 
understanding  that  a  lower  rate  would  be 
established  and  reparation  made  with  ap- 
proval of  the  Commission.  Armour  Car 
Lines  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  461. 

(x)  Defendant  charged  complainant  a 
rate  of  16c  on  a  shipment  of  sawdust  in 
carloads  from  Duluth  to  Andover,  S.  D. 
Shortly  after  the  rate  was  attacked  as  ex- 
cessive defendant  lowered  its  rate  to 
121/^c  under  the  apparent  influence  of  the 
complaint.  HELD,  while  as  a  general 
rule  a  voluntary  reduction  of  a  rate  by  a 
carrier  creates  no  presumption  of  liability 
for  reparation  on  shipments  made  under 
the  rate  as  it  existed  before  the  reduc- 
tion, this  rule  did  not  apply  where,  as 
here,  the  reduction  of  the  rate  was  an 
admission  of  its  unreasonableness  after 
defendant  had  refused  reparation  in  in- 
formal proceedings.  Reparation  awarded 
on  the  basis  of  the  12i^c  rate  and  de- 
fendant ordered  to  maintain  that  rate  for 
two  years.  Diehl  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  190,  192. 

(y)  Defendant  quoted  a  rate  to  com- 
plainant of  18c  on  chimney  brick  from 
North  Birmingham,  Ala.,  to  Washington. 
D.  C,  the  rate  theretofore  being  20c.  Be- 
fore the  new  rate  was  made  effective, 
a  part  of  complainant's  shipments  moved. 
Shortly  after  the  completion  of  the  ship- 
ments, defendants  re-established  the  20c 
rate.  HELD,  the  20c  rate  was  not  shown 
to  be  unreasonable.  A  conclusion  that  a 
rate  is  unreasonable  cannot  be  predicated 
upon  the  mere  fact  that  a  carrier  agrees 
to  lower  a  rate  and  does  lower  it  after 
the  movement  begins  and  then  cancels 
the  rate  after  the  movement  discon- 
tinues. Reparation  denied,  except  for 
straight  overcharge.  Alphons  Custodis 
Chimney  Construction  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  584,  586. 

(z)  The  voluntary  reduction  of  a  rate 
does  not  carry  with  it  a  conclusive  pre- 
sumption that  the  prior  rate  was  unjust 
or  unreasonable.  Commercial  Coal  Co. 
V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  11,  14. 

(aa)  The  voluntary  reduction  of  a 
rate  by  a  carrier,  without  proof  of  the 
unreasonableness  of  the  prior  rate,  does 
not  furnish  a  proper  basis  for  reparation. 


360 


EVIDENCE,  §64  (bb)— §65  (f) 


Harlow  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  501,  503. 

(bb)  The  voluntary  reduction  of  a 
rate  by  a  carrier  does  not  conclusively 
show  that  the  former  rate  was  unjust 
and  unreasonable,  and  that  reparation 
should  be  granted  on  all  shipments  mov- 
ing thereunder  within  the  period  of  the 
statute  of  limitation.  Ottumwa  Bridge 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
121,  125. 

(cc)  Reduction  subsequent  to  ship- 
ment is  not  conclusive  evidence  of  un- 
reasonableness of  rate  chc^rged.  Ham- 
mond P.  eking  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  120. 

(dd)  Mere  fact  that  rate  was  ad- 
vanced and  then  reduced  does  not  fol- 
low that  advanced  rate  was  unreason- 
able. Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v,  C.  M.  oc 
St.  P.   Ry.   Co.,  Unr€p.  Op.   259. 

(ee)  The  long  continuance  of  a  rate 
and  its  restoration  after  a  six  months' 
trial  of  the  increased  rate  tends  strongly 
to  show  that  the  defendants  considered 
the  lower  rate  remunerative.  Repara- 
tion awarded  on  shipments  made  dur- 
ing interim  of  advance.  Carstens  Pack- 
ing Co.  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  of  Tex., 
Unrep.  Op.  323;  Abeles  &  Co.  v.  St. 
L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  326. 

(ff)  It  is  well  settled  that  the  volun- 
tary reduction  of  a  rate  unaccompanied 
by  proof  that  the  higher  rate  was  un- 
reasonable is  no  sufficient  basis  for 
an  award  of  reparation.  Godfrey  & 
Sons  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.    Op.    503. 

(gg)  The  voluntary  reduction  of  a 
rate  does  not  of  itself  establish  the  un- 
reasonableness of  the  former  rate.  Edi- 
son Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  D.  L.  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  538;  Alaska 
Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  564. 

§64!/2.     Wages. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §7  (2)   (b),   (bb) ; 
Reasonableness   of   Rates,    §40^2. 

(a)  From  the  point  of  view  of  public 
policy  and  humanity,  considerations 
such  as  the  profits  of  the  operators  and 
the  carriers,  the  wages  and  standard  of 
living  of  the  miners  and  the  railway 
employees  should  not  be  ignored  in  the 
fixing  of  rates  on  coal.  Boileau  v.  P. 
&.  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.   C.   C.  640,  647. 


(b)  In  fixing  coal  rates  it  would 
seem  that  wages  of  miners  and  their 
standard  of  living  should  be  kept  in 
view  and  that  great  issues  affecting 
them  should  not  be  decided  without  at 
least  bringing  their  interests  into  the 
'horizon  of  consciousness.  Boileau  v. 
P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  640, 
647. 

§65.     Weight  of   Shipment. 

(a)  Weight  and  distance  are  two  uni- 
versally recognized  fundamental  factors 
in  rate  making.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates 
on  Locomotives  and  Tender3,  21  I.  C.  C 
103,  109. 

(b)  Weight  is  an  almost  immaterial 
factor  in  the  transportation  of  live  loco- 
motives. In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  on 
Locomotives  and  Tenders,  21  I.  C.  C. 
103,  111. 

(c)  Reparation  was  askei  on  a  car- 
load of  coiled  elm  hoops.  Freight  was 
paid  on  66,000  lbs.,  based  upon  actual 
scaling  at  West  Detroit,  evidenced  by  a 
weighmaster's  certificate,  together  with 
evidence  that  the  track  scales  were  accu- 
rate. Complainant  relied  upon  an  esti- 
mated weight  of  475  lbs.  per  thousand 
hoops  and  evidence  of  the  weight  of 
other  shipments.  HELD,  the  secondary 
evidence  introduced  by  complai^  int  not 
sufficient  to  establish  that  the  shipment 
was  not  properly  and  accurately  scaled, 
and  complaint  dismissed.  Noble  v.  D.  & 
T.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  60. 

(d)  Positive  evidence  of  the  incorrect- 
ness of  a  carrier's  scaling  is  necessary 
before  another  weight  can  be  substituted. 
Browne  Grain  Co.  v.  G.  C  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  163,  164;  Noble  v.  D.  &  T.  S. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C  60,  61. 

(e)  The  minimum  carload  weight  is 
1  factor  in  the  carload  rate,  and  in  con- 
nection with  the  rate  per  100  lbs.  de- 
termines the  carload  earnings.  Any  re- 
duction in  the  minimum  weight  without 
an  increase  in  the  rate  per  100  lbs.  wo  "'' 
therefore  reduce  the  carload  earnings  of 
the  carrier,  and  would  be  equivalent  to  a 
reduction  in  the  rate  itself.  Georgia 
Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
623,   630. 

(f)  The  cost  of  the  movement  to  the 
carrier  depends  upon  the  weight  loaded 
nto  the  car.  The  weight  of  the  car 
uust  be  hauled  whether  the  contents 
weigh  much  or  little.  The  expense  of 
transporting  a  car  containing  20,000  lbs. 
is  not  much  greater  than  the  expense  of 


EVIDENCE,  §65   (g)— §66   (m) 


361 


carrying  the  same  car  if  it  contains  but 
10,000  lbs.  Montague  &  Co.  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  72,  74. 

(g)  Evidence  which  clearly  demon- 
strates that  the  scale  weight  is  wrong 
may  be  made  the  basis  for  the  correc- 
tion of  that  weight.  Allen  v.  P.  R.  R. 
Co.,   Unrep.   Op.   415. 

(h)  It  is  a  known  fact  that  the 
weight  of  bran  obtained  from  a  good 
quality  of  wheat  averages  between  15 
and  23  per  cent  of  the  weight  of  the 
wheat,  dependent  upon  the  milling  proc- 
ess employed.  Blackwell  Milling  & 
Elevator  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.   Op.  483, 

§66.     Widespread   Rate  Adjustment. 

See  Blanket  Rates,  sr  (b);  Differen- 
tials, §5  (f);  Evidence,  §1  (m),  §43 
(a);  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §16, 
§25    (a),    (b);    Relative    Rates. 

(a)  The  advantage  of  Omaha  over 
Sioux  City  by  way  of  a  back-haul  privi- 
lege is  not  sufficient  to  justify  an  order 
which  would  seriously  disturb  rates  and 
result  in  substantial  loss  to  carriers. 
Sioux  City  Terminal  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  98,  109. 

(b)  Where  it  appears  obvious  that  to 
grant  the  prayer  of  a  complaint  to  re- 
duce the  rates  from  Indianapolis  to  the 
Mississippi  River  would  involve  the 
equalization  of  rates  in  all  the  territory 
between  Chicago  and  Buffalo,  it  must  be 
assumed  that  the  effect  of  such  wide- 
spread reductions  would  be  not  only 
great,  but  injurious  and  perhaps  con- 
fiscatory upon  the  revenues  of  the  car- 
riers. Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C. 
C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  195,  208. 

(c)  Local  rates  in  Central  Freight 
Association  territory  are  built  substan- 
tially on  distance.  This  adjustment  has 
obtained  for  many  years;  commercial 
interests  have  grown  up  thereunder,  and 
it  has  been  the  subject  of  less  com- 
plaint than  any  other  general  rate  ad- 
justment. The  Commission  has  some- 
times been  appealed  to  to  change  it, 
but  has  declined  to  do  so.  Indianapolis 
Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,   23   I.    C.    C.   195,   198. 

(d)  Difficulties  are  always  encount- 
ered when  long-established  rate  rela- 
tionships are  disturbed.  Indianapolis 
Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,    23   I.    C.    C.    195,   203. 


(e)  The  Commission  cannot  deny 
relief  on  ground  that  other  points  sim- 
ilarly situated  might  thereby  be  induced 
to  ask  for  like  relief.  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce of  Newport  News  v.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  345,  356. 

(f)  The  Commission  would  not  hesi- 
tate to  reduce  an  unreasonable  rate  be- 
cause of  threats  of  a  reduction  from 
competing  fields.  Bituminous  Coal 
Operators  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
385,  391. 

(g)  Rates  on  grain  from  the  West 
are  so  adjusted  that  grain  can  move  at 
same  charge  through  several  grain  mar- 
kets, like  Kansas  City,  St.  Louis  and 
Chicago,,  the  rate  from  market  to  market 
being  a  stated  amount.  Southern  Illi- 
nois Millers'  Ass'n  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  672,  674. 

(h)  The  Commission  has  uniformly 
sustained  carriers'  contention  that  the 
percentage  adjustment  between  Central 
Association  territory  and  the  East  ought 
not  to  be  disturbed  without  strong  rea- 
son for  so  doing.  Traugott  Schmidt  & 
Sons  V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  684, 
686. 

(i)  A  long-standing  system  of  rates 
ought  not  to  be  disturbed  without  con- 
sidering the  effect  upon  property  inter- 
ests; but  where  such  rate  is  unlawful 
it  should  be  corrected.  Albree  v.  B.  & 
M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  303,  315. 

(j)  While  the  Commission  ought  to 
consider  the  general  effect  upon  the 
revenues  of  carriers  by  the  establish- 
ment of  a  uniform-distance  scale,  the 
mere  fact  that  some  particular  rate  would 
be  somewhat  advanced  or  reduced  in 
comparison  with  other  rates  is  no  valid 
objection  to  that  course.  Florida  Fruit 
&  Vegetable  Shippers'  Protective  Ass'n 
V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  11,  16. 

(k)  A  change  in  one  of  a  series  of 
related  rates  changes  the  relation 
among  all  of  them.  Boileau  v.  P.  &  L. 
E.   R.   R.    Co.,   22   L   C.   C.  640,   654. 

(1)  Justice  should  not  be  denied  com- 
plainant because  to  grant  it  will  necessi- 
tate a  change  elsewhere.  Equality  can- 
not be  withheld  because  it  is  or  will  be 
objected  to  by  other  carriers  or  shippers. 
Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  93,  100. 

(m)  Where  rates  from  various  fields 
in  a  coal  belt  are  so  correlated  that  to 
change   one   may   disturb   the   entire   ad- 


362 


EVIDENCE,  §66  (n)— §67  (c) 


justment,  the  Commission  cannot  under- 
take to  pass  upon  the  reasonableness 
of  one  of  tiie  rates  involved  without 
considering  its  relation  to  the  rates 
from  the  other  coal  fields.  Victor  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  222,  226. 

(n)  Class  rates,  long  in  effect,  form- 
ing the  basis  of  a  rate  fabric,  to  which 
business  has  adjusted  itself,  are  not  dis- 
turbed upon  the  mere  suggestion  that  a 
better  scheme  might  have  been  originally 
devised.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — East- 
ern Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  306. 

(o)  It  is  the  duty  of  the  Commission 
to  consider  rates  applied  over  the  en- 
tire territory  likely  to  be  affected  by  a 
change  in  rates  to  particular  points.  Cor- 
poration Commission  of  North  Carolina 
v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  303,  309, 
310. 

(p)  Where  a  rate  on  some  other 
commodity  is  quoted  to  prove  that  the 
rate  complained  of  is  unreasonable,  the 
mere  fact  that  such  other  rate  is  in 
effect  or  has  been  for  a  long  time  in 
effect  does  not  indicate  that  it  is  a 
reasonably  high  rate  and  a  proper  rate 
to  be  used  as  a  standard  of  compari- 
son. Darling  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  79,  83. 

(q)  It  is  the  duty  of  the  Commission 
to  determine  a  question  of  relative  rates 
on  coal  as  between  competing  producing 
districts  upon  a  basis  which  will  per- 
mit them  to  compete  in  common  mar- 
kets and  under  circumstances  to  which 
their  location  and  conditions  of  produc- 
tion fairly  entitle  them  with  respect  of 
their  relation  one  to  another.  Black 
Mountain  Coal  Land  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  286,  295. 

(r)  While  it  is  proper  to  consider  the 
effect  of  a  decision  upon  the  general 
rate  adjustment  applying  over  a  wide 
scope  of  territory,  rates  which  discrim- 
inate against  one  locality  on  a  particular 
road  cannot  be  justified  on  the  ground 
that  they  are  part  of  a  general  scheme 
adopted  by  several  roads  entering  the 
same  territory  and  supplying  coal  from 
different  and  unassociated  districts. 
Black  Mountain  Coal  Land  Co.  v.  S,  Rv. 
Co.,  15   I.  C.  C.  286,  294. 

III.     JUDICIAL  NOTICE. 

See  Commerce  Court,  §8;  Courts,  §11 
(b) ;  Loss  and  Damage,  §16;  Over- 
charges, §5  (g) ;  Procedure  Before 
Commission,    §16. 


§67.     In  General. 

(a)  When  considering  a  complaint  in- 
volving the  rates  or  practices  of  a  car- 
rier, the  Commission,  being  an  admin- 
istrative body  performing  its  functions 
in  the  interest  of  the  general  public 
rather  than  in  the  interest  of  the  par- 
ticular litigants,  is  entitled  to  bring  to 
its  aid  all  the  information  that  can  be 
drawn  either  from  the  records  in  other 
complaints  before  it  or  from  it^  general 
experience  and  knowledge  of  transporta- 
tion matters.  The  right  which  courts 
have  to  these  judicial  notices  of  certain 
classes  of  facts  is  extended  in  the  case 
of  the  Commission  to  the  range  of  its  ex- 
perience with  transportation  problems 
and  embraces  all  the  knowledge  that  it 
has  gathered  from  any  source.  The  Com- 
mission is  assumed  to  know  what  needs 
to  be  known  in  correctly  solving  any 
question  relating  to  the  rates  or  to  the 
rules,  regulations  and  practices  of  car- 
riers affecting  rates;  and  where  it  does 
not  in  fact  know,  it  is  its  duty  to  ascer- 
tain what  is  essential  to  a  proper  con- 
clusion. Joynes  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
I.   C.   C.   361,   366. 

(b)  In  administering  the  law,  and  in 
its  endeavor  to  effectuate  justice  to  all 
concerned,  the  Commission  must  be  ob- 
servant of  the  weight  to  be  given  evi- 
dence adduced  before  it.  It  supplements 
the  records  by  using  official  information 
before  it  in  reaching  conclusions  as  to  the 
reasonableness  of  rates  and  in  determin- 
ing questions  presented  to  it  for  decision. 
Sanford  v.  Western  Express  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
C.  32,  36. 

(c)  The  Commission  in  prescribing 
maximum  rates  should  base  its  opinion 
upon  facts  and  circumstances  disclosed  at 
the  hearing,  or  otherwise  entitled  to  con- 
sideration of  sufficient  weight  and  force 
to  appeal  to  the  understanding  and  con- 
science of  intelligent  men.  The  experi- 
ence of  the  Commission,  as  well  as  numer- 
ous decisions  of  the  courts,  have  estab- 
lished precedents  and  standards  by  which 
the  Commission  ought  to  be  guided  and 
aided  in  reaching  a  just  and  reasonable 
conclusion.  National  Petroleum  Ass'n 
V.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  272, 
281. 

IV.     PRESUMPTIONS. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §8,  §8  (2)  (a); 
Any-Quantity  Rate,  §1  (b);  Equali- 
zation of  Rates,  §8  (c) ;  Evidence, 
§43  (e),  §64  (dd),  (z);  Express  Com- 
panies, §13  (b);  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,   §8   (2)    (b),    §16    (f).   §25    (h), 


EVIDENCE,  §68  (a)— §69  (e) 


363 


§89  (c),  §106  (b);  Reconsignment, 
§3  (b);  Reparation,  §16  (vvv) ; 
Through    Routes    and    Joint    Rates, 

§15. 

§68.     In   General. 

See  Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §12  (2) 
(f);  Loss  and  Damage,  §1  (g); 
Tariffs,   §3   (dd),   §14   (j). 

(a)  The  presumption  of  the  law  is 
that  rates  in  effect  on.  January  1,  1910, 
were  just  and  reasonable  and  may  not 
be  increased  without  satisfactory  de- 
fense being  made  before  the  Commis- 
sion. In  Re  Advances  on  Coal  to 
Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C.  604,  624. 

(aa)  The  law  presumes  that  the  meas- 
ure of  reasonableness  of  rates  will  be 
based  upon  all  the  many  elements  of  the 
particular  traffic  involved.  Ponchatoula 
Farmers'  Ass'n  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.  513,  516. 

(b)  Where  a  reduced  rate  has  been  in 
effect  for  a  considerable  period  of  time, 
the  presumption  is  that  it  is  a  reasonable 
rate.  Tully  Grain  Co.  v.  F.  S.  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  28,  29. 

(c)  Where  a  long-established  rate  is 
raised  for  a  short  period  and  then  volun- 
tarily reduced  to  a  former  point  the  pre- 
sumption is  that  the  advanced  rate  is  un- 
reasonable, but  this  presumption  may  be 
overcome  by  burden  of  proof  to  the  con- 
trary. Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R. 
R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  450,  451. 

(d)  After  complaint  filed  defendant 
voluntarily  accorded  complainant  the 
lower  rate;  no  tariff  authority  however, 
but  assumed  it  w^as  accorded  on  a  con- 
struction of  classification.  Presumption 
is  that  defendant  considers  lower  rate 
reasonable.  Reddick  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  492. 

(e)  Carrier  required  to  observe  pro- 
visions of  the  law,  and  in  absence  of 
showing  to  the  contrary,  it  is  presumed 
to  be  so  doing.  Fort  Dodge  Commercial 
Club  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  572,  583. 

(f)  No  conclusive  presumption  that  a 
rate  reasonable  to-day  was  reasonable  a 
year  before  or  a  day  before,  since  reason- 
ble  rates  vary  from  time  to  time,  and 
some  point  of  division  must  be  found. 
Penrod  Walnut  &  Veneer  Co.  v.  C.  B.  & 
Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  326. 

(g)  Where  a  long-established  rate  is 
raised  for  a  short  time  and  then  volun- 
tarily reduced  to  the  former  point  the 
presumption   is   that   the   advanced   rate 


is  unreasonable;  but  this  presumption 
may  be  overcome  by  proof  to  the  con- 
trary. Chaffin  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R. 
R.   Co.,  Unrep.   Op.   585. 

V.     STARE  DECISIS. 

See  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §35;  Mini- 
mums,  §1  (p);  Procedure  Before 
Commission,    §17;    Reparation,    §13. 

§69.     In  General. 

(a)  In  the  absence  of  a  showing  of 
change  of  conditions,  a  ruling  in  a  for- 
mer case  involving  the  same  commod- 
ity between  practically  the  same  points 
controls.  Jouannet  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  392,  393. 

(b)  Findings  in  former  case  that 
given  rate  would  be  reasonable,  even' 
though  the  Commission  at  that  time  had 
no  authority  to  fix  rates  for  the  future, 
may  be  accepted  as  final  by  the  Com- 
mission in  a  subsequent  suit  for  repa- 
ration without  requiring  other  evidence. 
Fels  &  Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C. 
C.   483,   486. 

(c)  While  the  Commission  is  not 
bound  by  any  rule  of  stare  decisis  and 
while  its  conclusions  are  not  res  judicata, 
still  when  a  matter  has  been  once  fully 
considered  and  decided,  it  must  be  re- 
garded as  settled,  unless  it  appears  from 
new  facts  presented  that  the  Commission 
was  wrong.  It  can  at  any  time  recall  and 
amend  its  order,  and  it  ought  to  do  so 
whenever  it  appears  that  an  order  is 
erroneous,  but  it  must  also  be  assumed 
that  the  judgment  of  the  Commission  was 
correct  upon  the  facts  as  presented. 
Schmidt  &  Sons  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  684,  685. 

(d)  In  cases  before  the  Commission 
involving  rates  neither  the  plea  of  res 
adjudicata  nor  stare  decisis  as  used  at 
common  law  has  any  standing  as  affect- 
ing shipments  moving  subsequent  to  the 
decision  of  the  Commission  relied  on. 
Waco  Freight  Bureau  v.  H.  &  T.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  22,  24. 

(e)  Rates  reasonable  at  the  present 
time  may  within  the  period  of  two  years 
become  very  unreasonable  by  reason  of 
changes  in  circumstances  and  conditions, 
economic  transportation,  or  the  like.  It 
should  be  just  as  apparent  that  a  rate 
which  was  unreasonable  two  years  or 
more  ago  may  become  reasonable  by  rea- 
son of  such  changes  in  conditions.  A 
plea  of  estoppel  by  reason  of  for^rer  ad- 
judication  is  not  good  in  so  far  as  an 


364 


EVIDENCE,  §69    (f)— EXPEDITED  SERVICE   (a) 


Investigation  of  present  rates  is  con- 
cerned, although  in  a  former  proceeding 
a  decree  of  a  court  was  a  general  finding 
for  the  defendants  on  all  the  issues  of 
fact.  National  Hay  Ass'n  v.  M.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  34,  37. 

(f)  The  decision  of  a  former  case  is 
not  necessarily  controlling.  Sawyer  & 
Austin  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  141,  143. 


EXAMINERS. 

See     Interstate     Commerce     Commis- 
sion,   §4. 


EXCHANGE  ORDERS. 

See  Passenger  Fares  and  Facilities, 
§6   (e),   (g),   (i),   (m). 

EXCLUSIVE  CONTRACTS. 

See  Auction  Company;  Baggage 
Transfer,  §1  (b),  II;  Special  Con- 
tract, §2  (h),  (L),  (m);  Terminal 
Facilities,  §3   (h),   (i),   (j). 

(a)  The  Commission  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion to  order  a  railroad  to  give  a  local 
baggage  transfer  company  an  oppor- 
tunity to  bid  against  another  one  for  the 
privilege  of  soliciting  on  trains,  any  more 
than  it  would  have  power  to  compel  a  rail- 
road to  place  its  fruit  vendors'  privilege 
up  at  auction,  for  neither  one  is  trans- 
portation under  the  Act,  and  over  neither 
one  has  the  Commission  jurisdiction. 
Cosby  V.  Richmond  Transfer  Co.,  23  I. 
C.  C.  72,  77. 

(b)  Defendants  made  an  exclusive  con- 
tract to  deliver  live  s^ock  to  the  Union 
Stock  Yards  of  Baltimore,  although  com- 
plainant had  its  own  side  track,  and 
had  shipped  to  it  weekly  carloads  of  live 
stock,  but  defendants  refused  to  deliver 
to  other  than  the  Urion  Stock  Yards, 
on  account  of  the  exclusive  contract. 
HELD,  railroads  may  not  make  contracts 
which  abrogate  the  Act;  they  may  not 
refuse,  because  of  their  own  contracts, 
to  furnish  a  delivery  that  is  reasonable 
upon  tracks  which  they  use,  as  a  ter- 
minal for  complainant;  they  may  not  dis- 
criminate as  between  commodities  in  the 
delivery  which  they  give  where  no  rea- 
son txists  for  such  discrimination  except- 
ing the  presence  of  a  contract  made  with 
a  private  corporation,  as  in  this  case. 
The  amended  Act  provides  that  it  is  the 
"duty  of  all  common  carriers  to  estab- 
lish, observe  and  enforce  just  and  rea- 
sonable regulations  and  practices  affect- 
ing all  matters  relating  to  or  connected 


with  the  receiving,  handling,  transporting, 
storing  and  delivery  of  property."  Bal- 
timore Butchers'  Live  Stock  Co.  v.  P.  B. 
&  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  1Z4,  128. 

(c)  Defendant  granted  the  exclusive 
right  to  a  company  to  conduct  its  busi- 
ness as  an  auctioneer  of  fruit  and  vege- 
tables on  its  terminal  premises  at  St. 
Louis.  Complainant,  a  rival  company, 
asked  for  the  same  facilities.  HELD, 
that  the  granting  of  the  exclusive  right 
to  maintain  a  fruit  auction  company  was 
somewhat  analogous  to  the  station  res- 
taurant, news-stand,  barber  shop,  and 
other  conveniences  which  travelers  ar- 
riving at  a  station  may  make  use  of  if 
they  so  desire.  They  are  enterprises  that 
outsiders  are  frequently  permitted  to  en- 
gage in  at  railroad  terminals,  not  as  a 
part  of  the  service  that  the  carrier  ren- 
ders to  the  public,  but  as  something  that 
adds  to  the  general  convenience  of  the 
public.  The  telegraph,  telephone,  trans- 
fer and  cab  offices  ordinarily  found  In 
passenger  stations  rest  upr  i  the  same 
basis.  They  add  to  the  convenience  of 
the  passenger  before  the  transportation 
by  the  carrier  has  commenced  or  after 
it  has  been  completed  without  adding 
to  the  service  undertaken  by  the  carrier 
for  the  traveler  under  its  published  rates. 
It  is  a  matter  that  is  wholly  outside  and 
apart  from  the  service  of  transportation, 
and  is  a  reasonable  use  for  the  defendant 
to  make  of  its  property.  Complaint  dis- 
missed. Southwestern  Produce  Dis- 
tributors V.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
C.  458,  460,  462. 

EXCURSION   RATES. 

See  Advertising,  I;  Passenger  Fares 
and    Facilities,    §3    (a),    §6. 

EXPEDITED   SERVICE. 

See  Import  Traffic,  II  (d);  Reason- 
ableness of  Rates.  §84  (d),  (g), 
§103    (a);   Tariffs,   §4   (a). 

(a)  The  transportation  of  live  stock 
demands,  above  almost  any  other  kind 
of  freight,  expedition  in  service.  Cattle 
or  other  live  animals  should  be  gotten 
to  the  market  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment  and  with  the  least  possible  rail- 
road haul.  Considering,  therefore,  the 
nature  of  the  transportation,  almost  any 
additional  length  of  haul  would  render 
the  route  unduly  circuitous,  and  would 
justify  the  Commission  in  establishing 
a  joint  rate  over  the  direct  line  even 
when  a  two-line  haul  was  involved.     In 


EXPEDITED  SERVICE  (b)— EXPORT  RATES  AND  FACILITIES,  I,  §1  (e)  365 


Re  Investigation  of  Unreasonable  Rates 
on  Meats,  23  I.  C.  C.  656.  662. 

(b)  In  the  shipment  of  fruit,  distance, 
time  in  transit,  and  dispatch  are  of 
prime  importance.  Stacy  &  Sons  v.  O. 
S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  136,  138. 

EXPENSE  BILLS. 

See  Substitution  of  Tonnage,  §2  (L), 
(m),    (n). 

EXPERIMENTAL    RATE. 

See  Equalization  of  Rates.  §8  (f ) ; 
Express  Companies,  §11    (2)    (a). 

EXPERT  TESTIMONY. 

See  Evidence,  §22^2»  §40;  Under- 
charges,  §6. 

EXPLOSIVES. 

(a)  Where  an  explosion  takes  place 
at  a  New  Jersey  pier  during  the  process 
of  unloading  into  a  vessel  dynamite 
shipped  by  rail  from  an  interior  point  of 
the  United  States  and  destined  to  South 
America,  the  liability  of  the  railroad 
company  while  transporting  the  dyna- 
mite is  governed  exclusively  by  the  Act 
of  Congress  of  March  4,  1909,  which  pro- 
vides that  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  shall  formulate  regulations 
for  the  safe  transportation  of  explosives 
binding  on  all  common  carriers  engaged 
In  interstate  or  foreign  commerce  and 
transporting  explosives  by  land,  and  such 
law  takes  the  place  of  all  local  laws  and 
ordinances  on  the  subject.  The  Ingrid, 
195  Fed.  59o,  602. 

EXPORT  RATES  AND  FACILI- 
TIES. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
II.     BILLS   OF  LADING. 

III.  DISCRIMINATION. 

IV.  PUBLICATION  AND   TARIFFS. 
V.     REASONABLENESS. 

CROSS-REFERENCES. 
See   Express   Companies,    §4;    Foreign 
Commerce. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 
§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

See  Crimes,  §1  (b),  §2  (d);  Equaliza- 
tion of  Rates,  §6  (bb);  Facilities 
and  Privileges,  §16  (a);  Through 
Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §3;  Water 
Carriers,   §2   (h). 

(a)  The  decision  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  in  14  I.  C.  C.  356 


ordered  the  carriers  to  so  adjust  their 
rates  on  grain  and  flour  for  export  from 
New  York  as  to  put  the  New  York  miller 
on  a  basis  of  equality  with  millers  at 
interior  points  and  required  the  carriers 
to  desist  from  according  to  flour  milled 
in  transit  at  interior  points  a  lower  rate 
than  was  imposed  on  the  grain  of  the. 
miller  at  New  York  City,  which  was  sub- 
sequently ground  into  flour  and  other 
grain  products  and  exported.  But  the 
order  was  made  upon  condition  that  the 
carriers  establish  the  necessary  regula- 
tions to  make  certain  that  the  grain 
upon  which  the  export  flour  rate  was  ap- 
plied was  actually  exported  as  flour  or 
other  grain  products,  for  which  the  car- 
riers might  impose  the  proper  charge  to 
cover  the  cost  of  executing  such  regula- 
tions. HELD,  the  conditions  in  the  or- 
der being  in  favor  of  the  carriers  and  a 
limitation  upon  the  application  of  the 
adjustment  of  rates  ordered,  the  order 
did  not  exceed  the  authority  of  the  Com- 
mission, and  was  not  invalid  on  the 
ground  it  was  a  regulation  imposed  after 
the  termination  of  the  interstate  ship- 
ment. N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  I.  C. 
C,  168  Fed.  131,  137. 

(b)  Export  traflic  and  export  rates 
from  Texas  points  to  Texas  ports  are 
subject  to  the  Act  to  regulate  commerce, 
and  clearly  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Commission.  In  Re  Advances  for 
Transportation  of  Cotton  and  Cotton 
Linters,  23  L  C.  C.  404,  410. 

(c)  Traffic  from  Louisiana  points  to 
New  Orleans  for  export  whether  on  local 
bills  of  lading  or  on  through  bills  is  sub- 
ject to  the  Act  and  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Commission.  Red  River  Oil  Co.  v. 
T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C  C.  438,  440.  In 
Re  Wharfage  Charges  at  Galveston,  23 
L  C.  C.  535,  548. 

(d)  The  Commission  has  jurisdiction 
over  export  rates.  New  Orleans  Board 
of  Trade  v.  1.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C. 
465,  470. 

(e)  Plaintiff  shipper  made  a  contract 
with  defendant  rail  carrier  for  the  car- 
riage of  goods  from  points  in  the  United 
States  to  domestic  ports  and  thence  to 
European  ports  at  a  specified  rate  for 
the  entire  haul.  Plaintiff  had  no  negotia- 
tions with  the  ocean  carriers.  HELD, 
even  though  the  defendant  was  compelled 
to  pay  the  ocean  carriers,  for  their  por- 
tion of  the  haul,  a  rate  that  would  make 
the  compensation  received  by  defendant 
less   than   the   published   interstate   rate 


366 


EXPORT  RATES  AND  FACILITIES,  II  (a)— III  (b) 


to  the  domestic  ports,  the  contract  was 
not  invalid,  since  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Act  does  not  apply  to  the  rate  con- 
tracted for.  St.  L.  S.  P.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Birge-Forbes  Co.  (Tex.,  1911),  139  S.  W. 
3,  4. 

II.     BILLS    OF    LADING. 

See  Bills  of  Lading,  §3;  Routing  and 
Misrouting,  §3;  Through  Routes 
and    Joint    Rates,    III. 

(a)  There  is  no  legal  obligation  on 
a  rail  carrier  to  give  a  through  bill 
of  lading  covering  movement  by  water 
beyond  its  line.  Such  practice  is, 
however,  of  great  advantage  to  ship- 
pers and  if  given  in  the  name  of 
one  boat  line  should  be  given  in  the 
name  of  others  who  are  similarly  cir- 
cumstanced. A  railroad  may  entirely 
destroy  the  export  traffic  of  a  port 
by  refusing  to  issue  two  bills  of  lading; 
and  to  say  that  it  may  exercise  this 
great  power  wantonly  and  arbitrarily  Is 
contrary  to  the  spirit  and  letter  of  the 
Act.  Mobile  Chamber  of  Commerce  v. 
M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  417,  424, 
425. 

(b)  If  a  rail  carrier  makes  a  rate 
and  issues  a  bill  of  lading  for  ship- 
side  delivery  at  a  port,  that  rate  and 
a  similar  bill  of  lading  should  be  open 
to  all  who  conform  to  the  reasonable 
conditions  of  the  carriers.  A  railroad 
cannot  adopt  a  policy  or  practice  which 
will  put  its  facilities  and  its  rates  at 
the  exclusive  service  of  one  line  of 
steamships,  or  one  set  of  shippers 
patronizing  that  line.  Mobile  Chamber 
of  Commerce  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
23    I.    C.    C.    417,    426,    427. 

(c)  A  rail  carrier  may  control,  or 
connect  with,  a  line  of  steamships 
engaged  in  foreign  commerce,  with 
which  it  may  interchange  business  as 
freely  as  with  another  rail  carrier, 
and  it  may  quote  a  combined  rate 
for  the  through  movement,  the  agent 
of  the  railroad  company  acting  as  the 
agent  of  the  steamship  company  in  so 
doing.  An  inland  carrier  may  go  into 
the  foreign  shipping  business  without 
contravening  any  provision  of  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Act;  nor  is  there 
anything  in  such  statute  which  denies 
to  a  rail  carrier  the  right  to  quote  a 
rate  from  an  inland  point  to  a  foreign 
destination  over  its  own  through  route 
or  by  any  other  route.  But  as  to  such 
carriers  engaged  in  foreign  business, 
the  rail  carrier  has,  so  far  as  this  law 


is  concerned,  a  purely  contractual  or 
proprietary  relation,  not  a  relation  re- 
lated or  controlled  in  any  manner  by 
this  Act.  On  foreign  commerce  the 
rate  to  be  published  with  the  Com- 
mission should  be  the  rate  to  the  port 
and  from  the  port,  an  open  rate,  which 
any  who  desire  to  do  so  may  use 
with  equal  advantage.  The  publica- 
tion of  such  rate  does  not  in  any  man- 
ner limit  the  very  valuable  privilege 
of  through  billing.  Such  through  bill- 
ing should  clearly  separate  the  liability 
of  the  rail  and  the  ocean  carrier  and 
show  the  published  rate  of  the  inland 
carrier.  The  routing  of  the  freight, 
however,  should  remain  with  the  ship- 
per and  upon  him  may  be  imposed 
no  greater  charge  to  the  port  when 
his  freight  goes  by  one  ocean  line 
than  by  another.  Cosmopolitan  Ship- 
ping Co,  V.  Hamburg-American  Packet 
Co.,    13   I.    C.   C.    266,   281. 

III.     DISCRIMINATION. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §19  (a);  Crimes, 
§7  (h),  (j);  Demurrage,  §15  (j),  (k); 
Facilities  and  Privileges,  §16  (b), 
(c),   (e);  Special  Contract,  §5   (h). 

(a)  Carriers  may  not  be  allowed 
to  compete  for  and  handle  foreign 
business  and  at  the  same  time  refuse 
to  handle  domestic  business.  A  car- 
rier by  transporting  traffic  destined 
for  export  to  a  port  makes  itself  a 
common  carrier  as  to  that  point,  and 
thereby  assumes  an  obligation  to  trans- 
port domestic  traffic  as  well  as  export 
•raffle.  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  New- 
port News  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C. 
345,    355. 

(aa)  A  refunding  clause  in  a  tariff  ap- 
plicable to  cotton  exported,  if  properly 
modified,  is  not  illegal.  In  Re  Advances 
on  Cotton,  23  I.  C.  C.  404,  411. 

(b)  The  Southern  Railway  and  the 
Mobile  &  Ohio  Railroad  owned  docks 
at  Mobile  to  which  they  made  ship- 
side  delivery  on  export  traffic.  The 
export  rate  included  not  only  trans- 
portation to  Mobile  but  switching  to 
the  wharves,  use  of  the  docks  and  the 
unloading  of  the  cars.  No  separate 
charges  were  published  for  these  ter- 
minal services,  they  being  included  In 
the  export  rate.  Each  of  these  car- 
riers made  ship-side  delivery  at  the 
docks  of  the  other  without  additional 
charge.  Neither  would  make  delivery  at 
any  other  wharf  without  a  charge  for 
the   terminal    services.     Neither   carrier 


EXPORT  RATES  AND  FACILITIES,  III   (c)  — (ee) 


367 


would  issue  through  bills  of  lading 
except  for  certain  preferred  steamship 
lines.  The  result  of  this  was  to  limit 
the  export  traffic  of  Mobile  to  the 
ships  favored  by  defendants.  HELD, 
that  the  defendant  carriers  should  not 
discriminate  in  .extending  delivery  at 
ehip-side  rates  at  the  port  of  Mobile 
on  traffic  moving  over  their  wharves 
when  destined  to  one  water  line  or 
another.  Where  a  railroad  has  a  wharf 
at  which  its  tariffs  offer  delivery  and 
at  which  part  of  the  shipping  public  is 
served,  but  to  which  it  does  not  give 
all  access,  it  must  make  delivery  at  the 
same  rate  at  some  other  wharf.  The 
Mobile  docks  of  defendants  are  pub- 
lic terminals  and  if  the  carriers  de- 
sire to  extend  their  use  to  a  favored 
few  equal  facilities  for  the  others  must 
by  provided  elsewhere.  The  defendants 
must  also  cease  to  discriminate  in  the 
Issuance  of  through  bills  of  lading  on 
export  traffic.  The  same  service  they 
give  to  the  shipper  in  the  interior  who 
uses  one  line  of  ships  from  the  port 
shall  be  given  to  another  shipper  who 
wishes  to  use  a  different  line  of  ships, 
provided  both  lines  of  ships  submit  to 
the  same  reasonable  conditions  im- 
posed by  the  rail  carrier.  Mobile 
Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  M.  &  O.  R. 
R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  417,  426. 

(c)  Where  carriers  publish  ship- 
side  rates  on  export  traffic  to  certain 
wharves  owned  by  them,  they  make 
such  wharves  public  terminals,  and 
the  necessary  implication  arising  from 
the  publication  of  such  rates  is  that 
access  must  be  given  to  such  wharves 
by  whatever  ship  the  shipper  chooses 
to  have  his  freight  carried  from  the 
wharf,  so  long  as  such  access  may 
be  safely  and  properly  given.  A  rail- 
road may  not  have  a  preferred  line 
of  steamships  to  the  exclusion  of 
other  ships.  It  may  prefer  one  line 
and  have  more  intimate  relationship 
with  such  line  than  with  others, 
but  its  duty  as  a  common  car- 
rier by  rail  cannot  be  neglected  be- 
cause of  such  arrangement.  It  may  set 
aside  one  or  more  docks  for  the  use  of 
such  allied  lines  so  long  as  such  prac- 
tice does  not  conflict  with  its  duty 
to  give  delivery  at  its  docks  to  whom- 
soever may  apply  for  the  freight  prop- 
erly deliverable  at  that  point.  If 
it  chooses  to  give  up  its  entire  dock 
facilities  to  some  particular  line  it 
may  do  so,  but  it  must  make  delivery 


upon  equal  terms  to  other  ships  at 
that  port,  for  it  has  undertaken  to  de- 
liver the  freight  it  transports  at  the 
ship-side.  Mobile  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce V.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C. 
C.    417,   423. 

(d)  It  is  unjustly  discriminatory  for 
carriers  to  assess  on  interstate  or 
export  traffic  concentration  charges  at 
competitive  points  different  from  or 
greater  than  those  which  they  con- 
temporaneously assess  at  non-competi- 
tive points.  Red  River  Oil  Co.  v.  T. 
&   P.  Ry.  Co.,  23   L   C.   C.  438,   447. 

(dd)  A  carrier  may  lawfully  make  an 
Import  rate  from  a  port  in  the  United 
States  to  an  interior  destination  less  than 
its  domestic  rate  from  the  same  port  to 
the  same  destination.  New  Orleans 
Board  of  Trade  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.  C.  465,  469. 

(e)  Defendants'  export  rates  from 
Henderson  and  Owensboro,  Ky.,  to  New 
Orleans,  La.,  were  21.5c  per  100  lbs. 
when  the  traffic  was  destined  to  Liver- 
pool; 22c  per  100  lbs.  when  destined  to 
Bristol,  and  25c  per  100  lbs.  when 
destined  to  other  European  ports.  New 
Orleans  was  the  only  port  to  which 
different  ex/ort  rates  from  the  same 
point  of  origin  when  for  the  same  Eu- 
ropean destination  were  published; 
Owensboro  and  Henderson  were  the 
only  places  from  which  such  varying 
export  rates  were  in  effect;  and  to- 
bacco was  the  only  commodity  so 
treated.  This  appeared  due  to  the 
influence  of  the  Imperial  Tobacco  Com- 
pany. HELD,  that  a  carrier  cannot 
lawfully  make  different  export  rates 
on  the  same  traffic  from  the  same  point 
in  the  United  States  to  the  same  port 
of  transhipment  by  reason  of  the  fact 
that  beyond  the  port  of  transhipment 
the  traffic  is  to  be  carried  to  different 
destinations.  To  permit  carriers  to  do 
this  would  enable  them  to  determine 
to  what  foreign  countries  the  exporta- 
tion of  tobacco  should  be  encouraged 
and  to  what  foreign  countries  it  should 
be  restricted.  Defendants  ordered  to 
desist  from  the  practices  of  which 
complaint  is  made.  New  Orleans 
Board  of  Trade  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
I.    C.    C.    465. 

(ee)  Water  competition  does  not  jus- 
tify charging  different  export  rates  on  the 
same  traffic  from  the  same  point  in  the 
United  States  to  the  same  port  of  trans- 
shipment by  reason  of  the  fact  that  be- 


3«8 


EXPORT   RATES   AND  FACILITIES,   III    (f)— (ff) 


yond  the  port  of  transshipment  the  traffic 
is  to  be  carried  to  different  destinations. 
New  Orleans  Board  of  Trade  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  465. 

(f)  Export  and  domestic  grain  rates 
from  Indiana  acd  Illinois  to  Baltimore, 
Md.,  were  assailed  as  unreasonable,  dis- 
criminatory, and  prejudicial  to  Baltimore 
as  a  grain  market.  Prior  to  May,  1907, 
these  rates  were  lower.  Proportional  or 
reshipping  rates  on  grain  to  Baltimore, 
export  and  domestic,  from  Cincinnati,  O., 
and  Chicago,  Beardstown,  Springfield,  Ash- 
land, Peoria,  and  East  St.  Louis,  111.,  were 
assailed  as  in  violation  of  sections  2  and 
4  of  the  Act.  The  local  rates  from  Ham- 
den,  Greenfield  and  Portsmouth,  O.,  were 
also  involved.  The  Indiana  and  Illinois 
points  first  referred  to  are  originating 
centers  served  by  defendant  carriers. 
Baltimore  was  formerly  the  chief  port  of 
export  for  these  territories  and  a  large 
domestic  consumer  as  well.  Of  late  years 
this  movement  has  greatly  increased. 
The  Merchants'  Exchange  of  St.  Louis  in- 
tervened to  support  the  principle  of  pro- 
portional or  reshipping  rates.  In  recent 
years  there  has  been  considerable  in- 
crease in  the  demand  for  grain  in  the 
south.  The  tendency  of  the  traffic  has 
been  to  the  south  and  southeast  through 
Louisville  and  Cincinnati.  The  produc- 
tion of  wheat  and  corn  in  the  Illinois  and 
Indiana  territory  in  question  has  de- 
creased while  the  home  demand  has  in- 
creased. Export  grain  has  not  been  so 
plentiful  in  recent  years,  Chicago  is  a 
grain  market  drawing  directly  on  Illinois 
and  Indiana,  and  is  much  nearer  than 
Baltimore,  The  present  rates  from  Chi- 
cago to  Baltimore  of  11.5c  export  and  13c 
domestic  are  proportional  or  reshipping 
rates.  Prior  to  1905  the  rates  in  and  out 
of  Chicago  were  locals.  Since  then 
through  rates  have  existed  via  other 
lines,  but  defendants  do  not  publish 
through  rates  via  Chicago,  but  since  1910 
proportional  rates  have  been  the  only 
ones  in  force  between  Chicago  and  Balti- 
more. Rates  are  adjusted  so  as  to  be  on 
a  level  with  the  through  rates  to  Balti- 
more from  the  same  originating  points. 
Reshipping  privileges  are  permitted  at 
Chicago  and  other  tranatt  points  named 
above.  Prom  the  Indiana  and  Illinois 
points  first  named  to  Baltimore,  the  aver- 
age export  rate  was  4.1  mills  per  ton 
mile,  the  average  domestic  rate  was  4.5 
mills.  Under  the  former  adjustment  the 
average    rates    were    3.3    and    3.9    mills. 


From  the  Ohio  points  the  average  rates 
were  5.2  and  5.4  mills.  Formerly  the 
rates  were  3.8  and  4.7  mills.  The  average 
rates  from  the  transit  points  above  named 
were  2  98  and  3.4  mille.  The  transit 
privilege  at  Chicago  is  worth  Ic  per  100 
lbs.  The  route  via  Chicago  is  much 
longer  but  shippers  get  the  same  rate 
with  the  transit  privilege.  There  is 
less  profit  to  Baltimore  dealers  on  grain 
coming  to  Baltimore  from  Chicago,  and 
the  higher  rates  have  not  resulted  to 
the  benefit  of  defendant  carriers,  who 
do  not  publish  through  rates  via  Chicago 
at  all.  When  the  rates  were  advanced 
the  same  advances  were  made  to  other 
eastern  points.  Defendants  have  no 
control  over  the  Chicago  rates.  HELD, 
the  rates  are  not  in  themselves  unreason- 
able and  the  defendants  are  not  guilty  of 
discrimination.  Baltimore  Chamber  of 
Commerce  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C, 
596,  603. 

(ff)  By  their  amended  complaint, 
complainants  attacked  a  rate  of  29i/^c 
from  Missouri  River  points  to  New 
York  on  flour  for  domestic  consumption 
and  of  2^1/^ c  on  flour  for  export.  The 
complaint  was  directed  against  the  di- 
visions received  by  the  western  car- 
riers for  the  haul  to  Chicago  when  the 
shipments  moved  via  Chicago,  and  the 
divisions  to  the  Mississippi  River  when 
the  shipments  moved  via  St.  Louis  but 
not  through  Chicago.  When  the  ship- 
ments moved  through  Chicago  the 
western  carriers  received  12c  of  the 
291/^c  domestic  rate,  and  the  carriers 
east  of  Chicago,  17i/4c,  When  the  ship- 
ments did  not  move  through  Chicago 
the  carriers  west  of  the  Missis- 
sippi River  received  9c,  and  those 
east  20 1/4  c.  Of  the  25i/^c  export 
rate  on  shipments  going  through 
Chicago,  the  carriers  west  received 
11.7c,  and  those  east  of  Chicago 
13.8c,  and  of  this  rate  on  ship- 
ments not  going  through  Chicago  the 
carriers  west  of  the  Mississippi  River 
received  9c,  and  those  east  16i^c.  The 
all-rail  rate  on  flour  from  Minneapolis 
to  New  York  for  domestic  consumption 
was  25c,  and  for  export  21i^c.  The 
distances  from  Minneapolis,  and  a 
typical  Missouri  River  point,  such  as 
Kansas  City,  to  New  York  were  sub- 
stantially the  same.  Out  of  the  25-cent 
domestic  and  21i/^c  export  rate  from 
Minneapolis,  the  carriers  east  of  Chi- 
cago took  16.7c  and  14c  respectively 
for  their  haul  from   Chicago  to  the  sea- 


EXPORT   RATES   AND   FACILITIES,    III    (g)— (i) 


369 


board;  the  carriers  west  of  Chicago, 
8.3c  on  domestic  and  T^^c  on  export 
shipments,  as  compared  with  12  and 
11.7c  respectively  received  by  the  car- 
riers west  of  Chicago  for  their  haul 
into  that  point  from  Kansas  City.  Kan- 
sas City  and  Minneapolis  are  about  the 
same  distance  from  Chicago.  Com- 
plainants attacked  these  rates  as  dis- 
criminatory in  favor  of  Minneapolis  and 
against  Kansas  City,  Leavenworth,  At- 
chison and  St.  Joseph,  as  typical  points. 
The  all-water  rate  from  Duluth  to 
Buffalo  was  a  differential  of  2i/4c  higher 
than  the  all-water  rate  from  Chicago 
to  Buffalo.  The  rate  on  export  flour 
from  Minneapolis  to  Duluth  was  5c,  so 
that  it  cost  only  T^/^c  more  to  move 
Minneapolis  flour  to  Buffalo  via  Duluth 
and  the  Lakes  than  it  did  to  lay  flour 
down  at  Buffalo  from  Chicago  through 
the  Lakes.  The  rail  lines  west  of  Chi- 
cago were,  therefore,  compelled  to  ac- 
cept a  margin  of  .  T^^c  on  export  flour 
for  the  haul  from  Minneapolis  to  Chi- 
cago. The  divisirn  received  by  the 
rail  lines  from  Minneapolis  to  Duluth 
on  through  shipments  of  domestic 
flour  was  5.8c,  which,  added  to  the 
21/^0  differential  mentioned,  resulted 
in  8.3c,  by  which  amount  the  rate  on 
domestic  flour  shipped  from  Minneap- 
olis through  Duluth  and  the  Lakes  to 
Buffalo  exceeded  the  rate  on  domestic 
flour  from  Chicago  through  the  Lakes 
to  Buffalo.  The  carriers  in  order  to 
participate  in  the  traffic  were,  there- 
fore, obliged  to  accept  8.3c  as  their 
division  of  the  domestic  rate  for  the 
haul  from  Minneapolis  to  Chicago. 
Complainants  relied  solely  on  the  lower 
divisions  from  Minneapolis  to  Chicago 
to  show  the  divisions  attacked  unduly 
discriminatory.  The  rates  on  flour  for 
export  were  higher  than  those  on 
wheat.  Complainants  demanded  that  the 
rates  on  flour  for  export  be  made  the 
same  as  those  on  wheat  for  export  m 
order  to  put  the  American  miller  on  a 
parity  with  the  foreign  miller.  At  the 
time  of  filing  the  original  complaint, 
the  rates  on  domestic  flour  and  flour 
for  export  from  Missouri  River  points 
to  New  York  were  28i^  and  24i/4c  re- 
spectively, the  29^/^0  and  25i/^c  rates 
attacked  being  the  result  of  an  increase 
of  li^c  in  the  proportionals  into  Chi- 
cago and  to  the  Mississippi  River 
crossings  made  subsequent  to  the  flling 
of  the  original  complaint.  This  advance 
was   a  mere   reflection  of  a  similar   ad- 


vance at  the  same  time  in  the  wheat 
rates,  and  was  made  in  order  to  pre- 
serve the  substantial  parity  of  rates 
on  wheat  and  flour  Subsequent  to 
the  filing  of  the  amended  complaint, 
the  rate  on  domestic  flour  from  Mis- 
souri River  points  to  New  York  was 
reduced  to  29c  as  compared  with  the 
rate  on  domestic  wheat  of  28c  in 
effect  at  the  time  of  the  hearing.  The 
rate  on  export  wheat  was  at  the  time 
of  the  hearing  25c  from  Missouri  River 
points  as  compared  with  25  ^c  on  ex- 
port flour.  HELD,  that  the  lower  di- 
visions on  domestic  and  export  flour 
accepted  by  the  carriers  for  the  haul 
from  Minneapolis  to  Chicago  were  the 
result  of  water  competition  and  did  not 
prove  the  higher  divisions  received  by 
the  carriers  for  the  haul  from  the 
Missouri  River  to  the  Mississippi  River 
and  from  the  Missouri  River  to  Chi- 
cago to  be  unjustly  discriminatory; 
that  the  Commission  had  no  authority 
to  make  the  rates  on  flour  for  export 
the  same  as  those  on  wheat  for  export 
for  the  purpose  of  enabling  American 
millers  to  meet  the  competition  of 
foreign  millers,  until  Congress  had 
adopted  such  a  national  policy;  and 
that,  without  entering  an  order,  the 
Commission  was  of  the  opinion  the 
absolute  parity  of  rates  on  wheat  and 
flour  in  effect  west  of  Chicago  and 
St.  Louis  should  be  extended  through 
to  the  seaboard.  Complaint  dismissed 
without  prejudice.  Bulte  Milling  Co.  v. 
C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  351. 
360. 

(g)  Defendants  should  publish  their 
inland  export  rate  on  raw  furs,  which 
is  less  than  their  domestic  rate,  and 
they  must  extend  it  to  the  complainant 
and  all  others  on  export  traflBc,  under 
proper  regulations,  to  make  certain 
that  the  trafiic  which  obtains  the 
lower  rate  is  actually  exported.  Ull- 
man  v,  Adams  Express  Co.,  14  I.  C, 
C.  340,  345;  rehearing  denied,  14  I.  C.  C. 
585. 

(h)  A  rail  line  may  make  a  lower 
rate  upon  export  or  import  traffic  than 
its  regular  domestic  rate,  but  it  can- 
not confine  this  rate  to  traffic  moving 
by  any  particular  boat  or  boats,  but 
must  transport  for  all  at  the  same 
charge.  Joseph  Ullman  v.  Adams  Ex- 
press  Co.,   14  L   C.   C.   340,   345. 

(i)  The  domestic  rate  of  defendant 
carriers  upon   grain   and  grain   products 


370 


EXPORT  RATES  AND  FACILITIES,  III   (k)— IV   (c) 


from  Chicago  to  New  York,  when  grain 
originated  west  of  Chicago,  was  IIV2C, 
but  if  exported,  then  the  grain  took  a 
rate  of  13c,  flour  of  14c,  and  other 
grain  products  of  15c.  Western  millers 
enjoyed  a  milling-in-transit  privilege, 
permitting  them  to  transport  wheat  to 
their  mills,  grind  and  send  on  the  flour 
to  its  destination,  at  a  total  rate  equiva- 
lent to  the  through  rate  on  flour  from 
the  point  of  origin  to  destination,  plus 
the  payment  of  an  additional  sum  for 
the  privilege.  Complainant  milling 
company  was  located  at  New  York  a 
short  distance  off  defendants'  lines  and 
was  obliged  to  pay  17^c  for  grain 
carried  from  Chicago  to  be  ground 
there  and  then  exported.  Defendants 
were  not  concerned  in  exporting  com- 
plainant's flour  from  New  York.  Com- 
plainant obtained  about  two-thirds  of 
its  grain  by  lake  and  canal  transpor- 
tation, where  the  rate  was  lower  than 
by  rail.  The  complainant  gave  evi- 
dence to  show  that  as  a  practical 
matter  the  grain  shipped  to  it  over 
defendants'  lines  and  ground  and  ex- 
ported could  be  kept  distinct  from  that 
received  by  canal  and  lake  transpor- 
tation by  placing  the  same  in  bins  in 
New  York  and  having  it  sealed,  ground 
and  exported  under  the  direction  of 
defendants.  HELD,  complainant  was 
not  entitled  on  grain  to  be  ground  in 
New  York,  and  exported,  to  the  export 
rate  on  grain,  but  such  grain  should 
take  the  export  rate  on  flour  accorded 
to  western  mills,  the  order  being  given 
on  condition  that  defendants  might  im- 
pose and  charge  for  the  expense  of 
such  regulations  as  might  be  necessary 
to  make  certain  that  the  grain  upon 
which  the  export  flour  rate  was  applied 
was  actually  exported.  Hecker-Jones- 
Jewell  Milling  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  356,  360,  363,  sustained; 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C. 
168  Fed.  131,  holding  the  order  of  the 
Commission  prescribing  an  adjustment 
of  rates  on  grain  and  flour  for  export 
from  New  York  City  is  not  so  clearly 
unreasonable  and  impracticable  as  to  de- 
mand an  injunction  pending  suit  and 
without   trial    of    its    workings. 

(j)  A  flour  mill  located  in  New 
York,  a  short  distance  from  de- 
fendant carriers'  rails  and  engaged  in 
shipping  grain  from  the  west,  grinding 
it  in  New  York  and  exporting  it, 
must  be  regarded  as  situated  on  de- 
fendants'   lines   so   far   as   its   right   to 


participate  in  export  rates  from  west- 
ern points  to  New  York  is  concerned. 
Hecker-Jones-Jewell  Milling  Co.  v.  B.  & 

0.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  356,  361,  sus- 
tained; N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  V. 
I  C.  C.  168  Fed.  131. 

(k)  Where  ex-lake  grain  from  Buf- 
falo to  New  York  enjoys  no  milling- 
in-transit  privilege,  but  export  flour 
ground  from  ex-lake  grain  at  Buffalo 
takes  an  export  rate  lower  than  the 
domestic  rate,  said  lower  rate  really 
represents  a  milling-in-transit  privi- 
lege, and  a  New  York  miller  is  entitled 
upon  ex-lake  grain  ground  for  export 
to  the  benefit  of  the  export  llour 
rate.  Hecker-Jones-Jewell  Milling  ,Co. 
V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  1.  C.  C.  356, 
363,  sustained;  N.  Y.  C,  &  H.  R.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  108  Fed.  131. 

(1)  Where  grain  for  export  goes 
over  tne  ship-side  as  grain,  it  should 
pay  the  grain  rate;  where  it  goes  over 
as  flour,  it  should  pay  the  flour  rate. 
Hecker-Jones-Jewell  Milling  Co.  v.  B. 
&  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  356,  360. 

(m)  Rates  cannot  be  based  on  de- 
lays of  loaded  cars  destined  for  ex- 
port when  such  delays  are  occasioned 
by  lack  of  terminal  facilities.  Thomp- 
son  Lumber   Co.    v.   I    C.   R.   R.   Co.,   13 

1.  C.    C.   657,    666. 

IV.     PUBLICATION    AND    TARIFFS. 

See  Special  Contract,  §2   (xx),    (ccc). 

(a)  A  refunding  clause  in  a  tariff 
applicable  to  cotton  destined  from 
Texas  points  to  New  Orleans  for  export 
is  not  unlawful  if  reasonable  and  prop- 
erly policed.  In  Re  Transportation  of 
Cotton  and  Cotton  Linters,  23  I.  C.  C. 
404,    411. 

(b)  Carriers  may  not  lawfully  apply 
refunds  on  transit  shipments  to  interstate 
or  export  trafllc  without  tariff  provisions 
on  file  with  the  Commission.  Red  River 
Oil  Co.  V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  438, 
441,  444. 

(bb)  Export  rates  must  be  published 
and  filed  and  may  be  changed  only  upon 
thirty  days'  notice.  New  Orleans  Board 
of  Trade  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
465,  467. 

(c)  Transit  privileges  and  charges 
thereunder  on  interstate  or  export  ship- 
ments must  be  clearly  and  definitely 
shown  in  tariffs  published  and  filed  in 
conformity    with     the     requirements     of 


EXPORT  RATES  AND  FACILITIES,  V   (a)— (d) 


371 


section    6    of    the    Act.      Red    River    Oil 
Co.    V.    T.    &    P.    Ry.    Co.,    23    I.    C.    C. 

438,    447,    448. 

V.     REASONABLENESS. 

See    Evidence,   §13   (2)    (L). 

(a)  The  rate  on  cotton  for  export 
from  Houston  to  Galveston,  a  distance 
of  48  miles,  was  6c.  The  distance  from 
Houston  to  New  Orleans  is  362  miles 
and  the  rate  was  18c.  HELD,  from 
Houston  to  New  Orleans  is  nearly  eight 
times  the  distance  from  Houston  to 
Galveston,  and  the  rate  was  about 
three  times  as  much.  Manifestly  the 
carriers  cannot  be  required  to  trans- 
port cotton  from  Houston  to  New 
Orleans  at  the  same  rate  as  from 
Houston  to  Galveston.  In  Re  Trans- 
portation of  Cotton  and  Cotton  Linters, 
23  I.  C.  C.  404,  408. 

(b)  Rates  on  cotton  from  Texas  pro- 
ducing points  were  and  for  some  time 
have  been  the  same  to  New  Orleans 
and  to  Texas  ports.  Upon  complaint 
to  the  Texas  Commission  that  this 
traffic  was  being  diverted  from  Texas 
ports  to  New  Orleans,  the  Texas 
Commission  proposed  to  reduce  the 
rates  to  the  Texas  ports  if  the  al- 
leged discrimination  was  not  removed. 
The  average  haul  on  cotton  from  Texas 
points  to  Galveston  is  225  miles;  to 
New  Orleans  488  miles.  On  account 
of  the  contemplated  action  of  the  Texas 
Commission  the  carriers  filed  increased 
rates  to  New  Orleans  (63c),  which, 
upon  complaint,  were  suspended  by  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission.  In 
the  year  1910-1911,  under  the  equality 
of  rates  to  New  Orleans  and  Galveston, 
New  Orleans  received  but  150,392  bales 
out  of  a  production  of  3,258,651  bales 
of  cotton  in  Texas.  HELD,  the  rates 
to  Texas  ports  not  being  alleged  to  be 
unreasonable  defendants  have  sus- 
tained the  burden  cast  upon  them  by 
the  statute,  and  the  proposed  increased 
rates  to  New  Orleans  are  not  unrea- 
sonable. Further,  the  export  rates  to 
Galveston  being  subject  to  the  Federal 
Act  it  is  clearly  within  the  right  of 
the  carriers  in  the  absence  of  order 
of  the  Interstate  Comemrce  Commission 
to  the  contrary  to  continue  the  present 
parity  of  export  rates  from  Texas  points 
to  New  Orleans  and  Texas  ports.  In 
Re  Advances  in  Rates  for  the  Trans- 
portation of  Cotton  and  Cotton  Linters, 
23  I.  C.  C.  404,  411. 


(bb)  The  export  rate  on  flour  from 
Glen   Elder,  Kan.,  to  New  Orleans,  was 

31  ^Ac    per    100    lbs.,    the    domestic    rate 

32  %c.  From  Concordia,  Kan.,  to  New 
Orleans,  the  domestic  rate  was  32c,  the 
export  rate  27c  per  100  lbs.;  from  Salina, 
Kan.,  the  domestic  rate  was  32 ^c,  the 
export  rate  26c.  Many  points  which  com- 
pete with  Glen  Elder  are  more  distant 
from  New  Orleans.  On  the  basis  of 
311^0,  the  export  rate  from  Glen  Elder  to 
New  Orleans,  the  lines  participating  in 
the  movement  earned  5  mills  per  ton 
mile.  HELD,  the  export  rate  from  Glen 
Elder  is -unreasonable  to  the  extent  that 
it  exceeds  28c  per  100  lbs.,  which  would 
be  a  reasonable  maximum  rate  for  the 
future.  R.  R.  Commissioners  of  Kan.  v. 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  24.  27. 

(c)  Export  rates  should  be  open 
and  available  alike  for  all  shippers.  In 
Re  Restricted  Rates,  20  L  C.  C.  426, 
434. 

(d)  Complainant  attacked  the  export 
rate  on  grain,  Buffalo  to  New  York,  of 
lie  per  100  lbs.  and  of  Chicago  to 
New  York,  13c  per  100  lbs.  It  appeared 
that  in  the  time  of  rebating  the  export 
rate  fell  as  low  as  2.75c  per  bushel,  and 
that  carriers  have  voluntarily  at  times 
maintained  an  export  rate  of  4c  per 
bushel  from  Buffalo.  It  appeared  that 
in  the  absence  of  a  rate  of  4c  per 
bushel  from  Buffalo,  the  export  grain 
will  move  via  Montreal.  Statistics  in- 
dicated that  the  export  movement  from 
Montreal  is  rapidly  increasing,  while 
the  export  movement  from  New  York 
is  rapidly  decreasing.  Complainant 
asked  the  Commission  to  establish 
a  rate  on  ex-lake  grain  of  4c 
a  bushel.  HELD,  that  under  the  cir- 
cumstances the  carriers  might  well  es- 
tablish during  the  period  of  navigation 
a  4c  ex-lake  export  rate  upon  wheat 
and  corresponding  rates  upon  other 
grain,  but  the  rate  itself  is  so  low,  the 
margin  over  and  above  the  cost  of 
operation  so  narrow,  that  the  Commis- 
sion does  not  feel  warranted  in  making 
this  requirement.  Whether  it  shall  be 
established  is  a  matter  of  policy  which 
must  be  left  to  the  carriers  themselves, 
and  not  a  matter  of  right  which  may  be 
demanded  by  the  port  of  New  York. 
When  the  improvements  in  progress 
upon  the  Erie  Canal  are  completed  that 
waterway  will  undoubtedly  determine 
the  rate  at  which  grain  shall  be  car- 
ried   from    Buffalo    to    tidewater.      Com- 


372       EXPORT  RATES  AND  FACILITIES,  V   (e)— EXPRESS  COMPANIES 


plaint  dismissed.  Board  of  Trade  of 
Chicago  V.  A.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
C.    504,    511,    518. 

(e)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate 
of  45c  on  shipments  of  agricultural 
implements  in  carloads  from  Minneapo- 
lis to  New  York  City,  when  for  export, 
as  excessive.  Defendants  thereafter  re- 
duced the  rate  to  37i/^c.  The  revenue 
under  this  rate  was  shown  to  not  great- 
ly exceed  the  per'  ton  mile  revenue 
yielded  under  rates  from  other  points  of 
manufacture  to  New  York.  The  Minne- 
apolis to  New  Orleans,  for  export, 
rate  was  35i^c,  but  it  appeared  that  the 
export  rates  through  New  Orleans  were 
generally  lower  than  through  New  York. 
HELD,  the  37i/^c  rate  was  not  unrea- 
sonable and  should  be  applied  in  the 
future.  Minneapolis  Thresh.  Mach.  Co. 
V.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
C.    193,   194. 

(f)  Defendants'  rate  on  clover  hull- 
ers  from  Newark,  O.,  to  Baltimore, 
for  export,  was  15i/^c  on  a  carload 
minimum  of  30,000  lbs.  The  rate  on 
movements  for  domestic  use  was  19c 
with  a  minimum  of  20,000  lbs.  per  36- 
foot  car,  and  22.000  lbs.  on  larger  cars. 
The  carloads  shipped  by  complainant 
were  all  of  less  than  20,000  lbs.  actual 
weight.  Complainant  was  assessed  on 
the  30,000-pound  minimum,  making  the 
cost  of  shipment  greater  when  for  ex- 
port than  when  for  domestic  use.  HELD, 
it  was  unreasonable  to  exact  more  for 
an  export  shipment  than  for  the  move- 
ment of  the  same  quantity  for  domestic 
use,  and  complainant  was  entitled  to 
reparation  on  the  basis  of  what  the 
charge  would  have  been  had  the  ship- 
ment been  for  domestic  use.  Newark 
Machine  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  16   1.   C.   C.   291,   292. 

(g)  An  export  rate  is  really  a  por- 
tion of  a  through  rate  which  must 
vary  according  to  the  cost  of  water 
transportation  from  the  port  to  the  for- 
eign country.  Hecker-Jones-Jewell  Mill- 
ing Co.,  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L 
C.   C.   356,   360. 

(h)  Machined  castings  excluded  from 
special  iron  and  steel  articles  list,  which 
has  lower  rate  on  export  than  domestic 
traffic.  Subsequently  included.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Rosedale  Foundry  &  Ma- 
chine Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
370. 

(i)  Rail  carriers'  proportional  rate 
from    Chicago    to    New    York    on    paper 


transported  by  water  from  latter  point 
to  coastwise  points  was  higher  than  the 
rate  applicable  to  paper  carried  to  New 
York  for  export  or  for  local  delivery  at 
New  York  lighterage  points.  HELD,  un- 
reasonable, and  reparation  awarded.  St. 
Regis  Paper  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  403. 

EXPRESS  COMPANIES. 

I.     CONTROL     AND     REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
§1|/^.     State  regulation. 
II.     FACILITIES. 

§2.    Delivery    and    receipt. 
§3.     C.  O.  D.  shipments. 
§4.     Export    service. 
§5.     Free    transportation. 
§6.     Money   orders. 
§7.     Prepaid      and      collect      ship- 
ments. 
§8.     Special   contracts. 

III.  DISCRIMINATION.  . 

§9.     In  -general. 

IV.  RATES. 

§10.  Reasonableness   in   general. 
§11.  Specific    rates. 

(1)  Bread  and  cake. 

(2)  Celery. 

(3)  Cream    cans. 

(4)  Drygoods. 

(5)  Eggs. 

(6)  Fish. 

(7)  Guinea     pigs,      rabbits, 

rats. 

(8)  Merchandise. 

(9)  Milk  and   cream. 

(10)  Raw    furs. 

(11)  Sample  brick. 

V.  ROUTE. 

§12.     In    general. 

VI.  TARIFFS. 

§13.     Construction. 
§14.     Double    graduate    charges. 
§15.     Graduate     scale    system. 
§16.     Mixed    shipments. 

VII.  EVIDENCE. 

§17.     In    general. 

§18.     Bulk. 

§19.     Commercial    advantages. 

§20.     Comparisons. 

§21.     Competition. 

§22.     Long   maintenance   of   rate. 

§23.     Percentage  of  freight  rate. 

§24.     Profit   and    capitalization. 

§25.     Surplus. 

§26.     Value   of  express   property. 


EXPRESS  COMPANIES,  §1   (a)— (1) 


373 


I.     CONTROL    AND    REGULATION. 
See   Association,   I    (dd). 

§1.     Jurisdiction   of  Commission. 

See     Interstate     Commerce     Commis- 
sion,   §14    (o). 

(a)  Under  the  Elkins  Act  as  amend- 
ed by  the  Hepburn  Act,  express  compa- 
nies may  be  enjoined  by  the  United 
States  at  the  instance  of  the  Commis- 
sion from  issuing  franks  for  the  free 
transportation  of  property  to  their  offi- 
cers, agents,  attorneys,  employes  and 
their  families  or  to  like  persons  con- 
nected with  railroads  or  other  express 
companies,  as  such  persons  do  not  come 
within  the  exceptions  named  in  the 
proviso  of  section  1  of  the  Hepburn 
law  allowing  the  issuance  of  free  pas- 
senger transportation  to  such  class  of 
persons.  American  Express  Co.  v.  U. 
S.,  212  U.  S.  522,  532,  29  Sup.  Ct.  315, 
53   L.   ed.   635. 

(b)  Conclusions  of  fact  arrived  at 
by  the  Commission  in  determining 
whether  express  companies  have  the 
right  to  deny  the  application  of  carload 
rates  to  carloads  of  packages  owned 
by  individuals  and  assembled  in  car- 
loads by  forwarding  agents  are  not  open 
to  review  by  the  courts.  I.  C.  C.  v.  D. 
L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  220  U.  S.  235,  251, 
31   Sup.   Ct.   392,   55   L,  ed.   448. 

(c)  By  the  amendment  of  June  29, 
1906,  express  companies  stand  with  ref- 
erence to  the  Act  and  the  several 
amendments  thereto  as  though  they 
had  been  named  in  the  original  Act 
of  1887  and  stand  in  the  same  atti- 
tude as  that  of  a  railroad  except  in 
so  far  as  the  language  of  the  Act 
necessarily  excludes  them.  United 
States  V.  Wells-Fargo  Co.,  161  Fed  606, 
609. 

(d)  Where  an  express  service  is 
already  maintained  by  a  single  com- 
pany the  Commission  has  authority  to 
require  the  application  of  a  through 
rate  by  that  company.  Certainly  it 
can  require  the  defendant  to  give  to 
those  communities  to  which  it  has 
withdrawn  a  certain  rate  a  reasonable 
rate  to  the  city  of  New  York  by  some 
other  route.  Douglas  Shoe  Co.  v.  Ad- 
ams Express  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  539,  543. 

(e)  The  Commission  cannot  require 
an  express  company  which  has  sold  out 
to  resume  business.  Douglas  Snoe  Co. 
v.  Adams  Expiess  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  539, 
542. 


(f)  The  complaint  was  that  defend- 
ant in  handling  small  packages  over 
certain  post  routes  established  by  the 
"United  States  government  was  com- 
peting  unlawfully   with   it  in   the  trans- 

oriaiion  of  mail  matter,  and  that  the 
tariff  schedules  of  defendant  were  un- 
lawful and  in  violation  of  the  Act. 
HELD,  that  in  the  acts  charged  there 
was  no  transgression  of  any  provision 
of  the  Act  and  that  the  Commission 
was  without  jurisdiction.  Williams  v. 
Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  17,  18. 

(g)  The  Commission  has  no  juris- 
diction over  a  discrimination  arising 
through  a  low  intrastate  rate  where  the 
interstate  rates  are  not  shown  to  be 
unreasonable  per  se.  Saunders  v. 
Southern    Express    Co.,    18    I.    C.   C.    415. 

(h)  The  Act  should  be  so  construed 
as  to  leave  to  carriers  the  greatest 
possible  latitude  in  the  management  of 
their  business,  consistent  with  proper 
protection  of  the  public.  In  Re  Con- 
tracts of  Express  Companies,  16  I.  C. 
C.    246,    249. 

(i)  There  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Commission  of  any 
question  of  discrimination  connected 
with  the  service  of  the  express  compa- 
nies as  carriers.  American  Bankers' 
Assn.  V.  American  Express  Co.,  15  I. 
C.  C.  15,  21. 

(j)  The  questions  of  where  the  of- 
fices of  an  express  company  shall  be 
located  or  what  hours  the  offices  shall 
be  open  are  not  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Commission,  unless  it  be  shown 
that  an  office  is  not  kept  open  sufli- 
ciently  long  to  reasonably  accommodate 
the  public  in  its  demand  upon  the  serv- 
ices of  the  express  company  as  a  car- 
rier. American  Bankers'  Assn.  v.  Amer- 
ican  Express    Co.,    15   L    C.   C.    15,   22. 

(k)  Under  section  15  of  the  Act, 
the  .Commission  has  jurisdiction  to  de- 
termine the  lawfulness  of  a  rule  pro- 
mulgated by  an  express  company  for- 
bidding its  agent  to  receive  for  ship- 
ment at  bulk  rates  goods  assembled 
by  public  shipping  companies  not  own- 
ing the  same.  California  Commercial 
Ass'n  V.  Wells-Fargo  &  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
422,    425. 

(1)  Where  the  conduct  of  express 
companies  in  failing  to  make  delivery 
to  residences  or  places  of  business  of 
consignees  is  objectionable,  complaint 
should  be  made  to  the  Interstate  Com- 


374 


EXPRESS  COMPANIES,  §11/2   (a)— §3  (c) 


merce  Commission,  and  not  to  the 
courts.  State  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  171 
Ind.  138,  151,  85  N.  E.  337  and  966. 

§114.     State    Regulation. 

See   Courts,    §11    (i);    Interstate   Com- 
merce,   §4. 

(a)  Under  the  Act,  as  amended  in 
1906,  a  state  court  has  no  jurisdiction 
to  determine  whether  an  express  com- 
pany shall,  as  to  interstate  commerce 
shipments,  deliver  packages  to  the  resi- 
dences and  places  of  business  of  con- 
signees, since  there  has  been  an  assum^n 
tion  of  exclusive  jurisdiction  by  Con- 
gress over  such  shipments  down  to  the 
point  where  the  transit  is  entirely  at  an 
end.  State  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  171 
Ind.  138,  144,  85  N.  E.  337  and  966. 

(b)  Where  a  state  statute  requires 
express  companies  to  deliver  at  the  resi- 
dences and  places  of  business  of  con- 
signees in  such  a  way  as  to  impose  ad- 
ditional burdens  and  call  for  a  revision 
of  interstate  rates,  it  is  in  conflict  with 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  as  amended 
in  1906,  and  is  void.  State  v.  Adams 
Express  Co.,  171  Ind.  138,  153,  85  N.  E. 
337  and  966. 

(c)  A  state  statute  attempting  to 
compel  express  companies  to  deliver  in- 
terstate shipments  to  residences  and 
places  of  business  is  rendered  void  by 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  as 
amended  June  29,  1906.  State  v.  Adams 
Express  Co.,  171  Ind.  138,  154,  85  N.  E. 
337  and  966. 

II.     FACILITIES. 

§2.     Delivery    and    Receipt. 
See    Transportation,    §8. 

,a)  Complainant's  place  of  business 
is  on  Green  Bay  Ave.,  Milwaukee,  Wis., 
six  and  one-half  blocks  north  of  Hadley 
St.,  to  which  street  free  gathering  and 
delivering  service  was  extended  in  the 
direction  of  Green  Bay  Ave.,  from  de- 
fendant's general  offices  in  the  central 
part  of  the  city.  Defendant's  wagons 
pass  up  Green  Bay  Ave.  on  the  way 
to  the  depot.  Free  gathering  and  deliv- 
ery was  extended  to  shippers  on  Western 
and  Fond  du  Lac  Aves.  to  a  distance  of 
about  four  miles  from  defendant's  gen- 
eral offices,  whereas  complainants'  place 
of  business  is  within  three  miles.  HELD, 
the  action  of  the  defendant  is  an  unjust 
discrimination      in      violation      of     law. 


Strauss    v.    American    Express    Co.,    19 
I.   C.   C.   112. 

(b)  Where,  upon  a  complaint  against 
an  express  company  to  compel  it  to 
extend  free  delivery  to  an  address  in 
Chicago,  the  parties  at  the  hearing 
stipulate  that  since  the  filing  of  the 
complaint  the  free  delivery  requested 
has  been  extended  by  defendant  and 
will  be  kept  in  force  as  long  as  present 
conditions  prevail,  the  complaint  at  the 
request  of  the  parties  will  be  dismissed. 
Pyro  Art  Club  v.  United  States  Ex- 
press Co.,   16  I.   C.  C.   37. 

(c)  The  right  of  an  express  company 
to  maintain  a  free  package  pick-up  and 
delivery  service  at  one  point,  while  not 
maintaining  such  a  service  at  another 
point,  must  necessarily  be  controlled 
by  the  conditions  existing  at  each  place, 
and  because  such  a  service  is  main- 
tained at  one  place,  where  the  volume 
of  the  traffic  is  large  and  a  wagon  serv- 
ice can  be  conducted  economically,  it 
by  no  means  follows  that  a  like  service 
must  be  maintained  at  another  point, 
where  the  traffic  is  small  and  the  cost 
of  keeping  up  a  wagon  service  might 
more  than  absorb  the  revenue.  Phil- 
lips V.  N.  Y.  &  B.  D.  Express  Co.,  15 
I.    C.    C.    631,    635. 

§3.     C.   O.   D.   Shipments. 

(a)  It  is  not  unjust  discrimination  for 
an  express  company  to  refuse  to  accept 
C.  O.  D.  shipments  of  intoxicating  liquors 
under  a  rule  applying  alike  to  all  ship- 
pers where  such  shipments  result  in 
undesirable  conditions  and  in  financial 
loss  to  the  company.  Burke  v.  Piatt, 
172  Fed.  777. 

(b)  A  decision  on  a  motion  made 
by  a  shipper  for  a  preliminary  injunc- 
tion against  an  express  company  for 
refusing  to  accept  from  all  shippers  C. 
O.  D.  shipments  of  intoxicating  liquor 
will  be  withheld  until  the  defendant  is 
given  an  opportunity  to  show  that  such 
shipments  impose  on  it  an  unreason- 
able burden  and  that  its  refusal  to  ac- 
cept same  does  not  constitute  undue 
discrimination.  Davis  Hotel  Co.  v. 
Piatt,   172  Fed.  775,  776. 

(c)  There  is  no  common  law  duty 
resting  on  an  express  company  to  act 
as  the  collection  agent  of  a  shipper,  but 
if  such  an  obligation  is  assumed  it 
arises  on  some  independent  contract, 
which  the  company  may  refuse  to  make. 


EXPRESS  COMPANIES,  §3  (d)— §6  (b) 


375 


Royal    Brewing    Co.    v.    Adams    Express 
Co.,   15   I.   C.    C.  255,  258. 

(d)  The  acceptance  of  C.  O.  D.  ship- 
ments of  intoxicating  liquors  is  a  mat- 
ter of  contract  and  an  express  com- 
pany may  refuse  to  make  such  a  con- 
tract notwithstanding  any  usage  or 
custom  it  may  have  established  or  fol- 
lowed. Royal  Brewing  Co.  v.  Adams 
Express  Co.,  15  I.  C.   C.  255,   258. 

(e)  Defenda  t  express  companies 
promulgated  a  rule  applying  to  all  ship- 
pers refusing  to  receive  C.  O.  D.  ship- 
ments of  intoxicating  liquors.  By  the 
pleadings  it  appeared  that  liquor  ship- 
pers were  accustomed  to  send  large 
quantities  of  liquors  to  fictitious  ad- 
dresses without  receiving  bona  fide 
orders  therefor;  that  the  shippers 
would  upon  the  arrival  of  liquors  scurry 
about  for  customers,  meanwhile  using 
the  offices  of  defendants  as  warehouses; 
that  the  presence  of  the  liquor  in  said 
offices  had  a  demoralizing  effect  upon 
defendant's  employes,  resulting  in  em- 
bezzlements and  drunkenness,  and  in- 
duced a  lawless  element  to  break  into 
said  offices  to  steal  said  liquor;  and 
that  defendants  were  subjected  to  heavy 
penalties  for  violation  of  local  liquor 
laws.  HELD,  said  rule  was  justified 
by  conditions  and  was  not  in  violation 
of  section  3  of  the  Act.  Royal  Brewing 
Co.  V.  Adams  Express  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
255,  258. 

§4.     Export   Service. 

(a)  Defendant  express  companies  in 
receiving  shipments  destined  to  for- 
eign parts  where  the  base  rate  to  New 
York  exceeded  $1  per  100  lbs.  and  the 
shipments  exceeded  300  lbs.  deducted 
by  their  published  inland  rate  33  1-3  per 
cent  for  the  inland  portion  of  the 
through  rate,  but  made  such  reduction 
only  where  the  shipments  were  con- 
signed to  themselves  at  New  York  to 
be  shipped  abroad  over  their  own  for- 
eign branch  service.  Complainant  ship- 
per of  raw  furs  from  St.  Paul  to  New 
York  and  foreign  points  claimed  that 
this  practice  resulted  in  giving  a  lov^er 
rate  to  New  York  to  certain  shippers, 
and  asked  that  defendants  be  compelled 
to  extend  to  all  shippers  the  reduced 
proportional  rate  with  the  privilege  re- 
served to  all  shippers  to  select  the 
steamship,  route,  etc.,  to  the  foreign 
point.  HELD,  following  Cosmopolitan 
Shipping      Co.      v.      Hamburg-American 


Packet  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  266,  complain- 
ant's demand  should  be  granted  to 
make  certain  that  the  traflic  which  on- 
joyed  the  lower  rate  was  actually  ex- 
ported. Joseph  Ullman  v.  Adams  Ex- 
press Co.,  14   I.  C.   C.   340,  344,  345. 

§5.  Free  Transportation. 
See  Crimes,  III. 
(a)  Under  the  Act  as  amended  by 
the  Elkins  Act  of  February  19,  1903, 
and  the  Hepburn  Act  of  June  29,  1906, 
an  express  company  was  prohibited  from 
issuing  franks  to  any  officer,  agent,  at- 
torney or  employe  of  itself  or  other 
express  companies,  and  of  any  railroad 
company,  and  to  the  respective  families 
of  such  persons,  and  from  transporting, 
without  demanding  the  payment  of  the 
full  published  rates,  any  property  of  such 
persons  in  an  interstate  shipment,  the 
granting  of  such  privileges  not  being 
within  the  exceptions  enumerated  in 
section  1  of  the  original  Act,  which 
provides  that  no  common  carrier  shall 
directly  or  indirectly  issue  any  inter- 
state free  tickets,  free  pass,  or  free 
transportation  for  passengers  except 
its  employes  and  their  families,  its 
officers,  agents,  etc.  United  States  v. 
Wells-Fargo  Express  Co.,  161  Fed.  606, 
616. 

§6.     IVIoney    Orders. 

(a)  Complainant  bankers  requested 
the  Commission  to  order  defendant  ex- 
press companies  to  disconiinue  the 
business  of  issuing  money  orders,  let- 
ters of  credit,  travelers'  checks  and 
drafts,  purchase  of  foreign  exchange 
and  purchase  and  sale  of  foreign  money, 
etc.,  on  the  ground  that  said  business 
peculiarly  belonged  to  complainants  and 
that  defendants  in  transportini;  money 
for  themselves  in  connection  with  said 
lines  of  business  carried  the  same  at 
lower  rates  than  they  accorded  to  com- 
plainants. HELD,  on  motion  of  defend- 
ants to  dismiss  the  complaint  defend- 
ants had  a  right  to  engage  in  said 
lines  of  business,  but  evidence  should 
be  submitted  on  the  question  whether 
in  the  transportation  of  money  defend- 
ants were  unduly  discriminating  against 
complainants  and  in  favor  of  them- 
selves, American  Bankers'  Ass'n  v. 
American  Express  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  15,  24. 

(b)  Where  a  United  States  Circuit 
Court  has  declared  a  provision  of  the 
Act  unconstitutional,  the  Commission 
will    not    undertake    to   apply   sush   pro- 


376 


EXPRESS   COMPANIES,  §6   (c)— §8    (d) 


vision  in  a  close  or  far-reaching  question 
such  as  the  right  of  express  companies 
to  engage  in  the  issuing  of  money 
orders,  letters  of  credit,  etc.  American 
Bankers'  Ass'n  v.  American  Express  Co., 
15    I.    C.    C.    15,    20. 

(c)  If  an  express  companj^'s  charges 
for  the  transportation  of  money  covered 
only  the  actual  cost  of  that  service 
it  would  he  no  discrimination  for  it 
to  ship  its  own  money.  American 
Bankers'  Ass'n  v.  American  Express  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  15,  22. 

§7.     Prepaid   and   Collect   Shipments. 

(a)  On  shipments  from  New  York 
City  to  Boise,  Idaho,  defendant  express 
companies  charged  a  higher  rate  for 
packages  sent  collect  than  for  those 
sent  prepaid.  HELD,  such  practice  was 
unlawful.  It  is  fundamental  there  can 
be  but  one  lawful  rate  between  two 
points  and  the  law  takes  no  cognizance 
whatever  of  the  distinction  made  by 
express  companies  between  prepaid  and 
collect  shipments.  It  is  a  carrier's 
right  as  a  public  service  corporation  to 
demand  prepayment  on  all  shipments 
and  it  may  not  distinguish  between 
persons  who  pay  in  advance  and  those 
who  do  not.  The  carrier  may  waive 
its  right  to  demand  prepayment  and  ac- 
cept a  shipment  with  the  understanding 
that  it  will  collect  the  charges  upon 
delivery  to  consignee;  but  if  it  does  not 
collect  such  charges  from  the  consignee 
it  must  look  to  the  consignor  for  pay- 
ment. The  collection  of  the  lawful 
rate  is  a  duty  imposed  on  the  carrier 
by  law,  and  it  is  given  a  lien  upon  the 
property  transported  to  enforce  the 
payment  of  charges.  To  accept  a  ship- 
ment without  prepayment  is  no  more 
than  to  extend  credit  to  the  consignor, 
and  this  within  reasonable  and  non-dis- 
criminatory limits  it  may  do.  But 
neither  a  railroad,  an  express  company 
nor  other  public  carrier  may  lawfully 
make  rates  based  upon  the  waiver  of 
Its  right  to  collect  charges  at  the  time 
it  receives  a  shipment.  Boise  Com- 
mercial Club  V.  Adams  Express  Co.,  17 
I.    C.    C.    115,    121. 

§8.     Special    Contracts. 

(a)  A  railway  company  may  lawfully 
transport  the  men  and  supplies  of  an 
express  company  without  reference  to 
any  tariff  provision,  when  employed  or 
used  in  the  business  of  the  express 
comply   upon   the   line   of   the   railway 


itself,  and  in  the  same  manner  an  ex- 
press company  may  lawfully  transport 
the  packages  of  a  railway  company  be- 
tween points  upon  that  line  of  railway, 
without  reference  to  its  tariff  rates; 
but  a  railway  company  may  not  trans- 
port men  and  supplies  for  an  express 
company  when  employed  and  used  in 
the  business  of  that  company  at  points 
not  on  the  line  of  railway,  and  an  ex- 
press company  may  not  transport  for 
the  railway  packages  between  points 
on  its  route  but  not  on  that  particular 
line  of  railway.  In  the  Matter  of 
Free  Transportation,  16  I.  C.  C.  246, 
250. 

(b)  Any  contract  for  the  free  trans- 
portation of  men  and  materials  of  ex- 
press companies  to  points  off  the  line 
of  a  carrier,  though  valid  when  entered 
Into,  must  become  invalid  under  the 
operation  of  the  Act.  In  Re  Contracts 
of  Express  Companies,  16  I.  C.  C.  246, 
253. 

(c)  A  contract  between  an  express 
company  and  railroad  companies  over 
whose  lines  it  operates  providing  that 
the  former  shall  not  charge  less  than  a 
certain  percentage  over  the  railroad 
rate  applying  on  the  same  commodity 
between  the  same  points,  cannot  be  con- 
sidered as  a  controlling  factor  iii  pass- 
ing upon  the  reasonableness  of  the  ex- 
press rates.  The  Commission  will,  of 
course,  notice  the  railroad  rate  as 
affording  a  basis  of  comparison,  but  the 
law  requires  the  fixing  of  just  and 
reasonable  charges,  and  the  authority 
of  the  Commission  to  prescribe  a  rea- 
sonable rate  is  not  restricted  by  the 
terms  of  any  agreement  between  the 
express  company  and  the  railroad  com- 
pany. Reynolds  v.  Southern  Express 
Co.,    13    I.    C.    C.    536,    539. 

(d)  Complainant  attacked  defendant's 
express  rate  of  60c  from  Boston,  Mass., 
to  Bristol  Ferry,  R.  I.,  58  miles,  as 
compared  with  that  of  50c  to  Fall 
River,  51  miles  from  Boston.  A  mini- 
mum charge  of  15c  on  packages  of 
5  lbs.  and  under  was  made  to  Fall  River 
and  of  25c  to  Bristol  Ferry.  The  Fall 
River  defendant  furnished  a  free  pick- 
up and  delivery  service  while  not  ac- 
cording the  same  to  Bristol  Ferry.  Fall 
River  had  a  population  of  over  100,000, 
and  Bristol  Ferry  of  73.  At  Fall  River 
defendant  met  severe  competition  with 
other  express  companies  operating  over 
freight  trains  at  lower  rates  and  furnish- 


EXPRESS   COMPANIES,  §8    (e)— §9    (a) 


377 


ing  a  free  pick-up  and  delivery  serv- 
ice. Defendant  had  no  competition  at 
Bristol  Ferry.  The  total  business  done 
by  defendant  at  Fall  River  was  some 
$64,000  annually,  as  compared  with  some 
$276  at  Bristol  Ferry.  The  territory 
between  'Boston  and  Newport  was  di- 
vided into  four  zones,  the  first  zone, 
20  mil€s  wide,  taking  a  rate  of  85c;  the 
second  zone,  the  same  width,  a  rate  of 
40c;  the  third,  10  miles  in  width  and 
including  Fall  River,  50c,  and  the 
fourth,  20  miles  wide,  including  Bristol 
Ferry,  60c.  The  rates  complained  of 
were  respectively  10  and  15c  lower  than 
formerly  to  Fall  River  and  Bristol 
Ferry.  Defendant's  evidence  indicated 
that  it  was  operating  at  a  loss.  HELD, 
the  rates  attacked  were  not  shown  to 
be  unreasonable  per  se,  nor  was  Bristol 
Ferry  unduly  discriminated  against  in 
view  of  the  difference  in  competitive 
conditions  at  that  point  and  Fall  River. 
Phillips  V.  N.  Y.  &  B.  D.  Express  Co., 
15   I.   C.   C.   631,   632,  633. 

(e)  Where  defendant  express  com- 
pany publishes  an  export  rate  from  St. 
Paul  to  New  York  which  is  less  than 
its  domestic  rate,  it  must  offer  that 
rate  to  the  entire  public  and  may  not 
coniane  it  to  itself  nor  to  a  particular 
express  company  or  forwarder.  Joseph 
Ullman  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  585,   587. 

(f)  Complainant  jobbers  in  mattress- 
es and  bed  springs  at  Denver,  Colo., 
shipping  by  express  to  and  from  points 
outside  Colorado  alleged  that  the  rates 
from  eastern  points  to  Denver  and  those 
between  Denver  and  western  points  were 
unduly  discriminatory  against  Denver  in 
that  the  rates  from  eastern  points  to 
Denver  were  made  by  combination  upon 
the  Missouri  River  and  other  shipping 
centers,  while  the  rate  through  Denver 
to  points  west  was  usually  lower  than 
the  sum  of  the  locals  to  and  from 
Denver.  The  rate  from  New  York  to 
Omaha  was  $4.50,  from  Omaha  to  Og- 
den,  $6,  making  a  through  rate  of  $10.50 
per  100  lbs.,  while  the  rate  from  New 
York  to  Denver  was  $8.50,  from  Den- 
ver to  Ogden  $4.25,  making  a  through 
rate  via  Denver  of  $12.75.  Complainant 
urged  these  rates  gave  the  Omaha 
merchant  an  advantage  over  the  Denver 
merchant  of  $2.25.  Most  merchandise, 
however,  moved  by  freight  with  the  ex- 
ception of  millinery  goods  and  photo- 
graphic supplies.  HELD,  the  amount 
of  merchandise  moving  by  express  was 


comparatively  so  slight  that  unjust  dis- 
crimination against  Denver  did  not 
arise.  Kindel  v.  Adams  Express  Co., 
13   I.   C.   C.   475,   480. 

(g)  The  express  rates  from  Chicago 
to  Omaha  were  $2  per  100  lbs.,  a  dis- 
tance of  500  miles,  while  from  Omaha 
to  Denver,  550  miles,  they  were  $4,  and 
from  Denver  to  Ogden,  600  miles,  they 
were  $4.25.  As  density  in  the  express 
traffic  reaches  a  certain  point  the  com- 
panies make  no  greater  profit  on  in- 
creased business  than  on  the  business 
before  its  increase.  In  the  Omaha  to 
Denver  and  Denver  to  Ogden  territory 
the  density  of  traffic  had  reached  such 
a  point  and  the  per  mile  earnings  were 
practically  as  great  as  in  the  Chicago 
to  Omaha  territory.  The  relation  of 
rates  had  been  in  effect  for  20  years. 
Freight  rates  had  been  reduced  in  the 
western  territory,  but  express  rates  re- 
mained stationary.  HELD,  the  dis- 
crimination against  Omaha  to  Denver 
and  Denver  to  Ogden  territory  was  un- 
justified, and  the  rates  from  Omaha  to 
Denver  should  not  exceed  $3.50  and 
from  Denver  to  Ogden  $4,  the  Commis- 
sion intimating  the  Omaha  to  Denver 
rates  ought  not  to  be  above  $3  and 
the  Denver  to  Ogden  above  $3.50,  but 
confining  its  order  to  putting  into  effect 
the  first  mentioned  reductions.  Kindel 
V.  Adams  Exp  ss  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  475, 
495. 

Ml.     DISCRIMINATION. 

§9.     In    General. 

See  Forwarders,    II    (b),   (d),   (e),    (f). 

(a)  Pensacola,  Fla.,  and  Mobile,  Ala., 
were  competitors  in  the  sale  of  fish  to 
Birmingham,  Montgomery,  Selma,  Green- 
ville, Evergreen  and  other  Alabama 
points.  The  shipment  from  Mobile  to 
these  points  is  entirely  intrastate, 
whereas  that  from  Pensacola  is  inter- 
state. For  many  years  the  same  ex- 
press rates  on  fish  were  maintained 
from  Mobile  and  Pensacola  to  these 
Alabama  cities.  These  rates,  taking 
Birmingham  as  a  typical  point,  were 
$1  per  100  lbs.  and  $1.75  per  sugar 
barrel,  containing  200  lbs.  of  fish,  ice  to 
the  amount  of  25  per  cent  of  that 
weight  being  carried  free.  September 
15,  1907,  the  Alabama  Commission  re- 
duced the  rate  from  Mobile  to  Birming- 
ham to  55c  per  100  lbs.  with  an  ar- 
rangement giving  a  sugar  barrel  rate  of 
$1.32     with     icing     privileges.       Defend- 


378 


EXPRESS  COMPANIES,  §9   (b)— §11  (1)    (a) 


ant's  rate  from  Pensacola  was  not  re- 
duced and  complainant  shippers  at  Pen- 
sacola attacked  the  same  as  discrimina- 
tory in  favor  of  Mobile.  Prior  to  this 
reduction  of  rates  the  Pensacola  fish 
dealers  through  natural  advantages  and 
skillful  methods  had  acquired  the  larger 
volume  of  the  business,  but  subsequent 
thereto  their  business  diminished  and 
that  of  Mobile  dealers  largely  increased. 
Complainants  did  not  attack  the  Mobile 
rate  as  unreasonable  per  se  which  com- 
pared favorably  with  the  rate  from 
Hainesville,  Fla.,  to  St.  Louis,  and  with 
the  rates  on  fish  shipped  from  South 
Carolina,  Arkansas,  Mississippi  and 
Virginia.  The  rates  established  by  the 
Alabama  Commission  were  found  by  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  to 
afford  less  than  reasonable  compensa- 
tion. Defendant  express  company  pro- 
tested against  the  action  of  the  Ala- 
bama Commission  and  made  efforts  to 
secure  a  withdrawal  or  a  modification 
of  the  order,  and  the  continuance  of  the 
Mobile  rates  was  therefore  not  voluntary. 
HELD,  although  the  rate  adjustment 
attacked  was  unjustly  discriminatory 
against  Pensacola,  the  Commission  had 
no  authority  to  order  the  defendant 
to  cease  such  discrimination  since  the 
Mobile  rates  were  intrastate  and  out- 
side the  Commission's  jurisdiction  and 
were  less  than  reasonable  rates,  and 
the  Pensacola  rates  were  not  shown  to 
be  unreasonable  per  se.  Order  dis- 
missing the  complaint  withheld,  how- 
ever, until  defendant  should  make  fur- 
ther effort  to  secure  a  modification  of 
the  Mobile  rates.  Saunders  and  Welles 
V.  Southern  Express  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  415, 
422. 

(b)  Even  where  unjust  and  undue 
discrimination,  free  from  criminal  act,  is 
shown  to  exist  in  the  practices  of  ex- 
press companies,  the  Commission  will 
go  no  further  in  destruction  or  disturb- 
ance of  the  business  of  the  carrier, 
or  in  depriving  the  public  of  conven- 
iences and  facilities  of  value  to  it, 
than  is  necessary  in  order  to  remove 
the  discrimination  to  the  extent  that  is 
unjust  or  undue.  American  Bankers' 
Ass'n  v.  American  Express  Co.,  15  I. 
C.   C.  15,  21. 

IV.     RATES. 

§10.     Reasonableness    in    General. 

See  Weights  and  Weighing,  §8  (b). 
(a)     The    putting    in    by    an    express 
company   of   certain   prescribed   reduced 


rates  will  exempt  the  railroad  from  the 
requirement  to  do  so.  Cobb  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.   Co.,   20  I.   C.   C.  100,   104. 

(b)  The  question  of  what  is  a  rea- 
sonable rate  for  a  transportation  serv- 
ice upon  a  certain  commodity  .must  be 
determined  individually,  and  the  ques- 
tion of  what  other  traffic  may  or  may 
not  move  has  no  bearing  upon  the  de- 
termination of  this  particular  issue. 
Ohio  Face  Brick  Mfrs.  Ass'n  v.  Ad- 
ams  Express   Co.,    20   I.    C.    C.   582,    585. 

(c)  A  system  must  be  developed  by 
which  express  rates  shall  conform  to 
standards  to  which  railroads  have  in  a 
great  measure  conformed  and  which 
the  law  enjoins.  Boise  Commercial 
Club  V.  Adams  Express  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
115,    122. 

(d)  There  can  be  but  one  lawful 
rate  between  two  points,  and  the  law 
takes  no  cognizance  whatever  of  the  dis- 
tinction made  by  express  companies  be- 
tween prepaid  and  collect  shipments. 
Boise  Commercial  Club  v.  Adams  Ex- 
press  Co.,    17  I.   C.   C.   115,   121. 

(e)  The  first  consideration  in  an  ex- 
press service  is  the  quality  of  the  service 
itself,  and  the  compensation  allowed 
should  be  adequate  to  a  service  of  high 
quality.  Maricopa  County  Commercial 
Club  V.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
182,  185. 

(f)  Express  company  differs  in  many 
particulars  from  a  railroad  and  from  a 
water  line.  Ullman  v  Adams  Express 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  585,  587. 

(g)  Express  rates  ought  not  to  be  so 
low  with  reference  to  freight  rates  as  to 
attract  to  the  express  service  business 
which  can  be  properly  and  more  cheaply 
handled  by  freight.  When  a  reasonable 
freight  rate  has  once  been  established 
the  express  rate  in  many  instances  ought 
to  be  fixed  with  reference  to  it.  Never- 
theless there  is  a  wide  field  in  which  ex- 
press charges  may  vary  without  unduly 
diverting  traffic  from  freight  to  express. 
Kindel  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
475,  484. 

§11.     Specific  Rates. 

See    Comparative    Rates. 

§11.     (1)      Bread     and     Cake. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  express 
rates  on  cake  from  Boston,  Mass.,  to  va- 
rious points  in  other  states,  to  the  extent 
that  they   exceeded   the   rate  on   bread- 


EXPRESS  COMPANIES,  §11  (2)    (a)— §11  (4)   (a) 


379 


Bread  is  handled  by  express  in  what  is 
known  as  bread  hampers,  which  are 
boxes  of  three  sizes.  The  cubical  con- 
tents of  these  different  sizes  are,  in  feet, 
3.9,  5  and  7.5.  The  weight  of  the  ham- 
pers in  pounds  is  22,  33  and  45.  The  weight 
of  the  bread  in  pounds,  which  each  of 
these  hampers  will  contain,  is  33,  59  and 
93.  The  weight  of  the  cake  shipped 
varies  greatly  with  the  different  varieties. 
Enough  to  fill  the  largest  sized  hamper 
weighs  from  641/^  to  257  lbs.  An  actual 
test  of  eighteen  days  indicated  that  upon 
the  average  the  net  weight  of  the  con- 
tents of  these  hampers  is  from  25  to  50 
per  cent  more  when  filled  with  cake  than 
when  filled  with  bread.  The  value  of  the 
bread  is  about  4c  per  lb.,  the  average 
value  of  the  cake  shipped  by  complainant 
about  12c  per  lb.  The  defendants  charge 
for  the  transportation  of  bread  their  gen- 
eral special  rate  and  apply  this  rate  to 
the  net  contents  of  the  package,  return- 
ing the  empty  packages  for  5c  each  when 
received  by  the  shipper  at  the  express 
ofllce.  For  the  transportation  of  cake 
the  regular  merchandise  rates  are 
charged,  and  these  rates  are  applied  not 
to  the  net  weight,  but  to  the  gross  weight 
of  the  package.  The  empty  packages  are 
returned  the  same  as  in  the  case  of 
bread.  HELD,  that  defendants  may  prop- 
erly apply  a  somewhat  lower  charge  to 
the  carriage  of  bread  than  of  cake,  but 
that  the  rate  now  applied  to  the  trans- 
portation of  cake  is  unreasonable  and 
ought  not  to  exceed  the  regular  merchan- 
dise rates  of  the  defendants  applied  to 
the  net  weight  of  the  packages.  The 
packages  themselves  when  empty  to  be 
returned  upon  the  same  terms  as  at 
present.  Oak  Grove  Farm  Creamery  v. 
Adams  Express  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  454,  455. 

§11.     (2)     Celery. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  defendant 
express  company's  rate  of  50c  per  100 
lbs.  on  celery  from  Hartville,  O.,  to  Pitts- 
burg, Pa.  Defendant  had  experimented 
at  various  rates,  one  as  low  as  40c,  and 
found  it  was  not  profitable,  and  on  rais- 
ing the  rate  to  50c  lost  the  traffic  from 
celery  growers  in  the  vicinity  of  Hart- 
ville, that  traffic  going  from  Alliance,  O., 
by  the  line  of  defendant's  competitor. 
Complainant's  farms  were  on  an  average 
of  two  and  one-half  miles  from  Hart- 
ville and  twelve  miles  from  Alliance. 
The  rate  from  Alliance  was  40c.  The 
extra  cost  of  hauling  the  celery  to  Alli- 
ance, however,  resulted  in  a  total  ex- 
pense to  complainants  as  high  under  the 


Alliance  rate  as  under  the  Hartville  rate 
attacked.  The  distance  from  Hartville 
to  Pittsburg  is  131  miles;  from  Alliance 
83  miles.  In  shipments  of  less  than  five 
tons  from  Hartville  the  celery  had  to  be 
transferred  from  car  to  car  at  Navarre, 
whereas,  shipments  from  Alliance  went 
direct  to  Pittsburg  without  transfer.  The 
rate  attacked  from  Hartville  was  lower 
than  rates  from  other  points  in  Ohio  to 
Pittsburg  of  similar  or  greater  distances. 
The  first-class  rate  from  Hartville  to 
Pittsburg  was  25c.  HELD,  the  rate  at- 
tacked was  not  shown  to  be  unreason- 
able. Reparation  denied.  Hartville  Cel- 
ery Growers'  Ass'n  v.  Pacific  Express  Co., 
14  L  C  C.  590,  592. 

§11.     (3)     cream   Cans. 

(a)  On  shipments  of  cream  to  Omaha 
defendant  express  company  charged  5c 
for  the  return  of  the  empty  can,  but 
claimed  the  charge  was  so  low  it  could 
not  afford  to  issue  receipts  for  said  cans 
or  to  pay  damages  for  loss  thereof.  Com- 
plainant alleged  violation  of  section  20 
of  the  amended  Act  by  the  failure  to 
issue  said  receipts.  HELD,  defendant 
recommended  to  install  some  satisfactory 
system  for  keeping  account  of  said  cans, 
but  no  order  entered.  The  question  of 
alleged  violation  not  decided.  Fairmont 
Creamery  Co.  v.  Pacific  Express  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  134,  135. 

§11.      (4)      Drygoods. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  express 
rate  of  50c  on  a  package  of  dry  goods  or 
other  merchandise  weighing  from  3  to  4 
lbs.  from  St.  Paul,  Minn.,  to  Courtenay, 
N.  D.,  and  the  charge  of  $1.90  on  a  pack- 
age of  medicine  or  other  merchandise 
weighing  10  to  15  lbs.  from  New  York 
City  to  Courtenay,  the  latter  rate  being 
$1.15  charged  by  defendant.  Wells,  Fargo 
&  Co.,  New  York  to  St.  Paul,  and  75c 
charged  by  defendant  Western  Express 
Co.  from  St.  Paul  to  Courtenay.  The 
50c  rate  attacked  was  made  in  competi- 
tion with  the  United  States  mails.  Under 
Official  Express  Classification,  almanacs, 
blanks,  blotters,  printed  matter,  samples 
of  grain,  etc.,  were  charged  Ic  for  every 
2  ounces,  or  fraction  thereof,  minimum 
charge,  10c.  Valley  City,  N.  D.,  and 
Courtenay  are  located  on  the  same  line, 
the  former  297  miles  from  St.  Paul,  and 
the  latter  331.  The  charge  on  a  ship- 
ment of  15  lbs.  from  New  York  to  Valley 
City,  a  competitive  point,  was  $1.50. 
Courtenay  was  an  exclusive  office.  The 
charge  of  $2  per  100  lbs.  from  St.  Paul 


380 


EXPRESS  COMPANIES,  §11  (5)    (a)— §11  (9)    (a) 


to  Courtenay,  upon  which  the  50c  rate 
complained  of  was  graduated,  repre- 
sented the  usual  basis  of  express  rates, 
as  compared  with  freight  rates,  namely 
two  and  one-half  times  the  first-class 
freight  rate.  The  merchandise  rate  from 
New  York  to  Courtenay  was  $6.50  per 
100  lbs.,  and  packages  of  10  and  not  over 
15  lbs.  were  assessed  the  charge  of  $1.90, 
inasmuch  as  the  reshipment  moved  over 
two  lines  and  the  per  100  lb.  rates  of 
$4.50  from  New  York  City  to  St.  Paul 
and  $2  from  St.  Paul  to  Courtenay,  grad- 
uated twice,  were  used.  Complainant  sub- 
mitted no  other  evidence  except  to  give 
his  opinion,  without  qualifying  as  an  ex- 
pert, that  the  rates  complained  of  were 
unreasonable,  and  to  submit  various 
comparisons  of  rates,  distances  and  com- 
modities charged  by  defendants  in  other 
portions  of  the  United  •  States.  HELD, 
that  the  50c  rate  attacked  was  not  shown 
to  be  unreasonable,  the  same  being  made 
in  competition  with  the  United  States 
mails;  and  that  the  Commission  was  not 
justified  on  the  evidence  submitted  and 
without  taking  into  account  the  v/holo 
schedule  of  express  rates  in  the  terri- 
tory involved  in  holding  the  $1.90  rate 
unreasonable.  Sanford  v.  Western  Ex- 
press Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  32,  34,  36. 

§11.      (5)      Eggs. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  express 
rate  of  47c  per.  case  on  eggs,  Pulaski, 
Tenn.,  to  Birmingham,  Ala.  This  rate, 
which  became  effective  a  week  before  the 
shipments  were  made,  was  an  advance 
of  lie  over  the  previous  rate  of  36c. 
Defendant  contended  that  although  this 
rate  was  in  effect  about  eight  years  its 
original  publication  was  an  error  and 
that  an  express  rate  v/hich  slightly  ex- 
ceeds the  freight  rate  is  not  properly 
adjusted,  and  that  the  present  rate  ap- 
proaches more  closely  the  proper  rela- 
tion between  express  rates  and  freight 
rates.  HELD,  as  there  was  no  evidence 
of  the  reasonableness  of  the  freight  rate 
before  the  Commission  and  substantially 
the  only  justification  of  the  express 
charge  is  a  statement  that  it  ought  to  be 
a  certain  percentage  of  the  freight  rate, 
it  cannot  be  held  that  the  express  com- 
pany has  sustained  the  burden  of  proof 
imposed  upon  it  by  the  Act;  neither  can 
it  be  conceded  that  the  alleged  erroneous 
publication  of  a  rate  which  remains  in 
effect  for  a  period  of  more  than  eight 
years  is  a  sufficient  reason  for  its  in- 
crease.    Reparation  awarded.     Franklin, 


Stiles   &   Franklin   v.   Southern   Express 
Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  88. 

§11.     (6)      Fish. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  express 
rate  of  3c  per  lb.  on  fish  in  sugar  bar- 
rels, flour  barrels  and  tubs  from  Haines 
City,  Fla.,  to  St.  Louis.  The  freight  rate 
in  effect  was  2c  per  lb.,  distance  1,200 
miles.  The  shipments  were  made  under 
estimated  weights.  Prior  to  the  passage 
of  the  Hepburn  Act  and  for  some  time 
thereafter  complainant  overloaded  his 
shipments  above  the  prescribed  weight 
per  barrel  and  also  loaded  with  ice  above 
the  prescribed  weight.  Defendant  com- 
pelled him  to  desist  from  such  practices 
and  the  higher  charges  resulting  there- 
from were  the  basis  of  his  complaint. 
The  shipments  required  fast  trains  and 
special  attention  and  were  delivered  to 
the  door  of  the  consignees.  HELD,  the 
rate  attacked  was  not  unreasonable.  Ban- 
non  V.  Southern  Express  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C 
516,   520. 

§11.      (7)      Guinea   Pigs,    Rabbits,    Rats. 

(a)  On  shipments  from  Vineland, 
N.  J.,  to  Philadelphia  and  other  Pennsyl- 
vania points  and  to  New  York  City  and 
Chicago  of  guinea  pigs,  rabbits  and  rats 
to  be  used  for  laboratory  and  scientific 
purposes,  a  charge  of  double  merchan- 
dise rates  by  defendant  express  com- 
panies is  unreasonable,  and  merchandise 
rates  should  be  charged  where  it  ap- 
pears that  such  animals  are  shipped  in 
secure  containers  and  do  not  require 
feeding  or  watering,  or  other  special 
care  en  route.  Davis  v.  West  Jersey  Ex- 
press Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  214,  216. 

§11.     (8)      Merchandise. 

(a)  On  merchandise  shipped  by  ex- 
press from  Washington,  D.  C,  to  Brem- 
erton, Wash.,  complainant  was  assessed 
$11.75  per  100  lbs.,  the  sum  of  the  locals 
between  the  points  in  question  being 
$11.35.  About  one  year  after  the  ship- 
ment defendants  established  the  $11.35 
rate  as  a  joint  through  rate.  HELD,  the 
rate  charged  was  unreasonable.  Repara- 
tion awarded  on  the  basis  of  the  $11.35 
rate.  U.  S.  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  394,  395. 

§11.      (9)      Milk  and   Cream. 

(a)  The  express  rates  on  milk  from 
Minnesota  points  to  Duluth  were  at- 
tacked as  unreasonable  and  discrimi- 
natory.    The  shipments   passed  through 


EXPRESS  COMPANIES,  §11  (9)   (b)— (c) 


381 


Wisconsin.  The  G.  N.  Ry.,  over  which 
defendant  express  company  operates, 
runs  from  Duluth  to  Brook  Park,  Minn., 
where  it  divides  into  two  branches,  one 
running  southerly  to  Coon  Creek,  Minn., 
the  other  westerly  to  St.  Cloud.  St. 
Cloud  and  Coon  Creek  are  joined  by  an- 
other branch,  th-us  completing  a  triangle. 
Across  this  triangle  another  branch  line 
extends  from  Milaca  on  the  Brook  Park- 
St.  Cloud  side.  The  rates  questioned  in- 
clude the  rates  from  all  points  in  the 
triangle  and  all  points  between  Brook 
Park  and  Duluth.  Distances  from  St. 
Cloud  and  from  Coon  Creek  to  Duluth 
are  140  and  134  miles,  respectively.  Com- 
plainant does  not  purchase  milk  at  more 
than  120  miles  from  Duluth.  The  rates 
charged  for  both  milk  and  cream  are 
set  forth  in  a  distance  schedule  which 
fixes  the  rate  at  intervals  of  five  miles. 
These  rates  are  the  same  ;.s  those  pre- 
scribed for  cream  by  the  Commission  in 
Beatrice  Creamery  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  109.  For  a  number  of  years 
prior  to  1907  defendant  had  charged  the 
same  rates  for  both  cream  and  milk. 
The  Minnesota  Commission  established 
new  and  separate  schedules  in  1907,  The 
milk  rate  was  75  per  cent  of  the  cream 
rate.  Such  rates  were  applied  by  the 
carriers  on  all  shipments  to  Duluth 
whether  interstate  or  intrastate.  Later 
the  reasonableness  of  the  cream  rate 
came  before  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  and  the  rate  was  fixed  in  ac 
cordance  with  the  rates  adopted  in  the 
Beatrice  case.  Defendant  published  a 
tariff  in  1911  naming  the  same  rates  for 
the  transportation  of  milk.  Complainant 
asked  that  the  Minnesota  Commission's 
rate  on  milk  be  restored.  Defendant  al 
leged  a  custom  prior  to  1907  to  charge 
the  same  rate  on  milk  and  cream;  that 
tl-  3  tariff  which  increased  the  milk  rat'  - 
reduced  the  cream  rates;  that  the  two 
commodities  are  transported  in  the  same 
manner,  move  in  the  same  cars,  occupy 
the  same  space,  claims  for  loss  or  dam- 
age are  nominal  on  both,  and  empty  cans 
are  returned  to  the  shipper  in  each  case. 
They  differ  only  in  the  greater  cost  of 
cream  and  the  greater  volume  of  the 
aovement  of  cream.  The  Minnesota 
Commission's  order  gave  no  reason  for 
fixing  lower  rr.tes  on  milk  than  on  cream. 
The  Wisconsin  Comrission  pres'iribed 
the  same  difference  in  the  rates  on  the 
two  commodities  for  the  following  rea- 
sons: the  rates  as  originally  promulgated 
were  terminal  rates  to  milk-consuming 
centers;    shipments    of    cream    were    so 


small  that  it  was  thought  not  worth 
while  to  make  separate  tariffs  for  them; 
now  milk  consti':utes  but  a  small  part  '^r 
the  tonnage  due  to  the  centralized  sys- 
tem *f  manufacturing  butter;  cream  is 
from  six  to  ten  times  more  valuable  than 
milk.  HELD,  defendant  has  not  sus- 
tained the  burden  of  proving  the  in- 
creased rate  on  milk  to  be  reasonable. 
Milk  should  take  a  lower  rate  than 
cream.  The  rate  on  milk  fixed  by  the 
Wisconsin  and  Minnesota  Commissions 
is  reasonable  and  defendants  will  be  or- 
dered to  desist  from  charging  more.  Rep- 
aration awarded.  Bridgeman-Russell  Co. 
e.  Great  Northern  Express  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
573,  577. 

(b)  Defendant  express  company,  by 
inadvertently  omitting  to  file  a  dis- 
tance scale  with  its  tariff  fixing  a  58c 
rate  on  milk  and  cream  from  St.  Paul, 
Neb.,  to  Denver,  Colo.,  left  in  effect,  as 
the  only  legal  lawful  rate,  a  class  rate 
of  $2  per  100  lbs.  Immediately  upon 
discovering  its  error  defendant  ob- 
tained special  permission  to  correct  the 
mistake  and  restore  the  58c  rate.  Later 
it  attempted  to  put  in  an  80c  rate  and 
was  enjoined  by  the  courts  pending  a 
hearing  before  the  Commission.  HELD, 
the  58c  rate  should  be  deemed  a  rea- 
sonable one  and  defendant  ordered  to 
maintain  same  for  two  years,  the  record 
to  be  held  under  advisement  until  milk 
and  cream  rates  generally  should  be 
determined  under  another  proceeding 
pending  before  the  Commission.  Mer- 
chants' Traffic  Ass'n  v.  Pacific  Express 
Co.,    13    L    C.    C.   131,    132,   133.. 

(c)  From  1900  to  1907,  the  express 
rate  per  ten  gallon  can  of  cream  was 
$1.50  from  Columbia,  Tenn.,  to  Jackson- 
ville, Fla.,  a  distance  of  646  miles, 
with  an  added  charge  of  25c  for  the  re- 
turn of  the  empty  can.  In  1907,  the 
rate  was  raised  to  $3.90  with  an  added 
charge  of  15c  for  the  return  of  the 
empty  can  and  tub  used  for  packing 
the  cream  in  ice.  The  tub  weighed  50 
lbs.  and  was  26  in.  in  height,  20  in. 
across  the  top,  and  17 1^  in.  across  the 
bottom.  The  cream  weighed  100  lbs. 
and  the  can  22  lbs.  Defendant  ex- 
press company  admitted  that  the  for- 
mer rate  of  $1.50  was  reasonable  com- 
pensation for  carrying  the  cream  and 
the  can,  but  claimed  the  new  rate  was 
necessary  as  compensation  for  handling 
the  extra  weight  of  the  ice  and  tub, 
the  combined  weight  of  which  was  88 
lbs.     The   former    rate   of   $1.50   on   the 


382 


EXPRESS  COMPANIES,  §11  (10)   (a)— §12  (a) 


cream  and  can  yielded  li/4c  per  lb. 
Applying  the  charges  to  the  ice  and 
tub  would  yield  a  revenue  of  $1.10, 
which  added  to  the  $1.50  charge,  made 
a  total  of  $2.60.  HELD,  the  $1.50  rate 
having  been  formerly  in  effect  for  a 
long  time  was  presumed  to  be  reason- 
able, and  the  rate  attacked  was  un- 
reasonable to  the  extent  that  it  ex- 
ceeded $2.60  plus  15c  for  the  back- 
haul of  the  empty  can  and  tub.  Rey- 
nolds V.  Southern  Express  Co.,  13  I.  C. 
C.    536,    540. 

§11.     (10)     Raw    Furs. 

(a)  Complainant  was  a  shipper  of 
raw  furs  St.  Paul,  Minn.,  to  New  York. 
From  1887  to  1906  raw  furs  were  classed 
as  "general-special"  by  defendant  ex- 
press companies,  which  class  embraced 
fruit  and  vegetables,  dairy  products,  but- 
ter and  eggs,  meat  and  poultry  and 
other  raw  products  as  distinguished  from 
manufactured  articles.  This  class  rate 
from  St.  Paul  to  New  York  was  $3  per 
100  pounds.  After  the  passage  of  the 
Hepburn  amendment,  defendants  put 
raw  furs  in  the  merchandise  class,  tak- 
ing a  rate  of  $4.50  per  100  lbs.  be- 
tween said  points.  The  ordinary 
value  of  articles  in  the  "general- 
special"  class  was  30c  to  40c  per 
lb.;  the  value  of  raw  furs  was  $2  to 
$3 '  per  pound.  Ordinarily  defendants 
paid  no  attention  to  value  in  fixing 
rates  except  to  require  extra  pay  where 
a  valuation  exceeding  $50  was  placed 
on  a  package.  Raw  furs  were  desirable 
traffic  for  defendants  on  account  of  their 
density  and  the  small  liability  of  in- 
jury in  handling.  It  was  impracticable 
to  ship  same  by  freight.  HELD,  the 
rate  of  $4.50  for  raw  furs  in  boxes 
and  bales  was  excessive  and  should 
not  exceed  $3.50  upon  an  agreed  valua- 
tion not  to  exceed  $2.50  per  lb.,  and 
when  shipped  in  bags  should  take  the 
merchandise  rate.  Ullman  v.  Adams 
Express  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  340,  342;  rehear- 
ing denied,  14  I.  C.  C.  585. 

§11.     (11)     Sample    Brick. 

(a)  Complainants  attacked  the  ex- 
press rates  on  sample  brick  shipped 
throughout  the  country  from  the  states 
of  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania.  In  1896 
sample  brick  was  carried  at  merchan- 
dise pound  rates  with  a  minimum  charge 
of  oUc  per  package.  In  1897  the  mini- 
mum charge  was  increased  to  35c. 
Since     then     the     charges     have     been 


gradually  increased  so  that  the  increase 
of  1910  was  about  71  per  cent  of  the 
rate  over  1897.  HELD,  the  service 
rendered  in  the  transportation  of  these 
brick  is  similar  to  that  given  to  the 
ordinary  express  shipment;  that  the 
cost  of  service  is  not  more  than  the 
average  and  there  are  certain  charac- 
teristics present  which  make  .the  trans- 
portation of  brick  a  desirable  business 
on  account  of  the  easiness  with  which, 
this  commodity  is  packed,  and  its 
weight  compared  to  the  amount  of 
space  it  occupies;  that  the  classification 
which  applies  merchandise  graduated 
charges  thereto  are  unjust  and  unrea- 
sonable, in  so  far  as  they  exceed  the 
charges  which  are  assessed  at  mer- 
chandise rates  with  a  minimum  charge 
of  35c.  Ohio  Face  Brick  Mfrs.  Ass'n  v. 
Adams  Express  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  582. 

V.     ROUTE. 

§12.     In     General. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate 
on  boots  and  shoes  from  Boston,  Mass., 
to  New  York  City.  At  one  time  the 
New  York  &  Boston  Express  Co.,  a 
Massachusetts  corporation,  transacted 
an  express  business  over  the  railroads 
and  steamships  of  the  Old  Colony  R.  R. 
Co.  and  had  maintained  a  rate  of  75c 
from  various  New  England  towns  to 
some  Sound  port  and  thence  to  New 
York  City.  Subsequently  the  Adams 
Express  Co.  acquired  the  New  York 
company  and  abolished  the  rail-and- 
water  haul  to  New  York,  retaining  only 
its  own  all-rail  route  via  the  N.  Y.  N. 
H.  &  H.  R.  R.,  with  a  rate  of  $1  per 
100  lbs.  to  New  York.  It  appeared  that 
by  the  consolidation  express  rates  be- 
tween various  New  England  points  had 
been  reduced.  HELD,  that  the  ques- 
tion for  determination  is  upon  the  rea- 
sonableness of  this  particular  route 
and  rate  from  the  complaining  commu- 
nities to  New  York  City,  and  not  as  to 
other  rates  to  different  points.  If  the 
complainants  are  entitled  to  the  75c 
rate  relief  should  not  be  denied  them 
upon  the  ground  that  certain  other 
communities  have  been  benefited,  or 
that  the  rates  which  they  themselves 
enjoy  to  other  points  have  been  re- 
duced. That  the  rail-and-water  route 
formerly  maintained  is  a  natural  one, 
and  that  an  express  service  ought  to 
be  maintained  via  that  route  or  at  all 
events  that  the  defendant  ought  not 
to   be   permitted   to   deprive   these   com- 


EXPRESS  COMPANIES,  §12  (b)— §15  (a) 


383 


munities  of  the  use  of  this  route  at  a 
reasonable  rate  unl€' i  it  gives  to  them 
the  benefit  of  a  corresponding  one  by 
some  other  route.  Douglas  Shoe  Co.  v. 
Adams  Express  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  539,  542. 

(bj  There  may  not  be  sufficient  vol- 
ume of  traffic  to  justify  carriers  in  main- 
taining through  express  service.  Ham- 
ilton V.  American  Express  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  355. 

VI.     TARIFFS. 

§13.     Construction. 

See   Tariffs,    §3    (t). 

(a)  Defendant  express  company's 
tariff  of  Nov.  15,  1906,  provided  that 
medical  packages  shipped  by  manufac- 
turers and  uncalled  for  might  be  re- 
turned at  specified  reduced  rates.  April 
14,  1908,  complainant  received  from  de- 
fendant notice  that  on  and  after  May 
20,  1908,  said  provision  would  be  can- 
celed, and  that  all  outstanding  pack- 
ages not  returned  before  May  20,  1908, 
would  be  charged  for  at  regular  rates, 
and  duly  filed,  effective  May  20,  1908,  a 
tariff  to  that  effect.  Prior  to  May  20, 
1908,  complainant  shipped  4,516  pack- 
ages, which  V  ere  not  returned  until 
June  13  and  after.  Of  this  number,  1,577 
packages  were  shipped  on  or  before 
April  14,  1908.  The  balance  were 
shipped  after  April  14,  1908,  but  prior 
to  May  20,  1908.  Complainant  was  as- 
sessed return  charges  on  the  4,516  pack- 
ages at  regular  rates.  HELD,  com- 
plainant was  entitled  to  the  reduced 
return  rates  on  all  shipments  prior  to 
May  20,  1908,  the  effective  date  of  the 
tariff.  Reparation  awarded.  Interstate 
Remedy  Co.  v.  American  Express  Co., 
16   I.    C.   C.   436,   438,   439. 

(b)  Where  a  tariff  makes  it  man- 
datory upon  an  express  company  to  im- 
mediately notify  the  shipper  in  case  of 
non-delivery,  the  prima  facie  presump- 
tion is  that  such  notice  was  duly  given 
to  the  shipper.  Interstate  Remedy  Co. 
V,  American  Express  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
436,  438. 

(c)  The  Commission  should  not  ap- 
prove a  rule  which  an  express  company 
could  not  enforce.  California  Commer- 
cial Ass'n  V.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  422,  433. 

(d)  Express  classification  is  not  so 
minute  as  freight.  Ullman  v.  Adams 
Express  Co.,   14  I.   C.   C.  340,  341. 


§14.     Double  Graduate  Charges. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  express 
rates  from  New  York  City  to  Boise, 
Idaho,  on  packages  weighing  in  excess  of 
7  lbs.  and  less  than  48  lbs.  Boise  was 
served  by  the  Pacific  Express  Co.  alone, 
and  on  shipments  from  New  York  the 
double  graduate  charge  was  applied.  The 
rules  of  defendants  provided  that  when 
shipments  passed  over  the  lines  of  two 
or  more  companies  and  the  shipping  or 
destination  point  was  an  exclusive  office, 
each  company's  charge  must  be  as- 
sessed separately  and  not  on  the 
through  rate  made  by  combining  the 
locals.  Under  said  rule  the  charges 
to  exclusive  points  exceeded  the  com- 
bination of  locals,  and  a  greater  charge 
was  often  made  for  the  shorter  than 
for  the  longer  haul  over  the  same  line 
in  the  same  direction.  Such  double  grad- 
uate charges  did  not  involve  substan- 
tially greater  service  by  defendants  than 
where  single  graduate  charges  were  ap- 
plied between  points  reached  by  all 
the  express  companies  involved  in  the 
haul.  HELD,  the  rates  and  rules  at- 
tacked were  unreasonable  and  unlawful 
and  must  be  adjusted.  Boise  Commer- 
cial Club  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  17  I. 
C.    C.   115,    119,    122. 

(b)  No  opinion  expressed  on  inequali- 
ties arising  from  the  application  of  the 
double-graduated  rule  in  the  express 
classification.  Reserved  for  further  in- 
vestigation. Browne  v.  American  Ex- 
press Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  237. 

§15.     Graduate    Scale    System. 

(a)  The  express  rate  from  Chicago 
to  Omaha  was  $2;  from  Omaha  to  Den- 
ver, $4;  from  Chicago  to  Denver,  $6, 
the  last  through  rate  being  no  less  than 
the  sum  of  the  locals,  based  on  Omaha. 
In  local  shipments  from  Chicago  to 
Omaha,  and  from  Omaha  to  Denver, 
two  more  terminal  services  were  re- 
quired than  on  a  shipment  from  Chi- 
cago to  Denver.  Defendants'  through 
rates  were  not,  however,  constructed 
on  the  theory  of  a  combination  of  lo- 
cals, but  on  the  "graduate  scale"  theory, 
under  which  package  rates  for  long 
distances  did  not  increase  in  proportion 
as  the  base  rate  increased.  For  ex- 
ample, the  rate  on  a  10-lb.  parcel  from 
Chicago  to  Omaha  was  70c,  from  Omaha 
to  Denver  $1,  making  a  combined  rate 
of  $1.70;  the  rate  upon  a  10-lb.  pack- 
age from  Chicago  to  Denver  was  $1.15, 


3^4 


EXPRESS  COMPANIES,  §15   (b)— §17   (d) 


or  55c  less  than  the  combination.  As 
the  size  of  the  package  increased  this 
difference  became  less  marked.  Thus 
the  combined  rate  upon  a  35-lb.  pack- 
age was  $2.70  while  the  through  rate 
was  $2.50.  For  packages  of  50  lbs. 
and  over  the  combined  rate  and  the 
through  rate  were  the  same.  Complain- 
ant at  Denver  attacked  the  Chicago  to 
Denver  rate  as  excessive  per  se.  HELD, 
that  while  there  was  much  reason  for 
complainant's  contention,  the  Commis- 
sion did  not  have  sufficient  informa- 
tion as  to  the  general  result  on  rates 
throughout  the  country  which  would 
arise  from  a  reduction  of  such  rate  as 
to  justify  it  in  entering  such  an  order. 
Kindel  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  13  I.  C. 
C.    475,    496. 

(b)  Complainant,  dealer  in  mattresses 
and  bed  springs  at  Denver,  Colo.,  ship- 
ping by  express  to  and  from  points  out- 
side Colorado,  attacked  defendant  ex- 
press company's  "graduate  scale"  sys'iem 
of  making  rates  on  general  merchandise. 
Under  this  system  the  base  used  for 
determining  the  rate  on  small  packages 
from  New  York  to  San  Francisco  was 
$14.00  per  100  lbs.  The  charge  for  car- 
rying a  1-lb,  package  between  two  points 
where  the  base  rate  was  50c  per  100  lbs. 
was  25c,  while  that  for  a  1-lb.  package 
from  New  York  to  San  Francisco  was 
but  30c.  The  rate  upon  a  20-lb.  package 
under'  the  50c  base  rate  was  30c,  while 
that  on  a  20-lb.  package  from  New  York 
to  San  Francisco  was  but  $2.85.  Com 
plainant  urged  that  if  the  increase  in 
charge  for  handling  the  small  package 
the  longer  distance  was  just  and  reason- 
able, then  the  increase  in  case  of  the 
larger  package  was  exorbitant,  and  that 
Denver  in  paying  these  long  distance 
charges  from  eastern  points  of  origin 
was  subjected  to  excessive  rates.  De- 
fendants made  their  rates  on  small  pack- 
ages up  to  7  lbs.  in  competition  with  the 
United  States  mail.  HELD,  under  these 
competitive  conditions  the  rates  upon 
small  packages  could  not  be  taken  as 
the  test  of  a  reasonable  rate  upon  larger 
packages  to  which  competition  did  not 
apply,  and  the  system  attacked  was  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable.  Kindel  v. 
Adams  Express  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  475,  478. 

§16.     Mixed  Shipments. 

See   Classification,    §7. 

(a)  Some  time  ago  the  defendants  ap- 
plied the  express  bread  rate  to  mixed 
shipments  of  bread  and  cake  from  Bos- 


ton to  various  interstate  points.  For  the 
purpose  of  availing  himself  of  the  lower 
rate  thus  made  possible  the  complainant 
became  to  a  limited  extent  a  b^.ker  of 
bread.  It  oftened  happened,  however, 
that  he  would  put  into  a  hamper  filled 
with  cake  only  a  loaf  or  two  of  bread  for 
the  purpose  of  obtaining  the  better  rate. 
With  a  view  to  preventing  this  the  de- 
fendants provided  that  the  bread  rate 
should  not  apply  unless  at  least  50  per 
cent  of  the  shipment  consisted  of  bread. 
This  rule  debarred  the  complainant  from 
making  mixed  shipments,  while  it  per- 
mitted certain  of  his  competitors  who 
baked  both  bread  and  cake  to  obtain  the 
bread  rate  upon  shipments  of  bread  and 
cake  and  the  complainant  alleged  that 
this  rule  was  unreasonable.  HELD,  the 
almost  universal  rule  is  that  where  a 
package  contains  articles  taking  differ- 
ent rates  of  transportation  the  entire 
package  goes  at  the  rate  applicable  ^o 
the  highest  rated  article  in  the  package. 
The  rule  of  the  defendants  discriminates 
against  the  complainant  and  is  unjust 
and  unreasonable  and  should  be  discon- 
tinued. Oak  Grove  Farm  Creamery  v. 
Adams  Express  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  454,  455. 

VII.     EVIDENCE. 

See     Procedure     Before     Commission, 
§18  (a). 

§17.     In  General. 

(a)  The  Commission  moves  with 
great  caution  in  condemning  a  rate  or 
practice  and  does  so  only  when  the  facti 
before  it  amply  warrant  such  action.  San- 
ford  V.  Western  Express  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
C.   32,   36. 

(b)  In  determining  the  reasonable- 
ness of  express  rates,  inquiry  must  be 
had  into  the  capital  required,  hazard  in- 
volved, and  especially  the  profits  made 
under  the  rates  attacked.  Sanford  v. 
Western  Express  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  32,  35. 

(c)  In  administering  the  law  the  Com- 
mission must  be  observant  of  the  weight 
to  be  given  the  evidence  adduced  before 
it.  Sanford  v.  Western  Express  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  32,  36. 

(d)  Taking  into  account  the  estimated 
statistics  submitted  by  defendant  express 
companies  as  to  capital,  gross  earnings, 
expenses,  net  income,  the  smallness  of 
loss  and  damage  claims,  the  evidence 
that  the  express  companies  are  not  do- 
ing as  well  as  formerly,  the  higher  cost 
of  labor  and  the  increase  in  salaries  of 
employes,    the    deliveries    through    more 


EXPRESS  COMPANIES,  §18   (a)— §24    (c) 


385 


extensive  territory,  and  the  accumula- 
tions of  surplus  from  past  profits  in- 
vested by  the  companies,  the  Commission 
reaches  the  impression'  that  the  general 
level  of  express  rates  in  the  country  as 
a  whole  are  not  excessive,  Kindel  v. 
Adams  Express  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  475,  491. 

§18.     Bulk. 

(a)  Bulk  as  an  element  is  to  be  con- 
sidered in  determining  the  reasonable- 
ness of  an  express  rate.  Ohio  Face  Brick 
Mfrs.  Ass'n  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  20 
I.   C.  C.  582,  584. 

§19.     Commercial    Advantages. 

See    Equalization    of    Rates,    §3. 

(a)  A  community  entitled  to  a  certain 
express  rate  cannot  have  this  rate  de- 
nied it  upon  the  ground  that  certain 
other  communities  have  been  benefited 
through  a  readjustment  of  rates.  Doug- 
las Shoe  Co.  V.  Adams  Express  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  539,  541. 

§20.     Comparisons. 

See  Comparative  Rates. 

(a)  A  comparison  of  the  rates  at 
which  express  companies  do  business  at 
other  localities  is  more  important  in  the 
determination  of  the  reasonableness  of 
these  rates  than  it  would  be  in  the  de- 
termination of  the  reasonableness  of 
freight  charges,  because  of  the  manner 
in  which  express  business  is  conducted. 
Sanford  v.  Western  Express  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
C.  32,  35. 

(b)  Where  a  rate  has  been  made  in 
competition  with  the  United  States  mails 
it  cannot  be  taken  as  a  comparison  of  a 
reasonable  rate  upon  larger  packages  to 
which  such  competition  did  not  apply. 
Kindel  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  13  I.  C. 
C.  475. 

(c)  The  express  rate  on  a  1-lb.  pack 
age  from  London  to  Denver  of  50c  as 
compared  with  the  70c  rate  from  Denver 
to  London  does  not  prove  the  latter  ra'e 
unreasonable,  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
the  package  in  the  shipment  from  Lon- 
don to  Denver  is  carried  part  way  by 
the  English  parcels  post,  whereas  it 
moves  all  the  way  by  express  on  a  ship- 
ment in  the  opposite  direction.  Kindel 
V.  Adams  Express  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  475,  497. 

§21.     Competition. 

See    Competition. 

(a)  An  express  rate  may  not  be  un- 
reasonable or  discriminatory  when  made 


in  competition  with  the  United  States 
mails.  Sanford  v.  Western  Express  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  32. 

§22.     Long    Maintenance   of   Rate. 

(a)  It  cannot  be  conceded  that  an  al- 
leged erroneous  publication  of  a  rate 
which  remains  in  effect  for  a  period  of 
more  than  eight  years  is  a  suffi-^ient  rea- 
son for  the  increase  of  such  rate.  Frank- 
lin, Stiles  &  Franklin  v.  Southern  Ex- 
press Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  88. 

(b)  Where  an  express  rate  has  been 
in  effect  for  a  long  time  it  is  presumed 
tr  be  reasonable.  Reynolds  v.  Southern 
Express  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  536,  540. 

§23.     Percentage  of  Freight   Rate. 

(a)  Where  the  only  justification  of  an 
increased  express  rate  is  a  statement 
that  it  ought  to  be  a  certain  percentage 
of  the  freight  rate,  it  cannot  be  held  that 
the  express  company  has  sustained  the 
burden  of  proof  imposed  upon  it  by  the 
Act.  Franklin,  Stiles  &  Franklin  v. 
Southern  Express  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  88. 

§24.     Profit  and   Capitalization. 

See  Evidence,  §7;  interstate  Com- 
merce Commission,  §7;  Reasonable- 
ness   of    Rates,    §5. 

(a)  The  cost  of  service  is  fairly  to 
be  considered  in  determining  the  reason- 
ableness of  a  rate.  Ohio  Face  Brick 
Mfrs.  Ass'n  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  20 
L  C.  C.  582,  584. 

(b)  Since  the  connection  between  the 
value  of  the  express  service  rendered 
and  the  cost  of  the  property  employed  in 
rendering  it  is  so  slight  little  reference 
can  be  had  to  such  cost  in  determining 
the  reasonableness  of  express  rates.  The 
same  is  true  of  capitalization,  and  to  de- 
cide the  question  of  reasonableness  of 
rates,  inquiry  must  be  had  into  the  char- 
acter of  the  business,  the  amount  of  cap- 
ital required  for  its  conduct,  the  hazard 
involved,  and,  especially,  the  profits  the 
companies  are  making  under  the  rates 
attacked.  Sanford  v.  Western  Express 
Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  32,  35. 

(c)  The  base  rates  per  100  lbs.  of  de- 
fendant express  company  from  Phoenix, 
Mesa  and  Tempe,  Ariz.,  to  various  points 
in  Arizona.  Colorado,  New  Mexico,  Kan- 
sas and  California  are  held  to  be  ex- 
cessive and  lower  rates  established,  the 
Commission  taking  into  consideration  the 
special  need  of  such  points  for  express 
service    on    shipments    of   manufactured 


386  EXPRESS  COMPANIES,  §24  (d)— FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §1  (d) 


articles,  sea  foods,  butter  and  eggo,  etc.; 
the  fact  of  defendant's  monopoly  of  the 
express  service  in  this  territory,  and  the 
fact  of  the  excessive  net  earnings  de- 
rived by  defendant  on  its  general  busi- 
ness. Maricopa  County  Commercial  Club 
V.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  182,  184. 

(d)  A  profit  of  10  per  cent  of  the 
gross  earnings  of  express  companies  is, 
in  view  of  the  comparatively  small  value 
of  the  property  invested,  an  extremely 
liberal  rate.  Kindel  v.  Adams  Express 
Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  475,  493. 

§25.     Surplus. 

(a)  Even  were  it  true  that  express 
companies  have  accumulated  a  surplus 
by  the  imposition  of  charges  in  the  past 
which  were,  when  made,  unjust  and  un- 
reasonable, the  Commission  cannot  un- 
dertake to  distribute  that  surplus  to  the 
public  by  putting  into  effect  rates  which 
are  not  fairly  compensatory  for  the  pres- 
ent service.  Kindel  v.  Adams  Express 
Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  475,  490. 

§26.  Value  of  Express  Property. 
See  Special  Contract,  §7  (b). 
(a)  In  determining  the  reasonable- 
ness of  freight  rates,  the  value  of  the 
property  which  a  railroad  company  de- 
votes to  the  use  of  the  public  is  an  im- 
portant element,  but  in  passing  upon 
express  company  rates  this  element  is 
of  little  importance,  since  tne  property 
devoted  to  such  use  is  comparatively 
insignificant.  Kindel  v.  Adams  Express 
Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  475,  481. 

FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES. 

L     JURISDICTION   OF   COMMISSION. 
§1.     In  general. 
IL     CARRIER'S    DUTY    TO    FURNISH 
OR  PERMIT. 
§2.     In  general. 
§3.     Compression. 
§4.     Concentration. 
§5.     Cooperage  and  bailing. 
§6.     Dumping  and  trimming. 
§7.     Free  back-haul. 
§8.     Free  storage. 
§9.     Grain  doors. 
§10.     Loading,  unloading,  bracing, 

etc. 
§11.     Notifying   shipper   of   rejec- 
tion. 
§12.     Scaleage      deductions      and 

shrii  kage. 
§13.     Staking  and  binding. 


§14.     Storing,  grading  and  resack 

ing. 
§15.     Transit. 
§16.     Wharfage. 

III.  PUBLICATION  AND  TARIFFS. 

§17.     Obligation  to  publish. 

§18.     Reshipping    under    through 

rate. 
§19.     Retroactive  application. 
§20.     Substitution  of  tonnage. 

IV.  DISCRIMINATION. 

§21.     In  general. 

CROSS-REFERENCES. 

See  Auction  Company;  Baggage 
Transfer;  Cartage;  Express  Com- 
panies,   11. 

I.     JURISDICTION  OF  COMMISSION. 
§1.     In  General. 

See     Interstate     Commerce     Commis- 
sion,   §1    (g),    (CO);    Procedure    Be- 
fore Commission,   §13    (L). 

(a)  There  is  no  specific  authority  in 
the  Act  under  which  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  may  require  carriers 
to  devise  and  frame  regulations  to  make 
its  order  effective,  and  specific  power  is 
only  conferred  upon  the  Commission  it- 
self to  make  regulations  and  practices 
in  lieu  of  those  which  it  finds  in  violation 
of  the  Act.     N.  Y.  C.  «&  H.  R    R.  R.  Co. 

V.  I.  C,  C,  168  Fed.  131,  136. 

(b)  Transit  is  a  practice  or  regulation 
included  within  the  provisions  of  the  fif- 
teenth section  over  which  the  Commis- 
sion has  jurisdiction,  and  it  may  in  a 
proper  case  require  carriers  to  accord 
that  privilege.  In  Re  Transportation  of 
Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts.  23  I.  C.  C.  151, 
174. 

(c)  Under  section  15,  as  amended  in 
1910,  the  Commission  is  empowered  to 
determine  and  prescribe  what  will  be 
the  just,  fair  and  reasonable  regulation  or 
practice  which  shall  be  thereafter  fol- 
lowed by  the  carrier  as  to  the  services 
which  the  carrier  is  required  to  give 
under  section  1.  If  language  can  be  used 
which  will  bring  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Commission  all  rates,  regulations 
and  practices  of  the  carrier  touching  the 
receipt  or  delivery  of  freight  and  by  all 
facilities,  such  language  is  found  in  the 
provisions  of  the  present  Act,  which  ef- 
fected a  complete  change  in  the  law  as 
affecting  such  interstate  carriers.  Mo- 
bile Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  M.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  417,  421. 

(d)  Upon  a  petition  for  the  establish- 
ment  of    milling-in-transit    and    elevator 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §1   (e)— (o) 


387 


allowances,  it  appeared  that  there  was 
no  mill  at  that  point,  but  that  certain 
interests  were  anxious  to  build  there  if 
a  satisfactory  rate  adjustment  could  be 
obtained.  While  the  Commission  would 
not  ordinarily  be  disposed  to  require 
publication  of  tariffs  which  could  not  be 
used,  under  certain  circumstances,  as  in 
this  case,  the  privilege  will  be  ordered 
in.  Suffern  Grain  Co.  v.  L  C.  C  R.  R.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  178,  180. 

(e)  The  Commission  has  power  to 
forbid  discrimination  in  making  allow- 
ances at  one  point  while  denying  them 
at  another  similarly  situated.  Suffern 
Grain  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C 
178,  183. 

(f)  The  Commission  found  certain 
privileges  at  one  point  when  denied  to 
another  an  unjust  discrimination.  In 
such  a  case  the  Commission  may  prop- 
erly order  the  discrimination  to  be  re- 
moved, but  not  by  ordering  a  transit 
privilege  to  be  accorded.  Douglas  &  Co. 
V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C  C. 
541,  542. 

(g)  The  Commission  has  jurisdiction 
to  determine  whether  the  inbound  or  out- 
bound carrier  at  a  milling-in-transit  point 
should  furnish  the  equipment  for  the  out- 
bound haul  where  each  carrier  contends 
that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  other  to  fur- 
nish such  equipment,  and  by  refusing  to 
do  so  subjects  the  shipper  to  annoyance 
and  expense.  Brook-Rauch  Mill  &  Ele- 
vator Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Rv.  Co.,  21 
I.  C.  C.  651,  654. 

(h)  While  a  common  carrier  must 
serve  the  traveling  and  the  shipping 
public  upon  equal  terms  and  without  dis- 
criminations and  preferences  in  under- 
taking to  perform  certain  duties  for  those 
who  travel  or  ship  their  merchandise 
over  its  lines,  it  does  not  assume  any 
obligation  to  those  who  do  neither  th^ 
one  nor  the  other.  If  any  such  obliga- 
tion exists  they  are  not  to  be  found  in 
the  Act,  and  are  beyond  the  power  of 
the  Commission  to  enforce  or  regulate. 
To  a  certain  extent  the  public  stations, 
depots  and  grounds  of  carriers  are  their 
private  property,  subject  to  their  own 
control  with  respect  to  any  private  busi- 
ness carried  on,  in  or  upon  them,  pro- 
vided that  what  is  thus  done  for  the 
public  is  in  itself  a  reasonable  use  of 
the  property,  and  contributes  to  the  pub- 
lic convenience  or  to  the  advantage  of 
the  carrier.  Southwestern  Produce  Dis- 
tributers V.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
45S.  461. 


(i)  Where  the  classification  primarily 
affects  and  controls  the  rates  or  charges 
demanded,  charged  or  collected  by  any 
common  carrier  or  carriers  subject  to  the 
provisions  of  the  Act  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  property  as  defined  in  the  first 
section  of  the  Act,  or  publishes  the  regu- 
lations or  practices  of  such  carrier  or 
carriers  affecting  such  rates,  the  Com- 
mission is  authorized  and  empowered  to 
pass  upon  such  rates,  or  charges,  or  such 
regulations  or  practices.  National  Hay 
Ass'n  V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  34,  38. 

(j)  Where  a  business  is  alleged  to 
have  been  built  up  on  the  strength  of  a 
sorting-in-transit  privilege,  when  such 
privilege  is  taken  rway  the  Commission 
may  decline  to  order  its  re-establishment. 
Schmidt  &  Sons  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  535. 

(k)  Omaha  and  Detroit  not  being 
served  by  the  same  carriers,  a  complaint 
seeking  the  extension  to  Detroit  of  a 
transit  privilege  enjoyed  at  Omaha  is 
dismissed,  the  Commission's  policy  being 
to  curtail  such  privileges.  Schmidt  & 
Sons  V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  535, 
537. 

(1)  The  Commission  has  jurisdiction 
to  remove  unjust  discrimination  resulting 
from  a  rule  or  practice  relating  to  the 
enclosing  of  advertising  matter  or  prizes 
in  packages  of  goods,  as  well  as  that  re- 
sulting from  a  rate.  Ouerbacker  Coffee 
Co.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  18  1.  C.  C.  566, 
570. 

(m)  The  Commission  is  expressly  au- 
thorized and  empowered  to  pass  upon 
the  reasonableness  of  a  charge  for  trans- 
portation or  the  reasonableness  of  any 
regulation  or  practice  affecting  such 
charge,  expressed  in  a  tariff  issued  by 
any  carrier  subject  to  the  provisions  of 
the  Act.  Hood  &  Sons  v.  Del.  &  Hud. 
Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  15,  19. 

(n)  The  mere  owning  of  a  majority 
of  stock  by  a  shipper  in  a  corporation 
performing  a  service  for  a  railroad  at 
compensation  involving  no  more  than 
reasonable  profit  is  no  violation  of  the 
Act;  but  a  paper  organization  cannot 
evade  the  provisions  of  the  law.  Mer- 
chants' Cotton  Press  &  Storage  Co.  v. 
I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  98,  105. 

(o)  There  can  be  no  question  as  to 
the  right  and  power  of  the  Commission 
to  order  the  removal  of  an  unjust  dis- 
crimination arising  from  the  withdrawal 
of  a   transit   privilege   and   to   prescribe 


388 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §1    (p)— §2   (ff) 


such  reasonable  rates  and  regulations  as 
will  effect  such  removal.  Douglas  &  Co. 
V.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  232,  245. 

(p)  Free  elevation  of  grain  may  be 
prohibited  ,by  the  Commission,  since 
there  is  no  difference  in  principle  be- 
tween the  giving  of  the  service  and  the 
giving  of  the  money  with  which  to  buy 
the  service.  Traffic  Bu.,  Merchants'  Ex- 
change V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C. 
317,  330. 

(q)  The  Commission  has  jurisdiction 
under  section  15  of  the  Act  to  determine 
the  obligation  of  a  carrier  to  bring  pack- 
ages of  fruit  and  vegetables  shipped  in 
carloads  to  the  car  door  in  the  process 
of  delivery.  Wholesale  Fruit  &  Produce 
Ass'n  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
410,  421. 

(r)  The  Commission  has  jurisdiction 
to  determine  what  are  just  and  reason- 
able practices.  California  Commercial 
Ass'n  V.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  422,  425. 

II.     CARRIER'S    DUTY    TO    FURNISH 
OR  PERMIT. 

§2.     In   General. 

See  Demurrage,  §4  (c);  Evidence,  §17 
(d),  §51  (d);  Loss  and  Damage, 
§5    (I). 

(a)  It  is  undue  prejudice  for  a  car- 
rier to  deny  to  points  on  its  line  a  tran 
sit  privilege  at  Chicago  while  partici- 
pating in  through  rates  under  which 
other  carriers  grant  such  privileges  to 
complainant's  competitors  on  tbeir 
lines.  Van  Natta  Bros.  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  1,  5. 

(aa)  The  proviso  of  section  3  that  a 
carrier  shall  not  be  required  to  give  the 
use  of  its  tracks  or  terminal  facilities 
to  another  carrier  engaged  in  like  busi- 
ness can  have  no  application  where  the 
carrier  is  already  permitting  the  use  of 
its  tracks  or  terminal  facilities.  Mer- 
chants &  Mfrs.  Ass'n  v.  Penn.  R.  R  Co., 
23   L   C.  C.  474,  476. 

(b)  Carriers  have  gone  to  unwar- 
ranted lengths  in  the  granting  of  transit 
privileges.  In  Re  Transportation  of  Wool. 
Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151,  171. 

(bb)  Transit  in  many  cases  is  bene- 
ficial in  its  application.  When  it  can 
be  applied  without  discrimination  it  re- 
sults in  the  diffusion  of  business  in 
giving  rival  communities  the  relative  ad- 
vantages to  which  they  are  entitled  and 


which  can  be  accorded  them  in  no  other 
way,  and,  generally  speaking,  in  the  ap- 
plication of  lower  transportation  charges. 
The  commercial  operations  of  this  coun- 
try have,  in  many  instances,  grown  up 
under  the  exercise  of  transit  privileges 
which  could  have  been  developed  in  no 
other  way.  In  Re  Transportation  of 
Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151, 
171. 

(c)  The  point  at  which  traffic  is  to 
be  interchanged  should  be  determined 
by  carriers,  but  the  Commission  will 
decide  the  matter  in  case  of  disagree- 
ment. Chamber  of  Commerce  of  New- 
port News  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
345,  357. 

(cc)  Transit  privileges  are  of  benefit 
to  carriers,  dealers  and  the  public.  Blod- 
gett  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  23  1.  C.  C.  448,  451. 

(d)  When  a  carrier  publishes  a  pro- 
portional rate  from  a  basing  point  to  a 
certain  destination  it  thereby  makes  it- 
self a  link  in  the  through  transportation, 
and  whatever  privileges  it  accords  to 
millers  at  the  basing  point  it  should  ac- 
cord to  millers  on  its  line  intermediate 
thereto.  Southern  Illinois  Millers'  Ass'n 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  672,  678. 

(dd)  A  carrier  may  not  permit  one 
shipper  to  provide  a  facility  and  per- 
form a  service  and  compensate  it  there- 
for while  refusing  a  similar  privilege  to 
another  shipper.  Federal  Sugar  Refin- 
ing Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  1.  C.  C. 
200,  213. 

(e)  A  shipper  is  entitled  not  only  to 
a  fair  use  of  a  carrier's  facilities  but  to 
the  assurance  that  no  one  fares  ratably 
better.  Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke  .  Co.  v. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  356,  368. 

(ee)  No  violation  of  the  statute  re- 
sults from  a  preference,  though  found  to 
exist,  to  a  corporation  engaged  solely  in 
the  compression  of  cotton  in  which  it  has 
no  interest.  Merchants'  Cotton  Press  & 
Storage  Co.  v.  1.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C. 
98,  104. 

(f)  A  carrier,  leasing  part  of  its  right 
of  way  and  erecting  thereon  an  expensive 
elevator,  which  it  leases  to  a  competitor 
of  complainant  at  a  nominal  rental,  oper- 
ates as  an  unlawful  preference.  Brook- 
Rauch  Mill  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  158. 

(ff)  The  law  does  not  require  a  car- 
rier  to   give   its   cars   and   tracks  under 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §2  (g)— §3   (a) 


389 


any  terms  for  use  as  warehouses  or 
places  of  business.  Wilson  Produce  Co. 
V.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  116,  122. 

(g)  Railroads  are  public  servants  and 
it  is  their  first  duty  to  accord  to  the 
public  proper  facilities.  In  Re  Through 
Passenger   Routes,   16  L   C.  C.   300,   309. 

(h)  There  is  no  more  insidious  and 
effective  way  by  which  a  carrier  may 
discriminate  between  its  shippers  than 
either  a  regulation  or  practice  that  de- 
nies to  them  the  equal  enjoyment  of 
its  facilities.  Rail  and  River  Coal  Co. 
V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  86,  88. 

(i)  The  underlying  purpose  of  the 
interstate  commerce  legislation  was  to 
put  shippers  on  a  basis  of  absolute 
equality;  to  assure  to  them  not  only 
equal  rates  but  an  impartial  enjoyment 
of  the  facilities  and  services  of  inter- 
state commerce.  Rail  and  River  Coal 
Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  1.  C.  C. 
86,    88. 

(j)  It  is  no  duty  of  carriers  to  fur- 
nish storehouses  for  goods  they  carry. 
New  York  Hay  Exchange  v.  Penn.  R. 
R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  178,  185. 

(k)  The  delivery  of  goods  to  a  carrier 
and  the  receiving  of  goods  from  a  car- 
rier are  duties  devolving  upon  the  ship- 
per for  which  the  carrier  cannot  be  com- 
pelled to  pay,  and  for  them  to  make 
allowances  based  upon  the  performance 
by  shippers  of  services  which  shippers 
are  legally  bound  to  render  for  them- 
selves is  a  violation  of  the  Act.  In  the 
Matter  of  Allowances  for  the  Transfer  of 
Sugar,  14  I.  C.  C.  619,  627. 

(1)  The  Commission  will  neither  ap- 
prove nor  permit  the  application  of  tran- 
sit privileges  under  circumstances  that 
would  impair  the  integrity  of  the  through 
rate.  Blackwell  Milling  &  Elevator  Co. 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  483. 

(m)  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that 
throughout  the  Northwest  rates  upon 
various  kinds  of  grain  are  highly  com- 
petitive, and  that  proportional  rates  and 
reshipping  arrangements  are  common. 
Electric  Malting  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.   Op.   504. 

(n)  Section  3  of  the  Interstate  Com 
merce  Act  requires  railroad  fcommon 
carriers  to  offer  all  reasonable,  proper 
and  equal  facilities  for  the  inter- 
change of  traffic  between  their  respect- 
ive lines  and  for  the  receiving,  forward- 
ing   and    delivering    of    passengers    and 


property  to  and  from  their  several  lines 
thus  connected  therewith,  and  provides: 
"But  this  shall  not  be  construed  as 
requiring  any  such  common  carrier 
to  give  the  use  of  its  track  or  ter- 
minal facilities  to  another  carrier  en- 
gaged in  like  business."  HELD,  this 
language  could  not  be  said  to  amount 
to  a  substantive  enactment.  It  is  a  mere 
interpretation  clause,  which  is  designed 
to  restrain,  if  necessary,  the  generality 
of  the  language  which  precedes  it. 
Pittsburgh,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R. 
Comm.,  171  Ind.  189,  210,  86  N.  E.  328. 

§3.     Compression. 

See        Compress        Companies        and 
Charges. 

(a)  Cotton  shipped  into  Memphis 
was  drayed  back  and  forth  by  defend- 
ant carriers  to  compressing  plants  lo- 
cated in  that  city  to  be  compressed 
and  then  carried  from  Memphis  to  des- 
tination points  at  the  through  rate. 
Defendants  paid  the  expense  of  drayage 
and  compression  to  private  companies, 
allowing  IIV2C  and  50c  per  bale  for 
drayage  and  compression  respectively. 
Complainant  was  a  compressor  of  cotton 
at  Memphis  but  not  a  shipper  thereof. 
Defendant  warehouse  company  estab- 
lished a  compressing  plant  at  South 
Memphis,  some  two  miles  from  the  mu- 
nicipal line.  The  stock  in  the  company 
was  principally  owned  by  dealers  and 
shippers  of  cotton.  The  company  con- 
nected its  plant  with  the  lines  of 
defendants  by  a  system  of  switching 
tracks.  On  cotton  compressed  by  the 
defendant  warehouse  the  defendant  car- 
riers allowed  10c  per  bale  for  switch- 
ing the  same  to  and  from  .  its  ware- 
house and  50c  per  bale  for  compression. 
Defendant  carriers  charged  a  rate  of  20c 
a  bale  for  hauling  cotton  from  ware- 
houses in  Memphis  to  South  Memphis. 
Complainant  alleged  that  the  stock- 
holders of  defendant  warehouse  com- 
pany at  South  Memphis  being  them- 
selves shippers  obtained  lower  jates 
through  the  dividends  derived  by  them 
from  the  profits  of  their  warehouse  com- 
pany. Complainant  introduced  no  evi- 
dence to  show  that  the  defendant  ware- 
house company  made  any  profit  on  cot- 
ton compressed  by  it  at  the  10c  switch- 
ing charge  and  50c  compressing  charge. 
HELD,  complainants,  not  being  them- 
selves shippers  of  cotton,  and  failing 
to  show  that  defendant  warehouse  com- 
pany   was    making    any    profits    at    the 


390 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §4  (a)— (d) 


10c  and  50c  charges  failed  to  estab- 
lish a  case  of  unjust  discrimination  be- 
tween shippers,  as  it  was  perfectly 
lawful  for  carriers  to  make  special  con- 
tracts with  private  companies  which 
were  not  shippers  on  their  lines.  (Clem- 
ents &  Lane  Comm'rs,  dissenting.) 
Merchants'  Cotton  Press  &  Storage  Co. 
V.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  98,  104,  106. 

§4.     Concentration. 

See    Concentrating    Rates    and    Priv- 
ileges. 

(a)  The  policy  of  denying  to  Shreve- 
port  similar  privileges  in  the  concen- 
tration of  cotton  as  are  accorded  to 
Texas  cities  is  discriminatory  and  the 
carriers  will  be  ordered  to  make  appli- 
cable at  Shreveport  whatever  lawful 
practices  obtain  in  this  connection  on 
Texas  points  on  defendants'  lines  under 
like  conditions.  Meredith  v.  St.  L.  S. 
W.  Ry.   Co.,  23   I.   C.   C.   31,   48. 

(b)  Manufacturers  of  cottonseed 
products  at  Alexandria  and  Natchitoches, 
La.,  attacked  the  concentration  charges 
exacted  on  shipments  of  cottonseed  from 
Louisiana  points  to  Alexandria  and 
Natchitoches  of  3c  per  100  lbs.,  added 
to  the  local  rates  governing  the  cotton- 
seed from  points  of  origin  to  the  mill. 
When  the  outbound  shipments  were  not 
tendered  to  the  same  carrier  that  hauled 
the  raw  product  in,  the  concentration 
charge  of  3c  was  forfeited,  but  if  the 
product  was  reshipped  over  the  line 
of  the  originating  carrier  the  concen- 
tration charge  was  refunded.  Many 
points  at  which  there  was  a  market  for 
products  were  located  on  lines  from 
which  no  seed  was  obtained.  The  con- 
centration charge  was  not  assessed  at 
points  where  there  was  absence  of 
competition  between  carriers.  HELD, 
the  Commission  does  not  condemn  rea- 
sonable non-discriminatory  and  properly 
applied  transit  rates  and  privileges,  or 
a  reasonable  and  non-discriminatory 
charge  for  the  additional  service  per- 
formed in  connection  with  a  transit 
privilege,  but  it  is  unreasonable  for  de- 
fendants to  add  to  their  reasonable 
local  rates  any  sum  as  a  penalty  to 
be  forfeited  if  the  outbound  shipment 
does  not  move  over  the  same  line 
which  hauled  the  inbound  shipment,  and 
It  is  also  unjustly  discriminatory  to 
assess  on  interstate  or  export  traffic 
concentration  charges  at  points  where 
there  is  competition  between  carriers 
different    from    or    greater    than    those 


which  they  contemporaneously  assess 
at  non-competitive  points.  Red  River 
Oil    Co.    V.    T.    &    P.    Ry.    Co.,    23    I.    C 

C.  438,  447. 

(c)  Paynesville  and  Alexandria, 
Minn.,  are  on  the  line  of  defendant 
about  83  miles  and  137  miles  respect- 
ively west  of  Minneapolis,  and  are  con- 
centrating points  for  butter  and  eggs 
produced  in  the  adjoining  farming  dis- 
tricts. From  these  points  defendant 
maintained  a  proportional  rate  of  20c 
to  Manistique,  Mich.,  limited  to  butter 
and  eggs  that  have  come  into  those 
markets  over  the  rails  of  the  defendant. 
The  40c  rate  from  both  points  is  an 
open  proportional  rate  to  Manistique 
applicable  on  through  shipments  of  but- 
ter and  eggs  originating  at  those  points 
or  that  have  come  in  over  the  rails 
of  other  carriers  from  more  distant 
points  of  production.  The  defendant 
had  similar  rates  in  effect  from  the 
Twin  Cities  subject  to  the  same  condi- 
tions. It  appeared  that  little,  if  any, 
traffic  moves  from  Alexandria  and 
Paynesville  under  the  40c  rate  and  on 
the  other  hand  very  little  of  the  traffic 
from  the  Twin  Cities  enjoyed  the  benefit 
of  the  20c  rate,  for  the  reason  that 
the  larger  part  of  the  butter  and  eggs 
concentrated  at  the  Twin  Cities  comes 
in  over  other  lines  and  therefore  takes 
the  40c  rate  to  Manistique.  HELD, 
in  so  far  as  the  record  throws  any 
light  on  the  matter  there  appears  no 
reason  why  the  total  through  charges 
from  a  given  producing  point  on  the  line 
of  defendant  to  Manistique  on  a  ship- 
ment destined  beyond  should  be  greater 
when  the  traffic  is  concentrated  at  the 
Twin  Cities  than  the  total  through 
charges  based  on  Alexandria  or  Paynes- 
ville. St.  Paul  Board  of  Trade  v.  M. 
St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.    285,   288. 

(d)  The  defendant  is  entitled  to  ad- 
just its  rates  in  such  manner  that  the 
butter  and  eggs  produced  in  volume 
at  distant  points  on  its  line  may  reach 
the  eastern  markets  at  a  reasonable 
through  charge.  With  this  end  in  view 
and  if  the  transit  privilege  is  properly 
policed  so  as  to  avoid  abuses,  the 
Commission  sees  no  reason  why  the 
defendant  may  not  make  a  distinction 
in  its  rates  between  butter  and  eggs 
that  originate  at  the  concentration 
points,  so  far  as  its  line  is  concerned, 
and  butter  and  eggs  upon  which  it  has 
had     a     haul     into     the     concentration 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §4  (e)— §7  (b) 


391 


points;  but  it  can  do  this  only  under 
proper  tariff  provisions  connecting  the 
inbound  with  the  outbound  movement, 
and  thus  fixing  the  through  charges  from 
the  producing  point.  To  hold  otherwise 
would  require  it  to  exclude  from  consid- 
eration the  rates  and  other  conditions 
under  which  other  lines  may  bring 
butter  and  eggs  to  these  points,  and 
would  put  it  beyond  the  power  of  the 
defendant  so  to  adjust  its  own  rates 
as  to  enable  butter  and  eggs  produced 
on  its  line  north  and  west  of  the  con- 
centration points  to  compete  at  destina- 
tion with  butter  and  eggs  produced  at 
the  concentration  points  or  which  may 
have  been  brought  in  under  favorable 
terms  over  other  lines.  St.  Paul  Board 
of  Trade  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  St.  Ste.  M.  Ry. 
Co.,   19   I.   C.   C.   285,   288. 

(e)  Any  attempt  on  the  part  of  a 
carrier  to  connect  outbound  interstate 
movements  with  inbound  movements  to 
a  concentrating  point  under  state  rates 
not  on  file  with  the  Interstae  Commerce 
Commission  is  unlaw.ful.  St.  Paul  Board 
of  Trade  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  285,  289. 

(f)  A  lower  proportional  rate  estab- 
lished after  a  separate  movement  from 
a  concentration  point  is  not  applicable 
where  the  movement  out  was  more  than 
a  year  prior  to  the  establishment  of 
such  a  rate.  Central  Lumber  Co.  v.  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L   C.  C.  495. 

§5.     Cooperage   and    Bailing. 

(a)  Cooperage  and  bailing  do  not 
affect  the  rate  as  such;  they  are  simply 
special  services  performed  by  the  carrier 
in  transit  when  it  is  necessary  to  pro- 
tect the  shipment  from*  damage  or  loss, 
and  such  services  neither  increase  nor 
diminish  the  rate,  but  are  charges  en- 
tirely apart  from  it.  Rail  and  River 
Coal  Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  86,  90. 

§6.     Dumping  and  Trimming. 

(a)  The  regulation  of  charges  for 
"trimming"  or  leveling  coal  on  vessels, 
loaded  from  the  piers  of  coal-carrying 
railroads,  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Commission,  when  the  railroads  do  per- 
form this  service  irrespective  of  wheth- 
er or  not  they  may  be  compelled  to  per- 
form it.  New  England  Coal  and  Coke 
Co.  V.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  398, 
401. 


(b)  The  rates  of  3c  and  4i^c  per* 
ton  at  Virginia  and  Maryland  ports  for 
the  "trimming"  or  leveling  of  coal  in 
the  holds  of  ships  were  attacked  as  un- 
reasonable. Prior  to  1907  the  charge 
was  7c  for  all  steamers.  Complainant's 
self-trimming  vessels  appeared  and  a 
reduction  to  the  present  rates  was 
secured.  These  charges  were  lower 
than  at  any  other  port,  either  foreign 
or  domestic.  An  exhibit  by  one  defend- 
ant showed  the  cost  of  dumping  and 
trimming  to  be  4.5c.  Another  defend- 
ant filed  an  exhibit  showing  the  aggre- 
gate cost  for  dumping  and  trimming 
1,604,495  tons  of  coal  to  be  $185,377.56. 
Of  this  amount  $34,637.31  was  regarded 
as  the  cost  of  trimming,  thus  giving  an 
average  cost  of  2.16c  per  ton,  and  even 
this  was  not  fairly  representative  for 
self-trimming  vessels.  HELD,  that  a 
charge  of  3c  for  trimming  is  not  un- 
reasonable, but  4.5c  for  dumping  is  to 
the  extent  it  exceeds  3c.  New  England 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 
22   I.  C.   C.  398,  404. 

§7.     Free    Back-haul.  ^ 

(a)  A  free  back-haul  in  connection 
with  a  milling-in-transit  privilege,  where 
it  results  in  discrimination,  must  either 
be  discontinued  or  made  effective  in 
favor  of  the  other  milling  points  discrim- 
inated against.  Celina  Mill  &  Elevator 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  138,  143. 

(b)  The  Frisco  system  runs  from  the 
wheat  fields  of  Kansas,  Oklahoma  and 
Nebraska  in  a  southerly  direction 
through  Sherman,  Celina  and  CarroUton, 
Tex.,  to  Fort  Worth.  Celina  is  28  miles 
south  of  Sherman  and  27  miles  north  of 
CarroUton.  The  Cotton  Belt  railroad 
runs  from  Sherman  southeasterly  to 
Commerce,  Tex.  Another  branch  of 
the  Cotton  Belt  extends  north  from  Fort 
Worth  to  CarroUton  and  thence  in 
an  easterly  direction  to  Commerce. 
Celina  is  therefore  located  on  a  base 
of  a  triangle  whose  vertices  are  Sher- 
man, CarroUton  and  Commerce,  and 
whose  sides  are  formed  by  the  two 
branches  of  the  Cotton  Belt.  Complain- 
ant flour  millers  at  Celina  demanded  a 
milling-in-transit  privilege  at  that  point 
on  wheat  originating  in  Kansas,  Okla- 
homa and  Nebraska,  ground  at  Celina 
and  destined  to  points  to  the  south- 
east on  the  Cotton  Belt  and  demanded  a 
free  back-haul  of  the  flour  from  Ce- 
lina   to    Sherman.      Celina    was    in    the 


392 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §8  (a)— §9  (a) 


center  of  the  wheat  fields.  Complainant 
obtained  his  supply  of  wheat  locally, 
and  chose  Celina  for  its '  geographical 
advantage  in  this  resp€ct.  For  some 
years  a  charge  had  been  made  for  the 
back-haul  from  Celina  and  Sherman; 
for  a  short  time  it  was  7-lOc,  later  1.4c 
and  more  recently  3c  per  100  lbs.  Since 
the  filing  of  the  complaint  it  was  re- 
duced to  2c.  The  2c  charge  yielded  for 
the  haul  of  56  miles  a  per  ton  mile 
revenue  only  slightly  above  7  mills, 
whereas  the  per  ton  mile  revenue  on  a 
typical  haul  of  857  miles  from  Kansas 
to  Texas  points  under  a  milling-in-tran- 
sit rate  was  about  8  mills.  HELD,  that 
although  the  defendants  might  volun- 
tarily establish  a  free  back-haul,  the 
Commission  could  not  compel  them  to 
do  so,  or  to  accept  any  rate  less  than 
a  reasonable  one;  that  the  back-haul 
rate  exacted  was  not  unreasonable;  that 
complainant  was  entitled  to  a  through 
rate  from  Celina  over  the  Frisco  and 
Cotton  Belt  lines  through  Carrollton  to 
points  on  the  line  of  the  Cotton  Belt  west 
of  Commerce,  where  the  mileage  via  Car- 
rollton was  not  greater  than  the  mileage 
via  Sherman;  and  that  intervening  mill- 
ers at  Fort  Worth  were  apparently  en- 
titled to  a  back-haul  service  at  reason- 
able rates  from  Fort  Worth  through 
Sherman  to  enable  them  to  market  their 
fiour  at  points  on  the  Cotton  Belt.  Ce- 
lina Mill  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  138,  141,  144. 

§8.     Free    Storage. 

(a)  Competition  at  New  York  justi- 
fies a  longer  free  time  for  unloading  of 
flour  than  at  Philadelphia.  Brey  v.  P. 
R.   R.   Co.,   16   I.   C.   C.   497. 

(b)  On  shipments  of  flour  upon  the 
domestic  rates  to  the  ports  of  Phila- 
delphia and  New  York,  defendants  al- 
lowed four  days'  free  storage  in  Phila- 
delphia, while  ten  days  were  allowed 
In  Jersey  City,  when  destined  to  New 
York,  and  three  days  additional  to  that 
city,  with  one  additional  day  for  lighter- 
age from  Jersey  City  to  the  New  York 
docks,  thus  making  substantially  four- 
teen days  from  the  time  the  flour  ar- 
rived at  Jersey  City  to  the  time  of  de- 
livery. Other  carriers  at  New  York, 
competing  with  defendants,  had  refused 
to  reduce  the  free  storage  time  at  New 
York,  but  these  carriers  did  not  enter 
Philadelphia.  Under  the  pleadings,  the 
sole  question  was,  whether  Philadel- 
phia was  discriminated  against,  as  com- 


pared with  New  York,  and  no  question 
was  raised  as  to  the  reasonableness  of 
the  free  storage  time  at  either  city. 
HELD,  on  account  of  competition  Phil- 
adelphia was  not  unduly  discriminated 
against.  Brey  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.  C.  497,  500-501. 

(c)  Defendants  on  merchandise  from 
Buffalo  and  other  eastern  shipping 
points  by  boat  line  to  Duluth  or  Su- 
perior, Wis.,  and  thence  by  rail  to 
points  beyond  Duluth,  allowed  freight 
storage  in  their  warehouses  at  Duluth 
and  Superior  from  the  time  of  the  close 
to  the  time  of  the  opening  of  navigation. 
At  the  end  of  the  freight  storage  time, 
merchants  at  St.  Paul  or  Minneapolis 
might  order  goods  remaining  in  the 
warehouse  to  be  sent  forward  and  the 
same  were  transported  by  defendants  at 
the  balance  of  the  through  rate  from 
eastern  points  of  origin.  Duluth  mer- 
chants at  the  end  of  the  free  storage 
time  received  the  unsold  remnants  of 
their  goods  at  the  lake  port  and  were 
compelled  to  pay  storage  on  goods  so 
received  for  the  time  they  had  been  in 
the  warehouse  and  also  dockage  and 
switching  charges.  St.  Paul  and  Minne- 
apolis jobbers  were  allowed  to  order 
goods  forward  from  the  warehouses  from 
time  to  time  during  the  winter  to  met 
business  requirements.  Complainants 
at  Duluth  alleged  that  this  practice  de- 
stroyed Duluth's  natural  advantage  of 
location.  Similar  privileges  were  ex- 
tended by  defendants'  competitors  at 
Milwaukee,  Manitowoc,  Green  Bay  and 
other  points.  Defendants  were  com- 
pelled to  extend  such  privileges  in  order 
to  share  the  business.  HELD,  the  privi- 
leges were  not  unlawful,  since  the  in- 
land jobbing  center  by  reason  of  its 
location  at  a  point  where  the  competi- 
tion of  several  lake  ports  operated, 
gained  this  privilege  as  an  advantage 
of  its  location.  Commercial  Club  of 
Duluth  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  288, 
291. 

§9.     Grain   Doors. 

(a)  Grain  and  lumber  are  not  com- 
petitive articles,  and  the  fact  that  extra 
doors  are  provided  for  grain  shipments 
is  quite  insufficient  to  establish  a  charge 
of  undue  discrimination  against  shippers 
of  lumber  on  open  cars  who  are  re- 
quired to  furnish  stakes,  binders  and 
racks.  National  Wholesale  Lumber 
Dealers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  L   C.  C.  154,  163. 


FACILITIES   AND  PRIVILEGES,   §10    (a)— (j) 


§10.     Loading,    Unloading,    Bracing,   etc. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §8  (1)  (i); 
Classification,  §13;  Evidence,  §63 
(a),  (e),  §65;  Facilties  and 
Privileges,  §17  (d),  (f ) ;  Tariffs,  §4 
(L);  Terminal  Facilities,  §4  (c) ; 
Track  Storage,  II  (a);  Transporta- 
tion,   §10,    §12    (f). 

(a)  Any  charge  by  defendants  for 
readjusting  a  load  of  piling  or  poles, 
made  necessary  by  shifting,  improper 
loading  or  heavy  grades,  must  be  pro- 
vided for  by  proper  tariff  rule.  Cali- 
fornia Pole  &  Piling  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  22 
L  C.  C.  507,  509. 

(b)  A  lower  rate  to  a  large  shipper 
providing  facilities  for  prompt  unloading 
than  accorded  to  a  small  competitor 
unable  to  provide  such  facilities  would 
constitute  unjust  discrimination.  In  Re 
Restricted  Rates,  20  I.  C.  C.  426,  435. 

(c)  Where  the  tariff  provides  that 
during  certain  seasons  of  the  year  re- 
frigerator cars  will  not  be  furnished 
individual  shippers  unless  loaded  to  10,- 
000  lbs.  minimum  and  contains  another 
rule  that  an  unloading  charge  will  be 
assessed  against  separate  shippers  using 
a  car  for  a  consolidated  shipment,  it  is 
unreasonable  to  assess  an  unloading 
charge  against  that  shipper  who  orders 
a  car  and  loads  it  to  the  minimum, 
even  though  other  shippers  subsequent- 
ly from  the  same  shipping  point  also 
load  into  the  car  which  then  moves  as  a 
consolidated  shipment.  Davies  v.  I.  C 
R.   R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  3. 

(cc)  As  long  as  no  discrimination 
exists,  the  Commission  will  decline  to 
require  a  carrier  to  furnish  a  car  shed 
under  which  vegetables  could  be  loaded 
without  damage  from  the  weather.  Pon- 
chatoula  Farmers'  Ass'n  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,   19   I.   C.   C.  513,  515. 

(d)  Defendants'  tariffs  provided  that 
they  might  load  or  unload  carload 
shipments  at  any  time  for  any  shipper 
at  a  specified  additional  charge  to.  that 
of  transportation  or  might  refrain  from 
so  doing,  the  service  to  be  performed 
at  the  option  of  the  carrier.  HELD, 
such  provision  was  discriminatory  and 
unlawful.  Schultz-Hansen  Co.  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,  18  L   C.   C.  234,   237. 

(dd)  It  is  not  improper  for  a  railroad 
to  make  a  reasonable  charge  for  un- 
loading carload  freight,  provided  the 
service  is  clearly  stated  in  the  tariff,  as 
consignees  are  generally  required  to  un- 
load carload  freight.  Schultz-Hansen 
Co.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  234,  235. 


(e)  Services  rendered  by  carriers  in 
loading  and  unloading  a  carload  of 
freight  and  charges  for  such  services 
are  analogous  to  other  terminal  services 
and  charges  such  as  demurrage,  milling- 
in  transit,  storage,  switching,  etc.  Schultz- 
Hansen  Co.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  234, 
237. 

(f)  Loading  carload  freight  by  the 
carrier  means  the  performance  by  it  of 
services  which  the  shipper  ordinarily 
performs,  consisting  of  taking  the  freight 
from  a  wagon,  platform  or  warehouse 
and  stowing  it  in  the  car  for  shipment; 
and  unloading  consists  of  taking  the 
freight  from  the  car  and  placing  it  on 
a  wagon  or  platform  or  in  a  warehouse. 
Merely  rendering  assistance  to  shippers 
in  making  car  door  delivery  and  in  re- 
ceiving freight  at  the  car  door  does  not 
constitute  unloading  and  loading. 
Schultz-Hansen  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I. 
C.   C.  234,  238. 

(g)  Under  a  tariff  specifying  a 
charge  to  be  exacted  by  the  carrier  for 
loading  and  unloading  in  addition  to 
the  transportation  charge,  the  carriers 
cannot  lawfully  exact  a  charge  for 
merely  bringing  the  goods  to  the  door  in 
unloading,  and  receiving  them  at  the  car 
door  in  loading,  since  such  a  tariff  pro- 
vision does  not  cover  that  kind  of 
service.  Schultz-Hansen  Co.  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,  18  L   C.  C.  234,   237. 

(h)  Where  a  specified  charge  by  the 
carrier  for  loading  and  unloading  is  a 
reasonable  one,  it  is  excessive  for  serv- 
ices rendered  by  the  carrier  merely  in 
making  car-door  delivery  and  in  receiv- 
ing freight  at  the  car  door,  Schultz- 
Hansen  Co.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C. 
234,  238. 

(i)  Throughout  the  country  loading 
and  unloading  carload  freight  is  consid- 
ered extra  service  if  performed  by  car- 
riers. Schultz-Hansen  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
18  L  C.  C.  234,  239. 

(j)  For  many  years  defendant  car- 
riers at  San  Francisco  made  car-door 
delivery  of  continental  package  freight 
in  carloads,  and  received  carload  ship- 
ments of  package  freight  to  continental 
points  at  the  door  without  charge.  On 
December  1,  1906,  they  discontinued 
such  free  assistance.  Charges  for  such 
assistance  were  collected  during  this 
period  on  shipments  from  and  to  Ne- 
vada, New  Mexico  and  Arizona.  De- 
fendant S.  P.  Co.  since  1872  required  in 


394 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,   §10    (k)— (r) 


its  tariffs  that  shippers  should  load 
and  unload.  Despite  these  privileges, 
for  a  period  of  some  thirty  years  the 
carriers  at  San  Francisco  were  accus- 
tomed to  furnish  assistance  in  loading 
and  unloading  transcontinental  carload 
package  freight.  Carload  freight  mov- 
ing by  the  Sun  Set  Gulf  route  from 
New  York  to  Galveston  and  thence  by 
rail  to  San  Francisco  was  until  recent 
years  broken  up  in  transit  and  the 
packages  distributed  through  different 
cars.  As  a  result,  it  was  necessary 
for  the  carriers  to  assist  in  unloading 
and  defendant  carriers  were  compelled 
to  adopt  this  practice.  This  situation 
ceased  in  recent  years  and  freight  now 
reaches  San  Francisco  in  unbroken  car- 
load lots.  HELD,  on  account  of  these 
changed  conditions  defendants  were  not 
obliged  to  continue  this  free  assistance 
in  loading  and  unloading  despite  their 
long-continued  practices  in  this  respect, 
and  defendants  were  justified  in  making 
reasonable  charge  for  any  service  over 
and  above  transportation  and  delivery. 
Schultz-Hansen  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I. 
C.  C.  234,  239. 

(k)  Competition  at  certain  points 
may  justify  a  carrier  in  rendering  as- 
sistance in  loading  and  unloading  car- 
load freight  while  refusing  to  do  so 
at  another.  Utica  Traffic  Bureau  v. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
271,  272. 

(1)  Defendant's  tariffs  formerly  pro- 
vided that  owners  should  load  and  un- 
load freight  except  that  the  carriers  re- 
served the  right  to  load  and  unload  at 
their  convenience.  Later  the  tariff  was 
amended  eliminating  the  exception  and 
defendants  gradually  ceased  giving  as- 
sistance in  unloading  to  complainant 
merchants  at  Utica,  N.  Y.  On  account 
of  competition  they  did,  however,  render 
some  assistance  in  loading  and  unload- 
ing at  New  York  City,  Yonkers  and 
other  points.  HELD,  the  rule  as  amend- 
ed was  not  unreasonable  nor  did  the 
practice  of  defendants  at  the  other  cit- 
ies constitute  unjust  discrimination. 
Utica  Traffic  Bureau  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H. 
R.   R.    R.   Co.,   18   L    C.   C.    271,   274. 

(m)  Loading,  furnishing  material  and 
placing  in  cars  is  an  additional  service 
for  which  carriers  are  entitled  to  re- 
ceive reasonable  compensation.  Davies 
v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  540. 

(n)  Defendant  charged  for  loading, 
stripping    and    bracing    carloads    of    to- 


matoes, strawberries  and  cabbages 
shipped  from  Gibson  and  Humboldt, 
Tenn.,  to  Chicago,  rates  of  $10,  $8  and 
$7  per  car  respectively.  The  evidence 
indicated  these  charges  to  be  less  than 
the  actual  cost  of  the  service  to  the 
carrier.  Under  these  charges,  however, 
the  total  charges  for  the  carload  ship- 
ments were  larger  than  on  less-than- 
carload  shipments,  no  charge  in  the 
latter  case  being  made  for  loading  and 
bracing.  HELD,  the  charges  for  load- 
ing, stripping  and  bracing  complained 
of  were  not  unreasonable;  but  that  the 
carload  and  less-than-carload  rates  should 
be  adjusted  so  as  to  avoid  the  existing 
anomalous  situation.  Davies  v.  L.  &  N. 
R.   R.   Co.,   18  I.    C.   C.   540,  542,   543. 

(o)  Providing  a  place  where  con- 
signments can  be  handled,  and  in  as- 
sorting into  lots  packages  marked  with 
names  of  several  dealers  to  whom  they 
are  consigned  is  a  thing  of  value  for 
which  the  shipper  may  be  required  to 
pay.  Davies  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.  186,  188. 

(p)  The  Penn.  R.  R.  gave  an  unload- 
ing service  and  furnished  facilities  at 
its  coal  terminals  at  Baltimore,  which 
rendered  it  impracticable  for  a  shipper 
not  on  its  line  to  deal  in  coal  from 
the  Alden,  Pa.,  district.  These  terminal 
facilities  consisted  of  chutes  and  bins, 
which  it  rented  to  the  coal  dealers  of 
Baltimore  at  an  annual  rental.  These 
terminals  adjoined  its  main  tracks  and 
coal  was  switched  into  them  and  there 
delivered  on  the  through  rate,  no  extra 
charge  being  made  for  the  delivery. 
No  coal  dealers  could  engage  profitably 
in  the  selling  of  Alden  coal  without 
the  benefit  of  such  service.  The  Penn. 
R.  R.  refused  to  furnish  such  a  yard 
and  service  to  complainant  coal  deal- 
er. HELD,  such  discrimination  was  un- 
lawful and  must  cease.  Enterprise  Fuel 
Co.  V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  219, 
224. 

(q)  Staking  a  load  of  lumber  on  an 
open  car  is  in  reality  a  part  of  the 
operation  of  loading.  National  Whole- 
sale Lumber  Dealers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  C. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  154,  IbU. 

(r)  Where  it  is  practically  impossible 
for  commission  men  handling  hay  to 
build  storehouses  at  the  railroad  yards, 
and  it  would  increase  the  cost  of  hand- 
ling the  hay  from  $10  to  $15  per  car  if 
the  same  were  unloaded  and  hauled  to 
storehouses  at  a  distance,  railroads  can- 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §10  (s)— §12  (a) 


395 


not  require  commission  men  to  give 
up  the  use  of  such  cars  for  storage 
purposes  and  supply  storehouses.  N.  Y. 
Hay  Exchange  Ass'n  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  178,  182. 

(s)  Where  a  course  of  business  has 
grown  up  with  the  permission  and  en- 
couragement of  a  railway  which  allows 
commodities  to  remain  for  storage  pur- 
poses in  cars,  and  which  practice  is  not 
in  itself  vicious  but  rather  in  the  inter- 
est of  economy,  such  fact  ought  to  be 
taken  into  account  in  determining  to 
what  extent  penalties  in  the  way  of 
demurrage  charges  should  be  inflicted. 
N.  Y.  Hay  Exchange  Ass'n  v.  Penn.  R. 
R.  Co.,  14  1.  C.  C.  178,  185. 

(t)  Whether  the  shipper  or  the  car- 
rier should  load  and  unload  commodities 
depends  not  upon  whether  the  commod- 
ity is  put  up  in  packages,  but  upon  the 
nature  of  the  commodity  itself,  or, 
rather,  the  manner  in  which  it  is 
handled.  Wholesale  Fruit  &  Produce 
Ass'n  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  410,  418. 

(u)  In  determining"  whether  the  car- 
rier or  the  shipper  is  bound  to  load  and 
unload  freight,  the  question  must  be  de- 
cided with  respect  to  each  commodity, 
the  physical  conditions  existing  at  the 
points  of  loading  and  unloading,  and  the 
previous  practice  of  the  carrier.  Whole- 
sale Fruit  &  Produce  Ass'n  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  410,  419. 

(v)  The  I.  C.  R.  R.,  having  provided 
at  Chicago  a  fruit  house  for  handling 
fruits  and  vegetables  to  avoid  the  liabil- 
ity of  freezing  in  the  delivery  of  the 
same,  may  impose  a  reasonable  charge 
for  handling  such  products  through  that 
house.  Wholesale  Fruit  &  Produce  Ass'n 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C. 
410,  420. 

(w)  The  furnishing  by  an  interstate 
carrier  of  bulkheads  with  cars  for  the 
transportation  of  grain  does  not  consti- 
tute the  granting  of  the  "privileges  or 
facilities"  which  are  required  to  be  pub- 
lished with  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  by  section  6  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act;  and  a  shipper, 
where  the  carrier  fails  to  furnish  bulk- 
heads, may  therefore  recover  in  an  action 
at  law  in  a  state  court  for  the  expense 
of  supplying  them,  although  the  pub- 
lished schedules  make  no  allowance  for 
furnishing  the  same.  (Kruse  and  Spring, 
JJ.,  dissenting.)     Loomis  v.  Lehigh  Val- 


ley R.   R.    Co.    (N.  Y.,   1911),   132   N.  Y. 
Supp.   138,   141. 

§11.     Notifying   Shipper  of   Rejection. 

(a)  Defendant  carrier's  practice  was, 
when  there  was  no  consignee  to  receive 
a  shipment,  to  have  its  local  agent  tele- 
graph the  freight  claim  agent,  who  in 
turn  communicated  by  telegrapb  with 
the  connecting  carrier  delivering  the 
freight  to  his  line,  and  in  this  way  the 
original  consignor  was  finally  reached. 
HELD,  this  practice  was  a  proper  one 
and  the  Commission  would  refuse  to 
order  the  local  agent  at  the  point  of 
destination  to  telegraph  directly  to  the 
consignor,  informing  the  latter  of  the  re- 
jection  of  the  shipment.  Kehoe  &  Co. 
V.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C. 
555,  557. 

§12.     Scaleage    Deductions    and    Shrink- 
age. 

(a)  Complainant,  grain  dealers  at 
Baltimore,  attacked  the  "scaleage  deduc- 
tions" made  by  defendant  carriers  upon 
grain  passing  through  elevators  owned 
by  defendants  at  that  port.  In  process  of 
elevation  grain  loses  in  weight  through 
loss  of  dust,  chaff  and  dirt,  which  re- 
mains behind  in  the  elevator  rooms  and 
spouts.  Defendants  issued  receipts  for 
the  actual  weight  of  the  grain  received 
at  their  elevators,  with  a  statement 
thereon  as  to  estimated  deductions  which 
would  be  made  from  the  weight  in  rede- 
livering to  complainants  the  grain.  These 
deductions  approximately  represented 
such  losses.  Defendants  at  New  York, 
however,  did  not  make  such  deductions 
and  actually  went  into  the  market  and  pur- 
chased grain  to  supply  shrinkage.  These 
practices  had  existed  for  many  years 
at  both  cities  and  the  discrimination  in 
favor  of  New  York  was  apparently  taken 
care  of  in  the  difference  of  rates  to  New 
York  and  Baltimore.  HELD,  said  scale- 
age  deductions  at  Baltimore  did  not  con- 
stitute a  matter  affecting  rates,  and  de- 
fendants were  not  required  to  place  such 
deductions  in  their  public  tariffs;  but 
that  the  actual  purchasing  by  defend- 
ants at  New  York  of  grain  to  make  up 
the  shrinkage  was  a  matter  affecting 
rates,  and  complainants  were  entitled  to 
a  remedy  of  that  situation  on  the  ground 
of  unjust  discrimination,  upon  further 
proof  that  such  practice  at  New  York 
actually  resulted  in  unjust  discrimina- 
tion. Baltimore  Chamber  of  Commerce 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  341,  346,  347. 


396 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §13   (a)— §15   (a) 


§13.     Staking  and   Binding. 

(a)  Taking  into  consideration  the  fact 
that  the  cost  of  staking  and  binding 
lumber  on  open  cars  varies  with  differ- 
ent parts  of  the  same  region,  making  it 
impossible  to  arrive  at  the  average  cost 
of  such  service;  that  no  practical  equip- 
ment of  permanent  stakes  has  been  de- 
vised; that  it  has  been  a  long-estab- 
lished custom  for  the  shipper  to  load  and 
unload;  that  rates  have  been  arrived  at 
on  this  basis;  that  the  shipper  is  best 
adapted  to  perform  this  service;  that 
the  lumber  business  has  been  conducted 
for  many  years  with  reference  to  this 
custom  of  loading  and  staking,  and  that 
rates  for  lumber  shipments  are  the  same 
for  box  and  open  cars,  it  is  HELD,  that 
regulations  of  carriers  requiring  ship- 
pers of  lumber  and  forest  products  on 
open  cars  to  furnish  at  their  own  ex- 
pense stakes,  racks,  binders  and  o^her 
appliances,  are  not  unreasonable  or  un- 
just. (Clark  and  Harlan,  Comm'rs,  dis- 
senting.) National  Wholesale  Lumber 
Dealers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I. 
C.  C.  154,  160,  162. 

§14.     Storing,  Grading  and  Resacking. 

See  Allowances,  §12  (1)  (d);  Com- 
press Companies  and  Charges,  §2 
(a);  Reparation,  §8  (e),  §15  (a); 
Tariffs,  §4  (i),  (o),  (x),  §9  (d),  §10 
(d),  §12  (a). 

(a)  Boston  is  the  chief  wool  market 
of  the  United  States.  Western  wool, 
meaning  that  which  comes  from  Montana, 
Idaho  and  other  far  western  states,  is 
shipped  to  Boston  via  Omaha,  St.  Louis 
or  ^Chicago.  If  shipped  via  Omaha  it  en- 
joys a  stop-over  privilege  at  that  city, 
where  it  may  be  sorted  and  graded 
under  the  tariffs  of  the  carriers,  and 
-thereby  Omaha  becomes  a  wool  market. 
For  some  years  prior  to  December,  1907, 
a  stop-off  privilege  for  the  purpose  of 
storing,  grading  and  resacking  wool  was 
allowed  at  Detroit,  where  the  complain- 
ant does  business  as  a  wool  merchant. 
The  same  privilege  is  granted  to  St. 
Louis  or  Chicago,  because  the  rates  from 
the  far  west  to  the  east  are  made  on 
these  markets,  the  rates  being  made  up 
of  the  rate  from  the  west  to  these 
markets  plus  the  rate  to  the  east.  In 
1907  the  stop-off  privilege  was  withdrawn 
from  Detroit.  In  1904  a  blanket  rate  on 
wool  in  the  grease  was  made  from  Chi- 
cago and  Chicago  rate  points  on  the  west 
to  a  point  near  Youngstown,  O.,  on  the 
east,  and  from  i}Oints  in  the  lower  pe- 
ninsula southward,  including  the  greater 


part  of  Indiana  and  Ohio.  Prior  to  the 
institution  of  this  50c  blanket  rate  the 
rate  on  wool  from  Detroit  to  the  eastern 
seaboard  was  fixed  upon  the  usual  Of- 
ficial Classification  percentage  basis.  The 
reason  for  making  this  blanket  rate,  as 
given  by  defendants,  was  competition  out 
of  Chicago,  and  that  as  this  competition 
is  not  strongly  felt  at  the  eastern  points 
of  the  blanket  territory  it  would  be  un- 
fair to  scale  the  rates  at  Detroit.  The 
present  rate  from  Detroit  was  much  lower 
than  any  previous  rate,  except  one  which 
obtained  for  about  a  year  in  1903.  The 
blanket  rate  allows  small  producers  and 
dealers  at  many  points  to  ship  directly 
to  Boston,  and  the  only  complaint  as  to 
this  rate  came  from  a  jobber.  HELD, 
that  it  would  be  a  difficult  matter  to 
grant  Detroit  the  same  privilege  as 
Omaha,  because  the  carriers  at  the  same 
points  are  not  the  same;  and  also  to 
uphold  the  claim  on  the  part  of  Detroit 
would  justify,  if  not  require,  a  wide  ex- 
tension of  the  privilege  to  other  points. 
If  Detroit  is  given  a  transit  privilege 
every  other  point  within  Official  Classi- 
fication territory  would  properly  feel  that 
it  would  be  entitled  to  such  a  privilege. 
And  instead  of  extending  such  privileges 
it  should  be  the  policy  of  the  Commission 
to  curtail  them  to  as  great  a  degree  as 
may  be  consistent  with  the  industrial 
development  of  the  country,  for  the  in- 
vestigations of  the  Commission  show 
they  are  the  source  and  aggravating 
cause  of  many  of  the  most  serious  com- 
plaints brought  to  its  notice.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  principle  the  petition  for  a  transit 
privilege  at  Detroit  is  denied.  Com- 
plaint dismissed.  Schmidt  &  Sons  v. 
M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  535. 

§15.     Transit. 

See  Bills  of  Lading,  §4;  Blanket 
Rates,  §11  (a);  Cars  and  Car  Sup- 
ply, §11;  Concentrating  Rates  and 
Privileges  (aa) ;  Discrimination,  §3 
(ee),  §4  (aa),  (c) ;  Reparation,  §8 
(u),  (w);  Special  Contract,  §5  (g) ; 
Tariffs,  §4  (e),  §9  (d). 

(a)  A  transit  privilege  in  many  cases 
is  beneficial  in  its  application.  When  it 
can  be  applied  without  discrimination  it 
results  in  the  diffusion  of  business,  in 
giving  to  rival  communities  the  relative 
advantages  to  which  they  are  entitled, 
and  which  can  be  accorded  them  in  no 
other  way,  and,  generally  speaking,  in 
the  application  of  lower  transportation 
charges.  The  commercial  operations  of 
this  country  have  in  many  instances 
grown  up   upon   the   exercise  of  transit 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §15   (aa)_(g) 


397 


privileges  and  could  have  been  developed 
In  no  other  way.  The  Commission  has 
never  held  that  transit  was  to  be  con- 
demned in  so  far  as  it  was  beneficial 
and  could  properly  be  applied.  In  so  far 
as  transit  lends  itself  to  the  defeating 
of  the  published  rate  or  to  the  prefer- 
ence of  one  individual  or  locality  over 
another,  this  Commission  has  condemned 
it.  In  Re  Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides 
and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151,  171. 

(aa)  Carriers  may  charge  a  reason- 
able compensation  for  granting  the 
transit  privilege  required  by  the  Com- 
mission's order  in  this  case;  but  what  is 
said  as  to  charging  for  the  transit  priv- 
ilege is  not  to  be  laid  hold  of  to  im- 
pose a  charge  for  this  and  similar  priv- 
ileges where  there  is  no  reduction  in 
the  rate.  In  Re  Transportation  of  Wool, 
Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151,  174. 

(b)  For  the  granting  of  a  transit 
privilege  carriers  should  charge  reason- 
able compensation.  In  Re  Transporta- 
tion of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I  C.  C. 
151,  174. 

(bb)  The  privilege  of  sorting  and 
grading  wool  in  transit  should  be  al 
lowed  at  intermediate  points  upon  pay- 
ment of  2i^c  per  100  lbs.  and  upon 
condition  that  it  applies  only  to  wool 
originating  west  of  the  Mississippi  River, 
which  must  be  kept  separate  from  wool 
originating  east  of  the  river.  In  Re 
Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and 
Pelts,  23  L   C.   C.   151,   176. 

(c)  A  refunding  clause  in  a  tariff  ap- 
plicable to  cotton  destined  from  Texas 
points  to  New  Orleans  for  export  is  not 
unlawful  if  reasonable  and  properly  po- 
liced. In  Re  Transportation  of  Cotton 
and  Cotton  Linters,  23  I.  C.  C.  404,  411. 

(d)  Millers  in  southern  Illinois,  inter- 
mediate to  Boston  and  St.  Louis,  attacked 
the  rates  on  flour  and  other  grain  prod- 
ucts of  24.7c  per  100  lbs.  from  their 
mills  to  Boston  as  discriminatory  when 
compared  with  the  rate  of  21.7  mills  from 
St.  Louis,  the  more  distant  point.  The 
differential  of  3c  over  St.  Louis  was  the 
customary  relationship,  but  it  was  con- 
tended that  St.  Louis,  Kansas  City  and 
other  markets  could  mill  in  transit  with- 
out extra  charge,  while  complainants  had 
in  all  cases  to  pay  a  penalty  of  at  least 
^c  per  100  lbs.,  and  in  some  instances 
more,  for  this  privilege.  The  L.  &  N. 
R.  R.,  for  example,  charged  complainant 
mills  upon  its  line  2.5c  per  100  lbs.  for 


transporting  the  grain  from  St.  Louis 
to  the  mill,  and  24.7c  per  100  lbs.  for 
carrying  the  product  from  the  mill,  thus 
making  the  cost  for  milling  in  transit 
5.5c  above  the  rate  paid  by  the  St.  Louis 
millers,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  grain 
could  move  into  St.  Louis  either  by  wag- 
on or  rail,  be  milled  there  and  sent  for- 
ward at  the  reshipping  or  proportional 
rate  of  21.7c.  HELD,  that  for  the  addi- 
tional service  involved  in  the  granting  of 
milling-in-transit  and  similar  privilges  an 
additional  charge  may  properly  be  made, 
and  that  i/^c  per  100  lbs.  is  reasonable 
for  that  service;  but  that  whatever  priv- 
ileges are  permitted  by  defendants  to 
St.  Louis  in  the  way  of  milling-in-transit 
ought  to  be  accorded  to  complainants, 
at  a  penalty  not  exceeding  i/^c  per  100 
lbs.  Southern  Illinois  Millers'  Ass'n  v. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  672,  678. 

(e)  Once  let  it  be  conceded  that  the 
inbound  and  outbound  movements  of  a 
commodity  which  is  milled  in  transit  are 
separate  and  distinct  the  impropriety  of 
applying  any  rates  other  than  the  regu- 
larly established  local  rates  is  obvious. 
Red  River  Oil  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  438,  446. 

(f)  Complainants  sought  reparation  for 
450  cars  which  moved  into  Newport, 
Tenn.,  between  Feb.  23,  1906,  and  Nov. 
28,  1910,  upon  which  charges  were  paid 
for  milling-in-transit  privileges.  In  a  pre- 
vious opinion  (19  I.  C.  C.  526)  the  Com- 
mission decided  that  reparation  should 
be  made  on  the  basis  of  the  rates  ai>- 
plicable  at  Johnson  City.  For  some  time 
the  milling-in-transit  rate  at  both  New- 
port and  Johnson  City  had  been  2c  per 
100  lbs.  On  March  27,  1908,  the  minimum 
charge  at  Newport  was  raised  from  $5 
to  $6  per  car;  in  April  the  Johnson  City 
rate  was  also  raised  to  $6.     On  Jan.  15, 

1909,  Johnson  City  was  given  a  flat  rate 
of  $2  per  car,  the  Newport  rate  remain- 
ing unchanged.  On  May  16,  1910,  the 
rate  at  Johnson  City  was  made  Ic  per 
100  lbs.  HELD,,  on  the  cars  which  moved 
into  Newport  between  Jan.  15,  1909,  and 
May  16,  1910,  the  amount  of  reparation 
should  be  computed  by  deducting  $2  (the 
rate  at  Johnson  City)  from  the  transit 
charge  collected  from  complainant.  On 
shipments  from  May  16,  1910,  to  Nov.  28, 

1910,  the  amount  of  reparation  should  be 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  dividing  the 
transit  charge  by  two.  Spiegle  &  Co. 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  22  1.  C.  C.  82,  83. 

(g)  Transit  privileges  to  give  to  ship- 
pers the  right  to  try  various  markets  are 


398 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,   §15    (h)— (k) 


of  great  benefit  and  as  these  markets 
multiply  it  becomes  evident  that  carriers 
may  with  propriety  impose  a  reason-^.ble 
charge  for  the  service.  In  Re  Advance 
on  Live  Stock  and  Packing  House  Prod- 
ucts, 22  L  C.  C.  160,  174. 

(h)  The  rates  charged  by  the  Nashville, 
Chattanooga  &  St.  Louis  Ry.  on  stave 
and  heading  bolts  from  Tennessee  points 
to  Paducah,  Ky.,  were  attacked  as  unrea- 
sonable and  discriminatory.  Stave  bolts 
are  logs  cut  up  into  3o-inch  lengths. 
Heading  bolts  are  shorter,  and  about 
two-thirds  of  the  bolt  is  lost  in  process 
of  manufacture.  The  rates  between  local 
points  were  less  than  the  rates  to  junc- 
tion points,  such  as  Paducah.  The  rates 
had  been  maintained  for  many  years. 
The  rates  on  stave  bolts  were  higher 
than  on  logs.  Transit  rates  were  in  ef- 
fect allowing  a  refund  for  the  outbound 
haul  of  the  manufactured  product,  and 
the  drawback  averaged  1.6c  per  100  lbs., 
or  17.2  per  cent  of  the  inbound  rate.  In 
1908  all  transit  rates  were  withdrawn 
and  flat  rates  established  slightly  higher 
than  the  transit  rates.  The  average  of 
the  old  net  rate  was  7.48c  for  a  distance 
of  from  9  to  203  miles,  while  for  the 
present  scale  it  was  7.94c.  The  I.  C. 
R.  R.  maintained  transit  rates  somewhat 
lower  than  defendant.  It  received  the 
outbound  shipments  for  long  hauls  over 
its  lines.  The  rates  on  lumber  between 
Omaha  and  Kansas  points  were  shown 
to  be  lower,  and  that  defendants'  lines 
traverse  a  mountainous  country  unfit  for 
agricultural  purposes,  and  that  timber 
once  cut  is  not  replaced  by  products  of 
the  field.  Defendant  showed  that  from 
stave-bolt  originating  points  situated  equi- 
distant from  local  stave-bolt  manufac- 
turing points  and  from  Paducah  the  ag- 
gregate cost  of  the  raw  material  into  the 
local  point  and  the  finished  product  out 
was  higher  than  in  and  out  of  Paducah. 
HELD,  no  reason  appeared  requiring 
defendant  to  establish  transit  rates  or 
rates  as  low  as  those  of  the  I.  C.  R.  R., 
but  the  rates  to  Paducah  are  unreason- 
able in  so  far  as  they  exceed  the  rates 
to  local  points.  Paducah  Cooperage  Co. 
V.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.,  22  L  C.  C.  226,  231. 

(i)  Complainant  in  a  supplf^mental 
proceeding  attacked  the  withdrawal  of 
certain  milling-in-transit  rates  at  Cedar 
Rapids,  la.,  under  which  corn  was  manu- 
factured into  starch  and  the  starch  for- 
warded to  destinations  at  the  corn  rates. 
In  the  original  proceeding,  under  the  con- 
ditions then  existent,  it  was  found  that 


the  withdrawal  of  the  transit  privileges 
created  unjust  discrimination  against 
complainant.  No  order  was  issued  be- 
cause defendants  restored  the  transit 
privileges,  but  subsequently  withdrew 
them.  It  appeared  that  the  conditions 
which  obtained  at  the  time  of  the  pre- 
vious hearing  had  been  materially 
changed,  inasmuch  as  there  is  now  no 
transit  on  starch  at  Pekin,  111.,  and  there 
will  be  none  at  Keokuk,  la.,  and  other 
competitive  points.  HELD,  the  question 
of  whether  or  not  conditions  and  circum- 
stances have  changed  is  of  primary  if 
not  of  controlling  importance.  That  in- 
asmuch as  through  transit  rates  on  starch 
from  point  of  origin  of  the  corn  to  the 
destination  of  the  starch  and  the  pro- 
posed corn  rates  to  Cedar  Rapids  or  to 
the  basing  points  plus  the  starch  rates 
from  Cedar  Rapids  or  from  the  basing 
points  result  in  earnings  as  low  as  5.20 
mills  per  ton  mile,  while  the  maximum 
is  8.7  mills  per  ton  mile,  the  earnings 
are  in  the  majority  of  instances  lower 
for  corresponding  destinations  than  the 
rates  on  corn  from  Omaha,  Neb.,  and 
western  Iowa  points  to  Chicago,  and  the 
proposed  rates  to  Cedar  Rapids  will  in 
no  instance  be  higher  than  those  to 
other  points  at  which  starch  is  manu- 
factured, and  in  some  instances  will 
be  lower.  Under  the  circumstances  the 
supplemental  petition  must  be  dismissed. 
Douglas  &  Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
21  L  C.  C.  97. 

(j)  A  privilege,  savoring  as  it  does 
of  a  gratuity,  however  valuable  and 
beneficial,  and  however  difficult  of  relin- 
quishment, cannot  as  a  matter  of  law 
be  continued  by  the  Commission  unless 
the  original  granting  of  the  privilege 
rested  on  some  legal  obligation,  which 
under  the  law  affords  ground  on  which 
the  Commission  could  as  an  original 
proposition  require  that  it  be  granted, 
or  if  discontinued  order  it  restored. 
Douglas  &  Co.  V.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
21  I.  C.  C.  97,  102. 

(k)  Complainant,  a  corporation  en- 
gaged in  buying,  grading  and  selling  hay 
in  New  York  City  and  vicinity,  attacked 
the  charge  of  $2  per  car  imposed  on  all 
hay  stopped  at  Townley,  N.  J.,  for  in- 
spection, grading  and  reconsignment, 
where  it  had  an  extensive  warehouse. 
The  stopping  of  cars  at  Townley  was  a 
transit  privilege  of  great  value  to  the 
complainant,  in  that  it  was  enabled  to 
grade  and  assort  hay  so  that  in  the  out- 
going shipments  to  its  customers  there 


FACILITIES  AND   PRIVILEGES,   §15    (1)— (o) 


399 


were  only  about  two  cars  rejected  in  the 
hundred,  whereas  the  percentage  of  re- 
jections was  much  higher  when  hay  went 
through  to  destination  without  having 
been  carefully  assorted.  The  charge  im- 
posed was  that  exacted  at  other  points, 
except  that  for  a  few  months  a  com- 
petitive plant  at  Sayre,  Pa.,  could  hold 
a  car  for  twenty-four  hours  and  divert 
without  any  charge  being  made,  if  the 
diversion  was  accomplished  within  the 
twenty-four  hours,  but  this  privilege  was 
also  extended  to  Towiiley  after  a  few 
months.  HELD,  that  on  the  record  tne 
reconsignment  charge  at  Townley  can- 
not be  held  unreasonable,  but  that  rep- 
aration should  be  awarded  for  cars  re- 
consigned  by  complainant  within  twenty- 
four  hours  after  arrival  during  the  period 
for  which  the  twenty-four-hour  reconsign- 
ment privilege  was  extended  to  Sayre 
and  not  at  Townley.  American  Hay  Co. 
V.  L.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  166. 

(1)  Transit  privileges  are  susceptible 
of  defense  only  upon  the  theory  that  the 
inbound  and  outbound  movements  are 
parts  of  a  single  continuous  transaction. 
In  Re  Reduced  Rates  on  Returned  Ship- 
ments,  19   I.   C.   C.   409,  417. 

(m)  The  mliling-iu-transit  rates  on 
lumber  of  the  Southern  Ry.  at  Bristol 
and  Johnson  City,  Tenn.,  competitive 
points,  were  lower  than  at  Newport, 
Tenn.,  a  non-competitive  point.  When 
complainant's  business  at  Newport  was 
inaugurated  in  1897  the  charge  for  the 
stop-over  privilege  on  lumber  at .  New- 
port was  $5  per  car.  This  was  gradually 
raised  until  on  Jan.'  1,  1905,  from 
certain  points  it  was  a  minimum  of  $15 
per  car  with  a  limit  on  reshipment  of 
one  year.  In  May,  1910,  the  privilege 
at  both  Bristol  and  Johnson  City  was 
made  a  minimum  of  $3  per  car,  with 
a  right  of  reshipment  in  twelve  months. 
Bristol  is  the  terminus  of  the  line  of 
the  Southern  Ry.,  running  northeast- 
ward from  Chattanooga  through  Knox- 
ville,  Morristown  and  Johnson  City. 
Morristown  is  89  miles  from  Bristol 
and  Johnson  City  is  between  the  two, 
64  miles  from  Morristown  and  25  miles 
from  Bristol.  At  Morristown  a  branch 
diverges  to  the  south  and  east,  connect- 
ing with  the  main  line  at  Asheville,  87 
miles  distant.  On  this  branch  22  miles 
from  Morristown  is  Newport.  The  mill- 
ing-in-transit rates  on  grain  are  the 
same  at  Bristol,  Johnson  City  and  New- 
port. The  situation  created  enabled 
jobbers  and  finishers  of  lumber  at  Bris- 


tol and  Johnson  City  to  monopolize  the 
trade  and  practically  forced  complainant 
to  go  out  of  business.  HELD,  it  is 
often  necessary  on  account  of  competi- 
tive conditions  to  recognize  the  justice 
of  charging  more  for  a  service  at  one 
point  where  all  the  conditions  except 
that  of  competition  is  similar,  than  for 
a  like  service  at  another  place  where  no 
competition  exists,  but  it  cannot  be 
held  to  be  just  to  so  fix  rates  or  charges 
as  to  destroy  the  business  of  one  con- 
cern and  create  a  monopoly  in  favor 
of  other  concerns  even  though  it  be 
merely  incidental  to  meeting  competi- 
tive rates.  Defendants  are  ordered  to 
charge  no  more  for  the  milling-in-transit 
privilege  extended  at  Newport  on  lum- 
ber shipments  than  is  contemporaneously 
imposed  at  Johnson  City.  Reparation 
awarded.  Spiegle  &  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  522. 

(n)  Defendant  railroads  expended 
some  $106,000  in  erecting  on  their  right 
of  way  at  Argenta,  across  the  river  from 
Little  Rock,  Ark.,  an  elevator  and  mill- 
ing plant.  It  was  leased  to  one  Bunch, 
a  grain  dealer  competing  with  complain- 
ant dealer  at  Little  Rock,  for  his  natural 
life  upon  a  rental  of  $1  per  year.  Bunch 
gave  to  defendants  promissory  notes  for 
some  $37,000,  which  was  a  sum  in  ex- 
cess of  the  anticipated  cost  of  the  plant. 
Bunch  as  lessee  agreed  to  pay  taxes, 
assessments  and  insurance  premiums  and 
to  keep  the  buildings  and  machinery 
in  repair.  By  the  lease  Bunch  agreed 
to  receive  and  handle  without  cost  and 
without  discrimination  all  grain  tendered 
to  him  by  other  shippers  for  elevation 
or  storage.  As  a  matter  of  practice  he 
did  not  do  so  and  it  was  never  in  good 
faith  intended  that  he  should  do  so. 
The  defendants  refused  to  extend  similar 
privileges  to  complainant.  As  a  result 
of  the  transaction  in  question  Bunch 
was  able  practically  to  monopolize  the 
situation  at  the  points  in  question. 
HELD,  the  practices  complained  of  were 
unlawful  and  discriminatory.  Brook- 
Rauch  Mill  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,   17  I.  C.  C.  158,   161,  163. 

(o)  On  shipments  of  grain  products 
and  hay  from  Ohio  and  Mississippi 
River  crossings  and  beyond  to  south- 
eastern destinations,  dealers  at  Nash- 
ville under  the  guise  of  "elevation  al- 
lowances" were  paid  by  defendants  al- 
lowances where  the  grain  was  unloaded 
or  sacked  at  their  stores  or  warehouses, 
irrespective   of   whether  there   was  any 


400 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,   §15    (p)— (u) 


elevation  involved,  or  whether  the  sack- 
ing was  done  by  hand  or  by  machinery, 
when  the  shipments  moved  out  of 
Nashville  to  southeastern  points.  These 
allowances  were  not  made  to  dealers 
located  at  Atlanta  and  other  Georgia 
points.  HELD,  following  Nebraska-Iowa 
Grain  Co.  v.  U.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
90,  such  allowances  were  unduly  dis- 
criminatory. Duncan  &  Co.  v.  N.  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  590,  592.  Order 
of  Commission  temporarily  enjoined  by 
Commerce  Court,  Nashville  Grain,  etc., 
V.  I.  C.  C,  191  Fed.  37,  40. 

(p)  Whenever  elevation  in  the  tran- 
portation  sense  of  the  term  is  afforded 
by  railroads,  it  must  be  without  any 
commercial  advantages  to  the  shipper, 
either  in  the  way  of  mixing,  grading, 
cleaning,  clipping,  or  of  storage  be- 
yond the  period  of  ten  days.  Washer 
Grain  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
147,   151. 

(q)  On  imported  brewers'  rice  in 
sacks,  complainant  was  assessed  a  stor- 
age charge  after  the  expiration  of  48 
hours'  free  time  of  Ic  per  100  lbs,  for  the 
first  10  days  and  for  every  additionil 
10  days  or  fraction  thereof,  %c  at  defend- 
ants' wharf  in  New  Orleans.  A  part  of 
the  rice  was  loaded  into  cars  and 
switched  to  a  warehouse  about  3,000 
feet  away  at  the  lower  end  of  the 
dock,  and  there  unloaded  and  held  to 
await  shipping  orders.  It  was  handled 
by  hand  labor  with  the  use  of  trucks  and 
was  stored  in  a  fireproof,  brick  ware- 
house with  cement  floor-  and  concrete 
roof.  Another  part  of  the  rice  was 
carried  a  distance  of  about  300  feet  and 
similarly  disposed  of.  When  the  rice 
was  shipped  out  it  was  handled  by  hand, 
put  upon  trucks,  loaded  into  cars,  piled 
and  checked.  The  storage  charge  cov- 
ered all  this  service.  Complainant  was 
permitted  to  ship  out  the  rice  at  his 
convenience  and  received  the  low  im- 
port proportional  rates.  The  charges 
exacted  were  not  in  excess  of  those 
at  other  landing  places.  HELD,  the 
storage  charges  imposed  were  not  un- 
reasonable. Gough  &  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  L  C.   C.  280,  282. 

(r)  Complainant  demanded  a  stop- 
page-in-transit privilege  at  Indianapolis 
on  structural  iron  and  steel  originating 
at  Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  Pittsburg  and  Johns- 
town, Pa.,  en  route  to  points  west  of  In- 
dianapolis, the  purpose  being  to  permit 
punching    and    riveting    at    Indianapolis, 


with  an  additional  charge  of  $3  per  car 
therefor.  Under  the  privilege  in  ques- 
tion the  material  shipped  in  is  sawed 
to  lengths,  riveted,  punched  and  put  into 
more  compact  form,  but  the  identical 
material  is  shipped  out.  Chicago  and 
St.  Louis,  the  principal  competitors  of 
Indianapolis,  were  accorded  this  privi- 
lege. The  rates  to  St.  Louis  and  Chicago 
from  the  Pittsburg-Buffalo  district  were 
221/^0  and  18c  respectively,  while  the  rate 
to  these  points  via  Indianapolis  were  30i/^c 
and  281/^c,  respectively.  The  rate  via  In- 
dianapolis on  steel  from  Pittsburg  to 
Missouri  River  points  was  7i/^c  in  excess 
of  the  rate  via  Chicago.  The  rates  via 
Chicago  to  St.  Paul  and  Minneapolis  and 
points  in  Minnesota  and  Wisconsin  were 
30i^c.  Via  St.  Louis  the  rate  from  Pitts- 
burg to  St.  Paul  was  36c,  via  Indianap- 
olis 41c.  Des  Moines  was  accorded  the 
privilege  in  question  on  shipments  from 
the  Pittsburg-Buffalo  district  to  Missouri 
River  points  and  secured  the  through 
rate  of  45c  to  Chicago  and  St.  Louis. 
HELD,  defendants  having  granted  since 
the  hearing  the  privilege  in  question  to 
Indianapolis  at  an  additional  charge  of 
li/^c  per  100  lbs.,  the  complaint  should 
be  dismissed  without  prejudice.  Indian- 
apolis Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  1.  C.  C.  370,  375. 

(s)  The  storage  of  grain  beyond  the 
elevation  period  of  10  days  and  the  mix- 
ing, weighing  and  inspection  of  the  same, 
are  commercial  services  and  are  in  no 
sense  a  part  of  elevation,  as  defined  in 
the  Act.  In  the  Matter  of  Allowances  to 
Elevators  by  the  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  315,  316. 

(t)  Elevators  are  essential  to  the 
proper  handling  of  grain.  Traffic  Bureau 
of  St.  Louis  V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
317,  318. 

(u)  Defendants  allowed  live-stock  men 
in  territory  west  of  the  Missouri  River  to 
bring  in  cattle  from  the  ranges  in  the 
southwest,  fatten  them,  and  ship  them  on 
to  the  market  under  a  feeding-in-transit 
privilege,  by  which  they  secured  the 
through  rate  from  the  range  to  the  mar- 
ket, plus  the  additional  charge  for  the 
privilege,  and  plus  the  local  rate  from 
the  feeding  point  for  the  additional 
weight  which  the  cattle  took  on  in  the 
process  of  fattening.  They  denied  this 
privilege  to  complainant  stockmen  in 
Iowa  territory.  Under  this  condition 
complainants  brought  in  very  few  cattle 
from  the  ranges,  and  confined  themselves 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §15    (v)— §16    (e) 


401 


to  fattening  feeders  purchased  at  points 
on  the  Missouri  River.  The  evidence  in- 
dicated that  if  extended  the  privilege  they 
would  bring,  in  cattle  from  the  ranges  for 
fattening  purposes.  HELD,  the  denial  of 
the  privilege  constituted  an  unjust  pref- 
erence. Corn  Belt  Meat  Producers'  Ass'n 
v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  376,  378. 

(v)  A  tariff  providing  a  milling-in- 
transit  privilege  stated  that  the  same 
would  be  extended  only  by  special  ar- 
rangement. HELD,  such  tariff  was  open 
to  criticism,  since  the  transit  privilege 
should  be  open  to  all  shippers  similarly 
situated  upon  like  terms,  and  those  terms 
should  be  so  clearly  and  definitely  stated 
that  knowledge  thereof  might  be  acquired 
from  examination  of  the  carrier's  tariff. 
Quimby  v.  Maine  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I. 
C.  C.  246,  249. 

§16.     Wharfage. 

See  Courts,  §10  (d);  Export  Rates 
and  Facilities,  III  (b);  Facilities 
and  Privileges,  §16,  §21  (w) ;  Repa- 
ration, §21  (j);  Special  Contract, 
§2  (z);  Terminal  Facilities,  §1  (a), 
(g),    (li);   Water   Carriers,   §3    (e). 

(a)  One  Young  obtained  the  lease  of  a 
wharf  at  Galveston  from  the  S.  P.  Ter- 
minal Co.,  which  company  was  controlled 
through  stock  ownership  by  the  Southern 
Pacific  Railroad  and  Steamship  Systems. 
The  cake  and  meal  purchased  by  Young 
were  bought  by  him  in  various  states, 
but  chiefly  in  Texas  and  shipped  to  him 
on  bills  of  lading  and  waybills,  showing 
the  point  of  origin  in  those  states  and  the 
destination  at  Galveston.  The  purchases 
were  made  for  export.  His  sales  to  for- 
eign countries  were  sometimes  for  im- 
mediate and  sometimes  for  future  de- 
livery, irrespective  of  whether  he  had  the 
product  on  hand  at  Galveston.  At  times 
therefore  orders  must  be  filled  on  cake 
to  be  purchased  in  the  interior  or 
shipped  in  transit  to  him.  When  the  cake 
reached  Galveston  it  was  ground  into 
meal  and  sacked  by  Young,  and  new 
shippers'  bills  of  lading  were  made  out 
to  his  order  for  foreign  parts.  HELD, 
the  manufacture  or  concentration  on  the 
wharves  of  the  terminal  company  were 
but  incidents  in  the  shipment  of  the 
product  in  export  trade,  and  the  regula- 
tions of  the  terminal  company  in  the 
handling  of  its  wharves  was  within  the 
power  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission. S.  P.  Terminal  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  219 
U.  S.  498,  526,  31  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  279,  55 
L.  ed.  310,  sustaining  14  L  C.  C.  250. 


(b)  Where  a  railroad  has  a  wharf  at 
which  its  tariffs  offer  delivery  and  at 
which  part  of  the  shipping  public  is 
served,  but  to  which  it  does  not  give  all 
access,  it  must  make  delivery  at  the  same 
rate  at  some  other  wharf.  Mobile  Cham- 
ber of  Commerce  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
L  C.  C.  417,  419. 

(c)  Where  carriers  publish  ship-side 
rates  on  export  trafllc  to  certain  wharves 
owned  by  them,  they  make  such  wharves 
public  terminals,  and  the  necessary  im- 
plication arising  from  the  publication  of 
such  rates  is  that  access  must  be  given  to 
such  wharves  by  whatever  ship  the 
shipper  chooses  to  have  his  freight  car- 
ried from  the  wharf  by,  so  long  as  such 
access  may  be  safely  and  properly  given. 
A  railroad  may  not  have  a  preferred  line 
of  steamships  to  the  exclusion  of  other 
ships.  It  may  prefer  one  line  and  have 
more  intimate  relationship  with  such  line 
than  with  others,  but  its  duty  as  a  com- 
mon carrier  by  rail  cannot  be  neglected 
because  of  such  arrangement.  It  may  set 
aside  one  or  more  docks  for  the  use  of 
such  allied  lines  so  long  as  such  practice 
does  not  conflict  with  its  duty  to  give  de- 
livery at  its  docks  to  whomsoever  may 
apply  for  the  freight  properly  deliverable 
at  that  point.  If  it  chooses  to  give  up  its 
entire  dock  facilities  to  some  particular 
line  it  may  do  so,  but  it  must  make  de- 
livery upon  equal  terms  to  other  ships,  at 
that  port,  for  it  has  undertaken  to  deliver 
the  freight  it  transports  at  the  ship's 
side.  Mobile  Chamber  of  Commerce  v. 
M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  1.  C.  C.  417,  423. 

(d)  A  railroad  line  has  the  right  to 
reserve  for  certain  boat  lines  certain  of 
its  water  terminals,  provided  such  reser- 
vations do  not  effect  discrimination 
against  traffic  destined  to  such  waterside 
terminals  and  to  be  carried  therefrom^by 
other  boat  lines.  Mobile  Chamber  of 
Commerce  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
417,  427. 

(e)  The  Southern  Railway  and  the 
Mobile  &  Ohio  Railroad  own  docks  at 
Mobile  to  which  they  make  ship-side  de- 
livery on  export  traffic.  The  export  rate 
includes  not  only  transportation  to  Mo- 
bile but  switching  to  the  wharves,  use  of 
the  docks  and  the  unloading  of  the  cars. 
No  separate  charges  are  published  for 
these  terminal  services,  they  being  in- 
cluded in  the  export  rate.  Each  of  these 
carriers  makes  ship-side  delivery  at  the 
docks  of  the  other  without  additional 
charge.     Neither  will  make  delivery  at 


402 


FACILITIES   AND  PRIVILEGES,   §16    (f)— §17    (i) 


any  other  wharf  without  a  charge  for  the 
terminal  services.  Neither  carrier  will 
issue  through  bills  of  lading  except  for 
certain  preferred  steamship  lines.  The 
result  of  this  is  to  limit  the  export  traffic 
of  Mobile  to  the  ships  favored  by  defend- 
ants. HELD,  that  the  defendant  carriers 
must  not  discriminate  in  extending  de- 
livery at  ship-side  rates  at  the  port  of  Mo- 
bile on  traffic  moving  over  their  wharves 
when  destined  to  one  water  line  or  an- 
other. Where  a  railroad  has  a  wharf  at 
which  its  tariffs  offer  delivery  and  at 
which  part  of  the  shipping  public  is 
served,  but  to  which  it  does  not  give  all 
access,  it  must  make  delivery  at  the  same 
rate  at  some  other  wharf.  "The  Mobile 
docks  of  defendants  are  public  terminals 
and  if  the  carriers  desire  to  extend  their 
use  to  a  favored  few  equal  facilities  for 
the  others  must  be  provided  elsewhere. 
The  defendants  must  also  cease  to  dis- 
criminate in  the  issuance  of  through  bills 
of  lading  on  export  traffic.  The  same 
service  they  give  to  the  shipper  in  the 
Interior  who  uses  one  line  of  ships  from 
the  port  should  be  given  to  another  ship- 
per who  wishes  to  use  a  different  line  of 
ships,  provided  both  lines  of  ships  submit 
to  the  same  reasonable  conditions  im- 
posed by  the  rail  carrier.  Mobile  Cham- 
ber of  Commerce  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
23  L  C.  C.  417,  427. 

(f)  If  a  shipper  is  so  situated  that  he 
cannot  conveniently  remove  goods  from 
a  dock  within  a  reasonable  time,  and 
therefore  requires  dock  insurance,  there 
is  no  hardship  in  compelling  him  to  pay 
for  such  protection,  according  to  the 
length  of  time  for  which  it  is  needed. 
Wyman,  Partridge  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  577,  579. 

111.     PUBLICATION  AND  TARIFFS. 

See  Tariffs,  §3  (d). 
§17.     Obligation  to  Publish. 

See  Tariffs,  §4  (L),  §9  (d). 

(a)  Transit  is  a  privilege  that  may  be 
accorded  by  carriers  to  shippers  only 
when  properly  provided  for  in  their 
tariffs.  Liberty  Mills  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
23  L  C.  C.  182,  185. 

(b)  Facilities  or  privileges  granted 
or  allowed  in  connection  with  rates 
should  be  stated  in  tariffs.  In  Re  Mileage, 
Excursion  and  Commutation  Tickets,  23 
L  C.  C.  95. 

(c)  Transit  privileges  and  charges 
thereunder  on  interstate  or  export  ship- 


ments must  be  clearly  and  definitely 
shown  in  tariffs  published  and  filed  in 
conformity  with  the  requirements  of  sec- 
tion 6  of  the  Act.  Red  River  Oil  Co.  v. 
T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  438,  447,  448. 

(d)  There  must  be  proper  tariff  pro- 
visions connecting  the  inbound  with  the 
outbound  movements,  thus  fixing  the 
through  charge  from  the  producing  point. 
St.  Paul  Board  of  Trade  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S. 
S.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  285,  288. 

(e)  Under  section  6  of  the  Act  re- 
quiring the  filing  of  tariffs  with  the  Com- 
mission showing  all  charges  and  facilities 
granted,  it  is  not  enough  to  state  the 
amount  of  the  charge  unless  the  services 
and  privileges  covered  by  it  are  also 
stated.  Whenever  any  service  is  ren- 
dered beyond  the  ordinary  receiving, 
transporting  and  delivering  of  freight,  the 
precise  character  of  that  service  should 
appear  in  the  printed  schedule,  and  this 
applies  to  charges  made  for  loading  and 
unloading  carload  freight.  Schultz-Han- 
sen  Company  v.  S.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C. 
234,  237. 

(f)  The  holding,  storing,  unloading 
and  reloading  of  Pacific  coast  shipments 
of  shingles  at  Menasha,  Wis.,  subject  to 
rebilling  and  reconsignment  under  the 
proportional  rate  from  Minnesota  Trans- 
fer to  Chicago,  is  a  privilege  and  service 
that  requires  publication  in  a  tariff  in 
order  to  be  lawful.  Folmer  &  Co.  v.  G. 
N.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  33,  36. 

(g)  The  privilege  embodied  in  a  sep- 
arate storage  and  reconsignment  tariff 
of  one  carrier  cannot  be  availed  of  un- 
der a  joint  tariff  to  which  that  carrier  is 
a  party,  unless  the  tariff  by  express  ref- 
erence to  the  former  so  provides.  Wash- 
ington Broom  &  Woodenware  Co.  v.  C.  R. 
L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  218,  219. 

(h)  A  shipper  cannot  be  deprived 
through  a  carrier's  negligence  of  any 
lawful  privilege  offered  by  another  car- 
rier, but  such  privilege  must  itself  be  not 
only  one  which  the  carrier  may  lawfully 
allow,  but  it  must  also  be  duly  estab- 
lished and  filed  with  the  Commission. 
Kile  &  Morgan  Co.  v.  Deepwater  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  235,  238. 

(i)  Reparation  will  not  be  awarded 
on  the  basis  of  a  reconsignment  priv- 
ilege customarily  extended  by  the  car- 
rier, but  not  duly  published  in  its  tariff. 
Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  267. 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §17   (j)— §18    (oc) 


403 


(j)  In  absence  of  tariff  authority 
privilege  of  milling  in  transit  cannot  be 
granted.  Neosho  Milling  Co.  v.  K,  C.  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  433. 

(k)  Through  a  defect  in  its  tariff 
defendant  failed  to  properly  provide  for 
a  concentration  privilege  in  connection 
with  shipments  of  cotton.  Subsequently 
corrected.  Reparation  awarded.  Rennert- 
Millette  Co.  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  525. 

§18.     Reshipping  Under  Through  Rate. 

See  Reparation,  §2  (f ) ;  Tariffs,  §14 
(e) ;  Through  Routes  and  Joint 
Rates,    §20. 

(a)  As  provided  in  the  tariff,  charges 
were  assessed  on  grain  products  at  rates 
in  effect  when  shipment  moved  from 
milling  point  and  not  at  rates  in  effect 
when  grain  moved  from  point  of  origin. 
Damages  denied.  Liberty  Mills  v.  L.  & 
N.   R.  R.  Co.,  23  L   C.   C.  182. 

(aa)  If  inbound  and  outbound  move- 
ments are  separate  and  distinct  it  is 
improper  to  apply  any  rates  other  than 
the  regularly  established  local  rates. 
Red  River  Oil  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  438,  446. 

(b)  Complainants  claimed  that  defend- 
ants through  the  adjustment  of  rates, 
rules  and  practices  granted  to  dealers  at 
Nashville,  Tenn.,  undue  preferences  and 
advantage  in  the  handling  of  grain, 
grain  products  and  hay  moving  from 
the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  River  cross- 
ings and  from  points  north  and  west 
thereof  through  Nashville  to  southeast- 
ern destinations.  The  particular  prac- 
tice attacked  was  that  of  rebilling  or 
reshipping  which  was  permitted  on  grain, 
grain  products  and  hay  at  Nashville,  but 
which  was  not  accorded  at  any  other 
point  in  the  southeastern  territory. 
Under  this  privilege  grain  moving 
through  Nashville  could  be  unloaded 
and  held  not  longer  than  six  months 
and  then  reshipped  at  the  through 
rate  from  origin  to  destination  instead 
of  at  the  sum  of  the  rates  into  and 
out  of  Nashville.  HELD,  considering 
particularly  the  traffic  involved,  viz., 
the  transportation  of  grain,  grain  prod- 
ucts and  hay  from  the  grain-growing 
region  lying  to  the  north  and  west, 
by  taking  out  the  privilege  at  Nashville, 
benefits  would  be  derived  by  all  parties 
and  interests  concerned,  by  a  due  ob- 
servance of  the  statute,  which  would  in 
and  of  itself  justify  the  action,  and  the 


results  on  the  business  at  Nashville 
would  not  be  as  dire  and  chaotic  as 
represented  by  the  defendants.  Duncan 
&  Co.  V.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.,  21  I.  C. 
C.  186. 

(bb)  Reshipment  is  the  right  of  a 
shipper  to  reship  goods  received  by  him, 
without  removal  from  the  car,  upon  pay- 
ment of  the  freight  charges  to  that 
point,  the  goods  going  forward  under  a 
new  transportation  contract.  It  is  an 
incident  to  the  transportation  facilities 
offered.  Any  consignee  has  the  right 
to  reship.  Detroit  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  L.  S; 
&  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  257,  258. 

(c)  Complainant  shipped  crude  cot- 
tonseed oil  into  Savannah,  Ga.,  on  the 
ocal  rates  from  the  various  points  of 
origin,  and  after  refining  at  that  place 
it  was  reshipped  on  the  balance  of  the 
through  rate  from  points  of  origin  to 
iltimate  destinations,  but  between  the 
times  of  inbound  and  outbound  move- 
ments the  rates  had  been  advanced  2c 
per  100  lbs.,  and  under  the  provisions 
of  the  tariffs  as  interpreted  by  defend- 
ants they  applied  the  higher  through  rate 
in  effect  at  the  time  of  reshipment.  The 
refining-in-transit  rules  provided  that  the 
through  rates  to  be  applied  should  be 
those  in  effect  at  the  time  of  reship- 
ment. HELD,  that  this  provision  in  the 
tariff  was  clearly  contrary  to  law  and  that 
the  rate  applicable  to  all  through  ship- 
ments is  the  rate  in  effect  at  the  tim.e 
of  the  initial  movement.  Southern  Cot- 
ton Oil  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  [. 
C.  C.  434,  435,  436. 

(cc)  Complainant  shipped  125  bales  of 
cotton  from  Lawton,  Okla.,  to  Chick- 
asha,  Okla.,  for  concentration,  charges 
being  collected  at  the  local  rate  of 
$1.50  per  bale.  Defendant's  tariffs  pro- 
vided that  on  reshipment  to  final  des- 
tination the  through  rate  from  the 
point  of  origin  would  be  protected.  The 
consignment  was  destroyed  by  fire 
while  standing  on  the  platform  of  the 
compress  at  Chickasha.  Complainant 
sought  to  recover  the  charges  paid  for 
the  movement  from  Lawton  to  Chick- 
asha. HELD,  transit  privileges  are 
allowed  upon  the  theory  that  the  in- 
bound shipment  may  be  stopped  and 
the  identical  freight,  or  its  product, 
or  its  exact  equivalent  of  the  same  com- 
modity moving  into  the  transit  point 
under  the  same  privilege,  may  be 
shipped  to  ultimate  destination  under 
the   through  rate   from   point  of  origin. 


404 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,   §18    (d)— (g) 


If  for  any  reason  reshipment  becomes 
Impossible  the  carrier  is  under  no  obli- 
gation to  refund  the  charges  collected 
for  the  movement  to  the  transit  point. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Anderson,  Clay- 
ton &  Co.  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co., 
17  L  C.  C.  12. 

(d)  Complainant  lumber  dealers  at 
Cairo  attacked  the  reshipping  privileges 
allowed  by  defendants  to  lumber  dealers 
at  Memphis  and  denied  to  complainants 
on  shipments  of  lumber  from  Mississippi 
points  to  points  north  and  east  of  the 
Ohio  and  Mississippi  rivers.  Under  such 
privilege  the  Memphis  dealer  was  per- 
mitted to  ship  lumber  from  the  Missis- 
sippi mills  to  Memphis,  and  unload  the 
same,  assort  and  dry  it,  covering  a  pe- 
riod of  90  days,  and  then  reship  same  to 
the  north  and  east  at  the  through  rate. 
Memphis  dealers  i  ecured  their  lumber 
from  mills  located  in  Mississippi  com- 
paratively short  distances  from  Memphis. 
The  millmen  supplying  the  same  had 
small  capital  and  were  financed  by  the 
Memphis  dealers.  The  timber  was 
cleared  by  the  millmen  without  regard 
to  the  kinds  of  lumber  cut.  The  mill- 
men  had  neither  the  means  nor  the  prac- 
tical facilities  for  assorting  and  drying 
the  lumber,  and  it  was  therefore  neces- 
sary that  these  processes  be  carried  on 
at  Memphis.  The  greater  portion  of  the 
lumber  shipped  into  Memphis  was  green. 
Nine  railroads  led  into  Memphis,  result- 
ing in  keen  competition.  The  reconsign- 
ment  privilege  at  Memphis  was  estab- 
lished to  enable  Memphis  to  compete 
with  Cairo  and  St.  Louis  for  Arkansas 
lumber.  At  Cairo  lumber  was  received 
from  millmen  located  much  farther  from 
that  city  than  the  millmen  supplying 
Memphis  were  distant  from  Memphis. 
The  greater  portion  of  lumber  coming  to 
Cairo  was  already  graded  and  dried. 
Competition  between  the  five  railroads 
running  into  Cairo  was  less  keen  than 
at  Memphis.  HELD,  the  difference  in 
conditions  at  Memphis  justified  the  de- 
fendants in  granting  the  reshipping  priv- 
ilege at  that  point  and  denying  the  same 
to  Cairo.  Sondheimer  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  60,  67,  68. 

(dd)  Whenever  by  any  transit  arrange- 
ment through  rates  are  applied  such 
rates  must  be  as  of  the  date  of  first 
movement  from  point  of  origin  under 
such  through  rates.  In  Re  Milling-in- 
Transit  Rates,  17  I.  C.  C.  113. 

(e)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload  of 
cement  containing  60,000  lbs.  from  Acme, 


Tex.,  to  East  St.  Louis  and  there  placed 
the  same  in  its  warehouse,  paying  the  18c 
rate  in  effect  between  said  points.  Com- 
plainant then  removed  one-half  of  the 
carload,  leaving  30,000  lbs.,  and  rebilled 
the  car  to  Braidwood,  111.,  and  was  as- 
sessed the  local  rate  to  Braidwood  of 
9c.  The  rate  from  Acme  to  Braidwood 
via  East  St.  Louis,  minimum  30,000  lbs., 
was  23c.  The  tariff  at  the  time  of  ship- 
ment provided  for  a  reconsignment  at 
East  St.  Louis.  It  had  beten  the  custom 
of  defendant  to  apply  in  cases  like  the 
one  in  question  the  balance  of  the 
through  rate  of  5c  for  the  haul  from  St. 
Louis  to  Braidwood,  and  at  the  time  of 
the  hearing  defendant  had  in  effect  a 
proportional  rate  from  East  St.  Louis 
upon  shipments  of  this  character.  HELD, 
assuming  there  ought  to  have  been  In 
effect  such  a  reconsignment  privilege, 
still  complainant  was  not  entitled  to  rep- 
aration, since  such  privilege  could  not 
be  held  to  permit  the  removal  of  a  por- 
tion of  a  carload  in  transit  and  the  send- 
ing forward  of  the  balance  at  the  through 
rate.  Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  C.  & 
A.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  220,  222. 

(f)  A  condition  that  the  ultimate  des- 
tination must  be  shown  on  the  original 
bill  of  lading,  to  obtain  the  through  rate, 
is  unreasonable.  Roper  Lumber-Cedar 
Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  382. 

(g)  Defendant's  tariff  provided  that 
shipments  of  lumber,  shingles,  posts  and 
poles  might  be  dressed,  sawed  or  con- 
centrated in  transit,  and  carried  at 
through  rates  from  point  of  shipment 
to  the  concentration  point,  thence  to 
point  of  ultimate  destination.  Prior  to 
Oct.  2,  1907,  the  tariff  provided  that  a 
shipper  could  avail  himself  of  this  transit 
privilege  only  by  showing  in  the  original 
shipping  bill  the  ultimate  destination  of 
the  shipment.  Enforcement  of  this  pro- 
vision was  impracticable,  the  shipper 
not  usually  knowing  the  ultimate  destina- 
tion of  a  shipment  until  after  it  reached 
the  concentration  point,  and  therefore 
this  provision  in  the  tariff  was  generally 
ignored.  On  shipments  by  complainant 
between  1906  and  1907,  however,  the  con- 
dition was  strictly  enforced,  resulting  in 
a  denial  of  the  transit  privilege  to  com- 
plainant. Oct.  2,  1907,  however,  it  was 
cancelled.  HELD,  the  condition  was  un- 
reasonable. Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  the  through  rate  on  the  190'o- 
1907  shipments.  Roper  Lumber-Cedar 
Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  382. 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §18    (h)— §19    (e) 


405 


(h)  If  there  is  offered  to  a  shipper 
under  the  tariff  a  right  of  stopping  in 
transit,  reconsignment,  storage,  or  return 
of  freight,  he  is  entitled  to  the  use  of 
such  privilege,  even  though  it  may  later 
be  canceled  out  of  the  tariff  before  the 
time  allowed  for  the  exercise  of  such 
right  has  expired.  Interstate  Remedy 
Co.  V.  American  Express  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
436,   439. 

§19.     Retroactive  Application. 

See    Infra,    §20    (e);    Long    and    Short 
Hauls,   §5    (J);    Reconsignment,   §6. 

(a)  In  April  and  May,  1909,  there 
were  shipped  from  McKenzie,  Tenn.,  to 
complainants  at  Evansville,  Ind.,  eight 
carloads  of  logs,  the  rate  charged  being 
12c  per  100  lbs.  Between  February  and 
May,  1909,  there  were  shipped  from  Hum- 
boldt, Tenn.,  to  complainants  twelve 
cars  under  a  rate  of  lie  per  100  lbs. 
During  the  same  period  defendant  main- 
tained a  rate  of  7c  from  certain  stations 
immediately  north  and  south  of  McKen- 
zie and  Humboldt,  applicable  on  logs 
shipped  into  Evansville,  there  manufac- 
tured into  lumber  and  shipped  out  in 
manufactured  form.  In  December,  1909, 
the  7c  rate  was  made  applicable  from 
McKenzie  and  in  February,  1910,  from 
Humboldt.  In  November,  1910,  com- 
plainants filed  claim  against  defendant 
to  have  the  subsequently  es.tablished 
milling-in-transit  rate  applied  to  the  ship- 
ments. The  outbound  shipments  upon 
which  this  claim  was  based  were  made 
about  eighteen  months  after  receipt  of 
the  inbound  shipments  at  Evansville.  It 
did  not  appear  affirmatively  whether  the 
inbound  shipments  were  manufactured 
into  lumber  at  Evansville  and  the  prod- 
uct reshipped,  or  whether  they  were  dis- 
posed of  locally.  HELD,  there  was  no 
obligation  on  the  carrier  to  make  the 
milling-in-transit  privilege  retroactive, 
and  the  period  which  intervened  between 
the  inbound  and  outbound  shipments  was 
unreasonably  long.  Young  &  Cutsinger 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  1,  3. 

(b)  Defendant  charged  7.7c  per  100 
lbs.  on  logs  from  McLean's  Spur,  Ky ,  to 
Louisville,  Ky.  Complainant  claimed  to 
have  an  understanding  that  a  refund 
would  be  made  on  the  basis  of  5c  upon 
proof  that  the  manufactured  product  had 
been  reshipped  via  defendant's  line.  The 
carrier  failed  to  establish  the  rate  con- 
tended for  until  after  the  inbound  ship- 
ment had  moved.  The  rate  was  alleged 
to  have  been  unreasonable  in  so  far  as 
it  exceeded  5c.     HELD,  the  Commission 


would  not  order  the  establishment  in 
the  first  instance  of  a  transit  privilege, 
or  permit  the  retroactive  application  of 
one  voluntarily  established  by  a  carrier, 
except  for  the  purpose  of  removing  a 
discrimination.  Complaint  dismissed. 
Wood-Mosaic  Flooring  &  Lumber  Co.  v. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  458. 

(c)  Reparation  was  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  a  transit  privilege  made  ap- 
plicable after  the  date  of  movement;  not 
viewed  as  the  retroactive  application  of 
a  transit  privilege,  the  privilege  being 
held  applicable  to  a  station  not  specific- 
ally mentioned  in  the  tariff.  Henry  v. 
E.  Ry.  Co.,  20  1.  C.  C.  171. 

(d)  Complainant  shipped  five  double- 
deck  carloads  of  sheep,  Vaughn,  N.  M., 
to  Kansas  City,  Mo.,  fed  in  transit  at 
Pampa,  Tex.,  under  a  rate  of  25c  to 
Pampa  and  36i/^c  beyond.  Defendants 
admitted  the  rate  to  be  unreasonable  to 
(he  extent  that  it  exceeded  a  rate  of  41c 
plus  a  feeding-in-transit  charge  of  7c, 
but  refused  to  apply  such  rate,  on  the 
ground  that  the  feeding-in-transit  charge 
was  not  applicable  to  a  shipment  from 
Vaughn  until  a  date  subsequent  to  that 
of  the  shipment.  The  tariff  under  which 
the  shipment  moved  was  lawfully  on 
file  prior  to  May  1,  1907.  At  the  time 
shipment  moved  there  was  in  force  to 
Kansas  City  from  points  south  of  Vaughn 
a  joint  rate  of  40 ^c  plus  a  feeding-in- 
transit  charge  of  7c.  A  large  majority 
of  these  points  are  farther  distant  from 
Kansas  City  than  Vaughn.  HELD,  that 
the  tariff,  being  lawfully  on  file  prior  to 
May  1,  1907,  was  not  strictly  subject 
to  rules  of  interpretation  subsequently 
promulgated,  and  that  under  the  cir- 
cumstances this  case  did  not  involve  the 
retroactive  application  of  a  transit  priv- 
ilege; that  the  ra^e  was  unreasonable 
to  the  extent  that  it  exceeded  a  rate  of 
48c  per  100  lbs.  Reparation  awarded. 
Henry  v.  Eastern  Ry.  Co..  20  I.  C.  C.  171. 

(e)  Complainant  shipped  from  Eddy, 
Ala.,  to  Columbus,  O.,  a  carload  of  yel- 
low pine  lumber  milled  in  transit  at 
Meridian,  Miss.,  under  a  combination 
rate  of  41c  per  100  lbs.  Reparation  was 
asked  to  the  basis  of  a  joint  rate  of  28c 
with  a  transit  privilege.  Prior  to  the 
shipment  the  28c  rate  had  been  effect- 
ive, but  a  month  before,  due  to  a  mis- 
understanding between  the  carriers,  this 
transit  privilege  was  withdrawn,  but 
was  restored  about  six  weeks  subse- 
quent to  the  shipment.  With  this  ex- 
ception the  rate  of  28c  with  the  transit 


406 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,   §19    (f)— §20    (c) 


privilege  had  been  continuously  in  force 
for  about  f/e  years.  HELD,  a  transH 
privilege  which  was  effective  for  eigh- 
teen months,  and  through  misunder- 
sJtanding  between  the  carriers  was  with- 
drawn for  a  period  of  two  and  one-half 
months,  and  then  restored  and  continued 
in  effect,  cannot  be  regarded  in  the  same 
light  as  a  newly  established  transit 
privilege,  and  does  not  come  within  th€ 
Commission's  rule  against  awarding  rep- 
aration which  amounts  to  the  retroactive 
application  of  a  transit  privilege.  Rep 
aration  awarded.  Crescent  Lumber  Co. 
V.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co..  20  I.  C.  C.  230. 

(f)  Complainant  shipped  between 
April  18,  1904,  and  May  9,  190G,  carloads 
of  lumber  from  Cady  Switch  and  Le 
Compt,  La.,  to  Omaha,  Neb.,  and  various 
other  points,  dressed  in  transit  at  Alex- 
andria, La.,  under  a  local  rate  of  5c  per 
100  lbs,  to  Alexandria  and  a  through 
rate  of  23c  per  100  lbs.  from  Alexandria 
to  destination.  After  the  lumber  was 
dressed  at  Alexandria  and  forwarded  the 
local  rate  was  usually  returned,  but  not 
on  these  particular  shipments.  The  tariff 
carried  no  milling-in-transit  privileges 
until  May  9,  1906.  Carriers  agreed  to 
refund  the  5c  if  permission  to  do  so  was 
obtained.  HELD,  the  Commission  will 
not  sanction  the  application  retroactively 
of  a  milling-in-transit  privilege,  even 
though  it  had  long  been  the  custom  of 
the  carrier  to  permit  it  without  tariff 
authority,  and  that  though  the  defend- 
ants express  willingness  to  make  refund 
on  the  ground  of  discrimination,  the  fact 
that  the  carriers  agreed  to  pay  the 
amount  does  not  form  any  basis  upon 
which  the  Commission  could  make  its 
findings,  or  apply  retroactively  the  tran- 
sit privileges  in  question.  Cady  Lumber 
Co.  V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  12. 

(g)  Transit  privileges  cannot  be 
given  a  retroactive  effect.  National 
Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  P.  L.  A.  &  S.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  434. 

(h)  Prior  to  the  enactment  of  the 
Hepburn  Act  defendant  accorded  a  yard- 
ing-in-transit  privilege  on  lumber  shipped 
from  San  Pedro  to  Los  Angeles  and  re- 
shipped  to  other  destinations,  by  which 
on  shipments  so  retained  at  Los  Angeles 
through  rates  were  granted.  Such  priv- 
ilege was  not  published,  and  upon  the 
enactment  of  the  Hepburn  Act  was  with- 
drawn. Later  it  was  restored  and  legally 
published.  In  the  interval  complainant 
made  the  shipments  in  question  and 
was    denied    such   privilege   and    reship- 


ment  under  the  through  rate.  HELD, 
the  practice  before  the  enactment  of 
the  Hepburn  Act  amounted  to  an  illegal 
rebate  and  could  not  be  made  the  basis 
of  an  award  of  damages.  Reparation 
denied.  National  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  P. 
L.  A.  &  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
434,  435. 

(i)  Reconsignment  privileges  cannot 
be  given  retroactive  effect.  Miller  &  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  60. 

(j)     Reconsignment  privileges  will  not 
be  given  retroactive  effect  unless  that  is 
necessary  to  correct  an   unjust  discrim- 
ination.    Menefee  Bros.  v.  R.  &  W.  R.  R. . 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  359. 

§20.     Substitution    of  Tonnage. 

(a)  Defendants  maintained  propor- 
tional or  milling-in-transit  tariff  rates 
under  which  large  volumes  of  grain 
moved  from  originating  points  in  the 
west  and  middle  west  to  Dyersburg, 
Tenn.  The  inbound  grain  moved  to  Dy- 
ersburg, where  after  elevation  or  milling 
it  was  reshipped  to  points  in  the  Mis- 
sissippi valley  at  the  local  rates  from 
Dyersburg,  having  paid  a  proportional 
rate  to  Dyersburg.  Upon  surrender  of 
the  inbound  expense  bills  the  charges 
were  corrected  to  equal  the  through  rates 
from  points  of  origin  to  points  of  des- 
tination. Complainant  maintained  a  mill 
at  Dyersburg,  which  became  bankrupt 
and  was  leased  to  the  president  of  com- 
plainant as-  an  individual,  and  after  the 
termination  of  the  bankruptcy  complain- 
ant again  took  possession  under  a  cor- 
porate name  slightly  different  from  its 
original  one.  At  the  time  of  the  bank- 
ruptcy there  was  in  the  mill  only  a 
nominal  amount  of  tonnage  on  which 
old  expense  bills  could  have  been  ap- 
plied, and  there  had  accumulated  in  the 
hands  of  complainants  a  vast  number  of 
old  expense  bills  which  it  desired  to  use 
subsequent  to  the  bankruptcy.  HELD, 
there  is  no  justification  for  any  such  use 
for  the  old  expense  bills  as  is  contended 
for  by  complainant.  Klyce  Co.  v.  I.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  567. 

(b)  The  fact  that  general  laxity  and 
irregularity  formerly  prevailed  in  tne 
matter  of  transit  privileges  and  cancel- 
lation of  inbound  expense  bills  affords 
no  warrant  for  now  approving  or  con- 
tinuing such  practice.  Klyce  Co.  v.  I.  C 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  567,  570. 

(c)  The  change  of  ownership  of  a 
milling-in-transit  plant  would  not  neces- 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,   §20    (d)— (h) 


407 


sarily  deprive  such  product  as  was  actu- 
ally in  transit  of  the  privilege  of  re- 
shipment  under  the  through  rate.  Klyce 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  567,  571. 

(d)  Transit  rules  and  regulations  and 
railroad  billings  which  do  not  distin- 
guish between  such  different  commod- 
ities as  hard  wheat  and  soft  wheat,  or  as 
yellow  corn  and  white  corn,  or  as  lumber 
and  maple  lumber,  or  as  rock  salt  and 
fine  salt,  leave  wide  open  the  oppor- 
tunity for  practices  which  defeat  rates 
and  discriminate  against  honest  ship- 
pers, in  that  substitution  at  transit  priv- 
ilege points  is  easily  effected.  In  Re 
Substitution  of  Tonnage  at  Transit 
Points,  18  L  C.  C.  280,  287. 

(e)  Defendant  had  no  agent  at  Po- 
mona, Tenn.,  located  on  the  switch  of 
defendant's  line  two  miles  from  Hum- 
boldt, Tenn.,  where  traffic  originating  at 
Pomona  was  billed.  The  same  carload 
rates  to  St.  Louis  applied  from  both 
places.  A  car  of  strawberries  partly  filled 
was  transported  to  Humboldt  and  there 
loaded  with  additional  crates,  thence  it 
was  moved  to  St.  Louis.  The  freight 
rate  of  23c  (any  quantity)  from  Pomona 
to  Humboldt  and  39c  (carload)  from 
Humboldt  to  St.  Louis  was  collected. 
Complainant  demanded  reparation  to  the 
basis  of  the  23c  rate  collected,  less  a  $5 
charge  for  concentration.  Defendant  al- 
lowed such  a  concentration  privilege  on 
other  parts  of  its  lines,  the  rate  applying 
in  such  case  being  the  rate  from  the  con- 
centration point.  HELD,  since  the  39c 
carload  rate  applied  from  both  Pomona 
and  Humboldt,  and  complainant  under 
the  facts  was  entitled  to  the  concentra- 
tion privilege,  reparation  should  be 
awarded  as  soon  as  defendant  published 
the  same  in  its  tariff,  and  this  despite 
the  fact  that  the  rates  charged  were  the 
legal  rates  and  that  concentration  or 
transit  privileges  cannot  be  given  retro- 
active effect  for  the  purpose  of  granting 
reparation.  A.  S.  Block  &  Co.  v.  L.  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  372,  373. 

(f)  Where  a  shipment  of  uncom- 
pressed cotton  was  destroyed  at  the 
transit  point,  the  Commission  will  not 
order  full  reparation  on  the  inbound 
charges  or  an  extension  of  time  to  sub- 
stitute another  shipment  for  the  out- 
bound movement.  Henderson  &  Barkdull 
V.  St.  L.  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
514. 

(g)  Complainant  b^oug^t  phosphate 
rock   and    acid    phosphate   from   various 


points  to  Prairie  Switch,  Ind.,  and  there 
mingled  it  with  humus  and  then  shipped 
the  same  out  to  various  destinations  to 
be  used  as  fertilizer.  Of  the  outgoing 
tonnage  more  than  half  consisted  of  the 
humus  originated  at  Prairie.  HELD,  in 
view  of  the  material  added  at  Prairie 
Switch  complainant  was  not  entitled  to 
a  transit  privilege  at  that  point.  Bash 
Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  522,  523. 

(h)  Under  the  rebilling  or  reshipping 
privilege  accorded  at  Nashville  on  ship- 
ments of  grain,  grain  products  and  hay 
from  Ohio  and  Mississippi  River  cross- 
ings to  points  in  the  southeast,  the 
through  rates  from  the  crossings  to  ulti- 
mate destinations  were  applied.  Ship- 
ments moved  into  Nashville,  where  they 
were  unloaded,  elevated  or  sacked  and 
at  any  time  within  six  months  might  be 
•eshipped  on  to  points  in  the  southeast, 
vvith  the  benefit  of  the  through  rate  from 
Doint  of  origin  to  destination.  When  a 
shipper  desired  to  reship  at  Nashville 
ae  took  the  expense  bill  covering  the 
nbound  movement  to  the  agent  of  the 
jarrier,  and  the  outbound  shipments  were 
charged  against  that  expense  bill.  He 
thereupon  secured  a  bill  of  lading  show- 
ing the  original  shipping  point.  Under 
this  practice  the  Nashville  dealer  might, 
for  example,  buy  two  cars  of  grain,  one 
at  Memphis  and  one  at  Louisville.  He 
paid  up  to  Nashville  on  the  Memphis 
car  lie,  and  on  the  Louisville  car  10c, 
which  were  the  local  rates.  Should  the 
Memphis  car  burn  after  being  put  in  the 
warehouse,  or  be  sold  at  Nashville,  he 
would  ,>iifrve  two  expense  bills  and  one 
car  of  grain.  Should  he  sell  a  car  at  At- 
lanta he  might  use  the  Memphis  bill, 
showing  a  payment  of  lie,  paying  the 
balance  of  the  through  rate  from  Mem- 
phis to  Atlanta  of  9c.  In  this  way  he 
might  secure  on  a  car  from  Louisville 
to  Atlanta  a  total  rate  of  19c,  whereas 
the  through  rate  from  Louisville  to 
Atlanta  was  24c,  and  the  combmation 
of  locals  27c.  These  reshipping  and  re- 
billing  privileges  were  accorded  to 
Nashville  in  order  to  meet  water  com- 
petition via  the  Cumberland  River. 
Georgia  and  other  southeastern  ship- 
pers were  denied  such  privileges. 
HELD,  that  while  the  conditions  at 
Nashville  tended  to  justify  the  practice 
in  question,  it  must  nevertheless  be  pro- 
hibited in  view  of  the  possibility  of 
discrimination  between  shippers  in 
rates    through    the    manipulation    of    ex- 


408 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §20  (i)— §21  (c) 


pense  bills.  Duncan  &  Co.  v.  N.  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  590,  598,  599. 

(i)  Prohibitions  of  law  are  not  invari- 
ably directed  against  illegal  acts  because 
they  might  be  numerous;  a  statute  may 
be  considered  equally  necessary  to  pre- 
vent sporadic  or  isolated  acts  in  con- 
travention of  public  policy;  and  a  prac- 
tice or  privilege  which  permits  the  move- 
ment of  a  single  shipment  at  less  than 
the  rate  lawfully  applicable  to  such  move- 
ment is  one  which  the  Commission  has, 
under  the  law,  no  alternative  but  to  con- 
demn. Duncan  &  Co.  v,  N.  C.  &  St.  L. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  599. 

(j)  A  tariff  providing  that  under  a 
milling-in-transit  privilege  on  corn, 
other  grains,  and  their  products,  may 
be  forwarded  from  the  milling  point,  is 
open  to  criticism  as  departing  from 
the  underlying  idea  of  milling  in  transit 
and  forwarding  the  products  of  the 
grain  brought  to  and  stopped  at  the 
milling  point.  Quimby  v.  Maine  Cen- 
tral R.  R.   Co.,   13   I.   C.   C.  246,   249. 

IV.     DISCRIMINATION. 
§21.     In  General. 

See   Discrimination,   §6   (d). 

(a)  Defendant  railroad  made  ar- 
rangements with  warehousemen  having 
their  warehouses  and  elevators  located 
along  its  tracks  to  use  the  same  as  fa- 
cilities in  storing  grain  brought  in  by 
the  shippers  and  in  elevating  and  unload- 
ing the  grain  into  defendant's  cars. 
While  the  warehousemen  were  strictly 
engaged  in  a  private  business,  they  did 
in  fact  serve  all  shippers  and  their 
plants  were  open  practically  to  the  gen- 
eral public.  Defendant  promulgated  a 
rule  requiring  that  all  orders  for  empty 
cars  should  be  made  through  these  ware- 
housemen, and  that  it  would  not  regard 
orders  made  to  it  directly  by  the  ship- 
pers. As  a  result  the  warehousemen 
gained  control  of  the  empty  cars  and  in 
times  of  shortage  supplied  their  own 
needs  from  cars  ordered  through  them  by 
shippers.  HELD,  on  mandamus,  the  ware- 
housemen were  the  agents  of  the  rail- 
road, and  the  latter  under  the  Act  for- 
bidding unjust  discrimination  must 
either  compel  the  former  to  desist  from 
such  practices  or  else  cancel  the  rule 
in  question.  U.  S.  v.  Oregon  R.  R.  & 
Navigation  Co.,  159  Fed.  975,  984. 

(b)  Complainants  were  owners  of 
grain  elevators  at  Templeton,  Ind.,  and 
neighboring    points   on   the    line   of   the 


C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Under  tariffs  of 
the  C.  &  E.  I.  and  C.  I.  &  S.  R.  Rs.  grain 
originating  at  competing  points  on  these 
lines  could  be  unloaded  into  elevators 
at  Chicago  and  there  treated,  and  if  with- 
in twelve  months  shipped  out  to  east- 
ern destinations  the  inbound  rate  would 
be  reduced  to  4i^c  per  100  lbs.,  whereas 
the  rates  of  the  C  C.  C  &  St.  L.  Ry.  were 
6c  and  7c.  The  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  as  a 
party  to  the  tariffs  referred  to,  partici- 
pated in  rates  out  of  Chicago  to  eastern 
destinations,  but  tariffs  expressly  pro- 
vided that  these  proportional  rates 
should  not  apply  on  grain  moving  into 
Chicago  from  points  on  its  own  line. 
Chicago  was  their  nearest  market  and 
nearest  point  at  which  complainants 
could  secure  proper  and  efficient  service 
for  treatment  of  their  grain.  No  joint 
rates  were  in  force  from  complainants' 
elevators  to  New  York  via  Chicago.  In 
justification  of  its  refusal  to  grant  com- 
plainants proportional  shipping  rates  and 
transit  privileges  the  C.  <^.  C  &  St.  L. 
Ry.  contended  that  it  had  a  right  to  hold 
complainants'  grain  to  its  own  line  in 
order  to  get  the  long  haul  to  the  mar- 
kets of  the  east.  HELD,  that  it  is  the 
right  of  a  shipper  to  reach  at  reasonable 
transportation  rates  all  markets  within 
the  sphere  of  his  commercial  activity. 
This  right  cannot  be  denied  by  means  of 
rate  schedules  intended  to  hold  traffic  to 
any  particular  line  or  with  a  view  to  com- 
pelling favor  to  one  market  or  another. 
So  long  as  the  C  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  par- 
ticipates in  transportation  of  grain  to 
eastern  points  which  has  moved  into 
Chicago  under  tariffs  that  provide  propor- 
tional rates  from  originating  points,  with 
transit  privileges  at  Chicago,  it  must 
accord  like  rates  and  privileges  on  grain 
from  complainants'  elevators.  Van 
Natta  Bros.  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  1. 

(bb)  To  deny  at  Omaha  certain  tran- 
sit privileges  on  the  ground  that  rates 
do  not  "break"  there,  because  a  carrier 
sees  fit  to  construct  a  joint  rate  beyond 
the  end  of  its  line  to  the  Mississippi 
River,  and  to  grant  such  privileges  at 
the  Mississippi  River  cities  on  the  theory 
that  the  "breaking"  of  rates  there  is  a 
"natural"  advantage,  is  unjust  discrimi- 
nation and  should  not  be  permitted.  In 
Re  Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and 
Pelts,  23  L  C.  C.  151,  170. 

(c)  The  Commission  has  never  held 
that  transit  was  to  be  condemned  in  so 
far  as  it  was  beneficial  and  could  properly 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §21   (cc)— (j) 


409 


be  applied.  In  Re  Transportation  of 
Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151, 
171. 

(cc)  In  so  far  as  transit  lends  itself  to 
the  defeating  of  the  published  rate,  or 
to  the  preference  of  one  individual  or 
locality  over  another,  the  Commission 
condemns  it.  In  Re  Transportation  of 
Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151, 
171. 

(d)  It  is  unlawful  for  a  carrier  to 
add  to  its  reasonable  rate  a  penalty 
by  way  of  a  concentration  charge,  to 
be  forfeited  if  the  outbound  movement 
is  not  over  the  same  line  as  the  in- 
bound movement.  Red  River  Oil  Co.  v. 
T.    &   P.   Ry.    Co.,    23    I.    C.    C.   438,   447. 

(e)  The  Commission  does  not  con- 
demn a  reasonable  or  non-discriminatory 
charge  for  additional  service  performed 
by  a  carrier  in  connection  with  a  tran- 
sit privilege.  Red  River  Oil  Co.  v.  T. 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C  438,  447. 

(ee)  Railroad  competition  may  justify 
the  granting  of  a  milling-in-transit  priv- 
ilege at  the  Twin  Cities  and  denying  it 
at  Janesville,  Wis.  Blodgett  Milling  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  448. 

(f)  Under  specific  rates  in  force,  grain 
from  some  quarters  pays  a  less  charge 
than  it  should,  while  grain  from  other 
quarters  pays  more  than  it  should.  On 
the  whole,  no  material  hardship,  results, 
and  in  view  of  the  greater  general  good 
these  incidental  discriminations  are  not 
undue.  Southern  Illinois  Millers'  Ass'n 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  672,  67G. 

(ff)  It  is  unjustly  discriminatory  to 
exact  of  Southern  Illinois  shippers  a 
transit  penalty  while  competitors  at  St. 
Louis  are  charged  nothing.  Reasonable 
penalty  suggested  for  both  points.  South- 
ern Illinois  Millers'  Ass'n  v.  L.  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  672,  677. 

(g)  Milling-in-transit  is  a  privilege 
which  may  be  granted  or  withheld  by  a 
carrier  in  its  discretion  so  long  as  no 
unlawful  discrimination  results  there- 
from. Young  &  Cutsinger  v.  L.  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  1,  3. 

(gg)  The  privilege  of  trying  the  mar- 
ket is  of  great  benefit  to  the  producer 
of  live  stock  and  ought  to  be  continued 
under  reasonable  terms  and  conditions, 
but  as  these  markets  multiply  it  becomes 
more  and  more  evident  that  carriers  may 
with    propriety    impose      a      reasonable 


charge  for  the  performance  of  the  serv- 
ice granted  in  connection  with  transit 
privileges.  Investigation  of  Alleged  Un- 
reasonable Rates  on  Meats,  22  I.  C.  C. 
160,  174. 

(h)  Because  a  transit  privilege  is  al- 
lowed at  a  particular  point  by  one  line 
is  no  reason  why  it  should  be  ordered  in 
on  another  line,  where  the  circumstances 
of  inbound  and  outbound  shipments  over 
the  two  roads  are  dissimilar.  Paducah 
Cooperage  Co.  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 
22  1.  C:  C.  226,  231. 

(hh)  Complainant,  a  miller  of  wheat 
and  corn  at  Piano,  Tex.,  complained  be- 
cause of  a  denial  of  the  transit  priv- 
ilege of  milling  under  through  rates  from 
St.  Louis  to  destinations  on  the  I.  &  G. 
N.  Ry.  The  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  had 
allowed  such  privileges  to  Fort  Worth, 
but  withdrew  them,  when  the  suit  was 
started.  Other  railroads,  however,  con- 
tinued such  a  privilege  to  Fort  Worth. 
The  complaint  charged  a  discrimina- 
tion in  favor  of  the  competing  mills  at 
Fort  Worth,  in  violation  of  the  third 
section  of  the  Act.  HELD,  that  ship- 
pers are  not  entitled  as  a  matter  of  right 
to  mill  their  grain  in  transit  and  forward 
the  product  under  the  though  rates,  and 
defendants  were  not  guilty  of  undue  dis- 
crimination. Piano  Milling  Co.  v.  St.  L. 
S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  360. 

(i)  The  inability  of  complainant  to 
reach  a  market  on  other  lines  owing  to 
the  failure  of  defendant  to  grant  it  a 
milling-in-transit  privilege  on  traflac  des- 
tined to  such  other  lines  is  not  an  undue 
discrimination  for  which  the  defendant 
is  liable.  Piano  Milling  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  3o0,  362. 

(j)  In  the  decisions  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  in  the  Diffen- 
baugh  case,  222  U.  S.  42,  and  the  Updike 
case,  222  U.  S.  215,  relating  to  the 
legality  of  the  allowances  paid  for  the 
elevation  of  grain  by  the  Union  Pacific 
at  Council  Bluffs,  la.,  it  was  the  inten- 
tion of  the  court  to  hold  that  whatever 
might  be  the  case  if  a  railroad  saw 
fit  to  confine  its  payment  to  elevation 
actually  required  in  the  conduct  of  its 
business,  it  must,  when  it  makes  an  al- 
lowance to  one  elevator  under  such  cir- 
cumstances as  to  give  that  elevator  pay- 
ment for  commercial  elevation,  extend 
the  same  privilege  to  all  other  elevators 
similarly  situated  at  that  point.  Defend- 
ant carriers  ordered  not  to  exceed  ^c 
in  the  payment  of  elevation  or  transfer 


410 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §21   (jj)— (p) 


allowances  on  grain  at  the  Missouri 
River  and  to  confine  that  payment  to 
grain  actually  passing  through  the  ele- 
vators in  ten  days.  Traffic  Bureau, 
Merchants'  Exchange  v.  C.  B,  &  Q.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  496,  505,  506. 

(jj)  A  railroad  has  no  right  under 
the  pretext  of  a  transfer  which  it  does 
not  require,  to  furnish  a  grain  dealer 
commercial  elevation,  or,  what  amounts 
to  the  same  thing,  to  pay  through  an 
elevation  allowance  for  the  commercial 
elevation  of  his  grain,  and  if  it  does  so 
it  must  accord  the  same  privilege  or 
make  the  same  payment  to  other  persons 
and  at  other  points.  Traffic  Bureau,  etc., 
of  St.  Louis  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  496. 

(k)  As  between  shippers,  carriers 
should  pursue  a  policy  of  uniformity 
concerning  the  extension  of  privileges, 
and  thus  avoid  the  charge  of  undue  dis- 
crimination in  connection  therewith. 
Scudder  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C. 
60,  61,  62. 

(kk)  The  defendant  permitted  milling- 
in-transit  at  St.  Joseph  and  Kansas  City, 
Mo.,  of  corn  originating  at  points  on  the 
St.  Joseph  &  Grand  Island  Ry.,  the 
product  of  which  was  shipped  to  Pacific 
coast  terminals  at  the  through  rate  from 
point  of  origin  to  destination,  and  under 
this  arrangement  millers  at  St.  Joseph 
and  Kansas  City  could  buy  their  corn 
at  points  west  thereof  on  the  St.  Joseph 
&  Grand  Island  Ry.,  while  complainants, 
whose  mills  were  at  Milford  and  Firth, 
Neb.,  on  the  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  (not  a  de- 
fendant) were  restricted  in  Che  purchase 
of  corn  to  be  milled  by  them  in  transit 
and  forwarded  to  Pacific  coast  points  to 
territory  east  of  their  mills.  Defendant 
did  not  serve  either  of  the  towns  where 
complainants  were  located.  HELD,  the 
adjustment  of  which  complaint  is  made 
does  not  result  in  uhdu ;  prejudice  to 
complainants  within  the  meaning  of  the 
Act,  as  defendant  cannot  be  charged  with 
subjecting  communities  to  disadvantage 
which  it  does  not  serve.  Complaint  dis- 
missed. Johnson  &  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  637. 

(I)  The  Commission  does  not  en- 
deavor to  establish  or  extend  transit 
privileges  in  the  absence  of  discrimina- 
tion. Anadarko  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  1.  C.  C.  43,  47. 

(II)  Complainant,  a  lumber  dealer  lo- 
cated  at   Cairo,    111.,   was    discriminated 


against  in  favor  of  dealers  at  Memphis 
with  respect  to  certain  privileges  in  re- 
spect of  yarding,  grading  and  sorting  in 
transit  of  lumber  from  certain  producing 
territory.  HELD,  that  complainant  was 
entitled  to  reparation  to  the  extent  of 
the  unreasonable  rate  paid  by  him  as 
evidenced  by  the  difference  between  the 
old  tariffs  condemned  in  the  first  report 
of  this  case  in  17  I.  C.  C.  60,  and  the 
new  tariffs;  that  as  complainant  sold 
his  lumber  delivered,  this  difference  in 
the  rate  was  the  extent  of  his  injury. 
Sondheimer  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  606. 

(m)  A  carrier  may  not  so  construct 
its  rates  as  to  compel  an  extra  charge 
for  a  like  service.  Associated  Jobbers 
of  Los  Angeles  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
18  L   C.   C.   310,   318. 

(n)  It  is  discriminatory  to  grant  to 
other  shippers  the  privilege  of  including 
advertising  matter  and  articles  in  pack- 
ages of  merchandise  and  to  refuse  the 
same  or  a  similar  privilege  to  complain- 
ant. Ouerbacker  Coffee  Co.  v.  So.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  566,  571. 

(o)  Where  a  carrier  grants  one  ship- 
per over  its  line  a  lawful  privilege  and 
by  a  construction  of  its  tariff  rule  de- 
nies the  same  concession  to  another 
shipper  over  its  line  under  similar  cir- 
cumstances and  conditions  the  latter  is 
subjected  to  undue  discrimination.  Ouer- 
backer Coffee  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C. 
C.  566,  570. 

(p)  Complainant,  lumber  dealers  at 
Cairo,  attacked  the  rates  on  lumber  from 
Mississippi  points  via  Cairo  to  points 
north  and  east  of  the  Ohio  and  Missis- 
sippi rivers,  as  compared  with  rates  be- 
tween the  same  points  via  Memphis. 
The  rates  via  Cairo  were  for  the  most 
part  constructed  by  adding  the  local  rate 
to  Cairo  to  the  local  rate  from  Cairo, 
the  through  rate  thus  obtained  being 
reasonably  low  on  account  of  competi- 
tion. At  Memphis  the  local  rate  was 
charged  from  the  point  of  origin  to  Mem- 
phis, and  to  this  was  added  the  local 
rate  from  Memphis  to  point  of  destina- 
tion. This  combination,  however,  was 
reduced  by  allowing  a  reconsignment 
privilege  at  Memphis,  under  which  the 
lumber  might  be  unloaded  and  dried  for 
a  period  of  ninety  days,  after  which  time 
it  was  shipped  out  on  the  local  rate, 
which  was  shrunk  from  2c  to  4c,  ac- 
cording to  destination.  Since  the  filing 
of    the    complaint    the    defendants    pub- 


FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §21   (q)— (w) 


411 


lished  a  new  tariff,  making  the  Memphis 
through  rates  between  the  points  in 
question  about  Ic  lower  than  the  com- 
bination of  locals  into  and  out  of  Mem- 
phis. Said  new  rates  appeared  to  be 
satisfactory  to  Memphis  shippers.  Un- 
der the  rates  attacked  Memphis  be- 
tween typical  points  had  lower  rates 
than  Cairo  in  138  instances.  Under  the 
new  tariff  it  had  lower  rates  in  forty- 
seven  instances.  The  old  rates  favored 
Memphis  in  many  instances  more  than 
5c  per  100  lbs.  and  differences  in  rates 
ranging  from  i/4c  to  more  than  5c 
prevailed  from  points  of  production 
within  short  distances  from  Memphis. 
HELD,  the  rates  attacked  were  unrea- 
sonable to  the  extent  that  they  exceeded 
the  new  rates  published  since  the  hear- 
ing. The  question  of  reparation  held 
open  for  further  evidence.  Sondheimer 
Co.  V.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  6^  70,  71. 

(q)  Where  discontinuance  of  a  cer- 
tain privilege  with  respect  of  one  com- 
modity would  not  benefit  those  shipping 
another  commodity  to  whom  it  is  denied, 
and  where  the  denial  to  them  does  not 
benefit  those  to  whom  it  is  granted,  the 
discrimination  is  not  undue.  Wholesale 
Fruit  &  Produce  Ass'n  v.  A.  T.  &  S  F 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  596,  601. 

(r)  While  it  might  be  reasonable  to 
withhold  milling-in-transit  privileges  from 
a  product  that  is  essentially  different 
from  the  raw  material  and  from  the  other 
products  of  the  same  raw  material  which 
are  accorded  transit  rates,  as,  for  ex- 
ample, a  liquid  product  of  grain,  it  is 
clearly  discriminatory  to  single  out  one 
or  more  of  several  milled  products  of 
grain  and  withhold  from  it  or  them  a 
transit  privilege  which  is  granted  at  that 
or  some  other  competitive  point  to  other 
milled  products  of  grain  of  substantially 
similar  character,  value  and  packing,  and 
which  are  transported  under  substan- 
tially the  same  conditions,  attended  by 
substantially  equal  risks,  where  there  is 
competition  between  the  millers  of  the 
grain,  either  in  marketing  their  product 
or  in  securing  their  material  for  milling. 
Douglas  &  Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P  Ry.  Co. 
16  I.  C.  C.  232,  244. 

(s)  In  1903  complainant  established  a 
starch  manufacturing  plant  at  Cedar 
Rapids,  la.,  and  in  1908  had  $500,000  in- 
vested in  it  and  $150,000  working  cap- 
ital. For  many  years  a  large  cereal  mill 
had  been  located  in  Cedar  Rapids  and 
enjoyed  milling-in-transit  privileges  on 
grain.    Before  establishing  its  plant  com- 


plainant consulted  with  defendant  car- 
riers and  was  assured  that  it  would  be 
granted  as  liberal  transit  privileges  as 
were  allowed  to  other  manufacturers  of 
grain  products  at  Cedar  Rapids.  In  1908 
defendants  withdrew  from  complainant 
the  milling-in-transit  privileges  on  grain 
manufactured  into  starch  and  established 
starch  rates,  resulting  in  increases  of 
from  25  to  100  per  cent.  Milling-in- 
transit  privileges  were  not  withdrawn 
from  other  manufacturers  located  at 
Cedar  Rapids  who  made  products  other 
than  starch  from  corn.  Complainant  had 
no  competitors  in  the  manufacture  of 
starch  located  at  Cedar  Rapids,  but  on 
account  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  priv- 
ileges complainant  was  at  a  serious  dis- 
advantage in  the  purchase  of  corn  at 
various  points  on  defendants'  lines. 
HELD,  complainant  was  unduly  discrim- 
inated against  by  the  withdrawal  of  such 
privileges  and  defendants  should  adjust 
their  rates  so  as  to  remove  it.  Douglas 
&  Co.  V.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
232,    236-245. 

(t)  It  is  discrimination  to  grant  com- 
mercial elevation  at  one  locality  and 
deny  it  at  another.  Washer  Grain  Co.  v. 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  147,  158. 

(u)  Defendant's  rules  limited  less- 
than-carload  shipments  of  petroleum  to 
one  day  a  week.  Complainants'  com- 
petitor constructed  tank  stations  at 
points  along  defendant's  line,  from  which 
it  supplied  tank  wagons,  distributing  said 
product  in  the  surrounding  territory.  Said 
competitor  was  thus  enabled  to  furnish 
oil  every  day  of  the  week,  while  com- 
plainants could  supply  the  same  only  one 
day.  To  permit  shipments  on  more  than 
one  day  a  week  would  require  additional 
equipment.  HELD,  the  rule  attacked, 
resulting  in  unjust  discrimination  be- 
tween shippers,  should  be  changed  so  as 
to  permit  the  shipments  on  two  days 
each  week  and  that  said  days  should  be 
separated  by  at  least  two  intervening 
days.  National  Petroleum  Ass'n  v.  L.  & 
N.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  473,  476. 

(v)  Any  regulation  or  practice  that 
unlawfully  discriminates  against  one 
shipper  and  affords  undue  preference  to 
another  shipper  is  a  regulation  or  prac- 
tice affecting  rates  within  the  meaning 
of  section  15  of  the  amended  Act  of  Jan. 
29,  1900.  Rail  &  River  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  & 
O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  86,  89. 

(w)  The  giving  of  an  unjust  prefer- 
ence  in   wharfage    privileges   to   an    ex- 


412    FACILITIES  AND  PRIVILEGES,  §21  (x)— FOREIGN  COMMERCE,  §1  (b) 


porter  of  cotton  seed  products  cannot 
be  justified  on  the  ground  that  such 
course  has  proved  beneficial  to  cotton 
seed  interests  generally;  that  better 
prices  have  prevailed,  and  that  more 
economic  methods  of  doing  business  have 
resulted  therefrom.  Carl  Eichenberg  v. 
Southern  Pacific  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  250,  269. 

(x)  A  railroad  company  by  granting 
a  privilege  v^hich,  although  ostensibly 
open  to  the  whole  public,  can,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  only  be  taken  ad- 
vantage of  by  certain  shippers,  creates 
thereby  a  discrimination  which  may  or 
may  not  be  undue,  according  to  the  cir- 
cumstances in  each  case.  Traffic  Bureau 
of  St.  Louis  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
r.  C.  C.  317. 

(y)  Defendant  carriers  allowed  %c 
per  100  lbs.  to  dealers  in  grain  in  Mis- 
Bouri  River  cities  as  an  elevation  allow- 
ance. They  extended  no  such  allow- 
ance to  dealers  located  in  Mississippi 
River  cities.  As  a  result  it  cost  the  lat- 
ter dealers  %c  per  100  lbs.  more  to 
move  grain  from  points  of  purchase 
through  their  elevators  and  beyond  to 
points  of  sale  than  the  same  transporta- 
tion cost  dealers  in  Missouri  River  cities. 
It  appeared  that  the  weighing  of  grain 
to  determine  the  amount  due  the  original 
seller  thereof  could  only  be  practically 
accomplished  through  the  process  of  ele- 
vation. Defendants  were  subjected  at 
Missouri  River  points  to  competition  with 
a  carrier  entering  from  the  northwest, 
which  they  did  not  meet  with  at  Missis- 
sippi River  points.  HELD,  distinguish- 
ing In  the  Matter  of  Allowances  to  Ele- 
vators by  the  Union  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  12 
I.  C.  C.  85,  that  the  elevator  allowance 
constituted  an  undue  and  unlawful  dis- 
crimination. Traffic  Bu.  Merchants'  Ex- 
change v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
317,  328-331. 

(z)  A  railroad  company  by  extending 
a  privilege  of  value  to  one  member  of 
the  shipping  public,  when  that  privilege, 
In  the  nature  of  things,  is  not  desired 
and  cannot  be  used  by  other  members  of 
the  public,  is  thereby  guilty  of  a  dis- 
crimination in  favor  of  the  one  who  can 
and  does  use  the  privilege.  Traffic  Bu. 
Merchants'  Exchange  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  317,  331. 

(aa)  The  Commission  will  neither  ap- 
prove nor  permit  the  application  of  tran- 
sit privileges  under  circumstances  that 
would  impair  the  integrity  of  the  through 


rate.     Blackwell  Milling  &  Elevator  Co. 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  483. 

(bb)  Transit  privileges  withheld  from 
complainant,  which  had  been  extended 
to  it  in  common  with  others  without 
tariff  authority,  and  which  later  had  been 
extended  to  its  competitors  under  au- 
thority of  a  lawful  tariff  and  which  in- 
advertently was  not  made  applicable 
from  the  complainant's  shipping  station. 
HELD,  unjust  discrimination.  Stras- 
burg  Steam  Flouring  Mills  v.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  531. 

FERRIES. 

Prior  to  the  amendment  of  June  29, 
1906,  to  the  Act  it  had  no  application  to 
ferries  except  where  a  railroad  used  and 
operated  a  ferry  as  a  part  of  its  road. 
(Gummere,  C.  J.,  dissenting.)  N.  Y. 
C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Freeholders  of 
Hudson,  76  N.  J.  L.  -664,  681,  74  A.  954. 


FEEDING-IN-TRANSIT. 

See  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §15   (u). 

FIRE. 

See  Facilities  and  PriviJeges,  §18 
(cc),  §20  (f);  Loss  and  Damage,  §6 
(11);  Through  Routes  and  Joint 
Rates,  §20  (c) ;  Substitution  of  Ton- 
nage, §2  (b);  Switch  Tracks  and 
Switching,   §5    (c),   §8   (a),    (b). 


FLOATAGE. 

See  Lighterage,  §3  (i). 

FOREIGN   COMMERCE. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 

See  Alasl<a;  Export  Rates;  Import 
Traffic,  II  (f) ;  Interstate  Com- 
merce,   §1    (a). 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction    of   Commission. 

(a)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission has  jurisdiction  and  authority 
to  regulate  rates  on  freight  actually- 
moving  in  foreign  commerce,  for  that 
part  of  the  carriage  through  the  United 
States,  whether  such  transportation  be 
interstate  or  wholly  within  one  state. 
T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  R.  R.  Commission 
of  Louisiana,   183  Fed.  1005,  1007. 

(b)  That  part  of  a  continuous  haul 
from  a  foreign  country  which  is  con- 
fined to  a  rail  transportation  from  a  port 
of  entry  to  a  point  in  the  same  state  is 


FOREIGN  COMMERCE,  §1   (c)— FORWARDERS,  I  (d) 


413 


within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commission 
though  the  shipment  does  not  move 
under  through  billing  nor  did  the 
water  and  rail  lines  operate  under 
any  common  control  or  management. 
In  Re  Rates,  etc.,  of  the  Louisiana  Ry. 
&   Nav.   Co.,   22   I.   C.   C.   558. 

(c)  No  joint  through  rates  are  rec- 
ognized with  water  carriers  beyond  the 
seas.  Borgfeldt  &  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  552,  553. 

(d)  The  Commission  has  no  control 
over  steamships  from  New  York  to 
foreign  countries.  Ullman  v.  Adams 
Express  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  340,  345. 

(e)  The  Commission  may  regulate 
interstate  traffic,  whether  by  rail  or 
by  a  combined  rail  and  water  route, 
from  point  of  receipt  to  point  of 
delivery;  but  the  Commission  in  its 
control  over  foreign  commerce  is  lim- 
ited to  the  regulation  of  such  traffic, 
whether  by  railroad  or  by  a  combina- 
tion of  rail  and  water  carriers,  from 
and  to  the  point  of  transhipment.  Cos- 
mopolitan Shipping  Co.  v.  Hamburg- 
American  Packet  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  266, 
271. 

(f)  A  rail  carrier  may  control  or 
connect  with  a  line  of  steamships  en- 
gaged in  foreign  commerce,  with  which 
it  may  interchange  business  as  freely 
as  with  another  rail  carrier,  and  it 
may  quote  a  combined  rate  for  the 
through  movement,  the  agent  of  the 
railroad  company  acting  as  the  agent 
of  the  steamship  company  in  so  doing. 
An  inland  carrier  may  go  into  the  for- 
eign shipping  business  wthout  contra- 
vening any  provision  of  the  Act  to 
Regulate  Commerce;  nor  is  there  any- 
thing in  such  statute  which  denies  to 
a  rail  carrier  the  right  to  quote  a  rate 
from  an  inland  point  to  a  foreign 
destination  over  its  own  through  route 
or  by  any  other  route.  But  as  to  such 
carriers  engaged  in  foreign  business, 
the  rail  carrier  has,  so  far  as  this 
law  is  concerned,  a  purely  contractual 
or  proprietary  relation,  not  a  relation 
related  or  controlled  in  any  manner 
by  the  Act.  On  foreign  commerce  the 
rate  to  be  published  with  the  Commis- 
sion should  be  the  rate  to  the  port 
and  from  the  port,  an  open  rate,  which 
any  who  desire  to  do  so  may  use  with 
equal  advantage.  The  publication  of 
such  rate  does  not  in  any  manner  limit 
the  very  valuable  privilege  of  through 
billing.       Such     through    billing    should 


clearly  separate  the  liability  of  the 
rail  and  the  ocean  carrier  and  show 
the  published  rate  of  the  inland  car- 
rier. The  routing  of  the  freight,  how- 
ever, should  remain  with  the  shipper 
and  upon  him  may  be  imposed  no 
greater  charge  to  the  port  when  his 
freight  goes  by  one  ocean  line  than 
by  another.  Cosmopolitan  Shipping  Co. 
V.     Hamburg-American     Packet    Co.,    13 

I.  C.   C.   266,   281. 

FORWARDERS. 

I.     ST^iTUS. 

II.  RIGHT  TO  COMBINE  SHIPMENTS. 

I.     STATUS. 

See  Classification,  §12;  Express 
Companies,  §1  (k);  Facilities  and 
Privileges,   §10    (c). 

(a)  A  forwarding  agent  is  a  person 
within  the  meaning  of  that  word  as 
employed  in  the  second  section  of  the 
Act.  I.  C.  C.  V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R., 
220  U.  S.  235,  254,  31  Sup.  Ct.  392, 
55  L.  ed.   448. 

(b)  Under  a  decision  of  the  Com- 
mission holding  that  carriers  can  not 
refuse  to  accept  at  carload  rates  car- 
loads of  goods  assembled  by  forward- 
ing agents,  the  findings  of  the  Commis- 
sion as  to  the  operation  of  the  business 
of  forwarding  agents  and  as  to  the 
difficulties  involved  in  the  efforts  of 
carriers  to  determine  the  nature  and 
character  of  a  person  tendering  goods 
for  shipment  are  findings  of  fact  not 
open  to  review  by  the  courts.  I.  C.  C. 
V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.,  220  U.  S.  235, 
256,  31  Sup.  Ct.  392,  55  L.  ed.  448. 

(c)  The  finding  of  the  Commission 
that  to  permit  carriers  to  discriminate 
In  the  application  of  carload  rates 
against  forwarding  agents  would  give 
rise  to  preferences  and  engender  dis- 
criminations prohibited  by  the  Act  em- 
bodies a  conclusion  of  fact  beyond 
the  competency  of  the  courts  to  re- 
examine. I.  C.  C.  V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R. 
R.,  220  U.  S.  235,  255,  31  Sup.  Ct. 
392,   55   L.  ed.  448. 

(d)  A  finding  of  the  Commission 
that  to  permit  forwarding  agents  to 
avail  themselves  of  carload  rates  does 
not  result  in  unjust  discrimination  to 
shippers  is  one  of  fact  and  is  not 
open  to  review  in  the  courts.  I.  C.  C. 
v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.,  220  U.  S.  235,  255, 
31  Sup.  Ct.  392,  55  L.  ed.  448. 


414 


FORWARDERS,  I  (e)— II  (d) 


(e)  Under  the  English  Act  regulat- 
ing commerce  a  carrier  is  forbidden 
to  charge  a  higher  rate  for  the  carriage 
of  goods  for  an  intercepting  or  forward- 
ing agent  than  for  others.  I.  C.  C.  v. 
D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.,  220  U.  S.  235,  254, 
31  Sup.  Ct.  392,  55  L.  ed.  448. 

(f)  The  settled  meaning  which  was 
affixed  to  the  Equality  Clause  of  the  Eng- 
lish Act  to  regulate  commerce  at  the 
time  of  the  adoption  of  the  American  Act 
to  regulate  commerce  applies  in  constru- 
ing the  second  section  of  the  Act  with  re- 
spect to  the  right  of  a  carrier  to  charge  a 
higher  rate  for  the  carriage  of  goods 
for  an  intercepting  or  forwarding  agent 
than  for  others.  I.  C.  C.  v.  D.  L.  & 
W.  R.  R.,  220  U.  S.  235,  254,  31  Sup. 
Ct.    392,    55    L.    ed.    448. 

(g)  The  fact  that  a  carrier  has  the 
authority  to  fix  rates  does  not  give  it 
the  right  to  discriminate  as  to  those 
who  shall  be  entitled  to  avail  of  them. 

I.  C.  C.  V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.,  220  U.  S. 
235,  254,  31  Sup.  Ct.  392,  55  L.  ed.  448. 

(h)  A  forwarding  agent  engaged  in 
assembling  express  packages  belonging 
to  others  and  sending  same  in  bulk 
by  express,  is  not  a  common  carrier 
so  as  to  be  precluded  from  claiming 
the  benefit  of  an  express  company's  fa- 
cilities. California  Commercial  Ass'n  v. 
Wells-Fargo  &  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  422, 
425. 

II.  RIGHT  TO  COMBINE  SHIPMENTS. 

See    Discrimination,   §6. 

(a)  A  carrier  cannot,  when  goods 
are  tendered  to  it  for  transportation, 
make  the  mere  ownership  of  the  goods 
the  test  of  the  duty  to  carry  or  dis- 
criminate in  fixing  the  charge  for  car- 
riage, not  upon  any  difference  inhering 
in  the  goods  or  in  the  cost  of  the 
service  rendered  in  transporting  them, 
but  upon  the  mere  circumstance  that 
the  shipper  is  or  is  not  the  real  owner 
of  the  goods.  Hence  a  forwarding 
company  is  entitled  to  aggregate  pack- 
age shipments  so  as  to  take  advantage 
of  a  carload  rate.  I.  C.  C.  v.  D.  L.  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  220  U.  S.  235,  252,  31 
Sup.  Ct.  392,  55  L.  ed.  448. 

(b)  Complainants  attacked  the  bulk 
shipment  rule  in  the  Official  Express 
Classification  which  practically  prevent- 
ed the  consolidation  of  L.  C.  L.  ship- 
ments by  a  forwarding  company  in 
order     to     give     consignors     the     car- 


load rate.  HELD,  that  it  is  unlawful 
for  defendants  to  make  the  ownership 
of  property  a  test  for  the  imposition 
of  rates,  and  that  the  rule  is  unjustly 
discriminatory,  unjust,  unfair  and  unrea- 
sonable, because  it  provides  that  de- 
fendants snail  collect  a  greater  com- 
pensation from  certain  persons  for 
transportation  of  property  subject  to 
the  Act  than  it  collects  from  other 
persons  for  doing  a  like  and  contem- 
poraneous service  in  the  transporta- 
tion of  a  like  kind  of  traffic  under  sub- 
stantially similar  circumstances  and 
conditions,  in  violation  of  section  2  of 
the  Act.  Reparation  awarded.  Cali- 
fornia Commercial  Ass'n  v.  Wells-Fargo 
&  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  300. 

(c)  Where  shipments  belonging  to, 
and  ultimately  intended  for,  various  con- 
signees have  been  united  in  a  bulked 
shipment  from  one  consignor  to  one 
consignee,  it  is  unlawful  for  the  car- 
rier to  refuse  to  apply  the  rate  appli- 
cable upon  the  shipment  as  a  whole 
and  to  insist  upon  making  a  separate 
charge  upon  the  package  or  packages 
intended  for  each  ultimate  consignee. 
California  Commercial  Ass'n  v.  Wells- 
Farro   &   Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  300. 

(d)  Defendant  express  company's 
rules  provided  that  two  or  more  pack- 
ages of  specified  weight  at  a  specified 
rate,  when  forwarded  by  one  company, 
from  the  same  point,  on  the  same  day, 
to  one  consignee,  whether  from  one 
or  more  shippers,  must  be  aggregated, 
if  a  lower  charge  was  made  thereby. 
Complainant  association,  through  its 
agent  in  New  York,  delivered  a  number 
of  packages  to  defendant  consigned  to 
itself  at  San  Francisco  and  marked 
with  the  number  of  the  ultimate  con- 
signee, and  asked  that  the  several  pack- 
ages bearing  the  same  number  and 
therefore  destined  to  the  same  ulti- 
mate consignee  be  aggregated  in  order 
to  obtain  the  lower  rate.  Defendant 
requested  complainant's  agent  to  fur- 
nish a  letter  stating  that  each  different 
number  represented  one  and  only  one 
consignee,  and  was  told  that  if  such 
letter  was  furnished  the  rule  in  re- 
gard to  aggregation  would  be  applied. 
The  agent  made  the  shipments  regard- 
less of  the  charges  and  thereafter  fur- 
nished the  information  requested  by 
defendant.  The  condition  of  requiring 
information  imposed  by  defendant  was 
one  not  specified  in  its  rules.  HELD, 
complainant,   having   been   assessed   the 


FORWARDERS,  II  (e)— IMPORT  TRAFFIC,  I   (b) 


415 


rates  on  the  :  "ckages  separately,  was 
entitled  to  reparation  on  the  basis  of 
the  rates  applying  to  aggregated  ship- 
ments. California  Commercial  Ass'n  v. 
Wells-Fargo  &  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  458, 
463,   464. 

(e)  An  express  company  may  not 
refuse  to  receive  at  bulk  rates  goods 
assembled  by  a  forwarding  company  on 
the  ground  that  the  cost  of  transpor- 
tation is  increased  by  the  liability  of 
multiplicity  of  suits  by  the  various 
owners,  since  the  company  may  stipu- 
late that  claims  for  damages  shall  be 
preferred  only  by  the  consignor  or 
consignee  designated  in  the  bill  of 
lading.  California  Commercial  Ass'n  v. 
Wells-Fargo  &  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  422,  431, 
432. 

(f)  Complainant  consignees  employed 
a  forwarding  company  at  New  York 
to  assemble  a  number  of  packages  of 
goods  belonging  to  complainants  indi- 
vidually, and  offered  same  in  bulk  to 
defendant  express  company  to  be  car- 
ried to  San  Francisco  at  its  bulk  rates. 
Defendant's  rules  forbade  its  agents 
from  receiving  goods  so  assembled  and 
complainants  were  charged  the  individual 
package  rate  on  them.  HELD,  said  rules 
were  unjustly  discriminatory  as  permit- 
ting defendant  to  collect  a  greater  com- 
pensation from  certain  persons  for  the 
transportation  of  property  than  it  col- 
lected from  other  persons  for  a  like  and 
contemporaneous  transportation  of  a 
like  kind  of  traffic  under  substantially 
similar  circumstances  and  conditions, 
and  complainants  were  entitled  to  rep- 
aration on  the  basis  of  bulk  rates. 
(Knapp  and  Harlan,  Comm'rs,  dissent- 
ing.) California  Commercial  Ass'n  v. 
Wells-Fargo  &  Co.,  14  I.-  C.  C.  422, 
434;  sustained,  I.  C.  C.  v.  D.  L.  &  W. 
R.  R.,  220  U.  S.  235,  252,  31  Sup. 
Ct.  392,  55  L.  ed.  448,  reversing  166 
Fed.  499,  enjoining  the  Commission's 
order. 

(g)  Rules  of  defendant  railroads  pro- 
vided that  consignors  or  consignees 
were  entitled  to  carload  rates  on  freight 
only  when  they  were  the  actual  owners 
of  the  property,  and  that  goods  com- 
bined into  carloads  by  forwarding 
agents  should  not  be  entitled  to  carload 
rates,  but  the  names  of  the  owners  of 
each  package  must  be  declared  to  the 
railroad  agent  and  said  packages  way- 
billed  as  separate  shipments.  Com- 
plainant   forwarding    agent    made    ship- 


ments of  goods  assembled  by  them  into 
carloads  and  were  charged  for  them  at 
less  than  carload  rates.  HELD,  follow- 
ing California  Commercial  Ass'n  v. 
Wells-Fargo  &  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  422, 
said  rules  were  unjustly  discriminatory 
and  in  violation  of  section  2  of  the  Act, 
in  permitting  defendant  to  collect  from 
one  class  of  persons  a  higher  rate  than 
from  another  class  of  persons  for  do- 
ing a  like  and  contemporaneous  service 
in  the  transportation  of  a  like  kind  of 
traffic  under  substantially  similar  cir- 
cumstances and  conditions,  and  com- 
plainants were  entitled  to  reparation 
on  the  carload  rate  basis.  (Knapp  and 
Harlan,  Comm'rs,  dissenting.)  Export 
Shipping   Co.   v.   Wabash   R.   R.   Co.,   14 

I.  C.  C.  437,  440;  sustained,  I.  C.  C. 
V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.,  220  U.  S.  235, 
252,  31  Sup.  Ct.  392,  55  L.  ed.  448;  revers- 
ing, 166  Fed.  499. 

FREE. 

storage — See  Facilities  and  Privi- 
leges, §8;  Time — See  Demurrage, 
§15;  Interstate  Commerce,  §4  (s), 
(t);  Transportation — See  Crimes, 
III;  Express  Companies,  §5;  Pas- 
senger Fares  and  Facilities,  §12; 
Special  Contract,  §1  (a),  §2  (a), 
(zz),  (aaa),  (bbb);  Transportation, 
§2   (n). 

GOVERNMENT  MATERIAL. 

See    Reduced    Rates,   §4. 

GRADING  RATES. 

See    Blanket    Rates,    §9. 

GROUP  RATES. 

See   Blanket   Rates. 

IMPORT   TRAFFIC. 

I.     DETERMINATION    OF    STATUS. 

II.  REASONABLENESS    OF   RATES. 

I.     DETERMINATION    OF   STATUS. 

See  Procedure  Before  Commission, 
§2    (b). 

(a)  In  arriving  at  the  construction 
of  the  term  "import  traffic"  in  a  tariff, 
the  point  of  origin  of  the  traffic,  the 
method  and  mode  of  transportation 
from  the  foreign  country  into  this  coun- 
try, and  the  point  of  destination  must 
be  considered.  Payne  v.  M.  L.  &  T. 
R.  R.   &  S.  S.  Co.,   15  L  C.  C.  185,  190. 

(b)  The  term  "import  traffic"  used 
vaguely  and  indefinitely  may  be  import 


416 


IMPORT  TRAFFIC,  I  (c)— II  (b) 


traffic  when  taken  from  the  ship's  side, 
or  import  traffic  after  it  has  been  stored 
at  the  port  of  entry  for  a  substantial 
period,  or  import  traffic  after  it  has 
been  merchandised  at  the  port  of  entry, 
and  therefore  carriers  should  clearly 
define  this  phrase  and  similar  phrases 
when  used  in  their  tariffs.  Payne  v. 
M.  L.  &  T.  R.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  185,  190. 

(c)  The  United  Fruit  Co.  transported 
bananas  from  Central  America  to  New 
Orleans.  The  Fruit  Despatch  Co., 
which  is  owned  and  operated  by  the 
same  officials  and  is  practically  the 
same  company,  receives  its  bananas  at 
New  Orleans  and  sells  them  in  its 
name.  Upon  arrival  at  New  Orleans 
the  bananas  are  unloaded  upon  wharves 
and  assorted.  The  ripe  ones  are  sold 
in  New  Orleans  and  the  green  ones 
are  delivered  to  the  carriers  to  be  car- 
ried to  various  other  points  in  the 
United  States,  on  local  bills  of  lading 
issued  to  the  Fruit  Despatch  Co.  The 
bananas  are  kept  within  the  control 
of  the  Fruit  Despatch  Co.  until  they 
are  turned  over  to  the  purchasers  at 
point  of  destination.  Defendants'  tar- 
iffs provided  a  banana  rate  of  64c 
from  New  Orleans  to  El  Paso  on  "im- 
port traffic."  Another  tariff  contained 
a  rate  of  82c  on  bananas  from  New 
Orleans  to  El  Paso.  Con\plainants  at 
El  Paso  contended  that  the  shipment 
from  New  Orleans  was  not  local  but 
was  a  through  shipment  from  Central 
America  to  El  Paso  and  that  the  64c  rate 
should  be  applied.  The  bananas  at 
New  Orleans  were  not  moved  by  the 
rail  carriers  from  shipside.  HELD, 
the  bananas  were  not  "import  traffic" 
within  the  meaning  of  the  64c  tariff 
and  should  take  the  82c  rate.  Payne 
V.    M.    L.    &    T.    R.    R.    &    S.    S.    Co.,    15 

I.  C.  C.  185,   191. 

II.  REASONABLENESS     OF     RATES. 

See  Branch  Lines,  §4  (b);  Evi- 
dence (§13  (4);  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,  §44   (a),   §84   (g). 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  as  unrea- 
sonable the  rates  assessed  by  reason 
of  defendant's  rule  applicable  to  im- 
port traffic  carried  in  the  tariffs  of  the 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  that  "Rates  named  herein 
apply  only  on  property  coming  from 
foreign  ports  into  the  United  States 
and  delivered  to  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio 
Railroad  direct  from  the  ship's  side 
or    dock    of    the    vessel    bringing    such 


property  to  the  port  of  entry,  or  on 
property  received  by  the  Baltimore  & 
Ohio  Railroad  from  customs  bonded 
warehouses  or  appraiser's  stores  (not 
internal-revenue  stores)."  And  also 
that  "property,  in  bulk,  will  be  held 
only  when  in  transit  from  foreign  ports, 
awaiting  shipment  via  the  Baltimore 
&  Ohio  Railroad,  when  necessary  to 
prevent  delay  in  unloading  vessels  and 
provided  storage  space  is  available." 
Complainant  expected  a  cargo  of  kainit, 
a  potash  salt  mineral  produced  in  (rer- 
many,  and  applied  to  the  B.  &  O.  R. 
R.  for  space  in  its  bonded  warehouses 
at  Locust  Point,  Md.,  the  marine  ter- 
minals of  that  carrier.  The  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  having  no  space  available,  com- 
plainant contracted  for  storage  in  a 
bonded  warehouse  at  Baltimore,  which 
was  destroyed  by  fire  prior  to  the 
arrival  of  the  cargo.  It  was  thereupon 
compelled  to  use  a  non-bonded  ware- 
house, with  the  result  that  when  the 
cargo  was  distributed  to  various  in- 
land points,  the  domestic  rate  was  as- 
sessed, which  increased  the  total  ag- 
gregate charge  above  the  import  rates. 
HELD,  the  tariffs  of  the  carrier  were 
not  objectionable  for  the  reason  that 
they  required  as  a  condition  of  accord- 
ing the  import  rate  that  the  traffic 
should  be  stored  in  a  bonded  warehouse 
or  delivered  to  the  carrier  from  the 
ship  itself.  The  railroad  not  only 
had  the  right  but  ought  to  protect 
itself  by  some  effective  means  against 
the  improper  application  of  the  import 
rate.  The  tariff  did,  however,  contain 
upon  its  face  an  unlawful  discrimina- 
tion in  that  it  provided  that  storage 
would  be  given  when  available.  This 
meant  that  one  shipper  might  receive 
this  concession  while  it  was  refused  to 
another.  The  practical  application  of 
the  tariff  in  this  case  has  been  to  un- 
justly discriminate  against  the  com- 
plainant in  that  it  has  been  compelled 
to  pay  a  domestic  rate,  and  reparation 
will  therefore  be  awarded  in  the  differ- 
ence between  that  rate  and  the  import 
rate.  Swift  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
21    L    C.   C.   241. 

(b)  It  is  an  established  principle 
that  the  carrier  is  entitled  to  repay- 
ment of  the  cost  of  the  service,  to- 
gether with  a  reasonable  profit  on  that 
cost,  when  performing  auxiliary  func- 
tions. Detroit  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  L.  S. 
&  M.   S.  Ry.   Co.,  21  L  C.   C.  257,  262. 


IMPORT   TRAFFIC,   II    (c)— INTERSTATE   COMMERCE 


417 


(c)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate 
on  spruce  lath  and  lumber  from  Bos- 
ton, Mass.,  to  Toledo,  0.,  under  the 
domestic  class  rate  of  19c  as  com- 
pared with  the  14c  import  rate  on  ma- 
hogany logs  from  and  to  the  same 
points.  HELD,  that  there  is  a  funda- 
mental dissimilarity  of  conditions  under 
which  import  and  domestic  rates  are 
constructed  and  that  one  affords  no 
just  criterion  for  the  other;  that  on 
the  evidence  the  rate  is  not  shown 
to  be  unreasonable.  Complaint  dis- 
missed. Furnace  Run  Saw  Mill  & 
Lumber  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  20  I.  C. 
C.    586. 

(d)  Defendant's  tariffs  provided  for 
class  and  commodity  rates  on  import 
traffic  from  New  Orleans,  La.,  and 
Galveston,  Tex.,  to  certain  Texas  points, 
and  applied  only  to  commodities  from 
"shipside."  Bananas  upon  arrival  pass 
into  the  possession  of  a  terminal  hand- 
ling company  which  forward  them 
by  rail  under  bills  of  lading.  Bananas 
take  a  commodity  rate  of  72c  per  100 
lbs.  from  New  Orleans  to  Texas  com- 
mon points,  a  distance  of  nearly  600 
miles,  revenue  per  ton  per  mile  2.4c. 
This  commodity  is  extremely  perishable 
and  does  not  move  in  solid  trainloads 
to  the  points  in  question.  From  Gal- 
veston the  same  points  are  from  200 
to  350  miles  nearer  than  to  New  Or- 
leans, and  the  rates  are  about  23c 
lower.  The  average  revenue  per  ton 
per  mile  on  bananas  from  New  Orleans 
to  points  in  Illinois,  Iowa,  Missouri  and 
Kansas  is  1.5c.  The  class  A  rate  from 
New  Orleans  to  Texas  common  points 
is  78c.  HELD,  that  bananas  are  not 
moved  by  the  rail  carriers  "from  ship- 
side"  and  hence  not  entitled  to  the 
import  rate;  that  this  commodity  re- 
quires an  expedited  service  with  mesr 
sengers  in  charge  who  are  returned 
free  on  regular  passenger  trains  and 
hence  this  rate  cannot  properly  be  com- 
pared with  rates  on  peaches,  plums, 
apples,  cabbages,  etc.,  and  that  as  the 
traffic  to  the  north  moves  in  solid  train- 
loads  those  rates  cannot  be  compared 
with  the  Texas  rate,  and  that  the  rates 
charged  by  defendants  were  reasonable. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Waco  Freight 
Bureau  v.  H.  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.   C.   C.   22. 

(e)  While  foolish  for  a  carrier  to  do 
so,  the  maintenance  of  a  lower  import 
rate  than  domestic  rate  is  not  unlawful. 


Florida   Fruit   &   Vegetable  Ass'n   v.   A. 
C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  552,  566. 

(f)  In  establishing  rates  and  privi- 
leges to  the  United  States  from  Cuba 
in  comparison  with  those  from  Florida 
the  carriers  have  no  right  to  count 
the  import  duty  as  a  part  of  the  trans- 
portation charge.  Florida  Fruit  &  Vege- 
table Ass'n  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I. 
C.  C.  552,  561. 

(g)  While  a  case  might  possibly 
arise  in  which  it  would  be  the  duty  of 
the  carrier  to  protect  an  industry 
against  a  low  import  rate  by  somewhat 
reducing  its  otherwise  reasonable  do- 
mestic rate,  such  is  not  this  record. 
Kent  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R. 
Co.,    15    L    C.    C.   439,   442. 

INJUNCTIONS. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §20. 

INSPECTION. 

See  Allowances,  §12  (1)  (d);  Loss 
and  Damage,  §6  (y). 

INSURANCE. 

See  Faciiities  and  Privileges,  §16 
(f);    Tariffs,    §4    (o). 

INTERCHANGE  OF  TRAFFIC. 

See   Cars,   §30. 

INTEREST  ON  FUNDED  DEBT. 

See  Transportation,  §14  (a). 

INTERMEDIATE   CARRIER. 

See  Loss  and  Damage,  §7;  Through 
Routes   and   Joint    Rates,   §10. 

INTERMEDIATE  CLAUSE. 

See  Crimes,  §5  (a);  Reparation,  §16 
(uu);  Through  Routes  and  Joint 
Rates,    §21. 

INTERSTATE  COMMERCE. 

I.     DETERMINATION. 

§1.  Beginning  and  end  of  tran- 
sit. 

§2.  State  shipment  through  an- 
other  state. 

§3.  Participation  in  interstate 
movement. 

II.     CONTROL   AND    REGULATION. 
§4.     State. 
§5.    United  States. 


418 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE,  §1   (a)— (g) 


I.     DETERMINATION. 

§1.     Beginning     and     End     of    Transit. 

See  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §18  (e) ; 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission, 
§10  (g);  Through  Routes  and  Joint 
Rates,  §19,  §22  (q);  Transporta- 
tion,   §11. 

(a)  Goods  are  in  interstate,  and 
necessarily  as  well  in  foreign,  commerce 
when  they  have  "actually  started  in  the 
course  of  transportation  to  another 
state,  or  are  delivered  to  a  carrier  for 
transportation."  S.  P.  Terminal  Co.  v. 
I.  C.  C,  219  U.  S.  498,  527,  31  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.    279,   55   L.    ed.    310. 

(b)  Interstate  commerce  begins  with 
the  shipment  of  the  article  in  one 
state  directed  and  destined  to  an- 
other state.  It  ends  only  with  the 
delivery  at  destination.  All  common 
carriers  by  railroad  which  participate 
in  its  actual  transportation  from  the 
time  of  shipment  to  the  time  of  deliv- 
ery are  engaged  in  the  transportation 
of  property  from  one  state  to  another, 
whether  their  services  be  performed 
wholly  within  one  state  or  in  more 
than  one  state,  whether  such  services 
be  primary  and  called  "carriage,"  or 
incidental,  and  called  "switching," 
whether  the  carriers  be  paid  a  flat 
sum  per  car  or  a  percentage  of  the 
through  rate,  and  whether  such  pay- 
ment be  made  directly  by  a  shipper 
or  consignee  on  the  one  hand,  or  by 
the  initial  or  final  carrier  on  the  other 
hand.  U.  S.  v.  Union  S.  &  T.  Co., 
192  Fed.  330,  339.  - 

(c)  Goods  were  shipped  into  the 
state  of  Oregon  billed  to  Portland.  The 
consignee  received  them,  paid  the 
freight  and  put  them  in  with  his  stock 
In  trade.  He  then  shipped  them  out 
in  the  original  packages  to  points  in 
Oregon.  HELD,  the  latter  movements 
were  wholly  intrastate  and  took  the 
state  rates  and  defendant  was  not  en- 
titled to  collect  the  interstate  rates 
in  effect.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v. 
Campbell,   180   Fed.   253,   256. 

(d)  In  July  and  August,  1909,  com- 
plainant shipped  from  Ingram,  Wis., 
to  Stevens  Point,  Wis.,  carloads  of  lum- 
ber. The  bills  of  lading  showed  no  des- 
tination beyond  Stevens  Point.  Both 
carloads  were  apparently  unloaded  at 
Stevens  Point  and  shipped,  the  one  to 
Chicago  and  the  other  to  Maywood, 
111.  Charges,  none  of  which  were  paid 
at   Stevens    Point,    were    assessed    at   a 


rate  of  10c  on  the  rough  weight  into 
Stevens  Point  and  the  same  rate  on 
the  dressed  weight  from  Stevens  Point 
to  destination.  The  bills  of  lading  to 
cover  shipments  from  Stevens  Point 
were  marked,  "dressed  in  transit." 
Complainant  alleged  that  the  rate 
from  Ingram  to  Stevens  Point  was  un- 
reasonable. At  the  time  of  the  ship- 
ments there  was  no  tariff  on  file  with 
the  Commission  which  authorized  a 
shipment  from  Ingram,  the  ultimate 
destination  of  which  was  outside  the 
state  of  Wisconsin,  to  be  dressed  in 
transit  at  Stevens  Point.  HELD,  the 
transportation  service  called  for  by  the 
bills  of  lading  was  wholly  completed 
when  the  cars  were  delivered  at  Stev- 
ens Point.  The  rate  complained  of 
was  for  a  service  performed  wholly 
within  the  state  of  Wisconsin,  and  is 
therefore  not  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Commission.  Complaint  dismissed. 
Johnson  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  255,  258. 

(e)  The  movement  of  a  shipment 
between  points  in  a  state  and  a  sub- 
sequent movement  out  of  the  state  is, 
as  to  the  first  shipment,  not  interstate 
commerce,  where  there  is  nothing  to 
connect  the  two  shipments,  either  in 
the  billing  or  the  charges  imposed. 
Johnson  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry. 
Co.,   22  I.   C.   C.  255. 

(f)  A  shipment  billed  from  one  point 
to  another  in  the  same  state  and  deliv- 
ered to  the  shipper's  agent  was  intra- 
state, though  it  was  intended  to  be, 
and  subsequently  was,  shipped  beyond 
state.  Big  Canon  Ranch  Co.  v.  G.  H. 
&  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  523,  526. 

(g)  Milk  was  shipped  from  various 
points  in  Vermont  and  New  York  to 
Eagle  Bridge,  N.  Y.,  where  it  was  in- 
spected, pasteurized,  refrigerated  and 
transferred  to  other  cars  to  be  trans- 
ported to  Boston.  If  upon  inspection 
any  of  the  milk  was  deemed  unfit  for 
the  Boston  market,  it  was  unloaded  and 
manufactured  into  cheese  or  other 
products  at  Eagle  Bridge.  Complain- 
ant attacked  the  rates  from  the  New 
York  and  Vermont  points  to  Eagle  Bridge. 
HELD,  the  shipments  of  milk  from  New 
York  points  to  Eagle  Bridge,  N.  Y.,  con- 
stituted interstate  commerce,  except  as 
to  shipments  actually  and  finally  ter- 
minated at  Eagle  Bridge.  When  a  com- 
modity is  purchased  in  and  shipped 
from   one    state   to    a   point   in   another 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE,  §1  (h)— §3   (b) 


419 


state  tli€  transaction  is  indelibly  im- 
pressed with  the  character  of  inter- 
state commerce,  and  the  various  muta- 
tions through  which  the  article  passes 
and  handlings  which  it  undergoes  while 
in  transit  are  merely  incidental  to  the 
movement,  and  every  carrier  by  railroad 
that  participates  in  the  carriage  of  any 
such  commodity,  or  that  performs  any 
part  of  the  transportation  in  a  con- 
tinuous passage  from  a  point  of  origin 
in  one  state  to  a  prescribed  destination 
in  another  state,  is  engaged  in  inter- 
state commerce  and  subject  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Act.  Hood  &  Sons 
V.  Delaware  &  Hudson  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
15,  20. 

(h)  Where  a  carload  of  cement  is 
shipped  from  Oklahoma  to  East  St. 
Louis,  a  portion  of  the  carload  removed 
at  East  St.  Louis,  and  the  balance  of 
the  carload  rebilled  from  East  St. 
Louis  to  Illinois  points,  the  latter  move- 
ment is  a  state  and  not  part  of  an 
interstate  movement.  Acme  Cement 
Plaster  Co.  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
I.   C.  C.  220,  221. 

(i)  Freight  received  by  a  railway  com- 
pany in  Kansas,  to  be  transported  over 
its  own  and  a  connecting  line,  on  a 
through  bill  of  lading  and  by  a  continu- 
ous trip,  to  a  point  beyond  the  state,  is 
deemed  to  be  interstate  commerce.  M. 
K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  V.  New  Era  Milling  Co., 
80  Kan.  141,  142,  143,  101  P.  1011. 

(j)  Where  goods  are  shipped  from  a 
point  of  origin  in  one  state  to  a  point  of 
destination  in  another,  the  commerce  is 
interstate  and  the  right  of  the  parties 
with  respect  to  rates  must  be  determined 
by  the  IFnited  States  statute  regulating 
such  shipments.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co. 
V.  Coquillard  Wagon  Works  Assignees 
(Ky.,  1912),  144  S.  W.  1080,  1081. 

(k)  Where  all  negotiations  and  ar- 
rangements in  regard  to  a  rate  are  made 
with  a  view  of  moving  goods  from  a 
point  in  one  state  to  a  point  in  another, 
where  carriers  involved  in  the  haul  have 
through  billing  arrangements,  and  there 
is  no  change  of  cars  or  interruption  in 
the  transportation,  the  shipment  is  inter- 
state commerce,  so  as  to  require  the 
application  of  the  published  inter- 
state rates.  Baldwin  Land  Co.  v.  Colum- 
bia Ry.  Co.,  58  Or.  285,  288,  114  P.  469. 

(1)  Where  a  shipment  is  intended  to 
be  carried  from  one  state  into  another, 
the  mere  fact  that  the  billing  is  made 


out  to  a  point  in  the  first  state  and  that 
a  representative  of  the  shipper  has  it 
moved  out  on  a  siding  and  then  rebills 
over  a  connecting  carrier  to  the  second 
state,  does  not  prevent  the  movement 
from  being  interstate  where  the  carriers 
do  not  relinquish  the  possession  of  the 
shipment  at  the  siding.  Galveston,  H.  & 
S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wood  (Tex.,  1912),  146 
S.  W.  538,  541. 

§2.     State     Shipment    Through     Another 
State. 

(a)  A  shipment  between  two  points 
In  the  same  state,  passing  en  route 
through  another  state,  is  an  interstate 
shipment.  Bridgeman-Russel  Co.  v.  G. 
N.  Exp.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  573;  Willman 
&  Co.  v.  S.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
I.    C.    C.    405. 

(b)  Where  a  shipment  in  moving 
from  a  point  in  one  state  to  another 
point  in  the  same  state  passes  through 
another  state,  it  is  interstate  com- 
merce and  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Commission.  Wells-Higman  Co.  v.  St. 
I.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C  175, 
176. 

(c)  Although  the  point  of  origin  and 
point  of  destination  lie  in  the  same  state, 
the  commerce  is  interstate  so  as  to  re- 
quire the  application  of  interstate  rates, 
where  the  carrier's  line  in  the  course  of 
the  journey  passes  through  another  state. 
Mires  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  134  Mo. 
App.  379,  388,  144  S.  W.  1052,  1055. 

§3.     Participation     in     Interstate     IVIove- 
ment. 

See  Supra,  §1  (b),  (g);  Through 
Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §2  (f); 
Water  Carriers,   §2   (k). 

(a)  The  test  of  through  billing  is 
not  necessarily  determinative  in  decid- 
ing whether  commerce  is  state  or  in- 
terstate. Ohio  R.  R.  Comm.  v.  Worth- 
ington,  225  U.  S.  101,  110,  32  Sup.  Ct. 
653,  56  L.  ed.  1004. 

(b)  Under  the  proviso  of  section  1 
of  the  Act  to  the  effect  that  its  pro- 
visions shall  not  apply  to  the  trans- 
portation of  passengers  or  property,  or 
to  the  receiving,  delivering,  storage  or 
handling  of  property  wholly  within  one 
state  and  not  shipped  to  or  from  a 
foreign  country  from  or  to  any  state 
or  territory,  a  carrier  participating  in 
the  movement  of  interstate  commerce 
is  not  exempted  from  the  Act  by  the 
fact  that  in  handling  its  portion  of  the 


420 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE,    §3    (c)_(k) 


haul     it     operated     wholly     within     one 
state.     Denver   &   R.   G.   R.   R.   Co.  v.  I. 

C.  C,   195  Fed.  968,  971. 

(c)  Interstate  commerce  begin -3  with 
the  shipment  of  the  article  in  one 
state  directed  and  destined  to  another 
state.  It  ends  only  with  the  delivery 
at  destination.  All  common  carriers  by 
railroad  which  participate  in  its  actual 
transportation  from  the  time  of  ship- 
ment to  the  time  of  delivery  are  en- 
gaged in  the  transportation  of  prop- 
erty from  one  state  to  another,  whether 
their  services  be  performed  wholly 
within  one  state  or  in  more  than  one 
state,  whether  such  services  be  pri- 
mary and  called  "carriage,"  or  inci- 
dental, and  called  "switching,"  whether 
the  carriers  be  paid  a  flat  sum  per  car 
or  a  percentage  of  the  through  rate, 
and  whether  such  payment  be  made 
directly  by  a  shipper  or  consignee  on 
the  one  hand,  or  by  the  initial  or  final 
carrier  on  the  other  hand.  U.  S.  v. 
Union  S.  &  T.  Co.,  192  Fed.  330,  339. 

(cc)  Movement  wholly  within  a 
single  state,  which  is  part  of  a  continu- 
ous movement  from  another  state,  is  in- 
terstate commerce,  subject  to  the  Act. 
Grand  Junction  Chamber  of  Commerce  v. 

D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  115,  120. 

(d)  A  local  state  rate  that  is  part  of 
a  combination  interstate  rate,  when 
applied  to  interstate  commerce,  is  with- 
in the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commission. 
Grand  Junction  Chamber  of  Commerce 
v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
115,   120. 

(e)  Since  the  transportation  service 
to  be  performed  by  the  carrier  is  not 
ended  until  the  cars  are  given  the 
terminal  delivery  directed  by  the  con- 
signee, it  follows  that  a  switching  serv- 
ice at  the  end  of  the  interstate  move- 
ment is  not  a  local  transaction  sub- 
ject to  the  laws  of  the  state  in  which  it 
is  performed,  and  that  the  charges 
therefor  are  subject  to  the  Act.  Bade- 
noch  Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
I.    C.    C.    36,   37. 

(f)  The  fact  that  through  tickets 
are  not  used  or  through  rates  paid 
does  not  prove  the  transportation  to 
be  other  than  interstate.  A  through 
route  exists  over  which  passengers 
are  actually  transported  by  continu- 
ous carriage,  and  that  fact  that  joint 
rates  or  fares  may  not  now  be  in  force 
does   not   prove   that   the   transportation 


is  not  interstate  in  character.  Citi- 
zens of  Somerset  v.  Washington  Ry. 
&  Elec.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  187,  191. 

(g)  The  traffic  on  sugar  from  New 
Orleans  or  Port  Chalmette  to  Gramercy, 
La.,  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Commission  where  it  appears  that  the 
sugar  is  imported  with  the  avowed  in- 
tention of  shipping  it  to  Gramercy, 
that  the  owner  pays  the  duty  and  turns 
over  the  customs  officer's  order  to  the 
defendant  railway  company  in  accord- 
ance with  a  previous  arrangement,  that 
the  defendant  loads  the  sugar  from  the 
wharf,  and  that  the  defendant  had 
previously  filed  a  tariff  with  the  Com- 
mission. In  Re  Transportation  of 
Sugar,    22    I.    C.    C.    558,    563. 

(h)  On  a  shipment  under  through 
billing  from  Manchester,  Vt.,  via  Milwau- 
kee to  Waterloo,  Wis.,  on  which  a  charge 
of  31c  is  made  to  Milwaukee  and  15c 
thence  to  Waterloo,  the  Commission  has 
jurisdiction  to  determine  the  reason- 
ableness of  the  rate  from  Milwaukee  to 
Waterloo  since  the  movement  between 
those  points  is  not  intrastate  but  a 
part  of  an  interstate  through  movement. 
Roach  &  Seeber  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  18   I.   C.  C.  172,   173. 

(i)  Shipments  are  accepted  for 
transportation  from  St,  Louis  to  Lead- 
ville,  Colo.,  and  delivered  by  the  M. 
P.  Ry.  to  the  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  at 
Pueblo,  neither  shipper  nor  consignee 
intervening  at  Pueblo  or  elsewhere. 
HELD,  these  facts  constitute  an  ar- 
rangement for  through  and  contin- 
uous carriage  which  clearly  brings 
the  transportation  within  the  scope  of 
the  Act.  Baer  Bros.  Mercantile  Co. 
V.  M,  P.  Ry.-  Co.,  17  1.  C.  C.  225,  226; 
sustained,  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C, 
195  Fed.   968. 

(j)  When  coal  is  destined  for  de- 
livery across  the  main  street  to  that 
part  of  Bristol  in  Tennessee,  these 
shipments  are  interstate  and  under  the 
jurisdiction  of  this  Commission.  Board 
of  Mayor  &  Aldermen  v.  V.  &  S.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,    15   I.    C.   C.    453,   454. 

(k)  On  carloads  of  beer  from  St. 
Louis,  Mo.,  to  Leadville,  Colo.,  com- 
plainant at  Leadville  was  assessed  dur- 
ing a  portion  of  the  period* 90c  and  the 
remainder  95c,  the  shipments  moving 
via  Pueblo  and  the  portion  of  the  charge 
from  Pueblo  to  Leadville  being  45c. 
The     only     routing     instructions     given 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE,    §3    (1)— (m) 


421 


were  that  the  shipments  should  move 
beyond  Pueblo  via  the  D.  &  R.  G.  R. 
R.  Shipping  receipts  issued  to  com- 
plainant's competitor  at  St.  Louis  stated 
Leadville  as  the  destination  of  the 
shipments.  On  one  of  the  shipments 
the  freight  was  paid  at  Leadville  by 
complainant  to  the  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R., 
which  paid  the  M.  P.  Ry.  for  the 
haul  from  St.  Louis  to  Pueblo,  treat- 
ing the  payment  as  an  advance  charge. 
Without  further  instructions  from  either 
th€  consignor  or  complainant  the  D.  & 
R.  G.  R.  R.  transported  the  beer  to 
Leadville  and  collected  the  charges 
for  the  entire  haul  from  St.  Louis  to 
Leadville.  On  the  other  shipments  the 
consignor  paid  the  freight  at  St.  Louis. 
They  wer-e  carried  by  the  M.  P.  Ry. 
to  Pueblo  and  there  delivered  to  the 
D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.,  the  M-  P.  Ry.  pay- 
ing to  the  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  the  lat- 
ter's  charges  for  transportation  from 
Pueblo  to  Leadville.  The  only  in- 
structions given  by  complainant  or 
consignor  were  those  given  at  St. 
Louis  to  the  effect  that  the  beer  should 
move  to  Pueblo  via  the  D.  &  R.  G.  R. 
R.  The  transportation  from  St.  Louis 
to  Pueblo  was  conducted  by  the  M.  P. 
Ry.  upon  a  local  waybill  and  that 
from  Pueblo  to  Leadville  by  the  D.  & 
R.  G.  R.  R.  also  upon  a  local  waybill; 
but  of  this  neither  the  complainant 
nor  the  consignor  had  information. 
The  complainant  attacked  the  45c 
portion  of  the  charge  for  the  haul  from 
Pueblo  to  Leadville  as  unreasonable. 
HELD,  the  haul  from  Pueblo  to  Lead- 
ville was  part  of  an  interstate  move- 
ment so  as  to  give  the  Commission 
jurisdiction  over  the  rate  even  as  to 
shipments  made  prior  to  the  amend- 
ment of  June  29,  1906.  Baer  Brothers 
Mercantile  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13 
I.   C.   C.  329,  340. 

(1)  Coal  was  carried  from  points  in 
Arkansas  over  the  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  to 
Dodson,  Mo.,  a  point  formerly  outside 
Kansas  City,  and  thence  over  defendant 
Belt  Railway  from  Dodson  to  Westport, 
a  point  within  the  limits  of  Kansas 
City.  The  shipping  receipt  specified 
Westport  as  the  ultimate  destination, 
the  car  was  waybilled  by  the  K.  C.  S. 
Ry.  to  Dodson,  transported  to  that 
point  and  there  placed  upon  the  side- 
tracks, from  which  it  was  taken  without 
further  instructions  by  defendant  Belt 
Railway  and  carried  to  Westport. 
Complainant      consignee      at      Westport 


paid  the  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  its  full  rate  to 
Dodsoo  and  the  Belt  Railway  its  full 
rate  of  20c  per  ton  for  the  haul  from 
Dodson  to  Westport.  HELD,  defendant 
Belt  Railway  in  said  shipments  was 
engaged  in  interstate  commerce  and 
was  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Commission  with  respect  to  through 
routes  and  joint  rates.  A  movement 
from  a  point  in  one  state  to  a  point 
in  another  is  to  be  treated  as  an  en- 
tirety and  cannot  be  split  up  into 
separate  movements  for  the  purpose  of 
exempting  one  of  the  carriers  operat- 
ing wholly  between  points  within  a 
state  from  the  regulations  of  inter- 
state commerce.  Leonard  v.  K.  C.  S. 
Ry.    Co.,    13    I.    C.    C.    573,    579. 

(m)  Section  1  of  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Act  as  amended  June  29,  1906,  pro- 
vides "that  the  provisions  of  this  Act 
shall  apply  to  any  common  carrier  or 
carriers  engaged  in  the  transportation  of 
passengers  or  property  wholly  by  rail- 
road (or  partly  by  railroad  and  partly  by 
water  when  both  are  used  under  a  com- 
mon control,  management,  or  arrange- 
ment, for  a  continuous  carriage  or  ship- 
ment), and  also  to  the  transportation  in 
like  manner  of  property  shipped  from  a 
foreign  country  to  any  place  in  the  United 
States  or  an  adjacent  foreign  country," 
Section  2  of  the  Act  requires  the  filing 
and  posting  of  charges  for  transportation 
between  points  on  the  line  of  the  carrier 
and  points  on  the  route  of  any  other  car- 
rier (by  railroad,  by  pipe  line,  or  by 
water,  when  a  through  route  and  joint 
rate  have  been  established).  Defendant 
Great  Northern  Ry,  Co.  established  a  rate 
of  85c  on  canned  goods  from  Stavanger, 
Norway,  to  Seattle,  Wash,,  with  the  pro- 
vision that  it  was  to  receive  75c  for  its 
portion  of  the  haul,  and  if  the  best  ocean 
rate  should  make  the  total  charge  exceed 
85c,  the  charge  for  the  entire  haul  was  to 
be  75c  plus  the  best  ocean  rate  obtain- 
able. HELD,  the  shipment  covered  by 
such  rate  was  subject  to  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act,  Fisher  v.  Great  Northern 
Ry,  Co.,  49  Wash.  205,  209,  95  P.  77. 

II.     CONTROL   AND    REGULATION. 

See   Constitutional    Law. 

§4.     State. 

See  Accounting,  I  (I);  Act  to  Regu- 
late Commerce,  II  (aa),  IV  (c) ; 
Courts,  V;  Crimes,  XI;  Demur- 
rage, §3  (b);  Discrimination,  §11; 
Evidence,  §35;  Explosives  (a);  Ex- 
press Companies,  %^y^^,  interstate 
Commerce,   §5   (f ) ;   Interstate  Com- 


422 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE,  §4  (a)— (i) 


merce  Commission,  §9  (v) ;  Loss 
and  Damage,  §3;  Reasonableness 
of  Rates,  §1  (o),  §3  (c);*  Switch 
Tracks  and  Switciiing,  §1  (b),  §7 
(g),  (P);  Terminal  Facilities,  §1 
(e),  (f);  Track  Storage,  I  (a); 
Tiirough  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 
§11    (2)    (f);  Transportion,   §9,  §11. 

(a)  The  Ohio  Railroad  Commission 
established  a  rate  of  70c  on  lak€-cargo 
coal  from  points  in  Ohio;  this  rate 
applied  solely  to  such  coal  as  was 
in  fact  placed  upon  vessels  for  carriage 
■to  points  beyond  the  state  via  the  port 
at  Huron  and  covered  the  transporta- 
tion from  the  mine  to  said  port,  the 
placing  upon  the  vessel  and  the  trim- 
ming or  distributing  in  the  hold.  The 
rate  applied  only  in  shipments  to  points 
in  other  states  beyond  the  port.  If 
the  whole  was  stopped  and  disposed 
of  at  the  port  another  and  higher  rate 
applied.  HELD,  the  traffic  constituted 
interstate  commerce  and  the  order  es- 
tablishing the  70c  rate  was  void.  Ohio 
R.  R.  Comm.  v.  Worthington,  225  U.  S. 
101,  108,  32  Sup.  Ct.  653,  56  L.  ed.  1004. 

(b)  An  order  made  by  a  state  com- 
mission under  assumed  authority  of  the 
state,  which  directly  burdens  or  regu- 
lates interstate  commerce,  will  be  en- 
joined. Ohio  R.  R.  Comm.  v.  Worthing- 
ton, 225  U.  S.  101,  i08,  32  Sup.  Ct. 
653,  56  L.  ed.  1004. 

(c)  Over  interstate  commerce  trans- 
portation rates  a  state  has  no  juris- 
diction, and  an  attempt  to  regulate 
such  rates  by  the  state  or  under  its 
authority  is  void.  Ohio  R.  R.  Comm.  v. 
Worthington,  225  U.  S.  101,  107,  32 
S.  Ct.  653,  56  L.  ed.  1004. 

(d)  Where  a  state  statute  provides 
penalties  against  a  carrier  for  refus- 
ing to  accept  goods  for  interstate 
transportation,  even  though  for  the  car- 
rier so  to  do  would  violate  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act  forbidding  carriers  to  transport 
property  in  the  absence  of  lawfully 
published  rates,  it  is  invalid  and  must 
give  way  to  such  Act.  Southern  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Reid,  222  U.  S.  424,  442,  32  Sup. 
Ct.  Rep.  140,  56  L.  ed.  257;  Southern  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Reid  &  Beam,  222  U.  S.  445,  32 
Sup.  Ct.  145;  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Burlr 
ington  Lumber  Co.,  225  U.  S.  99,  32  Sup. 
Ct.  657. 

(e)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Act 
of  Feb.  4,  1887,  applies  only  to  inter- 
state commerce  and  does  not  prevent 
the  states  from  passing  laws  regulating 


the  facilities  to  be  supplied  by  carriers 
in  intrastate  commerce.  S.  P.  Co.  v. 
Campbell,    189    Fed.   696,   698. 

(f)  Carloads  of  staves  and  poplar 
logs  were  shipped  on  local  bills  of 
lading  from  points  in  Louisiana  to  New 
Orleans,  La.  The  shipper  notified  the  car- 
rier that  the  cars  were  destined  for  ex- 
port and  when  they  arrived  they  were 
carried  free  of  charge  and  delivered  at 
shipside  by  the  carrier.  Under  the 
Louisiana  state  rates  in  force  the 
shipper  was  entitled  to  only  four  days' 
free  storage  and  to  no  free  belting  or 
switching  at  all  from  th^  depot  at 
New  Orleans.  The  rates  filed  with 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
on  traffic  for  export  allowed  a  larger 
storage  period  and  free  switching. 
HELD,  the  movement  was  not  an  intra- 
state one  takiftg  the  Louisiana  Commis- 
sion rates,  but  one  under  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission, to  which  the  rates  filed  with 
the  latter  applied,  and  the  fines  levied 
by  the  state  commission  for  accept- 
ing the  interstate  rates  should  be  en- 
joined. T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  V.  R.  R.  Comm. 
of  La.,  183   Fed.   1005,  1007. 

(g)  In  the  absence  of  Congressional 
action  the  states  may  legislate  with 
respect  to  matters  which  are  strictly 
local  in  character,  even  though  by  so 
doing  they  may  to  some  extent  regulate 
interstate  commerce,  but  whatever  sub- 
jects of  this  power  are  in  their  nature 
national  or  admit  only  of  one  uni- 
form system  or  plan  of  regulation  may 
justly  be  said  to  be  of  such  a  nature 
as  to  require  exclusive  legislation  by 
Congress.  Wilson  Produce  Co.  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  170,  174. 

(h)  A  state  statute  imposed  a  penalty 
on  carriers  of  a  stipulated  sum  per  car 
p-er  day,  or  per  100  lbs.  per  day,  for  fail- 
ure to  notify  the  consignee  of  the  arrival 
of  cars,  and  imposed  a  similar  demurrage 
charge  on  the  consignee  for  failure  to 
unload.  The  statute  applied  to  interstate 
as  well  as  state  shipments.  HELD,  in 
the  absence  of  regulations  by  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  covering  the 
subject  matter  in  question,  the  statute 
was  not  void  as  attempting  to  impose  a 
burden  on  interstate  carriers.  St.  L.  I. 
M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Edwards  (Ark.,  1910), 
127  S.  W.  713,  715. 

(i)  Where  Congress  or  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  has  prescribed 
regulations  upon  a  particular  subject  re- 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE,  §4  (j)— (q) 


423 


latin  g  to  interstate  commerce,  the  same 
are  exclusive  in  their  operation,  and  the 
states  no  longer  have  power  to  make 
regulations  on  that  subject,  but  until 
Congress  or  the  Commission  has  acted 
upon  a  particular  matter  of  regulation,  a 
state  may  enforce  its  regulations  which 
do  not  directly  burden  interstate  com- 
merce. St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  v. 
Edwards  (Ark.,  1910),  127  S.  W.  713,  714. 

(j)  Appellant  railroad  was  engaged  in 
hauling  cars  back  and  forth  between  the 
city  of  Lafayette,  Ind.,  and  a  gravel  pit 
some  2y2  miles  from  said  city.  These 
cars  were  hauled  in  by  other  carriers  run- 
ning into  Lafayette.  The  appellant  did 
not  issue  any  bill  of  lading  to  destina- 
tion points  and  was  in  no  way  liable  for, 
or  concerned  in,  the  movement  of  cars 
out  of  Lafayette  upon  the  rails  of  such 
other  roads,  nor  did  it  furnish  any  equip- 
ment. HELD,  an  order  of  the  Indiana 
Railroad  Commission,  reducing  appel- 
lant's charges  for  such  haul,  related  en- 
tirely to  intrastate  commerce  and  was 
not  void  under  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act,  as  an  attempted  regulation  of  inter- 
state commerce.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v. 
R.  R.  Comm.,  173  Ind.  469,  473,  87  .,.  E. 
1030. 

(k)  The  Act  of  March  3,  1901,  requir- 
ing common  carriers  engaged  in  inter- 
state commerce  to  make  full  reports  to 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  of 
all  accidents  to  passengers  and  em- 
ployees, and  the  Hepburn  Act  of  June  29, 
1906,  authorizing  the  Commission  to  re- 
quire annual  reports  from  all  railroad 
companies  engaged  in  interstate  com- 
merce, showing  the  number  of  employees, 
their  salaries,  etc.,  and  the  joint  resolu- 
tion of  June  30,  1906,  directing  the  Com- 
mission to  investigate  and  report  on  the 
use  of  and  necessity  for  block  signal  sys- 
tems, appliances,  etc.,  do  not  result,  taken 
In  connection  with  various  other  United 
States  statutes,  in  the  occupation  by 
Congress  of  the  field  of  legislation  with 
respect  to  safety  of  employees  and  pas- 
sengers upon  interstate  railway  trains, 
so  as  to  make  void  a  state  statute  regu- 
lating the  number  of  employees  on  trains 
involved  in  interstate  commerce,  where 
such  regulation  is  applied  only  to  intra- 
state operation.  Pittsburgh,  etc.,  R.  Co. 
v.  State,  172  Ind.  147,  156,  161,  87  N.  E. 
1034. 

(1)  State  legislation  with  reference  to 
the  duty  of  carriers  to  install  interchange 
tracks  is  not  prohibited  where  it  amounts 


to  no  more  than  a  reasonable  regulation 
of  an  instrumentality  of  interstate  com- 
merce, and  only  affects  such  commerce 
secondarily  or  in  a  remote  degree.  Pitts- 
burgh, etc.,  R.  Co.  V.  R.  R.  Comm.,  171 
Ind.   189,   211,  86  N.  E.  328. 

(m)  A  state  railroad  commission  or- 
dered plaintiff  carrier  to  construct  an  in- 
terchange track  between  another  rail- 
road's exchange  track  at  a  junction  point. 
The  interchange  track  ordered  was  to  be 
500  feet  in  length,  400  feet  of  which  would 
be  upon  the  land  of  the  plaintiff.  Plain- 
tiff purchased  this  land  to  be  used  for 
terminal  facilities  and  had  expended 
large  sums  of  money  in  constructing 
tracks,  platforms,  sheds,  buildings  and 
other  terminal  facilities.  HELD,  the  or- 
der was  not  in  violation  of  section  3  of 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  providing 
that  no  common  carrier  should  be  re- 
quired to -give  the  use  of  its  track  or  ter- 
minal facilities  to  another  carrier  en- 
gaged in  like  business.  Pittsburgh,  etc., 
R.  Co.  V.  R.  R.  Comm.,  171  Ind.  189,  210, 
86  N.  E.  328. 

(n)  Although  an  order  of  a  state  rail- 
road commission  requiring  a  carrier  to 
construct  an  interchange  track  may,  of 
necessity,  include  cars  moving  in  inter- 
state commerce  and  inure  to  the  benefit 
of  such  commerce,  the  order  is  not  void 
as  a  regulation  of  interstate  commerce, 
where  it  specifically  applies  only  to  the 
transportation  of  passengers  and  prop- 
erty between  points  within  the  state,  and 
to  the  receiving,  switching,  delivering, 
storing  and  handling  of  such  property. 
Pittsburgh,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Comm., 
171  Ind.  189,  212,  86  N.  E.  328. 

(o)  The  right  of  a  state  to  legislate 
as  to  the  validity  of  provisions  in  ship- 
ping contracts,  limiting  the  liability  of 
the  carrier,  is  recognized  by  the  Carmack 
amendment  to  the  Hepburn  Act.  McEl- 
valn  V.  Railroad,  151  Mo.  App.  126,  155, 
131  S.  W.  736. 

(p)  The  Hepburn  Act.  placing  inter- 
state railroads,  including  switches,  spurs, 
tracks,  and  terminal  facilities  of  every 
kind,  under  the  control  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission,  does  not  inter- 
fere with  state  control  of  the  road  and  its 
appurtenances  so  far  as  it  is  engaged  in 
intrastate  commerce.  State  v.  Missouri 
P.  R.  Co.,  81  Neb.  15,  21,  115  N.  W.  614. 

(q)  A  state  statute  prescribed  a  pen- 
alty against  carriers  for  refusal  to  accept 
freight  for  shipment.     Plaintiff  tendered 


424 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE,  §4  (r)  — (x) 


to  defendant  in  such  state  goods  for  ship- 
ment to  another  state.  Defendant's  line 
did  not  reach,  and  it  had  not  filed  with 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  a 
joint  rate,  to  the  destination  in  question. 
The  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  section  6, 
requires  a  carrier  to  file  with  the  Com- 
mission rates  to  all  points  on  its  own 
line,  and,  where  joint  rates  have  been 
established  with  other  carriers,  to  file 
such  rates.  HELD,  defendant  was  liable 
under  the  state  statute  for  failure  to  ac- 
cept the  goods.  If  it  had  failed  to  comply 
with  the  federal  statute  in  filing  rates, 
this  did  not  relieve  it  of  its  duty  to  re- 
ceive the  freight.  It  could  not  be  ex- 
pected that  a  freight  rate  to  every  rail- 
road section  in  the  Union  must  be  estab- 
lished and  published  before  defendant 
could  receive  freight  for  any  point  outside 
the  state.  The  federal  statute  does  not 
prohibit  the  receipt  or  forwarding  of  a 
single  shipment,  but  forbids  the  carrier 
to  "engage  or  participate  in  the  transpor- 
tation of  passengers  or  property"  inter- 
state, without  filing  its  rates.  It  is  the 
business  of  a  common  carrier  which  the 
defendant  is  forbidden  to  exercise  with- 
out filing  rates.  Defendant  could  have 
received  the  goods  to  be  shipped  to  the 
end  of  its  line,  there  to  be  delivered  to 
other  carriers  to  be  transported  to  des- 
tination, and  a  bill  of  lading  been  made 
out  showing  such  fact.  (Brown  and 
Walker,  JJ.,  dissenting.)  Reid  v.  South- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  153  N.  C.  490,  493,  69  S.  E. 
•618. 

(r)  The  Act  of  Congress  and  the  or- 
der of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion requiring  the  publication  of  rates  do 
not  interfere  with  a  state  statute  impos- 
ing a  penalty  for  failure  to  receive 
freight.  Reid  &  Beam  v.  Southern  Ry. 
Co.,  150  N.  C.  753,  765,  64  S.  E.  874. 

(s)  An  order  of  a  state  commission, 
providing  that  ten  days'  free  time  shall 
be  allowed  on  less-than-carload  shipments, 
when  destined  to  consignees  who  live  at 
interior  points  five  miles  or  more  from 
railroad  stations,  in  so  far  as  it  applies 
to  interstate  carriers,  is  void,  for  the 
reason  that  it  is  in  conflict  with  and  is 
superseded  by  sections  1  and  2  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  as  amended 
June  29,  1906.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  State  (Okla.,  1912),  123  P.  1065, 
1065. 

(t)  That  part  of  a  state  commission's 
order  which  provides  that  ten  days'  free 
storage  shall  be  allowed  on  less-than-car- 


load shipments  when  destined  to  con- 
signees who  live  at  interior  points  five 
miles  or  more  from  the  railroad  station, 
in  so  far  as  it  applies  to  interstate  com- 
merce, is  void,  for  the  reason  that  it  is 
in  conflict  with  and  is  superseded  by  sec- 
tions 1  and  2  of  the  amendment  to  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  of  June  29,  1906. 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  V.  State,  26  Okla.  62, 
72,  107  P.  929. 

(u)  A  state  statute  relating  to  the 
furnishing  of  cars  by  carriers  regulated 
the  manner  of  making  the  request  for 
cars,  the  time  within  which  they  should 
be  furnished,  the  excuses  that  might  be 
made  for  a  failure  to  deliver  them,  and 
added  a  penalty  by  way  of  demurrage  for 
a  failure  to  comply  with  the  terms  of  the 
statute.  HELD,  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act  had  not  so  occupied  the  field  as  to 
invalidate  such  statute  with  respect  to 
cars  used  in  interstate  commerce.  Martin 
V.  Oregon  R.  &  Nav.  Co.  (Ore.,  1910),  113 
P.   16,   20. 

(v)  A  state  statute  prescribed  a  pen- 
alty for  the  failure  of  a  carrier  to  trace 
and  inform  the  shipper  as  to  lost  pack- 
ages. The  Carmack  amendment  makes 
the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss  or  dam- 
age to  interstate  shipments  caused  by  it 
or  by  connecting  carriers.  HELD,  that 
such  state  statute,  with  respect  to  inter- 
state shipments,  must  yield  to  the  fed- 
eral statute;  that  the  Carmack  amend- 
ment prescribed  no  liability  for  failure  to 
trace  and  inform;  and,  therefore,  the 
shipper  could  not  recover  of  the  initial 
carrier.  Meetze  v.  Southern  Express  Co. 
(S.   C,   1912),   74   S.  E.  823,   824. 

(w)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Act  has 
no  bearing  upon  the  right  of  a  state  to 
refuse  to  enforce  a  special  contract  lim- 
iting the  liability  of  a  carrier,  though 
made  in  a  foreign  state.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Smith  (Tenn.,  1911),  134  S.  W. 
866,    872. 

(x)  The  clause  in  the  federal  statute 
(Act  Feb.  25,  1909,  C.  193),  declaring  it 
unlawful  for  carriers  engaged  in  inter- 
state commerce  to  keep  any  other  ac- 
counts, records,  or  memoranda  than  those 
prescribed  by  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission,  refers  to  interstate  com- 
merce and  does  not  prevent  the  states 
from  prescribing  additions  to  the  system 
of  bookkeeping  fixed  by  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  so  as  to  complete 
the  information  necessary  for  the  regulat- 
ing of  interstate  rates.    Railroad  Commis- 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE,  §4   (y)— §5   (f) 


425 


sion  of  Tex.   v.   T.   &   P.   Ry.   Co.    (Tex., 
1911),  140  S.  W.  829,  835. 

(y)  Congress,  or  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission,  cannot  prevent  a 
sovereign  state  from  adopting  and  en- 
forcing against  interstate  carriers  any 
just  and  reasonable  system  of  bookkeping 
that  it  may  see  fit,  and  which  does  not 
interfere  with  interstate  commerce.  Rail- 
road Commission  of  Tex.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.  (Tex.,  1911),  140  S.  W.  829,  835. 

(z)  Where  a  conflict  with  the  system 
of  bookkeeping  prescribed  by  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  is  found  as 
to  any  particular  item  in  a  system  of 
bookkeeping  prescribed  by  a  state  com- 
mission against  interstate  carriers,  such 
fact,  if  it  be  good  cause  for  setting  aside 
an  order  of  the  state  commission  pro 
tanto,  does  not  justify  setting  aside  the 
entire  system.  Railroad  Commission  of 
Tex.  V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Tex.,  1911),  140 
S.   W.    829,   834. 

(aa)  The  only  material  difference  be- 
tween the  system  of  bookkeeping  pre- 
scribed by  a  state  commission  and  that 
prescribed  by  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  was  that  the  former  required 
an  apportionment  of  expenses  between 
freight  and  passenger  and  between  state 
and  interstate  commerce,  while  the  latter 
did  not.  HELD,  the  system  of  the  state 
commission  was  not  invalid  as  conflicting 
with  that  prescribed  by  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission,  or  as  imposing 
too  great  a  burden  on  interstate  traffic. 
Railroad  Commission  of  Texas  v.  Texas 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Tex.,  1911),  140  S.  W.  829, 
833. 

(bb)  State  statutes  provided  for  the 
assessment  of  a  penalty  against  railroads 
for  each  day  freight  was  held  after  the 
payment  or  the  tender  of  freight  charges 
was  made,  or  for  the  holding  of  freight 
for  the  collection  of  excess  charges 
thereon.  HELD,  the  statutes  did  not  au- 
thorize the  recovery  of  the  penalty  on 
interstate  shipments,  being  in  conflict 
with  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act.  Trin- 
ity &  B.  V.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Geppert  (Tex., 
1911),  135  S.  W.  164,  165. 

(cc)  A  state  statute  practically  identi- 
cal in  language  with  the  provision  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  making  it  a 
crime  for  a  person  to  knowingly  and  wil- 
fully secure  transportation  at  less  than 
the  published  rates  by  false  representa- 
tion of  the  contents  of  the  package,  false 
weights,   etc.,   is   not  unconstitutional   as 


coming  into  conflict  with  the  federal  Act. 
Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Charlottesville 
Woolen  Mills  (Va.,  1908),  63  S.  E.  8,  9. 

§5.     United  States. 

See  Constitutional   Law. 

(a)  In  imposing  restrictions  as  to 
hours  of  service  of  employes  engaged  in 
interstate  commerce,  designed  reason- 
ably to  promote  efficiency  and  the  pro- 
tection of  lives  and  property,  there  is  no 
interference  by  Congress  with  liberty  of 
contract  as  guaranteed  by  the  Constitu- 
tion.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  v.  I.  C.  C,  221  U.  S. 
612,  619,  31  Sup.  Ct.  621,  55  L.  ed.  878. 

(b)  In  its  power  suitably  to  provide 
for  the  safety  of  employes  and  travelers 
Congress  is  not  limited  to  the  enactment 
of  laws  relating  to  mechanical  appli- 
ances, but  is  also  competent  to  consider 
and  to  endeavor  to  reduce  the  dangers 
incident  to  the  strain  of  excessive  hours 
of  duty  on  the  part  of  engineers,  con- 
ductors, train  dispatchers,  telegraphers 
and  other  persons  embraced  within  the 
class  defined  by  the  Act  regulating  the 
hours  of  service  of  certain  railroad  em- 
ployes. B.  &  O.  R.  R.  V.  I.  C.  C,  221 
U.  S.  612,  619,  31  Sup.  Ct.  021,  55  L. 
ed.  878. 

(c)  There  cannot  be  denied  to  Con- 
gress the  effective  exercise  of  its  consti- 
tutional authority.  By  virtue  of  its 
power  to  regulate  interstate  and  foreign 
commerce  Congress  may  enact  laws  for 
the  safeguarding  of  persons  and  property 
that  are  transported  in  that  commerce 
and  of  those  who  are  employed  in  trans- 
porting them.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  v.  I.  C.  C, 
221  U.  S.  612,  618,  31  Sup.  Ct.  621,  55 
L.  ed.  878. 

(d)  The  power  granted  to  Congress 
to  regulate  commerce  among  the  states 
and  foreign  nations  is  complete  in  itself, 
is  unrestricted  except  by  the  limitations 
upon  its  authority  to  be  found  in  the  Con- 
stitution. L.  &  N.  R.  R.  V.  Mottley,  219 
U.  S.  467,  480,  31  Sup.  Ct.  265,  55  L. 
ed.   297. 

(e)  Congress  has  power  to  regulate 
interstate  commerce  to  prevent  favorit- 
ism, and  to  secure  equal  rights  to  all  en- 
gaged in  interstate  trade.  N.  Y.  Cen- 
tral V.  U.  S.,  212  U.  S.  481,  495,  29  Sup. 
Ct.  304,  53  L.  ed.  613. 

(f)  The  mere  grant  by  Congress  to 
the  Commission  of  certain  national  rov.'- 
ers  with  respect  to  interstate  commerce 
does  not  of  itself  and  in  the  absence  of 
action  by  the  Commission  interfer3  with 


426 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION,  §1  (a)— (cc) 


the  authority  of  the  state  to  make  those 
regulations  conducive  to  the  welfare  and 
convenience  of  itsi  citizens.     M.  P.  Ry. 

V.  Larabee  Mills,  211  U.  S.  612,  623,  29 
Sup.  Ct.  214,  53  L.  ed.  352. 

INTERSTATE    COMMERCE 
COMMISSION. 

I.     JURISDICTION. 

§1.     In  general. 
II.     PRIMARY  JURISDICTION. 
§2.     In  general. 
§3.     Finality  of  findings. 

III.  OVER  PROCEDURE. 

§4.    Examiners. 
§5.     Orders. 
§6.    Witnesses. 

IV.  OVER  RAILROADS. 

§7.     Capitalization. 

§8.     Physical  valuation. 

V.  OVER  RATES. 

§9.    Interstate. 
§10.     Intrastate. 
§10^2  Territorial. 
§11.     Suspension. 
§12.     Undercharges. 
§13.     Unpublished  rate. 

VI.  TO  AWARD  DAMAGES. 

§14.     In  general. 

CROSS  REFERENCES. 
See  Accounting,  I  (d),  (e),  (f),  (g); 
Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  II  (bb), 
(hh),  (n),  (nn);  Adjacent  Foreign 
Country,  I;  Advanced  Rates,  §9  (a), 
§21;  Allowances,  I;  Discrimination, 
§11  (bb),  (f),  (h),  (1),  §12  (f); 
Equalization  of  Rates,  §4-1  (d), 
(kk),   §8   (a);   Evidence,   §67   (a). 

I.     JURISDICTION. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §1;  Alaska,  I; 
Bills  of  Lading,  1;  Blanket  Rates, 
I;  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  I,  A;  Clas- 
sification, §2,  §13  (i);  Demurrage, 
§1;  Discrimination,  §2;  Divisions, 
§1,  §3  (e);  Electric  Lines,  I;  Em- 
ployment,  §1  (c),  (d);  Equaliza- 
tion of  Rates,  §1;  Exclusive  Con- 
tract (a);  Explosives  (a);  Export 
Rates  and  Facilities,  §1;  Express 
Companies,  §1;  Facilities  and  Priv- 
ileges, I,  §16  (a);  Foreign  Com- 
merce, §1;  Interstate  Commerce,  §1 
(g),  §3  (a),  (j),  (k),  (I);  Ligliterage, 
§1;  Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §2;  Loss 
and  Damage,  §4;  Overcharges,  §2; 
Passenger  Fares  and  Facilities,  §1, 
§5  (a),  §6  (h);  Precooling,  I;  Rea- 
sonableness of  Rates,  §1  (a),  (b), 
(c),  (e),  (g),  (i),  (k),  (n),  (o), 
(P),  (q),  (r),  (v),  §2  (h),  §19  (e),  §24 
(b);  Reduced  Rates,  §1;  Refriger- 
ation, §1;  Released  Rates,  §1;  Rep- 
aration, I;  Routing  and  Misrouting, 
I;  Special  Contract,  §4  (1);  Switch 
Track  and  Switching,  §2;  Substitu- 
tion of  Tonnage,  §1;  Tap  Lines, 
§2;  Tariffs,  §1,  §3  (cc) ;  Terminal 
Facilities,  §1;  Through   Routes  and 


Joint  Rates,  §1,  §11  (2)  (p);  Trans- 
portation, §1  (a),  (d);  Under- 
charges,   §1;    Water    Carriers,    §2. 

§1.     In  General. 

(a)  The  outlook  of  the  Commission 
and  its  powers  must  be  greater  than  the 
interest  of  railroads  or  of  that  which 
may  affect  those  interests.  It  must  be 
as  comprehensive  as  the  interest  of  the 
whole  country.  I.  C.  C.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.,  218  U.  S.  88,  i03,  30  Sup.  Ct.  651, 
54  L.  ed.  946.  I.  C.  C.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry. 
Co.,  218  U.  S.  113,  30  Sup.  Ct.  660,  54 
L.  ed.  959. 

(b)  When  a  subject  requires  legisla- 
tion for  the  regulation  of  future  con- 
duct, but  the  objects  of  it  are  so  diffuse 
and  variable  that  they  cannot  be  dis- 
tinctly apprehended  and  comprised  in  the 
ordinary  terms  of  legislative  classifica- 
tion, it  is  not  unusual  to  prescribe  gen- 
eral rules,  if  such  do  not  already  exist, 
and  delegate  the  power  to  apply  those 
rules  to  the  varying  circumstances  which 
may  arise  and  give  occasion  for  control. 
The  necessity  of  legislation  in  such  form 
justifies  its  adoption,  and  it  is  not  ob- 
noxious to  the  Constitution  in  that  it 
delegates  legislative  power.  Hence,  the 
powers  delegated  to  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  may  be  exercised, 
subject  to  the  same  restrictions,  as  fully 
as  Congress  itself  could.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  184  Fed.  118,  122. 

(bb)  A  carrier's  practices  regarding 
delivery  are  within  control  of  Commis- 
sion, but  where  such  practices  follow  de- 
livery to  the  shipper  the  Commission  is 
without  power.  Cosby  v.  Richmond 
Transfer  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  72,  77. 

(c)  The  Commission,  being  an  admin- 
istrative body,  need  not  first  determine 
whether  the  subject  matter  of  a  com- 
plaint is  within  its  jurisdiction  before  it 
considers  the  merits  of  a  controversy; 
but  affirmative  relief  may  not  be  granted 
in  any  case  unless  jurisdiction  over  the 
subject  matter  is  definitely  ascertained. 
Without  determining  the  question  of  jur- 
isdiction, therefore,  it  may  analyze  the 
facts  presented,  and  if  insufficient  to 
grant  relief  dismiss  the  complaint.  Mat- 
tison  V.  Penn.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  233,  234. 

(cc)  The  Commission,  under  section 
15,  has  power  to  determine  and  pre- 
scribe what  will  be  just,  fair  and  reason- 
able regulations  or  practices  for  the 
future.  Mobile  Chamber  of  Commerce  v. 
M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  417,  421. 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION,  §1  (d)— (1) 


427 


'  (d)  The  Commission  is  not  author- 
ized to  control  the  general  policy  of 
carriers  in  their  competition  with  one 
another  or  to  regulate  the  general  man- 
agement of  their  properties  or  to  inter- 
fere with  legitimate  means  adopted  by 
them  in  the  form  of  favorable  rates, 
services  and  privileges  to  secure  the 
traffic  of  the  public  and  good  will  of 
shippers.  When  not  in  contravention  of 
law  these  matters  generally  are  beyond 
the  Commission's  control.  In  Re  Wharf- 
age Charges  at  Galveston,  23  I.  C.  C. 
535,  544. 

(dd)  The  Commission  has  no  juris- 
diction to  say  what  shall  be  done,  as  a 
matter  of  public  policy,  except  in  so  far 
as  the  public  will  must  always  be  con- 
sidered in  exercising  its  authority  under 
the  Act.  Its  duty  with  respect  to  rates 
is  to  inquire  whether  they  are  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  requirements  of  the 
Act.  Albree  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I. 
C.  C.  303,  319. 

(e)  The  discharge  by  the  Commis- 
sion of  its  duty  of  control  over  rates, 
regulations  and  practices  of  carriers  nec- 
essarily involves  consideration  of  the 
value  of  service  given  to  the  shipper  as 
well  as  the  cost  and  value  of  the  serv- 
ice furnished  by  the  carrier.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances on  Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I  C.  C. 
604,  613. 

(ee)  The  contention  that  there  exists 
no  power  anywhere  to  let  a  shipper  into 
a  market  by  advancing  the  rate  to  an- 
other shipper  does  not  appear  to  be 
sound.  Boileau  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  640,  654. 

'  (f)  The  Commission  does  not  sit  as 
a  supreme  traffic  manager  for  the  rail- 
roads of  the  country.  Consideration  of 
the  policy  which  they  may  pursue  is  not 
a  matter  delegated  to  it  so  long  as  such 
policy  does  not  infringe  upon  the  prohi- 
bitions of  the  law.  In  Re  Advances  on 
Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C.  604,  612. 

(ff)  By  section  15  of  the  amended  Act 
the  Commission  has  power  to  limit  and 
prescribe  the  amount  that  a  carrier  may 
pay  a  shipper  for  the  performance  of  a 
part  of  the  carrier's  duty  and  service  in 
connection  with  the  transportation  of  his 
freight.  Sterling  &  Son  v.  M.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  451,  454. 

(g)  The  fact  that  complainant  has  not 
made  a  shipment  and  possibly  may  not 
be  able  to  make  a  shipment  for  two 
years  is  no  ground  for  dismissing  a  com- 


plaint requesting  the  establishment  of 
reasonable  rates  on  ore  from  ore  lands 
owned  by  complainant  on  the  line  of  de- 
fendant, but  the  Commission  has  juris- 
diction to  consider  it,  and  require  the 
establishment  of  such  rates  as  it  deems 
reasonable  and  non-discriminatory.  Lum 
v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C  558,  561. 

(gg)  The  Commission's  jurisdiction,  in 
a  general  sense,  extends  only  to  rela- 
tions between  the  carrier  and  passenger 
and  carrier  and  shipper.  Southwestern 
Produce  Distributers  v.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
L   C.    C.   458,  461. 

(h)  While  it  has  long  been  the  ten- 
dency of  courts,  in  the  interest  of  jus- 
tice, to  enlarge  their  jurisdiction  by  con- 
struction in  cases  of  reasonable  doubt, 
a  similar  course  on  the  part  of  an  ad- 
ministrative and  quasi-legislative  body, 
such  as  the  Commission,  would  be  a 
questionable  propriety.  Being  a  special 
tribunal,  it  ought  not  in  any  event  to 
enlarge  its  territorial  jurisdiction  by  in- 
tendment, but  ought  to  exercise  its  pow- 
ers  only  under  the  clearly  expressed  au- 
thority of  the  statute.  In  Re  Jurisdic- 
tion in  Alaska,  19  I.  C.  C.  81,  93. 

(i)  Section  15  is  the  dominating  and  ^ 
controlling  expression  of  the  real  object 
and  meaning  of  the  Act.  It  makes  the 
Commission  a  special  expert  body  to  deal 
with  rates  and  practices  affecting  rates, 
not  a  body  to  take  the  place  of  courts. 
Joynes  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
361,  369. 

(j)  The  general  rule  that  a  tribunal, 
whose  authority  is  invoked  by  a  com- 
plaint filed  before  it,  must  determine 
whether  the  subject  matter  is  within  its 
jurisdiction  before  it  may  consider  the 
merits  of  the  controversy,  does  not  in 
all  cases  necessarily  control  an  adminis- 
trative  body  like  the  Commission.  Snook 
V.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  17  L  C.  C.  375,  376. 

(jj)  The  Commission  has  jurisdiction 
whenever  the  unreasonableness  of  the 
rate  is  in  issue.  Porter  v.  St.  L.  &  S. 
F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  1,  5. 

(k)  Section  8  of  the  Act  restricts  the 
Commission's  authority  to  award  dam- 
ages to  cases  in  which  the  carrier  may 
be  liable  under  the  Act  only.  Blume  & 
Co.  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
53,  55. 

(1)  No  holding  of  the  Commission  can 
render  lawful  that  which  is  of  itself  un- 
lawful. Nebraska-Iowa  Grain  Co.  v.  U.  P. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  90,  94. 


428 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION,  §1  (m)— (v) 


(m)  Under  section  16  of  the  Act,  pro- 
viding for  a  trial  de  novo  before  a  court 
and  jury  whenever  carriers  refuse  to 
obey  an  order  of  the  Commission  for  the 
payment  of  money,  and  making  at  such 
trial  the  findings  and  order  of  the  Com- 
mission prima  facie  evidence  of  the  facts 
therein  stated,  the  Commission  has  juris- 
diction, without  regard  to  the  amount  in 
controversy,  to  award  damages  whenever 
they  arise  under  the  Act,  except  in  those 
cases  where  the  Act  itself  names  an- 
other forum.  Washer  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  147,  155. 

(n)  The  Commission,  in  passing  upon 
the  reasonableness  or  unreasonableness 
of  a  rate,  acts  as  an  administrative  body 
having  quasi  judicial  functions;  when  it 
determines  what  the  rate  should  have 
been  and  shall  be  in  the  future  it  exer- 
cises certain  legislative  functions;  when 
it  computes  the  damages  or  reparation 
due  the  shipper  by  reason  of  the  enforce- 
ment and  collection  of  a  rate  unreason- 
able to  the  extent  that  it  exceeds  a  rate 
which  is  declared  to  be  reasonable,  there 
is  a  mere  mathematical  determination  of 
the  damages  the  shipper  should  receive. 
Washer  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  147,  15o. 

(o)  In  matters  of  jurisdiction  and  of 
undue  preference,  prejudice  or  disad- 
vantage the  services  of  a  jury  may  be 
necessary  in  determining  damages,  and 
although  it  may  be  proper  for  the  Com- 
mission to  award  money  damages  the 
proofs  to  support  such  awards  should  be 
very  clear  and  exact  and  free  from  sur- 
mise and  conjecture.  Washer  Grain  Co. 
V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C  147;  157. 

(p)  The  Commission  has  jurisdiction, 
without  regard  to  the  amount  in  contro- 
versy, to  award  damages  whenever  they 
arise  under  the  Act,  excepting  in  those 
cases  where  the  Act  itself  names  an- 
other forum.  Washer  Grain  Co.  v  M.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  147,  155. 

(pp)  The  Commission,  as  an  admin- 
istrative body  having  quasi  judicial 
power,  has  no  authority  whatever  under 
section  10,  as  such  section  is  directed 
solely  to  court  procedure.  Washer  Grain 
Co.  V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  147,  153. 

(q)  The  power  of  the  Commission  to 
award  damages  is  limited  to  such  cases 
as  arise  out  of  a  violation  of  the  Act. 
Woodward  &  Dickerson  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  170.  172. 


(qq)  It  is  the  duty  of  the  Commission 
to  determine  a  question  of  relative  rates 
on  coal  as  between  competing  producing 
districts  upon  a  basis  which  will  permit 
them  to  compete  in  common  markets 
and  under  circumstances  to  which  their 
location  and  conditions  of  production 
fairly  entitle  them  with  respect  of  their 
relation  one  to  another.  Black  Moun- 
tain Coal  Land  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.  C.  286,  295. 

(r)  The  Commission  has  authority  to 
pass  upon  questions  as  to  whether  the 
rates,  charges  and  rules  set  forth  in  a 
tariff  schedule  filed  with  the  Commission 
are  unjust  or  unreasonable  or  discrim- 
inatory, preferential  or  prejudicial,  and 
to  award  reparation  or  damages  for  vio- 
lations of  the  Act,  and  also  to  prescribe 
what  shall  be  a  reasonable  rate  for  the 
future,  and  when  a  rate  has  been  found 
and  determined  to  be  unreasonable  and 
unjust,  and  a  just  and  reasonable  rate 
for  the  future  has  been  established,  to 
make  reparation  tor  any  such  damages 
as  may  have  been  caused  thereby.  Morse 
Produce  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  334,  337. 

(s)  Complainant's  suggestion  that  the 
flour-milling  industry  of  this  country  can 
be  fostered  by  an  order  requiring  car- 
riers to  the  seaboard  to  maintain  lower 
rates  on  flour  than  on  wheat  involves  a 
matter  of  national  policy  beyond  the 
authority  of  the  Commission  to  adopt. 
Bulte  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  351,  364. 

(t)  The  Commission  is  not  concluded 
by  the  form,  but  looks  to  the  substance 
of  the  relations  between  corporations 
engaged  in  interstate  commerce.  Eichen- 
berg  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  250,  266. 

(u)  The  Commission  has  jurisdiction 
to  .prescribe  maximum  rates.  National 
Petroleum  Ass'n  v.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  272,  281. 

(v)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission is  given  jurisdiction  to  hear  com- 
plaints in  regard  to  rates,  rebates  and 
the  like,  and  the  language  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act  in  reference  to 
complaints  to  the  Commission  must  be 
construed  as  relating  to  those  subjects 
which  are  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Commission.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott, 
133  Ky.  724,  730,  118  S.  W.  990. 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION,   §2    (a)— (j) 


429 


II.     PRIMARY  JURISDICTION. 
§2.     In  General. 

See  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §33  (a); 
Commerce  Court,  §1  (a);  Courts, 
§1  (J),  §7,  §9  (e),  (m),  §11  (a),  (d), 
(e),  (h),  (i),  (j),  (p),  (r),  (s),  (V), 
(y)»  (z)»  (aa).  (cc);  Demurrage,  §1 
(f);  Undercharges,  §3  (c). 

(a)  An  interstate  carrier  refused  to 
accept  shipments  of  liquor  in  Indiana 
consigned  to  destinations  in  prohibition 
counties  in  Kentucky,  HELD,  a  bill  in 
equity  was  properly  filed  in  the  courts 
to  enjoin  the  carriers  from  refusing  to 
accept  such  shipments  without  first  re- 
sorting to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission, since  the  question  involved  was 
the  validity  of  the  prohibition  law,  over 
which  the  Commission  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion, and  did  not  present  an  administra- 
tive question  within  the  scope  of  its 
powers.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  v.  Cook  Brewing 
Co.,  223  U.  S.  70,  83,  32  Sup.  Ct.  189,  56 
L.  ed.  355. 

(b)  By  the  enactment  of  the  amend- 
ments of  1906  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
courts  has  been  materially  restricted, 
and  the  primary  jurisdiction  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission,  particularly 
under  section  10  of  the  Act  of  1889,  has 
been  considerably  extended.  Langdon 
v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  186  Fed.  237,  239. 

(c)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission alone  has  original  jurisdiction  to 
determine  whether  an  existing  rate 
schedule,  or  an  existing  regulation  or 
practice  affecting  rates,  or  an  existing 
regulation  or  practice  of  any  other  kind 
affecting  matters  sought  to  be  regulated 
by  the  Act,  is  unjust  or  u^ireasonable,  or 
unjustly  discriminatory,  or  unduly  pref- 
erential. Or  prejudicial,  and  the  courts 
cannot  by  mandamus,  injunction  or  other- 
wise control  or  modify  any  order  of  the 
Commission  made  by  it  in  the  due  per- 
formance of  its  merely  administrative 
functions.  Morrisdale  Coal  Co.  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.,  183  Fed.  929,  936. 

(d)  Where  the  practice  of  the  car- 
rier in  granting  unlawful  rebates  to  a 
shipper's  competitors  is  involved  and 
affects  not  only  the  plaintiff  shipper  but 
other  shippers  in  the  same  region,  such 
regulation  or  practice  is  one  affecting 
rates  and  must  be  first  brought  before 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 
The  U.  S.  Circuit  Court  has  no  original 
jurisdiction,  and  this  despite  the  fact 
that  the  practices  complained  of  may 
have  ceased.  Mitchell  Coal  &  Coke  Co. 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  183  Fed.  908,  909. 


(e)  The  jurisdiction  of  the  Commis-  -^' 
sion  is  primary  in  matters  of  unjust  dis- 
crimination, undue  or  unreasonable  pref- 
erence or  advantage,  undue  or  unrea- 
sonable prejudice  or  disadvantage,  and 
generally  whenever  the  Commission  may 
order  the  carrier  to  cease  and  desist 
from  violations  of  the  Act,  Washer  Grain 
Co.  V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  147,  156. 

(f)  Relief  from  excessive  freight  ^ 
charges  upon  interstate  shipments,  where 
the  charges  are  made  according  to  estab- 
lished rates  fixed  and  promulgated  as 
required  by  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act,  must  be  sought  through  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission.  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  The  Superior  Refining 
Co.,  83  Kan.   732,  734,  112  P.  604. 

(g)  Where    the    rate    charged    for    a    ^ 
through   interstate    shipment   is    the   ag- 
gregate of  the  local   rates  on  the  lines 

of  the  initial  and  connecting  carriers, 
and  where  the  connecting  line  has  pre- 
viously adopted  and  filed  with  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  a  tariff 
under  which  its  proportion  of  the  charge 
on  the  through  shipment  is  collected, 
and  there  is  a  claim  by  the  shipper  that 
the  charge  made  is  excessive,  unreason- 
able and  unjust,  his  redress  must  be 
through  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission and  cannot  be  obtained  in  a 
state  court.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  New 
Era  Milling  Co.,  80  Kan.  141,  144,  101  P. 
1011. 

(h)  Under  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act 
as  amended  a  shipper  cannot  sue  in  a 
state  court  to  recover  excessive  demur- 
rage charges  exacted  of  him  on  an  inter- 
state shipment,  but  must  first  resort  to 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission, 
which  has  exclusive  original  jurisdiction 
over  such  shipment.  Starks  Co.  v.  Grand 
Rapids  &  I.  Ry.  Co.  (Mich.,  1911),  131 
N.  W.  143,  145. 

(i)  In  an  action  in  a  state  court  by  a 
carrier  to  recover  demurrage,  based  on 
a  schedule  of  demurrage  charges  duly 
published  and  filed  with  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission,  the  court  has  no 
jurisdiction  to  determine  the  reason- 
ableness of  the  charges,  as  original 
jurisdiction  with  respect  thereto  is 
vested  in  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission. Erie  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wanaque 
Lumber  Co.,  75  N.  J.  L,  878,  881,  69  A. 
1G8. 

(j)  The  opinions  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce    Commission   interpreting  the 


430 


INTERSTATE   COMMERCE  COMMISSION,  §2    (k)— §3    (c) 


Interstate  Commerce  Act  are  entitled 
to  great  respect  in  the  courts.  Green- 
wald  V.  Weir,  130  Api>.  Div.  696,  701,  li5 
N.  Y.  Supp.  311. 

(k)  In  a  suit  by  a  carrier  to  recover 
the  published  interstate  rate  .the  defend- 
ant cannot  set  up  as  a  valid  plea  the 
unreasonableness  of  such  rate,  since 
original  jurisdiction  over  the  question 
of  reasonableness  in  establishing  inter- 
state rat€s  is  vested  with  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  La  Due,  128  App.  Div.  594,  596, 
112  N.  Y.  Supp.  964. 

(I)  A  United  States  circuit  court  has 
no  jurisdiction  to  enjoin  the  putting  into 
effect  of  a  schedule  of  interstate  rates 
without  prior  application  to  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission,  which  body  is 
vested  with  exclusive  jurisdiction  over 
questions  of  the  reasonableness  of  inter- 
state rates  under  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Act  as  amended  June  29,  190'6. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Foster  Lumber 
Co.  (Okla.,  1911),  122  P.  139. 

(mn)  The  question  of  the  reasonable- 
ness of  an  interstate  rate,  lawfully  p^-^h- 
lished,  can  be  heard,  in  the  first  instance 
at  least,  only  before  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission.  Oregon  R.  &  Nav. 
Co.v.  Coolidge  (Ore.,  1911),  116  P.  03,  95. 

(o)  The  United  States  courts  and  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  have 
exclusive  jurisdiction  of  actions  based 
upon  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  or 
brought  to  enforce  a  right  created  by 
tbe  Act.  Hardaway  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co. 
(S.  C,  1912),  73  S.  E.  1020,  1023. 

(p)  Under  the  provisions  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  no  court  has 
any  power,  in  the  first  instance,  to  in- 
quire into  the  reasonableness  of  any 
rate  that  has  been  regularly  established 
by  a  railway  company  and  filed  with  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  and 
published  by  posting;  and  the  question 
of  whether  or  not  a  rate  is  reasonable 
and  just  is  one  to  be  determined,  in  the 
first  instance,  in  a  proper  proceeding  be- 
fore the  Commission.  Great  Northern 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Loonan  Lumber  Co.  (S.  D., 
1910),  125  N.  W.  644,  645. 

(q)  Where  the  published  interstate 
rate  is  collected  and  an  action  is  brought 
in  a  state  court  to  recover  for  the  ex- 
cess exacted  above  a  sum  alleged  to 
be  a  reasonable  charge,  the  only  evidence 
that  will   justify   the   action   is   a   prior 


judgment  of  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  holding  the  rate  complained 
of  to  be  unreasonable.  Robinson  v.  B. 
&  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  64  W.  Va.  406,  410,  63 
S.  E.  323. 

-  (r)  Where  an  interstate  rate  has  been 
duly  published  and  filed  and  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  has  made 
no  ruling  holding  the  same  to  be  un- 
reasonable, a  shipper  cannot,  upon  the 
exaction  of  such  rate,  sue  in  a  state 
court  to  recover  the  excess  collected 
above  the  sum  claimed  to  be  a  reason- 
able charge.  Robinson  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  64  W.  Va.  406,  409,  63  S.  E.  323. 

§3.     Finality  of  Findings. 

See  Allowances,  §3;  Courts,  §2,  §9  (a); 
Forwarders,  I  (b)  (c),  (d);  Proced- 
ure Before  Commission,  §11;  Rea- 
sonableness of   Rates,   §1    (f),    (I). 

(a)  The  orders  of  the  Commission  are 
final  unless  (1)  beyond  the  power  which 
it  can  constitutionally  exercise;  -or  (2) 
beyond  its  statutory  power;  or  (3)  based 
upon  a  mistake  of  law.  I.  C.  C.  v.  U.  P. 
R.  R.  Co.,  222  U.  S.  541,  547,  32  Sup.  Ct. 
108,  56  L.  ed.  308. 

(b)  In  decisions  of  the  Commission 
questions  of  fact  may  be  involved  in  the 
determination  of  questions  of  law,  so  that 
an  order,  regular  on  its  face,  may  be 
set  aside  if  it  appears  that  the  rate  is 
so  low  as  to  be  confiscatory  and  in  vio- 
lation of  the  constitutional  prohibition 
against  taking  property  without  due 
process  of  law;  or  if  the  Commission 
acts  so  arbitrarily  and  unjustly  as  to  fix 
rates  contrary  to  evidence  or  without 
evidence  to  support  it;  or  if  the  authority 
therein  involved  has  been  exercised  in 
such  an  unreasonable  manner  as  to  cause 
it  to  be  within  the  elementary  rule  that 
the  substance,  and  not  the  shadow,  de- 
termines the  validity  of  the  exercise  of 
txie  power.  I.  C.  C.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.,  222 
U.  S.  541,  547,  32  Sup.  Ct.  108,  56  L. 
ed.  308. 

(c)  The  Supreme  Court  cannot  as- 
sume that  an  order  of  the  Commission 
reducing  rates  was  based  upon  the  power 
conferred  upon  it  to  prescribe  reasonable 
rates  rather  than  upon  a  basis  beyond 
the  scope  of  its  authority,  where  so  to 
assume  would  make  the  order  entered 
repugnant  to  the  statute  as  being  un- 
justly discriminatory  against  a  certain 
locality.  S.  P.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  219  U.  S. 
433,  450,  31  Sup.  Ct.  288,  55  L.  ed.  283. 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION,  §3   (d)— §9   (a) 


431 


(d)  It  is  not  for  the  Commerce  Court 
to  say  whether  the  Commission  has  prop- 
erly attached  great  or  little  weight  to 
evidence  adduced  upon  a  given  point  or 
whether  the  conclusion  reached  by  the 
Commission  upon  testimony  as  to  facts 
alone  shows  a  mistake  as  to  some  partic- 
ular fact  not  essential  or  vital  to  the 
proceeding,  or  an  inadvertency,  or  is  not 
such  a  conclusion  as  the  Commerce  Court 
might  have  reached.  If  the  particular 
matter  in  issue  and  inquired  into  was 
one  of  fact  and  a  full  hearing  was  af- 
forded and  the  conclusion  reached  is 
supported  by  substantial  evidence,  it  will 
not  be  nullified  by  the  courts.  N.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  195  Fed.  953,  959. 

(e)  By  the  Hepburn  amendment  the 
rate-making  power  was  conferred  to  a 
certain  extent  upon  the  Commission.  To- 
day its  conclusions  of  fact  in  administer- 
ing the  first,  third  and  apparently  the 
second  sections  are  conclusive.  City  of 
Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
400,  412. 

(f)  Within  broad  lines  of  discretion 
the  courts  regard  the  Commission's  con- 
clusions on  questions  of  fact  as  final. 
In  Re  Advances  of  Rates — Western  Case, 
20  I.  C.  C.  307,  317. 

(g)  The  courts  are  not  competent  to 
determine  questions  of  fact  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Commission  as  against 
the  Commission  after  the  latter,  upon 
complaint  and  answer,  has  investigated 
such  questions  and  found  thereon.  Gund 
&  Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
364,  366. 

III.     OVER    PROCEDURE. 

§4.     Examiners. 

(a)  Under  sections  12  and  14,  of 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  the  Com- 
mission through  examiners  may  make 
Investigations  where  the  report  of  the 
carrier  is  not  accurate  or  truthful,  or 
the  Information  furnished  is  not  suffi- 
ciently complete  to  enable  the  Commis- 
sion to  perform  its  duty,  and  may  in- 
quire into  the  intrastate  business  of  the 
carriers  where  such  inquiry  is  essential 
to  know  the  true  condition  of  inter- 
etate  business.  Goodrich  Transit  Co.  v. 
I.   C.   C,   190  Fed.  943,  965. 

§5.     Orders. 

See   Allowances,   §3. 
(a)     The    Commission    has    complete 
power  to  suspend  or  modify  its  orders. 


Loftus  V.  Pullman  Co.,  19  I.  C.   C.  102, 
104. 

(b)  Orders  with  respect  to  rates  are 
not  conclusive  beyond  a  period  of  two 
years.  National  Hay  Ass'n  v.  M.  C. 
R.   R.   Co.,    19   I.   C.   C.    34,    37. 

§6.     Witnesses. 

(a)  The  Commission  has  no  author- 
ity under  the  Act  as  amended  to  re- 
quire witnesses  to  answer  any  question 
it  chooses  to  ask  in  an  investigation 
Instituted  by  it  for  the  purpose  of  dis- 
covering any  facts  tending  to  defeat 
the  purposes  of  the  Act,  or  for  the 
purpose  of  recommending  additional  leg- 
islation relating  to  the  regulation  of 
commerce  that  it  may  conceive  to  be 
within  the  power  of  Congress  to  enact; 
but  the  purposes  for  which  it  may  exact 
evidence  embrace  only  complaints  for 
violations  of  the  Act  and  investiga- 
tions by  it  upon  matters  that  might 
have  been  made  the  object  of  com- 
plaint. (Day,  Harlan  and  McKenna,  J  J., 
dissenting.)  Harriman  v.  I.  C.  C,  211 
U.  S.  407,  419,  29  Sup.  Ct.  115,  53  L.  ed. 
253. 

IV.  OVER  RAILROADS. 
§7.     Capitalization. 

See  Evidence,  §7;  Express  Compa- 
nies, §24;  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§5. 

(a)  The  Commission  is  without  con- 
trol over  capitalization.  It  cannot  place 
limitations  upon  the  purposes  for  which 
stocks  or  bonds  may  be  issued,  nor 
designate  what  property  they  shall  rep- 
resent. Advances  in  Rates — Western 
Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307,  334. 
•  (b)  The  Commission  has  no  juris- 
diction over  stock  and  ,bond  issues  of 
corporations  engaged  in  interstate  com- 
merce. Morgan  Grain  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L. 
R.   R.    Co.,    19   I.    C.   C.    460,   471. 

§8.     Physical    Valuation. 

See  Evidence,  §49  (aa). 
(a)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission has  no  authority  to  make  ^ 
physical  valuation  of  a  carrier.  In  Re 
Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20 
I.  C.  C.  243,  256. 

V.  OVER   RATES. 

§9.     Interstate. 

See  Commerce  Court,  §4. 
(a)     In  Western   Oregon  L.  M.  A.  v. 
S.    P.    Co.,    14    I.    C.    C.    61,    the    Com- 


432 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION,  §9   (b)— (j) 


mission  ordered  a  reduction  of  the  rate 
of  $5  per  ton  upon  rougli  green  fir 
lumber  and  laths  from  points  in  the 
Willamette  Valley  to  San  Francisco  to 
$3.40.  Its  opinion  indicated  that  the  car- 
riers formerly  maintained  a  lower  rate; 
that  the  lumber  industry  had  been  built 
up  upon  those  rates;  and  that  it  was 
inequitable  to  the  shippers  for  carriers 
in  view  of  these  facts  to  raise  the  rate 
to  $5.  It  did  not  find,  however,  that 
the  rate  was  unreasonable  but  based 
its  decisions  on  the  foregoing  consid- 
erations. HELD,  the  Commission  ex- 
ceeded its  jurisdiction  in  assuming  that 
it  had  power  to  substitute  a  new  rate 
for  a  just  and  reasonable  rate  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  a  wise  policy  to 
do  so,  or  that  the  railroad  had  so 
conducted  itself  as  to  be  estopped  in 
the  future  from  being  entitled  to  re- 
ceive a  just  and  reasonable  compensa- 
tion for  the  service  rendered.  S.  P. 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  219  U.  S.  433,  443,  31 
Sup.  Co.  288,  55  L.  ed.  283. 

(b)  A  decision  as  to  reasonableness 
of  rates  is  peculiarly  within  the  prov- 
ince of  the  Commission  to  make,  and 
its  findings  are  fortified  by  presump- 
tions of  truth.  I.  C.  C.  V.  Chi.  R.  I. 
&  P.  Ry.,  218  U.  S.  88,  110,  30  Sup. 
Ct.    651,    54   L.   ed.,   946. 

(c)  Not  only  is  the  Commission 
vested  with  a  discretion  in  determin- 
ing the  reasonableness  of  rates  which 
cannot  be  disturbed  but  it  is  entitled 
to  select  the  testimony  which  it  will 
believe  and  rely  upon  according  as  it 
addresses  itself  to  the  discriminating 
judgment  of  the  Commission.  L.  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  195  Fed.  541, 
564. 

(d)  The  Commission  may  not  con- 
demn an  existing  rate  whenever  it  is 
of  the  opinion  that  the  same  is  un- 
just and  unreasonable  merely  upon  the 
expert  knowledge  and  accumulated  ex- 
perience of  its  members,  but  may  do 
so  only  upon  a  full  hearing  giving  an 
opportunity  to  the  carrier  to  be  heard 
and  upon  investigation  by  the  Com- 
mission itself  of  the  lawfulness  of  the 
rate  in  question.  A.  C,  L.  R.  R,  Co. 
V.   I.    C.   C,    194   Fed.    449,    457. 

(e)  The  Commission,  in  an  investi- 
gation of  rates,  may  bring  to  the  solu- 
tion of  the  question  the  accumulated 
experience  and  expert  knowledge  of 
its   members,  and  it  is  its  duty  to  do 


so,  but  before  an  existing  rate  may  be 
condemned  there  must  be  a  finding  of 
some  sort  that  it  is  unjust  and  unrea- 
sonable, and  this  finding  must  be  based 
upon  evidence  of  which  the  carrier  is 
apprised  so  that  it  may  meet  the  case 
brought  against  it  if  it  so  desires.  A. 
C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  194  Fed. 
449,   457. 

(f)  The  courts  will  not  interfere 
with  the  action  of  the  Commission  in 
fixing  rates  unless  it  clearly  appears 
that  the  Commission  went  beyond  its 
authority  and  the  rates  established  in- 
juriously affected  some  substantial  right 
of  the  carrier — are  confiscatory,  to  use 
that  term  in  its  broad  sense.  Whether 
the  rates  are  so  or  not  is  the  test  of 
their  reasonableness.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.   V.   I.   C.   C,   184  Fed.   118,   125. 

(g)  Congress  did  not  in  the  Act  and 
its  amendments  intend  to  vest  admin- 
istrative authority  in  the  courts  in  the 
matter  of  fixing  rates  but  on  the  con- 
trary committed  the  power  to  and 
imposed  the  duty  to  ascertain  facts  and 
determine  what  is  reasonable  in  regard 
to  rates  and  charges  in  view  of  such 
facts  on  the  Commission.  L.  &  N.  R. 
R.   Co.  V.  I.   C.   C,   184  Fed.   118,  124. 

(h)  The  fixing  of  the  rates  to  be 
charged  by  public  service  corporations 
is  •  a  legislative  function,  and  when 
Congress  in  the  Act  as  amended  June 
29,  1906,  confers  upon  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  the  power  to 
determine  what  are  and  should  be 
reasonable  rates  to  be  charged  by  the 
carriers  of  interstate  commerce,  its 
action  in  the  premises  is  conclusive  on 
the  courts,  subject  to  the  inhibition  of 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
which  protects  such  companies  against 
confiscatory  rates.  S.  P.  Co.  v.  I.  C. 
C,    177    Fed.    963,    964. 

(i)  The  courts  have  no  power  to  fix 
railroad  rates,  such  power  being  vested 
in  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion, and  where  the  Commission  acting 
in  its  administrative  capacity  establishes 
certain  rates  the  courts  will  not  inter- 
fere unless  some  legal,  constitutional  or 
natural  right  has  been  violated.  Phila. 
&  R.  Ry.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  174  Fed.  687,  688. 

(j)  Under  sections  12  and  15  of  the 
Act  as  amended  by  the  Hepburn  Act  of 
June  29,  1906,  the  Commission  has  au- 
thority to  order  a  railroad  to  so  adjust 
its    rates    as    to    prevent   discrimination 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION,  §9   (k)— (q) 


433 


against  a  shipper  without  prescribing 
th€  new  rates  to  be  applied  or  specifying 
how  the  cliarges  should  be  equalized. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  168 
Fed.  131,  136. 

(k)  The  rates  on  live  stock  to  the 
terminal  of  defendant  carriers  at  Chi- 
cago was  published  separately  from 
the  terminal  charges  for  the  haul  from 
the  terminal  to  the  Union  Stock  Yards. 
The  terminal  railroad  owned  by  the 
Union  Stock  Yards  &  Transit  Co. 
charged  defendants  for  the  haul  over  its 
tracks.  The  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission, in  12  I.  C.  C  507,  found  the  ter- 
minal charge  of  $2  excessive  and  or- 
dered it  reduced  to  $1,  but  based  its 
order  on  the  finding,  not  that  the  ter- 
minal charge  was  unreasonable  in  itself, 
but  that  when  combined  with  the  gen- 
eral transportation  rate,  produced  on 
the  whole  an  unreasonable  charge  for 
the  entire  haul.  HELD,  not  having 
found  the  terminal  charge  unreasonable, 
the  Commission  had  no  authority  to 
order  it  reduced  in  order  to  correct  the 
total  transportation  charges.  Stickney 
v.  I.  C.  C,  164  Fed.  638,  644. 

(I)  Power  to  determine  and  pre- 
scribe what  are  just  and  reasonable 
maximum  rates  to  be  charged  in  inter- 
state commerce  is,  in  a  limited  way,  con- 
ferred upon  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  by  existing  statute  laws; 
and  as  the  Commision  acts  only  as  a 
legislative  or  administrative  board,  and 
not  judicially,  its  determination  or  ac- 
tion does  not,  and  cannot  preclude 
judicial  inquiry  into  the  justness  and 
reasonableness  of  the  rates,  within  the 
meaning  of  the  constitutional  guaranty, 
for  that  is  a  judicial  question.  M.  K.  & 
T.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  164  Fed.  645,  648. 

(II)  The  Commission,  under  section 
15,  has  full  authority  over  interstate  rates 
and  whatever  regulations  or  practices 
enter  into  these  rates  and  determine  their 
value  and  availability.  In  Re  Trans- 
portation of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23 
I.   C.   C.   151,   173. 

(m)  The  Commission  is  expressly 
empowered  to  determine  the  reasonable- 
ness of  any  part  or  the  aggregate  of 
charges  for  interstate  transportation  and 
to  establish  joint  rates.  Sunderland 
Bros.  Co.  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  259,  261. 

(mm)  The  Commission  has  power  to 
determine   the   reasonableness   of   differ- 


ences in  rates  on  various  commodities. 
In  Re  Advances  of  Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22 
I.  C.  C.  604,  623. 

(n)  Defendants  filed  tariffs  increas- 
ing all  the  class  rates  and  about  half  of 
the  commodity  rates  in  Official  Classifi- 
cation territory.  Justification  presented 
by  the  carriers  was  the  want  of  addi- 
tional revenue,  and  the  question  pre- 
sented to  the  Commission  was  whether 
defendants  were  justified  in  laying  the 
additional  transportation  burden  upon 
the  public  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
greater  net  revenue.  HELD,  strictly 
speaking  the  Commission  has  no  juris- 
diction to  hear  and  determine  that  ques- 
tion; that  it  has  no  authority  as  such  to 
say  what  amount  the  defendants  shall 
earn,  nor  to  establish  a  schedule  of 
rates  which  will  permit  them  to  earn 
that  amount.  The  authority  of  the  Com- 
mission is  limited  to  inquiring  into  the 
reasonableness  of  a  particular  rate  or 
rates  and  establishing  that  rate  or  prac- 
tice which  is  found  lawful,  in  place  of 
the  one  condemned  as  unlawful.  In  Re 
Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I. 
C.  C.  243,  248. 

(o)  The  Commission  alone  has  the 
power  to  determine  the  reasonableness 
of  a  rate.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — 
Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307,  314. 

(p)  The  Commission  is  not  a  court 
of  law.  Its  function  is  to  apply  the  man- 
datory and  restrictive  provisions  of  the 
Act  to  stated  conditions  of  fact.  It 
must  regard  the  problems  presented  from 
as  many  standpoints  as  there  are  pub-' 
lie  interests  involved.  The  making  of  a 
rate  is  in  ultimate  analysis,  the  exercise 
of  a  taxing  power  on  commerce.  The 
reasonableness  of  a  rate  is  to  be  deter- 
mined by  no  mere  mathematical  calcu- 
lation, though  figures  of  cost  and  reve- 
nue must  play  a  not  inconsiderable 
part  in  arriving  at  a  final  judgment.  The 
unrestricted  power  to  make  rates,  how- 
ever, should  not  rest  in  the  hands  of 
those  whose  tendency  must  be  by  reason 
of  human  nature  to  exact  to  the  limit 
the  highest  return  that  can  be  procured. 
In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — Western  Case, 
20  L  C.  C.  307,  315. 

(q)  It  is  doubtless  true  that  in  its  con- 
trol over  the  charges  which  railroads 
may  make,  the  Commission  exercises  a 
power  so  extensive  as  to  justify  the 
broadest  consideration  of  the  economic 
and   financial  effects  of  its  orders.     By 


434 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION,  §9   (r)— (ee) 


its  decisions  in  the  Abilene  Cotton  Oil 
case,  204  U.  S.  426,  and  in  the  Illinois 
Central  case,  215  U.  S.  452,  the  Supreme 
Court  has  erected  the  Commission  into 
what  has  been  termed  "an  economic 
court,"  or  to  give  it  a  more  common- 
place definition,  but  one  of  stricter  legal 
analogy,  a  select  jury  to  pass  upon  the 
reasonableness  and  justness  of  railroad 
rates,  rules  and  practices.  Within  broad 
lines  of  discretion  the  courts  regard  the 
conclusions  of  the  Commission  on  ques- 
tions of  fact  as  final.  There  is  an  appeal 
upon  questions  of  law  by  the  carriers  to 
the  courts,  but  unless  a  constitutional 
guaranty  is  violated  the  order  of  the 
Commission  is  final,  provided,  of  course, 
the  Commission  does  not  overstep  the 
jurisdictional  limits  placed  upon  it  by 
the  statute.  And  as  to  the  shipper  this 
tribunal  is  his  one  and  only  resort 
against  injustice.  In  Re  Advances  in 
Rates — ^Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307,  317. 

(r)  The  Commission  has  jurisdiction 
to  determine  the  reasonableness  of  an 
unpublished  rate  and  award  reparation. 
Goldenberg  v.  Clyde  S.  S.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
527,  528;  Maxwell  v.  W.  F.  &  N.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  197,  198;  Memphis  Freight 
Bureau  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  90. 

(s)  Since  the  effective  date  of  the 
Hepburn  Act,  the  Commission  has  had 
authority  to  fix  rates  for  the  future.  Na- 
tional Hay  Ass'n  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  34,  37;  Receivers'  &  Shippers' 
Ass'n  of  Cincinnati  v.  C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  440,  443. 

(t)  The  Commission  may  prescribe 
rates  for  the  future.  Williams  v.  Wells, 
Fargo  &  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  17,  18. 

(u)  The  Commission  has  no  authority 
to  initiate  rates.  Williams  v.  Wells,  Fargo 
&  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  17,  18. 

(v)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission has  exclusive  jurisdiction  over 
interstate  rates,  and  is  necessarily  not 
bound  to  follow  decisions  of  state  com- 
missions. Railroad  Commission  of  Wis- 
consin V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
85,  89. 

(w)  The  Commission  has  no  power  to 
require  the  increase  of  a  rate.  Merchants' 
Cotton  Press  and  Storage  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R. 
R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  98,  102;  Kansas  City 
Transportation  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  491,  497. 

(x)  The  Act  provides  that  the  Com- 
mission may  prescribe  rates  for  a  future 


period  not  exceeding  two  years.  Pacific 
Coast  Lumber  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  y.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  465,  468. 

(y)  The  Commission  has  jurisdiction 
whenever  the  unreasonableness  of  the 
rate  is  in  issue.  Porter  v.  St.  L.  &  S. 
F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  1,  5. 

(z)  The  power  of  the  Commission  Is 
ample  to  declare  rates  and  rules  set  forth 
in  a  tariff  schedule  unjust  or  unreason- 
able ....  and  when  a  rate  has 
been  found  unreasonable,  and  a  reason- 
able rate  has  been  established,  to  award 
reparation.  Morse  Produce  Co.  v.  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  334,  337. 

(aa)  The  Commission  has  no  au- 
thority to  prescribe  a  minimum  rate. 
Kent  &  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  439,  442. 

(bb)  The  Commission  is  authorized 
to  reduce  a  rate,  or  to  modify  a  rule  or 
practice  which  affects  a  rate,  only  after 
full  hearing  upon  complaint,  and  no  or- 
der can  be  entered  by  the  Commission 
affecting  a  carrier's  rates  or  regulations 
except  after  such  carrier  has  been  given 
a  full  and  fair  opportunity  to  be  heard. 
Kindel  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.. 
15  I.  C.  C.  555,  557. 

(cc)  The  Commission  is  authorized 
under  the  law  to  condemn  an  existing 
rate  and  prescribe  a  reasonable  maximum 
rate  to  be  charged  in  the  future  only 
when,  upon  consideration  of  all  the  facts, 
circumstances  and  conditions  appearing, 
it  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  rate  com- 
plained of  is  unreasonable  or  unjust.  Mar- 
shall Oil  Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  210,  213. 

(dd)  The  Commission  has  no  au- 
thority to  fix  rates  to  be  charged  by  a 
carrier  in  the  future  operating  solely 
within  the  limits  of  the  present  state  of 
Oklahoma,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  it 
has  jurisdiction  to  award  reparation  for 
shipments  made  between  points  in  In- 
dian Territory  to  points  in  Oklahoma 
Territory  prior  to  its  formation  as  a 
state.  Haines  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
13  I.  C.  C.  214. 

(ee)  Complainant  shipped  cross  ties 
between  April  25  and  August  12,  1907, 
from  Barnett  to  McAlester,  both  located 
in  what  was  then  known  as  Indian  Terri- 
tory. The  proclamation  announcing  the 
admission  of  Oklahoma  as  a  state  was  is- 
sued November  16,  1907,  and  Barnett  and 
McAlester  are  now  located  in  the  state  of 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION,  §9   (ff)— §10   (f) 


435 


Oklahoma,  Under  section  1  of  the  Act, 
the  Commission  has  jurisdiction  over 
transportation  from  one  place  in  a  terri- 
tory to  another  place  in  the  same  terri- 
tory. HELD,  the  admission  of  the  state 
of  Oklahoma  revoked  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Commission  over  Barnett  and  Mc- 
Alester,  the  Enabling  Act  not  undertaking 
to  save  causes  pending  before  the  Com- 
mission. Complaint  dismissed  for  want 
of  jurisdiction.  (Harlan,  comm'r,  dissent- 
ing.) Hussey  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13 
I.  C.  C.  366,  368. 

(ff)  The  Act  creates  a  special  admini- 
strative tribunal  clothed  with  power  to 
hear  and  determine  causes  of  action  in- 
v^olving  a  right  which  has  long  existed 
at  common  law,  viz.,  the  right  to  re- 
cover for  an  unreasonable  transportation 
charge.  The  Act  did  not  abrogate  this 
common  law  right,  and  by  the  express 
language  of  section  22  the  remedies  al- 
ready existing  for  its  enforcement  are 
saved.  Where  the  special  remedy  is  lost 
by  a  subsequent  act  ousting  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  Commission,  this  does  not  af- 
fect the  right  of  claimant  to  pursue  his 
common  law  remedy.  Hussey  v.  C.  R.  I. 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  366,  368. 

(gg)  The  complaint  concerned  ship- 
ments of  cotton  seed  from  Prague,  Okla., 
to  Warwick,  Okla.  At  the  time  shipments 
moved  Oklahoma  was  a  territory,  and 
the  transportation  between  such  points 
was  wholly  within  that  territory.  Later 
it  was  admitted  as  a  state.  HELD,  the 
Commission  had  no  jurisdiction  to  enter- 
tain the  complaint,  since  the  provision  of 
the  amended  Act  relating  to  the  trans- 
portation of  property  "from  one  place 
in  a  territory  to  another  place  in  the 
same  territory"  expired  so  far  as  the 
territory  of  Oklahoma  was  concerned  at 
the  date  of  its  admission  into  the  Union. 
Chandler  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Ft.  Smith.  & 
Western  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  473,  474. 

(hh)  If  there  is  a  lack  of  jurisdiction, 
whether  from  absence  of  essential  facts 
or  through  want  of  power  in  the  statute, 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  Commission,  of  its 
own  motion,  to  deny  jurisdiction,  even 
when  such  a  question  is  not  otherwise 
suggested  and  without  respect  to  the  re- 
lation of  the  parties.  Chandler  Cotton 
Oil  Co.  V.  Ft.  Smith  &  Western  R.  R.  Co., 
13  L  C.  C.  473,  474. 

(ii)  Under  the  Hepburn  amendment 
the  (Commission  has  jurisdiction  over  car- 
riers engaged  in  the  transportation 
wholly  by  railroad  from  one  state  to  an- 


other, irrespective  of  "common  control, 
management  or  arrangement,"  and  the 
test  of  jurisdiction  is  not  the  arrangement 
under  which  the  freight  is  delivered,  but 
rather  the  character  of  the  transportation 
itself,  Leonard  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C. 
C.  573,  578. 

§10.     Intrastate  Rates. 

See  Interstate  Commerce,  §1  (d),  §3 
(d),  §5  (f);  Transportation,  §11 
(a),    (b). 

(a)  A  local  state  rate  that  is  part  of 
a  combination  interstate  rate  when  ap- 
plied to  interstate  commerce  is  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Commission.  Grand 
Junction  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  D.  & 
R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  115,  120. 

(b)  The  Commission  cannot  order  a 
reduction  of  intrastate  rates.  Roberts 
Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
C.  248,  249. 

(c)  The  Commission  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion over  a  shipment  moving  from  one 
point  to  another  in  the  same  state,  though 
it  was  intended  for,  and  subsequently  was 
ri  billed,  beyond  the  state.  Big  Canon 
Ranch  Co.  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  523,  526. 

(d)  The  Commission  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion over  an  intrastate  shipment.  Wells- 
Higman  Co.  v.  G.  R.  &  1.  Ry.  Co..  19  I.  C. 
C.  487,  490;  Pierce  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  & 
H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  579,  580. 

(e)  Where  cars  in  a  movement  from 
Traverse  City,  Mich.,  to  Horatio,  Ark., 
are  billed  to  Memphis,  rebilled  to  Wynne, 
Ark.,  and  there  received  by  the  shippers' 
agent  and  rebilled  to  Horatio,  the  Com- 
mission has  no  jurisdiction  over  the  rate 
from  Wynne  to  Horatio,  the  movement 
being  intrastate.  Wells-Higman  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  175, 
176. 

(f)  Complainant  shipped  cars  of 
canned  peaches  from  Oakhurst,  Ga.,  to 
himself  at  Marietta,  Ga.,  paid  the  freight 
thereon  at  Marietta  and  rebilled  the 
cars  to  Cincinnati,  O.,  and  Lexington, 
Ky.  The  rate  from  Marietta  to  the  points 
of  destination  was  27c.  Oakhurst  was 
only  4  miles  from  Marietta  and  complain- 
ant contended  that  it  should  take  the 
same  rate.  He  did  not  attack  as  unrea- 
sonable the  rates  from  Marietta  to  points 
of  destination.  HELD,  complainant  hav- 
ing voluntarily  adopted  an  intrastate 
movement  in  Georgia,  could  not  complain 
of  the  6c  charge  from  Oakhurst  to  Mari- 


436 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION,  §10  (g)— §14  (b) 


etta,  since  the  rate  being  intrastate  the 
Commission  had  no  jurisdiction  over  it. 
Dobbs  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
210,  211. 

(g)  Complainant  was  informed  by  de- 
fendant's agent  that  there  was  no  rate 
in  effect  from  Armour,  S.  D.,  to  Hettinger, 
N.  D.,  and  that  the  farthest  point  to  be 
reached  by  defendant's  line  was  Lem- 
mon,  S.  D.  Complainant  billed  the  car 
to  Lemmon  and  upon  arriving  there 
found  he  could  ship  to  Hettinger.  He 
thereupon  took  possession  of  the  car  and 
removed  a  part  of  its  contents  and  car- 
ried the  same  by  wagon  to  Hettinger. 
He  then  took  out  a  new  bill  of  lading 
and  sent  the  car  with  the  remainder  of 
its  contents  on  to  Hettinger.  HELD,  the 
movement  from  Armour  to  Lemmon  was 
intrastate  and  outside  the  Commission's 
jurisdiction.  Henley  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  382,  384. 

(h)  Complainant  at  Cincinnati,  en- 
gaged in  the  dyeing  of  cotton  fabrics 
from  southern  mills,  was  in  competition 
with  dyeing  establishments  at  Clear- 
water, S.  C,  and  Lanette,  Ala.  The  rates 
from  milling  points  in  the  state  in  which 
each  of  the  southern  dyeing  enterprises 
was  located  were  very  low  from  those 
establishments  to  Chicago,  the  result  be- 
ing that  the  total  rate  to  Chicago  from 
said  southern  milling  point  was  lower 
than  the  rates  from  that  point  to  Cin- 
cinnati plus  the  local  rates  from  Cin- 
cinnati to  Chicago.  HELD,  in  determin- 
ing the  question  whether  this  adjustment 
of  rates  unjustly  discriminated  against 
complainant,  the  Commission  had  juris- 
diction over  the  rates  from  a  milling 
point  in  a  southern  state  to  the  dyeing 
point  in  said  state,  irrespective  of  the 
fact  whether  the  state  rate  was  estab- 
lished voluntarily  by  the  carriers  or  by 
the  state  commission.  Reliance  Textile 
&  Dye  Works  v.  Sou.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
48,  54. 

§10^2-     "territorial    Rates. 

See  Supra,   §9   (dd),    (ee). 

(a)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission, prior  to  the  amendment  on 
August  29,  1906,  of  the  Act  under  which 
it  operated,  had  no  jurisdiction  to  fix 
or  adjust  charges  or  rates  on  shipments. 
the  carriage  of  which  was  wholly  with- 
in a  territory.  Ft.  Smith  &  W.  R.  Co. 
V.  Chandler  Cotton  Oil  Co.,  25  Okla.  82, 
83,  106  P.  10. 


§11.     Suspension. 

See  Advanced   Rates,  §1   (4)   (a). 

(a)  The  Commission  is  not  empowered 
to  suspend  the  operation  of  a  schedule 
after  it  has  gone  into  effect.  Rehearing 
denied.  In  Re  Investigation  of  Proposed 
Rates  on  Lumber,  21  I.  C.  C.  16,  17. 

(b)  Section  15,  as  amended  in  1910, 
confers  upon  the  Commission  authority 
to  postpone  the  effectiveness  or  to  sus- 
pend the  operation  of  any  tariff  filed  by 
an  interstate  carrier  in  which  any  new- 
rate,  fare,  charge  or  regulation  is  stated. 
Commutation  Rate  Case,  21  I.  C.  C.  428, 
429. 

§12.     Undercharges. 

See   Undercharges,   §1. 

(a)  The  Commission  is  without  au- 
thority to  enter  an  order  requiring  a 
shipper  to  make  good  an  undercharge. 
Falls  &  Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
L  C.  C.  269,  273. 

§13.     Unpublished   Rate. 
See   Evidence,   §60. 

(a)  Where  a  transportation  service 
has  been  rendered  for  which  no  tariff 
authority  whatever  exists,  and  the  ship- 
per has  paid  the  sum  claimed  by  the  car- 
rier for  that  service,  the  Commission  has 
jurisdiction  to  determine  the  reasonable 
charge  for  the  service,  and  to  order  re- 
payment of  the  amount  in  excess  thereof 
collected  by  the  carrier.  Maxwell  v.  W. 
F.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  197,  198; 
Goldenberg  v.  Clyde  S.  S.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
527,  528;  Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v  K. 
C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  90,  91,  92. 

VI.     TO  AWARD  DAMAGES. 

See   Reparation. 

§14.     In   General. 

See    Supra,    §1    (m);    Allowances,    §14 
(f),    (g);   Claims,   §1    (aa). 

(a)  Depreciation  of  real  estate  values 
and  loss  of  tenants  are  damages  over 
which  the  Commission  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion. Mattison  v.  P.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  233, 
235. 

(aa)  The  Commission  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion to  enforce  the  specific  performance  • 
of  a  contract  relating  to  switch  connec- 
tions nor  to  award  damages  for  its 
breach.  Ralston  Townsite  Co.  v.  M  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  354,  355. 

(b)  The  Commission  has  no  author- 
ity to  administer  a  remedy  in  applica- 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION,  §14  (c)— (m) 


437 


tions  for  relief  based  solely  upon  a  con- 
tractual relationship  between  the  parties. 
Wood-Mosaic  Flooring  &  Lumber  Co.  v. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  458,  459. 

(c)  Complainant  had  a  carload  of 
wheat  refused  that  was  an  "order-notify" 
shipment.  It  asserted  that  had  the  usual 
course  been  followed  of  placing  "order- 
notify"  shipments  on  defendant's  "hold" 
track  instead  of  consignee's  private  sid- 
ing, the  likelihood  of  an  unwarranted  in- 
spection and  refusal  of  shipment  would 
have  been  considerably  lessened.  HELD, 
responsibility  for  that  action  would  have 
to  be  determined  by  another  tribunal,  as 
the  Commission  is  not  authorized  under 
the  statute  to  regulate  such  matters.  Kay 
Co.  V.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  239, 
240. 

(d)  Complainant  shipped  by  barge 
from  Brevoort,  Miss.,  to  Cincinnati,  O.,  a 
cargo  of  rough  oak,  gum  and  cypress  lum- 
ber. Upon  arrival  at  Cincinnati,  it  was 
transferred  into  21  cars  and  charges 
based  on  a  weight  of  1,053,200  lbs.  were 
assessed.  Complainant  alleged  that  ow- 
ing to  negligent  handling  at  Cincinnati 
the  lumber  when  loaded  into  the  cars  was 
allowed  to  get  wet  and  absorbed  water  to 
the  extent  of  148,723  lbs.  At  destination 
complainant  weighed  dry  1,000  feet  of 
each  kind  of  lumber  shipped,  applied  such 
weights  to  the  respective  aggregate  num- 
ber of  feet  in  the  cars  and  obtained  an 
estimated  dry  weight  of  904,477  lbs.  It 
asks  reparation  for  the  difference  be- 
tween such  estimated  dry  weight  and  the 
billed  weight.  HELD,  the  Commission  is 
without  authority  under  the  Act  to  award 
damages  for  negligence  of  the  kind  here 
alleged,  such  matters  being  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  courts.  Buffalo  Hard- 
wood Lumber  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  536,  538. 

(e)  Damages  may  be  awarded  for  a 
loss  sustained  through  the  failure  of  the 
carrier  to  comply  with  reconsignment  or- 
ders; but  the  decline  in  the  market  price 
of  a  commodity  and  commissions  for  its 
sale  are  not  within  the  Commission's 
jurisdiction.  Hanley  Milling  Co.  v.  P.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  475,  476. 

(f)  The  Commission  assumes  no  juris- 
diction over  such  subjects  as  jolting, 
prompt  settlement  of  damages,  and  polite 
treatment.  Ponchatoula  Farmers'  Ass'n 
V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  513,  515. 

(g)  A  finding  of  general  damages  by 
the  Commission  would  be  mere  opinion. 


not  enforceable  by  the  Commission  nor 
conclusive  upon  the  courts,  to  which,  in 
any  event,  resort  must  be  had.  Hillsdale 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I. 
C.  C.  356,  371. 

(h)  It  is  in  the  nature  of  a  tort  for  a 
carrier  to  close  a  shipper's  switch  and  re- 
fuse to  place  cars  thereon.  Hillsdale  Coal 
&  Coke  Co.  V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C 

356,  308. 

(i)  The  petitioner,  a  Pittsburgh  com- 
mission merchant,  charged  the  defend- 
ant with  having  persistently  delayed 
his  carloads  of  fruit  at  yards  where 
they  were  not  accessible  to  teams  and 
could  not  be  unloaded,  while  at  the 
same  time  according  to  other  shippers 
prompt  service  in  placing  cars  at  the 
unloading  platform.  Complainant  asked 
damages  in  the  sum  of  $30,497.70  for 
loss  entailed  upon  him  through  demur- 
rage, storage,  the  employment  of  addi- 
tional help  and  loss  of  trade,  fruit  hav- 
ing reached  him  in  a  heated,  withered, 
shrunken  and  rotten  condition.  HELD, 
the  Commission  had  no  jurisdiction  to 
award  the  damages  asked,  the  case  be- 
ing one  for  the  courts.  (Lane,  Comm'r, 
dissenting.)  Joynes  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co., 
17   I.  C.   C.  361,  369. 

(j)  The  language  of  the  Act  being 
of  doubtful  interpretation,  the  Commis- 
sion, which  is  a  special  tribunal  of 
limited  powers,  ought  not  to  take  juris- 
diction, but  should  resolve  the  doubt  in 
favor  of  the  court,  where  claims  of  loss 
and  damage  resulting  from  discrimina- 
tion in  use  of  facilities  ordinarily  be- 
long, Joynes  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  361,  369. 

(k)  The  Commission  has  no  power  to 
award  damages  for  loss  and  damage  re- 
sulting from  decay  of  fruit  arising  from 
delay  and  discrimination  in  furnishing 
unloading  facilities.  Joynes  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  361,  368. 

(1)  The  Commission  is  not  vested 
with  the  powers  of  a  court  of  equity 
to  relieve  from  the  hardships  resulting 
from  improvident  arrangements  between 
the  parties.  Werner  Saw  Mill  Co.  v. 
I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  388y*396. 

(m)  The  Commission  has  no  com- 
mon-law or  equity  jurisdiction,  but  only 
such  authority  as  is  prescribed  in  the 
Act.  Laning-Harris  Coal  &  Grain  Co. 
V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
37,  38. 


438     INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION,  §14  (n)— JUDICIAL  NOTICE 


(n)  Breaches  of  duty  by  a  carrier, 
such  as  loss  of  or  damage  to  property 
in  transit  and  the  failure  to  make  de- 
livery safely  and  with  reasonable  des- 
patch, in  accordance  with  the  contract, 
expressed  or  implied,  which  a  carrier 
enters  into  when  accepting  a  shipment 
for  carriage,  are  matters  solely  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts.  Blume  & 
Co.  V.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
53,   55. 

(o)  Defendant  express  company,  on 
a  carload  of  a  perishable  commodity 
(not  specifically  described)  from  Rocky 
Ford,  Colo.,  to  Pittsburgh,  Pa.,  was 
specifically  instructed  to  deliver  the 
same  at  a  certain  produce  station  in 
Pittsburgh.  It  turned  the  shipment 
over  to  another  express  company  at  the 
wrong  junction  point,  and  the  car  was 
delivered  at  the  wrong  station  in  Pitts- 
burgh. Before  it  could  be  switched  to 
the  right  station  the  market  price  for 
the  commodity  had  gone  off  so  materi- 
ally that  complainant  sold  it  at  a  large 
loss.  HELD,  the  Commission  had  no 
jurisdiction  to  award  reparation  for 
the  damage  so  sustained.  Blume  &  Co. 
V.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  53,  55. 

(p)  With  respect  to  the  performance 
by  carriers  for  the  shipping  public  of 
their  general  duties  as  common  car- 
riers other  than  those  covered  by  the 
Act,  the  Commission  is  wholly  without 
authority.  Breaches  of  duty  in  that  re- 
spect, such  as  the  loss  of  or  damage 
to  property  in  transit,  the  failure  to 
make  delivery  safely  and  with  reason- 
able despatch,  in  accordance  with  the 
contract,  expressed  or  implied,  which  a 
carrier  enters  into  when  accepting  a 
shipment  for  carriage,  are  matters  that 
are  solely  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  courts.  Blume  &  Co.  v.  Wells, 
Fargo   &   Co.,  15  I.   C.   C.  53,  55. 

(q)  The  Act  confers  upon  the  Com- 
mission power  and  authority  to  enter 
orders  only  with  respect  to  the  rates 
and  practices  of  carriers;  as  to  all 
claims  that  may  arise  out  of  failure  of 
carriers  to  carry  out  their  contracts 
of  transportation  promptly,  and  safely 
and  properly  perform  their  duties  as 
common  <;arriers,  the  Commission  is 
without  authority  to  afford  redress. 
Blume  &  Co.  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  15 
I.   C.   C.   53. 

(r)  The  Commission  has  no  authority 
to  award  damages  due  to  loss  and  dam- 
age  resulting   from   wrong   terminal   de- 


livery of  shipment  of  perishable  fruit. 
Damages  may  be  awarded  by  the  Com- 
mission only  for  a  violation  of  some 
provision  of  the  Act.  Blume  &  Co.  v. 
Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  53. 

(s)  The  Commission  is  without  au- 
thority to  enforce  compliance  by  car- 
riers with  any  duties  except  those  pre- 
scribed by  the  Act;  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  duties  not  so  prescribed,  the 
appropriate  remedy  must  be  sought  in 
the  courts.  Royal  Brewing  Co.  v.  Adams 
Express    Co.,    15   I.   C.   C.    255,   256. 

(t)  The  Commission  has  no  juris- 
diction to  determine  whether  the  rights 
of  a  minority  stockholder  in  one  rail- 
road absorbed  by  another  have  been  in- 
fringed, where  the  purpose  of  the  pro- 
ceeding before  the  Commission  is  to 
obtain  information  for  the  complainant 
to  determine  whether,  as  a  stockholder, 
it  would  be  advisable  to  bring  a  suit 
in  equity  for  an  accounting  against  the 
railroads  involved.  Manning  v.  C.  &  A. 
R.   R.    Co.,    13    I.    C.    C.    125,    127. 

(u)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission is  not  vested  with  jurisdiction 
over  suits  to  recover  damages  for  de- 
lay in  the  delivery  of  an  interstate  ship- 
ment, so  as  to  prevent  the  state  courts 
from  entertaining  such  actions.  Pitts- 
burgh C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Knox 
(Ind.,  1912),  98  N.  E.  295,  299. 

(v)  The  Commission  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion over  loss  and  damage  claims.  Ful- 
lerton  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  150. 

(w)  The  Commission  is  without 
jurisdiction  to  award  damages  for  de- 
lay and  deterioration  of  shipments  in 
transit.  Rivers  Bros.  Co.  v.  Wells,  Fargo 
&  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  496. 

INTERVENERS. 

See  Courts,  §9   (i). 

INTRASTATE  COMMERCE. 

See  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §5;  Inter- 
state Commerce,  §3;  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission,  §10. 


JOINT  RATE. 


See  Through   Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 
§3. 


JUDICIAL  NOTICE. 

See    Evidence,    III. 


JUSTIFICATION— LIGHTERAGE,  §2  (a) 


439 


JUSTIFICATION. 

Of  Blanket  Rate — See  Blanket  Rates, 
§3.  Of  Discrimination — See  Dis- 
crimination, lit.  Of  Increased 
Rates — See    Advanced    Rates,    11. 

KNOCKED  DOWN  SHIP- 
MENTS. 

See  Classification,  §5. 

LACHES. 

See   Reparation,   §10. 

LAND  GRANT  RAILROADS. 

See  Reduced  Rates,  §4  (a);  Tariffs, 
§7  (cc). 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  11  carloads 
of  anthracite  coal  from  Chicago,  111.,  to 
Sturgis,  S.  D.,  for  use  of  the  United 
States  government  at  Fort  Meade,  S.  D., 
purchased  by  the  United  States  at  a 
price  which  included  delivery  of  the  coal 
at  Sturgis.  Defendant  operated  between 
Chicago  and  Sturgis  248  miles  of  land- 
grant  aided  railroad,  over  which  the  gov- 
ernment was  required  to  pay  only  50  per 
cent  of  the  commercial  rate.  The  ship- 
ments, however,  were  assessed  the  pub- 
lished rate  of  $6.80  per  ton.  The  car- 
rier, through  error,  quoted  to  complain- 
ant a  rate  of  $5.9915  per  ton,  the  land- 
grant  rate.  This  rate  was  established 
subsequent  to  the  shipment  to  coal  con- 
signed to  the  government  at  Sturgis.  The 
reasonableness  of  the  $6.80  rate  was  not 
questioned,  the  propriety  of  the  applica- 
tion of  the  land-grant  rate  to  the  ship- 
ment being  involved.  HELD,  that  it  is 
improper  to  permit  the  benefit  of  special 
rates  on  government  material  to  accrue 
to  anyone  other  than  the  government  it- 
self. Reparation  denied.  Havens  &  Co. 
V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  156,  158. 

(b)  Congress,  in  granting  rights  of 
way  to  defendants  in  Indian  Territory, 
provided  that  the  rates  in  that  territory 
should  not  be  higher  than  those  charged 
in  Kansas,  Arkansas  and  Te.:as.  HELD, 
the  Commission  had  no  jurisdiction  to 
enforce  such  provision,  and  even  if  it 
had,  the  provision  was  too  indefinite  to 
be  capable  of  enforcement.  Haines  v.  C. 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  214,  21o. 

LEASE. 

See  Common  Carrier,  §2;  Facilities 
and  Privileges,  §2  (f) ;  Reports,  I 
(d);  Restricted  Rates,  I  (d);  Spe- 
cial Contracts,  §2  (aa),  §5   (h). 


LEGAL  RATE. 

See  Tiirough  Routes  and  Joint 
Rates,  §22. 

LEGALITY. 

See  Reconslgnment,  I;  Released 
Rates,  ill;  Restricted  Rates,  i; 
Track  Storage,  11.  Of  Allowances 
— See  Allowances,  IV.  Of  Divi- 
sions— See  Divisions,  IV.  Of  Group 
Rates — See  Blanket  Rates,  §2.  Of 
Proportional  Rates — See  Propor- 
tional Rates,  III.  Of  Reduced 
Rates — See  Reduced  Rates,  II.  Of 
Special  Contract  Since  Passage  of 
Act — See  Special  Contract,  II.  Of 
Substitution  of  Damages — See  Sub- 
stitution of  Tonnage,  II:  Of  Tariffs 
—See  Tariffs,  §14. 

LIGHTERAGE. 

I.     CON'^ROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
II.     CHARGES. 

§2.     Reasonableness. 
§3.     Discrmination. 
III.     ALLOWANCES. 
§4.    In  general. 

I.  CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

See  Commerce  Court,  §3  (c). 
§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

(a)  It  must  not  be  inferred  that  the 
Commission  disclaims  jurisdiction  over 
lighterage  service.  On  the  contrary,  that 
service  must  be  conducted  in  accordance 
with  requirements  and  prohibitions  of 
the  Act.  Federal  Sugar  Refining  Co.  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  40,  45. 

II.  CHARGES. 

§2.     Reasonableness. 

See  Any  Quantity  Rates,  I    (f);  Ter- 
minal   Facilities,   §3   (k). 

(a)  On  cotton  moving  by  rail  and 
ocean  from  points  in  Georgia  and  Ala- 
bama to  New  YorK  City,  th,  defendants 
made  joint  any-quantity  rates  subject  to 
a  rule  providing  that  on  shipments  of 
less  than  24,000  lbs.  a  lighterage  charfre 
of  3c  per  100  lbs.,  with  a  minimum  charge 
of  $6,  should  be  assessed  when  the  light- 
erage service  was  performed  by  the 
steamship  company;  on  shipments  of  24,- 
000  lbs.  or  more,  the  rate  named  included 
lighterage  service.  Complainants  con- 
tended that  the  material  factor  in  deter- 
mining the  lighterage  charge  should  be 
the  quantity  delivered  on  one  lighter  or 
in  one  lighterage  service,  and  that  a 
charge  made  for  lighterage  of  smaller 
quantities  than  24,000  lbs.  was  unreason- 


440 


LIGHTERAGE,  §3   (a)— (h) 


able,  if  several  shipments  agp;regatin5 
more  than  24,u00  lbs.  arrived  on  one 
steamer.  HELD,  that,  individual  ship- 
ments by  different  shippers  cannot  lose 
their  identity  simply  because  tl-  y  are 
shipped  on  one  steamer;  that  the  lighter- 
age charge  imposed  is  on  the  principle  f 
a  lower  rate  on  carload  than  on  less-ihan- 
carload  quantities  and  therefore  must  be 
considered  reasonable.  Weld  &  Co.  v. 
Ocean  S.  S.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  58L 

§3.     Discrimination. 

See  Allowances,  §12  (1)    (a). 

(a)  Unjust  discrimination  results 
from  paying  lighterage  allowance  to  one 
shipper  and  refusing  such  allowance  to 
another  shipper  performing  a  similar 
service.     Federal   Sugar  Refining  Co.  v. 

B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  200. 

(b)  There  is  little  ground  for  denying 
a  lighterage  privilege  and  allowance  to 
complainant  where  its  sugar  crosses  the 
lighterage  limits,  while  according  such 
privilege  and  allowance  to  another  ship- 
per within  the  lighterage  limits.  Federal 
Sugar  Refining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
20  L  C.  C.  200,  215. 

(c)  When  a  shipper  tenders  its  sugar 
to  the  defendants  on  lighters  at  tl-eir 
regular  receiving  stations  on  the  Jersey 
shore,  it  must  be  received  and  carried 
thence  to  destination  on  rates,  terms  and 
conditions  that  are  no  less  favorable  to 
the  complainants  in  any  particular  than 
the  rates,  terms  and  conditions  governing 
and  surrounding  the  sugar  traffic  of  a 
competitor,  brought  by  them  on  floats  and 
lighters  to  the  same  station  for  carriage 
to  the  same  destination.  Federal  Sugar 
Refining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 

C.  200,  217. 

(d)  A  carrier  must  lighter  sugar  it- 
self or  allow  each  shipper  to  do  it  in  his 
own  way,  and  if  an  allowance  is  paid  to 
one  shipper  it  should  be  paid  to  another 
performing  the  same  service.  Federal 
Sugar  Refining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
20  l.  C.  C.  200,  215. 

(e)  Defendants  carried  a  rule  in  their 
tariffs  that  shipments  of  lurber  to  Npw 
York  could  be  consigned  "New  York 
lighterage  free,"  and  upon  arrival  of 
cars  the  consignee  should  specify  a 
particular  lighterage  destination,  and 
upon  the  arrival  of  the  lighter  at  such 
destination  provide  a  dock  berth  for  such 
lighter.  Complainant,  who  had  lumber 
delivered  at  Wallabout  Basin,  N.  Y.,  was 


assessed  demurrage  charges  whenever 
the  pier  he  designated  for  delivery  was 
occupied,  thus  compelling  the  lighter  to 
tie  up  to  another  boat  and  wait  until 
a  berth  was  made.  The  public  berths 
within  the  free  lighterage  limits  of  New 
York  are  329  in  number,  and  about  3,600 
boats,  excluding  steamers  and  sch-oners, 
are  engaged  in  making  deliv2ries  withia 
the  harbor.  HELD,  if  the  obligation  were 
imposed  upon  the  carrier  to  find  a  berih 
before  the  free  time  began  to  run  against 
the  consignee  it  would  be  possible  for 
consignees  who  desired  s^or  .ge  of  their 
shipment  to  regularly  designate  the  more 
congested  piers  and  thereby  obtain  the 
use  of  the  carrier's  equipment.  The 
present  practice  of  consigning  lumber 
"New  York  lighterage  free"  is  of  value  to 
the  consignee  in  that  it  enables  him  to 
find  a  purchaF3r  while  the  car  is  en  route 
or  before  ultimate  delivery.  On  account 
of  the  natural  congestion  of  the  New 
York  harbor  and  the  extent  of  the  free 
delivery  limits,  the  regulations  of  the  de- 
fendant must  be  held  reasonable,  and  de- 
fendants not  required,  when  a  designated 
pier  is  occupied,  to  deliver  to  an  adjacent 
wharf.  Mosson  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  30. 

(f)  Even  if  the  lighterage  service 
supplied  by  railroads  entering  New  York 
in  carrying  traffic  across  the  river  be 
regarded  as  a  species  of  cartage,  it 
would  not  necessarily  follow  that  such 
service  must  be  extended  to  Yonkers, 
because  it  is  provided  in  Greater  New 
York.  The  peculiarities  of  the  New 
York  situation  might  justify  the  car- 
riers in  affording  to  shippers  in  that 
city  a  facility  of  this  kind  which  they 
would  not  be  bound  to  furnish  else- 
where. Federal  Sugar  Refining  Co.  v. 
B.  &   O.  R.  R.  Co.,.  17  I.   C.   C.   40,  46. 

(g)  By  extension  of  their  lines  to 
New  York  by  lighterage  regulations, 
from  the  exercise  of  business  discretion 
and  not  from  compliance  -with  require- 
ments of  the  Act,  defendants  incur  no 
liability,  under  the  Act,  to  extend  their 
lines  to  Yonkers  or  other  near-by  com- 
munities. Federal  Sugar  Refining  Co. 
V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  40,  45. 

(h)  Terminals  within  the  lighterage 
limits  of  New  York  Harbor  are  railroad 
terminals,  none  the  less  so  because 
they  are  reached  by  ferries  instead  of 
bridges.  To  and  from  these  places  the 
defendants  are  common  carriers  "wholly 
by     railroad,"     within    the    meaning    of 


LIGHTERAGE,  §3    (i)— LOCAL  RATES 


441 


section   1,      Federal    Sugar   Refining   Co. 
V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  40,  46. 

(i)  Floatage  includes  delivery  of  car 
and  lading,  while  lighterage  includes 
delivery  only  of  the  lading.  Harlow 
Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
L  C.   C.  501,  503. 

III.     ALLOWANCES. 
§4.     In  General. 

See  Allowances,  §8  (4). 
(a)  Complainant,  operating  a  sugar 
refinery  at  Yonkers,  N.  Y.,  was  located 
about  10  miles  north  of  the  free  light- 
erage limits  prescribed  by  defendants. 
Under  the  free  lighterage  practices,  de- 
fendants carried  traffic  from  points  in 
the  harbor  and  from  the  east  side  of 
the  river  back  and  forth  to  the  ends 
of  their  lines,  located  on  the  Jersey 
side.  Competitors  of  complainant  were 
located  within  the  free  lighterage  lim- 
its, and  on  shipments  from  their  plants 
located  across  the  river  from  defend- 
ants' terminals  were  allowed  regular 
through  rates  without  the  expense  of 
lighterage.  Complainant  was  compelled 
to  pay  from  3c  to  4  l-5c  per  hundred 
lbs.  for  such  service,  in  addition  to  the 
through  rates.  Complainant  could  reach 
defendants'  terminals  over  the  line  of 
another  carrier,  but  such  course  was 
impracticable  on  account  of  the  con- 
gested traffic  of  said  line.  One  of  com- 
plainant's competitors  owned  one  of 
the  terminals  and  lighterage  systems 
located  across  the  river  and  used  same 
in  lightering  its  sugar,  being  allowed 
by  defendants  the  same  compensation 
as  it  derived  from  other  freight  light- 
ered by  it.  Nothing  in  the  evidence 
indicated  this  competitor  was  making 
a  profit  from  the  lighterage  of  its  sugar 
in  excess  of  the  lighterage  charges 
paid  by  the  complainant.  HELD,  de- 
fendants had  in  fact  extended  their 
lines  and  made  the  terminals  thereof 
the  east  side  instead  of  the  Jersey  side 
of  the  river,  and  inasmuch  as  carriers 
could  not  be  compelled  to  extend  their 
lines  to  new  localities,  complainant  was 
not  entitled  to  compel  defendants  to 
extend  their  lines  to  Yonkers,  a  point 
outside  of  New  York  City;  that  com- 
plainant's proper  remedy  -ivas  an  appli- 
cation for  joint  routes  over  defendants' 
and  the  lines  of  carriers  reaching  Yonk- 
ers; and  that  although  the  ownership 
of  the  terminal  system  by  complain- 
ant's   competitor    created    a    suspicious 


situation,  undue  discrimination  could 
not  be  held  to  arise  therefrom  in  the 
absence  of  evidence  that  said  competitor 
was  making  a  profit  on  the  lightering 
of  its  own  sugar.  (Lane,  Clements  and 
Harlan,  Comm'rs,  dissenting.)  Federal 
Sugar  Refining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.   C.  40,  45,   47. 

(b)  Defendant  carrier's  terminals  are 
located  at  Jersey  City  and  all  shipments 
made  over  its  lines  from  across  New 
York  Harbor  must  be  lightered  to  its 
docks  at  that  point.  This  service  la 
performed  by  the  defendant  without 
cost  to  shippers.  Complainant  found 
it  necessary  to  fill  all  the  orders  of  its 
customers  on  the  day  on  which  they 
were  received,  and  defendant  was  un- 
able to  furnish  barges  and  boats  prompt- 
ly enough  to  accomplish  this  purpose, 
sometimes  compelling  complainant  to 
wait  three  or  four  days.  Complainant 
took  the  matter  of  lighterage  into  its 
own  hands  and  performed  the  service 
on  its  own  boats.  It  sought  to  recover 
3  cents  per  100  lbs.  for  this  service. 
Some  years  after  the  shipments  in 
question  the  defendant  provided  in  its 
tariffs  for  the  payment  of  3  cents  for 
this  lighterage  service,  when  performed 
for  the  convenience  of  defendant,  but 
at  the  time  of  shipment  no  tariff  was 
in  effect  authorizing  defendant  to  pay 
for  lighterage  performed  by  the  shipper. 
HELD,  under  the  facts  disclosed,  the 
complainant  having  performed  such 
lighterage  service  for  its  own  conven- 
ience and  to  meet  the  special  require- 
ments of  its  business,  was  not  entitled 
to  compensation.  Barrett  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Central  R.  R.  of  New  Jersey,  17  I.  C. 
C.   464,   466. 

(c)  Because  defendant  may  not  be 
able  to  lighter  complainant's  shipments 
as  promptly  as  desired,  complainant  had 
no  right  to  lighter  its  shipments  and 
then  claim  reparation,  since  there  was 
no  tariff  permitting  such  allowance. 
Barrett  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co. 
of  New  Jersey,  17  I.  C.  C.  464,  465. 

LOADING  AND  UNLOADING. 

See  Classification,   §13;   Facilities  and 
Privileges,   §10. 

LOCAL  RATES. 


See      Through 
Rates.    §15. 


Routes      and      Joint 


442 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §1  (a)— §2  (e) 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Constitutionality  of  section  4. 
§2.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
IL     SECTION  4  AS  AMENDED. 
§3.    Constitutionality. 
§4.     Exceptions. 

III.  APPLICATION  OF  SECTION  4  TO 

RATES. 
§5.    Intermediate  points. 
§6.     Intermediate  points  off  line. 

IV.  COMPETITION      AS      JUSTIFICA- 

TION. 
§7.    In  general. 
§8.    Markets. 
§9.    Railroad. 
§10.    Water. 
V.     PROCEDURE. 

§11.    Complaints  and  orders. 
§12.    Evidence. 

(1)  Burden  of  proof. 

(2)  Circumstances  of  pro- 
bative force. 

f.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 
§1.     Constitutionality  of  Section  4. 
See   Constitutional    Law. 

(a)  Section  4  of  the  Act  to  regulate 
commerce,  as  amended  June  18,  1910,  is 
constitutional.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
U.  S.,  191  Fed.  856,  860. 

(b)  The  Government  may  properly  de- 
termine what  policy  railroads  shall  pur- 
sue so  long  as  the  guarantees  of  the  Con- 
stitution are  safeguarded.  If  it  is  injuri- 
ous to  the  interstate  commerce  of  the 
country  and  inimical  to  the  public  welfare 
to  permit  its  railroad  highways  to  be  used 
so  as  to  unduly  promote  the  growth  and 
prosperity  of  one  city  as  against  another, 
by  charging  more  to  the  nearer  point,  it 
is  within  the  proper  sphere  of  Congress  to 
prohibit,  absolutely  and  completely,  the 
pursuance  of  such  policy  by  the  railroads. 
In  Re  Application  of  the  S.  P.  Co.  for 
Relief  under  the  Provision  of  the  Fourth 
Section,  22  I.  C.  C.  366,  374. 

(c)  The  fourth  section,  as  amended, 
provides  that  no  carrier  shall  charge 
more  for  the  short  than  for  the  long  haul 
unless  upon  application  to  the  Commis- 
sion permission  to  do  so  is  granted  by 
It.  If  this  section  were  read  by  itself, 
and  were  taken  at  its  literal  face  mean- 
ing, the  Commission  would  possess  unre- 
stricted power  to  grant  or  deny  such  ap- 
plication. It  could  permit  in  one  case 
and  refuse  in  another,  according  as  its 
fancy  might  dictate.     So  construed,  the 


proviso  would  probably  be  void  as  a  dele- 
gation of  legislative  authority.  The  mak- 
ing of  rates  is  a  legislative  function.  To 
say  whether  a  carrier  shall  or  shall  not 
be  allowed  to  charge  more  for  the  short 
than  for  the  long  haul  is  virtually  the 
making  of  rates,  and  therefore  an  attri- 
bute of  the  legislature.  To  invest  an  ad- 
ministrative body  like  this  Commission 
with  that  unrestricted  and  unguided  au- 
thority would  be  to  give  it  legislative 
power,  which  cannot  be  done  under  our 
federal  constitution.  It  is  one  thing  to 
authorize  such  a  body  to  administer  the 
law  in  accordance  with  certain  rules  and 
standards  prescribed  by  the  legislature, 
and  an  entirely  different  thing  to  turn 
over  to  it  the  exercise  of  the  legislative 
discretion  itself.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  400,  411. 

§2.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

(a)  Congress  has  said  to  carriers  of 
interstate  commerce  by  rail  that  they 
must  not  charge  more  for  the  short  than 
for  the  long  haul,  unless  they  can 
show  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Commis- 
sion that  in  so  doing  their  rates  do  not 
violate  the  inhibition  of  the  Act  as  ex- 
pressed in  both  the  first  and  third  sec- 
tions. BluelSeld  Shippers'  Ass'n  v.  N.  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  519,  530. 

(b)  In  passing  upon  an  application  for 
relief,  the  Commission  must  inquire 
whether  rates  to  intermediate  points  are 
reasonable.  Bluefield  Shippers'  Ass'n  v. 
N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  519,  529. 

(c)  While  the  existence  of  a  wrong 
cannot,  of  itself,  justify  its  continuance, 
still,  in  determining  what,  under  all  the 
circumstances,  is  just  and  reasonable,  in 
pursuance  of  the  authority  delegated  to 
the  Commission  by  the  amended  fourth 
section,  it  must  certainly  be  to  some  ex- 
tent guided  by  conditions  as  it  finds  them. 
Bluefield  Shippers'  Ass'n  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  519,  525. 

(d)  Under  the  fourth  section,  as 
amended  in  1910,  the  Commission  may  fix 
a  rate  at  the  more  distant  point  below 
which  the  carrier  must  not  go.  City  of 
Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  400, 
415. 

(e)  Under  the  fourth  section,  as 
amended  in  1910,  the  Commission  may 
prescribe  the  maximum  difference  In 
rates  which  may  be  made  against  the  in- 
termediate point,  or  may  fix  a  rate  at  the 
more  distant  point  below  which  the  car- 
rier must  not  go,  or  may  define  the  terri- 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §2  (f)— §4  (c) 


443 


tory  from  which  a  higher  intermediate 
charge  may  be  made.  City  of  Spokane  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  400,  415. 

(f)  The  whole  situation  must  be  con- 
sidered by  the  Commission  in  passing 
upon  an  application  for  relief  from  the 
fourth  section.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  400,  414. 

II.     SECTION  4  AS  AMENDED. 

See    Passenger    Fares    and    Facilities, 

§6    (bb). 

§3.     Constitutionality. 

See   Constitutional    Law. 

(a)  The  proviso  in  the  fourth  section, 
as  amended  in  1910,  permitting  the  Com- 
mission in  particular  instances  to  author- 
ize the  charging  of  a  higher  rate  at  the 
intermediate  point  is  not  void  as  a  dele- 
gation of  legislative  authority.  City  of 
Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  400, 
411. 

(b)  If  section  4,  as  amended,  were 
read  by  itself  and  were  taken  at  its 
literal  face  meaning,  the  Commission 
would  possess  unrestricted  i>ower  to 
grant  or  deny  applications  under  it, 
and,  thus  construed,  would  probably  be 
void  as  a  delegation  of  legislative  au- 
thority. City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
21  I.  C.  C.  400,  411. 

(c)  Where  a  proviso  which  is  uncon- 
stitutional can  be  separated  from  the 
body  of  the  statute  the  unconstitutional 
provision  will  be  disregarded  and  the 
statute  enforced  as  though  it  contained 
no  such  proviso,  but  where  the  proviso 
Is  so  far  an  essential  part  of  the  statute 
that  it  is  evident  that  the  legislature 
would  not  have  enacted  the  statute  itself 
without  the  proviso,  then  the  entire  stat- 
ute falls  if  the  proviso  is  held  invalid. 
It  is  the  rule,  however,  that  where  a  stat- 
ute is  susceptible  of  two  interpretations 
under  one  of  which  it  is  constitutional 
and  under  the  other  unconstitutional, 
that  interpretation  must  be  adopted 
which  will  save  the  validity  of  the  Act. 
Under  that  view,  the  fourth  section,  as 
amended,  must  be  held  constitutional. 
City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
C.  400,  411,  412. 

§4.     Exceptions. 

(a)  The  guide  to  the  exercise  of  th-e 
Commission's  discretion  in  exempting 
carriers  from  the  operation  of  the  long 
and  short  haul  provision  in  section  4  of 
the  Act  as  amended  June  18,  1910,  is  to 


be  found  in  the  other  sections  of  the  Act, 
thereby  making  the  discretion  to  exempt 
carriers  from  the  prohibition  in  fact  not 
unlimited  and  imposing  upon  the  Com- 
mission, not  merely  the  right,  but  also 
the  duty  to  grant  such  exemptions  when- 
ever on  investigation  it  shall  find  that 
no  violation  of  any  section  of  the  Act 
would  thereby  be  involved.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  191  Fed.  856,  860. 

(aa)  Fourth  section  application  for 
permission  to  charge  lower  rates  from  the 
Missouri  River  and  other  territories  to 
Salt  Lake  City  than  to  intermediate 
points,  denied.  Grand  Junction  Chamber 
of  Commerce  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  115. 

(b)  Relief  from  the  rule  of  section  4 
granted  where  water  competition  forced 
below  what  would  be  otherwise  reasonable 
the  rate  on  wool  between  the  Pacific  coast 
terminals  and  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  the 
higher  rates  at  intermediate  points  being 
reasonable,  and  no  undue  preference 
being  given  one  locality  over  another.  In 
Re  Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and 
Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151,  178. 

(bb)  So  long  as  every  point  of  pro- 
duction is  given  a  rate  which  the  Commis- 
sion holds  to  be  reasonable,  and  so  long 
as  the  effect  of  water  competition  is  ap- 
plied uniformly  and  without  preference  to 
western  points  of  origin  the  Commission 
is  inclined  to  grant  transcontinental  lines 
relief  under  the  fourth  section.  In  Re 
Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts, 
23  I.  C.  C.  151,  179. 

(c)  The  Commission,  in  granting  ex- 
emption to  carriers  from  the  provisions 
of  the  long  and  short  haul  clause  of  sec- 
tion 4  of  the  Act,  may  accomplish  the  re- 
sult (1)  by  fixing  a  geographical  limit 
within  which  there  can  be  no  discrimina- 
tion, and  permitting  higher  rates  from 
other  territory,  having  regard  to  the  ex- 
tent of  the  competition  which  justifies 
the  discrimination;  or  (2)  it  may  fix  the 
limit  of  the  rail  rate  at  the  more  distant 
point  with  reference  to  the  rate. to  inter- 
mediate points,  thereby  prescribing  a 
zone  of  rate  discrimination  which  may  be 
lawful  and  justified;  or  (3)  where  either 
of  these  methods  does  not  seem  to  be 
practicable,  it  may  permit  the  carrier  to 
continue  the  rates  to  the  more  distant 
point,  and,  dealing  with  intermediate 
points  alone,  prescribe  the  reasonable 
rate  which  the  carrier,  as  an  outgrowth 
of  its  policies  or  its  methods  of  making 


444 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §4  (cc)  — (ff) 


rates,  may  not  exceed.    In  Re  Application 
of  the  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  366,  373. 

(cc)  In  point  of  law  the  Commission 
has  before  it,  on  every  application  by  car- 
riers for  deviation  from  the  long  and 
short  haul  clause  of  section  4  of  the  Act, 
the  reasonableness  of  the  rates  which  are 
involved  in  the  carrier's  application.  It 
was  not  the  intention  of  Congress  to  per- 
mit a  carrier  to  discriminate  in  favor  of 
a  more  distant  point  to  such  an  extent  as 
to  effect  not  only  an  undue  discrimination 
against  the  nearest  point,  but  the  imposi- 
tion of  an  excessive  charge.  In  Re  Appli- 
cation of  the  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  366,  373. 

(d)  The  relieving  power  of  the  Com- 
mission is  not  to  be  exercised  arbitrarily, 
but  it  is  its  duty  to  permit  a  higher  in- 
termediate charge  whenever  the  resulting 
rates  will  not  contravene  the  Act  in  that 
they  are  unjust  and  unreasonable  or  un- 
duly discriminatory.  This  embraces  both 
the  preference  against  the  intermediate 
point  and  the  rate  which  that  point  is  re- 
quired to  pay.  Bluefield  Shippers'  Ass'n 
v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  519,  530. 

(dd)  If  the  applicant  for  relief  controls 
the  long-distance  rate  and  can  determine 
what  effect  shall  be  given  to  competitive 
conditions  which  are  supposed  to  justify 
the  reduction  at  the  farther  point,  then 
the  Commission  may  also  determine 
whether  the  carrier  is  justified  in  giving 
to  those  competitive  conditions  the  effect 
which  it  does;  may  determine  the  effect 
which  such  conditions  might  properly 
have,  and  may  fix  the  extent  to  which 
those  conditions  shall  be  given  effect. 
Bluefield  Shippers'  Ass'n  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  519,  531. 

(e)  It  is  possible  that  cases  might 
arise  where  even  though  the  long-distance 
rate  were  beyond  the  control  of  the  appli- 
cant for  relief,  nevertheless  some  relation 
ought  to  be  established  between  the  rate 
to  the  more  distant  and  those  to  the 
intermediate  points.  The  intermediate 
rate  should  not  exceed  the  long-distance 
rate  plus  a  reasonable  local  charge  from 
the  more  remote  back  to  the  intermediate 
point,  and  should  perhaps  in  some  cases 
be  even  less.  Bluefield  Shippers'  Ass'n 
V.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  519,  531. 

(ee)  "While  the  e^tistence  of  a  wrong 
cannot,  of  itself,  justify  its  continuance, 
and  while  the  very  purpose  of  the  original 
fourth  section  of  the  Act  and  of  the  last 
amendment  of  June,  1910,  was  to  prevent 
discrimination  by  charging  a  higher  rate 


to  intermediate  points,  still,  in  determin- 
ing what,  under  all  the  circumstances,  is 
just  and  reasonable,  in  pursuance  of  the 
authority  delegated  to  the  Commission 
by  the  amended  section,  it  must  certainly 
be  to  some  extent  guided  by  conditions 
as  it  finds  them.  Bluefield  Shippers' 
Ass'n  V.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  519, 
525. 

(f)  Where  a  carrier,  applying  for  re- 
lief from  the  fourth  section  to  enable  it 
to  charge  a  higher  rate  to  an  intermediate 
point,  is  shown  to  control  the  rate  at  the 
farther  distant  point  and  where  it  can 
determine  the  effect  to  be  given  to  the 
competitive  conditions  at  the  farther 
point,  the  Commission  may  also  deter- 
mine whether  the  carrier  is  justified  in 
giving  to  those  competitive  conditions  the 
effect  which  it  does  give,  may  determine 
the  effect  which  such  conditions  may 
properly  have,  and  fix  the  extent  to  which 
those  conditions  shall  be  given  effect. 
Bluefield  Shippers'  Ass'n  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  519,  531. 

(ff)  The  Commission  has  not  been  left 
without  a  proper  test  to  apply  under  sec- 
tion 4  as  amended:  the  test  of  justness, 
of  reasonableness,  of  discrimination,  of 
preference  and  advantage;  the  test  of  fair 
play  as  between  communities.  "With 
this  construction  of  the  statute,  which 
is  historically  supported,  as  well  as  by 
those  more  or  less  variable  measures 
known  as  the  canons  of  statutory  con- 
struction, the  statute  becomes  both  prac- 
ticable and  constitutional.  The  Commis- 
sion is  neither  forced  to  disregard  it  as  a 
whole  nor  to  eliminate  any  of  its  provi- 
sions; the  section  does  not  become  an 
absolute  long-and-short-haul  section,  be- 
cause the  proviso  permitting  of  excep- 
tions remains;  the  provisional  clause  does 
not  relegate  the  entire  section  to  the  limbo 
of  unconstitutionality,  because  it  may 
be  administered  in  thorough  harmony 
with  the  whole  Act.  part  of  which  it  is; 
and  the  tests  and  standards  to  be 
applied  are  not  matters  of  fancy,  but 
are  the  express  and  positive  words  in 
the  law  itself.  In  short.  Congress  has 
undertaken  to  specify  distinctly  one 
practice  which  it  wishes  especially  to 
destroy  and  charges  the  Commission 
not  to  permit  it  to  obtain  unless  such 
discrimination,  such  preference,  such 
practice  may  be  shown  not  to  be  a  dis- 
crimination that  is  unjust,  a  preference 
that  is  undue,  or  a  practice  that 
is     unreasonable     because     of     peculiar 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §4  (g)— (i) 


445 


facts  and  conditions.  All  the  burdens 
of  establishing  these  justifying  condi- 
tions are  cast  upon  the  carriers; 
the  doubts  are  to  be  resolved  against 
them;  the  wish  of  Congress  is  expressed 
and  clear.  The  carrier  may  no  longer 
float  along  as  under  the  old  section, 
needing  no  other  justification  for  its 
policy  than  its  own  conscience,  but 
must  set  forth  clearly  what  it  is  doing 
and  convince  those  constituted  to  judge 
that  this  exceptional  policy  in  a  special 
case  is  in  harmony  with  the  intent 
of  Congress  that  communities  shall  be 
treated  fairly,  one  with  relation  to  the 
other.  The  more  distant  community 
shall  not  be  preferred  over  the  nearer 
one  because  it  may  please  the  carrier 
to  develop  the  one  and  retard  the  other. 
As  ■  it  costs  more  to  carry  traffic  a 
longer  distance,  so  the  rate  to  the 
farther  point  shall  not  be  made  less 
than  the  rate  to  the  nearer  point 
merely  because  of  railroad  policy.  So 
far  the  section  establishes  a  shipper's 
principle  and  is  in  sympathy  with  and 
expressive  of  the  most  primary  prin- 
ciple of  equality.  The  proviso,  how- 
ever, is  primarily  for  the  carrier's 
benefit;  it  recognizes  that  the  railroad 
may  engage  in  competition  for  traffic 
to  more  distant  points  at  lower  rates 
than  may  be  charged  to  intermediate 
points  without  doing  injury  or  injustice 
to  such  intermediate  points.  But  to 
this  policy  a  limit  may  be,  indeed  must 
be,  put.  Railroad  Commission  of  Ne- 
vada V.   S.   P.   Co.,   21  L   C.   C.   329,  339. 

*  (g)  The  test  which  the  Commission 
must  now  apply  to  determine  whether 
the  carrier  may  be  given  the  advan- 
tage of  an  exception  to  the  general  rule 
of  section  4  as  amended,  is  the  same 
test  that  it  may  apply  with  respect  to 
any  other  discrimination  or  inequality. 
There  is  incorporated  in  section  4  every 
standard  set  up  by  Congress  as  a  guide 
to  this  Commission  which  is  to  be 
found  in  any  section  of  the  Act.  And 
the  leeway  or  discretion  which  may 
properly  be  exercised  by  the  Commis- 
sion under  any  other  section  may  prop- 
erly be  exercised  under  this  section. 
For  instance  it  is  for  it  acting  within 
the  limitations  of  the  law  to  deter- 
mine what  is  a  reasonable  practice  for 
a  common  carrier  to  pursue.  This  calls 
for  the  widest  exercise  of  discretion. 
And  if  its  judgment  is  arbitrary  or  it 
transcends  those  limitations  properly 
binding    such    a    tribunal    its    act    may 


be  set  aside.  But  in  every  decision 
of  the  Commission  under  any  section 
f^hatsoever  there  enters  the  element 
of  personal  judgment,  just  as  in  every 
verdict  of  a  jury  the  result  is  colored 
necessarily  by  the  mental  attitude  and 
experience  of  the  juror.  R.  R.  Com- 
mission of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  L 
C.    C.    329,    338,    339. 

(gg)  The  more  difficult  labor  of  the 
Commission  latterly  has  been  to  ad- 
just difficulties  as  between  communities, 
and  it  has  as  one  guide  in  this  respect 
the  fourth  section  of  the  Act.  Congress 
felt  the  old  section  to  be  inadequate; 
it  substituted  another;  it  cast  the 
burden  upon  the  carrier  of  establishing 
its  right  to  an  exception  from  the 
general  rule  which  it  lays  down  and 
to  which  it  expects  adherence — the 
shorter  haul  shall  not  be  charged  the 
higher  rate.  R.  R.  Commission  of  Ne- 
vada V.   S.   P.   Co.,   21    I.   C.   C.   329,   337. 

(h)  The  Congress  intended  to  say 
by  the  new  fourth  section  that  as  a 
general  rule  there  should  be  no  lesser 
charge  to  the  more  distant  points,  but 
it  was  not  willing  to  say  that  there 
should  not  be  some  exceptions  to  this 
rule.  The  railroads,  however,  were  not 
to  make  these  exceptions  themselves. 
Such  exceptions  were  to  be  made  only 
upon  petition  to  the  Commission  upon 
public  justification  being  shown.  R. 
R.  Commission  of  Nevada  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  329,  335. 

(i)  There  comes  before  the  Com- 
mission upon  application  for  permission 
to  deviate  from  the  prohibitive  clause 
of  the  fourth  section  the  inclusive  ques- 
tion whether  by  such  deviation  any 
provision  of  the  Act  will  be  violated, 
and  the  burden  rests  upon  the  carrier 
to  satisfy  the  Commission  that  no  such 
result  would  be  effected  by  the  grant- 
ing of  such  permission — that  no  injus- 
tice will  be  done  to  the  intermediate 
points  with  relation  to  the  more  dis- 
tant point.  The  purpose  of  the  statute 
succinctly  stated  is  to  preserve  har- 
mony between  communities,  individuals 
and  carriers,  to  allay  discord  and  prevent 
so  far  as  may  be  oppression  and  in- 
justice. The  unhampered  exercise  of 
a  railroad  policy  may  make  for  the 
material  benefit  of  the  carrier — at  least 
for  its  immediate  profit — but  work  a 
wrong  with  which  the  public  must  con- 
cern itself.  To  be  concrete  it  may 
be    (although    this    fact    has    not    been 


446 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS.  §4  (.i)  — fk) 


established)  that  it  is  to  the  iBnancial 
interest  of  the  transcontinental  car- 
riers to  make  the  same  rates  from  the 
Missouri  River  as  from  Chicago,  Pitts- 
burg and  New  York  to  the  coast  cities 
which  lie  on  or  near  the  ocean's  edge, 
and  comi>el  the  intermediate  points 
to  base  their  rates  upon  these  coast 
terminals;  but  this  decision  on  their 
part  is  certainly  subject  to  review,  and 
when  Congress  says  that  the  Commis- 
sion "may  from  time  to  time  prescribe 
the  extent  to  which  such  designated 
common  carrier  may  be  relieved  from 
the  operation  of  this  section,"  it  means 
to  lodge  with  the  Commission,  if  it 
means  anything  at  all,  the  power  to 
pass  in  judgment  upon  the  effect  of  a 
railroad  policy  which  departs  from  the 
intendment  of  the  law.  A  community 
is  entitled  to  something  more  than  a 
reasonable  rate;  it  is  entitled  to  a  non- 
discriminatory rate.  A  carrier  may  not 
say,  "We  will  give  to  this  community 
a  reasonable  rate"  and  meet  the  full 
requirement  of  the  law;  it  must  view 
its  rates  as  a  whole  and  see  to  it  that 
they  effect  no  advantage  or  preference 
to  one  community  over  another  which 
does  not  arise  necessarily  out  of  the 
transportation  advantages  which  the 
one  has  over  the  other.  Railroad  Com- 
mission of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  L 
C.    C.    329,   366. 

(j)  The  Commission  must  regard  the 
proviso  in  the  fourth  section  ("That 
upon  application  to  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  such  common  carrier 
may  in  special  cases,  after  investigation, 
be  authorized  by  the  Commission  to 
charge  less  for  longer  than  for  shorter 
distances  for  the  transportation  of  pas- 
sengers or  property;  and  the  Commis- 
sion may  from  time  to  time  prescribe 
the  extent  to  which  such  designated 
common  carrier  may  be  relieved  from 
the  operation  of  this  section:  .  .  .") 
as  subordinate  to  the  preceding  clause 
prohibiting  the  higher  rate  for  the 
shorter  haul,  and  to  carry  out  this  in- 
tent of  the  law  a  carrier  must  es- 
tablish before  the  Commission  in  order 
to  secure  an  order  of  exception  there- 
under more  than  merely  its  own  desire 
to  haul  a  great  volume  of  traffic  be- 
tween two  distant  points;  it  must 
prove  that  by  such  policy  it  will  not 
impose  unreasonable  rates  upon  any 
intermediate  point,  and  that  its  policy 
will  not  work  an  injustice  of  which 
such  intermediate  point  may  fairly  com- 


plain. Unless  it  does  make  such  proof 
the  Commission  is  not  justified  unaer 
the  law  in  excusing  it  from  adopting 
its  rates  to  the  more  distant  point  as 
the  basis  for  rates  to  the  nearer  points. 
Railroad  Commission  of  Nevada  v.  S. 
P.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  329,  368. 

(k)  In  dealing  with  the  Reno  Inter- 
mountain  case  the  Commission  will  re- 
gard these  propositions  as  established: 
(1)  That  the  fourth  section  as  amended 
in  1910  is  as  a  whole  constitutional, 
a  provision  of  law  within  the  proper 
scope  of  Congressional  jurisdiction.  (2) 
That  the  proviso  authorizing  the  Com- 
mission to  permit  exceptions  to  the 
general  prohibition  of  the  section  is  not 
a  grant  of  arbitrary  or  absolute  power, 
but  its  exercise  must  be  limited  and 
conditioned  upon  the  presence  in  special 
cases  of  conditions  and  circumstances 
which  would  make  such  exceptions 
legU  and  proper  and  in  nowise  an- 
tagonistic to  other  provisions  of  the 
Act.  (3)  That  it  must  be  affirmatively 
shown  by  the  carriers  seeking  such  ex- 
ception that  injustice  will  not  be  done  to 
intermediate  points  by  allowing  lower 
rates  at  the  more  distant  points.  (4) 
That  the  intendment  of  the  law  is  to 
make  its  prohibition  of  the  higher  rate 
for  the  shorter  haul  a  rule  of  well- 
nigh  universal  application  from  whicii 
the  Commission  may  deviate  only  in 
special  cases,  and  then  to  meet  trans- 
portation circumstances  which  are  be- 
yond the  carriers'  control;  that  is  to 
say,  a  carrier  shall  not  prefer  the  more 
distant  point  by  giving  it  the  lower 
rate  because  of  any  policy  of  its  own 
initiation,  but  if  at  the  more  distant 
point  it  finds  a  condition  to  which  it 
must  conform  under  the  imperious 
law  of  competition  if  it  would  partici- 
pate in  traffic  to  that  point,  it  may 
discriminate  against  the  intermediate 
point  without  violating  the  law,  pro- 
vided it  establishes  such  necessity  be- 
fore the  Commission.  But  to  this 
discrimination  there  may  be  a  limit 
set  by  the  Commission.  The  discrim- 
ination may  not  be  such  as  to  offend 
the  reasonable  standards  of  the  law, 
for  it  is  said  that  the  Commission  may 
from  time  to  time  prescribe  the  extent 
to  which  such  designated  common  ca* 
rier  may  be  relieved  from  the  operation 
of  this  section.  In  what,  then,  does  the 
new  section  4  differ  from  its  prede- 
cessor? It  is  not,  perhaps,  necessary 
to   answer   this   question   in  all   possible 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §4  (1)— (n) 


447 


detail.  Two  things  are  obvious:  In- 
stead of  the  burden  being  upon  the 
complaining  shipper  to  show  the  injus- 
tice done  and  to  parallel  step  by  step 
the  circumstances  and  conditions  at 
the  two  contrasted  points,  the  burden 
now  rests  clearly  upon  the  shoulders 
of  the  carrier  to  make  good  its  own  title 
to  an  order  of  exception;  and,  further, 
this  important  modification,  that  by  the 
elimination  of  the  words  "under  sub- 
stantially similar  circumstances  and 
conditions"  Congress  has  taken  from 
the  law  an  embarrassing  modification 
of  the  prohibition  against  the  higher 
charge  to  the  intermediate  point.  Con- 
gress cut  these  words  from  the  Act 
for  the  same  reason  that  it  cast  the 
burden  upon  the  carriers  to  prove  their 
need  for  the  exception;  it  wished  to 
reduce  the  discrimination  in  rates  be- 
tween points  to  a  minimum  and  to 
make  the  pathway  to  the  exception 
difficult,  and  not  easy.  Railroad  Com- 
mission of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  I. 
C.   C.    329,    341. 

(1)  Under  the  decisions  of  the  courts 
construing  the  fourth  section  of  the 
Act  before  it  was  amended,  it  was  the 
law  that  if  circumstances  and  conditions 
at  the  more  distant  point  were  dis- 
similar carriers  might,  without  re- 
straint, depart  from  the  long-and-short 
haul  rule.  This  virtually  repealed  that 
section  for  the  reason  that  it  is  al- 
ways possible  to  show  in  the  inter- 
lacing network  of  railways  in  this  coun- 
try, and  in  view  of  the  intricate  com- 
mercial conditions,  that  circumstances 
are  different  at  one  point  from  another. 
To  hold  that  carriers  may,  wherever 
the  dissimilarity  exists,  meet  that  com- 
petition or  decline  to  meet  it.  partially 
meet  it  here  and  fully  meet  it  there,  is 
to  hold  that  they  may  without  practical 
restraint  discriminate  between  different 
localities.  The  Commission  was  forced 
to  and  did  dismiss  complaint  after  com- 
plaint upon  the  ground  that  there  was 
a  substantial  dissimilarity  of  conditions 
at  the  more  distant  point  without  in- 
quiring whether  in  point  of  fact  under 
the  circumstances  the  discrimination 
against  the  intermediate  point  should 
have  been  permitted.  That  provision  of 
the  section  authorizing  the  Commission 
to  prescribe  the  instances  in  which 
carriers  might  depart  from  the  rule 
of  the  section  and  the  extent  of  that 
departure  could  be  given  no  practical 
effect.    This  situation  has  been  changed 


by  the  section  as  amended.  The  effect 
of  the  present  section  is  certainly  to 
require  carriers  to  first  obtain  from 
the  Commission  leave  to  depart  from 
the  rule  of  that  section,  and  that  of 
itself  is  a  most  significant  and  im- 
portant thing.  There  is  certainly  a 
wide  difference  between  the  situation 
formerly  when  some  complainant  must 
attack  the  existing  rate  and  make  good 
by  evidence  his  complaint  and  now, 
when  the  railroad  must  assume  the 
burden  of  its  justification.  It  is  a 
matter  of  consequence  tfiat  every  dis- 
crimination of  this  sort  must  be  brought 
directly  to  the  attention  of  the  Com- 
mission and  passed  upon  by  that  body, 
but  something  beyond  this  was  within 
the  legislative  mind.  Bearing  in  mind 
the  authority  which  the  Commission 
now  administers  in  prescribing  a  rea- 
sonable rate  and  in  declaring  and  cor- 
recting an  undue  preference  it  seems 
evident  that  the  purpose  of  Congress 
was  to  commit  to  this  body  the  duty 
of  determining  whether,  if  the  carrier 
was  permitted  to  charge  a  higher  rate 
at  the  intermediate  point,  that  would 
result  in  a  violation  of  the  provisions 
of  the  Act.  But  in  so  doing  the  Com- 
mission cannot  act  arbitrarily.  It  must 
investigate  each  case  and  if  after  such 
investigation  it  is  of  the  opinion  that 
a  departure  from  the  rule  of  the  fourth 
section  would  not  result  in  unreason- 
able rates  or  undue  discrimination  it 
must  permit  that  departure.  If,  upon 
the  other  hand,  it  is  of  the  contrary 
opinion,  it  must  refuse  the  permission. 
Such  is  the  only  possible  construction 
which  can  be  put  upon  this  section 
in  connection  with  the  entire  Act,  and 
if  any  doubt  as  to  the  real  purpose  of 
Congress  could  exist  it  must  be  ef- 
fectively put  at  rest  by  an  examination 
of  the  history  of  the  passage  of  this 
measure.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  400,  409,  410,  412, 
413. 

(m)  Under  the  fourth  section  as 
amended  the  Commission  is  not  to  con- 
sider merely  whether  circumstances  at 
the  two  points  are  dissimilar  but 
whether  on  the  whole  that  dissimilar- 
ity justifies  a  departure  from  the  rule 
of  the  section.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  400,  414. 

(n)  Under  the  amended  fourth-  sec- 
tion it  is  the  duty  of  the  Commission 
to  investigate  each  application  made  by 
a    common    carrier   for   leave   to   depart 


446 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS.  §4  (.1)  — fk) 


established)  that  it  is  to  the  financial 
interest  of  the  transcontinental  car- 
riers to  make  the  same  rates  from  the 
Missouri  River  as  from  Chicago,  Pitts- 
burg and  New  York  to  the  coast  cities 
which  lie  on  or  near  the  ocean's  edge, 
and  compel  the  intermediate  points 
to  base  their  rates  upon  these  coast 
terminals;  but  this  decision  on  their 
part  is  certainly  subject  to  review,  and 
when  Congress  says  that  the  Commis- 
sion "may  from  time  to  time  prescribe 
the  extent  to  which  such  designated 
common  carrier  may  be  relieved  from 
the  operation  of  this  section,"  it  means 
to  lodge  with  the  Commission,  if  it 
means  anything  at  all,  the  power  to 
pass  in  judgment  upon  the  effect  of  a 
railroad  policy  which  departs  from  the 
intendment  of  the  law.  A  community 
is  entitled  to  something  more  than  a 
reasonable  rate;  it  is  entitled  to  a  non- 
discriminatory rate.  A  carrier  may  not 
say,  "We  will  give  to  this  community 
a  reasonable  rate"  and  meet  the  full 
requirement  of  the  law;  it  must  view 
its  rates  as  a  whole  and  see  to  it  that 
they  effect  no  advantage  or  preference 
to  one  community  over  another  which 
does  not  arise  necessarily  out  of  the 
transportation  advantages  which  the 
one  has  over  the  other.  Railroad  Com- 
mission of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  L 
C.    C.    329,   366. 

(j)  The  Commission  must  regard  the 
proviso  in  the  fourth  section  ("That 
upon  application  to  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  such  common  carrier 
may  in  special  cases,  after  investigation, 
be  authorized  by  the  Commission  to 
charge  less  for  longer  than  for  shorter 
distances  for  the  transportation  of  pas- 
sengers or  property;  and  the  Commis- 
sion may  from  time  to  time  prescribe 
the  extent  to  which  such  designated 
common  carrier  may  be  relieved  from 
the  operation  of  this  section:  .  .  .") 
as  subordinate  to  the  preceding  clause 
prohibiting  the  higher  rate  for  the 
shorter  haul,  and  to  carry  out  this  in- 
tent of  the  law  a  carrier  must  es- 
tablish before  the  Commission  in  order 
to  secure  an  order  of  exception  there- 
under more  than  merely  its  own  desire 
to  haul  a  great  volume  of  traffic  be- 
tween two  distant  points;  it  must 
prove  that  by  such  policy  it  will  not 
impose  unreasonable  rates  upon  any 
intermediate  point,  and  that  its  policy 
will  not  work  an  injustice  of  which 
such  intermediate  point  may  fairly  com- 


plain. Unless  it  does  make  such  proof 
the  Commission  is  not  justified  unaer 
the  law  in  excusing  it  from  adopting 
its  rates  to  the  more  distant  point  as 
the  basis  for  rates  to  the  nearer  points. 
Railroad  Commission  of  Nevada  v.  S. 
P.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  329,  368. 

(k)  In  dealing  with  the  Reno  Inter- 
mountain  case  the  Commission  will  re- 
gard these  propositions  as  established: 
(1)  That  the  fourth  section  as  amended 
in  1910  is  as  a  whole  constitutional, 
a  provision  of  law  within  the  proper 
scope  of  Congressional  jurisdiction.  (2) 
That  the  proviso  authorizing  the  Com- 
mission to  permit  exceptions  to  the 
general  prohibition  of  the  section  is  not 
a  grant  of  arbitrary  or  absolute  power, 
but  its  exercise  must  be  limited  and 
conditioned  upon  the  presence  in  special 
cases  of  conditions  and  circumstances 
which  would  make  such  exceptions 
legU  and  proper  and  in  nowise  an- 
tagonistic to  other  provisions  of  the 
Act.  (3)  That  it  must  be  affirmatively 
shown  by  the  carriers  seeking  such  ex- 
ception that  injustice  will  not  be  done  to 
intermediate  points  by  allowing  lower 
rates  at  the  more  distant  points.  (4) 
That  the  intendment  of  the  law  is  to 
make  its  prohibition  of  the  higher  rate 
for  the  shorter  haul  a  rule  of  well- 
nigh  universal  application  from  whicli 
the  Commission  may  deviate  only  in 
special  cases,  and  then  to  meet  trans- 
portation circumstances  which  are  be- 
yond the  carriers'  control;  that  is  to 
say,  a  carrier  shall  not  prefer  the  more 
distant  point  by  giving  it  the  lower 
rate  because  of  any  policy  of  its  own 
initiation,  but  if  at  the  more  distant 
point  it  finds  a  condition  to  which  it 
must  conform  under  the  imperious 
law  of  competition  if  it  would  partici- 
pate in  traffic  to  that  point,  it  may 
discriminate  against  the  intermediate 
point  without  violating  the  law,  pro- 
vided it  establishes  such  necessity  be- 
fore the  Commission.  But  to  this 
discrimination  there  may  be  a  limit 
set  by  the  Commission.  The  discrim- 
ination may  not  be  such  as  to  offend 
the  reasonable  standards  of  the  law, 
for  it  is  said  that  the  Commission  may 
from  time  to  time  prescribe  the  extent 
to  which  such  designated  common  car- 
rier may  be  relieved  from  the  operation 
of  this  section.  In  what,  then,  does  the 
new  section  4  differ  from  its  prede- 
cessor? It  is  not,  perhaps,  necessary 
to   answer   this   question   in  all   possible 


I 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §4  (1)— (n) 


447 


detail.  Two  things  are  obvious:  In- 
stead of  the  burden  being  upon  the 
complaining  shipper  to  show  the  injus- 
tice done  and  to  parallel  step  by  step 
the  circumstances  and  conditions  at 
the  two  contrasted  points,  the  burden 
now  rests  clearly  upon  the  shoulders 
of  the  carrier  to  make  good  its  own  title 
to  an  order  of  exception;  and,  further, 
this  important  modification,  that  by  the 
elimination  of  the  words  "under  sub- 
stantially similar  circumstances  and 
conditions"  Congress  has  taken  from 
the  law  an  embarrassing  modification 
of  the  prohibition  against  the  higher 
charge  to  the  intermediate  point.  Con- 
gress cut  these  words  from  the  Act 
for  the  same  reason  that  it  cast  the 
burden  upon  the  carriers  to  prove  their 
need  for  the  exception;  it  wished  to 
reduce  the  discrimination  in  rates  be- 
tween points  to  a  minimum  and  to 
make  the  pathway  to  the  exception 
difficult,  and  not  easy.  Railroad  Com- 
mission of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  I. 
C.   C.    329,    341. 

(1)  Under  the  decisions  of  the  courts 
construing  the  fourth  section  of  the 
Act  before  it  was  amended,  it  was  the 
law  that  if  circumstances  and  conditions 
at  the  more  distant  point  were  dis- 
similar carriers  might,  without  re- 
straint, depart  from  the  long-and-short 
haul  rule.  This  virtually  repealed  that 
section  for  the  reason  that  it  is  al- 
ways possible  to  show  in  the  inter- 
lacing network  of  railways  in  this  coun- 
try, and  in  view  of  the  intricate  com- 
mercial conditions,  that  circumstances 
are  different  at  one  point  from  another. 
To  hold  that  carriers  may,  wherever 
the  dissimilarity  exists,  meet  that  com- 
petition or  decline  to  meet  it,  partially 
meet  it  here  and  fully  meet  it  there,  is 
to  hold  that  they  may  without  practical 
restraint  discriminate  between  different 
localities.  The  Commission  was  forced 
to  and  did  dismiss  complaint  after  com- 
plaint upon  the  ground  that  there  was 
a  substantial  dissimilarity  of  conditions 
at  the  more  distant  point  without  in- 
quiring whether  in  point  of  fact  under 
the  circumstances  the  discrimination 
against  the  intermediate  point  should 
have  been  permitted.  That  provision  of 
the  section  authorizing  the  Commission 
to  prescribe  the  instances  in  which 
carriers  might  depart  from  the  rule 
of  the  section  and  the  extent  of  that 
departure  could  be  given  no  practical 
effect.     This  situation  has  been  changed 


by  the  section  as  amended.  The  effect 
of  the  present  section  is  certainly  to 
require  carriers  to  first  obtain  from 
the  Commission  leave  to  depart  from 
the  rule  of  that  section,  and  that  of 
itself  is  a  most  significant  and  im- 
portant thing.  There  is  certainly  a 
wide  difference  between  the  situation 
formerly  when  some  complainant  must 
attack  the  existing  rate  and  make  good 
by  evidence  his  complaint  and  now, 
when  the  railroad  must  assume  the 
burden  of  its  justification.  It  is  a 
matter  of  consequence  tfiat  every  dis- 
crimination of  this  sort  must  be  brought 
directly  to  the  attention  of  the  Com- 
mission and  passed  upon  by  that  body, 
but  something  beyond  this  was  within 
the  legislative  mind.  Bearing  in  mind 
the  authority  which  the  Commission 
now  administers  in  prescribing  a  rea- 
sonable rate  and  in  declaring  and  cor- 
recting an  undue  preference  it  seems 
evident  that  the  purpose  of  Congress 
was  to  commit  to  this  body  the  duty 
of  determining  whether,  if  the  carrier 
was  permitted  to  charge  a  higher  rate 
at  the  intermediate  point,  that  would 
result  in  a  violation  of  the  provisions 
of  the  Act.  But  in  so  doing  the  Com- 
mission cannot  act  arbitrarily.  It  must 
investigate  each  case  and  if  after  such 
investigation  it  is  of  the  opinion  that 
a  departure  from  the  rule  of  the  fourth 
section  would  not  result  in  unreason- 
able rates  or  undue  discrimination  it 
must  permit  that  departure.  If,  upon 
the  other  hand,  it  is  of  the  contrary 
opinion,  it  must  refuse  the  permission. 
Such  is  the  only  possible  construction 
which  can  be  put  upon  this  section 
in  connection  with  the  entire  Act,  and 
if  any  doubt  as  to  the  real  purpose  of 
Congress  could  exist  it  must  be  ef- 
fectively put  at  rest  by  an  examination 
of  the  history  of  the  passage  of  this 
measure.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  400,  409,  410,  412, 
413. 

(m)  Under  the  fourth  section  as 
amended  the  Commission  is  not  to  con- 
sider merely  whether  circumstances  at 
the  two  points  are  dissimilar  but 
whether  on  the  whole  that  dissimilar- 
ity justifies  a  departure  from  the  rule 
of  the  section.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  400,  414. 

(n)  Under  the  amended  fourth  sec- 
tion it  is  the  duty  of  the  Commission 
to  investigate  each  application  made  by 
a    common    carrier   for   leave   to   depart 


448 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §4  (o)— §5  Oc) 


from  the  rule  of  the  section.  If  it  is 
of  opinion  upon  a  view  of  the  entire 
situation  that  to  grant  the  application 
will  not  result  in  unjust  or  discrimina- 
tory rates  and  practices,  then  it  should 
b€  granted;  otherwise  it  should  be  de- 
nied, and  the  Commission  may,  if  in 
its  opinion  an  unlimited  departure  from 
the  rule  of  the  section  ought  not  to 
he  granted  but  that  a  limited  departure 
should  be,  prescribe  in  any  way  that 
is  definite  and  certain  the  extent  to 
which  the  departure  may  be  made. 
City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I. 

C.  C.   400,   415. 

(o)  The  amended  fourth  section  pro- 
vides as  did  the  original  section  that 
the  Commission  may  from  time  to  time 
prescribe  the  "extent  to  which  such 
designated  common  carrier  may  be  re- 
lieved from  the  operation  of  this  sec- 
tion." Congress  has  evidently  "had  it  in 
mind  at  all  times  that  cases  might 
arise  where  carriers  should  properly  be 
permitted  to  charge  a  lower  rate  at 
the  more  distant  point,  and  has  in- 
tended to  arm  the  Commission  with 
authority  to  do  justice  in  such  in- 
stances by  permitting  a  deviation  from 
the  rule  of  the  section  and  prescrib- 
ing the  amount  of  that  deviation.  This 
authority  can  be  exercised  by  prescrib- 
ing the  maximum  difference  which  may 
be  made  against  the  intermediate  point, 
or  by  fixing  a  rate  at  the  more  distant 
point  below  which  the  carrier  must 
not  go,  or  by  defining  the  territory 
from  which  the  higher  intermediate 
charge  may  be  made.  City  of  Spokane 
v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I    C.  C.  400,  415. 

III.     APPLICATION      OF     SECTION     4 
TO    RATES. 

§5.     Intermediate    Points. 

(a)  Grand  Junction,  Colo.,  is  located 
near  the  western  boundary  of  that 
state  upon  the  main  line  of  the  D.  & 
R.  G.  R.  R.  4C0.,  330  miles  west  of 
Pueblo  and  291  miles  east  of  Salt  Lake 
City.      TraflBc    from    the    east    over    the 

D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  passes  through  Pueblo 
on  its  way  west.  Traffic  between  the 
•ast  and  Salt  Lake  City  via  the  Colo- 
rado Midland  R.  R.  passes  through 
Grand  Junction  en  route.  The  car- 
riers sought  to  be  relieved  from  the 
operation  of  the  fourth  section  and 
permitted  to  charge  higher  rates  to 
Grand  Junction  than  to  Salt  Lake 
City.      The    average    mileage    from    the 


Missouri  River  to  Salt  Lake  City  via 
the  Union  Pacific  lines  is  1,150  miles, 
while  from  the  same  points  to  Grand 
Junction  the  average  distance  is  942 
miles.  It  was  urged  that  the  cost  of 
handling  business  upon  the  D.  &  R.  G. 
R.  R.  is  so  much  greater  than  upon 
the  Union  Pacific  that  the  higher 
charge  may  properly  be  imposed. 
HELD,  that  upon  the  score  of  distance 
alone  the  carriers  cannot  justify  the 
higher  rate  at  Grand  Junction;  that 
while  the  cost  of  service  is  higher 
upon  the  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  than  upon 
the  Union  Pacific  the  distance  from 
Pueblo  to  Grand  Junction  via  that 
carrier  is  331  miles  as  compared  with 
546  miles  from  Cheyenne  to  Salt  Lake 
City  via  the  lines  of  the  Union  Pacific, 
and  that  the  additional  cost  of  service 
over  the  shorter  distance  is  not  such 
as  to  justify  a  higher  rate  than  is  im- 
posed for  the  longer  haul;  and  there- 
fore the  application  of  the  D.  &  R.  G. 
R.  R.  and  the  Colorado  Midland  R.  R. 
for  permission  to  charge  higher  rates 
at  intermediate  points  than  are  con- 
temporaneously in  effect  to  more  dis- 
tant points  will  be  denied  as  to  all 
west-bound  traffic  originating  at  the 
Missouri  River,  the  Mississippi  River 
and  Chicago  and  similar  rate  territory. 
Grand  Junction  Chamber  of  Commerce 
V.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
115. 

(aa)  The  cost  of  service  is  not  suffi- 
cient justification  for  greater  charge  to 
intermediate  point.  Grand  Junction 
Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  1.  C.  C.  115,  119. 

(b)  A  higher  rate  for  a  shorter  than 
for  the  longer  haul  is  unduly  prejudicial 
to  the  intermediate  point.  Huntingdon 
Lumber  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 

507,  509. 

(bb)  Rates  on  flour  and  other  grain 
products  from  southern  Illinois  to  At- 
lantic seaboard  not  found  to  be  in  viola- 
tion of  section  4,  the  lower  rates  to  longer 
distance  points  being  really  divisions  of 
a  through  rate.  Southern  Illinois  Millers' 
Ass'n  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  672, 
074. 

(c)  A  complaint  that  because  through 
rates  are  much  lower  than  a  combina- 
tion on  an  intermediate  point  such  in- 
termediate poi'^t  cannot  compete  with 
points  from  which  the  through  rate  ap- 
plies  cannot  be   settled   by   a  reduction 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §5  (cc)  — (dd) 


449 


of  local  rates  from  such  intermediate 
point.  R.  R.  Comm.  of  Nev.  v.  N.  C. 
O.   Ry.   Co..   22   I.   C.  C.   205,  215. 

(cc)  The  S.  P.  Co.  petitioned  for  au- 
thority to  continue  a  schedule  of  rates  in 
force  under  which  the  charges  from  San 
Francisco  to  points  intermediate  to  San 
Francisco  and  Portland  were  higher  than 
from  San  Francisco  to  Portland  and  un- 
der which  the  charges  from  Portland  to 
intermediate  points  were  higher  than 
those  from  Portland  to  San  Francisco. 
Under  the  schedule  in  question  the  first 
class  rate  from  San  Francisco  to  Port- 
land by  rail,  746  miles,  was  51c;  from  San 
Francisco  to  Talent,  Ore.,  409  miles, 
$1.66;  from  Sacramento,  a  point  90  miles 
north  of  San  Francisco  and  connecting 
with  San  Francisco  by  water,  to  Port- 
land, 51c,  while  the  same  rate  to  Talent, 
346  miles,  was  $1.57;  from  Marysville,  a 
point  near  the  Sacramento  river  52  miles 
north  of  Sacramento,  to  Portland,  630 
miles,  70c,  while  the  first  class  rate  from 
Marysville  to  Talent,  294  miles,  was  $1.46. 
Other  first  class  rates  were,  from  San 
Francisco  to  Ashland,  Ore.,  404  miles, 
$1.63;  Sacramento  to  Ashland,  340  miles, 
$1.54;  Marysville  to  Ashland,  288  miles, 
$1.43;  San  Francisco  to  Medford,  Ore., 
416  miles,  $1.63;  Sacramento  to  Medford, 
353  miles,  $1.59;  Marysville  to  Medford, 
301  miles,  $1.48.  As  typical  of  this  sched- 
ule, for  the  long  haul  from  San  Francisco 
to  Portland,  the  petitioner  charged  less 
than  one-third  of  the  rate  which  it  im- 
posed upon  an  interior  city  for  a  distance 
little  more  than  half  of  that  from  San 
Francisco  to  Portland.  From  Sacramento, 
the  rate  to  Portland  was  less  than  one- 
third  of  the  rate  from  Sacramento  to  a 
point  just  one-half  as  far.  The  rail  rates 
between  San  Francisco  and  Portland  in 
cither  direction  were  influenced  by  water 
comp-etition,  but  were  not  extremely  low 
for  water  rates.  The  petitioner  received 
the  back  haul  into  southern  Oregon  by 
rail  on  much  of  this  water  traffic  and  was 
benefited  thereby.  The  rail  class  rates 
between  San  Francisco  and  Portland 
made  an  average  of  34.2c,  which  corre- 
sponded with  a  normal  scale  of  rates  be- 
ginning with  65c  for  first  class.  The 
petitioner  extended  the  San  Francisco- 
Portland  rates  to  bay  and  river  points  in 
the  vicinity  of  San  Francisco.  It  made 
no  showing  that  there  was  direct  water 
competition  between  said  points  and 
Portland.  While  extending  San  Francisco- 
Portland  rates  to  points  on  the  south  of 


San  Francisco,  it  did  not  extend  San 
Francisco-Portland  rates  to  points  on  the 
Williamette  river  on  the  north  and  of- 
fered no  explanation  for  this  discrimina- 
tion. Sacramento  had  the  same  rate  to 
Portland  that  San  Francisco  had  and  had 
the  same  first  class  rate  to  Oregon  City, 
Salem,  Albany,  Eugene,  and  Roseburg, 
Ore.,  but  to  Medford,  Ore.,  Sacramento 
had  a  lower  rate  than  San  Francisco.  No 
explanation  of  this  adjustment  was  of- 
fered. While  the  rates  from  Sacramento 
to  Portland  and  Albany,  a  point  80  miles 
south  of  Portland,  were  the  same  as  those 
from  San  Francisco  to  Portland  and  Al- 
bany, the  rate  from  Albany  to  San  Fran- 
cisco was  15c  less  than  the  rate  from 
Albany  to  Sacramento.  No  reason  was 
given  for  this  adjustment.  While  the  peti- 
tioner made  no  differential  between  Sac- 
ramento and  San  Francisco  on  traffic 
moving  to  Portland,  it  did  make  a  differ- 
ential on  traffic  moving  to  San  Francisco 
from  Oregon  City  and  Portland.  HELD, 
the  petitioner  had  failed  to  justify  the 
violation  of  the  long  and  short  haul 
clause  of  section  4  of  the  Act  in  the  ap- 
plication of  (1)  the  same  rates  from 
other  points  upon  San  Francisco  bay  and 
points  inland  to  Portland  as  were  ex- 
tended from  San  Francisco;  (2)  higher 
rates  southbound  from  Portland  to  points 
inland  than  to  San  Francisco;  (3)  higher 
rates  to  points  on  the  Wiiiiamette  river 
on  traffic  northbound  from  Sai  Francisco 
than  were  applied  on  traffic  southbound 
from  Portland  to  points  on  the  Sacra- 
mento river;  (4)  rates  from  San  Fran- 
cisco that  were  higher  to  points  between 
San  Francisco  and  Portland  than  the 
combination  of  locals  on  Portland;  (5) 
unreasonably  higher  rates  at  intermediate 
points.  In  Re  Application  of  the  S.  P.  Co. 
for  Relief  under  the  Provisions  of  the  4th 
Section,  22  I.  C.  C.  366,  376. 

(d)  Wherever  rates  to  intermediate 
points  are  made  upon  rates  to  more  dis- 
tant points,  the  Commission  should  not 
only  call  upon  the  carrier  to  establish 
the  nature  of  the  competition  between  the 
basing  points,  but  may  properly  require 
the  carrier  to  convince  the  Commission 
that  the  rates  so  made  do  not  result  in 
unreasonable  rates  to  intermediate  points. 
In  Re  Application  of  the  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I. 
C.  C.  366,  374. 

(dd)  In  making  rates  to  intermediate 
points  based  on  a  more  distant  point,  the 
carrier  should  give  to  the  intermediate 
point  the  benefit  of  the  rate  to  the  farther 


452 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §5  (kk)— (n) 


until  an  actual  test  has  been  made.  Com- 
mercial Club,  Salt  Lake  City,  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  218. 

(kk)  The  present  commodity  rates 
charged  by  the  Great  Northern  and  the 
Northern  Pacific  R.  Rs.,  from  eastern  ter- 
ritory to  Spokane,  are  unreasonable, 
and  just  and  reasonable  rates  which 
ought  not  to  be  exceeded  for  the  future 
would  be  those  which  are  set  forth  in 
schedule  A  attached.  In  fixing  these 
rates  the  Commission  has  proceeded  upon 
the  view  that  under  the  present  decisions 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  it  could  not  use  the  rate  to  Seattle 
as  a  standard  by  which  to  measure  that 
to  Spokane.  If  this  were  otherwise,  if  it 
were  free  to  take  into  account  all  the 
competitive  conditions  existing  both  east 
and  west,  and  to  determine  what  in  the 
light  of  all  these  conditions  would  be  a 
just  and  reasonable  relation  between  the 
rates  of  Seattle  and  Spokane,  a  somewhat 
different  question  would  be  presented. 
City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.  162,  174. 

(1)  Baker  City  and  LaGrand,  Ore.,  are 
located  upon  the  main  line  of  the  Ore. 
R.  &  N.  Co.,  and  are  distant  from  Omaha, 
1,442  and  1,494  miles  respectively.  Walla 
Walla  is  upon  a  branch  of  the  same  com- 
pany leading  from  Pendleton  to  Spokane, 
and  is  1,615  miles  from  Spokane.  In  the 
past  the  U.  P.  R.  R.  has  maintained  rates 
at  LaGrand  and  Baker  City  which  were 
somewhat  higher  than  those  to  Pendleton 
from  both  St.  Paul  and  Omaha.  The  dis- 
tance from  St.  Paul  to  Spokane  is  1,500 
miles,  from  Omaha  to  Baker  City  and 
LaGrand,  1,442  and  1,494  miles  respect- 
ively. HELD,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
the  Commission  can  with  any  consistency 
allow  higher  rates  to  these  points  from 
Omaha  than  are  established  from  St.  Paul 
to  Spokane.  There  is  no  condition  of  con- 
struction or  operation  or  financial  result 
that  would  justify  the  Union  Pacific  lines 
in  maintaining  a  higher  rate  for  1,500 
miles  from  Omaha  west  toward  Portland 
than  is  maintained  by  the  N.  P.  and  G. 
N.  R.  Rs.  for  a  corresponding  distance 
from  St.  Paul  towards  Seattle;  and  that 
the  class  and  commodity  rates  specified 
in  the  Commission's  schedule  A  would 
be  just  and  reasonable  rates  to  be  ap- 
plied by  the  Union  Pacific  lines  and  their 
eastern  connections  from  the  defined  ter- 
ritories therein  named  to  Baker  City,  La 
Grand    and    Pendleton,    Ore.,   and   Walla 


Walla,  Wash.     City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  162,  177. 

(11)  A  movement  of  traffic  may  be 
affected  by  water  competition  at  a 
more  distant  point  and  yet  a  rate  made 
up  of  the  combination  of  the  rate  by 
water  plus  the  rate  back  be  unreason- 
able and  unjust.  Nevada,  Utah,  Arizona 
and  Idaho  are  nearer  to  the  Pacific 
coast  than  to  the  Atlantic,  but  this 
does  not  of  itself  justify  charging  them 
overland  rail  rates  which  will  give 
them  none  of  the  advantages  arising 
out  of  their  shorter  distance  to  an 
eastern  base  of  supplies,  nor  does  it 
follow  that  a  rate  to  a  point  on  the 
seaboard  is  lower  than  would  be  justi- 
fied if  that  point  were  not  so  situated. 
In  short  it  is  not  sufficient  to  state 
that  the  terminal  points  are  situated 
on  the  water  to  excuse  the  imposition 
of  higher  rates  at  intermediate  points. 
Railroad  Commission  of  Nevada  v.  S. 
P.    Co.,    19   I.    C.    C.    238,    250. 

(m)  The  mere  fact  that  a  rate  to 
an  intermediate  point  is  as  high  as  that 
to  a  more  distant  point  on  the  same 
line  in  the  same  direction  does  not 
constitute  a  violation  of  the  fourth 
section  of  the  Act.  Wheeling  Corru- 
gating Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
I.    C.    C.    125,    126. 

(mm)  The  application  of  the  same 
rate  to  an  intermediate  point  for  a 
shorter  distance  as  that  to  the  more  dis- 
tant point  is  not  in  violation  of  the  long- 
and-short-haul  clause  of  section  4  of 
the  Act.  League  of  Southern  Idano 
Commercial  Clubs  v.  Oregon  Short  Line 
R.   R.   Co.,   18   I.   C.   C.   562,   565. 

(n)  Complainants  attacked  the  rate 
of  85c  on  hard  wood  lumber  in  car- 
loads from  various  points  along  and 
west  of  the  Mississippi  River  to  San 
Francisco  and  other  Pacific  terminals. 
In  Burgess  v.  Transcontinental  Freight 
Bureau,  13  I.  C.  C.  668,  the  Commis- 
sion found  that  the  rate  of  85c  per  100 
lbs.  on  hard  wood  lumber  in  carloads 
from  Chicago  and  Chicago  points  and 
from  Mississippi  River  points,  including 
Memphis,  Tenn.,  to  Pacific  terminals 
was  excessive  and  should  not  ex- 
ceed 75c,  and  complainants  in  that  case 
were  awarded  reparation  on  the  basis 
of  75c  on  shipments  made  subsequent 
to  the  filing  of  the  petition.  For  many 
years  carriers  had  maintained  the  same 
rate  to  Pacific  terminals  on  hard  wood 
lumber    from    Chicago    and    Chicago-rate 


LONG  AND  SHORT^  HAULS,  §5  (nn)  — (q) 


453 


territory,  Mississippi  River  common 
points  and  Missouri  River  common 
points,  as  well  as  from  points  in  Ar- 
kansas, Oklahoma,  Missouri  and  Ne- 
braska. When  the  order  in  the  Burgess 
case  was  entered  the  carriers  subse- 
quently put  into  effect  from  the  points 
in  question  the  75c  rate,  making  it 
applicable  to  all  the  territory  to  which 
the  85c  rate  had  applied.  The  points 
in  question  west  of  the  Mississippi 
River  are  intermediate  to  the  points 
involved  in  the  Burgess  case  and  the 
Pacific  coast.  Most  of  the  shipments 
involved  in  the  present  case  moved 
from  points  of  origin  farther  west  and 
were  therefore  hauled  shorter  distances. 
Defendants  submitted  no  evidence  show- 
ing the  rates  attacked  to  be  reasonable. 
HELD,  the  85c  rate  was  unreasonable. 
Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis  of  75c 
on  shipments  made  subsequent  to  the 
date  of  the  filing  of  the  complaint  in 
the  Burgess  case  but  not  upon  ship- 
ments made  prior  to  that  date.  Kinde- 
lon    V.    S.    P.    Co.,    17   L    C.    C.    251,    253. 

(nn)  The  southern  route  of  the  Ore- 
gon Short  Line  extends  from  Granger, 
Wyo.,  through  Pocatello,  Idaho,  to 
Huntington,  Ore.,  at  which  point  it 
joins  the  Oregon  Railroad  &  Naviga- 
tion Co.,  which  in  turn  connects  at 
Wallula  Junction,  Wash.,  with  the  N. 
P.  Ry.,  on  whose  rails  the  city  of  Ta- 
coma  is  situated.  The  northern  route 
of  the  Oregon  Short  Line  runs  from 
Pocatello,  north  through  Blackfoot,  Ida- 
ho Falls  and  Dubois,  Idaho,  thence  to 
Red  Rock  and  beyond  to  Silver  Bow, 
Mont.,  making  a  junction  at  Silver  Bow 
with  the  N.  P.  Ry.  Glenn's  Ferry  and 
Mountain  Home  are  on  the  southern 
route  in  Idaho  and  intermediate  to 
Pocatello  and  Huntington.  On  12  car- 
loads of  cattle  shipped  from  Glenn's 
Ferry  and  17  carloads  shipped  from 
Mountain  Home  to  Tacoma  over  the 
southern  route,  complainant  was  as- 
sessed $145  per  car.  A  10-car  rate 
of  $129.80  to  Tacoma  was  in  effect  at 
the  same  time  over  the  southern  route 
from  Blackfoot,  Idaho  Falls  and  Red 
Rock  to  Tacoma,  which  points  are  lo- 
cated on  the  northern  route  and  at 
considerably  greater  distances  from  Ta- 
coma than  Mountain  Home  and  Glenn's 
Ferry.  Defendant  attempted  to  justify 
this  apparent  violation  of  section  4 
by  showing  that  the  northern  and  south- 
ern routes  were  in  competition  for  busi- 
ness    and     the     lower    rates     over     the 


southern  route  from  Blackfoot,  Idaho 
Falls  and  Red  Rock  resulted  from  this 
fact.  It  appeared,  however,  that  at  the 
time  of  shipment  no  lO-carload  rate  was 
in  effect  from  Red  Rock  over  the  north- 
ern route  and  that  the  single-car  rate 
was  $138.  Shortly  after  the  shipments 
in  question  the  10-carload  rate  of  $129.80 
from  Blackfoot  and  Idaho  Falls  over 
the  southern  route  to  Tacoma  was  can- 
celed, and  defendant  also  voluntarily 
withdrew  the  10-car  rate  of  $145  from 
Glenn's  Ferry  and  Mountain  Home  and 
substituted  a  single  car  rate  of  $132  and 
$131.80  respectively.  HELD,  the  rates 
charged  were  unreasonable,  but  since 
the  violation  of  section  4  was  not  spe- 
cifically alleged  in  the  complaint,  rep- 
aration should  be  awarded  on  the  basis 
of  the  then  newly  established  rates  of 
$132  and  $131.80.  Carstens  Packing  Co. 
V.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  324, 
327. 

(o)  The  rate  on  laths  in  carloads 
from  Pembine,  Wis.,  to  Chicago  is  10c; 
a  charge  of  22i^c  from  Beecher  Lake, 
Wis.,  lying  intermediate,  is  excessive, 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  defendant 
shortly  after  the  shipment  in  question 
applied  the  Pembine  rate  to  Beecher 
Lake  and  the  circumstances  and  condi- 
tions affecting  the  two  points  appear 
similar.  Reparation  awarded.  Neufeld 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
26,    27. 

(oo)  A  high  rate  to  an  intermediate 
point  cannot  reasonably  exceed  the 
rate  to  a  competitive  point  plus  the 
local  back.  Valley  Flour  Mills  v.  A. 
T.   &   S.   F.   Ry.   Co.,   16   I.   C.   C.   73,   78. 

(p)  A  rate  from  an  intermediate 
point  should  not  exceed  that  from  a 
farther  distant  point.  Davenport  Com- 
mercial Club  V.  Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co., 
16   I.   C.  C.   209. 

(q)  Baden,  Miss.,  is  intermediate  to 
Tutwiler,  Miss.,  and  Davenport,  la, 
Kirkpatrick,  Miss.,  is  intermediate  to 
Drew,  Miss.,  and  Davenport,  la.  De- 
fendants charged  higher  rates  on  ship- 
ments of  cypress  lumber  from  Baden 
and  Kirkpatrick  to  Davenport  than 
from  Tutwiler  and  Drew,  respectively, 
to  Davenport.  They  also  charged  one 
cent  higher  than  the  lawful  rate  on 
shipments  from  Tutwiler  to  Davenport. 
HELD,  that  although  the  rates  were  not 
proved  unreasonable  per  se,  the  charges 
from  Baden  and  Kirkpatrick  were  in 
violation   of   section   4   of   the   Act,   and 


454 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §5  (r)— (w) 


complainant  was  entitled  to  reparation 
on  shipments  from  these  points  on  the 
basis  of  tne  legal  rates  from  Tutwiler 
and  Drew,  and  was  also  entitled  to 
reparation  for  the  one  cent  overcharge 
on  shipments  from  Tutwiler  to  Daven- 
port. Davenport  Commercial  Club  v. 
Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  209 
210. 

(r)  Prior  to  January  3,  1908,  the 
rate  on  chairs  in  carloads  from  Ply- 
mouth, Wis.,  to  Chicago,  and  from 
Grafton,  Wis.,  an  intermediate  point, 
to  Chicago,  was  15c  per  100  lbs.  under 
a  long-and-short-haul  tariff  provision. 
January  3,  1908,  defendant  canceled 
this  provision  and  charged  17i/^c  from 
Grafton  to  Chicago,  while  charging 
only  15c  from  Plymouth.  Sept.  1,  1908, 
defendant  extended  the  Plymouth  rate 
to  Grafton.  HELD,  that  on  shipments 
made  between  January  3  and  Septem- 
ber 1,  1908,  from  Grafton,  complainant 
was  entitled  to  reparation  on  the  basis 
of  the  15c  rate.  Milwaukee  Falls  Chair 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.  C.  217,  217. 

(s)  Rates  from  Chicago  and  Cincin- 
nati territory,  including  Indianapolis,  to 
Arkansas  common  points  are  ordinarily 
constructed  on  differentials  above  the 
rates  from  East  St.  Louis.  These  differ- 
entials apply  on  all  traffic  from  Chicago 
and  Cincinnati,  but  on  furniture,  chairs, 
barrels,  ladders,  etc.,  they  do  not  apply 
from  Indianapolis,  the  local  class  rates 
to  East  St.  Louis  being  charged  on 
such  shipments.  The  rates  at  the  time 
of  hearing  on  furniture,  chairs,  wooden- 
ware  and  vehicles  were,  from  Chicago 
and  Cincinnati  to  East  St.  Louis,  9, 
9,  10  and  9c,  respectively,  while  from 
Indianapolis  they  were  32^,  321/^,  16% 
and  161/^c,  respectively.  While  accord- 
ing to  Indianapolis  on  traffic  generally 
the  same  rates  to  Arkansas  as  from 
Chicago,  defendants  testified  that  they 
had  excepted  the  articles  complained 
of  from  the  application  of  the  Chicago 
rates  because  the  rates  on  these  articles 
from  Indianapolis  shipped  in  other  di- 
rections, similar  distances  to  those  be- 
tween Indianapolis  and  Arkansas  points, 
were  much  higher  than  the  Chicago  to 
Arkansas  rate.  The  carriers  contended 
that  any  change  in  Indianapolis  rates 
would  bring  down  the  entire  Central 
Freight  Association  territory  adjust- 
ment or  else  disturb  the  parity  existing 
between  Indianapolis  and  other  points 
in  that  territory.     HELD,   that  being  a 


shorter  average  distance  from  Arkansas 
points  than  Cincinnati,  and  traffic  from 
the  latter  place  in  many  cases  passing 
through  it,  Indianapolis  was  entitled  to 
the  same  rates  on  the  commodities  com- 
plained of  as  charged  from  Cincinnati. 
Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C. 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  254,  271, 
272. 

(t)  Defendants  exacted  a  rate  of  97c 
on  a  carload  of  beet  sugar  from  Las 
Animas,  Colo.,  to  Romero,  Tex.,  no 
through  rate  being  in  force,  the  charge 
being  the  sum  of  the  locals.  At  the  time 
of  shipment  a  through  rate  of  49c  from 
other  points,  to  which  Las  Animas  is 
intermediate,  was  in  force,  which  de- 
fendants later  applied  to  Las  Animas. 
HELD,  the  rate  attacked  was  unrea- 
sonable and  complainant  was  entitled  to 
reparation  on  the  basis  of  49c.  Ameri- 
can Beet  Sugar  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R. 
R.   Co.,   16   I.    C.   C.   288. 

(u)  Where  at  an  intermediate  point 
and  longer-distance  point  circumstances 
and  conditions  are  substantially  similar, 
a  higher  rate  to  the  former  must  be 
condemned.  Heileman  Brewing  Co.  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  396, 
397. 

(v)  On  beer  in  carloads  from  La 
Crosse,  Wis.,  to  Granite  Falls,  Minn., 
the  rate  was  15c,  but  was  not  applicable 
to  Glencoe,  an  intermediate  point  in 
Minnesota.  On  shipments  to  Glencoe, 
complainant  was  assessed  a  rate  of 
19.3c.  HELD,  the  charge  was  unrea- 
sonable. Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  15c.  Heileman  Brewing  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C. 
396. 

(w)  The  Col.  &  S.  E.  Ry.  was  owned 
by  a  coal  company  competing  with  com- 
plainants. Joint  rates  were  in  effect 
between  the  C.  &  S.  E.  Ry.  and  the 
Santa.  Fe  Ry.  from  points  upon  the  C. 
&  S.  E.  Ry.  to  points  upon  the  Santa 
Fe  east  and  south  of  Trinidad,  which 
took  the  same  rate  as  to  Trinidad. 
Complainant's  competitor  had  a  track- 
age contract  with  the  C.  &  S.  R.  R. 
under  which  its  coal  moved  from  Lud- 
low to  Trinidad.  Complainant  was  lo- 
cated at  Ludlow.  No  joint  rates  were 
in  effect  between  the  C.  &  S.  R.  R. 
and  the  Santa  Fe  and  the  local  rate 
from  Ludlow  to  Trinidad  for  shipment 
beyond  was  such  as  to  give  the  compet- 
ing company  an  advantage  of  40c  per 
ton    over    complainants    upon    shipments 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §5  (x)_(ff) 


455 


to  points  on  the  Santa  Fe,  although  the 
competing  coal  moved  by  the  mines  of 
complainants.  HELD,  the  rates  were 
unduly  discriminatory.  Defendants  or- 
dered to  desist  from  according  to  coal 
originating  upon  the  C.  &  S.  E.  Ry.  for 
points  upon  the  Santa  Fe  lower  rates 
than  was  given  to  complainants  at 
Ludlow  and  that  defendants  should 
state  the  division  of  the  joint  rate  al- 
lowed to  the  C.  &  S.  E.  Ry.  in  order 
that  the  competing  coal  company  should 
not  gain  an  advantage  in  that  respect. 
Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.   F.   Ry.   Co.,   16   I.   C.   C.  402,   403,  404. 

(x)  A  lower  rate  to  a  more  distant 
point  on  the  same  line  is  in  violation 
of  the  fourth  section  of  the  Act,  and 
is  therefore  unlawful.  It  might  also  be 
declared  unlawful  because  discrimi- 
natory. Sunderland  Bros.  Co  v.  C.  & 
N.   W.    Ry.    Co.,    16   I.   C.   C.    433,   434. 

(y)  Defendant  ordered  to  establish 
and  maintain  for  a  period  of  not  less 
than  two  years  a  rate  from  Superior, 
Neb.,  to  Lusk,  Wyo.,  that  shall  not 
exceed  the  rate  contemporaneously 
maintained  from  Superior  to  Douglas, 
Wyo.,  a  farther  distant  point.  Sunder- 
land Bros.  Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
16    I.    C.    C.    433,    434. 

(z)  Low  short-line  rate  to  a  longer- 
distance  point  justifies  lower  rates  than 
to  intermediate  points  on  a  longer  line. 
Fort  Dodge  Commercial  Club  v.  111. 
Cent.    R.    R.    Co.,    16    I.    C.    C.    572,    575. 

(aa)  Where  a  through  rate  from 
Chicago,  St.  Louis  and  similar  points  to 
Tucumcari,  N.  M.,  a  point  on  the 
Rock  Island  system  59  miles  east  of 
Santa  Rosa,  N.  M.,  plus  the  local  rate 
from  Tucumcari  to  Santa  Rosa,  w^as  made 
less  than  the  through  rate  to  Santa 
Rosa,  such  adjustments  of  rates  is  to 
be  condemned  and  should  be  revised  so 
that  the  through  rate  should  not  exceed 
the  sum  of  the  locals.  Moise  Brothers 
Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
550,    557. 

(bb)  On  a  carload  of  poles  from 
Laporte,  Minn.,  to  Louisville,  Ky.,  via 
Peoria,  111.,  complainant  was  assessed- 
31c.  The  rate  from  Bemidji  to  Peoria 
was  16c  and  from  Peoria  to  Louisville, 
lie,  a  total  of  27c.  Laporte  was  inter- 
mediate to  Bemidji  and  Peoria.  The 
tariff  containirg  the  Bemidji  rate  did 
not  specifically  apply  same  to  Laporte, 
but    said    rate   was    customarily    so    ap- 


plied and  defendants  admitted  its  ap- 
plicability. Subsequent  to  the  ship- 
ment in  question  said  16c  rate  was  ap- 
plied from  Laporte  to  Peoria.  HELD, 
the  31c  rate  was  unreasonable.  Repa- 
ration awarded  on  the  basis  of  27c.  Du- 
luth  Log  Co.  V.  M.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.  C.  192,  194. 

(cc)  Because  the  revenue  per  ton 
mile  yielded  by  rates  from  farther  dis- 
tant points  is  less  than  that  yielded 
by  rates  from  a  shorter  distant  point, 
it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  the 
latter  is  subjected  to  unjust  discrimina- 
tion. Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v. 
C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
504. 

(dd)  The  Commission  views  with  dis- 
favor the  maintenance  of  a  lower  rate 
for  a  longer  haul  than  for  a  shorter 
haul  included  within  the  longer,  and  the 
circumstances  and  conditions  obtaining 
at  the  more  distant  point  which  are 
relied  upon  to  justify  it  must  not  only 
be  clearly  shown  to  be  substantially 
dissimilar  from  those  prevailing  at  the 
nearer  point,  but  also  to  clearly  exer- 
cise a  potent  or  controlling  influence  in 
making  the  lower  rate.  Bovaird  Supply 
Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C. 
C.    56,    64. 

(ee)  Dissimilar  circumstances  which 
justify  a  greater  charge  for  a  shorter 
than  for  a  longer  haul  under  section  4 
will  also  prevent  such  rate  from  consti- 
tuting an  illegal  preference  or  advan- 
tage under  section  3.  Bovaird  Supply 
Co.    V.    A.    T.    &    S.    F.    Ry.    Co.,    13    I. 

c.  c.  56,  ee. 

(ff)  A  less  charge  for  a  longer  haul 
than  for  a  shorter  one,  where  the  latter 
is  included  within  the  former,  is  not 
unlawful  under  section  4  of  the  Act, 
if  there  is  substantial  dissimilarity  of 
circumstances  and  conditions.  Compe- 
tition between  carriers  at  the  more  dis- 
tant point  may  create  substantial  dis- 
similarity of  circumstances.  A  com- 
modity may  be  produced  at  two  points 
widely  distant  from  each  other  and 
different  carriers  may  serve  the  differ- 
ent points.  The  commodity  from  one 
point  of  production  may  meet  that  from 
the  other  in  competition  in  a  common 
territory  between  the  two  points.  If 
the  carriers  serving  the  one  point  of 
production  make  a  reasonable  and  re- 
munerative rate  therefrom  to  the  com- 
mon field  of  consumption,  the  other 
producing   point   may   be   given   equality 


456 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §5  (gg)— (ww) 


of  rates  to  the  common  competing  ter- 
ritory by  the  carriers  serving  such 
point  of  production,  if  such  equalizing 
in  rates  is  reasonable  and  remunerative. 
Bovaird  Supply  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,    13    I.    C.    C.    56,    62. 

(gg)  The  long-and-short-haul  clause 
of  the  Act  prohibits  the  charging  of  a 
higher  rate  to  a  less  distant  point  only 
where  the  carrier  responsible  for  both 
rates  occupies  a  like  relation  to  the 
more  distant  point  to  which  the  lower 
rate  applies.  Railroad  Commission  of 
Kentucky  v.  L.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I. 
C.    C.    300,    309. 

(hh)  Rate  on  wall  plaster  in  carloads 
from  Marlow,  Okla.,  to  Amsterdam,  N.  Y., 
found  unreasonable  to  the  extent  that  it 
exceeded  the  rate  from  Marlow  to  New 
York  City,  Amsterdam  being  intermedi- 
ate. Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I. 
&  P  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  4. 

(ii)  Combination  rate  applied  on  ship- 
ment of  cement  from  Marlow,  Okla.,  to 
Amsterdam,  N.  Y.  Joint  through  rate  in 
effect  from  Marlow,  Okla.,  to  New  York 
City.  Rate  to  Amsterdam  held  unreason- 
able to  the  extent  of  rate  to  Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam  being  intermediate.  Acme 
Plaster  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  4. 

(jj)  Rate  on  corn  from  Bingham,  la., 
to  St.  Charles,  Mo.,  found  unreasonable 
to  the  extent  that  it  exceeded  the  rate 
from  Bingham,  la.,  to  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  St. 
Charles  being  intermediate.  Langenberg 
Bros.  V.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  6. 

(kk)  Rate  on  pig  iron,  9c  per  100  lbs. 
from  Mayville,  Wis.,  to  West  Chicago,  111., 
$1  per  gross  ton  to  Joliet,  which  is  inter- 
mediate to  West  Chicago.  HELD,  un- 
reasonable. Northwestern  Iron  Co.  v.  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  9. 

(11)  Rate  on  lumber  from  West  Lake, 
La.,  to  Towner,  Colo.,  found  unreasonable 
to  extent  of  exceeding  rate  contempo- 
raneously in  effect  between  West  Lake 
and  Colorado  common  points,  Towner 
being  an  intermediate  point.  Foster 
Lumber  Co.  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  68. 

(mm)  A  through  joint  rate  of  39c  per 
100  lbs.  on  a  carload  of  watermelons 
from  Vincennes,  Ind.,  to  Owatonna,  Minn., 
when  there  was  a  joint  through  rate  of 
23c  per  100  lbs.  over  the  same  lines  from 
Vincennes  to  Faribault,  Minn.,  15  miles 
beyond  Owatonna,  found  unreasonable  to 


the  extent  it  exceeded  23c.     Stacy  &  Sons 
V.  E.  &  T.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  69. 

(nn)  Reparation  awarded  on  shipment 
of  charcoal  pig  iron  from  Elk  Rapids, 
Mich.,  to  Hamilton  and  Brantford,  Can- 
ada, on  basis  of  lower  rate  in  effect  to  a 
farther  distant  point.  Superior  Charcoal 
Iron  Co.  V.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  8G. 

(oo)  Rates  on  common  building  brick 
from  Mound  Valley,  Kan.,  to  Bellevue, 
Neb.,  should  not  exceed  rates  to  Omaha, 
Neb.  Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  128. 

(pp)  Rate  on  lumber  from  Tony, 
Wis.,  to  Zumbrota,  Minn.,  should  not  ex- 
ceed that  in  effect  from  Ingram,  Wis. 
Partridge  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S. 
Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  138. 

(qq)  Rate  applicable  to  point  46  miles 
beyond,  but  not  to  point  of  destination. 
HELD,  unreasonable,  and  reparation 
awarded.  Holverscheid  &  Co.  v.  L.  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  158. 

(rr)  Reparation  claimed  on  basis  of 
higher  rate  in  effect  to  an  intermediate 
point.  Commission  does  not  find  that 
Merrill,  Wis.,  is  intermediate  to  Grand 
Rapids,  Wis.  Dismissed.  Wisconsin 
Pulp  &  Paper  Mfrs.  v.  D.  &  I.  R.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  225. 

(ss)  Rate  canceled  to  prevent  an  ap- 
parent discrimination  in  favor  of  an  in- 
termediate point.  Isbell-Brown  Co.  v.  L. 
S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  231. 

(tt)  Rates  applicable  to  intermediate 
points  canceled  through  error.  Subse- 
quently restored.  Reparation  awarded. 
Mason  City  Brick  &  Tile  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  287. 

(uu)  Rate  on  crude  oil  from  Stoy,  111., 
to  points  in  Indiana  should  not  exceed 
those  in  effect  to  Muncie,  Ind.,  a  farther 
distant  point  on  the  same  line.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Standard  Oil  Co,  v.  I.  S. 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  319. 

(vv)  Higher  rate  in  effect  to  inter- 
mediate point  than  to  farther  distant 
point  on  the  same  line.  Reparation 
iwarded.  Fort  Scott  Sorghum  Syrup  Co. 
V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  339. 

(ww)  Rate  lower  from  Missouri  River 
to  Eads,  Colo.,  than  from  intermediate 
point  voluntarily  reduced.  Reparation 
awarded  and  reduced  rate  ordered  to  be 
maintained  for  two  years.  Burno  v.  M.  K. 
T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  488. 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §5  (xx)— §6  (f) 


457 


(xx)  Reparation  awarded  in  connec- 
tion with  shipments  of  beer  and  beer 
packages  to  and  from  points  intermediate 
to  Colorado  common-point  territory  be- 
cause of  exaction  of  rates  higher  than 
common-point  rates.  Anheuser-Busch 
Brewing  Ass'n  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  TJnrep. 
Op.  497. 

(yy)  Lower  rates  in  effect  to  more 
distant  point  on  same  line.  Subsequently 
reduced;  reparation  awarded.  Standard 
Oil  Co.  V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  513. 

(zz)  Rate  from  intermediate  point 
higher  than  from  farther  distant  point. 
HELD,  unreasonable,  and  reparation 
awarded.  Greer-Wilkinson  Lumber  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  &  S,  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  541. 

(aaa)  Rate  to  point  more  distant 
lower  than  to  intermediate  point.  Rep- 
aration awarded  and  lower  rate  estab- 
lished.    Burlington   Lumber  Co.  v.   C.   & 

A.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  577. 

§6.     Intermediate    Points    off    Line. 

(a)  The  fact  that  Little  Rock  and 
Van  Buren,  Ark.,  are  intermediate  to 
Coffeyville,  Kan.,  and  Memphis,  Tenn., 
on  the  line  of  one  carrier  does  not 
render  another  carrier  running  between 
Coffeyville  and  Memphis,  transporting 
petroleum  between  said  points  which  it 
does  not  carry  through  either  Van 
Buren  or  Little  Rock,  liable  for  vio- 
lating the  fourth  section  of  the  Act  for 
maintaining  higher  rates  to  such  points 
from  Coffeyville  than  to  Memphis.  Mer- 
chants' Freight  Bureau  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
21   L  C.  C.  573,  576. 

(b)  While  George's  Creek  mines  are 
on  lateral  roads  tliey  must  be  regarded 
as  intermediate  for  all  practical  rate- 
making  purposes.  Violation  of  the  4th 
section    found.      American    Coal    Co.    v. 

B.  &   O.  R.   R.   Co.,  17  I.   C.  C.   149,   156. 

(c)  Port  Gibson,  Miss.,  is  located  on 
the  main  line  of  the  Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  R. 
Co.,  about  10  miles  west  of  Hermanville 
and  seven  miles  from  the  east  bank 
of  the  Mississippi  River.  Hermanville 
is  located  on  a  branch  of  that  railroad, 
and  both  cities  are  substantially  the 
same  distance  from  New  Orleans.  De- 
fendant's rate  on  compressed  cotton 
was  from  Port  Gibson  to  New  Orleans 
22i^c  and  from  Hermanville  27c.  The 
lower  rate  from  Port  Gibson  had  orig- 
inally arisen  on  account  of  water  com- 
petition,   which    had    ceased.      The    Port 


Gibson  rate  on  uncompressed  cotton 
was  only  2c  less  than  that  from  Her- 
manville. HELD,  the  4i^c  difference  on. 
compressed  cotton  was  unreasonable 
and  the  Hermanville  rate  should  not 
exceed  the  Port  Gibson  rate  by  more 
than  two  cents.  Reparation  denied. 
Planters'  Gin  &  Compress  Co.  v.  Y.  & 
M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  131,  132,  133. 

(d)  Upon  a  carload  of  dried  fruit 
in  boxes  from  Fresno,  Cal.,  to  Bozeman, 
Mont.,  complainant  was  assessed  a 
rate  of  $1.32,  made  up  of  the  joint 
through  rate  of  $1  from  Fresno  to  Hel- 
ena, Mont.,  plus  the  local  rate  of  32c 
from  Helena  to  Bozeman.  On  a 
similar  shipment  from  Fresno  to  Bill- 
ings, Mont.,  complainant  was  assessed 
$1,371/^,  made  up  of  the  local  rate  of 
371/^c  from  Fresno  to  Lathrop,  Cal., 
plus  the  joint  through  rate  of  $1  from 
Lathrop  to  Billings.  Bozeman  is  lo- 
cated on  defendant's  line  140  miles 
west  of  Billings.  Helena  and  Butte, 
Mont.,  are  98  and  96  miles  respectively 
west  of  Bozeman.  The  joint  through 
rate  from  Fresno  to  Helena  and  Butte 
is  $1.  At  the  time  of  shipment  there 
was  a  joint  through  rate  from  Fresno 
of  $1.10  to  Fargo  and  Wahpeton,  N.  D., 
to  Crookston  and  Fergus  Falls,  Minn., 
and  to  other  points  in  both  states  more 
distant  from  Fresno  than  Bozeman  and 
Billings  by  a  substantial  mileage.  The 
$1.10  rate  to  these  points  applied  not 
through  Billings,  but  via  Omaha.  HELD, 
the  rates  charged  were  unreasonable, 
and  $1.10  was  a  reasonable  rate  to  both 
Bozeman  and  Billings.  Reparation  award- 
ed. Stone-Ordean-Wells  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  313,  314. 

(e)  On  carloads  of  clay  conduit 
from  Brazil,  Ind.,  to  Racine,  Wis.,  a 
class  rate  of  lie  was  exacted.  At 
the  same  time  a  rate  was  in  effect  of 
6%c  to  Milwaukee.  Racine  is  only  20 
miles  from  Milwaukee  and  is  intermedi- 
ate to  Brazil  and  Milwaukee  on  one 
line  but  not  on  defendant's  line,  which 
reaches  Racine  by  a  branch.  HELD, 
the  exaction  of  such  rate  did  not  vio- 
late the  long-and-short-haul  provision 
of  section  4  of  the  Act.  Milwaukee 
Electric  Ry.  etc.,  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.   Co.,  15   L  C.   C.  468,   468. 

(f)  On  carloads  of  clay  conduit 
from  Brazil,  Ind.,  to  Racine,  Wis.,  a 
class  rate  of  lie  was  assessed.  At 
the  time  a  rate  of  6%c  was  in  effect 
from    Brazil    to    Milwaukee.      Racine    is 


458 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §6  (g)— §7  (aa) 


only  20  miles  south  of  Milwaukee,  but 
is  not  intermediate  on  defendant's  line. 
Subsequent  to  the  shipment  a  rate  of 
6c  to  Racine  was  established.  Defend- 
ants admitted  the  rate  exacted  to  be 
unreasonable.  HELD,  the  lie  rate 
was  excessive.  Reparation  awarded. 
Milwaukee  Electric  Ry.  etc.,  Co.  v.  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  468, 
469. 

(g)  The  George's  Creek  coal  district 
was  connected  with  defendants'  lines 
by  two  short  lateral  lines.  The  dis- 
trict is  from  50  to  100  miles  nearer 
tidewater  points  than  the  Pennsylvania 
small  vein  coal  fields,  and  some  60 
to  85  miles  nearer  than  the  like  fields 
in  West  Virginia,  The  rates  from  the 
Pennsylvania  and  West  Virginia  fields 
were  less  than  from  the  George's  Creek 
field.  HELD,  the  rates  were  in  prac- 
tical violation  of  section  4  of  the  Act 
relating  to  long  and  short  hauls  despite 
the  fact  that  the  George's  Creek  district 
is  not  strictly  intermediate  between  the 
Pennsylvania  and  West  Virginia  fields 
and  tidewater.  George's  Creek  Basin 
Goal  Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L 
C.    C.    127,    130. 

(h)  On  carloads  of  beer  from  St. 
Louis  to  Leadville,  Colo.,  via  the  M.  P. 
and  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  Rs.  complainant  was 
assessed  for  a  part  of  the  period  90c 
and  for  the  remainder  95c,  the  charge 
for  the  portion  of  the  haul  from  Pueblo 
to  Leadville  over  the  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R. 
being  45c.  Complainant  attacked  this  por- 
tion of  the  charge  exacted.  The  joint 
rate  via  said  carriers  on  beer  from  St. 
Louis  to  Salt  Lake  City  was  70c,  the 
route  being  from  St.  Louis  to  Pueblo 
and  from  Pueblo  to  Salt  Lake  City  via 
Malta  Junction,  near  Leadville.  For- 
merly the  main  line  of  the  D.  &  R.  G. 
R.  R.  ran  through  Leadville.  During  the 
period  in  question,  however,  it  ran 
through  Malta  Junction,  a  point  about 
four  and  one-half  miles  from  Leadville. 
Leadville  was  some  700  feet  higher  than 
Malta  Junction  and  was  reached  by  a 
branch  line.  Complainant  contended  that 
Leadville  should  be  treated  as  an  inter- 
mediate point  and,  therefore,  the  higher 
charge  to  Leadville  than  to  Salt  Lake 
City  was  in  violation  of  the  long  and 
short  haul  clause  in  section  4  of  the  Act. 
The  distance  from  Pueblo  to  Leadville 
was  about  160  miles.  The  density  of 
traffic  upon  the  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  main 
line  was  about  the  average  for  the  whole 
United    States.      Its    net    earnings    were 


some  $3,000.00  per  mile,  and  its  funded 
indebtedness  some  $3,500.00  per  mile, 
with  a  stock  issue  of  some  $38,000  per 
mile.  For  the  past  six  years  it  had  paid 
a  5  per  cent  dividend  upon  its  preferred 
stock  and  had  shown  an  annual  surplus. 
Its  receipts  per  ton  mile  upon  all  busi- 
ness were  1.346c  and  its  cost  of  opera- 
tion 63.71  per  cent  of  its  earnings.  The 
rate  on  beer  from  Missouri  River  to  Den- 
ver, 538  miles,  was  30c;  from  Denver  to 
Salt  Lake  City  over  the  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R., 
742  miles,  the  rate  was  50c.  The  rate 
attacked  yielded  for  the  haul  from  Pu- 
eblo to  Leadville  over  5c  per  ton  mile. 
HELD,  the  45c  charge  from  Pueblo  to 
Leadville  was  unreasonable  to  the  ex- 
tent that  it  exceeded  30c,  and  reparation 
should  be  awarded;  but  the  rate  could 
not  be  attacked  on  the  ground  of  viola- 
tion of  the  long  and  short  haul  provi- 
sion of  section  4,  since  Leadville  could 
not  be  held  to  be  a  point  intermediate 
to  St.  Louis  and  Salt  Lake  City  so  as 
to  be  entitled  to  a  rate  not  higher  than 
the  70c  rate  between  these  points.  Baer 
Bros.  Mercantile  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
13  L  C.  C.  329,  336,  337,  340. 

(i)  On  bananas  from  Gulf  ports 
through  Kansas  City  to  Burlington,  la., 
the  rate  was  lower  than  to  Kansas  City. 
The  rate  was,  however,  a  mere  paper 
one,  the  shipments  to  Burlington  moving 
through  St.  Louis.  HELD,  section  4  of 
the  Act  was  not  violated.  Topeka  Ba- 
nana Dealers'  Ass'n  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R. 
R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  620,  627. 

IV.     COMPETITION      AS      JUSTIFICA- 
TION. 
See  Competition. 

§7.     In  General. 

(a)  Where  the  charge  to  the  more  dis- 
tant point  has  not  been  forced  down  by 
competitive  conditions  below  what  would 
be  a  reasonable  charge  to  the  intermedi- 
ate point,  then  there  is  no  justification  for 
failure  to  observe  the  rule  of  the  fourth 
section.  Grand  Junction  Chamber  of 
Commerce  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L 
C.  C.  115,  119. 

(aa)  In  determining  questions  under 
section  4,  rates  of  the  same  class  should 
be  compared  with  one  another.  Trans- 
shipment and  proportional  rates  should 
not  be  compared  with  local  rates.  South- 
ern Illinois  Millers'  Ass'n  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  672,  673. 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §7  (b)— §8  (a) 


459 


(b)  The  policy  of  the  Commission  is 
that  where  a  circuitous  route  desires  to 
compete  with  water  or  rail  transporta- 
tion at  a  given  point  it  may  do  so  with- 
out reducing  its  intermediate  rates.  Gile 
&  Co.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  298,  302. 

(bb)  When  competitive  conditions 
make  it  imperative  that  some  one  must 
suffer  it  is  pertinent  to  inquire  how  the 
least  injury  may  be  inflicted.  Bluefield 
Shippers'  Ass'n  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  519,  536. 

(c)  After  determining  the  existence  of 
competitive  influence  at  a  farther  dis- 
tant point,  the  next  question  is,  have 
those  influences  reduced  rates  to  that 
point  below  what  would  be  reasonable? 
For  if  the  rates  to  the  farther  distant 
point  are  sufficiently  high  these  ought 
not  to  be  exceeded  at  a  point  with  about 
a  100  miles  shorter  haul.  Bluefield  Ship- 
pers' Ass'n  V.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C. 
C.  519,  526. 

(cc)  The  purpose  of  Congress  seems 
to  have  been  to  keep  alive  competition 
between  carriers  at  competitive  points 
upon  the  theory,  probably,  that  while  in- 
justice might  in  some  instances  result, 
the  general  effect  would  be  for  the  public 
good.  Bluefield  Shippers'  Ass'n  v.  N.  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  1.  C.  C.  519,  536. 

(d)  While  market  competition  must 
be  considered  as  one  of  the  circumstances 
affecting  a  rate  situation,  to  allow  mar- 
ket competition  as  a  sole  and  controlling 
factor  under  section  4  would  render  it 
nugatory.  Railroad  Commission  of  Ne- 
vada V.  S.  P.  Co.   21  L  C.  C.  329,  367. 

(e)  Irrespective  of  the  fourth  section 
there  is  no  unjust  discrimination  because 
of  a  lower  rate  to  a  more  distant  point 
on  the  same  line  if  such  rate  is  forced 
through  competition.  Nebraska  Mate- 
rial Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I. 
C.   C.  89. 

(f)  Greater  charge  to  intermediate 
stations  will,  upon  expiration  of  six 
months  from  Aug.  17,  1910,  become  un- 
lawful, unless  application  is  made  to 
deviate  from  the  prescribed  rule.  Colo- 
rado Coal  Trafl^c  Ass'n  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  478,  479. 

(g)  A  higher  rate  to  a  shorter-distance 
point  is  justified  by  proving  competition. 
Paragon  Plaster  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  480. 

(gg)  The  rates  referred  to  by  defend- 
ant as  being  competitive  are  rates  estab- 


lished by  itself  over  one  of  its  own  branch 
lines,  and  are  not  rates  established  by  a 
competing  line;  hence,  they  cannot  be 
relied  on  for  justification.  Keich  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
230,  231. 

(h)  Where  competition  exists  at  the 
more  distant  point  which  controls  the 
rate  at  that  point  the  charging  of  a 
higher  rate  at  an  intermediate  point  is 
not  necessarily  in  violation  of  tne  third 
or  fourth  section  of  the  Act.  City  of 
Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
376,  387. 

(i)  No  rate  to  an  intermediate  point 
can  reasonably  be  higher  than  the  sum 
of  the  terminal  rate  plus  the  local  rate 
back.  Monroe  Progressive  League  v.  St. 
L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  534,  536. 

(j)  Whenever  competition  has  com- 
pelled carriers  to  establish  a  lower  rate 
to  a  more  distant  point  than  is  given  a 
non-competitive  point  intermediate  it  is 
practically  the  universal  custom  of  car- 
riers to  give  the  non-competitive  point  a 
rate  equivalent  to  the  combination  upon 
the  point  to  which  competition  is  con- 
trolling. Hardenberg,  Dolson  &  Gray  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  579,  580. 

§8.     Market  Competition. 

See   Equalization  of  Rates,   §3   (mm); 
Evidence,  §32. 

(a)  Ocean  competition,  say  the  car- 
riers, brings  about  the  lower  rates  from 
coast  to  coast;  market  competition  pro- 
duces the  lower  rates  from  the  interior 
to  the  coast.  "Market  competition"  is 
a  phrase  with  which  the  railroad  traffic 
manager  too  often  conjures.  When  no 
other  force  can  be  found  which  brihgs 
about  a  discrimination  market  competi- 
tion is  advanced.  It  is  both  a  sword  and 
a  shield;  it  is  used  to  protect  the  car- 
rier against  attack  because  of  undue  dis- 
crimination as  between  communities; 
and  it  is  a  weapon  of  offense  as  well, 
by  which  one  carrier  invades  the  territory 
of  another  upon  a  different  basis  from 
that  wbich  it  grants  to  its  own  immedi- 
ately dependent  community  and  forces 
concession  from  its  rival  carriers.  Mar- 
ket competition  is  a  euphemism  for  rail- 
road policy.  The  history  of  the  fourth 
section  makes  clear  that  it  was  born 
out  of  a  desire  and  has  been  amended  out 
of  the  purpose  to  restrict  the  force  and 
effect  of  market  competition.  The  ex- 
amples cited  before  Congress  by  those 
who  have  advocated  an  absolute  long- 
and-short-haul  section  have  largely  been 


460 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §9  (a)—  (d) 


such  as  arose  out  of  railroad  policy,  not 
such  as  were  developed  by  transporta- 
tion competition.  Congress,  however, 
has  not  seen  fit  to  say  (and  perhaps 
most  wisely  so)  that  this  economic  force 
shall  not  be  allowed  to  have  its  play  in 
the  making  of  rates.  Market  competition 
must  be  considered  as  one  of  those  cir- 
cumstances affecting  a  rate  situation  with 
which  the  Commission  is  called  upon  to 
deal.  But  may  it  not  be  said  that  while 
the  language  of  the  statute  does  not  say 
that  market  competition  shall  not  be  al- 
lowed to  justify  the  charging  of  the 
higher  rate  to  the  nearer  point,  the  very 
spirit  of  the  section  makes  against  the 
free  application  of  any  such  justifying 
principle?  A  national  policy  may  veto 
a  railroad  policy,  just  as  a  public  need 
may  overcome  and  set  aside  a  private 
desire.  Experience*  has  demonstrated  to 
the  national  legislature  that  it  is  not  safe 
to  leave  to  the  carriers  the  determina- 
tion of  the  question  what  markets  should 
be  brought  into  competition  with  one  an- 
other. The  policy  of  Congress  seems  to 
be  that  a  railroad  may  be  compelled  by 
transportation  competition  to  make  its 
rates  lower  than  it  otherwise  would  be- 
tween two  competitive  points,  and  that 
this  will  justify  a  breach  of  the  prohibi- 
tion of  the  fourth  section;  but  the  desire 
of  a  number  of  snippers  to  reach  a  mar- 
ket is  a  force  to  which  the  carrier  may 
not  yield  unless  it  can  establish  clearly 
that  the  adoption  of  such  policy  will  not 
unfairly  discriminate  against  one  com 
munity  and  in  favor  of  another,  and  will 
not  produce  those  results  which  the  law 
was  intended  to  destroy.  Clearly  to  al- 
low for  market  competition  as  a  sole  and 
controlling  factor  under  the  fourth  sec- 
tion is  to  render  it  nugatory,  for  this 
would  be  tantamount  to  saying  that  a 
railroad  could  justify  every  discrimina- 
tion as  between  communities  by  the  as- 
sertion of  nothing  more  than  its  own  de- 
termination of  policy.  Railroad  Commis- 
sion of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
329,  367. 

§9.     Railroad  Competition.  * 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  iron  and 
steel  rods,  carload,  Struthers,  O.,  to 
Worcester  and  Palmer,  Mass.,  under  a 
rate  of  $3.40  per  ton.  The  rate  from 
Monessen,  Pa.,  to  the  same  points,  a 
longer  haul  over  the  same  line  in  the 
same  direction,  was  $3  per  ton.  For  rate- 
making  purposes  Monessen  is  in  what  is 
known  as  the  Pittsburg,  Pa.,  group,  while 
Struthers      is    in    the      Youngstown,    O., 


group.  From  the  Pittsburg  group  the 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.,  which  is  the  direct 
line,  makes  the  rate  to  New  York  and 
Boston  rate  points  and  competing  car- 
riers must  meet  its  rate  if  they  desire 
to  participate  in  the  business.  The  same 
situation  does  not  exist  at  Youngstown. 
HELD,  the  conditions  surrounding  the 
ransportation  of  traffic  from  the  Youngs- 
town district  via  the  lines  of  defendants 
are  substantially  dissimilar  from  the  con- 
ditions which  pertain  to  the  movement 
3f  traffic  from  the  Pittsburg  district,  and 
the  maintenance  of  a  rate  from  Struthers 
higher  than  that  from  Monessen  did  not 
constitute  a  violation  of  the  fourth  sec- 
tion of  the  Act  as  it  existed  prior  to 
June  18,  1910.  Wright  Wire  Co.  v.  P.  & 
L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  64. 

(b)  Competition  with  the  short  line 
may  justify  a  departure  from  the  long- 
and-short-haul  clause.  Wright  Wire  Co. 
V.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  64. 

(c)  Competition  of  carriers  subject  to 
the  Act  is  a  factor  to  be  considered  in 
passing  upon  an  application  for  relief 
from  the  fourth  section  as  amended  in 
1910.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
21  I.  C.  C.  400,  414. 

(d)  Complainant  alleged  that  a  rate 
of  12c  per  100  lbs.  exacted  for  the  trans- 
portation of  four  carloads  of  brick,  Mouud 
Valley,  Kan.,  to  Tecumseh,  Neb.,  was 
unreasonable  so  far  as  it  exceeded  a  rate 
of  8c  contemporaneously  maintained  from 
Mound  Valley  to  Lincoln,  Neb.  Tecum- 
seh is  330  miles  from  Mound  Valley  and 
Lincoln  378  miles.  The  rate  to  Lincoln 
was  subsequently  canceled  and  a  com- 
bination rate  of  lie  put  in.  Attention 
was  called  to  defendant's  rate  of  IV2C 
to  Omaha,  Nebraska  City  and  Platts- 
mouth.  Neb. — all  longer  hauls  than  to 
Tecumseh — which  rate  was  subsequently 
canceled,  however,  and  the  lie  rate  put 
in.  The  revenue  per  ton  mile  to  Te- 
cumseh was  7.27  mills  per  ton  mile, 
whereas  the  revenue  per  ton  mile  to  the 
other  points  ranged  as  low  as  3.85  mills 
per  ton  mile.  It  appeared  competitive 
conditions  with  the  M.  P.  Ry.  existed 
at  the  other  points.  HELD,  the  main- 
tenance of  a  higher  rate  to  Tecumseh 
was  not  a  violation  of  the  fourth  section 
of  the  Act  aS"  interpreted  by  the  courts 
previous  to  its  recent  amendment,  and  on 
the  record  the  rate  to  Tecumseh  could 
not  be  deemed  unreasonable.  Nebraska 
Material  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  89,  90. 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §9  (e)  — (k) 


461 


(e)  A  less  distant  junction  point 
served  by  an  additional  road  seems  en- 
titled to  a  lower  rate.  Gamble-Robinson 
Commission  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R  R. 
Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  114,  115. 

(f)  Complainant  shipped  anthracite 
coal  from  Pennsylvania  fields  to  Holyoke, 
Mass.  Damages  were  asked  because  of 
alleged  violation  of  the  long-and-short- 
haul  clause  in  that  the  rate  to  Springfield, 
Mass.,  was  5c  per  100  lbs.  less  than  to 
Holyoke  and  intermediate  points.  Spring- 
field is  serv?d  by  the  B.  &  M..  N.  Y.  C, 
N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Rs.,  while  Holyoke 
is  reached  by  the  B.  <&  M.  and  N.  Y.  C. 
R.  Rs.  The  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  and 
connections  reach  ths  Pennsylvania  coal 
fields  direct  and  make  a  joint  rate  to 
Springfield.  The  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  reaches 
Springfield  only  through  Troy  and  Rot- 
terdam Junction  in  connection  with  lines 
terminating  at  those  points  and  this 
route  is  much  longer  than  the  direct  line 
of  the  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  and  con- 
nections. The  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  contended 
that  if  it  is  to  participate  in  Springfield 
business  it  must  meet  this  competition. 
HELD,  the  dissimilarity  of  conditions  af- 
fecting this  traffic  at  Springfield  and 
Holyoke,  respectively,  which  the  Com- 
mission finds  exists  and  which  was  ad- 
mitted by  complainant's  counsel  at  the 
oral  argument,  negatives  the  presump- 
tion of  unreasonableness  as  to  charges 
on  Holyoke  shipments  by  the  B.  &  M. 
R.  R.  Fisk  &  Sons  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  299,  301. 

(g)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  of 
20.5c  per  100  lbs.  on  oak  cross-ties,  car- 
load, from  Rockhouse,  Ky.,  to  Brockway- 
ville,  Pa.  Contention  was  made  that  this 
rate  was  unjustly  discriminatory  and  in 
violation  of  section  4  of  the  Act,  because 
of  a  rate  of  19c  from  Roc'ihouse  to  Buf- 
falo and  Salamanca.  N.  Y.  The  attacked 
rate  was  made  up  of  a  charge  of  2c  per 
100  lbs.  to  Marrowbone,  four  miles;  6c 
Marrowbone  to  Huntington,  3  30  miles, 
and  12.5c  Huntington  to  Brockwayville, 
419  miles,  a  revenue  for  the  entire  haul 
of  approximately  7  mills  per  ton  mile. 
Buffalo  and  Salamanca  are  terminal 
rate  points  between  Central  Freight  As- 
sociation and  Trmk  Line  territory. 
HELD,  that  the  maintenance  of  a  higher 
rate  from  Rockhouse  to  Brockwayville 
than  is  contemporaneously  maintained 
from  Rockhouse  to  Buffalo  and  Salaman- 
ca was  not  at  the  time  these  shipments 
moved  in  violation  of  the  fourth  section 
of  the  Act,  although  I^rockwayville  was 


an  intermediate  point,  nor  is  either  the 
rate  of  Gc  per  100  lbs.  from  Marrowbone 
to  Huntington,  the  rate  of  2c  per  100 
lbs.  from  Rockhouse  to  Marrowbone,  or 
the  rate  of  20.5c  per  100  lbs.  charged  un- 
reasonable. Preston  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  406. 

(h)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  of 
19c  on  rice  from  Houston,  Tex.,  to  New 
Orleans,  La.,  as  compared  with  a  rate  of 
15c  from  Clinton,  Tex.,  to  New  Orleans. 
Clinton  is  about  eight  miles  south  of 
Houston  and  the  traffic  from  Clinton 
passed  through  Houston  to  New  Orleans. 
The  15c  rate  was  extended  only  to  rice 
coming  by  water  to  Clinton  Irom  certain 
plantations.  The  15c  rate  from  Clinton 
was  made  to  meet  the  competition  of  a 
rail  carrier  making  a  15c  rate  to  New 
Orleans  from  a  point  near  Clinton  and 
to  meet  water  competition,  traffic  being 
about  to  move  from  Clinton  to  New  Or- 
leans entirely  by  water.  HELD,  the  rate 
attacked  was  apparently  not  in  violation 
of  section  4  of  the  Act,  on  account  of  the 
dissimilarity  of  circumstances  at  Clinton 
and  Houston;  but  that  it  was  unlawful 
to  extend  the  15c  rate  from  Clinton  to 
rice  coming  from  certain  plantations  and 
to  deny  this  rate  to  other  shippers. 
3ayou  City  Rice  Mills  v.  T.  &  N.  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  490,  492,  493. 

(i)  While  it  is  permissible  to  meet 
competition  at  a  longer  distant  point,  the 
intermediate  rate  should  not  be  prej- 
udiced by  an  unreasonably  low  rate  to 
the  farther  distant  point.  Kimberly  v.  C. 
&  O.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  335,  336. 

(j)  The  claim  that  the  fourth  section 
of  the  Act  was  violated  in  these  ship- 
ments was  not  sustained,  as  the  short 
line  made  the  rate  to  the  competitive 
point  and  defendants  had  to  meet  that 
condition.  Foster  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  C. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  385,  386. 

(k)  The  rate  on  potatoes  from  East 
Virginia  points  to  Charleston  and  Hunt- 
ington, W.  Va.,  was  26c;  to  Hinton,  W. 
Va.,  321/^c.  Hinton  lay  intermediate  to 
said  Virginia  points  and  Charleston  and 
Huntington,  being  97  miles  east  of 
Charleston  and  147  miles  east  of  Hunt- 
ington. The  only  competition  at  Charles- 
ton and  Huntington  not  applying  to  Hin- 
ton was  over  a  long  and  circuitous  route 
by  the  way  of  Pittsburgh.  HELD,  the 
32i^c  Hinton  rate  was  unreasonable. 
Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis  of  26c. 
Hinton  Fruit  &  Produce  Co.  v.  C.  &  O. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  578. 


462 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §9  (1)— (o) 


(1)     Complainant  attacked  the  rates  of 
the   Rock   Island   system   from    Chicago, 
Kansas  City,  St.  Louis  and  Memphis  to 
Santa  Rosa,  N.  M.,  when  compared  with 
rates  to  El  Paso  and  to  Dog  Canon  and 
other  points  lying  between   Santa  Rosa 
and  El  Paso.     Santa  Rosa  lay  interme- 
diate  on   defendants'    system    272    miles 
northeast  of  El  Paso.     The  rates  to  El 
Paso   were   lower   than   to    Santa   Rosa, 
the  class  rates  from   St.   Louis,   for   ex- 
ample,  exceeding   the   class    rates   from 
that  point  to  El  Paso  by  36c,  27c,  17c,  12c 
and  14c  for  Classes  1,  2,  3,  4  and  5,  re- 
spectively.      The     combination     of     the 
through  rate  to  El  Paso  and  the  lower 
rate  back  to  many  intermediate  points, 
including  Vaughn,  was  less  than  the  sum 
of  the  through  rate  to  Santa  Rosa  and 
the  local  rate  out  to   said   points,   thus 
giving  El  Paso  jobbers  an  advantage  at 
such  points  over  complainant,  who  was 
a    jobber    at    Santa    Rosa.      Defendants' 
rates  to  El  Paso  were  made  in  compe- 
tition   with    several    other    carriers.    El 
Paso  being  the  gateway  for  traffic  des- 
tined  to  Mexico.     Santa     Rosa     was   a 
non-competitive  point.     The  Rock  Island 
retained  75  per  cent  of  the  through  rate 
to  El  Paso  for  its  haul  to  Santa  Rosa  of 
traffic  destined  to  El  Paso,  the  other  25 
per   cent   going   to    the   connecting   car- 
rier for  its  haul  from  Santa  Rosa,  and 
complainant    contended    that    if    75    per 
cent  of  the   lower  through  rates   to   El 
Paso  yielded  a  profit  to   the   defendant 
lines  for  hauling  the  through   traffic  as 
far  as  Santa  Rosa,  their  higher  through 
rates  on  traffic  destined  to  Santa  Rosa 
must  of  necessity  yield  them  more  than 
a  reasonable  profit.     Santa  Rosa  is  sit- 
uated  in   a   sparsely   settled  and   unpro- 
ductive  country,   and   local    traffic     was 
very  slight  compared   with   the   through 
traffic    to    El     Paso.      The     rates     from 
the  points  in  question  to  points  between 
Dog   Canon,  located  on  the  Rock  Island 
some    72    miles    from    El    Paso,    and    El 
Paso   were   adjusted     on    a     descending 
scale,  all  points  taking  rates  lower  than 
the   Santa   Rosa   rates,   but  higher  than 
the  El  Paso  rates.     HELD,  that  in  view 
of   the   difference   of   competitive    condi- 
tions  at   El   Paso   and   Santa   Rosa,   the 
lower  rates  to  El  Paso  were  not  in  vio- 
lation of  the  long-and-short-haul  section 
of  the  Act;    and   tnat   the   rates   to  Dog 
Canon  and   points  lying  intermediate  to 
that  city  and  El  Paso  were  not  unduly 
discriminatory  against  Santa  Rosa,  these 
points   being   properly   grouped   with   El 


Paso.     Moise  Bros.  Co.  v    C    R    I    &  P 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  550,  552,  553,  555. 

(m)     Complainant,    refining     companv 
at  Paola,  Kan.,  attacked  the  rates  of  the 
M.   K.   &   T.  Ry.  on  petroleum   oil  from 
Paola,  Kan.,  to  Boonville,  Mo.,  138  miles 
and  to  Holden,  Mo.,  54  mile^,  of  17c  and 
15c,   respectively.     This     railway's     line 
from   Kansas   City,   Mo.,   to   these   desti- 
nations lies  partly  in  Kansas  and  passes 
through    Paola.     Its   rates    from    Kansas 
City  to  Boonville,  182  miles,  and  to  Hol- 
den,  97  miles,  through   Paola,   were    re- 
spectively, 9.85c  and  7c.     The  Standard 
Oil   Co.'s   refinery  at   Sugar   Creek,   Mo., 
was  within  the  switching  limits  of  Kan- 
sas  City   and   took   these   rates  of   9.85c 
and    7c    with     an     additional     switching 
charge  of   $4   per   car.     The   M.   P.   Ry., 
in  carrying  traffic  from  Kansas  City  to 
Boonville  and  Holden,   is  wholly  within 
the   state  of   Missouri,    and    established 
these  rates  of  9.85c  and  7c  pursuant  to 
the  order  of  the  Missouri  Railroad  Com- 
mission.     The    M.     K.     &     T.    Ry.    was 
obliged,   for   competitive    conditions,     to 
meet  these  rates.    The  17c  and  15c  rates 
from  Paola  complained   of  were  in  line 
with    the   rates    from    Coffeyville,    Hum- 
boldt,  Chanute,   Erie   and  other  refining 
points  in  the  Southern  Kansas  oil  fields. 
Under  the  adjustment  of  rates  in  ques- 
tion, the  Standard  Oil  Co.  had  a  monop- 
oly   on    the    business    at    Boonville    and 
Holden.      The    only   evidence    offered    of 
the  unreasonableness  per  se  of  the  rates 
^racked  was  the  lower  rates  from  Kan- 
sas   City.      HELD,    on   account   of   com- 
petition between  defendant   M.   K.   &   T. 
Ry.   and   other  carriers  at  Kansas   City, 
the  rates  attacked  were  not  in  violation 
of  the  long-and-short-haul  clause  of  sec- 
tion  4   of  the  Act,  nor  did   they   consti- 
tute undue  discrimination  under  section 
3;   and  that  the  rates  attacked  were  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable  per  se,  since 
the    rates    established    by    the    state    of 
Missouri  could    not    be    taken    as    con- 
clusive  of   the   unreasonableness   of   the 
Interstate  rates  in   question.     Paola  Re- 
fining Co.  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C 
C.  29,  31,  32. 

(n)  Competition  with  other  carriers 
at  a  longer  distance  point  may  justify 
lower  freight  rates  to  that  point  than 
to  neighboring  shorter  distance  points  not 
having  the  same  competition  Pilant  v 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  178,  179." 

(o)  On  beer  the  rate  from  Milwau- 
kee. Wis.,  to  Roswell,  N.  M.,  was  72c: 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §9  (p)— (r) 


4«3 


to  El  Paso,  60c.  Defendant  Santa  Fe 
reached  El  Paso  by  two  routes,  only  one 
of  which  ran  through  Roswell.  Ship- 
ments from  the  point  of  origin  in  ques- 
tion to  El  Paso  did  not  pass  through 
Roswell.  Roswell  was  a  local  point, 
whereas  EI  Paso  was  reached  by  sev- 
eral competing  lines  and  was  one  of  the 
three  competing  gateways  for  transpor- 
tation into  Mexico  to  which  carriers  ex- 
tended the  same  rates.  HELD,  the  rate 
to  Roswell  was  not  in  violation  of  section 
4  of  the  Act  on  account  of  the  different 
conditions  existing  at  El  Paso.  Pilant 
y.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  178, 
179. 

(p)  Bristol  lies  on  the  northeastern 
boundary  of  Tennessee,  Johnson  City  lies 
southwest  of  Bristol  and  Morristown 
southwest  of  Johnson  City  in  said  state. 
Johnson  City  lies  intermediate  on  de- 
fendant's line  to  the  former  two  cities. 
Traffic  from  New  York,  Philadelphia, 
Baltimore  and  other  eastern  cities  moved 
under  defendant's  rates  through  Johnson 
City  and  thence  northeastward  to  Bris- 
tol, and  through  Johnson  City,  thence 
southwest  to  Morristown,  at  lower  rates 
to  Bristol  and  Morristown  than  to  John- 
son City.  Defendant's  lower  rates  to  Mor- 
ristown than  to  Johnson  City  on  traffic 
passing  through  the  latter  city  to  the 
former  were  established  at  a  time  when 
defendant  did  not  control  the  lines  of 
railway  running  into  Morristown,  and 
were  made  to  meet  the  competition  of 
other  carriers  reaching  Morristown  from 
the  points  of  origin  in  question,  but  the 
rates  to  Johnson  City  had  all  along  been 
under  the  control  of  defendant.  After 
acquiring  the  lines  running  into  Morris- 
town, defendant  left  standing  the  old 
rate,  which  was  lower  than  the  rate  to 
Johnson  City.  The  rates  on  the  haul 
from  points  of  origin  in  question  via 
Johnson  City  to  Bristol  were  established 
by  defendant  and  kept  up  by  it  to  meet 
the  competition  of  the  short  line  road 
from  points  of  origin  to  Bristol.  HELD, 
the  lower  rate  to  Morristown  than  to 
Johnson  City  was  no  longer  justified, 
competitive  conditions  having  vanished; 
but  that  the  lower  rate  to  Bristol  than 
to  Johnson  City  for  traffic  hauled  through 
Johnson  City  was  justified  on  account  of 
continuing  competitive  conditions  at  Bris- 
tol. Defendants  ordered  to  adjust  their 
rates  on  canned  goods,  cement,  cotton, 
piece  goods  and  their  class  rates  accord- 
ingly. Gump  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C. 
C.  98,  104-106. 


(q)  Complainant  attacked  the  class 
rates  from  Chicago,  St.  Louis,  Omaha 
and  Denver  to  Pecos,  Tex.,  as  compared 
with  rates  to  El  Paso.  Pecos  is  located 
215  miles  east  of  El  Paso,  at  a  junction 
of  the  Texas  &  Pacific  and  Pecos  River 
railroads,  the  latter  being  subsidiary  to 
the  Santa  Fe.  The  rates  to  Pecos  from 
the  points  in  question  were  considerably 
higher  than  to  El  Paso,  although  the 
Santa  Fe  reached  both  points.  El  Paso 
was  reached  by  four  railroads  competing 
for  business  from  the  points  of  origin 
in  question.  El  Paso  rates  had  to  he 
maintained  with  reference  to  competing 
Mexican  gateways  at  Laredo  and  Eagle 
Pass.  The  higher  rates  to  Pecos  had 
been  in  effect  for  many  years,  and  it 
was  generally  true  that  points  inter- 
mediate to  El  Paso  and  the  points  of 
origin  in  question,  and  located  from  El 
Paso  even  greater  distances  than  Pecos, 
took  higher  rates  than  El  Paso.  No  evi- 
dence was  offered  to  show  the  rates  at- 
tacked unreasonable  per  se.  HELD,  that 
competition  with  other  carriers  at  a 
longer  distance  point  may  justify  lower 
rates  to  that  point  than  the  neighbor- 
ing shorter  distance  points  not  having 
the  same  competition,  and  that  the  rates 
attacked  were  not  unduly  discriminatory 
against  Pecos.  Pecos  Mercantile  Co.  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  1.  C.  C.  173, 
177. 

(r)  The  class  rates  from  Evansville, 
Ind.,  to  New  York  were  78l^c,  68c,  52i^c, 
361^0,  nVzc  and  26c  on  the  first  six 
classes,  respectively,  and  from  New 
York  to  Evansville  83c,  72c,  55c,  39c, 
33c  and  28c.  From  Owensboro  and 
Henderson,  Ky.,  to  New  York  the 
rates  were  86c,  74i^c,  57i^c,  41i^c, 
341/^c  and  29c.  Complainant  attacked 
the  rates  to  and  from  Owensboro 
and  Henderson  as  unreasonable  per  se 
and  unjustly  discriminatory  in  favor  of 
Evansville.  Complainant  also  attacked 
the  adjustment  of  rates  to  points  gen- 
erally in  Central  Freight  Association 
and  Trunk  Line  territory.  Evansville  is 
situated  on  the  north  branch  of  the 
Ohio  River,  11  miles  northwest  of  Hen- 
derson and  40  miles  from  Owensboro, 
the  last  mentioned  two  points  being 
south  of  the  river.  The  rates  between 
Henderson  and  Central  Freight  Associ- 
ation territory  were  made  by  adding 
arbitraries  to  the  Evansville  rates.  The 
rates  charged  for  the  11-mile  haul  be- 
tween Henderson  and  Evansville  were 
generally  lower  than  the  minimum  rates 


464 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §9  (s) 


for  similar  distances  in  Central  Freight 
Association  territory,  notwithstanding 
the  movement  between  Henderson  and 
Evansville  necessitated  crossing  the 
Ohio  River  bridge.  The  same  arbitraries 
applying  between  Evansville  and  Hen- 
derson were  used  in  constructing  rates 
between  Owensboro  and  points  in  that 
territory.  A  large  part  of  the  traffic  from 
New  York  and  other  eastern  points  to 
Owensboro  and  Henderson  moved  by  rail 
and  water  via  Norfolk,  thence  over  de- 
fendant's line,  running  along  the  south 
bank  of  the  Ohio  River.  Some  95  per 
cent  of  the  traffic  to  Evansville  was  de- 
livered by  carriers  operating  north  of 
the  Ohio  River.  The  ton  mile  earnings 
on  New  York  to  Evansville,  first-class 
rate,  by  the  short  line  distance  were 
1.68c;  on  the  New  York  to  Owensboro, 
first-class  rate,  1.84c;  on  the  New  York 
to  Henderson,  first-class  rate,  1.8c.  The 
first-class  rate.  New  York  to  Atlanta,  Ga., 
yielded  2.7c;  the  New  York  to  Chatta- 
nooga, 2.48c;  New  York  to  Nashville, 
1.82c;  New  York  to  Memphis,  1.7c.  The 
ton  mile  revenue  under  the  rates  at- 
tacked was  generally  lower,  also,  than 
revenue  on  the  rates  in  effect  from  Chi- 
cago to  eastern  points.  The  carriers 
more  directly  interested  in  the  Evans- 
ville rates  for  the  most  part  served  the 
territory  north  of  the  river,  where  there 
was  greater  density  of  population  and 
of  traffic  than  in  the  territory  south  of 
the  river.  The  carriers  more  directly 
interested  in  the  rates  to  Owensboro 
and  Henderson  served  the  territory  south 
of  the  river.  For  this  reason  the  ad- 
justment of  rates  north  of  the  river  was 
lower  than  that  south  of  the  same,  and 
the  lower  rates  at  Evansville  were  in 
part  the  result  of  this  situation.  On  ac- 
count of  denser  traffic,  and  the  greater 
number  of  carriers  operating  in  north- 
ern territory,  the  competition  for  busi- 
ness at  Evansville  was  keener  than  at 
other  cities.  The  carriers  in  northern 
territory  also  built  up  a  market  compe- 
tition, under  which  each  was  compelled 
to  establish  such  rates  to  points  which 
it  served  as  would  enable  them  to  com- 
pete with  other  points.  Defendants 
serving  Owensboro  and  Henderson 
passed  through  these  cities  in  delivering 
trafllc  from  New  York  to  Evansville. 
The  lower  rate  which  they  made  to 
Evansville  was  established  to  meet  the 
competition  of  northern  carriers  directly 
serving  Evansville.  Owensboro  and  Hen- 
derson enjoyed  advantages  in  rates,  by 


reason  of  their  proximity  to  Evansville, 
which  were  not  enjoyed  by  other  points 
along  the  lines  of  the  carriers  serving 
said  former  two  cities.  HELD,  the  rates 
attacked  were  not  shown  to  be  unreason- 
able per  se,  unjustly  discriminatory  be- 
tween the  cities  in  question,  or  in  viola- 
tion of  the  long-and-short-haul  provision 
of  section  4  of  the  Act.  Railroad  Com- 
mission of  Kentucky  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.. 
13  I.  C.  C.  300,  307,  309. 

(s)  Complainant  jobbers  in  cotton- 
piece  goods  and  knit  goods  at  Wichita, 
Kan.,  were  in  competition  with  jobbers 
at  Kansas  City  and  attacked  the  rates 
of  $1.36  and  93c  from  New  York  and 
eastern  territory  to  W'chita  and  Kansas 
City,  respectively,  on  cotton  goods  and 
the  rate  of  $1.64i/2  and  $1.38  to  said 
points,  respectively,  on  knit  goods.  Rates 
by  tne  all-rail  route  were  made  to  these 
points  by  combination  upon  the  Missis- 
sippi and  Missouri  rivers.  The  rate  ou 
cotton-piece  goods  from  New  York  to 
St.  Louis  was  G5c,  from  St.  Louis  to  Kan- 
sas City  35c,  making  a  through  rate  of 
$1.  Over  the  short-line  distance  from 
St.  Louis  to  Wichita,  south  of  Kansas 
City,  a  rate  of  9Gc  was  in  effect,  which 
would  make  the  rate  $1.01  from  New 
York  to  Wichita.  The  rate  was,  in  fact, 
$1.5G.  Over  the  ocean-rail  route  the 
transportation  was  by  ocean  from  New 
York  to  some  southern  part,  such  as 
Norfolk  or  Savannah,  and  thence  by  rail 
to  destination.  The  ocean  and  rail  rate 
to  St.  Louis  was  7c  less  than  the  all- 
rail,  or  58c.  To  this  was  added  35c  for 
the  Kansas  City  rate,  making  the  New 
York  to  Kansas  City  rate  over  such 
route  93c.  By  adding  the  St.  Louis  to 
Wichita  rate  of  96c  to  the  58c  rate  the 
ocean-and-rail  rate  from  New  York  to 
Wichita  would  be  $1.54.  This  was,  in  fact, 
$1.36,  due  to  another  route  known  as  the 
"Gulf"  route.  Such  route  involved  a 
carriage  by  water  to  Galveston,  whence 
the  traffic  was  carried  to  destination  by 
rail.  The  Gulf  route  was  the  last  to  be 
established.  Two  of  the  defendants 
operating  from  Galveston  through  Wich- 
ita to  Kansas  City  charged  93c  on  cot- 
ton-piece goods  from  New  York  to  Kan- 
sas City  and  $1.36  to  Wichita,  although 
the  added  distance  from  Wichita  to  Kan- 
sas City  was  225  miles.  Complainant 
contended  that  this  violated  the  long- 
and-short-haul  provision  of  section  4  of 
the  Act.  If  the  rates  from  New  York 
to  St.  Louis  were  reduced  the  complain- 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §9  (t) 


465 


ants   would  not  be  benefited,  since  that 
reduction   would    apply    equally    at    Kan- 
sas City  and  Wichita,  and  the  same  was 
true   of   a    reduction    between    St.    Louis 
and    Kansas    City.       A     reduction     from 
Kansas  City  to  Wichita  would  not  benefit 
complainants,  since  the  Kansas  City  job- 
ber would  be  able  to  distribute  his  goods 
to    retailers    upon   a    rate    proportionally 
less    than    before.      The    distance    from 
New   York   to   Wichita   via  Galveston   is 
3,000     miles,    twice     as     great     as    thai 
to     Kansas     City,     but     of     this     3,000 
mles      2  300      is     water.         The      actual 
cost    of    transporting    cotton-piece    goods 
from  New  York  to  Wichita  via  Galveston 
did    not    exceed    that    of    carrying    them 
from  New  York  to  Kansas  City  via  the 
cheapest  route.     The  all-rail  haul  to  the 
latter  point   is   1,300   miles.     The   ocean- 
and-rail    movement    involved    a   rail    car- 
riage    of     from     1,100     to     1,300     miles. 
Through  the  gulf  port  there  was  a  rail 
carriage   of   about    850    miles.      The    rail 
carriers   from    Galveston    to   Wichita   re- 
ceived   73c    for    the    haul    of    700    miles. 
The  first-class  rate  on  cotton-piece  goods 
from    Galveston    to    Wichita    was    $1.37. 
The    Texas    Commission    first-class    rate 
from  Galveston  to  Fort  Worth,  350  miles, 
was    80c.      The    first-class    through    rate 
from  New  York  to  Wichita  was  $1.97i/^. 
HELD,  that  the  93c  rate  on  cotton-piece 
goods    from    New    York    to   Kansas    City 
via   Wichita   and   Galveston   was   not   in 
violation  of  section  4,  as  compared  with 
the  rate   of  $1.3G   to  Wichita,   since   the 
defendants    involved    in    the    haul    were 
compelled  to  meet  the  93c  rate  to  Kansas 
City,    established    by    other    carriers,    in 
order  to  participate  in  the  business;  that 
Wichita   was,  however,  entitled  to  some 
recognition  on  account  of  her  proximity 
to  the  Gulf  ports,  and  the  rates  on  cot- 
ton-piece goods  should  be  reduced  from 
$1.36  to  $1.25  from  New  York  to  Wichita; 
but  that  the  rates  on  knit  goods  should 
not  be  disturbed.     Johnston   &   Larimer 
Dry  Goods  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
13  L  C.  C.  388,  396-400. 

(t)  Complainant,  wholesale  grocer  at 
Nashville,  Tenn.,  attacked  the  rates  from 
Pacific  coast  terminals  to  Nashville  of 
89c  on  canned  goods,  $1.16  on  dried  fruit 
in  boxes  and  $1.36  on  dried  fruit  in 
sacks,  as  compared  with  rates  of  75c, 
$1.00  and  $1.20,  respectively,  accorded 
to  Milan,  Humboldt  and  Jackson,  in  west- 
ern Tennessee,  Cincinnati,  O.,  Louisville, 
Owensboro,  Elizabethtown,  Henderson, 
Paducah     and     Hopkinsville,     Ky.,     and 


Evansville,    Ind.      Said    last-named    rates 
applied  alike  to  Missouri  River  and  Mis- 
sissippi River  common  points  and  Cincin- 
nati-Detroit common  points.     This  group 
rate  was  not  applied  generally  to  terri- 
tory  east   of   the   Mississippi   River   and 
south  of  the  Ohio  River  because  the  car- 
riers serving  this  southeastern  territory 
did  not  originate  traffic  destined  to  the 
Pacific  coast  and  were  unable,  therefore, 
'o  make  reciprocal  arrangements  on  west- 
bound business.     The  rates  from  Pacific 
coast    terminals    to    these    southeastern 
common  points  were  made  up  of  the  rates 
to  th3  Mississippi  River  plus  the  locals 
from   the   crossing  of   the   river  nearest 
the  point  of  destination,  or  of  rates  to 
the  Cincinnati-Detroit  territory  plus  the 
locals  from  the  Ohio  River  crossing  near- 
est   the    destination.      Milan,    Humboldt, 
Jackson,      Elizabethtown,      Hopkinsville 
and  Nashville  were  not  in  the' Mississippi 
River  territory  or  the  Cincinnati-Detroit 
territory.     The  through  cafload  rate  from 
the  points  of  origin  in  question  to  any  of 
the  points  takings  a  lower  rate  than  Nash- 
ville   plus    the   local    carload    rate    from 
that  point  permitted  a  dealer  thereat  to 
get  within  thirty  miles  of  Nashville,  from 
either    the    north    or    the    west,    on    an 
equality  of  rates  with  Nashville.     On  a 
combination  of  through  carload  rates  in, 
and  less-than-carload  rates  out,  the  rates 
from    such    points    and    from    Nashville 
equalized   at   something  over   fifty  miles 
either    north    or    west    from    Nashville. 
Under  the  rates  attacked,  however,  Nash- 
ville   had    an    advantage    in    distributing 
goods  to  points  much  nearer  to  Decatur, 
Birmingham,    Chattanooga    and    Atlanta 
than  those  points  can   get  to  Nashville. 
The    traffic    in    question    moved    by    the 
Texas  Pacific  and  the  Southern  Pacific'  R. 
Rs.  via  New  Orleans.    Defendants  were 
compelled  to  meet  in  the  haul  to  the  Ohio 
River  the  rates  fixed  by  the   short  line 
roads  through  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  and  Cairo, 
111.,  to  the  river.     In  making  the  haul  de- 
fendant  I.    C.    R.    R.    carried    the    traffic 
through  Milan,  Humboldt,  Jackson,  Nor- 
tonville     and     Elizabethtown,     but     not 
through   Nashville.     It  adopted   a  policy 
In    literal    compliance    with    the    fourth 
section  of  the  Act  and  applied  to  inter- 
mediate points  no  higher  rates  than   to 
farther  distant  basing  points.    When  this 
traffic    was    carried    to    the    Ohio    River 
through  Nashville  it  was  hauled  by  tue 
L.   &   N.   R.   R.,  which   had   not  adopted 
a  policy  similar  to  that  of  the  I.  C.  R.  R. 
The   rate   at   Hopkinsville   was   ffxed   by 
the  I.  C.  R.  R.  and  met  by  the  L.  &  N.  R. 


466 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §10  (a)— (aa) 


R.,  but  they  did  not  so  compete  at  Nash- 
ville. HELD,  Nashville  not  being  entitled 
by  its  location  to  be  included  in  the  Mis- 
sissippi River  or  other  groups,  and  com- 
petitive conditions  applicable  at  the  other 
points  taking  lower  rates  than  Nashville 
not  being  influential  at  Nashville,  that 
city  was  not  unduly  discriminated  against 
and  defendants  were  not  violating  the 
long-and-short-haul  provision  of  sec- 
tion 4.  Phillips-Trawick-James  Co.  v. 
S.  P.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  644,  647,  648. 

§10.     Water  Competition. 

See  Discrimination,  §8  (5)  (k); 
Equalization  of  Rates,  §4  (4)  (aa); 
Evidence,  §14    (5)    (u). 

(a)  Where  a  higher  rate  to  an  inter- 
mediate point  is  justified  upon  the  ground 
of  water  competition,  the  Commission  has 
certain  rules  for  its  guidance:  1.  Is  it 
true  that  the  long-distance  rate  is  forced 
by  water  competition?  2.  Is  the  long-dis- 
tance rate  which  has  been  established  in 
view  of  water  competition  less  than 
would  otherwise  be  reasonable?  3.  Are 
the  rates  at  the  intermediate  points  rea- 
sonable? 4.  Do  the  rates  unduly  prefer 
one  locality  to  another?  And  relief  from 
the  fourth  section  may  be  granted  be- 
cause of  water  competition.  In  Re 
Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts, 
23  I.  C.  C.  151,  178. 

(aa)  For  the  purpose  of  disposing  of 
the  Spokane  case  under  the  fourth  sec- 
tion the  Commission  has  divided  the 
United  States  into  five  territorial  zones, 
as  follows:  (The  transcontinental  groups 
hereinafter  described  are  as  specified  in 
R.  H.  Countiss'  (agent)  transcontinental 
tariff  I.  C.  C.  No.  929.)  Zone  No.  1  com- 
prises all  that  portion  of  the  United 
States  lying  west  of  a  line  called  line 
No.  1,  which  extends  in  a  general  south- 
erly direction  from  a  point  immediately 
east  of  Grand  Portage,  Minn.;  thence 
southwesterly  along  the  northwestern 
shore  of  Lake  Superior  to  a  point  im- 
mediately east  of  Superior,  Wis.;  thence 
southerly  along  the  eastern  boundary  of 
transcontinental  group  F  to  the  inter- 
section of  the  Arkansas  and  Oklahoma 
state  line;  thence  along  the  west  side  of 
the  Kansas  City  Southern  Ry.  to  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico.  Zone  No.  2  embraces  all 
territory  in  the  United  States  lying  east 
of  line  No.  1  and  west  of  a  line  called 
line  No.  2,  which  begins  at  the  interna- 
tional boundary  between  the  United 
States  and  Canada  immediately  west  of 
Cockburn  Island  in  Lake  Huron,  passes 


westerly  through  the  Straits  of  Mack- 
inaw, southerly  through  Lake  Michigan 
to  its  southern  boundary;  follows  the 
west  boundary  of  transcontinental  group 
C  to  Paducah,  Ky.;  thence  follows  the 
east  side  of  the  Illinois  Central  R,  R. 
to  the  southern  boundary  of  transconti- 
nental group  C;  thence  follows  the  east 
boundary  of  group  C  to  the  Gulf  of  Mex- 
ico. Zone  No.  3  embraces  all  territory 
in  the  United  States  lying  east  of  line 
No.  2  and  north  of  the  south  boundary  of 
transcontinental  group  C  and  west  of  line 
No.  3,  which  is  the  Buffalo-Pittsburg  line 
from  Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  to  Wheeling,  W.  Va.; 
thence  follows  the  Ohio  River  to  Hunt- 
ington, W.  Va.  Zone  No.  4  embraces  all 
territory  in  the  United  States  east  of  line 
No.  3  and  north  of  the  south  boundary 
of  transcontinental  group   C.     Zone  No. 

5  embraces  all  territory  south  and  east 
of  transcontinental  group  C.  From  Zone 
No.  1  no  higher  charge  can  justly  be 
made  at  any  intermediate  point  than  to 
a  more  distant  point,  and  there  is  no 
justification  for  a  system  of  rates  which 
maintains  from  this  territory  a  higher 
charge  to  any  interior  point  than  is  made 
to  the  coast.  From  Zone  No.  2  the  rates 
to  intermediate  points  may  properly  ex- 
ceed by  not  more  than  7  per  cent  rates 
from  the  same  points  of  origin  to  Pacific 
coast  terminals.  In  Zone  No.  3  the  rates 
from  points  of  origin  to  intermediate 
points  may  properly  exceed  those  to 
terminal  points  by  not  more  than  15  per 
cent.  In  Zone  No.  4  rates  from  points 
of  origin  to  intermediate  points  may 
properly  exceed  those  to  terminal  points 
by  not  more  than  25  per  cent.  In  Zone 
No.  5  no  opinion  is  expressed  at  this 
time,  since  rates  from  that  territory  are 
not  involved  in  these  proceedings.  City 
of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
400,   425,  426;    order  enjoined,   in   A.   T. 

6  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  191  Fed.  856, 
holding  that  the  Commission  by  its  or- 
ders respecting  the  relation  of  rates  from 
eastern  points  to  Spokane,  Reno  and  other 
intermountain  cities  as  compared  with 
the  rates  to  Pacific  coast  terminals  estab- 
lished certain  zones  and  entered  orders 
which  did  not  establish  absolute  rates 
for  either  the  long  or  short  haul,  or  pre- 
scribe the  extent,  in  dollars  and  cents, 
that  the  short-haul  rate  might  exceed  the 
present  or  some  definitely  fixed  long- 
haul  rate,  but  established  a  relation  be- 
tween any  long-haul  rate  that  the  car- 
rier might  put  into  effect  and  the  short- 
haul  rate  by  determining  that  from  Zone 
1  the  western  short-haul  rate  should  not 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §10  (b)— (d) 


467 


exceed  the  long-haul  rate,  and  from  Zones 
2,  3  and  4  the  short-haul  rate  should  not 
exceed  the  long-haul  rate  by  more  than 
7  per  cent,  15  per  cent  and  25  per  cent, 
respectively,  and,  therefore,  the  Commis- 
sion exceeded  its  authority,  since  it  has 
no  power  to  say  that  any  given  percent- 
age of  an  unknown  less  than  reasonable 
rate  to  the  coast  is  necessarily  a  maxi- 
mum reasonable  and  non-discriminatory 
rate  from  the  same  point  of  origin  to  an 
interior  point. 

(b)  Spokane  is  a  great  distributing 
center  and  aims  to  be  a  greater  one.  It 
demands  the  right  to  rates  which  will 
enable  it  to  bring  from  the  east  and  dis- 
tribute into  territory  lying  east  of  the 
Cascade  range.  Such  traffic,  when  dis- 
tributed from  Spokane,  is  hauled  a  less 
distance  by  400  miles  than  when  dis- 
tributed from  Seattle,  and  the  distribu- 
tion haul  itself  is  also  much  less  ex- 
pensive. It  is  a  manifest  economic  waste 
to  haul  traffic  over  the  Cascade  Moun- 
tains and  back  again.  The  interest  of 
the  carrier  and  the  public  as  much  re- 
quire that  this  business  should  stop  at 
Spokane,  instead  of  going  on  to  Seattle, 
as  that  it  should  originate  in  the  middle 
west  instead  of  upon  the  Atlantic  sea- 
board. Spokane  insists  that  if  these  de- 
fendants give  to  Seattle  the  right  to  buy 
in  both  New  York  and  Chicago,  when  its 
location  entitles  it  to  buy  in  New  York 
alone,  they  should  give  to  Spokane, 
which  is  nearer  by  400  miles,  the  right 
to  buy  in  both  New  York  and  Chicago. 
New  York  urges  that  if  Chicago  is  given 
an  opportunity  to  sell  in  Seattle  then 
New  York  shall  be  given  the  opportunity 
to  sell  in  Spokane.  In  other  words,  the 
same  blanket  rate  which  is  applied  on 
the  east  should  be  applied  upon  the 
west.  The  carriers  insist  that  they  may 
determine  as  a  matter  of  policy  whether 
they  will  meet  this  water  competition 
and  in  what  manner  and  at  what  points; 
and  this  is  true  so  far  as  that  is  a  mat- 
ter of  policy.  To  a  disinterested  ob- 
server it  would  seem  to  be  in  the  true 
interest  of  these  transcontinental  lines, 
which  begin  at  the  Missouri  River,  to 
make  rates  which  would  build  up  interior 
points  as  against  the  coast.  The  haul 
to  these  points  is  shorter  and  less  ex- 
pensive. The  distribution  from  these 
points  is  easier,  but,  above  all,  the  traf- 
fic which  is  created  at  such  a  point  be- 
longs to  the  rail  line  which  creates  it, 
while  the  traffic  which  is  fostered  upon 
the   coast   is   the  prey  of   every   vessel 


which  sails  the  sea.  Carriers  in  the 
future  will  doubtless  adopt  this  method 
and  will  voluntarily  make  rates  to  inte- 
rior points  like  Spokane  which  will  en- 
able those  localities  to  compete  with 
coast  cities.  Admitting,  however,  that  it 
is  for  those  defendants  to  say  to  what 
extent,  if  at  all,  they  will  meet  these 
competitive  conditions,  they  are  not  at 
liberty  in  meeting  them  to  adopt  such  a 
policy,  nor  to  execute  the  policy  adopted 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  unjustly  discrim- 
inate between  different  localities.  They 
may,  perhaps,  determine  whether  they 
will  apply  the  coast  rate  which  is  fixed  by 
water  competition  at  the  interior  point, 
but  if  they  apply  it  at  one  point  they 
must  apply  it  at  others  which  are  sim- 
ilarly situated;  they  cannot,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  some  sufficient  reason,  give 
Chicago  that  rate  and  refuse  it  to  St. 
Louis  and  Kansas  City.  They  cannot 
so  adjust  their  whole  tariff  scheme,  upon 
the  plea  of  water  competition,  as  to  con- 
centrate in  these  coast  cities  commercial 
and  transportation  advantages  to  which 
their  mere  location  does  not  entitle 
them,  and  that  in  substance  is  the  ef- 
fect of  the  present  rate  adjustment.  City 
of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
400,  423,  424. 

(c)  Considering  the  question  broadly 
with  reference  to  the  situation  in  the 
Spokane  case  in  all  its  aspects,  it  cannot 
be  said  that  the  legitimate  effect  of 
water  competition  upon  the  Atlantic  sea- 
board may  not  be  to  reduce  the  rail  rate 
from  interior  points.  City  of  Spokane  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  400,  423. 

(d)  In  the  Reno  case  the  carriers  in- 
volved have  not  shown  that  undue  dis- 
crimination was  not  effected  by  their 
rate  adjustment  between  points  in  Ne- 
vada and  points  in  California,  nor  have 
they  established  that  the  rates  to  the 
coast  cities  if  extended  by  them  from 
eastern  points  outside  the  zone  of  water 
Infiuence  are  not  fully  compensatory. 
The  Commission,  however,  desires  to  be 
extremely  conservative  in  this,  the  first 
application  of  the  new  law,  and  to  require 
an  adjustment  of  rates  that  will  be 
safely  within  the  zone  of  its  discretion. 
For  this  reason  it  has  decided  that  the 
transcontinental  carriers  serving  Reno 
and  other  points  upon  the  main  line  of 
the  Central  Pacific  R.  R.  shall  make  no 
higher  charge  upon  any  article  carrying 
a  commodity  rate  than  is  contempora- 
neously in  effect  from  Missouri  River 
points,  such  as  Omaha  and  Kansas  City, 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §10  (e)  — (f) 


to  coast  terminal  points.  This  principle 
should  also  be  applied  on  commodity  rates 
to  all  main-line  intermediate  points  in 
Nevada  and  California.  Traffic  originat- 
ing at  Chicago  and  in  Chicago  territory 
moving  under  commodity  rates  may 
have  a  rate  7  per  cent  higher  than  that 
imposed  on  freight  originating  in  Chi- 
cago and  Chicago  territory,  and  destined 
to  the  coast  terminals.  From  Buffalo- 
Pittsburg  territory  the  rates  to  intermedi- 
ate points  may  rise  above  those  de- 
manded and  charged  from  the  same 
points  and  territory  to  the  coast  termin- 
als to  the  extent  of  15  per  cent,  while 
from  New  York  and  trunk  line  territory 
the  rates  charged  shall  not  exceed  25  per 
cent  over  and  above  terminal  rates.  This 
means  that  Suisun,  Auburn,  Truckee. 
Reno  and  Elko,  for  instance,  points  inter- 
mediate to  San  Francisco  from  the  east, 
shall  have  at  least  the  benefit  of  the 
commodity  rates  extended  from  the  Mis- 
souri River  to  Sacramento  and  San  Fran- 
cisco, and  shall  pay  no  more  than  7  per 
cent  above  the  Chicago-coast  terminal 
rates,  and  corresponding  increases  of  15 
and  25  per  cent,  respectively,  from  Pitts- 
burg and  New  York  territories.  Some 
of  the  petitions  under  the  fourth  section 
which  have  been  considered  are  made 
by  carriers  reaching  California  terminals 
through  the  southern  gateways,  southern 
Nevada  and  Arizona.  These  applications 
are  also  denied  in  so  far  as  they  in- 
volve the  imposition  of  higher  rates  upon 
intermediate  points  than  are  applied  on 
commodities  from  the  Missouri  River  to 
Los  Angeles,  San  Francisco  or  other 
coast  terminals.  To  all  such  intermedi- 
ate points  (Ash  Fork,  Maricopa,  San 
Bernardino,  Bakersfield,  Fresno  and  Ven- 
tura, for  instance)  terminal  rates  shall 
not  be  exceeded  as  from  Missouri  River 
points,  with  the  same  proportionate  ad- 
vances east  of  the  Missouri  River  as 
heretofore  specified.  Railroad  Commis- 
sion of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
329,  369;  order  enjoined,  in  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  191  Fed.  856,  holding 
that  the  Commission  by  its  orders  re- 
specting the  relation  of  rates  from  east- 
ern points  to  Spokane,  Reno  and  other  in- 
termountain  cities  as  compared  with  the 
rates  to  Pacific  coast  terminals  estab- 
lished certain  zones  and  entered  orders 
which  did  not  establish  absolute  rates 
for  either  the  long  or  short  haul,  or  pre- 
scribe the  extent,  in  dollars  and  cents, 
that  the  short-haul  rate  might  exceed 
the  present  or  some  definitely  fixed  long- 
haul  rate,  but  established  a  relation  be- 


tween any  long-haul  rate  that  the  car- 
rier might  put  into  effect  and  the  short- 
haul  rate  by  determining  that  from  Zone 
1  the  western  short-haul  rate  should  not 
exceed  the  long-haul  rate,  and  from 
Zones  2,  3  and  4  the  short-haul  rate 
should  not  exceed  the  long-haul  rate  by 
more  than  7  per  cent,  15  per  cent  and  25 
per  cent,  respectively,  and,  therefore,  the 
Commission  exceeded  its  authority,  since 
it  has  no  power  to  say  that  any  given 
percentage  of  an  unknown  less  than  rea- 
sonable rate  to  the  coast  is  necessarily 
a  maximum  reasonable  and  non-discrim- 
inatory rate  from  the  same  point  of 
origin  to  an  interior  point. 

(e)  It  is  no  reflection  upon  the  traf- 
fic manager  of  a  railroad  to  say  that  he 
bases  his  rates  upon  some  line  of  policy. 
He  deals  directly  and  in  most  cases  ex- 
clusively with  the  producer  or  the  jobber. 
His  concern  is  to  keep  these  patrons 
satisfied  and  at  the  same  time  bring  to 
his  railroad  the  greatest  possible  rev- 
enue. This  is  what  he  means  by  saying 
that  he  charges  what  the  trafl^c  will 
bear.  He  regards  as  reasonable  what- 
3ver  rate  will  make  for  the  best  interest 
for  his  road,  and  in  determining  this  he 
adopts  a  line  of  policy  which  affects 
either  favorably  or  unfavorably  the  in- 
dustrial growth  of  the  communities 
which  the  carrier  serves.  The  restric- 
tions of  the  Act  are  governmental  limita- 
tions placed  upon  the  unlimited  and  ar- 
bitrary discretion  of  traffic  officials. 
While  the  latter  may  adopt  policies  which 
they  regard  as  most  favorable  to  their 
roads,  such  policies  must  be  restricted  by 
the  inhibitions  of  the  law  which  this 
Commission  must  enforce.  The  policy 
of  making  Reno  rates  base  upon  those 
extended  to  the  more  distant  Pacific 
terminal  points  may  not  be  justified  upon 
the  ground  that  Reno  traffic  will  bear 
that  imposition,  but  may  be  justified  by 
conditions  obtaining  at  the  more  distant 
point,  which  the  carrier  may  meet  with- 
out offense  to  any  provision  of  the  Act. 
It  is  not  sufficient  to  state  that  the  ter- 
minal points  are  situated  on  the  water 
to  excuse  the  imposition  of  high  rates 
at  intermediate  points.  Railroad  Com- 
mission of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
238,  249,  250. 

(f)  The  present  commodity  rates 
charged  by  the  Great  Northern  and  the 
Northern  Pacific  R.  Rs.  from  eastern  ter- 
ritory to  Spokane  are  unreasonable,  and 
just  and  reasonable  rates  which  ought 
not  to  be  exceeded  for  the  future  would 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §10  (g)_(m) 


469 


be  those  which  are  set  forth  in  Schedule 
A,  attached.  In  fixing  these  rates  the 
Commission  has  proceeded  upon  the 
view  that  under  the  present  decisions 
cf  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  it  could  not  use  the  rate  to  Seattle 
r.s  a  standard  by  which  to  measure  that 
to  Spokane.  If  this  were  otherwise,  if 
it  were  free  to  take  into  account  all  the 
competitive  conditions  existing  both  east 
and  west,  and  to  determine  what,  in  the 
light  of  all  these  conditions,  would  be  a 
just  and  reasonable  relation  between  the 
rates  of  Seattle  and  Spokane,  a  some- 
what different  question  would  be  pre- 
sented. City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,   19   I.   C.  C.   162,  174. 

(g)  Where  an  inherently  reasonable 
rata  is  established  by  the  Commission  to 
Srokane,  a  higher  rate  to  an  intermedi- 
ste  point  cannot  be  permitted.  City  of 
Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
162,  169. 

(h)  The  mere  statement  that  terminal 
roints  are  situated  on  the  water  is  not 
sufficient  to  excuse  higher  rates  at  in- 
trrmediate  points.  R.  R.  Commission  of 
Nev.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  238,  250. 

(i)  The  city  of  San  Pedro  is  situated 
en  San  Pedro  Bay  about  twenty  two 
miles  distant  from  Los  Angeles,  which 
is  inland.  Los  Angeles  takes  Pacific 
coast  terminal  rates,  as  does  San  Diego, 
which  is  about  125  miles  south  of  San 
Pedro  bay  on  the  coast.  Tonnage  mov- 
ing by  water  that  could  not  be  unloaded 
at  San  Diego  for  any  reason  could  move 
through  the  harbor  at  San  Pedro,  and 
this  creates  a  potential  competition  at 
San  Pedro.  Through  shipments  from  the 
east  to  San  Pedro  pay  the  terminal  rates 
to  Los  Angeles  plus  the  local  rates  to 
San  Pedro.  HELD,  that  a  rate  adjust- 
ment that  deprives  San  Pedro  of  the 
benefit  of  its  own  geographical  situation, 
while  according  the  benefit  of  it  to  Los 
Angeles,  constitutes  a  discrimination 
aeainst  San  Pedro  that  i^  undue  and  un- 
just, and,  therefore,  unlawful.  To  recog 
nize  to  any  extent  in  the  rates  to  Los 
Angeles  cither  the  actual  or  the  potential 
competition  through  San  Pedro,  without 
riving  recognition  to  such  competition 
in  the  rates  to  San  Pedro  itself,  is  a  dis- 
criminatory and  unlawful  adjustment.  If 
such  competition  is  recognized  in  the 
Los  Angeles  rates  there  is  no  justice  in 
obscuring  it  in  the  San  Pedro  rates. 
When  one  community  leans  upon  an- 
other for  its  competitive  rates,  the  benefit 


Df  such  rates  ought  not  to  be  denied  to 
:he    point    that   creates    the    competitive 
ondition.      Harbor    City    Wholesale    Co. 
V.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  323,  331. 

(j)  The  existence  cf  competition  at 
I  farther  distant  point  does  not  excuse 
che  unreasonableness  per  se  of  the 
higher  rate.  Southern  Timber  &  Land 
Co.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  232. 

(k)     Water  competition  creates  prima 

acie  dissimilarity  of  conditions  justifying 

1  violation  of  the  fourth  section.     Bayou 

City  Rice  Mills  v.  T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co., 

18  i.  C.  C.  490,  492. 

(1)  A  carrier  may  make  low  rates  to 
points  for  the  purpose  of  meeting  water 
competition  at  those  points,  and  may 
make  somewhat  higher  rates  to  inter- 
mediate points  at  which  the  same  com- 
petition does  not  exist,  but  obviously  its 
higher  rate  to  such  intermediate  point 
cannot  reasonably  exceed  its  rate  to  the 
competitive  point  plus  its  local  rate  back 
from  that  point  to  the  intermediate 
ooint.     Valley  Flour  Mills  v.  A.  T.  &  S. 

F.  Ry.  Co  •  16  I.  C.  C.  73,  78. 

(m)  The  Commission  established 
class  and  commodity  rates  from  St.  Paul 
and  Chicago  to  Spokane,  the  order  being 
directed  against  the  U.  P.,  the  N.  P.  and 

G.  N.  R.  Rs.  The  U.  P.  R.  R.  filed  a  peti- 
tion asking  to  be  relieved  from  the  order, 
first,  on  the  ground  it  had  no  direct  line 
leading  from  St.  Paul  to  Omaha  and, 
second,  the  distance  from  St.  Paul  and 
Chicago  via  its  line  was  much  greater 
than  via  the  N.  P.  R.  R.  and  G.  N.  R.  R. 
and,  therefore,  while  the  rates  fixed 
might  be  just  and  reasonable  for  the 
shorter  distance  over  the  Hill  lines,  they 
were  unjust  over  the  U.  P.  R,  R.  In 
establishing  the  rates  in  question  the 
Commission  took  into  consideration,  as 
an  important  factor,  the  difference  in  dis- 
tances to  Seattle  and  to  Spokane,  and 
the  difference  in  distances  from  Chicago 
and  St.  Paul  to  those  points.  Via  the 
U.  P.  R.  R.  the  distance  from  Chicago 
to  Spokane  was  2,300  miles;  via  the 
other  lines,  1,900  miles.  HELD,  the 
order  should  be  modified,  excepting  the 
U.  P.  R.  R.,  as  to  St.  Paul  traffic,  and 
that  the  effective  date  of  the  order  should 
be  postponed  until  a  readjustment  of 
rates  might  be  made  by  the  carriers, 
under  which  the  carriers  must  take  care 
to  protect  the  cities  of  Pendleton,  Baker 
City,  Walla  Walla,  etc.,  which  were  far- 
ther than  Spokane  on  the  N.  P.  R.  R.  and 


470 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §10  (n)— (s) 


nearer  to  Spokane  on  the  U.  P.  R.  R., 
and  might  suffer  if  the  U.  P.  R.  R.  should 
be  relieved  from  establishing  the  rate 
ordered  to  Spokane.  Spokane  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  179. 

(n)  The  rate  to  San  Francisco  is 
made  under  circumstances  of  water  com- 
petition, and  therefore  may  be  lower 
than  to  intermediate  points  where  such 
competition  does  not  exist.  Rogers  v. 
O.  R.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  424,  425. 

(o)  On  a  carload  of  household  goods 
from  Spokane  to  Medford,  Ore.,  com- 
plainant was  charged  $1.11  per  100  lbs., 
made  up  of  55c  from  Spokane  to  Port- 
land and  56c  from  Portland  to  Medford. 
Medford  lay  intermediate  to  Spokane  and 
San  Francisco,  and  the  rate  between  the 
two  latter  points  was  71c,  resulting  from 
water  competition.  HELD,  the  rate  at- 
tacked was  not  unreasonable.  Repara- 
tion denied.  Rogers  v.  Ore.  R.  R.  &  N. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  424,  425. 

(p)  Carriers  may,  for  the  purpose  of 
meeting  water  competition,  make  rates 
lower  than  would  otherwise  •  be  justifi- 
able, even  to  the  extent  of  charging  a 
less  rate  to  the  more  distant  point. 
Darling  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
L  C.  C.  79,  87. 

(q)  A  through  rate  on  cross-ties  to 
a  longer  distance  point,  less  than  the 
combination  to  an  intermediate  point, 
may  be  justified  by  water  competition. 
MacGillis  &  Gibbs  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  329. 

(r)  On  a  carload  of  cross-ties  from 
Sault  Ste.  Marie,  Mich.,  to  Thiensville, 
Wis.,  a  rate  of  20c  was  exacted,  made  up 
of  9c  to  Champion  and  lie  from  Cham- 
pion to  destination.  A  joint  through  rate 
of  13c  was  in  effect  over  defend- 
ants' lines  from  the  point  of  origin  to 
Milwaukee,  Chicago  and  points  inter- 
mediate to  said  latter  two  cities.  Thiens- 
ville is  17  miles  north  of  Milwaukee  and 
intermediate  to  said  city  and  Sault  Ste. 
Marie.  The  rate  to  Milwaukee  was  in- 
fluenced by  water  competition.  The  local 
rate  from  Milwaukee  to  Thiensville  was 
3c,  making  the  combination  on  Milwau- 
kee 16c.  HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was 
excessive  to  the  extent  that  it  exceeded 
16c,  but  Thiensville  was  not  entitled  to 
the  13c  Milwaukee  rate,  nor  was  the 
exaction  of  the  higher  rate  in  violation 
of  section  4  of  the  Act.  Reparation 
awarded.  MacGillis  &  Gibbs  Co.  v.  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  329,  330. 


(s)  Complainant  interests  at  Spokane 
attacked  the  rates  from  Chicago  and  St 
Paul,  as  typical  points,  to  Spokane  as 
unjustly  discriminatory  in  favor  of  Seat- 
tle, as  a  typical  coast  point,  compared 
with  the  rates  from  Chicago  and  St.  Paul 
to  Seattle.  The  traffic  to  Seattle  over 
defendants,  G.  N.  and  N.  P.  R.  Rs.,  passed 
through  Spokane,  which  is  some  400 
miles  east  of  Seattle.  The  class  rates 
from  St.  Paul  to  Seattle  and  Spokane 
were  practically  the  same;  from  Chicago 
to  Spokane  the  rates  were  materially 
higher  than  to  Seattle.  The  commodity 
rates  under  which  most  of  the  traffic 
moved  were  usually  higher  to  Spokane 
from  St.  Paul  than  to  Seattle,  the  Spo- 
kane rate  being,  in  a  majority  of  cases, 
higher  than  that  to  Seattle  by  about  70 
per  cent  of  the  local  rate  from  Seattle 
to  Spokane.  From  all  shipping  points 
east  of  the  Missouri  River  the  rates  to 
Seattle  were  the  same,  whereas  the  rates 
from  said  points  to  Spokane  were  in- 
creased according  to  the  distance  of  the 
point  of  origin  eastward;  i.  e.,  the  com- 
modity rates  were  higher  to  Spokane 
from  Chicago  than  from  St.  Paul,  and 
higher  from  New  York  than  from  Chi- 
cago, thereby  restricting  Spokane  job- 
bers to  the  eastern  markets  from  which 
they  could  purchase.  Water  competition 
existed  between  eastern  ports  and  Seat- 
tle via  ocean  steamships,  and  the  Pana- 
ma Railroad  by  means  of  ocean  tramp 
vessels,  of  ocean  steamships  plying  via 
Cape  Horn  and  via  the  Straits  of  Magel- 
lan, and  by  means  of  ocean  steamships 
from  New  York  to  Mexico,  and  thence 
across  to  the  Pacific  Ocean,  by  rail  and 
thence  by  vessel  to  destination.  By  some 
ocean  lines  the  per  annum  tonnage 
amounted  to  as  high  as  250,000  tons,  and 
the  carriage  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pa- 
cific coast  was  accomplished  in  from  25 
to  40  days.  Water  competition  influenced 
the  rates  from  eastern  interior  points, 
the  goods  being  shipped  from  said  points 
to  New  York  and  thence  by  water  to 
the  Pacific  coast.  The  rates  to  Seattle 
from  Chicago  were  made  the  same  as 
from  New  York  in  order  to  enable  the 
Chicago  manufacturer  to  compete  with 
New  York  and  also  to  develop  Chicago 
as  a  manufacturing  center  in  order  to 
give  the  carriers,  which  must  meet  the 
New  York  to  Seattle  water  rate,  the  ben- 
efit of  the  shorter  distance  haul  from 
Chicago  to  Seattle  as  compared  with  that 
from  New  York  to  Seattle.  HELD,  on 
account  of  water  competition,  the  higher 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §10  (t)— (v) 


471 


rates  to  Spokane  than  those  on  traffic 
to  Seattle,  hauled  through  Spokane,  were 
not  in  violation  of  section  4  of  the  Act. 
Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  376, 
388. 

(t)  Water  competition  at  the  Pacific 
coast  on  transcontinental  traflSc  creates 
a  dissimilarity  of  circumstances  and  con- 
ditions between  the  interior  and  the 
coast.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  376. 

(u)  On  shipments  of  various  com- 
modities to  Seattle  from  eastern  points 
of  origin  better  minima  were  accorded 
than  upon  similar  shipments  to  Spokane 
and,  as  to  cotton  fabrics,  the  right  to 
mix  carloads  was  accorded  to  Seattle  and 
denied  to  Spokane.  HELD,  the  existence 
of  water  competition  justified  said  dif- 
ference in  minima  and  in  the  privilege 
of  mixing  carloads  exactly,  as  it  jus- 
tified a  lower  rate  to  Seattle.  Spokane 
V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  389. 

(v)  The  class  rates  from  St.  Paul 
and  Chicago  to  Seattle  were  substan- 
tially the  same,  first  class  being  $3; 
from  St.  Paul  and  Chicago  to  Spokane 
they  were  higher  from  Chicago,  the  rat-e 
from  St.  Paul  being  $3  and  from  Chi- 
cago $3.60.  From  New  York,  class  rates 
were  the  same  to  Seattle  as  from  Chi- 
cago and  St.  Paul,  but  were  materially 
higher  to  Spokane  than  the  St.  Paul  and 
Chicago  to  Spokane  rates.  The  commodity 
rates  from  said  points  of  origin  were 
generally  higher  to  Spokane  than  to 
Seattle  by  about  70  per  cent  of  the  local 
rate  from  Seattle  to  Spokane.  As  a  re- 
sult of  such  rates  the  Spokane  jobber 
was  obliged  to  pay  a  higher  rate  upon 
practically  everything  from  the  Missouri 
River,  or  east,  and  was  restricted  in  the 
markets  in  which  he  could  buy,  for  while 
Seattle  could  purchase  at  all  points  of 
origin  east  of  the  Missouri  River  at  th»3 
sames  rates,  Spokane  was  unable  to  do 
so,  since  the  rates  increased  to  Spokane 
according  to  the  distance  from  the  east- 
ern point  of  origin.  Over  a  territory  of 
about  100  miles  to  the  east  and  to  the 
south,  however,  Spokane  was  given  lower 
rates  than  any  other  jobbing  center  and 
was  able  to  dominate  the  sales  to  deal- 
ers in  said  territory.  The  N.  P.  and  the 
G.  N.  R.  Rs.  were  the  carriers  chiefly 
concerned  in  the  controversy.  The  cost 
of  reproduction  of  the  N.  P.  R.  R.  was 
some  $325,000,000  for  a  mileage  of  some 
5,810   miles,   or  about   $56,000   per   mile. 


As  to  its  original  cost  of  construction,  no 
reliable  figures  were  presented.  Its  cap- 
italization was  about  $342,000,000,  or  $57,- 
800  per  mile.  From  1898  to  1907  said 
defendant  earned  over  and  above  all 
fixed  charges,  taxes  and  other  expenses, 
in  addition  to  the  payment  of  a  dividend 
for  every  year  except  the  first,  some  $55,- 
000,000.  During  the  last  six  years  of 
that  period  it  earned,  in  addition  to  the 
payment  of  its  taxes  and  fixed  charges, 
from  10  to  15  per  cent  upon  its  capital- 
stock  of  $155,000,000.  No  accurate  esti- 
mate of  the  cost  of  reproduction  of  the 
G.  N.  R.  R.  was  submitted,  but  the  same 
ranged  somewhere  between  $335,000,000 
and  $415,000,000.  No  reliable  statement 
was  furnished  of  its  original  cost  of 
construction.  Its  capitalization  was  some 
•^  000,000.  From  1891  to  1907  said  de- 
fendant accumulated,  in  addition  to  fixed 
charges,  taxes  and  a  dividend  of  7  per 
cent  paid  upon  many  millions  of  stock 
issued  without  any  money  consideration, 
some  $61,000,000.  During  the  last  six 
years  of  said  period  it  earned  upon  the 
par  value  of  its  capital  stock  from  10 
to  15  per  cent.  The  coal  lands  owned 
by  defendant  N.  P.  R.  R.  were  leased  to 
an  independent  company,  which  oper- 
ated the  same  at  a  handsome  profit,  and 
their  value,  therefore,  was  not  included 
by  the  Commission  in  determining  the 
amount  upon  which  an  income  might  be 
properly  demanded  by  said  carrier.  The 
ore  properties  of  the  defendant  G.  N.  R. 
R.  were  transferred  to  an  outside  com- 
pany and  an  ore  certificate  was  given 
free  to  each  holder  of  a  share  of  stock, 
which  certificate  entitled  him  to  a  propor- 
tionate share  of  the  income  derived  from 
said  ore  leases.  New  issues  of  stock 
were  at  various  times  distributed  by  the 
G.  N.  R.  R.  to  stockholders  at  par  when 
the  market  value  of  such  stock  ranged 
from  $140  to  $264  per  share.  Some  $30,- 
000,000  of  its  stock  was  issued  without 
any  money  consideration.  The  stock  of 
the  N.  P.  R.  R.  was  originally  sold  at 
from  $10  to  $15  per  share.  In  arriving 
at  the  cost  of  reproduction  of  the  N.  P. 
R.  R.  the  value  of  the  land  was  placed 
at  $107,000,000,  or  about  one-third  of  said 
cost.  Most  of  the  right-of-way  was  orig- 
inally acquired  by  gift.  To  apply  to 
Spokane  the  rates  to  Seattle  would 
taken  in  connection  with  the  losses 
incident  to  the  consequent  adjustment 
of  rates  in  intermediate  territory,  result 
in  a  loss  of  some  $645,000  a  year  to  the 
G.  N.  R.  R.  and  some  $1,197,000  to  the 


472 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §10  (w)— (cc) 


N.  P.  R.  R.  In  recent  years  the  density 
of  traffic  and  prosperity  of  these  carriers 
were  as  great  as  that  of  the  most  pros- 
perous road  connecting  Chicago  and  New 
York,  Complainant  urged  that  commod- 
ity rates,  which  paid  the  cost  of  the 
movement  from  New  York  to  Seattle,  a 
distance  of  3,200  miles,  through  St.  Paul 
and  Spokane,  must  yield  a  reasonable 
profit  when  applied  as  a  local  rate  for 
the  1,500  miles  of  that  haul  between  St. 
Paul  and  Spokane.  In  applying  the  Chi- 
cago to  Seattle  rates  as  locals  between 
St.  Paul  and  Spokane  the  per  ton  mile 
revenue  would  equal  or  exceed  that  under 
the  rates  which  defendants  had  volun- 
tarily established  upon  fruits,  vegetables 
and  other  products  from  the  Pacific  coast 
to  the  Bast  and  would  be  fairly  in  line 
with  that  derived  upon  similar  commod- 
ities for  corresponding  distances  in  vari- 
ous parts  of  the  United  States.  HELD, 
that  the  class  rates  attacked  from  St. 
Paul  to  Spokane  were  unreasonable  and 
should  be  reduced  so  as  to  be  16  2-3  per 
cent  below  the  Seattle  rate;  that  Chi- 
cago to  Spokane  class  rates  might  prop- 
erly be  higher  than  those  from  St.  Paul 
by  arbitraries  of  50c,  42c,  33c,  21c  and 
17c  for  the  first  five  classes,  respectively; 
that  the  Chicago  to  Seattle  commodity 
rates  should,  with  certain  exceptions,  be 
applied  from  St.  Paul  to  Spokane,  and 
that  commodity  rates  from  Chicago  to 
Spokane  should  be  made  by  adding  16  2-3 
per  cent  to  the  new  St.  Paul  to  Spokane 
commodity  rates.  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  421,  425. 

(w)  Transcontinental  rates  are  lower 
from  the  Missouri  River  and  east  to  Pa- 
cific coast  than  to  intermediate  interior 
points.  HELD,  that  this  has  been  forced 
by  water  competition  between  the  At- 
lantic and  Pacific  coasts.  Spokane  v.  N. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376. 

(xy)  Where  rates  are  fixed  at  certain 
terminal  points  by  water  competition  a 
general  custom  has  obtained  of  making 
rates  to  intermediate  points  upon  the 
combination  of  the  competitive  rates  to 
the  terminal  rate  plus  the  local  rate  back. 
The  reasonableness  of  a  rate  so  con- 
structed necessarily  depends  largely  upon 
the  reasonableness  of  the  local  rate, 
which  is  added  to  the  terminal  rate,  and, 
obviously,  no  rate  to  an  intermediate 
point  constructed  under  those  conditions, 
and  on  that  principle,  can  reasonably  be 
higher  than  the  sum  of  the  terminal  rate 
plus  the   local  rate  back.     Monroe  Pro- 


gressive League  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  534,  536. 

(z)  Competition  may  be  eliminated  by 
low  rail  rates,  but  any  increase  in  rail 
rates  sufficient  to  induce  the  establish- 
ment of  additional  lines  would  transform 
the  diminished,  but  strongly  potential, 
steamer  lines  into  active  water  compe- 
tition, which,  once  established,  must 
continue.  Monroe  Progressive  League  v. 
St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  534, 
539. 

(aa)  Controlling  competition,  espe- 
cially water  carriers,  such  as  exists  at 
New  Orleans,  Natchez  and  Vicksburg, 
justifies  lower  rates  to  those  points  than 
to  intermediate  points  where  the  same 
competition  does  not  exist  and  control. 
Monroe  Progressive  League  v.  St.  L.  1. 
M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  534,  536. 

(bb)  Rates  from  St.  Louis  to  New 
Orleans  and  other  Mississippi  River 
points  are  controlled  by  water  compe- 
tition, and  therefore  the  fact  that  such 
rates  are  lower  than  from  said  points  of 
origin  to  Monroe,  La.,  does  not  unjustly 
discriminate  against  Monroe.  Monroe 
Progressive  League  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  534. 

(cc)  Monroe,  La.,  is  located  at  the 
crossing  of  the  Iron  Mountain's  line 
and  the  Vicksburg,  Shreveport  &  Pa- 
cific line  running  in  connection  with 
the  Alabama  &  Vicksburg  Ry.,  from 
Vicksburg  to  Shreveport,  and  lies  upon 
the  Ouachita  River,  75,  120  and  216 
miles  west  of  Vicksburg,  Jackson  and 
Meridian,  respectively;  96  miles  east  of 
Shreveport,  292  miles  northwesterly 
from  New  Orleans,  98  miles  north  of 
Alexandria,  95  miles  northwest  of  Nat- 
chez and  152  miles  south  of  Pine  Bluff. 
Complainant  attacked,  as  unreasonable 
and  discriminatory,  all  rates  in  general 
from  St.  Louis  to  Monroe  on  traffic 
coming  from  defined  territories  north, 
northwest  and  north  of  St.  Louis.  Com- 
plainant attacked  the  rate  adjustment 
under  which  traffic  moved  from  St. 
Louis  to  New  Orleans  at  lower  rates 
than  from  St.  Louis  to  Monroe  and 
under  which  the  rates  from  St.  Louis  to 
Jackson  and  Meridian,  Miss.,  were  lower 
than  from  St.  Louis  to  Monroe.  The 
class  rates  from  Vicksburg  to  Monroe 
were  attacked  as  discriminatory  and 
unreasonable  per  se.  Complainant  also 
alleged  discrimination  in  that  Monroe 
was    governed    by    the    Western    Classi- 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §11  (dd) 


473 


fication,  while  traffic  from  St.  Louis 
and  other  points  to  New  Orleans,  Vicks- 
burg,  Meridian  and  Natchez  was  gov- 
erned by  the  Southern  Classification. 
The  rate  from  St.  Louis  to  New  Orleans 
was  originally  established  by  river  car- 
riers and  the  same  rate  was  extended 
by  the  river  carriers  to  Vicksburg  and 
Natchez.  The  railroads  were  compelled 
by  competition  to  establish  the  same 
rates  to  these  points.  As  a  result  of 
this  water  competition,  the  rates  to 
these  points  were  low.  In  many  in- 
stances the  rates  to  Monroe  from  St. 
Louis  were  in  excess  of  the  sums  of 
the  terminal  rates  to  Vicksburg  and 
the  local  rates  from  Vicksburg  to  Mon- 
roe. The  Iron  Mountain  R.  R.  joined 
in  the  transportation  of  traffic  from  St. 
Louis  to  Vicksburg  via  Monroe  in  com- 
petition with  rail  lines  reaching  Vicks- 
burg from  the  east  side  of  the  INIissis- 
sippi  River.  The  class  rates  complained 
of  from  Vicksburg  to  Monroe  were  60, 
50,  40,  30  and  22c  for  the  first  five 
classes,  respectively.  Vicksburg  is  75 
miles  from  Monroe,  Shreveport  96  miles 
west  of  Monroe  and  Alexandria  98 
miles  south  of  Monro-e,  but  for  many 
years  Monroe,  Alexandria  and  Shreve- 
port had  been  grouped  together  and 
had  taken  the  same  rates.  The  60c 
scale  applied  from  New  Orleans  to  Alex- 
andria, 194  miles;  New  Orleans  to 
Shreveport,  335  miles;  New  Orleans  to 
Monroe,  292  miles;  Vicksburg  to  Shreve- 
port, 171  miles,  and  Vicksburg  to  Alex- 
andria, 173  miles,  so  that  these  places 
were  put  on  an  equal  footing  as  to 
rates  from  New  Orleans  and  Vicksburg. 
The  direct  rate  from  St.  Louis  to  Mon- 
roe was  $1.17,  first  class,  whereas  the 
combination  on  Vicksburg  was  $1.50. 
Consequently,  if  complainant's  request 
that  the  Vicksburg-Monroe  rates  be  re- 
duced one-half  were  granted,  the  com- 
bination on  Vicksburg  would  be  $1.20 
and  Monroe  would  suffer  since  Vicks- 
burg could  sell  in  Monroe  itself  at  a 
disadvantage  of  only  3c.  The  rates  in 
Question  to  Monroe  were  first  fixed  by 
the  river  carriers  and  met  by  the  rail- 
roads, and  Monroe  was  enjoying,  there- 
fore, the  benefit  due  it  from  water  com- 
petition. Complainant  contended  that 
Monroe,  being  less  distant  from  St. 
Louis,  New  Orleans  or  Vicksburg  than 
was  Shreveport,  was  entitled  to  lower 
rates  than  Shreveport.  Monroe  is  near- 
er to  Vicksburg  than  these  other  places 
are,   but  aside   from  that  the   difference 


in  distance  is  insignificant  in  view  of 
the  500-mile  haul  involved.  Water  com- 
petition at  Vicksburg,  though  not  active, 
was  potential.  Jackson  was  given  a 
low  rate  from  St.  Louis  on  account  of 
its  proximity  to  Vicksburg.  Meridian 
was  given  the  Jackson  rate  by  a  carrier 
not  reaching  Jackson  and  in  competition 
with  the  carrier  serving  Jackson.  The 
rates  from  St.  Louis  to  Jackson  and 
Meridian  were,  for  these  reasons,  lower 
than  to  Monroe,  being  90c,  first  class,  to 
Vicksburg;  98c  to  Jackson  and  Meridian, 
and  $1.17  to  Monroe.  To  divorce  Monroe 
from  the  Shreveport  group,  would  es- 
tablish discrimination  against  Shreve- 
port and  Alexandria.  The  rates  to 
Monroe  and  the  Shreveport  group  were 
as  low,  on  the  whole,  as  the  rates  to 
any  other  jobbing  point  in  Louisiana, 
except  the  Mississippi  River  points. 
HELD,  the  rates  attacked  were  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable  or  unduly 
discriminatory  as  compared  with  the 
rates  from  St.  Louis  to  Vicksburg, 
Natchez,  Jackson,  Meridian  and  New 
Orleans  in  view  of  the  difference  in 
competitive  conditions;  that  the  class 
rates  from  Vicksburg  to  Monroe  were 
not  shown  to  be  discriminatory  or  un- 
reasonable per  se;  that  there  was  no 
occasion  for  excepting  Monroe  from  the 
Western  Classification  or  from  the  Shreve- 
port group;  but  that  the  defendants 
should  not  maintain  from  St.  Louis  to 
Monroe  a  rate  in  excess  of  the  rate 
from  St.  Louis  to  Vicksburg  or  New 
Orleans,  plus  the  local  rate  from  Vicks- 
burg or  New  Orleans  to  Monroe.  Mon- 
roe Progressive  League  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  & 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  534,  537,  538, 
541,    542. 

(dd)  The  rate  on  coal  from  Jellico 
mines,  Tenn.,  to  Augusta,  Ga.,  was 
$2.20  and  to  Charleston,  S.  C,  $1.90. 
Complainant  dealer  at  Augusta  attacked 
the  rate  as  unreasonable  and  unjustly 
discriminatory  in  favor  of  Charleston. 
The  Jellico  coal  passed  through  Au- 
gusta to  Charleston  in  some  instances 
but  for  the  most  part  was  carried  via 
the  Southern  Railway  to  Charleston 
without  passing  to  Augusta.  The  Jel- 
lico coal,  being  a  high-grade  domes- 
tic, competed  at  Charleston  with  anthra- 
cite, water-borne  from  Virginia  points, 
and  the  lower  rate  to  Charleston  was 
in  part  due  to  competition.  The  rates 
from  Alabama  coal  fields  to  Charleston 
were  on  an  average  about  $1.95;  from 
Alabama    fields    to    Charleston    and    Au- 


474 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §10  (ee)— §11  (e) 


gusta  they  were  generally  the  same. 
The  distances  from  the  Alabama  fields 
and  from  the  Jellico  district  to  Augusta 
are  approximately  the  same.  The  Ala- 
bama product  being  a  steam  coal  d.d 
not  compete  with  the  Jellico.  The 
transportation  frrn  the  Jellico  fields 
to  Augusta  involved  heavy  grades, 
whereas  such  physical  conditions  did 
not  exist  from  the  Alabama  fields  to 
Augusta.  The  rates  from  the  Alabama 
fields  into  Augusta  were  the  result  of 
keen  competiti(  n  between  carriers  serv- 
ing different  districts.  No  coal  from 
any  of  these  districts  competed  in  the 
Augusta  market  to  the  disadvantage  of 
any  dealer  in  Je-'ico  coal.  The  rate 
attacked  yielded  5.5  mills  per  ton  mile. 
The  average  rate  per  ton  mile  from 
various  Southern  Railway  groups  to 
Augusta  was  5.4  mills;  from  all  dis- 
tricts served  by  the  different  carriers 
to  Augusta,  5  mills.  The  average  rate 
per  ton  mile  on  coal  on  the  entire 
system  of  the  Southern  Railway  was 
4.37  mills.  HELD,  the  rate  attacked 
was  not  unjustly  discriminatory  in  favor 
of  Charleston  or  in  violation  of  section 
4  of  the  Act;  and  that  the  rate  was  not 
unreasonable  per  se.  Rice  v.  Georgia 
R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  75,  77,  78. 

(ee)  On  a  carload  of  tanks  and  sub- 
structures from  Kendallville,  Ind.,  to 
Gallatin,  Tenn.,  complainant  was  as- 
sessed 46c,  made  up  of  the  16c  rate 
from  Kendallville  to  Louisville  and  the 
local  rate  from  Louisville  to  Gallatin 
of  30c.  The  rate  from  Louisville  to 
Nashville  was  15c.  Gallatin  is  an  in- 
termediate point  between  Louisville  and 
Nashville.  The  15c  rate  from  Louisville 
to  Nashville  was  forced  by  water  com- 
petition which  was  not  operative  with 
respect  to  Gallatin.  HELD,  in  view  of 
the  competition  the  rate  charged  could 
not  be  held  to  be  in  violation  of  sec- 
tion 4  of  the  Act.  Flint  &  Walling 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  14  1. 
C.    C.   520,    521. 

V.     PROCEDURE. 

See    Courts,    §11     (v) ;    Undercharges, 
§3  (d). 

§11.     Complaints   and    Orders. 

See     Procedure     Before     Commission, 
M,   §2  (c). 

(a)  The  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  a 
city  Is  a  proper  party  to  be  heard  upon 
the  application  of  carriers  to  be  re- 
lieved from  the  operation  of  the  fourth 
section    in    fixing    rates    to    such    city. 


Grand  Junction  Chamber  of  Commerce 
V.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  115, 
117. 

(b)  The  statute  does  not  in  terms 
define  the  proceeding  in  which  the  Com- 
mission may  inquire  into  alleged  vio- 
lations of  the  fourth  section  of  the 
Act  and  grant  the  relief  as  specified  in 
the  proviso,  but  it  is  clear  that  any 
order  which  the  Commission  makes  in 
that  respect  must  be  at  all  times  sub- 
ject to  modification  by  it,  and  it  seems 
equally  clear  that  when  complaint  is 
made  of  a  violation  of  the  fourth  sec- 
tion the  Commission  may.  by  order  in 
that  proceeding,  grant  appropriate  re- 
lief against  any  violation  of  the  Act 
which  is  found  to  exist,  including  a  viola- 
tion of  the  fourth  section,  nor  is  it  signifl- 
jant  that  the  complaint  was  pending  at  the 
time  of  the  amendment  of  the  section.  It 
should  also  be  noted  that  this  is  not  a 
new  and  additional  authority,  but  is 
simply  the  exercise  of  the  jurisdiction 
provided  for  in  the  fifteenth  section  for 
the  correction  of  unjust  discrimination. 
There  is  no  essential  difference  be- 
tween this  order  and  an  order  which 
the  Commission  might  make  under 
the  third  section.  City  of  Spokane  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.   C.  400,  426. 

(c)  Where  the  rates  of  carriers  are 
not  in  unlawful  violation  of  the  pro- 
visions of  section  4  of  the  Act,  it  is 
not  the  practice  of  the  Commission  to 
enter  an  order  fixing  an  absolute  rate 
for  the  shorter  haul,  but  only  to  re- 
quire the  carriers  guilty  of  the  violation 
to  cease  and  desist  from  charging  a 
higher  rate  for  the  shorter  than  for  the 
longer  haul,  and  it  is,  therefore,  neces- 
sary that  connecting  carriers  joining  in 
the  rates  attacked  should  be  made 
parties.  Moise  Brothers  Co.  v.  C.  R. 
L   &   P.  Ry.   Co.,  16   L   C.   C.   550,   55L 

(d)  A  carrier  which  is  party  to  a 
through  rate  to  a  longer  distance  point 
should  be  made  a  party  to  a  complaint 
alleging  a  violation  of  section  4.  Moise 
Bros.  Co.  V.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Co.,  16  I.  C  C. 
550,  552. 

(e)  Ordinarily  orders  are  intended 
only  to  correct  the  unlawful  relation  of 
rates  and  give  the  carriers  concerned  the 
option  either  of  increasing  the  rates  for 
the  longer  haul  or  reducing  the  rate  for 
the  shorter  haul.  Moise  Bros.  Co.  v. 
C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  550,  552. 


LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §12  (1)   (a)— §12  (2)   (e) 


475 


§12.     Evidence. 

See   Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §2   (d), 
§28    (e). 

§12.      (1)      Burden  of  Proof. 
See    Evidence,    I. 

(a)  Defendants  serving  the  Kansas 
salt  field  sought  permission  from  the 
Commission  to  enable  them  to  charge 
higher  rates  from  there  to  some  points 
west  of  the  Mississippi  than  to  the  river 
crossings.  Defendants  practically  failed 
to  submit  any  evidence.  HELD,  the  Com- 
mission could  not  on  the  record  find  that 
the  rates  to  the  river  crossings  were  un- 
reasonably low  or  that  the  rates  to  inter- 
mediate points  were  reasonable  and  de- 
fendants had  failed  to  justify  the  de- 
parture from  the  mandate  of  section  4 
of  the  Act;  but  that  defendants  might  re- 
open the  question  for  further  investiga- 
tion. R.  R.  Commissioners  of  Kansas  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  407,  419. 

(aa)  Under  section  4  of  the  Act  the 
burden  rests  upon  the  carrier  to  justify 
a  rate  from  an  intermediate  point  that  is 
higher  than  the  rate  from  a  more  dis- 
tant point  when  the  shipments  move  over 
the  same  rails  and  in  the  same  direc- 
tion. Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  O.  S.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  324,  326. 

(b)  Where  a  carrier  in  defending  a 
rate  to  El  Paso  lower  than  that  to  Santa 
Rosa,  an  intermediate  point  nearer  the 
point  of  origin  of  the  shipment  proves 
that  the  lower  rates  at  El  Paso  are  due 
to  competitive  conditions  not  existing  at 
Santa  Rosa,  it  does  not  then  have  the 
burden  of  proof  of  justifying  the  Santa 
Rosa  rates,  but  such  burden  is  on  the 
person  attacking  such  rates.  Moise  Bros. 
Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C. 
550,  553. 

(c)  Having  explained  and  excused  a 
violation  of  section  4,  the  issue  as  to  the 
reasonableness  of  the  intermediate  rate 
must  take  same  course  as  any  other 
issue  involving  reasonableness  of  rates. 
Moise  Bros.  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  r50,  553. 

§12.      (2)      Circumstances     of     Probative 
Force. 
See  Evidence,  II,  §13  (3)   (a),  §20   (b); 

(a)  Millers  in  southern  Illinois,  in- 
termediate to  Boston  and  St.  Louis,  at- 
tacked the  rates  on  flour  and  other  grain 
products  of  24.7c  per  100  lbs.  from  their 
mills  to  Boston  as  violating  the  fourth 
section,  when   compared   with  the  rates 


of  21.7c  from  St,  Louis,  a  more  dis- 
tant point.  The  rates  from  St.  Louis 
apply  on  grain  or  grain  products  orig- 
inating west  of  that  market  and  often 
west  of  the  Missouri  River.  The  grain 
in  its  progress  from  the  field  where  it 
grows  to  the  point  of  final  consumption 
may  pass  through  several  grain  markets, 
like  Kansas  City,  St.  Louis,  Chicago  and 
others.  Rates  are  so  adjusted  that  the 
grain  can  move  at  the  same  charge 
through  several  of  these  markets,  the 
rate  from  market  to  market  being  a 
stated  amount.  HELD,  following  Balti- 
more Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  596,  that  the  spe- 
cific rates  from  St.  Louis  are  really  di- 
visions of  a  through  rate  and,  therefore, 
cannot  be  compared  with  the  local  rates 
paid  by  complainants,  and  from  this  it 
follows  that  the  fourth  section  is  not 
violated.  Southern  Illinois  Millers'  Ass'n 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  672,  674. 

(b)  On  plain  wire  from  Waukegan, 
III.,  to  Carthage,  Mo.,  complainant  was 
charged  the  fifth-class  rate  of  33c  per 
100  lbs.  The  rate  to  Kansas  City  was 
27c,  a  point  150  miles  nearer  north,  and 
the  rate  to  Springfield,  Mo.,  seventy-five 
miles  east  of  Carthage,  27c,  a  commodity 
rate.  The  rate  on  spring  beds  ^the  prod- 
uct) to  Springfield,  a  distributing  point, 
was  30c.  Defendants  attempted  to  justify 
rates  largely  upon  state  rates  determined 
by  statute.  HELD,  existing  rates  were 
discriminatory  against  the  manufacturer 
in  Carthage  in  favor  of  the  jobber  in 
Springfield,  and  that  for  the  future  the 
rate  should  be  at  least  3c  per  100  lbs. 
less  than  the  rate  contemporaneously 
applied  by  defendant  to  the  transporta- 
tion of  spring  beds.  Reparation  denied. 
Leggett  &  Piatt  Spring  Bed  &  Mfg.  Co. 
V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  513. 

(c)  Rates  over,,  for  the  most  part, 
identical  routes  and  for  almost  exactly 
the  same  distance,  which  differ  by  one- 
eighth,  require  explanation.  Bluefield 
Shippers'  Ass'n  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  519,  528. 

(d)  In  deciding  questions  under  the 
fourth  section,  each  case  must  stand 
upon  its  own  facts,  and  no  situation  can 
furnish  an  exact  precedent  for  another. 
Bluefield  Shippers'  Ass*n  v.  N.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  519,  526. 

(e)  In  determining  questions  under 
section  4,  rates  of  the  same  kind  must 
be  compared  with  one  another.  In  other 
words,  transshipment  rates  must  be  com- 


476   LONG  AND  SHORT  HAULS,  §12  (2)  (f)— LOSS  AND  DAMAGE,  §1  (c) 


pared  with  transshipment  rates,  propor- 
tional rates  with  proportional  rates,  and 
so  on.  Baltimore  Chamber  of  Commerce 
V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  59G,  601. 

(f)  Complainants  shipped  numerous 
carloads  of  ice  from  ice  plants  in  the 
Pocono  jMountains  upon  the  line  of  the 
D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  to  various  points  of 
consumption  upon  the  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R. 
in  New  Jersey.  In  previous  proceedings 
the  Commission  found  the  rate  to  the 
terminal  points  unreasonable  (15  I.  C.  C. 
305;  17  L  C.  C.  447).  Carriers  reduced 
the  rates  to  the  terminal  points,  but  did 
not  reduce  the  rates  to  intermediate 
points,  although  the  Commission  found 
the  rate  to  be  unreasonable  to  the  ter- 
minal points.  HELD,  there  is  no  reason 
why  the  Commission  must  not  also  have 
found  the  same  rate  unreasonable  to  the 
intermediate  point  upon  the  direct  line 
of  transportation,  since  it  found  the  rate 
to  be  unreasonable  to  the  terminal  point. 
Rates  to  the  terminal  points  reduced  and 
reparation  awarded.  Mountain  Ice  Co.  v. 
D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  45. 

(g)  Complainant  attacked  the  local 
rates  from  Indianapolis  to  East  St.  Louis 
of  38c,  321/20,  24c,  16y2C,  I31/2C  and  lOi^c, 
as  compared  with  the  rates  from  Cin- 
cinnati, Jeffersonville,  New  Albany  and 
other  Ohio  River  points  to  East  St.  Louis 
of  41c,  34i^c,  251/20,  I71/2C,  15c  and  12c 
for  the  six  numbered  classes,  respect- 
ively. The  Indianapolis  distance  is  ap- 
proximately 78.5  per  cent  of  the  average 
short  line  distance  from  the  Ohio  River 
crossings  in  question  to  Fast  St.  Louis 
and  complainant  demanded  that  the  rates 
from  Indianapolis  be  made  80  per  cent 
of  those  from  the  Ohio  River  points. 
Under  the  rates  attacked  the  per  ton 
mile  revenue  was  3.2,  2.74,  2.03,  1.39. 
1.14c  and  8.9  mills  for  the  first  six  classes, 
respectively.  Under,  the  rates  from 
Cincinnati  to  East  St.  Louis  the  per  ton 
mile  revenue  was  2.43,  2.04,  1.51,  1.0  xC 
and  8.9  mills  and  7.1  mills,  and  under 
the  rates  from  Jeffersonville  to  East 
St.  Louis,  3.03,  2.55,  1.88.  1.29,  1.11c 
and  8.8  mills  for  the  first  six  classes, 
respectively.  HELD,  the  rates  attacked 
being  constructed  in  accordance  with  the 
Central  Freight  Association  distance 
scale  and  no  hurtful  discrimination  be- 
ing shown,  the  change  demanded  must 
be  denied,  since  to  grant  them  would 
disturb  every  other  rate  established  un- 
der that  scale.  Because  the  revenue  per 
ton  per  mile  yielded  by  rates  from  fp-- 
ther    distant    points    is    less    than    that 


yielded  by  rates  from  a  shorter  distant 
roint,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that 
the  latter  is  subjected  to  unjust  discrim- 
ination. Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v. 
C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
504,  513. 

LOSS  AND  DAMAGE. 

I.  THE    CARMACK    AMENDMEINT. 

§1.     Constitutionality. 
§2.     Construction    in    general. 
§3.     Effect    of    state    legislation. 
§4.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
§5.     Jurisdiction  of  state  courts. 

II.  CARRIERS'    LIABILITY. 

§6.     Initial    carrier. 

§7.     Intermediate  carrier. 

§8.     Delivering    carrier. 

§9.     Agreed     or    restricted     valua- 
tion. 
§10.     Common    law    liability. 
§11.     Notice  of  loss. 
§12.     Settlements    and    rights    inter 

se. 
§13.     Special   damages. 

III.  EVIDENCE. 

§14.     Acts     of     connecting     carrier. 
§15.     Burden  of  proof. 
§16.     Judicial    notice. 

I.     THE    CARMACK  AMENDMENT. 
§1.     Constitutionality. 

See   Constitutional   Law. 

(a)  The  Carmack  amendment  of  the 
Hepburn  Act  of  1906  (Sec.  20  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act)  is  constitu- 
tional. Galveston  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Wallace,  223  U.  S.  481,  491,  32  Sup.  Ct. 
205,  56  L.  ed.  516. 

(b)  The  Carmack  amendment  requir- 
ing carriers  in  interstate  commerce  as 
a  condition  of  continuing  in  that  traffic 
to  obligate  themselves  to  carry  to  the 
point  of  destination,  using  the  lines  of 
the  connecting  carriers  as  their  own 
agencies,  is  not  beyond  the  scope  of 
the  power  of  regulation.  A.  C.  L.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Riverside  Mills,  219  U.  S. 
186,   203,   31   Sup.   Ct.   164,   55   L.  ed.   167. 

(c)  The  Carmack  amendment,  mak- 
ing the  initial  carrier  liable  for  the  loss 
of  goods  occurring  on  the  lines  of  con- 
necting carriers,  is  not  unconstitutional 
as  denying  the  right  of  contract,  since 
the  right  to  freedom  of  contract  is  not 
unlimited  and  the  regulation  imposed 
is  not  an  unwarranted  abridgment 
thereof  but  is   merely   a  denial   of   such 


LOSS  AND  DAMAGE,  §1   (d)— (m) 


477 


right  to  the  extent  of  forbidding  or 
regulating  every  contract  which  is  rea- 
sonably calculated  to  injuriously  affect 
the  public  interest.  A.  C.  L..  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Riverside  Mills,  219  U.  S.  186, 
202,    31    Sup.    Ct.    164,   55   L.   ed.    167. 

(d)  The  Carmack  amendment  is  not 
in  violation  of  the  third  amendment 
of  the  constitution  in  taking  the  prop- 
erty of  the  initial  carrier  to  pay  the 
debt  of  an  independent  connecting  car- 
rier whose  negligence  may  have  been 
the  sole  cause  of  the  loss,  since  the 
resulting  liability  of  the  initial  carrier  is 
that  of  a  principal  for  the  negligence  of 
its  own  agent.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Riverside  Mills.  219  U.  S.  186,  206,  31 
8up.  Ct.   164,   55  L.  ed.   167. 

(e)  Section  7  of  the  Hepburn  Act  of 
June  29,  1900,  making  the  initial  carrier 
liable  for  any  loss,  damage,  or  injury 
caused  to  the  property  by  connecting  car- 
riers, is  not  unconstitutional  as  violating 
the  fifth  amendment  of  the  constitution 
of  the  United  States  in  depriving  the  car- 
rier of  property  without  due  process  of 
law.  Riverside  Mills  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  168  Fed.  987,  989. 

(f)  Section  7  of  the  Act  of  June  29, 
1906,  making  the  initial  carrier  of  in- 
terstate commerce  liable  for  any  loss 
of  or  damage  to  goods  in  transit  caused 
by  a  connecting  carrier  despite  any  pro- 
vision in  its  bills  of  lading  to  the  con- 
trary, is  not  unconstitutional  on  the 
ground  that  the  right  of  the  initial  car- 
rier to  contract  is  infringed,  or  on 
the  ground  that  it  is  deprived  of  prop- 
erty without  due  process  of  law.  Smelt- 
zer  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  158 
Fed.   649,    655,   659. 

(g)  The  portion  of  the  Carmack 
amendment  providing  that  the  carriers 
issuing  the  receipt  or  bill  of  lading 
shall  be  entitled  to  recover  from  the 
carrier  on  whose  line  the  loss  or  dam- 
age occurs,  "the  amount  of  such  loss, 
damage,  or  injury  as  it  may  be  re- 
quired to  pay  to  the  owners  of  such 
property,  as  may  be  evidenced  by  any 
receipt,  judgment  ry  transcript  thereof," 
is  not  unconstitutional,  since  it  makes 
the  receipt,  judgment  or  transcript  only 
prima  facie  or  presumptive,  and  not 
conclusive,  evidence.  Central  of  Ga. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Sims,  169  Ala.  295,  301,  53 
So.    826. 

(h)  The  Carmack  amendment  making 
the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss  or  dam- 


age occurring  on  the  lines  of  connect- 
ing carriers  is  constitutional.  Central 
of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sims,  169  Ala.  295, 
301,    53    So.    826. 

(i)  The  Carmack  amendment  to  the 
Hepburn  Act,  making  the  init':al  carrier 
liable  for  loss  or  damage  to  an  inter- 
state shipment  caused  by  connecting 
carriers,  is  not  unconstitutional  as  de- 
priving the  carrier  of  the  right  of  the 
liberty  of  contract.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Heyser  (Ark.  1910),  130  S.  W. 
562,    566. 

(j)  The  Carmack  amendment  to  the 
Hepburn  Act,  making  the  initial  carrier 
liable  for  loss  or  damage  to  an  inter- 
state shipment  caused  by  connecting  car- 
riers, is  not  beyond  the  legislative  power 
of  Congress  to  enact  under  the  commerce 
clause  of  the  constitution.  St.  L.  &  S.  F. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Heyser  (Ark.  1910),  130  S. 
W.  562,  566. 

(k)  The  Carmack  amendment  to  the 
Hepburn  Act,  making  the  initial  carrier 
liable  for  loss  or  damage  to  an  inter- 
state shipment  caused  by  connecting  car- 
riers, is  not  unconstitutional  as  depriv- 
ing the  initial  carrier  of  its  property 
without  due  process  of  law.  St.  L.  &  S. 
F.  R.  R.  Co.  -V.  Heyser  (Ark.  1910),  130 
S.  W.  562,  566. 

(1)  Section  20  of  the  Act  as  amended 
June  29,  1906,  making  the  initial  car- 
rier liable  for  loss  occurring  on  the  lines 
of  connecting  carriers,  is  not  unconsti- 
tutional on  the  ground  that  such  provi- 
sion is  not  a  regulation  of  commerce, 
since  the  Act,  as  a  whole,  does  control 
interstate  shipments  in  niany  respects. 
Pittsburgh,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mitchell  (Ind. 
1910),  91  N.  E.   735,  740. 

(m)  The  provision  of  section  20  of 
the  Act  as  amended  June  29,  1906,  mak- 
ng  the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss  oc- 
curring on  the  line  of  connecting  car- 
riers, is  not  unconstitutional  as  taking 
private  property  without  due  process,  or 
as  requiring  one  carrier  to  answer  for 
the  default  of  another,  irrespective  of 
solvency  or  insolvency  in  the  latter,  with 
whom  it  has  no  contract  relations  and 
over  which  it  has  no  control,  with  the 
right  in  the  shipper  to  route  the  ship- 
ment as  he  pleases,  or  as  failing  to  pro- 
vide an  adequate  indemnity  or  means  of 
enforcing  the  demands  of  the  initial  car- 
rier against  the  delinquent  carrier. 
Pittsburgh,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mitchell  (Ind. 
1910),  91  N.  E.  735,  740. 


478 


LOSS  AND  DAMAGE,  §1   (n)  — (z) 


(n)  The  Carmack  amendment,  mak- 
ing the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss  oc- 
curring on  the  lines  of  connecting  car- 
riers and  forbidding  exemption  from  such 
liability,  is  constituMonal.  .  Sturges  v. 
D.  G.  H.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  (Mich.  1911),  131 
N.  W.  706,  708. 

(o)  The  provision  of  the  amendment 
to  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  making  the 
initial  carrier  liable  for  damage  occur- 
ring on  the  line  of  connecting  carriers 
and  providing  that  no  contract  should 
exempt  it  from  such  liability,  is  consti- 
tutional. Dodge  V.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry. 
Co.   (Minn.  1910),  126  N.  W.  627,  629. 

(p)  The  Carmack  amendment,  mak- 
ing the  initial .  carrier  of  an  interstate 
shipment  liable  for  the  loss  or  damage 
by  connecting  carriers  and  forbidding 
exemption  from  such  liability,  is  not  un- 
constitutional as  abridging  the  right  of 
contract.  Greenwald  v.  Weir,  59  Misc. 
431,  434,  111  N.  Y.  Sup.  235. 

(q)  The  Carmack  amendment,  mak- 
ing the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss, 
damage  or  injury  caused  by  itself  or  a 
connecting  carrier  and  forbidding  ex- 
emption from  such  liability,  is  not  un- 
constitutional, as  taking  .private  prop- 
erty without  compensation  and  without 
due  process  of  law,  or  as  denying  the 
initial  carrier  the  equal  protection  of  the 
law.  Galveston  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Johnson  (Tex.  1911),  133  S.  W.  725,  731. 

(r)  The  Carmack  amendment  to  the 
Hepburn  Act,  making  the  initial  carrier 
liable  for  loss  or  damage  to  an  interstate 
Shipment  caused  by  connecting  carriers, 
is  not  unconstitutional  as  taking  private 
property  for  public  purposes  without  due 
process.  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lewis  (Tex.  1910),  129  S.  W.  594,  595. 

(s)  The  Carmack  amendment,  making 
the  initial  carrier  of  an  interstate  ship- 
ment liable  for  loss  or  damage  caused  by 
it  or  connecting  carriers  and  forbidding 
exemption  by  contract  from  such  liabil- 
ity, is  not  unconstitutional  as  taking  pri- 
vate property  without  due  process.  L.  & 
N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Scott,  133  Ky.  724,  730, 
118  S.  W.  990. 

(t)  The  Carmack  amendment  of  June 
29,  1906,  making  the  initial  carrier  liable 
for  loss  or  damage  to  an  interstate  ship- 
ment caused  by  the  connecting  carrier, 
and  forbidding  exemption  from  such  lia- 
bility, is  not  unconstitutional  as  invading 
the  sovereignty  of  states  or  as  violating 


the  fourteenth  amendment  of  the  Fed- 
eral Constitution.  Galveston  H.  &  S.  A. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Crow  (Tex.  1909),  117  S.  W. 
170,  170. 

vu)  The  CarmacK  amendment  of  June 
29,  1906,  making  the  initial  carrier  of  an  i 
interstate  shipment  liable  for  loss  or  1 
damage  caused  by  it  or  connecting  car- 
riers and  forbidding  exemption  by  con- 
tract from  such  liability,  is  not  uncon- 
stitutional as  invading  the  sovereignty  ^f 
the  states.  Galveston  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Wallace  (Tex.  1909),  117  S.  W.  1C9. 

(v)  The  Carmack  amendment  of  June 
29,  1906,  making  the  initial  carrier  of  an 
interstate  shipment  liable  for  loss  or 
damage  caused  by  it  or  connecting  car- 
riers and  forbidding  exemption  by  con- 
tract from  such  liability,  is  not  uncon- 
stitutional as  taking  the  carrier's  prop- 
erty without  due  process  of  law.  Gal- 
veston H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wallace 
(Tex.  1909),  117  S.  W.  169. 

(w)  The  Carmack  amendment  of  June 
29,  1906,  making  the  initial  carrier  of  an 
interstate  shipment  liable  for  loss  or 
damage  caused  by  it  or  connecting  car- 
riers and  forbidding  exemption  by  con- 
tract from  such  liability,  is  not  unconstitu- 
tional as  depriving  the  carrier  of  equal 
protection  of  the  law.  Galveston,  H.  & 
S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Wallace  (Tex.  1909),  117 
S.  W.  169,  169. 

(x)  The  Carmack  amendment,  provid- 
ing that  the  initial  carrier  shall  be  liable 
for  loss  or  damage  to  an  interstate  ship- 
ment caused  by  itself  or  by  connecting 
carriers  and  prohibiting  the  initial  car- 
rier from  limiting  its  liability  by  receipt 
or  by  bill  of  lading,  is  not  unconstitutional 
as  interfering  with  the  rights  of  the 
states.  Galveston  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co,  v. 
Piper  Co.,  52  Tex.  Civ.  App.  568,  573, 
115  S.  W.  107. 

(y)  The  Carmack  amendment  making 
the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss,  damage 
or  injury  caused  to  an  interstate  ship- 
ment by  connecting  carriers  is  not  un- 
constitutional as  depriving  such  carrier 
of  its  property  without  due  process  of 
law.  Galveston  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Piper  Co.,  52  Tex.  Civ.  App.  568,  573,  115 
S.  W.  107. 

(z)  The  Carmack  amendment  to  the 
Act,  making  the  initial  carrier  liable  for 
loss  and  injury  occurring  on  the  lines  of 
connecting  carriers,  is  constitutional. 
Old  Dominion  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Flanary  &  Co. 
(Va.  1911),  69  S.  E.  1107,  1108. 


LOSS  AND  DAMAGE,  §2  (a)— §3   (d) 


479 


§2.     Construction  in  General. 

(a)  The  Carmack  amendment,  making 
the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss,  damage 
or  injury  caused  on  its  own  or  the  line 
of  a  connecting  carrier,  imposes  the  ordi- 
nary common-law  liability  and  denies  the 
common-law  right  to  contract  for  special 
exemptions  therefrom,  and  the  word 
"caused"  implies  not  only  active  miscon- 
duct and  deeds  of  commission,  but  also 
passive  neglect,  deeds  of  omission  and 
failures  to  exercise  duties  faithfully.  L. 
&  N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Warfield,  6  Ga.  App.  550, 
553,  G5  S.  E.  308. 

(b)  The  clause  in  the  Carmack  amend- 
ment to  the  Hepburn  Act,  making  the 
initial  carrier  liable  for  loss  or  damage 
to  goods  on  its  own  line  or  the  line  of 
connecting  carriers,  is  declaratary  of  the 
common  law;  the  clause  forbidding  it  by 
receipt,  contract,  rule  or  regulation  to 
exempt  itself  from  the  liability  imposed 
is  in  derogation  of  the  common  law.  S. 
P.  Co.  V.  Crenshaw,  5  Ga.  App.  675,  685, 
63  S.  E.  865. 

(c)  The  Carmack  amendment  created 
only  one  new  liability — that  of  the  initial 
carrier  for  loss  or  damage  caused  by  the 
connecting  carrier.  It  did  not  create 
or  alter  the  liability  of  the  initial  carrier 
for  loss  or  damage  on  its  own  line.  Mc- 
Elvain  v.  Railroad,  151  Mo.  App.  126, 
153,  131   S.  W.  736. 

(d)  Defendant  truckman  received 
goods  in  New  York  City  to  be  carried  to 
the  wharf  and  thence  to  be  transported 
by  ocean  carrier  to  Boston.  Defendant's 
duty  was  simply  to  cart  same  from  the 
store  to  the  dock  as  an  independent  em- 
ployment. HELD,  he  was  not  a  common 
carrier  engaged  in  the  transportation  of 
property  "wholly  by  railroad  (or  partly 
by  railroad,  and  partly  by  water  under  a 
common  control,  management  or  arrange- 
ment)" within  the  meaning  of  section  1 
of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  so  as  to 
make  him  liable  under  the  Carmack 
amendment  for  loss  caused  by  the  ocean 
carrier.  Hirsch  v.  New  England  Nav.  Co., 
129  App.  Div.  178,  181,  113  N.  Y.  Sup. 
395. 

(e)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
making  the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss 
or  damage  caused  Ly  its  own  or  the  line 
of  a  connecting  carrier,  as  to  shipments 
"from  a  point  in  one  state  to  a  point  in 
another  state,"  and  forbidding  exemption 
from  such  liability,  the  word  "state"  re- 
fers to  a  state  of  the  Union  and  not  to  a 
foreign  country,  and  the  amendment  has 


therefore  no  application  to  a  shipment 
received  in  Texas  to  be  carried  via  Gal- 
veston to  Bremen,  Germany.  Houston  E. 
&  W.  Tex.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Inman  (Tex.  1911), 
134  S.  W.  275,  277. 

(f)  The  Carmack  amendment  to  the 
Hepburn  Act,  passed  June  29,  1906,  and 
approved  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  June  30,  1906,  making  the  initial 
carrier  of  an  interstate  shipment  liable 
for  loss  or  damage  caused  by  connecting 
carriers,  was  in  force  on  July  3  and  4, 
1906,  despite  a  resolution  of  Congress 
passed  June  30,  1906,  providing  that  said 
amendment  should  take  effect  and  be  in 
force  sixty  days  after  its  approval  by  the 
President.  S.  P.  Co.  v.  Meadors  &  Co. 
(Tex.  1910),  129  S.  W.  170,  173. 

§3.     Effect  of  State  Legislation. 

See   Interstate  Commerce,   §4  (o). 

(a)  The  Carmack  amendment  does  not 
prevent  the  shipper  from  enforcing  the 
liability  created  by  the  law  of  his  state 
against  a  carrier  for  loss  of  goods  in  an 
interstate  shipment.  Latta  v.  C.  St.  P. 
M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  172  Fed.  850,  855. 

(b)  The  Hepburn  Act  makes  the  ini- 
tial carrier  liable  for  loss  or  damage  to 
an  interstate  shipment  caused  by  a  con- 
necting carrier.  Defendant  initial  carrier 
received  goods  under  a  shipping  contract 
made  prior  to  the  passage  of  this  Act, 
and  nothing  was  stated  therein  as  to 
defendant's  liability  beyond  its  own  line. 
HELD,  under  the  law  of  California,  de- 
fendant was  liable  for  damage  caused  by 
the  connecting  carrier's  negligence. 
Schwartz  v.  Panama  R.  R,  Co.,  155  Cal. 
742,  748,  103  P.  196. 

(c)  In  Georgia,  prior  to  the  enact- 
ment of  the  Carmack  amendment  mak- 
ing the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss  and 
injury  occurring  on  the  lines  of  connect- 
ing carriers,  and  forbidding  exemption 
by  contract  from,  such  liability,  a  provi- 
sion in  a  shipping  contract  making  an 
arbitrary  preadjustment  of  damages  was 
invalid,  and  nothing  in  said  amendment 
changes  this  rule.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Warfield,  6  Ga.  App.  550,  552,  65  S.  E.  308. 

(d)  The  regulations  of  Congress  mak- 
ing the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss  or 
damage  to  interstate  shipments,  whether 
occurring  on  its  own  or  the  line  of  a 
connecting  carrier,  are  paramount  and 
supersede  all  state  laws,  and  a  state  court 
in  a  case  to  which  the  provisions  of  the 
federal  statute  are  applicable  will  follow 
such  statute,  any  state  laws  to  the  con- 


480 


LOSS  AND  DAMAGE,  §3   (e)— §4  (a) 


trary  notwithstanding.    S.  P.  Co.  v.  Cren- 
shaw, 5  Ga.  App.  675,  689,  eS  S.  E.  865. 

(e)  Where  a  state  statute  forbids  a 
carrier  by  contract  to  make  its  liability 
for  loss  or  damage  other  than  that  im- 
posed at  common  law,  the  shipper  may 
recover  damages  based  on  the  full  value 
of  the  goods  despite  a  shipping  contract 
limiting  the  liability  to  an  unreasonably 
low  sum,  and  this  irrespective  of  the  fact 
that  the  carrier  regularly  filed  the  form 
of  shipping  contract  involved  with  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission.  Blair 
&  Jackson  v.  Wells,  Fargo  Co.  (la.  1912), 
135  N.  W.  615,  620. 

(f)  A  state  statute  forbade  carriers 
from  in  any  way  limiting  their  liability 
for  losses  and  injuries.  Defendant  car- 
rier filed  with  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  two  rates  on  hogs,  extend- 
ing the  lower  one  of  same  only  when  the 
shipper  agreed  upon  an  arbitrary  valua- 
tion of  $10  per  head.  HELD,  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act  as  amended  by  the 
Carmack  amendment  and  as  it  stood 
prior  to  the  amendment  of  June  18,  1910, 
did  not  supplant  the  state  statute  so  as 
to  prevent  the  shipper  in  an  interstate 
shipment  from  recovering  in  the  state 
court,  damages  based  on  the  full  value  of 
the  hogs.  Cramer  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.   (la.  1911),  133  N.  W.  387,  390. 

(g)  Where  a  state  statute  forbids  the 
carrier  in  any  way  to  limit  its  liability, 
nothing  in  the  Carmack  amendment  of 
June  29,  1906,  prevents  a  shipper  from  re- 
covering the  full  value  for  the  loss  of 
live  stock,  despite  the  limitation  of  lia- 
bility to  a  specified  sum  in  the  shipping 
contract.  Betus  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co. 
(la.  1911),  129  N.  W.  962,  963. 

(h)  The  right  of  a  state  to  legislate 
as  to  the  validity  of  provisions  in  ship- 
ping contracts,  limiting  the  liability  of 
the  carrier,  is  recognized  by  the  Car- 
mack amendment  to  the  Hepburn  Act. 
McElvain  v.  Railroad,  151  Mo.  App.  126, 
155,  131  S.  W.  736. 

(i)  The  provision  of  the  Act  of  Con- 
gress of  June  29,  1906,  known  as  the 
"Hepburn  Act,"  does  not  displace  a  pre- 
viously existing  state  statute  restricting 
the  right  of  a  common  carrier  to  limit 
liability  upon  interstate  shipments.  A. 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rodgers  (N.  M. 
1911),  113  P.  805,  809. 

(j)  Unless  and  until  there  is  some 
valid  regulation  by  Congress  or  the  Inter- 


state Commerce  Commission  directly 
affecting  the  matter,  a  state  has  the  right 
to  establish  a  policy  of  forbidding  car- 
riers to  limit  liability  for  loss  and  injury 
to  goods  arising  from  their  negligence, 
and  the  right  to  enforce  such  policy  in 
reference  to  interstate  shipments.  Kis- 
singer V.  Fitzgerald,  152  N.  C.  247,  253, 
67  S.  E.  588. 

(k)  The  Pennsylvania  law  forbids  a 
carrier  from  limiting  its  liability  for 
negligence,  and  does  not  prevent  such 
exemption  even  to  the  extent  of  allowing 
the  shipper  and  the  carrier  to  make 
binding  an  agreed  valuation.  HELD,  in 
a  suit  in  a  Pennsylvania  court  to  recover 
lor  the  loss  of  property  shipped  from 
Pennsylvania  to  New  York,  the  Carmack 
amendment  to  the  Act  did  not  result  in 
the  application  of  the  rule  of  the  federal 
court  permitting  a  limitation  of  liability 
to  an  agreed  valuation,  nor  did  it  sup- 
plant the  Pennsylvania  rule,  and  the 
shipper  was  free  to  recover  the  true 
value  of  the  property.  Wright  v.  Adams 
Express  Co.,  230  Pa.  635,  639,  79  A.  760. 

(1)  A  state  statute  prescribed  a  penalty 
for  the  failure  of  a  carrier  to  trace  and 
inform  the  shipper  as  to  lost  packages. 
The  Carmack  amendment  makes  the 
initial  carrier  liable  for  loss  or  damage 
to  interstate  shipments  caused  by  it  or 
by  connecting  carriers.  HELD,  that  such 
state  statute,  with  respect  to  interstate 
shipments,  must  yield  to  the  federal 
statute;  that  the  Carmack  amendment 
prescribed  no  liability  for  failure  to  trace 
and  inform,  and  therefore  the  shipper 
could  not  recover  of  the  initial  carrier. 
Meetze  v.  Southern  Express  Co.  (S.  C. 
1912),  74  S.  E.  823,  824. 

§4.     Jurisdiction   of  Commission. 

See  Discrimination,  §15  (f ) ;  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission,  §1 
(k). 

(a)  The  Commission  is  without  juris- 
diction to  award  tort  damages.  Mattison 
V.  P.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  233.  235;  Ralston 
Townsite  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C. 
C.  354,  355;  Wood-Mosaic  Flooring  & 
Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  «fe  N.  R.  R  Co.,  22  I.  C. 
C.  458,  459;  Kay  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R. 
Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  239,  240;  Buffalo  Hard- 
wood Lumber  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  536,  538;  Hanley  Milling 
Co.  V.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  475,  476;  Poncha- 
toula  Farmers'  Ass'n  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  513,  515;  Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke 
Co.  V.  Penn.  R.  R.   Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  356, 


LOSS  AND  DAMAGE,  §4   (b)— §5  (g) 


481 


371;  Joynes  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.  361,  369;  Werner  Saw  Mill  Co.  v.  I. 
C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  388,  391;  Lan- 
ing-Harris  Coal  &  Grain  Co.  v.  St.  L.  & 
S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  37,  38;  Blume 
&  Co.  V.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
53,  55;  Royal  Brewing  Co.  v.  Adams  Ex- 
press Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  255,  256;  Manning 
V.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  125,  1-27; 
Pittsburgh  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Knox 
(Ind.,  1912),  98  N.  E.  295,  299;  Fuller- 
ton  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  150;  Rivers  Bros.  Co.  v. 
Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  496. 

(b)  The  Commission  is  without  juris- 
diction to  award  damages  for  delay  and 
deterioration  of  shipments  in  transit. 
Rivers  Bros.  Co.  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  496. 

(c)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission is  not  a  court  and  cannot,  there- 
fore, under  the  Carmack  amendment,  try 
an  action  by  a  shipper  against  an  initial 
carrier  for  damage  to  an  interstate  ship- 
ment caused  by  the  connecting  carrier. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Scott,  133  Ky  724, 
729,  118  S.  W.  990. 

§5.     Jurisdiction  of  State  Courts. 

See    Courts,     §11     (f),     (h),     (k),     (o), 
(w),     (X). 

(a)  In  a  suit  against  an  initial  carrier 
under  the  Carmack  amendment  to  the 
Hepburn  Act  of  1906,  for  a  failure  to  de- 
liver goods  at  destination,  a  state  court 
has  jurisdiction  since  the  Act  complained 
of  is  not  a  violation  of  the  original  Act 
of  1887,  and  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  does  not  have,  therefore,  the 
exclusive  jurisdiction  under  section  9  of 
the  Act.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Wallace,  223  U.  S.  481,  489;  32  Sup.  Ct. 
205,  56  L.  ed.  516. 

(b)  The  Carmack  amendment  making 
the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss  or  dam- 
age occurring  on  its  own  or  on  the  line 
of  a  connecting  carrier  will  be  recognized 
and  enforced  by  the  state  courts.  Central 
of  Ga.  Ry.  v.  Sims,  169  Ala.  295,  300,  53 
So.  826. 

(c)  A  state  court  has  jurisdiction  un- 
der the  Carmack  amendment  to  the  Hep- 
burn Act,  making  the  initial  carrier  liable 
for  loss  or  damage  caused  by  connecting 
carriers,  to  entertain  an  action  against 
an  initial  carrier  for  damages  caused  by 
a  connecting  carrier  in  failing  to  carry 
an  interstate  shipment  of  peaches  with 
reasonable    dispatch,    and    to    keep    the 


same  properly  iced.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Heyser  (Ark.  1910),  130  S.  W.  562, 
564. 

(d)  Sections  8  and  9  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act  declare  a  liability  for  dam- 
ages which  result  where  the  common 
carrier  "shall  do,  cause  to  be  done,  or 
permit  to  be  done,  any  act,  matter  or 
thing  in  this  Act  prohibited  or  declared 
to  be  unlawful  or  shall  omit  to  do  any 
act,  matter  or  thing  in  this  Act  required." 
HELD,  the  liability  created  by  the  Car- 
mack amendment  to  the  Hepburn  law, 
making  the  initial  carrier  of  an  interstate 
shipment  responsible  for  loss  or  damage 
occurring  on  the  line  of  a  connecting  car- 
rier, is  not  governed  by  said  sections  8 
and  9  so  as  to  give  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  and  the  federal 
courts  exclusive  jurisdiction,  but  since 
the  liability  under  the  Carmack  amend- 
ment was  not  created  by  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act,  state  courts  have  at  least 
concurrent  jurisdiction  with  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  and  the 
federal  courts.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Heyser  (Ark.  1910),  130  S.  W.  562,  565. 

(e)  A  state  court  has  jurisdiction  to 
enforce  the  Carmack  amendment  to  the 
Hepburn  Act,  making  the  initial  carrier 
liable  for  loss  occurring  on  the  lines  of 
connecting  carriers.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Warfield,  6  Ga.  App.  550,  551,  65  S.  E.  308. 

(f)  Neither  the  federal  courts  nor  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  is 
given  jurisdiction,  under  sections  8  and 
9  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  over 
actions  to  recover  against  the  initial 
carrier  for  loss  of  or  injury  to  goods 
occurring  on  its  line  or  that  of  con- 
necting carriers,  in  pursuance  of  the 
liability  imposed  by  the  Carmack  amend- 
ment; and  even  if  the  contrary  be  true, 
the  state  courts  have  at  least  concur- 
rent jurisdiction  over  such  actions.  S. 
P.  Co.  V.  Crenshaw,  5  Ga.  App.  675,  686, 
687,   63    S.   E.    865. 

(g)  Under  section  20  of  the  Act,  as 
amended  June  20,  1906,  making  an  in- 
itial carrier  liable  for  loss,  damage  or 
injury  to  property  occurring  on  the  line 
of  a  connecting  carrier,  and  providing 
that  nothing  in  the  amendment  should 
deprive  a  shipper  of  any  remedy  or 
right  of  action  under '  existing  laws,  and 
under  section  22  of  the  Act,  as  amended 
in  1889,  providing  that  nothing  therein 
should  in  any  way  abridge  or  alter  the 
remedies   now   existing  at   common   law 


482 


LOSS  AND  DAMAGE,  §5   (h)_§6  (c) 


or  by  statute,  but  the  provisions  of  the 
Act  should  be  in  addition  to  such  rem- 
edies, a  state  court  has  jurisdiction  over 
a  suit  in  assumpsit  to  recover  damages 
for  delay  of  an  interstate  shipment. 
Pittsburgh,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mitchell 
(Ind.    1910),    91    N.    E.    735,    738. 

(h)  Since  an  action  against  an  in- 
itial carrier  to  recover  for  damage  to 
an  interstate  shipment  caused  by  a 
connecting  carrier,  though  brought  un- 
der the  Carmack  amendment  to  the 
Hepburn  Act,  is  not  an  action  based  on 
a  violation  of  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act,  but  is  an  action  based  on  the  in- 
jury to  the  property,  the  state  courts 
have  jurisdiction,  especially  in  view  of 
the  provision  "that  nothing  in  this  sec- 
tion shall  deprive  any  holder  of  such 
receipt  or  bill  of  lading  of  any  remedy 
or  right  of  action  which  he  has  under 
existing  law."  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Scott,   133   Ky.   724,   729,   118   S.  W.  990. 

(i)  The  furnishing  by  an  interstate 
carrier  of  bulkheads  with  cars  for  the 
transportation  of  grain  does  not  con- 
stitute the  granting  of  the  "privileges 
or  facilities"  which  are  required  to  be 
published  with  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  by  section  6  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act;  and  a  shipper, 
where  the  carrier  fails  to  furnish  bulk- 
heads, may  therefore  recover  in  an 
action  at  law  in  a  state  court  for  the 
expense  of  supplying  same,  although  the 
published  schedules  make  no  allowance 
for  furnishing  same.  (Kruse  and  Spring, 
J.  J.,  diss.)  Loomis  v.  Lehigh  Valley 
R.  R.  Co.,  132  N.  Y.  Supp.  138,  141. 

(j)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment 
to  the  Hepburn  Act,  making  the  initial 
carrier  liable  for  loss  or  damage  to  an 
Interstate  shipment  caused  by  cc-nnect- 
ing  carriers,  a  state  court  has  juris- 
diction by  virture  of  its  own  law  and 
of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  to  en- 
tertain a  suit  for  damages  to  enforce 
such  liability.  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Lewis  (Tex.  1910),  129  S.  W.  594,  594. 

(k)  A  state  court  has  jurisdiction  of 
an  action  brought  under  the  Carmack 
amendment  against  an  initial  carrier 
for  non-delivery  of  interstate  freight  by 
the  connecting  carriers.  Galveston,  H. 
&  S.  A.  Ry.  Co..  V.  Crow  (Tex.  1909), 
117    S.   W.   170,   170. 

(1)  A  suit  brought  against  an  Initial 
carrier  to  recover  for  loss  or  damage 
to  an   interstate   shipment   caused   by  a 


connecting  carrier,  under  the  provision 
of  the  Carmack  amendment,  is  not  a 
suit  for  the  violation  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act  and  one  required- by  sec- 
tion 8  of  such  Act  to  be  brought  in  the 
federal  courts  or  before  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission,  but  Is  a  suit 
for  the  value  of  property,  and  the  state 
courts  have  jurisdiction,  therefore,  to 
entertain  the  same.  Galveston,  H.  &  S. 
A.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Piper  Co.,  52  Tex.  Civ. 
App.   568,   572,   115   S.   W.   107. 

(m)  While  paragraph  3,  section  10, 
of  the  Act  as  amended  by  the  Act  of 
March  2,  1889,  prohibits  a  shipper  from 
obtaining  the  transportation  of  property 
at  less  than  the  regular  rates  by  fraud- 
ulent representations  as  to  the  value, 
and  makes  such  fraud  a  misdemeanor 
and  imposes  a  penalty  therefor,  the  ship- 
per is  not  prevented  from  recovering,  if 
the  goods  are  lost,  their  apparent  value 
according  to  the  representation  made. 
Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Green  (Va.  1911), 
72  S.  E.  102,  105. 

II.     CARRIERS'    LIABILITY. 

See     Facilities     and     Privileges,     §18 
(cc),   §20   (f). 

§6.     Initial    Carrier. 

(a)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment 
(section  20  of  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act),  wherever  the  carrier  voluntarily 
accepts  goods  for  shipment  to  a  point 
on  another  line  in  another  state,  it  is 
conclusively  treated  as  having  made 
a  through  contract  and  as  though 
the  points  of  destination  were  on  its 
own  line,  and  is  liable  for  any  loss  or 
damage  occurring  on  its  own  line,  or 
that  of  a  connecting  carrier.  Galveston, 
H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wallace,  223  U. 
S.,  481,  491;  32  Sup.  Ct.  205,  56  L.  ed. 
516. 

(b)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment 
an  initial  carrier  is  liable  for  the  loss 
of  goods  by  the  connecting  carrier  de- 
spite a  provision  in  the  bill  of  lading 
to  the  contrary.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Riverside  Mills,  219  U.  S.  186,  201;  31 
Sup.  Ct.  164,  55  L.  ed.  167. 

(c)  The  effect  of  the  Carmack 
amendment  in  respect  to  carriers  receiv- 
ing packages  in  one  state  for  points  in 
another  and  beyond  their  own  lines.  Is 
to  deny  to  the  initial  carrier  the  former 
right  to  make  a  contract  limiting  lia- 
bility to  its  own  line.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Riverside  Mills,  219  U.  S.  186, 
201;   31  Sup.  Ct.  164,  55  L.  ed.  167.  ♦ 


.  LOSS  AND  DAMAGE,  §6  (d)— (n) 


483 


(d)  All  provisions  and  bills  of  lading 
for  interstate  commerce,  contrary  to  sec- 
tion 7  of  the  Hepburn  Act  of  June  29, 
1906,  which  makes  the  initial  carrier 
liable  for  loss  of  or  dam.age  to  goods  in 
transit  caused  by  a  connecting  carrier, 
are  void.  Smeltzer  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.,  158  Fed.  649,  654. 

(e)  The  initial  carrier  of  an  interstate 
shipment  cannot  validly  stipulate  against 
Its  liability  for  any  loss  or  damage  not 
occurring  on  its  own  line.  Robertson  v. 
S.  Ry.  Co.   (Ala.  1912),  59  So.  232,  232. 

(f)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
the  initial  carrier  of  an  interstate  ship- 
ment cannot  limit  its  liability  to  loss  or 
damage  occurring  on  its  own  line.  A.  C. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ward  (Ala.  1912),  58  So. 
677,  678. 

(g)  The  fact  that  a  bill  of  lading  con- 
tains an  exemption  of  liability  void  under 
the  Carmack  amendment,  making  the 
Initial  carrier  liable  for  loss  occurring 
on  the  lines  of  connecting  carriers  and 
forbidding  the  exemption  from  such  lia- 
bility, does  not  vitiate  the  entire  contract 
of  shipment  so  as  to  preclude  the  holder 
from  recovery  for  a  failure  safely  to 
transport  goods.  Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Sims,  169  Ala.  295,  301,  53  So.  826. 

ih^  A  provision  in  the  bil  of  lading  of 
an  interstate  shipment  limiting  the  lia- 
bility of  the  initial  carrier  to  loss  or 
damage  occurring  on  its  own  line  is  In- 
valid under  the  Carmack  amendment  to 
section  20  of  the  Act,  making  the  initial 
carrier  liable  for  loss  damage  or  injury 
occurring  on  its  own  line  or  on  the  lines 
of  connecting  carriers.  Central  of  Ga. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Sims,  169  Ala.  295,  299,  53 
So.  826. 

(i)  Where  an  initial  carrier  is  sued 
under  the  Carmack  amendment  to  re- 
cover for  loss  occurring  on  the  lines  of 
a  connecting  carrier,  defendant  cannot 
question  the  constitutionality  of  that  por- 
tion of  the  amendment  which  gives  the 
initial  carrier  a  right  to  recover  of  the 
connecting  carrier  the  amount  which  the 
'nitial  carrier  was  required  to  pay  to  the 
wner  of  the  property,  since  defendant 
fs  not  within  the  class  affected  by  such 
provision.  Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Sims,  169  Ala.  295,  301,  5^  So.  82G. 

(j)  The  rule  in  Alabama,  making  each 
carrier  responsible  only  for  the  loss  or 
Injury  occurring  on  its  own  line,  was 
changed  by  state  statute  and  by  the  Car- 
mack amendment  of  June  29,  1906,  so  as 


to  make  the  initial  carrier  responsible  for 
any  loss,  damage  or  injury  caused  by  it 
or  the  connecting  carriers.  Central  of  Ga. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Chicago  Varnish  Co.,  169  Ala. 
287,  290,  53  So.  832. 

(k)  The  Carmack  amendment  to  the 
i^epburn  Act,  making  the  receiving  car- 
rier of  an  interstate  shipment  liable  for 
loss  or  damage  caused  by  its  own  or  ti-e 
lines  of  connecting  carriers,  does  not  ren- 
der such  carrier  liable  for  loss  or  injury 
to  cattle  occurring  before  the  same  were 
unloaded  and  resulting  from  their. escape 
from  the  stock  pen  of  the  carrier  at  the 
point  of  origin.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co. 
V,  Jones  (Ark.  1910),  125  S.  W.  1025,  1029. 

(1)  A  stipulation  in  an  oral  or  written 
contract  of  an  interstate  shipment,  limit- 
ng  the  liability  of  the  initir.l  carrier  to 
losses  occurring  on  its  own  line,  stating 
:hat  it  did  not  agree  to  transport  the  cat- 
tle at  any  specifisd  time,  or  deliver  them 
it  any  particular  hour,  or  in  season  for 
iny  particular  market,  and  limiting  the 
'lability  in  case  of  loss  to  a  specified  sum, 
s  void  under  the  Carmack  amendment  to 
the  Hepburn  Act  making  the  receiving 
carrier  liable  for  loss  or  damage  caused 
by  it  or  by  connecting  carriers  and  forbid- 
ding exemption  from  such  liability.  C. 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Miles,  92  Ark.  573, 
5./,  123  S.  W.  775. 

(m)  In  an  action  against  an  initial 
carrier  for  loss  or  damage  to  an  inter- 
state shipment  caused  by  a  connecting 
carrier,  an  instruction  limiting  defend- 
ant's liability  to  the  damage  to  stock  oc- 
curring while  the  stock  were  in  its  pos- 
session is  contrary  to  the  Carmack 
amendment  to  the  Hepburn  Act.  St.  L. 
I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Furlow,  89  Ark. 
104,    412,    117    S.    W.    517. 

(n)  By  the  schedules  filed  with  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  the 
rate  on  horses  was  lower  when  they  were 
shipped  under  the  "uniform  bill  of  lading 
conditions"  than  when  shipped  not  sub- 
ject to  such  conditions.  Plaintiff  ship- 
per, in  ignorance  of  the  provisions  of  the 
schedule,  made  a  special  contract  for  ex- 
pedited service  in  the  shipment  of 
horses  at  the  rates  specified  in  t-ie  sched- 
ule for  shipment  under  the  "uniform  bill 
of  lading  conditions."  HELD,  he  was  not 
precluded  from  recovering  in  a  suit 
against  the  carrier  for  delay  on  tie 
ground  that  his  contract  attempted  to 
secure  a  preference  in  violation  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act.  Kirby  v.  C. 
&  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  242  111.  418,  432,  90  N.  E. 


4S4 


LOSS  AND  DAMAGE,  §6  (o)  — (y). 


252;    reversed  on  other  grounds,  225  U. 
S.  155,  32  Sup.  Ct.  648,  56  L.  ed.  1033. 

(o)  The  initial  carrier  is  expressly 
made  liable  by  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act  for  a  continuous  carriage,  and  a 
contract  to  the  contrary  is  iiA^alid.  Pitts- 
burgh C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Knox 
(xnd.  1912),  98  N.  E.   295,  300. 

(p)  Where  an  initial  carrier  in  the  bill 
of  lading  contracts  to  carry  to  a  point 
beyond  its  own  line  and  receives  pay  for 
the  whole  distance,  a  provision  in  the  bill 
of  lading,  limiting  its  liability  to  loss  oc- 
curring on  its  own  line,  is  void,  as  being 
in  conflict  with  section  20  of  the  Act  as 
amended  June  29,  1906,  making  the  initial 
carrier  liable  for  loss  occurring  on  the 
line  of  connecting  carriers.  Pittsburgh, 
etc.,  Ry.  Co.  V.  Mitchell  (Ind.  1910),  91 
N.  B.  735,  739. 

(q)  A  provision  in  a  bill  of  lading  of 
an  interstate  shipment  exempting  the  ini- 
tial carrier  from  all  liability  for  damage 
occurring  on  the  lines  of  connecting  car- 
riers is  void  as  being  in  contravention  of 
the  Carmack  amendmet  of  June  29,  190'o. 
Dodge  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  (Minn. 
1910),  126  N.  W.  627,  629. 

(r)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
making  the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss 
occurring  on  the  lines  of  connecting  car- 
riers and  forbidding  exemption  by  con- 
tract from  such  liability,  a  stipulation  in 
the  bill  of  lading  of  an  interstate  ship- 
ment limiting  the  liability  of  the  initial 
carrier  to  loss  occurring  on  its  own  line 
is  invalid.  S.  P.  Co.  v.  Lyon  &  Co.  (Miss. 
1911),  54  So.  784. 

(s)  An  initial  carrier  cannot  escape 
the  liability  imposed  upon  it  by  the  Car- 
mack amendment  for  loss  of  goods  on 
the  line  of  the  connecting  carrier  by  rea- 
son of  the  fact  that  it  fails  to  issue  a  re- 
ceipt or  bill  of  lading  therefor.  Interna- 
tional Watch  Co.  V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
80  N.  J.  L.  553,  556,  78  A.  49. 

(t)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
a  carrier  receiving  property  in  New 
Jersey  for  transportation  to  New  York 
becomes  liable  to  the  shipper  for  any 
loss  caused  by  any  connecting  carrier 
to  which  the  initial  carrier  deliv-ers  the 
goods  to  be  transported  to  the  desig- 
nated point  in  New  York.  Florman  v. 
Dodd  &  Childs  Express  Co.,  79  N.  J. 
L.  63,  65,   74  A.  446. 

(u)  Defendant  initial  carrier  issued 
a   bill   of   lading   for   the    transportation 


of  eggs  from  a  point  in  Texas  to  New 
York  at  the  published  through  rate. 
The  bill  provided  that  other  cases  of 
eggs  might  be  loaded  at  points  on  the 
line  of  the  connecting  carrier.  HELD, 
under  the  Carmack  amendment,  the  in- 
itial carrier  was  liable  for  loss  or  dam- 
age caused  by  the  connecting  carrier 
to  the  eggs  received  at  points  on  the 
line  of  connecting  carriers.  (Ingraham, 
P.  J.,  dissenting.)  DeWinter  &  Co.  v. 
Tex.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (N.  Y.  1912),  135  N. 
Y.    Supp.    893,    896. 

(v)  Where  the  bill  of  lading  issued 
by  the  initial  carrier  of  an  interstate 
shipment  provides  that  additional  goods 
may  be  loaded  into  the  cars  at  points 
on  the  connecting  lines,  the  stopping  of 
the  cars  at  such  line  to  receive  the 
goods  does  not  amount  to  a  delivery  to 
the  shipper,  so  as  to  deprive  him  of  his 
remedy  under  the  Carmack  amendment 
against  the  initial  carrier  for  loss  or 
damage  caused  by  the  connecting  car- 
rier. De  Winter  &  Co.  v.  Tex.  Cent. 
R.  Co.  (N.  Y.  1912),  135  N.  Y.  Supp. 
893,    897. 

(w)  The  effect  of  the  Carmack 
amendment  as  to  interstate  shipments 
is  to  make  the  connecting  carriers  the 
agents  of  the  initial  carrier,  the  same 
as  if  it  had  contracted  for  through 
carriage  to  the  point  of  destination. 
Earnest  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  (N.  Y. 
1912),  134   N.   Y.  Supp.   323,  325. 

(x)  The  provision  in  the  uniform  bill 
of  lading  approved  by  the  Commission, 
which  forbids  inspection  except  with 
the  shipper's  permission,  does  not  en- 
large the  liability  of  the  initial  carrier 
for  acts  of  the  connecting  carrier  cre- 
ated by  the  Carmack  amendment.  Ear- 
nest V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  (N.Y.  1912), 
134  N.  Y.  Supp.  323,  326. 

(y)  An  interstate  shipment  of  apples 
was  sent  under  a  uniform  bill  of  lad- 
ing approved  by  the  Commission,  which 
provided  that  inspection  would  not  be 
permitted  without  the  consignor's  con- 
sent. Plaintiff  consignor  gave  no  con- 
sent and  sent  the  bill  of  lading,  with 
draft  attached,  to  a  Chicago  bank  for 
collection.  The  connecting  carrier  at 
Chicago,  while  retaining  possession,  al- 
lowed the  consignee  to  inspect  the  ap- 
ples in  the  car,  and  the  consignee  re- 
jected the  same,  being  under  no  legal 
contract  to  purchase  them.  Plaintiff 
did  not  prove  the  apples  were  damaged 
by    the    inspection    or    that    the   fact   of 


LOSS  AND  DAMAGE,  §6  (z)— (jj) 


485 


inspection  caused  the  consignee  to  re- 
ject them.  HELD,  the  violation  of  the 
provision  in  the  bill  of  lading  against 
inspection  by  the  connecting  carrier  did 
not,  under  the  Carmack  amendment 
making  the  initial  carrier  responsible 
for  loss,  damage  or  injury  caused  by 
the  connecting  carrier,  render  the  in- 
itial carrier  liable  for  conversion  of  the 
apples.  Earnest  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co.  (N.  Y.  1912),  134  N.  Y.  Supp.  323, 
326. 

(z)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment 
the  initial  carrier  is  liable  for  damage 
to  an  interstate  shipment  caused  by 
the  negligence  of  the  connecting  carrier, 
despite  a  clause  in  the  bill  of  lading 
limiting  its  liability  to  loss  or  damage 
occurring  on  its  own  line.  Shultz  v. 
Skaneateles  R.  Co.,  66  Misc.  9,  12,  122 
N.  Y.  Supp.  445. 

(aa)  Where  defendant  initial  carrier 
accepts  in  New  York  goods  destined  to 
another  state,  it  is  liable  under  the 
Carmack  amendment  for  damage  to  the 
goods  resulting  from  the  negligence  of 
the  connecting  carrier  in  loading  same 
into  an  unsuitable  car,  although  defend- 
ant's line  lies  wholly  in  the  state  of 
New  York.  Shultz  v.  Skaneateles  R. 
Co.,  66  Misc.  9,  18,  122  N.  Y.  Supp.  445. 

(bb)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
making  the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss 
or  damage  caused  by  connecting  car- 
riers, and  forbidding  exemption  by  con- 
tract from  such  liability,  an  exemption 
clause  in  the  bill  of  lading  is  void. 
Shidlovsky  v.  Mallory  S,  S.  Co.,  60  Misc. 
67,  68,  111  N.  Y.  Supp.  778. 

(cc)  Where  an  interstate  shipment 
is  specifically  routed  over  the  lines  of 
connecting  carriers  by  the  shipper,  and 
the  connecting  carrier  in  conjunction 
with  the  initial  carrier,  alters  the  rout- 
ing and  diverts  the  shipment  in  such 
a  way  as  to  result  in  the  loss  of  the 
same,  the  initial  carrier  is  liable,  under 
the  Carmack  amendment.  Drake  v. 
Nashville,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  (Tenn. 
1911),   148    S.   W.    214,   218. 

(dd)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment 
to  the  Hepburn  Act,  making  the  initial 
carrier  liable  for  loss  or  damage  caused 
by  it  or  connecting  carriers,  a  shipper 
is  not  prevented  from  recovering  the 
entire  loss  from  the  initial  carrier  by 
reason  of  the  fact  that  he  joins  the  con- 
necting carriers  as  defendants  to  the 
suit.      Missouri,    K.    &    T.    Ry.    Co.    v. 


Demere  (Tex.  Civ.  App  1912),  145  S.  W. 
623,  626. 

(ee)  The  Carmack  amendment,  mak- 
ing the  initial  carrier  liable  in  inter- 
state shipments,  does  not  apply  where 
the  damage  claimed  arises  from  delay 
in  transit,  and  is  not  in  reference  to 
the  property  itself,  which  is  the  subject 
of  transportation.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Nelson  (Tex.  1911),  139  S.  W. 
81,    85. 

(ff)  Where  damage  to  live  stock  is 
caused  on  the  line  of  several  connect- 
ing carriers,  between  whom  no  partner- 
ship relation  exists,  each  is  liable  only 
for  the  portion  of  the  damage  caused  by 
it,  as  the  initial  carrier  is  the  only  car- 
rier made  liable  by  the  Carmack  amend- 
ment to  the  Hepburn  Act  for  all  dam- 
age, irrespective  of  the  line  on  which 
it  takes  place.  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Montgomery  (Tex.  1911),  139  S.  W.  885, 
886. 

(gg)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
a  clause  in  a  shipping  contract  limiting 
liability  for  loss  or  damage  to  an  inter- 
state shipment  to  that  occurring  on  the 
initial  carrier's  line  is  void.  Pecos  & 
N.  T.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Crews  (Tex.  1911),  139 
S.   W.  1049,   1051. 

(hh)  Where  defendant  initial  carrier 
has  entered  into  no  agreement  to  make 
diversion  of  an  interstate  shipment,  it 
is  not  liable,  under  the  Carmack  amend- 
ment making  it  responsible  for  loss  or 
damage  caused  by  the  connecting  car- 
rier, for  the  failure  of  the  connecting 
carrier,  after  receiving  the  shipment,  to 
divert  same,  such  failure  being  the  re- 
sult of  defendant's  omission  to  notify 
the  connecting  carrier  of  the  wishes  of 
the  shipper  in  this  respect.  Patton  v. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Tex.  1911),  137 
S.    W.    721,    723. 

(ii)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
making  the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss 
or  damage  caused  by  itself  or  connect- 
ing carriers  and  forbidding  exemption 
from  such  liability,  a  stipulation  in  a 
bill  of  lading  of  an  interstate  shipment 
for  exemption  from  liability  for  loss  or 
damage  to  the  goods  occasioned  by 
fire,  is  without  effect,  if  the  fire  is  due 
to  the  negligence  of  any  carrier  handling 
the  goods.  Southern  P.  Co.  v.  Weather- 
ford  Cotton  Mills  (Tex.  1911),  134  S.  W. 
778,  779. 

(jj)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
making  the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss 


486 


LOSS  AND  DAMAGE,  §6   (kk)— (ss) 


or  damage  caused  by  the  connecting 
carrier,  the  initial  carrier's  liability  is 
the  same  whether  by  its  shipping  con- 
tract it  states  that  it  undertakes  to 
transport  to  destination  or  only  to  the 
end  of  its  own  line,  where  the  contract 
provides  for  and  contemplates  delivery 
to  the  connecting  carrier  and  the  car- 
rying of  the  goods  to  the  destination  on 
the  line  of  the  connecting  carrier.  Gal- 
veston, H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Johnson 
(Tex.   1911),   133   S.  W.  725,   730. 

(kk)  Where  an  initial  carrier  issues 
a  bill  of  lading  for  a  shipment  from 
New  Orleans,  La.,  to  Waco,  Tex.,  and 
names  the  connecting  carriers  therein, 
the  shipment  is  interstate,  so  as  to 
bring  it  under  the  Carmack  amendment 
and  make  void  a  provision  in  the  bill 
of  lading  limiting  the  initial  carrier's 
liability  to  loss  or  damage  occurring  on 
its  own  Une.  Kemendo  v.  Fruit  Dis- 
patch Co.   (Tex.  1910),  131  S.  W.  73,  78. 

(11)  Where  a  connecting  carrier 
causes  damage  to  an  interstate  shipment 
by  wrongful  diversion  of  the  same,  the 
shipper  may,  under  the  Carmack  amend- 
ment of  June  29,  1906,  recover  for  such 
damage  of  the  initial  carrier.  Kemendo 
V.  Fruit  Dispatch  Co.  (Tex.  1910),  131 
S.   W.   73,  79. 

(mm)  Whatever  presumption  may 
have  existed,  prior  to  the  enactment  of 
the  Carmack  amendment  of  1906,  that 
damages  occurred  on  the  line  of  the 
finals  carrier,  can  have  no  place  in  con- 
struing the  liability  of  the  carrier,  on 
whose  line  the  damages  occurred,  to 
the  initial  carrier,  because  the  right  of 
the  initial  carrier  to  recover  against  a 
connecting  carrier  is  made  to  rest  alone 
on  proof  that  the  damages  occurred  on 
that  line.  Presumptions  indulged  in 
by  courts,  prior  to  the  enactment  of 
the  amendment,  in  regard  to  the  final 
carrier,  have  no  bearing  or  effect  upon 
cases  arising  under  the  amendment. 
These  presumptions  have  been  effectu- 
ally destroyed  by  the  declaration  that 
the  initial  carrier  in  interstate  ship- 
ments is  liable,  no  matter  on  what  line 
the  damages  occurred.  Carlton  Produce 
Co.  V.  Velasco,  B.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  (Tex. 
1910),   131    S.   W.   1187,    1188. 

(nn)  A  "shipping  order  contract  and 
bill  of  lading,"  stating  the  number  and  de- 
scribing the  horses  shipped,  the  name  of 
the  consignee  and  the  destination  in  an- 
other state,  and  containing  stipulations 
governing  the  entire  transportation  from 


the  initial  point  in  one  state  to  the  dfea- 
tination  in  another  state,  and  undertak- 
ing to  specify  the  rights,  duti^a  and  limi- 
tations of  the  parties  and  also  of  those 
of  subsequent  carrjpra,  is  a  "receipt  or 
bill  of  lading:"  ^vilhin  the  meaning  of  the 
Carmack  amendment,  which  requires  the 
issuance  of  such  a  receipt  for  an  inter- 
state shipment  and  makes  the  initial  car- 
rier liable  for  loss  or  damage  caused  by 
connecting  carriers.  S.  P.  Co.  v.  Meadors 
&  Co.   (Tex.  1910),  129  S.  W.   170,  172. 

(oo)  A  provision  in  a  shipping  con- 
tract limiting  the  liability  of  the  initial 
carrier  of  an  interstate  shipment  to  loss 
or  damage  occurring  on  its  own  line  is 
invalid  under  the  Carmack  amendment 
to  the  Hepburn  Act,  making  such  carrier 
responsible  for  loss  or  damage  caused  by 
connecting  carriers.  S.  P.  Co.  v.  Meadors 
&  Co.   (Tex.  1910),  129  S.  W.  170,  172. 

(pp)  An  initial  carrier,  with  its  line 
entirely  within  the  state  of  Texas,  issued 
a  through  bill  of  lading  and  guarantee  of 
a  through  rate  for  the  carriage  of  goods 
from  a  point  in  Texas  to  a  point  in  Ala- 
bama. The  shipping  contract  stated  that 
the  initial  carrier  agreed  only  to  carry 
the  goods  to  the  end  of  its  line  and  de- 
liver same  to  the  connecting  carrier. 
HELD,  the  shipment  was  interstate,  so  as 
to  make  the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss 
or  damage  caused  by  the  connecting  car- 
riers. Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lewis   (Tex.  1910),  129  S.  W.  594,  595. 

(qq)  The  Carmack  amendment  to  the 
Hepburn  Act  makes  "any  carrier  receiv- 
ing property  for  transportation  from  a 
point  in  one  state  to  a  point  in  another 
state"  liable  for  loss  caused  by  itself  or 
by  connecting  carriers,  and  the  shipper 
may,  therefore,  sue  an  intermediate  car- 
rier receiving  the  goods,  and  is  not 
obliged  to  institute  action  against  the 
initial  carrier.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  of 
Tex.  V.  Ray  (Tex.  1910),  127  S.  W.  281, 
282. 

(rr)  Under  the  provisions  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act  as  amended  June  29, 
1906,  a  carrier  who  receives  property  for 
transportation  from  one  state  into  an- 
other is  made  liable  for  any  loss,  damage 
or  injury  to  such  property  caused  by  a 
connecting  carrier,  and  cannot  restrict 
its  liability  to  its  own  line.  INI.  K.  &  T. 
Ry.  Co.  of  Tex.  v.  Carpenter,  52  Tex.  Civ. 
App.    585,    587,    114    S.    W.    900. 

(ss)  The  Carmack  amendment  to  the 
Act,  making  the  initial  carrier  liable  for 
loss    and    injury   occurring   on    the   lines 


LOSS  AND  DAMAGE,  §6  (tt)— §9   (b) 


487 


of  connecting  carriers  and  forbidding  the 
exemption  by  contract  from  such  liability, 
makes  void  a  limitation  in  the  bill  of 
lading  limiting  the  liability  of  the  initial 
ocean  carrier  to  losses  occurring  on  its 
own  line,  in  an  interstate  shipment  by 
ocean  and  rail.  Old  Dominion  S.  S.  Co. 
V.  Flanary  &  Co.  (Va.  1911),  69  S.  E.  1107, 
1108. 

(tt)  The  initial  carrier  is  not  liable, 
under  the  Carmack  amendment,  making 
It  answerable  for  loss  of  any  interstate 
shipment  occurring  on  the  line  of  the  con- 
necting carrier,  where  the  loss  com- 
plained of  arises  from  the  sale  of  the 
goods  by  the  latter  carrier  to  satisfy 
freight  charges  after  the  consignee  has 
negligently  failed  to  call  for  them  and  the 
connecting  carrier  has  placed  them  in  its 
warehouse.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Stuart  Draft  Co.,  109  Va.  184,  188,  63  S.  E. 
415. 

(uu)  Defendant  initial  carrier  re- 
ceived a  shipment  of  shingles  at  Sisco, 
Wash.,  to  be  carried  to  Kankakee,  111. 
Defendant  transported  the  same  to  Min- 
nesota Transfer  in  an  ordinary  box  car 
and  delivered  the  shingles  to  the  connect- 
ing carrier,  which  road,  without  the 
knowledge  of  defendant  initial  carrier, 
transferred  the  shingles  to  open  gondola 
cars  and  forwarded  the  cars  to  Kanka- 
kee. Thereafter,  and  before  the  arrival 
of  the  cars  at  Kankakee,  plaintiff  sold  the 
shingles  and,  without  notice  to  defend- 
ant, instructed  the  delivering  carrier  to 
divert  the  shipment  to  a  point  in  New 
Jersey.  HELD,  the  initial  carrier  was 
not  liable  for  any  damage  to  the  shingles 
occurring  while  they  were  en  route  from 
Kankakee  to  the  New  Jersey  point,  for 
while  the  initial  carrier  by  the  Carmack 
amendment  is  liable  for  loss  or  damage 
caused  by  connecting  carriers,  that  liabil- 
ity cannot  be  extended  to  lines  beyond 
the  destination  fixed  in  the  bill  of  lading. 
Parker-Bell  Lumber  Co.  v.  Great  North- 
ern Ry.  Co.  (Wash.  1912),  124  P.  389,  390. 

§7.     Intermediate  Carrier. 

(a)  Although  the  Carmack  amend- 
ment to  the  Hepburn  Act  renders  the  ini- 
tial carrier  liable  for  loss  or  damage  to 
interstate  shipments  caused  by  its  own  or 
a  connecting  line,  the  connecting  carrier 
Is  also  liable  for  the  damage  resulting 
from  its  negligence.  Gibson  &  Draughn 
V.  Little  Rock  &  H.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Ark. 
1910),  124  S.  W.  1033,  1034. 


(b)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
making  the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss 
or  damage  caused  by  its  own  or  connect- 
ing carriers,  the  connectmg  carrier  is 
still  liable  if  the  damage  results  from  its 
negligence,  and  there  is  still  a  presump- 
tion that  the  last  carrier  caused  the  in- 
jury. Gibson  &  Draughn  v.  Little  Rock  & 
H.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Ark.  1910),  124  S.  W. 
1033,  1034. 

(c)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
making  the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss 
or  damage  caused  by  it  or  by  a  connect- 
ing carrier,  both  carriers  are  jointly 
liable  for  loss  or  damage  occurring  on  the 
line  of  the  connecting  carrier,  but  no  re- 
covery can  be  had  of  the  connecting  car- 
rier for  loss  or  damage  taking  place,  with- 
out its  negligence,  on  the  initial  carrier's 
line.  Otrich  v.  St.  L.  L  M.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.  (Mo.  App.'  1911),  134  S.  W.  665,  669. 

(d)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment 
of  June  29,  1906,  the  initial  carrier  is  lia- 
ble for  damage  to  an  interstate  shipment 
arising  from  delay  on  its  own  line,  but 
the  intermediate  carrier  is  not  liable  for 
this  delay  of  the  initial  carrier,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  partnership  relations  between 
such  carriers.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co. 
of  Texas  v.  Stark  Grain  Co.,  103  Tex.  542, 
546,  131  S.  W.  410. 

§8.     Delivering  Carrier. 
See  Supra,   §7    (b). 

(a)  The  Carmack  amendment  to  the 
Hepburn  Act,  making  the  initial  carrier 
liable  for  loss  or  damage  to  an  interstate 
shipment  caused  by  the  connecting  car- 
rier, does  not  prevent  the  shipper  from 
recovering  from  the  last  carrier.  Trade* 
well  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Wis.  1912), 
136  N.  W.  794,  796. 

§9.     Agreed  or  Restricted  Valuation. 

See     Advanced     Rates,     §6     (7);     Re- 
leased  Rates. 

(a)  A  carrier  cannot  escape  the  effect 
of  the  Carmack  amendment,  making  the 
initial  carrier  liable  for  loss  or  damage 
occurring  on  the  lines  of  connecting  car- 
riers and  forbidding  exemption  from  such 
liability,  by  the  fact  that  its  contract  of 
shipment  was  based  upon  a  particular 
rate  granted  in  consideration  of  such  ex- 
emption. Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sims, 
169  Ala.  295,  302,  53  So.  826. 

(b)  Under  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act  as  amended  by  the  Hepburn  Act,  any 
contract  limiting  the  liability  of  the  car- 
rier for  loss  of  property  transported  in  in* 


488 


LOSS  AND  DAMAGE,  §9  (c)— (1) 


terstate  commerce  to  a  specified  maxi- 
mum amount  is  void.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Pape  (Ark.  1911),  140  S.  W. 
265,  267. 

(c)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment  to 
the  Hepburn  Act,  making  the  initial  car- 
rier liable  for  loss  or  damage  caused  by 
it  or  connecting  carriers  and  forbidding 
exemption  from  such  liability,  a  provision 
in  the  shipping  contract  restricting  liabil- 
ity in  case  of  loss  through  negligence  to 
a  specified  value  is  void  and  cannot  be 
availed  of  as  a  defense  in  a  suit  against 
the  connecting  carrier.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Carl,  91  Ark.  97,  100,  121  S.  W.  932. 

(d)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment,  a 
limitation  in  the  shipping  contract  of  lia- 
bility for  damage  in  transit  arising  from 
negligence  will  not  be  held  to  prevent  the 
shipper  from  recovering  damages  based 
on  the  true  value  of  the  goods.  S.  P.  Co. 
v.  Crenshaw,  5  Ga.  App.  675,  689,  63  S.  E. 
865. 

(e)  The  common  law  right  to  contract 
with  respect  to  the  value  of  an  article  to 
be  transported  upon  the  character  and 
value  of  which  a  rate  may  depend,  and 
the  right  to  contract  against  loss  beyond 
the  carrier's  control,  are  unaffected  by 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  though  the 
contract  must  be  fairly  made  upon  a  sufli- 
clent  consideration,  after  the  shipper  has 
been  given  an  opportunity  to  choose  be- 
tween the  common  law  right  and  rate 
and  the  limited  liability,  Pittsburgh,  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Mitchell  (Ind.  1910),  91  N.  E. 
735,  740. 

(f)  Where  a  state  law  provides  that 
the  carrier  shall  not  in  any  way  limit  its 
liability  for  loss  and  damage,  nothing  in 
the  Carmack  amendment,  making  the  ini- 
tial carrier  liable  for  loss  and  damage  on 
the  lines  of  connecting  carriers  and  for- 
bidding the  exemption  from  such  liability, 
supplants  said  state  law  so  as  to  prevent 
the  shipper  from  recovering  the  full 
value  of  the  goods  lost  despite  a  limita- 
tion of  liability  to  a  specified  sum  in  the 
bill  of  lading.  Winn  v.  American  Express 
Co.  149  la.  259,  271,  128  N.  W.  663. 

(g)  Where  a  carrier  has  filed  sched- 
ules of  interstate  rates  based  on  an  arbi- 
trary limitation  of  value,  the  enforcement 
of  a  state  statute  forbidding  all  limitation 
of  liability  for  loss  or  damage,  so  as  to 
permit  the  shipper  to  recover  on  the  basis 
of  the  full  value  of  the  goods,  is  not  for- 
bidden on  the  ground  that  to  permit  such 
recovery    would    result    in    a    departure 


from  the  published  rates  and  would  open 
the  way  for  rebates.  Cramer  v.  C.  R.  I.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.  (la.  1911),  133  N.  W.  387,  392. 

(h)  Section  20  of  the  Act  as  amended 
June  29,  1906,  making  the  initial  carrier 
liable  for  loss  occurring  on  the  lines  of 
connecting  carriers,  does  not  prevent  the 
initial  carrier  from  entering  into  an 
agreement  with  the  shipper  to  limit  the 
value  of  the  goods  transported,  where 
the  rates  are  graduated  according  to  the 
value  of  the  goods.  Bernard  v.  Adams 
Express  Co.,  205  Mass.  254,  258,  91  N.  E. 
325. 

(i)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
forbidding  the  initial  carrier  from  ex- 
empting itself  from  liability  for  loss  or 
damage  caused  by  the  connecting  car- 
rier, the  shipper  may  recover  the  full 
value  of  goods  lost  despite  an  agreed 
value  in  the  shipping  contract,  unless  the 
agreement  as  to  value  is  fairly  entered 
into  and  is  just  and  reasonable.  O'Con- 
nor V.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  (Minn.  1912),  136  N. 
W.  743,  745. 

(j)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment 
to  the  Hepburn  Act,  making  the  initial 
carrier  liable  for  loss  caused  by  itself  or 
by  the  connecting  carrier  and  forbidding 
exemption  from  such  liability,  the  car- 
rier is  not  prevented  from  limiting  its 
liability  for  loss  occurring  on  its  own 
line  to  an  agreed  valuation  made  in  good 
faith  in  consideration  of  the  extension 
of  a  lower  rate.  McElvain  v.  Railroad, 
151  Mo.  App.  126,  153,  131  S.  W.  736. 

(k)  Where  an  interstate  shipment 
was  made  prior  to  the  passage  of  the 
Carmack  amendment  to  the  Hepburn 
law,  the  initial  carrier  might  restrict  its 
common  law  liability,  as  insurer,  for  a 
consideration  such  as  a  reduced  rate  of 
freight.  Blackmer  &  Post  Pipe  Co.  v. 
M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  (Mo.  App.  1909),  119 
S.  W.  1,  10. 

(1)  Nothing  in  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Act  as  amended  June  29,  1906,  pro- 
viding that  the  initial  carrier  shall  be  lia- 
ble for  the  losses  occurring  upon  the 
lines  of  connecting  carriers  and  that  no 
contract  shall  exempt  such  a  carrier,  pre- 
vents a  shipper  from  recovering  the  full 
value  of  the  article  injured  despite  a  con- 
tract limiting  liability  to  a  specified 
value,  where  the  state  constitution  and 
statutes  prohibit  such  limitation.  Miller 
v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  85  Neb.  458,  466, 
123  N.  W.  449. 


LOSS   AND  DAMAGE,   §9    (m)— (u) 


489 


(m)  Where  the  law  of  a  state  forbids 
a  carrier  from  limiting  its  liability  for 
loss  or  injury  to  goods,  due  to  its  negli- 
gence, a  shipper  who  secures  the  lower 
interstate  rate  published  to  apply  to  ship- 
ments under  limited  liability  is  not  pre- 
vented from  recovering  for  injury  to 
goods  on  the  basis  of  their  true  value  on 
the  ground  that  to  permit  such  recovery 
would  amount  to  allowing  the  prefer- 
ences forbidden  by  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Act.  Kissenger  v.  Fitzgerald,  152 
N.  C.  247,  252,  67  S.  E.  588. 

(n'  Upon  delivery  of  an  interstate 
shipment  to  defendant  initial  carrier,  de- 
fendant issued  a  shipping  receipt  which 
stated  that  the  company's  charge  was 
based  upon  the  value  of  the  property  and 
the  value  must  be  declared  by  the  ship- 
per, and  that  it  should  be  taken  to  be 
not  more  than  $50,  unless  the  shipper 
stated  a  greater  value.  The  shipper  made 
no  declaration  of  the  value.  The  ship- 
ment was  lost  by  the  connecting  carrier. 
HELD,  under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
making  the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss 
occurring  on  the  line  of  a  connecting 
carrier  and  forbidding  exemption  from 
such  liability,  the  shipper  was  entitled 
to  recover  only  on  the  basis  of  the  $50 
value  limited  in  the  bill  of  lading.  Flor- 
man  v.  Dodd  &  Childs  Exp/ess  Co.  79 
N.  J.  L.  63,  66,  74  A.  446. 

(o)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
making  the  initial  carrier  of  an  inter- 
state shipment  liable  for  loss  or  dam- 
age caused  by  it  or  by  connecting  car- 
riers, and  forbidding  exemption  by  con- 
tract or  otherwise  from  the  liability  im- 
posed, an  initial  carrier  is  not  prevented 
from  limiting  the  liability  as  to  loss  or 
damage  on  its  own  line,  since  the  clause 
forbidding  exemption  refers  only  to  ex- 
emption from  loss  or  damage  caused  by 
the  connecting  carrier.  Travis  v.  Wells, 
Fargo  &  Co.,  79  N.  J.  L.  83,  86,  74  A.  444. 

(p)  The  purpose  of  the  amendment  of 
June  29,  1906,  to  section  20  of  the  Act 
was  to  render  the  initial  carrier,  in  tue 
case  of  interstate  transportation  over 
connecting  lines,  liable  to  the  lawful 
holders  of  its  receipt  or  bill  of  ladii.g 
for  any  loss  or  injury  to  the  property 
shipped,  whether  such  loss  or  injury 
occurred  after  the  goods  had  passed  out 
of  the  hands  of  the  initial  carrier  or 
not,  and,  furthermore,  to  prevent  inter- 
state carriers  from  exempting  th'-:- selves 
from  liability  for  the  loss  of  property  or 
damage  thereto  when  it  had  passed  into 
the  hands  of  another  carrier  to  be  trans- 


ported to  its  destination.  The  language 
of  the  enactment  does  not  disclose  any 
intent  to  abrogate  the  right  of  common 
carriers  to  regulate  the  cost  of  trans- 
portation for  the  carriage  of  goods  or  to 
agree  with  the  shipper  upon  a  valuation 
of  the  property  carried.  Greenwald  v. 
Barrett,  199  N.  Y.  170,  175,  92  N.  E.  218. 

(q)  While  the  Carmack  amendment 
abrogates  the  common  law  rule,  making 
each  carrier  liable  only  for  damage  oc- 
curring on  its  own  line,  and  renders  the 
initial  carrier  responsible  for  loss  or 
damage  caused  by  the  connecting  carrier, 
it  does  not  prevent  the  initial  carrier 
from  limiting  its  liability  to  an  agreed 
sura  specified  in  the  shipping  receipt. 
Greenwald  v.  Weir,  130  App.  Div.  696, 
700,  115  N.  Y.  Supp.  311,  reversing  59 
Misc.  431,  111  N.  Y.  Supp.  235. 

(r)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
making  the  initial  •  carrier  of  an  inter- 
state shipment  liable  for  loss  or  injury 
caused  by  the  connecting  carrier,  and  for- 
bidding exemption  from  such  liability, 
a  provision  in  a  shipping  receipt  limit- 
ing the  amount  of  liability  to  an  agreed 
sum  in  the  manner  allowed  at  common 
law  is  invalid.  Vigouroux  v.  Piatt,  62 
Misc.  364,  3-69,  115  N.  Y.  Supp.  880. 

(s)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
making  the  initial  carrier  of  an  inter- 
state shipment  liable  for  loss  or  dam- 
age caused  by  connecting  carriers,  and 
forbidding  exemption  by  contract  from 
such  liability,  a  provision  in  a  shipping 
receipt  limiting  liability  to  the  sum  spec- 
ified therein  to  be  an  agreed  amount 
between  the  parties  is  void.  Schutte  v. 
Weir,  59  Misc.  438,  440,  111  N.  Y.  Supp. 
240. 

(t)  Where  a  shipper  merely  keeps 
silent  as  to  the  value  of  goods  tendered 
to  a  carrier  and  receives  a  shipping  re- 
ceipt limiting  the  carrier's  liability  to 
a  stated  sum  and  reciting  that  the  rate 
granted  is  based  on  the  limited  value 
specified,  he  is  not  guilty  under  section 
10  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  of 
fraudulently  securing  transportation  at 
less  than  regular  rates  so  as  to  preclude 
his  recovering  for  loss  of  the  goods  on 
the  basis  of  their  true  value.  Schutte  v. 
Weir,  59  Misc.  438,  441,  111  N.  Y.  Supp. 
240. 

(u)  The  servant  of  a  shipper  delivered 
a  package  for  interstate  shipment  and 
upon  being  asked  the  value  by  the  agent 
of  the  carrier  stated  that  he  did  not 
know.     The  agent  then  stamped  on  the 


490 


LOSS  AND  DAMAGE,  §9  (v)— §11  (a) 


shipping  receipt,  "Value  asked  and  not 
given."  The  sliipping  receipt  limited  the 
value  to  $50.  A  higher  rate  was  in  effect 
where  the  value  exceeded  that  sum.  The 
shipper  proved  at  the  trial  that  the  true 
value  of  the  goods  was  $350.  HELD,  in 
a  suit  under  the  Carmack  amendment  to 
recover  for  the  loss  of  the  goods,  the 
shipper  could  not  be  denied  recovery  on 
the  ground  that  he  had  been  guilty  of  se- 
curing transportation  by  undervaluing 
the  goods  at  less  than  the  published 
rate.  Wright  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  230 
Pa.  635,  G45,  79  A.  760. 

(v)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
making  the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss 
or  damage  to  an  interstate  shipment 
caused  by  itself  or  connecting  carriers, 
and  forbidding  exemption  by  contract 
from  such  liability,  a  stipulation  in  the 
bill  of  lading  of  a  shipment  of  fruit  trees 
limiting  the  liability  of  the  initial  car- 
rier to  an  agreed  valuation  of  3c  a 
pound,  is  invalid.  Drake  v.  Nashville  C. 
&  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  (Tenn.  1911),  148  S. 
W.  214,  218. 

(w)  The  Carmack  amendment,  mak- 
ing the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss  or 
damage  caused  by  it  or  by  connecting 
carriers,  and  forbidding  exemption  from 
such  liability,  does  not  make  invalid  a 
provision  in  a  shipping  receipt  limiting 
liability  to  a  stipulated,  reasonable  sum 
in  view  of  the  lower  rate  accorded.  Lar- 
sen  V.  Oregon  Short  Line  R.  Co.  (Utah 
1910),    110    P.    983,    986. 

(x)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  as 
amended  June  29,  1906,  does  not  pro- 
hibit an  interstate  carrier  from  limiting 
the  amount  of  its  liability  for  loss,  dam- 
age or  injuries  to  property  intrusted  to 
it  for  shipment  by  an  agreement  with 
the  shipper  as  to  the  value  thereof,  en- 
tered into  in  good  faith,  or  procured  by 
a  misrepresentation  on  the  part  of  the 
shipper  as  to  the  value  thereof.  Fielder 
&  Turley  v.  Adams  Express  Co.  (W.  Va. 
1911),  71  S.  E.  99. 

§10.     Common   Law  Liability. 

(a)  In  the  absence  of  legislation  a 
carrier,  unless  there  be  a  special  con- 
tract, is  only  bound  to  carry  over  its 
own  line  and  then  deliver  to  a  connect- 
ing carrier.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  River- 
side Mills,  219  U.  S.  186,  197,  31  Sup.  Ct. 
164,  55  L.  ed.  167. 

(b)  Where  an  initial  carrier  contracts 
to  carry  over  the  whole  route  its  com- 
mon-law carrier  liability  extends  over  its 


entire  route.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  River- 
side Mills,  219  U.  S.  186,  197,  31  S.  Ct. 
164,  55  L.  ed.  167. 

(c)  Where  goods  have  been  appro- 
priated by  the  initial  carrier,  the  liabil- 
ities are  the  same  under  the  general  law 
as  they  would  be  under  the  Carmack 
amendment  to  the  Hepburn  Act.  Central 
of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dowe,  6  Ga.  App.  858, 
65  S.  E.  1091. 

(d)  In  a  suit  against  an  express  com- 
pany for  the  death  of  a  hog  in  transit 
the  plaintiff  cannot  further  found  his 
claim  on  the  theory  that  he  had  a  special 
contract  by  which  the  defendant  agreed 
to  haul  the  animal  to  the  cars  in  a 
single  covered  wagon.  Where  such  spe- 
cial services  are  not  provided  for  in  the 
published  tariffs  the  carrier  is  forbid- 
den by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  to 
extend  to  any  shipper  privileges  or  fa- 
cilities not  specified  in  the  tariffs.  Winn 
V.  American  Express  Co.,  149  la.  259, 
269,  128  N.  W.  663. 

(e)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment 
to  the  Hepburn  Act,  making  the  initial 
carrier  liable  for  loss  or  damage  caused 
by  it  or  by  connecting  carriers,  and  for- 
bidding exemption  from  such  liability, 
the  scope  of  the  word  "caused"  is  co- 
extensive with  the  full  measure  of  a  car- 
rier's common  law  liability,  and  the  in- 
itial carrier  cannot,  by  stipulation  in  a 
shipping  contract,  release  itself  from  any 
part  of  its  common  law  liability.  Holland 
V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  139  Mo.  App. 
702,  722,  123  S.  W.  987. 

(f)  Leaving  out  of  account  the  pro- 
vision of  the  Act  making  the  initial  car- 
rier liable  for  the  default  of  connecting 
carriers,  the  mere  designation  of  the 
destination  of  the  goods  in  the  contract 
with  the  first  carrier  will  not  make  it  a 
contract  for  through  transportation  where 
the  other  terms  indicate  a  limitation  of 
liability  to  the  end  of  the  first  carrier's 
line.  Reid  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  153  N.  C. 
490,   496,   69   S.   E.  '618. 

§11.    'Notice   of   Loss. 

(a)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
making  the  initial  carrier  of  an  inter- 
state shipment  liable  for  loss  or  dam- 
age caused  by  itself  or  connecting  car- 
riers, a  provision  in  the  shipping  con- 
tract requiring  the  shipper  to  present  a 
claim  in  writing  for  loss  or  damage  to 
the  carrier  at  the  point  of  shipment  or 
delivery  within  four  months  after  deliv- 


LOSS  AND  DAMAGE,  §11  (b)_§12  (c) 


491 


ery  is  not  invalid.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R,  Co.  v. 
Ward    (Ala.   1912),   58  So.  677,   678. 

(b)  A  stipulation  in  a  shipping  con- 
tract requiring  the  shipper  to  make  claim 
at  the  point  of  delivery  or  at  the  point 
of  origin  for  loss,  damage  or  delay  within 
four  months  after  delivery  of  the  prop- 
erty is  not  invalidated  by  the  Carmack 
amendment,  making  the  initial  carrier 
liable  for  loss  or  damage  caused  by  it- 
self or  connecting  carriers  and  forbid- 
ding exemption  by  contract  from  such 
liability.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams  (Ark.  1912),  142  S.  W.  826,  827. 

(c)  The  Carmack  amendment  to  the 
Hepburn  Act,  making  the  initial  carrier 
liable  for  loss  or  damage  caused  by  con- 
necting carriers,  and  forbidding  exemp- 
tion from  such  liability,  does  not  invali- 
date a  stipulation  in  the  bill  of  lading 
for  a  shipment  of  peaches  that  the  shlp- 

.per  shall  give  notice  of  loss  or  damage 
to  the  delivering  carrier  within  thirty 
hours  after  delivery.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Keller,  90  Ark.  308,  316,  119  S.  W. 
254. 

(d)  The  Carmack  amendment  to  the 
Hepburn  Act,  forbidding  the  initial  car- 
rier to  exempt  itself  from  liability  for 
loss  or  damage  to  an  interstate  shipment 
caused  by  itself  or  a  connecting  carrier, 
does  not  render  invalid  a  stipulation  in 
the  bill  of  lading  that  as  a  condition 
precedent  to  recovery  the  shipper  must 
give  notice  of  the  claim  within  a  reason- 
able time.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Furlow,  89  Ark.  404,  411,  117  S.  W.  517. 

(e)  A  shipping  receipt  for  an  inter- 
state shipment  of  horses  provided  V  :  t, 
as  a  condition  precedent  to  recovery,  the 
shipper  must  give  notice  of  any  injury  be- 
fore removing  the  horses  to  some  general 
officer,  claim  agent  or  station  agent,  and 
should  serve  same  within  one  day  after 
arrival  at  destination.  HELD,  the  pro- 
vision was  void,  as  conflicting  with  the 
Carmack  amendment,  making  the  initial 
carrier  liable  for  loss  caused  by  its  own 
or  a  connecting  line,  and  forbidding  ex- 
emption from  such  liability.  McKinstry 
V.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  1911),  134 
S.   W.   1061,   1063. 

(f)  The  Carmack  amendment,  making 
the  initial  carrier  liable  for  loss  or  in- 
jury caused  by  the  connecting  carrier  and 
forbidding  exemption  from  such  liability, 
does  not  prevent  the  initial  carrier  from 
enforcing  the  reasonable  rule  in  its  ship- 
ping receipt,  requiring  notice  of  loss  or 
damage  to  be  given  by  the  shipper  within 


sixty  days  after  date  of  shipment.  Vig- 
ouroux  V.  Piatt,  62  Misc.  364,  371,  115 
N.  Y.  Supp.  880. 

(g)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
forbidding  the  initial  carrier  from  ex- 
empting itself  from  liability  for  loss  or 
damage  occurring  on  lines  of  its  con- 
necting carriers,  a  clause  in  the  shipping 
contract  which  requires  the  shipper,  as 
a  condition  precedent  to  recovery,  to  no- 
tify some  general  officer,  claim  agent  or 
station  agent  of  the  loss  or  injury  to 
stock  en  route  when  discovered  and  be- 
fore the  cattle  are  mingled  with  other 
stock,  and,  in  any  event,  within  one  day 
after  delivery  of  the  stock  at  destina- 
tion, is  not  invalid  as  being  in  conflict 
with  the  amendment  mentioned,  where 
said  rule  of  notice  is  deemed  reasonable 
and  is  authorized  by  the  laws  of  the 
state  governing  the  shipping  contract. 
C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Rich  (Tex.  1911), 
138  S.  W.  223. 

§12.     Settlements  and   Rights  Inter  Se. 

(a)  Where  in  a  suit  against  the  initial 
and  the  connecting  carrier  of  an  inter- 
state shipment  for  delay  and  damage  to 
goods  the  complaint  is  dismissed  with 
plaintiff's  consent  as  to  the  latter  car- 
rier the  initial  carrier  may  still  be  prose- 
cuted and  recovery  had  against  it  under 
the  Carmack  amendment,  making  such 
carrier  liable  for  loss,  damage  or  in- 
jury caused  by  subsequent  carriers.  Shid- 
lovsky  V.  Mallory  S.  S.  Co.,  60  Misc.  67, 
68,  111  N.  Y.  Supp.  778. 

(b)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment 
of  June  29,  1906,  making  the  initial  car- 
rier liable  for  damage  caused  by  the  con- 
necting carrier  and  allowing  the  former 
to  recover  of  the  latter  for  the  amount 
of  the  judgment  secured  by  the  shipper, 
the  initial  carrier  cannot  so  recover  when 
it  delivers  cattle  in  an  injured  condition 
to  the  connecting  carrier  and  thero  is  no 
evidence  to  show  that  the  damage  sus- 
tained by  the  shipper  was  caused  by  the 
connecting  carrier.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Jarmon  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1911),  141 
S.  W.  155,  156. 

(c)  An  interstate  shipment  passed 
over  the  lines  of  five  connecting  carriers. 
Plaintiff  sued  the  initial  carrier  for  dam- 
age to  the  goods.  After  the  institution 
of  the  action  it  entered  into  an  agree- 
ment with  the  last  two  connecting  car- 
riers that  it  would  not  further  prosecute 
its  suit  against  them  and  would  protect 
them  against  the  suit  of  anyone  else,  in 


492 


LOSS  AND  DAMAGE,  §12   (d)— MARINE  INSURANCE   (a) 


consideration  of  the  payment  of  $275. 
HELD,  under  the  Carmack  amendment 
of  June  29,  1906,  the  initial  carrier  could 
not  be  deprived  by  this  indemnity  agree- 
ment of  its  right  to  recover  the  amount 
of  any  judgment  paid  by  it  against  the 
two  indemnified  carriers,  in  case  such 
carriers  caused  the  damage.  Carlton 
Produce  Co.  v.  Velasco  B.  &  N.  Ry.  Co. 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.  1910),  131  S.  W.  1187, 
1188. 

(d)  An  interstate  shipment  passed 
over  the  lines  of  five  carriers.  Plaintiff 
sued  the  initial  carrier  for  damage  to 
the  goods.  After  the  institution  of  the 
action  it  entered  into  an  agreement  with 
the  last  two  connecting  carriers  that  it 
would  not  further  prosecute  its  suit 
against  them  and  would  protect  them 
against  the  suit  of  anyone  else,  in  con- 
sideration of  the  payment  of  $275.  HELD, 
in  case  the  damage  was  caused  by  the 
two  indemnified  carriers  the  plaintiff 
could  not  recover  of  defendant  initial 
carrier,  since  the  defendant  could  then 
recover  of  the  two  indemnified  carriers 
and  the  latter  could  in  turn  obtain  judg- 
ment on  the  indemnifying  contract 
against  the  plaintiff;  but  it  was  not  so 
estopped  if  the  damages  occurred  on 
other  lines  than  on  those  of  the  two  in- 
demnified carriers.  Carlton  Produce  Co. 
V.  Velasco  B.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  (Tex.  1910), 
131  S.  W.  1187,  1188. 

§13.     Special  Damages. 

(a)  Although  under  the  Carmack 
amendment,  making  the  initial  carrier  of 
an  interstate  shipment  liable  for  loss  or 
damage  caused  by  it  or  connecting  car- 
riers and  forbidding  exemption  by  con- 
tract from  such  liability,  the  initial  car- 
rier cannot  refuse  to  accept  a  shipment 
or  exact  a  special  charge  for  the  extra 
risk,  and  is  liable  for  special  damages 
for  delay,  where  it  is  notified  at  the 
time  of  tender  of  the  shipment  that  such 
damages  are  likely  to  arise  if  the  ship 
ment  is  not  promptly  carried.  C.  R.  I. 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Planters'  G.  &  O.  Co., 
88  Ark.  77,  85,  113  S.  W.  352. 

III.     EVIDENCE. 

§14.     Acts  of  Connecting  Carrier. 

(a)  Inasmuch  as  the  initial  carrier  is 
liable  under  the  Carmack  amendment  for 
Injuries  caused  to  cattle  by  its  con- 
necting carriers,  evidence  of  injuries 
done  them  by  such  carriers  is  admissible 
to  prove  the  extent  of  such  liability.    Pecos 


&  N.   T.  Ry.   Co.  V.   Crews   (Tex.  1911), 
139  S.  W.  1049,  1051. 

§15.     Burden   of   Proof. 
See   Evidence,    I. 

(a)  Under  the  Carmack  amendment, 
when  the  holders  of  the  bills  of  lading 
prove  the  goods  have  not  been  delivered 
to  the  consignee,  the  presumption  arises 
that  they  have  been  lost  by  reason  of 
the  neglect  of  the  carrier  or  its  agents, 
and  the  burden  of  proof  that  the  loss 
resulted  from  some  other  cause  for  which 
the  initial  carrier  is  not  responsible  in 
law  or  by  contract  is  then  cast  upon  the 
carrier.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Wallace,  223  U.  S.  481,  492,  32  Sup. 
Ct.  205,  56  L.  ed.  516. 

§16.     Judicial  Notice. 
See  Evidence,   III. 

(a)  The  Carmack  amendment  to  the 
Hepburn  Act,  making  the  initial  carrier 
liable  for  loss  or  damage  to  goods  on  its 
own  line  or  the  lines  of  connecting  car- 
riers, and  forbidding  exemption  by  con- 
tract from  such  liability,  is  a  law  of  gen- 
eral operation  in  Georgia  and  is  to  be 
given  effect  as  such  by  the  courts  of  the 
state.  S.  P.  Co.  v.  Crenshaw,  5  Ga.  App. 
675,   680,   63   S.   E.   865. 

(b)  A  state  statute  provided  that 
"neither  the  evidence  relied  on  by  a 
party  nor  presumptions  of  law,  nor  facts 
of  which  judicial  notice  is  taken,  except- 
ing private  statutes,  shall  be  stated  in 
the  pleadings."  HELD,  in  a  suit  against 
an  initial  carrier  to  recover  for  damage 
to  an  interstate  shipment  caused  by  the 
connecting  carrier  it  was  not  necessary 
for  the  plaintiff  to  plead  the  Carmack 
amendment  in  order  to  avail  himself  of 
the  benefit  thereof.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Scott,  133  Ky.  724,  727,  118  S.  W.  990. 

MARINE  INSURANCE. 

(a)  In  13  L  C.  C.  258,  defendants  were 
directed  to  either  restore  former  rates 
On  lake  traffic  or  to  incorporate  in  their 
tariffs  the  following  provision:  "While 
shipments  carried  under  this  tariff  are 
water  borne  between  lake  ports  on  the 
vessels  of  a  lake-line  party  hereto  the 
lake  carrier  and  the  rail  carrier  deliv- 
ering the  property  to  the  lake  carrier 
jointly  assume  liability  for  loss  or  damage 
to  said  shipments  caused  by  marine  per- 
ils, to-wit:  Of  the  seas  and  lakes,  fire, 
collision,  stranding,  jettisons,  pirates,  as- 
sailing thieves  and  barratry  of  the  mas* 


MARKING  AND  ADDRESSING— MINIMUMS,   §1    (b) 


493 


ter  or  mariners,  excluding  risks  of  riots, 
war  or  insurrection;  any  loss  from  said 
marine  perils  for  which  the  lake  line 
and  the  rail  line  delivering  to  the  lake 
line  are  liable  hereunder  to  be  paid  in 
sixty  days  after  proof  of  loss  and  proof 
of  interest  in  said  property  are  furnished 
said  company."  Defendants  were  also 
directed  to  incorporate  said  provisions 
in  their  bills  of  lading.  Complainants 
attacked  the  provisions  of  said  tariffs 
upon  petitions  for  rehearing  as  follows: 

(a)  The  tariff  provision  only  covered 
perils  of  the  sea  while  traffic  was  being 
borne  from  port  to  port  upon  the  Great 
Lakes  and  the  liability  of  the  carrier 
should  be  extended  to  all  water  trans- 
portation,   including    canals    and    rivers. 

(b)  The  tariff  provision  should  specify 
as  one  of  the  perils  of  the  sea  "general 
average  charges  and  expenses  for  which 
the  owner  may  under  the  maritime  law 
be  chargeable."  (c)  Loss  should  be  pay- 
able in  thirty  instead  of  sixty  days,  (d) 
The  phrase  "between  lake  ports"  did  not 
give  the  shipper  indemnity  while  the 
vessel  was  lying  at  the  port,  and  the 
words  "at  and  between''  should  be  used 
instead  of  "between."  (e)  Said  tariff 
contained  no  provision  protecting  goods 
after  they  were  loaded  upon  the  dock, 
(f)  Tariff  should  contain  the  provision 
found  in  marine  policies,  to  the  effect 
that  in  case  of  loss  settlement  should  be 
upon  the  basis  of  the  invoice  price  plus 
10  per  cent,  (g)  Liability  should  be  joint 
and  several,  instead  of  joint,  (h)  If  the 
shipper  sees  fit  to  place  insurance  on  his 
own  account  the  fact  that  the  carrier 
has  also  placed  insurance  uppn  this 
same  property  would,  in  the  event  of  loss, 
either  avoid  the  insurance  of  the  shipper 
altogether  or  require  him  to  accept  a 
proportionate  share  of  the  amount  in- 
sured, (i)  The  tariff  should  contain  in- 
demnity against  "and  all  other  perils  or 
misfortunes  that  have  or  shall  come  to 
the  hurt  or  damage  of  said  property  or 
any  part  thereof,"  instead  of  containing 
merely  the  words  "perils  of  the  sea." 
HELD,  complainants'  demands  under 
(a),  (c),  (e),  (f)  and  (h)  should  be  de- 
nied. With  respect  to  (e)  the  shipper 
would  be  protected  as  to  goods  upon 
the  dock  until  a  reasonable  opportunity 
was  afforded  him  to  remove  his  property. 
As  to  (h)  the  shipper  would  be  suf- 
ficiently protected  by  said  tariff  provision 
without  the  aid  of  this  insurance.  De- 
mands (b),  (d),  (g)  and  (i)  should  be 
granted.  Defendants  ordered  to  incor- 
porate  the   provisions   of   said    tariff   in 


their  bills  of  lading.  Wyman,  Partridge 
&  Co.  V.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  15  L  C.  C.  577, 
578-583. 

MARKING  AND  ADDRESSING. 

See   Classification,   §14. 

MEETING  RATES. 

See  Equalization  of  Rates,  §4  (2) 
(o). 

MILEAGE  SCALE. 

See  Evidence,  §20  (p),  §58,  §59;  Pas- 
senger  Fares  and  Facilities,  §6,  §32 
(a);  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §10 
(g),  §25  (c),  §28  (c),  §37  (a),  §41 
(a),  §104  (a),  §118  (b);  Tariffs,  §7 
(ss),  §14  (b). 

MINIMUMS. 

I.     APPLICATION  OF  MINIMUM. 

§1.     In  general. 

§2.     Effect  of  not  publishing. 

§3.  Furnishing  car  of  minimum  or- 
dered. 

§4.  Larger  car  furnished  than  or- 
dered. 

§5.  Minimum  higher  than  car  ca- 
pacity. 

§6.     Mixed  carloads. 

§7.     Reasonableness. 

§8.     Two  cars  for  one  ordered. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 

See  Cars;  Loading  and  Unloading; 
Refrigeration,  §6;  Weights  and 
Weighing. 

I.     APPLICATION  OF  MINIMUM. 
§1.     In   General. 

See  Reparation,  §8  (f) ;  Tariffs,  §3 
(2)    (I),   §7  (ggg). 

(a)  If  collapsible  bunker  cars  are 
presented  for  loading  with  the  bunkers 
thrown  up,  carriers  may  by  their  tariffs 
fix  such  minima  as  will  require  the 
loading  of  these  cars  to  their  full  ca- 
pacity, not,  however,  exceeding  two 
tiers  in  height.  In  Re  Advances  on 
Lemons,  23  I.  C.  C.  27,  30. 

(aa)  A  mere  increase  in  a  minimum 
formerly  15,000  lbs.  to  20,000  lbs.  can- 
not be  said  to  be  an  advance  in  the 
rate  where  no  additional  burden  is 
placed  on  the  shipper.  In  Re  Trans- 
portation of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23 
1.  C.  C.  151,  158. 

(b)  The  actual  cost  of  transportation 
is  much  less  with  a  loading  of  28,000 
lbs.    than    with    a    loading   of    15,000    to 


494 


MINIMUMS,  §1   (bb)— (jj) 


20,000  lbs.  In  Re  Transportation  of 
Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151, 
158. 

(bb)  There  are  greater  car  earnings 
under  a  lower  rate  with  a  higher  mini- 
mum than  under  a  higher  rate  with  a 
lower  minimum.  In  Re  Transportation 
of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C. 
151,  167. 

(c)  No  practical  hardship  would  be 
imposed  upon  shippers  of  wool  by  re- 
quiring a  loading  of  at  least  24,000  lbs. 
of  sacked  wool  into  a  standard  car  36 
feet  long,  and  the  minimum  might  prop- 
erly be  increased  with  the  increase  of 
the  size  of  the  car.  In  Re  Transporta- 
tion of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C. 
C.  151,  165. 

(cc)  The  minimum  on  wool  in  sacks 
might  properly  be  increased  with  the 
increase  of  the  size  of  the  car.  In  Re 
Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts, 
23   I.  C.  C.   151,  165. 

(d)  At  the  present  time  on  the 
transcontinental  lines  it  is  in  the  inter- 
est  of  both  shipper  and  carrier  to  se- 
cure the  heaviest  possible  loading.  In 
Re  Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and 
Pelts,   23  I.    C.   C.   151,   167. 

(dd)  An  increased  loading,  which  re- 
sults in  decreased  cost  of  transporta- 
tion, may  well  justify  a  lower  rate  for 
a  higher  minimum.  In  Re  Transporta- 
tion of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C. 
C.  151,  167. 

(e)  Market  conditions  frequently  dic- 
tate the  quantity  of  a  given  commodity 
a  jobber  may  handle,  but  it  is  often  to 
the  shipper's  interest  to  have  a  high 
minimum  with  a  low  rate.  Du  Pre  Co. 
v.  B.  R.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  226, 
228. 

(ee)  Since  the  loading  and  unload- 
ing are  done  by  shippers  in  both  in- 
stances, the  dilTerence  in  the  length  of 
mine-prop  logs  and  saw  logs  becomes 
of  minor  importance  as  a  transporta- 
tion consideration.  Rickards  v.  A.  C. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  239,  240. 

(f)  The  minimum  weight  and  the 
rate  are  united.  Sunderland  Bros.  Co. 
V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
259,  261. 

(ff)  The  question  of  minimum  weights 
on  light  and  bulky  articles  is  a  vexed 
one,  because  of  wide  differences  in  cu- 
bical capacities  of  cars.     Much  attention 


has  been  given  to  it  by  carriers  and 
much  has  been  done  toward  harmonizing 
the  difficulties.  The  minimum  weight 
upon  the  basis  of  which  charges  are 
assessed  is  nearly,  if  not  quite,  as  im- 
portant as  the  classification  rating  of  the 
commodity.  Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S. 
&  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  93,  104. 

(g)  Minimum  weights  on  all  carload 
shipments  are  to  be  considered  as  part 
of  the  rate.  Lull  Carriage  Co.  v.  C.  K. 
&  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  15,  16. 

(gg)  The  minimum  carload  weight  is 
a  factor  in  the  carload  rate,  and  in  con- 
nection with  the  rate  per  100  lbs.  de- 
termines the  carload  earnings.  Any  re- 
duction in  the  minimum  weight  without 
an  increase  in  the  rate  per  100  lbs.  would, 
therefore,  reduce  the  carload  earnings  of 
the  carrier  and  would  be  equivalent  to  a 
reduction  in  the  rate  itself.  Georgia  Fruit 
Exchange  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  623, 
630. 

(h)  A  minimum  as  high  as  the  prod- 
uct can  be  carried  under  the  most  ad- 
vantageous circumstances,  with  a  com- 
paratively low  rate  is,  it  seems,  best  for 
the  shipper.  Ponchatoula  Farmers'  Ass'n 
V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  513,  517. 

(hh)  It  is  in  the  interest  of  economical 
transportation  that  cars  containing  light 
and  bulky  articles  should  be  loaded  as 
heavily  as  possible,  and  it  is  equally  plain 
that  a  carrier  can  afford,  to  an  extent, 
to  decrease  its  rates  in  proportion  as 
the  loading  increases.  Montague  &  Co. 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  72,  75. 

(ii)  It  is  not  possible  to  fairly  adjust 
a  rate  without  a  proper  adjustment  of 
the  minimum.  Montague  &  Co.  v.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  72,  75. 

(j)  A  tariff  prescribing  the  same  mini- 
mum for  cars  of  different  capacities  is 
not  per  se  unlawful,  since  when  loaded 
with  certain  kinds  of  commodities  the 
minimum  may  easily  be  loaded  in  a  car 
of  any  length.  Montague  &  Co.  v.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  72,  76. 

(jj)  A  minimum  may  be  established 
which  shall  protect  the  carrier  against 
being  required  to  haul  its  car  for  less 
than  a  fair  compensation,  and  so  long 
as  the  combination  of  rate  and  minimum 
in  a  particular  case  does  not  yield  to  the 
railway  more  than  a  just  sum  for  the 
transportation  of  the  car  the  minimum  is 
not  unlawful.  Montague  &  Co.  v.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  72,  75. 


MINIMUMS,  §1  (k)— §2   (a) 


495 


(k)  It  is  not  practical  to  eistablish  a 
minimum  for  each  kind  of  furniture;  uor 
could  such  minimums,  if  established,  be 
made  available,  sinc8  the  consignee  fre- 
quently, and  perhaps  usually,  desires  to 
put  different  sorts  of  furniture  into  the 
same  car.  Montague  &  Co.  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  72,  \ .. 

(kk)  There  should  be  a  relation  be- 
tween the  minimum  and  the  physical  ca- 
pacity of  the  car,  which  means  that  the 
minimum  might  properly  increase  as  the 
size  of  the  car  increases.  Pease  Bros. 
Furniture  Co.  v.  S.  P.  L.  A.  &  S.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  223,  224. 

(I)  Lower  rates  should  be  applied  on 
higher  carload  minimum.  Indianapolis 
Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  56,  70. 

(II)  A  high  minimum  and  low  rate 
automatically  adjust  themselves  to  the 
needs  of  the  shipper,  while  returning  to 
the  carrier  the  same  revenue  per  car. 
Ozark  Fruit  Growers'  Ass'n  v.  St.  L. 
&  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  106,  109. 

(m)  Complainant  attacked  the  mini- 
mum of  24,000  lbs.  on  refrigerator  cars 
of  apples  from  the  Ozark  fruit  region. 
It  admitted  that  24,000  lbs.  could  be 
safely  loaded,  but  that  such  quantity 
could  not  be  advantageously  marketed. 
HELD,  the  carrier  has  the  right  to  es- 
tablish a  minimum  on  carload  shipments 
as  high  as  will  permit  the  commodity 
to  be  safely  carried  without  injury.  No 
duty  rests  upon  it  to  establish  this  mini- 
mum at  such  an  amount  as  the  consignee 
decides  is  advantageous  for  him,  but  it 
should  be  established  with  relation  to  the 
capacity  of  the  car.  Ozark  Fruit  Grow- 
ers' Ass'n  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  134,  136. 

(mm)  Where  earnings  per  car  at  a  less 
rate  on  a  high  minimum  is  nearly  the 
same  as  earnings  at  a  higher  rate  on  a 
less  minimum,  the  Commission  is  not 
justified  in  reducing  the  higher  rate. 
La  Salle  Paper  Co.  v.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  R. 
Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  149,  150. 

(n)  Water  competition  may  justify 
a  difference  in  carload  minimums  and  in 
the  right  to  combine  different  commodi- 
ties at  the  carload  rate.  City  of  Spokane 
V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  389. 

(o)  The  maximum  or  minimum  weight 
of  a  carload  is  not  something  affecting 
the  rate,  but  is  in  fact  a  part  of  the 
rgte;  a  factor  which  is  just  as  essential 


to  a  correct  statement  of  the  rate  as  is 
the  rate  per  100  lbs.  itself.  Rail  &  River 
Coal  Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 

86,  90. 

(p)  While  uniformity  in  the  matter 
of  car  minima  on  the  same  commodity 
is  highly  desirable,  and  while  the  con- 
clusion reached  by  the  Commission  in 
one  case  touching  the  reasonableness  of 
a  rule  or  regulation  affecting  rates  ought 
ordinarily  to  afford  a  guide  in  another 
case  in  which  the  same  rule  or  regula- 
tion is  involved,  nevertheless  reasonable- 
ness is  ordinarily  a  question  of  fact  to 
be  decided  upon  the  record  in  the  pro- 
ceeding in  question  and  upon  such  inde- 
pendent investigation  as  the  Commission 
may  make.  Conclusions  of  fact  arrived 
at  in  one  case  between  one  set  of  liti- 
gants need  not  necessarily  be  accepted 
by  the  Commission  as  constituting  a  prec- 
edent to  be  followed  as  a  binding  au- 
thority in  a  subsequent  proceeding  be- 
tween another  group  of  litigants  without 
regard  to  the  record  in  the  subsequent 
case  and  the  facts  that  it  may  establish. 
Kansas  City  Hay  Dealers'  Ass'n  v.  M.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  597,  '600. 

(q)  Where  a  rate  itself  is  not  attacked 
and  the  evidence  indicates  that  it  is  low 
and  the  traffic  involved  is  not  desirable 
to  the  carriers,  a  shipper  will  not  be  per- 
mitted to  gain  a  reduction  therein  in- 
directly by  securing  a  lower  car  mini- 
mum. Kansas  City  Hay  Dealers'  Ass'n 
v;  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  597,  603. 

(r)  Carriers  are  under  obligation  to 
establish  and  maintain  reasonable  mini- 
mum weights  for  carload  shipments, 
and,  when  lawfully  published,  the  pre 
scribed  minimum  is  as  much  an  integral 
part  of  the  tariff  as  is  the  rate;  both 
must  be  strictly  observed  by  carriers 
and  shippers  alike,  and  the  Commission 
can  set  aside  neither  except  upon  satis- 
factory proof  of  the  unreasonableness 
thereof.  Kaye  &  Carter  Lumber  Co.  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  392. 

§2.     Effect  of  Not  Publishing. 

(a)  On  sacks  of  Portland  cement 
weighing  38,000  lbs.  from  Chanute,  Kan., 
to  Denison,  la.,  a  joint  rate  of  10c  to 
Council  Bluffs  and  a  local  rata  of  4.9c 
thence  to  destination  were  collected,  no 
through  rate  being  in  effect.  Defendant 
initial  carrier's  tariff  failed  to  provide  a 
carload  minimum  for  the  10c  rate  to 
Council  Bluffs.  The  delivering  carrier 
established,  by  a  tariff  published  subse- 


496 


MINIMUMS,  §3  (a)— (g) 


quently  to  that  of  the  initial  line  fixing 
the  10c  rate,  a  minimum  of  40,000  lbs. 
HELD,  the  10c  rate  to  Council  Bluffs 
should  be  assessed  on  the  actual  weight 
of  shipment.  When  a  car  is  demanded 
and  loaded  by  the  shipper  and  is  tendered 
and  otherwise  delivered  as  a  carload, 
and  no  minimum  carload  weight  is  le- 
gally provided,  the  carload  rate,  if  it 
makes  less  than  the  less-than-carload 
rate,  must  be  applied  on  the  actual 
weight,  whether  the  actual  weight  of 
shipment  be  more  or  less  than  an  ordi- 
nary carload  quantity.  Sunderland  Bros. 
Co.  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
425,  426. 

§3.    Furnishing  Car  of  Minimum  Ordered. 
See  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §8. 

(a)  Where  a  carrier  by  its  tariffs  es- 
tablishes particular  minima  as  appli- 
cable to  cars  of  given  dimensions,  it  must 
furnish  a  car  of  the  size  provided  for  in 
its  tariff  and  ordered  by  the  shipper; 
or,  in  case  of  its  inability  to  do  this,  it 
must  provide  other  equipment  under  such 
conditions  as  to  fairly  protect  the  mini- 
mum of  the  car  ordered,  and  its  tariffs 
should  contain  a  provision  to  that  ef- 
fect. Noble  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  432,  438. 

(b)  It  is  not  unreasonable  for  car- 
riers to  provide  that  the  minimum  ap- 
plicable to  a  special  car  would  not  be 
protected  unless  carrier  had  failed  for 
six  days,  excluding  the  day  of  notice,  to 
furnish  a  car  of  the  size  ordered;  but 
this  is  not  intended  to  relieve  carriers 
from  duty  of  furnishing  equipment  with- 
in reasonable  time.  It  simply  fixes  a 
definite  period  beyond  which  the  duty  to 
furnish  other  equipment  in  lieu  of  that 
ordered  shall  attach.  Noble  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  432,  438. 

(c)  Shippers  desiring  to  use  equip- 
ment of  unusual  size  may  be  required  to 
give  a  considerable  notice  of  such  desire, 
and  it  would  be  reasonable  to  provide 
that  a  minimum  should  not  be  protected 
unless  the  carrier  has  failed  for  six  days, 
excluding  the  day  of  notice,  to  furnish 
the  car  ordered.  Noble  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  432,  438. 

(d)  On  a  shipment  of  66,000  lbs.  of 
dried  pease,  known  as  garbanzo,  packed 
in  300  sacks  and  shipped  in  two  cars  of 
minimum  capacity  of  40,000  lbs,  each, 
which  were  furnished  by  the  initial  car- 
rier for  its  convenience,  instead  of  one 
car  of  minimum   capacity  of  60,000  lbs. 


and  carrying  under  the  rules  of  the  de- 
fendants 66,000  lbs.,  and  which  were  in 
the  possession  of  the  initial  carrier  and 
expressly  ordered  for  said  shipment  by 
the  complainant,  the  defendants  collected 
75c  on  a  basis  of  80,000  lbs.  Though  not 
in  force  at  the  time  of  shipment  a  rule 
of  the  tariffs  in  effect  at  the  time  of  the 
hearing  provided  in  substance  that  under 
circumstances  such  as  the  foregoing  the 
carrier  might  furnish  two  smaller  cars 
on  the  basis  of  the  minimum  weight  fixed 
for  the  car  ordered.  HELD,  that  the  total 
charges  should  have  been  collected  on 
the  basis  of  66,000  lbs.  Reparation 
awarded.  Maldonado  &  Co.  v.  Ferrocar- 
ril  de  Sonora,  18  I.  C.  C.  65,  67. 

(e)  Although  a  box  car  fifty  feet  in 
length  is  not  an  ordinary  car  within  the 
meaning  of  rules,  still  if  one  of  that 
length  happens  to  be  available  and  in 
use  for  less-than-carload  shipments,  and 
such  a  shipment  is  actually  loaded  into 
it,  it  is  unreasonable  to  assess  charges 
on  the  basis  of  a  minimum  weight  in  ex- 
cess of  the  actual  weight,  under  a  rule 
providing  that  such  minimum  shall  be 
assessed  when  the  articles  are  too  long 
to  be  loaded  into  the  side  door  of  a 
thirty-six-foot  box  car.  Jones  v.  South- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  150,  153. 

(f)  Defendants'  tariff  prescribed  a 
minimum  of  16,000  lbs.  on  carloads  of 
wood  mantels  without  making  any  dis- 
tinction as  to  the  size  of  cars.  Com- 
plainant was  furnished  a  fifty-foot  car 
and  the  actual  weight  of  the  shipment 
was  14,580  lbs.  It  did  not  appear  that 
he  needed  a  fifty-foot  car,  nor  that  the 
car  was  filled  to  its  capacity,  nor  that 
he  ordered  or  could  use  a  car  of  that 
length.  Since  the  shipment  the  Com- 
mission in  Montague  &  Co.  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co..  17  I.  C.  C.  72,  prescribed 
a  14,000-lb.  minimum  for  a  forty-foot  car. 
Complainant  was  assessed  on  a  minimum 
of  16,000  lbs.  It  might  have  adopted  a 
sliding  scale  by  which  the  minimum  ap- 
plicable to  the  car  furnished  complainant 
would  have  exceeded  the  minimum  for 
which  charges  were  imposed,  but  they 
had  not  elected  to  do  so  and  were  fur- 
nishing to  shippers  cars  of  different 
sizes.  HELD,  the  charges  were  unrea- 
sonable. Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  actual  weight.  (Clark,  Clements 
and  Lane,  Comm'rs,  dissenting.)  Peer- 
less Agencies  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  218. 

(g)  While  a  long  course  of  dealing 
between  the  shipper  and  the  carrier,  in- 


MINIMUMS,  §3   (h)— §4   (a) 


497 


volving  daily  or  frequent  shipments  of 
automobiles  from  a  definite  station,  might 
so  familiarize  the  carrier's  agents  at  that 
point  with  the  requirements  of  the  ship- 
per in  the  way  of  equipment  as  to  justify 
a  holding  that  an  order  for  a  car  for 
three  automobiles  was  sufficient  to  charge 
the  carrier  with  notice  that  a  thirty-six 
foot  car  was  wanted,  such  a  relationship 
between  shipper  and  carrier  must  be 
clearly  made  out  before  reparation  can 
be  awarded  on  that  basis  for  the  exac- 
tion by  the  carrier  of  the  minimum  for  a 
larger  car  than  the  one  alleged  to  be 
ordered.  Pope  Mfg.  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  400,  403. 

(h)  When  shippers  order  cars  for-par- 
ticular  movements  in  which  dimensions 
are  important  because  of  the  graded 
minimum  weights  usually  applicable  to 
cars  of  different  lengths,  the  order  should 
be  in  writing,  or  if  not  actually  given  in 
writing  should  be  promptly  and  definitely 
confirmed  in  writing.  Pope  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  400,  403. 

(i)  On  shipments  of  cattle  from  South 
St.  Paul  to  Hammond,  Ind.,  complainants 
ordered  ten  thirty-six-foot  stock  cars.  De- 
fendant carriers  at  South  St.  Paul,  for 
their  convenience,  furnished  seven  thirty- 
three-foot  cars,  two  forty-four-foot  cars 
and  one  thirty-six-foot  car.  The  shipments 
were  received  by  complainants'  repre- 
sentative at  Blue  Island,  111.,  and  the 
cattle  were  there  unloaded  by  him  and 
reloaded  into  the  same  cars  for  ship- 
ment from  Hammond,  Ind.,  to  Philadel- 
phia. Complainants  made  out  bills  of 
lading  at  South  St.  Paul  for  the  reship- 
ment  of  the  cattle  from  Hammond  to 
Philadelphia,  mailed  the  same  to  their 
representative  at  Blue  Island,  who  gave 
the  billing  instructions  to  a  representa- 
tive of  the  Indiana  Harbor  Belt  Ry.  at 
that  point,  who  in  turn  gave  them  to  the 
agent  of  the  Indiana  Harbor  Belt  at 
Hammond,  who  rebilled  the  shipments 
to  Philadelphia.  Complainants'  repre- 
sentative at  Blue  Island  did  not  inform 
the  Pennsylvania  Co.  receiving  the  ship- 
ments at  Hammond  that  they  required 
ten  cars  of  certain  dimensions,  and  that 
road  assessed  charges  on  the  basis  of 
260,000  lbs.,  the  minimum  for  thirteen 
cars,  instead  of  200,000  lbs.,  the  mini- 
mum for  ten  cars.  HELD,  complainants 
having  failed  to  notify  the  Pennsylvania 
Co.  the  shipment  required  ten  cars,  were 
not  entitled  to  reparation.  Slimmer  & 
Thomas  Co.  v.  Penn.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  531, 
533. 


(j)  Where  neither  the  bill  of  lading 
nor  the  waybill  bears  any  notation  indi- 
cating that  a  car  of  a  particular  size  was 
ordered  by  the  shipper,  and  neither  the 
complainant  nor  any  other  witness  states 
definitely  that  the  order  given  for  the 
shipment  required  the  defendant  carrier 
to  furnish  a  car  of  small  capacity,  and 
where  no  other  evidence  that  such  equip- 
ment was  made  is  offered,  rep- 
aration will  not  be  granted  for  charges 
assessed  on  the  minimum  of  a  larger 
car  than  the  one  complainant  alleges  he 
ordered.  Wheeler  Lumber,  Bridge  & 
Supply  Co.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  547, 
548. 

§4.     Larger  Car  Furnished  Than  Ordered. 

See    Weights    and    Weighing,    §3    (k), 
§10   (e). 

(a)  A  supplement  to  a  tariff  of  the 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  provided  that  certain 
lumber  and  forest  products  should  take 
a  minimum  of  30,000  lbs.  for  cars  over 
thirty-six  feet  and  24,000  lbs.  for  cars 
under  thirty-six  feet.  Complainant  ap- 
plied for  a  thirty-three-foot  car  in  which 
to  ship  elm  hoops.  After  six  days  he 
accepted  a  thirty-six  foot  car.  His  ship- 
ment weighed  20,100  lbs.,  but  he  was 
charged  on  a  minimum  of  30,000  lbs. 
The  Commission  held  in  20  L  C.  C.  172 
that  complainant  was  entitled  to  a  thirty- 
three-foot  car;  that  defendant  having 
furnished  the  larger  car  for  its  own  con- 
venience, the  minimum  of  the  smaller 
car  should  be  applied,  and  that  the  tariff 
was  unreasonable  in  not  containing  that 
provision,  and  awarded  reparation  to  the 
complainant  and  ordered  the  incorpora- 
tion of  a  proper  rule  in  the  tariff.  The 
defendant  filed  a  petition  for  rehearing, 
based  upon  the  fact  that  the  B.  &  O.  R. 
R.  operating  in  Official  Classification  ter- 
ritory is  subject  to  a  provision  that  the 
minimum  shall  be  protected  in  such  in- 
stances, except  where  a  car  more  than 
forty  feet  six  inches  in  length  is  fur- 
nished, in  which  case  the  minimum  of 
the  car  furnished  must  be  applied,  and 
that  if  it  should  be  compelled  to  abro- 
gate this  rule  it  would  necessitate  similar 
action  by  all  its  .  competitors.  HELD, 
that  in  all  cases  where  the  carrier  by  its 
tariff  established  particular  minima  as  ap- 
plicable to  cars  of  given  dimensions,  it 
must  furnish  a  car  of  the  size  provided 
for  and  ordered  by  the  shipper,  or  pro- 
vide other  equipment  under  such  condi- 
tions as  to  fairly  protect  the  minimum 
of  the  car  ordered.     Prior  report  modi- 


498 


MINIMUMS,  §4  (b)— (f) 


fled.     Noble  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I. 
C.  C.  432,  438. 

(b)  On  carloads  of  farm  and  freight 
wagons  from  Toledo,  O.,  to  Smith ville, 
Tex.,  the  initial  carrier  supplied  a  forty- 
five-foot  car,  when  the  complainant  or- 
dered a  thirty-six-foot  car.  Complainant 
was  charged  the  minimum  weight  ap- 
plicable to  the  car  furnished.  Defendant 
stated  that  a  car  of  the  size  ordered  was 
unavailable,  and  that  a  forty-foot  car  was 
ordered,  but  by  mistake  a  forty-f /e-foot 
car  was  used,  and  offered  to  refund  upon 
the  basis  of  a  forty-foot  car.  HELD,  that 
the  initial  carrier  should  establish  for 
the  future  a  rule  to  the  effect  that  when 
a  car  of  the  capacity  or  dimensions  or- 
dered cannot  be  furnished  after  six  full 
days'  notice,  and  a  larger  car  is  furnished, 
such  larger  car  shall  be  used  on  the  basis 
of  the  minimum  weight  fixed  in  the  tariff 
for  the  car  which  was  ordered,  provided 
the  shipment  could  have  been  loaded 
upon  the  cars  ordered.  Reparation 
granted.  Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  & 
M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  511. 

(c)  Complainant  ordered  cars  of 
40,000  lbs.  capacity  for  shipments  of 
brick,  but  cars  of  60,000  lbs.  capacity 
were  furnished  for  the  convenience  of 
the  carrier.  The  shipments  weighed  less 
than  50,000  lbs.  to  the  car,  but  were 
assessed  on  a  minimum  of  50,000  lbs., 
as  specified  in  the  tariff.  A  reference 
mark  annexed  to  the  Item  in  the  tariff 
specifying  the  minimum  weight  referred 
to  a  foot-note  which  read,  "except  when 
the  marked  capacity  of  the  car  is  less, 
in  which  event  the  marked  capacity  of 
the  car  will  govern."  HELD,  the  pre- 
cise meaning  of  this  rule  in  relation  to 
the  prescribed  minimum  weight  of  50,000 
lbs.  is  ambiguous  and  uncertain.  It  does 
not  indicate  under  what  circumstances 
a  smaller  car  may  be  used,  whether  upon 
order  from  the  shipper  for  a  car  of  less 
capacity,  or  whether  at  the  will  and 
for  the  convenience  of  the  carrier.  If 
the  latter,  it  is  obviously  improper,  since 
under  such  a  rule  it  might  happen  that 
one  shipper  would  always  be  furnished 
with  cars  of  50,000  lbs.  capacity  or 
greater,  and  be  obliged  to  pay  freight  on 
that  minimum  when  his  shipments,  as 
in  this  case,  might  run  several  thousands 
under  the  minimum.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  might  happen  that  another  shipper 
would  for  the  convenience  of  the  car- 
rier or  otherwise  be  always  furnished 
with  cars  of  less  capacity  and  accordingly 
be  required  to  pay  on  the  lower  minimum, 


or  only  on  actual  weight  if  greater  than 
such  lower  minimum.  Manifestly  it  can- 
not be  claimed  that  the  rule  fixed  an  in- 
variable or  even  a  definitely  ascertain- 
able minimum  weight  relative  to  the 
rates  named.  The  tariff  does  not  con- 
tain elscAvhere  within  itself  an  absolute 
rule,  nor  does  it  refer  to  any  other  tariff 
wherein  an  absolute  rule  is  published. 
In  both  cases  the  fact  that  the  shipper 
had  ordered  a  smaller  car  was  noted  on 
the  bill  of  lading.  Reparation  awarded 
for  excess  of  rate  above  actual  weight 
of  shipment.  Hull  &  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  486. 

(d)  Complainant  demanded  repara- 
tion on  a  shipment  of  coiled  elm  hoops 
from  Creston,  O.,  to  Windsor  Shades,  Va. 
The  shipment  moved  on  June  18,  1909. 
June  12,  a  thirty-four-foot  car  was  or- 
dered of  the  railroad  agent  at  Creston 
and  if  furnished  the  shipment,  which 
weighed  20,100  lbs.,  would  have  moved 
subject  to  a  minimum  of  24,000  lbs. 
Shipper  could  not  secure  the  car  ordered 
and  on  June  18  was  compelled  to  use  a 
thirty-six-foot  car  to  which  was  ap- 
plicable a  30,000-lb.  minimum.  A  thirty- 
four-foot  car  was  received  at  Creston 
June  19.  Creston  is  a  small  local  sta- 
tion and  defendants  contended  that  rea- 
sonable notice  for  this  kind  of  a  car 
would  be  a  week  or  ten  days.  HELD, 
that  under  Rule  66  of  Tariff  Circular 
1/-8A  it  is  the  duty  of  carriers  to  prompt- 
ly furnish  cars  on  order,  which  was  not 
the  fact  in  this  case;  that  where  car- 
riers cannot  promptly  furnish  equipment 
of  the  capacity  ordered  tariff  should  pro- 
vide that  if  a  car  of  a  different  capacity 
is  furnished  such  car  might  be  used  upon 
the  basis  of  the  minimum  fixed  for  the 
car  which  was  ordered.  Reparation 
awarded  on  6,000  lbs.,  the  difference  be- 
tween the  minimum  of  a  thirty-four-foot 
car  and  the  car  furnished.  Noble  v,  B. 
&  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  72. 

(e)  Where  the  carrier  furnishes  a 
larger  car  than  what  the  shipper  orders 
and  the  traffic  contains  no  provision  as- 
sessing charges  upon  the  basis  of  a  mini- 
mum for  the  car  ordered,  reparation 
should  be  awarded  for  such  failure. 
Noble  V.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co..  20  I.  C.  C.  72. 

(f)  Where  a  shipper  orders  a  car  of 
specified  length  and  the  carrier  supplies 
one  of  larger  dimensions,  the  shipper  is 
entitled  to  charges  assessed  on  the  actual 
weight  of  the  shipment  where  the  weight 
exceeds  the  minimum  of  the  kind  of  car 
ordered,  but  is  less  than  that  of  the  one 


MINIMUMS,  §4  (g)— (p) 


499 


furnished,  despite  the  fact  that  at  the 
time  of  the  shipment  the  carrier  had 
no  published  rule  to  that  effect  where 
the  shipment  actually  moved  could  have 
been  loaded  into  the  car  ordered.  Rep- 
aration awarded  on  shipment  of  cedar 
posts  from  Hines,  Minn.,  to  Benton,  Neb., 
where  the  shipper  ordered  a  thirty-three- 
foot  car,  was  furnished  a  thirty-four-foot 
car  and  assessed  on  the  thirty-four-foot 
car  minimum.  Kaye  &  Carter  Lumber 
Co.  V.  M.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  209,  211. 

(g)  A  fifty-foot  car  was  furnished, 
with  a  mimimum  of  16,000  lbs.;  actual 
weight  of  shipment  was  14,580  lbs.,  and 
charges  were  based  on  16,000  lbs.  mini- 
mum; car  was  not  loaded  to  full  capacity 
and  forty-foot  car  could  have  held  ship- 
ment. HELD,  as  applied  to  this  shipment 
(wood  mantels)  14,000  would  have  been 
a  reasonable  minimum.  (Clark,  Comm'r, 
dissenting.)  Peerless  Agencies  Co.  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  1.  C.  C.  218. 

(h)  The  tariffs  of  a  defendant  are  un- 
reasonable and  unlawful  in  failing  to  pro- 
vide that,  when  a  larger  capacity  car  is 
furnished  instead  if  the  smaller,  yca- 
pacity  demanded,  the  minimum  appli- 
cable to  the  smaller  capacity  car  should 
be  observed.  Beggs  v.  Wabash  R.  R. 
Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  208. 

(i)  Complainant,  for  carload  ship- 
ments of  anthracite  coal  from  Superior, 
Wis.,  to  points  in  North  and  South  Da- 
kota, ordered  cars  of  40  000  lbs.  capacity. 
Defendants,  for  their  own  convenience, 
furnished  cars  of  60,000  lbs.  capacity 
and  charged  on  the  basis  of  the  minimum 
for  such  60,000-lb.  cars,  instead  of  upon 
the  actual  weight  of  the  shipments,  which 
exceeded  the  minimum  required  for  the 
40,000-lb.  capacity  cars.  HELD,  com- 
plainant was  entitled  to  reparation  on 
the  basis  of  actual  weight.  Hanna  Coal 
Co.  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  289. 

(j)  Defendant,  for  its  own  conven- 
ience, having  furnished  an  80.000-lb.  car 
when  complainant  had  ordered  one  of 
GO  000  lbs.,  the  latter  is  entitled  to  have 
charges  on  sulphide  of  iron  from  Pu- 
laski. Va.,  to  Edgewater,  N.  J.,  assessed 
on  the  basis  of  the  smallar  minimum. 
General  Chemical  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 
15  L  C.  C.  349,  350. 

(k)  If,  upon  reasonable  demand,  a 
carrier  cannot  supply  a  car  of  the  size 
ordered  it  is  its  duty  to  accept  shipment 
and  move  it  in  any  available  car,  ap- 
plying a  rate  on  the  basis  of  the  marked 


capacity  of  the  car  ordered.  General 
Chemical  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  349. 

(1)  Where,  under  a  tariff  naming  a 
rate  with  the  minimum  to  be  the  marked 
capacity  of  the  car,  a  car  of  a  particular 
capacity  is  not  available  upon  the  reason- 
able demand  of  the  shipper,  the  carrier 
must  nevertheless  accept  and  carry  the 
shipment  in  any  car  or  cars  available, 
assessing  the  charges  on  the  basis  of 
the  marked  capacity  of  the  car  de- 
manded. General  Chemical  Co.  v.  N,  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  349,  350. 

(m)  On  a  shipment  of  lumber  weigh- 
ing 39,500  lbs.  from  Paper  Mills,  Ore., 
to  Queen  Junction,  Pa.,  complainant 
ordered  a  car  of  40,000  lbs.  capacity 
and  was  furnished  one  of  80,000  lbs. 
capacity.  He  protested  at  the  time  of 
loading  and  was  advised  by  the  de- 
fendants' representative  to  go  ahead 
and  take  up  the  matter  of  the  charge 
later.  He  was  assessed  on  the  basis 
of  the  minimum  of  60,000  lbs.  for  a 
car  of  80,000  lbs.  capacity.  Under 
their  published  tariff  defendants  offered 
cars  of  40,000  lbs.  capacity,  but  were 
unable  to  furnish  one  at  the  time  in 
question.  Defendants  west  of  Chicago 
by  their  tariffs  provided  that  the  rate 
should  be  applied  on  a  minimum  of 
40,000  lbs.  when  a  car  of  40,000  lbs. 
capacity  was  furnished.  Defendants 
east  of  Chicago  provided  a  minimum  of 
34,000  lbs.  on  lumber  in  cars  of  any 
capacity.  HELD,  reparation  should  be 
awarded  based  on  40,000  lbs.  between. 
Paper  Mills  and  Chicago,  and  39,500 
lbs.  between  Chicago  and  destination. 
American  Lumber  &  Mfg.  Co  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,    14    I.    C.    C.    561,    562. 

(n)  Reparation  awarded  because 
rates  were  charged  on  larger  cars  than 
those  ordered.  Bentley  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  181. 

(o)  Tariffs  of  defendants  should  have 
provided  that  when  cars  of  dimensions 
ordered  by  the  shipper  could  not  be 
furnished  and  cars  of  larger  dimensions 
were  furnished  for  convenience  of  car- 
riers, such  cars  might  be  used  upon 
the  basis  of  the  minimum  fixed  for  the 
cars  which  were  ordered.  Reparation 
ordered.  Lininger  Implement  Co.  v.  C. 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  414. 

(p)  Larger  car  furnished  than  one 
ordered  and  rates  based  on  minimum 
of     larger     car.       HELD,     rates     should 


500 


MINIMUMS,  §5   (a)— (d) 


have  been  based  on  actual  weight  of 
shipment,  which  was  more  than  mini- 
mum of  car  ordered,  but  less  than  car 
furnished.  Reparation  awarded.  Torrey 
Cedar  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Un- 
rep.   Op.   420. 

§5.     Minimum      Higher     Than     Car     Ca- 
pacity. 

(a)  Complainant  asked  reparation  on 
a  carload  of  hay  shipped  from  Brainerd, 
Minn.,  to  Tampa,  Fla.,  because  charges 
were  assessed  upon  a  minimum  weight 
of  20,000  lbs.,  although  the  car  was 
loaded  to  its  utmost  capacity  and  con- 
tained but  16,500  lbs.  Complainant 
did  not  appear  at  the  hearing.  No 
witnesses  testified  in  his  behalf,  and 
he  presented  no  documentary  evidence 
to  prove  the  averment  of  his  petition, 
the  exact  amount  of  the  freight  charges 
paid  or  that  the  car  was  properly  load- 
ed. Defendants  denied  that  the  minimum 
was  unreasonable,  and  their  witness 
testified  that  complainant  ordered  a  car 
of  the  size  which  was  tendered  to  him 
for  this  shipment.  HELD,  upon  con- 
sideration of  all  the  facts  of  record  the 
minimum  carload  weight  under  which 
the  shipments  moved  was  not  unrea- 
sonable. Complaint  dismissed.  Rich- 
ards  V.   N.   P.   Ry.   Co.,   21   I.   C.   C.   468. 

(b)  Where  the  carrier's  regulations 
restrict  the  loading  capacity  of  a  car 
to  less  than  its  rated  minimum,  it  is 
unreasonable  to  assess  charges  on  such 
minimum,  but  it  should  be  on  the  actual 
weight.  Oregon  Lumber  Co.  v.  O.  R.  R. 
&   N.   Co.,   19   L   C.   C.    582. 

(c)  A  carload  minimum  for  light  and 
bulky  articles  like  furniture  should  be 
such  that  the  minimum  can  ordinarily 
be  loaded,  but  the  minimum  is  not 
necessarily  unreasonable  because  it  oc- 
casionally happens  that  cars,  although 
loaded  to  their  full  physical  capacity, 
will  not  contain  it.  Montague  &  Co. 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
72,  76. 

(d)  Complainant  shippers  attacked 
the  various  minima  on  furniture  from 
eastern  points  of  origin  to  Pacific  coast 
terminals.  The  minima  attacked  and  the 
rates  were  as  follows:  Wooden  man- 
tels, 16,000  lbs.,  $1.50;  steel  bath  tubs, 
10,000  lbs.,  $2.40;  furniture,  new,  all 
kinds,  12,000  lbs.,  $2.20;  bedroom  fur- 
niture, 20,000  lbs.  $1.50;  iron  and  brass 
beds,  30,000  lbs.,  $1.10;  folding  beds, 
20,000      1^^,^      $1.50;      mattresses      and 


springs,    20,000    lbs.,    $1.10;     chairs    and 
chair    stock,    20,000    lbs.,    $1.50;     tables 
24,000     lbs.,     $1.50.      Furniture    is    light 
and  bulky  as  compared  with  most  other 
kinds   of   freight.     The   weight  of  furni- 
ture  possible   to   load   into   a  car   varies 
with   the   kind    and   grade,    cheap   furni- 
ture  weighing   less   than  that  of  higher 
grade.      The    weight    capable    of    being 
loaded  into   a  car  depends  on  the  form 
of   the   article  and   whether   or  not  pre- 
sented   for    shipment    in    knocked    down 
form.     It   also   varies   with   the   skill   of 
the  loader.  The  expense  of  transporting 
a  car  containing  20,000  lbs.  of  furniture 
was  not  much  greater  than  that  of  car- 
rying    the     same     car     containing     but 
10,000    lbs.      It    was,    therefore,    to    the 
interest    of    the    carrier    that    cars    be 
loaded  as   heavily   as  possible.     No  dis- 
tinction was   made   in   the  tariffs  estab- 
lishing   the    minima    attacked    between 
cars    of    different    lengths,    whereas    in 
point    of    fact    the    cars    actually    used 
varied  greatly  in  loading  capacity.     The 
great    majority    of    all    cars    used    were 
40  ft.  in  length.     Complainant  contended 
that   any   minimum   which  could   not  be 
invariably  loaded  into  the  car  furnished 
with   proper   care  upon  the  part  of  the 
shipper,  was  unlawful.     HELD,  the  true 
rule   was   that  the   minimum  should   not 
exceed  what  could  ordinarily  be  loaded 
with   proper   care  and   skill;    that  apply- 
ing this   principle   the  minima  on  wood 
mantels  and  iron  and  brass  beds  of  16,- 
000  and  30,000  lbs.,  respectively,  were  un- 
reasonable   and    should    be    reduced    to 
14,000   and   24,000   lbs.,   respectively,   but 
that  the  minima  on  steel  bath  tubs,  bed- 
room furniture,  folding  beds,  mattresses 
and  springs,  chairs  and  chair  stock  and 
tables     should    not    be    disturbed,    said 
ruling    to    be    applicable    to    cars    of    40 
feet   in   length.      Carriers    authorized   to 
establish   a  sliding  scale  of   minima  for 
cars      of     other      lengths.        Reparation 
awarded  on  shipments  of  wood  mantels 
between  the  points  in  question  in  40-ft. 
cars  on  the  basis  of  a  14,000  lbs.  mini- 
mum,  charges  being  assessed  on   a  16,- 
000  lbs.  minimum,  and  on  shipments  in 
50-ft.  cars  on   the  basis  of  a  17,500  lbs. 
minimum,    the    charges    being    assessed 
on    a    20,000    lbs.    minimum;    reparation 
also  awarded  on  shipments  of  brass  beds 
between   the   points   in   question   on   the 
basis    of    a    24,000     lbs.     minimum,     the 
charges  being  assessed  on  a  30,000  lbs. 
minimum.     Montague  &  Co.  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.   Ry.   Co.,   17  L  C.   C.   72,   76,  78-84. 


MINIMUMS,  §5  (e)— §7  (c) 


501 


(e)  The  minimum  should  never  ex- 
ceed the  capacity  of  the  car.  Ozark 
Fruit  Growers'  Ass'n  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F. 
R.  R.   Co.,   16   I.   C.  C.   106,   109. 

(f)  It  is  improper  for  carriers  to 
regulate  the  amount  of  freight  charges 
by  prescribing  minima  which  manifestly 
cannot  be  loaded.  Indianapolis  Freight 
Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 
15   I.    C.   C.   504,    527. 

(g)  Where  a  tariff  provides  that  the 
minimum  weight  shall  be  the  marked 
capacity  of  the  car,  a  shipper  of  a  car- 
load weighing  less  than  such  marked 
capacity  cannot  demand  reparation  on 
the  basis  of  the  actual  weight  of  the 
shipment.  Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke 
Co.  V.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
606,  608. 

(h)  Reparation  denied  on  shipment 
of  baled  straw,  as  car  could  have  been 
loaded  to  the  prescribed  minimum. 
Richmond  Co.  v.  G.  T.  Rv.  Co.  of  Can., 
Unrep.   Op.   161. 

(i)  Minimum  weight  on  washing- 
machine  tubs  should  not  exceed  actual 
weight.  Reparation  awarded.  Thistle 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  299. 

§6.     Mixed   Carloads. 

See  Classification,  §7. 
(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  mixed 
carload  rule  of  the  defendant  which 
provided  that  the  deficit  in  minimum 
should  be  added  to  the  weight  of  the 
highest  rated  article  in  the  shipment. 
HELD,  that  the  rule  is  unreasonable  in 
the  requirement  that  "when  the  ag- 
gregate weight  of  a  mixed  carload  ship- 
ment does  not  amount  to  20,000  lbs. 
add  to  the  weight  of  the  highest  rated 
article  in  the  shipment  sufficient  to 
make  minimum  weight  of  20,000  lbs." 
and  that  in  lieu  of  this  requirement 
the  rule  should  provide  that  when  the 
aggregate  weight  of  a  mixed  carload 
shipment  does  not  amount  to  20,000  lbs., 
there  should  be  added  to  the  weight  of 
the  heaviest  loaded  article  in  the  ship- 
ment sufficient  to  make  minimum  weight 
of  20,000  lbs.,  except  that  when  the  ship- 
ment consists  of  two  or  more  articles  of 
equal  weight,  the  weight  sufficient  to 
make  the  minimum  weight  of  20,000  lbs. 
should  be  added  to  the  weight  of  the  low- 
est rated  article.  Ponchatoula  Farmers' 
Ass'n  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  513   520 


(b)  A  minimum  was  assessed  on 
each  of  two  kinds  of  grain  in  one  car 
separated  by  a  bulkhead,  the  tariff  pro- 
viding for  the  mixed  carload  rate  only 
when  all  but  one  of  the  grains  were 
sacked.  Rule  amended  and  reparation 
ordered  on  shipment  made.  Hewitt  & 
Connor  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.   C.   431. 

§7.     Reasonableness. 

See  Evidence,  §63  (a),  (e) ;  Long  and 
Short  Hauls,  §10  (u);  Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §84  (aa);  Repara- 
tion, §16  (uuuu);  Through  Routes 
and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (m);  Weights 
and  Weighing,  §10  (b),   (c),   (f). 

(a)  Proposed  minimum  of  30,000 
lbs.  upon  potatoes  originating  in  Louisi- 
ana and  Texas  and  applying  from  St. 
Louis,  Mo.,  to  points  east  of  the  Illinois- 
Indiana  state  line,  held  unreasonable,  it 
appearing  that  the  Texas  and  Louisiana 
potato  is  extremely  perishable,  possesses 
little  keeping  qualities,  and  requires  the 
exercise  of  great  care  in  loading  to 
insure  the  best  possible  ventilation  and 
the  least  possible  pressure  from  the 
weight  of  one  sack  upon  or  against 
another.  Minimum*  of  24,000  lbs.  pre- 
scribed, it  appearing  that  these  po- 
tatoes cannot  be  safely  loaded  to  a 
greater  weight.  In  Re  Rates  for  Trans- 
portation of  Potatoes,  23  I.  C.  C^  69. 

(b)  Complainants  attacked  the  rea- 
sonableness of  the  minimum  weight  on 
grapes  in  baskets  of  24,000  lbs.  from 
Rochester,  Albion  and  Appleton,  N.  Y., 
to  Columbia,  S.  C.  Under  the  rate 
of  79c  the  per  car  revenue  was  $189.60. 
No  evidence  was  introduced  bearing 
upon  the  reasonableness  of  the  rate  or 
the  per  car  charge.  HELD,  the  con- 
tinuous increase  in  the  volume  of 
traffic  has  necessitated  the  construc- 
tion of  cars  of  greater  capacity  and 
the  Commission  is  reluctant  to  reduce 
a  minimum  weight  unless  it  may  be 
done  with  substantial  justice  to  all 
parties,  and  as  the  question  of  the 
rate  is  not  involved,  it  does  not  seem 
expedient  to  reduce  the  existing  mini- 
mum upon  the  record  presented.  Du- 
Pre  Co.  V.  B.  R.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.   C.    226,   228. 

(c)  Complainant  alleged  that  the 
rates  charged  by  defendants  for  the 
transportation  of  sheep  and  cattle 
from  California  points  to  Tacoma  and 
Seattle,  Wash.,  and  the  rules  pertain- 
ing to  the  shipment  of  sheep  in  double- 
deck    cars    were    unjust,    unreasonable. 


502 


MINIMUMS,   §7    (cc)  — (g) 


and  unduly  discriminatory.  A  general 
rule  in  the  tariff  provided  that  where 
double-deck  cars  are  ordered  and  single 
cars  are  furnished  instead,  the  rate 
provided  for  the  cars  used  is  charged. 
Under  a  special  rule  it  was  provided 
that  where  two  single-deck  cars  are 
furnished  the  charge  therefor  would 
be  on  the  basis  of  a  double-deck 
car  or  170  per  cent  of  the  single-deck 
car  rate.  Tingle-deck  stock  cars  are 
available  for  shipments  of  lumber,  coal, 
and  other  commodities,  while  double- 
deck  cars  cannot  be  so  used  to  good 
advantage,  and  are  therefore  not  of 
such  general  utility.  On  a  36-foot  car 
from  San  Francisco  to  Portland  the  rate 
on  cattle  would  be  $120.95;  on  sheep 
double-deck  cars  $155.46,  single-deck 
cars  $91.45,  and  fresh  meat,  25,000 
pounds  at  41c  plus  $50  refrigeration, 
$152.50.  An  exhibit  filed  by  defendant 
shows  that  the  rates  are  generally 
lower  to  Portland  on  both  cattle  and 
sheep  than  from  similar  distances 
into  San  Francisco,  although  the  oper- 
ating conditions  are  more  favorable  to 
the  San  Francisco  movement  than  over 
the  Shasta  route  to  Portland.  HELD, 
the  tariff  provisions  are  conflicting, 
but  that  so  long  as  defendants  have 
provisions  in  their  tariffs  for  the  use 
of  double-deck  cars,  the  tariffs  should 
provide  that  where  a  double-deck  car 
is  ordered  and  two  single-deck  cars 
are  furnished  charges  will  be  assessed 
on  the  basis  of  the  rate  provided  for 
the  double-deck  car  ordered,  and  that 
the  rates  per  se  are  not  unjust  or  un- 
duly discriminatory.  Carstens  Packing 
Co.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  236,  237, 
238. 

(cc)  The  rule  providing  for  a  mini- 
mum charge  of  5,000  lbs.  on  first-class 
rate  upon  an  article  too  large  to  be 
loaded  through  the  side  door  or  too 
long  to  be  loaded  through  the  end  win- 
dow of  a  36-ft.  box  car  or  stock  car 
found  to  be  unreasonable  and  unjustly 
discriminatory.  Rule,  providing  that 
when  articles  are  loaded  on  open  cars 
on  account  of  being  too  large  or  too 
long  to  be  loaded  through  the  side  door 
of  a  closed  car  shall  be  charged  a  mini- 
mum of  5,000  lbs.  at  the  first-class 
rate,  prescribed.  Brunswick-Balke-Col- 
lender  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  395. 

(d)  Defendant  maintained  a  mini- 
mum carload  weight  on  lumber  from 
eoutheastern  Georgia  points  to  Jackson- 


ville, Fla.,  of  24,000  lbs.  and  on  cross- 
ties  of  32,000  lbs.  HELD,  the  mainte- 
nance of  a  higher  mimimum  on  cross- 
ties  than  contemporaneously  maintained 
on  lumber  is  unreasonable.  Reparation 
awarded.  Baxter  &  Co.  v.  G.  S.  &  F. 
Ry.   Co.,   21   I.   C.   C.   647,   649. 

(e)  Where  apples  are  given  a  lower 
rate  than  other  deciduous  fruits  they 
are  subject  to  high  minimum  weights. 
Stacy  &  Sons  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
I.    C.    C.    136,    137. 

(f)  Complainants  attacked  the  mini- 
mum weight  on  peaches  from  Georgia 
to  markets  east  of  the  Mississippi  and 
north  of  the  Ohio  and  Potomac  rivers 
in  refrigerator  cars  of  22,500  lbs., 
which  compelled  complainants  to  load 
peach  crates  five  tiers  high.  HELD, 
that  the  ordinary  refrigeration  method 
will  not  perfectly  cool  the  two  top 
tiers  because  Georgia  peaches  are 
picked  and  packed  in  very  hot  weather 
and  moved  through  hot  regions  of  the 
country;  that  the  proper  method  of 
shipping  these  peaches  would  be  to 
pre-cool  the  crates  before  loading  into 
the  car;  that  comparisons  cannot  be 
made  with  the  transportation  of  Cali- 
fornia peaches  (these  peaches  being 
cooled  by  exposure  to  the  cool  night 
air  or  in  pre-cooling  stations,  and  sub- 
ject to  a  cool  mountain  haul  shortly 
after  moving),  nor  in  the  northern 
states  where  there  is  a  short  haul. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Georgia  Fruit 
Exchange  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C. 
C.  623. 

(g)  Complainant  made  a  shipment 
of  wooden  buggy  bodies  in  the  white, 
weighing  less  than  18,000  lbs.,  Moline, 
111.,  to  Kalamazoo,  Mich.,  via  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  and  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  R.  Rs.  under 
the  joint  through  class  rate  of  43c  per 
100  lbs.,  minimum  18,000  lbs.  Contem- 
poraneously there  was  a  rate  of  10c 
per  100  lbs.  via  the  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
R.  R.  to  Chicago,  20,000  lbs.  minimum, 
and  22c  via  the  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  R.  R. 
to  Kalamazoo,  18,000  lbs.  minimum. 
HELD,  the  minimum  weights  on  all 
carload  shipments  are  to  be  consid- 
ered as  part  of  the  rates  and  the  mere 
fact  that  a  minimum  applicable  to  parts 
of  a  combination  of  rates  may  be 
higher  or  lower  than  the  minimum  ap- 
plicable to  the  joint  through  rates 
does  not  overcome  the  presumption  of 
unreasonableness  in  a  joint  rate  and 
minimum   in  excess  of   the   sum   of   the 


MINIMUMS,    §7    (h)  — (o) 


503 


local  and  resulting  from  the  respective 
minima  applicable  thereto.  Were  the 
contrary  to  be  held  carriers  by  simply 
making  different  minima  on  local  and 
through  shipments  could  carry  all 
through  traffic  via  gateways  they  might 
select  on  higher  charges  than  would 
result  from  combinations  of  locals 
through  the  same  gateway.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Lull  Carriage  Co.  v.  C. 
K.    &    S.    Ry.    Co.,    19   I.   C.   C.   15. 

(h)  A  20,000-lb.  minimum  is  excess- 
ive as  applied  to  consignments  of  empty 
beer  kegs  in  refrigerator  cars,  but 
the  same  conclusion  cannot  be  reached 
with  respect  to  empty  kegs  and  bottles 
mixed  or  to  straight  shipments  of 
empty  bottles.  Miller  Brewing  Co.  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
590. 

(i)  Prior  to  November  1,  1908,  the 
minimum  on  iron  fences  in  carloads 
from  Brighton,  O.,  to  Tombstone,  Ariz., 
was  30,000  lbs.,  which  upon  said  date 
was  raised  to  36,000  lbs.,  the  rate  re- 
maining $1.94.  Complainant  made  a  bid 
to  furnish  an  iron  fence  in  Tombstone 
in  June,  1908,  which  bid  was  not  ac- 
cepted until  September,  the  shipment 
being  made  in  November.  The  bid 
was  made  after  taking  into  considera- 
tion the  existing  freight  rate.  No  evi- 
dence of  the  unreasonableness  of  the 
increased  minimum  was  offered  except 
the  fact  of  said  increase.  HELD,  the 
increased  minimum  was  not  shown  to 
be  unreasonable.  Barnum  Iron  Works 
V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
94,    95. 

(j)  An  increased  minimum  cannot  be 
condemned  merely  because  a  contract 
is  made  by  a  shipper  based  on  the 
lower  minimum.  Barnum  Iron  Works 
V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I. 
C.  C.  94. 

(k)  A  carload  minimum  of  30,000  lbs. 
on  lime  from  Ash  Grove,  Mo,,  to  Pine 
Bluff  and  Laramie  is  unreasonable  to 
the  extent  that  it  exceeds  24,000  lbs. 
in  view  of  the  necessity  for  a  low 
minimum  due  to  the  perishable  nature 
of  the  commodity  and  of  the  fact  that 
said  lower  minimum  is  applied  by  de- 
fendant to  practically  all  points  to 
which  through  rates  are  provided  and 
of  the  further  fact  that  the  24,000  lbs. 
minimum  is  accorded  to  complainants' 
competitors  located  at  Quincy  and 
Hannibal,  Mo.     Sunderland  Bros.   Co.  v. 


St.  L.     &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  545, 
546. 

(1)  On  carloads  of  sheep  from  points 
in  California  to  Tacoma,  Wash.,  com- 
plainant ordered  double-deck  cars  and 
was  furnished  single-deck  cars.  Defend- 
ant's tariff  provided  that  on  double- 
deck  cars  a  charge  of  170  per  cent  of 
the  rate  on  single-deck  cars  would  be 
charged,  and  that  if  the  company  could 
not  furnish  the  double-deck  equipment 
the  single-deck  car  rates  would  be 
charged.  Defendant,  at  the  time  of 
the  shipments  in  question,  had  no 
double-deck  cars  available  and  the  evi- 
dence indicated  that  on  account  of 
curves,  tunnels  and  grades  on  its  line 
the  use  of  double-deck  cars  was  not 
practicable.  Complainant  also  attacked 
the  rates  charged  as  unreasonable  and 
offered  in  evidence  comparative  rates 
on  shipments  of  sheep  westbound  into 
Tacoma,  and  of  cattle  northbound  into 
Tacoma.  HELD,  the  provision  in  the 
tariff  relating  to  single-deck  charges 
was  not  unreasonable,  and  the  evidence 
of  comparative  rates  was  not  sufficient 
to  establish  the  unreasonableness  of 
defendant's  rates.  Carstens  Packing  Co. 
V.  S.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  6. 

(m)  Following  the  decision  in 
Montague  &  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  72,  defendants  are  held 
properly  to  have  instituted  a  sliding 
scale  of  minima  for  shipments  of  fur- 
niture from  eastern  points  of  origin 
to  the  Pacific  Coast  above  the  minima 
prescribed  in  said  decision  for  cars 
40  feet  in  length.  Sliding  scale  held  to 
be  reasonable;  complaint  dismissed. 
Pease  Bros.  Furniture  Co.  v.  S.  P.  L. 
A.  &  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  223, 
224. 

(n)  Tariffs  in  effect  at  time  of  move- 
ment provided  for  a  minimum  of  24,000 
lbs.,  while  complaint  alleged  such 
minimum  to  have  been  30,000  lbs.  and 
that  charges  were  based  on  the  latter 
minimum.  Based  upon  24,000-pound 
minimum  there  has  been  an  overcharge, 
for  which  reparation  will  be  awarded. 
James  &  Abbot  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R. 
Co.,   17   I.    C.   C.   273. 

(o)  On  a  carload  of  hand  agricul- 
tural implements,  weighing  24,617  lbs., 
from  Wallingford,  Vt.,  to  Denver,  Colo., 
complainant  was  assessed  31c,  minimum 
24,000  lbs.,  to  the  Mississippi  River,  and 
$1.07,  minimum  30,000  lbs.,  from  the 
river  to  Denver.     A  commodity   rate  of 


504 


MINIMUMS,   §7    (p)— (u) 


27c,  minimuin  30,000  lbs.,  was  in  effect 
from  the  Mississippi  River  to  the  Mis- 
souri River;  a  commodity  rate  of  80c, 
minimum  30,000  lbs.,  from  the  Mis- 
souri River  to  Denver.  The  class  rate, 
minimum  24,000  lbs.,  from  the  Missis- 
sippi River  to  the  Missouri  River  was 
35c;  from  the  Missouri  River  to  Denver 
80c.  The  commodity  rate  with  a  min- 
imum of  30,000  lbs.  would  produce  a 
less  charge  between  the  rivers  than 
the  class  rate,  but  from  the  Missouri 
River  to  Denver  the  commodity  rate 
and  the  class  rate  were  the  same,  al- 
though the  minima  were  different. 
HELD,  the  minimum  applied  from  the 
Missouri  River  to  Denver  should  not 
have  exceeded  the  24,000-lb.  minimum 
prescribed  for  the  class  rate  between 
said  points.  Reparation  awarded. 
George  Tritch  Hardware  Co.  v.  Rutland 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.   C.  542. 

(p)  On  shipments  of  carloads  of  to- 
bacco from  Kentucky  to  Laredo,  thence 
over  the  line  of  the  Mexican  National 
railroad  to  Monterey,  Mex.,  complain- 
ant was  assessed  on  the  basis  of  a 
minimum  of  33,069  lbs.,  the  actual 
weight  of  shipments  being  less  than 
said  minimum.  From  1900  to  1903,  the 
minimum  over  the  lines  in  question  was 
20,000  lbs.;  from  1903  to  .1907,  22,046 
lbs.;  from  October  5,  1907,  to  June  5, 
1908,  33,069  lbs.,  and  after  June  5,  1908, 
27,558  lbs.  The  shipments  in  question 
moved  between  October  8  and  Decem- 
ber 6,  1907.  It  was  impossible  to  load 
into  cars  not  exceeding  40  feet  in 
length  33,069  lbs.  of  tobacco  in  hogs- 
heads, and  lower  minima  prevailed  in 
other  territory.  HELD,  the  33,069-lb. 
minimum  was  unreasonable  and  the 
minimum  should  not  have  exceeded 
27,558  lbs.  Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  said  lower  minimum.  Black 
Horse  Tobacco  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
17    I.    C.    C.    588,    589. 

(q)  In  determining  a  reasonable  car- 
load minimum  for  strawberries  and 
peaches,  the  interest  of  the  shipper 
demands  that  the  minimum  should  be 
fixed  as  high  as  the  product  may  be 
carried  under  the  most  advantageous 
circumstances,  and  that  the  rate  should 
be  made  as  low  as  possible,  based 
on  this  high  minimum,  since  if  the 
shipper  deems  it  advantageous  to  ship 
fewer  crates  in  a  car  the  only  penalty 
upon  him  is  that  he  will  have  to  pay 
a  somewhat  higher  rate  per  crate  de- 
pending    upon     how     much     below     the 


minimum  he  loads.  Ozark  Fruit  Grow- 
ers' Ass'n  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  106,  109. 

(r)  The  carload  minimum  for  re- 
frigeration on  strawberries  and  peaches 
must  be  the  same  as  that  for  trans- 
portation. Ozark  Fruit  Growers'  Ass'n 
V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
C.    106,    108. 

(s)  Complainant  attacked  the  mini- 
ma of  17,000  and  20,000'  lbs.  on  straw- 
berries and  peaches  respectively  on 
shipments  from  points  in  the  Ozark 
country,  in  southwestern  Missouri  and 
northwestern  Arkansas,  to  various 
points  east  and  west.  A  refrigerator 
car  is  physically  capable  of  carrying 
1,523  crates  of  strawberries,  while  the 
17,000-lb.  minimum  amounts  to  only 
567  crates.  It  appeared  that  shippers 
of  strawberries  in  nearly  all  cases  load- 
ed up  to  the  minimum,  finding  it  to 
their  advantage  to  take  the  chance 
of  imperfect  refrigeration  rather  than 
pay  the  extra  charge  which  would 
follow  from  -  loading  below  the  mini- 
mum. With  proper  refrigeration  it  ap- 
peared the  17,000-lb.  minimum  might 
be  safely  carried.  This  minimum  on 
strawberries  compared  favorably  with 
that  in  force  on  shipments  from  points 
in  Tennessee  and  Mississippi.  HELD, 
the  minima  on  strawberries  and  peaches 
were  reasonable  and  should  not  be  re- 
duced. Ozark  Fruit  Growers'  Ass'n  v. 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
106,   109,   110. 

(t)  Complainant  on  a  carload  of 
coiled  elm  hoops  weighing  24,000  lbs., 
shipped  from  Cardington,  O.,  via  Coster, 
111.,  to  Green  Bay,  Wis.,  was  charged 
24i^c.  The  rate  from  Cardington,  O., 
to  Coster,  111.,  on  a  minimum  of  24,000 
lbs.  was  lli/^c;  from  Coster  to  Green 
Bay  on  a  minimum  of  30,000  lbs.,  SVzC. 
Under  these  rates  and  minima  the 
charge  would  have  been  $53.10.  The 
charges  under  the  24i^c  rate  assessed 
were  $58.80.  HELD,  complainant  was 
entitled  to  $5.70  reparation,  being  the 
difference.  Coster,  111.,  to  Green  Bay 
minimum  of  30,000  lbs.,  held  to  be  rea- 
sonable following  Oshkosh  Logging  Tool 
Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C 
C.  109.  W.  Noble  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.    Co.,   16   I.    C.   C.   420,   421. 

(u)  On  a  package  of  plate  glass  8 
feet  square  and  weighing  900  lbs.,  from 
St.  Paul,  Minn.,  to  Douglas,  N.  D., 
complainant  was  assessed  the  first  class 


MINIMUMS,   §7    (v)— (bb) 


505 


rate  of  $1.11  on  a  minimum  of  5,000 
lbs.  The  value  of  the  glass  was  $46 
and  freight  charges  collected  were 
$55.50.  Defendant's  rules  provided  that 
said  rate  exacted  should  apply  to  plate 
glass  exceeding  7^/^  ft.  in  length.  Said 
rule  was  adopted  when  with  the  size 
of  the  cars  then  in  use  an  article  of 
said  length  would  have  to  be  loaded  on 
a  flat  car.  On  account  of  the  increase 
in  the  size  of  the  cars,  it  was  easily 
loaded  in  a  furniture  box  car.  HELD, 
the  minimum  was  unreasonable.  Repa- 
ration awarded  on  the  basis  of  actual 
weight.  Bennett  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste. 
M.  Ry.   Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  301,  303. 

(v)  Defendants'  tariff  provided  a 
carload  minimum  of  60,000  lbs.  on  wheat 
from  Kansas  City  to  Galveston  for 
export.  Complainant  loaded  into  a 
50,000  lbs.  capacity  car  its  maximum 
capacity  of  55,000  lbs.  and  was  assessed 
the  minimum  of  60,000.  Defendants 
had  over  1,200  cars  of  40,000  lbs.  capac- 
ity, 663  of  50,000  lbs.,  and  125  of  28,- 
000  lbs.  Other  carriers  of  wheat  for 
export  from  Kansas  City  to  New  Or- 
leans at  the  same  rate  charged  com- 
plainant made  the  marked  capacity  of 
the  car  the  minimum.  HELD,  said 
minimum  was  unreasonable.  Repara- 
tion awarded  on  the  basis  of  actual 
weight.  Rosenbaum  Grain  Co.  v.  M. 
K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C  C.  499, 
500. 

(w)  Defendants  advanced  the  mini- 
mum on  building  stone  from  30,000  lbs. 
to  40,000  lbs.  Complainant,  in  shipping 
104  cars  of  the  commodity  from  Barre, 
Vt.,  was  unable  to  load  to  this  minimum 
on  24  of  the  cars  on  account  of  the 
fact  that  the  stones  could  not  be 
placed  one  upon  another.  The  cars 
furnished  by  the  initial  carrier  were 
less  than  standard  length  and  width. 
The  experience  of  other  quarries  was 
that  no  difficulty  was  experienced  in 
loading  to  a  minimum  of  40,000  lbs. 
upon  standard  cars.  HELD,  a  mini- 
mum of  40,000  lbs.  was  unreasonable 
and  unjust;  that  a  minimum  of  36,000 
lbs;  should  be  established  upon  cars 
36  ft.  in  length  and  over,  and  of  30,- 
000  lbs.  upon  cars  of  less  than  36  ft., 
and  that  reparation  should  be  awarded 
for  the  excess  paid  over  and  above  what 
would  ha^'e  been  paid  upon  the  minimum 
ordered  to  be  established.  Tayntor 
Granite  Co.  v.  Montpelier  &  Wells 
River  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C  136,  137. 


(x)  Where  on  four  carloads  of  gran- 
ite shipped  from  Barre,  Vt.,  to  Lester- 
shire,  N.  Y.,  17c  per  100  lbs.  was  col- 
lected upon  a  minimum  of  40,000  lbs., 
the  cars  being  less  than  36  feet  in 
length,  the  charges  should  have  been 
assessed  upon  a  minimum  of  30,000 
lbs.,  and  the  consignee  is  entitled  to 
recover  the  excess  with  interest.  Tayn- 
tor Granite  Co.  v.  Montpelier  &  Wells 
River  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  136,  138. 

(y)  One  carload  of  building  granite 
shipped  from  Barre,  Vt.,  to  Chesaning, 
Mich.,  was  assessed  at  the  1.  c.  1. 
rate  of  29c  per  100  lbs.  The  car 
weighed  26,100  lbs.  and  was  less  than 
36  ft.  in  length.  HELD,  it  should  have 
been  assessed  at  the  carload  rate  of 
21c  upon  a  30,000-lb.  minimum  and  com- 
plainant was  entitled  to  recover  the 
overcharge  with  interest.  Jones  Bros. 
Co.  v.  Montpelier  &  Wells  River  R.  R. 
Co.,   14   L   C.   C.   139. 

(z)  Three  carloads  of  building  gran- 
ite shipped  from  Barre,  Vt.,  to  Troy, 
N.  Y.,  were  assessed  at  15c  per  100 
lbs.  upon  a  minimum  carload  weight 
of  40,000  lbs.  The  cars  were  less 
than  36  ft.  in  length  and  each  carried 
a  load  exceeding  30,000  lbs.  HELD, 
the  assessment  should  have  been  based 
upon  the  actual  weights,  and  complain- 
ant was  entitled  to  recover  the  over- 
charge with  interest.  Jones  Bros.  Co. 
V.  Montpelier  &  Wells  River  R.  R.,  14 
I.  C.   C.  140. 

(aa)  One  carload  of  building  gran- 
ite shipped  from  Barre,  Vt,  to  Bush- 
wick  Junction,  L.  L,  N.  Y.,  was  assessed 
at  20c  per  100  lbs.  upon  a  minimum 
of  40,000  lbs.  The  car  was  less  than 
36  ft.  in  length  and  the  actual  weight 
carried  32,900  lbs.  HELD,  it  should 
have  been  assessed  at  the  actual 
weight  and  the  complainant  was  enti- 
tled to  recover  the  overcharge  with 
interest.  Jones  Bros.  Co.  v.  Central 
Vermont   Ry.   Co.,   14   L   C.   C.  141. 

(bb)  One  carload  of  building  gran- 
ite was  shipped  from  Barre,  Vt.,  to 
Bushwick  Junction,  L.  L,  N.  Y.,  and 
was  assessed  at  20c  per  100  lbs.  on 
a  minimum  of  40,000  lbs.  The  car  was 
less  than  36  ft.  in  length  and  carried 
an  actual  weight  of  30,600  lbs.  HELD, 
It  should  have  been  assessed  at  actual 
weight,  and  complainant  was  entitled 
to  recover  the  overcharge  with  interest. 
Jones  Bros,  Co.  v.  Central  Vermont  Ry. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  142. 


506 


MINIMUMS,   §7   (cc)— (ii) 


(cc)  One  carload  of  building  granite 
was  shipped  from  Barre,  Vt.,  to  Scran- 
ton,  Pa.,  and  assessed  at  17c  per 
100  lbs.  on  a  minimum  of  40,000  lbs. 
The  car  was  less  than  36  ft.  in  length 
and  carried  39,400  lbs.  HELD,  it  should 
have  been  assessed  at  actual  weight, 
and  complainant  was  entitled  to  re- 
cover the  overcharge  with  interest. 
Jones  Bros.  Co.  v.  Central  Vermont  Ry. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  143. 

(dd)  One  carload  of  building  granite 
shipped  from  Barre,  Vt,  to  Chesaning, 
Mich.,  carrying  an  actual  weight  of  31,- 
900  lbs.,  was  assessed  at  20c  per  100  lbs. 
upon  a  minimum  of  40,000  lbs.,  the  car 
being  less  than  36  ft.  in  length.  HELD, 
it  should  have  been  assessed  at  actual 
weight,  but  at  the  rate  of  21c,  and 
complainant  was  entitled  to  recover 
the  overcharge  with  interest.  Jones 
Bros.  Co.  V.  Montpelier  &  Wells  River 
R.   R.,    14   L    C.    C.    144. 

(ee)  Two  carloads  of  building  gran- 
ite shipped  from  Barre,  Vt.,  to  Spring- 
field, Mass.,  in  cars  less  than  36  ft. 
in  length  and  containing  each  an  actual 
weight  of  less  tha.i  30,000  lbs.,  were  as- 
sessed at  15c  per  100  lbs.  upon  a  mini- 
mum of  40,000  lbs.  HELD,  they  should 
have  been  assessed  at  a  minimum  of 
30,000  lbs.  and  complainant  was  entitled 
to  recover  the  excess  with  interest. 
Jones  Bros.  Co.  v.  Montpelier  &  Wells 
River  R.   R.,   14  I.   C.   C.   145. 

(ff)  Five  carloads  of  building  gran- 
ite shipped  from  Barre,  Vt.,  to  Wood- 
lawn,  N.  Y.,  in  cars  less  than  36  ft. 
in  length,  each  carrying  more  than 
30,000  lbs.  actual  weight,  were  assessed 
at  15c  per  100  lbs.  upon  a  minimum  of 
40,000  lbs.  HELD,  they  should  have 
been  assessed  at  actual  weights  and 
complainant  was  entitled  to  collect 
the  excess  with  interest.  Lazarri  & 
Barton  Co.  v.  Montpelier  &  Wells 
River   R.  R.,   14   L   C.   C.   146. 

(gg)  Complainant,  wholesale  and  re- 
tail hay  merchants  of  Kansas  City  and 
vicinity,  attacked  the  19,000  and  22,000 
lbs.  minima  applicable  respectively  on 
34  and  36  ft.  cars.  The  so-called  34-ft. 
car  of  defendants  varied  in  length  from 
32    ft.    11    in.    to    34   ft.;    in    width   from 

7  ft.  8  in.  to  8  ft.  10  in.;  and  in 
height  from  6  ft.  1  in.  to  8  ft.  The 
36-ft.   cars   ranged  from   36   ft.  to   36   ft. 

8  in.  in  length;  from  8  ft.  3  in.  to  8 
ft.  6  in.  in  width,  and  from  6  ft.  9  in.  to 


8  ft.  in  height.  Of  the  hay  cars  coming 
into  Kansas  City  and  consigned  to  com- 
plainants, some  65  to  70  per  cent  were 
loaded  to  or  in  excess  of  the  minima 
attacked,  and  some  90  per  cent  of  the 
cars  outbound  were  likewise  so  loaded. 
Of  some  2,000  cars  loaded  under  the 
minimum  required,  some  1,299  of  the 
34-ft.  cars  contained  loads  actually 
weighing  on  an  average  17,505  lbs.  and 
some  654  36-ft,  cars  contained  loads 
actually  weighing  on  an  average  20,358 
lbs.  The  density  of  the  bales  of  hay 
handled  by  complainants  was  consid- 
erably less  than  that  of  other  shippers 
throughout  the  country  generally,  re- 
sulting in  inability  on  their  part  to 
load  as  heavily  as  other  shippers.  Com- 
plainants did  not  attack  the  hay  rate 
itself  as  unreasonable.  HELD,  the  min- 
ima attacked  with  respect  to  the  so- 
called  34  and  36  ft.  cars  should  not 
be  disturbed  except  as  to  cars  having 
a  height  of  6  ft.  9  in.  and  less;  for  a 
34-ft  car  of  such  height  or  less  a  mini- 
mum of  17,500  lbs.  should  be  estab- 
lished, and  for  a  36-ft.  car  of  such 
length  or  less,  a  minimum  of  20,000  lbs. 
Kansas  City  Hay  Dealers'  Ass'n  v.  M. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  597,  603. 

(hh)  On  a  carload  of  corrugated 
iron  from  Newport,  Ky.,  to  Globe,  Ariz., 
complainant  was  assessed  a  through 
rate  of  $2.08  per  100  lbs.,  minimum  30,000 
lbs.  The  combination  of  locals  was 
$1.68,  minimum  30,000  lbs.  Subsequent  to 
the  shipment  in  question  defendants 
established  a  joint  through  rate  of  $1.68, 
minimum  36,000  lbs.  Complainant  of- 
fered no  evidence  that  36,000  lbs.  mini- 
mum was  unreasonable.  Defendants 
admitted  the  $2.08  rate  to  be  unreason- 
able, but  did  not  admit  the  same  with 
respect  to  the  36,000-lb.  minimum.  HELD, 
(the  $2.08  rate  was  excessive,  but  repa- 
ration on  the  basis  of  the  $1.68  rate 
must  be  computed  on  the  36,000  and  not 
on  the  30,000  lb.  minimum.  Gus  Momsen 
&  Co.  V.  Gila  Valley,  Globe  &  Northern 
Ry.   Co.,  14  I.  C.   C.  614,  615. 

(ii)  Defendants  prescribed  a  mini- 
mum of  24,000  lbs.  on  36 14 -ft.  cars  of 
cattle  originating  west  of  a  line  drawn 
from  Mandan,  N.  D.,  to  Velva,  Canada. 
This  minimum  had  been  in  force  for 
many  years  without  complaint  from 
shippers.  East  of  this  line  a  lower 
minimum  was  prescribed.  The  reason 
for  such  discrimination  was  that  the 
bulk  of  cattle  originating  west  of  the 
line  was  fattened  and  would  load  easily 


MINIMUMS.  §7    (jj)  — (XX) 


507 


in  excess  of  the  minimum  required.  No 
evidence  was  offered  to  show  that  the 
rates  as  practically  applied  under  the 
minimum  were  unreasonable.  HELD, 
the  demand  for  a  lower  minimum  and 
for  reparation  should  be  denied.  Reed 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
616,    618. 

(jj)  Complainant  attacked  the  less- 
than-carload  rate  of  $1.79  on  cotton 
piece  goods  from  New  England  produc- 
ing points  to  Denver  and  asked  for  the 
establishment  of  carload  rates.  The 
less-than-carload  rate  to  Pacific  coast 
terminals  was  $1.50  and  the  carload 
rate  $1  on  cotton  piece  goods  and  90c 
upon  coarser  grades.  It  is  2,000  miles 
to  Denver  and  1,400  miles  from  Den- 
ver to  San  Francisco.  Water  competi- 
tion determined  the  rail  rates  between 
the  Atlantic  seaboard  and  the  Pacific 
Coast.  HELD,  it  must  be  presumed 
that  the  Pacific  coast  rates,  though 
established  by  water  competition,  were 
compensatory  to  defendants  and  that 
the  less-than-carload  rates  to  Denver 
should  not  exceed  $1.50;  but  that  car- 
load rates  should  not  be  established, 
the  almost  universal  practice  being 
against  the  establishment  of  such  rates. 
Merchants'  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H. 
&  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  225,  228. 

(kk)  Minimum  fixed  by  defendants 
condemned  as  too  high.  Peerless  Agen- 
cies Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.   33,   34,   35. 

(11)  Greater  minimum,  inserted  in 
tariff  through  error,  subsequently  cor- 
rected; reparation  awarded  on  basis  of 
lower  minimum.  Acme  Cement  Plaster 
Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
56. 

(mm)  Reparation  awarded  on  ac- 
count of  unreasonable  minimum.  Mil- 
waukee Beer  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  61. 

(nn)  Reparation  awarded  on  ship- 
ment of  cast-iron  pipe  from  Cleveland, 
O.,  and  Bessemer,  Ala.,  to  Wessington 
Springs,  S.  D.,  the  weight  of  which  was 
less  than  the  carload  minimum  of  30,000. 
United  States  Cast  Iron  Pipe  &  Foun- 
dry Co.  V.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  67. 

(oo)  Reparation  awarded  on  basis  of 
lower  minimum  voluntarily  established 
on  beer.  Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  E.  P. 
&  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  109,  110. 


(pp)  Reparation  awarded  on  ship- 
ment of  cement  from  Chanute,  Kan.,  to 
Whitewood,  S.  D.,  on  account  of  unrea- 
sonable minimum.  Sunderland  Bros. 
Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
148. 

(qq)  Minimum  applied  to  shipments 
of  pulp  wood  from  points  in  Minnesota 
to  Appleton,  Wis.,  found  excessive  and 
reparation  awarded.  Wisconsin  Pulp  & 
Paper  Mfrs.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.   Op.   224. 

(rr)  Minimum  weight  applied  to 
shipments  of  pulp  wood  found  excessive 
and  reparation  awarded.  Wisconsin 
Pulp-  &  Paper  Mfrs.  v.  D.  &  R.  I.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.   Op.  225. 

(ss)  The  minimum  weight  of  30,000 
lbs.  on  potatoes  from  Cane  Brake,  Tex., 
to  St.  Louis,  when  destined  to  points 
east  of  the  Indiana-Illinois  state  line, 
found  unreasonable,  when  compared 
with  the  minimum  of  24,000  lbs.  on  such 
shipments  to  St.  Louis  proper.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Miller  &  Co.  v.  G.  H.  & 
S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  249. 

(tt)  A  minimum  weight  on  carload 
shipments,  exceeding  that  granted  to 
complainant's  competitors  in  the  same 
territory  by  tariff  in  which  defendant 
joined.  HELD,  to  be  discriminatory, 
and  reparation  awarded.  American  Ce- 
ment Plaster  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,   Unrep.   Op.  285. 

(uu)  Minimum  applied  to  shipments 
of  empty  beer  packages  instead  of  ap- 
plying any-quantity  basis.  Reparation 
awarded.  Milwaukee-Waukesha  Brewing 
Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  294. 

(vv)  Carload  minimum  weight  on 
washing-machine  tubs  should  not  exceed 
actual  weight.  Reparation  awarded. 
Thistle  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  299. 

(ww)  Joint  rate  which  exceeds  com- 
bination of  intermediates,  with  varying 
minima,  held  unreasonable  and  repara- 
tion awarded.  Stacy  &  Sons  v.  C.  B.  & 
Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  343. 

(xx)  Reparation  awarded  on  ship- 
ments of  brass  bedsteads  from  Cleve- 
land, O.,  to  San  Francisco,  Cal.,  on 
basis  of  minimums  established  in  Mon- 
tague &  Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  72.  Walter  &  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  350. 


508 


MINIMUMS,  §7  (yy)— §8  (f) 


(yy)  Actual  weight  of  shipment  lower 
than  prescribed  minimum  not  found  un- 
reasonable. Kaye  &  Carter  Lumber  Co. 
V.   N.   P.   Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.   392. 

(zz)  Minimums  on  two  carloads  of 
fleshings  and  glue  stock  from  New  York 
to  Chicago  not  found  unreasonable. 
Barr  Chemical  Works  v.  P.  &  R.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  473. 

(aaa)  Minimum  applied  to  the  trans- 
portation of  burlap  bags  found  unreason- 
able; reduction  ordered  and  reparation 
awarded.  Sallisaw  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  St. 
L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  484. 

(bbb)  Minimums  reduced  shortly  after 
movement.  HELD,  higher  minimum  un- 
reasonable and  reparation  awarded.  Wis- 
consin Bridge  &  Iron  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  582. 

§8.     Two    Cars    for    One. 

See  Bills  of  Lading,  §5. 

(a)  Where  carriers  by  their  tariffs 
specify  minima  for  large  size  cars  they 
should  further  provide  that  when  such 
cars  are  not  available  two  smaller  cars 
may  be  used  under  such  circumstances 
as  will  fairly  protect  the  minimum  spec- 
ified for  the  larger  car.  Noble  v.  B. 
&   O.  R.  R.   Co.,  22  L  C.  C.   432,   437. 

(b)  Complainant  shipped  sugar  from 
New  Orleans,  La.,  to  Sioux  City,  la. 
He  had  a  sufficient  number  of  barrels  to 
make  more  than  one  carload  and  less 
than  two  carloads.  He  took  bills  of 
lading  for  the  shipments  and  was  as- 
sessed a  carload  rate  on  one  and  the 
less-than-carload  rate  on  the  other. 
Western  Classification  contained  a  rule 
as  follows:  "When  the  minimum  car- 
load weight  or  more  of  one  article  is 
shipped  in  one  day,  by  one  consignor 
to  one  consignee,  covered  by  one  bill  of 
lading,  the  established  rate  for  a  car- 
load shall  apply  on  the  entire  lot 
although  it  may  be  less  than  two  or 
more  full  carload  lots."  HELD,  under 
the  classification,  to  obtain  the  appli- 
cation of  the  carload  rate  at  the  actual 
weight  of  the  part  carload,  the  entire 
consignment  must  move  upon  one  bill 
of  lading.  Complainant's  action  in  se- 
curing a  bill  of  lading  for  each  car 
rendered  the  rule  inapplicable  and  each 
carload  became  a  separate  shipment 
subject  to  the  prescribed  minimum 
rate  per  car.  Reparation  denied.  Scud- 
der  V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
60. 


(c)  A  carrier  furnishing  two  short 
cars  in  lieu  of  the  larger  car  ordered 
should  assess  charges  on  the  basis  of 
the  rate  and  minimum  applicable  to 
the  car  ordered.  Minneapolis  Threbh- 
ing  Machine  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.   Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  181. 

(d)  Two  separate  bills  of  lading 
were  taken  out  by  complainant  cover- 
ing two  cars  of  machinery  shipped  on 
the  same  day  to  the  same  consignee. 
Under  Rule  8  of  the  Western  Classi- 
fication defendants  assessed  charges 
thereon  on  the  basis  of  the  minimum 
carload  weight  for  each.  HELD,  that 
under  the  rule  the  established  rate 
for  a  carload  can  only  apply  on  the 
entire  lot  when  the  shipments  are 
covered  by  one  bill  of  lading,  and  that 
this  rule  having  been  considered  and 
approved  in  prior  cases  cannot  be  held 
unreasonable,  and  the  charges  were 
properly  assessed.  Goodman  Mfg.  Co. 
V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C 
583. 

(e)  Complainant  had  shipped  to  it 
two  carloads  of  news  printing  paper, 
Los  Angeles,  Cal.,  to  Grand  Rapids, 
Wis.,  under  a  rate  of  75c  per  100  lbs. 
The  first  car  weighed  51,000  lbs.,  the 
second  car  23,000  lbs.,  shipped  different 
days  under  separate  bills  of  lading. 
The  minimum  weight  for  each  car  was 
30,000  lbs.  Rule  8  of  Transcontinental 
Freight  Bureau  Tariff,  I.  C.  C.  889, 
in  force  when  the  shipments  were  made, 
provided  that  when  minimum  carload 
weight  or  more  is  shipped  in  one  day 
by  one  consignor  to  one  consignee  cov- 
ered by  one  bill  of  lading  the  estab- 
lished rate  for  a  carload  shall  apply 
on  the  entire  lot,  although  it  may  be 
less  than  two  or  more  full  carload 
lots.  The  consignor  was  notified  of 
this  rule  but  loaded  the  cars  in  the 
manner  he  did  instead  of  loading  two 
cars  to  the  full  minimum  or  shipping 
them  on  the  same  day  under  one  bill 
of  lading.  HELD,  complainant  was  not 
entitled  to  reparation  on  second  car  on 
difference  between  actual  weight  and 
minimum  weight.  Consolidated  Water 
Power  Co.  v.  S.  P.  L.  A.  &  S.  L.  R. 
R.    Co.,    20   I.    C.    C.    169. 

(f)  On  a  shipment  of  furniture  from 
Chicago  complainant  ordered  a  50-foot 
car,  into  which  his  shipment  could  have 
been  loaded.  Defendants,  for  their  con- 
venience, furnished  one  40-foot  car  and 
one  car  of  smaller   dimensions,  and  as- 


MINIMUMS,  §8  (g)— (j) 


509 


sessed  charges  on  the  basis  of  the 
combined  minima  of  the  cars  furnished. 
HELD,  a  carload  rate  and  a  minimum 
weight  for  a  car  of  definite  dimensions, 
when  lawfully  published  in  the  tariffs 
of  the  carrier,  constitute  an  open  offer 
to  the  shipping  public  to  move  merchan- 
dise on  those  terms;  and  there  should 
he  SL  rule  in  the  tariffs  to  the  effect  that 
when  a  carrier  is  unable  to  furnish  the 
car  of  size  ordered  and  for  its  own 
convenience  furnishes  two  cars  in  lieu 
thereof,  it  should  do  so  on  the  basis 
of  the  rate  and  minimum  weight  pub- 
lished in  the  tariffs  and  applicable  to 
the  car  of  the  size  ordered  by  the  ship- 
per. Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis 
of  the  minimum  weight  of  the  50-foot 
car.  Springer  v.  E.  P.  &  S.  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,    17    I.    C.    C.    322,    323. 

(g)  On  a  carload  of  persulphate  of 
iron,  complainant  ordered  a  60,000-lb. 
car  and  was  furnished  two  40,000-lb. 
cars,  into  one  of  which  complainant 
loaded  44,013  lbs.  and  into  t^^e  other 
15,696  lbs.  He  was  assessed  on  the 
basis  of  the  minimum  for  the  two  cars 
furnished.  HELD,  defendants'  tariffs 
were  unreasonable  in  failing  to  provide 
a  rule  allowing  the  shipper  the  benefit 
of  the  minimum  of  the  car  ordered 
where,  for  the  convenience  of  the  car- 
rier, cars  of  different  dimensions  are 
furnished.  Reparation  awarded.  Job- 
bins  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.    297,    299. 

(h)  On  shipments  of  furniture  and 
chairs  from  Chicago  to  Missouri  River 
points,  the  minimum  rule  permitted 
the  use  of  two  cars  on  the  basis  of 
the  minimum  applicable  on  one  where 
the  shipper  was  unable  to  load  the 
minimum  in  the  first  car.  This  "two- 
for-one"  privilege  was  denied  on  ship- 
ments from  Indianapolis  to  Missouri 
River  points.  HELD,  this  discrimina- 
tion was  unlawful  and  should  be  cor- 
rected. Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v. 
C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
56,    68. 

(i)  Defendant's  tariff  provided  that 
where  it  could  not  furnish  one  car  large 
enough  to  accommodate  the  minimum 
weight,  it  might  supply  two  cars  and 
assess  its  charge  on  the  basis  of  the 
lowest  rate  and  the  highest  minimum 
weight  for  the  one  car  ordered.  HELD, 
complainant,  having  ordered  one  car 
and  defendant,  for  its  own  convenience, 
having    supplied    two    and    charged    for 


the  minimum  on  each  of  the  two  cars, 
was  entitled  to  reparation  on  the  basis 
of  the  actual  weight.  Milwaukee  Falls 
Chair  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.    C.   C.  217,   218. 

(j)  Complainant,  shippers  at  Indian- 
apolis, Ind.,  attacked  the  rules  and  prac- 
tices of  defendant  carriers  which,  on 
shipments  of  furniture,  chairs,  ladders 
and  vehicles  from  Cincinnati,  O.,  Louis- 
ville, Ky.,  New  Albany  and  Evansville, 
Ind.,  and  Chicago,  allowed  shippers  from 
these  cities  carload  rates  on  part  car 
lots  in  excess  of  full  carloads  and  per- 
mitted them  to  use  two  cars  and  ob- 
tain thereon  the  rate,  on  the  basis  of 
actual  weight,  published  to  apply  to  the 
minimum  weight  of  one  car,  under  the 
"two-for-one"  rule;  which  privileges  were 
denied  to  Indianapolis  dealers  on  shii>- 
ments  to  such  points.  The  effect  oil 
these  rules  and  practices  were,  for 
example,  to  enable  shippers  at  the 
privileged  points  to  load  the  minimum 
prescribed  for  a  50-ft.  car  into  any 
equipment  which  might  be  available  and 
have  the  carload  rate  applied  on  the 
entire  shipment  and  have  the  benefit 
of  the  carload  rate  on  any  excess 
loaded  in  a  second  car.  To  obtain  the 
benefit  of  this  it  was  not  necessary 
that  the  shipper  request  and  the  carrier 
fail  to  furnish  a  50-ft.  car.  At  Indian- 
apolis the  less-than-carload  rate  was 
charged  on  such  excess  under  the  rules 
in  question;  for  example,  if  an  Indian- 
apolis shipper  ordered  a  40-ft.  car  and 
the  carrier  was  not  able  to  furnish  that, 
but  did  furnish  a  50-ft.  car,  he  was  re- 
quired to  pay  charges  on  the  minimum 
weight  prescribed  for  the  50-ft.  car, 
and  where  he  ordered  a  50-ft.  car  and 
the  carrier  was  only  able  to  furnish  a 
40-ft.  car,  he  had  to  pay  the  higher 
rate  on  the  lower  minimum  prescribed 
for  the  smaller  equipment  and  the  less- 
than-carload  rate  on  any  excess.  The 
minimum  on  vehicles  in  50-ft.  cars 
was  22,720  lbs.  It  was  impossible  to 
load  in  excess  of  20,000  lbs.  A  Cin- 
cinnati shipper,  for  example,  with 
22,720  lbs.  of  vehicles  destined  to  an 
Arkansas  point  might  obtain  the  carload 
rating  on  the  whole  consignment  by 
using  two  cars,  the  combined  measure- 
ment of  which  did  not  exceed  72  ft 
To  obtain  this  privilege  it  was  not  nec- 
essary for  him  to  order  a  50-ft.  car; 
with  one  50-ft.  and  two  36-ft.  cars  avail- 
able he  could  select  the  two  smaller 
cars     and    have    it.       The    Indianapolis 


510 


MINIMUMS,  §8    (kl)— (n) 


shipper  was  denied  this  right.  The 
minimum  on  vehicles  from  Indianapolis 
was  14,000  lbs.  for  each  36-ft.  car  used, 
irrespective  of  the  fact  that  an  entire 
consignment  moved  forward  as  a  single 
shipment  in  two  such  cars  billed  out  at 
the  same  time;  whereas,  from  Cincin- 
nati, under  the  "two-for-one"  rule,  two 
36-ft.  cars  combined  would  be  subject 
to  the  minimum  of  22,720  lbs.  prescribed 
for  a  50-ft.  car,  or  11,^60  lbs.  each. 
Defendants  contended  that  the  roads 
operating  from  Cincinnati  were  forced 
by  the  competition  of  western  lines  to 
accord  the  "two-for-one"  rule  at  that 
place,  and  that  this  competition  did 
not  exist  at  Indianapolis,  HELD,  that 
either  the  "two-for-one"  rule  in  modi- 
fied form  should  be  extended  to  Indian- 
apolis, or  else  there  should  be  a  re- 
adjustment of  the  minimum  weights  so 
as  to  make  them  conform  approxi- 
mately to  the  actual  loading  capacity 
of  cars,  in  order  to  eliminate  unjust 
discrimination  against  Indianapolis.  In- 
dianapolis Freight  Bureau  v.  C,  C.  C. 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C,  254,  258- 
260. 

(kl)  On  shipments  of  lumber  com- 
plainant ordered  two  33-ft,  cars.  De- 
fendants furnished  one  33 ^^  and  one 
34  ft.  cars.  The  actual  weight  of  each 
shipment  exceeded  the  minimum  of  the 
smaller  car  ordered,  but  was  less  than 
the  minimum  for  the  larger  car  fur- 
nished. Complainant  was  assessed  on 
the  basis  of  the  minimum  for  the  larger 
car.  Only  one  of  the  defendants  had 
a  published  tariff  permitting  it,  when 
supplying  a  shipper  with  a  larger  car 
than  ordered,  to  assess  the  charges  on 
the  basis  of  the  minimum  for  the  small- 
er car.  HELD,  the  carload  rate  and 
a  minimum  rate  for  a  car  of  definite 
dimensions  when  lawfully  published  in 
the  tariffs  of  a  carrier  constitute  an 
open  offer  to  the  shipping  public  to 
move  their  merchandise  on  those  terms; 
and  it  would  be  wholly  unsound  in 
principle  to  permit  the  carrier  to  im- 
pose additional  transportation  charges 
on  the  shipper  who  orders  a  car  of  a 
capacity,  length  or  dimension  speci- 
fied in  its  tariffs,  simply  because  it 
was  not  provided  with  cars  of  the  di- 
mensions ordered.  The  obligation  to 
carry  merchandise  of  shippers  on  the 
basis  of  the  published  rates  and  mini- 
mum weights,  and  to  use  whatever 
cars  are  available  for  that  purpose, 
ought  to  have  been  covered  in  the  pub- 


lished tariffs  of  the  defendants  by 
proper  rule  to  that  effect;  and  their 
tariffs  were  unreasonable  and  unlawful 
in  not  containing  such  a  provision  at 
the  time  the  shipments  in  question 
were  made.  Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  actual  weight.  Kaye  &  Carter 
Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.    C.    285,    287. 

(m)  On  a  shipment  of  31  farm  wag- 
ons weighing  36,200  lbs.  from  Racine, 
Wis.,  to  Abilene,  Tex.,  complainant  or- 
dered a  50-ft.  box  car  which  would 
easily  hold  the  31  farm  wagons,  and 
which  kind  of  car  was  named  in  defend- 
ants' tariff.  Defendants  for  their  own 
convenience  supplied  two  36-ft.  cars, 
and  assessed  charges  on  48,000  lbs., 
the  minimum  of  the  36-ft.  cars  being 
24,000  lbs.  HELD,  the  charges  were 
unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded  on 
the  basis  of  actual  weight.  Racine-Sat- 
tley  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.    C.    C.    488,    489. 

(n)  For  the  purpose  of  shipping  50 
bales  of  uncompressed  cotton  linters 
weighing  22,471  lbs.  from  Maiden,  Mo., 
to  Minneapolis,  Minn.,  via  the  Frisco 
lines  from  Maiden  to  St.  Louis  and 
thence  via  the  C.  B,  &  Q,  and  the  Rock 
Island  lines  to  destination,  complainant 
requested  the  Frisco  to  furnish  a  car 
large  enough  to  carry  the  entire  50 
bales.  Instead  it  supplied  a  40-ft.  car 
into  which  30  of  the  bales  were  loaded 
and  a  36-ft.  car  into  which  the  remain- 
ing 20  bales  were  loaded.  No  joint 
through  rate  over  these  lines  existed 
from  Maiden  to  Minneapolis.  The  25c 
rate  of  the  Frisco  from  Maiden  to  St. 
Louis  was  an  "any-quantity  rate."  The 
joint  through  carload  rate  of  the  ot?ier 
two  lines  from  St.  Louis  to  Minneapolis 
was  26c.  The  shipment  moved  on. 
these  local  rates  but  under  through 
billing.  For  the  St.  Louis  to  Minneap- 
olis haul,  the  Rock  Island  assessed  the 
26c  rate  on  the  40-ft.  car  on  the  basis 
of  a  minimum  of  24,000  lbs.,  and  also 
the  same  rate  on  the  basis  of  the  36-ft. 
car,  which  contained  only  8,988  lbs. 
Complainant  demanded  reparation  on 
the  theory  that  if  the  Frisco  had  fur- 
nished a  car  large  enough  to  take  the 
50  bales,  complainant  would  have  es- 
caped the  high  charges  imposed  on 
a  36-ft.  car  by  the  Rock  Island.  HELD, 
reparation  should  be  denied.  While  a 
carrier  in  accepting  a  shipment  ought 
to  consider  the  convenience  and  inter- 
ests   of   the   shipper,   nevertheless,   as   a 


MINIMUMS,   §8    (o)— MISBILLING 


511 


matter  of  law,  it  is  under  an  obli- 
gation only  of  satisfying  the  require- 
ments of  its  own  tariffs.  It  can  be 
called  upon  to  do  for  shippers  only 
what  it  offers  to  do  in  its  tariffs  or  in 
any  joint  tariffs  to  which  it  is  properly 
named  as  a  party.  It  cannot  be  com- 
pelled to  meet  the  requirements  of  the 
separate  tariffs  of  its  connections. 
Falls  &  Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
I.   C.   C.   269,  272. 

(o)  Shippers  at  Indianapolis,  Ind., 
complained  of  the  unjust  discrknina- 
tion  arising  from  the  application  of  the 
"two-for-one"  rule  on  shipments  of  light 
and  bulky  articles  such  as  furniture, 
chairs,  ladders  and  vehicles  from  Chi- 
cago and  its  non-application  on  similar 
shipments  from  Indianapolis  to  West- 
ern Trunk  Line  territory  and  the  Mis- 
sissippi River  crossings.  Under  this 
rule,  which  was  applicable  on  ship- 
ments from  Chicago  to  the  west,  by 
exceptions  to  Western  Classification,  a 
shipper  upon  the  failure  of  the  carrier 
to  furnish  the  size  of  car  ordered  could 
obtain  the  carload  rates  at  the  minimum 
weight  and  the  rate  provided  for  one 
car,  although  the  second  car  might 
contain  less  than  a  carload.  Under  the 
operation  of  this  rule  the  rates  on  the 
articles  in  question  to  western  points 
from  Indianapolis  were  .greatly  in  ex- 
cess of  those  from  Chicago,  in  some 
instances  the  total  charges  under  the 
minima  prescribed  being  twice  as  high. 
Articles  in  question  varied  greatly  in 
weight  and  bulk  and  the  minima  pre- 
scribed could  not  in  many  instances 
be  actually  loaded.  Defendant  con- 
tended that  under  the  regular  classi- 
fication ratings  it  was  necessary  to 
prescribe  varying  minima  on  the  vari- 
ous articles  in  order  to  make  the 
charges  compensatory  in  view  of  the 
varying  bulk  and  weight.  On  extremely 
light  and  bulky  articles  charges  must 
be  assessed  on  higher  minima  than 
could  be  loaded  into  the  cars.  The 
only  other  method  of  fixing  charges 
would  to  be  abandon  the  use  of  the 
classification  ratings  and  publish  nu- 
merous special  rates  varying  with  the 
bulk  and  loading  possibilities  of  each 
class  of  freight.  To  apply  the  "two- 
for-one"  rule  to  Indianapolis  would  re- 
sult in  sending  the  equipment  of  car- 
riers off  their  rails  into  other  terri- 
tories and  in  restricting  the  car  supply. 
Dishonest  shippers  were  able  to  order 
a    large    car    with    the    knowledge    that 


it  could  not  be  furnished  and  thus  se- 
cure the  application  of  the  rule  when 
it  was  not  proper  or  necessary.  On 
account  of  the  fact  that  the  western 
lines  handled  the  larger  part  of  their 
freight  eastward,  the  operations  of  the 
two-for-one  rule  in  Western  Classifica- 
tion territory  did  not  result  in  the  same 
restriction  of  car  supply  as  would 
result  from  its  application  to  Official 
Classification  territory.  HELD,  the  ap- 
plication of  the  two-for-one  rule  to 
Chicago  and  i*:s  non-application  from 
Indianapolis  worked  an  unjust  dis- 
crimination against  the  latter  city;  and 
the  carriers  should  meet  the  situation 
either  by  the  adoption  of  the  rule  at 
Indianapolis  with  such  restrictions  or 
modifications  as  would  prevent  improper 
manipulation  or  else  should  readjust  the 
minimum  weights  on  the  various  arti- 
cles referred  to  so  that  they  would 
conform  approximately  to  the  actual 
loading  capacity  of  cars.  The  Com- 
mission would  not,  unconditionally,  or- 
der the  extension  of  the  rule,  how- 
ever, in  view  of  the  abuses  connected 
with  it.  Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v. 
C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
504,   526. 

(p)  Shipper  ordered  one  large  car; 
two  smaller  cars  furnished.  Charges 
should  have  been  assessed  on  basis  of 
actual  weight  of  shipment.  Reparation 
awarded.  Pate  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.   Op.   417. 

(q)  Reparation  awarded  against  in- 
itial line  where  shipment  moves  on  joint 
rate  when  such  initial  line  for  its  own 
convenience  furnishes  two  smaller  cars 
in  lieu  of  a  larger  car  ordered,  even 
though  the  tariff  carrying  the  joint  rate 
fails  to  contain  such  a  provision.  Mo- 
line  Plow  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St,  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep,   Op.   419. 

(r)  Defendants'  tariffs  should  provide 
that  when  a  car  of  a  particular  size  is 
ordered,  and  for  the  convenience  of  the 
carrier  two  smaller  cars  are  furnished, 
the  two  cars  so  furnished  shall  be  used 
upon  the  basis  of  the  minimum  weight 
fixed  for  the  car  ordered.  Reparation 
awarded.  Bradford-Kennedy  Co.  v.  N. 
P.  R.v.   Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  455. 

MISBILLING. 

See   Classification,    §8. 


512 


MISROUTING— NARROW-GAUGE   RAILROADS,   I    (d) 


MISROUTING. 

See    Routing    and    Misrouting. 

MISTAKE. 

See    Crimes,    §8    (d). 

MIXED  CARLOADS. 

See   Classification,    §7. 

MOOT  QUESTION. 

See  Courts,  §10  (c) ;  Facilities  and 
Privileges,  §1  (d);  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission,    §1    (g). 

NARROW-GAUGE  RAILROADS 

I.  REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES. 
See  Demurrage,  §6  (a), 
(a)  Somewhat  higher  rates  may  exist 
on  narrow-gauge  lines  than  on  the  stand- 
ard trunk  lines.  In  Re  Transportation 
of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C. 
151,   176. 

(aa)  On  mixed  carloads  of  potatoes 
and  onions  in  sacks  and  packages  from 
Reno,  Nev.,  to  Alturas,  Cal.,  a  rate  was 
exacted  of  80c  per  100  lbs.  Defendant 
was  a  narrow-gauge  railroad  extending 
from  Reno  to  Alturas,  a  distance  of  184 
miles.  The  rate  in  the  opposite  direction 
between  these  points  was  $G  per  ton. 
One  of  the  carloads  moved  while  a  com- 
bination rate  of  $12  per  ton  was  in  ef- 
fect between  the  points  in  question.  The 
rate  charged  yielded  8.7c  per  ton  mile. 
HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was  unreason- 
able to  the  extent  that  it  exceeded  $12 
per  to'n.  Reparation  awarded.  E.  Lauer 
&  Son  V.  Nevada-California-Oregon  Ry., 
17  I.  C.  C.  488,  489. 

(b)  On  300  boxes  of  apples  from 
Reno,  Nev.,  to  Alturas,  Cal.,  complainant 
was  assessed  $1.70  per  100  lbs.  De- 
fendant had  in  effect  at  the  time  a  rate 
of  $7  per  ton  on  apples  in  carloads,  and 
$13  per  ton  on  less  than  carload  lots 
from  Alturas  to  Reno.  Defendant  oper- 
ated a  narrow-gauge  railroad  184  miles 
long.  The  rate  attacked  yielded  more 
than  18c  per  ton  mile  and  was  much 
higher  than  that  charged  over  narrow- 
gauge  railroads  in  the  same  territory  for 
similar  distances.  HELD,  the  rate 
charged  was  unreasonable  to  the  extent 
that  it  exceeded  $1.  Reparation  awarded. 
The  question  whether  the  $1  rate  was 
still  an  excessive  one  left  open  for  the 
future.  Bunch  &  Tussey  v.  Nevada-Cali- 
fornia-Oregon Ry.,  17  I.  C.  C.  506. 


(c)  Defendant,  Big  Sandy  &  Cumber- 
land R.  R.,  which  is  but  seventeen 
miles  long,  is  a  narrow-gauge  road,  with 
the  exception  of  two  and  one-half  miles, 
and  extends  from  Devon,  W.  Va.,  to 
Blackey,  Va.  It  serves  some  3,000  peo- 
ple engaged  in  the  lumber  industry.  On 
total  earnings  of  $48,710.99  it  made  a 
profit  of  some  $12,000  per  year.  HELD, 
its  rates  should  be  reduced  so  as  not  to 
exceed  for  a  distance  of  ten  miles  a 
rate  of  20c  for  less  than  carloads  and 
15c  for  carloads,  and  for  distances  over 
ten  miles  25c  for  less  than  carloads  and 
20c  on  carloads;  that  its  demurrage  rate 
upon  cars  held  over  forty-eight  hours 
should  be  fixed  at  $1  per  car;  that  the 
rate  on  malt  and  alcoholic  liquors  should 
be  one  and  one-half  times  the  merchan- 
dise rate,  and  on  explosives,  any  quan- 
tity, one  and  one-half  times  the  merchan- 
dise rate.  Order  establishing  joint  rates 
with  the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  denied,  but  the  for- 
mation of  a  through  route  with  said  road 
ordered,  with  the  privilege  of  publishing 
and  using  the  local  interstate  rates  pre- 
scribed as  proportionals.  Blankenship 
V.  Big  Sandy  &  Cumberland  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  569,  571. 

(d)  The  Uintah  R.  R.  is  the  only 
railroad  extending  from  Dragon,  Utah, 
and  surrounding  territory  to  Mack,  Colo., 
where  it  connects  with  the  D.  &  R.  G. 
R.  R.  This  railroad  was  constructed 
and  its  stock  owned  by  complainant's 
competitor,  complainant  being  engaged 
in  the  mining  of  gilsonite  in  the  vicinity 
of  Dragon.  Its  competitor  constructed 
this  line  from  Mack  to  Dragon  for  the 
sole  purpose  of  developing  its  gilsonite 
mines  at  the  latter  point  and  only  did 
so  after  failing  in  its  attempts  to  induce 
other  railroads  to  construct  a  line.  To 
increase  the  traffic  of  this  road  complain- 
ant's competitor  built  wagon  roads  from 
Vernal  and  Fort  Du  Chesne,  points  to  the 
north  producing  live  stock  and  wool,  es- 
tablished a  stage  line  to  those  points 
and  constructed  hotels  at  Dragon  for  the 
accommodation  of  passengers  and  cot- 
tages for  the  housing  of  employes.  The 
distance  from  Mack  to  Dragon  was  fifty- 
four  miles,  the  highest  elevation  being 
3,500  feet  above  Mack.  The  average 
grade  was  5  per  cent,  the  heaviest  grade 
7^/^  per  cent,  and  the  curvature  in  some 
instances  75  degrees.  The  road  was  nar- 
row gauge,  the  country  through  which  it 
ran  was  unproductive,  the  road  required 
numerous  culverts,  and  was  subject  to 
snow  blockades,  washouts  and  rock 
slides.      Defendant    assessed    a    rate    of 


NEWS  STAND— OVERCHARGES,  §3   (b) 


513 


$10.00  per  ton  on  gilsonite  from  Dragon 
to  Mack.  Gilsonite  was  a  low  grade 
commodity  and  under  ordinary  transpor- 
tation conditions  would  have  taken  a 
rate  similar  to  lumber  and  coal.  On  mer- 
chandise defendant  assessed  for  its  part 
of  the  service  40c  for  traffic  from  the 
west  and  30c  for  that  from  the  east.  On 
this  traffic  there  was  no  competition  with 
wagon  transportation.  The  cost  of  the 
road  with  legitimate  accessories,  exclud- 
ing the  wagon  road  and  stage  line  to 
Vernal  and  Fort  Du  Chesne,  was  some 
$700,000.  The  net  earnings  for  1905  were 
$35,000,  for  1906  some  $47,000  and  for 
eight  months  of  1907  some  $91,000.  Had 
complainant's  competitor  not  constructed 
defendant  road  the  expense  of  wagon 
haul  to  complainant  between  the  points 
In  question  would  have  exceeded  the 
$10.00  rate  by  from  $2.00  to  $3.00  per 
ton.  HELD,  that  a  just  rate  should  be 
arrived  at  principally  by  comparing  the 
cost  of  defendant  railroad  with  appur- 
tenances, excluding  the  wagon  road  and 
appurtenances,  with  the  net  income  de- 
rived, and  that  on  such  basis  the  rate 
charged  was  excessive  to  the  extent  that 
it  exceeded  $8.00  per  ton.  Reparation 
denied.  American  Asphalt  Ass'n  v. 
Uintah  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  196,  209,  211. 

NEWS  STAND. 

See  Auction  Company;  Terminal  Fa- 
cilities, §3  (j);  Transportation,  §1 
(m). 

NOTICE. 

Of  Arrival — See  Demurrage,  §16.  Of 
Cars — See  Evidence,  §39;  Mini- 
mums,  §3  (1),  (j).  Of  Complaint — 
See  Procedure  Before  Commission, 
§3.  Of  Loss — See  Loss  and  Dam- 
age, §11.  Of  Commission's  Orders 
— See  Allowances,  §3  (a).  Of  Un- 
loading Service — See  Routing  and 
Misrouting,  §2  (e).  To  Shipper — 
See  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §11; 
Tariffs,   §3    (3) ;    Transportation,   §6. 

OVERCHARGES. 

I.  ACTIONS  FOR  RECOVERY. 

§1.  Definition  of  overcharge. 

§2.  Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

§3.  Jurisdiction  of  state  courts. 

§4.  Jurisdiction  of  U.  S.  courts. 

§5.  Proof  and  evidence. 

§6.  Right  to  attorney's  fees. 

§7.  Statute  of  limitations. 

II.  DUTY  TO  REFUND. 

§8.  In  general. 

§9.  Necessity  of  order. 


III. 


CRIMINAL   LIABILITY. 
§10.     In  general. 


I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 
§1.     Definition  of  Overcharge. 

(a)  The  phrase  "overcharge"  as  used 
by  the  Commission  embraces  only  cases 
where  carriers  have  demanded  and  re- 
ceived a  rate  in  excess  of  the  published 
rate.  Tyson  &  Jones  Buggy  Co.  v.  Aber- 
deen &  Asheboro  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
330,  332. 

(b)  An  overcharge  is  a  charge  col- 
lected above  the  lawful  tariff  rate. 
Copper  Queen  Consolidated  Mining  Co. 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  279. 

(c)  Overcharges  are  charges  collected 
in  excess  of  those  which  should  have 
been  assessed  under  the  published  tariffs. 
Hendrie  &  Bolthoff  Mfg.  Co.  v.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  380;  Morris  &  Co.  v.  N. 
&  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  411. 

§2.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

See     Reparation,     §6     (dd);     Weights 
and  Weighing,  §2  (a). 

(a)  On  carloads  of  hay  from  Quapaw, 
I.  T.,  to  Kansas  City,  Mo.,  com- 
plainant was  assessed  at  Kansas  City 
a  switching  charge  in  excess  of 
that  lawfully  published.  The  reasonable- 
ness of  the  published  charge  was  not 
in  question.  HELD,  the  Commission  had 
authority  to  award  reparation  in  a  case 
merely  involving  collection  of  a  rate 
higher  than  that  named  in  the  published 
tariff.  While  the  shipper  might  bring  his 
suit  in  a  court  in  the  first  instance,  the 
Act  also  gave  the  Commission  jurisdic- 
tion concurrent  with  that  of  the  courts. 
Laning-Harris  Coal  &  Grain  Co.  v.  St  L. 
&  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  37,  39. 

§3.     Jurisdiction  of  State  Courts. 

See  Courts,   §11    (d),    (e),    (p),    (z). 

(a)  Where  a  carrier  of  an  interstate 
shipment  erroneously  collects  a  sum  in 
excess  of  the  published  charge  a  state 
court  has  jurisdiction  to  entertain  a  suit 
to  recover  the  excess,  since  the  case  is 
not  one  involving  the  reasonableness  of 
rates,  and,  therefore,  it  is  not  necessary 
for  the  shipper  first  to  resort  to  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Commission  for  re- 
lief. Kansas  City  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tonn 
(Ark.  1912),  143  S.  W.  577,  580. 

(b)  Where  a  carrier  has  by  mistake 
collected  charges  in  excess  of  its  pub- 
lished interstate  rates  a  state  court  is 


514 


OVERCHARGES,   §3    (c)— §5    (d) 


not  deprived  by  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act  of  jurisdiction  over  an  action  by  the 
shipper  to  recover  the  excess.  C.  R.  I. 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Lena  Lumber  Co.  (Ark. 
1911),  137  S.  W.  562. 

(c)  Where  a  carrier  charges  more 
than  the  interstate  rate  set  out  in  the 
published  schedule,  an  action  will  lie  in 
the  state  court  for  the  difference  between 
the  schedule  rate  and  the  rate  exacted. 
Brantley  Co.  v.  Ocean  S.  S.  Co.,  5  Ga. 
App.  844,  845,  63  S.  E.  1129. 

(d)  A  shipper  may  recover  the  ex- 
cess collected  over  and  above  the  rate 
filed  with  the  Commission.  Hardaway  v. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  (S.  C.  1912),  73  S.  E. 
1020,  1021. 

(e)  A  state  court  has  jurisdiction  un- 
der section  22  of  the  Act,  providing  that 
nothing  therein  shall  abridge  or  alter 
existing  remedies  at  common  law,  to  en- 
tertain a  suit  to  recover  the  excess  col- 
lected by  a  carrier  over  and  above  the 
interstate  rates  published  and  filed  with 
the  Commission,  since  the  cause  of  ac- 
tion arises  at  common  law.  Hardaway 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (S.  C.  1912),  73  S.  E. 
1020,  1022. 

(f)  Where  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  has  held  a  published  rate  to 
be  excessive,  a  state  court  has  jurisdic- 
tion under  section  22  of  the  Act  to  en- 
tertain an  action  by  a  shipper  to  recover 
the  excess  exacted  over  and  above  the 
reasonable  rate  prescribed.  Robinson  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  64  W.  Va.  406,  411,  63 
S.  E.  323. 

§4.     Jurisdiction  of  U.  S.  Courts. 

See  Courts,  §8  (c),  §9   (b),  §10   (b). 

(a)  Where  in  a  suit  in  a  state  court 
to  recover  an  overcharge  the  interpreta- 
tion of  the  Act  is  involved  to  determine 
what  were  the  legally  applicable  rates  on 
the  shipments  in  question,  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  has  jurisdic- 
tion to  review  the  decision  of  the  state 
courts.  Kansas  City  So.  Ry.  v.  Albers 
Comm.  Co.,  223  U.  S.  573,  591,  32  Sup.  Ct. 
316,  56  L.  ed.  556. 

(b)  Where  a  suit  to  recover  the  ex- 
cess exacted  over  a  lawfully  published 
rate  is  started  in  a  state  court  and  re- 
moved on  the  ground  of  diversity  of  cit- 
izenship to  a  federal  district  court,  juris- 
diction cannot  be  conferred  on  the  latter 
court  by  agreement  of  the  parties.  Dar- 
nell V.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  190  Fed.  656,  658. 


(c)  The  exclusive  jurisdiction  con- 
ferred upon  United  States  courts  in  all 
actions  for  violation  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act  does  not  apply  to  an  ac- 
tion to  recover  overcharges  paid  upon 
shipments  made  under  a  contract  which 
was  not  made  in  violation  of  that  Act. 
K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Albers  Com.  Co., 
79  Kan.  59,  60,  99  P.  819. 

§5.     Proof  and  Evidence. 

See   Reparation,   §4   (g),   §6  (n);  Spe- 
cial  Contracts,  §2   (ff),   (jj). 

(a)  In  September,  1901,  certain  con- 
necting railroads  entered  into  a  contract 
with  a  grain  dealer,  whereby  they  agreed 
to  transport  grain  for  him  from  Omaha, 
Neb.,  to  Texarkana,  Tex.,  through  Kan- 
sas City,  Mo.,  at  a  stipulated  joint  rate. 
No  legally  established  joint  rate  was 
then  in  force  on  these  roads  between  the 
points  named.  The  contract  specified  the 
proportion  of  the  stipulated  rate  each  road 
was  to  receive.  A  large  amount  of  grain 
was  shipped  over  these  roads  at  this 
rate.  The  rate  was  not  established  as 
required  by  law.  Afterward  the  shipper 
commenced  an  action  against  one  of  the 
roads  to  recover  overcharges  paid  to  it 
upon  its  proportion  of  such  rate  for  such 
shipment.  HELD,  that  the  failure  to 
establish  the  rate  as  required  by  law 
could  not  be  interposed  as  a  bar  to  the 
action.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Albers  Comm. 
Co.,  79  Kan.  59,  60,  99  P.  819. 

(b)  Where  the  complaint  in  a  suit  by 
a  shipper  to  recover  the  excess  exacted 
above  the  quoted  rate  does  not  reveal  on 
its  face  that  the  quoted  rate  was  less 
than  the  schedule  rate  filed  with  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Commission,  the  de- 
fendant carrier  cannot  prove  such  fact 
as  a  defense  under  a  plea  of  the  general 
issue.  Baldwin  Land  Co.  v.  Columbia 
Ry.  Co.,  58  Or.  285,  291,  114  P.  469. 

(c)  In  a  suit  in  a  state  court  to  re- 
cover an  excess  collected  on  interstate 
shipments  over  and  above  the  rate  filed 
with  the  Commission,  the  Commission 
will  be  presumed  to  have  done  its  duty 
and  directed  the  time  and  place  and  man- 
ner of  publication,  and  the  burden  is  on 
the  carrier  to  show  compliance  there- 
with. Hardaway  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co. 
(S.  C.  1912),  73  S.  E.  1020,  1024. 

(d)  In  a  suit  in  a  state  court  to  re- 
cover an  excess  collected  on  interstate 
shipments  over  and  above  the  published 
rates,  evidence  that  the  carrier  in  the 
past  carried  the  material  in  question  as 
lumber  is  admissible  on  the  question  as  to 


OVERCHARGES,  §5   (e)— §8   (e) 


515 


what  classification  applies,  where  the 
jury  is  instructed  that  no  device  or 
agreement  or  custom  of  dealing  can 
avail  to  make  the  shipment  other  than 
what  it  really  is,  and  that  they  must 
determine  its  real  character.  Hardaway 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (S.  C.  1912),  73 
S.  E.  1020,  1025. 

(e)  In  a  suit  in  a  state  court  to  re- 
cover an  excess  collected  over  the  pub- 
lished interstate  rate  it  is  proper  for 
the  court,  on  the  question  of  the  proper 
classification  to  be  given  the  material 
in  question,  to  instruct  the  jury  that 
where  a  house  has  been  torn  down,  the 
classification  governing  lumber  might 
apply.  Hardaway  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co. 
(S.  C.  1912),  73  S.  E.  1020,  1025. 

(f)  In  an  action  in  a  state  court  by  a 
shipper  to  recover  an  overcharge  a  good 
defense  is  not  made  out  by  proof  that 
the  rate  exacted  was  filed  with  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Commission,  but  it 
is  necessary,  under  section  6  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  relating  to  pub- 
lication of  charges,  that  the  rate  set  up 
be  proved  to  have  been  filed  at  the  sta- 
tion with  the  agent  of  the  initial  car- 
rier. Pecos  River  R.  Co.  v.  Reynolds 
Cattle  Co.  (Tex.  1911),  135  S.  W.  162, 
163. 

(g)  In  an  action  in  a  state  court  to 
recover  the  excess  exacted  above  a 
charge  alleged  to  be  a  reasonable  inter- 
state rate,  the  court  will  not  take  ju- 
dicial notice  of  a  judgment  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  holding  the 
rate  charged  to  be  unreasonable,  but  the 
same  must  be  proved.  Robinson  v.  B.  & 
O.  R.  R.  Co.,  64  W.  Va.  406,  411,  63  S.  E. 
323. 

§6.     Right  to  Attorney's  Fees. 

(a)  In  an  action  in  a  state  court  to 
recover  the  excess  exacted  by  a  carrier 
over  and  above  the  published  interstate 
rate,  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  recover 
an  attorney's  fee  under  any  provision  of 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  granting 
in  certain  cases  the  right  to  shippers  to 
recover  such  fee,  since  the  suit  is  not 
to  recover  a  penalty  from  the  carrier  for 
violation  of  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act,  but  is  in  the  nature  of  an  action  for 
money  had  and  received  by  a  carrier  col- 
lecting a  greater  amount  of  charges  than 
it  was  entitled  to  receive.  Kansas  City 
S.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Tonn  (Ark.  1912),  143  S. 
W.  577,  581. 


§7.     Statute   of   Limitations. 
See   Claims,    I. 

(a)  In  an  action  in  a  state  court  to 
recover  the  excess  collected  by  a  carrier 
over  and  above  the  published  interstate 
rate,  the  two-year  limitation  period  pre- 
scribed by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act 
does  not  apply,  and  the  period  fixed  by 
the  state  law  is  controlling.  C.  R.  I.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Lena  Lumber  Co.  (Ark. 
1911),  137  S.  W.  562,  553. 

II.     DUTY  TO  REFUND. 

§8.     In  General. 

See    Reparation,   §19    (p). 

(a)  It  is  suggested  that  the  shipper 
should  not  be  deprived  of  his  money  as 
straight  overcharges  by  any  disagree- 
ment among  the  carriers  as  to  which  one 
was  guilty  of  the  overcharges,  and  should 
make  the  refund,  as  the  Commission 
ought  not  to  be  troubled  with  suits 
growing  out  of  differences  of  this  kind. 
Edison  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  D.  L.  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  95,  96. 

(b)  All  carriers  participating  in  the 
overcharge  should  share  in  its  refund. 
Platten  Produce  Co.  v.  K.  L.  S.  &  C.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  249. 

(bb)  It  is  not  proper  practice  for  the 
delivering  carrier  to  make  delay  in 
refunding  a  clear  overcharge  until  it 
can  ascertain  which  carrier  participating 
in  the  movement  is  responsible.  The 
shipper  is  entitled  to  repayment  from 
the  carrier  that  has  collected  the  freight 
charges  as  soon  as  it  appears  that  an 
overcharge  has  in  fact  been  made.  Ty- 
son &  Jones  Buggy  Co.  v.  A.  &  A.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  330,  332. 

(c)  A  claim  presented  against  the  de- 
livering line,  but  not  against  connecting 
lines,  is  not  barred  as  to  the  delivering 
line,  though  the  complaint  has  no  stand- 
ing as  against  the  other  lines,  and  the 
fact  that  the  delivering  line,  who  has 
collected  an  overcharge,  has  paid  it  to 
another  carrier,  does  not  excuse  it  from 
repayment  of  the  same.  Rehberg  &  Co. 
V.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  17  1.  C.  C.  503,  510. 

(d)  Where  higher  than  the  published 
charges  are  assessed  in  error,  it  is  in- 
cumbent upon  the  carrier  to  make  refund, 
irrespective  of  any  other  consideration. 
Forster  Bros.  Co.  v.  D.  S.  S.  &  A.  Ry.  Co., 
14  L  C.  C.  232,  234. 

(e)  Where  the  tariff  on  lumber  from 
Ridge,    Mich.,    to    South   Chicago   is    12c 


516 


OVERCHARGES,  §9   (a)— (1) 


per  100  lbs.,  and  defendant  carrier,  by 
mistake,  charges  13c  on  shipments  of 
cedar  cross-ties,  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
latter  to  refund  the  excess  to  the  ship- 
per despite  complainant's  refusal  to 
abandon  a  proceeding  instituted  to  have 
the  12c  rate  declared  unreasonable.  For- 
ster  Bros.  Co.  v.  D.  S.  S.  &  A.  Ry.  Co., 
14   I.    C.   C.   232,   234. 

§9.     Necessity  of  Order. 

(a)  Straight  overcharges  should  be 
and  can  be  refunded  without  an  order  of 
the  Commission.  Priesmeyer  Shoe  Co. 
V.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  78,  80; 
Cohen  &  Co.  v.  Mallory  S.  S.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  '6li,  375;  Casey-Hedges  Co.  v. 
A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C,  249,  250; 
American  Cigar  Co.  v.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  81;  Georgia-Carolina  Brick  Co. 
V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  148,  149;  Na- 
tional Refrigerator  &  Butcher  Supply 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  64,  65; 
Pacific  Coast  Biscuit  Co.  v.  S.  P.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  546,  549;  Riverside 
Mills  V.  G.  R.  R.,  20  I.  C.  C.  423,  424; 
Isbell-Brown  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  616,  617 

(b)  On  a  shipment  of  iron  wagon 
axles  from  Wilkes-Barre,  Pa.,  to  Carth- 
age, N.  C.,  an  overcharge  resulted  from 
the  inadvertent  collection  at  destination 
of  the  fourth  class,  instead  of  the  fifth 
class  rate,  as  required  under  the  pub- 
lished tariffs.  Reparation  awarded.  Ty- 
son &  Jones  Buggy  Co.  v.  A.  &  A.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  330,  331. 

(c)  The  lack  of  practice  among  car- 
riers of  failing  to  refund  overcharges 
promptly  is  open  to  severe  criticism. 
The  retention  of  an  overcharge  by  a 
carrier  is  not  only  an  unjust  discrimina- 
tion, but  is  a  violation  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act  and  the  Elkins  Act.  When 
an  overcharge  has  been  discovered  it 
should  immediately  be  repaid  by  the  car- 
rier that  collected  the  charges,  whether 
a  demand  has  been  presented  by  the 
shipper  or  not.  The  claims  officers  of 
carriers  should  be  so  organized  as  to 
enable  them  to  dispose  of  all  over- 
charge claims  within  thirty  days,  except 
those  of  unusual  or  special  character,  and 
such  claims  ought  to  be  disposed  of 
within  sixty  days  at  the  utmost.  Tyson 
&  Jones  Buggy  Co.  v.  A.  &  A.  Ry.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  330,  331,  332. 

(cc)  The  carrier  in  the  cases  indi- 
cated in  Administrative  Ruling  No.  70  of 
Tariff    Circular    15-A    may    without    any 


order  of  the  Commission  refund  all  ex- 
cess charges  due  to  misrouting  by  its 
agent.  The  duty  of  the  carrier  is  to 
charge  and  collect  the  lawful  rate,  no 
more  and  no  less,  and  when  more  is 
collected  the  excess  shonld  be  refunded, 
and  when  less  the  deficiency  should  be 
collected.  Accrual  of  cause  of  action, 
15  I.  C.  C.  201,  204. 

(d)  Where  an  overcharge  has  resulted 
from  the  misrouting  of  cars  it  should  be 
refunded  by  the  carrier  making  the  error 
without  contribution  by  the  other  con- 
necting carriers.  C.  L.  Flaccus  Glass  Co. 
V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
333,  335. 

(e)  Where  a  carrier  has  collected  in 
excess  of  its  published  tariff  it  is  its 
duty  to  refund  such  excess  without  spe- 
cific authority  from  the  Commission.  Gus 
Momsen  &  Co.  v.  Gila  Valley,  Globe  & 
Northern  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  614. 

(f)  Carriers  should  refund  over- 
charges on  stone  paving  blocks  from 
Lithonia,  Ga,,  to  Chicago.  Georgia  Rough 
&  Cut  Stone  Co.  v.  Georgia  R.  R.  Co., 
13  I.  C.  C.  401,  404. 

(g)  An  overcharge  resulted  from  the 
misapplication  of  the  rate  on  a  shipment 
of  fiaxseed  from  Minneapolis,  Minn.,  to 
Petaluma,  Cal.  Dickinson  Co.  v.  C.  St. 
P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  82. 

(h)  The  excess  charge  collected  by 
C.  P.  R.  R.  and  Soo  Line,  these  carriers 
being  parties  to  Pac.  Coast  Lumber 
Mfrs.  Ass'n  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C. 
C.  23,  may  be  refunded  under  general 
orders  issued  in  that  case.  Arrow  Lum- 
ber &  Shingle  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste. 
M.  Ry.   Co.,  Unrep.   Op.  145. 

(i)  No  order  made  for  refund  of  an 
overcharge,  carriers  agreeing  voluntarily 
to  make  refund.  American  Lumber  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
153. 

(j)  Reparation  awarded  on  a  ship- 
ment of  oats  from  Elk  City,  Okla.,  to 
Columbus,  Ga.,  on  account  of  a  charge 
for  overweight.  Joseph  Co.  v.  C.  of  Ga. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.   Op.  166. 

(k)  Charges  assessed  in  excess  of 
legal  rate.  Refund  made.  Complaint 
dismissed.  Robinson  Clay  Product  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
276. 

(1)  Reparation  awarded  on  carload  of 
lumber,    as    according    to    the    tariffs    a 


OVERCHARGES,  §9  (m)— PANAMA  CANAL 


517 


lower    rate    was    properly    applicable    to 
the   shipment.     Germain  Co.  v.  A.  B.  & 

A.  R.   R.   Co.,   Unrep.   Op.   277. 

(m)  Charges  collected  above  lawful 
tariff  rate.  Refund  to  be  made.  No 
order  entered.  Copper  Queen  Consoli- 
dated Mining  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.   Op.   279. 

(n)  An  overcharge  resulting  from  er- 
roneous application  of  rate  should  be 
refunded  without  order  of  the  Commis- 
sion. Emery,  Bird,  Thayer  Dry  Goods 
Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  310. 

(o)  Charges  collected  in  excess  of 
rate  lawfully  applicable,  resulting  over- 
charge may  be  refunded  without  an 
order  of  the  Commission.  Clover  Leaf 
Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.    311. 

(p)  Reparation  awarded  on  ship- 
ments of  grapes  from  Douville,  Ga.,  to 
New  York  and  Milwaukee,  Wis.,  for 
charges  collected  in  excess  of  published 
tariff.  Douville  v.  G.  F.  &  A.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.   Op.   342. 

(q)  Carriers  assessed  the  higher  of 
two  possible  combination  rates.  HELD, 
that  an  overcharge  resulted,  which 
should  be  refunded  without  an  order 
from  the  Commission.  Ottumwa  Box 
Car  Loader  Co.  v.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  382;  Neosho  Milling  Co.  v.  K.  C.  S. 
Ry.   Co.,  Unrep.  Op.   450. 

(r)  Certain  rates  applicable  on  coal 
when  passing  through  screens  of  given 
dimensions.  Rates  charged  in  excess 
of  those  established.  Reparation  award- 
ed. Huerfano  Coal  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R. 
R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  390. 

(s)  Charges  assessed  in  excess  of 
actual  weight.  Reparation  awarded. 
Sonneland  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
399. 

(t)  Charges  assessed  for  the  trans- 
portation of  soda  water  fountain  based 
upon  a  rate  applicable  to  the  shipment 
when  crated,  instead  of  basing  rate  upon 
shipment  when  boxed.  Overcharge  to 
be  refunded.     Imperial  Candy  Co.  v.   C. 

B.  &   Q.  R.   R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.   412. 

(u)  Combination  based  on  point  tak- 
ing higher  rate.  Should  be  refunded. 
Alabama  Lumber  &  Export  Co.  v.  C. 
of  Ga.   Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  442. 

(v)  No  joint  through  rate  in  effect; 
highest  combination  charged.    Should  be 


refunded  without  order  of  Commission. 
Browne  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  L.  &  T.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  499. 

(w)  A  shipment  of  advertising  mat- 
ter (printed  cards)  was  erroneously 
charged  by  defendants  at  rate  applicable 
on  "Christmas,  Easter  and  Souvenir" 
cards.  Refund  of  overcharge  directed. 
Haas  &  Sons  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
578. 

III.     CRIMINAL  LIABILITY. 

See   Crimes,   V. 
§10.     In  General. 

(a)  It  is  as  unlawful  for  a  carrier  to 
overcharge  the  shipper  as  to  give  re- 
bates. Criminal  prosecutions  will  follow 
if  overcharges  are  not  promptly  refunded 
when  admittedly  due.  Interstate  Grain 
Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
34,  35. 

(b)  There  should  be  no  necessity  for 
appealing  to  governmental  authority  to 
award  damages  for  plain  overcharges.  It 
is  the  plain  duty  of  the  carriers  to  col- 
lect no  more  than  the  published  rate. 
To  do  otherwise  is  a  crime,  for  which 
indictment  would  lie,  and  for  which  there 
is  serious  punishment  provided  in  the 
law  against  both  the  carrier  and  its 
agent.  When  there  is  a  contest  between 
the  shipper  and  the  carrier  as  to  the 
lawful  rate  applicable  arising  out  of  an 
obscure  tariff  there  may  properly  be  an 
appeal  to  the  Commission  to  give  con- 
struction to  the  schedule.  The  law  ex- 
pressly makes  it  illegal  for  a  carrier  to 
exact  more  than  the  lawful  rate,  and 
the  Commission  will  regard  it  as  its 
duty  henceforward  to  enforce  this  pro- 
vision by  indictment  in  cases  where  the 
carrier  appears  wilfully  to  have  required 
payment  of  an  illegal  amount  or  refuses 
to  make  restitution  immediately  upon 
Its  attention  being  called  to  its  improper 
and  unlawful  action.  National  Refrig- 
erator and  Butcher  Supply  Co.  v.  I.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  64,  65. 

(c)  The  retention  of  an  overcharge 
by  a  carrier  is  not  only  an  unjust  dis- 
crimination, but  is  a  violation  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  and  the  El- 
kins  Act.  Tyson  &  Jones  Buggy  Co.  v. 
A.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  330,  332. 

PANAMA  CANAL. 

§ee    Evidence,    §42. 


518 


PASSENGER  FARES  AND  FACILITIES,  §1  (a)— §2  (d) 


PASSENGER   FARES    AND 
FACILITIES. 

I.     CONTROL    AND    REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction    of    Commission. 
II.     REASONABLENESS. 
§2.    In   general. 
§3.    Basing  fares. 
§4.    Certificate  plan. 
§5.     Commutation   fares. 
§6.     Mileage  and  excursion  rates. 
§7.     Party   rates. 
§8.    Validation. 

III.  DISCRIMINATION  IN  FACILITIES. 

§9.  In    general. 

§10.  Baggage. 

§11.  Colored  passengers. 

§12.  Free  transportation. 

§13.  Stations. 

§14.  Through  routes  and  rates. 

IV.  CLAIMS    FOR   DAMAGES. 

§15.     Errors    of   ticket   agents. 
§16.    Lost  tickets. 

I.     CONTROL    AND    REGULATION. 

See  Crimes,  §7  (c);  Evidence,  §1 
(dd);  Tlirough  Routes  and  Joint 
Rates,    §2    (f). 

§1.     Jurisdiction    of    Commission. 

See  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  II 
(u);  Courts,  §11  (s) ;  Special  Con- 
tracts,   §4    (1)    (L);   Tariffs,   §1    (a). 

(a)  The  frequent  repetition  in  the 
Act  of  the  phrase  "passenger  or  freight" 
clearly  indicates  that  a  carrier  of  pas- 
sengers only  is  as  subject  to  regulation 
by  the  Commission  as  is  a  carrier  of 
both  freight  and  passengers.  O.  &  C. 
B.  St.  Ry.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  191  Fed.  40, 
48. 

(aa)  The  Commission  has  no  juris- 
diction over  alleged  unreasonable 
charges  of  a  transfer  company  where 
the  railroad  carrier  does  not  undertake 
to  make  delivery  of  passenger  baggage 
at  residences  for  rate  of  fare  stated  in 
tariffs.  Unless  the  railroad  carrier  un- 
dertakes to  make  delivery  at  residences 
for  the  rate  of  fare  in  the  tariff,  the 
carrier's  duty  to  the  public  begins  and 
ends  in  the  baggage  room.  Cosby  v. 
Richmond  Transfer  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  72. 

(b)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission has  jurisdiction  over  commu- 
tation fares  and  charges.  Commuta- 
tion Rate  Case,  21  I.  C.  C.  428,  443. 

(c)  Passenger  traffic  is  comprehend- 
ed in  the  Act,  although  owing  to  the 
relative  importance  of  freight  and  pas- 
senger    transportation     necessarily     in- 


creased attention  is  given  to  the  for- 
mer and  minimized  discussion  to  the 
latter.  West  End  Improvement  Club 
V.  O.  &  C.  B.  R.  &  B.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
239,    244. 

(d)  The  Act  applies  to  both  passenger 
and    freight    business.      West    End    Im-  £ 
provement   Co.   v.   O.   &   C.   B.   R.   &   B.  f 
Co.,   17   I.    C.   C.   239,   244. 

(e)  The  Act  empowers  the  Commis- 
sion to  establish  a  through  passenger 
route  and  joint  rate,  provided  no  satis- 
factory through  route  already  exists. 
In    Re    Through    Passenger    Routes,    16 

I.  C.  C.  300,  301. 

(f)  The  Commission  has  no  authority 
to  order  carriers  to  re-establish  special 
party  rates  accorded  in  the  past  by 
them  to  theatrical  companies  and  other 
special  organizations  engaged  in  giving 
public  exhibitions.  Field  v.  Southern 
Ry.   Co.,    13    L    C.   C.    298,    298. 

II.  REASONABLENESS. 
§2.     In    General. 

(a)  The  great  cost  of  elevating 
tracks,  increase  in  taxes,  increase  in 
payroll  and  cost  of  the  use  of  a  tun- 
nek  may  be  taken  into  consideration 
by  a  carrier  in  readjusting  its  rates, 
but  in  doing  so  the  carrier  cannot  de- 
mand more  than  a  reasonable  charge 
for  the  service.  Commutation  Rate 
Case,  21  L  C.  C.  428,  449. 

(b)  Through  passenger  business  can 
be  carried  at  lower  rates  than  strictly 
local  business.  Commercial  Club  of 
Salt  Lake  City  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,    19   I.    C.   C.   218,    228. 

(c)  Where  passenger  rates  are 
found  unreasonable  and  reduced  rates 
prescribed,  the  sparcity  of  population  is 
hardly  a  controlling  inquiry;  the  ques- 
tion is  rather  how  much  passenger 
business  the  lines  handle  and  under 
what  circumstances.  Commercial  Club 
of  Salt  Lake  City  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  218,  227. 

(d)  Complainant  attacked  the  first- 
class  one-way  passenger  fares  in  both 
directions  between  Salt  Lake  City,  Og- 
den  and  Provo,  Utah,  to  Denver  and 
Omaha.  The  present  rate  from  these 
points  is  obtained  by  applying  a  3c 
mileage  scale  to  the  actual  distance 
via  the  U.  P.  R.  R.  from  Ogden,  that 
being  the  short  line  distance.  The  fare 
to    Portland    from    Salt    Lake    City,    945 


PASSENGER  FARES  AND  FACILITIES,  §2  (e)— §3  (b) 


519 


miles,  is  $27,  about  2.86c  per  mile 
being  also  attacked.  HELD,  that  while 
the  present  3c  fare  upon  the  Union 
Pacific  lines  might  be  somewhat  re- 
duced, upon  the  present  investigation 
the  Commission  is  inclined  to  hold  that 
the  complaint  is  not  sustained.  Com- 
mercial Club  of  Salt  Lake  City  v.  A.  T. 
&    S.   P.   Ry.    Co.,    19    I.    C.    C.   218,   229. 

(e)  Complainants  attacked  the  pas- 
senger fares  both  ways  from  Ogden, 
Salt  Lake  City  and  Provo,  Utah,  to 
San  Francisco,  Cal,  From  Ogden  the 
distance  being  70.  miles  and  the  fare 
$30,  about  3%c  per  mile.  HELD,  that 
the  fare  from  Ogden  should  not  exceed 
$23.68,  from  Salt  Lake  City  $24.69,  from 
Provo  $26.04.  Commercial  Club  of  Salt 
Lake  City  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.   C.  218,  229. 

(f)  Complainants  attacked  the  pas- 
senger rates  in  both  directions  from 
Salt  Lake  City,  Provo  and  Ogden, 
Utah,  to  Los  Angeles,  Cal.  From  Salt 
Lake  the  distance  is  781  miles,  the 
fare  $30,  being  3%c  per  mile.  HELD, 
the  rate  between  Salt  Lake  and  Provo 
to  Los  Angeles  should  not  exceed  $25 
and  from  Ogden  $26.10.  Commercial 
Club  Salt  Lake  City  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.    Co.,    19    L    C.    C.    218,   229. 

(g)  Complainant  charged  '  a  passen- 
ger fare  of  $15.95  from  Waco,  Tex.,  to 
Cairo,  111.,  and  shortly  thereafter  a  fare 
of  $19.85  on  the  return  journey.  The 
difference  in  charges  was  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  carriers  on  account  of  the 
complicated  state  of  their  tariffs  had 
been  unable  to  restore  the  north-bound 
fare  of  $19.85  after  the  injunction  of 
the  2c  fare  laws  in  Arkansas  and  Mis- 
eouri;  although  they  had  promptly  re- 
stored the  $19.85  south-bound  fare  on 
account  of  the  simplicity  of  the  sched- 
ules involved.  Complainant  offered  no 
evidence  as  to  the  unreasonableness 
of  the  south-bound  fare  exacted  except 
the  fact  of  the  lower  north-bound  fare 
paid  by  him.  HELD,  the  south-bound 
fare  exacted  was  not  shown  to  be  un- 
reasonable. The  mere  fact  that  a  rate 
or  fare  in  one  direction  exceeds  the 
rate  or  fare  between  the  same  points 
In  the  opposite  direction  is  not  a  con- 
trolling test  of  the  unreasonableness 
of  the  higher  fare,  nor  does  it  in  itself 
necessarily  constitute  an  unreasonable 
discrimination.  Littell  v.  St.  L.  S.  W. 
Ry.   Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  187,  189. 


(h)  Volume  of  passenger  traffic 
would  be  stimulated  by  suggested  reduc- 
tions, thus  compensating  for  loss  of 
revenue.  Weber  Club  &  Intermoun- 
tain  Fair  Ass'n  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
17   I.   C.   C.   212,   217. 

(i)  The  general  rule  as  to  passen- 
ger fares  must  be  the  same  as  to 
freight  rates.  Kurtz  v.  Penn  R.  R.  Co., 
16   J.   C.   C.   410,  415. 

(j)  There  appears  to  be  no  differ- 
ence in  principle  between  passengers 
and  freight,  so  far  as  comparisons  be- 
tween combinations  of  local  rates  and 
through  rates  are  concerned.  U.  S.  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  470,  471. 

§3.     Basing  Fares. 

(a)  It  is  lawful  for  a  carrier  or 
carriers  having  duly  established  in  the 
Tianner  required  or  authorized  by  law 
any  form  of  excursion,  commutation,  or 
mileage  fares,  to  provide  in  their  sched- 
ules for  the  use  of  any  of  said  fares  as 
basing  fares,  thus  enabling  other  car- 
riers to  use  the  same,  in  connection  with 
their  own  duly  established  fares,  for  the 
through  transportation  of  passengers  on 
any  physical  line  of  connecting  carriers, 
upon  a  combination  of  tickets  over  all 
of  the  component  parts  of  such  through 
lines,  and  for  the  carriers  composing  or 
operating  such  through  line  to  afford 
through  sleeping  car,  baggage,  checking 
and  other  through  accommodations  in 
the  same  manner  as  in  case  of  through 
tickets  over  the  entire  line,  provided  the 
passenger  demanding  such  through  trans- 
portation and  through  accommodation 
shall  present  to  the  initial  carrier  at  the 
point  of  starting  the  lawfully  authorized 
tickets  covering  the  lines  necessary  for 
the  entire  through  journey.  It,  how- 
ever, is  not  deemed  lawful  for  a  carrier 
to  check  a  passenger's  baggage  beyond 
the  point  to  which  he  presents  tickets 
at  the  point  of  starting,  upon  the  mere 
declaration  of  intention  to  go  farther 
upon  another  ticket,  to  be  thereafter 
purchased  or  otherwise.  In  Re  Mileage, 
Excursion  and  Commutation  Tickets,  23 
I.  C.  C.  95,  96. 

(b)  Upon  duly  established  tariff  au- 
thority therefor  the  initial  carrier  may 
issue  to  a  passenger  a  through  ticket 
for  the  sum  of  two  or  more  duly  es- 
tablished fares  applicable  over  the 
several  connecting  roads  composing  the 
through  physical  line  from  the  starting 
point   to   destination,    or   may   issue   ad- 


520 


PASSENGER  FARES  AND  FACILITIES,  §4  (a)— §5  (e) 


ditional  or  separate  ticket  or  tickets 
at  lawful  tariff  fares  therefor,  which, 
in  connection  with  the  ticket  or  tickets 
already  held  by  the  passenger,  will 
cover  the  entire  journey  that  the  pas- 
senger desires  to  take.  In  Re  Mileage, 
Excursion  and  Commutation  Tickets,  23 
I.   C.    C.   95,   97. 

§4.     Certificate    Plan. 

(a)  Defendant  carriers  published  tar- 
iffs for  the  letter  carriers'  convention 
at  St.  Paul,  Minn.,  1909,  which  carried 
the  provision  that  a  rate  of  a  fare  and 
a  half  on  the  certificate  plan  would 
apply  to  this  occasion  from  points  east 
of  the  Missouri  River,  on  condition  that 
a  thousand  or  more  persons  be  in  at- 
tendance by  rail,  holding  certificates 
which  show  the  purchase  of  one-way 
tickets  at  a  dollar  or  more.  It  was 
also  provided  that  passengers  must  pur- 
chase one-way  tickets  at  place  of  meet- 
ing or  normal  (not  special  or  reduced) 
one-way  fare  and  obtain  a  certificate 
receipt.  The  receipt,  when  signed  by 
the  secretary  of  the  meeting  and 
stamped  by  the  joint  agent,  to  be  hon- 
ored for  "delegate"  return  ticket  at  re- 
duced fare.  Attendance  at  the  conven- 
tion was  over  1,400,  but  there  were  only 
888  certificates.  The  St.  Louis  delega- 
tion purchased  106  summer  tourist's 
round-trip  tickets,  St.  Louis  to  St.  Paul 
and  return,  and  the  Kansas  City  dele- 
gation 391/4  round-trip  tickets,  Kansas 
City  to  St.  Paul  and  return.  The  agent 
refused  to  validate  any  certificates  un- 
less there  were  1,000  or  more  present, 
and  would  not  allow  the  tickets  from 
St.  Louis  to  Kansas  City  to  be  counted. 
HELD,  that  the  certificate  plan  be  ap- 
proved; that  the  tariffs  must  control, 
and  that  reparation  would  not  be  al- 
lowed to  those  certificate  holders  who 
had  been  compelled  to  pay  the  full  fare 
on  the  return.  National  Ass'n  of  Let- 
ter Carriers  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
20   I.   C.  C.   6. 

§5.     Commutation    Fares. 

See  Supra,  §1  (b),  §3  (a);  Commuta- 
tion Fares;  Through  Routes  and 
Joint    Rates,   §22   (I). 

(a)  Complainants  attacked  the  pro- 
posed new  commutation  fares  between 
New  York  City  and  points  in  the  state 
of  New  Jersey  as  unjust,  extortionate 
and  unreasonable.  HELD,  that  the  car- 
riage of  a  commuter  differs  in  many 
respects  from  other  passenger  traffic, 
and    is    an    independent    and    a   special 


service  and  a  special  kind  of  traflac. 
This  being  the  case,  the  reasonableness 
of  the  fares  demanded  for  the  service 
may  be  looked  into  by  the  Commission 
under  section  1  of  the  Act.  The  new 
commutation  rate  of  the  Central  of 
New  Jersey  R.  R.,  which  ranges  from 
$5.95  for  ten  miles  up  to  $10.35  for  40 
miles,  is  held  reasonable,  and  these 
rates  are  taken  as  a  standard,  and 
under  that  view  the  new  fares  of 
the  Erie,  Lackawanna  and  West  Shore 
railways,  being  approximately  the  same, 
are  not  unreasonable.  The  new  rates 
of  the  Pennsylvania  Co.,  which  range 
from  $6.25  for  10  miles  to  $16  for  40 
miles,  are  unreasonable  and  should  not 
exceed  more  than  $10  for  the  commuta- 
tion tickets  from  New  Brunswick  to 
New  York,  31.3  miles,  rates  for  other 
distances  being  adjusted  relatively. 
Commutation  Rate  Case,  21  I.  C.  C.  428. 

(b)  Commutation  fares  are  entirely 
different  from  mileage  books.  Commu- 
tation Rate  Case,  21  I.  C.  C.  428,  434. 

(c)  A  carrier  that  has  not  under- 
taken a  commutation  service  may  pos- 
Bibly  not  be  compelled  to  do  so  under 
the  present  law,  but  whether,  having 
done  so,  it  can  withdraw  such  service,  is 
another  question.  Commutation  Rate 
Case,   21   I.   C.   C.   428;   437. 

(d)  As  applied  to  passenger  traffic, 
commutation  seems  to  signify  the  pay- 
ment in  a  single  sum  of  the  cost  to  the 
traveler  for  transportation,  limited  in 
point  of  time  or  in  the  number  of  trips, 
between  two  designated  points.  Appar- 
ently it  implies  also  a  fare  per  trip 
that  is  less  than  the  normal  fare  for 
a  one-way  journey.  Commutation  Rate 
Case,  21  I.   C.   C.  428,  438. 

(e)  The  prosperity  and  growth  of 
many  communities  throughout  the  coun- 
try depend  upon  an  efficient  and  reason- 
able commutation  service.  Many  such 
communities  have  not  only  been  encour- 
aged by  the  carriers,  but  were,  in  fact, 
originally  established  largely  on  their  ini-. 
tiative.  Suburban  property  has  been 
bought,  homes  have  been  established, 
business  relations  made,  and  the  entire 
course  of  life  of  many  families  adjusted 
to  the  conditions  created  by  a  commuta- 
tion service.  This  may  not  have  been 
done  on  the  theory  that  the  fares  in  ef- 
fect at  any  particular  time  would  always 
be  maintained  as  maximum  fares,  but 
countless  homes  have  been  established  in 
suburban  communities  in  the  belief  that 


PASSENGER  FARES  AND  FACILITIES,  §5    (f)— (i) 


521 


there  would  be  a  reasonable  continuity 
in  the  fares,  and  that  the  carriers  in  any 
event  would  perform  the  service  at  all 
times  for  a  reasonable  compensation. 
S  burban  communities  have  grown  into 
existence  on  the  theory,  voluntarily  ac- 
cepted by  the  carriers  as  well  as  by  the 
public,  that  one  who  makes  daily  use  of 
an  agency  of  transportation  between  his 
place  of  business  and  his  home  must 
necessarily  be  accorded  a  special  and  a 
low  rate.  This  theory  is  firmly  fixed  in 
the  history  and  traditions  of  transporta- 
tion by  rail  and  must,  therefore,  be  re- 
garded as  embraced  in  the  law  under 
which  such  transportation  is  regulated. 
Commutation  Rate  Case,  21  I.  C.  C.  428, 
437,  442. 

(f)  Commutation  traffic  stands  by  it- 
self as  a  special  and  distinct  kind  of 
service,  for  which  the  carrier  may  de- 
mand no  more  than  a  reasonable  compen- 
sation. Excursion  traffic  is  sporadic  and 
occasional,  and  altogether  exceptional. 
Unlike  excursion  traffic,  commutation 
traffic  is  neither  occasional  nor  sporadic, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  is  characterized  by 
an  unusual  regularity  in  volume;  it  may 
be  accurately  measured  and  provided  for 
more  readily  than  in  the  case  of  any 
other  kind  of  passenger  traffic.  It  is  ordi- 
narily constant,  except  as  it  may  gradu- 
ally grow  in  volume.  Its  stability  is 
established  by  the  juxtaposition  of  a 
community  of  homes  and  a  community 
of  workshops;  and  this  separation  of  the 
place  of  residence  from  the  place  of 
work  is  in  many  cases  the  direct  result 
of  the  efforts  of  the  carrier.  It  has  been 
encouraged,  developed  and  fostered  by 
the  carriers,  and  large  and  numerous  sub- 
urban communities  have  grown  up  in  the 
belief,  not  that  some  fare  less  than  the 
normal  full  passenger  fare  would  be  de- 
manded in  the  future,  but  in  the  belief 
that  no  more  than  a  just  and  reasonable 
fare  w^ould  at  any  time  be  exacted,  con- 
sidering the  special  character  of  the 
traffic  and  of  the  service  and  the  condi- 
tions that  differentiate  both  the  traffic 
and  the  service  so  completely  and  abso- 
lutely from  all  other  kinds  of  passenger 
traffic  and  service.  That  it  has  been  re- 
garded as  a  different  class  of  traffic  con- 
ducted under  entirely  different  conditions 
and  a  different  kind  of  service  is  shown, 
not  only  by  the  origin  of  commutation  and 
the  subsequent  traditions  that  have  accu- 
mulated with  its  growth,  but  by  the  gen- 
eral recognition  of  it  by  the  carriers 
themselves  as  an  indepen  lent  and  a  spe- 


cial service.  This  being  so,  there  is  no 
reason  why  the  reasonableness  of  the 
fares  demanded  for  the  service  may  not 
be  looked  into  by  the  Commission  under 
section  1.  It  is  conceded  on  behalf  of  the 
principal  complainant  that  a  carrier  mi. 7 
not  be  compelled  under  the  present  law 
to  undertake  a  commutation  service  and 
to  establish  commutation  rates.  That  is 
probably  true.  But  having  undertaken  a 
definite  and  regular  commutation  service, 
such  as  is  shown  of  record  on  the  part 
of  each  of  the  defendants  in  this  pro- 
ceeding, the  power  as  well  as  the  duty  of 
the  Commission  under  section  1  to  ex- 
amine into  the  reasonableness  of  the 
charges  exacted  when  complaint  has  b3en 
made  seems  to  be  beyond  question.  Read- 
ing section  22  (which  provides  "that 
nothing  in  this  Act  shall  prevent  .  .  . 
the  issuance  of  mileage,  excursion  or 
commutation  passenger  tickets")  in  the 
light  of  the  special  nature  and  character 
of  commutation  traffic  and  service,  the 
utmost  that  reasonably  may  be  said  of 
it  as  applied  to  commutation  tickets  is 
that  it  constitutes  a  statutory  recogni- 
tion of  the  fact  that  commutation  is 
a  different  kind  of  traffic.  Commuta- 
tion Rate  Case,  21  I.  C.  C.  428,  441, 
442,   443. 

(g)  Improvements  which  required  ex- 
penditures of  large  sums  of  money,  which 
have  added  to  the  efficiency- of  the  serv- 
ice, and  therefore  to  its  value  to  the 
commuters,  are  entitled  to  some  recog- 
nition in  determining  the  reasonableness 
of  the  increased  commutation  rates. 
Commutation  Rate  Case,  21  I.  C.  C.  428, 
444. 

(h)  The  administrative  ruling  of  the 
Commission  adopted  October  12,  1908, 
holding  it  unjustly  discriminatory  for  a 
carrier  to  offer  special  rates  on  monthly 
commutation  tickets  to  school  children, 
and  to  deny  such  rates  to  other  children 
of  the  same  age,  is  upheld,  but  under  the 
ruling  the  carrier  may  offer  special  rates 
to  children  between  certain  ages,  pro- 
vided same  is  open  to  all  persons  within 
the  age  limits  prescribed.  In  Re  Com- 
mutation Tickets  to  School  Children,  17 
I.    C.   C.   144. 

(i)  A  carrier  may  determine  for  itself 
whether  it  will  sell  commutation  tickets; 
but  if  it  elects  to  sell  them,  it  must  do 
so  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  Act. 
Weber  Club  &  Intermountain  Fair  Ass'n 
V.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  212,  216. 


522 


PASSENGER  FARES  AND  FACILITIES,  §«  (a)— (1) 


§6.     Mileage  and  Excursion   Rates. 

See   Advertising,    I;    Mileage   Scale. 

(a)  Carriers  are  permitted  but  not 
compelled  to  establish  excursion,  commu- 
tation and  mileage  tickets;  but  are  not 
at  liberty  to  discriminate  with  respect 
thereto.  In  Re  Mileage,  Excursion  and 
Commutation  Tickets,  23  I.  C.  C.  95,  96. 
96. 

(aa)  The  volume  of  traffic,  competi- 
tion and  other  conditions  may  justify 
lower  excursion  fares  to  Atlantic  City 
from  New  York  than  from  Baltimore. 
Merchants  &  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  of  Baltimore 
V.  A.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  129. 

(b)  Though  exceptional  cases  may  re- 
quire a  different  conclusion,  ordinarily  a 
carrier  may  refuse  to  continue  to  issue 
excursion  tickets  lower  than  its  normal 
fares.  Commutation  Rate  Case,  21  I.  C. 
C.  428,  437. 

(bb)  With  respect  to  some  kind  of  ex- 
cursion traffic,  section  4  has  been  applied 
by  the  Commission.  Commutation  Rate 
Case,  21  I.  C.  C.  428,  442. 

(c)  Unusual  conditions  may  require 
the  enforcement  of  sections  2  and  3,  as 
regards  excursion  tickets,  though  the 
Commission  has  not  yet  done  so.  Com- 
mutation Rate  Case,  21  I.  C.  C.  428,  442. 

(d)  Section  1,  requiring  that  all  rates 
must  be  reasonable,  has,  it  seems,  no  real 
application  to  mileage  books,  and  though 
an  exceptional  case  might  require  a  dif- 
ferent conclusion,  a  carrier  ordinarily 
may  refuse  to  continue  to  issue  mileage 
tickets  lower  than  its  normal  fares. 
Commutation  Rate  Case,  21  I.  C.  C.  428, 
437,  442. 

(e)  Exchange  orders  are  issued  volun- 
tarily, and  carriers  may  therefore  attach 
reasonable  and  non-discriminatory  regu- 
lations to  their  use.  Eschner  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  60,  64. 

(f)  Mileage  books  carriers  issue  vol- 
untarily, and  therefore  may  attach 
thereto  reasonable  and  non-discrimina- 
tory regulations.  Eschner  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  60,  "64. 

(g)  Defendant  joined  in  the  sale  of  a 
book  known  as  an  exchange  order  and 
good  only  west  of  Pittsburgh,  by  which 
the  purchaser  obtained  a  reduction  of 
the  regular  fare.  It  issued  a  similar  book 
called  a  mileage  book,  good  only  east  of 
Pittsburgh.  Complainant  presented  to 
defendant's  ticket  agent  at  Cleveland,  O., 


both  an  exchange  order  and  a  mileage 
book  and  demanded  the  through  checking 
of  his  baggage  and  a  through  Pullman 
ticket  from  Cleveland  to  Philadelphia. 
His  request  was  refused,  and  he  was  com- 
pelled to  recheck  his  baggage  at  Pitts- 
burgh and  buy  a  new  Pullman  ticket  at 
Pittsburgh  for  Philadelphia.  HELD,  de- 
fendant's practice  in  this  respect  was  not 
unreasonable  or  unduly  discriminatory, 
since  defendant  was  entitled  to  refuse 
certain  accommodations  accorded  to  pur- 
chasers of  tickets  in  view  of  the  lower 
rate  granted  complainant  by  the  mileage 
books,  and  since  complainant  was  free  to 
purchase  regular  tickets  for  himself. 
Eschner  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
60,  63. 

(h)  The  language  of  section  22  of  the 
Act,  to  the  effect  that  nothing  in  the  Act 
shall  prevent  the  issuance  of  mileage,  ex- 
cursion or  commutation  passenger  tick- 
ets, is  permissive  and  does  not  give  the 
Commission  any  authority  to  require  in- 
terstate carriers  to  sell  interstate  trans- 
portation in  that  form.  Eschner  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  60,  '63. 

(i)  The  right  to  use  exchange  order 
and  mileage  books  is  in  the  nature  of  a 
privilege,  and  must  be  accepted  with  all 
the  lawful  limitations  that  may  be  at- 
tached. Eschner  v.  Penn.  R.  r'  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  60,  64. 

(j)  In  extending  the  privilege  of  mile- 
age, excursion  and  commutation  tickets, 
a  carrier  may  attach  to  them  conditions 
as  to  the  checking  of  baggage,  purchase 
of  Pullman  accommodations,  etc.,  so  long 
as  the  conditions  result  in  no  violation  of 
any  provision  of  the  Act.  Eschner  v. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  60,  64. 

(k)  Mileage,  commutation  or  excur- 
sion tickets,  when  published  for  sale, 
must  be  open  impartially  to  all.  Weber 
Club  &  Intermountain  Fair  Ass'n  v.  O.  S. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  212,  216. 

(1)  The  Mormon  Church  held  two  con- 
ferences each  year  at  Salt  Lake  City — 
in  April  and  October.  Defendants  at  such 
times  granted  round-trip  tickets  for  the 
price  of  one  fare.  During  the  October 
conference,  the  state  fair  was  also  held 
at  Salt  Lake.  Ogden'  held  its  fair  dur- 
ing the  fall,  and  defendants  refused  to 
grant  round-trip  tickets  for  less  than  a 
fare  and  a  third.  From  many  points 
north,  east  and  west  of  Ogden,  passengers 
might  make  the  trip  through  Ogden  to 
Salt  Lake  and  back  for  less  than  the 
round  trip  at  one  and  one-third  fare  to 


PASSENGER  FARES  AND   FACILITIES,    §6    (m)— §8    (a) 


523 


Ogden.  The  statistics  relating  to  the 
movement  of  passengers  through  Ogden 
to  attend  the  fall  conference  at  Salt  Lake 
as  compared  with  the  movement  to  <^''- 
den  for  attendance  upon  the  latter's  fair 
did  not  indicate  that  any  great  prejudice 
was  being  worked  against  Ogden.  HELD, 
defendants  were  not  shown  to  have  un- 
duly discriminated  against  Ogden.  U 
must  ordinarily  be  left  with  the  carrier 
to  determine  the  place,  the  time  and 
amount  of  an  excursion  rate,  but  it  is 
conceivable  that  by  the  granting  of  re- 
duced transportation  under  the  guise  of 
excursion  rates  the  most  serious  and 
unjustifiable  discrimination  might  be 
worked.  The  Commission  is  not  pre- 
pared to  admit  that  under  no  circum- 
stances could  it  inquire  whether  undue 
discrimination  had  arisen  from  the  issu- 
ing of  mileage  commutation  or  excur- 
sion tickets,  but  the  statute  itself  author- 
izes discrimination  in  permitting  the  is- 
suance of  excursion  tickets,  and  it  is  only 
in  cases  where  this  privilege  has  been 
plainly  abused  that  the  Commission  would 
be  justified  in  interfering.  Weber  Club 
(fe  Intermountain  Fair  Ass'n  v.  O.  S.  L.  R. 
R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  212,  216. 

<m)  Where  no  provision  appears  in 
the  tariff,  either  of  the  Penn.  P.  R.  Co. 
extending  from  Pittsburgh  to  New  York, 
providing  for  the  issue  of  its  mileage 
books,  nor  of  the  Pennsylvania  company 
extending  from  New  Castle  to  Pittsburgh 
providing  for  an  interchangeable  mile- 
age book,  which  in  any  way  limits  these 
books  to  a  local  trip,  a  passenger  from 
New  Castle  to  New  York  is  entitled  to 
purchase  a  Pullman  berth  upon  presenta- 
tion of  such  a  book.  Kurtz  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  410,  415. 

(n)  A  mileage  book  is  issued  usually, 
if  not  invariably,  at  a  rate  less  than  the 
local  fare,  and  in  consideration  of  this 
the  railroad  issuing  the  book  may  attach 
to  its  use  various  conditions.  Kurtz  v. 
Penn.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  410,  416. 

§7.     Party  Rates. 

(a)  Special  party  rates  cannot  law- 
fully be  limited  by  carriers  to  particular 
classes  of  persons,  such  as  theatrical 
companies  and  other  special  organiza- 
tions engaged  in  giving  public  exhibi- 
tions, but  must  be  open  to  the  general 
public.  Field  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C  C. 
298,  299. 

(b)  Complainant,  a  secret  service  and 
detective  organization,  presented  parties 


of  men  in  excess  of  ten  for  transportation 
from  Nashville,  Tenn.,  to  Evansville,  Ind., 
an(J  from  Evansville  to  Nashville  anl 
were  refused  the  ten-party  rates  which 
defendant  under  its  tariffs  was  offering 
to  other  classes  of  passengers.  Com- 
plainant was  obliged  to  pay  the  full  in- 
dividual fare  on  each  man.  HELD,  the 
tariff  was  unlawful  in  applying  to  certain 
classes  of  passengers  and  not  to  others. 
Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis  of  the 
ten-party  rates.  Koch  Secret  Gervice  v. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  523,  524. 

(c)  Complainant  presented  a  party  of 
ten  men  for  transportation  and  de- 
manded the  ten-party  rates,  which  were 
refused  on  the  ground  that  such  men,  be- 
ing engaged  in  secret  service  and  de- 
tective work,  were  not  included  in  the 
tariffs  extending  party  rates  to  certain 
classes  of  passengers.  Complainant  then 
sent  on  only  nine  men,  paying  full  indi- 
vidual fares.  HELD,  although  the  re- 
fusal to  grant  the  fare  was  unlawful, 
complainant  could  not  recover,  since  it 
did  not  actually  send  over  defendant's 
line  the  full  ten  men  required  to  obtain 
party  rates.  Koch  Secret  Service  v.  L. 
&  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  1.  C.  C.  523,  525. 

§8.     Validation. 

(a)  Respondents  sold  to  a  passenger, 
on  Sept.  10,  1909,  a  limited  round-trip 
ticket  from  Goldfield,  Nov.,  to  Omaha, 
Neb.,  via  the  lines  of  the  Las  Vegas  & 
Tonopah  R.  R.  to  Las  Vegas,  Nov.,  the 
San  Pedro,  Los  Angeles  &  Salt  I-ake  Ry. 
to  Salt  Lake  City,  Utah,  the  D.  &  R.  G. 
Ry.  to  Denver,  Colo.,  the  C.  B.  &  ^. 
Ry.  to  Omaha,  Neb.,  and  return  via  the 
same  route.  The  return  portion  of  the 
ticket  was  not  validated  at  Omaha  be- 
fore being  presented  for  the  return  pas- 
srge,  as  required  by  the  tariff  and  the 
contract  printed  on  the  ticket.  Through 
error  on  the  part  of  railroad  conductors 
the  return  portion  of  the  ticket,  although 
not  validated,  was  accepted  by  all  of  the 
carriers,  except  the  Las  Vegas  &  Tono- 
pah R.  R.,  which  refused  to  accept  the 
ticket  for  the  portion  of  the  journey  from 
Las  Vegas  to  Goldfield,  thereby  com- 
pelling the  passenger  to  pay  an  additional 
fare  of  $11.55.  Effective  Nov.  5,  1909,  the 
Las  Vegas  &  Tonopah  R.  R.  published 
regulations  which  provided  that  when  a 
passenger  was  compelled  to  pay  an  extra 
fare  by  reason  of  the  non-validation  of 
a  limited  return  ticket,  it  would  refund 
the  amount  so  paid,  providing  all  other 
conditions  of  th».  contract  of  the  ticket 


524 


PASSENGER  FARES  AND  FACILITIES,  §8  (b)— §9   (a) 


and  the  tariff  under  which  it  is  sold  were 
complied  with,  and  that  satisfactory  evi- 
dence was  furnished  that  the  extra  fare 
was  paid  by  the  passenger.  Similar  rules 
have  been  published  by  other  respond- 
ents. HELD,  these  rules  appear  to 
be  reasonable,  and  perhaps  go  further 
to  protect  the  passenger  from  his  own 
carelessness  than  the  Commission  would 
be  inclined  to  require.  That  this 
regulation  not  having  been  in  effect 
at  the  time  the  passenger  performed 
the  travel,  she  is  claiming  reparation 
under  a  right  which  she  did  not 
possess  at  that  time.  The  Commission 
will,  therefore,  decline  to  authorize  the 
carrier  who  sold  the  ticket  to  make  the 
refund.  The  Commission  is  further  of 
opinion  that  all  carriers  should  estab- 
lish regulations  relating  to  refund  of 
excess  amounts  collected  from  pas- 
sengers by  reason  of  their  failure  to 
validate  round-trip  excursion  tickets 
which  shall  be  at  least  as  favorable  to 
the  passenger  as  those  carried  in  re- 
spondent's tariffs,  above  quoted,  Non- 
Validation  of  Limited  Excursion  Tickets, 
19  L  C.  C.  440. 

(b)  Where  there  is  tariff  authority, 
it  is  no  violation  of  the  Act  to  require 
validation  of  limited  excursion  tickets 
and  to  charge  validation  fee  therefor. 
Riter  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
443,  444. 

(c)  The  validating  fee  on  limited  ex- 
cursion tickets  is  paid  to  the  validation 
agent.  The  Pacific  Coast  agencies  are 
maintained  by  the  Transcontinental  Pas- 
senger Association,  and  the  agencies  ac- 
count to  the  association  for  the  fees 
received.  If  the  amount  of  these  fees 
exceeds  the  expense  of  maintaining  the 
agency,  the  surplus  is  transmitted  to  the 
Transcontinental  Passenger  Association, 
whereas,  if  the  cost  of  the  agency  is 
greater  than  the  receipts  in  the  way  of 
fees,  the  transcontinental  association 
makes  up  the  deficiency.  The  expenses 
of  the  Transcontinental  Passenger  Asso- 
ciation itself,  including  these  validating 
expenses,  are  paid  by  the  railroads  be- 
longing to  that  association  in  proportion 
to  the  mileage  of  the  railroads,  according 
to  the  testimony  in  this  record.  It  fol- 
lows, therefore,  that  under  the  method 
of  handling  these  validation  fees,  they 
never  find  their  way  into  the  revenue 
returns  of  the  carriers  to  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission.  For  the  valida- 
tion of  tickets  at  the  twenty  agencies  on 
the  Pacific  coast  during  the  period  from 


1901  to  1909,  inclusive,  over  $290,350 
must  have  been  paid,  which  is  nowhere 
reported  as  a  part  of  the  passenger  re- 
ceipt of  the  railroads  handling  that  busi- 
ness. This  is  clearly  wrong.  In  some 
way  those  fees  should  find  their  way  into 
the  accounts  of  the  railroad.  But  the 
circumstances  that  a  proper  account  of 
the  fee  is  not  given  does  not  of  necessity 
stamp  the  exaction  of  it,  or  the  method  of 
its  exaction,  as  illegal.  The  complainant 
contends  that  the  manner  in  which  these 
validation  fees  are  handled  amounts  to 
a  violation  of  the  5th  section  of  the  Act, 
but  the  Commission  is  unable  to  see  how 
in  the  transaction  as  detailed  in  the  testi- 
mony, there  is  anything  amounting  to  a 
pooling  of  freight  or  .  division  of  earn- 
ings.    Riter   v.    O.    S.    L.   R.   R.    Co.,   19 

I.  C.  C.  443,  446. 

(d)  Defendants  advertised  an  ex- 
cursion rate  of  $42  for  the  round  trip 
from  Salt  Lake  City  to  San  Francisco. 
At  San  Francisco  complainant  was  re- 
quired to  pay  an  additional  sum  of  50c 
as  a  validating  charge.  Tickets  were 
validated  at  an  office  quite  distant  from 
the  regular  station  and  complainant  in 
searching  for  this  office  missed  his  train. 
HELD,  the  purchaser  should  in  all  cases 
be  advised  when  he  buys  his  ticket  that 
it  must  be  validated  and  that  a  valida- 
tion fee  will  be  charged.  These  facts 
should  be  plainly  stated  upon  the  face 
of  the  ticket  itself.  Some  tickets  now 
state  the  amount  of  the  fee  to  be  ex- 
acted, while  others  state  that  a  valida- 
tion fee  will  be  required  in  accordance 
with  the  terms  of  the  tariff.  In  all 
cases  upon  the  face  of  the  ticket  the 
amount  of  the  validation  fee  should 
appear.  Railroad  companies  should  also 
exercise  great  care  in  providing  con- 
venient places  for  the  establishment  of 
validation  agencies  and  in  supplying  a 
sufficient  number  of  agents  so  that  what 
occurred  in  the  case  of  the  complainant 
can  seldom  if  ever  happen.  Riter  v. 
O.   S.  L.   R.  R.   Co.,  19   I.   C.  C.  443,   446. 

II.  DISCRIMINATION   IN  FACILITIES. 

§9.     In   General. 

See   Special    Contracts,   §5    (de) ;   Tar- 
iffs,  §3    (d). 

(a)  The  law  will  not  permit  deviation 
from  the  services,  facilities  and  privileges 
offered  in  the  tariffs  any  more  than  from- 
the  amount  of  the  rates,  fares  or  charges 
therefor.  In  Re  Mileage,  Excursion  and 
Commutation  Tickets,  23  I.  C.  C.  95. 


PASSENGER   FARES  AND  FACILITIES,   §9    (b)— §11    (a) 


525 


(b)  To  prevent  discrimination  and 
promote  equality  of  treatment  in  charges 
and  services,  the  law  requires  not  only 
definite  statement  of  the  amount  of  the 
rates,  fares  and  charges  of  carriers  in 
their  established  schedules,  but  equally 
definite  statement  therein  of  all  privileges 
and  facilities  granted  or  allowed  in  con- 
nection therewith,  and  any  rules  or  regu- 
lations which  in  anywise  affect  or  deter- 
mine any  part  or  the  aggregate  of  the 
rates,  fares  or  charges,  or  the  value  of 
the  service  rendered  to  the  passenger, 
shipper  or  consignee.  It  is  clear  that 
no  schedule  complies  with  the  require- 
ments of  the  law  which  does  not  defi- 
nitely and  fully  state  the  charges,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  services  to  be  rendered 
therefor  on  the  other.  In  Re  Mileage, 
Excursion  and  Commutation  Tickets,  23 
I.  C.  C.  95. 

(c)  Carriers,  individually  and  jointly, 
may  afford  many  facilities,  accommoda- 
tions and  conveniences  to  shippers  and 
passengers  which  they  may  not  be  com- 
pelled to  afford,  but  they  are  no  more  at 
liberty  to  unjustly  discriminate  with  re- 
spect to  such  services  than  with  respect 
to  those  things  which,  under  the  law, 
they  may  be  compelled  to  do.  In  Re 
Mileage,  Excursion  and  Commutation 
Tickets,  23  I.  C.  C.  95,  96. 

(d)  Complainant  alleged  that  defend- 
ants subjected  Baltimore  to  undue  dis- 
crimination in  certain  passenger  excur- 
sion fares  from  Baltimore  to  Atlantic  City, 
and  gave  unreasonable  preference  to  New 
York  in  similar  fares  from  New  York  to 
Atlantic  City,  also  that  the  fares  from 
Baltimore  were  unreasonable.  Defendants 
maintained  a  six  months'  round-trip  fare 
of  $5  from  New  York  to  Atlantic  City, 
while  from  Baltimore  the  round-trip  fares 
were  $6  and  $6.50  for  fifteen-day  trips  and 
$6.75  and  $7.25  for  trips  with  a  limit 
of  six  months.  The  distance  from  Balti- 
more to  Atlantic  City  via  the  lines  of 
defendants  is  from  153  to  165  miles.  The 
$5  rate  from  New  York  City  is  made  in 
competition  with  the  similar  fc^re  in- 
augurated by  the  short  line,  a  distance 
of  137  miles,  as  early  as  1889.  During 
the  season  of  greatest  travel  in  each  year, 
from  June  16  to  September  16,  Baltimore 
has  a  $5  week-end  excursion  fare  to  At- 
lantic City  good  for  five  days  via  all 
routes.  The  volume  of  trafllic  from  New 
York  is  about  six  times  that  from  Balti- 
more. HELD,  that  the  lower  fares  from 
New  York  are  forced  by  competition  and 
the  difference  in  mileage  is  a  factor  to 


be  considered  on  a  round  trip,  and  upon 
the  record  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  ex- 
cursion fares  involved  are  excessive  or 
unreasonable.  Complaint  dismissed..  Mer- 
chants' &  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  129. 

(e)  There  may  be  undue  discrimina- 
tion in  maintaining  a  round-trip  fare 
from  one  town  and  not  maintaining  such 
a  fare  from  a  neighboring  town.  Ballin 
V.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  503,  504. 

(f)  Provisions  of  section  22  of  the  Act 
do  not  entirely  exempt  the  issuance  of 
commutation,  mileage  or  excursion  ticK- 
ets  from  the  operation  of  the  undue  dis- 
crimination provision  of  the  Act.  Web«r 
Club  &  Intermountain  Fair  Ass'n  v.  O.  S. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  212. 

(g)  In  the  performance  of  its  pas- 
senger service,  a  carrier  operates  in  a 
wide  field  of  reasonable  discretion  in  the 
adaptation  of  its  service  to  the  infinite 
variety  of  circumstances  and  conditions 
confronting  it.  Only  such  resulting  dis- 
criminations as  are  undue  and  unreason- 
able are  forbidden.  Loch  Lynn  Construc- 
tion Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
396,  399. 

(h)  Accidents  occur  where  all  pas- 
sengers are  deprived  of  accommodations 
usually  afforded  them,  but  that  fact  could 
not  be  a  foundation  for  a  finding  of  un- 
just discrimination.  Cozart  v.  So.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  226,  231. 

§10.     Baggage. 

See  Supra,    §1    (aa);    Infra,   §14   (dd) ; 
Baggage    Transfer. 

(a)  Undue  discrimination  is  not  ex- 
ercised by  a  railroad  company  in  car- 
rying free  150  pounds  of  baggage  for  a 
passenger,  as  against  the  many  pas- 
sengers who  travel  without  baggage. 
Herbeck-Demer  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  88,  89. 

§11.     Colored    Passengers. 

(a)  Compartment  passenger  cars  run- 
ning from  Atlanta,  Ga.,  to  Washington, 
D.  C,  were  provided  for  the  colored  peo- 
ple and  for  the  whites.  The  forward 
compartment  was  occupied  by  the  col- 
ored people  and  was  supplied  with  a 
washbowl,  a  duplicate  of  that  in  the  com- 
partment assigned  to  white  passengers. 
Ordinarily,  soap  and  towels  vere  fur- 
nished to  all  passengers,  and,  if  on  ac- 
count of  an  emergency  they  were  not 
furnished,  the  white  and  colored  pas- 
sengers  suffered   alike.     But  one   toilet 


526 


PASSENGER  FARES  AND  FACILITIES,  §11   (b)— §12    (d) 


was  furnished  for  men  and  women  in 
each  compartment  which  did  not  bear 
designation.  In  emergency,  the  cars  were 
sometimes  turned  so  that  the  colored 
compartment  was  in  the  rear,  in  which 
case  a  separate  smoking  compartment 
was  not  furnished  the  colored  passerger. 
HELD,  the  general  treatment  and  accom- 
modation of  colored  passengers  was  not 
unduly  discriminatory  in  favor  of  the 
whites.  Cozart  v.  S.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
C.  226,  230. 

(b)  Complainant,  colored  bishops,  al- 
leged that  colored  passengers  in  the 
southeastern  states  were  unduly  discrimi- 
nated against,  in  the  character  and  con- 
dition of  the  passenger  coaches  furnished 
to  them,  in  the  refusal  to  sell  sleeping 
car  tickets,  or  to  deny  the  holder  of  such 
tickets  the  right  to  use  the  space  called 
for  by  them,  and  in  refusal  to  colored  pas- 
sengers of  access  to  dining  cars,  and  of 
service  of  food  and  refreshments.  The 
evidence  showed  that  the  day-coach  ac- 
commodations offered  to  colored  pas- 
sengers were  tie  same  as  to  white 
people,  and  that  more  space  was  pro- 
vided for  the  colored  than  the  white 
travelers.  Colored  passengers  were  not 
served  with  meals  in  the  dining  car 
at  the  same  time  with  whites,  but 
were  served  on  the  third  and  last 
call,  or  upon  request  were  served  at 
their  seats  either  in  the  Pullman,  or 
in  the  ordinary  coach,  portable  tables 
being  used  for  that  purpose.  In 
other  respects  the  dining  service  was  the 
same  for  the  colored  as  for  white  travel- 
ers. As  to  sleeping  cars,  the  rules  and 
regulations  did  not  discriminate  against 
colored  persons,  the  real  discrimination 
arising  from  the  application  of  the  rules 
to  individual  travelers  by  the  carriers' 
servants.  The  laws  in  the  section  of 
the  country  involved  provided  for  t'  e 
separation  of  the  white  and  black  pas- 
sengers on  trains,  such  laws  having  been 
upheld  as  constitutional.  The  evidence 
indicated  that  the  average  colored  trav- 
eler was  not  welcomed  by  the  average 
ticket  seller  or  Pullman  conductor  when 
applying  for  sleeping  car  accommoda- 
tions on  itccount  of  the  exceeding  infre- 
quency  of  the  demand,  and  the  fear  of 
breaking  state  laws  in  acceding  thereto, 
the  confusion  with  respect  to  state  and 
federal  laws,  and  the  rights,  obligations 
and  penalties  attaching  thereto,  and  the 
manner  of  the  makirg  of  the  demand. 
Colored  travel  for  long  distance  was  ex- 
ceedingly slight,  as  compared  with  white 


travel.  The  evidence  indicated  that  the 
colored  people  demanding  accomc^oda- 
tions  were  often  lacking  in  tact  with  re- 
spect to  the  race  problcxus  actually  ex- 
isting. HELD,  under  the  evidence  no 
undue  discrimination  or  prejudice  was 
established.  Complaint  dismissed.  Gaines 
v.  S.  Air  Line  Ry,  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  471, 
474-476. 

§12.     Free  Transportation. 
See    Crimes,    ill. 

(a)  Sections  1  and  2  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act,  as  amended  June  29, 
1906,  forbidding  carriers  from  issuing 
free  transportation  to  passengers  and 
from  transporting  passengers  for  a 
greater  or  less  or  different  compensation 
than  that  required  in  the  published  sched- 
ules, are  not  retroactive,  and  do  not  in- 
validate a  contract  entered  into  prior  to 
the  passage  of  the  Act,  by  whic'i  an  in- 
terstate carrier  in  consideration  of  a 
settlement  of  a  claim  for  damages  for 
personal  injuries  agreed  to  issue  free 
transportation  for  life  to  the  injured  per- 
sons over  its  main  line  and  branches.  L. 
&  N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Mottley,  133  Ky.  652, 
657,  118  S.  W.  982;  reversed,  219  U.  S. 
467,  31  Sup.  Ct.  265,  55  L.  ed.  297. 

(b)  Under  section  1  of  the  Act,  as 
amended  June  29,  19(6,  forbidding  car- 
riers to  issue  interstate  free  tickets  'r 
free  passes,  a  free  pass  issued  prior  to  the 
passage  of  the  Act,  granting  free  trans- 
portation for  life  in  consideration  of  a 
release  of  a  right  of  action  for  personal 
injuries  inflicted  by  the  carrier,  is  not 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute,  and  its 
continuance  is  not  unlawful.  L.  &  N, 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Mottley,  133  Ky.  652,  658, 
118  S.  W.  982;  reversed,  219  U.  S.  467, 
31  Sup.  Ct.  265,  55  L.  ed.  297. 

(c)  Section  1,  paragraph  4,  of  the 
Hepburn  Act,  forbidding  interstate  car- 
riers from  giving  free  transportation  ex- 
cept to  railway  mail  service  employes 
and  other  excepted  classes  of  persons, 
does  not  forbid  a  carrier  from  giving  a 
mail  service  employe  free  passage  when 
not  on  duty,  so  as  to  prevent  his  -personal 
r  T)resentative  from  recovering  for  his 
death,  caused  by  the  carrier's  negligence, 
while  riding,  with  the  knowledge  of  the 
carrier's  trainmen,  not  in  the  perfor^m- 
ance  of  his  office,  but  for  his  own  benefit 
or  pleasure.  Schuyler  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  ?7 
Utah  581,  606,  109  P.  458. 

(d)  Prior  to  the  passage  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act,  defendant  carrier. 


PASSENGER  FARES  AND  FACILITIES,   §12    (e)— §13    (b) 


527 


in  consideration  of  a  tract  of  land  deeded 
by  plaintiff  to  it,  contracted  to  issue  and 
deliver  annual  passes  to  plaintiff  and  his 
wife,  for  and  during  their  natural  life, 
entitling  them  to  free  transportation  over 
defendant's  entire  system  of  railway  and 
steamship  lines,  and  to  issue  like  passes 
to  their  five  children  for  a  period  of  five 
years.  HELD,  the  land  conveyed  having 
greatly  increased  in  value,  plaintiff  could 
not  rescind  the  contract  and  get  back  the 
land,  since  the  performance  of  the  agree- 
ment by  the  defendant  was  prevented  by 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  as 
amended  June  29,  1906,  forbidding  car- 
riers from  accepting  a  greater  or  less  or 
different  compensation  than  that  pro- 
vided for  in  their  published  schedules. 
Cowley  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Wash.  1912), 
123  P.  998,  1000. 

(e^  Prior  to  the  passage  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act,  defendant  carrier, 
in  consideration  of  a  tract  of  land  deeded 
by  plaintiff  to  it,  contracted  to  issue  and 
deliver  annual  passes  to  plaintiff  and  his 
wife  for  and  during  their  natural  life,  en- 
titling them  to  free  transportation  over 
defendant's  entire  system  of  railway  and 
steamship  lines,  and  to  is  ue  like  passes 
to  their  five  children  for  a  period  of  five 
years.  HELD,  plaintiff  could  not  recover 
damages  for  the  refusal  of  the  defend- 
an-"  to  perform  the  contract,  since  de- 
fendant was  prevented  from  so  doing  by 
oi;3ration  of  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act,  as  amended  June  29,  1906,  forbidding 
carriers  from  accepting  a  greater  or  less 
o'  different  compensation  than  that  pro- 
vided for  in  their  published  schedules. 
Cowley  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Wash.  1912) 
123  P.  998,  1001. 

(f)  Where  a  free  pass  is  issued  to  a 
person  to  whom  a  carrier,  under  a  con- 
tract long  existing  and  valid  when  made, 
has  agreed  to  pay  an  annual  sum  and  to 
furnish  free  interstate  transportation,  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act,  as  amended 
June  29,  1906,  is  violated  unless  such  per- 
son is  an  employe  or  agent  of  the  carrier. 
Gill  V.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.  (N.  Y.  1912),  135 
N.  Y.  Sup.  355,  359. 

(g)  Prior  to  the  passage  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act  defendant  carrier, 
in  consideration  of  a  tract  of  land 
deeded  by  plaintiff  to  it,  contracted  to 
issue  and  deliver  annual  passes  to  plain- 
tiff and  his  wife  for  and  during  their 
natural  life,  entitling  them  to  free  trans- 
portation over  defendant's  entire  sys- 
tem of  railway  and  steamship  lines,  and 


to  issue  like  passes  to  their  five  chil- 
dren for  a  period  of  five  years.  HELD, 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  as 
amended  June  29,  1906,  forbidding  car- 
riers from  accepting  a  greater  or  less 
or  different  compensation  than  that  pro- 
vided for  in  their  published  schedules, 
prevented  the  performance  of  the  con- 
tract by  defendant.  Cowley  v.  Northern 
P.  Ry.  Co.  (Wash.,  1912),  123  P.  998,  999. 

§13.     Stations. 

See    Special     Contracts,    §4    (1)     (L); 
Terminal    Facilities,    §1    (c). 

(a)  Inhabitants  of  Park  Manor,  a  sub- 
urb of  Chicago,  having  a  population  of 
about  6,000,  sought  the  re-establishment 
of  the  Park  Manor  station,  abandoned  by 
defendant.  The  Englewood  and  Grand 
Crossing  stations  are  maintained  within 
short  distances  of  most  of  the  residents 
of  Park  Manor  and  are  reasonably  access- 
ible; Lake  Shore  R.  R.  service  is  available 
within  a  hundred  feet  of  the  site  of  the 
former  Park  Manor  station  to  and  from 
nearly  all  of  the  interstate  points  reached 
by  the  Pennylvania  company  trains  pre- 
viously serving  Park  Manor,  and  the  in- 
terstate passenger  traffic  at  Park  Manor 
is  s^own  to  have  been  inconsequential. 
HELD,  that  the  convenience  of  the  gen- 
eral public  has  not  been  seriously  im- 
paired by  the  discontinuance  of  Park 
Manor  station  or  complainant  subjected 
to  undue  prejudice  or  disadvantage. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Mattison  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.,  23  l.  C.  C.  233. 

(b)  Defendant  maintained  a  station  at 
Roycefield,  N.  J.,  for  about  40  years  and 
then  withdrew  same.  Complainant  asked 
that  defendant  be  ordered  to  restore  it. 
Roycefield  lay  2.6  miles  south  of  Somer- 
ville,  and  Flagtown  lay  2.8  miles  south 
of  Roycefield  on  defendant's  line.  South 
Somerville  was  about  three-fifths  of  a 
mile  from  Roycefield.  Roycefield  had  no 
postoflSce,  church,  stores  or  other  busi- 
ness houses.  The  majority  of  residences 
and  farmhouses  in  and  surrounding 
Roycefield  were  nearer  to  Somerville 
than  to  Roycefield.  The  revenue  derived 
at  Roycefield  from  freight  and  passenger 
service  was  only  slightly  in  excess  of  the 
cost  of  maintaining  a  station.  Defend- 
ant maintained  Roycefield  as  a  fiag  sta- 
tion and  received  passenger  and  carload 
freight  upon  signal.  HELD,  waiving  the 
question  of  the  Commission's  authority 
to  order  the  restoration  of  a  station,  the 
public  was  properly  served  by  the  sta- 
tions at  Somerville  and  South  Somerville, 


528 


PASSENGER  FARES  AND  FACILITIES,   §13    (c)— §14   (a) 


and  no  public  interest  was  violated  in  the 
removal  of  the  station  at  Roycefield  suffi- 
cient to  constitute  a  violation  of  the  Act. 
Snook  V.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  17 
I.  C.   C.  375,  378. 

(c)  A  carrier  cannot  justify  unreason- 
able discrimination  between  localities  in 
refusing  to  stop  its  passenger  trains  at  a 
particular  place  on  certain  days  by  a  con- 
tract not  to  do  so.  A  controversy  in- 
volving a  question  of  such  discrimination 
must  be  determined  independent  of  the 
contract.  Loch  Lynn  Construction  Co. 
V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  396. 

(d)  Deer  Park  is  located  in  West  Vir- 
ginia on  the  line  of  defendant  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.,  256  miles  from  Baltimore.  Moun- 
tain Park  Lake  is  3i/4  miles  west  of  Deer 
Park,  Oakland  is  two  miles  west  of  Moun- 
tain Park  Lake,  and  Terra  Alta  10  miles 
west  of  Oakland.  Deer  Park  and  Moun- 
tain Park  are  summer  resorts.  Oakland 
is  a  county  seat  of  3,000  people.  Terra 
Alta  has  a  population  of  1,000.  Complain- 
ant hotel  company  at  Mountain  Lake 
alleged  that  the  failure  of  defendant  to 
stop  its  trains  on  Sunday  at  Mountain 
Park  Lake  while  stopping  them  on  Sun- 
day at  Deer  Park,  Oakland  and  Terra 
Alta  constituted  unjust  discrimination. 
Mountain  Park  Lake  was  established  as 
a  religious  summer  resort  by  the  inter- 
vener, a  religious  association,  and  de- 
fendant for  many  years  prior  to  the  es- 
tablishment of  complainant's  hotel  had 
an  agreement  with  this  association  not 
to  stop  trains  on  Sunday  for  the  purpose 
of  preserving  the  sanctity  of  the  Sabbath. 
The  intervener  had  more  than  $300,000  in- 
vested in  improvements.  The  hotel  prop- 
erty was  located  1,000  feet  south  of  the 
Mountain  Park  Lake  station,  in  the  incor- 
porated village  of  Lock  Lynn.  Complain- 
ant's patronage  was  largely  made  up  of 
the  visitors  of  the  intervening  association. 
HELD,  the  practice  complained  of  did  not 
constitute  unjust  discrimination.  Re- 
specting discriminations  in  these  matters, 
as  between  places,  the  carriers  must  have 
regard  to  the  communities  as  such,  rather 
than  the  special  interest  of  particular 
individuals.  Loch  Lynn  Construction 
Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C  396, 
399. 

(e)  Carriers  have  the  right,  and  it  is 
their  duty,  in  the  operation  of  their  roads, 
reasonably  and  practically  to  adjust  the 
same  as  to  stopping  at  stations,  particu- 
larly with  reference  to  the  number  and 
speed  of  passenger  trains,  frequency  of 


stops  and  the  like,  with  reasonable 
adaptation  to  all  of  the  varying  circum- 
stances and  conditions  existing  along 
their  lines  at  different  places.  There  is 
a  large  field  for  the  exercise  by  them  of 
reasonable  discretion  respectin,-^  the 
many  details  of  operation  and  adjustment 
to  varying  conditions,  particularly  with 
regard  to  through  or  limited  trains,  local 
or  accommodation  trains,  and  stops  rang- 
ing all  the  way  from  what  is  suitable  and 
reasonable  with  respect  to  mere  flag  sta- 
tions where,  upon  signal  from  the  pas- 
senger, a  local  or  accommodation  train 
may  stop,  up  to  the  fastest  trains  for 
long  distances  in  through  travel,  stop- 
ping only  at  important  cities  or  junction 
points.  Loch  Lynn  Construction  Co.  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  396,  399. 

(f)  A  contract  between  a  religious 
association  and  a  carrier  by  which  the 
latter  agrees  not  to  stop  trains  on  Sun- 
day cannot  in  any  degree  justify  undue 
or  unreasonable  discrimination  between 
stations  on  its  line.  Loch  Lynn  Construc- 
tion Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
396,  399. 

(g)  In  July,  ly05,  defendant  located  a 
station  on  its  line  at  Elder,  Okla.,  be- 
tween the  towns  of  Haskell  and  Bixby, 
the  latter  two  stations  being  some  sixteen 
miles  apart  on  defendant's  line.  In  De- 
cember, 1906,  defendant  abandoned  the 
station  at  Elder  and  established  two  sta- 
tions between  Haskell  and  Bixby  so  as 
to  divide  up  the  distance  between  these 
four  stations  equally.  From  the  stand- 
point of  the  general  public,  the  location 
of  the  two  new  stations  was  much  more 
desirable  than  would  be  a  single  station 
at  Elder  and  the  traffic  of  the  road  and 
the  necessities  of  the  country  did  not 
require  more  than  two  stations  between 
Haskell  and  Bixby.  Complainant  had  in- 
vested considerable  money  in  reliance 
upon  the  station  being  maintained  at 
Elder.  HELD,  complainant's  demand 
that  defendant  be  ordere :  to  r3-establish 
its  station  at  Elder  should  be  denied. 
Eddleman  v.  Midland  Valley  R.  R.  Co., 
13  I.  C.  C.  103,  104. 

§14.     Through    Routes   and    Pates. 

(a)  The  courts  in  determining  whether 
a  satisfactory  through  route  for  pas- 
senger service  already  exists  will,  in  com- 
plex and  delicate  cases,  attach  great 
weight  to  the  judgment  of  the  Commis- 
sion. I.  C.  C.  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co..  21S  U.S. 
538,  544,  30  Sup.  Ct.  417,  54  L.  ed.  608. 


PASSENGER  FARES   AND  FACILITIES,   §14    (b)  — (g) 


529 


(b)  Whether  a  reasonable  and  satis- 
factory through  route  for  passenger  serv- 
ice already  exists  so  as  to  prevent  the 
Commission  from  establishing  another 
such  route  may  be  inquired  into  by  the 
courts.  I.  C.  C.  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  216  U. 
S.  538,  544,  30  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  417,  54  L. 
ed.  608. 

(c)  The  Commisbion  has  no  power  to 
make  an  order  establishing  a  through 
route  for  passenger  traffic  if  a  reasonable 
and  satisfactory  one  already  exists.  I. 
C.  C.  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  210  U.  S.  538, 
544,  30  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  417,  54  L.  ed.  608. 

(d)  Upon  duly  established  tariff  a  i- 
thority  therefor,  the  initial  carrier  may 
issue  to  a  passenger  a  through  ticket  for 
the  sum  of  two  or  more  duly  established 
fares  applicable  over  the  several  connect- 
ing roads  composing  the  through  physical 
line  from  the  starting  point  to  (^  stina- 
tion,  or  may  issue  additional  or  separate 
ticket  or  tickets  at  lawful  tariff  fares 
therefor,  which,  in  connection  with  V  e 
ticket  or  tickets,  already  held  by  the  pas- 
senger, will  cover  the  entire  journey  that 
the  passenger  desires  to  take.  In  Re 
Mileage,  Excursion  and  Commutation 
Tickets,  23  I.  C.  C.  95,  97. 

(dd)  Through  checking  of  baggage 
and  through  sleeping  accommodations 
and  other  through  passenger  accommo- 
dations may  properly  be  accorded,  under 
tariff  authority,  upon  presentation  to  the 
initial  carrier  of  a  combination  of  tick- 
ets covering  the  entire  journey,  in  which 
may  be  included  mileage,  excursion  and 
commutation  tickets,  but  it  is  unlawful 
to  check  baggage  beyond  the  point  to 
'^'>iich  a  ticket  is  presented  upon  a  mere 
declaration  of  intention  to  go  farther. 
In  Re  Mileage.  Excursion  and  Commuta- 
tion Tickets,  23  I.  C.  C.  95,  96. 

(e)  The  caprice,  or  even  a  proper  de- 
sire, of  an  occasional  passenger  should 
not  govern,  but  if  any  considerable  part 
of  the  traveling  public  reasonably  prefer 
to  use  some  other  route  rather  than  the 
one  existing,  then  the  existing  route  can- 
not be  called  a  reasonable  and  satisfac- 
tory through  route.  In  the  Matter  of 
Through  Passenger  Routes  via  Portland, 
Ore.,  16  I.  C.  C.  300,  303. 

(f)  In  freight  it  is  possible  to  dis- 
tinguish between  different  commodities 
and  to  establish  a  through  route  as  to  one 
and  not  as  to  another;  with  passengers 
whatever  joint  rate  is  ordered  must  be 
kept  open  to  the  general  public.     In  Re 


Through   Passenger   Routes,   16   I.   C    C 
300,  303. 

(g)  The  Commission  instituted  pro- 
ceedings to  compel  the  N.  P.  Ry.  Co. 
to  join  in  the  sale  of  through  passenger 
tickets  between  Seattle  and  other  points 
in  the  northwest  and  eastern  destinations 
via  Portland,  Ore.,  and  to  accord  through 
facilities  over  that  route.  Portland  may 
be  reached  via  Omaha,  Kansas  City  and 
other  Missouri  River  points  over  the  U. 
P.  R.  R.,  in  which  case  the  passenger  is 
carried  over  the  N.  P.  Ry.  only  from  Port-'i 
land  to  Seattle.  The  N.  P.  Ry.  refused: 
to  establish  a  through  rate  with  the  U. 
P.  R.  R.,  since  such  rate  tended  to  give 
it  only  a  small  part  of  the  through  haul 
and  to  divert  passenger  traffic  to  the  U.  P. 
R.  R.,  from  the  route  via  St.  Paul  over 
the  N.  P.  Ry.  On  the  route  via  St.  Paul 
over  the  N.  P.  Ry.  to  Tacoma  and  Se- 
attle, the  passenger  received  as  low  rates 
and  as  good  service  as  over  the  U.  P. 
R.  R.,  but  the  evidence  disclosed  that 
many  travelers  preferred  to  go  by  the 
U.  P.  R.  R.  on  account  of  climate,  scenery, 
the  desire  to  see  the  western  country 
around  Omaha,  Ogden  and  other  points, 
to  use  stopover  privileges  and  visit 
friends  at  those  points,  etc.  It  also  ap- 
peared that  the  lack  of  through  transpor- 
tation through  Portland,  and  the  conse- 
quent necessity  for  purchasing  tickets 
and  rechecking  baggage  from  Portland  to 
Seattle  caused  great  inconvenience  to  the 
traveling  public  and  resulted  in  r  larger 
cost  for  the  trip  to  Tacoma  and  Seattle.- 
At  the  time  of  the  hearing  a  passenger  at 
Chicago  might  travel  on  a  through  ticket 
via  St.  Paul  on  the  Canadian  Pacific  lines 
to  Sumas,  thence  over  the  N.  P.  Ry.  to- 
Tacoma,  the  distance  between  Sumas 
and  Tacoma  being  160  miles,  or  he  might 
go  via  St.  Paul  on  the  Gt.  N.  Ry.,  the  N. 
P.  Ry.  securing  the  transportation  from 
Seattle  to  Tacoma,  a  distance  of  41  miles. 
V'hen  the  passenger  traveled  via  Port- 
land, the  N.  P.  Ry.  obtained  a  haul  of 
14^  miles.  HELD,  the  demand  of  the 
traveling  public  for  a  through  route  via 
Portland  was  a  reasonable  one  and  such 
route  should  be  established  on  passenger 
traffic.  (Knapp,  Comm'r,  dissenting.)  In 
the  Matter  of  Through  Passenger  Routes 
via  Portland.  Ore.,  16  L  C.  C.  300,  SOS-'^'^P; 
reversed,  I.  C.  C.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  216 
U.  S.  538,  544,  30  Sup.  Ct.  417,  5^  L.  ed. 
608,  on  the  ground  that  the  evidence  indi- 
cr.ted  that  a  reasonable  and  satisfactory 
route  already  existed  via  the  N.  P.  R^„; 
and    the   order  of   the   Commission   was^ 


530 


PASSENGER  FARES  AND  FACILITIES,  §14  '(h)— §15  (b) 


based  not  on  the  absence  of  such  a  route, 
but  on  the  desirability  of  a  new  route  in 
order  to  enable  passengers  to  ^isit  ci'^ies 
not  reached  by  the  northern  lines  for  the 
purpose  of  searching  for  homesteads  and 
enjo:  ing  natural  beauties. 

(h)  The  through  passenger  rates  from 
eastern  points  via  Portland  to  Tacoma 
and  Seattle  should  be  the  same  as  those 
in  effect  via  the  N.  P.  Ry.  and  its  present 
connections.  No  opinion  is  expressed 
touching  the  division  of  these  rates.  The 
local  fare,  however,  upon  the  line  of  the 
Northern  Pacific  is  not  of  necessity  the 
measure  of  its  division.  In  the  Matter 
of  Through  Passenger  Routes  via  Port- 
land, Ore.,  16  I.  C.  C.  300,  310. 

(i)  The  through  fare  from  New 
Castle,  Pa.,  to  New  York  via  Pittsburg 
was  $11.75,  the  route  being  over  the 
Penn.  Co.  to  Pittsburg,  thence  over 
the  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  to  New  York,  said 
carriers  being  separate  and  distinct.  The 
regular  fare  from  Pittsburg  to  New  York 
was  $10.50  and  from  New  Castle  to 
Pittsburg  $1,  making  a  combination  of 
$11.50.  The  New  Castle  to  Pittsburg 
rate  was  formerly  $1.25,  the  $1  rate  hav- 
ing been  put  in  force  upon  the  passage 
of  the  2c  rate  law  by  the  Pennsylvania 
legislature,  but  not  published,  and  avail- 
able, for  the  construction  of  an  inter- 
state rate.  The  complainant  purchased  a 
ticket  for  $1  from  New  Castle  to  Pitts- 
burg and  presented  it,  together  with  his 
mileage  book  over  the  Penn.  R.  R.,  to 
the  Pullman  Co.,  demanding  a  through 
berth  from  New  Castle  to  New  York. 
The  tariff  of  the  Pullman  Co.  provided 
that  accommodations  in  its  cars  should 
be  sold  only  to  passengers  holding  trans- 
portation required  by  the  railroad  con- 
cerned. HELD,  the  Pullman  Co.  prop- 
erly refused  to  sell  a  berth  to  complain- 
ant upon  the  transportation  offered  by 
him,  but  that  defendant  carrier  should 
revise  its  through  rate  from  Pittsburg 
to  New  York  so  that  it  should  not  ex- 
ceed the  combination  of  locals.  Kurtz  v. 
Penn.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  410,  414,  415. 

(j)  A  passenger  may  properly  pay  a 
fare  to  the  state  line  and  again  from 
the  state  line  to  destination,  though  he 
thereby  obtains  through  transportation 
for  less  than  published  through  rate,  and 
though  deliberately  seeking  this  means 
of  obtaining  transportation  at  less  than 
the  through  rate.  Kurtz  v.  Penn.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  410,  413. 


(k)  While  in  some  cases  a  higher 
through  passenger  fare  may  be  main- 
tained than  the  sum  of  the  local  fares, 
such  fare  can  only  be  so  maintained 
under  peculiar  circumstances  and  for 
special  reasons.  Kurtz  v.  Penn.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  410,  415. 

(1)  If  carriers  maintain  through  pas- 
senger fares  made  up  of  the  sums  of 
locals  they  should  use  the  lowest  scale 
available,  especially  when  the  higher  lo- 
cal includes  privileges  not  directly  per- 
taining to  the  transportation  and  of 
which  the  through  passenger  does  not 
care  to  avail  himself.  U.  S.  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  470,  472. 

(m)  Circumstances  can  rarely  exist 
which  would  justify  charging  a  passen- 
ger more  for  a  through  ride  between  two 
points  than  the  combination  of  locals 
between  the  same  points,  where  the  lo- 
cals have  been  voluntarily  established. 
U.  S.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  470, 
471. 

(n)  On  the  transportation  of  passen- 
gers from  Pittsburg,  Pa.,  to  Newport, 
R.  I.,  defendant  assessed  a  through  rate 
via  New  York  of  $12.50.  Defendant's  lo- 
cal fare  from  Pittsburg  to  New  York,  in- 
eluding  stop-over  privileges,  was  $10.50, 
and  without  said  privileges  $9.00.  The 
$12.50  rate  complained  of  was  $1.50  in 
excess  of  said  $9.00  local  plus  the  local 
from  New  York  to  Newport.  Defend- 
ant put  in  said  $9.00  local  in  competition 
with  another  carrier.  HELD,  since  the 
higher  local  included  privileges  not  di- 
rectly pertaining  to  transportation  and 
of  which  the  through  passenger  did  not 
care  to  avail  himself,  the  through  rate 
should  have  been  based  on  a  combination 
of  the  lower  locals,  and  is  unreasonable, 
Reparation  awarded.  U.  S.  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  1.  C.  C.  470,  472. 

IV.     CLAIMS  FOR  DAMAGES. 

See  Association,   I    (c). 
§15.     Errors  of  Ticket  Agents. 

See   Supra,   §14   (d);   Tariffs,    §3   (2). 

(a)  Damages  may  be  awarded  where 
additional  charges  accrue  as  a  result  of 
•■he  error  of  the  carrier's  agent  in  in- 
dorsing an  excursion  ticket.  Gorman  v. 
C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  613. 

(b)  Complainant  bought  a  round-trip 
ticket  from  Norfolk,  Va.,  to  San  Fran- 
cisco, Cal.,  for  $105.30.  By  a  note  in 
the  tariff  the  ticket  was  not  good  on  the 
Overland    Limited    from    Chicago    west. 


PASSENGER  FARES  AND  FACILITIES,  §15  (c)— PASSES 


531 


For  $136.80  a  round-trip  ticket  from  Nor- 
folk could  have  been  obtained  that  was 
good  on  any  train.  Complainant,  when 
he  bought  the  ticket,  was  not  told  of  the 
restriction  in  the  tariff  and,  in  fact,  the 
agent  of  the  defendant  had  reserved  a 
berth  for  him  on  the  Overland  Limited. 
At  the  advice  of  the  agent  of  the  C.  & 
N.  W.  R.  R.,  not  a  party  to  this  proceed- 
ing, but  over  whose  line  complainant 
traveled  in  the  Overland  Limited,  com- 
plainant purchased  another  ticket  from 
Chicago  to  San  Francisco  and  return  to 
St.  Louis,  Mo.,  for  which  he  paid  $105.75. 
In  this  way  complainant  paid  for  his 
transportation  from  Norfolk  to  San  Fran- 
cisco and  return  $211.05.  HELD,  repara- 
tion should  be  awarded  for  the  difference 
between  the  amount  complainant  paid 
and  the  sum  of  $136.80,  for  which  he 
could  have  obtained  the  same  transporta- 
tion but  for  the  error  of  defendant's 
agent.  Gorman  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  21 
I.  C.  C.  613. 

(c)  Complainant  desired  to  go  from 
Elko,  Nev.,  to  San  Francisco  and  re- 
turn, and  applied  to  the  agent  of  the 
S.  P.  Co.  at  Elko  for  a  return  ticket. 
The  agent  had  no  such  ticket  and  in- 
formed him  to  get  a  round-trip  ticket 
from  Elko  to  Reno  and  from  Reno 
to  San  Francisco.  Complainant  attempted 
to  do  this,  and  purchased  a  return  ticket 
from  Elko  to  Reno,  but  the  train  upon 
which  he  was  riding  did  not  stop  long 
enough  at  Reno  to  permit  him  to  pur- 
chase a  round-trip  ticket,  and  he  was 
compelled  to  pay  his  fare  to  San  Fran- 
cisco and  purchase  tickets  at  San  Fran- 
cisco back  to  Reno.  HELD,  the  only 
way  in  which  complainant  could  obtain 
passage  from  Elko  to  San  Francisco  and 
back  was  to  buy  a  one-way  ticket  each 
way  and  the  ticket  agent  at  Elko  had  no 
authority  to  bind  the  company  by  any 
suggestion  of  thei  sort  which  he  'made, 
and  that  complainant  cannot  recover  the 
difference  between  the  amount  paid  by 
him  and  what  he  would  have  been  com- 
pelled to  pay  had  he  been  able  to  pur- 
chase the  round-trip  ticket  at  Reno.  Bal- 
lin  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  503. 

(d)  Complainants  purchased  round- 
trip  tickets  from  Bloomfield,  la.,  to  Og- 
den,  Utah,  of  which  only  the  going  cou- 
pons were  given  to  complainants,  with 
an  exchange  coupon  attached  to  be  pre- 
sented by  them  to  the  agent  at  Ogden 
in  exchange  for  return  coupons,  which 
the  selling  agent  was  supposed  to  mail 
to    the    Ogden    agent    immediately    after 


the  purchase  of  the  tickets.  The  tickets 
gave  stop-over  privileges  at  any  point 
on  the  going  or  the  return  journey.  The 
selling  agent  failed  to  mail  the  coupons 
to  the  Ogden  agent,  and  the  latter  gave 
to  the  complainants  return  tickets  with- 
out the  stop-over  privilege.  Complain- 
ants made  the  journey  for  the  purpose  of 
getting  employment  as  fruit  pickers  and 
claimed  that  on  account  of  their  inability 
to  stop  off  at  a  certain  point  on  the  re- 
turn journey  they  failed  to  secure  em- 
ployment at  that  point  and  suffered  a 
loss  of  $200  wages.  HELD,  the  proof 
of  damages  was  too  speculative  to  entitle 
complainants  to  recover.  Allender  v. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  103,  105. 

(e)  Where  a  carrier  by  mistake  issues 
an  interstate  passenger  ticket  expiring 
before  the  date  called  for  by  the  terms 
of  the  oral  sale  to  the  passenger-  it  does 
not  violate  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act 
so  as  to  subject  itself  to  criminal  prose- 
cution, if  it  permits  the  passenger  to 
ride  on  the  ticket  after  the  expiration 
date.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  v.  Fleming  (Ky. 
1912),  146  S.  W.  1110,  nil. 

(f)  Where  an  agent  inadvertently 
sells  a  passenger  ticket  at  less  than  the 
lawfully  published  rate,  the  carrier  is  not 
liable  for  failure  to  honor  such  ticket, 
since  every  person  dealing  with  an  in- 
terstate carrier  is  as  effectually  bound 
by  the  law  and  the  orders  of  the  Com- 
mission as  is  the  carrier  himself,  and 
neither  party  may  be  estopped  from  as- 
serting the  illegality  and  validity  of  a 
contract  made  in  violation  of  the  inter- 
state commerce  law  and  the  orders  of 
the  Commission.  Melody  v.  G.  N.  Ry. 
Co.,  25  S.  D.  606,  610,  127  N.  W.  543. 

§16.     Lost  Tickets. 

(a)  Complainant  lost  a  commutation 
ticket  issued  under  a  tariff  that  provided 
refund  would  be  made  only  when  the 
lost  ticket  was  found  and  returned  to  the 
proper  officer  of  the  issuing  company. 
The  ticket  was  never  used  apparently 
by  the  finder  and  defendant  refused  to 
make  refund  on  account  of  the  tariff. 
HELD,  that  the  condition  in  the  tariff 
is  unreasonable  and  discriminatory,  be- 
cause many  cases  exist  in  which  recov- 
ery of  a  lost  ticket  is  impossible.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Moore  v.  N.  Y.  &  L.  B. 
R.  R.  Co..  20  I.  C.  C.  557. 

PASSES. 

See    Crimes,    III. 


532 


PAST  RATES,  PRECOOLING,  II   (d) 


PAST  RATES. 

See    Evidence,    §29. 

PEDDLER  CAR   SERVICE. 

See  Refrigeration,  §3   (c). 

(a)  The  operation  of  the  peddler  car 
is  as  follows:  The  car  is  iced,  for  the 
service  must  in  all  cases  be  under  re- 
frigeration, and  loaded  by  the  packer 
with  fresh  meats  and  packing  house  prod- 
ucts, in  whatever  quantity  and  proportion 
may  be  desired.  The  car  is  then  trans- 
ported to  the  first  unloading  point,  where 
it  is  opened  and  a  portion  of  the  con- 
tents removed.  From  thence  it  goes  to 
the  next  unloading  point,  and  so  on  to  its 
final  destination.  The  work  of  unloading 
is  performed  by  the  employes  of  the  car- 
rier in  the  same  manner  that  local  freight 
is  unloaded  at  the  various  stations,  no 
special  or  additional  storage  facilities 
being  provided.  The  initial  icing  is  by 
the  packer  and  if  any  subsequent  icing 
is  needed  the  packer  pays  for  the  ice 
actually  used.  In  Re  Investigation  of 
Unreasonable  Rates  on  Meats,  23  I.  C.  C. 
65o,  670. 

(b)  Carriers  should  publish  tariffs 
according  peddler  car  service  on  packing 
house  products  and  fresh  meats  from 
Oklahoma  City  and  Wichita  to  various 
points  in  Oklahoma,  Texas  and  New  Mex- 
ico; the  rate  upon  packing  house  prod- 
ucts should  be  130  per  cent  and  upon 
fresh  meats  150  per  cent  of  the  carload 
rate;  and  a  minimum  may  be  required 
equivalent  to  the  earnings  upon  10,000 
lbs.  of  fresh  meat  to  the  most  distant 
point.  Refrigeration  should  be  provided 
or  paid  for  by  the  shipper  in  addition  to 
the  above  rates.  In  Re  Investigation  of 
Unreasonable  Rates  on  Meats,  23  I.  C.  C. 
656,  670. 

PERCENTAGE  SYSTEM. 

See  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §16 
(cc). 

PHYSICAL  VALUATION. 

See  Interstate  Commerce  Commission, 
§8;  Evidence,  §49   (aa). 

POTENTIAL  COMPETITION. 

See  Discrimination,  §8  (5)  (h);  Long 
and  Short  Haul,  §10  (I),  (z) ;  Rea- 
sonableness of  Rates,  §8  (h),  (n), 
(o). 


PRECOOLING. 

I.  JURISDICTION  OF  COMMISSION 

II.  RIGHT  OF  SHIPPER. 

III.  EFFICIENCY  OF  METHOD. 

IV.  LIABILITY  FOR  DAMAGE. 

CROSS-REFERENCE. 
See    Refrigeration. 

I.  JURISDICTION  OF  COMMISSION. 

(a)  Shippers,  being  entitled  to  pre- 
cool  upon  a  reasonable  charge,  the  Com- 
mission has  authority  to  determine  that 
reasonable  charge  and  require  carriers 
to  file  tariffs  establishing  it.  In  Re  Reg- 
ulations and  Practices  With  Regard  to 
Precooling  and  Preicing,  23  I.  C.  C.  267. 
268,  271. 

II.  RIGHT  OF  SHIPPER. 

See  Refrigeration,  §3  (a),   (b),   (d). 

(a)  Carriers  involved  herein,  comply- 
ing with  an  order  of  the  Commission  in 
Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  So, 
Pac.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  106,  filed  tariffs  es- 
tablishing the  rate  of  $7.50  per  car  for 
precooling  oranges  shipped  from  points 
in  southern  California  to  the  east,  and 
immediately  thereafter  filed  other  tariffs 
canceling  these  tariffs  and  withdrawing 
the  privilege  of  precooling  altogether. 
Upon  protests  from  interested  shippers 
the  Commission  suspended  the  tariffs  can- 
celing the  precooling  privilege.  HELD, 
that  shippers  have  the  right  to  precool; 
that  $7.50  per  car  is  a  reasonable  charge 
to  be  made  by  the  carriers  for  their  serv- 
ice in  that  connection;  that  the  tariffs 
withdrawing  this  charge  are  unlawful; 
and  that  the  present  tariffs  or  their 
equivalent,  granting  this  privilege,  should 
be  continued  in  effect.  In  Re  Regulations 
and  Practices  with  Regard  to  Precooling 
and  Preicing,  23  L  C.  C.  267,  271. 

(b)  A  carrier  may  decline  to  use  an 
equipment,  needed  for  precooling,  fur- 
nished by  the  shippers,  but  it  cannot  re- 
fuse to  furnish  proper  equipment  upon 
fair  terms.  Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Ex- 
change V.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  106,  118. 

(c)  A  carrier  may  insist  upon  fur- 
nishing all  equipment  needed  for  move- 
ment of  precooled  shipments  and  might 
decline  to  use  equipment  furnished  by 
shippers.  Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Ex- 
change V.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  106,  118. 

(d)  A  shipper  is  not  obliged  to  sub- 
mit fruit  to  the  hazard  of  a  system  of 
precooling  by  the  carrier  which  the  car- 
rier declines  to  guarantee,  but  a  shipper 


PRECOOLING,    II   (e)— III   (b) 


533 


has  the  right  himself  to  r^ecool  and  pre- 
ice  his  shipment.  Arlington  Heights 
Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
106,  119,  120. 

(e)  Precooling  is  of  two  kinds:  that 
furnished  by  the  carriers  and  that  which 
is  furnished  by  the  shippers.  That  fur- 
nished by  the  shippers  is  performed  im- 
mediately after  the  fruit  is  picked;  that 
furnished  by  the  carriers  can  only  be 
done  after  the  cars  are  loaded  and  hauled 
to  the  precooling  stations  at  San  Ber- 
nardino or  at  Colton,  when  whole  train 
loads  and  carloads  are  precooled  at  once, 
whereas  the  shippers  precool  each  box 
separately.  After  being  precooled  by  the 
carriers  the  shipments  must  be  reiced 
before  reaching  destination,  which  does 
not  appear  to  be  the  case  when  pre- 
cooled by  the  shippers.  HELD,  that  the 
precooling  system  of  the  shippers  is  su- 
perior to  that  used  by  the  carriers  and 
that  the  shippers  have  a  right  to  precool 
and  preice  their  shipments.  Arlington 
Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  106,  120. 

(f)  The  car  used  for  the  shipment 
of  oranges  and  lemons  from  California 
is  exactly  the  same  whether  the  move- 
ment is  under  ventilation  or  refrigera- 
tion, or  is  precooled  and  preiced.  The 
use  of  this  special  car  is  taken  account 
of  in  the  rate.  Carriers  are  not,  there- 
fore, in  case  of  shipments  precooled  by 
the  shipper,  entitled  to  additional  com- 
pensation by  reason  of  the  fact  that  a 
car  of  this  type  is  necessary  and  fur- 
nished. Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Ex- 
change V.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  106,  120. 

(g)  The  public  is  not  required  to 
make  good  a  carrier's  blunders  in  erect- 
ing facilities.  Arlington  Heights  Fruit 
Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  106,  122. 

(h)  Discrimination,  it  seems,  will  not 
result  in  favor  of  the  larger  shipper 
from  allowing  shippers  to  precool  their 
own  shipments.  Arlington  Heights  Fruit 
Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  106, 121. 

III.     EFFICIENCY  OF  METHOD. 
See  Minimums,  §7  (f). 

(a)  Precooled  shipments,  without  ad- 
ditional compensation,  are  more  desirable 
traffic  than  either  the  ventilated  or  re- 
frigerated movement.  Arlington  Heights 
Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
106,  121. 

(b)  The  system  of  refrigeration 
known  as  precooling  is  essentially  differ- 


ent from  the  standard  form  of  refrigera- 
tion. In  actual  practice  it  takes  two 
forms.  Precooling  by  the  shipper  and 
precooling  by  the  railroad.  In  precool- 
ing by  the  shipper  the  basic  idea  is  to 
bring  the  fruit  under  the  influence  of  a 
low  temperature  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment.  The  oranges  are  brought  from 
the  tree  to  the  packing  house,  packed  in 
a  box,  which  is  immediately  deposited 
in  a  cold  room.  At  the  end  of  twenty- 
four  to  forty-eight  hours  all  parts  of  the 
fruit  and  all  parts  of  the  box  have  been 
reduced  to  a  uniform  temperature  of 
from  33  degrees  to  35  degrees  F.  The 
box  remains  in  the  cold  room  until  it  is 
loaded.  The  box  is  taken  directly  to  the 
car  and  packed  solid  and  not  with  air 
spaces  between,  as  in  case  of  ordinary 
refrigeration  or  ventilation.  The  bunk- 
ers of  the  car  are  filled  with  large  blocks 
of  ice,  especially  intended  for  that  pur- 
pose, and  the  bunkers  and  vents  sealed 
up  so  as  to  make  the  car  as  nearly  air- 
tight as  possible.  This  is  all  done  by 
the  shipper,  and  the  car  is  then  delivered 
to  the  railroad  with  instructions  to  trans- 
port to  destination  without  reicing  and 
without  breaking  the  seal.  By  this 
method  an  additional  tier  of  boxes  can 
be  loaded,  thereby  increasing  the  paying 
load  of  the  car  one-sixth.  Under  this 
system  the  fruit  is  in  cold  storage  from 
the  beginning  and  can  be  held  without 
danger,  and  thereby  minimizes  the  effect 
of  car  shortage.  The  cost  of  precooling 
and  preicing  a  car  in  this  manner,  in- 
cluding interest  on  the  investment  and 
depreciation  of  the  plant  on  a  fair  aver- 
age, is  about  $32.50.  There  is  an  expense 
in  repairing  the  ice  bunkers  of  about 
$5.00  per  car  per  trip.  The  average 
weight  of  the  ice-  during  the  entire  jour- 
ney is  about  5,000  lbs.  The  extra  tier 
which  can  be  loaded  when  precooled  by 
the  shipper  adds  a  revenue  in  the  case 
of  the  Santa  Fe  lines  of  $53,  and  in  case 
of  the  S.  P.  Co.,  $55  on  a  haul  from 
California  points  to  Chicago,  while  the 
actual  additional  cost  of  moving  the  car 
does  not  exceed  half  these  sums.  HELD, 
that  the  shippers  who  have  devised  and 
perfected  this  system  of  precooling 
should  not  be  compelled  to  pay  for  the 
privilege  of  using  it  more  than  the  fair 
cost  to  the  carrier  of  providing  the  ad- 
ditional facilities  which  are  not  included 
in  the  ventilated  rate,  with  a  fair  profit, 
and  that  the  precooling  charge  of  $30.00 
per  car  charged  by  defendants  when  car 
is  precooled  by  the  shipper  is  unreason- 
able to  the  amount  that  it  exceeds  $7.50 


534     PRECOOLING,  III   (c)— PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMMISSION,  §1  (aa) 


per    car.     Arlington    Heights    Fruit    Ex- 
change V.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  106,  121. 

(c)  Complainants  attacked  the  mini- 
mum weight  on  peaches  from  Georgia  to 
markets  east  of  the  Mississippi  and 
north  of  the  Ohio  and  Potomac  rivers  in 
refrigerator  cars,  of  22,500  lbs.,  which 
compels  complainants  to  load  peach 
crates  five  tiers  high.  HELD,  that  the 
ordinary  refrigeration  metnod  will  not 
perfectly  cool  the  two  top  tiers,  because 
Georgia  peaches  are  picked  and  packed 
in  very  hot  weather  and  moved  through 
hot  regions  of  the  country;  that  the  prop- 
er method  of  shipping  these  peaches 
would  be  to  precool  the  crates  before 
loading  into  the  car;  that  comparisons 
cannot  be  made  with  the  transportation 
of  California  peaches  (these  peaches  be- 
ing cooled  by  exposure  to  the  cool  night 
air  or  in  precooling  stations,  and  subject 
to  a  cool  mountain  haul  shortly  after 
moving),  nor  in  the  northern  states, 
where  there  is  a  short  haul.  Complaint 
dismissed.  Georgia  Fruit  Exchange  v. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  623. 

(d)  Fruit  may  be  safely  transported 
under  the  precooling  method.  Arling- 
ton Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S  P.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  106,  113;  Georgia  Fruit  Ex- 
change V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C  623,  626. 

IV.     LIABILITY  FOR  DAMAGE. 

(a)  A  carrier's  entire  duty  is  dis- 
charged when  it  places  the  precooled  car 
on  its  train  and  hauls  it  to  destination. 
Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S. 
P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  106,  116. 

(b)  When  shipments  are  precooled 
by  the  shipper  at  the  packing  houses  the 
car  is  delivered  sealed  to  the  carrier 
with  instructions  not  to  open  nor  reice 
until  destination  is  reached.  HELD,  that 
the  carrier  under  such  circumstances  as- 
sumes no  liability  for  defective  refrig- 
eration, and  if  it  handles  the  precooled 
car  with  due  diligence  it  is  not  liable  for 
any  damage  due  to  deterioration  of  the 
shipment.  Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Ex- 
change V.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  106,  117. 

PREPAY  STATIONS. 

See    Demurrage,    §5    (c),    §9    (d),    §11 

(fg). 
PRESUMPTIONS. 

See    Evidence,    IV. 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COM- 
MISSION. 

I.     PRACTICE. 

§1.     In  general. 
II.     COMPLAINT. 

§2.     Form  and  issues  tendered. 

§3.     Notice  of  complaint. 

§4.    Amendment. 

§5.     Hearing. 

§6.     Briefs. 

§7.     Oral  argument. 

§8.     Rehearing. 

§9.     Costs,  attorneys'  fees,  etc. 

III.  MOTIONS. 

§10.     Dismissing  complaint. 

(1)  In  general. 

(2)  Adjustment  since  fil- 
ing. 

IV.  ORDERS  OF  COMMISSION. 

§11.     Modification,  validity  and  ef- 
fect. 

§12.     Review. 
V.     PARTIES. 

§13.     Necessary   and    proper   par- 
ties. 

VI.  SET-OFF. 

§14.     In  general. 

VII.  EFFECT  OF  EVIDENCE. 

§15.     Equities  of  cause. 

§16.     Judicial  notice. 

§17.     Res  judicata. 

§18.     Requesting    information    of 

carrier. 
§19.     Tests  of  revenue. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  VI;  Allowances, 
I;  Claims;  Commerce  Court,  II; 
Crimes,  IX;  Discrimination,  V;  In- 
terstate Commerce  Commission, 
III;  Long  and  Sliort  Hauls,  V;  Re- 
consignment,   V;    Reparation,   V. 

I.     PRACTICE. 

§1.     In   General. 

See  Absorption  of  Charges,  §4  (a); 
Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §6  (a);  Elec- 
tric   Lines,    II    (a). 

(a)  Liberal  rules  of  pleading  are  ap- 
plied by  the  Commission.  Stonega  Coke  & 
Coal  Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
17,  25. 

(aa)  Where  a  complaint  was  filed 
after  the  filing  of  a  fourth  section  ap- 
plication involving  the  same  rates, 
whether  a  hearing  can  properly  be  had 
upon  the  complaint  before  the  applica- 
tion is  disposed  of  is  of  no  practical  im- 
portance. Grand  Junction  Chamber  of 
Commerce  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
I.   C.   C.   115,  117. 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMIMISSION,  §1   (b)— §2   (d) 


535 


(b)  The  Commission  has  endeavored 
to  simplify  its  practice  and  procedure, 
without  permitting  technical  matters  to 
interfere  with  substantial  results.  Cin- 
cinnati &  Columbus  Traction  Co.  v.  B. 
&  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  486,  489. 

(bb)  The  practice  rules  of  the  Com- 
mission, while  not  overlooking  the  def- 
inite requirements  of  the  law  in  respect 
to  filing  complaints,  were  intended  to  re- 
lieve complainants,  so  far  as  possible, 
from  observance  of  the  technical  rules 
of  pleading,  in  order  that  shippers  un- 
skilled in  such  matters  might  bring  their 
troubles  to  the  Commission  in  their  own 
proper  persons.  Memphis  Freight  Bu- 
reau V.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
67,  69. 

(c)  It  is  improper  practice  for  a  car- 
rier to  decline  to  make  application  for 
the  informal  adjustment  of  an  unreason- 
able charge,  thereby  compelling  the  ship- 
per to  file  formal  complaint,  and  then,  by 
answer  and  stipulation,  admit  the  allega- 
tions of  the  complaint  and  agree  to  sub- 
mission of  the  case  on  the  pleadings. 
Davenport  Pearl  Button  Co.  v.  C.  B.  & 
Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  193,  194. 

(d)  The  Commission  is  given  a  rea- 
sonable discretion  in  entertaining  and 
refusing  to  entertain  complaints  that  are 
presented  to  it.  Even  if  it  had  the 
power  to  entertain  a  complaint  seeking 
general  damages,  that  discretion  is  rea- 
sonably exercised  when  it  declines  in  the 
general  public  interest  and  in  deference 
to  the  other  important  work  before  it  to 
deal  with  matters  about  which  it  can 
know  but  little,  and  which  thei  courts, 
where  such  matters  properly  belong,  can 
deal  with  much  more  efficiently.  Joynes 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  361,  367. 

(e)  However  strongly  the  Commis- 
sion might  feel  inclined  to  relieve  condi- 
tions complained  of,  its  actions  must  be 
within  the  provisions  of  law  and  with 
due  and  proper  regard  for  the  rights  of 
every  affected  interest.  Commercial 
Club  of  Hattiesburg  v.  Alabama  Great 
Southern  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  534,  545. 

(f)  The  conclusion  of  the  provision, 
"any  reasonable  ground,"  leaves  the  ques- 
tion whether  investigation  shall  result 
to  the  legal  discretion  of  the  Commis- 
sion. Taylor  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I  C. 
C.  165. 

(g)  The  Commission  is  an  administra- 
tive body,  created  to  effect  substantial 
justice  in  the  matters  under  its  control, 


and  is  not  bound  or  limited  by  the  strict 
rules  of  pleading.  Nollenberger  v.  M.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  595,  598. 

(h)  It  is  not  the  proper  course  of 
procedure  for  complainants  to  file  com- 
plaint and  proceed  no  further.  Some 
obligation  rests  upon  a  complainant  who 
seeks  reparation  to  prosecute  his  case 
witl>  due  diligence.  Advance  Thresher 
Co.   V.   Orange   &   N.   W.   R.   R.   Co.,   15 

I.  C.  C.  599,  600. 

II.  COMPLAINT. 

See  Long   and   Short  Hauls,  §11. 
§2.     Form  and   Issues  Tendered. 

(a)  Complaint  filed  in  Corporation 
Commission  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.  303,  examined,  and,  HELD,  to  be  suf- 
ficient  to  bring  in  issue  the  local  rates 
of  the  N.  &  W.  from  Roanoke  and 
Lynchburg  to  Winston-Salem  and  Dur- 
ham. N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  195  Fed. 
953,  958. 

(aa)  The  joint  rate  under  which  this 
shipment  moved  not  having  been  at- 
tacked, and  the  proper  parties  defendant 
not  having  been  joined,  the  complaint 
must  be  dismissed.  Reno  Grocery  Co. 
v.  S.  P.  Co.,  23  1.  C.  C.  400. 

(b)  Commission  refrains  from  pass- 
ing upon  an  import  rate  which  was  not 
attacked  in  the  complaint,  though  re- 
ferred to  at  hearing  and  argument.  Case 
held  open  to  permit  readjustment  or  fil- 
ing of  amended  petition.  Thropp  v.  P. 
R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  497,  499. 

(bb)  In  dealing  with  certain  class 
rates  applicable  to  specific  kinds  of  a 
commodity  from  a  particular  locality,  the 
Commission  cannot  determine  what  rates 
are  reasonable  for  the  transportation  of 
other  commodities  from  the  same  point, 
or  of  the  same  commodity  from  other 
points,  but  such  questions  must  be  de- 
termined in  other  proceedings.  Milbum 
Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  93,  101. 

(c)  Where  there  is  no  issue  tendered 
in  the  complaint  or  any  evidence  sub- 
mitted in  regard  to  a  violation  of  the 
long-and-short-haul  clause,  such  matter 
cannot  be  considered  in  a  petition  attack- 
ing reasonableness,  relatively  and  per  se, 
of  the  rates.  Chamber  of  Commerce  of 
Augusta  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  1.  C.  C.  233,  238. 

(d)  Where  no  issue  under  section  4 
is  raised  by  the  petition  and  the  matter 
is  not  the  subject  of  inquiry  on  the  hear- 


536 


PROCEDURE   BEFORE    COMMISSION,   §2    (e)— (h) 


ing,  the  question  will  not  be  determined. 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Augusta,  Ga., 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  233,  238. 

(e)  With  only  one  carrier  as  a  party 
defendant,  the  issue  cannot  be  broadened 
to  embrace  matters  which  were  brought 
into  existence  by  other  carriers,  and  for 
which  defendant  alone  is  in  no  sense  re- 
sponsible. Chattanooga  Feed  Co.  v.  A. 
G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  480,  485. 

(f)  The  fact  that  the  issue  raised  by 
a  petition  is  not  as  broad  as  it  might 
have  been  if  other  carriers  had  been 
made  parties  can  furnish  no  warrant  for 
a  refusal  to  pass  upon  matters  clearly 
embraced  within  it.  Chattanooga  Feed 
Co,  V.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
480,  485. 

(g)  Complainant  filed  a  petition  con- 
taining the  following  averments:  "This 
petition  is  presented  upon  behalf  of  the 
complainants  and  such  other  persons, 
firms  or  corporations  as  may  hereafter 
by  proper  petition  become  parties  in  in- 
terest to  this  suit,  and  the  complainants 
reserve  the  right  to  show  damages  and 
to  demand  reparation  at  any  time  there- 
after, to  which  any  of  them,  or  interve- 
ners in  this  action  may  be  entitled  under 
the  law."  The  prayer  contained  no  alle- 
gation whatever  to  the  subject  of  repara- 
tion or  damages.  Subsequently,  supple- 
mental petitions  were  filed  which  fur- 
ther stated  that  complainants  had 
shipped  large  quantities  of  ice  over  the 
lines  of  the  defendant,  for  which  an  un- 
reasonable charge  had  been  made.  The 
points  of  origin  were  definitely  named, 
the  points  of  destination  stated  to  be 
upon  the  lines  of  the  defendant  in  va- 
rious states,  and  that  the  freight  had 
been  paid  by  the  complainants.  HELD, 
the  averment  quoted  from  the  original 
complaints  cannot  be  construed  as  the 
filing  of  a  claim  for  reparation.  It  is 
true  that  the  complainants  stated  they 
had  shipped  ice  and  had  been  compelled 
to  pay  excessive  rates  for  that  service, 
but  the  reference  to  the  subject  of  rep- 
aration contained  no  statement  whatever 
that  reparation  would  be  demanded  nor 
was  there  any  prayer  in  the  complaints 
that  reparation  be  awarded.  However, 
the  supplemental  petition,  when  taken  in 
connection  with  the  original  petition,  is  a 
sufficient  filing  of  a  claim  for  reparation 
within  the  sixteenth  section  of  the  Act, 
which  will  interrupt  the  running  of  the 
two-year  period.  It  contains  a  clear 
statement  that  the  complainants  have 
made  shipments  of  ice  over  the  lines  of 


the  defendants;  that  the  defendants  have 
charged   and   complainants   paid   an    ex- 
cessive rate  and  that  complainants  will 
seek  to  recover  as  reparation  the  amount 
of  the  excessive  charges.     There  is  no 
statement  of  any  definite  number  of  ship- 
ments,    nor     of     any     definite     amount 
claimed,  nor  is  there  any  statement  of 
the  period  within  which  these  shipments 
have  been  made,  but  the   original  peti- 
tion refers  definitely  to  the  rates  which 
are  in  controversy,  setting  forth  in  great 
detail  the  points  between  which  the  rates 
apply,  the  history  of  the  rates  themselves 
and  the  contention  of  the  complainants 
as  to  the  reasonableness  of  these  rates. 
Both  the  Commission  and  the  defendants 
were  fully  advised  of  exactly  what  the 
complainants  claimed  by  way  of  repara- 
tion, and  to  have  gone  into  greater  de- 
tail at  that  time  would  have  been  a  work 
of  great  expense  without  profit  to  any- 
one.     Until    the    final    decision    of    the 
Commission   establishing   the  rates   was 
made,    neither    the    defendants    nor    the 
complainants  could  know  the  amount  of 
reparation    to    which    the    complainants 
were  entitled  or  the  points  with  respect 
to   which   reparation  would   be  allowed. 
To  have  required  the  complainants  to  set 
forth  in  detail  their  claim  for  damages 
would  simply  have  been  to  require  them 
to  file  a  statement  of  every  shipment  of 
a  carload  of  ice  during  the  period  cov- 
ered.    The  defendants  had  in  their  pos- 
session all  this  information  and  have  not 
been  in  any  way  prejudiced  or  inconven- 
ienced  by   the   fact   that  detailed  state- 
ments were  not  sooner  filed.    Admitting 
that  at  some  time  the  complainants  should 
present    to    the    defendants    a    specifica- 
tion showing  the  several  shipments  upon 
which  claim  for  damages  was  based,  still 
that  statement  stands  like  a  bill  of  par- 
ticulars in  a  suit  at  law,  which  may  or 
may  not  be  required,   according  as  the 
due    administration    of   justice    requires. 
There  is  a  wide  distinction  between  this 
case  involving  rates  to  numerous  destina- 
tions which  have  been  attacked,  but  is 
still  in  effect,  and  an  instance  where  rep- 
aration is  claimed  on   account  of  some 
one  or  more  specific  transactions  in  the 
past.       A     general     description     which 
would  be  entirely  adequate  in  this  case 
to  definitely  show  the  extent  of  the  dam- 
ages   claimed    would    be    entirely   insuf- 
ficient   for    that    purpose    in    the    other. 
Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
21  I.  C.  C.  45,  47,  48,  49. 

(h)     It  is  due  both  to  the  Commission 
and  to  the  defendant  carrier  that  a  com- 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMMISSION,   §2    (i)— (q) 


537 


plaint  should  state  seasonably  whether 
he  will  claim  reparation,  and  that  he 
should  state  this  with  suflacient  definite- 
ness  so  that  both  the  Commission  and 
the  carrier  may  be  advised  of  the  nature 
of  his  claim,  but  every  rule  of  conven- 
ience and  of  justice  requires  that  where  a 
large  number  of  existing  rates  are  at- 
tacked, which  are  still  in  effect,  a  state- 
ment should  be  made  in  general  terms 
that  reparation  will  be  claimed  when  a 
decision  finally  reducing  the  rates  is 
made,  so  that  the  matter  may  be  held  in 
abeyance  until  the  main  question  has 
been  decided  and  the  parties  know 
whether  any  reparation  will  be  awarded, 
and  if  so,  upon  what  basis.  Mountain  Ice 
Co.  V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
45,  49. 

(i)  The  reasonableness  of  rates  can- 
not be  considered  except  under  a  pro- 
ceeding which  properly  puts  them  in  is- 
sue. Douglas  &  Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  97,  102;  21  I.  C.  C. 
541,   545. 

(J)  Upon  a  complaint  alleging  undue 
preference,  it  was  held  that  the  question 
of  the  reasonableness  per  se  of  rates  is 
automatically  imported  into  a  case 
through  the  suspension  of  the  tariffs. 
Douglas  &  Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
21  I.  C.  C.  97,  102. 

(k)  The  Commission  expressed  no 
opinion  as  to  the  reasonableness  of  any 
of  the  rates  in  controversy  where  the 
question  present  was  upon  the  relation 
of  such  rates.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates 
on  Locomotives  and  Tenders,  21  I.  C.  C. 
103,  112. 

(1)  A  complaint  does  not  raise  the  is- 
sue that  rates  are  discriminatory  when 
it  simply  contains  a  general  allegation 
that  the  rates  of  the  defendant  violate 
sections  1,  2  and  3  of  the  Act,  and  there 
is  no  attempt  to  point  out  in  any  par- 
ticular the  character  of  the  discrimina- 
tion, nor  the  locality  against  which  or  in 
favor  of  which  the  discrimination  oc- 
curs, nor  any  prayer  for  the  correction 
of  any  discrimination.  United  States 
Leather  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
323,  324. 

(m)  If  a  question  of  discrimination  in 
rates  is  not  specifically  alleged  in  the 
complaint,  but  is  actually  tried  upon 
the  hearing,  the  Commission  may  allow 
an  amendment  upon  such  terms  as  would 
properly  protect  the  defendants,  but  can- 
not decide  that  question  when  raised  for 
the  first  time  in  the  briefs.    The  remedy 


of  complainants  is  to  file  a  separate  com- 
plaint to  that  specific  end.  United  States 
Leather  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C. 
323,  324. 

(n)  While  the  Commission  is  ex- 
tremely liberal  in  construing  the  plead- 
ings before  it,  the  statute  requires  that 
carriers  shall  be  notified  of  the  com- 
plaint which  they  are  required  to  answer, 
and  though  no  particular  form  is  insisted 
upon,  there  must  be  a  statement  of  the 
thing  which  is  claimed  to  be  wrong,  suf- 
ficiently plain  to  put  the  carrier  upon 
its  defense.  United  States  Leather  Co. 
V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  323,  324. 

(o)  The  Commission  can  take  judicial 
cognizance  of  and  make  findings  upon 
only  such  issues  as  are  clearly  raised  by 
the  complaint,  while  fully  weighing  all 
of  the  pertinent  facts  and  testimony  ad- 
duced. Sinclair  &  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  490,  494. 

(p)  An  examination  into  the  specific 
provisions  of  the  Act,  especially  into 
those  of  section  13,  will  make  clear  to 
the  candid  mind  that  a  complaint  be- 
fore the  Commission  was  not  intended  to 
be  regarded  in  the  same  strict  and  hard 
light  as  a  complaint  in  an  action  at  law, 
but  was  to  be  regarded  as  an  appeal  to 
the  government  against  oppressive,  un- 
just and  illegal  action.  A  shipper  may 
not  dismiss  his  complaint  without  con- 
sent. T\ie  fact  that  he  has  no  interest 
in  the  traffic  concerned  in  his  complaint 
does  not  put  him  out  of  court.  These 
and  similar  provisions  indicate  that  the 
purpose  of  Congress  in  enacting  the  Act 
was  to  establish  a  body  whose  function 
should  be  to  protect  the  public  interest, 
and  not  merely  regard  the  technical 
rights  of  an  individual  shipper,  and  in 
this  view  of  the  law  the  Act  has  been 
administered  by  the  Commission.  Ad- 
vances in  Rates — Western  Case,  20  I. 
C.  C.  307,  315. 

(q)  Complainant  by  a  complaint  filed 
July  12,  1909,  attacked  certain  lumber 
rates  as  unreasonable,  which  the  Com- 
mission reduced.  On  April  '6,  1911,  the 
same  complainant  prayed  for  reparation 
on  shipments  of  lumber  based  upon  the 
findings  of  the  Commission  in  the  orig- 
inal case.  HELD,  in  order  to  avoid 
multiplicity  of  actions  and  consequent 
unnecessary  labor  and  expense,  and  in 
order  that  defendants  as"  well  as  the 
Commission  might  have  due  notice  of  the 
full  extent  of  the  complaint,  and  the  ef- 
fect of  an  order  thereunder,  it  adopted  a 


538 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMMISSION,   §2    (r)— (x) 


rule  that  reparation  will  not  ordinarily 
be  awarded  in  a  formal  case  attacking 
a  rate  as  unreasonable  or  otherwise  in 
violation  of  law,  unless  intent  to  claim 
reparation  is  specifically  indicated  there- 
in, or  in  an  amendment  thereof  filed 
before  the  submission  of  the  case.  It  is 
obvious  fairness  that  complainants  be 
required  to  dispose  of  their  whole  case, 
and  the  demands  upon  the  time  of  the 
Commission  are  so  many  and  pressing 
that  unnecessary  multiplicity  of  pro- 
ceedings cannot  be  encouraged  or  even 
tolerated.  Freeman  Lumber  Co.  v.  St. 
L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  612,  613. 

(r)  A  general  allegation  that  all  rates 
from  St.  Paul  and  Chicago  to  Spokane 
were  unreasonable,  could  not  lay  the 
foundation  for  an  order  reducing  all  the 
commodity  rates,  but  there  must  be  a 
specific  attack  upon  each  specific  rate 
which  would  put  the  defendant  upon  no- 
tice of  the  exact  thing  complained  of. 
City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I. 
C.  C.  162,   170. 

(s)  A  complaint  against  all  rates  be- 
tween two  points  is  not  sufficient;  there 
must  be  a  specific  attack  upon  specific 
rates.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  162,  170. 

(t)  The  Commission  is  not  disposed 
to  try  complaints  piecemeal.  If  a  com- 
plainant desires  to  secure  reparation 
upon  trafllc,  in  respect  of  which  4ie  also 
seeks  reduction  of  the  rate  for  the  fu- 
ture, he  may  reasonably  be  required  to 
present  his  whole  case  at  once.  The 
Commission  enforces  in  its  investigation 
only  the  most  elementary  rules  of  pro- 
cedure, requiring  merely  that  the  com- 
plainant shall  set  forth  concisely  an  al- 
leged violation  of  the  Act.  It  is  aimed 
to  avoid  technical  rules  which  might  im- 
pede the  way  to  substantial  justice,  and 
to  determine  each  case  upon  the  merits 
alone.  Obviously,  however,  it  is  in  the 
interest  of  good  administration,  that  an 
entire  case  should  be  presented  to  the 
Commission  and  to  the  defendants. 
Cases  are  ordinarily  assigned  for  hear- 
ing at  some  point  convenient  to  the  com- 
plainant, but  each  hearing  involves  at- 
tendance by  a  member  of  the  Commis- 
sion or  an  examiner,  and  of  the  defend- 
ant's counsel  and  witnesses  at  the  place 
assigned.  If  after  an  order  for  the  fu- 
ture is  secured,  complainant  may  in- 
stitute another  proceeding  for  reparation 
on  past  shipments,  a  second  hearing  be- 
comes necessary  which  may  involve  an 
expenditure  of  public  funds  and  a  hard- 


ship upon  defendants  quite  out  of  propor- 
tion to  the  amount  sought  to  be  recov- 
ered. Moreover,  it  does  not  follow  be- 
cause the  Commission  has  found  a  rate 
unreasonable,  and  established  a  lower 
rate  for  the  future,  that  the  former  rate 
was  unreasonable  at  all  times  in  the 
past,  and,  therefore,  in  such  a  proceed- 
ing as  this  a  second  and  independent  in- 
vestigation would  be  unavoidable.  Ull- 
raan  v.  American  Express  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
354,  355. 

(u)  By  complaint  filed  Dec.  6,  1907, 
and  amended  May  26,  1908,  complainants 
attacked  defendant's  rate  for  transporta- 
tion of  raw  furs  from  St,  Paul  to  New 
York.  No  reparation  was  asked.  The 
Commission  reduced  the  rate.  Subse- 
quently this  complaint  was  filed,  asking 
reparation  on  shipments  which  moved 
prior  to  the  effective  date  of  the  Com- 
mission's order  in  the  original  case. 
HELD,  if  complainant  desired  an  award 
of  reparation  he  should  have  given  no- 
tice to  that  effect  in  his  original  com- 
plaint, and  having  failed  to  do  so  should 
now  be  estopped  from  claiming  damages 
upon  shipments  which  moved  prior  to  the 
filing  of  such  complaint.  The  Commis- 
sion will,  of  course,  reserve  the  right  to 
deal  as  may  be  deemed  just  with  a  claim 
for  reparation  disclosing  unusual  cir- 
cumstances, where  application  of  the 
general  rule  might  be  unjust  or  inequi- 
table, UUman  v.  American  Express  Co., 
19  L  C.  C.  354,  355. 

(v)  In  a  complaint  by  Minneapolis 
fiour  millers  against  the  rates  on  flour 
from  Minneapolis  to  New  York,  as  com- 
pared with  those  accorded  to  Buffalo 
millers  on  wheat  from  Minneapolis  to 
New  York  milled-in-transit  at  Buffalo, 
Chicago  millers  intervening  in  the  pro- 
ceeding are  not  entitled  to  have  raised 
the  question  whether  Minneapolis  by  its 
milling-in-transit  privileges  has  an  ad- 
vantage over  Chicago,  in  laying  down 
flour  in  Chicago,  as  compared  with  the 
rate  at  which  Chicago  millers  can  lay 
wheat  down,  since  such  question  is  not 
germane  to  the  issues  raised  by  the  com- 
plaint. Jennison  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.. 
18  I.  C.  C.  113,  120. 

(w)  Questions  of  reasonableness  of 
rate  and  reparation  should  be  brought 
in  one  complaint.  Delray  Salt  Co.  v. 
M.  C,  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  247,  248. 

(x)  A  complainant  attacking  the  rate 
exacted  as  unreasonable  and  seeking  rep- 
aration   should    not    multiply    the    com- 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMMISSION,  §2   (y)— (hh) 


539 


plaints  filed,  but  all  damages  should  be 
heard  and  determined  in  one  proceed- 
ing. Delray  Salt  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  247,  248. 

(y)  Under  a  complaint  which  chal- 
lenged the  reasonableness  of  charges  by 
a  carrier  for  loading,  stripping  and  brac- 
ing carloads  of  fruit  and  vegetables,  but 
which  did  not  challenge  the  reasonable- 
ness of  the  carload  or  less-than-carload 
rates,  except  to  claim  that  the  total  re- 
sulting charges  were  excessive,  no  find- 
ing can  be  made  by  the  Commission  as 
to  the  reasonableness  of  the  carload  or 
less-than-carload  rates.  Davies  v.  L.  & 
N.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  540,  544. 

(z)  Under  a  petition  asking  for  the 
reduction  of  rates  from  Boston,  New 
York  and  "eastern  ports,"  a  reduction 
can  be  ordered  only  from  Boston  and 
New  York,  the  term  "eastern  ports"  be- 
ing too  indefinite  to  warrant  an  order 
with  respect  to  any  other  than  the  cities 
specifically  referred  to.  Kiser  Co.  v. 
Central  of  Georgia  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
430,  441. 

(aa)  Greneral  designations  cannot  be 
accepted  as  the  basis  for  an  order  which, 
to  be  enforceable  under  the  law,  must 
be  specific  and  definite  either  in  enu- 
merating particular  points  or  indicat- 
ing a  specifically  defined  group  or  terri- 
tory. Kiser  Co.  v.  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  430,  442. 

(bb)  In  claim  for  reparation  for  al- 
leged unlawful  exaction  of  demurrage 
charges  based  upon  the  construction  of 
a  tariff  provision  and  dependent  upon  a 
question  of  fact  in  each  instance,  in  the 
absence  of  specific  proof  as  to  each  car, 
the  Commission  could  not  make  an 
award.  Murphy  Bros.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  & 
H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.   C.  C.  457,  459. 

(cc)  Where  the  original  complaint 
seeking  a  reduction  of  rates  makes  no 
claim  for  reparation  and  a  reduction  Is 
granted,  complainants  cannot  later  by 
a  separate  proceeding  ask  for  reparation 
on  the  shipments  involved  in  the  orig- 
inal complaint  on  the  basis  of  the  newly 
established  rate.  West  Texas  Fuel  Co. 
V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  491, 
492. 

(dd)  While  complainant  may  put  in 
issue  an  entire  schedule  of  rates 
upon  a  single  commodity  to  and  from 
all  points,  in  some  way  the  rates  to 
be  dealt  with  must  be  definitely  stated 
in     the     complaint.       The     thing     found 


fault  with  must  definitely  appear.  Flor- 
ida Fruit  &  Vegetable  Ass'n  v.  A.  C. 
U  R.   R.  Co.,   17  I.   C.   C.  552,  554. 

(ee)  The  Commission  has  little  doubt 
that  where  the  defendants  are  before 
it  upon  notice  of  the  matter  which  will 
be  examined  into,  where  a  full  hearing 
is  had  and  a  conclusion  reached,  it  may 
in  its  sound  discretion  establish  rates 
to  points  not  referred  to  by  any  intend- 
ed complaint,  Florida  Fruit  &  Vege- 
table Ass'n  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  552,  556. 

(eee)  Where  reparation  is  awarded 
for  an  excessive  charge  upon  marble 
shipped  from  Long  Island  City,  N.  Y., 
to  Shipman,  Va.,  but  the  record  is  not 
sufficient  to  enable  the  Commission  to 
undertake  a  revision  of  the  classification 
of  marble,  nor  to  enable  it  to  express 
an  intelligent  criticism  of  the  new  regu- 
lations suggested,  no  order  will  be  made 
governing  future  rates.  Cohen  &  Co.  v. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  177,  178. 

(ff)  It  is  always  best,  in  all  proceed- 
ings before  the  Commission,  for  the 
complainant  to  state  his  whole  case 
clearly  and  fully,  and  if  he  claims  to 
have  suffered  damages,  to  state  them. 
Morse  Produce  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.   Co.,    15    I.    C.    C.    334    (338). 

(gg)  The  Commission  can  only  act 
upon  those  rates  specifically  called  to 
its  attention,  although  it  must  have  in 
mind  the  effect  upon  the  revenues  of 
these  companies  of  resulting  reductions 
upon  other  commodities  and  at  other 
points.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  389. 

(hh)  Complaints  charged  that  the 
through  rates  shown  in  a  certain  tariff 
to  various  Wisconsin  points  were  unrea- 
sonable compared  with  combinations  of 
local  rates  to  the  same  points.  In  the 
lists  with  respect  to  each  shipment 
appeared  the  number  of  the  waybill  and 
the  date  it  was  issued,  the  point  from 
which  the  commodity  was  billed,  the 
point  of  origin,  the  name  of  the  con- 
signee, the  rate  charged,  and  the  amount 
of  the  claimed  overcharge.  The  plead- 
ings and  evidence  showed  that  the 
larger  part  of  the  claims  included  in  the 
schedules  was  duly  presented  to  the 
defendants  and  payment  thereof  refused. 
HELD,  the  complaints  and  the  informa- 
tion contained  in  the  schedules  were 
sufficient  to  put  defendants  on  notice 
and    demurrers   thereto   should   be  over- 


540 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMMISSION,  §2    (ii)— (oo) 


ruled  and  motions  to  dismiss  denied. 
Oshkosti  Logging  Tool  Co.  v.  C.  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  109,  110. 

(ii)  In  a  complaint  against  through 
rates  as  being  unji.st  and  discriminatory 
for  exceeding  combinations  of  local 
rates,  lists  submitted  are  open  to  criti- 
cism where  the  items  are  not  grouped 
as  to  routes  and  neither  the  commodity 
transported,  nor  weight  thereof,  is  given, 
but  such  objection  is  not  fatal  whereby 
nn  agreement  reached  at  the  hearing 
said  matters  are  to  be  set  out  in  new 
lists  thereafter  to  be  submitted.  Osh- 
kosh  Logging  Tool  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.   Co.,   14   I.   C.   C.   109,   111. 

(jj)  Where  by  agreement  of  the  par- 
ties further  schedules  showing  dates 
and  other  facts  with  respect  to  various 
shipments  on  which  reparation  is  asked, 
are  to  be  filed  by  complainants,  the 
Commission  will  enter  no  order  until 
such  schedules  are  presented.  Osh- 
kosh  Logging  Tool  Co.  v.  C.  &  N  W 
Ry.  Co.,   14  I.   C.  C.  109,  113. 

(kk)  Complaint  challenged  rates  of  51 
defendants  for  the  transportation  of  pe- 
troleum and  its  products  between  points 
generally  in  Official  Classification  terri- 
tory because  of  unreasonableness  and 
undue  preference;  but  the  record  did 
not  indicate  which  of  the  51  defendants 
the  order  should  run  against,  even  if 
there  were  a  proper  foundation  upon 
which  to  base  it.  No  showing  was 
made  indicating  that  the  present  classi- 
fication of  such  articles  was  unduly  dis- 
criminatory, but  the  Commission  was 
asked  to  reduce  by  one  sweeping  order 
thousands  of  rates  concerning  which 
no  specific  complaint  had  been  made 
and  no  evidence  offered.  HELD,  that 
no  omnibus  complaint  of  this  nature 
should  be  dismissed  without  prejudice, 
but  if  any  of  the  alleged  specific  dis- 
criminations are  in  violation  of  law 
they  should  be  brought  to  the  atten- 
tion of  the  Commission  in  a  proceeding 
directed  against  the  carrier  responsible 
therefor.  National  Petroleum  Ass'n  v. 
Ann   Arbor  R.    R.    Co.,   14    I.   C.    C.   272. 

(11)  Complainant  association,  com- 
posed of  firms  engaged  in  the  petroleum 
business,  filed  a  complaint  against  51 
defendant  carriers  to  compel  the  reduc- 
tion of  oil  rates  in  force  throughout 
Official  Classification  territory.  Said 
rates,  as  published,  provided  that  oil 
in  carloads  should  take  90  per  cent  of 
fifth    class    rates,    and    in     less    than 


carloads  third  class  rates.  Complainant 
submitted  only  vague  evidence  and  gen- 
eral comparisons  as  to  the  unreasonable- 
ness of  the  rates  complained  of;  and 
where  particular  shipping  points  were 
mentioned  as  being  subjected  to  unjust 
rates,  no  evidence  was  submitted  to  s 
show  that  the  many  thousands  of  other  i 
rates  involved  in  such  territory  were  ■ 
unreasonable  or  unjust.  Complainant 
asks  for  general  blanket  order  reducing 
rates  throughout  this  territory  without 
specifying  the  particular  localities  or 
particular  defendants.  HELD,  the  Com- 
mission could  not  on  such  a  general 
complaint,  and  on  such  indefinite  evi- 
dence, reduce  by  one  sweeping  order 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  rates,  and 
the  complaint  should  be  dismissed  with- 
out prejudice.  National  Petroleum  Ass'n 
V.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
272,   282. 

(mm)  Complainant  attacked  defend- 
ants' carload  rate  of  20c  per  100  lbs. 
on  petroleum  and  its  products  from 
Chicago,  Peoria,  111.,  and  Milwaukee, 
Wis.,  to  St.  Paul,  Minneapolis  and  Du- 
Juth,  Minn.  It  appeared  that  complain- 
ant's members  shipped  oil  only  from 
Ohio  territory  and  on  a  joint  rate  to 
those  points  in  Minnesota  of  33l^c, 
made  up  of  a  rate  of  13i/^c  from  Cleve- 
land to  Chicago,  and  one  of  20c  from 
Chicago  to  Minnesota  points.  After  the 
filing  of  the  complaint  the  joint  rate 
was  reduced  to  30c  by  defendants.  The 
carriers  from  Cleveland  to  Chicago 
were  not  made  parties  defendant.  Com- 
plainant did  not  pretend  to  carry  oil 
under  the  20c  rate  attacked,  but  brought 
its  complaint  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
reducing  that  rate  in  order  that  -it 
might  later  on  compel  a  reduction  of 
the  joint  rate  on  the  theory  that  the 
joint  rate  could  not  exceed  the 
combination  of  locals.  HELD,  complain- 
ant should  attack  the  joint  rate  directly 
in  order  to  secure  the  relief  desired, 
and  its  complaint  should  be  dismissed 
without  prejudice.  National  Petroleum 
Ass'n  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  284,  286. 

(nn)  Where  in  a  suit  for  reparation 
based  on  former  rates,  no  issue  is  made 
by  the  pleadings  to  the  reasonableness 
of  a  present  rate,  it  will  not  be  passed 
upon  by  the  Commission.  Gamble- 
Robinson  Commission  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,   14  I.  C.  C.  523,  524. 

(oo)  Where  an  excessive  charge  of 
the    same    amount   has    been    made    on 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMMISSION,  §2   (pp)— §3   (d) 


541 


different  shipments  "of  lumber,  the  same 
parties  and  the  same  shipping  points 
being  involved,  the  cases  should  be  com- 
bined and  presented  to  the  Commission 
in  one  proceeding.  Hayden  &  West- 
cott  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  &  S.  I.  R.  R. 
C,  14  I.  C.  C.  540. 

(pp)  Where  the  reasonableness  of  a 
rate  on  grapes  in  carloads  from  Pewee 
Valley,  Ky.,  to  Pittsburg,  Pa.,  over  the 
line  of  defendant  and  connecting  car- 
riers is  attacked;  where  the  combina- 
tions of  rates  between  such  points 
is  not  shown  on  any  legal  tariff,  and 
where  complainant  does  not  include 
the  connecting  carriers  as  parties  de- 
fendant, the  Commission  will  render 
no  decision  but  will  give  complainant 
leave  to  amend  its  complaint  for  a  later 
hearing.  Crutchfield  &  Woolfolk  v.  L. 
&  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  558,  560. 

(qq)  The  Commission  will  not  modify 
its  previous  order  upon  petition  so  as 
to  extend  the  relief  granted  in  its 
order  "from  points  intermediate  between 
Memphis  and  New  Orleans,"  because  no 
evidence  is  submitted  and  the  Com- 
mission is  not  advised  as  to  what 
points  are  referred  to  or  what  would 
be  a  reasonable  rate  from  such  points 
to  New  Orleans.  Thompson  Lumber  Co. 
V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  566,  566. 

(rr)  Where  a  point  to  which  rates 
are  sought  to  he  reduced  as  excessive 
is  not  situated  on  defendants'  lines,  the 
complaint,  unless  amended,  must  b«  dis- 
missed as  to  that  point.  Baker  v.  Cum- 
berland Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
568,  570. 

(ss)  On  carloads  of  sash  and  doors 
from  Chicago  to  Williamson,  W.  Va., 
a  rate  of  33c  was  exacted.  The  rate 
to  Roanoke  and  Norfolk,  Va.,  was  27c. 
Williamson  was  intermediate  to  Chicago 
and  Roanoke,  the  distance  from  Chicago 
to  Williamson  being  528  miles,  to  Roan- 
oke 700  miles,  and  to  Norfolk  908  miles. 
Competitive  conditions  existed  at  Roan- 
oke which  did  not  exist  at  Williamson. 
If  the  rates  on  sash  and  doors  to  Wil- 
liamson were  reduced,  every  other 
class  rate  would  be  open  to  the  same 
objection.  Complainant's  evidence  was 
so  meager  as  not  to  warrant  a  general 
readjustment  of  the  rates  to  the  terri- 
tory in  question.  HELD,  the  complaint 
should  be  dismissed  without  prejudice 
and  with  no  approval  of  the  rates  at- 
tacked precluding  further  inquiry  by 
the     Commission.       Chicago     Sash     and 


Door  Ass'n  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.   594,   595. 

(tt)  Complainant  stated  that  it  only 
prayed  for  reparation  and  did  not  ask 
the  establishment  of  a  rate  for  the  fu- 
ture, but  cases  cannot  be  disposed  of 
with  respect  to  a  single  shipper  or  a 
single  transaction.  Acme  Cement  Plaster 
Co.  V.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  41. 

§3.     Notice    of    Complaint. 

(a)  Section  13  of  the  Act  requiring 
the  Commission,  when  a  complaint  stat- 
ing the  facts  is  filed,  to  forward  the 
same  "to  such  common  carrier,  who 
shall  be  called  upon  to  satisfy  the  com- 
plaint or  to  answer  the  same  in  writing 
within  a  reasonable  time  to  be  specified 
by  the  Commission,"  requires  that  notice 
should  be  given  to  the  party  immedi- 
ately interested  and  not  to  those  re- 
motely concerned.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
I.  C.  C,  184  Fed.  118,  127. 

(aa)  Section  13  requires  that  any  car- 
rier complained  of  shall  be  supplied  by 
the  Commission  with  a  copy  of  the 
charges  and  be  given  an  opportunity  to 
answer.     Fels  &  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 

I.  C.  C.  483,  486. 
• 

(b)  Full  publicity  attends  every  step 
of  all  proceedings  before  the  Commis- 
sion and  it  must  be  assumed  that  par- 
ties interested  will  take  notice  of  what 
is  going  on.  Lum  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  21 
I.  C.  C.  558,  561. 

(c)  The  decision  in  the  present  case 
was  based  on  a  decision  as  to  hard 
wood  lumber  rates  made  in  a  former 
case.  Some  of  the  defendants  in  the  pres- 
ent case  were  not  defendants  in  the 
former  case,  but  were  duly  notified  of 
the  hearing  in  that  cas€  and  full  oppor- 
tunity was  given  them  to  make  a  show- 
ing why  reparation  should  not  be  award- 
ed against  them,  but  none  of  them  ap- 
peared. HELD,  they  had  had  their  day 
and  could  not  be  heard  to  say  that 
reparation  based  on  the  decision  of  the 
former  case  could  not  be  awarded  against 
them  in  the  present  case.  Kindelon  v. 
S.  P.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  251,  255. 

(d)  Proceedings  before  Commission 
given  wide  publicity,  and  any  interested 
carriers  are  given  opportunity  to  de- 
fend the  rate  or  provision  in  a  classi- 
fication, either  by  intervention  or  by 
request  of  original  defendant  that  such 
carriers  may  be  made  defendants.     Ben- 


542 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMMISSION,  §4  (a)— §5   (h) 


nett  V.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.   C.  C.  301,  303. 

§4.     Amendment. 

(a)  Where  an  amended  petition  ask- 
ing for  reparation  is  filed  the  statute 
of  limitation  runs  from  the  date  of  amend- 
ment. Virginia-Carolina  Chemical  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  1.  C.  C. 
1,  2;  Same  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  3,  4;  Same  v.  St.  L.  &  S. 
F.   R.   R.    Co.,   18  I.   C.   C.   5,   6. 

(b)  Where  a  complaint  seeking  repa- 
ration for  certain  claims  is  filed  be- 
fore the  expiration  of  the  limitation 
period  applicable  to  said  claims,  and 
upon  motion  of  complainant  is  dismissed 
without  prejudice,  the  Commission  may 
in  its  discretion  reinstate  said  original 
petition  by  a  nunc  pro  tunc  order  as  of 
date  of  the  filing  of  the  complaint  in 
the  first  place,  but  it  cannot  reinstate 
such  a  complaint  when  the  same  has 
been  amended  to  include  claims  not  in- 
cluded in  the  original  complaint,  and 
which  are  at  the  time  of  the  motion 
for  reinstatement  barred  by  the  statute 
of  limitations.  The  Commission  cannot 
sanction  a  practice  permitting  the  re- 
vival of  claims  barred  by  the  statute, 
by  subsequently  attaching  them  to»  other 
claims,  presented  within  the  prescribed 
period,  despite  any  promises  on  the 
part  of  defendant  carriers  that  they 
will  not  take  advantage  of  the  statute 
of  limitations.  The  Commission  has  no 
jurisdiction  to  deal  with  complaints  for 
reparation  in  any  way  unless  filed  with 
or  presented  to  it  within  the  period  spec- 
ified by  the  statute.  It  is  not  vested 
with  the  powers  of  a  court  of  equity 
to  relieve  from  hardships  resulting  from 
improvident  arrangements  or  agreements 
between  the  parties.  Werner  Sawmill 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  R  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  388, 
389-391. 

(c)  Where  a  claim  of  reparation  is 
not  filed  with  the  original  complaint 
but  is  filed  at  a  later  date  by  amend- 
ment, application  of  the  statute  of  limi- 
tations is  to  be  determined  as  of  the 
date  of  filing  such  amendment.  East 
St.  Louis  Walnut  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W. 
Ry.  Co.  of  Tex.,  17  I.  C.  C.  582,  584. 

(d)  Where  under  a  complaint  asking 
merely  for  reparation  the  facts  are 
stipulated  by  the  parties,  the  complaint 
cannot  be  amended  at  the  hearing  so 
as  to  include  an  application  for  through 
routes  and  joint  rates.    La  Salle  and  Bu- 


reau   County    Railro'ad    Co.    v.    C.    &,   N. 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  610,  613. 

§5.     Hearing. 

(a)  The  Commission  is  not  invested 
with    authority    to  find   any   rate   unrea- 
sonable except  after  full  hearing.  Doug-  JH 
las   &  Co.  V.   C.  R.  I.   &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I 
I.   C.  C.  541,   543. 

(b)  Rates  established  by  carriers  can- 
not be  condemned  except  upon  full  hear- 
ing. Anadarko  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  A.  T. 
&    S.  F.  Ry.   Co.,   20  I.   C.   C.   43,   50. 

(c)  The  Commission  will  suspend  the 
operation  of  its  orders  reducing  rates 
on  Pullman  berths  to  permit  other 
carriers  than  those  defendants  in  the 
original  case  to  present  additional  evi- 
dence, if  convinced  that  such  evidence 
would  show  the  pertinent  circumstances 
and  conditions  to  be  materially  different 
from  those  indicated  by  the  evidence 
which  was  considered  when  the  orders 
were  made.  Loftus  v.  Pullman  Co.,  19 
I.   C.   C.  102,  104.. 

(d)  An  order  condemning  an  existing 
rate,  awarding  reparation,  and  estab- 
lishing a  rate  for  the  future  cannot 
be  made  on  mere  complaint,  without 
appearance  or  evidence.  Quammen  & 
Austad  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  I.   C.  C.   110,  111. 

(e)  The  Commission  cannot  be  ex- 
pected to  supervise  the  conduct  of 
cases  before  it  to  the  extent  of  remind- 
ing the  parties  of  the  necessity  of  fol- 
lowing up  their  complaint,  and  may 
fairly  dismiss  a  complaint  for  lack  of 
diligent  prosecution.  Ocheltree  Grain 
Co.  V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C:  C.  412, 
413. 

(f)  Carriers  notified  of  hearing  and 
failing  to  appear  have  had  their  day  in 
court  and  cannot  now  be  heard  to  say 
that  no  order  can  be  made  against  them 
to  share  in  the  reparation  awarded. 
Kindelon  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  251, 
255. 

(g)  Complainant,  discovering  at  the 
close  of  the  hearing  that  he  did  not 
have  the  expense  bills  or  any  other 
memoranda  showing  the  shipments  in 
question  or  the  moneys  paid,  moved  to 
dismiss  the  case.  Complaint  dismissed. 
Roper  Lumber-Cedar  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  397. 

(h)  On  a  shipment  of  household 
goods    from    El    Reno,    Okla.,    to    Cabin 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMMISSION,  §5   (i)— §7  (b) 


543 


Creek,  Ark.,  complaint  against  rate 
charged  dismissed  for  failure  of  com- 
plainant to  appear  at  hearing.  Guthrie 
V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C 
i25. 

(i)  This  being  primarily  an  appli- 
cation for  reparation.  Commission  could 
make  no  order  awarding  damages  in 
the  absence  of  proof  on  the  part  of 
complainant  of  the  extent  of  his  injury, 
raylor  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.^  165. 

(j)  While  the  Act  does  not  presume 
to  cast  the  burden  of  proof  upon  the 
complainant  to  establish  the  unreason- 
ibleness  of  a  rate  complained  of,  as 
would  be  the  case  in  a  court  of  law, 
aevertheless  a  complainant  is  not  re- 
lieved of  all  responsibility  as  to  his  case 
upon  the  mere  filing  of  a  complaint, 
md  where  after  due  notification  he  ap- 
pears neither  in  person  nor  by  counsel 
at  the  hearing  and  his  application  is 
[)rimarily  one  for  reparation,  his  com- 
plaint must  be  dismissed.  Taylor  v. 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  165. 

(k)  No  question  being  involved  ex- 
cept one  of  reparation  and  the  com- 
plainant not  appearing  and  submitting 
10  evidence,  the  complaint  for  alleged 
nisrouting  is  dismissed.  Wakita  Coal 
&  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
L5  I.  C.  C.  533. 

(1)  Complaint  attacking  the  double 
'ate  assessed  upon  typewriters  when 
lot  properly  boxed  is  dismissed  upon 
ippearance  of  defendant,  which  justified 
said  rule,  and  upon  complainant's  failure 
:o  appear  and  prosecute.  Maxwell  v. 
A.dams  Express  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  609. 

(m)  Complaint  attacking  the  rate  on 
Deans  in  carloads  from  Lansing,  Mich., 
:o  Cedar  Rapids,  la.,  is  dismissed,  the 
complainant  not  appearing  and  no  evi- 
ience  being  presented  as  to  the  al- 
leged unreasonableness  of  the  rate  ex- 
icted.  Isbell-Brown  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R. 
R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  616,  617. 

(n)  Where  a  case  is  set  for  hearing 
md  the  parties  notified  by  mail  and 
:elegraph,  and  complainant  fails  to  ap- 
pear by  reason  of  his  absence  in  another 
state  and  failure  to  receive  notice  until 
1  few  days  before  the  date  set,  his  com- 
plaint will  not  be  dismissed  for  want 
3f  prosecution  and  opportunity  will  be 
given  him  to  present,  in  the  form  of  a 
svritten  communication,  evidence  bear- 
ing upon  the  unreasonableness  of  the 
rate    in    question.      William    Patten    v. 


Wisconsin  Central  Ry.  Co.,   14  L  C.  C. 

189,   189. 

(o)  The  question  of  the  admissibility 
of  depositions  taken  by  complainant 
with  respect  to  rates  allowed  another 
shipper  by  defendants,  becomes  imma- 
terial where  the  defendants  admit  the 
fact  sought  to  be  established  by  such 
depositions.  Forster  Brothers  Co.  v.  D. 
S.  S.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  232, 
234. 

§6.     Briefs. 

(a)  If  briefs  are  not  filed  within  the 
time  fixed  by  the  Commission,  no  failure 
to  accord  the  defendants  a  full  hearing, 
as  required  by  the  fifteenth  section, 
results  from  disposing  of  the  case  be- 
fore briefs  are  received.  Ullman  v. 
Adams  Express  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  585. 

(b)  Under  the  order  of  the  Commis- 
sion at  the  close  of  testimony  complain- 
ant had  until  June  11  to  file  its  brief 
and  defendants  until  June  21.  Com- 
plainant filed  its  brief  June  13  and  con- 
sented that  defendants  might  have  ad- 
ditional time.  HELD,  complainant  had 
no  authority  to  extend  the  time  for 
filing  defendants'  briet,  and  such  brief 
not  being  filed  at  the  time  ordered  by 
the  Commission,  the  case  was  properly 
decided  without  receiving  defendants' 
briefs.  Ullman  v.  Adams  Express  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  585,  586. 

(c)  Cases  before  the  Commission  are 
not  like  private  lawsuits;  parties  do 
not  stand  like  litigants  before  courts, 
and  the  Commission  cannot  upon  the 
agreement  of  parties  grant  applications 
for  continuances  and  extensions  of 
time  to  accommodate  parties  and  their 
counsel.  Ullman  v.  Adams  Express  Co., 
14   1.    C.    C.    585,    586. 

§7.     Oral    Argument. 

(a)  Under  ordinary  circumstances 
oral  argument  will  be  permitted  in  pro- 
ceedings before  the  Commission  in 
which  an  order  reducing  a  rate  or 
changing  a  regulation  or  practice  is 
prayed  for,  but  requests  for  such  argu- 
ment should  be  made  not  later  than 
at  the  close  of  the  taking  of  the  testi- 
mony. Ullman  v.  Adams  Express  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  585,  58«. 

(b)  Although  it  is  probable  the  Com- 
mission may,  in  its  discretion,  require 
the  submission  of  a  case  upon  the  testi- 
mony taken  by  a  single   Commissioner, 


544 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMMISSION,  §8  (a)— §10  (2)   (a) 


or  an  examiner,  and  upon  written  briefs, 
the  application  of  a  party  to  be  heard 
orally  will  not  be  refused  except  under 
peculiar  and  unusual  circumstances,  but 
such  application  for  oral  argument  must 
be  made  when  the  testimony  is  con- 
cluded and  not  after  the  expiration  of 
the  time  for  filing  briefs.  Ullman  v. 
Adams  Express  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  585, 
586. 

§8.     Rehearing. 

See   Allowances,   §3   (b). 

(a)  When  full  opportunity  for  hear- 
ing has  been  accorded,  carriers  must 
show  as  ground  for  a  rehearing  that  the 
evidence  which  they  now  offer  either 
could  not  or  ought  not  to  have  been 
introduced  upon  the  first  hearing,  and 
also  that  this  evidence,  if  introduced, 
would  probably  lead  to  a  reversal  of  the 
previous  conclusion.  It  is  no  hardship 
to  require  carriers  in  the  trial  of  their 
cases  before  the  Commission  to  observe 
to  a  very  moderate  degree  the  same 
rules  which  would  obtain  in  a  trial  at 
law.  Whenever  the  Commission  is  con- 
vinced that  its  order  works  substantial 
injustice  it  will  unhesitatingly  set  aside 
that  order,  but  cannot  continually  retry 
cases  upon  the  mere  statement  of  the 
carrier  that  it  desires  to  introduce 
some  further  testimony  and  believes 
that  the  decision  of  the  Commission  is 
wrong.  Whiteland  Canning  Co.  v.  P.  C. 
C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  92,  94. 

(aa)  The  fact  that  a  carrier  is  indi- 
rectly interested  in  the  result  and  has 
no  notice  of  the  pendency  of  proceed- 
ings in  which  an  order  was  made  ordi- 
narily is  no  valid  ground  for  a  rehearing. 
Whiteland  Canning  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.,  23  1.  C.  C.  92,  93. 

(b)  The  original  complaint  being  con- 
fined at  the  hearing  to  the  question 
whether  the  Moundsville,  W.  Va.,  dis- 
trict was  unduly  discriminated  against 
in  the  rates  on  coal  to  various  points 
as  compared  with  the  rates  from  the 
Ohio  district  west  of  Wheeling,  and  the 
evidence  being  confined  to  that  issue, 
a  petition  for  rehearing  will  not  be 
granted  to  determine  whether  unjust 
discrimination  exists  between  shippers 
in  the  Moundsville  district,  or  whether 
the  rates  from  the  Moundsville  district 
were  unreasonable  per  se.  Hitchman 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
17    I.    C.    C.    473,    474. 

-    (c)     Where,    upon    a    motion    for    the 
reopening  of  a  case, -complainant's  brief 


presents  no  questions  of  law  or  fact  no 
fully  considered  by  the  Commission  i] 
its  previous  disposition  of  the  complaini 
and  the  motion  rests  entirely  upon  th 
contention  that  the  conclusions  of  \si^ 
of  the  Commission  leading  it  to  dismis 
the  complaint  were  erroneous,  the  mc 
tion  will  be  denied.  Hussey  v,  C.  R.  1 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  215,  215. 

§9.     Costs,    Attorneys'    Fees,    Etc. 
See    Attorneys'    Fees. 

(a)  The  Commission  does  not  asses 
costs;  nor  does  it  allow  attorney's  fees 
Washer  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  1 
I.  C.  C.  147,  154. 

III.     MOTIONS. 

§10.     Dismissing    Cormplalnt. 

§10.     (1)     In     General. 

(a)  The  Spokane  case  cannot  be  dii 
continued  until  matters  in  issue  hav 
been  finally  disposed  of.  City  of  Sp( 
kane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.   Co.,  23  I.  C.   C.  45^ 

455. 

(b)  The  Commission  must  deal  wit 
the  question  from  the  standpoint  c 
the  lawful  tariff  rates.  The  Act  pn 
hibits  the  dismissal  of  any  complair 
because  it  is  not  shown  that  the  con 
plainant  was  damaged.  Indianapoli 
Freight  Bureau  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  ( 
C.   567,   571. 

(c)  Complainant  did  not  appear  £ 
hearing;  dismissed  for  want  of  proseci 
tion.  Weis  Mfg.  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  R: 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  142;  Arrow  Lumbe 
&  Shingle  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  'h 
Ry.   Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  145. 

§10.     (2)     Adjustment   Since    Filing. 

(a)  The  Commission  in  the  origins 
proceeding  in  this  matter,  19  I.  C.  ( 
162,  held  that  the  class  and  commodit 
rates  in  effect  from  eastern  defined  te 
ritories  to  Spokane  and  Spokane  ten 
tory  were  unreasonable,  and  prescribe 
certain  rates.  The  class  rates  name 
were  established,  but  the  commodit 
rates  were  postponed,  to  determine  the: 
effect  upon  the  revenues  of  the  carrier 
Before  the  result  of  this  investigatio 
was  known  the  fourth  section  wa 
amended  and  the  city  of  Spokane  coi 
tended  it  was  entitled  to  more  favo 
able  rates  than  originally  prescribe 
by  the  Commission.  A  hearing  wa 
had  and  as  a  result  a  fourth  sectio 
order    was    issued.      21    I,    C.    C    40i 


PROCEDURE   BEFORE   COMMISSION,    §10    (2)    (b)— (f) 


54f 


An  appeal  was  taken  which  reached  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
and  that  court,  after  once  hearing  argu- 
ment, reassigned  the  cases  for  argu- 
ment in  October,  1912.  The  Commerce 
Court  had  restrained  the  order  of  the 
Commission  and  when  it  was  evident 
that  a  considerable  time  must  elapse 
before  the  complaining  communities 
could  get  relief,  the  Commission  was  pe- 
titioned to  take  immediate  steps  to 
secure  some  relief  from  the  present 
unreasonable  rates.  The  Commission  set 
the  case  down  for  further  consideration 
on  May  8,  1912.  At  this  hearing  the 
defendant  carriers  presented  a  sched- 
ule of  carload  commodity  rates  from 
eastern  defined  territories  to  Spokane 
and  Spokane  territory.  The  rates  named 
by  this  schedule  were  on  the  average 
some  4  per  cent  higher  than  those 
found  reasonable  by  the  Commission 
from  the  Missouri  River,  7  per  cent 
from  Chicago,  10  per  cent  from  Detroit 
and  Pittsburgh,  while  from  the  Atlantic 
seaboard  they  were  practically  the  same. 
The  schedule  of  the  Commission  had 
named  both  carload  and  less-than-car- 
load  commodity  rates,  but  the  schedule 
of  the  carriers  embraced  no  less-than- 
carload  rates.  It  was  stated  by  repre- 
sentatives of  the  defendant  carriers  and 
by  the  attorney  of  the  city  of  Spokane 
that  an  agreement  had  been  reached 
whereby  this  schedule  was  to  be  forth- 
with established  by  the  carriers  and  this 
proceeding  discontinued  by  the  complain- 
ant. The  approval  of  the  Commission 
to  this  agreement  was  requested.  Upon 
this  proposition  the  Commission  re- 
marks: First.  The  Spokane  case  can- 
not be  discontinued.  Other  parties  in- 
volving other  communities  have  inter- 
vened and  are  parties  to  that  proceed- 
ing. After  the  time  and  effort  expend- 
ed in  perfecting  that  record  the  Commis- 
sion would  not  feel  warranted  in  allow- 
ing the  proceeding  to  be  discontinued 
until  the  matters  in  issue  had  been 
finally  disposed  of.  Second.  The  rea- 
sonableness of  the  proposed  schedule 
has  not  been  considered  by  the  Com- 
mission and  no  opinion  whatever  is  ex- 
pressed thereon.  Third.  No  opinion  is 
expressed  whether  less-than-carload 
commodity  rates  should  be  finally  pre- 
scribed. Fourth.  The  Commission  ad- 
heres to  the  position  which  it  has  taken 
under  the  fourth  section  and  will  feel 
entirely  free  to  dispose  of  this  whole 
question  as  may  seem  just  when  it  is 
determined  by  the  Supreme  Court  what 


action  can  be  taken  under  that  section. 
If  the  carriers  understanding  the  po- 
sition of  the  Commission  to  be  as  above 
stated  see  fit  to  make  the  proposed 
rates  effective  by  June  1  next,  the 
Commission  will  take  no  further  action 
until  the  final  decision  of  the  court  upon 
the  fourth  section  proceeding.  If  the 
carriers  do  not  on  or  before  May  25, 
1912,  notify  the  Commission  of  their 
intention  to  establish  this  schedule  the 
matter  will  be  at  once  otherwise  pro- 
ceeded with  as  may  seem  just  and 
proper  in  the  premises.  City  of  Spo- 
kane v.   N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  454. 

(b)  The  cause  of  complaint  having 
been  removed  since  these  cases  were 
submitted  the  complaints  are  dismissed 
without  prejudice.  Gay  Coal  &  Coke 
Co.  V.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
471. 

(c)  Where  defendants  agree  with 
complainant  to  establish  rates  on  build- 
ing and  roofing  paper  from  Erie,  Pa., 
to  various  points  in  Central  Freight 
Association  territory  not  to  exceed 
83  1-3  per  cent  of  the  6th  class  rates, 
and  complainant  expresses  its  willing- 
ness to  rely  on  the  promises  of  defend- 
ants to  establish  such  rates,  complain- 
ant's motion  to  dismiss  its  complaint 
demanding  such  rates  will  be  granted. 
Watson  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
16   I.    C.   C.   124,   125. 

(d)  Where  on  a  shipment  of  paper 
pails  from  Chicago  to  San  Francisco 
complainant  challenges  the  reasonable- 
ness of  a  carload  minimum  of  20,000 
pounds  and  later  by  formal  pleadings 
admits  the  reasonableness  of  such  mini- 
mum, the  complaint  will  be  dismissed. 
Zellerbach  Paper  Co.  ,v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  128. 

(e)  Where  upon  a  complaint  asking 
a  reduction  of  rates  on  various  com- 
modities from  Audianapolis  to  various 
points  in  the  southern  states,  it  appears 
that  since  the  filing  of  the  complaint 
the  defendant  carriers  involved  have 
substantially  complied  with  the  adjust- 
ment demanded,  complainant's  nntion 
to  dismiss  will  be  granted.  Indianapolis 
Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L. 
Ry.   Co.,   16   I.  C.   C.  142,  143. 

(f)  Complaint  demanding  the  estab- 
lishment of  joint  rates  on  masurite  from 
Sharon,  Pa.,  to  Wilcoe,  W.  Va.,  is.  dis- 
missed, the  joint  rates  being  already 
in  effect.  Masurite  Explosive  Co.  v. 
N.   &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.   C.  530. 


546 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMMISSION,  §10    (2)    (g)— (q) 


(g)  The  complaint  asking  for  rea- 
sonable rates  on  bullion  and  jewelers' 
sweepings  from  points  in  Minnesota 
to  points  in  Rhode  Island  is  dismissed, 
defendants  having  granted  the  rates  de- 
manded. Rentz  Brothers  v.  C.  B.  &  Q. 
R.   R.    Co.,    15   I.   C.    C.   7. 

(h)  Complaint  attacking  rates  on 
fertilizer  in  carloads  from  Montgomery, 
Ala.,  to  stations  on  the  Mobile,  Jackson 
&  Kansas  City  R.  R.  in  Mississippi  is 
dismissed,  an  agreement  having  been 
reached  by  the  parties  under  which  de- 
fendant was  to  reduce  the  rates  to 
certain  of  the  destinations  in  question. 
Montgomery  Freight  Bureau  v.  W.  Ry. 
of  Ala.,   15  I.  C.  C.  199. 

(i)  Defendant  carriers  and  complain- 
ants in  113  cases  involving  the  causes 
and  facts  covered  in  Nicola,  Stone  & 
Myers  Company  v.  Louisville  &  Nash- 
ville Railroad  Company  et  al.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  199,  having  entered  into  a  stipulation 
by  which  defendants  are  to  pay  an 
agreed  sum  as  reparation  and  it  ap- 
pearing that  none  of  the  provisions  of 
said  stipulation  in  so  far  as  they  relate 
to  matters  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Commission  are  inconsistent  with 
any  provision  of  the  Act,  said  stipulation 
is  approved  and  defendants  authorized 
to  pay  to  complainants  the  agreed  sum 
in  satisfaction  of  such  complaints.  Joice 
&  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
239,    243. 

(j)  Complaint  attacking  rates  on 
wheat  from  Oklahoma  points  to  Kansas 
City  is  dismissed,  complainant  having 
secured  prior  to  the  hearing  the  relief 
sought  therein.  Southern  Kansas  Mill- 
ers' Commercial  Club  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  604. 

(k)  Complaint  attacking  the  rates 
on  grain  and  grain  products  from  Kan- 
sas points  to  Memphis  and  Little  Rock 
is  dismissed  upon  complainant's  motion 
and  representation  that  actual  experi- 
ence under  the  rates  attacked  showed 
them  to  be  reasonable.  Kansas  Millers' 
Commercial  Club  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  605. 

(1)  Complaint  attacking  the  rates  on 
grain  and  grain  products  from  Kansas 
points  to  Oklahoma  points,  especially 
those  on  corn  and  wheat,  between  points 
within  Oklahoma,  is  dismissed  upon  the 
motion  of  complainant  and  its  repre- 
sentation that  actual  experience  under 
the  rates  attacked  has  proved  them  not 


to  prejudicial  and  that  necessary  relief 
has  already  been  received.  Kansas 
Millers'  Commercial  Club  v.  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.    Ry.    Co.,   15   I.   C.   C.   607. 

(m)  Where  after  a  hearing  a  general 
outline  of  rates  is  agreed  upon  between 
complainant  and  defendant,  the  com- 
plaint will,  at  the  request  of  the  com- 
plainant, be  dismissed  without  prejudice. 
Oklahoma  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
1.  C.   C.   147,   149. 

(n)  Complaint  having  been  filed  ask- 
ing that  defendant  be  ordered  to  re-es- 
tablish a  station  at  Fanshawe,  Okla., 
and  the  parties  since  the  hearing  hav- 
ing reached  an  agreement  for  stopping 
trains  at  said  point  satisfactory  to  the 
public,  the  complaint  is  dismissed  with- 
out prejudice.  Lewis  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  138. 

(o)  Complaint  dismissed,  defendants 
having  withdrawn  the  rate  complained 
of  and  re-established  the  rate  previously 
in  force.  Bunch  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  377. 

(p)  On  lumber  from  Boardman,  N. 
C,  to  Pottsville,  Pa.,  and  Schuylkill 
Haven,  Pa.,  a  charge  of  25c  was  exacted. 
At  the  time  shipments  moved  a  local 
rate  of  13c  was  in  effect  from  Board- 
man  to  Richmond  and  lie  from  Rich- 
mond to  Pottsville  and  Schuylkill  Haven, 
and  a  local  rate  from  Boardman  to  Nor- 
folk of  13c,  and  from  Norfolk  to  Potts- 
ville and  Schuylkill  Haven  of  13c.  It 
appeared  that  it  was  the  uniform  rule  to 
extend  the  same  rates  between  North 
Carolina  and  Pennsylvania  points  wheth- 
er the  shipment  moved  via  Norfolk  or 
via  Richmond;  that  the  lie  local  from 
Richmond  to  the  Pennsylvania  points 
in  question  in  effect  at  the  time  of  the 
shipment  was  a  mistake;  and  that  short- 
ly thereafter  a  13c  rate  was  extended. 
No  evidence  was  offered  of  the  unrea- 
sonableness of  the  rate  attacked.  HELD, 
that  by  agreement  of  both  sides  confin- 
ing the  record  to  the  present  case,  and 
establishing  no  precedent  for  similar 
complaints,  an  order  might  be  entered 
permitting  defendc^nts  to  make  repara- 
tion of  Ic  per  100  lbs.  Butters  Lumber 
Co.  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
521,    522. 

(q)  Cause  of  complaint  having  been 
apparently  removed,  and  complainant 
not  appearing  at  the  hearing,  complaint 
was  dismissed.  Learned-Haynes  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  152. 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMMISSION,   §11    (a)— (j) 


547 


IV.     ORDERS    OF   COMMISSION. 

§11.     Modification,    Validity,    and    Effect. 

(a)  An  order  of  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  is  not  invalid  be- 
cause it  fails  to  correct  the  more  serious 
discrimination  found  to  exist  by  the 
Commission.  If  it  removes  one  discrim- 
ination it  is  not  inoperative  because  it 
fails  to  remove  others.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H. 
R.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  168  Fed.  131, 
137. 

(b)  An  order  of  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  is  not  invalid  from 
the  fact  that  it  goes  beyond  the  issues 
technically  presented  by  the  pleadings 
where  the  parties  in  interest  appear 
and  the  situation  is  fully  considered  so 
as  to  cover  the  ground  involved  in  the 
order  entered.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R. 
Co.   V.   I.   C.   C,   168   Fed.   131,  139. 

(bb)  No  order  establishing  rates 
covering  a  wide  expanse  of  territory 
made  at  the  present  time,  carriers  be- 
ing given  a  certain  time  within  which 
to  comply  with  the  Commission's  find- 
ings. City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  454,  456. 

(c)  Only  carriers  that  are  before  the 
Commission  are  bound  by  findings  of 
the  Commission  in  a  particular  case. 
Fels  &  Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C 
483,  486. 

(cc)  Commission  can  at  any  time  re- 
call and  amend  its  order,  and  it  ought 
to  do  so  whenever  it  appears  that  an 
order  is  erroneous,  but  it  must  also  be 
assumed  that  judgment  of  Commission 
was  correct  upon  facts  as  presented. 
Traugott  Schmidt  &  Sons  v.  M.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  I.   C.  C.   684,   685. 

(d)  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
rates  attacked  prior  to  the  filing  of  the 
complaint  and  that  the  present  rate 
has  been  maintained  for  more  than  two 
years,  no  requirement  as  to  a  rate  for 
the  future  will  be  made.  Acme  Cement 
Plaster  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  283,  285;  Switzer  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  A.  &  M.  R.  R  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
471,   474. 

(dd)  Where  an  unreasonable  joint 
rate  has  been  collected,  the  liability  of 
the  parties  to  such  action  is  joint  and 
several,  and  the  Commission  may  award 
reparation  against  one  of  the  roads 
which  participated  in  the  traffic,  even 
though  other  roads  which  performed 
a  part  of  the  service  are  not  made  par- 


ties defendant  to  the  formal  complaint 
asking  reparation.  Webster  Grocer  Co. 
v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  20,  21. 

(e)  Orders  of  the  Commission,  other 
than  for  the  payment  of  money,  may 
continue  in  force  for  a  period  not  ex- 
ceeding two  years.  Douglas  &  Co.  v. 
C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  97, 
98. 

(f)  Where  part  of  a  joint  through 
rate  is  found  unreasonable  and  the 
carriers  for  the  part  of  transportation 
for  which  the  rate  is  found  unreason- 
able are  parties  defendant,  reparation 
may  be  awarded  against  such  carriers, 
although  the  delivering  carrier  whose 
local  rate  formed  part  of  the  through 
joint  rate,  which  local  rate  is  not  at- 
tacked, is  not  a  party  defendant.  Wil- 
lamette Pulp  &  Paper  Co.  v.  B.  &  A. 
R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  178,  180. 

(g)  The  law  permits  the  Commission 
to  make  an  order  effective  for  a  maxi- 
mum period  of  two  years.  If  an  order 
is  issued  it  does  not  necessarily  follow 
that  it  would  be  for  the  maximum 
period.  Any  decision  made  or  order 
entered  by  the  Commission  may  be  re- 
opened by  the  Commission  at  any  time. 
Douglas  &  Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
21  I.  C.  C.  541,  544. 

(h)  While  it  has  great  respect  for 
the  official  actions  of  state  commissions 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
cannot  withhold  proper  action  in  an  in- 
terstate situation  because  it  is  antici- 
pated that  some  opposing  or  retaliatory 
action  will  be  taken  by  a  state  body. 
In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  by  Carriers 
Operating  Between  the  Mississippi  and 
Missouri  Rivers,  21  I.   C.   C.  546,   552. 

(i)  The  Commission  has  complete 
power  to  suspend  or  modify  its  orders. 
Loftus  V.  Pullman  Co.,  19  1.  C.  C.  102, 
104. 

(j)  Where  a  carrier  has  voluntarily 
reduced  a  rate  shortly  after  charging 
the  higher  rate  attacked,  15  months 
prior  to  the  filing  of  a  complaint,  and 
the  claim  was  never  presented  to  de- 
fendant for  informal  adjustment  and  the 
latter  stood  willing  to  adjust  it,  the 
Commission  will  order  defendant  to 
maintain  the  rate  only  for  two  years 
from  the  date  defendant  voluntarily  put 
the  same  in  force.  Tully  Grain  Co.  v. 
F.  S.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  28, 
29. 


148 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE   COMMISSION,   §11    (k)— (u) 


(k)  Where  one  of  defendant  carriers 
by  its  pleadings  denies  the  unreason- 
ableness of  a  rate  charged,  making  a 
formal  complaint  and  hearing  necessary, 
and  another  defendant,  being  the  only 
defendant  appearing  at  the  hearing,  ad- 
mits the  unreasonableness  of  the  rate 
and  the  justness  of  the  rate  claimed 
by  complainant,  the  Commission  will  not 
treat  the  complaint  as  an  informal  one 
and  prescribe  that  the  rate  demanded 
be  kept  in  force  for  only  one  year,  but 
will  treat  the  complaint  and  hearing  as 
formal  and  prescribe  a  rate  to  be  kept 
in  force  for  a  period  of  not  less  than 
two  years.  Stone-Ordean-Wells  Co.  v.  C. 
B.    &   Q.    R.   R.   Co.,   16   I.   C.   C.   30,   31. 

(1)  Where  rates  generally  are  at- 
tacked, all  parties  should  have  an  op- 
portunity to  be  put  on  notice  of  the 
charges  which  must  be  met.  Where 
specific  rates  are  attacked  the  Commis- 
sion cannot  legitimately  go  beyond  these 
rates  in  its  decision.  Sanford  v.  West- 
ern Express  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  32,  36. 

(m)  Any  order  must  be  limited  to 
the  situation  under  the  petition  filed. 
Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C. 
&   St.  L.  Ry.   Co.,   16   I.   C.  C.  56,  71. 

(n)     The  Commission    can  only    act 

in    making  its    orders    upon  the    case 

presented.  City    of    Spokane  v.    N.    P. 

Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.   C.  179,  181. 

(o)  The  Commission  is  an  adminis- 
trative body.  The  rates,  regulations, 
and  practices  which  it  establishes  with- 
in its  jurisdiction  become  rules  of  ac- 
tion which  may  and  must  enter  into 
the  business  dealings  of  the  court.  It 
may  be  necessary  to  change  from  time 
to  time  these  rulings  as  varying  con- 
ditions require,  but  they  should  never 
be  changed  except  upon  due  notice  to 
the  public,  which  is  affected  by  them, 
and  it  would  be  altogether  intol^able 
if  the  change  could  be  made  retro- 
active. Nebraska-Iowa  Grain  Co.  v.  U. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  90,  93. 

(p)  An  order  of  the  Commission  for 
the  payment  of  money  does  not  have  the 
effect  of  an  order,  decree  or  judgment  of 
a  court,  nor  is  it  enforceable  by  process, 
nor  does  it  become  a  lien  upon  the 
property  of  the  defendant.  Washer 
Grain  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
147,  155. 

(q)  While  ordinarily  in  awarding 
reparation  the  Commission  will  order 
the   rate   found   to  be  reasonable  to  be 


established  for  the  future,  it  is  not  nec- 
essary for  it  to  inquire  into  this  indi- 
vidual rate  pending  the  general  in- 
quiry. Hydraulic  Press  Brick  Co.  v. 
Vandalia  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  175, 
176. 

(r)  Where  the  Commission  has  in 
its  opinion  indicated  that  through  rates 
are  unreasonable,  but  enters  no  order, 
shippers  may  later  call  attention  of  the 
Commission  to  the  matter  and  secure 
such  order  if  defendants  do  not  within 
a  reasonable  time  adjust  their  rates  as 
suggested  by  the  Commission.  Oshkosh 
Logging  Tool  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  109,  113. 

(s)  Where  points  of  shipment  are 
not  involved  in  a  proceeding  for  the 
reduction  of  rates  and  for  reparation 
but  would  have  been  entitled  to  such 
reduction  and  reparation  had  they  been 
included  in  the  complaint,  the  Commis- 
sion, though  it  will  not  enter  an  order 
with  respect  to  such  points,  will  inti- 
mate to  the  railroad  that  it  should 
make  for  them  a  like  reduction.  For- 
ster  Brothers  Co.  v.  D.  S.  S.  &  A.  Ry. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  232,  236. 

(t)  Where  a  suit  has  been  begun  to 
vacate  an  order  of  the  Commission  pro- 
hibiting the  payment  of  elevation 
charges  and  certain  interests  are  about 
to  institute  injunction  proceedings,  and 
it  is  evident  that  if  the  payment  of 
such  allowances  were  stopped  at  cer- 
tain points  and  to  certain  persons,  while 
continuing  at  other  points  and  to  other 
persons,  a  condition  of  discrimination 
and  confusion  might  result,  the  Commis- 
sion will  postpone  the  effective  date  of 
its  order  and  recommend  to  carriers 
to  defer  suits  until  the  opinion  of  the 
courts  may  be  obtained.  Traffic  Bureau 
Merchants'  Exchange  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  551,  552. 

(u)  Where  complainant  is  charged  a 
rate  of  IIV2C  on  walnut  logs  from  New- 
port, Ark.,  to  East  St.  Louis,  111.,  where 
defendants  agree  to  establish  a  rate 
between  those  points  of  ll%c  and  to 
make  reparation  on  that  basis,  and 
where  complainant  concurs  upon  the 
condition  that  the  Commission  will  fix 
the  rate  for  a  period  of  one  year,  the 
Commission  will  hold  the  171^0  rate  un- 
reasonable, establish  the  11  ^/^c  rate  and 
award  reparation  on  that  basis.  East 
St.  Louis  Walnut  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
14   L   C.   C.   553,   554. 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMMISSION,  §11  (v)— §13   (f) 


549 


(v)  Defendant  having  voluntarily  re- 
duced its  rate  on  snapped  corn  and  made 
reparation  for  the  shipment  under  its 
former  rate  is  ordered  to  keep  the  re- 
duced rate  in  effect  for  a  period  of 
two  years.  Ocheltree  Grain  Co.  v.  C. 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  238,  239. 

§12.     Review. 

See  Courts,  §5;  Commerce  Court, 
I,  A;  Forwarders,  I  (d);  Reason- 
ableness  of    Rates,   §1    (g),    (I). 

By  amendments  to  Act  of  1906,  orders 
of  Commission,  if  resisted  by  carriers, 
may  be  reviewed  before  jury  in  courts 
of  common  law.  Washer  Grain  Co.  v. 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  147,  154. 

Under  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce 
complainants  have  no  recourse  to  the 
courts  in  order  to  test  the  soundness 
of  the  rulings  of  the  Commission.  Field 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  298,  299. 

V.     PARTIES. 

See  Association;  Courts,  §1  (a); 
Crimes,  §24;  Procedure  Before 
Commission,  V;  Througii  Routes 
and  Joint  Rates,  §11  (2)  (f),  §16; 
Transportation,  §11  (b);  Recon- 
signment,  §7;  Reparation,  §6,  §18 
(b). 

§13.     Necessary   and   Proper  Parties. 
See  Association. 

(a)  It  would  seem  to  be  the  com- 
monest prudence  on  the  part  of  car- 
riers to  require  every  complaint  affect- 
ing the  Official  Classification  to  be  forth- 
with submitted  to  the  Official  Classifi- 
cation Committee,  which  should  be  au- 
thorized to  make  a  full  presentation 
of  the  matter  to  the  Commission.  But 
while  this  is  true  the  Official  Classifica- 
tion Committee  is  not  a  body  against 
which  the  orders  of  the  Commission 
can  run,  and  it  is  no  part  of  the  Com- 
mission's duty  to  bring  to  the  atten- 
tion of  this  committee  proceedings 
which  affect  that  classification.  White- 
land  Canning  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L. 
Ry.   Co.,  23  I.  C.   C.   92,   93. 

(aa)  No  decision  can  be  made  by 
the  Commission  where  carriers  inter- 
ested are  not  parties  to  a  proceeding. 
Byrnes  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
251,  252. 

(b)  The  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  a 
city  is  a  proper  party  to  he  heard  upon 
the  application  of  carriers  to  be  relieved 
from  the  operation  of  the  fourth  sec- 
tion in  fixing  rates  to  such  city.     Grand 


Junction    Chamber    of   Commerce   v.    D. 
&  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  115,  117. 

(bb)  Only  carriers  that  are  before 
the  Commission  are  bound  by  findings 
of  Commission  in  a  particular  case. 
Fels  &  Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
483,    486. 

(c)  All  participating  carriers  should 
be  joined  as  parties  in  an  attack  upon 
a  joint  rate.  Reno  Grocery  Co.  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  400.  401. 

(d)  A  complaint  for  damages  named 
one  road  as  defendant.  HELD,  that  two 
'connecting  lines  were  necessary  parties, 
such  roads  being  operated  as  independ- 
ent properties,  though  controlled, 
through  stock  ownership,  by  the  road 
named  as  defendant.  Mountain  Ice  Co. 
V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
45,  51. 

(dd)  Where  an  objection  as  to  the 
sufficiency  of  the  parties  defendant  was 
raised  for  the  first  time  on  the  final  ar- 
Tument.  HELD,  that  where  the  neces- 
sary parties  were  omitted  in  the  original 
petition  and  leave  was  granted  to  bring 
them  in  by  amendment,  and  such  car- 
riers understood  that  they  had  been 
made  parties  and  filed  answers  and  the 
case  proceeded  as  though  they  were 
parties  the  Commission  regarded  the 
carriers  as  properly  before  it;  but,  if 
not,  then  the  necessary  amendment 
should  be  treated  as  filed  nunc  pro 
tunc.  Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  45,  51,  52. 

(e)  Where  the  Commission  has  sus- 
pended rates  in  Southern  Classification 
territory  upon  hearing,  it  cannot  pass 
upon  the  reasonableness  of  rates  in 
Official  Classification  territory,  none  of 
the  carriers  in  the  latter  territory  hav- 
ing   been    made    parties.      In    Re    Ad- 

RHces    in    Rates    on    Locomotives    and 
Tenders,  21  L  C.  C.  103,  112. 

(f)  Complainant  attacked  the  publica- 
tion of  an  unreasonable  rate  for  the 
transportation  of  iron  ore  from  Grand 
Rapids,  Minn.,  to  Allouez  Bay  in  the 
city  of  Superior,  Wis.  Complainant 
and  his  associates  had  spent  about  $50,- 
000  in  work  preliminary  to  the  opening 
of  ore  mines  owned  by  them  at  Grand 
Rapids.  The  actual  opening  and  opera- 
tion of  them  would  require  an  expendi- 
ture of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  dollars. 
Defendants  published  a  distance-tariff 
rate  of  8.1c  per  100  lbs.,  which  com- 
plainant alleged   depressed   the  value  of 


550 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMMISSION,   §13    (g)— (i) 


his  lands  so  that  it  was  impossible 
for  him  and  his  associates  to  sell,  lease 
or  develop  the  same.  Defendant  moved 
to  dismiss  the  complaint  at  the  close  of 
complainant's  case,  principally  because 
it  contended  it  could  not  be  required 
to  publish  a  rate  until  ore  should  actually 
be  offered  it  for  shipment,  and  also  be- 
cause complainant  had  ulterior  motives 
in  the  filing  of  the  complaint  and  could 
not  be  in  a  position  to  ship  ore  within 
the  maximum  order  the  Commission 
could  enter,  namely,  two  years.  De- 
fendant claimed  it  would  publish  a  suit- 
able rate  when  ore  was  offered  it  for 
shipment.  HELD,  a  difference  in  the 
rate  of  transportation  may  determine 
whether  certain  ore  lands  have  com- 
mercial value  or  not;  whether  they 
shall  be  developed  or  lie  idle.  Without 
in  the  least  questioning  the  good  faith 
of  the  statement,  the  promise  of  the 
defendant  to  publish  a  rate  in  line  with 
the  then  established  rate  from  common 
territory,  when  complainant's  mine  shall 
have  actually  been  opened  and  ore 
offered  for  shipment,  can  scarcely  be 
regarded  as  sufficiently  definite  and 
certain  to  warrant  hnudreds  of  thou- 
sands of  dollars  being  invested  upon  th€ 
strength  of  it.  If  it  is  necessary  under 
the  Act  to  have  the  freight  actually 
upon  the  ground  before  the  Commission 
can  assume  jurisdiction  and  prescribe  a 
just  and  reasonable  rate,  what  is  there 
to  prevent  a  railway  company,  if  its 
agents  should  see  fit,  to  resort  to  such 
perversity,  from  refraining  to  publish 
a  rate  on  potatoes,  for  instance,  until 
the  potatoes  are  actually  within  sight, 
and  from  refusing  to  publish  such  a  rate 
before  the  potatoes  are  planted,  or 
while  they  are  being  cultivated  and 
growing,  and  after  they  have  been  dug, 
but  not  yet  brought  to  the  station. 
Any  man  who  is  situated  as  is  the 
complainant  has  a  right  to  know  what 
the  lawful  published  rate  on  his  pro- 
posed product  is  and  will  be  for  a 
reasonable  period  of  time  in  the  future. 
The  fact  that  complainant  could  not  pos- 
sibly ship  within  two  years  of  the 
effective  period  of  an  order  of  the 
Commission  is  not  a  material  point.  If 
the  Commission  prescribes  a  reasonable 
rate  to-day  for  the  movement  of  traffic 
which  possibly  may  not  move  within 
two  years,  and  the  railway  company 
refuses  voluntarily  to  continue  that  rate 
for  a  period  longer  than  two  years,  it 
becomes  the  plain  duty  of  the  Commis- 
sion to  institute  a  new  investigation  at 


the  proper  time,  and  prescribe  a  rate 
which  shall  be  just  and  reasonable, 
under  the  circumstances  and  conditions 
prevailing  at  such  time.  The  fact  that 
all  the  carriers  operating  in  the  Mesaba 
district,  and  all  of  the  carriers  and  par- 
ties interested  in  the  ore  rates  are  not 
made  parties  to  this  proceeding  is  im-3j 
material,  in  its  bearing  upon  the  legality  J 
of  this  complaint.  A  complainant  can- 
not be  expected  to  search  public  and 
private  records,  with  the  view  of  discov- 
ering all  parties  that  may  be  interested 
in  a  certain  proceeding.  Full  publicity 
attends  every  step  of  all  proceedings 
before  the  Commission,  and  it  must  be 
assumed  that  parties  interested  will 
take  notice  of  what  is  going  on.  The 
complainant  in  the  present  proceeding 
was  clearly  within  his  legal  rights  when 
he  filed  his  complaint,  and  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  Commission  after  full  hear- 
ing and  investigation  to  render  a  deci- 
sion with  reference  to  the  reasonable- 
ness of  the  rate  under  attack.  If  the 
complainant  has  ulterior  motives  or 
hopes  for  indirect  benefits  not  directly 
arising  out  of  the  rate  in  controversy, 
that  is  a  matter  which  should  not  re- 
strain this  Commission  from  performing 
its  plain  duty  under  the  law.  Motion 
overruled.  Lum  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  21 
I.  C.  C.  558,  560,   561,  562. 

(g)  The  rate  of  a  carrier  not  made  a 
party  defendant  cannot  be  held  to  be 
in  issue.  Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v. 
St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  33,  36. 

(h)  The  Commission  declines  to  ex- 
press an  opinion  whether  the  assignee 
of  a  claim  for  reparation  can  maintain 
proceedings  in  his  own'  name  before  the 
Commission.  O'Brien  Commercial  Co. 
V.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
68. 

(i)  Complainant  asked  reparation  on 
a  shipment  of  glue  stock  shipped  from 
Philadelphia,  Pa.,  to  Gowanda,  N.  Y. 
The  complaint  alleged  that  the  ship- 
ment moved  via  the  lines  of  the  Phil- 
adelphia &  Reading  R.  R.  Co.  and  the 
Erie  R.  R.  Co.  HELD,  that  in  as  much 
as  the  carriers  named  are  not  connect- 
ing lines  it  is  apparent  there  is  a  de- 
fect of  parties  defendant,  and  on  ac- 
count of  the  non-joinder  of  certain  of 
the  carriers  participating  no  finding 
will  be  made  with  respect  to  the  rate 
applying  between  those  points.  Com- 
plaint dismissed  without  prejudice.  Barr 
Chemical  Works  v.  P.  &  R.  R.  R.  Co., 
20   I.   C.   C.  77,   78. 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE   COMMISSION,   §13    (j)— (v) 


551 


(j)  A  complaint  mistakenly  alleged 
that  shipments  moved  from  Manchester, 
N.  Y.,  via  Milwaukee,  to  Waterloo,  Wis., 
when  they  moved  from  Manchester,  Vt. 
and  all  the  carriers  between  the  point  of 
origin  and  Milwaukee  were  not  made  de- 
fendants on  account  of  this  mistake. 
HELD,  such  error  was  not  material  with 
respect  to  the  power  of  the  Commission 
to  determine  the  reasonableness  of  the 
portion  of  the  through  rate,  from  Mil- 
waukee to  Waterloo,  and  did  not  pre- 
vent it  from  awarding  reparation  against 
the  delivering  carrier.  Roach  &  Seeber 
Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I. 
C.    C.    172,   172. 

(k)  The  fact  tnat  one  of  the  car- 
riers participating  in  a  movement  is 
not  made  a  party  and  at  the  time  of 
the  hearing,  when  the  statute  of  limi- 
tations has  run,  does  not  constitute  a 
fatal  defect  in  the  record  so  as  to  pre- 
vent the  awaraing  of  reparation  for  the 
exaction  of  an  unreasonable  rate.  Och- 
eltree  Grain  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  412,  413. 

(1)  Where  a  carrier  involved  in  rates 
attacked  is  not  made  a  party,  the  Com- 
mission can  only  deal  with  the  rates 
themselves;  if  an  order  is  desired  di- 
recting the  carrier  to  desist  from  un- 
lawful practices,  it  must  be  made  a 
party  defendant.  Cedar  Hill  Coal  & 
Coke  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  402,  403. 

(m)  The  Commission  will  not  enter 
an  order  against  a  carrier  to  desist  from 
an  arrangement  resulting  in  unjust  dis- 
crimination where  the  carrier  is  not  a 
I  arty  to  the  proceeding.  Cedar  Hill 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,    15    I.    C.    C.    73,    77. 

(n)  Complaints  may  be  filed  even 
where  there  is  no  direct  damage  to  the 
complainant.  Washer  Grain  Co.  v.  M 
P.   Ry.,  15  I.  C.  C.   147. 

(o)  Where  charges  are  paid  by  the 
consignee,  but  billed  back  against"  the 
consignor,  the  consignor  is  properly  the 
moving  party  in  a  reparation  proceed- 
ing. Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L  I 
M.    &    S.   Ry.    Co.,    15   L    C.    C.   274. 

(p)     A  change  cannot  be  ordered  in  a 

classification   rule,   except   as   it   applies 

•    e   defendant.     Bennett   v.    M.   St.   P. 

&    S.   Ste.    M.   Ry.    Co.,   15   I.   C.    C.   301, 

303. 

(q)  Where  the  connections  of  a  de- 
fendant   railroad    have    not    been    made 


parties  in  a  proceeding  to  compel  a 
rate  revision,  no  order  will  be  entered 
governing  rates  for  shipments  over 
such  connecting  carriers,  but  defendant 
will  be  admonished  to  arrange  with  its 
connections  for  the  application  of  the 
new  rates  decreed.  George's  Creek 
Basin  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  127,  134. 

(r)  No  order  will  be  entered  against 
lines  not  parties  to  the  record.  National 
Petroleum  Ass'n  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  284,  285. 

(s)  Where  the  delivering  carrier  as- 
sesses a  demurrage  charge  and  is  not 
made  a  party  to  a  proceeding  against 
the  initial  carrier,  no  order  can  be 
entered  for  reparation  with  respect  to 
sucn  chargfe.  Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke 
Co.  V.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C  C.  606, 
608. 

(t)  A  freight  bureau  which  is  main- 
tained by  a  manager  and  whose  mem- 
bers become  such  by  entering  into  writ- 
ten contracts  with  the  bureau,  by  which 
each  pays  a  stipulated  annual  fee  and 
by  which  the  bureau  undertakes  to 
adjust  rate  disputes,  is  a  competent 
party  complainant  in  a  proceeding  be- 
fore the  Commission  for  the  reduction 
of  rates.  Forest  City  Freight  Bureau 
V.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
109,   114. 

(u)  Where  an  interstate  rate  at- 
tacked and  found  to  be  unreasonable  is 
made  up  of  several  locals,  and  is  not  a 
joint  through  rate,  the  proper  method 
before  a  formal  order  is  entered  is  to 
cite  before  the  Commission  the  proper 
defendants,  praying  the  establishment 
of  a  through  route  and  joint  rate,  upon 
which  the  Commission  can  do  justice  to 
all  parties,  as  upon  a  complaint  asking 
an  order  to  compel  defendants  to  desist 
from  maintaining  the  attacked  rates,  the 
Commission  can  enter  no  order,  as  Its 
power  to  reduce  a  through  rate  composed 
of  several  locals,  by  reducing  each  local, 
is  doubtful.  Merchants  Traffic  Ass'n  v. 
N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
225,  228. 

(v)  Joint  class  rate  exceeded  cer- 
tain combination  of  commodity  rates. 
Upon  examination  of  tariffs  carrying 
the  commodity  rates,  it  is  found  that 
the  lines  on  whose  rails  the  traffic  orig- 
inated are  not  parties  hereto.  Complaint 
dismissed.  Carpenter  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  & 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.   Op.  529. 


552 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMMISSION,  §14  (a)— §16  (g) 


VI.  SET-OFF. 

§14.     In  General. 

(a)  The  Commission  has  no  authority 
In  a  proceeding  by  a  shipper  to  recover 
reparation  to  award  a  set-off  to  the  car- 
rier for  unpaid  freight  bills  due  from  the 
shipper,  since  to  award  set-off  amounts 
to  the  same  thing  as  adjudicating  the 
claim  of  a  railroad  company  against  a 
shipper,  whereas,  the  only  authority  of 
the  Commission  is  to  adjudicate  a  claim 
of  a  shipper  against  a  railroad  company 
for  violation  of  the  interstate  commerce 
law.  Laning-Harris  Coal  &  Grain  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  37,  38. 

VII.  EFFECT  OF  EVIDENCE. 

§15.     Equities  of  Cause. 

See     Reasonableness     of     Rates,     §24 
(b). 

(a)  There  are  cases  in  which  "tainted 
hands"  unquestionably  compel  a  per- 
emptory dismissal;  but  the  Commission 
does  not  inquire  into  equities  not  con- 
nected with  the  issue  before  it.  Lum 
V.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  558,  562. 

(b)  The  through  rate,  $9.75  per  ton, 
on  blacksmith  coal  from  Chicago  to 
Portales,  N.  M.,  was  higher  than  the 
combination  of  locals,  $8.25  per  ton,  on 
bituminous  coal  via  Pittsburg,  Kan., 
from  Chicago  to  Portales.  In  order  to 
secure  such  lower  rate  complainant  at 
Chicago,  with  full  knowledge  of  the  rate 
situation,  connived  with  defendant's 
agent  at  Chicago  to  have  the  shipment  of 
blacksmith  coal  billed  to  Pittsburg  as 
bituminous  coal.  The  agent  at  Pittsburg 
refused  to  rebill  the  coal  to  Portales  as 
bituminous  coal  and  demanded  the  local 
rate  on  blacksmiths'  coal  from  Pittsburg 
to  Portales,  $13.20  per  ton.  Complainant 
refused  to  pay,  and  the  coal  was  seized 
and  sold  by  defendant  for  freight  charges. 
HELD,  complainant  having  fraudulently 
attempted  to  obtain  the  benefit  of  a  rate 
not  applicable  to  its  shipment,  and  de- 
fendant having  concurred  therein,  neither 
party  came  before  the  Commission  with 
clean  hands,  and  a  relieving  order  with 
respect  to  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of 
the  coal  should  be  denied.  Sligo  Iron 
Store  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.  139,  142. 

§16.     Judicial  Notice. 

See    Evidence,    III. 

(a)  While  the  rates  from  certain  east- 
ern and  southern  points  are  not  involved 


in  this  proceeding,  the  Commission  never- 
theless considers  the  entire  situation. 
Merchants'  Freight  Bureau  v.  M.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  573,  575. 

(b)  The  Commission  should  exhaust 
its  activities  in  developing  pertinent 
facts  necessary  to  full  investigation  and 
hearing  of  complaint.  Quammen  &  Au- 
stad  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  110,  111. 

(c)  The  Commission  is  bound  to  con- 
sider the  whole  field  when  a  general 
rate  adjustment  is  demanded,  and  must 
carefully  consider  the  probable  effects 
upon  other  points  not  involved  in  the 
specific    complaint    under    consideration. 

•Greater  Des  Moines  Committee  v.  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  73,  79. 

(d)  No  reason  exists  why  the  Com- 
mission cannot  take  judicial  notice  of 
the  lawful  rate  established  by  another 
sovereign  p-ower  applicable  to  shipments 
in  its  own  domain,  Awbrey  &  Semple  v. 
G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  267,  271. 

(e)  In  the  general  adjustment  of 
rates,  individual  instances  of  seeming 
discrepancy  are  noticed,  which  are  inex- 
plainable  from  a  cursory  examination, 
but  often  when  such  instances  are  made 
the  subject  of  specific  complaint,  cir- 
cumstances and  conditions  before  un- 
known are  brought  out  tending  to  justify 
the  apparently  unreasonable  relation. 
The  Commission  consequently  moves 
with  great  caution  in  condemning  a  rate 
or  practice,  and  does  so  only  when  the 
facts  before  it  amply  warrant  such  ac- 
tion. Sanford  v.  Western  Express  Co., 
16  L  C.  C.  32,  36. 

(f)  The  Commission's  conclusions 
must  be  reached  with  due  consideration 
for  conclusions  which  it  has  already  an- 
nounced on  the  same  subject  and  from 
knowledge  which  it  has  gathered  with 
relation  thereto  in  other  cases  and  inves- 
tigations. Swift  &  Co.  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R. 
Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  426,  429. 

(g)  The  only  duty  of  the  Commission 
In  this  case  is  to  establish  reasonable 
rates  from  eastern  points  of  origin  to 
Spokane,  and  in  so  doing  it  can  only 
act  upon  those  rates  specifically  called 
to  Its  attention,  although  it  must  have 
in  mind  the  effect  upon  the  revenues  of 
the  carriers  of  resulting  reductions  upon 
other  commodities  and  at  other  points 
from  Spokane.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co..  15  L  C.  C.  376,  419. 


PROCEDURE   BEFORE   COMMISSION,   §17    (a)  — (1) 


55^ 


§17.     Res  Adjudlcata. 
See   Evidence,  V. 

(a)  In  cases  before  this  Commission 
involving  rates,  neither  the  plea  of  res 
adjudicata  nor  stare  decisis,  as  used  at 
common  law,  has  any  standing  as  affect- 
ing shipments  moving  subsequent  to  the 
decision  of  the  Commission  relied  on. 
Waco  Freight  Bureau  v.  H.  &  T.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  22,  24. 

(b)  A  plea  of  res  adjudicata  is  con- 
clusive as  to  all  that  preceded  the  ef- 
fective date  of  the  Hepburn  Act.  Na- 
tional Hay  Ass'n  v,  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  34,  37. 

(c)  Rates  reasonable  at  the  present 
time  may  within  the  period  of  two  years 
become  very  unreasonable  by  reason  of 
changes  in  circumstances  and  conditions, 
economic,  transportation,  or  the  like.  It 
should  be  just  as  apparent  that  a  rate 
more  ago  may  become  reasonable  by 
which  was  unreasonable  two  years  or 
reason  of  such  changes  in  conditions.  A 
plea  of  estoppel  by  reason  of  former 
adjudication  is  not  good  in  so  far  as  an 
investigation  of  present  rates  is  con- 
cerned, although  in  a  former  proceeding 
a  decree  of  a  court  was  a  general  find- 
ing for  the  defendants  on  all  the  is- 
sues of  fact.  National  Hay  Ass'n  v.  M. 
C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  34,  37. 

(d)  While  an  order  of  the  Commis- 
sion in  a  particular  case  must  necessarily 
fix  the  rights  of  a  party  to  the  proceed- 
ing so  far  as  past  shipments  are  con- 
cerned, and  must  necessarily  restrain  un- 
til further  order  the  continuance  of  a 
rate  or  practice  condemned,  and  compel 
the  carrier  to  observe  the  rate  or  prac- 
tice prescribed  for  the  future,  these  great 
questions  of  transportation  are  not  fore- 
closed of  further  discussion  and  consid- 
eration upon  further  complaint.  Addi- 
tional experience  with  the  actual  opera- 
tion of  rules  that  combine  commercial 
with  physical  capacity  in  the  rating  of 
coal  mines  for  car  distribution,  may 
throw  new  light  upon  a  matter  that  has 
vexed  the  Commission,  as  well  as  many 
carriers  that  have  endeavored  to  do 
equity  as  between  different  mines  on 
their  lines,  and  if  so  the  Commission 
shall  not  hesitate  to  modify  what  has 
been  said  in  this  and  in  other  cases  be- 
fore it  on  that  question.  The  principle 
of  stare  decisis  has  little  application  in 
proceedings  involving  questions  of  this 
nature.  Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke  Co  v. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  356,  361. 


(e)  The  doctrine  of  stare  decisis  has 
little  application  in  proceedings  before 
the  Commission  involving  economic  ques- 
tions of  transportation.  Hillsdale  Coal 
&  Coke  Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
356,  361. 

(f)  Although  the  Commission  in  a 
prior  case  has  held  that  a  general  ad- 
justment of  rates  in  a  large  territory  is 
not  shown  to  be  unreasonable,  shippers 
are  not  precluded  from  bringing  subse- 
quent complaints  against  particular  rates 
in  the  territory  alleged  to  be  unreason- 
able. Ferguson  Saw  Mill  Co,  v.  St.  L. 
I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  391,  393. 

(g)  Plainly  there  can  be  no  such  thing 
as  judicial  estoppel  in  the  proceedings 
of  the  Commission,  since  its  orders  are 
not  judgments,  nor  is  it  a  judicial  body, 
and  this  is  especially  true  where  the 
parties  are  not  the  same.  Receivers  & 
Shippers  Ass'n  of  Cincinnati  v.  C.  N.  O. 
&  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  440,  444. 

(h)  When  a  given  rate  situation  has 
been  fully  considered  and  deliberately 
passed  upon  by  the  Commission,  the  de- 
cision ought  to  be,  if  not  binding  upon 
it,  certainly  of  very  great  weight  with 
it  in  considering  the  same  situation  in  a 
later  proceeding  between  different  par- 
ties, but  this  rule  applies  only  where 
the  same  state  of  facts  is  involved  in  the 
latter  as  in  the  former  proceeding.  Re- 
ceivers &  Shippers'  Ass'n  of  Cincinnati 
V.  C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
440,  445. 

(ij)  Where  reparation  has  been 
awarded  for  an  excessive  charge  on  hay. 
the  Commission  will  not  enter  an  order 
establishing  for  the  future  the  lower 
rate  upon  which  such  reparation  is  based 
where  the  rate  situation  between  the 
points  in  question  has  been  determined 
by  a  previous  decision.  Arkansas  Fuel 
Co.  V,  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C 
95,  99. 

(k)  A  decision  in  another  case 
against  other  carriers  operating  in  dif- 
ferent territory  under  essentially  dis- 
similar circumstances  and  conditions  af- 
fords no  controlling  precedent.  Chicago 
Lumber  &  Coal  Co.  v.  Tioga  Southeast- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  16  I,  C.  C.  323,  328. 

(1)  While  there  is  in  the  nature  of 
things  no  estoppel  of  record  in  proceed- 
ings before  the  Commission  it  must  of 
necessity,  when  it  reaches  a  conclusion 
upon  a  given  state  of  facts,  adhere  to 
that    conclusion    in   subsequent   proceed- 


554 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMMISSION,  §17   (m)— §19   (c) 


ings  unless  some  new  facts  or  changed 
conditions  are  brought  to  its  attention, 
or  unless  it  proceeded  upon  some  mis- 
conception in  reaching  the  original  de- 
cision. Banner  Milling  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C. 
«&  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  398,  400. 

(m)  Where  the  rate  question  as 
raised  in  a  complaint  is  the  same  as 
that  determined  in  a  former  proceeding 
before  the  Commission,  between  the 
same  parties,  the  Commission  may,  in 
its  discretion,  treat  such  complaint  as 
a  new  and  independent  proceeding 
where  it  is  claimed  the  former  decision 
was  made  under  a  misapprehension 
of  fact  or  of  law.  Banner  Milling  Co.  v. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.    398,    401. 

(n)  While  the  action  of  the  Com- 
mission in  one  case  touching  the  reason- 
ableness of  a  rule  or  regulation  affect- 
ing rates  ought  ordinarily  to  afford  a 
guide  for  its  action  in  another  case  in- 
volving the  same  rule  or  regulation, 
even  though  between  other  litigants, 
nevertheless  the  question  of  reasonable- 
ness is  always  one  of  fact,  and  each 
case  must  stand  upon  its  own  record. 
The  ruling  on  a  question  of  reasonable- 
ness in  a  previous  case  between  other 
parties  is  not  controlling  where  different 
facts  are  involved.  Kansas  City  Hay 
Dealers'  Ass'n  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  597,  600. 

§18.     Requesting   Information   of   Carrier. 

(a)  In  a  complaint  charging  an  ex- 
press company  with  unjust  discrimina- 
tion in  transporting  money,  a  subpoena 
duces  tecum  will  not  issue  to  compel 
defendant  to  furnish  voluminous  infor- 
mation with  respect  to  its  financial  and 
business  transactions  where  it  does 
not  appear  necessary  so  to  do  and  the 
information  sought  is  not  pertinent  to 
the  questions  involved.  American  Bank- 
ers' Ass'n  V.  American  Express  Co.,  15 
I.   C.   C.   15,   24. 

§19.     Tests  of    Revenue. 

(a)  Proposed  commodity  rates  in  in- 
termountain  cases  to  be  put  into  effect 
pending  decision  by  the  Supreme  Court. 
City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.   C.  454,  456. 

(aa)  Commodity  rates  proposed  by 
carriers  permitted  to  go  into  effect 
pending  decision  of  long-and-short-haul 
question.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Nev.  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  456,  457. 


(b)  The  Commission  reduced  com- 
modity rates  from  the  east  to  Spokane. 
HELD,  that  before  making  the  final 
order  it  will  be  advisable  to  learn  the 
result  of  an  actual  test,  and  that  car- 
riers will  be  required  for  the  months 
of  July,  August  and  September,  1910, 
or  for  such  other  representative  months 
as  may  be  determined  upon  by  the 
Commission,  after  conference  with  the 
carriers,  to  furnish  an  accurate  and  de- 
tailed account,  showing  the  revenue 
which  accrued  upon  business  actually 
handled  under  present  rates,  and  the 
revenue  which  would  have  accrued  upon 
the  same  business  had  the  rates  here 
prescribed  been  in  effect.  This  ac- 
count should  be  confined  to  traffic  cov- 
ered by  the  rates  named,  but  the  car- 
riers may,  if  they  elect,  indicate  what 
other  changes  will  be  required  which 
are  not  covered  by  the  rates  prescribed 
in  this"  and  other  cases,  and  may  keep 
separate  accounts  showing  the  loss  as 
applied  to  actual  transactions.  City  of 
Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
162,   178. 

(bb)  Before  reducing  the  class  and 
commodity  rate  between  eastern  terri- 
tory and  Utah  common  points  by  a 
formal  order,  the  Commission  will  re- 
quire the  defendant  to  furnish  an  ac- 
curate account  for  representative  months, 
showing  the  difference  between  the  re- 
ceipts upon  traffic  actually  moved  under 
present  rates  and  what  those  receipts 
would  have  been  on  the  same  traffic 
had  the  proposed  reduced  rates  been  in 
effect.  Carriers  may  also  indicate  any 
changes  in  other  rates  which  would  in 
their  opinion  be  necessitated  by  the 
putting  in  of  the  rates  proposed  and 
may  show  tne  reduction  in  revenue 
so  occasioned,  but  the  changes  should 
be  definitely  indicated,  and  the  loss  of 
revenue  due  to  other  reductions  should 
be  kept  entirely  distinct  from  that  due 
to  the  rates  here  specified.  Commercial 
Club,  Salt  Lake  City,  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.   Co.,   19   I.   C.  C.  218,  230. 

(c)  Before  making  a  formal  order  re- 
ducing the  commodity  rates  from  east- 
ern territory  into  Nevada,  the  Com- 
mission will  require  from  the  carriers 
for  such  representative  months  as  may 
be  agreed  upon  statements  showing  the 
following  facts  with  reference  to  ship- 
ments into  Nevada:  The  commodity; 
the  weight,  C.  L.  or  L.  C.  L.;  point  of 
origin,  and  the  transcontinental  terri- 
torial  group   in   which   the   same   is   sit- 


PROCEDURE  BEFORE  COMMISSION,  §19  (d)— PROPORTIONAL  RATES,  I  (b)    555 


uated;  rates  that  would  be  applied 
under  the  tariffs  in  effect  July  1,  1910; 
the  gross  charges  thereunder;  the 
rate  applicable  under  the  order  made  in 
this  case;  the  gross  charges  thereunder; 
the  rate  that  would  be  applied  were  the 
movement  to  Sacramento;  the  gross 
charges  thereunder.  The  complainant 
will  be  ordered  in  this  case  on  or  be- 
fore Oct.  1,  1910,  to  furnish  to  the  Com- 
mission and  to  the  defendant  S.  P.  Co. 
a  list  of  commodities  upon  which  com- 
modity rates  are  desired,  together 
with  an  outline  of  the  various  terri- 
tories or  groups  from  which  commodity 
rates  should  apply.  Railroad  Commis- 
sion of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
238,    256. 

(d)  Before  reducing  the  commodity 
rates  to  Phoenix  from  eastern  territory 
to  a  basis  of  those  enjoyed  by  Los  An- 
geles, the  Commission  will  require  a 
statement  for  such  representative  months 
as  may  be  agreed  upon,  showing  the 
commodity,  the  weight,  carload  or  less- 
than-carload,  point  of  origin,  and  the 
transcontinental  territorial  group  in 
which  the  same  is  situated,  rate  appli- 
cable under  the  tariffs  in  effect  July  1, 
1910,  the  gross  charges  thereunder,  the 
rate  applicable  under  the  order  made  in 
this  case,  if  extended  to  all  points  in 
Arizona  east  of  and  intermediate  to 
Phoenix,  the  gross  charges  thereunder, 
the  rate  that  would  be  applied  were  the 
movement  to  Los  Angeles,  and  the  gross 
charges  thereunder.  The  complainant 
will  be  required  to  furnish  to  the  Com- 
mission on  or  before  Oct.  J.,  1910,  and  to 
the  delivering  carriers  a  list  of  commod- 
ities upon  which  commodity  rates  are  de- 
sired, together  with  an  outline  of  the 
various  territories  or  groups  from  which 
rates  should  apply.  Maricopa  County 
Commercial  Club  v.  S.  F.  P.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  257,  258. 

(e)  Before  reducing  the  class  rates 
from  Tacoma,  Seattle  and  Portland  to 
points  in  Washington,  Idaho,  Montana 
and  Oregon,  the  Commission  will  require 
an  accurate  statement  for  such  repre- 
sentative months  as  may  be  agreed  upon, 
showing  the  revenue  which  actually  ac- 
crued under  the  class  rates  in  issue  and 
the  revenue  which  would  have  accrued 
on  the  same  volume  of  business  under  a 
20  per  cent  reduction  in  those  rates.  The 
account  must,  of  course,  be  limited  to  the 
rates  and  traffic  mentioned,  but  the  car- 
riers may  keep  and  present  to  the  Com- 
mission  separate  accounts,  showing  the 


loss  and  revenue  resulting  from  other 
reductions,  which  they  would  feel  obliged 
to  make,  as  a  consequence  of  the  Com- 
mission's finding  in  this  case.  Portland 
Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  O.  R.  R.  &  Nav. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  265,  284. 

(f)  Where  the  Commission  has  al- 
lowed defendant  railroads  to  assess  cer- 
tain track  storage  charges,  it  may  limit 
the  order  to  a  certain  date  and  require 
defendants  to  file  at  the  expiration  of  the 
period  a  statement  showing  the  amount 
of  track  storage  charges  assessed,  the 
contents  of  each  car  against  which  they 
are  assessed,  and  the  reason,  if  known, 
why  the  car  was  not  more  promptly  un- 
loaded. Such  information  to  serve  as  a 
guide  to  the  Commission  in  fixing  said 
charges  for  the  future.  N.  Y.  Hay  Ex- 
change Ass'n  V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I. 
C.  C.  178,  188. 

PROPORTIONAL  RATES. 

I.  APPLICATION. 

II.  DISCRIMINATION. 

III.  LEGALITY. 

IV.  REASONABLENESS      AND      EVI- 

DENCE. 

I.     APPLICATION. 

See   Facilities    and    Privileges,    §4    (f ) ; 
Through    Routes    and    Joint    Rates, 

§18. 

(a)  The  fact  that  a  published  sched- 
ule contains  a  heading  indicating  that 
the  proportional  rates  contained  therein 
are  adopted  in  connection  with  certain 
other  designated  roads,  does  not  limit 
the  application  of  these  rates  to  ship- 
ments received  by  the  carrier  publish- 
ing the  rates  from  those  roads  where 
the  body  of  the  tariff  indicates  that  the 
proportional  rates  named  therein  are  to 
be  applied  on  traffic  received  by  it 
from  roads  other  than  those  designated 
in  the  heading.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  v.  Albers 
Comm.  Co.,  223  U.  S.  573,  595,  32  Sup. 
Ct.  316,  56  L.  ed.  556. 

(b)  Defendant  carrier  extended  from 
Kansas  City,  to  Texarkana  a  propor- 
tional rate  of  10c  from  Kansas  City 
to  Texarkana  on  grain  coming  to  Kan- 
sas City  by  another  line  from  Omaha. 
The  tariff  also  applied  this  proportional 
from  certain  common  points  such  as 
St.  Joseph,  Atchison,  and  Leavenworth 
to  Texarkana  on  grain  coming  froni 
beyond  to  these  points  and  carried  by 
roads  other  than  defendant  from  these 
common  points  to  Kansas  City.    HELD, 


556 


PROPORTIONAL  RATES,  I    (c)— II    (a) 


in  order  to  make  the  10c  proportional 
the  legally  established  rate  on  grain 
coming  from  Omaha  to  Kansas  City  xnd 
shipped  thence  over  defendant's  line 
to  Texarkana  it  was  not  necessary  that 
the  carriers  from  these  common  points 
of  St.  Joseph,  Atchison,  'and  Leaven- 
worth should  concur  therein,  since  they 
had  no  interest  in  the  shipmeni.  K.  C. 
S.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Albers  Comm.  Co.,  223 
U.  S.  573,  594,  32  Sup.  Ct.  316,  56  L. 
ed.  556. 

(c)  When  a  carrier  publishes  a  pro- 
portional rate  from  a  basing  pomt  to 
a  certain  destination,  it  thereby  makes 
itself  a  link  in  the  through  transporta- 
tion, and  whatever  privileges  it  accords 
to  millers  at  the  basing  point  it  should 
accord  to  millers  on  its  line  intermedi- 
ate thereto.  Southern  Illinois  cViillers' 
Ass'n  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
672,  678. 

(d)  There  is  no  substantial  differ- 
ence between  a  "reshipping"  rate  and 
what  is  known  as  a  "proporuonal" 
rate.  The  Commission  has  held  that 
proportional  rates  are  not  per  se  un- 
lawful, and  there  is  no  reason  to  con- 
demn "reshipping"  rates,  as  such,  upon 
the  present  record.  Baltimore  Chamber 
of  Commerce  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co..  22 
L  C.  C.  596,  600. 

(e)  Complainants  shipped  a  carload 
of  gum  lumber  from  Brilliant,  Ala.,  to 
Thebes,  111.,  and  thence  forwarded  it 
to  Clinton,  la.  The  tariff  under  which 
the  shipment  moved  carried  a  i'l'opor- 
tional  rate  of  lie  per  100  lbs.  from 
Winfield  to  Thebes  when  "for  beyond." 
HELD,  the  fact  that  the  shipment  was 
intended  to  be  reconsigned  at  Thebes 
for  Clinton  did  not  entitle  complainant 
to  the  proportional  rate  under  a  proper 
construction  of  the  tariff.  Beekman 
Lumber  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
C.   98,   99. 

(f)  Where  a  shipment  to  a  local 
point  is  unloaded,  and  later  reshipped 
at  the  local  rates,  it  is  not  entitled 
to  the  benefit  of  a  lower  proportional 
established  more  than  a  year  thereafter. 
Central  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  495,  496. 

(g)  A  proportional  rate  should  not  be 
limited  to  traffic  from  particular  places. 
Bayou  City  Rice  Mills  v.  T.  &  N.  O. 
R.   R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.   490,  493. 

(h)  A  proportional  rate  was  pub- 
lished, but  this  did  not  make  it  a  legal 


rate  in  view  of  the  existence  of  a  pub- 
lished through  rate.  Lindsay  Bi'os.  v. 
B.    &    O.    S.   W.   R.   R.    Co.,   16    L    C.   C. 


(i)  A  proportional  rate  means  a  part 
of  or  a  remainder  of  the  through  rate, 
or  it  means  nothing  at  all.  Kansas  City 
Transportation  Bureau  v.  A.  f.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  195,  201. 

(j)  There  is  no  uniform  percentage 
relationship  between  local  and  propor- 
tional rates,  the  proportional  rates 
from  one  point  being  made  with  re- 
lation to  those  from  a  compcititive  point 
to  the  same  markets.  Indianapolis 
Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  504,  511. 

II.     DISCRIMINATION. 

See  Discrimination,  §5  (i),  §7  (z) ; 
Express  Companies,  §4  (a);  Facil- 
ities and  Privileges,  §2  (d),  §21   (b). 

(a)  Certain  milling  points  in  central 
and  eastern  Wisconsin  have  been 
grouped  with  Chicago  and  Milwaukee 
in  the  proportional  rates  on  grain  ani 
grain  products  from  Kansas  City,  Oma- 
ha and  Council  Bluffs.  On  May  15,  1911, 
the  proportional  rates  of  these  Wiscon- 
sin points  were  withdrawn,  which 
raised  the  rate  from  Omaha  and  Coun- 
cil Bluffs  from  12c  to  the  local  rate 
of  15 %c  and  to  14 %c  from  Kansas 
City.  The  proportional  rates  were  can- 
celed because  complaint  had  been  made 
that  the  application  of  a  proportional 
rate  of  12c  from  the  Missouri  River 
to  Wisconsin  points,  a  distance  of  700 
miles,  while  •  the  rate  to  Duluth  was 
15c  for  a  distance  of  600  miles,  was  a 
discrimination  against  the  millers  of 
Duluth.  The  12c  proportional  rate  to 
Chicago  and  Milwaukee  resulted  to  some 
extent  from  the  competition  of  the 
Memphis  and  St.  Louis  gateways,  which 
does  not  apply  to  the  Wisconsin  terri- 
tory in  question.  Chicago  is  not  a 
competitor  of  complainants  who  are 
millers  in  central  and  eastern  Wis- 
consin. While  Chicago  and  Milwaukee 
millers  may  receive  grain  on  the  12c 
proportional  rate  it  may  be  cleaned 
and  milled  only  on  the  basis  of  the 
15%c  rate  with  the  privilege  of  ship- 
ping the  .  product  to  points  beyond  tak- 
ing the  same  rate.  Complainants  ex- 
pressly admitted  the  reasonableness  of 
the  local  rates  to  Wisconsin  points,  but 
•complained  of  the  discrimination  against 
them  by  the  lower  proportional  rates 
to    Chicago    and    Milwaukee.     HELD,   if 


PROPORTIONAL  RATES,  II  (aa)  — (h) 


557 


the  transit  privilege  is  not  abused  at 
Chicago  and  Milwaukee  there  is  no  dis- 
crimination against  the  Wisconsin  mill- 
ers based  on  the  proportional  rates  to 
these  two  points,  because  it  will  cost 
millers  at  these  points  the  same  to 
compete  with  the  millers  in  central  and 
eastern  Wisconsin  as  those  millers  pay. 
The  admission  of  complainants  that 
they  do  not  contend  that  the  present 
charges  are  unreasonable  relieves  defend- 
ants of  the  burden  of  justifying  them, 
and  therefore,  there  being  no  discrim- 
ination apparent,  and  no  unreasonable 
rate  involved,  the  complaint  must  be 
dismissed.  Wisconsin  State  Millers' 
Ass'n  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.   C.   C.   494. 

(aa)  Competition  may  justify  the 
maintenance  of  proportional  rates  on 
grain  at  Omaha  while  denying  such 
rates  at  Sioux  City.  Sioux  City  Ter- 
minal Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  98,  109. 

(b)  There  can  be  no  discrimination 
against  one  manufacturer  who  does  not 
ship  over  the  defendant's  line  because 
it  maintains  a  low  inland  proportional 
rate  on  a  commodity,  raw  material  des- 
tined to  a  competitor.  In  Re  Rates, 
etc.,  of  the  Louisiana  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  558,  564. 

(c)  A  proportional  rate,  like  any 
other  rate,  should  be  open  to  all  ship- 
pers. In  Re  Restricted  Rates,  20  I.  C. 
C.   426,  436. 

(d)  On  carloads  of  ear  corn  orig- 
inating at  points  on  connecting  lines 
beyond  Enfield,  111.,  and  shipped  from 
Enfield  to  Henderson,  Ky.,  and  des- 
tined to  southeastern  territory,  a  rate 
of  7.08c  was  collected  by  the  defendant 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  At  the  time  of  ship- 
ment it  published  for  transportation 
to  Henderson  from  all  junction  points 
on  its  St.  Louis  division  other  than 
Enfield  of  grain  originating  beyond  said 
junction  points  and  reshipped  to  east- 
ern points,  a  proportional  rate  of  3c. 
Such  proportional  rate  was  formerly 
applicable  from  Enfield  but  was  omitted 
by  mistake  and  was  established  sub- 
sequent to  the  shipments  in  question. 
HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was  unduly 
discriminatory  and  unreasonable  and 
should  not  have  exceeded  3c.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Henderson  Elevator  Co. 
v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  538, 
539. 


(e)  A  proportional  rate  is  nothing 
more  or  less  than  a  separately  es- 
tablished rate,  as  that  phrase  is  used 
in  section  6  of  the  amended  Act,  ap- 
plicable to  through  transportation.  And 
it  has  not  been  understood  that  a  sepa- 
rately established  rate  can  be  other 
than  an  open  rate  available  to  all. 
Bascom  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  354,  356. 

(f)  The  rate  on  sugar-beet  pulp 
from  Waukesha,  Wis.,  to  eastern  points 
is  the  same  as  from  Chicago  on  ship- 
ments originating  from  Janesville,  Wis. 
The  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  has  a  direct  route 
from  Janesville  to  Chicago  which  is 
shorter  than  its  indirect  route  via 
Waukesha.  The  rate  from  Janesville 
to  Chicago  via  the  direct  route  is  6.09c; 
the  rate  from  Janesville  to  Waukesha 
is  3c.  HELD,  following  Larrowe  Milling 
Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
443,  on  shipments  from  Janesville  to 
eastern  points,  complainant  was  entitled 
to  the  combination  on  Waukesha,  the 
proportional  of  said  combination  from 
Waukesha  to  said  eastern  point  to  be 
the  same  as  the  proportional  from  Chi- 
cago to  said  points,  although  the  ship- 
ments in  question  actually  moved  by 
the  direct  route  from  Janesville  to 
Chicago.  Reparation  awarded.  Larrowe 
Milling  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  548,  549. 

(g)  The  application  of  proportional 
rates  on  grain  from  Omaha  and  Council 
Bluffs  through  Ohio  River  crossings 
and  not  through  Henderson,  Ky.,  is 
discriminatory.  Henderson  Elevator  Co. 
V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  573,  575. 

(h)  Complainants  were  engaged  in 
the  grain  business  at  Henderson,  Ky. 
On  carloads  of  corn  and  oats  from 
Omaha,  Neb.,  and  Council  Bluffs,  la., 
through  Henderson  to  points  in  the 
southeast,  complainant  was  assessed  4c 
higher  than  the  rate  in  effect  at  the 
time  of  shipments  on  grain  from  said 
points  to  other  Ohio  River  crossings 
destined  to  southeastern  points,  on 
account  of  a  failure  of  defendant  to 
provide  in  its  tariffs  for  the  same  re- 
shipping  privileges  at  Henderson  as  it 
provided  in  its  tariffs  at  other  Ohio 
River  crossings.  Subsequently,  such 
transit  privileges  were  extended  to 
Henderson.  HELD,  the  rate  charged 
was  excessive  to  the  extent  of  4c. 
Reparation  awarded.  Henderson  Ele- 
vator Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.   573,   575. 


558 


PROPORTIONAL  RATES,  II   (i)— III   (aa) 


(i)  Lower  proportionals  from  points 
served  by  foreign  carriers  afford  no 
basis  for  a  charge  of  discrimination 
against  a  complaining  point  served  by 
other  carriers.  Indianapolis  Freight 
Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  56,  66. 

(j)  On  a  shipment  of  elm  hoops 
from  Prairie  Grove,  Ark.,  to  Nashville, 
111.,  without  routing  instructions  from 
the  complainant,  defendant  charged  a 
rate  of  28i/^c  per  100  lbs.  made  up, 
221^0  Prairie  Grove  to  Bast  St.  Louis, 
111.,  and  6c  East  St.  Louis  to  Nashville. 
Prairie  Grove  was  13  miles  west  of 
Fayetteville,  Ark.,  from  which  station 
defendant's  rate  to  East  St.  Louis 
was  15c.  Defendant  might  have  routed 
the  shipment  so  as  to  gain  a  5c  rate 
from  East  St.  Louis  to  Nashville.  HELD, 
the  proportional  rate  from  Prairie  Grove 
to  East  St.  Louis  should  not  have  ex- 
ceeded the  15c  rate  from  Fayetteville, 
and  complainant  was  entitled  to  repa- 
ration against  defendant  initial  carrier 
alone  on  the  basis  of  15c  and  also 
of  Ic  per  100  lbs.  additional  for  mis- 
routing.  Noble  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.,    16    I.    C.    C.    186,    187. 

(k)  Defendants  charged  on  19  car- 
loads of  range  cattle  shipped  from 
Midland,  Tex.,  to  Kennebeck,  S.  D.,  15c 
from  Midland  to  Fort  Worth;  $95  per 
car  from  Fort  Worth  to  Chamberlain, 
S.  D.,  and  a  rate  of  9i/^c  thence  to  des- 
tination. Kennebeck  is  located  30  miles 
west  of  Chamberlain.  HELD,  the  $95 
per  car  rate  should  have  been  extended 
to  Kennebeck,  and  complainant  was  en- 
titled to  reparation  for  the  9i^c  excess 
paid.  Philip  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  418,  419. 

(1)  Complainant  attacked  the  propor- 
tional rates  from  Indianapolis,  Ind.,  to 
Cincinnati,  O.,  and  Jeffersonville,  Ind., 
110  miles,  on  through  traffic  destined  to 
southeastern  territory  of  22,  19.5,  17.5, 
11,  8.5,  and  7c  and  yielding  a  per  ton 
mile  revenue  of  4,  3.5,  3.2,  2,  1.5,  and 
1.27c  for  the  first  six  numbered  classes 
respectively  as  compared  with  the  pro- 
portional rates  from  Chicago  and  Ohio 
river  crossings,  300  miles,  on  traffic 
destined  to  southeastern  territory  of  35, 
30,  22,  15,  13,  and  10c,  yielding  a  per 
ton  mile  revenue  of  2.33,  2,  1.46,  Ic,  and 
8.6  and  6.7  mills  for  the  first  six  num- 
bered classes,  respectively.  The  pro- 
portional rates  from  East  St.  Louis  to 
Cincinnati- Jelfersonville,  304  miles,  were 


23,  19,  17,  12,  10,  and  8c,  and  yielded 
a  per  ton  mile  revenue  of  1.53,  1.26, 
1.13c  and  7.9,  6.7  and  5.3  mills  for  the 
first  six  classes,  respectively,  which 
rates  were  the  basis  in  constructing 
rates  to  southeastern  territory.  Pro- 
portional rates  were  not  applied  from 
other  intermediate  points  between  In- 
dianapolis and  Cincinnati  and  Louisville, 
such  as  Columbus,  O.,  which  paid  the 
full  local  on  through  traffic  to  south- 
eastern territory.  The  proportionals 
from  Indianapolis  ranged  from  12  to 
15  per  cent  below  the  local  rates  to 
Ohio  River  points  substantially  increas- 
ing with  relationship  between  the  local 
and  proportional  rates  from  Chicago. 
To  grant  Indianapolis  lower  proportion- 
als would  disturb  the  parity  existing 
between  the  rates  from  Indianapolis  to 
Ohio  River  points  on  traffic  destined 
beyond  and  the  rates  from  intermedi- 
ate points  lying  between  Indianapolis 
and  the  Ohio  River.  HELD,  since  the 
rates  from  Indianapolis  were  not  shown 
to  be  unreasonable  per  se  and  were 
lower  by  reason  of  its  proximity  than 
those  from  Chicago,  giving  Indianapolis 
an  advantage  in  reaching  southeastern 
territory  and  resulting  in  .  no  unjust 
discrimination  against  Indianapolis,  the 
Commission  would  not  grant  the  demand 
of  complainant  that  the  Indianapolis 
proportionals  be  determined  strictly 
according  to  distances  and  be  made  50 
per  cent  of  the  Chicago  proportionals, 
since  so  to  do  would  result  in  an 
undue  advantage  to  Indianapolis  over 
Chicago.  Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v. 
C.  C.  C.  &  St,  Louis  Ry.  Co..  15  I.  C. 
C.    504,    512. 

III.     LEGALITY. 

See  Advanced    Rates,  §5    (2)    (f ) ;   Evi- 
dence,   §1     (c);    Tariffs,    §14. 

(a)  A  proportional  rate  limited  in 
application  to  traffic  from  defined  terri- 
tory is  not  of  itself  unlawful  per  se. 
Serry  v.   S.  P.   Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  554,  556. 

(aa)  On  carloads  of  salt  from  De- 
troit to  Memphis  complainant  was 
charged  a  rate  of  16c,  which  was  the 
published  joint  rate  from  Detroit  to 
Memphis.  At  the  same  time  a  propor- 
tional rate  of  5%c  was  in  effect  from 
Detroit  to  St.  Louis,  for  shipments  be- 
yond, which,  with  the  local  rate  of  the 
connecting  carrier,  produced  a  through 
rate  of  13  %c.  The  proportional  rate 
could  be  used  in  constructing  the  rate 
to   any  point  beyond   St.   Louis,  but  no 


PROPORTIONAL  RATES,  III  (b)— IV  (d) 


559 


particular  point  was  designated.  HELD, 
the  16c  rate  was  the  lawful  rate  for 
the  shipment  under  the  general  rule 
that  the  specific  rate  must  govern.  Del- 
ray  Salt  Co.  V.  Detroit,  Toledo  &  Iron- 
ton  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  245,  246. 

(b)  A  proportional  rate  is  nothing 
more  or  l€ss  than  a  separately  estab- 
lished rate,  as  that  phrase  is  used  in 
section  6  of  the  amended  Act,  applica- 
ble to  through  transportation.  A  sepa- 
rately established  rate  cannot  be  other 
than  an  open  rate  available  to  all.  A 
proportional  rate  is  simply  one  way  of 
making  up  the  through  charges  between 
two  points;  but  while  no  criticism  can 
be  directed  against  proportional  rates 
applicable  only  to  through  movements 
from  a  defined  territory  or  group  of 
points,  the  Commission  cannot  recognize 
as  valid  a  proportional  rate  limited  to 
shipments  that  come  into  the  propor- 
tional rate  point  over  the  lines  of  a 
particular  carrier,  since  such  a  rate  dis- 
criminates against  shippers  over  other 
lines.  Bascom  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,   17   I.   C.   C.  354,   356. 

(c)  There  exists  no  ground  for  a 
criticism  of  proportional  rates  applica- 
ble only  to  through  movements  from  a 
defined  territory  or  group  of  points. 
Bascom  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17 
I.   C.   C.  354,  356. 

(d)  The  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  al- 
lowed a  rate  of  10c  on  barbed  wire, 
wire  nails,  wire  staples,  and  wire  fenc- 
ing, in  carloads,  from  El  Paso,  Tex., 
to  Las  Cruces,  N.  M.,  when  brought 
into  El  Paso  over  its  lines,  but  charged 
a  rate  of  30c  when  brought  into  El 
Paso  over  the  lines  of  other  carriers. 
To  take  advantage  of  the  10c  rate 
the  shipper  might  keep  the  goods  at 
El  Paso  as  long  as  he  desired  and  the 
rate  would  be  accorded  to  him  upon 
shipment  of  the  same  to  Las  Cruces, 
provided  only  the  goods  were  originally 
shipped  into  El  Paso  over  defendant's 
lines.  HELD,  such  a  rate  was  not  in 
any  sense  a  proportional  rate,  could  not 
be  sanctioned  as  a  transit,  reconsign- 
ment,  or  diversion  privilege,  and  was 
unlawful,  being  merely  a  device  to  com- 
pel shippers  to  send  their  goods  into 
El  Paso  over  defendant's  road.  Bas- 
com Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  354,  357. 

(e)  Proportional  rates  from  more  dis- 
tant points  must  be  less  per  mile  to 
permit   such    points   to   compete   in   the 


common  market,  and  the  Commission 
is  not  warranted  in  condemning  a  sys- 
tem of  rate  making  whereby  wholesome 
competition  between  producing  centers 
is  preserved.  Indianapolis  Freight  Bu- 
reau V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  504,  512. 

IV.      REASONABLENESS      AND      EVI- 
DENCE. 

See  Classification,  §3  (h);  Discrim- 
ination, §4  (00):  Evidence,  §13  (5); 
Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §7  (aa).  §12 
(2)    (e). 

(a)  A  carrier  cannot  maintain  a  pro- 
portional rate  on  traffic  reaching  its 
line  via  one  or  more  specified  routes 
and  at  the  same  time  maintain  a  higher 
proportional  rate  on  the  same  traffic 
from  the  same  point  of  origin  and  des- 
tined to  the  same  point  of  consumption 
that  comes  to  it  at  the  same  point  via 
the  same  connecting  carrier  but  over 
another  route  formed  by  different  inter- 
mediate connecting  carriers.  Rosen- 
baum  Bros.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.'R.  Co.,  22  L 
C.    C.   62,   65. 

(b)  Proportional  rates  applying  to 
through  traffic  might  well  be  lower 
than  corresponding  local  rates.  R.  R. 
Comm.  of  Kan.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  407,  415. 

(c)  While  local  and  proportional 
rates  are  not  ordinarily  comparable, 
comparisons  of  such  rates  may  be  con- 
sidered in  connection  with  other  evi- 
dence in  determining  the  reasonable- 
ness of  a  particular  rate.  Lindsay 
Bros.  V.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co..  22  L 
C.  C.  516,  517. 

(d)  Complainants  attacked  the  local 
rate  of  $1.35  per  net  ton  and  the  pro- 
portional rate  of  80c  per  net  ton  on 
cement,  from  Martin's  Creek,  Pa.,  to 
Philadelphia,  Pa.  The  proportional  rate 
of  80c  applied  on  cement  from  Martin's 
Creek  to  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  only  when 
carried  from  the  latter  point  by  water 
to  Wilmington,  N.  C,  and  points  south 
thereof,  and  was  alleged  to  subject  Phila- 
delphia to  undue  prejudice  by  reason 
of  the  fact  that  a  similar  rate  from 
Martin's  Creek  to  Jersey  City,  N.  J.,  was 
unrestricted  as  to  points  of  ultimate 
destination.  Martin's  Creek  as  a  point 
of  origin  for  cement  is  a  part  of  what 
Is  known  as  the  Lehigh  cement  dis- 
trict. All  shipments  of  cement  via  de- 
fendant's line  from  Martin's  Creek  to 
Jersey  City  and  Philadelphia  move 
through  Trenton,  N.  J.,  making  a  total 


560 


PROPORTIONAL  RATES,  IV   (e)— (j) 


distance  of  114  miles  to  Jersey  City, 
and  90  miles  to  Philadelphia.  The  rate 
to  Jersey  City  was  $1.10  per  ton.  At 
Jersey  City  the  defendant  has  two  pub- 
lic team  tracks  where  carload  freight 
is  delivered.  At  Philadelphia  it  has 
about  60  team  tracks  distributed  about 
the  city  within  a  track  mileage  of  about 
400  miles.  HELD,  there  is  nothing  un- 
reasonable or  unjust  in  the  restriction 
of  the  proportional  rate  of  80c  to  ce- 
ment carried  by  water  to  Wilmington, 
N,  C,  and  points  south  thereof,  as 
neither  the  cement  mills  nor  the  des- 
tination points  north  of  Wilmington 
have  complained  of  the  restriction  upon 
this  rate,  and  in  the  absence  of  any  in- 
dication that  the  rates  charged  to  coast 
points  south  of  Philadelphia  are  unrea- 
sonable or  otherwise  unlawful  an  order 
ought  not  to  be  made  which  will  require 
defendant  to  hand  over  at  Philadel- 
phia to  water  carriers  traffic  which  it 
now  hauls  to  destination  over  its  own 
rails.  FURTHER  HELD,  cement  is  a 
commodity  which  under  every  consid- 
eration is  entitled  to  a  low  rate,  and 
giving  due  weight  to  the  terminal  ad- 
vantages offered  by  defendant  at  Phil- 
adelphia and  other  matters  urged  in 
its  behalf  the  cement  rate  from  Martin's 
Creek,  Pa.,  to  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  is  reduced 
to  $1.10  per  ton.  Maritime  Exchange  v. 
P.  R.   R.   Co.,   21   L   C.   C.   81. 

(e)  The  idea  of  differing  propor- 
tional rates  for  the  same  service  depend- 
ing upon  the  origin  or  destination  of  the 
traffic  did  not  originate  with  the  Com- 
mission. It  originated  with  and  has 
been  used  by  carriers  to  a  greater  or 
less  extent,  and  is  now  and  for  a  long 
time  has  been  in  effect  on  the  lines  of 
some  of  these  defendants.  The  Com- 
mission is  not  insensible  to  the  force  of 
competitive  conditions  and  is  not  dis- 
posed in  these  premises  to  insist  upon 
the  application  of  that  theory  in  the 
face  of  the  combined  and  harmonious 
judgment  of  complainants  and  defend- 
ants that  it  is  undesirable  and  imprac- 
ticable to  apply  it  to  traffic  originating  in 
Atlantic  seaboard  territory  or  in  terri- 
tory east  of  the  Indiana-Illinois  state 
line  and  moving  to  the  Missouri  River 
through  Mississippi  River  crossings. 
In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  by  Carriers 
Operating  Between  the  Mississippi  and 
Missouri  Rivers,  21  I.  C.  C.  546,  551. 

(f)  A  proportional  rate,  which  is 
different  when  a  carrier  has  the  haul 
into   a   concentration    point,    can   be   es- 


tablished under  the  proper  tariff  author- 
ity connecting  the  inbound  and  out- 
bound movements.  St.  Paul  Board  of 
Trade  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co., 
19.  L   C.   C.  285,   288. 

(g)  On  carloads  of  salt  shipped  from 
Hartford  and  Mason  City,  W.  Va.,  either 
over  the  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  and  the  N.  & 
W.  Ry.,  via  Kenova,  W.  Va.,  to  Roan- 
oke, W.  Va.,  or  over  the  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
and  the  C.  &  O.  Ry.  via  Huntington, 
W.  Va.,  to  Lynchburg,  Va.,  for  points 
beyond  in  the  South  Atlantic  country, 
the  defendants  increased  the  propor- 
tional rate  from  8c  to  12c  from  said 
points  of  origin  to  Roanoke  and  Lynch- 
burg. This  advance  in  the  rate  mate- 
rially reduced  the  sales  of  salt  produc- 
ers at  said  points  of  origin.  HELD, 
that  the  proportional  rate  was  unrea- 
sonable and  that  in  the  future  the 
rate  should  not  exceed  10c.  Liverpool 
Salt  &  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
18  L   C.   C.   51,   52. 

(h)  Ex-lake  rates  from  Buffalo  lower 
than  the  locals  afford  no  measure  of 
the  local  rates.  Jennison  Co.  v.  G.  N. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  113,  124. 

(i)  Freight  originating  east  of  the 
Indiana-Illinois  line  was  carried  to  Des 
Moines,  la.,  over  the  Rock  Island  lines 
on  a  combination  of  rates,  consisting 
of  a  joint  proportional  rate  to  the  Mis- 
sissippi River  added  to  an  individual 
proportional  made  by  the  Rock  Island 
lines  from  the  river  to  Des  Moines. 
Rates  examined  and,  HELD,  that  the 
combination  through  rates  were  unrea- 
sonable on  account  of  the  unreasonable 
proportionals  applied  by  the  Rock  Is- 
land lines  from  Rock  Island,  111.,  to 
Des  Moines.  Reductions  ordered.  Ap- 
plication for  joint  through  rates  denied. 
Greater  Des  Moines  Committee  v.  C. 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  54,  55. 

(j)  Complainants  were  charged  on 
carloads  of  grapes  from  Pewee  Valley, 
Ky.,  to  Pittsburg,  Pa.,  45c.  Pewee  Val- 
ley lies  17  miles  east  of  Louisville  on  a 
branch  line  of  defendant.  The  legally 
assessable  rate  was  42c,  made  up  of 
the  local  rate  of  12c  per  100  lbs.  to 
Louisville,  plus  a  proportional  rate  of 
30c  applying  from  Louisville  to  Pitts- 
burg. The  flat  rate  from  Louisville  to 
Pittsburg  was  39c.  The  proportional 
from  Louisville  on  shipments  originat- 
ing beyond  was  30c,  this  proportional 
being  in  a  large  measure  forced  upon 
the  defendant  by  competitive  conditions. 


PROPORTIONAL  RATES,  IV   (k)— PULLMAN  COMPANY 


oGl 


HELD,  the  Commission  was  not  justi- 
fied in  fixing  this  30c  proportional  as 
the  rate  from  Pewee  Valley  to  Pitts- 
burg, but  that  the  rate  assessed  was 
unreasonable;  and  that  39c  would  be  a 
reasonable  rate.  Reparation  awarded 
on  the  basis  of  39c.  Crutchfield  & 
Woolfolk  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.  302. 

(k)  Following  the  decision  in  Greater 
Des  Moines  Committee  v.  C.  R.  L  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  54  and  57,  the 
combination  of  class  through  rates 
from  points  east  of  the  Indiana-Illinois 
state  line  to  Ottumwa,  la.,  are  found 
to  be  unreasonable,  arising  from  the 
proportional  rates  applying  on  the  pro- 
portion of  the  haul  west  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi River,  and  lower  proportional 
rates  are  prescribed.  The  prayer  for 
the  establishment  of  joint  through  rates 
to  Ottumwa  denied.  Ottumwa  Commer- 
cial Ass'n  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
I.    C.    C.    413,    414. 

(1)  Low  proportional  rates  on  through 
shipments  do  not  justify  unreasonable  lo- 
cals. Board  of  Trade  of  Winston-Sa- 
lem V.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
12,  16. 

(m)  Complainants  shipped  carloads 
of  hay  originating  at  various  points 
west  of  the  Missouri  River  and  recon- 
signed  from  Kansas  City  to  Peoria  and 
LaSalle,  111.,  to  Des  Moines,  la.,  and  to 
Stillwater,  Minn.  Shortly  before  the 
shipments  the  proportional  commodity 
rates  from  Kansas  City  to  these  points 
were  canceled,  and  shortly  after  the 
shipments  the  proportional  rates  were 
restored.  Complainants  were  charged 
the  Class  C  rate  in  effect  during  the 
interval.  HELD,  following  North  Bros, 
v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
70,  complainants  were  entitled  to  repa- 
ration on  the  basis  of  the  prior  propor- 
tional rates  and  that  such  proportional 
rates  should  be  maintained  in  the  fu- 
ture. Kansas  City  Hay  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  100,  102. 

(n)  After  long  maintenance  of  a  pro- 
portional rate,  which  was  advanced  and 
subsequently  reduced  to  the  former 
basis,  on  shipments  made  under  the 
higher  rate,  reparation  should  be  award- 
ed. Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  P.  M.  xl.  R. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  450. 

(o)  On  a  shipment,  July  18,  1907,  of 
baled  hay  in  carloads  from  Batesville, 
Kan.,   via    Kansas   City,   to   Clinton,   la.. 


complainant  was  assessed  the  class  rate 
of  17c  on  the  haul  from  Kansas  City 
to  Clinton.  For  a  long  period  prior  to 
June  30,  1907,  defendant's  proportional 
commodity  rates  on  carloads  of  hay 
originating  at  points  beyond  Kansas 
City  were  12i^c  from  Kansas  City  to 
Mississippi  River  points,  including 
Clinton.  On  that  date  these  rates  were 
canceled,  but  were  restored  September 
9,  1907.  HELD,  the  17c  rate  was  un- 
reasonable. Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  121/^0.  Tyler  Commission  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
C.  490,  491. 

(p)  The  circumstances  and  condi- 
tions surrounding  the  transportation  of 
flour  through  Chicago  from  Minneapolis 
to  the  seaboard  for  export  or  domestic 
consumption  are  substantially  dissimilar 
to  those  surrounding  the  traffic  through 
Chicago  from  Missouri  River  points,  in 
that  the  lower  proportional  rates  from 
Minneapolis  to  Chicago  are  the  direct 
result  of  the  competition  of  lake  and 
rail  routes.  Bulte  Milling  Co.  v  C.  & 
A.   R.  R.   Co.,   15   I.   C.   C.  351. 

(q)  The  Commission  cannot  hold  that 
because  the  proportionals  from  Chicago 
to  Cincinnati  on  traffic  destined  to 
southeastern  territory  are  not  higher 
than  the  proportionals  from  Indianap- 
olis by  the  same  percentages  as  the 
Chicago  mileage  is  in  excess  of  the 
Indianapolis  mileage,  such  an  adjust- 
ment ipso  facto  gives  undue  preference 
and  advantage  to  the  Chicago  shipper 
and  subjects  the  Indianapolis  shipper  to 
unjust  discrimination.  Proportional 
rates  from  a  more  distant  point  must 
be  less  per  mile  to  permit  that  place 
to  compete  In  the  common  market.  In- 
dianapolis Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C. 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  504,  512. 

(r)  Rail  carriers'  proportional  rate 
from  Carthage  to  New  York  on  paper 
transported  by  water  from  latter  point 
to  coastwise  points  was  higher  than 
the  rate  applicable  to  paper  carried  to 
New  York  for  export  or  for  local  de- 
livery at  New  York  lighterage  points. 
HELD,  unreasonable  and  reparation 
awarded.  St.  Regis  Paper  Co.  v.  N.  Y. 
C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  403. 

PULLMAN  COMPANY. 

See  Evidence,  §1  (i);  Passenger 
Fares  and  Facilities,  §6  (m),  §14 
(dd);  Procedure  Before  Commis- 
sion,   §5    (c). 


562 


RATE  VIA   COMPETING  LINE—REASONABLENESS   OF  RATES 


RATE  VIA  COMPETING  LINE. 

See  Differentials,  §6  (c) ;  Equaliza- 
tion of  Rates,  §1  (y),  §2  (j),  §4  (2); 
Evidence,  §1  (d),  §13  (1)  (n),  §20 
(e),  §28  (e),  §47;  Long  and  Short 
Haul,  §6  (a);  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,  §37  (g),  (h).  §63  (a),  §84  (I); 
Reparation,  §11,  §16  (vvv),  (xxx) ; 
Routing  and  IVIisrouting,  §5;  Spe- 
cial Contract,  §2  (k);  Through 
Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §16  (c). 

RATE  WARS. 

See    Evidence,   §14   (3)    (b). 

REASONABLE  RATES. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  IV;  Allowances, 
V:  Alternative  Rates;  Any-Quan- 
tity  Rates;  Blanket  Rates,  II,  IV, 
§12;  Branch  Lines,  I;  Class  Rates; 
Classification,  §5;  Compress  Com- 
panies and  Charges,  §2;  Divisions, 
V;  Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  V; 
Import  Traffic,  II;  Lighterage,  §2; 
IVIinimums,  §7;  Narrow  Gauge 
Railroads,  I;  Passenger  Fares  and 
Facilities,  §2;  Proportional  Rates, 
IV;  Reasonableness  of  Rates;  Re- 
consignment,  III;  Refrigeration,  III; 
Released  Rates,  IV;  Restricted 
Rates;  Switch  Tracks  and  Switch- 
ing, III;  Terminal  Facilities,  §5; 
Through    Routes    and    Joint    Rates, 

REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES. 

I.     CONTROL  AND   REGULATION. 

§1.     In  general. 
II.     ELEMENTS    DETERMINING    REA- 
SONABLENESS. 
§2.     In  general. 
§3.     Actions     of    state     commis 

sions. 
§4.     Attractiveness    of    traffic. 
§5.    Capitalization. 
§6.     Car-mile    or   train-mile    rev- 
enue. 
§7.     Changed  circumstances. 
§8.     Competition. 

(1)  In  general. 

(2)  Railroad  competition. 

(3)  Rail-and-water. 

(4)  Water    competition. 
§9.     Cost  of  service. 

§10.    Distance. 

§11.     Earnings. 

§12.     Economical   management. 

§1214.     Equalizing     of     rates     or 

markets. 
§13.     Equipment  furnished. 
§14.     Investment  relying  on  rate. 
§15.     Investment  of  carrier. 
§16.     Long-continued   adjustment. 
§17.     Manufactured  product. 


§18. 


Mineral     lands     owned 
carriers. 


by 


III. 


§19. 

Natural     advantages. 

§20. 

Need  for  revenues. 

§21. 

Obsolescence. 

§22. 

Origin  of  traffic. 

§23. 

Ownership    or   use    of   com 

modity. 

§24. 

Paper    rate. 

§25. 

Past   rates. 

§26. 

Permanent  improvements. 

§27. 

Profits   of   shipper. 

§28. 

Relativity  of  the  rate. 

§29. 

Reproduction  value  of  road. 

§30. 

Revenues   from   facilities. 

§31. 

Special   service. 

§32. 

Standard   for   carriers. 

§32/2.     Subsequent    reduction. 

§33. 

Surplus. 

§34. 

Terminal   facilities. 

§35. 

Time  of  changing  rate. 

§36. 

Ton-mile   revenue. 

§37. 

Two-line   haul. 

§38. 

Value   of  commodity. 

§39. 

Value   of   service. 

§40. 

Volume  of  traffic. 

§401/2-     Wages. 

§41. 

Weight. 

REASONABLE    RATES. 

§42. 

Adding-machine  paper. 

§43. 

Agricultural    implements. 

§44. 

Antimony      ware,      baskets, 

brushes,    camphor,    earthen- 

ware, gums,  rugs,  sago,  tea 

and  tapioca. 

§45. 

Asphaltum. 

§46. 

Automobile   parts. 

§47. 

Beer. 

§48. 

Beer   bottles. 

§49. 

Bottle   caps. 

§50. 

Box  shooks. 

§51. 

Brass   and   iron   tubing. 

§52. 

Brick. 

§53. 

Broom   corn. 

§54. 

Burlap    bags. 

§55. 

Butter  boxes. 

§56. 

Butter,  eggs  and  poultry. 

§57. 

Canned   goods. 

§58. 

Car   wheels   and   axles. 

§59. 

Catsup. 

§60. 

Cement. 

§61. 

Chautauqua   outfits. 

§62. 

Cheese. 

§63. 

Cheese  boxes. 

§64. 

Cinders. 

§65. 

Clam  shells. 

§66. 

Class  rates. 

§67. 

Coal. 

§68. 

Coal-tar   paving   cement. 

§69. 

Coal-tar   paving   pitch. 

§70. 

Coke. 

REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §1  (a)  — (b) 


563 


§71. 

Condensed  milk. 

§126. 

Phosphate     rock    and     acid 

§72. 

Corn   shucks. 

phosphates. 

§73. 

Cotton. 

§127. 

Potatoes. 

§74. 

Cotton  linters,   cotton  shod- 

§128. 

Pulp   wood. 

dy  lining. 

§129. 

Pyrite  cinder. 

§75. 

Cotton  seed  and   products. 

§130. 

Roofing  material. 

§76. 

Cotton  waste. 

§131. 

Rosin. 

§77. 
§78. 

Doors. 
Dried  fruits. 

§132. 
§133. 
§134. 

Sacked    corn. 
Safety    fuse. 
Salt. 

§79. 

Egg-case  material. 

§135. 

Sash  windows. 

§80. 

Elm   hub   blocks. 

§136. 

Sawdust. 

§81. 

Fertilizer. 

§137. 

Second-hand  steel  rails  and 

182. 

Flaxseed  and  oats. 

logging  equipment. 

§83. 

Flour. 

§138. 

Sheet-iron  roofing. 

§84. 

Fruits    and    vegetables. 

§139. 

Shingles. 

§85. 

Fruit  baskets. 

§140. 

Snapped    corn. 

§86. 

Furniture. 

§141. 

Stamped   ware. 

§87. 

Gas  machinery. 

§142. 

Staves. 

§88. 

Go-carts. 

§143. 

Stucco. 

§89. 

Grain   and   hay. 

§144. 

Sugar. 

§90. 
§91. 

Grates. 
Gunpowder. 

§145. 

Sulphuric    acid. 

§146. 
§147. 

Tanners'  outfits. 
Tent  pins. 
Ties. 

§92. 

Hay,   straw   and   alfalfa. 

§148. 
§149. 

§93. 

Hickory  spokes. 

Tin-plate  scrap. 

§94. 
§95. 

Ice. 

Iron   and    steel  bars,   plates 

§150. 

Vehicles,    wagons    and   bug- 
gies. 
Walnut  veneer. 

and    sheets    and    structural 

§151. 

steel. 

§152. 

Watermelons. 

§96. 

Iron,   iron    pyrites. 

§153. 

Wheat,  corn  and  rye. 

§97. 

Iron   roofing. 

§154. 

Wire. 

§98. 

Junk. 

§155. 

Wood  pulp. 

§99. 

Kanite. 

§156. 

Wool. 

§100. 

Lead  ore. 

§101. 

Leather    and    other    materi- 

1.    CONTROL    AND    REGULATION. 

§102. 

als. 
Lime. 

§1.     In    General. 

§103. 

Live   stock. 

See 

Act    to    Regulate    Commerce,    II 

§104. 

Locomotives. 

(d) 
(d) 

,    (x);   Commerce  Court,   §4   (a), 
;  Crimes,  §1   (d) ;   Undercharges, 

§105. 

Lumber  and  products. 

§2 

(h). 

§106. 

Malt. 

(a)     The 

Commission  has  no  power  to 

§107. 
§108. 
§109. 

Manila  paper  folders. 

Masurite. 

Merchandise. 

substitute 

a    new    rate    for    a   just   and 

reasonable 

rate    on    the   ground    that   it 

§110. 

Metal  furniture  knobs. 

was  a  wise 

policy  to  do  so,  or  that  the 

§111. 

Milk. 

railroad     had     so     conducted     itself     as 

§112. 

Mine-prop    logs. 

to  be  estopped  in  the  future  from  being 

§113. 

Mohair. 

entitled    to 

receive    a   just   and    reason- 

§114. 

Motorcycles. 

able   compensation   for   the   service   ren- 

§115. 

Mussel  shells. 

dered.     S. 

P.   Co.  V.  I.  C.   C,  219  U.  S. 

§116. 

Newspaper. 

433,    443,    31    Sup.    Ct.    Rep.    288,    55    L. 

§117. 

Oil. 

ed.    283. 

§118. 

Packing-house         products, 

meat   and    poultry. 

(b)     It    is    not    within    the    authority 

§119. 

Paper  and  stock. 

of  the   Commission  to  reduce  rates  not 

§120. 

Passenger   car. 

merely    against   the   weight    of   the    evi- 

§121. 

Peas,  beans  and  hominy. 

dence    produced    to    sustain    them,    but 

§122. 

Petroleum. 

without  anything  substantial  to  warrant 

§123. 

Petroleum    skimmings. 

the    conclusion    reached    or   the    reasons 

§124. 

Plaster    board. 

assigned   therefor.     L.   &   N.    R.   R.   Co. 

§125. 

Poles,  piling  and  posts. 

V.  I.  C.  C, 

195  Fed.  541,  564. 

564 


REASONABLENESS   OF  RATES,    §1    (c)— (j) 


(c)  The  authority  granted  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  under  sec- 
tion 15  of  the  Act  to  prescribe  reason- 
able rates  does  not  confer  absolute  or 
arbitrary  power  to  act  on  any  con- 
siderations which  the  Commission  may 
deem  best  for  the  public,  the  shipper, 
and  the  carrier.  Its  order  must  be  based 
on  transportation  considerations.  While 
it  may  give  weight  to  all  factors  bear- 
ing either  on  the  cost  or.  the  value  of 
the  transportation  services,  it  must 
disregard  as  well  the  demand  of  the 
shipper  for  protection  from  legitimate 
competition,  domestic  or  foreign,  for 
unlimited  markets,  or  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  equitable  estoppels  arising 
from  a  justifiable  expectation  that  past 
rates  will  be  maintained,  and  the  demand 
of  the  carrier  for  the  maximum  rate 
under  which  the  traffic  will  move  freely. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  190 
Fed.  591,   594. 

(d)  When  the  legislative  power  con- 
cerns the  administrative  affairs  of  the 
Commission,  it  may  be  delegated  to 
an  officer,  or  a  board  already  existing 
or  created  for  the  purpose,  and,  when 
so  delegated,  the  power  may  be  as 
fully  exercised  as  the  legislature  might 
have  exercised  it  subject  to  any  limita- 
tions imposed  by  the  legislature  itseii. 
Under  this  rule  the  power  vested  in  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  to  fix 
rates  for  the  future  is  constitutional. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  184  Fed. 
118,  122. 

(e)  Congress  did  not  in  the  Act  and 
its  amendments  intend  to  vest  admin- 
istrative authority  in  the  courts  in  the 
matter  of  fixing  rates,  but  on  the  con- 
trary committed  the  power  to  and 
imposed  the  duty  to  ascertain  facts  and 
determine  what  is  reasonable  in  regard 
to  rates  and  charges  in  view  of  such 
facts  on  the  Commission.  L.  &  N.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  184  Fed.  118,  124. 

(f)  What  rates,  involved  in  a  com- 
plaint before  the  Commission,  should 
be,  whether  they  should  remain  as  fixed 
by  the  railroad  company  or  whether 
there  should  be  other  rates,  is  a  mat- 
ter committed  by  the  statute  to  the 
Commission  to  be  settled  by  its  opinion 
as  to  what  is  just  and  reasonable,  and 
when  so  settled,  its  determination  is 
binding,  and  is  not  subject  to  judicial 
review,  unless  it  is  made  to  appear 
that  the  Commission  in  making  it  has 
not  merely  erred  in  the  exercise  of  its 


power,  or  has  proceeded  upon  grounds 
and  reasons  which  to  a  court  might 
seem  unsatisfactory,  but  has  violated 
some  distinct  paramount  right  secured 
by  tne  Constitution  or  otherwise  vested 
in  the  carrier,  or  in  the  public.  L.  & 
N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  184  Fed.  118, 
128. 

(g)  The  courts  have  no  power  to  fix 
railroad  rates,  such  power  being  vested 
in  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion, and  where  the  Commission  acting 
in  its  administrative  capacity  establishes 
certain  rates  the  courts  will  not  inter- 
fere unless  some  legal  constitutional  or 
natural  right  has  been  violated.  Phila. 
&  R.  Ry.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  174  Fed.  687, 
688. 

(h)  To  be  just  and  reasonable,  within 
the  meaning  of  the  constitutional  guar- 
anty, the  rates  must  be  prescribed  by 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
with  reasonable  regard  for  the  cost  to 
the  carrier,  of  the  service  rendered, 
and  for  the  value  of  the  property  em- 
ployed therein;  but  this  does  not  mean 
that  regard  is  to  be  had  only  for  the 
interests  of  the  carrier,  or  that  the 
rates  must  necessarily  be  such  as  to 
render  its  business  profitable,  for  rea- 
sonable regard  must  also  be  had  for 
the  value  of  the  service  to  the  public. 
And  where  the  cost  to  the  carrier  is  not 
kept  within  a  reasonable  limit,  or  where 
for  any  reason  its  business  cannot  rea- 
sonably be  so  conducted,  as  to  render  it 
profitable,  the  misfortune  must  fall 
upon  the  carrier.  M.  K.  &  T.  R.  R. 
Co.   V.   I.   C.   C,   164   Fed.  645,   648. 

(i)  Powers  to  determine  and  pre- 
scribe what  are  just  and  reasonable 
maximum  rates  to  be  charged  in  inter- 
state commerce  is,  in  a  limited  way,  con- 
ferred upon  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  by  existing  statute  laws; 
and  as  the  Commission  acts  only  as  a 
legislative  or  administrative  board,  and 
not  judicially,  its  determination  or  ac- 
tion does  not,  and  cannot,  preclude 
judicial  inquiry  into  the  justness  and 
reasonableness  of  the  rates,  within  the 
meaning  of  the  constitutional  guaranty, 
for  that  is  a  judicial  question.  M.  K.  & 
T.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  164  Fed.  645, 
648. 

(j)  Neither  Congress,  nor  any  legis- 
lative or  administrative  board  acting 
by  its  authorization,  can  competently 
establish  rates  for  the  transportation 
of  property  in  interstate  commerce    that 


REASONABLENESS   OF  RATES,   §1    (k)— (u) 


565 


will  not  admit  of  the  carrier  earning 
such  compensation  for  the  services  ren- 
dered as,  under  all  the  circumstances, 
is  just  and  reasonable  to  it  and  to  the 
public,  for  that  would  be  depriving  the 
carrier  of  its  property,  without  due 
process  of  law,  and  would  be  taking  its 
property  for  public  use  without  just 
compensation,  in  violation  of  the  5th 
amendment  to  the  Constitution.  M.  K. 
&  T.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  164  Fed.  645, 
647. 

(k)  The  Commission  has  power  to 
determine  the  reasonableness  of  differ- 
ences in  rates  on  various  commodities. 
In  Re  Advances  of  Coal  to  I^ke  Ports, 
22   I.   C.   C.   604,   623. 

(1)  It  is  doubtless  true  that  in  its 
control  over  the  charges  which  railroads 
may  make,  the  Commission  exercises  a 
power  so  extensive  as  to  justify  the 
broadest  consideration  of  the  economic 
and  financial  effects  of  its  orders.  By 
its  decisions  in  the  Abilene  Cotton  Oil 
case,  204  U.  S.  426,  and  in  the  Illinois 
Central  case,  215  U.  S.  452,  the  Supreme 
Court  has  erected  the  Commission  into 
what  has  been  termed  "an  economic 
court,"  or  to  give  it  a  more  common- 
place definition,  but  one  of  stricter  legal 
analogy,  a  select  jury  to  pass  upon  the 
reasonableness  and  justness  of  railroad 
rates,  rules  and  practices.  Within  broad 
lines  of  discretion  the  courts  regard  the 
conclusions  of  the  Commission  on  ques- 
tions of  fact  as  final.  There  is  an  ap- 
peal upon  questions  of  law  by  the  car- 
riers to  the  courts,  but  unless  a  con- 
stitutional guaranty  is  violated  the  order 
of  the  Commission  is  final,  provided,  of 
course,  the  Commission  does  not  over- 
step the  jurisdictional  limits  placed  upon 
it  by  the  statute.  And  as  to  the  shipper 
this  tribunal  is  his  one  and  only  resort 
against  injustice.  In  Re  Advances  in 
Rates— Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307, 
317. 

(m)  The  Commission  is  not  a  court 
of  law.  Its  function  is  to  apply  the  man- 
datory and  restrictive  provisions  of  the 
Act  to  stated  conditions  of  fact.  It 
must  regard  the  problems  presented 
from  as  many  standpoints  as  there  are 
public  interests  involved.  The  making 
of  a  rate  is  in  ultimate  analysis,  the 
exercise  of  a  taxing  power  on  com- 
merce. The  reasonableness  of  a  rate  is 
to  be  determined  by  no  mere  mathe- 
matical calculation,  though  figures  of 
cost   and   revenue   must   play   a   not  in- 


considerable part  in  arriving  at  a  final 
judgment.  The  unrestricted  power  to 
make  rates,  however,  should  not  rest 
in  the  hands  of  those  whose  tendency 
must  be  by  reason  of  human  nature  to 
exact  to  the  limit  the  highest  return 
that  can  be  procured.  In  Re  Advances 
in  Rates — Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C. 
307,   315. 

(n)  The  Commission  alone  has  the 
power  to  determine  the  reasonableness 
of  a  rate.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — 
Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307,  317. 

(o)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission has  exclusive  jurisdiction  over 
interstate  rates,  and  is  necessarily  not 
bound  to  follow  decisions  of  state' com- 
missions. Railroad  Commission  of  Wis- 
consin V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.  C.  85,  89. 

(p)  The  Commission  has  jurisdiction 
whenever  the  unreasonableness  of  the 
rate  is  in  issue.  Porter  v.  St.  L.  &  S. 
F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  1,  5. 

(q)  The  jurisdiction  of  the  Com- 
mission to  establish  reasonable  rates  is 
settled  by  the  Abilene  case,  206  U.  S. 
26.  Washer  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  147,  156. 

(r)  The  power  of  the  Commission  is 
ample  to  declare  rates  and  rules  set 
forth  in  a  tariff  schedule  unjust  or 
unreasonable  ....  and  when  a 
rate  has  been  found  unreasonable,  and  a 
reasonable  rate  has  been  established, 
to  make  reparation.  Morse  Produce  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
334,  337. 

(s)  If,  being  authorized  to  impose 
for  its  services  a  reasonable  rate,  a  rail- 
road in  fact  imposes  one  that  is  excess- 
ive, it  is  answerable  to  the  Govern- 
ment. City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  414. 

(t)  If  any  government  tribunal  is  to 
do  justice  between  the  railway  and  the 
public,  its  supervisions  must  be  con- 
tinuous and  not  spasmodic.  City  of 
Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
376,  416. 

(u)  Before  the  Commission  makes  an 
order  for  reparation  or  establishes  a 
rate  for  the  future  it  must  have  some 
opinion  of  its  own  upon  the  reasonable- 
ness of  the  rate  involved.  Holley  Mat- 
thews Mfg.  Co.  V.  Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  436,  437. 


566 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §1  (v)— §2  (h) 


(v)  The  Act  creates  a  special  admin- 
istrative tribunal  clothed  with  power  to 
hear  and  determine  causes  of  action  in- 
volving a  right  which  has  long  existed 
at  common  law,  viz.,  the  right  to  re- 
cover for  an  unreasonable  transportation 
charge.  The  Act  did  not  abrogate  this 
common  law  right,  and  by  the  express 
language  of  section  22  the  remedies  al- 
ready existing  for  its  enforcement  are 
saved.  Where  the  special  remedy  is 
lost  by  a  subsequent  act  ousting  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Commission,  this 
does  not  affect  the  right  of  claimant 
to  pursue  his  common  law  remedy. 
Hussey    v.    C.    R.    I.    &    P.    Ry.    Co.,    13 

I.  C.    C.    366,    368. 

(w)  Under  the  Hepburn  amendment 
the  Commission  has  jurisdiction  over 
carriers  engaged  in  the  transportation 
wholly  by  railroad  from  one  state  to  an- 
other, irrespective  of  "common  control, 
management  or  arrangement,"  and  the 
test  of  jurisdiction  is  not  the  arrange- 
ment under  which  the 'freight  is  deliv- 
ered, but  rather  the  character  of  the 
transportation  itself.  Leonard  v.  K.  C. 
S.   Ry.   Co.,   13  I.   C.  C.   573,  578. 

II.  ELEMENTS    DETERMINING    REA- 

SONABLENESS. 
See    Evidence,    III. 
§2.     In  General. 

(a)  It  does  not  follow  as  a  matter  of 
law  that  rates  should  be  the  same  for 
the  same  distance  over  two  different 
roads.  I.  C.  C.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
222  U.  S.  541,  549,  32  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
108,  56  L.  ed.  308. 

(b)  A  carrier  under  section  15  of 
the  Act  as  amended  June  29,  1906,  is 
entitled  to  have  a  finding  by  the  Com- 
mission that  any  particular  charge  is 
unreasonable  and  unjust  before  it  is 
required  to  change  such  charge.  I.  C. 
C.  V.  Stickney,  215  U.  S.  98,  105,  30 
Sup.  Ct.  6Q,  54  L.  ed.  112. 

(c)  Railroads  are  the  private  property 
of  their  owners  and  while  from  the  pub- 
lic character  of  the  work  in  which 
they  are  engaged  the  public  has  'the 
power  to  prescribe  rules  for  securing 
faithful  and  efficient  service  and  equal- 
ity between  shippers  and  communities, 
yet  in  no  proper  sense  is  the  public 
a  general  manager.  I.  C.  C.  v.  C.  G. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  209  U.  S.  108,  118,  28  Sup. 
Ct.  493,  52  L.  ed.  705. 


(d)  In  order  to  sustain  reasonable 
rates  to  intermediate  points,  unrea- 
sonable rates  between  more  distant 
points  cannot  be  sustained.  N,  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  U.   S.,  195  Fed.  953,  959. 

(e)  Where  the  rates  ordered  by  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  to  be 
put  in  force  by  one  carrier  are  unrea- 
sonable, the  courts  cannot  say  that  be- 
cause other  roads  have  not  met  the 
reduced  rates  and  are  losing  traffic  as 
a  consequence,  the  order  of  the  Commis- 
sion should  be  interfered  with.  N.  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  195  Fed.  953,  962. 

(f)  A  shipper  is  not  prevented  from 
invoking  the  provisions  of  the  5th 
amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  against  confiscatory  rates 
established  by  a  carrier,  on  the  theory 
that  he  is  not  obliged  to  ship  under 
such  rates  and  may  utilize  them  or 
not  as  he  sees  fit.  Hooker  v.  I.  C.  C, 
188   Fed.    242,   248. 

(ff)  Whether  a  coal  mine  can  sell  in 
a  particular  market  usually  depends  upon 
its  rate  of  freight.  In  Re  Transportation 
of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151, 
164. 

(g)  Proper  rate  making  secures  to 
every  shipper  the  performance  of  the 
transportation  service  for  no  more  than 
a  reasonable  charge  and  requires  of 
every  shipper  the  payment  for  every 
service  performed  of  what  is  reason- 
able. In  Re  Transportation  of  Wool, 
Hides  and   Pelts,  23  I.  C.   C.  151,  174. 

(gg)  The  Northern  Pacific  railroad,  be- 
ing the  only  line  having  rails  extending 
to  South  Tacoma,  Wash.,  a  point  just  out- 
side the  Tacoma  switching  district,  is  en- 
titled, in  the  protection  of  its  investment, 
to  conduct  traffic  between  South  Tacoma 
and  other  points  on  its  line  on  a  preferred 
basis,  and  shippers  who  desire  to  use 
competing  lines  ought  not  to  object  to 
paying  in  addition  to  the  Tacoma  rate  a 
reasonable  charge  to  the  Northern  Pacific 
for  its  local  haul  between  Tacoma  and 
South  Tacoma.  Public  Service  Commis- 
sion, Wash.,  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
256. 

(h)  An  unreasonable  rate  may  not 
be  permitted  to  stand  merely  because 
if  reduced  other  rate  readjustments  might 
follow.  Whatever  the  carriers  might 
do  in  this  respect  the  Commission's 
duty  in  each  case  is  to  inquire  into  the 
reasonableness  and  justness  of  the  rate 
I  under     immediate     consideration.      New 


REASONABLEENESS  OF  RATES,   §2    (hh)— (s) 


567 


Orleans  Board   of  Trade  v.   L.   &  N.  R. 
R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  429,  431. 

(hh)  All  rules,  regulations  and  charges 
affecting  ultimate  cost  of  transportation 
must  be  made  with  a  reasonable  regard 
for  the  nature  of  the  commodity  trans- 
ported. Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  St.  L.  & 
S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  259,  262. 

(i)  State  lines  do  not  in  themselves 
furnish  any  reasonable  excuse  for  their 
use  as  basing  points.  Medford  Traffic 
Bureau  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  701,  706. 

(ii)  A  carrier  is  not  entitled  to  with- 
hold reasonable  rates  from  a  city  on  the 
ground  that  it  is  unable  to  agree  upon 
divisions  with  connecting  carriers.  Mil- 
burn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  93,  100. 

(j)  What  is  a  reasonable  freight  rate 
cannot,  strictly  speaking,  be  the  sub- 
ject of  agreement  between  carriers  and 
shippers,  nor  between  carriers  and  the 
Commission.  If  in  a  given  case,  after 
hearing  all  that  is  to  be  said  by  the 
parties,  the  Commission  is  clearly  of 
the  conviction  that  the  rates  in  effect 
are  wrong,  it  is  its  duty  to  substitute 
for  those  rates  others  which  it  believes 
to  be  right.  But  it  is  not  required  to 
interfere  unless  clearly  convinced  that 
the  schedule  in  effect  is  unlawful.  Ar- 
lington Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S. 
P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  149,  156. 

(jj)  A  just  and  reasonable  rate  must 
be  one  which  respects  alike  the  car- 
rier's deserts  and  the  character  of  the 
traffic.  The  words  "just  and  reason- 
able" imply  the  application  of  good 
faith  and  fairness,  of  common  sense  and 
a  sense  of  justice  to  a  given  condition 
of  facts.  They  are  not  fixed,  unalter- 
able, mathematical  terms.  Their  mean- 
ing implies  the  exercise  of  judgment. 
In  Re  Advances  on  Coal  to  Lake  Ports, 
22  I.  C.  C.  604,  624. 

(k)  The  Commission  is  conscious 
that  there  is  a  considerable  zone  within 
which  a  rate  may  be  held  to  be  just 
and  reasonable.  In  Re  Advances  on 
Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C.  604, 
625. 

(1)  A  carrier  may  properly  with- 
draw from  a  field  if  it  is  compelled  to 
maintain  rates  lower  than  those  which 
are  just  and  reasonable  to  itself.  In 
Re  Advances  on  Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22 
I.  C.  C.  604,  625. 


(m)  The  rate  made  by  the  carrier 
must  be  just  and  reasonable  for  the 
service  which  it  gives  and  should  have 
relation  to  the  cost  of  that  service  and 
the  character  of  the  commodity  trans- 
ported. In  Re  Advances  on  Coal  to 
Lake    Ports,   22   I.   C.   C.   604,   625. 

(n)  What  the  public  is  primarily  in- 
terested in  is  the  charge  for  the  trans- 
portation service  rendered,  irrespective 
of  the  divisions  of  the  rate,  and  if  the 
rate  itself  is  reasonable  and  just  the 
fact  that  it  is  unequally  divided  be- 
tween the  participating  lines  is  not  a 
basis  for  reduction.  There  may  be 
many  reasons  why  a  particular  carrier 
would  be  willing  to  accept  a  very  small 
proportion  of  a  joint  rate  in  order  to 
secure  business,  and  it  is  within  its 
rights  in  bargaining  with  its  connec- 
tions for  tonnage  so  long  as  it  does  not 
undertake  to  haul  one  class  of  freight 
at  rates  so  low  as  to  thereby  burden' 
other  traffic.  Florida  Mercantile  Agency 
V.   Penn.   R.   R.   Co.,  21   I.   C.   C   85,   87. 

(o)  The  exaction  of  an  unreasonable 
rate  upon  a  considerable  volume  of  traf- 
fic is  a  manifest  injustice,  and  a  com- 
plainant cannot  be  deprived  of  the  rate 
to  which  it  is  entitled  because  all 
others  similarly  situated  have  not  joined 
in  its  petition.  Texas  Brewing  Co.  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  171, 
175. 

(p)  A  shipper  is  entitled  to  demand 
transportation  at  a  reasonable  rate, 
and  that  requirement  cannot  be  denied 
because  of  the  carrier's  preference  as 
to  the  form  in  which  the  traffic  shall 
be  carried.  Auto  Vehicle  Co.  v.  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  286, 
288. 

(q)  As  to  the  value  of  a  rate  com- 
parison, everything  depends  upon  the  cir- 
cumstances under  which  the  rate  is  made 
and  the  transportation  conducted.  Ore- 
gon &  Washington  Lumber  Mfrs.  Ass'n 
V.   S.   P.   Co.,   21   I.   C.   C.   389,   392. 

(r)  It  is  for  the  interest  of  the  con- 
sumer and  producer  that  the  cost  of 
carriage  should  be  reasonable.  Board 
of  Trade  of  Chicago  v.  A.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  504,  507. 

(s)  The  prohibition  of  the  law  is 
against  charging  differently  for  a  like 
and  contemporaneous  service  in  the 
transportation  of  a  like  kind  of  traffic 
under  substantially  similar  circum- 
stances and  conditions.    In  Re  Advances 


568 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §2   (t)  — (dd) 


in  Rates  by  Carriers  Operating  Between 
the  Mississippi  and  Missouri  Rivers,  21 
I.    C.    C.    546,    552. 

(t)  The  standard  of  the  law  by  which 
the  validity  of  any  rate  as  affected  by 
its  amount  is  determined  is  not  more 
definite  than  that  it  must  be  reasonable 
and  just.  The  test  of  reasonableness 
can  be  applied  only  by  reference  to  and 
upon  consideration  of  all  pertinent  facts, 
circumstances  and  conditions  affecting 
the  rate  in  effect  at  any  particular  time. 
In  the  nature  of  the  case  there  can  be 
no  rule  or  process  whereby  the  definite 
absolute  maximum  limit  of  reasonable- 
ness in  the  amount  of  a  rate  can  be 
fixed  with  the  certainty  of  a  demonstra- 
tion. Anadarko  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  43,  49. 

(u)  Carriers  are  presumed  to  act 
in  good  faith  in  initiating  rates,  and 
their  rates  cannot  be  condemned  except 
upon  investigation  and  full  hearing.  A 
rate  reasonable  in  view  of  the  circum- 
stances and  conditions  when  it  is  es- 
tablished may  in  course  of  time  become 
unreasonable  by  virtue  of  changed  cir- 
cumstances and  conditions.  It  is  mani- 
festly impracticable  for  the  carriers  or 
the  Commission  in  such  a  case  to  de- 
termine at  what  exact  time  in  the 
gradual  process  of  changes  the  rate 
becomes  unreasonable.  Anadarko  Cot- 
ton Oil  Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co., 
20  I.   C.   C.   43,   50. 

(uu)  There  is  no  objection  to  package 
rates.  National  League  of  Commission 
Merchants  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C. 
132,  135. 

(v)  The  railroad  rates  of  this  coun- 
try have  not  been  constructed,  as  a  rule, 
upon  any  scientific  basis,  and  this  is 
especially  true  of  the  interstate  rates. 
The  traffic  officials  who  have  estab- 
lished these  rates  have  generally  done 
so  without  any  special  inquiry  as  to  the 
total  amount  of  revenue  which  ought 
to  be  produced,  or  as  to  the  part  of 
that  burden  which  a  particular  com- 
modity ought  to  bear.  This  Commis- 
sion is  called  upon  to  deal  with  rates 
as  they  exist,  and  in  so  doing  it  ordi- 
narily considers  them  not  from  the  rev- 
enue standpoint  but  rather  from  the 
commercial  and  trafiic  standpoint.  At 
the  same  time  it  is  now  the  settled 
law  that  there  is  a  limit  below  which 
the  revenue  of  railroads  cannot  be  re- 
duced by  public  authority,  and  if  there 
were   no   such   constitutional   limitations 


it  would,  nevertheless,  behoove  every 
regulating  body  to  permit  the  existence 
of  such  rate,  when  possible,  as  would 
yield  just  earnings  to  the  railway. 
The  question  of  revenue  is  therefore 
fundamental  and  ever  present  in  all  con- 
siderations as  to  the  reasonableness  of 
railroad  rates,  although  it  may  not  be, 
and  seldom  is,  where  single  rates  are 
presented,  the  controlling  question.  In 
Re  Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20 
I.   C.   C.   243,   248. 

(w)  Railroads  should  be  kept  in  a 
high  state  of  efficiency  and  rates  should 
be  sufficient  to  permit  this.  In  Re 
Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20 
I.   C.  C.  243,  250. 

(x)  The  risk  is  less  in  a  railroad 
than  in  most  industrial  operations.  In 
Re  Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case, 
20  I.  C.  C.  243,  263. 

(y)  A  rate  is  a  tax  laid  upon  nearly 
every  species  of  property  and  upon  al- 
most every  sort  of  activity.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I. 
C.   C.  243,  263. 

(z)  It  would  be  much  better  for 
Government  to  guarantee  railroad  bonds 
than  to  permit  people  to  bear  burden 
of  unreasonable  rates.  In  Re  Advances 
in  Rates— Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C. 
243,  253. 

(aa)  A  railroad  is  a  monopoly;  its 
rates  are  not  made  under  the  infiuence 
of  competition.  In  Re  Advances  in 
Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243, 
280. 

(bb)  Every  rate  question  is  a  public 
question.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — 
Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307,  315. 

(cc)  Railroad  management  should  be 
most  progressive.  In  Re  Advances  In 
Rates— Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307, 
317. 

(dd)  The  Commission  must  be  con- 
scious in  its  consideration  of  rate  ques- 
tions of  their  effect  upon  the  policy  of 
the  railroads  and  ultimately  upon  the 
welfare  of  the  state.  This  country 
cannot  afford  to  have  poor  railroads,  in- 
sufficiently equipped,  unsubstantially 
built  and  carelessly  operated.  We  need 
the  best  of  service.  Our  railroad  man- 
agement should  be  the  most  progressive. 
It  should  have  wide  latitude  for  ex- 
periment. It  should  have  such  encour- 
agement as  would  attract  the  imagina- 
tion  of   both   the    engineer    and   the   in- 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §2  (ee)— (pp) 


569 


vestor.  Nevertheless  it  is  likewise  to 
be  remembered  that  the  government  has 
not  undertaken  to  become  the  directing 
mind  in  railroad  managment.  The  Com- 
mission is  not  the  manager  of  the  rail- 
roads. And  no  matter  what  the  revenue 
they  may  receive  there  can  be  no  con- 
trol placed  by  the  Commission  upon  its 
expenditure,  no  improvements  directed, 
no  economy  enforced.  Advances  in 
Rates— Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  S.  307, 
317. 

(ee)  The  legislature  may  not  make 
rates  so  as  to  confiscate  the  carrier's 
property.  The  carrier  on  the  other 
hand  may  not  make  rates  which  are 
unjust  to  those  who  by  economic  neces- 
sity are  compelled  to  employ  its  services. 
Advances  in  Rates — Western  Case,  20  I. 
C.  C.  307,  347. 

(ff)  It  may  not  answer  public  needs 
to  always  measure  rates  by  any  fixed 
standard,  but  deviations  from  standard 
should  be  made  primarily  with  regard 
to  public  advantage,  rather  than  to  the 
volume  of  freight  which  the  carrier 
may  secure.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates 
—Western  Case,   20  I.   C.   C.   307,  355. 

(gg)  Under  regulation  a  reasonable 
rate  is  one  which  the  shipper  should 
pay  in  justice  to  the  carrier  which 
renders  the  service.  In  Re  Advances  in 
Rates— Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307, 
356. 

(hh)  Once  the  comparative  cost 
for  various  services  is  learned  a  sched- 
ule of  rates  may  be  made  which  will 
approach  justice  as  between  services. 
Supplement  cost  with  scientific  classi- 
fication of  freight  giving  their  due  to 
all  the  various  factors  such  as  value, 
bulk  and  hazard — especially  to  value — 
adding  return  for  use  of  plant,  and 
force  is  given  to  every  factor  which  the 
Supreme  Court  has  said  should  be  con- 
sidered in  the  fixing  of  rates  for  public 
utilities.  Advances  in  Rates — W^estern 
Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307,  362. 

(ii)  It  is  the  ultimate  charge  to 
which  Commission's  rule  is  directed. 
Lull  Carriage  Co.  v.  C.  K.  &  S.  Ry.  Co., 
19   I.   C.   C.   15,   16. 

(jj)  Freight  rates  cannot  be  made 
solely  with  reference  to  the  value  of 
the  article  transported,  or  with  refer- 
ence alone  to  the  loss  and  damage 
claims  arising  from  transportation.  The 
carrier  is  entitled  to  take  into  consid- 
eration  the  occupancy  of  its   equipment 


I  and  facilities,  or  in  other  terms,  to 
charge  for  the  service  rendered.  This 
charge  for  the  service  rendered  may  be 
tested  relatively  by  means  of  the  rate 
per  ton  mile,  which  is  most  helpful  in 
connection  with  dense  and  heavy  articles, 
or  the  value  of  the  service  and  the 
reasonableness  of  the  rate  may  be  tested 
by  means  of  the  rate  per  car  per  mile, 
where  articles  of  the  same  relative 
weight,  density,  direction  and  volume 
of  movement  are  in  question;  but  gen- 
erally the  ultimate  test  with  the  carrier 
itself  must  be  the  return  for  the  occu- 
pation and  use  of  its  equipment  and 
facilities.  National  Hay  Ass'n  v.  M.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  34,  47. 

(kk)  The  Commission  hesitates  to 
reduce  a  rate  unless  clearly  excessive. 
Chappelle  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I. 
C.   C.   56,   59. 

(11)  Jobbers  are  shippers,  and  every 
shipper  is  entitled  to  reasonable  rates. 
Billings    Chamber    of    Commerce    v.    C. 

B.  &   Q.    R.    R.    Co.,   19   I.   C.   C.   71,   75. 

(mm)  Compensation,  through  the  ex- 
action of  a  reasonable  rate,  implies  the 
payment  of  the  cost  of  the  service, 
interest  on  bonds,  and  then  some  divi- 
dend. Morgan  Grain  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  460,  470. 

(nn)  The  sole  duty  of  a  carrier  is 
to  provide  a  rate  that  is  reasonable 
for  the  service  performed.  Ponchatoula 
Farmers'    Ass'n    v.    I.    C.    R.    R.,    19    I. 

C.  C.  513,  515. 

(oo)  The  American  railroad  rate  has 
always  been  recognized  as  covering  the 
full  service  which  the  carrier  gives — 
in  furnishing  the  car,  a  proper  place 
at  which  to  load  it,  the  conveyance  of 
that  loaded  car,  and  its  terminal  de- 
livery. The  charge  for  these  various 
services  is  not  in  America  broken  up 
into  its  component  parts  and  a  charge 
imposed  for  each,  as  in  England.  The 
rate,  which  it  requires  shall  be  pub- 
lished, is  a  complete  rate  which  in- 
cludes not  only  the  charge  for  haul, 
but  the  charge  for  the  use  of  the  ter- 
minals at  both  ends  of  the  line.  As- 
sociated Jobbers  of  Los  Angeles  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  310, 
314. 

(pp)  Where  one  ships  from  a  certain 
point  on  the  assurance  of  the  carrier 
that  a  certain  rate  applied,  a  higher 
rate  being  in  fact  in  force,  it  is  imma- 
terial    on    the     question    of    reparation 


570 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §2   (qq)  — (yyy) 


whether  the  shipper  would  have  se- 
cured the  material  and  made  the  ship- 
ment from  other  points  taking  the  lower 
rate  had  he  not  been  misinformed,  since 
the  only  question  at  issue  is  the  rea- 
sonableness of  the  rate  exacted.  Wil- 
lamette Pulp  &  Paper  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  388,  388. 

(qq)  Rates  should  be  so  adjusted  as 
to  permit  the  widest  possible  competi- 
tion. Andy's  Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  So.  Ry. 
Co.,    18    I.    C.    C.   405,  410. 

(rr)  It  is  a  maximum  of  rate  mak- 
ing that  the  rate  should  be  such,  if 
possible,  as  to  move  the  traffic.  Within 
certain  limits  a  railroad  is  bound  to 
protect  its  territory,  and  within  those 
limits  the  Commission  may  consider 
the  rates  and  their  effects  upon  the 
movement  of  traffic.  Receivers  and 
Shippers'  Ass'n  of  Cincinnati  v.  C.  N. 
O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  440, 
458. 

(ss)  If  rates  are  reasonable  it  makes 
no  difference  as  to  the  motives  of  the 
carriers  in  fixing  the  same.  Receivers 
&  Shippers'  Ass'n  of  Cincinnati  v.  C. 
N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  440, 
447. 

(sss)  Where  rates  on  a  particular 
commodity  bear  a  uniform  relation  to 
rates  of  a  certain  class,  any  inequalities 
in  those  rates  as  between  different  places 
are  those  peculiar  to  that  class.  Acme 
Cement  Plaster  Co.  v,  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  30,  35. 

(tt)  Complainant's  chief  witness  testi- 
fied that  he  had  closed  his  eyes  to 
every  condition  and  all  circumstances 
except  those  relating  to  the  situation 
as  between  Fort  Smith  and  Muskogee. 
The  Commission's  vision,  however,  must 
not  be  so  restricted.  The  whole  ad- 
justment from  points  of  production  to 
points  of  dest'nation  must  be  viewed. 
Muskogee  Traffic  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.   Ry.   Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  169,  172. 

(ttt)  Where  two  rates  are  in  effect, 
the  shipper  is  justified  in  demanding  the 
lower,  and  the  carrier  may  not  lawfully 
collect  more.  The  Commission  likewise 
is  justified  in  holding  the  lower  rate  rea- 
sonable, or  at  least  not  unreasonably  low, 
because  it  is  the  voluntary  rate  of  the 
carrier.  Boise  Commercial  Club  v. 
Adams  Express  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  115,  121. 

(uu)  The  reasonableness  of  a  rate 
depends   upon    the    conditions    surround- 


ing traffic  at  the  time  it  moves.  And 
these  factors  are  in  their  nature  neither 
permanent  nor  fixed,  but  necessarily 
change  with  the  general  economic  pan- 
orama. Memphis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  I. 
C.   R.  R.   Co.,  17  I.   C.  C.   313,  318. 

(uuu)  The  law  plainly  provides  for 
but  one  method  of  getting  rid  of  the  un- 
reasonableness or  injustice  of  duly  estab- 
lished rates,  and  that  is  by  their  con- 
demnation upon  complaint  and  investi- 
gation. Old  Dominion  Copper  &  Smelt- 
ing Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  309, 
312. 

(vv)  A  complainant  is  not  deprived 
of  his.  right  to  a  reasonable  rate  by  the 
fact  that  the  defendants,  through  neg- 
lect of  the  rules  of  this  Commission  as 
to  publication  of  their  tariffs,  had 
failed  to  establish  that  rate  in  legal 
form.  Black  Horse  Tobacco  Co.  v.  I. 
C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  588,  592. 

(ww)  Interstate  rates  must  be  rea- 
sonable in  themselves.  Railroad  Com- 
mission of  Wisconsin  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.    Co.,    16    I.    C.    C.    85,    91. 

(xx)  In  publishing  a  rate  or  a  sched- 
ule of  rates  the  carrier  must  act  under 
section  1  of  the  Act  requiring  rates  to 
be  reasonable  and  just.  If  it  establishes 
a  rate  which  is  excessive,  such  rate  is 
not  lawful  when  its  reasonableness  is 
subsequently  questioned  upon  complaint 
filed.  While  it  is  the  legal  rate — the 
rate  that  must  be  paid  by  the  shipper 
and  collected  by  the  carrier  because  it 
is  the  published  rate — the  mere  publica- 
tion cannot  make  a  rate  lawful  that  Is 
unreasonable  and  excessive.  No  rate 
can  be  lawful  in  the  sense  of  being 
immune  from  attack  with  respect  to 
past  or  future  shipments  if  it  be  excess- 
ive and  unreasonable  in  amount.  Ar- 
kansas Fuel  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  95,  97. 

(yy)  The  determination  of  a  reason- 
able rate  rests  in  the  service  performed, 
the  risk  involved,  the  value  of  the  arti- 
cle and  the  degree  of  care  required  to 
be  exercised.  Davis  v.  West  Jersey 
Express   Co.,   16   I.   C.   C.   214,  216. 

(yyy)  While  the  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  owns 
most  of  the  stock  and  therefore  controls 
the  Pennsylvania  Company,  the  opera- 
tions of  the  two  are  kept  entirely  distinct, 
and  this  particular  case  must  be  dis- 
posed of  as  though  there  were  no  com- 
mon interest  in  the  management  of  the 
two.     Kurtz  V.  Penn.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  410. 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §2  (zz)— (111) 


571 


(zz)  The  Commission  is  justified  in 
reducing  a  rate  only  when,  upon  consid- 
eration of  all  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances, it  is  of  opinion  that  the  rate 
in  question  is  unreasonable,  unduly  dis- 
criminatory, or  otherwise  in  violation  of 
the  Act.  Paola  Refining  Co.  v.  M.  K. 
&  T.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C  29,  31. 

(aaa)  Under  the  law  carriers  must 
initiate  rates,  and  so  long  as  they  do 
not  abuse  the  right  conferred  upon  them 
by  the  statute,  the  Commission  is  not 
justified  in  penalizing  them.  Foster 
Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  56,  58. 

(bbb)  It  is  well  established  that  rates 
are  not  made  with  respect  to  distance 
alone.  Differences  in  cost  of  service 
to  the  carrier,  value  of  service  to  the 
shipper  and  questions  of  competition  in 
the  selling  market  should  be  taken 
into  consideration.  Black  Mountain 
Coal  Land  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.   286,   295. 

(ccc)  There  is  no  absolute  test  of 
a  reasonable  rate,  and  the  Government 
has  supplied  none.  City  of  Spokane  v. 
N.   P.   Ry.   Co.,   15   I.   C.   C.   376,   416. 

(ddd)  The  rate  might  be  reduced, 
but  it  would  be  unjust  to  compel  de- 
fendants to  receive  less  than  a  reason- 
able charge  for  the  transportation.  Kent 
Co.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.   C.  439,   441. 

(eee)  A  shipper  is  entitled  to  rates 
that  are  reasonable,  not  when  tested  by 
the  fact  that  the  carrier  may  earn 
larger  revenues  by  hauling  to  a  point 
that  he  does  not  desire  to  reach,  but 
in  accordance  with  the  usual  and  ordi- 
nary tests,  that  are  applied  to  rates. 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Milwaukee  v. 
C.  R.  L  &   P.   Ry.    Co.,   15   1.   C.   C.   460. 

(fff)  The  rate  must  be  reasonable 
with  respect  to  the  service  actually 
performed  and  not  with  respect  to  the 
service  that  could  be  performed  and  the 
revenue  that  could  be  earned  if  the 
shipper  permitted  the  carrier  to .  select 
a  market  for  him.  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce of  Milwaukee  v.  C.  R.  L  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  ^x60,  466. 

(ffff)  A  shipper  is  entitled  to  the 
transportation  that  he  desires  on  rates 
that  are  reasonable,  not  when  tested  by 
the  fact  that  the  carrier  may  earn  larger 
revenues  by  hauling  his  wares  to  a  point 
that  he  does  not  desire  to  reach,  but  on 


rates  that  are  reasonable  in  a'Ccordance 
with  the  usual  and  ordinary  tests  that  are 
applied  to  rates.  Chamber  of  Commerce 
of  Milwaukee  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
15  L  C.  C.  460,  465. 

(ggg)  The  public  interest  is  the  first 
consideration  in  determining  the  rea- 
sonableness of  a  rate.  Pacific  Coast 
Lumber  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
51,  58. 

(hhh)  The  Commission  is  authorized 
to  condemn  an  existing  rate  and  pre- 
scribe a  reasonable  maximum  rate  to  be 
charged  in  the  future,  only  when  upon 
consideration  of  all  the  facts,  circum- 
stances and  conditions  appearing,  it  is 
of  the  opinion  that  the  rate  complained 
of  is  unreasonable  or  unjust.  Marshall 
Oil  Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I. 
C.   C.   210,   213. 

(iii)  In  the  absence  of  actual  and 
effective  competition  compelling  the 
carriers  to  make  rates  upon  traffic  upon 
a  competitive  basis,  the  Commission  is 
called  upon  to  fix  reasonable  rates 
which  shall  be  used  as  maxima  and 
which  the  carriers  may  reduce  to  meet 
competition  with  other  carriers  and  be- 
tween themselves  as  they  may  deem 
advisable.  Okla.  &  Ark,  Coal  Traffic 
Bu.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  216,  221. 

(iiii)  The  Commission  must  base  its 
opinion  as  to  rates  upon  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances disclosed  at  the  hearing,  or 
otherwise  entitled  to  consideration,  of 
suflicient  weight  and  force  to  appeal  to 
the  understanding  and  conscience  of  in- 
telligent men,  and  the  experience  of  the 
Commission,  as  well  as  the  numerous 
decisions  of  the  court,  have  established 
precedence  and  standards  by  which  the 
Commission  should  be  guided  and  aided 
in  reaching  a  just  and  reasonable  con- 
clusion. National  Petroleum  Assn.  v. 
Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  272,  281. 

(jjj)  The  question  of  the  reasonable- 
ness of  a  rate  is  always  one  of  fact. 
Kansas  City  Ass'n  v.  M.  P.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  597,  600. 

(kkk)  The  rate  attacked  must  be  so 
out  of  proportion  as  to  be  unreason- 
able or  must  so  discriminate  as  to  be 
undue  or  must  be  unlawful  for  some 
other  special  reason.  Corn  Belt  Meat 
Producers'  Ass'n  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co., 
14  i.  C.  C.  376,  394. 

(Ill)  Every  shipper  is  entitled  to 
reasonable  rates.     Corn  Belt  Meat  Pro- 


572 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §2  (111)— §3   (h) 


ducers'  Ass'n  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  376,  395. 

(Ill)  The  interstate  rates  of  the  coun- 
try, having  grown  up  under  the  operation 
of  various  forces  and  conditions  and  not 
on  any  consistent  theory,  must  be  dealt 
with  by  the  Commission  as  it  finds  them; 
the  Commission  has  no  authority  to  estab- 
lish general  rate  schedules;  and  unless, 
therefore,  the  general  result  of  all  rates 
is  to  yield  an  undue  revenue  to  the  car- 
rier, the  Commission  will  not  reduce  a 
particular  rate  simply  because  it  may 
think,  in  establishing  the  rate  de  novo  as 
part  of  the  general  scheme,  that  it  ought 
to  be  somewhat  lower  or  higher  in  pro- 
portion to  others;  the  rate  attacked  must 
be  so  out  of  proportion  as  to  be  un- 
reasonable, or  must  so  discriminate  as 
to  be  undue,  or  must  be  unlawful  for 
some  other  special  reason.  Corn  Belt 
Meat  Producers'  Assn.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R  R. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  376,  394. 

(mmm)  Rates  cannot  be  established 
to  shut  out  foreign  products.  Florida 
Fruit  &  Vegetable  Shippers  v.  A.  C.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  476,  502. 

(nnn)  Because  articles  are  in  the 
same  class  it  does  not  follow  that  com- 
modity rates  should  be  alike  on  both, 
when  they  are  wholly  dissimilar.  Good- 
man Mfg.  Co.  V.  P.  B.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.. 
Unrep.  Op.  362. 

§3.     Actions    of    State    Commissions. 

(a)  The  fact  that  the  Texas  state 
Commission  has  established  such  low 
rates  on  live  stock  from  Texas  points 
of  origin  to  Fort  Worth,  Tex.,  that 
Fort  Worth  thereby  gains  an  advantage 
as  against  the  rates  established  from  the 
same  points  of  origin  to  Oklahoma  City, 
Okla.,  by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission, which  rates  are  higher  than  the 
low  mileage  scale  prescribed  by  the 
Texas  Commission,  is  not  such  undue 
discrimination  nor  such  a  situation  with 
which  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission can  properly  deal.  In  Re  In- 
vestigation of  Unreasonable  Rates  on 
Meats,  23  I.  C.  C.  656,  664. 

(b)  In  fixing  interstate  rates,  the 
Commission  cannot  be  governed  by  a 
state  tariff  unless  in  its  opinion  such 
tariff  is  just  and  reasonable.  Investiga- 
tion of  Alleged  Unreasonable  Rates  on 
Meats,  22  I.  C.  C.  160,  164. 

(c)  State  rates  afford  standards  of 
comparison  of  greater  or  less  value,  ac- 


cording as  they  appear  reasonable,  espe- 
cially so  when  acquiesced  in  by  the  car- 
riers; but  when  a  state  rate  is  under 
protest  and  being  contested,  and  appears 
unreasonably  low,  it  is  not  valuable  as 
a  comparison.  Willman  &  Co.  v.  St.  L. 
I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  405. 

(d)  While  it  has  great  respect  for 
the  official  actions  of  state  commissions, 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
cannot  withhold  proper  action  in  an 
interstate  situation  because  it  is  antici- 
pated that  some  opposing  or  retaliatory 
action  will  be  taken  by  a  state  body.  In 
Re  Advances  in  Rates  by  Carriers  Oper- 
ating Between  the  Mississippi  and  Mis- 
souri Rivers,     21  I.  C.  C.  546,  552. 

(e)  In  attacking  rates  on  cross-ties 
from  southeastern  (Georgia  points  to 
Jacksonville,  Fla.,  attention  was  called 
to  the  fact  that  the  interstate  rates  to 
Jacksonville  are  in  excess  of  the  Georgia 
intrastate  rates  on  cross-ties  originating 
in  the  same  territory;  but  defendant 
showed  it  had  several  times  protested 
to  the  Georgia  Commission  and  sought 
permission  to  raise  its  intrastate  rates 
to  correspond  with  the  interstate  rates, 
but  that  Commission  withheld  its  con- 
sent. HELD,  while  state  rates  are  valu- 
able for  comparative  purposes  in  fix- 
ing a  reasonable  charge  for  a  transpor- 
tation service,  the  assumption  of  com- 
plainant that  the  action  of  the  defend- 
ant in  maintaining  higher  transporta- 
tion rates  on  interstate  than  upon  Intra- 
state traffic  amounts  to  unlawful  dis- 
crimination is  not  sound,  for  It  is 
shown  that  the  condition  is  one  over 
which  the  carrier  has  no  control.  Bax- 
ter &  Co  V.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
C.  647,  648. 

(f)  There  ought  always  to  be  har- 
mony between  state  and  interstate  rates, 
but  the  Commission  has  no  right  to 
respect  any  state  policy  which  inter- 
feres with  the  application  of  a  just  and 
reasonable  interstate  rate.  Cobb  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  100,  103. 

(g)  .A  rate  established  by  a  state 
commission  affords  little  value  for  com- 
parative purposes.  Waco  Freight  Bu- 
reau V.  H.  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.  22,  26. 

(h)  While  upon  general  principles  of 
comity  the  action  of  a  state  commission 
in  fixing  a  rate  on  state  traffic  must  be 
treated  with  all  due  respect,  the  Inter- 
state  Commerce   Commission   has  never 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §3  (i)~§4  (a) 


57: 


felt  itself  bound  to  accept  a  state-made 
rate  as  a  necessary  measure  of  an  inter- 
state rate.  Saunders  &  Co.  v.  Southern 
Exp-ress  Co.,  18  I.   C.  C.  415,  421. 

(i)  Low  state  rates  cannot  be  neu- 
tralized by  increases  in  interstate  rates. 
Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  Anderson 
&  Saline  River  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  532, 
536. 

(j)  The  Commission  is  not  controlled 
by  the  rates  established  by  state  com- 
missions, unless  they  seem  to  be  reason- 
able when  applied  to  interstate  move- 
ments. Bartles  Oil  Co.  v.  C.  :\L  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  146,  148. 

(k)  The  Commission  will  always  give 
all  due  and  respectful  consideration  to 
lecisions  of  state  commissions.  Railroad 
Commission  of  Wisconsin  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.   Co.,   16  I.   C.  C.  85,  89. 

(1)  A  low  state  concentration  rate 
not  being  competitive  with  an  interstate 
rate  complained  of,  it  cannot  be  said 
that  the  one  compels  the  other.  Railroad 
Commission  of  Wisconsin  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.   C.  85,  91. 

(m)  A  low  state  rate  is  no  reason  for 
exacting  unreasonable  interstate  rates. 
Fort  Dodge  Commercial  Club  v.  1.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  572,  579. 

(n)  The  rates  established  by  a  state 
::iommission  cannot  be  taken  as  conclu- 
sive of  the  unreasonableness  of  higher 
interstate  rates  between  the  same  points, 
since  the  rates  voluntarily  established  by 
=L  carrier  are  entitled  to  the  same  pre- 
sumption of  reasonableness  as  that  at- 
taching to  rates  prescribed  by  a  state 
commission.  Paola  Refining  Co.  v.  M. 
K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  29,  31,  32. 

(o)  No  greater  sanctity  can  be  pre- 
sumed in  respect  of  rates  established  by 
I  state  railroad  commission  than  those 
v^oluntarily  established  by  carriers.  Paola 
Refining  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
[.   C.   C.    29. 

(p)  The  fact  that  a  rate  does  not 
cross  a  state  line  is  no  reason  why  it 
may  not  be  considered  when  an  inter- 
state rate  over  the  same  line  and  for 
substantially  the  same  distance  is  under 
examination.  Board  of  Mayor  and  Alder- 
men V.  V.  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
3.  453,  459. 

(q)  The  reasonableness  of  a  through 
rate  cannot  be  determined  by  a  compari- 
son with  a  local  intrastate  rate,  plus 
an  Independent  interstate  rate.     Marble 


Falls   Insulator  Pin   Co.   v.   H.   &   T.   C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  167,  169. 

(r)  Although  rates  established  by 
state  authority  may  be  valuable  for  the 
purpose  of  comparison,  they  are  not  con- 
clusive of  the  unreasonableness  of  a  rel- 
atively higher  interstate  rate.  Hafey  v. 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
245,   246. 

(s)  In  determining  the  reasonable- 
ness of  an  interstate  rate,  the  decisions 
of  the  several  state  railroad  commissions 
are  worthy  of  consideration,  but  the 
Commission  is  not  justified  in  accepting 
a  comparison  of  lower  intrastate  rates 
prescribed  by  the  state  authorities  with 
those  applying  on  interstate  traffic  as 
conclusive  of  the  unreasonableness  of 
the  interstate  rates.  Marshall  Oil  Co. 
v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  210, 
213. 

(t)  There  are  many  reasons  why 
state  and  interstate  rates  should  be  es- 
tablished in  harmony  with  one  another. 
When  the  Commission  is  asked  to  ex- 
amine the  reasonableness  of  an  inter- 
state rate,  similar  rates  established  by 
state  authority  in  that  territory  must 
have  great  influence,  especially  where 
they  have  been  long  acquiesced  in  by 
the  carriers.  Still,  these  state  rates 
have  no  binding  force  upon  the  Com- 
mission. They  are  standards  of  compari- 
son of  greater  or  less  value,  according 
as  they  appear  to  be  just  and  reason- 
able. Corn  Belt  Meat  Producers'  Ass'n 
V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  H  I.  C.  C.  376,  385. 

(u)  While  in  determining  interstate 
rates  similar  rates  established  by  state 
authority  must  have  great  influence, 
especially  where  they  have  been  long 
acquiesced  in  by  the  carriers;  still  such 
rates  have  no  binding  force  upon  the 
Commission,  and  where  the  Commission 
finds  state  rates  unreasonable,  a  through 
interstate  rate  may  be  established  by 
it  higher  than  the  sum  of  the  state  lo- 
cals. Corn  Belt  Meat  Producers'  Ass'n 
v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  376, 
385. 

§4.     Attractiveness  of  Traffic. 

(a)  There  is  no  warrant  in  law  for 
the  maintenance  of  a  rate  for  the  pur- 
pose of  restricting  the  movement  of  a 
certain  class  of  traffic  because  it  is 
unattractive  to  carriers.  Indianapolis 
Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  370,  373. 


574 


REASONABLENESS  OP  RATES,  §5    (a)— §6    (c) 


§5.     Capitalization. 

See  Evidence,  §7;  Express  Compa- 
nies, §24;  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission,    §7. 

(a)  The  market  value  of  stock  should 
be  considered  in  fixing  rates,  but  such 
rates  cannot  be  allowed  as-  will  guaran- 
tee the  prices  at  which  the  stock  was 
bought.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — 
Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  260. 

(b)  In  determining  the  reasonable- 
ness of  rates  advanced  by  the  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  the  Commission  holds  that  this 
road  should  be  allowed  to  earn  such 
an  amount  that  the  sum  remaining 
after  the  payment  of  fixed  charges,  in- 
cluding as  a  fixed  charge  the  dividend 
upon  the  preferred  stock,  should  be 
equivalent  to  between  7  and  8  per  cent 
on  the  common  stock.  It  should  have 
sufficient  earnings  so  that  it  may  pay 
a  dividend  of  5  per  cent  upon  its  com- 
mon stock  and  carry  2^^  per  cent  to 
surplus,  or  pay  6  per  cent  upon  its 
common  stock  and  carry  l^/^  per  cent 
to  surplus.  This  is  upon  the  assump- 
tion that  the  capitalization  does  not 
exceed  its  actual  value.  In  Re  Advances 
in  Rates— Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243, 
289. 

(c)  It  is  almost  axiomatic  that  the 
investment  in  an  American  railroad  is 
not  represented  by  its  capitalization. 
The  Commission  cannot  accept  capitali- 
zation as  representing  either  investment 
or  value.  Advances  in  Rates — ^Western 
Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307,  320. 

(d)  There  is  no  relation  between 
capital  and  value  and  there  is  no  rela- 
tion between  stocks  representing 
value  and  bonds  representing  value.  In 
Re  Advances  in  Rates — Western  Case, 
20   I.   C.    C.    307,   335. 

(e)  The  fact  that  a  carrier  has  issued 
watered  stock  cannot  be  urged  on  a 
question  of  reasonableness  of  rates  to 
deny  the  right  of  present  holders  of  said 
stock  to  receive  reasonable  dividends 
thereon.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  410. 

(f)  Defendant  issued  to  its  old  share 
holders  new  shares  of  stock  at  par, 
when  such  stock  was  worth  from  $140  to 
$264  per  share  in  the  market.  HELD,  this 
fact  could  not  be  urged  upon  a  question 
of  reasonableness  of  rates  to  deny  the 
right  of  the  present  holders  of 
such    stock   to    receive   reasonable   divi- 


dends  thereon.      Spokane   v.    N.    P.   Ry. 
Co.,   15   I.   C.   C.   376,   409. 

(g)  Neither  can  the  capital  stock 
of  the  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  be  re- 
duced for  the  purpose  of  determining 
what  its  fair  earnings  should  be  by  the 
amount  of  that  stock  which  was  orig- 
inally issued  without  money  considera- 
tion. City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  376,  408. 

(h)  The  fact  that  a  carrier's  stock 
originally  sold  at  less  than  par  cannot 
be  urged  on  a  question  of  reasonable- 
ness of  rates  to  deny  the  present  hold- 
ers thereof  fair  dividends  therefrom. 
City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.   C.   376,   411. 

(i)  The  Great  Northern  Railway  Co. 
has  in  the  past  distributed  its  stock 
issues  among  its  stockholders  at  par 
from  time  to  time,  although  the  market 
value  of  the  stock  was  often  much 
above  par.  Without  expressing  any 
opinion  upon  the  legality  or  propriety  of 
this  practice,  it  is  held  that  this  fact, 
at  this  time,  can  have  no  bearing  upon 
the  earnings  to  which  that  company  is 
entitled.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  409. 

§6.     Car-mile   or   Train-mile    Revenue. 
See    Evidence,    §8. 

(a)  Car  revenue  is  an  important  ele- 
ment in  determining  the  reasonableness 
of  a  rate.  Merchants  &  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v. 
A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  1.  C.  C.  467,  469. 

(b)  The  earnings  per  car  mile  and 
per  train  mile  of  a  carrier  constitute 
a  much  fairer  basis  for  determining  the 
reasonableness  of  a  rate  than  the  earn- 
ings per  ton  mile.  On  account  of  the 
volume  of  traffic,  the  heavy  load  per 
car  and  the  regularity  of  movement, 
most  of  the  freight  which  pays  the  car- 
rier the  best  is  that  which  yields  the 
lowest  rate  per  ton  mile.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances on  Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C 
C.    604,    620. 

(c)  A  just  and  reasonable  rate  must 
be  one  which  respects  alike  the  carriers' 
deserts  and  the  character  of  the  traffic. 
It  cannot  be  a  rate  which  takes  from 
the  carrier  profit  and  thus  favors  the 
shipper  at  the  carrier's  expense,  nor 
Is  it  one  which  compels  the  shipper  to 
yield  for  the  transportation  given  a 
sum  disproportionate  either  to  the  serv- 
ice given  by  the  carrier  or  to  the 
service    rendered    to    the    shipper.      In 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §6  (d)— §7  (a) 


575 


Re    Advances    on    Coal    to    Lake    Ports, 
22  L  C.  C.  604,  624. 

(d)  The  rate  per  car  per  mile  is  en- 
titled to  be  considered  as  a  relative 
test  in  rate  making.  National  Hay 
Ass'n  V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C. 
34,  47. 

(e)  Car  earnings  of  $44  on  a  40-ton 
car  for  a  one-line  haul  of  113  miles  and 
for  a  50-ton  car  of  $55  seem  excessive 
for  a  commodity  like  coal,  which  can 
move  in  almost  any  kind  of  a  car, 
Rainey  &  Rodgers  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R. 
R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  88,  90. 

(f)  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  earn- 
ings of  from  $24  to  $48  per  car  for  a 
haul  of  some  500  miles  can  be  held  an 
excessive  return  for  the  service  ren- 
dered. Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  359,  360. 

(g)  The  most  satisfactory  comparison 
to  ascertain  whether  relative  injustice 
is  being  done  one  section  against  an- 
other is  through  the  earnings  per  car. 
Ozark  Fruit  Growers'  Ass'n  v.  St.  L.  & 
S.  F.  R.  R.   Co.,   16  L  C.  C.   106,  114. 

§7.     Changed    Circumstances. 

See  Infra,  §28  (q);  Advanced  Rates, 
§7;  Evidence,  §9;  Facilities  and 
Privileges,   §15   (i). 

(a)  In  Burnham-Hanna-Munger  Dry- 
goods  Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  299,  reductions  were  ordered  in 
the  portions  of  the  through  rates  on  the 
first  five  classes  applying  from  the  Mis- 
sissippi River  to  the  Missouri  River 
on  shipments  from  Atlantic  seaboard 
territory  to  Missouri  River  cities.  The 
order  of  the  Commission  was  enjoined 
but  finally  upheld  by  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court  in  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.,  218 
U,  S.  88.  The  rates  prescribed  were 
thereupon  published,  effective  Oct.  26, 
1910.  The  two-year  limit  of  the  Com- 
mission's order  expired  Nov.  10,  1910, 
and  thereupon  defendants  filed  increases 
in  those  rates  restoring  the  rates  which 
had  been  condemned.  .The  proposed  in- 
creases were  suspended,  and  are  in- 
vestigated in  this  proceeding.  In  Docket 
No.  3684  (consolidated  for  hearing)  it 
is  alleged  that  prior  to  the  establish- 
ment of  the  rates  prescribed  in  the 
Burnham-Hanna-Munger  case  defendants 
had  for  many  years  applied  the  same 
rates  between  the  Mississippi  River  and 
the  Missouri  River  upon  all  traffic  mov- 
ing under  the  class  rates  involved  from 


all    territory   east   and   southeast   of   the 
Indiana-Illinois  state  line  to  the  Atlantic 
coast;   that  rates  from  all  of  said  points 
excepting     Atlantic     seaboard     territory 
have  since  Aug.  25,  1908,  been  excessive 
and  unreasonable,  at  least  to  the  extent 
that    they   exceed    the    rates    prescribeo 
by  the   Commission  on   trafiic   from  the 
Atlantic  seaboard  territory,  and  that  rates 
be    established    from    Mississippi    River 
crossings   on    traffic   originating   in   Cen- 
tral   Freight    Association,    southeastern 
and    Carolina    territories,   not   in    excess 
of    those    prescribed    in    the    Burnham- 
Hanna-Munger   case   on   shipments   from 
Atlantic   seaboard   territory.     Reparaivjii 
is   prayed   for  on  shipments  moving  subse- 
quent to  Aug.  25,  1908.    It  appeared  that 
competition    forced    the    making    of    the 
same     rates     from     all     of    the     Missis- 
sippi   River    crossings    to    the    Missouri 
River   cities,    except    Sioux    City,    where 
the  rates  apply  only  through  the  upper 
Mississippi  River  crossings.    It  appeared 
that  the  combination  of  rates  from  At- 
lantic seaboard  territories  to  the  Missis- 
sippi   River    plus    the    rates    prescribed 
in      the      Burnham-Hanna-Munger      case 
make     lower     through     rates     than     the 
present    combinations   from    some    inter- 
mediate points  in  Central  Freight  Asso- 
ciation   territory.      It    is    the    Commis- 
sion's view  expressed  in  former  opinions 
that    higher    differentials    applying    be- 
tween the  Mississippi  and  Missouri  riv- 
ers might  be  maintained  from  Indianap- 
olis   than    from    the    Atlantic    seaboard 
and    the   reduction   in   the   Atlantic   sea- 
board   rate   was    therefore   greater   than 
would    have    been    prescribed    to    apply 
to  all  of  the  territory  east  of  the  Indi- 
ana-Illinois state  line.     Since  its  former 
decision    the    Commission    has    carefully 
investigated     the     question     of    whether 
or  not  there  was  justification  for  general 
advances  in  freight  rates.     Taking  all  of 
the   records  now   available   the   Commis- 
sion   finds    that    defendants    have    to    a 
certain     extent     sustained     the     burden 
of  proof  cast  upon  them  by  the  statute 
with    regard    to    the    advances    in    these 
rates   on   traffic   from  Atlantic   seaboard 
territory,   because   it  now  has  the  ques- 
tion  of   those   rates   before   it   upon   the 
traffic   from  all  of  the  territory  east  of 
the    Indiana-Illinois    state    line.      HELD, 
that  defendants'  through  rates  upon  the 
first   five   classes   to  the   Missouri   River 
cities,   Kansas   City  to   Sioux   City,  both 
inclusive,  and  to  points  taking  the  same 
rates,  from  points  of  origin  east  of  the 


576 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §7  (b)— §8  (1)   (bb) 


Indiana-Illinois  state  line,  commonly 
known  in  traffic  circles  and  described 
in  tariffs  as  trunk  line  territory,  Central 
Freight  Association  territory,  southeast- 
ern territory  and  Carolina  territory,  and 
exclusive  of  points  in  Atlantic  seaboard 
territory,  applying  through  the  Missis- 
sippi River  crossings,  St.  Louis  to  East 
Dubuque,  both  inclusive,  are  unjust  and 
unreasonable,  because  those  portions  of 
the  through  rates  which  apply  from 
those  Mississippi  River  crossings  to  the 
Missouri  River  cities  as  applied  to 
through  shipments  are  unreasonable.  In 
both  cases  defendants  should  be  required 
to  establish  and  maintain  for  a  period 
of  not  less  than  two  years  as  parts  of 
the  through  rates  applying  from  the 
Mississippi  River  crossings  mentioned, 
to  the  Missouri  River  cities  mentioned, 
and  to  points  taking  the  same  rates, 
except  that  to  Sioux  City  and  to  points 
taking  the  same  rates  they  shall  apply 
from  upper  Mississippi  River  crossings. 
East  Burlington  to  East  Dubuque,  in- 
clusive, rates  from  all  the  said  points 
of  origin,  east  of  the  Indiana-Illinois 
state  line,  including  Atlantic  seaboard 
territory,  which  shall  not  exceed  the  fol- 
lowing: 

Class      1       2       3       4       5 

Rate      55     41     32     24     20 

That  on  the  lettered  classes  correspond- 
ing reduction  should  be  made  as  follows: 

Class     A      B      C      D      E 

Rate      22     18     15     12     10 

That  considering  the  Commission  is  pre- 
scribing what  may  well  be  considered  a 
new  rate  adjustment  for  a  large  terri- 
tory and  an  enormous  volume  of  traffic, 
reparation  should  be  denied.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances in  Rates  by  Carriers  Operating 
Between  the  Mississippi  and  Missouri 
Rivers,  21   L   C.   C.  546,   555,   557. 

(b)  A  rate  reasonable  as  of  to-day 
may  have  been  unreasonable  in  the  past 
or  may  become  unreasonable  in  the  fu- 
ture. It  is  not  necessarily  required  by 
the  law  that  the  rate  found  to  be  un- 
reasonable at  the  time  of  complaint 
shall  be  prescribed  for  the  future,  or  that 
a  rate  for  the  future  must  as  a  pre- 
requisite to  reparation  be  prescribed. 
Steinfeld  &  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I. 
C.  C.  12,  14. 

(c)  A  rate  may  be  reasonable  when 
established  but  may  become  unreason- 
able by  virtue  of  changed  circumstances. 
Anadarko  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  43,  50;  Riverside 
Mills  V.  G.  R.  R.,  20  I.  C.  C.  423,  425. 


(d)  Rates  reasonable  at  the  present 
time  may  within  the  period  of  two  years 
become  very  unreasonable  by  reason 
of  changes  in  circumstances  and  con- 
ditions, economic  transportation  or  the 
like.  It  should  be  just  as  apparent  that 
a  rate  which  was  unreasonable  two 
years  or  more  ago  may  become  reason- 
able by  reason  of  such  changes  in  con- 
ditions. National  Hay  Ass'n  v.  M.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  34,  37. 

(e)  Where  present  transportation 
conditions  are  likejy  to  change,  the  Com- 
mission may  take  this  fact  into  con- 
sideration in  adjusting  rates.  Florida 
Fruit  &  Vegetable  Shippers'  Protective 
Ass'n  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C. 
476,    488. 

§8.     Competition. 

See   Competition. 
§8.     (1)     In  General. 

(a)  Competition  of  controlling  force 
cannot  be  ignored  by  the  Commission  In 
determining  whether  an  advantage  In 
rate  at  the  competitive  points  is  undue 
or  is  one  not  chargeable  to  the  carriers 
defendant  because  involuntarily  made. 
Sioux  City  Terminal  Elevator  Co.  v.  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  98,  107. 

(b)  In  establishing  reasonable  rates 
distance  is  a  factor  always  to  be  consid- 
ered, and  is  sometimes  controlling,  but 
established  commercial  conditions,  com- 
petition of  water  carriers  and  competi- 
tion between  railroads  with  termini  at 
different  points  may  make  it  imprac- 
ticable to  consider  a  situation  from  the 
standpoint  of  distance  alone.  Indian- 
apolis Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  195,  205. 

(bb)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
on  salt  from  the  Kansas  salt  field, 
of  which  Hutchinson  is  the  center,  of 
13^/^0  to  St.  Louis  as  a  typical  point  and 
of  15c  from  this  field  to  Keokuk  and 
Fort  Madison,  Mississippi  River  points 
north  of  St.  Louis,  and  of  18c  to  Burling- 
ton, Davenport,  Clinton  and  Dubuque, 
also  Mississippi  River  points  north  of 
St.  Louis,  as  unreasonable  per  se  and 
unjustly  discriminatory  in  favor  of  the 
Michigan  salt  field,  from  which,  taking 
Detroit  as  a  typical  point,  the  rates  to 
St.  Louis  were  ll^/^c  on  package  salt 
with  a  10c  proportional  on  salt  destined 
beyond,  and  9c  upon  bulk  salt.  The 
Michigan  field  covers  the  entire  lower 
peninsula  of  the  state  of  Michigan.     As 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §S  (1)   (bb) 


577 


to  these  competing  fields  the  debatable 
ground  lay  between  the  Mississippi  and 
the  Missouri  rivers.  The  cost  of  produc- 
ing salt  in  the  two  fields  was  substan- 
tially the  same,  as  was  also  the  quality. 
Whether,  therefore,  this  debatable  terri- 
tory should  be  supplied  from  Kansas  or 
Michigan  depended  mainly  upon  the  rate 
of  transportation.  Salt  loads  heavily,  is 
not  liable  to  loss  or  damage  in  transit, 
can  be  handled  at  the  convenience  of 
the  carrier,  affords  a  uniform  business, 
and  is  therefore  desirable  from  a  trans- 
portation standpoint.  The  13l^c  rate 
from  the  Kansas  field  to  St.  Louis  yielded 
only  5  mills  per  ton  mile.  The  salt  rate 
established  by  the  Missouri  and  Kansas 
state  commissions  for  a  distance  of  400 
miles  was  15i^c.  The  distance  from 
Hutchinson  to  Dubuque  is  610  miles  as 
compared  with  500  miles  to  St.  Louis. 
The  Michigan  salt  producing  points  in 
question  are  located  mainly  upon  water. 
The  distance  from  a  typical  Michigan 
point  to  Milwaukee  is  100  miles,  and  to 
Chicago  150  miles.  About  eighty  or 
ninety  per  cent  of  the  salt  from  the  Mich- 
igan field  moved  by  water  and  took  a 
rate  of  2  l-3c  to  Milwaukee  and  Chicago. 
The  Wabash  R.  R.  transported  salt  from 
Detroit  to  St.  Louis  and  from  Kansas 
City  to  St.  Louis,  but  does  not  extend 
to  the  Kansas  salt  field.  It  was  obliged 
to  meet  this  2  l-3c  rate  for  the  haul  from 
Detroit  to  Chicago.  Competition  on  traf- 
fic from  Chicago  to  St.  Louis,  278  miles, 
is  very  keen,  and  the  rate  on  salt  to  East 
St.  Louis  from  Chicago  was  for  a  long 
time  6  2-3c  per  100  lbs.,  and  at  the  time 
of  the  hearing  was  9c  beyond  in  pack- 
age and  in  bulk.  It  was,  therefore,  im- 
possible for  the  Wabash  R.  R.  to  main- 
tain a  rate  lower  than  11  l-3c  from  Chi- 
cago and  Detroit  to  St.  Louis.  While  the 
rate  from  Detroit  to  St.  Louis  was  less 
than  from  Hutchinson,  although  the  dis- 
tance is  the  same,  the  general  level  of 
rates  in  the  territory  east  of  St.  Louis  is 
much  lower  than  that  in  the  territory  of 
the  west;  the  first-class  rate  from  Hutch- 
inson to  St.  Louis  is  $1,191/4,  while  that 
from  Detroit  is  4Gc.  Defendant  Wabash 
R.  R.  could  only  engage  in  the  transpor- 
tations from  the  Kansas  fields  in  con- 
nection with  some  line  operating  to  Kan- 
sas City  from  such  field.  It  could  reduce 
the  rate  from  the  Kansas  field  to  St. 
Louis  only  by  sacrificing  its  own  revenue 
from  Kansas  City  to  St.  Louis.  The  rate 
in  effect  to  the  Missouri  River  from  the 
Kansas  field  was   10c.   and  the  Wabash 


R.  R.,  in  order  to  make  a  rate  of  ll^c  to 
St.  Louis,  would  be  compelled  to  accept 
its  haul  from  Kansas  City  to  St.  Louis  at 
a  compensation  of  l^/^c  per  100  lbs.  The 
distance  from  Kansas  City  and  Chicago 
to  St.  Louis,  respectively,  is  the  same. 
To  bring  about  the  result  demanded  the 
Wabash  R.  R.  would  be  compelled  to 
name  a  rate  from  Kansas  City,  7  2-3c 
lower  than  that  from  Chicago,  although 
upon  every  consideration  the  Chicago 
rate  should  be  the  lower.  From  Hutchin- 
son to  Dubuque,  the  most  northerly  of 
the  Mississippi  crossings  in  controversy, 
is  610  miles,  while  the  distance  from  Chi- 
cago to  that  crossing  is  but  172  miles. 
The  rates  from  the  Kansas  fields  in  ques- 
tion increased  from  13i^c  at  St.  Louis 
to  18i/4c  at  Dubuque,  while  those  from 
the  Michigan  fields  were  13i^c  to  all 
Mississippi  River  crossings  north  of  St. 
Louis.  Under  the  adjustment  attacked 
the  rates  from  Michigan  in  all  cases 
were  less  from  the  Mississippi  River  than 
from  Kansas.  Soon  after  crossing  that 
river  a  point  is  reached  where  the  rate 
from  the  two  fields  became  the  same. 
And  this  relation  was  continued  west, 
producing  a  blanket  of  considerable  ex- 
tent, beyond  which  the  rate  was  in  favor 
of  Kansas.  HELD,  that  the  13i^c  rate 
from  the  Kansas  field  to  St.  Louis  and 
the  rates  complained  of  to  the  upper  Miss- 
issippi River  crossings  from  the  Kansas 
fields  were  not  unreasonable  per  se;  that 
the  disparity  in  rates  complained  of  be- 
tween the  Michigan  and  Kansas  fields 
was  not  improper;  and  that  the  Wabash 
R.  R.,  in  view  of  the  water  competition 
met  with  in  shipments  from  Detroit,  was 
not  obliged  to  reduce  the  small  compen- 
sation derived  by  it  for  the  haul  from  Kan- 
sas City  to  St.  Louis  in  order  to  overcome 
the  disadvantage  suffered  by  the  Kan- 
sas field;  that  the  9c  rate  upon  bulk  salt 
from  Detroit  to  St.  Louis,  not  being  forced 
by  legitimate  competition,  resulted  in  un- 
due discrimination  and  the  Wabash  R.  R. 
should  either  join  in  establishing  a  corre- 
sponding rate  from  the  Kansas  field  or 
should  advance  its  rate  from  Detroit; 
and  that  in  view  of  the  longer  distances 
from  Hutchinson  to  the  more  northerly 
of  the  Mississippi  River  crossings  as 
compared  with  the  distances  from  De- 
troit to  these  crossings,  the  higher  rates 
"rom  the  Kansas  fields  were  not  unjustly 
iiscriminatory  against  it.  R.  R.  Commis- 
sioners of  Kansas  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  407. 


578 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §8  (1)    (c)— (cc) 


(c)  A  competitive  rate  to  one  point 
Is  not  a  measure  of  the  rate  to  a  non- 
competitive point.  Georgetown  Ry.  & 
Light  Co.  V.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C. 
C.   144. 

(cc)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
from  New  York,  Philadelphia  and  Balti- 
more to  Bluefield,  W.  Va.,  as  unreason- 
able per  se,  and  those  from  Cincinnati, 
Columbus,  Chicago  and  Pittsburgh  to 
Bluefield  as  unreasonable  per  se,  and 
also  in  violation  of  the  fourth  section. 
Defendant  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  runs  from 
Cincinnati  and  Columbus  to  Portsmouth, 
O.,  where  it  unites  and  proceeds  easterly, 
crossing  the  Ohio  River  at  Kenova  and 
extending  through  Roanoke  and  Lynch- 
burg to  Norfolk.  The  distance  from 
Columbus  or  Cincinnati  to  Norfolk  is 
about  700  miles.  Bluefield  is  upon  the 
main  line,  205  miles  east  of  Kenova,  and 
105  miles  west  of  Roanoke.  Rates  from 
Cincinnati,  Columbus,  Chicago  and  Pitts- 
burgh to  Roanoke  and  all  i>oints  upon  the 
N.  &  W.  Ry.  east  of  Roanoke  were  the 
same.  Selecting  the  first-class  rates  as 
typical,  the  relative  rates  from  the  points 
of  origin  in  question  to  Bluefield  and 
Roanoke  were  as  follows:  From  Colum- 
bus to  Bluefield  and  Roanoke,  66i/^c  and 
54^c,  respectively;  from  Cincinnati  to 
these  points,  68c  and  62c,  respectively; 
from  Chicago,  84c  and  72c;  from  Pitts- 
burgh, 86^^c  and  54l^c.  The  rates  on  grain 
and  grain  products  from  Columbus  were, 
to  Bluefield,  nV2C  and  18c,  respectively; 
to  Roanoke,  12i/^c  and  13c,  respectively; 
from  Cincinnati  to  Bluefield,  19c  and 
19V^c,  respectively;  from  Cincinnati  to 
Roanoke,  14c  and  14  ^/^c;  from  Chicago  to 
Bluefield  they  were  18c  and  18.7c,  respect- 
ively; and  from  Chicago  to  Roanoke,  13c 
and  13.7c,  respectively.  Although  Blue- 
field  is  105  miles  nearer  these  points  of 
origin,  and  the  traflic  in  all  cases  passed 
through  Bluefield,  the  rates  to  Bluefield 
were  uniformly  higher  than  to  Roanoke. 
Defendant  N.  &  W.  Ry.  attempted  to  jus- 
tify the  higher  rate  to  Bluefield  by  show- 
ing that  the  rate  to  Roanoke  was  com- 
pelled by  competitive  conditions,  and  was 
lower  than  would  otherwise  be  reason- 
able; and  the  higher  rate  to  Bluefield 
was  reasonable  per  se.  The  rates  from 
the  points  of  origin  in  question  to 
Roanoke  were  influenced  by  the  active 
competition  between  carriers  hauling 
traflic  to  seaboard  points.  Richmond, 
Lynchburg,  Norfolk  and  other  Virginia 
cities  wholesaled  into  surrounding  terri- 
tory in  competition  with  Baltimore.    The 


B.  &  O.  R.  R.  serving  Baltimore  as  a 
jobbing  center  was  in  competition  with 
the  C.  &  O.  R.  R.  serving  these  Virginia 
cities  as  competing  jobbing  centers.  As 
a  result  of  this  competition  the  rates  to 
these  Virginia  cities  were  lower  than 
they  might  otherwise  have  been.  De- 
fendant N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  upon  entering 
into  the  field  was  obliged  to  meet  the 
rates  in  effect  to  these  Virginia  cities 
from  the  points  of  origin  in  question. 
Prior  to  its  acquisition  by  the  N.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  the  Shenandoah  Valley  R.  R., 
extending  from  Hagerstown  to  Roanoke, 
formed  a  connection  with  the  C.  &  O. 
R.  R.,  and  named  a  rate  to  Roanoke 
which  would  enable  that  city  to  compete 
as  a  jobbing  center  with  Baltimore. 
When,  in  1890,  the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  obtained 
control  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley  R.  R., 
and  thereby  eliminated  all  competition 
by  rail  at  Roanoke,  it  did  not  advance 
the  rates  to  Roanoke,  but  left  them  the 
same  as  those  established  by  competition 
from  the  points  of  origin  in  question  to 
the  Virginia  cities  east  of  Roanoke.  The 
N.  &  W.  Ry.  continued  to  maintain  the 
low  rates  to  Roanoke  for  the  further 
reason  that  it  was  to  its  interest,  since 
it  exclusively  served  that  city,  to  build  it 
up  as  a  jobbing  center  in  competition 
with  Lynchburg,  which  latter  city  it 
served  only  in  rivalry  with  the  C.  &  O. 
R.  R.  In  1909  the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  met  com- 
petition at  Roanoke  with  the  Virginian 
Ry.  running  from  Deepwater  to  Norfolk, 
and  making  a  connection  with  the  C.  & 
O.  R.  R.  at  Deepwater.  On  the  question 
as  to  whether  the  competitive  influences 
at  Roanoke  reduced  the  rates  to  that 
point  below  what  would  otherwise  be  rea- 
sonable, it  appeared  that  the  distance 
from  Kenova  to  Roanoke  was  310  miles; 
that  the  class  rates  from  Kenova  to 
Roanoke  for  the  flrst  six  classes,  respect- 
ively, were  54i^c,  47c,  SBVzC,  24c,  20c 
and  16c,  and  the  rates  on  grain  and  grain 
products,  12i^c  and  13c,  respectively. 
The  same  rates  were  in  effect  from 
Columbus  to  Roanoke.  If  it  should  be 
held  proper  to  construct  these  rates  by 
combination  upon  the  Ohio  River,  and  if 
the  mileage  scale  of  the  N.  &  W.  Ry., 
which  was  lower  than  that  in  effect  upon 
most  southern  lines,  should  be  applied, 
the  rates  mentioned  to  Roanoke  were 
lower  than  would  otherwise  be  proper. 
It  appeared,  however,  that  taking  into 
view  the  immense  tonnage  of  the  N.  & 
W.  Ry.,  the  average  miles  operated,  the 
freight    density,    passenger    density    and 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §8  (1)   (cc) 


579 


other  traffic  and  financial  elements,  the 
N.  &  W.  Ry.  was  fully  as  strong  as  the 
C.  &  O.  R.  R.  or  the  B.  &  O.  R.  R., 
stronger  than  the  average  of  railroads 
in  the  middle  west,  and  was  very  much 
above  the  railroads  in  West  Virginia, 
Virginia  and  the  Carolinas.  The  heavy 
tonnage  per  mile  and  the  satisfactory 
earnings  of  the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  as  compared 
with  the  other  groups  of  railroads  men- 
tioned were  computed,  not  upon  its  main 
line  mileage,  but  upon  the  entire  mileage 
of  the  whole  system.  The  N.  &  W.  Ry. 
largely  originated  the  enormous  tonnage 
which  it  handled,  and  while  its  course 
was  in  a  large  part  through  southern 
territory,  the  road  itself  as  a  system  was 
rather  to  be  compared  with  those  in 
Trunk  Line  and  Central  Freight  Associa- 
tion territory.  That  part  of  its  business 
moving  under  class  rates,  however,  was 
rather  small  as  compared  with  other 
roads  which  made  a  traffic  and  financial 
showing  comparable  with  the  N.  &  W. 
Ry.,  since  a  large  part  of  its  traffic  was 
coal  and  coke  and  other  low-grade 
freight.  The  distance  from  Columbus  to 
Roanoke  is  449  miles,  and  from  Cincin- 
nati, 456  miles.  The  rates  from  Colum- 
bus and  Cincinnati,  respectively,  to 
Roanoke  were  54i/^c  and  62c.  Ftom  Chi- 
cago to  Kenova,  the  distance  is  431  miles, 
the  first-class  rate,  45c,  and  the  grain 
rate,  10c,  the  class  rates  being  estab- 
lished upon  the  regular  Central  Freight 
Association  territory  mileage  scale. 
From  New  York  to  Pittsburgh,  440  miles, 
the  first-class  rate  was  45c,  and  the  rate 
on  grain  and  grain  products,  15c.  The 
rates  mentioned  from  Cincinnati  to 
Roanoke  were  therefore  distinctly  too 
high  when  tested  by  those  prevailing  in 
territory  where  operating  conditions, 
earnings,  etc.,  were  substantially  the 
same  as  upon  the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  The  dis- 
tance from  Chicago  to  Roanoke  is  741 
miles.  The  first-class  rate  from  Chicago 
to  Cincinnati  was  40c,  the  grain  rate, 
10c,  In  this  opinion  the  Commission 
found  the  rates  attacked  'from  both  Cin- 
cinnati and  Columbus  to  Bluefield  un- 
reasonable and  prescribed  lower  rates. 
With  respect  to  the  first-class  rate  from 
Chicago  to  Bluefield,  which  was  84c,  it 
appeared  that  this  rate  was  about  10c 
less  than  the  contbination  rate  from  Chi- 
cago to  Bluefield  made  up  of  the  40c 
charge  from  Chicago  to  Cincinnati  plus 
the  541/^c  rate  from  Cincinnati  to  Blue- 
field  prescribed  in  the  opinion  as  a  fu- 
ture rate.     It  further  appeared  that  the 


first-class  rate  attacked  from  Chicago  to 
Bluefield,  84c,  was  a  blanket  rate  cover- 
ing some  five  or  six  hundred  stations  on 
the  N.  &  W.  Ry.  between  Kenova  and 
Roanoke,  and  that  this  rate  was  higher 
than  that  to  the  Virginia  cities  by  an 
arbitrary  of  12c.  The  first-class  rates 
from  New  York,  Philadelphia  and  Balti- 
more to  Bluefield  were  99i/^c,  91^/^0  and 
861/^c,  respectively,  and  from  these  cities 
to  Roanoke  were  68c,  63c  and  58c,  re- 
spectively. The  rates  from  New  York  to 
Bluefield  exceeded  those  from  New  York 
to  Roanoke  by  differentials  of  31^c,  25c, 
14l^c,  14c,  12c  and  7c  for  the  first  six 
classes,  respectively,  and  the  differentials 
in  case  of  Philadelphia  and  Baltimore 
were  substantially  the  same,  whereas  in 
the  rates  from  Hagerstown  to  Bluefield 
and  Roanoke,  the  differentials  of  Blue- 
field  over  Roanoke  were  only  13V^c,  9c, 
6^^c,  8c,  7c  and  6c  for  the  first  six  classes 
respectively.  The  rates  from  Hagers- 
town to  Roanoke  and  Bluefield  were  not 
influenced  by  any  competitive  conditions. 
For  the  distance  from  Hagerstown  to 
Roanoke,  240  miles,  the  rates  in  effect 
were  normal.  Defendant  N.  &  W.  Ry. 
was  unable  to  explain  why  the  first-class 
rate  from  New  York  to  Bluefield  ex- 
ceeded that  to  Roanoke  by  Sli/^c,  whereas, 
in  case  of  Hagerstown,  the  difference  was 
but  131/^c.  The  distances  from  New  York, 
Philadelphia  and  Baltimore  to  Bluefield 
were,  respectively,  613,  523  and  408  miles. 
HELD,  that  competitive  conditions  ex- 
isted at  Roanoke  which  did  not  obtain 
at  Bluefield,  and  which  compelled  the 
maintenance  to  Roanoke  of  the  rates  at- 
tacked from  the  western  points  of  origin; 
that  the  rates  in  effect  from  both  Cin- 
cinnati and  Columbus  to  Roanoke  were 
lower  than  they  might  reasonably  be, 
were  it  not  for  the  competition  which 
induced  them;  that  the  class  rates  in 
effect,  beginning  with  72c,  first  class,  and 
the  grain  and  grain-product  rates,  13c 
and  13.7c,  respectively,  from  Chicago  to 
Roanoke  were  lower  than  they  might 
properly  be,  and  that  the  same  conclu- 
sion must  follow  as  to  the  rates  from 
Pittsburgh  on  traffic  moving  to  Roanoke 
via  Columbus  and  Kenova;  that  the  rates 
from  both  Cincinnati  and  Columbus  to 
Bluefield  were  unjust  and  unreasonable 
and  should  not  exceed  54i/^c,  47c,  35i/^c, 
24c,  20c  and  16c,  for  the  first  six  classes 
respectively,  and  the  rates  on  grain  and 
grain  products,  respectively,  should  not 
exceed  12^ c  and  13c;  that  the  first-class 
rate  from  Chicago  to  Bluefield,  84c,  was 


583 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §8  (1)    (d)  — (p) 


not  excessive;  that  the  class  rates  from 
Pittsburgh  to  Bluefield  were  excessive  and 
should  not  exceed  79c,  68c,  53c,  35c,  29c 
and  22c  for  the  first  six  classes  respect- 
ively; and  that  the  rates  upon  iron  ar- 
ticles, classified  as  fourth,  fifth  and  sixth 
class,  of  31c,  26c  and  21c,  respectively, 
from  Pittsburgh  to  Bluefield  were  not  ex- 
cessive; that  higher  rates  might  be 
charged  at  intermediate  points  than  to 
Roanoke  and  points  east,  from  Pittsburgh, 
Columbus,  Cincinnati,  Chicago  and  kin- 
dred points,  so  long  as  the  present  rates 
from  those  points  to  Roanoke  and  points 
beyond  did  not  exceed  those  in  effect  at 
the  time  of  the  hearing,  and  provided 
that  no  higher  rates  were  charged  at 
Bluefield  and  points  to  the  west  than 
those  found  to  be  reasonable  from  Cin- 
cinnati, Columbus  and  Pittsburgh;  and 
that  the  rates  attacked  from  New  York, 
Philadelphia  and  Baltimore,  via  Hagers- 
town,  to  Bluefield,  were  unjust  and  un- 
reasonable, and  should  not  exceed  81i/^c, 
76^c  and  Tl^/^c,  respectively,  for  first 
class,  the  other  classes  to  be  reduced  in 
proportion.  Bluefield  Shippers'  Ass'n  v. 
N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  519. 

(d)  The  fact  that  rail  carriers  are 
able  to  participate  under  their  estab- 
lished rates  in  competition  with  a  line 
of  steamers,  tends  to  prove  that  the 
rail  rates  are  reasonable.  Florida  Mer- 
cantile Agency  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
C.  85. 

(dd)  A  less-distant  junction  point 
served  by  an  additional  carrier  seems 
entitled  to  a  lower  rate.  Gamble-Robin- 
son Commission  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  114,  115. 

(e)  Competition  is  an  important  ele- 
ment in  determining  reasonableness  of 
rate.  Corporation  Commission  of  N.  C. 
V.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  303,  309. 

(f)  The  reasonableness  of  a  rate 
from  a  non-competitive  point  is  not 
measured  by  a  rate  from  competitive 
points.  Florida  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  C.  of 
G.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  336,  339. 

(g)  Rates  to  local  points  must  be  de- 
termined independent  of  comparisons 
with  competitive  points.  Rainey  &  Rog- 
ers V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C. 
C.  88,   89. 

(h)  Competition  has  a  more  or  less 
definite  relation  to  the  rate  that  carrier 
may  reasonably  demand.     Memphis  Cot- 


ton  Oil  Co.  V.   I.   C.   R.  R.   Co.,  17   I.   C. 
C.  313,  318. 

(i)  While  a  carrier  may  establish  a 
lower  rate  to  meet  competitive  condi- 
tions and  the  Commission  takes  into 
account  such  conditions  in  passing  upon 
the  reasonableness  of  the  rate  adjust- 
ment, it  does  not  follow  that  in  a  par- 
ticular instance  the  Commission  will 
condemn  an  advance  of  a  rate  which 
was  formerly  maintained  to  meet  com- 
petition between  different  producing 
points.  Florida  Fruit  &  Vegetable  Ass'n 
v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  552, 
558. 

(j)  A  carrier  may,  for  competitive 
reasons,  voluntarily  do  things  which  it 
may  not  lawfully  be  compelled  to  do. 
Swift  &  Co.  V.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.  C.  426,  428. 

(k)  There  is  no  principle  of  law  that 
requires  a  carrier  to  be  content  with 
half  the  traffic  or  that  forbids  it  to  adjust 
its  rates  so  as  to  fight  for  the  whole  the 
moment  it  feels  the  effect  of  its  competi- 
tors' rates.  Bulte  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  &  A. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  351,  359. 

(1)  A  carrier  may  voluntarily  make, 
under  the  force  of  controlling  competi- 
tion, rates  which  it  might  not  be  re- 
quired to  make.  Indianapolis  Freight 
Bureau  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  507, 
576. 

(m)  While  the  law  permits  carriers 
to  make  and  maintain  a  low  rate  under 
stress  of  competition,  there  is  no  law  re- 
quiring the  carriers  to  make  such  a  rate. 
Oregon  &  Washington  Lumber  Mfrs. 
Ass'n  V.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  1,  14. 

(n)  The  rate  to  Nashville  is  forced 
by  competitive  conditions  not  existing  at 
Gallatin,  and  cannot  be  taken  as  stand- 
ard by  which  to  measure  the  Gallatin 
rate.  Flint  &  Walling  Mfg.  Co.  v.  G.  R. 
&  I.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  520. 

(o)  Where,,  owing  to  competition,  a 
rate  is  unnecessarily  low  it  affords  no 
basis  for  comparison.  Flint  &  Walling 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  G.  R.  &  L  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  520. 

(p)  A  carrier  may  in  its  own  interest, 
if  it  so  desires,  carry  for  a  longer  dis- 
tance over  its  own  line  than  would  be 
necessary  if  carried  between  the  same 
points  over  the  line  of  its  competitors,  in 
order  to  obtain  a  portion  of  the  compet- 
itive  business   upon   terms   that  will  af- 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §8  (2)   (a)— §8  (3)   (c) 


581 


ford  some  profit.  It  does  not  necessa- 
rily follow,  however,  that  a  carrier  not 
competing  for  trafl!ic  in  this  way  thereby 
subjects  itself  to  an  order  compelling  it 
to  do  so.  Hydraulic  Press  Brick  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  342, 
347. 

§8.     (2)      Railroad    Competition. 

(a)  Carriers  in  fixing  their  own 
rates  may  take  into  account  competition 
with  other  carriers,  provided  only  that 
the  competition  is  genuine  and  not  a  pre- 
tense. I.  C.  C.  V.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  209 
U.  S.  108,  119.  28  Sup.  Ct.  493,  52  L.  ed. 
705. 

(b)  Most  of  the  great  systems  in  Of- 
ficial Classification  territory  have  ex- 
isted in  substantially  their  present  form 
for  the  past  twenty-five  years.  Orig- 
inally there  was  the  most  active  com- 
petition in  the  rate  of  transportation 
by  rail,  and  the  tariffs  in  Oflicial  Classi- 
fication territory  are  largely  the  product 
of  that  competition.  There  is  a  strong 
presumption  that  rates  so  arrived  at  are 
reasonable  rates.  In  Re  Advances  in 
Rates— Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243, 
259. 

(c)  Rate  wars  were  unreasonable 
and  their  results  cannot  be  used  as 
measure  of  reasonableness.  Morgan 
Grain  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.   460,   463. 

(d)  Between  Feb.  1,  1909,  and  June 
2,  1909,  complainant  shipped  less-than- 
carloads  of  harness  leather,  in  boxes, 
rolls  and  bundles,  from  San  Francisco 
and  other  California  points  to  Denver, 
and  was  charged  $1.25  per  100  lbs.  For 
a  number  of  years  prior  to  Jan.  1,  1909, 
the  rate  was  $1.05,  and  on  June  6,  1909, 
it  was  reduced  from  $1.25  to  $1.15.  De- 
fendant showed  that  the  reduction  was 
made  in  order  to  enable  producers  In 
Kentucky,  Michigan,  Ohio  and  other 
states  to  compete.  The  $1.25  rate  at- 
tacked was  as  low  or  lower  than  rates 
generally  on  the  same  traffic  for  less 
distances  and  over  routes  involving 
greater  transportation  difficulties.  HELD, 
the  rate  attacked  having  been  decreased 
in  order  to  meet  competition,  it  was  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable.  Wilson  Sad- 
dlery Co.  V.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C 
220.  221. 

(e)  Existence  of  competition  at  a 
farther  distant  point  does  not  excuse 
the  unreasonableness  per  se  of  a  higher 


rate.     Southern   Timber   &   Land   Co.   v. 
S.   P.   Co.,   18   I.   C.  C.   232. 

(f)  On  a  carload  of  empty  beer  kegs 
from  Frontenac,  Kan.,  to  Chicago,  a 
rate  of  17i^c  was  imposed.  Prior  to 
shipment  a  rate  of  lie  had  been  in 
effect,  caused  by  severe  competition  of 
carriers  and  markets.  At  the  time  of 
the  movement  rates  upon  empty  kegs 
had  been  generally  advanced,  and  no 
competitive  reason  existed  requiring  a 
rate  lower  than  17i^c.  HELD,  the  rate 
charged  was  not  unreasonable.  Com- 
plaint dismissed.  Schoenliofen  Brev-int^ 
Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
329. 

(g)  A  carrier  may  voluntarily  make, 
mder  the  force  of  controlling  competi- 
tion, rates  which  it  might  not  be  required 
.0  make.  Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  567,  576. 

§8.      (3)      Rail-and-Water  Competition. 

(a)  The  rates  upon  grain  and  grain 
products  between  points  of  production  in 
the  West  and  the  Atlantic  seaboard  are 
low  in  proportion  to  other  commodities. 
A  rate  of  16c  per  100  lbs.  from  Chicago 
to  New  York  yields  a  ton-mile  revenue 
of  about  3.5  mills.  These  low  rates  are 
due  partly  to  water  competition  and 
partly  to  severe  rail  competition  in  th3 
past,  which  has  produced  a  low  level  of 
rates.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  for  the 
Transportation  of  Flaxseed  in  Carloads, 
23   I.   C.   C.   272,   275. 

(b)  Where  at  one  point  water  and 
rail  competition  exists  to  an  •  extent  not 
present  at  another  point  the  conditions 
are  so  dissimilar  that  the  rates  to  the 
former  are  not  necessarily  a  measure  of 
a  reasonable  rate  to  the  latter.  George- 
town Railway  &  Light  Co.  v.  N  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  144. 

(c)  Complainant  alleged  that  the 
rate  for  the  transportation  of  coal  from 
the  Pocahontas  district,  in  West  Vir- 
ginia, to  Georgetown,  S.  C.  ($2.40),  as 
against  the  rate  to  points  further  frora 
the  Pocahontas  district  (to  Charlcsion, 
S.  C,  $2.15;  to  Port  Royal,  S.  C,  and  to 
Savannah,  Ga.,  $2.40,  and  to  Jackson- 
ville, Fla.,  $2.75),  subjected  it  to  undue 
prejudice.  The  evidence  disclosed  that 
the  defendant  had  to  meet  water  and 
rail  competition  at  Charleston.  HELD, 
on  account  of  water  and  rail  competi- 
tion at  Charleston  the  circumstances 
and  conditions  surrounding  the  carriage 


582 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §8  (4)    (a)— (j) 


of  traffic  to  the  two  points  are  so  (lis- 
similar  that  the  rate  to  Charleston  is 
not  necessarily  the  measure  of  a  rea- 
sonable rate  to  Georgetown,  and  the 
existence  of  a  higher  rate  to  Goorge- 
town  than  to  Charleston  is  not  of  itself 
proof  of  undue  preference  at  the  latter 
point.  Complaint  dismissed.  George- 
town Ry.  &  Light  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  144,  146. 

§8.     (4)     Water    Competition. 
See  Evidence,  §14  (5). 

(a)  The  fact  that  there  is  a  water 
route  from  a  given  point  to  a  certain 
destination  affording  a  low  and  reason- 
able rate  does  not  justify  the  Commis- 
sion in  permitting  the  rail  carriers  to 
charge  a  high  and  unreasonable  rate 
on  traffic  between  these  points.  S.  P. 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  219  U.  S.  433,  451,  31 
Sup.  Ct.  288,  55  L.  ed.  283. 

(b)  Ocean  competition,  as  well  as 
circumstances  and  conditions  beyond 
the  seaboard,  are  to  be  considered  in 
determining  whether  differences  in  rates 
as  between  foreign  and  domestic  trattiv. 
are  unreasonable  or  unduly  discrimina- 
tory. Chamber  of  Commerce  of  New- 
port News  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C. 
345,  355. 

(c)  A  water-compelled  rate  is  not 
the  measure  of  a  normal  all-rail  rate. 
Cohen  &  Co.  v.  Mallory  Steamship  Co., 
23  L   C.   C.   374,   377. 

(d)  Complainant  shipped  rough  mar- 
ble, in  carloads,  from  New  York  City  to 
San  Francisco,  Cal.,  via  Galveston,  Tex.. 
a  distance  of  4,349  miles,  under  a  rate 
of  95c  per  100  lbs.  Between  the  same 
points  a  rate  of  55c  per  100  lbs.  applied 
on  rough  stone,  which  is,  however,  a 
much  cheaper  commodity.  The  stone 
rate  was  put  in  to  meet  the  water  com- 
petition via  Cape  Horn,  but  the  car- 
riers, on  account  of  the  greater  value 
of  marble,  did  not  care  to  meet  the 
competitive  rates  by  the  water  carriers 
on  that  commodity.  HELD,  the  exist- 
ence of  competition  by  water  carriers 
is  not  of  itself  a  ground  upon  which  a 
shipper  may  demand  a  lower  rate  by 
rail.  It  is  the  privilege  of  a  carrier  in 
its  own  interest  to  meet  such  competi- 
tion, but  it  is  not  the  privilege  of  a 
shipper  to  demand  less  than  normal 
rates  because  of  the  existence  of  a 
competition  which  the  carrier  in  its 
own  behalf  does  not  choose  to  meet.  It 
is    also    a   well-settled    principle   that   a 


water-compelled  rate  is  not  a  measure 
of  a  normal  all-rail  rate;  the  95c  is  not 
unreasonable,  and  the  complaint  must  be 
dismissed.  Cohen  v.  Mallory  Steamship 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  374,  377. 

(e)  Lower  rates  which  are  forced  by 
water  competition  cannot  be  accepted  as 
a  measure  of  reasonableness  of  rates 
from  points  where  such  competition  does 
not  exist.  South  Atlantic  Waste  Co.  v. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  293,  296. 

(ee)  Complainants  shipped  a  carload 
of  soap  from  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Nogales, 
Ariz.  Defendants  at  the  time  shipment 
moved  recognized  water  competition.  A 
combination  which  was  used  aggregated 
$1.10.  The  rate  before  and  after  the 
shipment  was  $1.10  and  defendants  at- 
tempted to  establish  $1.10  as  the  legal 
rate  at  the  time  of  the  shipment,  but 
the  rate  was  not  effective  for  failure  to 
give  statutory  notice;  $1.22  per  hun- 
dred pounds  was  exacted,  which  was  the 
legal  rate  in  effect  at  that  time.  HELD, 
carriers  may  meet  water  competition  in 
their  own  interest,  and  when  they  choose 
to  regard  it  a  shipper  should  receive  the 
benefit  of  its  recognition;  that  the  rate 
was  unreasonable  to  the  extent  it  ex- 
ceeded $1.10  per  100  lbs.  Reparation 
awarded.  Steinfeld  &  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  12. 

(f)  The  Commission  cannot  overcome 
by  an  adjustment  of  freight  rates  natu- 
ral advantages,  such  as  water  competi- 
tion and  climatic  conditions,  which  one 
competing  locality  has  over  another. 
Truck  Growers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  190,  193. 

(g)  Rates  are  not  properly  compar- 
able where  water  competition  controls. 
Truck  Growers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,   20   1.   C.   C.  190,   194. 

(h)  Potential  water  competition  is 
considered  in  fixing  rates.  Audley  Hill 
&  Co.  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  225,  226. 

(i)  Terminal  rates,  such  as  a  blanket 
rate  from  the  Mississippi  River  to  the 
Atlantic  seaboard,  to  all  Pacific  ter- 
minals are  low  and  not  a  fair  measure 
of  rates  generally.  Ohio  Foundry  Co. 
V.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
65,  67. 

(j)  Under  the  Supreme  Court  deci- 
sions, the  Seattle  rate  cannot  be  used  as 
a  standard  by  which  to  measure  the 
Spokane  rate.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  162,  174. 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §8  (4)   (k)  — (u) 


583 


(k)  Complainants  attacked  the  pro- 
posed adjustment  of  commodity  rates, 
Chicago,  111.,  and  St,  Paul,  Minn.,  to 
Spokane,  Wash.  Defendants  proposed 
to  readjust  the  Spokane  rates  by  taking 
75  per  cent  of  the  terminal  rate  from 
eastern  territory  and  adding  thereto 
a  rate  which  is  16  2-3  per  cent  less  than 
the  present  local  rates  from  Seattle  to 
Spokane.  Water  competition  exists  at 
the  terminal  points  and  eastern  terri- 
tory to  these  points  takes  a  blanket 
rate.  HELD,  the  scheme  of  the  defend- 
ants assumes  that  water  competition  ex- 
ists at  Spokane  which  must  be  met,  and 
is  therefore  founded  upon  facts  which 
do  not  exist,  and  as  the  Commission  is 
asked  to  establish  rates  to  Spokane 
which  are  inherently  reasonable,  the 
scheme  of  defendants  is  of  no  assist- 
ance in  solving  the  general  problem  be- 
fore the  Commission,  and  cannot  there- 
fore be  approved.  Spokane  v,  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  162,  169. 

(1)  The  mere  fact  of  water  competi- 
tion is  not  proof  that  rail  rates  are  so 
low  as  to  deprive  a  carrier  of  a  rea- 
sonable return.  R.  R.  Commission  of 
Nev.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  238,  250. 

(m)  Competitive  conditions,  when 
shown  to  exist,  may  justify  the  fixing  of 
rates  which  are  not  in  line  with  the 
rates  to  points  where  such  competition 
does  not  obtain.  Rainey  &  Rogers  v. 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
88,  89. 

(n)  The  potential  competition  through 
the  Tehuantepec  route  justifies  low  rates 
to  the  Pacific  coast.  Kentucky  Wagon 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C. 
360,  362. 

(o)  Potential  competition,  as  well  as 
actual,  justifies  low  rates.  Kentucky 
Wagon  Mfg.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
L  C.  C.  360,  363. 

(p)  On  farm  wagons  from  Louisville, 
Ky.,  to  Sacramento,  Cal.,  and  from  To- 
ledo, O.,  to  Portland  and  Eugene,  Ore., 
and  Seattle,  Wash.,  a  rate  of  $1.35  was 
collected.  Shortly  before  shipments 
moved  a  rate  of  $1.25  was  in  effect,  and 
had  been  so  for  five  years,  and  prior 
to  that  period  the  rate  had  been  for 
some  time  $1.15.  These  lower  prior 
rates  had  been  compelled  by  potential 
water  competition.  Shortly  after  the 
shipments  in  question  the  $1.25  rate 
was  restored,  a  small  amount  of  actual 
traffic     having     moved     meanwhile     by 


water  via  the  American-Hawaiian  Steam- 
ship Co.  and  the  Tehuantepec  Ry. 
HELD,  the  lower  rates  in  effect  prior 
and  subsequent  to  the  shipment  in 
question  being  forced  by  actual  or  po- 
tential water  competition,  proof  of  the 
existence  of  such  lower  rates  was  not 
sufficient  to  establish  the  unreasonable- 
ness of  the  higher  rate  complained  of. 
Kentucky  Wagon  Mfg.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  360,  363. 

(q)  Rates  from  the  Atlantic  coast  to 
southern  points  are  fixed  by  the  water 
routes,  and  no  comparison  can  be  made 
with  all-rail  rates  from  interior  points 
to  the  same  destinations.  Receivers  & 
Shippers'  Asso.  of  Cincinnati  v.  C.  N.  O. 
&  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  440,  453. 

(r)  For  many  years  prior  to  Jan. 
1,  1909,  the  ra,te  on  oil  in  barrels  from 
New  York,  Cleveland  and  Minneapolis 
to  San  Francisco  and  Seattle  was  90 
cents  per  100  lbs.  From  Jan.  1  to  June 
1,  1909,  when  the  shipments  in  question 
moved,  defendants  had  in  effect  a  rate 
of  $1.  After  June  1,  1909,  the  90c  rate 
was  restored.  The  evidence  indicated 
that  the  90c  rate  was  forced  by  water 
competition.  HELD,  that  a  compelled 
rate  could  not  be  taken  as  the  standard 
by  which  to  measure  the  reasonableness 
of  a  voluntary  rate  and  that  therefore 
the  maintenance  of  the  90c  rate  did  not 
prove  the  unreasonableness  of  the  $1 
rate.  Reparation  denied.  Fuller  &  Co. 
V.  P.  C.  &  Y.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  594, 
595. 

(s)  While  water  competition  may  be 
availed  of  by  a  carrier  as  its  justifica- 
tion and  excuse  for  rates  that  are  lower 
than  would  otherwise  be  lawful,  the 
existence  of  such  competition  is  not  in 
itself  a  ground  upon  which  a  shipper 
may  demand  a  lower  rate.  Lindsay 
Brothers  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  6,  8. 

(t)  A  factor  to  be  considered  in  mak- 
ing rates  from  Chicago  and  St.  Louis  to 
St.  Paul  is  the  competition  of  lake  lines 
from  Chicago.  Indianapolis  Freight  Bu- 
reau V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.    C.   276,    281. 

(u)  Market  competition  afforded  by 
jobbing:  centers,  such  as  Duluth,  which 
have  the  benefit  of  low  lake  rates,  must 
be  considered  in  establishing  rates  from 
St.  Louis  and  Chicago  to  St.  Paul.  In- 
dianapolis Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C. 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C  276,  281. 


584 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §8   (4)    (v)— §9   (aa) 


(v)  Carriers  can  not  be  compelled  to 
meet  water  competition;  they  do  it  of 
their  own  volition,  or  whenever  the  same 
is  potent  enough  to  compel  them  to  do 
so  in  order  to  secure  the  traffic.  In  each 
instance  the  carrier  determines  for  itself 
whether  such  water  competition  has  suffi- 
cient influence  on  the  traffic  to  make  it 
reduce  its  rates.  Bainbridge  Board  of 
Trade  v.  L.  H.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
586,  594. 

(w)  There  may  be  water  competition 
at  each  of  two  points,  and  yet  a  differ- 
ence in  rates  to  those  points  may  be  jus- 
tified. Bainbridge  Board  of  Trade  v.  L. 
H.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  586,  594. 

§9.     Cost  of  Service. 

See    Advanced    Rates,    §7    (2);     Evi- 
dence, §18. 

(a)  The  cost  of  the  transportation 
service  is  an  element  to  be  considered 
in  determining  the  reasonableness  of  the 
rate.  Nebraska  State  Ry.  Commission 
V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  121, 
126.  Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  O.  &  W. 
R.  R.   Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  77,  81.     Albree  v. 

B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  303,  316. 
In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  on  Packages, 
22  I.  C.  C.  328,  335.  In  Re  Advances 
on  Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C.  604, 
615,  625.  Boileau  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  640,  646,  652.  In  Re 
Advances  on  Grain,  21  I.  C.  C.  22,  28. 
Maritime  Exchange  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  21 
I.  C.  C.  81,  84.  Meeker  v.  L.  V.  R.  R. 
Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  129.  In  Re  Advances  in 
Rates— Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243, 
275.  Si)iiliaiie...v^NJ._^£^o.,  19  L-C 
a_162^  173.  ComlnercialCTub  of  Salt 
CakeCtt3r^.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
L  C.  C.  218,  222.  Commercial  Club  of 
Omaha  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C. 
397,  401.  Board  of  Trade  of  Winston- 
Salem  V.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
12,  17.  Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v. 
Colo.  &  So.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C  387,  391. 
Duncan  &  Co.  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  590,  593.  Shippers'  and  Re- 
ceivers' Bureau  of  Newark  v.  N.  Y.  O. 
&  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  264.  Kindel 
V.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.   R.   R.   Co  ,  15  I.  C. 

C.  555,  558.  Oregon  &  Washington  Lum- 
ber Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  1,  9,  10.  Burnham,  Hanna, 
Munger  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  299,  310.  American  Asphalt 
Ass'n  V.  Uintah  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  196, 
204.  Cattle  Raisers'  A*'n  of  Texas  v.  ! 
M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  418,  430.  ' 


(aa)     Complainant  attacked   the  rates 
of  defendant  S.  P.  Co.,  on  classes  1  to  4, 
inclusive,  from  Medford,  Ore.,  as  a  jobbing 
center,  to  Hornbrook,   Klamathon,  Ager, 
Montague,     Gazelle,     Edgewood,     Weed, 
Sisson  and  Dunsmuir,  Cal.,  as  unreason- 
able  and    discriminatory.      The    rates    to 
these  points  for  distances  ranging  from 
47  to  120  miles  ranged  from  40c  to  75c, 
first  class;   35c  to  60c,  second  class;  32c 
to  59c,  third  class,  and  27c  to  51c,  fourth 
class.     The   rates   were   combinations   of 
local  rates  from  Medford  to  the  Oregon- 
California  state  line,  and  from  the  state 
line   to   these   destination   points.     From 
Medford  to  the  state  line  the  class  rates 
were  32c,  28c,  25c  and  21c  for  the  first 
four  classes.     From  the  state  line  to  the 
destinations    in    question    for    distances 
ranging    from    9    to    82    miles    the    rates 
ranged  from  8c  to  43c,  first  class;   7c  to 
38c,  second  class;  7c  to  34c,  third  class; 
6c  to   30c,  fourth  class.     The  defendant 
on  shipments  south  from  Portland,  Ore., 
and    north    from    Sacramento,    Cal.,    to 
points  approximately  the  same  distances 
as  the  destinations  in  question  from  Med- 
ford,  was   applying  from   Portland   rates 
ranging  from  24c  to  45c,  first  class;   21c 
to   41c,    second   class;    18c   to   38c,   third 
class,  and  16c  to  34c,  fourth  class;   and 
from  Sacramento,  21c  to  45c,  first  class; 
I9c  to   40c,    second   class;    17c  to   34i^c, 
third    class,    and    15c    to    31i/^c,    fourth 
class.     Defendants' .rates  in  the  state  of 
Oregon  were  on  a  higher  basis  than  its 
rates    for    substantially    the    same    dis- 
tances in  the  state  of  California.     From 
Ashland,    Ore.,   to   the  -Oregon-California 
line,   25   miles,   the   class   rates,   first   to 
fourth,     were     27c,     24c,     20c     and     17c, 
whereas  from  the  state  line  to  Montague, 
Cal.,    28    miles,   they   were   17c,    16c,   15c 
and  14c.    From  Medford  to  the  state  line, 
38  miles,  they  were  32c,  28c,  25c  and  21c, 
whereas  from   the   state   line  to  Gazelle, 
Cal.,  taken  as  a  typical  point,  43  miles, 
they    were    24c,    22c,    20c    and    18c.      De- 
fendants rates  from  Suisun,  Cal.,  to  Cal- 
istoga,   Cal.,   47   miles,   where   there   was 
no  water  competition,  were  25c,  18c,  15c 
and  13c,  first  to  fourth  class;    and  from 
Napa  Junction,  Cal.,  to  Santa  Rosa,  Cal., 
37   miles,   they  were,   in  the   absence  of 
water  competition,  25c,  18c,  15c  and  13c 
for  the  first  to  fourth  classes.  These  com- 
parisons   were    typical    as    showing    the 
higher  charge  of  defendants  for  similar 
hauls  of  like  distances  in  Oregon  than  in 
California.      The     rates     attacked     were 
higher   than   those   out   of   Spokane    via 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §9  (b)— (i) 


585 


Boise  over  the  G.  T.  N.,  N.  P.,  O.  R.  R. 
&  N.  and  O.  S.  L.  Rys.,  the  rates  over 
these  latter  carriers  for  first  class,  taken 
as  typical,  for  distances  ranging  from  51 
to  79  miles,  being  from  25c  to  38c.  De- 
fendants' rates  from  Portland  to  the  Cali- 
fornia destinations  in  question  for  dis- 
tances ranging  from  376  to  449  miles 
were  from  $1.41  to  $1.59  for  first  class, 
taken  as  typical.  The  class  rates  estab- 
lished by  the  state  commissions  of  Illi- 
nois, Iowa  and  Minnesota  for  distances 
ranging  from  50  to  120  miles  ranged  from 
20c  to  34.54c;  first  class  taken  as  typical. 
The  transportation  conditions  were  prac- 
tically the  same  on  both  sides  of  the  Cali- 
fornia-Oregon state  line.  Defendant  at- 
tempted to  justify  the  rates  attacked  on 
account  of  the  heavy  grades  and  sharp 
curves  incident  to  the  part  of  the  haul 
lying  in  Oregon.  It  appeared,  however, 
that  similar  grades  and  curves  were  en- 
countered in  moving  northbound  traffic 
over  the  mountains;  yet  from  Zuleka, 
Cal.,  to  the  state  line,  a  distance  of  8 
miles  of  ascending  grade,  the  rates,  first 
to  fourth  class,  were  6c,  6c,  6c  and  5c, 
while  from  the  state  line  to  Siskiyou, 
Cal.,  a  distance  of  8  miles  of  the  same 
degree  of  ascending  grade,  the  rates 
were  16c,  14c,  lie  and  10c.  Complainant 
contended  that  the  rates  in  question 
should  be  adjusted  to  a  scale  of  through 
mileage,  and  that  there  was  no  justifica- 
tion in  basing  them  on  combinations  to 
and  from  the  state  line.  HELD,  that  the 
transportation  conditions  being  practi- 
cally the  same  on  both  sides  of  the  line, 
the  difference  in  the  rates  for  hauls  in 
Oregon  and  for  those  in  California  for 
similar  distances  was  not  justified;  and 
that,  on  the  whole,  the  rates  attacked 
were  unreasonable.  Rates  to  the  destina- 
tions in  question,  taken  in  the  order 
named  in  the  beginning  of  this  para- 
graph, were  prescribed  ranging  from  28c 
to  59c  first  class;  23c  to  49c,  second  class, 
21c  to  44c,  third  class;  and  17c  to  35c, 
fourth  class.  Medford  Trafl^c  Bureau  v. 
S.  P.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  701. 

(b)  In  the  end  there  must  be  a  rela- 
tion between  the  cost  of  service  and 
the  charge  to  the  public  for  that  serv- 
ice. If  the  character  of  service  per- 
formed is  changed  by  public  mandate 
so  as  to  increase  the  expense  of  per- 
forming the  service,  then  the  public 
must  pay  for  its  performance.  It  is 
therefore  in  the  public  interest  that 
every  transportation  service  should  be 
performed  by  the  most  economical  meth- 


od.    Albree   v.   B.    &    M.   R.   R.    Co.,   22 
I.    C.    C.    303,   316. 

(c)  Carriers  may  not  haul  a  particu- 
lar class  of  traffic  or  trafllc  for  a  par- 
ticular community  at  less  than  the  cost 
of  the  service,  and  recoup  themselves 
from  the  charges  levied  against  other 
traflic.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  by 
Carriers  for  the  Transportation  of  Sin- 
gle  Package   Lots,   22   I.   C.   C.   328,   335. 

(d)  There  is  no  flexible  limit  of 
judgment  if  all  rates  must  be  upon  a 
level  of  cost,  and  out  of  every  dollar 
paid  to  the  carrier  must  come  a  fixed 
amount  of  return  for  the  capital  in- 
vested. In  Re  Advances  on  Coal  to 
Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C.  604,  624. 

(e)  Costs  do  not  determine  rates; 
yet  most  rates  have  within  them  as  a 
constituent  the  element  of  cost.  Cost 
is  generally  an  important  element  in 
arriving  at  a  judgment  with  respect  to 
a  rate.  What  weight  shall  be  given  to 
that  element  as  compared  with  all  the 
other  elements  entering  into  a  particu- 
lar rate  is  a  matter  to  be  decided  in 
each  individual  case.  Boileau  v.  P.  & 
L.  E.  R.  R.   Co.,   22  I.  C.  C.  640,  652. 

(f)  Certain  portions  of  a  system  of 
railroad  cannot  be  segregated  from  the 
whole  and  the  expenses  and  earnings 
charged  and  credited  to  such  portions 
on  a  mileage  pro  rata  basis.  In  Re  In- 
vestigation of  Advances  on  Grain,  21 
I.  C.  C.  22,  25. 

(g)  In  fixing  rates  on  competitive 
articles  the  relation  should  be  determined 
on  the  basis  of  a  difference  in  the  cost 
of  service,  and  many  of  the  other  con- 
siderations entering  into  the  establish- 
ment of  rates  upon  independent  or  iso- 
lated articles  should  be  in  a  large  part 
eliminated.  Carstens  Packing  Co.  v. 
O.   &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  77.  81. 

(h)  An  increase  in  the  cost  of  labor 
and  in  the  price  of  railway  materials  and 
supplies  does  not  necessarily  imply  a  de- 
crease in  the  net  earnings  of  a  carrier  or 
preclude  the  possibility  of  an  increase  in 
its  net  earnings,  due  to  an  increase  in  the 
volume  of  traflfic.  Shippers  &  Receivers' 
Bureau  of  Newark  v.  N.  Y.  O.  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  264,  265. 

(i)  In  determining  the  cost  of  hauling 
ice  from  New  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania 
points  to  Jersey  City,  Hoboken  and  other 
points  the  defendant  obtained  indirect 
line  expense  by  assuming  that  the  cost  in 


586 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §9    (j)— §10    (bb) 


the  case  of  ice  equaled  the  average  cost 
of  moving  a  ton  of  freight  upon  its  line 
without  presenting  the  slightest  evidence 
to  bear  out  the  assumption.  The  indi- 
rect terminal  expense  was  obtained  by 
taking  an  average  obtained  by  dividing 
the  total  terminal  cost,  including  a  pro- 
portion of  the  fixed  charges,  by  the  total 
number  of  cars  of  traffic  of  all  kinds 
shipped  on  the  railroad.  Nearly  one-third 
of  the  total  amount  which  was  used  for 
the  purpose  of  determining  the  ton-mile 
cost  of  hauling  ice  in  case  of  indirect 
line  expenses  and  of  terminal  cost  was 
styled  "fixed  charges,"  which  consisted 
mainly  of  rent  and  to  a  small  extent  of 
interest  and  taxes.  HELD,  this  method 
of  computing  the  cost  of  transportation 
of  the  ice  was  unreliable.  The  indirect 
line  expense  might  be  greater  or  less, 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  entire  traf- 
fic handled  over  the  system.  Some  of  the 
items  which  were  included  in  the  indirect 
line  expense  were  due  in  part  to  the 
movement  of  the  ice  trains  and  others 
were  not,  and  to  assume  that  every  ton 
of  the  ice  should  bear  a  proportionate 
share  of  all  the  expenses  of  the  railroad 
of  all  kinds  was  to  beg  the  whole  ques- 
tion. It  was  erroneous  to  assume  that 
ice  should  pay  in  proportion  to  the  num- 
ber of  tons  exactly  the  same  contribution 
to  fixed  charges  that  all  other  traflUc 
paid.  Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  305,  316,  318,  319. 

(j)  Rates  over  the  same  lines,  be- 
tween the  same  points  but  under  dif- 
fering conditions,  must  be  made  with 
some  consideration  for  the  difference  in 
the  cost  of  service.  Kindel  v.  N.  Y.  N. 
H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  555, 
558. 

(k)  A  carrier  may  not  properly  or 
lawfully  engage  in  transportation  at  a 
rate  less  than  the  cost  of  the  service, 
since  to  do  so  would  place  an  improper 
and  unlawful  burden  upon  other  traffic. 
Burnham,  Hanna,  Munger  Co,  v.  C.  R. 
I.   &  P.  Ry.   Co..   14   I.   C.  C.  299,  310. 

§10.     Distance. 

See    Evidence,    §58. 

(a)  Distance  is  always  a  factor  to 
be  taken  into  consideration  in  determin- 
ing the  reasonableness  of  a  rate.  Dis- 
tance alone,  however,  is  not  controlling. 
I.  C.  C.  V.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  222  U.  S. 
541,  549,  a2  Sup.  Ct.  108,  56  L,  ed.  308;  In- 
dianapolis Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  195,  205;  In  Re 
Advances  in  Rates  *or  the  Transportation 


of  Cotton  and  Cotton  Linters,  23  I.  C.  C. 
404,  408;  In  Re  Investigation  of  Unreason- 
able Rates  on  Meats,  23  I.  C.  C.  656, 
669;  Southern  Illinois  Millers'  Ass'n  v. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  672,  673; 
Florida  Fruit  &  Vegetable  Shippers' 
Protective  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  11,  17;  Arlington  Heights 
Fruit  :  ^change  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
149,  ±52;  Sioux  City  Commercial  Club  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  110, 
114;  Maricopa  County  Commercial  Club 
V.  Maricopa  &  Phoenix  R.  R.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  279;  Sunflower  Glass  Co.  v.  M. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  391;  In  Re  Inves- 
tigation of  Advances  in  Rates  on  Grain, 
21  I.  C.  C.  22,  34;  Meridian  Fertilizer 
Factory  v.  V.  S.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
554;  Commercial  Club  of  Salt  Lake  City 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  218, 
226;  Corporation  Commission  of  North 
Carolina  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
303,  309;  Florida  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  C.  of 
G.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  336,  C  9; 
Omaha  Grain  Exchange  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  424,  431;  Andy's 
Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  405,  410;  Receivers  &  Ship- 
pers' Ass'n  of  Cincinnati  v.  C.  N. 
O.  &  ^.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  440,  455; 
Muskogee  Trafliic  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C  169,  172; 
Memphis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  313,  318;  Kansas  City 
Transportation  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  195,  203,  204;  Phillip 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C 
418.  419;  Fort  Dodp^e  Commercial  Club 
V.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  572,  581. 

(b)  When  long  distances  are  under 
consideration,  it  often,  and  perhaps  usu- 
ally, happens  that  a  considerable  differ- 
ence in  mileage  may  be  disregarded  in 
fixing  the  total  through  charge,  but 
where  different  packing-houses  pay 
freight  upon  the  animals  which  they 
slaughter  in  proportion  to  distance,  the 
element  of  distance  ought  to  be  con- 
sidered in  fixing  the  proper  relation  in 
rates  upon  the  product  out.  [nvestiga 
tion  of  Alleged  Unreasonable  Rates  on 
Meats,  22  I.  C.  C.  160,  168. 

(bb)  Defendants'  tariffs  named  a  pro- 
portional rate  of  18c  per  100  lbs.  from 
Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Little  Rock,  Ark.,  on 
grain  and  grain  products  destined  to  Con- 
way and  Morrilton,  points  lying  between 
Little  Rock  and  Memphis,  Tenn.,  with  a 
milling-in-transit  privilege  at  Little  Rock. 
The  tariffs  provided  for  an  additional 
charge  for  out-of-line  hauls  of  Ic  per  100 


REASONABLENESS  OP  RATES,  §10  (c)— (1) 


587 


lbs.  for  40  and  over  5  miles;  l^c  for  60 
and  over  40  miles.  The  distance  from 
Little  Rock  to  Conway  is  30  miles,  and 
to  Morrilton,  50  miles.  Defendants  under 
this  tariff  exacted  extra  charges  of  ll^c 
to  Conway  and  2i/^c  to  Morrilton.  Under 
a  provision  in  the  tariffs,  in  assess- 
ing these  extra  charges  the  difference 
between  the  mileage  a  shipment  actually 
traveled  via  a  transit  point  and  the  mile- 
age via  the  shortest  route  from  point  ot 
origin  to  destination  should  be  consid- 
ered the  mileage  of  the  out-of-line  haul. 
The  short  line  distance  from  Omaha  to 
Conway  is  695  miles  via  Coffeyville,  Kan., 
while  the  distance  via  Little  Rock  is  738 
miles,  a  difference  of  43  miles,  for  which 
the  out-of-line  charge  was  l^/^c,  according 
to  the  tariff.  By  a  similar  test  the  out- 
of-line  haul  from  Omaha  to  Morrilton  is 
83  miles,  for  which  the  out-of-line  charge 
according  to  the  tariff  would  be  2l^c. 
HELD,  that  the  charges  exacted  were  in 
accordance  with  the  tariff  and  were  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable.  Brook-Rauch 
Mill  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  249. 

(c)  Carriers  are  ordinarily  entitled 
to  charge  a  slightly  higher  per  mile 
rate  for  shorter  hauls  than  are  proper 
to  be  charged  for  longer  distances.  Met- 
ropolitan Paving  Brick  Co.  v.  A.  A.  R. 
R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  197,  207. 

(d)  It  is  well  settled  that  distance  is 
always  a  factor  to  be  taken  into  consid- 
eration in  determining  either  the  rea- 
sonableness of  a  rate  by  itself  or  in  oon- 
sid-ering  its  relation  to  rates  to  other 
points,  but  it  is  equally  well  settled  that 
distance  alone  is  not  controlling.  Com- 
petition is  an  important  element  and 
there  are  various  other  considerations, 
all  of  which  must  be  taken  into  account 
in  determining  the  fact  whether  a  partic- 
ular rate  or  a  system  is  entitled  as  a 
matter  of  law  to  rates  that  are  reason- 
able and  that  do  not  operate  to  unduly 
discriminate  against  them.  Corporation 
Commission  of  North  Carolina  v.  N.  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  303,  309. 

(e)  The  fact  that  the  commodity  does 
not  ordinarily  move  to  any  great  dis- 
tance from  the  mill  is  entitled  to  proper 
weight.  Florida  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  C.  of 
G.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  336,  339. 

(f)  Distance  is  an  element  in  rate 
adjustment,  and,  all  other  things  being 
equal,  it  perhaps  is  a  controlling  ele- 
ment, but  can  hardly  control  where 
other  substantial  considerations  are  ma- 


terially different.  Omaha  Grain  Ex- 
change V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C. 
C.    424,   431. 

(g)  A  fair  profit  in  the  mining  of 
coal  is  said  to  be  10c  per  ton.  Perma- 
nent advantage  in  the  freight  rate  of 
15c  per  ton,  other  conditions  being 
equal,  gives  to  the  favored  mine  the 
market.  An  attempt,  therefore,  to  apply 
a  strictly  mileage  scale  to  relative  rates 
from  different  mines  would  practically 
eliminate  all  competition.  Andy's  Ridge 
Coal  Co.  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  18  1.  C.  C. 
405,    410. 

(gg)  The  same  rate  for  a  short  as  for 
a  long  haul  goes  to  the  question  of  the 
reasonableness  of  the  rate,  and  not  a 
violation  of  the  fourth  section.  Idaho 
Commercial  Clubs  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
18  L  C.  C.  562,  565. 

(h)  Distance  is  an  important,  but  not 
necessarily  a  controlling,  factor  in  rate 
questions.  Whether  or  not  it  is  conclu- 
sive depends  upon  the  facts  in  the  case. 
Muskogee  Traffic  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.  Ry.  Co.,   17  I.   C.  C.  169,  172. 

(i)  Length  of  haul  and  other  trans- 
portation factors  have  a  more  or  less 
definite  relation  to  the  rate  that  a  car- 
rier may  reasonably  demand  for  a  trans- 
portation service.  Memphis  Cotton  Oil 
Co.  V.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C  313, 
318. 

(j)  If  strictly  distance  rates  were  ap- 
plied to  grain  moving  from  points  of 
origin  it  is  apparent  that  at  a  certain 
distance  the  rate  would  be  prohibitive. 
Kansas  City  Transportation  Bureau  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  195, 
204. 

(k)  While  the  Commission  is  not  to 
be  understood  as  intimating  that  sub- 
stantial differences  in  distance  are  not 
to  be  given  consideration,  it  is  not  will- 
ing to  accept  the  theory  of  rate  con- 
struction based  purely  on  distances. 
Kansas  City  Transportation  Bureau  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C  195, 
203. 

(kk)  It  is  a  rule  of  well  nigh  uni- 
versal application  that,  as  distance  in- 
creases, difference  in  distance  becomes 
relatively  less  important.  Black  Moun- 
tain Coal  Land  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.   C.  286,  29-6. 

(1)  In  view  of  the  length  of  the  haul, 
it  is  unreasonable  to  add  9i/^c  for  a 
haul    of   only    30    miles   farther.     Philip 


588 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §10  (11)— §11   (e) 


V.   C.   M.   &   St    P.   Ry.   Co.,   16  I.  C.   C. 
418,  419. 

(11)  Rates  are  not  made  with  respect 
of  distance  alone.  Differences  in  cost  of 
service  to  the  carrier,  the  value  of  service 
to  the  shipper,  and  questions  of  competi- 
tion in  the  selling  market  should  also  be 
taken  into  consideration.  Black  Moun- 
tain Coal  Land  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  286,  295. 

(m)  Unquestionably  mileage  is  a  fac- 
tor in  the  determination  of  the  reason- 
ableness of  rates,  but  how  important,  or 
what  effect  it  should  have  in  judging 
the  fairness  of  a  challenged  rate  is  a 
question  which  must  be  answered  in  the 
light  of  all  the  facts  surrounding  the 
exaction  of  the  rate.  The  Commission 
will  not  compel  the  establishment  of 
rates  solely  according  to  mileage;  the 
public  benefits,  the  greater  volume  of 
business  of  carriers  warranting  lower 
rates  to  all,  the  force  of  competition  and 
many  otTier  potent  considerations  may 
far  outweigh  a  claim  of  right  founded 
only  on  geographic  location.  Fort  Dodge 
Commercial  Club  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I. 
C-  C.  572,  581. 

(n)  A  route  may  be  so  circuitous  that 
what  would  be  a  reasonable  charge  for 
its  short-line  competitor  is  not  reasonable 
for  it.  Olive-Sternenberg  Lumber  Co.  v. 
T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  2. 

§11.     Earnings. 

See  Infra.  §30  (a),  §36;  Evidence,  §51. 

(a)  While  earnings  may  be  consid- 
ered in  the  fixing  of  a  reasonable  rate 
to  be  charged  by  a  carrier  for  the  trans 
portation  of  freight,  rates  necessarily 
cannot  be  based  upon  earnings  alone. 
This  is  made  clearly  to  appear  when  it 
Is  considered  that  a  just  and  reasonable 
rate  is  one  which  is  just  to  the  carrier 
and  to  the  shipper.  It  is  a  rate  which 
yields  to  tne  carrier  a  fair  return  upon 
the  value  of  the  property  employed  in 
the  public  service,  and  it  is  a  rate  which 
is  fair  to  the  shipper  for  the  services 
rendered;  and  when  this  rate  is  estab- 
lished, if  it  results  in  large  profits  to 
the  carrier,  the  carrier  is  fortunate  in 
its  business,  and  if  it  results  in  a  loss 
of  earning  power,  so  that  the  business 
of  the  carrier  is  unprofitable,  the  car- 
rier is  unfortunate.  But  the  rate  may 
not  be  lowered  or  raised  merely  upon 
the  ground  that  the  carrier  is  either 
making  or  losing  money,  providing  al- 
ways the  rate  is  a  reasonable  and  just 


rate.     Hooker  v.  1.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  242, 
253. 

(b)  The  fact  that  the  net  revenues 
of  a  carrier  from  its  ownership  of  a 
bridge  on  which  an  arbitrary  is  charged 
for  passengers  and  freight  carried  across 
the  same  may  be  greater  than  the  re- 
turns on  ordinary  business  enterprises 
is  not  sufficient  in  itself  to  justify  a 
holding  that  the  bridge  tolls  are  ex- 
cessive. Bridges  are  and  have  been 
regarded  as  precarious  property.  They 
may  be  damaged  or  entirely  swept  away 
by  fioods,  and  erection  of  other  bridges 
nearby  may  draw  away  their  tenants, 
and  thus  seriously  affect  their  earning 
capacity.  The  net  revenues  have  an 
undoubted  and  also  an  important  bear- 
ing upon  the  question  of  the  reasonable- 
ness of  rates,  but  the  value  of  the 
service  to  the  shipper  and  the  other 
elements  so  often  referred  to  as  enter- 
ing into  the  reasonableness  of  rates 
must  also  be  taken  into  consideration. 
A  railroad  company  may  be  operated 
with  a  less  return  than  it  ought  to  en- 
joy, or  even  at  a  loss,  but  neither  con- 
dition of  affairs  would  justify  the  ex- 
action by  it  of  rates  that  are  higher 
than  they  reasonably  should  be  for 
service  performed,  all  things  being  con- 
sidered. So  also  the  fact  that  the  net 
earnings  of  a  carrier  may  be  large  does 
not  of  itself  justify  the  Commission  fix- 
ing a  rate  at  less  than  is  reasonable 
for  the  service,  all  other  things  being 
considered.  Railroad  Commissioners  of 
Iowa  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  181, 
186. 

(c)  The  question  of  revenue  must 
play  a  not  inconsiderable  part  in  deter- 
mining reasonableness  of  rates.  In  Re 
Advances  in  Rates — Western  Case,  20 
I.  C.  C.  307,  315. 

(d)  The  ultimate  test  of  reasonable- 
ness of  rates  with  the  carrier  itself  is 
the  return  for  the  use  of  its  equipment 
and  facilities.  National  Hay  Ass'n  v. 
M.   C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  1.  C.  C.  34,  48. 

(e)  Complainant  attacked  rates  from 
Billings,  Mont.,  to  points  in  Wyoming 
on  branch  lines  of  defendant.  HELD, 
that  these  branch  lines  traverse  a  new 
country,  where  transportation  conditions 
are  difficult  and  the  volume  of  business 
comparatively  small.  These  lines,  how- 
ever, are  operated  as  part  of  a  great 
and  prosperous  system;  they  are  feed- 
ers to  the  main  line  and  help  to  swell 
the  revenue  of  that  line.  A  part  of 
any  great  railroad  system  might  be  se- 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,   §11    (f)— §12    (c) 


589 


lected,  and,  counting  cost  of  operation 
and  fixed  charges,  such  part  be  shown 
to  be  unprofitable.  This,  however,  would 
not  truly  indicate  its  value  and  profit- 
ableness as  an  integral  part  of  the 
whole  property.  The  fact  that  these 
branch  lines,  considered  by  themselves, 
fail  to  show  large  earnings  does  not 
justify  the  charging  of  unreasonable 
rates.  Billings  Chamber  of  Commerce 
v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  71, 
75. 

(f)  Whether  the  result  of  a  proposed 
rate  adjustment  will  deprive  carriers  of 
a  fair  return  on  their  property  must  be 
considered  before  making  any  reduction. 
City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I. 
C.    C.    162,    173. 

(g)  Unreasonable  rates  cannot  be 
permitted  simply  because  the  entire  re- 
sult of  the  railroad's  operations  might 
not  be  as  favorable  as  would  otherwise 
be  proper.  Commercial  Club  of  Salt 
Lake  City  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
I.   C.   C.  218,   222. 

(h)  The  fact  that  the  rate  on  a  par- 
ticular commodity  could  he  reduced 
without  impairing  seriously  the  revenues 
of  the  carrier,  standing  alone,  has  little 
value  and  forms  no  basis  upon  which  to 
determine  reasonableness  of  rates.  Min- 
neapolis Threshing  Machine  Co.  v.  C.  St. 
P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  189,  192. 

(i)  Because  the  revenues  of  a  carrier 
are  high  during  a  period  of  general  pros- 
perity, rates  should  not  be  reduced;  the 
periods  when  it  operated  almost  at  a 
loss  should  be  considered.  Florida  Fruit 
&  Vegetable  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  552,  564. 

(j)  The  unfavorable  financial  condi- 
tion of  defendant  cannot  lawfully  be 
remedied  by  imposing  unreasonable 
rates.  Railroad  Commissioners  of 
Florida  v.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  16  L  C.  C. 
1,  5. 

(k)  Where  particular  rates  on  a  par- 
ticular commodity  between  particular 
points  are  challenged,  the  question  of 
net  earnings  on  the  particular  lines  in- 
volved is  not  important,  unless  it  be 
shown  that  the  margin  of  profit  is  so 
small  on  the  system's  business,  as  a 
whole,  that  a  reduction  in  the  particular 
rates  would  reduce  the  whole  income 
below  the  reasonable  profit  point. 
Board  of  Trade  of  Winston-Salem  v. 
N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  12,  17. 

(1)  An  increase  in  the  cost  of  labor 
and    materials,    accompanied    by    a    de- 


crease in  the  net  revenues  of  the  car- 
rier, is  not  necessarily  inconsistent  with 
the  possibility  that  its  net  earnings  may 
still  suffice  to  afford  it  a  fair  return  on 
the  investment  without  an  increase  in 
its  rate  schedules.  Shippers'  &  Receiv- 
ers' Bureau  of  Newark  v.  N.  Y.  O.  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  264,  265. 

(m)  The  Commission  is  bound  to 
consider  whether  any  contemplated  re- 
adjustment will  result  in  serious  im- 
pairment of  business  investments  or 
undue  depreciation  in  the  revenues  of 
the  carrier.  Black  Mountain  Land  Co. 
v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,   15  I.  C.  C.  286,  295. 

(n)  If  the  present  system  of  private 
ownership  of  railways  is  to  be  con- 
tinued, sufficient  inducement  must  be 
extended  to  private  investors.  City  of 
Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
376,    417. 

(o)  As  the  rates  of  defendants  ought 
not  to  be  fixed  altogether  with  respect 
to  the  recent  years  of  prosperity,  so 
neither  should  they  be  established  upon 
the  basis  of  this  year  of  adverse  condi- 
tions. City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  376,  418. 

§12.     Economical    Management. 

See  Advanced   Rates,   §7   (2)    (f),   §10; 
Transportation,  §13. 

(a)  It  is  for  the  public  interest  that 
every  transportation  service  should  be 
performed  by  the  most  economical 
method,  since  that  must  ultimately  re- 
sult in  the  lowest  transportation  charge. 
Albree  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
303,  316. 

(b)  It  is  unfair  to  take  from  the 
carrier  whatever  of  profit  it  may  secure 
by  reason  of  improvement  in  its  plant 
and  adoption  of  the  most  modern  meth- 
ods. If  our  railroad  systems  are  to  re- 
main in  private  hands,  stimulus  must 
be  given  to  the  initiative  and  imagina- 
tion of  railroad  operators.  The  commu- 
nity may  not  take  with  justice  what- 
ever comes  by  the  labor  or  time  saving 
devices  adopted  by  those  who  serve  the 
public,  nor  may  the  carriers  absorb  the 
profits  of  the  shipper  resulting  from 
similar  efforts.  In  Re  Advances  on 
Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C.  604,  625. 

(c)  Something  should  be  expected 
from  the  introduction  of  additional 
economies.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — 
Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  285, 


590 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §121/2   (a)— (c) 


§12J/2'  Equalizing  of  Rates  or  Markets. 
See  Equalization  of  Rates,  §6. 
(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  of 
88c  per  net  ton  on  bituminous  coal  in 
carloads  from  the  Pittsburgh,  Pa.,  district 
to  Ashtabula  Harbor,  O.,  for  transship- 
ment by  vessel  on  the  Great  Lakes  to 
points  beyond.  The  coal  moving  over 
the  New  York  Central  lines  from  the 
Pittsburgh  district  to  Ashtabula  was  car- 
ried in  solid  trains  averaging  65  cars 
each  of  42  to  44  tons  per  car.  That  mov- 
ing via  the  Pennsylvania  lines  moved  in 
trainloads  of  40  cars,  averaging  from  40 
to  44  tons  each.  The  weighted  average 
distance  from  Pittsburgh  district  to  Ash- 
tabula is  148  miles.  From  1901  to  1911 
the  rate  was  increased  from  73c  to  88c. 
From  1887  to  1900,  the  rate  fluctuated 
from  70c  to  $1.  Defendant  carrier  in 
transporting  the  coal  in  question  re- 
ceived the  benefit  of  using  the  empty 
cars  engaged  in  hauling  iron  ore  from 
lake  points  east,  thereby  removing  the 
expense  of  any  back  haul  of  empty  cars. 
Complainants  contended  that  the  rates 
attacked  were  unjust  as  compared  with 
those  from  the  West  Virginia  coal  fields. 
The  distances  from  the  Pittsburgh  district 
and  from  West  Virginia  districts  of  Poca- 
hontas, Kanawha  and  Fairmont  to  Ashta- 
bula were  160,  434,  400  and  248  miles,  re- 
spectively, yielding  ton  mile  revenues  of 
5.5,  2.6,  2.4  and  3.9  mills,  respectively. 
In  fixing  the  rates  from  these  competing 
mining  districts,  defendants  had  practi- 
cally disregarded  distance  as  well  as  the 
fact  that  the  rail  competition  from  the 
Pittsburgh  district  to  Lake  Erie  was  much 
greater  than  that  from  any  of  the  West 
Virginia  fields.  For  ten  years  prior  to 
March  1st,  1912,  the  differentials  between 
these  competing  fields  were  unchanged 
and  under  this  relation  of  rates  the  coal 
tonnage  from  the  West  Virginia  mines  to 
the  lake  ports  increased  some  885  per 
cent,  while  that  from  the  Pittsburgh  dis- 
trict increased  only  277  per  cent.  The 
cost  of  mining  coal  in  the  Pittsburgh  dis- 
trict was  more  than  in  the  competing 
West  Virginia  districts,  being  from  80c 
to  $1  per  ton  in  the  former  and  from  50c 
to  60c  in  the  latter.  Defendants  did  not 
equalize  this  advantage  in  rates  in  its 
charges  on  coal  shipped  to  the  Atlantic 
seaboard  for  transshipment,  but  on  such 
coal  accorded  an  advantage  in  rates  to 
the  West  Virginia  mines.  The  rate  of  88c 
complained  of  afforded  a  ton  mile  rev- 
enue  of  5.94   mills   under   the   weighted 


average  distance  of  148  miles  and  approx- 
imately 5.87  mills  under  straight  average 
mileage.  The  larger  and  more  prosperous 
carriers  engaged  in  transporting  the  coal 
under  the  rates  in  question  were  paying 
dividends  between  the  years  1907  and 
1911  ranging  from  6  to  18  per  cent.  The 
operating  expenses  of  transporting  Pitts- 
burgh coal  to  Ashtabula  was  probably  less 
than  one-half  of  the  rate  of  88c.  The  evi- 
dence indicated  that  the  rate  complained 
of  was  raised,  step  by  step,  not  to  bring 
it  up  to  a  level  which  the  carriers  might 
have  regarded  and  defended  as  reason- 
able, but  in  order  to  let  certain  compet- 
ing coal  fields  into  the  trade.  HELD, 
that  the  rate  complained  of  was  unrea- 
sonable and  unjust  and  should  not  ex- 
ceed 78c.  Boileau  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  640. 

(b)  Complainant  manufacturer  of 
window  glass  in  Coffeyville,  Kan.,  com- 
plained of  rates  to  the  upper  Mississippi 
River  crossings,  like  Fort  Madison.  The 
rate  was  27c  per  100  lbs.,  as  compared 
with  a  rate  of  19c  from  competing  terri- 
tory in  Indiana  and  Ohio.  Distance  from 
the  two  centers  differed  by  about  50  miles. 
Rates  from  the  east  had  been  reduced 
from  23c  to  19c,  because  18c  had  been 
the  rate  to  St.  Louis  and  the  higher  rate 
was  discriminatory.  Defendants  did  not 
carry  goods  from  the  east.  The  general 
level  of  rates  in  the  Central  Freight  As- 
sociation territory  east  of  the  Mississippi 
River  was  very  much  lower  than  that 
prevailing  in  territory  west  of  that  river. 
HELD,  that  defendants  should  maintain 
from  the  Kansas  fields  a  rate  which  was 
fairly  in  line  with  the  general  level  of 
rates,  and  that  had  been  done.  The  rea^ 
sons  which  induced  the  reduction  of 
rates  from  the  east  did  not  apply  here, 
as  the  distance  to  these  northern  points 
was  considerably  more  than  to  St.  Louis, 
which  was  not  true  of  shipments  from 
the  east.  Complaint  dismissed.  Sun- 
fiower  Glass  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  1. 
C.  C.  391. 

(c)  Complainant  millers  located  at 
Buffalo  attacked  an  increase  by  defend- 
ant carriers  of  Ic  per  100  lbs.  upon  fiour 
and  other  grain  products  from  Buffalo  to 
New  England  points,  and  from  Buffalo  to 
New  York  City  and  New  York  points. 
The  differential  from  New  York  City  to 
Boston  points  was  two  cents,  and  from 
New  York  City  to  Sherbrooke  points  in 
New  England  was  one-half  cent  above 
the   Boston   differential.     The   Buffalo  to 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §13    (a)— §14   (d) 


591 


New  York  rate  before  the  advance  was 
10c  per  100  lbs.  Millers  at  Buffalo  re- 
ceived their  wheat  from  Duluth.  In  mak- 
ing the  advance  attacked  no  change  was 
made  in  the  rates  from  Minneapolis  and 
Duluth  to  Buffalo.  Complainants  at  Buf- 
falo were  in  competition  with  millers  at 
Minneapolis  and  Duluth.  The  10-cent 
rate  from  Buffalo  to  New  York  had,  be- 
fore the  advance,  been  in  effect  for  many 
years.  Complainants  showed  that  de- 
fendants transported  grain  and  its  prod- 
ucts for  other  persons  for  a  much  less 
rate  per  ton  mile  than  would  be  yielded 
by  the  lie  or  even  the  10-cent  rate  from 
Buffalo  to  New  York.  The  distance  from 
Buffalo  to  New  York  is  400  miles,  and 
the  10-cent  rate  would  yield  a  revenue  to 
defendants  of  5c  per  ton  mile.  Under 
the  export  rate  from  Chicago  to  New 
York  on  wheat  and  flour,  carriers  were 
deriving  2.8  mills  and  3  mills  per  ton 
mile,  respectively.  Under  the  domestic 
rate  on  ex-lake  wheat,  on  corn,  and  on 
oats  from  Buffalo  to  New  York,  the  rev- 
enue was  10c,  7  11-120  and  6  2-3c  per  100 
lbs.,  respectively.  Millers  at  Minneapolis 
objected  to  the  restoration  of  the  10-cent 
rate  from  Buffalo  to  New  York  on  the 
ground  that  the  differential  between  Du- 
luth and  Minneapolis  was  5  cents  per 
hundred  pounds,  and  that  even  under  the 
advanced  11-cent  rate  from  Buffalo  to 
New  York  millers  at  Buffalo  had  an  ad- 
vantage of  4c  per  hundred  pounds  over 
millers  at  Minneapolis.  It  appeared, 
however,  that  on  account  of  the  advan- 
tages of  location,  Minneapolis  was,  de- 
spite this  differential,  a  better  milling 
point  than  Duluth.  HELD,  following 
Banner  Milling  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R. 
R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  31,  defendants  in 
making  an  advance  must  consider  the 
effect  upon  the  business  of  Buffalo  mill- 
ers, and  that  the  one  cent  advance  was 
unjust  and  unreasonable,  and  the  former 
10c  rate  from  Buffalo  to  New  York 
should  be  restored,  and  that  the  rates 
from  Buffalo  to  Boston  points  and  Sher- 
brooke  points  should  correspondingly  be 
reduced  to  12c  and  12i^c,  respectively. 
Banner  Milling  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R, 
R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  398,  401. 

§13.     Equipment   Furnished. 

(a)     The    Commission   frequently    con- 
siders,   in    determining    the    reasonable- 
ness of  rates,   the   equipment  furnished. 
Bash    Fertilizer    Co.    v.    Wabash    R.    R 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  522,  524. 


(b)  The  character  of  equipment  used 
is  in  the  discretion  and  for  the  conve- 
nience of  the  carrier,  and  the  conditions 
surrounding  the  transportation  of  mine 
props  are  not  so  dissimilar  as  to  justify 
a  higher  charge  therefrom.  Rickards  v. 
A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  239. 

§14.     Investment    Relying   on    Rate. 

(a)  The  Commission  has  never  un- 
derstood that  it  could  dictate  the  policy 
of  a  carrier  in  the  making  of  its  rates 
in  so  far  as  there  was  just  room  for 
the  exercise  of  a  policy.  It  has  several 
times  explicitly  so  declared.  It  has, 
however,  believed  that  it  might  consider 
what  the  policy  of  a  carrier  had  been 
in  determining  whether  the  rates  result- 
ing from  a  change  in  that  policy  were 
just  and  reasonable.  It  often  happens 
that  the  very  existence  of  an  industry 
depends  upon  the  rate  accorded  to  it. 
If,  now,  a  carrier  has  established  a  par- 
ticular rate  for  the  express  purpose  of 
enabling  an  industry  to  exist,  and  if 
upon  the  strength  of  that  rate  money 
has  been  invested  which  must  be  de- 
stroyed if  the  rate  is  withdrawn,  this 
fact  might  properly  be  considered  in 
passing  upon  the  reasonableness  of  the 
proposed  change  in  the  rate.  Such  fact 
is  not  controlling,  but  is  one  of  the  cir- 
cumstances which  may  properly  be  kept 
in  view.  The  Commission  might  in  a 
proper  case  order  the  continued  main- 
tenance of  a  rate  upon  which  the  in- 
vestment of  money  had  been  induced, 
even  though  it  would  not  in  the  first 
instance  as  an  original  proposition  have 
directed  the  establishment  of  that  rate. 
Oregon  &  Washington  Lumber  Mfrs.' 
Ass'n  V.   S.  P.   Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  389,  394. 

(b)  Under  the  particular  facts  in  this 
case,  where  a  business  has  been  built 
up  and  maintained  under  a  certain 
rate,  that  rate  should  not  be  disturbed. 
Corporation  Commission  of  N.  C.  v.  N. 
&  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  303,  308. 

(c)  Where  a  plant  has  been  estab- 
lished and  money  invested  on  the  faith 
of  certain  rates  and  conditions,  the  car- 
rier may  not  increase  those  rates  to 
the  serious  disadvantage  of  such  invest- 
ment without  good  cause  or  reason. 
Douglas  &  Co.  V.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
16  L  C.  C.  232,  237. 

(d)  The  fact  that  the  business  of 
complainants  has  been  built  up  under 
much  lower  rates  would  be  no  reason 
for  requiring  the  defendants  to  perform 
transportation  service  for  a  sum  which 


592 


REASOJ^ABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §15    (a)— §16    (a) 


would  not  fairly  compensate  them. 
Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R^. 
Co.,    15   I.    C.    C.    305,    316. 

§15.     Investment  of  Carrier. 

See  Advanced   Rates,   §12  (2). 

(a)  Rates  should  be  sufficient  to 
guarantee  a  fair  annual  return  on  the 
investment  and  to  provide  reasonably 
for  keeping  the  property  up  to  the  im- 
proved modern  methods.  Meeker  &  Co. 
V.   L.  V.  R.  R.-  Co.,  21   I.   C.  C.   129,   161. 

(b)  Were  it  possible  to  determine  the 
exact  amount  of  money  which  has  been 
put  into  the  railroad  properties  in  Offi 
cial  Classification  territory,  the  amount 
of  return  which  has  been  paid  to  the 
present  time,  the  degree  of  prudence 
with  which  the  property  has  been  con- 
structed and  operated,  the  investment 
would  furnish  a  very  satisfactory  basis  in 
arriving  at  an  equitable  return.  Advances 
in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C  243, 
258. 

(c)  The  ordinary  considerations  of 
Justice  require  that  money  invested  in 
railroads  by  invitation  of  the  govern 
ment  should  be  allowed  a  fair  return. 
This  does  not  mean  that  the  Commis- 
sion should  permit  rates  which  will 
guarantee  all  railroad  investment,  nor 
which  will  guarantee  any  railroad  in- 
vestment at  all  times,  but  it  should 
allow  rates  which  will  yield  to  this 
capital  as  large  a  return  as  it  could 
have  obtained  from  other  investments 
of  the  same  grade.  If  rates  formerly  in 
effect  have  become  insufficient,  then 
higher  rates  should  be  permitted.  Rates 
should  be  such  as  to  render  possible  a 
high-class,  not  an  extravagant,  trans- 
portation service.  In  Re  Advances  in 
Rates— Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243, 
262. 

(d)  The  nearest  approximation  to  the 
fair  standard  of  rate  regulation  is  that 
of  bona-fide  investment — the  sacrifice 
made  by  the  owners  of  the  property — 
considering  as  part  of  the  investment 
any  shortage  of  return  that  there  may 
be  in  the  early  years  of  the  enterprise. 
Upon  this,  taking  a  life  history  of  the 
road  through  a  number  of  years,  its  pro- 
moters are  entitled  to  a  reasonable  re- 
turn. This,  however,  is  limited;  for  a 
return  should  not  be  given  upon  waste- 
fulness, mismanagement,  or  poor  judg- 
ment, and  always  there  is  present  the 
restriction  that  no  more  than  a  reason- 
able rate  shall  be  charged.    Advances  in 


Rates— Western    Case,    20    I.    C.    C.    307, 
347. 

(e)  The  original  cost  of  a  carrier's 
property  devoted  to  the  public  use  is 
an  element  to  be  considered  in  deter- 
mining the  reasonableness  of  rates. 
Portland  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  O.  R. 
R.  &  N.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  265,  280. 

(f)  A  carrier  is  entitled  to  ask  a 
fair  return  upon  the  value  of  its  prop- 
erty devoted  to  the  public  use,  and  the 
public  is  entitled  to  demand  rates  not 
higher  than  the  services  are  reasonably 
worth.  Morgan  Grain  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R. 
R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  460,  471. 

(g)  A  railroad  is  entitled  to  a  fair 
return  upon  the  value  of  the  property 
devoted  by  it  to  the  public  use,  but  it 
is  not  entitled  to  have  that  property 
paid  for  by  the  public,  and  cannot  there- 
fore demand  unreasonably  high  rates 
on  the  ground  that  one  of  the  railroads 
leased  by  it  will  request  permanent  im- 
provements before  the  expiration  of  the 
lease,  the  money  for  which  must  come 
from  the  income  from  operation.  Re- 
ceivers' &  Shippers'  Ass'n  of  Cincinnati 
v.  C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C 
440,    462. 

(h)  Any  outlay  which  is  not  required 
to  keep  a  railroad's  property  up  to  its 
present  standards,  but  which  is  neces- 
sary to  provide  for  the  handling  of  in- 
creased business,  and  which,  therefore, 
adds  to  the  permanent  earning  capacity 
of  the  property,  should,  as  between  the 
railway  and  the  public,  when  the  rail- 
way demands  the  right  to  increase  a 
rate  for  the  mere  sake  of  additional 
revenue,  be  made,  not  out  of  the  earn- 
ings, but  out  of  the  capital  or  surplus. 
Cattle  Raisers'  Ass'n  of  Texas  v.  M.  K. 
&  T.  Ry.   Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  418,  432. 

§16.     Long-Continued     Adjustment. 

See  Evidence,  §29;  Voluntary  Rates, 
(a)  The  long  and  voluntary  mainte- 
nance of  a  rate,  is  a  strong  admission 
that  a  higher  rate  would  be  unreason- 
able, unless  satisfactorily  explained. 
A^rlington  Heights  Fruit  Exchange  V.  S. 
P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  149,  151.  Chatta- 
nooga Feed  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  480,  484.  Audley  Hill  &  Co. 
7.  S.  Ry.  Co..  20  I.  C.  C.  225,  226.  Com- 
mercial Club  of  Omaha  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20 
T.  C.  C.  631,  636.  Millar  v.  N.  Y.  C.  & 
H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  78.  Gamble- 
Robinson  Commission  Co.  v.  St.  L.  & 
S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C,  C.  114,  116.   Mor, 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,- §16   (b)— (h) 


593 


gan  Grain  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I. 
C.  C.  460,  468.  Clark  Co.  v.  Buffalo  & 
Susquehanna  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  380, 
381.  Bartles  Oil  Co.  v.  C.  M,  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  146,  148.  Memphis 
Cotton  Oil  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I. 
C.  C.  313,  318.  Riser  Co.  v.  C.  of  G. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  430,  440.  Sunder- 
land Bros.  Co.  V.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  450,  451.  Green  Bay  Business 
Men's  Ass'n  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
I.   C.   C.   59,   G3.    Darling-   &   Co.   v.   B.   & 

0.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  79,  80.  Burgess 
V.   Transcontinental    Freight   Bureau,    13 

1.  C.  C.  668,  677. 

(b)  Carriers  may,  to  meet  competi- 
tion, establish  lower  rates  than  they 
could  justly  be  compelled  to  make. 
Hence,  a  voluntary  rate,  established  to 
meet  competition,  is  not  to  be  taken 
as  the  measure  of  what  is  reasonable. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  195  Fed. 
541,  558.  Chamber  of  Commerce,  Ash- 
burn,  Ga.,  V.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.  C.  140,  149.  Simon  Cook  v.  Wabash 
R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  563,  564.  Georgia- 
Carolina  Brick  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I. 
C.  C.  148,  149.  Audley  Hill  &  Co.  v.  S. 
Kv.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  225  226.  Pabst  Brew- 
ing Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  584,  586,  587.  Breese-Trenton 
Mining  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I. 
C.  C.  598,  600.  Frederich  &  Kempe 
Co.  V.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  481,  484.  Commercial 
Club  of  Omaha  v.  Anderson  &  Saline 
River  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  532,  536.  La 
Salle  Paper  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  149,  150.  Burgess  v.  Transcon- 
tinental Freight  Bureau,  13  I.  C.  C.  668, 
677. 

(bb)  The  fact  that  rates  were  not 
complained  of  in  past  is  not  decisive  that 
they  are  reasonable.  In  Re  Transporta- 
tion of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C. 
151,  157. 

(c)  The  Commission  must  be  largely 
influenced  in  many  instances  in  passing 
upon  the  reasonableness  of  a  given 
rate  by  the  adjustment  which  has  grown 
up  in  the  particular  locality  under  con- 
sideration. In  Re  Advances  for  the 
Transportation  of  Fresh  Meats,  23  I.  C 
C.  652,  655. 

(cc)  With  very  few  exceptions,  rates 
from  Detroit  to  Boston,  New  York  and 
Philadelphia  are  78  per  cent  of  corre- 
sponding rates  from  Chicago.  This  per- 
centage adjustment  between  Central 
Freight    Association    territory    and    the 


east  has  been  long  in  effect,  and  has 
given  general  satisfaction.  Commission 
has  uniformly  sustained  carriers'  con- 
tention that  this  system  of  rate  making 
ought  not  to  be  disturbed  nor  even 
broken  in  upon  in  special  cases  without 
strong  reason  for  so  doing.  Traugott 
Schmidt  &  Sons  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
L  C.  C.  684,  686. 

(d)  To  hold  that  a  carrier  may  not 
withdraw  a  rate  found  by  the  Commis- 
sion in  another  case  to  be  unreasonably 
low  merely  because  that  rate  was  vol- 
untarily established  .in  the  first  place, 
would  amount  to  requiring  unjust  pref- 
erence, and  to  setting  aside  the  funda- 
mental principle  that  rates  must  be  uni- 
form under  similar  conditions.  Fair- 
mont Creamery  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
Co.,   22   L   C.   C.   252,   254. 

(dd)  The  fact  that  a  reduction  of  an 
unreasonable  rate  or  the  correction  of 
an  unjust  discrimination  will  require  re- 
ductions or  corrections  at  other  points  ' 
cannot  be  accepted  as  a  valid  defense 
of  an  unreasonable  rate  or  an  unjust  dis- 
crimination. Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S. 
&  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  93,  101. 

(e)  Neither  a  carrier  nor  the  Com- 
mission should  disturb  a  long-standing 
system  of  rates  without  considering  the 
effect  on  property  interests;  but  when 
a  rate  is  unlawful  it  should  be  cor- 
rected though  it  destroys  property  rights. 
Albree  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
303,  315. 

(ee)  Within  proper  limitations  car- 
riers are  justified  in  making  low  rates 
for  a  particular  traffic  to  induce  a  move- 
ment which  would  not  otherwise  occur. 
Consumers  Ice  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  277,  278. 

(f)  The  voluntary  act  of  carriers  in 
keeping  rates  in  effect  for  a  long  period 
of  time  raises  a  presumption  that  such 
rates  are  reasonable.  This  presumption 
is  rendered  stronger  if  subsequently  the 
rates  are  reduced.  Gamble-Robinson 
Commission  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.,   19  L   C.   C.  114. 

(g)  The  long  maintenance  of  a  com- 
petitive rate  was  not,  upon  advance  of 
the  rate,  an  admission  that  the  former 
rate  was  reasonable.  Breese-Trenton 
Mining  Co.  v.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
598,  600. 

(h)  In  attacking  the  carload  rate  of 
$2  per  ton  on  soft  coal  originating  in 
Illinois    from    East    St.    Louis,    111.,    to 


594 


REASONABLENESS   OF  RATES,   §16    (i)— (q) 


Omaha,  Neb.,  complainants  relied  on 
the  long  maintenance  of  a  rate  of  $1.80 
per  net  ton  as  proof  that  the  newly 
established  rate  of  $2  was  excessive. 
HELD,  that  the  rate  from  East  St.  Louis 
to  Omaha  on  Illinois  coal  has  at  all 
times  had  reference  to  competitive  con- 
ditions, including  those  affecting  rates 
to  East  St.  Louis,  and  since  it  has  often 
been  held  that  a  carrier  may  establish 
rates  of  this  kind  for  competitive  rea- 
sons lower  than  it  could  justly  be  com- 
pelled to  establish,  it  does  not  seem 
that  the  long  existence  of  a  rate  estab- 
lished and  maintained  under  former 
and  different  conditions  (not  altered  by 
any  illegal  act  of  its  own)  than  those 
now  existing  should  have  the  same 
weight  and  force  as  proof  in  the  nature 
of  an  admission  of  reasonableness  of 
the  former  rate,  as  would  ordinarily  at- 
tach to  the  long  continuance  of  a  rate 
voluntarily  established  and  maintained 
.under  other  conditions.  Breese-Trenton 
Mining  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I. 
C.  C.  598,  600. 

(i)  Rates  long  in  effect  as  the  result 
of  experimenting  ought  not  to  be  dis- 
turbed unless  the  Commission  is  certain 
justice  requires  it.  Andy's  Ridge  Coal 
Co.  V.  So.  Ry.   Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  405,  410. 

(j)  It  is  plainly  undesirable  to  dis- 
turb a  method  of  rate  making  long 
established  and  generally  satisfactory 
without  convincing  proof  of  its  injus- 
tice. Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  L.  S. 
&  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  30,  35. 

(k)  For  a  period  of  at  least  14  years 
prior  to  Jan.  1,  1909,  the  rate  on  beer 
in  carloads  to  San  Francisco  was  $1 
per  100  lbs.  from  points  on  the  Missis- 
sippi River  and  points  east  thereof  to 
the  Atlantic  seaboard.  Jan.  1,  1909,  the 
rate  was  raised  to  $1.10,  and  on  June 
5,  1909,  the  rate  of  $1  was  restored,  the 
minimum  of  24,000  lbs.  being,  however, 
raised  to  30,000  lbs.,  at  the  time  of  said 
restoration.  The  rate  of  $1  on  beer 
wad  blanketed  from  the  Atlantic  coast 
to  a.)  points  as  far  west  as  the  Missis- 
sippi iliver  In  shipments  to  San  Fran- 
cisco. Peer,  on  shipments  generally 
throughou:  the  country,  took  the  fifth- 
class  rate  of  $1.65.  HELD,  the  case 
was  clearly  distinguishable  from  that 
class  of  cases  where  a  rate  long  in  force 
Is  advanced,  maintained  at  the  higher 
figure  for  a  short  time,  and  then  volun- 
tarily reduced  to  the  former  basis,  with- 
out satisfactory  explanation  of  the  ad- 
vpnce,  since  in  the  case  in  question  the 


restoration  of  the  old  rate  was  accom- 
panied with  an  increase  of  the  carload 
minimum.  Reparation  denied.  Liebold 
V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
503,    505. 

(1)  In  the  interest  of  the  shipping 
and  consuming  public,  a  carrier  has  the 
undoubted  right  to  consider,  within 
proper  limitations,  the  conditions  under 
which  industries  on  its  lines  in  the 
same  general  territory  with  other  in- 
dustries are  compelled  to  conduct  their 
business,  and  one  of  these  conditions 
may  be  a  handicap  of  higher  rates  on 
raw  material.  Avery  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.   Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  20,  24. 

(m)  The  fact  that  an  order  reducing 
Indianapolis  to  Missouri  River  rates  on 
furniture  will  result  in  a  general  read- 
justment of  the  rates  from  other  points 
in  Central  Freight  Association  territory, 
will  not  lead  the  Commission  to  deny 
such  order,  and  the  Commission  cannot 
deny  such  relief,  for  the  sole  reason 
that  other  points  in  like  situation  may 
be  able  to  show  that  they  are  entitled 
to  a  similar  order.  Indianapolis  Freight 
Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.  C.  56,  71. 

(n)  Where  a  rate  is  found  to  be  un- 
reasonable, the  mere  fact  that  a  change 
will  require  a  new  alignment  of  rates 
will  not  deter  the  Commission  for  or- 
dering a  reduction.  Fort  Dodge  Com- 
mercial Club  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co..  16  I.  C. 
C.  572,  582. 

(o)  While  the  Commission  has  held 
that,  where  upon  the  strength  of  a 
given  rate  capital  has  been  invested 
and  industrial  conditions  have  become 
established,  this  rate  cannot  be  discon- 
tinued without  taking  into  account  its 
effect  upon  these  commercial  and  indus- 
trial conditions,  there  is  no  absolute 
rule  requiring  for  any  reason  the  indefi- 
nite continuance  of  such  a  rate,  for  the 
question  is  also  one  as  to  what,  under 
all  the  circumstances,  is  just  and  rea- 
sonable. Green  Bay  Business  Men's 
Ass'n  V.  B.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
59,  64. 

(p)  Where  a  particular  industry  has 
grown  up  under  rates  voluntarily  estab- 
lished by  carriers,  these  rates  cannot 
be  advanced  without  considering  the 
effect  upon  that  industry.  Beatrice 
Creamery  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C. 
C.  109.  128. 

(q)  The  Commission  will  not  reduce 
rates    as    between    certain    points    in    a 


REASONABLENESS   OF  RATES,  §16    (r)— §19    (a) 


595 


given  classification  territory  where  no 
evidence  is  offered  that  such  reduction 
would  be  proper  as  applying  to  such 
territory  generally.  Marshall  Oil  Co.  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  210,  214. 

(r)  When  an  individual  or  a  com- 
munity claiming  to  suffer  from  an  im- 
proper adjustment  of  rates  makes  com- 
plaint, the  situation  must  be  viewed  as 
it  exists  at  the  time  of  complaint,  and 
present  conditions  and  circumstancefi 
must  be  given  due  force  and  effect  in 
establishing  the  just  relation  of  rates  to 
the  places  involved.  Anthony  Whole- 
sale Grocery  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  605,  608. 

(s)  Where  a  rate  is  voluntarily  estab- 
lished and  maintained  for  a  consider- 
able period,  this  fact,  although  not  con- 
clusive, is  strong  evidence  of  the  rea- 
sonableness of  the  rate.  The  .force  of 
this  presumption  is  greatly  weakened, 
and  may  be  altogether  destroyed  by  the 
circumstances  under  which  the  rate  was 
established  and  maintained,  but  if  no 
particular  reason  is  shown  for  the  put- 
ting in  of  the  rate,  if  no  commercial  or 
competitive  condition  prevents  the  main- 
tenance of  a  higher  rate,  if  the  main- 
tenance of  this  rate  has  been  voluntary 
upon  the  part  of  the  carrier,  the  force 
of  the  admission  becomes  exceedingly 
strong.  Burgess  v.  Transcontinental 
Freight  Bureau,  13  I.  C.  C.  668,  677. 


§17. 


Manufactured    Product. 
See   Evidence,   §31. 


(a)  Carriers  may  make  a  reasonable 
differential  between  the  rates  on  raw 
material  and  the  article  manufactured 
therefrom.  Electric  Malting  Co.  v.  A. 
T.  &   S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.   C.  378,  380. 

(b)  As  a  general  rule  there  is  no 
objection  to  a  reasonable  differential  be- 
tween the  rates  on  material  and  the 
manufactured  product  thereof.  McClung 
&  Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
414,  416. 

(c)  The  general  rule  is  that  manufac- 
tured products  bear  higher  rates  of 
transportation  than  does  raw  material, 
and  is  founded  in  reason,  because  ordi- 
narily there  is  a  substantial  difference 
between  the  value  of  the  one  and  thai 
of  the  other,  and  frequently  there  is  a 
greater  degree  of  risk  incident  to  the 
transportation  and  care  of  the  manufac- 
tured product  than  of  the  raw  material. 
The  practice,  however,  is  not  universal, 
and  is  departed  from  in  some  instances 


because  the  reasons  for  the  distinction 
are  lacking,  and  in  other  cases  because 
of  countervailing  commercial  and  market 
conditions  and  considerations.  Within 
the  last  main  class  of  exceptions  would 
fall  the  case  of  grain  and  grain  prod- 
ucts, which  are  generally  carried  at  the 
same  rate.  The  rule,  however,  more 
nearly  universally  applies  with  respect 
to  the  primary  or  principal  product  or 
products  than  to  the  secondary  products 
or  by-products  from  the  same  raw  ma- 
terial. East  St.  Louis  Cotton  Oil  Co. 
v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
37,  40. 

(d)  Rates  on  manufactured  products 
ought  generally  to  be  higher  than  the 
rates  on  the  raw  materials  from  which 
they  are  made.  Bulte  Milling  Co.  v. 
C.   &  A.   R.   R.   Co.,   15   I.  C.  C.  351,  364. 

(e)  Beet  final  molasses  took  higher 
rate  than  finished  product  for  which  it 
was  used.  Reparation  awarded.  Ameri- 
can Milling  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  328. 

§18.     Mineral    Lands   Owned    by   Carrier. 
See   Evidence,  §34. 

(a)  Where  the  coal  lands  owned  by 
a  carrier  are  leased  to  an  independent 
company,  which  makes  a  profit  out  of 
their  operation,  the  carrier  should  not 
be  permitted  to  use  the  value  of  such 
property  for  the  purpose  of  swelling  the 
amount  upon  which  it  may  demand  an 
income  from  rates  to  be  paid  by  the 
public.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  15   I.   C.   C.   376,  407. 

(b)  Ore  properties  belonging  to  de- 
fendant carrier  were  transferred  to  an 
independent  company  in  exchange  for 
certificates  entitling  the  holders  thereof 
to  participate  in  the  profits  of  said  com- 
pany. These  certificates  were  turned 
over  gratis  to  the  shareholders  of  de- 
fendant. HELD,  upon  a  question  of 
reasonableness  of  rates  said  fact  could 
not  be  urged  to  deny  the  right  of  said 
shareholders  to  receive  a  reasonable  in- 
come on  their  stock.  City  of  Spokane 
V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  408. 

§19.     Natural   Advantages. 

(a)  A  point  is  entitled  to  the  rate 
which  its  location  and  other  advantages 
dictate,  without  taking  into  account  con- 
ditions which  bring  about  different  rates 
to  other  points.  Commercial  conditions 
cannot  be  equalized  by  an  adjustment  of 
freight  rates.     Penn  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Inter- 


596 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §19  (b)— §20  (a) 


national  Coal  Mining  Co.,  173  Fed.  1,  6. 
Meredith  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  31,  34.  National  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  86,  87. 
Elk  Cement  &  Lime  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R, 
Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  84,  88.  In  Re  Advances  of 
Rates  on  Meats,  22  I.  C.  C  160,  163.  Nor- 
man Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I. 
C.  C.  239.  Sinclair  &  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  490,  507,  508. 
East  St.  Louis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  St.  L. 
&  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  37,  41. 
Truck  Growers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  190.  193.  National  Refining 
Co.  V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L 
C.  C.  649.  California  Sugar  Co.  v.  S.  P. 
L.  A.  &  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  6,  9 
Railroad  Commission  of  Nevada  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,  19  1.  C.  C.  238,  256.  Maricopa 
County  Commercial  Club  v.  S.  F.  P.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  257,  258.  Cor- 
poration Commission  of  N.  C.  v.  N.  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  303,  309.  Harbor 
City  Wholesale  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  L 
C.  C.  323,  331.  Ponchatoula  Farmers' 
Ass'n  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  513, 
516.  Colorado  Coal  Traffic  Ass'n  v. 
C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  1.  C.  C  572,  576 
Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  L.  S.  & 
M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  30,  33.  Sagi- 
naw Board  of  Trade  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  128.  Florida  Fruit  and 
Vegetable  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  552,  561.  Board  of  Trade  of 
Winston-Salem  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  12,  16.  Chicago  Lumber  &  Coal 
Co.  V.  T.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  323,  331. 
Hafey  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
L  C.  C.  245,  246.  Black  Mountain  Coal 
Land  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  286. 
Bulte  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  351.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  419.  Kansas 
City  Transportation  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  491,  498.  Ken- 
del  V.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  555.  George's  Creek  Basin  Coal 
Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C 
127,  133.  Greater  Des  Moines  Com 
mittee  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C. 
294,  297,  298.  Burnham,  Hanna,  Munger 
Co.  V.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C. 
299,  303.  Hecker- Jones- Jewel  Milling 
Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C. 
356,  359.  Quimby  v.  Maine  Central  R. 
R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  246,  248.  Bovaird 
Supply  Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13 
I.    C.   C.   56,    64. 

(b)  While  commercial  and  Industrial 
conditions  often  enter  into  the  reason- 
ableness of  a  transportation  charge,  it 
is    no    part   of    the    Commission's    duty 


to  so  adjust  rates  that  business  will  or 
will  not  be  done  at  a  particular  point, 
and  this  is  especially  true  where  no 
natural  advantage  is  possessed  by  any 
locality.  Investigation  of  Alleged  Un- 
reasonable Rates  on  Meats,  22  I.  C.  C. 
160,    163. 

(c)  Th«  Commission  cannot  overcome 
by  an  adjustment  of  freight  rates  natu- 
ral advantages  which  one  competing 
locality  has  over  another.  Truck  Grow- 
ers' Ass'n  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
C.  190,  193. 

(d)  Every  city  is  entitled  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  its  location,  and  may  not 
lawfully  be  subjected  to  high  freight 
charges  merely  because  carriers,  for  rea- 
sons of  convenience  or  otherwise,  in- 
clude it  with  a  number  of  other  points 
in  surrounding  territory,  which  latter 
points  are  not  similarly  situated.  Cor- 
poration Commission  North  Carolina  v. 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  303,  309. 

(e)  While  it  is  within  the  power 
of  the  Commission  to  guard  the  public 
against  unreasonable  charges  or  unduly 
discriminatory  practices  on  the  part  of 
a  particular  carrier,  the  vicissitudes  of 
competition  among  shippers  cannot  be 
compensated  for  in  the  freight  rate. 
Ponchatoula  Farmers'  Ass'n  v.  I.  C.  R. 
R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  513,  516. 

(f)  Proximity  of  Detroit  and  Toledo 
to  the  great  channels  of  through  trans- 
portation and  their  location  on  direct 
through  routes  and  other  circumstances 
cannot  be  ignored,  and  tend  to  lower 
rates  than  can  be  accorded  communities 
removed  from  these  streams  of  traffic. 
Saginaw  Board  of  Trade  v.  G.  T.  Ry. 
Co.,   17  I.   C.   C.   128. 

(g)  Where  competitive  conditions 
among  shippers  are  leading  considera- 
tions that  induce  complaint,  the  Com- 
mission must  have  due  regard  to. trans-* 
portation  conditions  and  rights  of  car- 
riers, as  well  as  shippers.  Chicago  Lum- 
ber &  Coal  Co.  V.  Tioga  Southeastern 
Ry.   Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  323,  331. 

§20.     Need   for    Revenue. 

See    Infra,   §30,   §36;    Evidence,    §36, 

(a)  In  considering  the  reasonableness 
of  a  whole  schedule  of  rates  the  Com- 
mission may  well  at  the  outset  make  in- 
quiry as  to  the  general  financial  con- 
dition of  the  defendant  railroad.  R.  R. 
Com.  of  Nev.  v.  N.  C.  O.  Ry,  Co.,  22  I. 
C.    C.    205,   210. 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §20   (b)— §23    (a) 


597 


(b)  The  necessitous  circumstances  in 
which  defendant  finds  itself  as  a  result 
of  events  not  connected  with  the  Pitts- 
burgh lake  coal  traffic  cannot  be  ac- 
cepted as  the  measure  of  reasonableness 
of  a  rate  to  be  imposed  upon  that 
traffxc.  Boileau  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R  Co., 
22   I.   C.   C.   640,   655. 

(bb)  If,  contrary  to  general  impres- 
sion and  logical  expectation,  a  more 
highly  developed  and  better  equipped 
railway  cannot  do  business  on  as  low  a 
basis  per  unit  of  traffic  as  a  railway  less 
developed  and  with  poorer  equipment, 
that  conclusion  should  be  clearly  and  un- 
mistakably demonstrated  and  proven, 
and  not  be  accepted  on  vague  impres- 
sions or  general  allegations  before  con- 
sequential action  is  taken  based  upon  it 
in  fixing  rates.  Boileau  v,  P.  &  L.  E.  R. 
R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  640,  651. 

(c)  The  fact  that  a  road  may  be 
operated  at  a  loss  does  not  justify  rates 
unreasonably  high  for  the  service  per- 
formed. Railroad  Commissioners  of  Iowa 
V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  181,  186. 

(d)  Complainant  attacked  rates  from 
Fillings,  Mont.,  to  points  in  Wyoming  on 
branch  lines  of  defendant.  HELD,  that 
these  branch  lines  traverse  a  new  coun- 
try, where  transportation  conditions  are 
difficult  and  the  volume  of  business  com- 
paratively small.  These  lines,  however, 
are  operated  as  part  of  a  great  and  pros- 
perous system;  they  are  feeders  to  the 
main  line  and  help  to  swell  the  revenue 
of  that  line.  A  part  of  any  great  railroad 
system  might  be  selected  and  counting 
cost  of  operation  and  fixed  charges  such 
part  be  shown  to  be  unprofitable.  This, 
however,  would  not  truly  indicate  its 
value  and  profitableness  as  an  integral 
part  of  the  whole  property.  The  fact 
that  these  branch  lines  considered  by 
themselves  fail  to  show  large  earnings 
does  not  justify  the  charging  of  unrea- 
sonable rates.  Billings  Chamber  of 
Commerce  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  71,  75. 

(e)  Rates  on  a  branch  line  may  la^v 
fully  be  higher  than  on  main  lines 
through  well-developed  territory  where 
the  density  of  traffic  is  much  greater 
Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  C  &  N 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  156,  159. 

(f)  A  new  line  ought  to  be  wortr 
what  it  cost  and  ought  to  earn  a  return 
upon  that  amount.  City  of  Spokane  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  162,  171. 


(g)  If  the  branch  lines  of  a  railroad 
are  judiciously  planned  and  constructed 
they  should  certainly  be  taken  into  ac- 
count in  determining  the  value  of  the 
railroad,  for  although  they  may  not  earn 
a  large  return  upon  the  cost  considered 
as  an  independent  proposition,  they  do 
add  to  the  traffic  and  the  earning  power 
of  the  entire  system;  but  it  must  be  as- 
sumed that  the  new  branches  which 
have  been  constructed  are  good  invest- 
ments, otherwise  they  would  not  have 
been  built,  and  that  they  will  add  to  the 
earnings  of  the  property  in  proportion 
as  they  have  added  to  its  cost.  No  in- 
crease in  rate  should  be  called  for  on 
this  account.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.   Co.,   19   I.   C.   C.  162,   171. 

(h)  The  unfavorable  financial  condi- 
tion of  defendant  (in  the  hands  of  a  re- 
ceiver) cannot  lawfully  be  remedied  by 
imposing  unreasonable  rates.  Railroad 
Commissioners  of  Florida  v.  S.  A.  L.  Ry., 
16  L  C.  C.  1,  5. 

§21.     Obsolescence. 

(a)  The  cost  of  construction  should 
contain  no  factor  of  obsolescence;  when 
a  thing  goes  out  of  service,  its  value 
should  be  written  off.  In  Re  Advances  in 
Rates— Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  271. 

§22.     Origin  of  Traffic. 

(a)  It  makes  no  difference  so  far  as 
the  rate  is  concerned  whether  traffic 
originates  at  one  point  or  at  numerous 
local  stations.  Commercial  Club  of  Salt 
Lake  City  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.   218,  228. 

(b)  A  common  carrier  cannot  impose 
an  unreasonable  rate  because  of  the 
origin  of  the  traffic.  Acme  Cement  Plas- 
ter Co.  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
19. 

(c)  Emigrants'  movables  do  not  enter 
mto  commerce  and  a  railroad  company 
may  be  justified  in  moving  them  on  a 
ess  than  normal  rate  as  a  means  of  in- 
'^reasing  its  general  traffic  by  building  up 
the  country.  Patten  v.  Wis.  C.  Ry.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  189. 

}23.     Ownership  or  Use  of  Commodity. 
See   Discrimination,   §6. 

(a)  A  carrier  cannot,  when  goods  are 
tendered  to  it  for  transportation,  make 
'he  mere  ownership  of  the  goods  the  test 
^f  the  duty  to  carry,  or  discriminate  in 
fixing  the  charge  for  carriage,  not  upon 
any  difference  inhering  in  the  goods  or 


598 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §23  (b)— §24  (b) 


in  the  cost  of  the  service  rendered  in 
transporting  them,  but  upon  the  mere 
circumstance  that  the  shipper  is  or  is  not 
the  real  owner  of  the  goods.  I.  C.  C.  v. 
D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  220  U.  S.  235,  252, 
31  Sup.  Ct.,  392,  55  L.  ed.  448. 

(b)  The  rule  is  well  established  that 
a  rate  cannot  be  based  upon  the  use  to 
which  the  commodity  is  to  be  devoted; 
neither  can  a  rate  be  confined  in  its 
terms  to  an  individual  or  to  a  class;  it 
must  be  open  to  all  shippers  alike.  Vir- 
ginia-Carolina Chemical  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  394,  397. 

(c)  It  is  improper  for  carriers  to  base 
their  charges  for  transportation  upon  the 
use  to  which  a  commodity  may  be  put. 
Anaconda  Copper  Mining  Co.  v.  C.  &  E. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  592,  596. 

(d)  Subsidiary  corporations  of  the 
Amalgamated  Copper  Company,  located 
at  Anaconda  and  Black  Eagle,  Mont.,  at- 
tacked the  rate  of  $2.G5  per  net  ton 
for  the  transportation  of  coke  when  used 
for  other  purposes  than  the  smelting  of 
iron  from  the  ores  from  West  Virginia 
and  Pennsylvania  ovens  to  Chicago  and 
certain  Chicago  points.  Between  these 
points  defendants  maintained  a  rate  of 
$2.35  per  net  ton  on  coke  when  used  for 
smelting  iron  from  the  ores.  Complain- 
ants contended  that  it  was  illegal  to 
charge  a  different  or  greater  rate  for 
transporting  coke  based  upon  its  use  and 
that  the  $2.65  rate  was  unjust,  unreason- 
able and  discriminatory.  They  offered 
no  evidence  whatever  to  show  or  prove 
that  the  $2.65  rate  was  in  and  of  itself 
unjust,  unreasonable  or  discriminatory, 
save  what  appeared  on  the  face  of  the 
tariffs,  and  left  the  unjustness,  the  un 
reasonableness  or  the  discrimination  to 
be  deduced  or  inferred  as  a  matter  of  law. 
The  freight  traffic  managers  of  the  de- 
fendants testified  that  the  $2.35  rate  was 
very  low  and  that  $2.65  was  just  and 
reasonable.  The  average  distance  from 
the  ovens  to  Chicago  by  the  lines  of  de- 
fendants is  about  575  miles,  and  the 
$2.65  yields  an  average  revenue  of  4.6 
mills  per  ton  mile.  HELD,  in  view  of  all 
the  facts  and  circumstances,  it  is  not 
established  that  the  rate  of  $2.65  per  net 
ton  is  either  unjust  or  unreasonable. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Anaconda  Copper 
Mining  Co.  v.  C.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
592,  rehearing  denied,  21  I.  C.  C.  40. 

(e)  The  determination  of  a  reason- 
able rate  rests  in  the  service  performed, 
the   risk   involved,  the   value   of  the   ar- 


ticle, and  the  degree  of  care  required 
to  be  exercised,  but  the  use  to  which 
articles  are  put,  without  any  difference 
between  them  and  dissimilarity  in  con- 
ditions under  which  the  transportation 
is  performed,  may  not  lawfully  be  made 
the  basis  for  a  difference  in  charge. 
Davis  V.  West  Jersey  Express  Co.,  16 
L   C.   C.   214,   216. 

(f)  In  the  imposition  of  freight  rates 
the  man  who  has  little  with  which  to 
pay  should  not  be  charged  in  excess  of 
his  more  fortunate  neighbor.  Associa- 
tion of  Union  Made  Garment  Manufac- 
turers V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
C.    405,    406. 

(g)  A  lower  rate  was  in  effect  on 
steam  than  commercial  coal.  Subse- 
quently changed  in  accordance  with 
Commission's  ruling.  No  reparation  in 
absence  of  showing  of  special  damage  on 
basis  of  steam-coal  rate,  but  awarded  on 
basis  of  rate  established  regardless  of 
use.  Tennessee  Lumber  Mfg.  Co.  v.  N.  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  371. 

§24.     Paper    Rate. 

(a)  A  proposed  industry  has  the 
right  to  ascertain  in  advance  what 
rates  will  be  established  relative  to  its 
business.  Suffern  Grain  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R. 
R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  178,  184. 

(b)  Complainant  attacked  the  pub- 
lication of  an  unreasonable  rate  for  the 
transportation  of  iron  ore  from  Grand 
Rapids,  Minn.,  to  Allouez  Bay,  in  the 
city  of  Superior,  Wis.  Complainant  and 
his  associates  had  spent  about  $50,000 
in  work  preliminary  to  the  opening  of 
ore  mines  owned  by  them  at  Grand 
Rapids.  The  actual  opening  and  opera- 
tion of  them  would  require  an  expendi- 
ture of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  dol- 
lars. Defendants  published  a  distance- 
tariff  rate  of  8.1c  per  100  lbs.,  which 
complainant  alleged  depressed  the  value 
of  his  lands  so  that  it  was  impos- 
sible for  him  and  his  associates  to 
sell,  lease  or  develop  the  same.  De- 
fendant moved  to  dismiss  the  complaint 
at  the  close  of  complainant's  case,  prin- 
cipally because  it  contended  it  could  not 
be  required  to  publish  a  rate  until  ore 
should  actually  be  offered  it  for  shipment, 
and  also  because  complainant  had  ul- 
terior motives  in  the  filing  of  the  com- 
plaint and  could  not  be  in  a  posi- 
tion to  ship  ore  within  the  maximum 
effective  period  of  any  order  the  Com- 
mission could  enter,  namely,  two  years. 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §24   (c)— §25   (aa) 


599 


Defendant  claimed  it  would  publish  a 
suitable  rate  when  ore  was  offered  it  for 
shipment.  HEuD,  a  difference  in  the 
rate  of  transportation  may  determine 
whether  certain  ore  lands  have  com- 
mercial value  or  not;  whether  they 
shall  be  developed  or  lie  idle.  Without 
in  the  least  questioning  the  good  faith 
of  the  statement,  the  promise  of  the 
defendant  to  publish  a  rate  in  line 
with  the  then  established  rate  from 
common  territory  when  complainant's 
mine  shall  have  actually  been  opened 
and  ore  offered  for  shipment,  can 
scarcely  be  regarded  as  sufficiently  defi- 
nite and  certain  to  warrant  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  dollars  being  invested 
upon  the  strength  of  it.  If  it  is  neces- 
sary under  the  Act  to  have  the  freight 
actually  upon  the  ground  before  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  can 
assume  jurisdiction  and  prescribe  a 
just  and  reasonable  rate,  what  is  there 
to  prevent  a  railway  company,  if  its 
agents  should  see  fit  to  resort  to  such 
perversity,  from  refraining  to  publish 
a  rate  on  potatoes,  for  instance,  until 
the  potatoes  are  actually  within  sight, 
and  from  refusing  to  publish  such  a 
rate  before  the  potatoes  are  planted,  or 
while  they  are  being  cultivated  and 
growing,  and  after  they  have  been  dug 
but  not  yet  brought  to  the  station?  Any 
man  who  is  situated  as  is  the  complain- 
ant has  a  right  to  know  what  the  law- 
ful published  rate  on  his  proposed  prod- 
uct is  and  will  be  for  a  reasonable 
period  of  time  in  the  future.  The  fact 
that  complainant  could  not  possibly  ship 
within  two  years  of  the  effective  period 
of  an  order  of  the  Commission  is  not 
a  material  point.  If  the  Commission 
prescribes  a  reasonable  rate  to-day  for 
the  movement  of  traffic  which  possibly 
may  not  move  within  two  years,  and 
the  railway  company  refuses  volun- 
tarily to  continue  that  rate  for  a  period 
longer  than  two  years,  it  becomes  the 
plain  duty  of  the  Commission  to  insti- 
tute a  new  investigation  at  the  proper 
time  and  prescribe  a  rate  which  shall 
be  just  and  reasonable  under  the  cir- 
cumstances and  conditions  prevailing  at 
such  time.  The  fact  that  all  the  car- 
riers operating  in  the  Mesaba  district 
and  all  of  the  carriers  and  parties  in- 
terested in  the  ore  rates  are  not  made 
parties  to  tnis  proceeding  is  immaterial 
in  its  bearing  upon  the  legality  of  this 
complaint.  A  complainant  cannot  be  ex- 
pected to  search  public  and  private  rec- 
ords   with    the    view    of   discovering    all 


parties  that  may  be  interested  in  a  cer- 
tain proceeding.  Full  publicity  attends 
every  step  of  all  proceedings  before  the 
Commission,  and  it  must  be  assumed 
that  parties  interested  will  take  notice 
of  what  is  going  on.  The  complainant 
in  the  present  proceeding  was  clearly 
within  his  legal  rights  when  he  filed  his 
complaint,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
Commission,  after  full  hearing  and  in- 
vestigation, to  render  a  decision  with 
reference  to  the  reasonableness  of  the 
rate  under  attack.  If  the  complainant 
has  ulterior  motives  or  hopes  for  indi- 
rect benefits  not  directly  arising  out  of 
the  rate  in  controversy,  that  is  a  matter 
which  should  not  restrain  this  Com- 
mission from  performing  its  plain  duty 
under  the  law.  Motion  overruled.  Lum 
V.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C  558,  560, 
561,  562. 

(c)  A  shipper  is  entitled  to  have  his 
interstate  freight  moved  at  reasonable 
rates.  The  fact  that  for  a  long  time 
there  hftd  been  no  movement  of  a  par- 
ticular commodity  is  no  justification  for 
the  maintenance  of  an  unreasonable 
rate.  Neither  is  the  -probable  effect  of 
state  prohibitory  laws  upon  the  tonnage 
material,  such  as  beer.  Scheuing  v.  L. 
&  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  550,  552. 

(d)  Where  blacksmith  coal  is  mined 
only  in  the  eastern  states  and  can  reach 
Portales,  N.  M.,  only  from  the  mines  or 
from  some  distributing  point  lika  Chicago 
and  reasonable  through  rates  are  in  ef- 
fect from  mines  and  distributing  points, 
a  rate  from  Pittsburg,  Kan.,  where  such 
coal  is  not  mined,  to  Portales  is  a  mere 
paper  rate,  and  the  Commission  will  not 
consider  the  question  of  its  ^  asonable- 
ness.  Sligo  Iron  Store  Co.  v.  A.  T,  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  139,  142. 

§25.     Past  Rates. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §5  (4)    (a);  Evi- 
dence, §29. 

(a)  Where  it  appears  obvious  that  to 
grant  the  prayer  of  a  complaint  to  re- 
duce the  rates  from  Indianapolis  to  the 
Mississippi  River  would  involve  the 
equalization  of  rates  in  all  the  territory 
between  Chicago  and  Buffalo,  it  must  be 
assumed  that  the  effect  of  such  wide- 
spread reductions  would  be  not  only 
great,  but  injurious,  and  perhaps  con- 
fiscatory upon  the  revenues  of  the  car- 
riers. Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C. 
C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  195,  208. 

(aa)     Many  of  the  western  rates,  both 
class   and   commodity,    were   established 


600 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §25  (b)— §26  (a) 


long  ago,  when  conditions  were  entirely 
different  from  what  they  are  to-day. 
Whenever  those  rates  have  been  exam- 
ined by  the  Commission,  they  have  al- 
most without  exception  been  found  to  be 
extravagant,  and  have  been  reduced.  In 
Re  Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and 
Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151,  162. 

(b)  The  Commission  must  be  largely 
Influenced  in  many  instances  in  passing 
upon  the  reasonableness  of  a  given  rate 
by  the  adjustment  which  has  grown  up 
in  the  particular  locality  under  consid- 
eration. In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  for  the 
Transportation  of  Fresh  Meats,  23  I.  C. 
C,    652,    655. 

(c)  While  the  Commission  ought  to 
consider  the  general  effect  upon  the 
revenues  of  carriers  by  the  establish- 
ment of  a  uniform-distance  scale,  the 
mere  fact  that  some  particular  rate  would 
be  somewhat  advanced  or  reduced  in 
comparison  with  other  rates  isi  no  valid 
objection  to  that  course.  Florida  Fruit 
&  Vegetable  Shippers'  Protective  Ass'n 
V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  11,  16. 

(d)  Justice  should  not  be  denied  com- 
plainant because  to  grant  it  will  necessi- 
tate a  change  elsewhere.  Equality  can- 
not be  withheld  because  it  is  or  will  be 
objected  to  by  other  carriers  or  shippers. 
Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.   C.   93,   100. 

(e)  While  the  existence  of  a  wrong 
cannot,  of  itself,  justify  its  continuance, 
still,  in  determining  what  under  all  the 
circumstances  is  just  and  reasonable,  in 
pursuance  of  the  authority  delegated  to 
the  Commission,  it  must  be  to  some  ex- 
tent guided  by  conditions  as  it  finds 
them.  Bluefield  Shippers'  Ass'n  v.  N.  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  519,  525. 

(f)  Class  rates,  long  in  erect,  form- 
ing the  basis  of  a  rate  fabric,  to  which 
business  has  adjusted  itself,  are  not  dis- 
turbed upon  the  mere  suggestion  that  a 
better  scheme  might  have  been  originally 
devised.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — East- 
ern Case,  20   I.  C.  C.  243,  306. 

(g)  It  is  the  duty  of  the  Commission 
to  consider  rates  applied  over  the  en- 
tire territory  likely  to  be  affected  by  a 
change  in  rates  to  particular  points.  Cor- 
poration Commission  of  North  Carolina 
v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  303.  309, 
310. 

(h)  The  reasonableness  of  a  rate 
must  of  necessity  depend  upon  the  con- 
ditions surrounding  the  traffic  at  the  time 


it  moves.  The  length  of  the  haul,  the 
competition  to  be  met,  the  cost  of  the 
service,  the  value  of  the  service,  the 
density  or  volume  of  the  tonnage,  as  well 
as  the  general  transportation  conditions 
then  existing,  are  factors  that  have  a 
more  or  less  definite  relation  to  the  rate 
that  a  carrier  may  reasonably  demand  for 
a  transportation  service.  And  these  fac- 
tors, except,  possibly,  the  length  of  the 
haul,  the  grades  and  other  transportation 
conditions,  are  in  their  nature  neither 
permanent  nor  fixed,  but  necessarily 
change  with  the  general  economic  pano- 
rama. No  presumption  of  law,  there- 
fore, can  arise  against  an  advanced  rate 
simply  because  a  lower  rate  previously 
existed.  Memphis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  I.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  313,  318. 

(i)  While  it  is  always  persuasive, 
yet  it  is  not  conclusive  that  because  rates 
were  lower  at  one  time  the  present  rates 
are  unreasonable.  Lagomarcino-Grupe  Co. 
V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  151.   152. 

(j)  Past  rates  voluntarily  established 
many  years  ago  are  presumed  to  have 
been  remunerative.  Board  of  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  v.  V.  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  453.  (458). 

(k)  Development  of  new  territory  is 
not  conclusive  as  to  the  justness  at  the 
present  time  of  a  rate  adjustment  in  ef- 
fect in  the  past.  Burnham,  Hanna,  Mun- 
ger  Dry  Goods  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  299. 

§26.  Permanent  Improvements. 
See  Advanced  Rates,  §6  (5). 
(a)  Both  the  Supreme  Court  and  the 
Commission  are  committed  to  the  propo- 
sition that  in  fixing  a  fair  return  upon 
railroad  property,  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
termining whether  a  given  advance  is 
reasonable,  the  railway  ought  not  to 
treat  as  a  part  of  its  operating  expenses 
the  cost  of  permanent  improvements  or 
extensions,  and  this  must  of  necessity 
mean  that  the  rates  should  not  be  suffi- 
cient to  allow  both  the  payment  of  divi- 
dends to  stockholders  and  interest  to 
bondholders,  and  an  additional  sum  for 
the  purpose  of  improving  and  increasing 
the  value  of  the  property.  Each  genera- 
tion may  well  be  required  to  bear  its  own 
burden,  and  the  stockholder  should  not 
obtain  both  an  adequate  dividend  upon 
his  stock  and  an  addition  to  the  value  of 
his  property.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates 
—Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  266. 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §27   (a)— (h) 


601 


§27.     Profits  of  Shipper. 

See    Advanced    Rates,     §6     (6);     Evi- 
dence, §45,   §62. 

(a)  The  Commission  has  never  ac- 
cepted the  theory  that  if  traffic  moves 
freely  under  a  given  rate,  that  is  the  best 
test  of  the  reasonableness  of  the  rate; 
still  the  Commission  has  always  deemed 
the  state  of  an  industry  a  pertinent  fact 
in  considering  the  reasonableness  of  a 
rate.  In  Re  Transportation  of  Wool, 
Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151,  156. 

(aa)  A  railway  may  not  impose  un- 
reasonable rates  merely  because  the  busi- 
ness of  the  shipper  is  so  profitable  he 
can  pay  it.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Kan.  v.  A.  T. 
&   S.  F.   Ry.    Co..  22  I.   C.   C.  407,   410. 

(b)  The  effect  of  a  rate  upon  com- 
mercial conditions,  whether  an  industry 
can  exist  under  particular  rates  or  par- 
ticular adjustment  of  rates,  are  matters 
of  consequence,  and  facts  tending  to 
show  these  circumstances  and  conditions 
are  always  pertinent.  But  they  are  only 
a  single  factor  in  determining  the  funda- 
mental questions.  A  narrowing  market, 
increased  cost  of  production,  overpro- 
duction and  many  other  considerations 
may  render  an  industry  unprofitable 
without  showing  the  freight  rate  to  be 
unreasonable.  R.  R.  Com  of  Kans.  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  407,  410. 

(bb)  A  railroad  may  not  impose  an 
unreasonable  transportation  charge 
merely  because  the  business  of  the 
shipper  is  so  profitable  that  he  can  pay 
it;  nor,  conversely,  can  the  shipper  de- 
mand that  an  unreasonable  low  charge 
shall  be  accorded  him  simply  because  the 
profits  of  his  business  have  shrunk  to  a 
point  where  they  are  no  longer  sufficient. 
R.  R.  Commissioners  of  Kansas  v.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  407,  410. 

(c)  The  Commission  cannot  require 
of  carriers  the  establishment  of  rates 
which  will  guarantee  to  a  shipper  the 
profitable  conduct  of  his  business.  R.  R. 
Commissioners  of  Kansas  v.  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  407,  410. 

(cc)  It  has  never  been  the  view  of  the 
Commission  that  the  prosperity  of  a 
shipper,  a  locality  or  a  state  was  a  rea- 
sonable excuse  for  the  imposition  of 
rates  conditioned  on  such  prosperity,  t)ut 
when  coincident  with  very  substantial 
reductions  in  rates  the  price  of  a  com- 
modity has  nearly  doubled  in  value  and 
claims  for  loss  and  damage  have  ma- 
terially  increased,   two   of   the   essential 


factors  of  a  reasonable  rate,  value  and 
risk,  have  been  changed  in  favor  of  the 
carrier's  contention  that  proposed  ad- 
vances in  rates  should  be  allowed.  In 
Re  Investigation  of  Advances  in  Rates 
on   Grain,  21  I.   C.  C.  22,  35. 

(d)  If  the  principle  that  a  railroad 
should  charge  what  the  traffic  will  bear 
is  the  criterion  of  railroad  rates,  no  ex- 
ception can  be  taken  to  the  transcon- 
tinental situation,  for  it  is  masterfully 
designed  to  secure  a  maximum  of  rev- 
enue and  yet  develop  such  industries 
and  benefit  such  communities  as  the 
railroad  in  its  wisdom  may  wish  to 
thrive,  for  the  growth  of  the  Pacific 
coast  certainly  is  in  no  small  part  to 
be  accredited  to  the  discretion  lodged 
in  and  exercised  by  the  transcontinental 
traffic  manager.  Railroad  Commission 
of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  329, 
368. 

(e)  For  a  carrier  to  make  rates  for 
transportation  based  solely  upon  the 
ability  of  the  shipper  to  pay  those  rates 
is  to  make  the  charge  for  transporta- 
tion depend  upon  the  cost  of  production, 
rather  than  upon  the  cost  of  carriage — 
to  measure  a  public  service  by  the  econ- 
omy practiced  by  the  private  shipper. 
This  necessarily  gives  to  the  carrier 
the  right  to  measure  the  amount  of 
profit  which  the  shipper  may  make  and 
fix  its  rate  upon  a  traffic  manager's 
judgment  as  to  what  profit  he  will  be 
permitted.  This  theory  entitles  the 
railroad  to  enter  the  books  of  every 
enterprise  which  it  serves  and  raise  the 
lower  rates  without  respect  to  its  own 
earnings,  but  solely  with  respect  to  the 
earnings  of  those  whose  traffic  it  carries. 
This  is  not  regulation  of  the  railroads 
by  the  nation,  but  regulation  of  the  in- 
dustries and  commerce  of  the  country 
by  its  railroads.  Advances  in  Rates — 
Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307,  350. 

(f)  The  cost  of  production  may  be 
considered  in  determining  the  reason- 
ableness of  A  rate.  City  of  Spokane  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  162,  170;  Port- 
land Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  O.  R.  R. 
&  N.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  265,  280. 

(g)  The  theory  is  rejected  that 
rates  may  be  increased  by  progressive 
advances  as  long  as  traffic  moves  freely. 
Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  A.  &  S. 
R.    R.    Co.,  19   I.   C.   C.   419,   421. 

(h)  In  comparing  the  transportation 
charges  on  wheat  and  on  fiour  from 
Minneapolis    to   New    York    in   a   contro- 


602 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §27  (i)— §28  (e) 


versy  between  Minneapolis  and  Buffalo 
millers  the  commercial  profits  of  the 
parties  are  neither  controlling  nor  im- 
portant. Jennison  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co., 
18  I.   C.  C.  113,  121. 

(i)  The  rates  necessary  to  permit 
growers  to  market  their  product  at  a 
reasonable  profit  are  not  the  test  of  the 
justness  of  a  transportation  charge. 
Florida  Fruit  &  Vegetable  Ass'n  v.  A. 
C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  552,  560. 

(j)  The  fact  that  complainant  has 
been  prosperous,  although  a  matter  to 
be  considered,  does  not  conclusively 
show  that  rates  are  not  discriminatory. 
Hitchman  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  512,  519. 

(k)  A  controversy  over  rates  .cannot 
be  determined  wholly  upon  the  ground 
that  the  shippers  have  enjoyed  the  low 
rate  for  many  years  and  that  interests 
were  built  up  thereunder,  and  that  loss 
of  business,  investments,  profits  and 
markets  will  result  under  the  increased 
rates,  since  such  controversy  must  be 
determined  on  the  justness  or  reason- 
ableness of  the  rates  in  question.  Ore- 
gon &  Washington  Lumber  ]\Ifrs.'  Ass'n 
V.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  1,  14. 

§28.     Relativity   of  the   Rate. 

See  Discrimination,  §3  (a);  Equali- 
zation of  Rates,  §8  (dd);  Relative 
Rates. 

(a)  Breaking  rates  is  an  artificial  cir- 
cumstance. In  Re  Transportation  of 
Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151, 
170. 

(aa)  There  would  certainly  be  as 
much  reason  for  equalizing  the  combina- 
tions as  between  Chicago  and  St.  Louis 
as  between  Indianapolis  and  Chicago. 
Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C. 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  195,  204. 

(b)  In  absence  of  an  order  of  Com- 
mission to  the  contrarv,  carriers  have  a 
right  to  maintain  a  parity  of  .rates  on  ex- 
port cotton  from  Texas  producing  points 
to  New  Orleans  and  to  Texas  ports  if 
they  choose  to  do  so.  "  In  Re  Advances  on 
Cotton,  23  I.  C.  C.  404,  411. 

(bb)  On  cases  of  liquor  in  glass  from 
Galveston,  Tex.,  to  New  Orleans,  La., 
complainant  was  charged  the  first-class 
Tate  of  80c.  Galveston  and  New  Orleans 
competed  in  the  importation  of  the  class 
of  liquors  in  question.  Defendants'  rate 
from  New  Orleans  to  Galveston  was  46c. 
They    signfied   their    willingness    to    put , 


into  effect  the  46c  rate  from  Galveston  to 
New  Orleans  and  made  no  effort  to  jus- 
tify the  great  disparity  between  the  rates 
in  the  opposite  direction.  HELD,  the  rate 
exacted  was  unreasonable  to  the  extent 
it  exceeded  46c.  Reparation  awarded. 
Galveston  Commercial  Assn.  v.  G.  H.  & 
S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  512. 

(ba)  Rate  on  pig  iron  from  Birming- 
ham, Ala.,  to  New  Orleans,  La.,  not  found 
to  be  unreasonable,  as  compared  with 
other  cities  similarly  situated.  New  Or- 
leans Board  of  Trade  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.. 
23  L  C.  C.  429,  431. 

(c)  The  Commission's  authority  with 
respect  to  relative  adjustments  upon  a 
mileage  or  other  basis  is  more  t  roperly 
to  be  exercised  where  transportation  to 
common  destination  is  performed  by 
same  carriers  or  set  of  carriers  from  re- 
spective points  of  origin.  Ashgrove  Ce- 
ment Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  519,  525. 

(cc)  Unless  some  substantial  reason 
to  the  contrary  is  shown,  rates  from  De- 
troit should  bear  the  ordinary  relation  to 
those  from  Chicago.  Traugott  Schmidt 
&  Sons  V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C. 
684,  687. 

(d)  Rates  can  seldom  be  tested,  even 
as  to  their  reasonableness,  strictly  by 
themselves,  but  must  be  considered,  to 
an  extent,  in  reference  to  their  environ- 
ment. Southwestern  Missouri  Millers' 
Club  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
422,  427. 

(dd)  When  it  appears  that  a  carrier 
gives  to  one  point  substantially  lower 
rates  for  substantially  the  same  service 
that  it  accords  to  a  competing  point, 
those  comparisons  are  forceful,  and  in 
the  absence  of  modifying  conditions 
might  well  be  considered  conclusive. 
Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v.  St.  L.  I. 
M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  548,  555. 

(e)  Complainants  shipped  numerous 
carloads  of  ice  from  ice  plants  in  the 
Pocono  Mountains  upon  the  line  of  the 
D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  to  various  points  of 
consumption  upon  the  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R. 
in  New  Jersey.  In  previous  proceed- 
ings the  Commission  found  the  rate  to 
the  terminal  points  unreasonable  (15 
1.  C.  C.  305;  17  I.  C.  C.  447).  Carriers 
reduced  the  rates  to  the  terminal  points 
but  did  not  reduce  the  rates  to  inter- 
mediate points,  although  the  Commis- 
sion found  the  rate  to  be  unreasonable 
to    the    terminal    points.      HELD,    there 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §28   (ee)  — (p) 


603 


Is  no  reason  why  the  Commission  must 
not  also  have  found  the  same  rate  un- 
reasonable to  the  intermediate  point 
upon  the  direct  line  of  transportation 
since  it  found  the  rate  to  be  unreason- 
able to  the  terminal  point.  Rates  to 
the  terminal  points  reduced,  and  repa- 
ration awarded.  Mountain  Ice  Co.  v. 
D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  45; 
reparation  orders  modified,  and  state- 
ment of  facts  concerning  reparation,  re- 
written,   21    I.    C.    C.    596. 

(ee)  The  rates  applicable  to  each 
kind  of  traffic  necessarily  must  be 
made  with  reference  to  the  facts,  cir- 
cumstances and  conditions  governing 
the  production,  transportation  and  mar- 
keting of  the  respective  products.  With 
the  exception,  perhaps,  of  the  long-and- 
short-haul  clause  the  law  has  not  under- 
taken to  prescribe  for  the  guidance  of 
the  Commission  any  measure  of  reason- 
ableness and  justness  of  rates,  and  it 
is  therefore  left  to  judge  from  the  facts, 
circumstances  and  conditions  affecting 
the  particular  traffic.  East  St.  Louis  Cot- 
ton Oil  Co.  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co., 
20   I.   C.  C.   37,  42. 

(f)  Both  class  and  commodity  rates 
to  Spokane  should  be  slightly  lower 
from  Mississippi  River  points  than  from 
Chicago  points.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N. 
P.   Ry.   Co.,   19   L   C.   C.  162,   176. 

(ff)  It  is  self-evident  that  the  car- 
riage of  through  traffic  is  less  expensive 
than  the  movement  of  local  business, 
and  this  fact  has  served  in  part  as  a 
basis  for  lowering  through  rates,  which 
were  made  up  of  the  combination  upon 
intermediate  points.  In  no  case,  how- 
ever, has  this  been  the  sole  ground  for 
action,  and  the  Commission  has  ex- 
pressly recognized  the  possibility  that 
the  factors  comprising  a  through  rate 
may  be  so  low  in  themselves  as  to  yield 
a  reasonable  through  charge.  This  ele- 
ment alone,  without  support  of  any  sub- 
stantial character,  would  not  afford  suf- 
ficient reason  for  a  reduction  in  rates. 
Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  397,  402. 

(g)  It  is  unjust  to  fix  rates  so  as  to 
destroy  the  business  of  one  concern  and 
create  a  monopoly  in  favor  of  other 
concerns,  even  though  it  be  merely  in- 
cidental to  meeting  competitive  rates. 
Spiegle  &  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
522,   525. 

(h)  Rates  to  local  points  must  be 
determined   independent   of   comparisons 


with  competitive  points.  Rainey  & 
Rogers  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
I.   C.   C.   88,   89. 

(i)  There  is  no  ground  for  charging 
a  higher  rate  than  the  lowest  combina- 
tion. Noble  V.  V.  S.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  224,  225. 

(j)  The  unreasonableness  of  a  rate 
cannot  be  established  by  comparing  it 
with  the  rate  to  a  point  situated  at  the 
farther  edge  of  territory  taking  a 
blanket  rate,  when  the  purpose  of  the 
comparison  is  to  show  the  rates  charged 
with  respect  to  distance  involved.  Bash 
Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.   C.  522,  523. 

(k)  Where  rates  on  a  particular  com- 
modity bear  a  uniform  relation  to  rates 
of  a  certain  class,  any  inequalities  in 
those  rates,  as  between  different  places, 
are  those  peculiar  to  that  class.  A  find- 
ing, therefore,  that  rates  on  such  com- 
modities made  to  conform  to  a  class  are 
relatively  unjust  would  inferentially  con- 
fiemn  the  adjustment  with  respect  of  the 
entire  class,  and  this  is  also  true  of  the 
reasonableness  of  the  rates.  Acme  Ce- 
ment Plaster  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  30,  35. 

(1)  The  question  of  whether  or  not 
the  rate  to  an  interior  point,  made  up  of 
a  competitive  water  or  terminal  rate  plus 
a  local  rate,  is  reasonable,  must  of  neces- 
sity depend  largely  upon  the  reasonable- 
ness of  the  local  rate.  Commercial  Clab 
of  Hattiesburg  v.  Ala.  Gt.  So.  R.  R.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  534,  543. 

(mn)  The  Commission  is  bound  to  con- 
sider the  relation  that  rates  involved  in 
any  case  bear  to  rates  at  other  point?;, 
and  to  take  into  account  the  probable 
result  of  a  change  in  that  relation.  Board 
of  Trade  of  Winston-Salem  v.  N.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  12,  18. 

(o)  One  of  the  most  satisfactory  tests 
of  the  reasonableness  of  the  rates  of  one 
carrier  is  a  comparison  with  the  rates 
of  other  carriers  operating  in  the  same 
territopy  under  the  same  general  condi- 
tions. Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Mil- 
waukee V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
460,  466. 

(p)  Rates  made  up  on  the  combina- 
tion of  a  closely  adhered  to  basing  line 
must  be  made  with  regard  to  the  cost 
of  the  terminal  service,  which  is  neces- 
sarily high.  Kindel  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  555.  558. 


604 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §28  (q)— (cc) 


(q)  A  system  of  making  rates  on  cer- 
tain basing  lines  should  not  be  abolished, 
since  no  system  of  rate  making  has  been 
devised  successfully  as  a  substitute  for 
it;  but  it  must  not  be  assumed  that  a 
basing  line  for  rates  may  be  established, 
and  be  made  an  impassable  barrier  for 
through  rates,  or  that  cities  or  markets 
located  at  or  upon  such  basing  line  havp 
any  inviolable  possession  of,  or  hold 
upon,  the  right  to  distribute  traffic  in 
or  from  the  territory  lying  beyond,  and 
development  of  .natural  resources,  in- 
crease of  population,  growth  of  manufao 
turing  or  producing  facilities  and  in- 
creased traffic  on  railroads  may  create 
changed  conditions,  warranting  changes 
in  rates,  in  order  to  afford  .iust  and  rea 
sonable  opportunity  for  interchan.'^'^  of 
traffic  between  points  of  production  anr^ 
points  of  consumption.  Burnham,  Hanna. 
Hunger  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.    C.   C.   299,   312. 

(r)  The  Commission  has  no  authority 
to  establish  general  rate  schedules  but 
must  deal  with  the  interstate  rates  ^' 
this  country,  which  have  not  been  estab- 
lished upon  any  consistent  theory,  as 
it  finds  them.  What  the  Commission 
takes  off  in  one  place  it  cannot  add  in 
another.  Unless,  therefore,  the  general 
result  of  all  rates  is  to  yield  an  undue 
revenue  to  the  carrier,  the  Commission 
should  not  reduce  a  particular  rate  sim- 
ply because  ft  might  think,  if  establish- 
ing that  rate  de  novo  as  part  of  the  gen- 
eral scheme,  that  it  ought  to  be  some- 
what lower  Or  somewhat  higher  in  pro- 
portion to  others.  The  rate  attacked 
must  be  so  out  of  proportion  as  to  be 
unreasonable,  or  must  so  discriminate  as 
to  be  undue,  or  must  be  unlawful  for 
some  other  special  reason.  Corn  Belt 
Meat  Producers'  Ass'n  v.  C.  B.  &  Q  Ry 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  376,  394. 

(s)  A  most  important  consideration 
in  determining  the  reasonableness  of  a 
rate  is  its  relation  to  other  rates.  This 
is  especially  so  where  the  rate  attacked 
is  highly  competitive.  Banner  Millins:  Co. 
V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
31,  34. 

(t)  It  is  not  sufficient  for  a  carrier 
when  called  upon  to  justify  a  rate,  the 
reasonableness  of  which  is  questioned, 
to  assert  that  its  rates  generally  are  fair 
and  just,  and  that  no  change  may  prop- 
erly be  made  in  any  particular  rate  be- 
cause it  would  disturb  the  integrity  of  the 
system  as  a  whole  and  produce  inconsist- 
encies.    This  proposition  is  too  general 


and  theoretical  for  acceptance  in  th'U 
application  of  the  requirements  of  the 
law  to  a  practical  situation.  In  dealing 
with  a  particular  rate  it  is  the  purpo^-e 
of  the  Commission  to  consider  such  other 
rates,  as  affording  a  basis  for  compari- 
son, but  where  a  given  rate  is  found  to 
be  unreasonable,  it  will  not  hesitate  to 
order  such  rate  reduced,  although  the 
reduction  might  disarrange  the  relative 
adjustment  existing  between  that  rate 
and  other  rates.  Reynolds  v.  South- 
ern Express  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  536,  540. 

(u)  Rates  on  corn  and  wheat  from 
Cook,  Neb.,  to  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  via  Auburn, 
should  not  exceed  that  ma'ntaiT^ed  via 
Nebraska  City,  Neb.  Robertson  Bros.  v. 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  126. 

(v)  Rates  on  common  buildino:  brick 
from  Mound  Valley,  Kan.,  to  Bellevue, 
Neb.,  should  not  exceed  the  rates  to 
Omaha,  Neb.  Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v. 
M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  128. 

(w)  Rates  on  apples  from  Atchison 
and  Leavenworth,  Kan.,  and  Savannah, 
Mo.,  to  La  Crosse,  Wis.,  should  not  ex- 
ceed that  in  effect  to  St.  Paul,  Minn. 
Reparation  awarded.  Lamb  Co.  v.  C.  & 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  133. 

(x)  Rate  on  lumber  from  Tony,  Wis., 
to  Zumbrota,  Minn.,  should  not  exceed 
that  in  effect  from  Ingram,  Wis.  Part- 
ridge Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste. 
M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  138. 

(y)  Rate  on  cement  from  lola,  Kan., 
'o  Tekamah,  Neb.,  should  not  exceed  that 
n  effect  to  Sioux  City  over  the  same 
route.  Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  C.  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  148. 

(z)  Rates  on  sugar  from  Sterling  and 
Windsor,  Colo.,  to  La  Crosse,  Wis.,  should 
not  exceed  those  in  effect  to  St.  Paul. 
Reparation  awarded.  Great  Western 
Sugar  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
157. 

(aa)  Rate  from  La  Junta,  Colo.,  to 
Milwaukee,  Wis.,  out  of  line  with  other 
rates  from  Colorado  common  points.  Rep- 
aration awarded.  Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v. 
0.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  259. 

(bb)     Rate  to  Rock  Island,  111.,  should 

lot  exceed   that  in  effect  to  Davenport, 

a.,    from    Hartford,    Mich.      Reparation 

awarded.      Lagomarcino-Grupe    Co.   v.    C. 

B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  269. 

(cc)  Rate  on  ground  phosphate  rock 
to  Newport,  Del.,  from  Mount  Pleasant, 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §28  (dd)— §32  (a) 


605 


Tenn.,  should  not  exceed  that  contempo- 
raneously in  effect  to  Wilminpton,  Del., 
and  Philadelphia,  Pa.  Central  Phosphate 
Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  440. 

(dd)  Rate  on  windmill  towers  shoull 
not  exceed  the  rate  on  windmills.  Stover 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  114. 

(ee)  Rate  on  empty  mineral-water  bot- 
tles, returned,  should  not  exceed  rate  on 
empty  beer  bottles,  returned.  Sheboygan 
Mineral  Water  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Un- 
rep. Op.  116. 

(ff)  Rate  on  empty  beer  p-ackages 
from  Atchison,  Kan.,  to  Milwaukee,  Wis., 
not  found  unreasonable.  Complaint  dis- 
missed. Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  125. 

(gg)  Rates  on  petroleum  and  prod- 
ucts from  Chanute  and  Erie,  Kan.,  to 
Omaha,  Neb.,  should  not  exceed  those  in 
effect  from  Coffeyville,  Kan.  Rates  re- 
duced and  reparation  awarded.  Chanute 
Refining  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  348. 

(hh)  Rates  on  brewers'  refuse,  wet, 
should  not  exceed  that  in  effect  on  brew- 
ers' refuse,  dry.  Degentesh  Bros.  v.  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  365. 

(ii)  Rates  on  sugar  butter  should  not 
exceed  rates  contemporaneously  in  effect 
on  maple  sugar.  Reparation  awarded. 
Post  Co.  V.  D.  L.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  425. 

(jj)  Locomotive  tires  and  iron  axles 
and  wire  articles  are  dissimilar.  Not  en- 
titled to  same  rates.  Goodman  Mfg.  Co. 
V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  570. 

(kk)  Double  first-class  rate  on  sodium 
peroxide  found  unreasonable  to  the  ex- 
tent of  first-class  rate.  Goldfield  Con- 
solidated Mines  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  Unrep 
Op.  593. 

§29.     Reproduction    Value   of    Road. 
See   Evidence,  §49. 

(a)  The  Commission  has  for  many 
years  felt  the  necessity  of  having  infor- 
mation regarding  the  value  of  the  physi- 
cal properties  of  the  carriers  in  the 
United  States  as  an  elament  in  the  valu- 
ation of  their  entire  properties.  Boileau 
V.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I  C.  C.  640. 
652. 

(aa)  If  any  importance  whatever  is  to 
be  attached  to  the  cost  of  reproduction 
in  the  establishment  of  railway  rate-;,  the 


valuation  must  be  undertaken  by  tlie 
Government  itself.  City  of  Spokane  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C  376,  403. 

(b)  In  passing  upon  a  question  of  rea- 
sonableness of  rates  the  present  value 
of  the  carrier's  right  of  way  is  to  be  con- 
sidered, despite  the  fact  that  its  original 
cost  may  have  been  slight  and  its  jires- 
ent  value  be  great.  City  of  Spokane  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  415. 

§30.     Revenues    From    Facilities. 
See    Evidence,  §36. 

(a)  The  fact  that  the  net  revenues 
of  a  carrier  from  its  ownership  of  a 
bridge,  on  which  an  arbitrary  is  charged 
for  passengers  and  freight  carried  across 
the  same,  may  be  greater  than  the  re- 
turns on  ordinary  business  enterprises 
is  not  sufficient  in  itself  to  justify  a 
holding  that  the  bridge  tolls  are  ex- 
cessive. Bridges  are  and  have  been 
regarded  as  precarious  property.  They 
may  be  damaged  or  entirely  swept  away 
by  floods  and  erection  of  other  bridges 
nearby  may  draw  away  their  tenants, 
and  thus  seriously  affect  their  earning 
capacity.  The  net  revenues  have  an 
undoubted  and  .also  an  important  bear- 
ing upon  the  question  of  the  reason- 
ableness of  rates,  but  the  value  of  the 
service  to  the  shipper  and  the  other  ele- 
ments so  often  referred  to  as  entering 
into  the  reasonableness  of  rates  must 
also  be  taken  into  consideration.  A 
railroad  company  may  be  operated  with 
a  less  return  than  it  ought  to  enjoy,  or 
even  at  a  loss,  but  neither  condition  of 
affairs  world  justify  the  exaction  by 
it  of  rates  that  are  higher  than  they 
reasonably  should  be  for  service  per- 
formed, all  things  being  considered.  So 
also  the  fact  that  the  net  earnings  of 
a  carrier  may  be  large  does  not  of  it- 
self justify  the  Commission  fixing  a  rate 
at  less  than  is  reasonable  for  the  serv- 
ice, all  other  things  being  considered. 
Railroad  Commissioners  of  la.  v.  I.  C. 
R.   R.   Co.,   20  L  C.  C.  181,   186. 

§31.     Special    Service. 

See  Special   Services. 

(a)  A  commodity  transported  in 
special  cars  should  be  charged  a  higher 
rate  than  when  transported  in  ordinary 
box  cars.  Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D.  L. 
&  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  447. 

§32.     Standard  for   Carriers. 

(a)  In  determining  the  reasonable- 
ness  of  an  advance  in  rates  by  all  the 


606 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES.  §32   (b)— §821/2   (a) 


railroads  in  Official  Classification  terri- 
tory, the  Commission  ought  not  to  make 
the  most  opulent  nor  the  poorest  rail- 
road the  standard  by  which  to  measure 
the  reasonableness  of  the  rates.  In 
this  territory  the  Pennsylvania  system, 
the  New  York  Central  lines  and  the 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  may  be  taken 
as  typical,  and  whatever  rate  might 
reasonably  be  imposed  upon  the&e  three 
systems  must  be  held  to  be  a  reasonable 
charge  for  that  service  by  all  lines. 
Under  rates  reasonable  for  these  three 
systems  there  may  be  lines  whose  earn- 
ings will  be  extravagant,  but  that  is 
their  good  fortune.  There  may  be  lines 
which  cannot  make  sufficient  earnings, 
but  that  is  their  misfortune.  The  Com- 
mission ought  not  to  impose  upon  this 
territory,  for  the  purpose  of  allowing 
defendants  additional  revenues,  higher 
rates  than  are  adequate  to  these  three 
systems,  considered  as  a  whole.  In  Re 
Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20 
I.   C.  C.   243,  274. 

(b)  In  determining  a  freight  rate 
which  must  of  necessity  be  charged  by 
competing  lines  the  Commission  would 
not  look  exclusively  to  that  line  which 
could  handle  the  business  the  cheapest, 
or  which  was  the  strongest  financially, 
but  would  consider  as  well  the  weaker 
rival.  It  has  never  intimated  that  the 
rate  should  be  fixed  solely  with  refer- 
ence to  the  weakest  line,  and  it  would 
certainly  be  most  unjust  to  the  public 
in  establishing  rates  to  Utah  common 
points  to  consider  merely  the  expensive 
and  circuitous  route  via  the  D.  &  R.  G. 
R.  R.  The  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  handles 
about  40  per  cent  of  the  Utah  business 
from  the  East  at  the  present  time.  It 
will  continue  to  handle  a  considerable 
part  of  it,  and  must  accept  a  rate  estab- 
lished by  the  Commission.  This  the 
Commission  must  and  does  take  into 
account  in  the  fixing  of  that  rate,  but 
it  must  be  largely  influenced  by  the 
cost  of  handling  that  business  over  the 
short  and  easy  line,  the  U.  P.  R.  R. 
While  this  traffic  is  important  to  the 
D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.,  its  revenue  from  this 
source  is  but  a  small  part  of  its  entire 
income,  and  the  Commission  could  not 
permit  the  maintenance  of  unreasonable 
rates  simply  because  the  entire  result 
of  the  operations  of  this  company  might 
not  be  as  favorable  as  would  otherwise 
be  proper.  Commercial  Club  of  Salt 
Lake  City  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  218,  222. 


(c)  In  determining  the  reasonable- 
ness of  rates  from  the  West  to  southern 
territory,  the  interests  of  all  competing 
lines  must  be  considered,  and  not  merely 
that  line  which  can  handle  the  business 
cheapest.  Receivers'  &  Shippers'  Ass'n 
of  Cincinnati  v.  C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  440,  464. 

(d)  In  determining  rates  between  two 
points,  neither  that  railroad  which  can 
afford  to  handle  traffic  at  the  lowest 
rate  nor  that  whose  necessities  might 
justify  the  highest  rate  should  be  exclu- 
sively considered.  City  of  Spokane  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  392. 

(e)  What  may  be  a  proper  rate  as  be- 
tween separate  railroads  may  become  un- 
reasonable and  unjust  when  these  rail- 
roads are  absorbed  by  a  large  system 
serving  an  extensive  territory.  Black 
Mountain  Coal  Land  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co  ,  15 
I.  C.  C.  286,  292. 

(f)  Before  the  Commission  can  con- 
clude that  a  rate  on  a  given  commodity 
is  too  high,  because  it  is  higher  than 
some  other  rate  named,  it  must  know 
that  the  rate  selected  as  the  standard  for 
a  comparison  is  a  reasonable  and  a  fair 
one.  Darling  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  O,  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  79,  83. 

§32"/2-     Subsequent   Reduction. 

See  Absorption  of  Charges,  §2  (b); 
Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 
§13   (j). 

(a)  The  voluntary  reduction  of  a  rate 
is  not  necessarily  of  itself  proof  of  the 
fact  that  the  prior  rate  was  unreasonable. 
Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A. 
Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  214,  217;  National 
Refining  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  527,  530;  Pierce  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R 
R.,  23  I.  C.  C.  89,  91;  Portsmouth  Steel 
Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  510, 
511;  Fairmont  Creamery  Co.  v.  C.  B.  & 
Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  252,  253;  Carter 
White  Lead  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21 
I.  C.  C.  41,  44;  Victor  Mfg.  Co.  v.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  222,  226;  Roberts  Cotton 
Oil  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I  C.  C.  248, 
251;  Steinfeld  &  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  12,  14;  Anadarko  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  43,  50; 
Riverside  Mills  v.  G.  R.  R.,  20  I.  C.  C.  423, 
425;  Indepenaent  Supply  Co.  v.  C.  &  P.  R. 
R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  66,  67;  American  Cigar 
Co.  V.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  81,  82; 
Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  L 
C.  C.  165,  166;  Maxwell  v.  W.  T.  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  1.  C.  C.  197,  198;  UUman 
V.  American  Express  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  354, 


REASONABLENESS  OP  RATES,  §32i/o  (aa)— §33  (c) 


607 


355;  Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P 
Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  584,  586;  Wabash  Coat- 
ing Mills  V.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
91;  Penn.  Tobacco  Co.  v.  Old  Dominion 
S.  S.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  197,  199;  Lamb  Co. 
V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  279;  Ken- 
tucky Wagon  Mfg.  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
18  L  C.  C.  360,  363;  Stock  Yards  Cotton 
&  Linseed  Meal  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  295,  296;  Foster  Lumber 
Co.  V.  G.  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
385,  386;  Armour  Car  Lines  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  461;  Diehl  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  190,  192;  Alphons 
Custodis  Chimney  Construction  Co.  v.  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  10  L  C.  C.  584,  586;  Com- 
mercial Coal  Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  11,  14;  Harlow  Lumber  Co.  v. 
A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  501,  508; 
Ottumwa  Bridge  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  121,  125;  Hammond 
Packing  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.   Op.    120;    Pabst   Brewing   Co.   v. 

C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  259; 
Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry. 
Co.  of  Tex.,  Unrep.  Op.  323;  Godfrey  & 
Sons  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  503;   Edison  Portland  Cement  Co.  v. 

D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  538; 
Alaska  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep  Op.  564. 

(aa)  On  ground  iron  ore  in  carloads 
from  Iron  Ridge  Junction,  Wis.,  to  Spo- 
kane, Wash.,  complainant  was  assessed 
$1.04,  60c  to  Portland,  Ore.,  and  44c  back 
to  Spokane.  One  day  after  shipment 
moved  defendants  in  pursuance  of  an  or- 
der of  the  Commission  reduced  the  rate 
in  question  to  00c  to  make  it  equal  to  the 
Portland  rate.  Defendants  admitted  the 
rate  collected  to  be  unreasonable.  HELD, 
reparation  should  be  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  60c.  Winters  Metallic  Paint  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  596, 
597. 

(b)  Through  class  rate  in  excess  of 
through  commodity  rate  formerly  in  ef- 
fect and  subsequently  restored  found  to 
be  unreasonable.  Western  Lime  &  Ce- 
ment Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  20. 

(c)  Cotton-seed  meal,  Sumter,  S.  C, 
to  Tampa,  Fla.,  found  unreasonable  on 
basis  of  lower  rate  subsequently  estab- 
lished. Reparation  awarded.  Southern 
Cotton  Oil  Co.  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  119. 

(d)  Commission  held  motorcycles 
should  not  exceed  first-class  rate  in  car- 


loads and  one  and  one-half  times  the 
first  class  in  less  than  carloads.  Car- 
rier put  in  effect  commodity  rates 
equal  to  such  reduction  and  subse- 
quently Commission  reduced  class  rates. 
Reparation  awarded  on  basis  of  subse- 
quent reduction.  Mead  Auto  Cycle  Co. 
V.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  435;  Whiting 
V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  436. 

(e)  Rate  voluntarily  reduced,  ordered 
maintained  for  two  years.  Paonia  Pack- 
ing Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  487;  Burno  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  488. 

(f)  Class  rate  held  unreasonable  as 
compared  with  lower  commodity  rate 
subsequently  established.  Reparation 
awarded  and  reduced  rate  to  be  main- 
tained for  two  years.  Platte  Bros.  v.  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  493; 
Moore  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  574. 

§33.     Surplus. 

See  Advanced    Rates,   §6    (4). 

(a)  A  definite  and  uniform  allotment 
of  funds  from  the  charge  imposed  for 
the  movement  of  each  character  of 
traflSc  to  provide  for  interest,  dividends 
and  surplus  is  not  proper  or  justifiable, 
for  the  plain  reason  that  it  entirely 
abrogates  all  classification.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances on  Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C. 
C.   604,   625. 

(b)  Carriers  in  Oflicial  Classification 
territory  increased  all  class  rates  and 
about  half  their  commodity  rates.  They 
contended  they  should  be  allowed  to  in- 
vest in  improvements  and  additions  to 
the  property  an  amount  equal  to  that 
paid  by  way  of  dividends  to  stockhold- 
ers. In  the  year  1910  railroad  dividends 
aggregated  $405,131,650.  HELD,  that  in- 
asmuch as  every  dollar  thus  added  to 
the  value  of  the  property  justifies,  ac- 
cording to  the  claim  of  the  defendants, 
an  added  net  return,  the  Commission 
cannot  properly  permit  an  advance  in 
rates  with  the  intent  to  produce  an  ac- 
cumulation of  surplus  for  this  purpose, 
until  the  status  of  the  surplus  is  deter- 
mined by  legislative  actions  or  judicial 
interpretation.  In  Re  Advances  in  Rates 
—Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  270. 

(c)  A  railroad  in  ordinary  years 
should  be  permitted  to  show  a  substan- 
tial surplus  over  and  above  the  payment 
of  a  reasonable  dividend.  This  is  nec- 
essary to  provide  for  interest  on  capital 
invested  in  improvements  which  will 
not  yield  an  immediate  return,   to  take 


608 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §33  (d)— §3G  (g) 


care  of  the  element  of  obsolescence  and 
to  tide  over  years  of  depression,  the 
amount  of  this  surplus,  if  estimated  in 
comparison  with  the  dividend  of  stock- 
holders, must  depend  upon  the  relation 
between  stocks  and  bonds  and  between 
value  and  capitalization.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C. 
C.   243,    271,   272. 

(d)  It  seems  proper  that  the  accu- 
mulation of  a  surplus  should  be  allowed 
a  carrier  to  provide  for  the  deprecia- 
tion of  way  and  structures.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C 
C.  243,  271. 

(e)  The  Commission  in  fixing  rates 
cannot  assume  that  the  surplus  accumu- 
lated by  a  railroad  has  been  derived  from 
unreasonable  exactions,  and  establish 
low  rates  with  a  view  of  returning  it 
to  the  public.  City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  416. 

(f)  In  determining  what  will  be  rea- 
sonable rates  for  the  future,  the  Commis- 
sion may  properly  consider  that  under 
the  rates  in  effect  a  large  surplus  has 
been  accumulated  in  the  past,  but  it 
should  not  make  rates  for  the  purpose  of 
distributing  that  surplus  to  the  public- 
City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.  C.  376,  416. 

(g)  It  is  impossible  to  restore  what 
has  been  improperly  taken  in  the  way 
of  excessive  rates  to  those  persons  fron: 
whom  it  has  been  received.  The  Gov 
ernment,  under  those  circumstances,  can 
not  lay  hold  of  this  surplus  as  a  fund  in 
trust  for  the  public.  City  of  Spokane  v. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  376,  416. 

§34.     Terminal  Facilities. 

See  Terminal  Facilities, 
(a)  Terminal  facilities,  such  as  team 
tracks  located  on  an  extensive  switching 
system,  are  entitled  to  weight  in  the  con- 
sideration of  the  reasonableness  of  a 
rate.  Maritime  Exchange  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  81,  84. 

§35.     Time  of  Changing  Rate. 

(a)  The  public  is  entitled  to  depend 
within  bounds  upon  the  continuance  of 
rates  when  they  are  once  established. 
Western  Oregon  Lumber  v.  S.  P.  Co.. 
14  L  C.  C.  61,  72. 

(b)  Carriers  in  changing  rates,  mini- 
ma, or  other  rules  which  affect  the  trans- 
portation charges  on  a  commodity  mov- 
ing only  at  a  particular  season,  should 


give  consideration  to  the  shipping  and 
selling  seasons  for  that  commodity,  and 
arrange  for  such  changes  to  become  ef- 
fective at  a  time  when  they  will  not 
seriously  disarrange  or  unfavorably  af- 
fect the  movement  or  sale  of  the  sea- 
son's output.  Hartville  Celery  Growers' 
Ass'n  V,  Pacific  Express  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
590,  593. 

§35.     Ton-IVIile  Revenue. 

See   Supra,   §11;   Evidence,   §36. 

(a)  The  revenue  per  ton-mile  in  it- 
self is  not  a  sufficient  basis  for  a  judg- 
ment regarding  the  reasonableness  of 
the  rate  which  yields  that  revenue.  In- 
quiry must  be  made  regarding  the  ex- 
pense incurred  in  doing  the  business. 
Nebraska  State  Ry.  Commission  v.  C.  B. 
&  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  1.  C.  C.  121,  125. 

(aa)  The  rate  per  ton-mile  is  but  one 
of  many  influences  in  rate  adjustments; 
and  in  the  present  case  its  value  as  a 
comparison  is  somewhat  impaired.  Ash- 
grove  Cement  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  519,  524. 

(b)  It  is  fallacious  to  place  reliance 
upon  ton-mile  earnings  as  a  basis  of  rate- 
raking.  Much  profitable  freight  is  car- 
ried which  yields  the  lowest  rates  per  ton 
per  mile.  In  Re  Advances  on  Coal  to 
Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C.  604,  620. 

(c)  On  no  traffic,  except  it  be  lum- 
ber, are  per  ton-mile  earnings  more  help- 
rul  in  the  determination  of  a  reasonable 
rate  than  on  grain.  In  Re  Investigation 
of  Advances  in  Rates  on  Grain,  21  I.  C.  C. 
22,  33. 

(d)  Ton-per-mile  revenue  is  far  from 
conclusive  evidence  of  the  reasonable- 
ness of  a  rate.  Danville  Brick  Co.  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  239,  241. 

(e)  The  rate  per  ton  per  mile  is  en- 
titled to  be  considered  as  a  relative  test 
in  rate-making.  National  Hay  Ass'n  v. 
M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  34,  47. 

(f)  Per-ton-per-mile  comparisons  are 
often  helpful  in  reaching  a  conclusion  in 
respect  to  the  reasonablenes  of  rates, 
but  to  take  that  as  the  sole  test  would 
be  a  scrutiny  from  the  narrowest  view- 
point, which  would  deny  consideration 
to  many  other  potent  and  frequently  con- 
trolling forces  which  must  be  given  due 
weight  in  a  proper  determination.  Mus- 
kogee Trafl^c  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
R/.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  169,  173. 

(g)  The  rate  per  ton-mile  rule  brings 
rates    down    to    the    narrowest    point    of 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §36    (li)— §38   (c) 


60d 


scrutiny,  and  for  that  purpose  is  valu- 
able; but  it  excludes  consideration  of 
other  circumstances  and  conditions 
which  enter  into  the  making  of  rates,  no 
matter  how  compulsory  or  imperious 
they  may  be,  and  it  cannot,  therefore, 
be  accepted  as  controlling  in  determin- 
ing the  reasonableness  of  rates.  Cedar 
Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  387,  393. 

(h)  The  rate  per  ton-mile  is  not  the 
generally  accepted  basis  for  making  up 
rates,  so  far  at  least  as  interstate  move- 
ments are  concerned,  Bulte  Milling  Co. 
V.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  351,  362. 

§37.     Two-Line  Haul. 

See  Evidence,  §59. 

(a)  A  mileage  scale  of  rates  ordina- 
rily yields  a  much  higher  rate  in  propor- 
tion for  a  short  haul  than  for  the  long 
one;  and  when  two  short  hauls  are  com- 
bined it  is  usually  unjust  to  require  the 
two  carriers  to  accept  compensation  at 
the  rate  per  mile  applied  for  the  entire 
long  haul.  To  a  degree  they  are  entitled 
to  a  higher  rate  in  consideration  of  the 
fact  that  their  individual  hauls  are  short. 
In  Re  Investigation  of  Alleged  Unreason- 
able Rates  on  Meats,  23  I.  C.  C.  656,  661. 

(b)  A  rate  for  a  two-line  haul  from 
producing  points  of  live  stock  to  packing 
houses  may  properly  be  2i/^c  per  100  lbs. 
higher  than  for  a  one-line  haul.  In  Re 
Investigation  of  Rates  on  Meats,  22  I.  C. 
C.  160,  165. 

(c)  The  Commission  has  often  recog- 
nized that  rates  over  a  two-line  haul  may 
properly  exceed  what  would  be  reason- 
able rates  for  same  distance  and  under 
same  conditions  over  a  one-line  haul. 
Maricopa  County  Commercial  Club  v.  S. 
P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  429,  431. 

(d)  The  fact  that  transportation  in 
volves  a  two-line  haul  is  of  itself  a  rea- 
son for  a  somewhat  higher  charge  than 
if  the  service  were  entirely  over  a  sin- 
gle line.  Ontario  Iron  Ore  Co.  v.  N.  Y. 
C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  204,  206. 

(e)  A  commodity  rate  to  one  point 
over  one  line  affords  no  basis  of  com- 
parison with  a  higher  class  rate  to  a 
longer  distance  point  over  two  lines. 
Wells-Higman  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  L   C.   C.  175,  176. 

(f)  A  one-line  haul  rate  is  no  meas- 
ure of  reasonableness,  standing  alone, 
of  a  higher  rate  over  the  route  taken 
consisting  of  two  lines.     Snyder-Malone- 


Donahue  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
L   C.   C.  498. 

(g)  On  carloads  of  stock  cattle  from 
South  Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Cushman,  Mont., 
a  rate  of  43c  was  exacted  by  the  C.  B. 
&  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  and  the  G.  N.  R.  R.  The 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  had  in  effect  a  rate 
of  30 %c  from  South  Omaha  to  Lavina, 
Mont.,  a  point  six  miles  from  Cushman, 
and  not  reached  by  the  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
or  the  G.  N.  R.  R.  The  lower  rate  to 
Lavina  was  a  one-line  rate  for  a  one- 
line  haul,  whereas  the  rate  attacked  was 
divided  between  two  carriers.  No  other 
evidence  was  offered  to  show  the  rate 
complained  of  to  be  unreasonable. 
HELD,  evidence  that  there  is  a  lower 
rate  to  a  nearby  point  via  another  line 
is  not  sufficient  to  establish  the  unrea- 
sonableness of  the  rate  in  question. 
Snyder-Malone-Donahue  Co.  v.  C.  B.  & 
Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  498,  499. 

(h)  If  one  carrier  voluntarily  gives  a 
very  low  rate  per  ton  per  mile  over  a 
long  and  circuitous  route  in  order  to 
handle  traffic  entirely  over  its  own  lines 
this  affords  no  standard  of  the  reason- 
ableness of  a  rate  on  other  traffic  which 
passes  over  two  or  more  separately 
owned  lines  of  railroad.  Cedar  Hill 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17 
I.   C.   C.   479,   485. 

§38.     Value    of   Commodity. 
See  Classification,   §11. 

(a)  The  fact  that  the  value  of  wool 
is  much  greater  than  that  of  sheep  and 
the  rate  is  a  thing  of  less  relative  con- 
sequence to  the  producer  might  justify 
a  somewhat  higher  rate  on  the  wool 
than  on  the  live  animal.  In  Re  Trans- 
portation of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23 
I.   C.   C.   151,  159. 

(b)  The  fact  that  a  commodity  is 
v-ery  desirable  traffic  from  a  transporta- 
tion standpoint,  loading  heavily,  and  not 
being  liable  to  loss  or  damage  in  transit, 
can  be  handled  at  the  convenience  of  the 
carrier,  and  affords  a  uniform  business, 
and  has  a  very  low  value  at  its  point 
of  production,  are  considerations  which 
call  for  a  low  rate  of  transportation. 
R.  R.  Com.  of  Kan.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.    Co.,   22   L   C.   C.   407,   410. 

(c)  Value  is  an  essential  factor  of  a 
reasonable  rate.  In  Re  Investigation  of 
Advances  in  Rates  on  Grain,  21  I.  C.  C. 
22,  35.  Maritime  Exchange  v.  P.  R.  R. 
Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  81,  85.  Commercial 
Clubs  V.   O.   S.  L.  R.  R.   Co.,  18  L  C.  C. 


610 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §38  (d)— §39  (d) 


562,  564.  James  &  Abbot  Co.  v.  B.  &  M. 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  273,  274.  Moun- 
tain Ice  Co.  V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  305,  320. 

(d)  In  fixing  a  rate  a  fair  allowance 
should  be  made  for  the  value  of  the 
commodity  handled.  Auto  Vehicle  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
286,  288. 

(e)  The  ad  valorem  principle  of  rate- 
making  can  never  be  departed  from.  In 
Re  Advances  in  Rates — Western  Case, 
20  I.  C.  C.   307,  355. 

(f)  It  is  a  well-established  theory  of 
rate-making,  and  generally  approved  by 
the  Commission,  that  raw  materia] 
should  be  carried  at  a  lower  rate  than 
its  finished  product,  but  there  are  ex- 
ceptions to  it,  such  as  tne  rate  on 
wheat  and  flour,  which,  because  of 
commercial  conditions,  are  ordinarily 
carried  at  the  same  rate.  For  many 
years  in  Official  Classification  territory 
petroleum  and  its  products  have  been 
given  the  same  rates;  although  refined 
oil  is  more  valuable  than  crude  petro- 
leum there  are  a  number  of  by-products 
of  petroleum  which  are  of  small  value, 
and  the  Commission  is  not  prepared  to 
say  in  this  case  that  on  the  whole  the 
practice  of  charging  the  same  rate  on 
petroleum  and  its  products  is  improper. 
National  Refining  Co.  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  649,  650. 

(g)  Rates  cannot  be  made  solely  with 
reference  to  the  value  of  the  article 
transported.  National  Hay  Ass'n  v.  M. 
C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  34,  47. 

(h)  It  is  axiomatic  that  rates  depend 
largely  upon  value,  and  hence,  there  is 
no  objection  to  a  special  rate  for  dam- 
aged or  defective  goods,  based  upon  the 
low  value  of  the  freight.  In  Re  Reduced 
Rates  on  Returned  Shipments,  19  I.  C.  C. 
409,  418. 

(i)  The  increase  in  value  of  the  com 
modity  transported  is  a  circumstance 
which  should  be  considered  in  determin- 
ing fhe  reasonableness  of  the  rate.  Dar- 
ling &  Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  79,  81. 

(j)  An  element  of  importance  in  the 
fixing  of  rates  is  the  value  of  the  article 
shipped,  since  it  affects  the  value  of  the 
service  to  the  shipper.  When,  however, 
the  carrier  has  established  a  reasonable 
rate  on  a  given  commodity,  it  cannot  be 
required  to  change  that  rate  to  accord 
with   the   differing  values   of   said   com- 


modity produced  by  defendant  shippers, 
riafey  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.    C.    245,    246. 

(k)  A  rate  that  nearly  approaches 
the  value  of  the  shipment  is  suggestive 
of  error  or  inadvertence  in  the  adjust- 
ment of  such.  Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  274, 
275. 

(1)  On  a  demand  that  the  rates  on 
chinaware  be  graded  according  to  value, 
the  Commission,  while  declining  to  do 
so  in  the  present  instance,  suggests  that 
there  are  many  reasons  for  adopting  such 
a  basis  of  rates  and  suggests  the  con- 
sideration of  such  plan  by  the  carriers. 
Union  Pacific  Tea  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  L  C.   C.  545,  546. 

(m)  Freight  rates,  as  a  whole,  should 
not  vary  with  the  price  of  the  commodity 
carried,  nor  with  general  business  condi- 
tions. The  railroad  shares  in  the  gen- 
eral adversity  or  general  prosperity  by 
loss  or  gain  in  the  amount  of  its  traffic, 
without  change  in  the  rate  itself.  Cattle 
Raisers'  Ass'n  of  Tex.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry. 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  418,  429. 

(n)  No  impropriety  exists  in  a  gradu- 
ation of  rates  in  accordance  with  the 
actual  values  of  specified  commodities. 
Tn  the  Matter  of  Released  Rates,  13  I. 
C.  C.  550,  564. 

(o)  Window  glass  is  a  desirable  traf- 
fic, because  it  loads  heavily  and  there  is 
little  risk  of  damage  under  the  present 
methods  of  packing.  Abeles  &  Co.  v.  St. 
L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  326. 

§39.     Value  of  Service. 

(a)  The  discharge  by  the  Commission 
of  its  duty  of  control  over  rates,  regu- 
lations and  practices  of  carriers,  neces- 
sarily involves  consideration  of  the  value 
of  the  service  given  to  the  shipper,  as 
well  as  the  cost  and  value  of  the  service 
furnished  by  the  carrier.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances on  Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C. 
60^4,  613. 

(b)  The  value  of  the  service  is  en- 
titled to  be  considered  in  rate  making. 
National  Hay  Ass'n  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C,  34,  47. 

(c)  The  value  of  the  service  has  a 
more  or  less  definite  relation  to  the  rate. 
Memphis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  318.  318. 

(d)  The  value  of  the  service  to  the 
shipper  is  not  conclusive  as  to  the  rea- 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §40    (a)— (j) 


611 


sonableness  of  the  rate  exacted,  Wilson 
Produce  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
170,  175. 

§40.     Volume  of  Traffic. 
See   Evidence,  §63. 

(a)  Rates  charged  for  the  transporta 
tion  of  mine-prop  logs  from  points  Id 
North  Carolina  to  Norfolk,  Va.,  of  3  and 
Zy2  cents  per  100  lbs.  were  attacked  to 
the  extent  they  exceeded  the  rates  on 
saw  logs  between  the  same  points  ol 
$2.50  per  1,000  board  feet.  The  logs  in 
tended  for  mine  props  are  similar  tc 
those  intended  for  conversion  into  lum- 
ber, except  that  they  are  longer;  how- 
ever, the  loading  and  unloading  are  done 
by  the  shippers  in  both  cases.  Logs  in- 
tended for  mine  props  are  handled  on 
single  cars  that  must  be  switched  out  of 
a  train  at  the  loading  point,  switched  into 
another  train  when  loaded  and  switched 
to  the  track  of  a  connecting  carrier  at 
destination,  and  are  moved  on  logging 
cars,  while  sawmill  logs  generally 
move  in  solid  trains.  The  only  serv- 
ice of  the  carrier  in  addition  to  the  road 
haul  is  the  coupling  and  uncoupling 
of  the  engine  at  the  two  ends  of  the 
run.  HELD,  the  fact  that  certain  traffic 
is  hauled  in  trainload  lots,  while  com- 
plainant's traffic  moves  in  carloads,  can- 
not be  made  the  basis  of  a  difference  in 
rates.  The  character  of  the  equipment 
used  is  in  the  discretion  and  for  the  con- 
venience of  the  carrier,  and  the  condi- 
tions surrounding  the  transportation  of 
mine  props  are  not  so  dissimilar  as  tc 
justify  a  higher  charge  thereon.  Defend- 
ant's rates  for  the  transportation  of  saw 
logs  in  this  territory  having  proven  to 
be  reasonable  and  compensatory,  it  is 
ordered  to  maintain  the  same  rate  on 
mine-prop  logs  as  is  contemporaneously 
applied  on  saw  logs.  Reparation  awarded. 
Rickards  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C. 
C.  239. 

(b)  Where  an  article  is  shipped  both 
in  carload  and  less-than-carload  lots,  the 
carrier  must  .provide  a  less-than-carload 
rate,  and  cannot  confine  the  movement  to 
carloads.  Albree  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 
22   I.    C.    C.   303,   320. 

(c)  A  rate  should  decrease  as  the 
density  of  traffic  increases.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C. 
C.    243,   275. 

(d)  Rates  are  usually  lowest  in  those 
sections  where  traffic  is  most  dense.    In 


Re  Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20 
I.  C.  C.  243,  275. 

(e)  The  volume  of  traffic  is  an  ele- 
ment of  rate  making.  National  Hay 
Ass'n  V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C 
34,  47. 

(fg)  If  a  rate  remains  the  same  nd 
the  cost  of  service  continues  the  same, 
an  increase  in  tonnage  must  produce  in- 
creased revenue.  Commercial  Club  of 
Salt  Lake  City  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
19    L    C.    C.    218,    223. 

(h)  In  attempting  to  establish  its 
contention  that  the  rates  on  butter,  eggs 
and  poultry  from  Omaha  to  points  in  Cen- 
tral Freight  Association  territory  and  the 
Atlantic  seaboard  were  discriminatory, 
complainant  compared  these  rates  with 
those  in  effect  on  packing-house  products 
and  fruits  and  vegetables.  HELD,  that 
fresh  meats  move  from  the  Missouri  River 
in  enormous  volume,  thus  in  1909,  29,000 
carloads,  as  against  790  of  dairy  prod- 
ucts; that  in  view  of  the  history  of  the 
rate,  as  well  as  the  tonnage,  the  Com- 
mission is  not  persuaded  that  the  rate 
on  fresh  meats  can  be  fairly  used  as 
a  standard  of  reasonableness;  that  such 
perishable  products  as  fruits  and  vege- 
tables likewise  afford  no  proper  com- 
parison with  the  traffic  under  considera- 
tion, for  they  differ  from  dairy  products 
so  materially  in  character  and  value, 
as  well  as  in  the  conditions  under  which 
they  are  transported.  A  comparison, 
however,  between  rates  on  butter,  eggs 
and  poultry  throughout  the  country  gen- 
erally, especially  in  sections  where  the 
traffic  conditions  are  essentially  similar, 
is  of  recognized  evidentiary  value.  Com- 
mercial Club  of  Omaha  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,   19   I.   C.   C.   397,  402. 

(i)  The  fact  that  brick  moves  in 
large  quantities  should  be  considered  in 
making  the  rate.  Hydraulic-Press  Brick 
Co.  V.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
530,   531. 

(j)  Whatever  difference  there  may 
be  in  the  cost  to  the  carrier  between 
traffic  in  trainloads  and  traffic  in  car- 
loads, it  appears  from  the  general 
course  of  legislation,  with  respect  to 
con;merce  between  the  states,  from  the 
debates  and  reports  of  the  various  com- 
mittees in  Congress  when  the  Act  was 
under  consideration,  from  the  better- 
considered  court  opinions  and  from  the 
reports  and  opinions  of  the  Commis- 
sion, that  to  give  greater  consideration 
to  trainload  traffic  than  to  carload  traf- 


612 


REASONABLENESS  OP  RATES,  §40  (k)— §41  (a) 


fiQ  would  create  preference  iu  favor  of 
large  shippers  and  he  to  the  prejudice 
of  small  shippers  and  the  public.  Ana- 
conda Copper  Mining  Co.  v.  C.  &  E. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  592,  596. 

(k)  Fertilizer  is  a  commodity  which 
ought  to  move  in  carloads  at  a  low  rate, 
and  in  sections  where  its  use  has  not 
become  extensive  and  there  is  consid- 
erable movement  in  less-than-carload 
lots  the  difference  in  rates  between  car- 
load and  less-than-carload  shipments 
should  not  be  too  wide.  Virginia-Caro- 
lina Chemical  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  1. 

(1)  In  regard  to  a  less-than-carload 
can  rate  on  milk,  that  rate  should  be 
somewhat  higher  than  the  rate  per  can 
when  transported  in  carloads,  but  such 
less-than-carload  rate  per  can  should 
bear  a  reasonable  and  proper  relation  to 
the  carload  rate.  Hood  &  Sons  v.  Del. 
&  Hud.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  15,  20. 

(m)  While  the  amount  shipped  by  a 
concern  has  little  or  no  bearing  on  the 
question  of  the  reasonableness  of  the 
rates,  it  is  of  some  significance  where 
the  shipments  reach  substantial  propor- 
tions. Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  L. 
S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  30,  38. 

(n)  So  long  as  carriers  publish  a  rea- 
sonable any-quantity  rate  the  mere  fact 
that  they  publish  a  lower  rate  in  car- 
loads on  other  commodities  does  not  jus- 
tify the  Commission  in  ordering  a  car- 
load rate  on  the  article  in  question. 
Bentley  &  Olmstead  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  56. 

(nn)  Propriety  of  trainload  rates 
doubted.  Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  O.  S. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  324,  328. 

(o)  Cheese  tonnage  from  southwest- 
ern Wisconsin  is  extraordinarily  dense, 
which,  all  other  elements  being  equal, 
should  cause  the  rates  to  be  lower.  Rail- 
road Commission  of  Wisconsin  v.  C.  & 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  85,  90. 

(p)  Since  traflfic  into  Oklahoma  and 
Texas  is  increasing  at  a  rate  not  ex- 
ceeded in  any  other  section  of  the  coun- 
try, some  reduction  should  be  made  in 
the  rates.  Ozark  Fruit  Growers'  Aes'n 
V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
134,    139. 

(q)  The  greater  density  of  popula- 
tion is  on  the  east  side  of  the  Missis- 
sippi River  and  the  development  is  such 
that  the   volume  of  traffic  exceeds  that 


on  the  west  side.  This  fact  greatly 
contributes  to  the  ability  of  the  lines 
to  handle  business  with  greater  advan- 
tage and  profit.  Chicago  Lumber  & 
Coal  Co.  V.  Tioga  Southeastern  Ry.  Co., 
16    L    C.    C.    323.   328. 

(r)  A  larger  volume  of  tonnage 
tends  to  lower  rates.  Moise  Bros.  Co. 
V.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  550, 
555. 

(s)  A  road  in  accepting  on  a  com- 
paratively small  volume  of  traffic  mov- 
ing to  a  given  point  exceptionally  low 
comparative  rates,  which  it  must  estab- 
lish in  order  to  secure  any  part  of  the 
traffic,  is  not  thereby  estopped  from 
charging  reasonably  remunerative  rates 
to  other  points  to  which  it  hauls  the 
volume  of  the  traffic  from  which  it 
must  derive  the  principal  part  of  its 
revenues.  Railroad  Commission  of  Ken- 
tucky V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
300,   308. 

(t)  Volume  of  traffic  may  excuse  a 
lower  rate,  partly  because  freight  can 
be  handled  more  cheaply  in  large  quan- 
tities than  in  small,  and  partly  because 
a  railroad  is  justified  in  making  a  lower 
rate  to  induce  a  large  volume  of  traffic, 
where  the  circumstances  are  such  that 
the  rate  will  have  this  effect.  Bur- 
gess V.  Transcontinental  Freight  Bu- 
reau,  13   I.    C.    C.    668,   675. 

§405^.     Wages. 

See     Blanket     Rates,     §4;     Evidence, 

§64/2. 

it  would  seem 

their  standard 

view  and  that 

should  not  be 

bringing  their 

of  conscious- 

E.  R.  R.  Co., 


(a)  In  fixing  coal  rates 
that  wages  of  miners  and 
of  living  should  be  kept  in 
great  issues  affecting  them 
decided   without   at   least 
interests  into   the  horizon 
ness.     Boileau  v.   P.   &  L, 
22  I.  C.  C.  640,  647. 

(b)  From  the  point  of  view  of  public 
policy  and  humanity,  considerations  such 
as  the  profits  of  the  operators  and  the 
carriers,  the  wages  and  standard  of  liv- 
ing of  the  miners  and  the  railway  em- 
ployees should  not  be  ignored  in  the  fix- 
ing of  rates  on  coal.  Boileau  v.  P.  &  L. 
E.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  640,  647. 

§41.     Weight. 

(a)  The  total  disregard  of  weight 
existing  under  the  mileage  basis  of 
making  rates  is  manifestly  unfair  to 
the    carrier    and    discriminatory    as    be- 


REASONABLENESS   OF  RATES,  §41    (b)— §44    (b) 


<)13 


tween  shippers.  The  cost  of  transpor- 
tation is  likely  to  vary  with  some  de- 
gree of  directness  with  tho  weight  of  the 
object  to  be  transported,  and  in  so  far 
as  cost  is  a  factor  in  rate  making, 
weight  must  likewise  be  a  factor.  This 
disregard  of  weight  existing  under  the 
mileage  basis  was  and  is  fundamentally 
wrong  and  should  be  corrected.  In  Re 
Advances  on  Locomotives  and  Tenders, 
21  L   C.  C.  103,  105. 

(b)  Weight  and  distance  are  two 
universally  recognized  fundamental  fac- 
tors in  rate  making.  In  Re  Advances 
in   Rates   on   Locomotives   and   Tenders, 

21  I.    C.   C.    103,   109. 

(c)  Weight  is  an  almost  immaterial 
factor  in  the  transportation  of  live  loco- 
motives. In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  on 
Locomotives  and  Tenders,  21  I.  C.  C 
103,  111. 

(d)  The  minimum  carload  weight  is 
a  factor  in  the  carload  rate,  and  in  con- 
nection with  the  rate  per  100  lbs.,  de- 
termines the  carload  earnings.  Any  re- 
duction in  the  minimum  weight  without 
an  increase  in  the  rate  per  100  'lbs. 
would  therefore  reduce  the  carload 
earnings  of  the  carrier,  and  would  be 
equivalent  to  a  reduction  in  the  rate 
Itself.  Georgia  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  G23,  630. 

(e)  The  cost  of  the  movement  to  the 
carrier  depends  upon  the  weight  loaded 
into  the  car.  The  weight  of  the  car 
must  be  hauled  whether  the  contents 
weigh  much  or  little.  The  expense  of 
transporting  a  car  containing  20,000  lbs. 
is  not  much  greater  than  the  expense  of 
carrying  the  same  car  if  it  contains 
but  10,000  lbs.  Montague  &  Co.  v.  A. 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  72,  74. 

ill.     REASONABLE  RATES. 
§42.     Adding-Machine    Paper. 

(a)  On  adding-machine  paper  in 
less  than  carloads  from  Chicago  to 
Portland,  a  rate  of  .$2.20  per  100  lbs. 
was  charged.  Check  paper  for  cash 
registers  was  charged  at  the  rate  of 
$1.75  in  less  than  carloads.  The  two 
articles  were  similar  in  character  and 
value.  HELD,  the  rate  charged  on  roll 
paper  was  discriminatory  to  the  extent 
that  it  exceeded  $1.75.  Reparation 
awarded.     Gill  Co.  v.  O.  R.  R.  &  N.  Co., 

22  I.   C.   C.  442. 


§43.     Agricultural    Implements. 

(a)  On  carloads  of  agricultural  Im- 
plements from  Horicon  Junction,  Wis., 
to  points  beyond  Minnesota  Transfer, 
a  rate  of  20c  was  assessed  on  the  haul 
to  Minnesota  Transfer.  For  several 
years  prior  to  a  date  shortly  before 
the  movement  in  question,  the  rate  to 
the  Transfer  was  17c,  and  shortly  after 
shipment  it  was  restored.  Defendant 
did  not  admit  on  the  pleadings  the  un- 
reasonableness of  the  rate,  but  waived 
hearing,  filing  of  briefs  and  argument, 
and  suggested  no  condition  justifying 
the  advance  in  rate  in  effect  for  a  short 
period  of  time  at  the  time  of  shipment. 
HELD,  the  rate  assessed  was  unreason- 
able. Reparation  awarded.  Van  Brunt 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.   C.   195,  196. 

(b)  On  a  carload  of  agricultural  ma- 
chinery from  Bancroft,  Tex.,  via  Orange, 
Tex.,  to  Crowley,  La.,  a  rate  of  59c 
was  exacted.  The  local  rate  from  Ban- 
croft to  Orange,  a  distance  of  5  miles, 
was  7c,  and  from  Orange  to  Crowley, 
91  miles,  25c.  This  local  rate  from 
Bancroft  to  Orange  was  not  filed  with 
the  Commission,  and  was  fixed  by  the 
Texas  commission.  Subsequent  to  the 
shipment  a  rate  of  35c  was  established 
by  defendants  between  the  points  in 
question.  HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was 
unreasonable  to  the  extent  it  exceeded 
35c.  Reparation  awarded.  Advance 
Thresher  Co.  v.  O.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.   C.   C.  599,  601. 

§44.  Antimony  Ware,  Baskets,  Prushes, 
Camphor,  Eartlienware,  Gum-:;, 
Rugs,   Sago. 

(a)  The  Commission  holds  that  de- 
fendants should  establish  to  Utah  com- 
mon points  import  rates  on  antimony 
ware,  baskets,  brushes,  camphor,  earthen- 
ware, gums,  rugs,  sago,  tea,  tapioca  and 
tea  dust,  which  do  not  exceed  those  con- 
temporaneously in  force  to  the  Missouri 
River.  Commercial  Club  of  Salt  Lake  City 
v.'A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  218, 
226. 

(b)  Carloads  of  bushel  baskets  from 
Traverse  City,  Mich.,  to  Horatio,  Ark., 
were  rebilled  by  complainant  shipper's 
agent  at  Memphis  to  Wynne,  Ark.,  where 
another  agent  of  complainant  received 
them,  paid  the  freight  to  that  point,  and 
rpbilled  them  via  Texarkana  to  Horatio, 
the  movement  passing  through  Texas. 
Had  the  shipments  been  billed  through 
from  Memphis  to  destination,  very  much 


614 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §45   (a)— §47    (c) 


lower  charges  would  have  applied.  Com- 
plainant attacked  the  rate  from  Memphis 
to  Wynne  and  from  Wynne  via  Texarkana 
to  Horatio,  but  offered  no  evidence  as 
to  their  reasonableness,  except  to  quote 
a  commodity  ra:te  of  30c  on  baskets  from 
Memphis  to  Clarksville,  Arli.  The  rates 
exacted  were  class  rates,  while  the  rate 
quoted  was  a  commodity  rate.  The  dis- 
tance to  Clarksville  from  Memphis  wc.s 
only  250  miles  and  to  Horatio  via  Tex- 
arkana 338  miles.  The  total  charges  on 
four  cars  were  $660.35,  based  upon  mini- 
mum weights  aggregating  81,560  lbs.  and 
a  through  rate  of  83c.  HELD,  the  fac's 
presented  did  not  show  the  i-xte  assessed 
to  be  unreasonable,  except  in  so  far  as 
the  minima  applied  exceeded  those  law- 
fully published.  Wells-Higman  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I  C.  C.  175, 
176. 

§45.     Asphaltum. 

(a)  On  liquid  asphaltum  from  Canr-, 
Kan.,  to  Minneapolis,  complainant  was 
assessed  38c.  A^  the  time  of  shipment 
there  was  in  effect  from  Coffeyvilie.  Cha- 
nute,  Erie  ind  other  points  near  Caney 
a  rate  of  19i/^c,  which  lower  rate  was 
shortly  after  the  shipment  in  questior 
made  effective  from  Caney.  Defendar^^ 
admitted  the  rate  charged  to  be  unrea- 
sonable. HELD,  the  rate  attacked  wa? 
excessive.  Reparation  awarded.  Central 
Commercial  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,' 
17  I.  C.  C.  166. 

§46.     Automobile  Parts. 

(a)  Complainant  alleged  that  unreason- 
able charges  were  exacted  on  metal  auto- 
mobile parts,  in*  carloads,  Milwaukee, 
Wis.,  to. Los  Angeles  Cal.,  via  the  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  R.  R.  and  Santa  Fe  lines,  viz., 
the  first-class  rate  of  $3  per  100  lbs.,  and 
between  the  same  points  via  the  C.  &  N. 
W.,  U.  P.,  O.  S.  L.  R.  Rs.,  and  S.  P.,  Los 
A.  &  S.  L.  R.  R.,  the  same  charge.  The  rate 
of  $3  was  a  less-than-carload  rate  as- 
sessed under  the  Western  Classification, 
which  did  not  provide  any  carload  rate. 
Many  kinds  of  machines,  such  as  dyna- 
mos in  parts,  freight  conveyors,  cotton 
ginning  machinery,  laundry  machinery, 
and  the  like,  took  first-class  rates  in  less 
than  carloads,  and  the  Class  A  rate  in 
carloads,  and  these  rates  applied  whether 
the  machine  was  shipped  entire  or  knocked 
down.  HELD,  the  tariffs  of  the  defend- 
ants are  unreasonable  in  not  providing 
for  a  carload  rating  on  metal  automo- 
bile parts,  and  the  rates  exacted  are  un- 


reasonable to  the  extent  that  they  ex- 
ceed tha  fourth-class  rate  of  $1.90  per 
100  lbs.,  minimum  24,000  lbs.  Reparation 
awarded.  Auto  Vehicle  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.   Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  286. 

§47.     Beer. 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  bottled  beer 
in  carloads,  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Cullman, 
Ala.,  under  a  class  rate  of  56i/^c  per  100 
lbs.;  distance,  478  miles.  Defendant 
maintained  a  commodity  rate  of  SO^/^c  to 
Birmingham,  54  miles  south  of  Cullman, 
and  to  Decatur.  32  miles  north.  Decatur 
is  a  junction  of  defendant's  road  and  the 
Southern  Ry.  Cullman  is  located  only 
On  the  line  of  defendant,  while  Birming- 
ham is  the  point  of  convergence  of  many 
lines.  The  class  rates  to  Decatur  and 
Birmingham  from  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  were 
42c  and  47c,  respectively.  HELD,  the  rate 
to  Cullman  should  not  be  relatively 
higher  in  the  case  of  an  article  which  is 
generally  given  a  commodity  rate  than  in 
the  case  of  articles  which  are  carried  at 
class  rates,  and  that  the  rate  to  Cull- 
man was  unreasonable  to  the  extent  it 
exceeded  37c  per  100  lbs.  Reparation 
awarded.  Scheuing  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  550. 

(b)  Complainant  shipped  beer,  St. 
Louis,  Mo.,  to  Leadville,  Colo.,  via  the 
D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.,  under  a  rate  of  45c 
per  100  lbs.  HELD,  that  under  the  au- 
thority of  Baer  Bros.  INTercantile  Co.  v. 
Ry.,  17  I.  C.  C.  225,  the  charges  exacted 
were  unreasonable  to  the  extent  they  ex- 
ceeded 30c  per  100  lbs.  Reparation 
awarded.  Baer  Bros.  Mercantile  Co.  v. 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  18. 

(c)  Complainant  shipped  beer  in  car- 
loads Milwaukee,  Wis.,  to  Escanaba  and 
Gladstone,  Mich.,  at  22c  per  100  lbs.  At 
time  of  shipment  there  was  in  effect  a 
rate  of  ]9c  per  100  lbs.  from  such  points 
qs  Springfield,  Kankakee  and  Peoria,  111., 
and  Fort  Madison,  Dubuque  and  Clinton, 
la.,  to  Escanaba,  and  this  rate  extended 
to  such  northerly  points  as  Ashland,  Wis., 
and  Duluth,  Minn.  Much  of  the  traffic 
originating  in  this  territory  must  pass 
through  Milwaukee  en  route  to  Escanaba, 
while  the  length  of  haul  is  materially 
greater  than  the  distance  from  Milwau- 
kee to  either  Escanaba  or  Gladstone. 
HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was  unreason- 
able to  the  extent  it  exceeded  19c  per  100 
lbs.  Reparation  awarded.  Cleary  Bros. 
Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
588. 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §47   (d)— §49    (a) 


615 


(d)  On  carloads  of  beer  from  St. 
Louis,  Mo.,  via  Pueblo,  to  Leadville, 
Colo.,  complainant  was  assessed  92c, 
made  up  of  47c  to  Pueblo  and  45c  from 
Pueblo  to  Leadville.  HELD,  following 
Baer  Bros.  Mercantile  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  329.  and  Nollenberger  v. 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  595,  the 
45c  portion  of  the  charge  from  Pueblo  to 
Leadville  was  excessive  to  the  extent 
that  it  exceeded  30c.  Reparation  awarded. 
Baer  Bros.  Mercantile  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  225,  227;  sustained,  D. 
&  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  195  Fed.  968. 

(e)  Subsequent  to  the  decision  in 
Roswell  Commercial  Club  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  C.  339,  defendants 
reduced  the  rate  on  beer  from  Mil- 
waukee to  Roswell,  N.  M.,  from  78  to 
72c.  HELD,  this  reduction  was  a  sufla- 
cient  compliance  with  the  general  scale 
of  reductions  ordered  in  said  case. 
Pilant  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L 
C.   C.   178,   180. 

(f)  Following  Baer  Brothers  Mercan- 
tile Co.  V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C. 
329,  the  rate  of  45c  on  beer  in  car- 
loads from  Pueblo  to  Leadville,  Colo.,  as 
applied  on  shipments  from  St.  Louis, 
Mo.,  to  Leadville,  is  held  to  be  unrea- 
sonable to  the  extent  that  it  exceeds 
30c.  Reparation  awarded.  Nollenberger 
V.   M.   P.    Ry.    Co.,   15   I.   C.   C.    595,   597. 

(g)  Near  beer,  so  far  as  transporta- 
tion is  concerned,  differs  in  no  particu- 
lar from  beer,  and  is  entitled  to  similar 
rates.  Portner  Brewing  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co  , 
TJnrep.  Op.  361. 

(h)  Rate  on  beer  from  La  Crosse, 
Wis.,  to  Tyndall,  S.  Dak.,  found  un- 
reasonable; ordered  reduced  and  repara- 
tion awarded.  Gund  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  I^t. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  501. 

§48.     Beer    Bottles   and    Packages. 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload 
of  second-hand  beer  bottles,  St.  Louis, 
Mo.,  to  San  Antonio,  Tex.,  under  a  rate 
of  62c.  Contemporaneously  there  was 
in  effect  a  rate  on  junk,  including  junk 
bottles,  of  33c.  Also  a  rate  on  empty 
bottles  returned  from  Texas  points  to 
breweries  in  St.  Louis  of  21l^c.  HELD, 
the  rate  exacted  was  unreasonable  to 
the  extent  it  exceeded  33c,  minimum 
30,000  lbs.  Newding  v.  M.  K.  &  T. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  29. 

(b)  On  carloads  of  empty  beer 
packages  from  Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Milwau- 


kee, Wis.,  and  from  Kansas  City,  Mo^,  to 
Milwaukee,  complainant  was  assessed  16c, 
or  one-half  the  fourth-class  rate.  Shortly 
prior  to  the  shipment  a  rate  of  lie 
was  in  effect.  Shortly  after  the  ship- 
ment this  lie  rate  was  restored.  De- 
fendants admitted  the  rate  charged  to 
be  unreasonable  and  joined  in  asking 
reparation  on  the  basis  of  lie.  Under 
the  lie  rate  the  earnings  per  carload 
ranged  from  $16.50  to  $33.  Under  the 
16c  rate  it  ranged  from  $24  to  $48.  The 
distance  was  500  miles.  HELD,  that 
an  award  of  reparation  can  be  predicated 
only  upon  an  affirmative  finding  that 
the  rate  exacted  was  in  fact  excessive, 
and  not  merely  upon  a  showing  that 
the  carrier  is  willing  to  honor  the 
claim;  that  the  fact  that  the  defend- 
ants found  it  impracticable  to  main- 
tain the  increased  charge  did  not 
demonstrate  its  inherent  unreasonable- 
ness, and  the  16c  charge  could  not  be 
held  to  be  excessive.  Reparation  de- 
nied. Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.   P.  Ry.   Co.,   17  I.  C.  C.  359,  360. 

§49.     Bottle   Caps. 

(a)  On  a  carload  of  bottle  caps  from 
Baltimore,  Md.,  to  Denver,  Colo.,  mov- 
ing to  New  York  by  rail,  thence  to 
Galveston,  Tex.,  by  water,  and  thence 
to  destination  by  rail,  a  rate  of  $1.87 
was  charged.  The  Western  Classifi- 
cation gave  to  tin  discs  used  to  make 
caps  for  covering  tops  of  beer  bottles 
and  to  can  caps  in  packages  the 
fourth  class  rate  of  $1.16.  Complain- 
ant showed  that  stamped  tinware  and 
can  tops  took  lower  rates  than  the 
rate  complained  of  in  Western  and 
Official  Classifications,  but  submitted  no 
evidence  as  to  the  conditions  of  trans- 
portation and  volume  of  traffic.  The 
articles  in  question  were  circular  pieces 
of  tin  stamped  by  machinery  into 
caps  to  cover  beer  bottles  and  fitted 
inside  with  a  thin  cork  or  fibered 
disc.  The  plain  tin  disc  taking  the 
fourth  class  rate  was  the  raw  ma- 
terial used  to  make  the  bottle  cap  in 
question.  No  competition  was  shown 
with  articles  taking  a  lower  rate.  Some 
two  years  after  the  shipments  in  ques- 
tion a  third  class  rate  of  $1.48  was 
established  on  the  commodity,  and  be- 
nveen  the  points  in  question.  HELD, 
the  rate  complained  of  was  not  shown 
to  be  unreasonable.  The  voluntary  re- 
duction of  a  rate  does  not  of  itself 
establish  that  the  pre-existing  rate  was 
unreasonable     or     otherwise     unlawful. 


616 


REASONABLENESS   OF  RATES.   §50    (a)— §52    (c) 


Coors    V.    S.    P.    Co.,    18    I.    C.    C.    352, 
353. 

§50.     Box    Shooks. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  of 
22%c  per  100  lbs.  on  box  shooks,  from 
Pine  Bluff,  Ark.,  to  Fort  Worth,  Tex. 
Lumber,  lath,  sash  and  doors  took  a 
rate  of  18 %c  between  these  points,  and 
were  double  the  value  of  the  shooks, 
which  were  worth  from  $5  to  $7.50  per 
1,000  ft.  The  shooks  are  in  the  nature 
of  a  by-product  of  saw-mills,  and  are 
cut  from  inferior  lumber  and  sawed  to 
the  required  length,  in  order  to  make 
boxes  of  given  dimensions.  Shooks 
load  to  50,000  lbs.,  carloads,  while  lumber 
loads  on  the  average  to  about  44,000  lbs. 
HELD,  that  as  sash  and  doors,  shingles, 
lath,  molding  and  cooperage  stock  enjoy 
the  benefit  of  the  lumber  rate,  box 
shooks  should  not  take  a  higher  rate, 
and  the  rate  for  the  future  between  the 
same  points  should  not  exceed  the  cur- 
rent rate  on  yellow  pine.  Sawyer  & 
Austin  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  & 
S.  Ry.  Co.,   19  I.  C.  C.  141. 

§51.     Brass    and     Iron    Tubing. 

(a)  Defendants'  rate  from  Rome,  N. 
Y.,  to  San  Francisco  on  "brass  goods 
not  silver  plated,  pipe,  tubes  and  flues 
(copper  or  brass)"  was  $1.35  per  100 
lbs.,  in  carloads,  and  $1.85  in  less  than 
carloads.  On  "iron  and  steel,  articles 
of,  tubing  cut  and  bent  in  shape  for 
bed  ends"  the  rate  was  $1  on  carloads 
and  $1.25  on  less  than  carloads.  The 
tubing  shipped  by  complainant  was  % 
iron  with  an  outside  covering  of  Vs 
brass.  HELD,  such  tubing  should  take 
neither  the  rate  on  brass  tubing  nor  the 
rate  on  iron  tubing;  that  a  reasonable 
rate  on  the  same  was  $1.25  in  carloads 
and  $1.75  on  less  than  carloads.  The 
charges  being  assessed  at  $1.35  for  car- 
loads and  $1.85  for  less  than  carloads, 
reparation  was  awarded  on  the  basis  of 
$1.25  and  $1.75,  respectively.  Merle 
Co.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
I.    C.    C.    475,    477. 

§52.     Brick. 

(a)  Complainant,  a  manufacturer  of 
low-grade  fire  brick,  attacked  the  rea- 
sonableness of  the  rates  on  fire  brick 
from  Perla,  Ark.,  to  certain  points  in 
Louisiana.  The  rate  on  fire  brick  from 
Perla  to  Ruston,  La.,  per  100  lbs.,  was 
12c,  to  Monroe,  La.,  17c,  to  Tallulah, 
La,    13y2C.    to    Winnfield,    La.,    17c,    to 


Alexandria,  La.,  17c,  and  to  Shreveport, 
La.,  17c,  whereas  the  corresponding 
rates  on  common  brick  were  7,  6,  7,  12, 
7,  and  8c,  respectively.  HELD,  the 
rates  on  fire  brick  are  unreasonable. 
Reasonable  rates  for  transportation  of 
fire  brick  from  Perla,  Ark.,  to  Ruston 
should  not  exceed  12c;  to  Monroe,  7c; 
to  Tallulah,  7i^c;  to  Winnfield,  lie;  to 
Alexandria,  10c,  and  to  Shrevepor't,  7c. 
Atchinson  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co., 
22    I.    C.    C.    131,    134. 

(b)  Complainant  was  charged  rates 
varying  from  lie  to  13.1c  per  100  lbs. 
for  the  transportation  of  carloads  of 
brick  shipped  in  190y  from  Coffeyville, 
Buff  City  and  Tyro,  Kan.,  to  Lewis, 
Marne,  Oakland  and  Shelby  on  the 
lines  of  the  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  in 
Iowa.  These  rates  were  alleged  to  be 
unreasonable  to  the  extent  that  they 
exceeded  a  rate  of  10c  from  the  same 
points  of  origin  to  more  distant  points 
on  the  Rock  Island  in  the  Mississippi 
River  territory.  HELD,  the  conditions 
surrounding  the  transportation  of  brick 
from  the  Kansas  gas  belt  to  above- 
named  destinations  are  not  so  dissimilar 
to  those  involved  in  the  transportation 
of  the  same  commodity  to  the  towns 
taking  the  Mississippi  River  rate  as  to 
justify  higher  rates.  The  rates  are 
unreasonable  in  so  far  as  they  exceed 
lOc.  Reparation  awarded  and  reason- 
able rate  fixed.  Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v. 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  141,  143. 

(c)  Complainant  shipped  paving 
bricks  in  carloads,  Danville,  111.,  to 
Cedar  Rapids,  la.,  under  a  rate  of  9c 
per  100  lbs.  Prior  to  the  shipment  de- 
fendant was  asked  to  quote  a  rate  and 
stated  that  the  rate  was  7c.  Prior 
to  the  shipment  the  rate  on  com- 
mon brick  had  been  7c,  and  on 
other  brick  9c.  After  the  decision  of 
the  Commission  in  Metropolitan  Paving 
Brick  Co.  v.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  197,  in  which  the  opinion  was 
expressed  that  there  was  no  transporta- 
tion reason  for  making  different  rates 
on  different  grades  of  fire,  building  and 
paving  brick,  the  7c  rate  was  canceled, 
thus  making  all  kinds  of  brick  take 
the  9c  rate.  Complainant  asserted  the 
9c  rate  should  have  been  reduced  to  7c. 
The  rate  via  the  short  line  distance  to 
Cedar  Rapids  yielded  a  per  ton  mile 
revenue  of  6.2  mills,  while  over  the 
routes  actually  taken  the  revenue  was 
as  low  in  some  instances  as  4.5  mills. 
The   average   revenue    per   ton   mile   for 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,   §52    (d)  — (i) 


617 


all  the  defendants  upon  all  traffic  was 
6.8  mills.  Paving  brick  is  about  double 
the  value  of  common  brick.  The  prin- 
cipal points  with  which  complainant 
had  to  compete  had  rates  of  lO^/^c  per 
100  lbs.,  except  one  point  where  the 
rate  was  e^^c,  but  the  revenue  to  Cedar 
Rapids  was  9.2  mills  per  ton  mile.  The 
9c  rate  was  81  per  cent  of  the  class 
rate  to  Cedar  Rapids  and  in  the  Metro- 
politan case  the  rate  fixed  by  the  Com- 
mission was  84  per  cent  of  the  class 
rate.  HELD,  the  rate  charged  was 
reasonable,  and  not  discriminatory. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Danville  Brick 
Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
239,    241. 

(d)  Rate  of  16c  per  100  lbs.  on  brick 
in  carloads  from  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Ft. 
Smith,  Ark.,  found  reasonable.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Hydraulic-Press  Brick 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I. 
C.  C.   532. 

(e)  The  rate  on  enameled  brick  in 
carloads,  Cheltenham,  Mo.,  to  Chicago, 
111.,  is  unreasonable  and  unduly  dis- 
criminatory to  the  extent  that  it  ex- 
ceeds the  rate  of  8c  per  100  lbs.,  one 
cent  more  than  the  rate  on  pressed 
brick  and  the  same  rate  as  subsequently 
established  by  defendants  after  the 
shipment  moved.  Hydraulic-Press  Brick 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L 
C.  C.  554. 

(f)  For  many  years  prior  to  the  de- 
cision in  the  Stowe-Fuller  case,  12  I. 
C.  C.  215,  defendants  carried  brick  from 
points  in  Central  Freight  Association, 
especially  from  Ohio  and  contiguous 
Kentucky  and  West  Virginia  territory, 
to  Trunk  Line  territory  at  rates  scaled 
on  the  basis  of  a  25c  Chicago  to  New 
York  rate  on  fire  brick  and  a  20c  Chi- 
cago to  New  York  rate  on  building  and 
paving  brick,  these  rates  being  volun- 
tarily established  by  the  carriers.  Under 
the  decision  referred  to  defendants 
established  a  Chicago  to  New  York 
basing  rate  of  22i/^c  on  all  three 
classes  of  brick.  Under  the  former 
rates  it  appeared  that  most  of  the 
brick  moved  under  the  20c  basing 
rate,  the  evidence  indicating  that 
fire  brick  was  usually  billed  under 
that  rate.  The  movement  of  brick  had 
recently  increased  enormously.  It  was 
moved  in  large  volume,  could  be  loaded 
to  the  full  capacity  of  cars,  and  it  was 
not  subject  to  loss  and  damage.  It 
was  a  very  desirable  traffic,  calling  for 
low  rates,     HELD,  the  evidence  indicat- 


ing that  prior  to  the  former  decision 
the  carriers  did  not  receive  on  an 
average  above  a  basic  rate  of  21c  on  all 
three  classes  of  brick,  this  rate  should 
be  established  as  a  Chicago  to  New 
York  basing  rate  for  the  future,  rates 
to  intermediate  points  to  be  scaled  on 
it  at  established  percentages.  Metro- 
politan Paving  Brick  Co.  v.  Ann  Arbor 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  197,  206-208. 

(g)  On  carloads  of  face  brick  valued 
at  from  $18  to  $24  per  thousand  pounds, 
from  Boston  to  Lewiston,  Me.,  139 
miles,  complainant  was  assessed  the 
sixth-class  rate  of  12c.  The  rate  on 
common  brick  was  much  lower  and  com- 
plainant contended  that  the  brick 
shipped  should  have  taken  the  com- 
modity rate  on  common  brick,  the  value 
of  which  was  from  $6  to  $8  per 
thousand  pounds.  The  rate  per  ton 
mile  charged  was  17  mills,  or  50  per 
cent  greater  than  the  average  earnings 
on  all  classes  of  freight  over  defend- 
ants' lines.  This  rate  was  applied  on 
this  kind  of  brick  generally  throughout 
the  country.  There  was  water  competi- 
tion between  Boston  and  Portland, 
which  would  tend  to  keep  class  rates 
within  reasonable  bounds.  The  traffic 
in  brick  between  the  points  in  ques- 
tion was  small.  HELD,  the  rates  charged 
were  not  unreasonable.  James  &  Abbot 
Co.  V.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  17  I.  C.  C.  273, 
275. 

(h)  On  carloads  of  fire  brick  from 
Joliet,  111.,  to  Milwaukee,  Wis.,  a  rate 
of  5c  was  charged.  Defendants  ad- 
mitted the  same  to  be  unreasonable  to 
the  extent  that  it  exceeded  4c.  The 
distance  is  124  miles.  Prior  to  the 
shipment,  another  carrier  had  in  effect 
a  4c  rate  and  subsequent  to  the  ship- 
ment defendants  published  a  4c  rate. 
HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was  excessive 
to  the  extent  that  it  exceeded  4c. 
Reparation  awarded.  American  Refrac- 
tories Co.  V.  E.  J.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 
L   C.  C.  480,  481. 

(i)  The  rate  on  enameled  brick  in 
carloads  from  Cheltenham,  Mo.,  to  New 
Iberia,  La.,  via  the  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R. 
R.  to  Houston,  Tex.,  and  thence  by  the 
M.  L.  &  T.  R.  R.  &  S.  Co.  was  48c, 
minimum  40,000  lbs.  At  the  time  of 
movement  the  rate  on  enameled  brick 
from  Cheltenham  via  the  I.  C.  R.  R. 
to  New  Orleans  was  15c  and  from  New 
Orleans  to  New  Iberia  via  the  M.  L. 
&  T.  R.  R.  &  S.  Co.  18c.  The  rate 
from     Cheltenham     to     Texas     common 


618 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §53  (a)— §56  (a) 


points,  also  Galveston  and  Houston,  was 
22c.  The  rates  between  these  points 
were  generally  the  same  on  pressed 
brick  and  enameled  brick.  The  average 
value  of  the  former  was  about  $18 
and  of  the  latter  about  $55,  per  thou- 
sand. On  account  of  the  care  required 
in  loading  enameled  brick,  less  damage 
is  done  in  transit  than  to  pressed 
brick.  The  short  line  distance  from 
Cheltenham  to  New  Iberia  via  New 
Orleans  was  835  miles;  the  distance 
by  which  the  shipments  moved  was 
1,208  miles.  HELD,  the  48c  rate  was 
excessive  to  the  extent  that  it  exceeded 
30c.  Hydraulic  Press  Brick  Co.  v.  St. 
L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  342, 
348. 

§53.     Broom    Corn. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  of 
90c  per  100  lbs.  on  broom  corn  in 
carloads,  Higgins,  Tex.,  to  Des  Moines, 
la.,  a  distance  of  603  miles.  From 
Shattuck,  Okla.,  15  miles  nearer  Des 
Moines  than  Higgins,  a  rate  of  54c  was 
in  force,  and  shortly  after  the  shipment 
was  made,  a  rate  of  60c  was  put  into 
effect  from  Higgins.  HELD,  that  since 
a  rate  of  55c  from  Higgins^  to  Des 
Moines  would  yield  1.82c  per  ton  mile, 
substantially  the  same  as  the  rate  from 
Shattuck,  such  rate  would  be  reason- 
able. Reparation  awarded.  Harrah  & 
Stewart  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,   21   L   C.   C.   484. 

§54.     Burlap    Bags. 

(a)  The  rate  on  burlap  bags  ought 
to  be  somewhat  higher  than  upon  the 
burlaps,  but  there  is  no  theory  upon 
which  the  carriers  could  justly  establish 
and  this  Commission  approve  a  rate 
upon  burlap  bags  twice  as  great  as  that 
upon  the  raw  product.  Kent  Co.  v. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
439,  441. 

§55.     Butter    Boxes. 

(a)  On  wooden  butter  boxes  in  car- 
loads from  Manchester,  Vt.,  to  Waterloo, 
Wis.,  via  Milwaukee,  shipped  under 
through  billing,  a  rate  of  46c  was  ex- 
acted consisting  of  31c  to  Milwaukee 
and  15c  from  Milwaukee  to  Waterloo, 
the  minimum  being  20,000  lbs.  by  one 
carrier  and  16,000  by  another.  Com- 
plainant contended  that  the  articles 
in  question  should  be  classified  with 
wooden  pails,  tubs,  kits,  barrels,  kegs, 
well   buckets,   or   wooden   drums,   which 


took  the  class  D  rate  of  6c,  minimum 
24,000  lbs.  The  boxes  shipped  held 
from  3  to  5  lbs.  of  butter,  were  made 
of  thin  wood  and  fitted  with  a  tightly 
coopered  lid,  had  to  be  shipped  in 
crates,  and  could  not,  like  the  other 
articles  named,  be  nested.  They  could 
not  load  to  a  minimum  to  exceed 
16,000  lbs.  and  were  not  analogous  in 
weight  to  the  other  articles  mentioned. 
HELD,  the  15c  portion  of  the  rate  from 
Milwaukee  to  Waterloo  was  excessive 
and  should  not  exceed  9c,  minimum  16,- 
000  lbs.  Reparation  awarded.  Roach 
&  Seeber  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,   18   L   C.   C.   172,   173. 

§56.     Butter,    Eggs    and    Poultry. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  rates  on 
butter,  eggs  and  poultry  in  carloads 
from  Omaha,  Neb.,  to  points  in  Indi- 
ana, Michigan,  Ohio,  West  Virginia, 
Pennsylvania,  New  York,  Maine,  New 
Hampshire,  Vermont,  Massachusetts, 
Rhode  Island,  Connecticut,  Delaware, 
Virginia  and  the  District  of  Columbia. 
There  were  no  joint  rates  in  effect  from 
Omaha  to  the  destinations  named,  the 
rates  being  made  by  combination  either 
upon  the  Mississippi  River  or  Chicago. 
The  rates  from  Omaha  to  the  Missis- 
sippi River  were  commodity  rates  and 
varied  to  some  extent  with  the  ulti- 
mate destination  of  the  traffic.  The 
rates  from  Omaha  to  Chicago  were  class 
rates  applying  on  both  locals  and 
through  traflac.  Under  the  Western 
Classification  butter  and  eggs  L.  C.  L. 
took  second-class  rates,  while  dressed 
poultry  was  placed  in  the  first  class. 
All  three  commodities  in  straight  or 
mixed  carloads  took  third-class  rates. 
The  rates  from  Mississippi  River  cross- 
ings and  Chicago  to  eastern  points 
were  any-quantity  class  rates  effective 
on  both  through  and  local  business. 
The  Official  Classification  provided  the 
second  class  rating  for  butter  and  eggs, 
while  dressed  poultry  moved  under 
first-class  rates.  The  any-quantity  rates 
in  Official  Classification  territory  in- 
cluded the  expense  of  icing,  whereas 
the  carload  rates  from  Omaha  to  the 
IMississippi  River  and  Chicago  were  ex- 
clusive of  icing.  On  shipments  L.  C.  L. 
the  western  carriers  bear  the  cost  of 
T-efrigeration.  As  representative  of 
the  rates  in  issue  those  applying  on 
butter  and  eggs  from  Omaha  to  New 
York  were  $1.10  per  100  lbs.  C.  L. 
and    $1.21   per   100   lbs.   L.   C.   L.     Com- 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §56   (b)— §57   Oc) 


619 


plainant  contended  that  if  the  L.  C.  L. 
rates  were  remunerative,  the  C.  L.  rates 
should  he  reduced  and  also  that  the  pres- 
ent rates,  being  made  up  of  the  combina- 
tion of  the  intermediate  ideal  rates,  were 
unreasonable  by  virtue  of  that  fact;  and 
that  the  rates  on  the  commodities  men- 
tioned were  materially  higher  than  the 
rates  on  other  perishable  products,  such 
as  fresh  meats,  fruits  and  vegetables. 
HELD,  that  it  must  be  conceded  car- 
riers are  under  a  greater  expense  in 
taking  care  of  L.  C.  L.  freight  than  in 
moving  C.  L.  traffic.  However,  the  ad- 
mitted difference  in  the  cost  of  service 
is  entirely  consistent  with  the  con- 
clusion that  the  existing  rates  are  lib- 
eral as  far  as  L.  C.  L.  freight  jls  con- 
cerned and  no  more  than  a  reason- 
able charge  upon  C.  L.  traffic;  that 
the  Commission  cannot  condemn  the 
existing  any-quantity  rates  and  reduce 
the  C.  L.  rate,  thus  giving  the  car-lot 
shipper  a  greater  advantage  than  he 
at  present  possesses;  and  that  the 
through  rates  cannot  be  lowered  on 
account  of  the  mere  fact  alone  that 
they  are  made  up  of  the  combination 
on  intermediate  points;  that  the  com- 
parison with  packing-house  products 
cannot  be  used  as  a  criterion  by  which 
to  determine  the  reasonableness  of  rates 
on  other  perishable  products  on  ac- 
count of  the  enormous  difference  in 
tonnage,  and  the  difference  from  dairy 
products  in  character  and  value;  that 
a  comparison  between  rates  on  butter, 
eggs  and  poultry  throughout  the  coun- 
try generally,  especially  in  sections 
where  the  traffic  conditions  are  es- 
sentially similar,  is  of  recognized  evi- 
dentiary value,  and  that  if  such  a  com- 
parison is  undertaken  it  will  appear 
that  nowhere  in  the  United  States  are 
there  lower  rates  on  dairy  products 
than  now  in  effect  from  Omaha  to 
points  in  Central  Freight  Association 
territory.  The  fact  that  these  rates 
have  been  maintained  at  their  present 
level  for  over  20  years  while  the  volume 
of  traffic  has  greatly  increased,  rising 
from  approximately  126  carloads  in 
1900  to  790  carloads  in  1909  does  not 
show  the  rates  to  be  excessive.  Com- 
plaint dismissed.  Commercial  Club  of 
Omaha  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.   397. 

(b)  On  carloads  of  eggs  from  Leslie, 
Ark.,  to  Chicago,  defendants  assessed 
the  only  published  rate,  $1.10  per  100 
lbs.  Shortly  thereafter  they  established 
a  special  commodity  rate  of  77  ^c.  They 


signified  their  willingness  to  the  Com- 
mission to  continue  this  commodity  rate 
and  to  make  reparation.  For  similar 
distances  from  Arkansas  points  to  Chi- 
cago, defendants'  rates  ranged  from  57c 
to  67c.  HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was 
unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded  on 
the  basis  of  77 %c.  Smith  &  Co.  v.  M. 
&  N.  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  449, 
450. 

§57.     Canned    Goods. 

(a)  On  a  carload  of  canned  goods, 
weight  43,300  lbs.,  from  San  Jos§,  Cal., 
to  Roundup,  Mont.,  complainant  was 
assessed  a  commodity  rate  of  $1.10 
from  San  Jos6  to  Harlowton,  Mont., 
plus  the  local  fifth-class  rate  of  24c  from 
Harlowton  to  Roundup.  Canned  goods 
for  transportation  is  a  commodity  of 
lower  grade  than  dried  fruit,  taking 
under  Western  Classification  the  fifth- 
class  rate.  The  commodity  rate  on 
dried  fruit  in  boxes  at  the  time  of  said 
shipment  from  San  Jos6  to  Harlow- 
ton was  $1.10.  HELD,  that  the  rate 
complained  of  from  San  Jos6  to  Har- 
lowton, when  to  a  point  beyond,  was 
unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded  on 
basis  of  $1.10  from  San  Jos6  to  Har- 
lowton. Stone-Ordean-Wells  Co.  v.  S. 
P.    Co.,   18  L   C.   C.   13,   14. 

(b)  On  three  carloads  and  one  less- 
than-carload  lot  of  canned  peaches  from 
Martindale,  Ga.,  to  Chattanooga,  Tenn., 
complainant  was  assessed  the  fifth- 
class  rate  or  19c  upon  carload  lots  and 
the  third-class  rate  or  26c  upon  less-than- 
carload  lots.  Shortly  thereafter,  defendant 
established  carload  and  less-than-car- 
load  rates  of  18  and  24c,  respectively. 
Such  rates  correspond  to  the  rates  from 
other  points  in  the  vicinity  of  Martin- 
dale.  Rates  between  points  within  the 
the  state  of  Georgia  were  considerably 
lower,  as  established  by  the  Georgia 
Railroad  Commission,  but  there  was 
no  evidence  that  the  18c  and  24c 
rates  were  unreasonable.  HELD,  the 
charges  exacted  were  unreasonable. 
Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis  of 
the  18c  and  24c  rates.  Hutcheson  &  Co. 
V.  Central  of  Georgia  Ry,  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
C.    523,    524. 

(c)  The  application  of  the  Cleveland 
to  Boston  fifth-class  rate  on  canned 
goods  to  shipments  of  same  from  Ir- 
ving, N.  Y.,  to  Burlington,  Vt,  is  un- 
reasonable to  the  extent  of  4c  per  100 
lbs.      Reparation     awarded.      Erie    Pre- 


620 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §58   (a)— §61    (a) 


serving   Co.   v.   L.   S.   &    M.    S.   Ry.   Co., 
14   I.   C.  C.   118. 

§58.     Car    Wheels    and    Axles. 

(a)  In  January,  1908,  complainant 
shipped  a  carload  of  car  wheels  on 
axles  from  Wilmington,  Del.,  to  Dia- 
mondville,  Wyo.  Complainant  asked  rep- 
aration of  the  difference  between  the 
amount  charged  west  of  the  Mississippi 
River  upon  the  wheels,  and  the  amount 
that  would  be  charged  at  the  commodity 
rate  of  97%c  per  100  lbs.  on  mining- 
car  skips.  HELD,  since  the  wheels  are 
an  integral  part  of  the  skips,  and 
are  no  more  liable  to  damage  in 
transit  than  the  completed  skips,  the 
rate  assessed  west  of  the  Mississippi 
on  the  wheels  was  unreasonable  to  the 
extent  that  it  exceeded  97*^0.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Diamond  Coal  &  Coke 
Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C. 
129,    130. 

(b)  On  a  carload  of  car  wheels  and 
axles  from  Marshall,  Tex.,  to  Holdup, 
La.,  the  legally  applicable  fifth-class 
rate  of  69c  on  a  minimum  of  24,000 
lbs.  was  assessed.  A  rate  of  24c  ap- 
plied between  the  same  points  in  the 
opposite  direction.  Defendants  assured 
complainant  that  if  he  would  let  his 
shipment  go  forward  at  that  rate  they 
would  join  with  him  in  an  application  to 
the  Commission  for  reparation  on  the 
basis  of  24c.  The  distance  was  178 
miles.  No  unusual  difficulties  were 
connected  with  the  construction  or 
operation  of  defendants'  lines.  HELD, 
reparation  should  be  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  24c,  minimum  36,000  lbs.  Cro- 
well  &  Spencer  Lumber  Co.  v.  T.  &  P. 
Ry.   Co.,    17   I.   C.   C.    333,   334. 

§59.     Catsup. 

(a)  The  rate  on  catsup  in  tin,  glass 
or  earthenware,  boxed,  under  a  mini- 
mum of  40,000  lbs.,  was  85c  from  coast 
terminals  to  the  Missouri  River  and 
east;  from  Salt  Lake  City  the  rate  was 
$1.28  to  the  Mississippi  River  and  $1.33 
to  Chicago,  minimum  36,000  lbs.  HELD, 
that  the  present  rates  to  the  Mississippi 
River  and  Chicago  are  unreasonable  to 
the  extent  they  exceed  85c,  minimum 
40,000  lbs.  Commercial  Club  of  Salt 
Lake  City  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
19   I.   C.   C.    218,   225. 

§60.     Cement. 

(a)  A  rate  of  $1.35  per  ton  on 
cement,    Martin's    Creek,    Pa.,    to    Phila- 


delphia, Pa.,  90  miles,  was  defended 
as  against  a  rate  to  Jersey  City,  114 
miles,  of  $1.10  per  ton,  on  the  ground 
that  at  Jersey  City  the  defendant  had 
two  public  team  tracks  where  carload 
freight  was  delivered,  while  at  Philadel- 
phia it  had  about  60  team  tracks  dis- 
tributed about  the  city  within  a  "track 
mileage  of  about  400  miles.  HELD, 
terminal  facilities  such  as  these  are 
entitled  to  weight  in  the  consideration 
of  the  reasonableness  of  the  rate,  and 
where  the  commodity  is  of  the  weight 
and  bulk  of  cement,  such  facilities 
broadly  distributed  are  of  value  to 
the  consignees  in  that  the  amount  of 
cartage  is  not  nearly  so  great  as  if 
deliveries  were  confined  to  one  or 
two  points.  Cement  is  a  commodity 
which  under  every  consideration  is 
entitled  to  a  low  rate.  It  loads  easily 
to  the  marked  capacity  of  the  car 
and  is  liable  to  but  little  loss  by 
damage  in  transit.  The  rate  to  Phila- 
delphia is  unreasonable  to  the  extent 
it  exceeds  $1.10  per  ton.  Maritime  Ex- 
change V.  Penn  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
81,   84. 

(b)  Complainants  shipped  carloads 
o'f  cement  from  Fordwick,  Va.,  to  Hope 
Mills,  N.  C,  and  were  assessed  a  rate 
of  22i/4c  per  100  lbs.  The  shipment 
could  have  been  carried  to  Wilmington 
and  then  reshipped  to  Hope  Mills, 
involving  an  out-of-line  haul  of  272 
miles  under  rates  aggregating  19i^c 
per  100  lbs.  HELD,  that  although  the 
facts  do  not  present  a  situation  where  a 
joint  through  rate  exceeds  the  combi- 
nation of  intermediate  rates  between  the 
same  points,  substantially  the  same 
principle  is  involved,  and  as  a  rate 
of  19V^c  would  yield  a  revenue  per  ton 
mile  of  9.1  mills,  it  should  be  consid- 
ered a  reasonable  rate.  Reparation 
awarded.  Carolina  Portland  Cement  Co. 
v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  533,  535. 

(c)  Cement  is  sold  on  a  small  margin 
of  profit  and  a  very  slight  difference  in 
rate  deflects  the  tonnage.  Great  Western 
Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  454. 

§61.     Chautauqua    Outfits. 

(a)  Complainant  sought  the  establish- 
ment of  a  carload  classification  and 
minimum  weight  on  shipments  of  "Chau- 
tauqua outfits,"  consisting  of  tents, 
poles,  camp-chairs,  etc.  Prior  to  the 
filing  of  this  petition  it  had  been  pay- 
ing    the     less-than-carload    rate.      Each 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §62   (a)— §66   (a) 


621 


outfit  was  shipped  in  one  car,  weighing 
about  18,000  lbs.,  loaded  and  unloaded 
by  the  shipper.  HELD,  a  carload  rating 
on  Chautauqua  outfits  should  be  estab- 
lished, not  higher  than  fifth  class,  mini- 
mum 20,000  lbs.  Redpath-Vawter  Chau- 
tauqua System  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  135,  137. 

§62.     Cheese. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
on  cheese  from  points  in  southwestern 
Wisconsin  on  the  C.  &  N.  W.  and  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Rs.  to  Chicago.  By 
adjustments  in  1899  and  1902,  the 
cheese  rates  had  been  raised  from  these 
Wisconsin  points  to  Chicago  from  about 
20c  on  carload  and  less-than-carload 
shipments  to  22i^c  on  carload  and  28c 
on  less-than-carloads.  The  special  ex- 
penses attached  to  the  transportation 
of  cheese  were:  That  about  75  per  cent 
of  the  cheese  shipments  moved  in  less- 
than-carload  lots;  these  were  delivered 
in  special  refrigerator  cars  and  iced 
at  the  carriers'  expense,  and  special 
cars  were  required  on  account  of  the 
contaminating  odor.  The  rates  in  ques- 
tion to  Chicago  were  from  11  to  61 
per  cent  higher  than  from  Indiana 
points  to  Chicago,  equally  distant;  from 
7  to  56  per  cent  higher  than  from 
Michigan,  points  to  Chicago,  equally 
distant;  and  higher  than  the  rates  for 
hauls  of  equal  length  between  points 
In  Ohio  and  Indiana,  Ohio  and  Michi- 
gan, New  York  and  Pennsylvania,  and 
eastern  Wisconsin  and  Chicago.  The 
rates  attacked  were  by  these  compari- 
sons excessive  by  from  6  to  80  per 
cent.  The  cheese  tonnage  from  south- 
western Wisconsin  was  extraordinarily 
dense.  Concentration  in  transit  privi- 
leges were  allowed  only  on  intrastate 
shipments  in  Wisconsin,  and  these 
privileges  did  not  account  for  the  higher 
rates  attacked.  HELD,  the  rates  com- 
plained of  were  unreasonable  and  should 
be  reduced.  Railroad  Commission  of 
Wisconsin  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.    C.    85,    88,    90,    91. 

863.     Cheese   Boxes. 

(a)  Complainants  shipped  cheese 
boxes,  Richland  Center,  Wis.,  to  Dodge- 
vllle.  Wis.,  under  a  combination  rate 
of  341^0  via  the  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R. 
and  the  I.  C.  R.  R.  Subsequently  a 
Joint  commodity  rate  of  17l^c  was  es- 
tablished which  equalized  an  intrastate 
rate  via  the  C.  M.   &   St.  P.  and   C.   & 


N.  W.  R.  Rs.  The  distance  by  the 
Intrastate  route  is  104  miles,  by  the 
interstate  route,  168  miles.  The  intra- 
state rate  was  ordered  by  the  Wiscon- 
Bin  R.  R.  Commission.  HELD,  that  de- 
fendants should  not  be  required  to  ac- 
cept for  the  transportation  performed 
the  rate  of  17i/^c  deemed  reasonable 
over  a  much  shorter  route,  but  that 
the  rate  was  unreasonable  to  the  ex- 
tent that  it  exceeded  28  ^^c.  Repa- 
ration awarded.  Parfrey  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.   Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  104. 

§64.     Cinders. 

(a)  On  carloads  of  mill  cinders  from 
Chicago  to  Omaha,  complainant  was  as- 
sessed $2  per  net  ton  through  an  error 
In  the  tariff,  the  intention  being  for 
the  rate  to  apply  per  gross  ton,  which 
correction  was  made  soon  after  the 
shipment  in  question.  HELD,  the  rate 
charged  was  unreasonable.  Reparation 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  the  per  gross 
ton  rate.  American  Trust  &  Savings 
Bank  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I. 
C.   C.  11. 

§65.     Clam     Shells. 

(a)  On  a  shipment  of  a  carload  of 
clam  shells  from  Mendota,  Minn.,  to 
LaCrosse,  Wis.,  complainant  was 
charged  20c  a  100  lbs.  Mendota  was 
six  miles  from  St.  Paul.  Shortly  after 
this  shipment  one  of  defendants  es- 
tablished a  commodity  rate  of  8c  from 
St.  Paul  to  LaCrosse,  and  of  6c  from 
LaCrosse  to  St.  Paul.  The  combination 
of  local  rates  between  Mendota  and 
LaCrosse  based  on  St.  Paul  through 
Elroy  was  9.9c.  For  a  short  time  after 
the  shipment  in  question  another  car- 
rier published  a  commodity  rate  of  8c 
from  Mendota  to  LaCrosse.  HELD,  the 
rate  charged  was  unlawful  and  com- 
plainant was  entitled  to  reparation  on 
the  basis  of  the  8c  rate.  Wisconsin 
Pearl  Button  Co.  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O. 
Ry.  Co.,   16   L   C.  C.   80,  81. 

§66.     Class  Rates. 

(a)  The  complainant  alleged  that  the 
class  rates  from  Minneapolis,  Minn.,  to 
Denver,  Colo.,  were  unjust  and  discrimi- 
natory as  compared  with  class  rates  from 
St.  Ix)uis,  Mo.,  and  Chicago,  111.  The  class 
rates  attacked  taking  the  first  five  classes 
as  typical,  were  to  Chicago  and  common 
points  and  to  Minneapolis,  180,  145,  110, 
85  and  67c  and  to  St.  Louis  and  common 
points,    162,   127,   101,   80 1/^    and   63c  for 


622 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §66  (b)— (dd) 


the  first  five  classes  respectively.  At 
the  time  of  the  complaint  the  rates 
from  Minneapolis  and  Chicago  were  the 
same,  being  higher  than  the  rates  from 
St.  Louis,  although  for  12  years  there 
existed  practically  the  same  rates  from 
Minneapolis  as  from  St.  Louis.  The 
distance  from  Minneapolis  is  less  than 
from  either  Chicago  or  St.  Louis.  The 
testimony  of  Minneapolis  manufacturers 
indicated  that  they  could  not  compete 
at  the  existing  rates  with  similar  en- 
terprises in  St.  Louis.  HELD,  the 
rates  applicable  to  the  first  ten  classes 
as  published  from  Minneapolis  to  Den- 
ver are  excessive  and  unreasonable  and 
should  not  exceed  162,  127,  101,  80i^ 
and  63c  for  the  first  five  classes  taken 
as  typical.  The  class  rates  from 
Minneapolis  should  not  exceed  those 
from  St.  Louis.  Minneapolis  Traffic 
Ass'n  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C. 
C.    259,    260. 

(b)  Complainant  attacked  the  class 
rates  irom  El  Paso,  Tex.,  to  Phoenix, 
Ariz.,  as  unreasonable.  The  rates  for 
the  distance  of  433  miles  were  216,  189, 
172,  160,  132c,  on  classes  1,  2,  3,  4,  5, 
respectively.  After  the  filing  of  the 
complaint  the  defendants  reduced  the 
rates  as  follows:  192,  164,  153,  133. 
112c.  HELD,  rates  complained  of  and 
those  at  present  effective  were  unrea- 
sonable, and  the  following  rates,  based 
on  the  Western  Classification,  were  just 
and  reasonable:  165,  137,  122,  99,  83c. 
Maricopa  County  Commercial  Club  v. 
Maricopa  &  Phoenix  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I. 
C.   C.  279. 

(bb)  Complainant  shipped  two  car- 
loads of  leaf  tobacco  in  bales,  Ephrata 
Pa.,  to  Richmond,  Va.  The  lawfully 
published  rate  was  24c  per  100  lbs. 
Subsequently  a  rate  of  21c  per  100  lbs, 
was  published  between  these  points  by 
a  different  route  to  which  defendants 
were  parties.  HELD,  that  on  the  rec- 
ord the  class  rate  under  which  the 
shipment  moved  could  not  be  declared 
unreasonable  from  the  mere  fact  that  a 
lower  commodity  rate  was  subsequently 
published.  American  Cigar  Co,  v.  P. 
&   R.   R.   R.    Co.,   20   I.   C.    0.   81,   82. 

(c)  A  rate  should  not  be  relatively 
higher  In  the  case  of  an  article  which 
Is  generally  given  a  commodity  rate 
than  In  the  case  of  articles  which  are 
carried  at  class  rates.  Scheuing  v. 
U  ^  JsT.  JR,  R,  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  550,  552. 


(d)  Complainant  attstcked  the  C.  L. 
and  L.  C.  L.  class  rates,  Billings,  Mont., 
to  points  in  Wyoming  on  defendant's 
main  line  as  far  as,  and  including,  New- 
castle, Wyo.,  321  miles  distant,  and  to 
all  points  on  defendant's  branch  lines 
extending  from  Toluca,  Mont.,  to  Cody, 
Wyo.,  174  miles  distant,  and  from 
Frannie,  Wyo.,  131  miles  distant,  to 
Kirby,  Wyo,  242  miles  distant  from 
Billings.  The  L.  C.  L.  first-class  rate, 
Billings  to  Newcastle,  was  $1.55  per  100 
lbs.;  to  Dakoming,  20  miles  farther 
distant  on  the  same  line,  $1.61;  to 
Edgemont,  24  miles  still  farther  dis- 
tant, $1.38.  Rates  on  the  C.  B.  &  Q. 
R.  R.  from  Cheyenne,  Wyo.,  for  approx- 
imately equal  distances  were  materially 
less,  as  were  rates  on  the  O.  S.  L.  R.  R. 
from  Boise,  Ida.,  and  on  the  N.  P. 
Ry.  from  Fargo,  N.  D.  The  defendant's 
rates  from  Billings  to  Sheridan  and 
from  Sheridan  to  Billings  in  opposite 
directions  over  the  same  track,  and 
not  on  long  and  heavy  mountain  grades, 
differed  in  that  the  rate  from  Sheridan  to 
Billings  on  first  class  was  66c,  and  from 
Billings  to  Sheridan,  91c,  the  other 
'•ates  being  proportionately  higher. 
HELD,  that  since  defendant's  rates 
from  Billings  to  the  Wyoming  points 
'n  question  are  higher  than  rates  from 
and  to  any  other  points  for  similar 
distances  on  defendant's  system,  and 
are  much  higher  than  are  applied  gen- 
erally from  and  to  points  on  lines  of 
other  carriers  in  the  same  general  ter- 
ritory, they  should  be  reduced  accord- 
ing to  the  schedule  made  out  by  the 
Commission,  making  the  first-class  rate 
^o  Frannie  66c;  to  Newcastle,  $1.21; 
Cody,  80c;  to  Kirby,  $1,  and  the  other 
rates  In  proportion.  On  L.  C.  L.  ship- 
ments from  Sheridan  to  points  on  the 
branch  line  south  of  Toluca  they  should 
not  exceed  those  from  Billings  by  a 
differential  of  more  than  8c  for 
first  class  and  others  in  proportion. 
Reparation  denied.  Billings  Chamber  of 
Commerce  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.   C.  C.  71. 

(dd)  Complainant  attacked  the  class 
rate  from  Sacramento,  Cal.,  eastward 
to  all  points  upon  the  main  line  of 
the  S.  P.  Co.  in  the  states  of  Nevada 
and  Utah  up  to  but  not  including 
Ogden.  The  first-class  rate  from  Sac- 
ramento to  Reno,  154  miles,  was  $1.29 
and  gradually  increased  from  Reno 
eastward,  until  at  Moline,  Nev.,  the 
first-class    rate    was    $1,725,    which    ratQ 


REASONABLENESS   OP-  RATES,  §6«    (e)— (f) 


623 


obtained  as  a  maximum  up  to  Cecil 
Junction,  Utati,  1  mile  west  of  Ogden. 
The  Sacramento-Ogden  rates  were  on 
a  lower  scale,  the  first-class  rate  be- 
ing $1.54.  The  rates  between  Sacra- 
mento and  Reno  were  higher  than  on 
any  other  main  line  in  the  United 
States.  HELD,  the  class  rates  east- 
bound  out  of  Sacramento  are  practi- 
cally without  precedent  or  parallel.  The 
class  rates  to  Reno  and  all  stations 
east  thereof  up  to  and  including  Love- 
lock from  Sacramento  are  unreason- 
able to  the  extent  they  exceed  85  cents 
first  class;  to  points  east  of  Love- 
lock to  and  including  Elko,  $1.15  first 
class;  points  east  of  Elko,  including 
Cecil  Junction,  Utah,  ^1.54  first  class 
(other  classes  reduced  proportionately), 
the  rates  prescribed  to  be  governed  by 
the  Western  Classification.  Traffic  Bu- 
reau of  Merchants  Exchange  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,    19   I.    C.    C.   259. 

(e)  Complainants  attacked  the  class 
rates  in  both  directions  between  Chi- 
cago, Mississippi  River  and  Missouri 
River  rate  territories  upon  the  one 
hand,  and  Utah  common  points  upon 
the  other,  and  also  the  westbound  com- 
modity rates.  The  westbound  class 
rates  from  Chicago  ranged  from  first 
class  $2.85  to  58c  class  E;  from  the 
Mississippi  River,  $2.65  first  class  to 
53c  class  E;  from  the  Missouri  River, 
$2.05  first  class  to  42c  class  E.  HELD, 
that  the  rates  attacked  were  abnormal 
and  unreasonable  to  the  extent  that 
they  exceeded  first  class  from  Chicago, 
Mississippi  River  and  Missouri  River, 
$2.45,  $2.27  and  $1.90,  respectively; 
other  classes  reduced  proportionately  to 
class  E,  which  is  reduced  to  52c,  48c 
and  42c,  respectively.  Commercial  Club 
of  Salt  Lake  City  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.Ry. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  218,  223,  224. 

(ee)  Complainants  attacked  the 
class  rates  from  Portland  east  to  points 
in  Washington,  Idaho  and  Montana, 
and  from  Seattle  and  Tacoma  to  points 
in  Oregon,  Idaho  and  Montana.  It 
appeared  that  jobbers  and  wholesale 
merchants  in  the  three  cities  could  sell 
goods  to  points  about  100  miles  west 
of  Spokane  and  east  en  the  O.  R.  & 
N.  and  O.  T.  Line  as  far  as  Arcadia, 
which  is  midway  between  Portland 
and  Salt  Lake  City.  The  rates  from 
Seattle  and  Tacoma  to  various  repre- 
sentative points  east  on  the  N.  P.  R.  R. 
earned    about    6Hc    per    ton    mile    first 


class  to  about  1^/4  c  class  E.  From 
Seattle,  Wash.,  to  representative  points 
on  the  Great  Northern  Ry.  the  earn- 
ings per  ton  mile  first  class  ranged 
from  5.69c  to  7.32c,  1.42c  to  1.14c,  class 
E;  from  Portland  to  representative  points 
on  the  O.  R.  &  N.  Co.  and  O.  S.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  from  5.72c  to  8.99c  first  class, 
and  from  1.20c  to  1.82c,  class  E.  These 
rates  were  considerably  higher  than  the 
class  rates  westbound  for  similar  dis- 
tances from  the  eastern  terminals  of 
the  N.  P.,  Gt.  N.  and  U.  P.  R.  Rs. 
Other  things  being  equal,  the  coast  cities 
could  sell  on  the  several  lines  to  the 
points  where  the  c.  1.  rate  to  the  coast 
plus  the  1.  c.  1.  rate  back  equaled  the 
1.  c.  1.  rate  from  the  middle  western 
jobbing  center  with  which  jobbers  at 
the  coast  competed.  HELD,  upon  con- 
sideration of  the  whole  record,  as  well 
as  the  facts  stated  in  the  opinion,  the 
present  interstate  class  rates  exacted 
by  defendants  for  transportation  from 
Seattle,  Tacoma  and  Portland  to  points 
in  Washington,  Oregon,  Idaho  and  Mon- 
tana are  unreasonable  and  that  sub- 
stantial justice  can  be  accomplished 
only  by  a  horizontal  reduction  of  the 
class  rates  of  not  less  than  20  per 
cent.  Portland  Chamber  of  Commerce 
V.  O.  R.  R.  &  Nav.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  265. 

(f)  The  highest  main-line  rates  to  be 
found  in  the  United  States  were  those 
from  eastern  points  to  stations  in  Ne- 
vada. For  carrying  a  carload  of  first- 
class  traffic  containing  20,000  lbs.  from 
Omaha  to  Reno,  the  U.  P.-S.  P.  line 
charged  $858.  If  a  like  carload  was  car- 
ried 154  miles  further  to  Sacramento, 
the  charge  was  but  $600.  The  first-class 
rate  to  the  more  distant  point,  Sacra- 
mento, was  $3  per  100  lbs.,  and  to  the 
nearer  point,  Reno,  $4.29  per  100  lbs. 
If  a  light  carload  of  freight  originated 
at  Denver,  500  miles  west  of  Omaha, 
the  same  rates  to  Reno  and  Sacramento 
applied,  and  if  the  freight  originated  at 
Boston,  1,700  miles  east  of  Omaha,  the 
rates  were  the  same.  This  arose  be- 
cause the  whole  of  the  United  States 
from  Colorauo  common  points  to  the 
Atlantic  seaboard,  barring  a  few  of  tlie 
southeastern  states,  was  one  wide  group 
or  zone  from  which  practically  uniform 
rates  to  Pacific  coast  water  points  were 
made,  and  the  rates  to  Reno  were  based 
upon  these  blanket  rates  to  coast 
cities  and  amounted  to  the  sum  of  the 
rates  to  the  coast  plus  the  local  rates 
back  to  point  of  destination.     Formerly 


624 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §6G  (ff)— §67  (b) 


Nevada  traffic,  save  to  the  mines  on 
its  westernmost  border,  was  but  trifling. 
At  present,  however,  Nevada  had  a 
traffic,  both  freight  and  passenger, 
which  was  far  too  considerable  to  be 
overlooked  under  the  rule  de  minimis. 
Upon  freight  shipped  from  Boston,  New 
York,  Chicago,  St.  Louis  or  Omaha  to 
Sacramento  or  to  Reno,  the  carriers 
east  of  Ogden  received  precisely  the 
same  earnings  on  both  shipments,  but 
the  S.  P.  Co.  west  of  Ogden  received 
far  more  upon  the  Reno  shipment  than 
on  the  Sacramento  shipment.  HELD, 
the  time  has  come  when  the  carriers 
west  of  the  Rocky  Mountains  must 
treat  the  intermountain  country  upon 
a  different  basis  from  that  which  has 
hitherto  obtained.  Nevada  cannot  to 
the  fullest  extent  be  given  rates  as 
low  as  those  given  to  Sacramento,  be- 
cause in  making  rates  to  Reno  from  a 
territory  as  large  as  that  of  the  east, 
consideration  must  necessarily  be  given 
to  existing  rates  to  other  intermediate 
points  and  to  points  upon  the  Pacific. 
The  class  rates  to  Reno  and  points 
east  thereof,  through  but  not  including 
Winnemucca,  from  groups  of  eastern 
defined  territory  are  unreasonable  first 
class  (other  classes  reduced  proportion- 
ately) to  the  extent  they  exceed  the 
following  from  Denver  and  other  points 
in  group  J,  $2.10;  Grand  Island  and 
other  points  in  group  G,  $2.30;  Omaha 
and  group  F,  $2.50;  Clinton  and  group 
E,  $2.80;  Chicago  and  group  D,  $2.90; 
Cincinnati-Detroit  common  points,  $3.05; 
Pittsburgh-Buffalo  common  points,  $3.20; 
New  York  common  points,  $3.50.  Rates 
to  Winnemucca  and  points  east  thereof 
to  the  Nevada-Utah  state  line  reduced 
about  5  per  cent  less  than  the  forego- 
ing. Commodity  rates  reserved  for  fur- 
ther consideration.  Railroad  Commis- 
sion of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C 
238. 

(ff)  Complainant  attacked  the  local 
rates  from  Roanoke  to  Lynchburg,  Va., 
and  to  Winston-Salem  and  Durham,  N.  C. 
The  local  rate  from  Cincinnati  to 
Roanoke,  a  distance  of  456  miles,  was 
G2c  per  100  lbs.  first  class,  and  for  the  haul 
of  122  miles  from  Roanoke  to  Winston- 
Salem  61c  was  charged.  It  was  admitted 
by  the  N.  &  W.  R.  R.  at  the  hearing  that 
to  no  point  on  its  line  were  as  high 
rates  made,  mileage  alone  considered,  as 
applied  to  Winston-Salem  and  Durham 
from  Roanoke  and  Lynchburg,  respect- 
ively.    HELD,   that   the   first-class    rate 


should  not  exceed  52c.  Other  classes 
proportionately  reduced.  Corporation 
Commission  of  North  Carolina  v.  N.  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  303,  311,  312. 

(g)  Phoenix,  Ariz.,  asked  for  the  es- 
tablishment of  class  rates  to  that  city 
from  points  within  eastern  defined  ter- 
ritory lying  between  the  Missouri  River 
and  the  Pittsburgh-Buffalo  line.  The 
first-class  rates  were  as  follows:  From 
Kansas  City  and  St.  Louis,  $3.41;  from 
Chicago  and  Cincinnati,  $3.61;  from 
Pittsburgh,  $3.91.  HELD,  that  the  first- 
class  rates  are  unreasonable  to  the 
extent  they  exceed,  from  Kansas  City, 
$2.50;  St.  Louis,  $2.80;  Chicago,  $2.90; 
Cincinnati,  $3.05;  Pittsburg,  $3.20;  other 
classes  reduced  proportionately.  Mari- 
copa County  Commercial  Club  v.  S.  F. 
P.  &   P.  Ry.   Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  257,  258. 

(gg)  The  through  class  rates  from 
Chicago  to  Ottumwa,  la.,  are  found  to  be 
unreasonable  as  compared  with  the  pres- 
ent class  rates  from  Chicago  to  Burling- 
ton, and  as  compared  with  the  rates  pre- 
viously in  effect  to  Ottumwa,  and  the 
first  and  second  class  rates  of  61c  and 
50c,  respectively,  are  ordered  reduced  to 
56c  and  46c  respectively.  Ottumwa  Com- 
mercial Ass'n  V.  C.  B.  &  Q,  R.  R.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  413,  415. 

(h)  Rates  from  Dow,  Lowe,  Gowan, 
Alderson,  Holdenville,  Wilburton  and 
Haileyville,  Okla.,  on  coal  to  Goltry, 
Okla.,  are  not  shown  to  be  unreasonable. 
Haines  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I. 
C.   C.   214,   219. 

§67.     Coal. 

(a)  The  petition  attacked  a  through 
rate  of  $4.15  on  coal  from  Gallup,  N. 
^I.,  to  Tempe  and  Mesa,  Ariz.  HELD, 
the  rate  of  $4.15  is  excessive.  Rate 
of  $3.60  per  ton  is  prescribed  as  a 
maximum  for  the  future.  Maricopa 
County  Commercial  Club  v.  Phoenix  & 
Eastern   R.   R.    Co.,    22    I.    C.    C.    221. 

(b)  The  rate  of  $2.10  per  ton  on 
coal  from  Coal  Creek,  Tenn.,  to  Au- 
gusta, Ga.,  was  attacked  as  unreasonable 
and  prejudicial  as  compared  with  rates 
to  Macon,  Athens,  and  Atlanta,  Ga. 
Augusta  is  a  manufacturing  center  com- 
'>eting  with  Macon,  Athens  and  Atlanta. 
\ugusta  used  76,000  tons  of  coal,  of 
which  45,000  tons  came  from  Coal  Creek 
and  30,000  tons  from  Pocahontas,  Va. 
Prior  to  1907,  the  rate  was  $2.05  per 
ton.  The  evidence  did  not  show  the 
cost  of  service,  the  amount  of  the  in- 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §67    (c)  — (g) 


625 


vestment  or  the  amount  of  earnings 
necessary  to  insure  a  reasonable  in- 
come. The  rates  to  Augusta  and  Ath- 
ens were  shown  to  be  higher  per  ton 
mile;  the  rate  to  Macon  was  one-tenth 
of  a  mill  lower.  The  Coal  Creek-Au- 
gusta rate  and  other  rates  were  the 
result  of  the'  competition  between  car- 
riers serving  various  coal  fields.  The 
service  from  Coal  Creek  involved  ex- 
pensive mountainous  transportation.  The 
rate  from  the  Jellico  mines  in  Tennes- 
see on  shipments  through  Coal  Creek 
to  Augusta  produced  a  revenue  of  5.5 
mills  per  ton  mile.  The  rate  from 
Coal  Creek  produced  a  revenue  of  5.7 
mills.  The  rate  from  Pocahontas  to 
Winston-Salem  of  8.2  mills  per  ton 
mile  was  established  by  the  Commis- 
sion. A  rate  from  Coal  Creek  to  Spar- 
tanburg, S.  C,  of  7.8  mills  per  ton  mile 
was  established  by  the  Commission. 
IMacon,  Athens  and  Atlanta  got  a  con- 
siderable portion  of  their  supply  from 
other  points.  Coal  Creek  rates  were 
based  on  Birmingham,  Ala.,  rates  with 
an  added  differential  of  15c  per  ton. 
The  reasonableness  of  this  differential 
bad  been  adjudged  by  the  Commission. 
A  reduction  in  Coal  Creek-Augusta  rates 
would  necessitate  reductions  from  nu- 
merous other  points  in  Tennessee,  Vir- 
ginia and  Kentucky.  HELD,  that  com- 
plainants' allegations  of  unreasonable- 
ness and  prejudice  are  not  sustained. 
Chamber  of  •  Commerce  of  Augusta,  Ga., 
V.   S.   Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  233,  238. 

(c)  Defendant's  present  rates  for  the 
transportation  of  anthracite  coal  in 
carloads  from  the  mines  of  complain- 
ants in  the  Wyoming  region  in  Penn- 
sylvania to  Perth  Amboy,  N.  J.,  an 
average  distance  of  about  165  miles,  of 
$1.55  per  gross  ton  on  prepared  sizes, 
$1.40  on  pea  coal  and  $1.20  on  buck- 
wheat coal  are  unreasonable  to  the 
extent  they  exceed  $1.40  on  prepared 
sizes,  $1.30  on  pea  coal  and  $1.15  on 
buckwheat  coal,  which  latter  rates  are 
established  as  maxima  for  the  future. 
Reparation  awarded.  Meeker  &  Co.  v. 
L.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  129,  162. 

(d)  Complainants  attacked  an  advance 
of  15c  per  ton,  making  a  rate  of  $1.95,  on 
coal  from  the  Coal  Creek  fields  in  Ten- 
nessee to  Spartanburg,  S.  C,  effective 
Aug.  15,  1910.  For  17  years  this  rate  was 
$1.85.  In  1909,  to  comply  with  the  order  of 
the  Commission  in  the  Black  Mountain 
Coal  Co.  case,  15  I.  C.  C.  286,  establish- 
ing certain  differentials  from  coal  fields 


correlated  to  the  Coal  Creek  fields,  the 
defendants  reduced  the  rate  to  $1.80. 
The  average  distance  from  Coal  Creek 
to  Spartanburg  was  235  miles,  and  to 
the  group  taking  the  Spartanburg  rate, 
250  miles.  At  the  rate  of  $1.80  the 
revenue  per  ton  mile  to  Spartanburg 
was  7.6  mills,  and  to  Spartanburg 
group  7.2  mills.  At  the  rate  of  $1.85 
the  respective  ton  mile  revenues  were 
7.87  and  7.4  mills,  while  at  the  rate 
of  $1.95  they  were  8.29  and  7.8  mills. 
HELD,  the  rate  in  question  should  not 
exceed  $1.85  per  ton.  Carriers  permit- 
ted to  work  out  proper  differentials  be- 
tween the  various  districts.  Reparation 
awarded.  Victor  Mfg.  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
21   I.   C.  C.   222. 

(e)  Complainant,  on  shipments  of 
coal  from  the  Walsenburg  District,  Colo., 
to  Salina,  Kan.,  and  thence  to  the  Mis- 
souri River,  asked  reparation  to  the 
extent  the  charges  exacted  exceeded 
$3.50  a  ton  to  Salina  and  $3.75  thence 
to  the  Missouri  River.  The  same  record 
was  presented  in  the  case  of  Cedar 
Hill  C.  &  C.  Co.  V.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  387.  HELD,  for  the  reasons 
stated  in  that  case,  complaint  dis- 
missed. Sunnyside  Coal  Mining  Co.  v. 
D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
20. 

(f)  The  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  made  a  pro- 
portional rate  of  95c  from  Rotterdam 
Junction,  Pa.,  to  Holyoke,  Mass.,  via 
the  circuitous  route  of  Greenfield  and 
down  the  Connecticut  Valley,  on  coal 
originating  on  the  C.  of  N.  J.,  Erie  and 
the  L.  V.  R.  Rs.  This  proportional  rate 
formed  part  of  the  joint  rate  of  $2.80 
charged  by  these  carriers.  On  coal 
originating    on    the    D.    L.    &    W.,    the 

B.  &  M.  charged  its  full  local  rate  of 
$1.15  from  Rotterdam  Junction,  the 
coal  paying  $2.45  to  the  D.  L.  &  W.  or 
a  full  through  charge  of  $3.60  per  ton. 
HELD,  in  the  absence  of  other  evidence 
as  to  the  reasonableness  of  the  $1.15 
local  rate,  it  could  not  be  held  unrea- 
sonable. Fisk  &  Sons  v.  B.  &  M.  R. 
R.,  19  1.  C.  C.  299,  301,  302. 

(g)  Complainant    shipped     soft    coal, 

C.  L.,  Thomas,  W.  Va.,  to  Tonopah, 
Nev.,  under  a  combination  rate  of  $20.60 
per  ton,  of  which  it  attacked  the  rate  of 
$7.30  for  the  movement  from  Omaha  to 
Ogden.  Defendant  being  willing  to 
make  refund  on  this  basis,  it  was  held 
that  this  particular  part  of  the  rate  was 
unreasonable   to  the  extent   it  exceeded 


626 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §67    (h)— (1) 


$5.25   per   ton.     Sligo   Iron   Store   Co.   v. 
U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  527,  528. 

(h)  Complainant  shipped  blacksmith 
coal,  C.  L.,  Lilly,  Pa.,  to  Texarkana,  Ark., 
under  a  rate  of  $2.50  per  ton  from  Lilly 
to  Cairo,  111.,  and  $4.25  from  Cairo  to 
Texarkana.  The  latter  rate  is  alleged 
to  be  unreasonable  because  there  was 
in  force  at  the  same  time  a  rate  of 
$2.40  a  ton  on  soft  coal  between  those 
points.  The  distance  between  Cairo  and 
Texarkana  via  the  Iron  Mountain  R.  R. 
was  399  miles,  and  the  rate  on  soft 
coal  referred  to  applied  only  from  the 
Illinois  mine,  having  been  put  in  to 
meet  competition  of  the  Illinois  Central 
and  its  connections.  A  few  months 
after  the  shipment  moved  the  soft  coal 
rate  was  canceled  so  that  at  the  present 
time  the  only  rate  in  effect  between 
these  points  on  soft  coal  was  $4.25. 
HELD,  that  smithing  coal  was  of  great- 
er value  than  ordinary  bituminous  coal, 
and  that  a  higher  rate  might  properly 
be  applied  to  its  transportation,  and 
that  the  rate  charged  was  not  unrea- 
sonable, Sligo  Iron  Store  Co.  v.  U.  P. 
R.  R.   Co.,   19   L   C.   C.   527,   529. 

(ij  Complainant  attacked  the  reason- 
ableness of  defendant's  separately  es- 
tablished rate  of  75c  per  gross  ton  for 
the  transportation  from  Waverly,  N.  Y., 
to  Binghamton,  N.  Y.,  of  C.  L.  ship- 
ments of  semi-anthracite  coal  originat- 
ing at  Bernice,  Pa.,  a  distance  of  39 
miles.  The  bulk  of  the  shipments  was 
pea  and  buckwheat  coal  and  screenings. 
HELD,  the  rate  is  unreasonable  to  the 
extent  that  it  exceeds  65c  per  gross  ton 
on  the  larger  sizes  and  55c  on  pea, 
buckwheat  and  screenings.  Northern 
Anthracite  Coal  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,   19   L   C.   C.   549. 

(j)  Complainants  attacked  the  rate 
of  $2  per  ton  from  East  St.  Louis,  111., 
to  Omaha  and  South  Omaha,  Neb.,  on 
soft  coal  originating  in  Illinois.  De- 
fendants had  a  rate  of  $1.80  in  effect 
for  a  number  of  years.  Owing  to  keen 
competition  the  rate  had  been  subject 
to  some  severe  fluctuations.  Via  the 
Wabash  R.  R.,  with  a  short-line  mileage 
of  413  miles  to  Omaha,  the  revenue  per 
ton  mile  was  4.84  mills,  out  of  which 
must  be  paid  a  bridge  charge  of  20c 
per  ton  across  the  Mississippi  and  $4 
per  car  across  the  Missouri.  Via  the  M. 
P.  Ry.  the  mileage  was  487,  revenue  per 
ton  mile  4.1  mills,  out  of  which  a  bridge 
charge  o^  20c  per  ton  must  be  deducted. 


The  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  had  two  routes,  its 
west  side  line  having  a  mileage  of  466.5 
and  its  east  side  line  507.2,  yielding 
revenue  of  4.28  and  3.94  mills  respect- 
ively. Via  the  west  side  line  there  was 
a  bridge  charge  of  20c  per  ton.  All  of 
the  defendants  absorbed  switching  charges 
at  Omaha  and  South  Omaha,  when  coal 
was  consigned  to  parties  located  on  other 
roads.  HELD,  the  rate  complained  of 
is  not  unreasonable.  Complaint  dis- 
missed. Breese-Trenton  Mining  Co.  v. 
Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  598. 

(k)  The  carload  rate  assessed  by 
defendant  on  coal  shipped  from  the 
Carbon  Hill  mines  in  Alabama  to  New 
Albany,  Miss.,  was  $1.10,  yielding  a  per 
ton  mile  revenue  of  9.7  mills,  or  an 
earning  of  at  least  $44  on  a  40-ton  car 
and  $55  on  a  50-ton  car.  The  average 
revenue  per  ton  mile  for  the  entire 
coal  movement  of  the  six  principal 
carriers  in  the  southern  coal  field 
varied  from  4.98  mills  to  6.84  mills, 
that  of  defendant  being  5.7  mills;  and 
the  revenue  from  all  freight,  for  the 
same  carriers,  varied  from  8.21  mills 
to  1.079c,  that  of  the  defendant  being 
9.79  mills.  HELD,  that  the  rate  was 
unreasonable  and  that  a  rate  of  95c, 
yielding  a  per  ton  mile  revenue  of  over 
8  mills  and  per  car  earnings  of  $38  for 
40-ton  cars  and  $47.50  for  50-ton  cars, 
should  be  established  for  the  future. 
Rainey  &  Rogers  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R. 
R.    Co.,   18   I.    C.   C.   88,   90. 

(1)  Complainants  attacked  the  rate 
of  $2.60  on  slack  coal  in  carloads  from 
Gallup,  N.  M.,  to  El  Paso,  Tex.  At 
the  time  of  shipment  a  $2.15  rate  was 
in  effect  to  Courchesne,  a  point  2^ 
miles  from  El  Paso  and  intermediate  to 
Gallup  and  El  Paso,  but  no  iraffic 
moved  under  this  rate  and  it  was  in 
effect  by  a  mistake  of  defendant.  The 
$2.60  rate  attacked  yielded  some  7  mills 
per  ton  mile.  The  $2  rate  put  into 
effect  subsequent  to  the  shipment  in 
question  by  defendant  yielded  4.5  mills. 
Defendant  put  the  $2  rate  in  as  an 
experiment  for  the  purpose  of  inducing 
the  use  of  slack  by  the  electric  rail- 
way and  gas  company  at  El  Paso.  The  rate 
on  lump  slack  was  $2.60,  which  compared 
favorably  with  the  rates  generally  pre- 
vailing in  the  region  for  similar  distances 
and  conditions.  HELD,  the  $2.60  rate  was 
not  shown  to  be  unreasonable.  Within 
proper  limitations  carriers  are  justified 
in  making  low  rates  for  traffic  of  this 
character,    to    induce    movement    which 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §67   (m)— (r) 


627 


would  not  otherwise  occur  and,  gener- 
ally speaking,  rates  on  lump  and  slack 
coal  are  the  same  in  tro  territory  in- 
volved. Consumers'  Ice  Co.  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.   C.  C  277,  278. 

(m)  On  soft  coal  in  carloads  from 
Christopher,  111.,  to  Ainsworth  and  Val- 
entine, Neb.,  a  combinaticn  rate  of  $4.45 
per  ton  was  collected  based  on  the  Bur- 
lington rate  of  70c,  Christopher  to  Pe- 
oria, and  the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.'s 
rate  of  $3.75,  Peoria  to  destination.  The 
$3.75  portion  of  the  clvar^e  was  at- 
tacked as  excessive.  Valentino  and 
Ainsworth  are  781  and  735  miles,  re- 
spectively, from  Peoria  and  791  and  924 
miles,  respectively,  from  Christopher. 
The  rate  charged  yielded  4.8  mills  on 
the  shipments  to  Valentine  and  5.1 
mills  on  those  to  Ainswortu.  One  year 
and  one-half  after  the  shipments  moved 
defendants  published  latcs  from  Chris- 
topher to  Ainsworth  and  Valentino  of 
$4.10  and  $4.25,  respeoi.ively.  No  other 
evidence  was  offered  except  rate  com- 
parisons, the  bearing  of  which  was  not 
shown.  HELD,  the  rate  attacked  was 
not  shown  to  be  unreasonabhi,  and  a 
yield  of  5  mills  per  ton  mile  was  not 
excessive  in  the  territory  involved. 
Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q. 
R.    R.    Co.,    18    I.    C.    C.    512,   513. 

(n)  Complainant  attacked  the  car- 
load rate  of  $4  per  ton  on  coal  from 
Rock  Springs,  Kemmerer  and  Diamond- 
ville,  Wyo.,  to  Boise,  Buhl,  Filer,  Hailey, 
Twin  Falls,  Gooding,  Mt  Home,  Nampa, 
Caldwell  and  Wiser,  Ida.,  and  of  $3.75 
to  Burley  and  Ruppert,  Ida.  The  Kem- 
merer and  Diamondville  mines  are  on 
the  Oregon  Short  Line  in  Wyoming. 
The  Rock  Springs  mines  are  on  the 
Union  Pacific  line  in  Wyoming,  and  85 
miles  east  of  Kemmerer.  Buite,  Mont., 
is  437  miles  from  Kemmerer  and  522 
miles  from  Rock  Springs;  Anaconda  is 
about  26  miles  from  Butte.  Fjom  the 
points  of  origin  in  questio.i  to  Butte 
and  Anaconda  the  rates  were  $3.25  on 
lump  coal  and  $3  on  slack.  Portland, 
Ore.,  is  906  miles  from  Kemmerer  and 
991  miles  from  Rock  Springs.  The 
rate  to  Portland  was  $4  per  ton  All 
coal  transported  to  the  Idaho  destina- 
tions in  question  or  to  Butte  and  Ana- 
conda passed  through  Pocatello,  and 
the  conditions  of  transportation  from 
the  mines  to  Pocatello  weri  therefore 
precisely  the  same  irrespective  of  the 
destination  of  the  coal.  Butte  is  263 
miles  north  of  Pocatello,  and  the  Idaho 


destinations  in  question  are  an  average 
distance  of  173  miles  from  Pocatello. 
The  rates  to  Butte  and  Anaconda  are 
carried  back  to  all  points  intermediate 
from  Butte  to  Pocatello  as  far  as  Idaho 
Falls,  a  distance  of  213  railes.  The 
average  distance  from  the  mines  to 
the  Idaho  points  in  question  is  389 
miles  and  the  average  distance  to  Butte 
and  Anaconda  is  485  miles.  The  grades 
are  steeper  and  of  greater  frequency  on 
the  line  from  Pocatello  to  Butte  than 
from  Pocatello  to  the  Idaho  points. 
Coal  moved  in  solid  trains  and  in 
greater  volume  to  Butte  and  Anaconda 
than  to  the  Idaho  points.  The  average 
per  ton  mile  on  coal  to  the  Idaho 
points  under  the  rate  attacked  was 
9.35  mills.  The  average  revenue  on 
all  traffic  on  the  defendant  Oregon 
Short  Line  for  a  typical  year  was  9.51 
mills.  HELD,  the  rates  attacked  were 
excessive  to  the  extent  that  they  ex- 
ceeded $3.50  per  ton.  League  of  South- 
ern Idaho  Commercial  Clubs  v.  O.  S. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  562,  565. 

(o)  Where  blacksmith  coal  is  mined 
only  in  the  eastern  states  and  can 
reach  Portales,  N.  M.,  only  from  the  mines 
or  from  distributing  points  like  Chicago 
and  reasonable  through  rates  are  in  effect 
from  the  mines  and  distributing  points,  a 
rate  from  Pittsburgh,  Kan.,  where  such 
coal  is  not  mined,  to  Portales  is  a 
mere  paper  rate  and  the  Commission 
will  not  consider  the  question  of  its 
reasonableness.  Sligo  Iron  Store  Co. 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  139, 
142. 

(p)  The  rate  of  $9.75  per  ton  on 
blacksmith  coal  from  Chicago  to  Port- 
ales, N.  M.,  is  held  not  to  be  excessive 
on  the  basis  of  a  comparison  of  rates 
to  California,  Arizona  and  other  New 
Mexico  Points.  Sligo  Iron  Store  Co. 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  139, 
143. 

(q)  The  rates  on  cannel  coal  from 
Mill  Creek-Elk,  W.  Va.,  to  points  in 
Ohio,  Illinois,  Michigan  and  other  states, 
having  been  satisfactorily  adjusted  by 
the  application  of  commodity  rates,  and 
a  reduction  of  some  10  or  15c  per 
ton  from  former  rates,  on  motion  of 
complainant  complaint  is  dismissed. 
Mill  Creek  Cannel  Coal  Co.  v.  Coal  & 
Coke  Ry.   Co.,   17  I.   C.   C.   306. 

(r)  On  shipments  of  steam  and  do- 
mestic coal  from  the  Pocahontas,  Va., 
fields  to  Winpton-galem  and  Durham,  N. 


628 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §67   (s)  — (v) 


C,  at  the  published  rate  of  $2.30  per  ton, 
the  ton  mile  revenue  was  respectively 
9  and  1V2  mills.  These  North  Carolina 
points  were  reached  by  branch  lines  of 
defendant.  These  rates  were  higher 
than  to  other  points  on  defendant's  sys- 
tem for  similar  distances  and  higher 
than  most  rates  over  other  carriers 
serving  the  same  section  and  yielded  a 
higher  per  ton  mile  revenue  than 
the  average  rate  on  all  traffic  on 
defendant's  system.  These  rates  were 
also  much  higher  than  to  points 
located  on  defendant's  main  line,  which 
were  subject  to  competition.  Defend- 
ant's system,  as  a  whole,  was  earn- 
ing fair  returns.  The  cost  of  hand- 
ling traffic  over  the  Winston-Salem 
and  Durham  branches  was  higher 
than  on  other  parts  of  the  system  on 
account  of  the  prevalence  of  grades 
and  sharp  curves,  and  on  account  of 
the  comparative  lightness  of  traffic. 
HELD,  that  while  the  rates  should  not 
be  reduced  to  equal  those  to  points 
on  or  near  the  main  line,  they  should 
not  exceed  $2.10  to  Winston-Salem  and 
$2.20  to  Durham.  Reparation  denied. 
Board  of  Trade  of  Winston-Salem  v. 
N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  12,  16. 

(s)  On  a  shipment  of  soft  coal  in 
carloads  from  Christopher,  111.,  to 
Wausa,  Neb.,  via  Sterling,  111.,  $5.20 
per  net  ton  was  charged  on  the  haul 
from  Sterling  to  Wausa.  HELD,  such 
rate  was  unreasonable  to  the  extent 
it  exceeded  a  rate  of  $2.70  per  net  ton. 
Reparation  awarded.  Sunderland  Bros. 
Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C 
212,  213. 

(t)  On  carloads  of  soft  coal  from 
Wellston,  O.,  to  Manitowoc,  Wis.,  des- 
tined to  points  beyond,  charges  were  as- 
sessed at  the  rate  of  $1.85  and  $1.80 
per  ton.  The  rate  from  Wellston  to 
ultimate  destination  was  made  up  of 
the  through  proportional  rate  to  Mani- 
towoc plus  the  charges  of  the  connect- 
ing carrier  beyond.  Shortly  before  the 
shipments  in  question  moved  a  rate 
of  $1.65  was  in  effect  which  was  re- 
stored shortly  afterwards.  The  ship- 
ments might  have  moved  via  Milwau- 
kee at  the  cheaper  rate,  but  a  supply  of 
coal  had  been  purchased  by  complain- 
ant and  ordered  sent  via  Manitowoc 
when  the  $1.65  rate  was  in  effect  via 
that  route,  and  the  billing  could  not 
readily  be  changed.  HELD,  the  rate 
charged  was  unreasonable.  Reparation 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  the  $1.65  rate. 


Sunderland    Brothers    Co.    v.    Pere    Mar- 
quette R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  450,  451. 

(u)  Complainant  miners,  located  in 
western  Colorado  at  Cameo  and  South 
Canon,  attacked  the  rates  on  coal  from 
these  -points  to  points  in  Utah,  Nevada, 
California,  Oregon,  Washington,  Idaho 
and  Montana  as  unreasonable  compared 
with  rates  from  other  producing  fields 
served  by  defendants  in  Wyoming  and 
Utah,  especially  Rock  Springs,  Wyo., 
and  asked  for  the  establishment  of 
joint  through  rates.  Comparison  of  the 
per  ton  mile  revenue  from  the  points 
in  question  showed  that  complainants 
were  charged  higher  rates  than  their 
competitors.  Special  operating  difficulti- 
ies  were  encountered  by  defendants  in 
hauling  coal  from  Cameo  and  Canon 
City,  not  met  with  at  other  producing 
points,  such  as  high  grades  and  sharp 
curves,  which  resulted  in  defendants 
being  forced  to  carry  a  much  lower 
tonnage  per  train  than  from  other  pro- 
ducing fields.  The  traffic  from  Cameo 
and  South  Canon  moved  from  points  of 
origin  from  264  to  324  miles  through 
desert  country  before  reaching  a  junc- 
tion at  which  it  might  be  delivered  to 
a  line  reaching  Nevada  or  California. 
Rock  Springs  was  most  favorably  lo- 
cated with  respect  to  the  markets  com- 
plainants desired  to  reach,  being  a  local 
point  on  the  Union  Pacific.  The  car- 
riers connecting  with  the  lines  at  Cameo* 
and  South  Canon  were  in  poor  financial 
condition  and  insufficiently  equipped  with 
cars  to  engage  in  joint  trafiic.  The 
rates  attacked  were,  subsequently  to 
the  hearing,  substantially  reduced,  al- 
though not  to  the  point  demanded  by 
complainants.  HELD,  on  account  of 
the  difficulties  of  transportation  encoun- 
tered at  Cameo  and  Canon  City  the 
rates  attacked  were  not  shown  to  be  un- 
reasonable. Request  for  the  establish- 
ment of  joint  rates  and  routes  denied. 
Grand  Junction  Mining  &  Fuel  Co.  v. 
C.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.   C.  C.  452,  457. 

(v)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
on  splint  coal  from  Chicago  and  other 
Illinois  points  to  Fort  Dodge,  la.,  as 
being  unreasonable  per  se,  and  as  com- 
pared with  rates  to  Des  Moines,  la.,  and 
Albert  Lea,  Minn.  Fort  Dodge  is  lo- 
cated 50  miles  northwest  of  the  center 
of  Iowa,  86  miles  from  Des  Moines,  and 
375  miles  from  Chicago.  Des  Moines 
is  358  miles  from  Chicago,  and  340 
from  St.  Louis.  Albert  Lea  is  119 
miles    from    St.    Paul,    100    northeast   of 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §67  (w)— (aa) 


629 


Ft.  Dodge,  and  382  miles  from  Chicago. 
The  coal  in  question  was  used  in  the 
manufacture  of  clay  products  at  Ft. 
Dodge.  The  Chicago  to  Ft.  Dodge 
rate  was  $1.85  per  ton;  from  Chicago  to 
Des  Moines  the  rate  was  $1.60;  from 
Chicago  to  Albert  Lea,  $1.40.  The  Chi- 
cago to  Albert  Lea  $1.40  rate  was  made 
on  the  basis  of  the  $1.40  rate  from  Chi- 
cago to  St.  Paul,  the  St.  Paul  rate  being 
forced  by  the  low  rates  to  Duluth.  The 
St.  Louis  to  Des  Moines  rate  on  coal 
was  $1.60  per  ton,  established  by  the 
Wabash,  and  this  carrier  also  applied 
that  rate  from  Springfield,  111.,  to  Des 
Moines.  The  Wabash  terminates  at 
Des  Moines.  Other  carriers,  including 
defendant,  were  compelled  to  meet  this 
$1.60  rate  in  shipments  to  Des  Moines 
from  Chicago  and  Illinois  points.  Indi- 
ana and  Iowa  keenly  felt  the  competi- 
tion of  Illinois  in  the  production  of 
coal.  The  lowering  of  the  rate  to  Fort 
Dodge  would  compel  a  cutting  of  rates 
from  Iowa  and  Indiana  to  prevent 
Illinois  from  monopolizing  the  Ft.  Dodge 
trade,  and  a  substantial  reduction  of 
rates  to  Ft.  Dodge  would  drive  many 
Iowa  coal  fields  out  of  business.  HELD, 
the  conditions  at  Des  Moines  and  Albert 
Lea  were  essentially  different  from 
those  obtaining  at  Ft.  Dodge,  and  the 
rates  to  the  latter  point  should  not  be 
reduced.  Fort  Dodge  Commercial  Club 
T.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  572,  575, 
577,   582. 

(w)  Complainant,  the  city  of  Bristol, 
Tenn.,  attacked  the  rate  of  85c  on  bi- 
tuminous coal  from  the  Appalachia  coal 
field  in  Virginia.  For  the  past  ten  years 
defendants  had  fluctuated  their  charges 
greatly,  but  for  a  period  of  one  year 
had  maintained  voluntarily  a  rate  as  low 
as  70c.  This  70c  rate  was  put  into 
effect  after  a  75c  rate  had  been  main- 
tained for  many  years.  The  coal  ton- 
nage was  very  heavy  and  had  steadily 
increased.  One  of  defendants  for  many 
years  hauled  coal  from  the  Appalachia 
field  through  Bristol  to  Bluff  City,  a 
point  11  miles  beyond  Bristol,  and  ac- 
cepted as  its  division  of  the  through 
rate  from  50  to  60c  a  ton,  which  rate 
was  admitted  to  yield  a  profit.  It  also 
hauled  coke  at  35c  between  the  points 
in  question,  although  this  commodity 
ordinarily  moves  at  a  higher  rate  than 
coal.  During  the  past  ten  years  the 
principal  defendant,  a  new^  line,  had 
greatly  prospered  so  as  to  make  its 
shares  of  stock  given  as  a  bonus  for 
bonds    worth    $200    per    share.      HELD, 


the  85c  rate  attacked  was  unreasonable 
and  should  be  reduced  to  75c.  Board 
of  Bristol,  Tenn.,  v.  V.  &  S.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,    15    I.    C.    C.    453,    458. 

(x)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
on  slack  and  on  nut  and  soft  coal  from 
Pittsburg,  Kan.,  to  points  in  Oklahoma. 
A  comparison  of  the  rates  in  question 
with  those  prescribed  by  the  Commis- 
sion in  recent  decisions  respecting  the 
territory  west  of  the  Mississippi  failed 
to  show  that  the  rates  attacked  were 
excessive,  nor  were  they  unreasonable 
as  compared  with  rates  prescribed  by 
the  Oklahoma  commission  for  similar 
distances  from  Oklahoma  coal  mines 
to  points  of  destination  in  that  state. 
Should  the  rates  requested  by  com- 
plainant be  granted,  Pittsburg  coal,  on 
account  of  its  inferiority  as  compared 
with  Oklahoma  coal,  would  not  be  able 
to  compete  seriously  at  Oklahoma 
points.  HELD,  the  complaint  should  be 
dismissed.  State  of  Oklahoma  v.  A.  T. 
&   S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.   C.   516,  519. 

(y)  Rates  on  slack  coal  from  Weir 
and  Midway,  Kan.,  to  Goltry,  Okla., 
should  be  somewhat  lower  than  that  on 
lump  and  should  not  exceed  $1.50  per 
ton.  Haines  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
13   J.   C.    C.    214,   219. 

(z)  Following  Johnston  v.  St.  L.  & 
S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  C.  73,  rates 
on  coal  from  Hartford  and  Huntington, 
Ark.,  and  Dow,  Haileyville,  Wilburton, 
Alderson,  South  McAlester,  Prairie 
Creek,  Craig,  Howe,  Bonanza,  Hackett 
and  Henryetta,  Okla.,  to  Kingfisher, 
Okla.,  are  held  not  to  be  shown  un- 
reasonable. Haines  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  214,  217,  218,  220; 
Gentry  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I. 
C.   C.   257. 

(aa)  Cannel  coal,  a  variety  of  bitu- 
minous coal,  is  adapted  for  use  only  in 
grates.  It  costs  $1  per  ton  to  mine  as 
against  53c  on  ordinary  bituminous 
coal  and  sells  at  the  mine  for  $2.75  as 
against  $1.25  for  other  coal.  It  can  be 
sold  in  many  localities  for  a  consider- 
ably higher  price  than  other  coals  on 
account  of  its  superior  quality  for  use 
In  grates  and  this  gives  it  a  much 
wider  distribution  than  attaches  to  or- 
dinary soft  coal.  It  does  not  move  in 
large  quantities  to  particular  places. 
The  loading  is  less  both  for  physical 
and  commercial  reasons  than  obtains 
with  bituminous  coal.  Defendant  had 
in  the  past  generally  transported  cannel 


630 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §68  (a)— §71  (a) 


coal  at  the  ordinary  bituminous  coal 
rate.  Complainant's  mine  had  been  de- 
veloped under  that  system  of  rates  and 
its  competitors  were  enjoying  the  soft 
coal  rate.  Nothing  in  the  physical  at- 
tributes of  cannel  coal  served  to  dis- 
tinguish it  from  bituminous  coal  proper. 
HELD,  the  ordinary  bituminous  coal 
rate  should  be  extended  to  cannel 
coal  except  to  markets  which  the  bitu 
minous  coal  proper  could  not  be  ex- 
pected to  reach,  in  such  case  a  higher 
chsirge  being  permissible.  Goff-Kirby 
Coal  Company  v.  B.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co., 
13  L  C.  C.  383,  385. 

§68.     Coal-tar    Paving    Cement. 

(a)  On  coal-tar  paving  cement  from 
Ensley,  Ala.,  to  La  Grange,  Ga.,  de- 
fendants assessed  a  class  rate  of  30c. 
This  product  is  exactly  the  same  as 
coal-tar  pitch  except  for  a  slight  differ- 
ence in  consistency.  It  is  liquefied  by 
heat  and  poured  into  interstices  be- 
tween stone  blocks  used  for  paving,  and 
is  also  used  for  roofing  purposes.  HELD, 
it  should  take  the  same  rate,  16.5c,  as 
coal-tar  pitch.  Reparation  awarded. 
Barrett  Mfg.  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
15   I.    C.    C.   196,   198. 

§69.     Coal-tar    Paving     Pitch. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  of 
24c  per  100  lbs.  for  the  transportation  of 
two  carloads  of  coal-tar  paving  pitch  from 
Carthage,  O.,  to  Birmingham,  Ala.  At 
the  time  of  shipment  defendants  main- 
tained a  rate  of  19c  from  Cincinnati  to 
Birmingham  on  asphalt  in  carloads  and 
the  same  rate  on  tar  and  pitch  classed 
as  "naval  stores."  Under  the  same 
tariff  the  rate  on  tar  and  pitch  or  tar 
(coal)  "paving  or  roofing"  was  24c. 
Carthage  is  within  the  switching  limits 
of  Cincinnati  and  takes  Cincinnati  rates. 
Asphalt  and  pitch  or  tar  are  both  ex- 
tensively used  for  paving  and  roofing 
purposes  and  are  therefore  competitive 
commodities.  The  cost  of  their  trans- 
portation is  practically  the  same  and 
they  are  equally  desirable  as  freight 
tonnage.  HELD,  the  rate  complained 
of  was  unreasonable  and  unjustly  dis- 
criminatory to  the  extent  that  it  ex- 
ceeded the  rate  of  19c  contemporaneous- 
ly in  force  on  asphalt  via  the  same 
lines,  and  should  not  exceed  such  rate 
for  the  future.  Reparation  awarded. 
Southern  Bitulithic  Co.  v.  C.  C.  C.  & 
St.    L.    Ry.    Co.,    21    I.    C.    C.    588,    590. 


§70.     Coke. 

(a)  On  coke  in  carloads  from  Trini- 
dad, Colo.,  to  Amarillo,  Tex.,  a  distance 
of  255  miles,  complainant  was  assessed 
$3.35  per  ton.  The  rate  from  Trinidad 
via  Amarillo  to  Fort  Worth,  a  distance 
of  591  miles,  was  $3  per  ton.  On  soft 
coal  the  rate  from  Trinidad  to  Amarillo 
was  $2.90  and  to  Fort  Worth  .$3  per 
ton.  Shortly  prior  to  the  time  ship- 
ments moved  the  rates  on  both  coal 
and  coke  from  Trinidad  to  Amarillo 
were  the  same,  $3.35  per  ton,  but  a  re- 
duction to  $2.90  was  made  in  the  coal 
rate.  The  rates  generally  in  the  terri- 
tory in  question  on  coke  were  about 
equal  to  or  slightly  in  excess  of  those  on 
coal.  No  special  equipment  was  re- 
quired for  shipments  of  coke  from  Trini- 
dad to  Amarillo,  box  or  stock  cars  being 
employed.  The  rate  of  $3.35  attacked 
yielded  1.45c  per  ton  mile.  The  aver- 
age rate  received  by  one  defendant  on 
all  business  was  1.033c  per  ton  mile 
and  by  another  9.11  mills.  The  average 
rate  on  all  commodities  in  the  entire 
country  was  7.66  mills  per  ton  mile. 
HELD,  coke  being  a  low-grade  com- 
modity, the  rate  should  not  exceed  be- 
tween the  points  in  question  the  soft- 
coal  rate  of  $2.90.  Amarillo  Gas  Co.  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  240, 
242. 

§71.     Condensed    Milk. 

(a)  The  petitioner  attacked  the  rates 
on  condensed  milk  from  Creamery, 
Ariz.,  to  various  points  in  Arizona,  New 
Mexico,  Nevada  and  California.  The 
following  table  gives  the  condensed  milk 
rates   complained   of: 

Rates  Com- 
plained of. 
Rates  from  Cream-     Distance.  C.L.  L.C.L. 

ery,  Ariz.,  to —  Miles.  Cents.  Cents. 

Wickenburg,    Ariz 63  35  43 

Prescott,    Ariz 146  77  89 

Jerome  Junction,  Ariz..  164  79  98 

Parker,    Ariz 174  82  98 

Ash  Fork,  Ariz 203  88         102 

Williams,    Ariz 226         100         115 

Flagstaff,    Ariz 260         106         134 

Kingman,   Ariz 318         106         167 

Needles,    Cal 380         106         200 

Gallup,   N.   M 446         106         214 

Searchlight,    Nev 463         134         238 

Ludlow,    Cal 495         106         215 

Albuquerque,  N.  M 604         106         214 

Complaint  was  also  made  of  the  con- 
densed milk  rate  from  Creamery  to  Los 
Angeles,  Cal.     This  complaint  was  based 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §72    (a)— §73    (b) 


631 


on  the  fact  that  the  carload  rate  from 
Creamery  to  Los  Angeles,  a  distance  of 
441  miles,  was  65c,  whereas  the  rate 
from  Richmond,  Utah,  to  Los  Angeles, 
896  miles,  was  55c;  from  Portland,  Ore., 
to  Los  Angeles,  1,197  miles,  47.5c,  and 
from  Kent,  Wash,,  to  San  Francisco,  94U 
miles,  38c.  Since  the  filing  of  the  com- 
plaint, however,  the  Richmond  to  Los 
Angeles  rate  had  been  increased  to  97c, 
while  the  Creamery  to  Los  Angeles  rate 
had  been  reduced  to  55c.  HELD,  the 
rates  from  Creamery  to  points  named 
in  the  table  above  are  unreasonable. 
The  following  rates  are  held  to  be  rea- 
sonable : 

■♦-'         i^  *"• 

^•^  5 
.2       to  ®   . 

Rates   From   Creamery,  g  S   3  tf  3 

Ariz.,  to —  Cents.  Cents. 

Wickenburg,  Ariz 24  31 

Prescott,    Ariz 40  52 

Jerome  Junction,  Ariz 44  58 

Parker,    Ariz 46  60 

Ash  Fork,  Ariz 50  65 

Williams,  Ariz 51  66 

Flagstaff,  Ariz 53  68 

Ludlow,   Cal 57  74 

Kingman,   Ariz 58  76 

Needles,   Cal 59  77 

Searchlight,   Nev 61  78 

Gallup,  N.  M 66  84 

Albuquerque    75  93 

The  rate  from  Creamery,  Ariz.,  to 
Los  Angeles  is  held  to  be  reasonable. 
Maricopa  County  Commercial  Club  v.  P. 
&  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  218,  220. 

§72.     Corn    Shucks. 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload 
of  baled  corn  shucks,  Alexandria,  La., 
to  Brownwood,  Tex.,  under  a  rate  of  56c 
per  100  lbs.,  a  distance  of  911  miles.  A 
rate  of  20c  was  in  effect  via  shorter 
routes  of  494  to  722  miles.  At  the  time 
of  shipment  a  rate  of  20  cents  was 
applicable  on  hay,  an  article  analogous 
to  corn  shucks,  via  the  shorter  routes. 
HELD,  the  rate  charged  was  not  unrea- 
sonable. Browne  Grain  Co.  v.  F.  W.  & 
R.  G.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  410. 

§73.     Cotton. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  less- 
than-carload  rate  of  $1.67  on  cotton 
from    St.    Louis,    Mo.,    to    Pueblo,    Colo., 


to  the  extent  that  it  exceeded  70c.  De- 
fendant admitted  the  rate  to  be  unrea- 
sonable to  the  extent  that  it  exceeded 
$1.15.  A  rate  of  70c  was  in  effect  from 
Helena,  Ark.,  to  Pueblo.  Nothing  in 
the  tariff  prevented  it  from  applying 
from  Helena  via  St.  Louis.  Such  a 
route,  nowever,  was  not  a  practical  and 
reasonable  one,  since  the  initial  carrier 
at  Helena,  the  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.,  had 
a  direct  haul  from  Helena  to  Pueblo 
in  connection  with  the  M.  P.  Ry.,  which 
haul  did  not  pass  through  St.  Louis. 
Subsequent  to  the  shipment  in  question 
a  70c  rate  was  established  by  defend- 
ants from  St.  Louis  to  Pueblo  in  order 
to  enable  St.  Louis  to  compete  with 
Helena.  HELD,  a  70c  rate  was  not 
shown  to  be  reasonable,  but  on  defend- 
ant's admission  the  rate  attacked  was 
unreasonable  to  the  extent  that  it  ex- 
ceeded $1.15.  Reparation  awarded. 
Colorado  Bedding  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R. 
R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  401,  402. 

(b)  The  rate  on  cotton  from  Okla- 
homa points  to  Kansas  City  was  55c  to 
571/^c;  from  Texas  to  Kansas  City,  70c. 
The  rate  on  cotton  fabrics  from  Guthrie, 
Okla.,  to  Kansas  City  was  55c;  from 
Texas,  65c,  on  fabrics,  any  quantity,  and 
55c  on  duck,  carload.  Complainant, 
manufacturer  of  cotton  goods  at  Kan- 
sas City,  attacked  such  rates  as  unrea- 
sonable per  se,  and  as  giving  Texa^s  mills 
an  advantage  over  complainant's  mills 
at  Kansas  City  in  that  there  was  a  differ- 
ential of  5c  in  favor  of  the  manufactured 
products  from  Texas  to  Kansas  City  over 
the  raw  cotton  from  Texas  to  Kansas 
City.  The  price  of  raw  cotton  in  Okla- 
homa and  Texas  was  fixed  by  the  price 
at  Liverpool,  England,  being  the  Liver- 
pool price  less  the  cost  of  transportation 
from  Texas  and  Oklahoma  to  Liverpool. 
The  freight  rate  being  15c  less  to  Liver- 
pool than  from  Oklahoma,  the  price  of 
cotton  was  15c  higher  in  Texas  than  in 
Oklahoma.  Consequently,  complainant 
did  not,  in  fact,  purchase  cotton  in  Texas. 
The  55c  rate  attacked  from  Oklahoma 
points  to  Kansas  City  yielded  a  per- 
on-mile  revenue  of  2.51c  as  against  2.35c 
md  2.56c  yielded  by  the  rates  on 
"otton  from  Oklahoma  points  to  St. 
'^ouis  and  Galveston,  respectively,  the 
haul  to  the  latter  cities  being,  however, 
longer.  The  rate  attacked  was  higher 
than  that  on  cattle,  corn,  wheat,  or  pe- 
troleum moving  into  Kansas  City.  The 
lower  rates  on  these  products  were,  how- 
ever,  in  part  the  result  of  competition 


632 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §74  (a)— §75  (a) 


between  various  cities  for  them,  which 
competition  did  not  exist  with  respect 
to  cotton,  the  natural  trend  of  which  was 
to  the  East  and  to  the  South  through 
the  gulf  ports.  Under  the  55c  rate  at- 
tacked, defendants  were  obliged  to  pay 
10c  for  compression  and  for  the  charges 
for  the  haul  to  and  from  the  compress. 
However,  the  rate  attacked  compared 
favorably  with  other  rates  on  cot- 
ton throughout  the  country.  HELD, 
since  the  rate  on  cotton  from  Texas 
to  Kansas  City  was  merely  a  paper 
one,  no  Texas  cotton  being  in  fact  bought 
by  complainant,  no  consideration  should 
be  given  to  the  reasonableness  of  the 
differential  of  5c  in  favor  of  manufac- 
tured products  from  Texas  mills  moving 
to  Kansas,  City,  and  that  the  55c  rate 
attacked  on  cotton  from  Oklahoma  points 
to  Kansas  City  was  not  unreasonable. 
Kansas  City  Cotton  Mills  Co.  v.  C.  R.  L 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  468,  471-475. 

§74.     Cotton   LInters,  Cotton-Shoddy  Lin- 
ing. 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  cotton-shod- 
dy lining  from  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  to 
Chicago,  111.,  under  a  rate  of  61c  per  100 
lbs.,  which  was  the  rate  applicable  to 
dry  goods  in  bales  or  boxes.  Cotton- 
shoddy  lining  is  used  foi*  the  lining  of 
horse  blankets  and  is  made  of  cotton 
of  a  v§ry  low  grade,  including  sweepings 
and  linters.  One  of  the  defendants  ad- 
mitted that  this  traffic  should  have  taken 
the  cotton  piece  goods  rate,  which  was 
45c.  HELD,  the  rate  was  unreasonable 
to  the  extent  it  exceeded  45c.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Johnson  Co.  v.  Clyde  S.  S. 
Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  512. 

(b)  The  rate  on  compressed  cotton 
linters  via  lines  of  defendants  from  Alice- 
ville,  Ala.,  to  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  carload, 
released  to  a  valuation  of  2c  per  lb.,  is 
unreasonable  to  the  extent  that  it  ex- 
ceeds 82c  per  100  lbs.  Du  Mee,  Son  & 
Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
575. 

§75.     Cotton  Seed  and   Products. 

(a)  The  rates  on  cotton  seed  from  va- 
rious points  on  defendants'  lines  in  Mis- 
souri, Oklahoma  and  Louisiana  to  Mem- 
phis, Tenn.,  were  attacked  as  unreason- 
able per  se,  and  as  discriminatory  in  fa- 
vor of  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  and  East  St.  Louis, 
111.,  and  various  mill  points  in  Arkansas, 
Louisiana  and  Oklahoma.  Complainants, 
dealers  in  cotton  seed  at  Memphis,  con- 
tended that  these  rates  should  be  estab- 


lished on  a  distance  basis,  using  the  rates 
of  the  "Arkansas  court  tariff."  Several 
years  previously  the  Arkansas  intrastate 
rates  were  fixed  in  accordance  with  a 
suggestion  of  the  Federal  Court  as  a 
compromise  rate.  All  of  the  roads  ex- 
cept the  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  and  the 
St.  L.  S.  W.  R.  R.  agreed  to  try  these 
rates  for  one  year.  At  the  expiration  of 
the  year  the  carriers  asked  for  a  rein- 
statement of  their  former  cases,  and  re- 
newed the  litigation.  The  Merchants' 
Freight  Bureau  of  Arkansas  and  the  Ar- 
kansas Cotton  Seed  Association  inter- 
vened, resisting  especially  the  petition 
to  have  the  Arkansas  court  tariff  taken 
as  a  basis  for  interstate  rates.  More  cot- 
ton seed  was  crushed  at  Memphis  than 
any  other  point,  due  to  its  central  loca- 
tion. The  strongest  competition  com- 
plainants met  in  the  purchase  of  cotton 
seed  was  that  of  the  St.  Louis  and  East 
St.  Louis  mills,  especially  those  on  the 
Frisco  line.  Competition  at  stations  on  the 
Iron  Mountain  Railway  was  principally 
from  local  mills.  Shipments  on  the  Iron 
Mountain  were  made  on  commodity 
rates  lower  than  the  class  rates 
in  effect  to  Memphis.  The  Iron  Moun- 
tain Ry.  explained  this  by  saying  that 
Memphis  was  provided  with  a  full  line 
of  commodity  rates  from  Arkansas, 
Louisiana  and  Oklahoma  points.  Its  main 
supply  was  obtained  at  low  rates  from 
Arkansas,  whereas  St.  Louis  was  limited 
to  southeastern  Missouri  and  northern 
Arkansas.  Rates  to  Arkansas  local 
points  were  fixed  by  the  court  tariff,  while 
rates  to  Memphis  were  those  higher  rates 
voluntarily  established  under  interstate 
tariffs.  Rates  to  St.  Louis  were  much  lower 
per  mile  than  to  Memphis.  Defendants 
admitted  that  St.  Louis  rates  were  "ab- 
surdly" low.  The  Iron  Mountain  Ry.  de- 
clared it  was  prevented  from  raising 
St.  Louis  rates  by  complaints  from  St. 
Louis.  The  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  defended 
its  rates  on  the  ground  that  they  were 
fixed  when  it  came  into  that  territory, 
and  it  met  the  conditions  as  it  found 
them.  No  cotton  seed  moved  to  Kansas 
City  now  via  the  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
Mills  located  at  Kansas  City  or  St.  Louis 
were  so  far  from  cotton  territory  that  they 
could  not  survive  on  reasonable  rates.  St. 
Louis  mills  were  established  when  the  in- 
dustry was  young  and  not  strongly  com- 
petitive. A  statement  of  the  movement 
of  cars  of  cotton  seed  on  the  Frisco  from 
Missouri  points  for  the  year  1910-1911 
showed  41  to  Memphis,  121  to  East  St. 
Louis  and  61  to  St.  Louis,  at  an  average 


REASONABLENESS   OF  RATES,  §75    (b)  — (c) 


633 


distance  of  112,  213  and  214  miles,  re- 
spectively. Many  of  the  rates  com- 
plained of  were  established  for  the  pur- 
pose of  protecting  local  mills.  The  St.  L.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  alleged  that  the  rates  were  not 
higher  than  tlie  Texas  commission  rates, 
or  the  interstate  Oklahoma,  Arkansas, 
Missouri  rates.  Rates  were  shown  to  be 
higher  to  Memphis  than  those  on  lines 
east  of  Memphis.  The  average  rate  per 
ton  mile  east  of  Memphis  is  8.15  mills, 
while  on  the  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  it  was 
9.79  mills;  the  average  density  of  traffic 
in  tons  on  the  east  side  was  817,839,  while 
that  of  the  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  was  513,085 
tons.  Similarly,  group  five,  embracing 
the  east  side,  showed  an  8.24  mill  rate  and 
a  629,050  tonnage  density,  as  compared 
with  group  eight,  embracing  the  west 
Bide  roads,  showing  a  rate  of  9.81  miPs 
and  a  density  of  508,557  tons.  Prior  to 
1900  the  voluntary  rate  to  Mei..phis  was 
lower.  Milling  points  and  points  to  which 
the  seed  and  its  products  should  go  were 
largely  controlled  by  the  ownership 
of  the  gins  and  mills,  irrespective  of 
slightly  higher  freight  rates.  The  ca- 
pacity of  mills  greatly  exceeded  the  sup- 
ply. They  operated  only  five  months  of 
the  year.  Other  mills  were  being  erected 
by  manufacturers  who  used  the  products. 
A  bridge  arbitrary  of  li/^c  per  100  lbs.  was 
imposed  on  defendants.  The  rates  from 
southeastern  Missouri  to  St.  Louis  were 
state  rates.  They  were  not  fixed  by  state 
authorities.  HELD,  in  view  of  the  fact  the 
Arkansas  rate  is  still  in  litigation  and  the 
St.  Louis  mills  must  necessarily  go 
further  for  their  supply,  neither  the  Ar- 
kansas nor  Missouri  rates  should  apply. 
The  rates  to  Memphis  now  In  force  on 
the  Iron  Mountain  are  unreasonable  In 
so  far  as  they  exceed  the  rates  In  the 
table  incorporated  in  the  opinion.  The 
rates  on  the  Iron  Mountain  to  Memphis 
points  from  points  on  its  Oklahoma  divi- 
sion. Greenwood  Junction  to  Seminole,  in- 
clusive, are  discriminatory  In  favor  of  St. 
Louis,  and  those  on  the  Frisco  to  Mem- 
phis are  unreasonable  and  discriminatory 
In  so  far  as  they  exceed  the  rates  pre- 
scrlled  In  the  opinion.  :^eparatIon 
denied.  Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v.  St. 
L.  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C  548,  555. 

(b)  Complainants  attacked  defend- 
ants' rates  on  cottonseed  roducts,  in- 
cluding oil,  meal,  cake,  hulls  and  linters, 
from  various  Oklahoma  points  to  prac- 
tically all  consuming  territory.  HELD, 
the  rates  to  Galveston,  Tex.,  should  not 
exceed  27i/^c  from  points  where  the  rate 


now  charged  Is  31i/4c;  the  rate  from  Ard- 
more,  Durant,  Madill  and  Tishomingo, 
Okla.,  to  Galveston,  Tex.,  should  not  ex- 
ceed 22*^ c.  The  rates  from  other  Okla- 
homa points  are  unreasonable  and  dis- 
criminatory, but  no  formal  order  is  cHr 
tered,  and  carriers  are  given  90  days 
within  which  to  submit  a  scheme  of  rate 
adjustment.  Anadarko  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  43. 

(c)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
on  cotton  seed  from  Georgia  producing 
points  and  one  point  in  Alabama  to  Jack- 
sonville, Fla.  From  competitive  points 
on  the  line  of  the  Central  of  Georgia  R. 
R.,  the  defendants  published  joint  rates 
which  were  approximately  the  same  to 
both  Savannah  and  to  Jacksonville.  From 
non-competitive  points  the  lawful  through 
charge  was  the  combination  of  the  local 
base  point  rate  of  the  Central  of  Georgia 
R.  R.  to  Savannah  or  other  junction 
point  plus  the  rate  of  its  connec- 
tions beyond  to  Jacksonville.  The  com- 
plainant contended  that  the  defendants 
ought  t^  have  established  the  same  joint 
rates  from  the  local  stations  to  Jackson- 
ville as  were  applicable  from  the  contigu- 
ous competitive  points.  In  support  of  this 
view  of  what  it  regarded  as  a  proper 
relation  of  rates,  the  complainant  of- 
fered certain  exhibits,  one  showing  a 
comparison  of  the  rates  to  Jacksonville 
with  the  rates  to  Savannah  and  Chat- 
tanooga, and  another  presenting  a  com- 
parison between  rates  on  cotton  seed 
and  rates  on  cottonseed  meal  and  hulls. 
HELD,  that  the  rates  of  the  Central  of 
Georgia  R.  R.  for  a  haul  over  its  own 
rails  from  these  prints  of  origin  to  Sa- 
vannah do  not  constitute  a  particularly 
helpful  test  of  the  reasonableness  of  the 
rates  for  a  two-line  haul  to  a  point  so 
dissimilarly  located  as  Jacksonville.  Nor 
can  the  reasonableness  of  the  'atrs  from 
these  non-competitive  points  of  origin  to 
Jacksonville,  be  tested  by  rates  to 
the  same  destination  from  competitive 
points  in  this  territory.  Because  of 
the  differences  In  the  conditions  sur- 
rounding the  traffic  the  rates  to  Chat- 
tanooga are  also  of  doubtful  usefulness 
as  a  measure  of  the  reasonableness  of 
(he  rates  to  Jacksonville.  Certainly  none 
of  the  comparisons  offered  by  the  com- 
plainant sufficed  to  justify  reductions  in 
rates  that  are  not  otherwise  shown  to  be 
unreasonable.  FURTHER  HELD,  how- 
ever, that  certain  of  the  rates  from  va- 
rious points  were  unreasonable  and 
should  be  reduced  to  such  a  basis  that 
/he  rate  per  100  lbs.  would  run  from  13c 


634 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §75  (d)— §79  (a) 


to   15i^c.     Florida   Cotton   Oil   Co.   v.    C. 
of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  336,  339,  342. 

(d)  Complainant  shipped  cottonseed 
oil,  C.  L.,  Orangeburg  and  Sumter,  S.  C. 
to  Jacksonville,  Fla.,  via  the  A.  C. 
L.  R.  R.,  under  a  rate  of  32c.  The  com- 
bination of  local  rates  between  Orange- 
burg and  Jacksonville  was  21i/4c,  and  be- 
tween Sumter  and  Jacksonville  22i/4c. 
At  the  same  time  the  S.  A.  L.  maintainel 
a  rate  of  17^c  from  Orangeburg  and 
1814  c  from  Sumter.  The  A.  C.  L.  R.  R. 
admitted  that  the  charges  exacted  were 
unreasonable  and  all  of  the  defendant 
carriers  have  since  published  a  rate  of 
18c  from  Orangeburg  and  18 14  c  from 
Sumter.  HELD,  the  rates  were  unrea- 
sonable to  the  extent  that  they  exceeded 
the  present  rates.  Reparation  awar  led. 
Florida  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  C.  of  Ga.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  336,  342. 

(e)  On  a  carload  of  cottonseed  meal 
and  hulls  and  one  of  cottonseed  hull? 
shipped  to  Memphis,  Tenn.,  from  Little 
Rock  and  Pine  Bluff,  Ark.,  respectively, 
complainant  was  assessed  a  rate  of  lOo. 
At  the  time  of  the  shipments  the  St,  L. 
I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  maintained  a  rate  of  6c 
between  the  same  points,  and  four 
months  after  said  shipments  were  made 
t^e  Arkansas  Freight,  Committee  filed 
a  tariff  naming  a  rate'  of  8c  on  cotton- 
seed meal  and  cake,  straight  or  mixed 
v!th  hulls,  to  Memphis  from  the  same 
points  of  origin.  Over  the  St.  L.  L  M. 
&  S.  Ry.  this  same  tariff  continued  in 
effect  a  rate  of  6c  on  cottonseed  hulls 
and  established  a  rate  of  8c  for  the  de- 
fendant. HELD,  that  the  rate  exacted 
was  excessive  to  the  extent  that  it  ex- 
ceeded 8c.  Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v. 
St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  67,  70. 

§76.     Cotton  Waste. 

(a)  On  carloads  of  cotton  waste  from 
Charlotte,  N.  C.,  to  New  York,  N.  v., 
complainant  objected  to  a  rate  of  46c  per 
100  lbs.  At  the  time  the  petition  was 
filed,  the  rate  had  been  reduced  to  41c. 
A  rail-and-water  rate  of  35c  per  100  lbs. 
was  charged  from  Augusta  Ga.,  to  New 
York,  a  longer  distance.  The  same  rate 
had  been  charged  for  cotton  waste  as 
for  cotton  goods,  although  it  was  much 
less  valuable  and  required  less  care  in 
handling  it.  HELD,  that  as  the  Augusta 
rate  was  determined  by  water  competi- 
tion, it  would  not  influence  the  decision 
of  this  case,  but  it  was  unreasonable  to 
make  the  same  charge  for  cotton  waste 
as  for  cotton  goods,  and  the  rate  should 


be  reduced  to  40c  per  100  lbs.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Southern  At:antic  Waste 
Co.  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  293. 

§77.     Doors. 

(a)  A  rate  of  19c  was  charged  on 
carloads  of  doors  from  Dubuque,  la.,  to 
Sioux  Falls,  S.  D.  At  the  time  ship- 
ment moved  a  rate  of  10c  was  in  effect 
over  a  competing  line,  and  shortly 
thereafter  said  10c  rate  was  established 
by  defendant.  Defendant  admitted  the 
rate  exacted  to  be  unreasonable.  HELD, 
the  rate  charged  was  excessive.  Repa- 
ration awarded  on  the  basis  of  10c.  Far- 
ley &  Loetscher  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  602,  603. 

§78.     Dried   Fruit. 

(a)  On  a  carload  of  dried  fruit  from 
Fresno,  Cal.,  to  Roundup,  Mont.,  weight 
38,100  lbs.,  complainant  was  assessed  a 
rate  of  $1.66i/^  based  on  the  following 
combination:  From.  Fresno  to  Lathrop, 
Cal.,  the  local  fourth-class  rate  of  STVzc; 
Lathrop  to  Harlowton,  Mont.,  $1;  from 
Harlowton  to  Roundup,  the  local  fourth- 
class  rate  of  29c.  Complaint  is  made 
of  the  unreasonableness  of  the  combina- 
tion rate  of  $1.37 1^  from  Fresno  to  Har- 
lowton. HELD,  following  16  I.  C.  C. 
!  313,  where  the  distance  from  Fresno 
to  Billings,  Mont.,  was  1,911  miles,  as 
compared  with  1,922  miles,  the  distance 
from  Fresno,  to  Harlowton,  and  where 
a  rate  of  $l.io  yielded  a  return  of  1.14c 
per  ton  mile,  that  the  rate  from  Fresno 
to  Harlowton,  when  the  shipment  was 
for  a  point  beyond  Harlowton,  was  un- 
reasonable. Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  $1.10  from  Fresno  to  Harlow- 
ton. Stone-Ordean-Wells  Co.  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,   18  I.   C.    C.   15,   16. 

§79.     Egg   Case   Material. 

(a)  On  a  carload  of  material  tied  in 
bundles  and  not  manufactured  further 
than  to  be  cut  to  length  for  egg  cases, 
billed  by  the  shipper  as  "box  lumber," 
and  rebilled  by  an  inspector  for  one  of 
the  defendants  as  "egg  case  material," 
shipped  over  defendants'  lines  from 
Memphis,  Tenn.,  to  Woodward,  Okla., 
via  Oklahoma  City,  charges  on  the  basis 
of  the  lawful  through  rate  of  60c  for 
"egg  case  material,"  including  "egg 
boxes,"  were  collected.  Under  the  West- 
ern Classification,  "egg  box  material" 
cut  to  length  takes  "box  lumber"  rates. 
When  the  shipment  moved  defendants 
had  on   box  lumber,  via  route  of  move- 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §80  (a)— §81  (e) 


635 


ment,  a  combination  rate  of  44c;  also 
a  combination  local  rate  via  Alva,  Okla., 
of  39c,  Subsequently,  the  rate  on  "box 
lumber"  from  Memphis  to  Woodward 
via  defendants'  lines  was  29c,  but  this 
rate  to  Woodward  was  later  canceled, 
though  box  lumber  rates  still  applied 
to  egg  case  material.  ,  The  St.  L.  &  S. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.'s  tariff  in  force  at  the  time 
of  the  shipment  from  Memphis  to  points 
in  Kansas,  in  the  same  section  of  the 
country  as  Woodward,  Okla.,  produced 
a  per  ton  mile  revenue  of  from  8  to 
8.62  mills.  A  rate  of  29c  from  Memphis 
to  Woodward  would  produce  a  revenue 
per  ton  per  mile  of  8  1-3  mills.  HELD, 
that  the  rate  was  unreasonable  and 
that  for  the  future  the  rate  should  be 
29c.  Reparation  awarded.  Anderson- 
Tully  Co.  v.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C. 
C.  48,  50. 

§80.     Elm    Hub    Blocks. 

(a)  On  a  carload  of  elm  hub  blocks 
in  the  rough  from  Will's  Point,  Tex.,  to 
Stockton,  Cal.,  a  rate  of  $1.25  was  col- 
lected. The  rate  from  Texarkana  to 
Stockton  was  at  the  time  of  shipment 
85c,  and  the  movement  from  Texarkana 
was  through  Will's  Point.  In  13  I.  C. 
C.  668,  the  Commission  held  that  the 
rate  on  hardwood  lumber  from  Chicago 
points  and  points  farther  west  to  Pa- 
cific coast  terminals  should  not  exceed 
75c.  The  commodity  in  question  Avas 
somewhat  more  valuable  than  hardwood 
lumber.  The  distance  from  Will's  Point 
is  considerably  less  than  that  from  Chi- 
cago and  Chicago  points.  Subsequent 
to  the  shipment  the  rate  from  Will's 
Point  was  reduced  to  85c.  HELD,  the 
rate  charged  was  unreasonable.  Repara- 
tion awarded  on  the  basis  of  85c.  South- 
ern Timber  &  Land  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18 
L   C.   C.   232,   233. 

§81.     Fertilizer. 

(a)  On  carloads  of  fertilizer  ma- 
terials from  Ruston,  La.,  to  El  Dorado, 
Ark.,  a  rate  of  7i/^c  per  100  lbs.  was 
charged.  About  a  year  later  complain- 
ant showed  that  the  through  rate  from 
New  Orleans,  La.,  to  El  Dorado,  Ark., 
was  reduced  from  17i/^c  to  12i/^c,  but 
no  corresponding  reduction  was  made 
for  part  of  the  distance,  Ruston  to  El 
Dorado,  56  of  the  331  miles.  Complain- 
ant sought  reparation  and  the  establish- 
ment of  equal  combination  and  through 
routes.  HELD,  that  the  charge  was  un- 
reasonable   to    the    extent    that    it    ex- 


ceeded 5c  per  100  lbs.,  and  that  repara- 
tion be  granted,  but  that  the  contention 
that  the  combination  and  through  rates 
should  be  equal  was  without  merit.  El 
Dorado  Oil  Mills  &  Fertilizer  Co.  v. 
C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  286. 

(b)  On  tankage,  a  fertilizer  material, 
from  Ottumwa,  la.,  to  destinations  in 
southeastern  states,  the  defendant  line 
extending  from  Ottumwa  to  the  Ohio 
River  maintained  a  proportional  rate  of 
$2.80  per  net  ton,  applicable  on  through 
shipments  from  Kansas  City  to  Ohio  River 
crossings.  The  proportional  rate  from  Kan- 
sas City  was  $2.20  per  net  ton.  After  some 
years  the  Ottumwa  rate  was  reduced 
to  the  same  as  the  Kansas  City  rate. 
The  haul  from  Ottumwa  was  a  two-line 
movement,  and  the  revenue  under  the 
reduced  rate  was  5.27  mills.  HELD,  the 
voluntarily  reduced  rate  was  a  low  one 
and  no  ground  for  reparation  appears. 
Morrell  &  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 
20   L   C.   C.   400. 

(c)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  on 
commercial  fertilizer,  Shreveport,  La., 
to  Hamburg  and  Crossett,  Ark.,  which 
took  rates  of  12i/^c  and  16c,  respectively, 
and  are  distant  152  and  149  miles.  The 
St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.  published  a 
rate  of  13c  from  Memphis  to  these 
points,  218  and  230  miles  distant.  HELD, 
that  while  mileage  is  not  the  only  fac- 
tor to  be  considered  in  rate  adjustment, 
commercial  fertilizer  is  a  lowrgrade 
traffic,  and  the  rates  to  the  points  at- 
tacked are  unreasonable  to  the  extent 
they  exceed  lie  per  100  lbs.,  C.  L. 
Meridian  Fertilizer  Factory  v.  V.  S.  &  P. 
Ry.   Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  554. 

(d)  Defendants,  carriers  of  fertilizer 
out  of  Memphis,  Tenn.,  to  points  in 
Arkansas,  established  certain  joint  rates 
for  carload  and  less-than-carload  ship- 
ments. HELD,  following  V.-C.  C.  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  49,  that 
the  rates  were  unreasonable  to  the  ex- 
tent to  which  they  exceeded  certain 
reasonable  rates  established  for  the  fu- 
ture on  a  mileage  basis  and  ranging 
from  5c,  C.  L.  minimum  30,000  lbs.,  for 
a  haul  under  five  miles,  to  15c  for  a 
haul  over  350  and  less  than  400  miles, 
the  L.  C.  L.  rates  being  double  the  C.  L. 
rates.  Reparation  awarded.  Virginia- 
Carolina  Chemical  Co  v.  St.  L  I.  M. 
&  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  1,  2. 

(e)  On  carloads  of  manure  from  Chi- 
cago to  Toledo,  O.,  the  sixth-class  rate, 
10c,  was  assessed.     At  the  same  time  a 


636 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §81  (f)— §83  (c) 


commodity  rate  was  in  effect  via  an- 
other carrier  of  $1  per  2,000  lbs.  About 
a  year  after  the  shipment  this  lower 
rate  was  made  effective  via  the  lines 
of  defendants.  HELD,  the  rate  charged 
was  unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded 
on  the  basis  of  the  $1  rate.  Crane 
Brothers  v.  C.  H.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C 
C.  57L 

(f)  On  a  carload  of  stable  manure  a 
charge  of  55c  p-er  ton  was  assessed  on 
the  haul  from  Washington,  D.  C,  to 
Glenndale,  Md.,  13  miles.  Shortly  prior 
to  the  shipment  a  rate  of  not  to  ex- 
ceed 45c  was  in  effect  between  the 
points  in  question,  and  shortly  after  the 
shipment  a  rate  of  40c  was  established 
by  defendants.  HELD,  manure  being 
a  low-grade  product,  the  55c  rate  was 
unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded  on 
the  basis  of  40c.  White  Water  Farms 
Co.  V.  P.  B.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C. 
526,    527. 

§82.     Flaxseed   and  Oats. 

(a)  On  a  mixed  carload  of  flaxseed 
screenings  in  bulk  and  oats  in  bulk,  the 
screenings  weighing  40,650  lbs.  and  the 
oats  20,950  lbs.,  defendant  exacted  7c 
on  the  flaxseed  and  3c  on  the  oats, 
minimum  30,000  lbs.  Reparation  was 
demanded  to  the  extent  that  the  charge 
on  the  flaxseed  exceeded  3c  and  the 
charge  on  the  oats  exceeded  the  actual 
weight.  Some  two  years  after  the  ship- 
ment moved  defendant  put  into  effect 
the  rates  alleged  by  complainant  to  be 
reasonable,  and  at  the  hearing  admitted 
the  charges  exacted  to  be  unreasonable. 
HELD,  reparation  should  be  awarded  en 
the  basis  claimed  by  complainant.  Rot- 
sted  Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L 
C.    C.    257,   258. 

(b)  On  carloads  of  flaxseed  from 
Britton,  S.  D.,  to  Red  Wing,  Minn.,  com- 
plainant was  assessed  26.5c.  Shortly 
thereafter  defendant  put  into  effect  a 
rate  of  15.5c,  and  by  its  pleadings  ad- 
mitted the  rate  exacted  to  be  unrea- 
sonable. HELD,  the  rate  charged  was 
excessive.  Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  15.5c.  Red  Wing  Linseed  Co.  v. 
C.  M.  &   St.   P.  Ry.   Co.,   15  I.   C.   C.  47. 

§83.     Flour. 

(a)  Millers  in  southern  Illinois  at- 
tacked the  rates  on  flour  and  other 
grain  products  of  24.7c  per  100  lbs.  from 
their  mills  to  Boston,  an  average  distance 
of  1,000  miles,  yielding  a  ton  mile  rev- 


enue somewhat  less  than  5  mills.  HELD, 
the  rates  cannot  be  deemed  excessive 
and  are  no  higher,  distance  considered, 
than  many  approved  by  the  Commission 
in  Baltimore  Chamber  of  Commerce  v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  596. 
Southern  Illinois  Millers'  Ass'n  v.  L.  & 
N.   R.    R.   Co.,  23   L   C.   C.   672,   673. 

(b)  On  two  carloads  of  flour  from 
Turon,  Kan.,  to  Lake  Charles,  La., 
routed  via  Fort  Worth,  Tex.,  the  fifth- 
class  rate  of  70c  was  charged,  being 
the  only  rate  applicable,  the  route  be- 
ing specified  by  complainant.  At  the 
time  shipments  moved  there  was  a  rate 
of  421/^c  over  one  route,  and  approxi- 
mately the  same  rate  over  other  routes. 
Since  the  shipment  a  rate  of  43c  was 
put  into  effect  over  all  routes.  HELD, 
the  charges  were  unreasonable.  Repa- 
ration awarded  on  the  basis  of  43c. 
Monarch  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  1. 

(c)  On  shipments  of  carloads  of 
flour  in  February,  1908,  from  Windsor, 
Colo.,  to  Eunice,  La.,  and  from  Windsor 
to  Opelousas,  La.,  charges  were  collected 
to  Eunice  of  the  77c  class  rate  from 
Windsor  to  Midland,  plus  5c  beyond, 
and  to  Opelousas  the  class  rate  of  77c. 
Eunice  is  located  on  a  branch  line  con- 
necting at  Midland  with  the  main  line 
running  between  Windsor  and  New  Or- 
leans. Opelousas  is  located  on  another 
branch  of  the  main  line,  leaving  the 
main  line  at  LaPayette.  Prior  to  Oct. 
26,  1907,  the  rate  from  Windsor  to  New 
Orleans  was  42 %c,  this  rate  being  ap- 
plicable at  intermediate  points.  Ship- 
ments to  Eunice  and  Opelousas  took 
the  4234c  rate,  plus  the  locals  from 
Midland  and  LaFayette,  respectively. 
Oct.  26,  1907,  the  rate  to  Nejv  Orleans 
was  increased  to  45c,  but  through  a 
clerical  error  the  tariff  did  not  make 
that  rate  applicable  at  intermediate 
points.  Effective  March  20,  1908,  this 
error  was  corrected,  giving  Eunice  a 
rate  of  50c,  made  up  of  the  45c  rate, 
plus  the  arbitrary  from  Midland.  The 
rate  to  Opelousas  was  thereby  59c  by 
combination  on  LaFayette.  Sept.  15, 
1908,  a  new  tariff  established  a  rate  of 
57i^c  to  both  Eunice  and  Opelousas. 
HELD,  the  charges  assessed  were  un- 
reasonable. Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  50c  and  59c  on  shipments  to 
Eunice  and  Opelousas,  respectively. 
Windsor  Milling  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  C. 
&  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  349. 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §83    (d)— §84   (b) 


637 


(d)  Prior  to  the  shipment  of  rye 
flour  in  carloads  from  Janesville,  Wis., 
to  Kansas  City,  Mo.,  a  rate  of  13^c 
was  in  effect,  and  shortly  subsequent 
to  said  shipment  said  13i^c  rate  was 
restored.  HELD,  a  rate  in  excess  of 
said  rate  was  unreasonable.  Reparation 
awarded.  Bowman-Kranz  Lumber  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
277,    278. 

(e)  Following  Banner  Milling  Co.  v. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  31, 
the  rate  of  13c  on  flour  from  Buffalo 
to  Providence  is  unreasonable  to  the 
extent  it  exceeds  12c.  Thornton  & 
Chester  Milling  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,   13  1.   C.  C.   37. 

(f)  Following  Banner  Milling  Co.  v. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  31, 
the  rate  of  13c  on  flour  from  Buffalo  to 
Unionville,  Conn.,  is  declared  unreason- 
able to  the  extent  that  it  exceeds  12c. 
Washburn-Crosby  Co.  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co., 
13  L  C.  C.  38. 

(g)  Following  Banner  Milling  Co  v. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  31, 
the  rate  of  lie  on  flour  from  Buffalo, 
N.  Y.,  to  Irvington,  N.  J.,  is  declared 
unreasonable  to  the  extent  that  it  ex- 
ceeds 10c,  that  point  taking  the  New 
York  rate.  Washburn-Crosby  Co.  v. 
L.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  39. 

§84.     Fruits  and  Vegetables. 

(a)  The  carload  rate  of  42c  and  less- 
than-carload  rate  of  46c  on  vegetables 
N.  O.  S.  from  Charleston,  S.  C,  to  New 
York  City,  in  place  of  the  any-quantity 
rate  of  45c  in  effect  when  the  complaint 
was  filed  for  packages  holding  :'/^ 
bushels,  are  not  found  to  be  unreasonable. 
It  appearing  there  has  been  no  change 
In  conditions  since  prior  decisions  of 
the  Commission  on  various  phases  of 
the  rate  adjustment  between  these 
points,  and  the  new  rates  on  the  whole 
being  lower  than  the  any-quantity  lates 
heretofore  prescribed  by  the  Commission 
from  this  district.  Jouannet  v.  A.  C.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  392. 

(b)  In  Florida  F.  &  V.  S.  P.  A.  v. 
A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  1.  C.  C.  476,  the 
Commission  held  that  the  rates  on 
fruits  and  vegetables  from  Florida  base 
points  to  northern  destinations  were  ex- 
cessive, but  approved  as  reasonable  the 
rates  from  Florida  points  of  origin  up 
to  the  base  points.  The  gathering  rates 
approved  by  the  Commission  were  "any- 


quantity  rates,"  In  a  supplementary 
proceeding,  17  I.  C.  C.  552,  the  Com- 
mission held  that  in  the  case  of  pine- 
apples distinction  should  be  made  be- 
tween C.  L.  and  L.  C.  L.  rates,  and 
established  a  distance  tariff  upon  the 
Florida  East  Coast  Ry.  for  the  trans- 
portation of  pineapples  in  C.  L.  and 
L.  C.  L.  from  the  various  points  of 
origin  to  Jacksonville  when  for  points 
beyond.  The  present  proceeding  de- 
mands the  establishment  of  C.  L.  rates 
upon  fruits  and  vegetables  from  points 
of  origin  to  basing  points.  Since  the 
former  decision  the  volume  of  business 
transacted  increased,  but  such  increase 
was  offset  by  enlarged  expenses  of 
operation.  Formerly,  however,  citrus 
fruits,^  to  some  extent,  and  vegetables 
to  a  m'uch  greater  extent,  were  shipped  in 
small  lots  to  Jacksonville,  and  there  re- 
loaded for  movement  beyond.  In  mak- 
ing the  former  decisions  the  Commis- 
sion acted  upon  the  expectation  thai 
the  commodities  in  question  would  move 
in  small  lots  up  to  the  base  points;  that 
consolidation  would  take  place  at  that 
point,  and  the  carload  movement  would, 
in  fact,  be  mainly  beyond  the  base 
point.  This  result  was  not  brought 
about,  and  the  shipper  was  compelled, 
in  order  to  obtain  the  C.  L.  rate  beyond 
the  basing  point,  to  present  a  full  car- 
load at  the  point  of  origin,  and  the 
loading  was  being  done  mainly  by  the 
shipper  instead  of  the  carrier.  The 
loading  of  the  cars  from  the  point  of 
origin  was  much  heavier  in  1910  than 
at  the  time  of  the  previous  decisions. 
Complainants  demanded  that  the  dis- 
tance scale  established  for  pineapples 
upon  the  Florida  East  Coast  Ry.  in 
the  former  decision  should  be  applied 
to  vegetables,  and  that  the  standard 
box  of  oranges  weighing  80  lbs.  and  the 
standard  box  of  vegetables  weighing  50 
lbs.,  five-eighths  of  the  rate  per  box  of 
citrus  fruits  should  be  applied  per  crate 
of  vegetables.  Vegetables  are  usually 
a  more  perishable  commodity  than  cit- 
rus fruits  and  pineapples  and  require 
greater  expedition  and  care  in  handling 
them.  The  loading  of  vegetables  is  also 
lighter.  HELD,  that  the  distance  scale 
established  for  pineapples  upon  the 
Florida  East  Coast  Ry.  in  the  former 
opinion  should  be  applied  to  the  trans- 
portation of  citrus  fruits  and  pineapples 
to  the  base  points  upon  the  A.  C.  L. 
and  the  Seaboard  Air  Line  railways; 
that    the     vegetable     rate     in    carloads 


638 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §84    (c)  — (e) 


should  be,  in  crates,  approximately  70 
per  cent  of  the  orange  rate  per  box 
when  under  ventilation,  and  80  per 
cent  under  refrigeration;  that  the  L.  C. 
L.  rate  might  exceed  the  ventilation 
rate  2c  per  standard  crate  up  to  dis 
tances  of  100  miles,  beyond  that,  by  3c, 
and  that  the  carriers  might  at  their 
option  accomplish  this  result  by  estab- 
lishing C.  L.  rates  up  to  base  points  or 
by  establishing  through  C.  L.  rates 
from  points  of  origin  to  points  of  des- 
tination in  the  North.  Florida  Fruit 
&  Veg.  Shippers'  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
22   I.  C.   C.  11,  18. 

(c)  In  19  I.  C.  C.  148,  the  Commis- 
sion held  that  the  rate  on  lemons  from 
southern  California  to  territory  east  of 
the  Rocky  Mountains  should  not  exceed 
$1.  The  Commerce  Court  in  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  190  Fed.  591,  en- 
joined this  order  on  the  ground  that 
the  Commission  in  fixing  this  rate  was 
not  attempting  to  determine  a  reason- 
able rate,  but  was  endeavoring  to  pro- 
tect California  lemon  growers  against 
Sicilian  competition.  The  Commission 
now  points  out,  as  the  evidence  upon 
which  it  based  its  former  decision,  that 
the  carriers  for  parts  of  two  years  prior 
to  the  rendition  of  the  former  opinion, 
and  for  the  entire  preceding  six  years, 
had  voluntarily  maintained  a  rate  ot 
$1  on  lemons;  that  the  carriers  had  for 
the  better  part  of  eight  years  volun- 
tarily maintained  a  rate  on  lemons,  at 
first  25c,  and  subsequently  15c,  lower 
than  that  contemporaneously  in  effect 
on  oranges;  that  in  its  former  decision 
it  stated  at  considerable  length  the  vari- 
ous elements  in  the  evidence  entering 
into  a  determination  of  the  reasonable- 
ness of  the  rate  on  oranges;  t-hat  it  in- 
tended the  evidence  relating  to  oranges 
to  apply  to  the  question  of  rates  on 
lemons;  that  the  carriers  in  the  former 
case  attempted  to  explain  the  lower 
rate  in  the  past  as  being  established 
for  the  purpose  of  meeting  competition 
from  Sicily;  that  the  average  haul  on 
lemons  was  some  500  miles  less  than 
on  oranges,  and  that  a  much  smaller 
percentage  of  lemons  than  of  oranges 
moved  under  the  expense  of  refrigera- 
tion. The  Commission,  in  addition,  points 
out  that  it  deems  the  orange  rate  of 
$1.15  an  extremely  liberal  one,  and  that 
on  account  of  the  shipment  of  lemons 
under  ventilation  instead  of  under  re- 
frigeration, the  cars  may  be  loaded  to 
a  minimum  of  34,000  lbs.   instead  of  to 


the  former  minimum  of  26,200  lbs., 
thereby  making  the  per  car  earnings  at 
a  rate  of  $1  amount  to  $340  as  against 
earnings  of  $301.30  per  car  at  the  $1.15 
rate  under  former  minimum.  With  re- 
spect to  the  holding  of  the  Commerce 
Court  that  the  Commission  had  no  au- 
thority to  prescribe  a  blanket  rate  ex- 
tending from  the  Rocky  Mountains  east, 
the  Commission  points  out  that  the  car- 
riers themselves  requested  the  rate  to 
be  fixed  on  the  blanket  plan.  Under 
the  blanket  system  the  producers  are 
given  the  widest  possible  market;  the 
carriers  obtain  a  certain  amount  of 
long  distance  business  at  remunerative 
rates  which  they  would  not  otherwise 
have;  and  the  freight  does  not  so  far 
enter  into  the  cost  of  the  articles  to 
the  consumer  as  to  impose  any  notice- 
able burden  upon  any  section  of  the 
country.  To  establish  graded  rates  at 
this  time  would  be  to  break  up  the 
blanket  rate  system,  which  is  highly 
satisfactory  to  all  parties  concerned. 
HELD,  the  former  $1.15  rate  was  un- 
reasonable and  should  not  exceed  $1. 
Reparation  awarded.  (Clark,  Com'r,  con- 
curring in  part.)  Arlington  Heights 
Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C 
149,  154. 

(d)  Distance,  while  an  important  fac- 
tor in  rate  adjustment,  cannot  be  ac- 
cepted as  the  sole  or  necessarily  con- 
trolling factor.  In  the  shipment  of  fruit, 
distance,  time  in  transit  and  dispatch 
are  prime  considerations  and  of  more 
than  ordinary  importance.  These  com- 
modities must  be  moved  at  the  proper 
season.  They  are  easily  injured  by  ex- 
tremes in  temperature.  They  must  move 
promptly  and  expeditiously  in  order  to 
reach  points  of  consumption  in  desir- 
able and  proper  condition,  and  the  best 
facilities  and  widest  opportunities  for 
their  movement  via  available  lines 
should  be  provided,  within  the  limits  of 
reasonable  compensation  for  the  service 
performed.  Stacy  &  Sons  v.  O.  S.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  136,  138. 

(e)  Rates  on  deciduous  fruit  in  car- 
loads to  points  on  the  Northern  Pacific 
R.  R.  in  Montana  may,  and  probably 
ought  to,  be  given  rates  via  Butte,  Mont., 
or  Silver  Bow,  Mont.,  from  Logan,  Brig- 
ham  and  Hot  Springs,  Utah,  which  in  no 
case  exceed  either  the  rate  to  any  North 
Dakota  point  or  the  combination  of  in- 
termediate rates  on  Silver  Bow  or 
Butte.  Stacy  &  Sons  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R, 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  136,  138. 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §84   (f)— (g) 


639 


(f)  Complainant  alleged  the  short 
and  expeditious  route  for  transportation 
of  apples  and  other  deciduous  fruits 
from  Logan,  Brigham  and  Hot  Springs, 
Utah,  to  points  on  the  Northern  Pacific 
R.  R.  in  North  Dakota  was  via  Silver 
Bow,  Mont.,  and  complained  that  defend- 
ants' present  rates  upon  such  shipments 
via  Silver  Bow,  made  in  full  combina- 
tion on  that  point,  were  unreasonable 
and  discriminatory.  Violations  of  sec- 
tions 1  and  3  of  the  Act  were  alleged  in 
that  defendants  had  failed  or  refused 
to  establish  reasonable  through  rates 
via  Silver  Bow.  Defendants  were  parties 
to  a  rate  of  $1.25  per  100  lbs.,  carloads, 
on  these  commodities  from  Brigham, 
Logan  and  Willard,  Utah,  to  certain 
North  Dakota  points,  including  Fargo 
and  Bismarck,  via  Omaha  and  St.  Paul, 
or  Minnesota  Transfer.  The  distance 
via  this  route  from  Brigham,  the  most 
representative  shipping  point,  to  Fargo, 
a  representative  destination,  is  1,660 
miles.  The  distance  from  Brigham  to 
Fargo  via  Silver  Bow  is  1,250  miles,  and 
the  $1.25  rate  was  made  up,  60c,  Brigham 
to  Silver  Bow,  and  65c,  Silver  Bow  to 
Fargo.  The  rate  on  other  deciduous 
fruits  was  $1.82^^,  made  up  70c  to  Silver 
Bow,  and  $1.12 J^,  Silver  Bow  to  Fargo. 
The  N.  P.  R.  R.  rate  on  apples,  North 
Yakima,  Wash.,  to  Fargo,  was  75c;  on 
other  deciduous  fruit  $1.12 1/^;  distance, 
1,520  miles.  The  Great  Northern  R.  R. 
rate,  Wenatchee,  Wash.,  to  Fargo,  on 
apples  was  75c;  on  other  deciduous  fruits 
$1,121^;  distance,  1,405  miles.  The  joint 
rate  of  the  O.  R.  &  N.  Co.  and  the  N. 
P.  R.  R.  from  Hood  River,  Ore.,  to 
Fargo,  was  on  apples,  80c;  on  other  de- 
ciduous fruits  $1.25;  distance,  1,65€ 
miles.  Transcontinental  lines,  including 
defendants,  carried  a  rate  on  deciduous 
fruits  from  California  shipping  points 
to  Fargo  and  Grand  Forks,  N.  D.,  via 
Omaha  and  the  -Twin  Cities,  of  $1.35. 
Defendants  were  willing  to  establish 
lower  rates  via  the  Silver  Bow  gate- 
way, but  were  unable  to  agree  upon  the 
division  of  the  same,  or  the  North  Da- 
kota points  to  be  included  as  destina- 
tions. Ordinarily  defendants  had  lower 
rates  on  apples  than  on  other  deciduous 
fruits,  but  apples,  where  they  carried  a 
lower  rate,  had  a  higher  minimum. 
Apples  had  a  minimum  of  30,000  lbs.; 
other  deciduous  fruits  and  mixed  car- 
loads, from  20,000  to  24,000  lbs.  HELD, 
complainant  is  entitled  to  the  relief 
prayed  for  and  defendants  are  required 


to  establish  a  joint  rate  on  deciduous 
fruits  in  carloads,  including  apples,  from 
Hot  Springs,  Utah,  via  Silver  Bow  or 
Butte,  Mont.,  to  Grand  Forks,  N.  D.,  not 
in  excess  of  $1.25  per  100  lbs.,  and  from 
Willard,  Brigham  and  Logan,  Utah,  to 
Grand  Forks,  N.  D.,  via  Silver  Bow  or 
Butte,  Mont.,  not  exceeding  $1.25  per 
100  lbs.,  and  from  Hot  Springs,  Willard, 
Brigham  and  Logan,  Utah,  via  Silver 
Bow  or  Butte,  Mont.,  to  Fargo,  Wahpe- 
ton.  Valley  City,  Jamestown,  Bismarck 
and  other  intermediate  points  on  the 
N.  P.  R.  R.  in  North  Dakota,  not  ex- 
ceeding in  any  case  the  rate  prescribed 
from  Hot  Springs,  Utah,  to  Grand  Forks, 
N.  D.,  and  not  exceeding  in  any  case 
the  combination  of  intermediate  rates 
on  Butte  or  Silver  Bow.  Minima  in 
connection  with  foregoing  rates  not  to 
exceed  30,000  lbs.  on  straight  carloads 
of  apples  and  24,000  lbs.  on  other  ship- 
ments. Stacy  &  Sons  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  20  L   C.  C.  136. 

(g)  Defendant's  tariffs  provided  for 
class  and  commodity  rates  on  import 
traffic  from  New  Orleans,  La.,  and  Gal- 
veston, Tex.,  to  certain  Texas  points, 
and  applied  only  to  commodities  from 
"shipside."  Bananas  upon  arrival  passed 
into  the  possession  of  a  terminal  hand- 
ling company,  which  forwarded  them  by 
rail  under  bills  of  lading.  Bananas  took 
a  commodity  rate  of  72c  per  100  lbs. 
from  New  Orleans  to  Texas  common 
points,  a  distance  of  nearly  600  miles, 
revenue  per  ton  per  mile  2.4c.  This 
commodity  is  extremely  perishable  and 
did  not  move  in  solid  trainloads  to 
the  points  in  question.  From  Galveston 
the  same  points  are  from  200  to  350 
miles  nearer  than  to  New  Orleans,  and 
the  rates  were  about  23c  lower.  The 
average  revenue  per  ton  per  mile  on 
bananas  from  New  Orleans  to  points  in 
Illinois,  Iowa,  Missouri  and  Kansas  was 
1.5c.  The  Class  A  rate  from  New  Or- 
leans to  Texas  common  points  was  78c. 
HELD,  that  bananas  are  not  moved  by 
the  rail  carriers  "from  shipside"  and 
hence  not  entitled  to  the  import  rate; 
that  this  commodity  requires  an  ex- 
pedited service,  with  messengers  in 
charge,  who  are  returned  free  on  regu- 
lar passenger  trains,  and  hence  this 
rate  cannot  properly  be  compared  with 
rates  on  peaches,  plums,  apples,  cab- 
bages, etc.;  that  as  the  traffic  to  the 
North  moves  in  solid  trainloads  those 
rates  cannot  be  compared  with  the 
Texas  rate,  and  that  the  rates  charged 


640 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §84  (h)  — (1) 


by  defendants  were  reasonable.  Com- 
plaint dismissed.  Waco  Freight  Bureau 
V.  H.  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.   C.  C.  22. 

(h)  Complainant  shipped  two  car- 
loads of  cabbage,  Lewiston,  N.  Y.,  to 
Houston,  Tex.,  on  a  rate  of  74c  west  of 
Suspension  Bridge,  plus  a  local  rate  of 
4V^c  from  Lewiston  to  that  point.  Prior 
to  the  shipments  for  several  years  a 
rate  of  49c  from  Suspension  Bridge  to 
destination  existed.  A  month  after  the 
shipments  the  49c  rate  was  re-estab- 
lished, and  subsequently  raised  to  53c, 
at  which  it  remained.  HELD,  the  fact 
that  defendants  had  for  some  time  main- 
tained a  rate  of  49c  and  soon  after 
these  shipments  moved  reduced  the 
rate  from  74c  back  to  49c  is  in  the  na- 
ture of  an  admission  that  this  rate  was 
a  fair  one  under  the  circumstances.  Rep- 
aration awarded.  Millar  v.  N.  Y,  C.  & 
H.   R.   R.    R.   Co.,   19   I.   C.   C.   78. 

(i)  Complainant  shipped  apples,  C. 
L.,  Seymour  and  Cedar  Gap,  Mo.,  to 
Minneapolis  and  St.  Paul,  Minn.,  a  dis- 
tance of  about  840  miles.  Prior  to 
Sept.  6,  1906,  the  rate  from  Seymour 
was  34c  and  from  Cedar  Gap  34i/^c.  On 
that  date  and  to  Aug.  6,  1909,  the  rates 
were  41c  and  .42c,  respectively,  and  on 
Aug.  6,  1909,  were  reduced  to  31c. 
HELD,  a  presumption  that  34c  and  34 ^c 
were  reasonable  arose  from  the  volun- 
tary act  of  the  carriers  in  keeping  them 
in  effect  for  a  long  period  of  time, 
rendered  stronger  by  the  fact  that  these 
rates  were  voluntarily  reduced  to  31c. 
Reparation  awarded  for  charges  exacted 
in  excess  of  34c  and  34i/^c.  Gamble- 
Robinson  Commission  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S. 
F.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  114;  reparation 
awarded,  Unrep.  Op.  211. 

(j)  Complainants  attacked  the  orange 
rate  from  southern  California  to  the 
East  of  $1.15  per  100  lbs.  In  the  year 
1908  to  1909  33,947  cars  of  oranges 
moved.  One-sixteenth  of  the  entire 
freight  revenues  of  the  Santa  Fe  sys- 
tem was  from  the  handling  of  California 
citrus  fruit.  The  movement  to  Chicago 
was  equivalent  to  a  solid  train  movement. 
The  average  number  of  loaded  cars  in 
•astbound  trains  for  the  first  week  of 
March,  1909,  when  the  Commission  made 
a  test,  was  30.  Under  the  orange  rate, 
had  these  cars  been  loaded  with  that 
fruit,  the  earnings  per  train  mile  would 
have  been  $4.25,  against  an  average 
train  mile  earning  upon  the  Santa  Fe 
system    for    1909    of    $3.09.      The    equip- 


ment in  which  the  traffic  was  handled 
was  more  expensive  than  the  ordinary 
box  car  and  the  loading  was  lighter  in 
comparison  with  the  weight  of  the  car.  The 
schedule  under  which  the  traffic  moved 
was  between  10  and  11  miles  per  hour, 
including  stops  at  divisonal  points,  which 
was  nothing  more  than  a  fair  merchan- 
dise schedule.  Shippers  were  accorded 
the  "diversion"  privilege,  which  gives 
the  right  to  change  the  point  to  which 
the  car  was  consigned  while  in  transit 
without  additional  expense.  HELD,  that 
while  the  Commission  regards  this  traf- 
fic as  highly  profitable  at  the  existing 
rate,  yet  on  the  whole  at  the  present 
time  it  ought  not  to  be  disturbed.  Ar- 
lington Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  148. 

(k)  Complainants  attacked  the  rates, 
minima,  and  rules  of  transportation 
governing  the  movement  of  produce 
from  the  truck-farming  district  of  Pon- 
chatoula.  La.,  to  Chicago,  111.  In  the 
season  of  1909  2,260,949  lbs.  of  straw- 
berries, beans,  lettuce,  cabbage  (these 
commodities  being  90.34  per  cent  of  the 
total  produce  tonnage)  and  other  fruits 
and  vegetables,  moved  from  this  district 
to  Chicago.  The  rate  on  strawberries, 
C.  L.,  was  61c  per  100  lbs.,  minimum 
18,000  lbs.,  but  the  record  showed  that 
this  commodity  cannot  be  safely  loaded 
to  this  weight.  The  rate  on  beans  was 
52c,  lettuce  58.5c  and  cabbage  44c.  The 
minimum  on  vegetables  and  fruits  gen- 
erally, except  strawberries,  was  20,000  lbs. 
HELD,  that  the  rate  on  strawberries 
should  not  exceed  61c,  minimum  17,000 
lbs.,  and  that  the  rate  on  lettuce  should 
not  exceed  55c.  Reparation  denied. 
Ponchatoula  Farmers'  Ass'n  v.  I.  C.  R. 
R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  513. 

(1)  On  apples  in  carloads  from 
Mount  Ross  and  Elizaville,  N.  Yi.,  to 
Birmingham,  Ala.,  via  the  Seaboard  De- 
spatch, operating  thr(3ugh  Portsmouth 
or  Richmond,  a  combination  rate  of  51c 
was  exacted,  defendant  Central  New 
England  Co.  being  the  initial,  and  the 
Seaboard  Air  Line  the  delivering,  car- 
rier. At  the  time  of  shipment  a  rate 
of  42c  was  in  effect  via  the  Southern 
Despatch,  operating  through  Hagers- 
town  and  Bristol,  with  the  Alabama 
Great  Southern  as  the  delivering  car- 
rier, and  defendant  Central  New  Eng- 
land as  the  initial  carrier.  The  Sea- 
board Air  Line  did  not  participate  in 
the  Southern  Despatch  route.  The  Sea- 
board   Despatch    route    was    104    miles 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §84   (m)  — (p) 


641 


shorter.  HELD,  the  only  evidence  of- 
fered of  the  uhreasonableness  of  the 
rate  attacked  being  a  comparison  with 
a  different  route,  the  rate  attacked  could 
not  be  found  excessive  on  the  record. 
Pankey  &  Holmes  v.  Central  New  Eng- 
land Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  578,  579. 

(m)  On  a  carload  of  peaches  from 
Horatio,  Ark.,  to  Memphis,  Teun.,  com- 
plainant was  charged  89c  per  100  lbs., 
and  for  refrigeration  $70.50.  Subsequent 
to  the  shipment  the  initial  carrier  joined 
in  a  rate  of  39c  between  said  points  and 
a  refrigeration  charge  of  5c  per  crate 
of  four-basket  carriers.  The  delivering 
carrier  refused  to  join  in  such  new 
rates.  The  shipment  weighed  21,120 
lbs.  HELD,  the  89c  rate  and  refrigera- 
tion charge  were  excessive.  Reparation 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  43c,  held  to 
be  a  just  and  reasonable  rate,  and  of 
$48  for  refrigeration.  (Cockrell,  Com'r, 
dissenting  as  to  refrigeration  and  icing 
charges.)  Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v. 
K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  90,  91. 

(n)  Complainants  attacked  the  rates 
on  barrel  or  malaga  grapes  from  New 
York,  Philadelphia,  Baltimore  and  Wash- 
ington to  Pittsburgh,  and  asked  that 
rates  be  established  on  carloads  equal 
to  those  applicable  to  fresh  vegetables, 
and  on  less  than  carloads  lower  than 
less-than-carload  rates  on  fresh  vege- 
tables. Grapes  were  usually  not  classi- 
fied with  fresh  vegetables,  but  with 
cherries,  apricots  and  plums.  The  aver- 
age value  of  malaga  grapes  exceeded 
the  average  value  of  fresh  vegetables 
by  about  one-third.  Under  the  rates 
attacked  the  total  cost  of  transportation 
from  the  vineyards  in  Spain  to  Pitts- 
burgh was  higher  than  (exclusive  of 
duty)  the  rates  from  California  on  To- 
kay grapes  to  Pittsburgh,  which  com- 
peted with  the  malaga  grapes.  Malaga 
grapes,  while  not  requiring  refrigeration, 
did  require  special  care  in  transporta- 
tion to  protect  against  low  tempera- 
tures. HELD,  the  rates  assessed  were 
not  shown  to  be  unreasonable.  Com- 
plaint dismissed.  Connolly-Fanning  Co. 
V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  283,  285. 

(o)  On  a  shipment  of  a  mixed  car- 
load of  potatoes  and  onions  in  packages 
from  Reno,  Nev.,  to  Alturas,  Cal.,  a 
charge  of  80c  per  100  lbs.  was  exacted. 
Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis  of  $12 
a  ton,  following  E.  Lauer  &  Son  v.  N. 
C.  &  O.  Ry.,  17  L  C.  C.  488.     Bunch  & 


Tussey  v.  Nevada,  C.  &  O.  Ry.,  17  L  C. 
C.    490i 

(p)  Complainant  asparagus  growers 
in  the  Charleston  district,  S.  C,  at- 
tacked the  rate  of  90c  per  crate  of  24 
bunches,  weighing  65  lbs.,  to  Boston,  and 
of  65c  per  crate  to  Washington,  Balti- 
more, Philadelphia  and  New  York.  The 
refrigeration  charges  were  21c  per  crate 
on  a  minimum  carload  of  230  crates 
and  15c  on  a  minimum  of  325  crates  to 
New  York  and  the  other  cities  named 
except  Boston,  and  to  Boston  were  24i/4c 
and  171/^c  per  crate,  respectively,  for 
the  same  minimum  carloads.  Complain- 
ants alleged  unjust  discrimination 
against  small  shippers  in  that  defend- 
ants refused  to  furnish  refrigeration  for 
less-than-carload  lots.  The  average  net 
return  to  growers  on  asparagus  for 
1908  and  1909  was  about  $4.50  per 
crate,  exclusive  of  transportation  and 
refrigeration  charges  and  commissions. 
Conflicting  evidence  indicated  that  the 
gross  selling  price  at  New  York  ranged 
from  about  $6  to  $8  per  crate.  The 
asparagus  grown  around  Charleston  was 
transported  by  boats  to  the  vegetable 
wharves,  in  Charleston,  of  defendants 
Southern  Ry.  and  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  It 
comprised  one-third  of  all  vegetable 
traffic  moving  over  the  wharves.  De- 
fendants unloaded  the  vegetables  from 
the  boats  to  the  wharves.  The  re- 
frigerating company  loaded  them  into 
the  cars.  The  traffic  was  forwarded  in 
expedited  trains  of  light  tonnage  that 
were  given  preference  over  all  other 
trains  except  passenger  trains.  While 
defendants  formerly  granted  refrigera- 
tion on  less-than-carload  shipments,  the 
evidence  indicated  that  to  do  so  under 
the  rates  attacked  would  result  in  loss 
to  both  the  railroads  and  the  refrigera- 
tion companies.  The  practice  at  other 
producing  points  was  to  consolidate 
small  shipments  in  carloads.  The  mini- 
ma under  the  rates  complained  of  could 
be  easily  loaded.  The  cost  of  refrigera- 
tion from  Charleston  to  New  York  was 
over  $48  per  car  of  21,125  lbs.  when 
325  crates  were  loaded.  In  1907  on 
business  over  the  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  the 
profit  from  refrigeration  was  $4.06,  and 
in  1908  $3.36,  a  car,  which  profit  ac- 
crued entirely  to  the  refrigeration  com- 
pany and  not  to  the  carriers.  In  Flor- 
ida Fruit,  etc.,  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  476,  the  Commission  found 
that  refrigeration  charges  of  $70  per 
car    of    21,400    lbs.    on    fruit    and    vege- 


642 


REASONABLENESS   OF  RATES,   §84    (q) 


tables  from  Florida  and  northern  points 
were  not  unreasonable.  The  65c  rate 
complained  of  to  New  York  had  been  in 
effect  since  1903.  From  1894  to  1899 
the  rate  was  85c,  and  from  1900  to  1902, 
80c.  Some  7,000  cars  of  vegetables  per 
year  were  shipped  from  the  Charleston 
district.  On  account  of  the  absence  of 
refrigeration  by  water  lines  and  the 
longer  time  required  to  get  to  market, 
the  rates  complained  of  were  but 
slightly  influenced  by  water  competition. 
On  asparagus,  under  the  rates  attacked, 
the  earnings  via  the  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  for 
the  year  1908  averaged  about  $198.  De- 
fendants' earnings  on  lettuce  from 
Charleston  to  New  York  were  about  $156 
per  car.  In  the  Florida  Fruit  case, 
supra,  a  rate  on  vegetables  of  43c  per 
crate  of  50  lbs.  from  Florida  base  points 
to  New  York  was  held  to  be  reasonable, 
tvhich  rate  did  not,  however,  include 
the  gathering  charge  or  the  rates  up  to 
the  base  points.  The  average  loading  of 
vegetables  was  found  in  that  case  to 
be  17,600  lbs.  and  the  per  car  earnings 
$150.  Jacksonville  is  1,000  miles  and 
Charleston  740  miles  from  New  York. 
A  rate  of  60c  per  crate  from  Charleston 
via  the  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  to  New  York 
would  yield  per  car  earnings  of  $180, 
and  one  of  55c,  $165.  The  losses  to  the 
carriers  from  damage  and  deterioration 
of  asparagus  were  heavy.  HELD,  that 
in  view  of  the  cost  of  the  service,  com- 
parisons with  rates  in  other  localities 
and  former  decisions  of  the  Commis- 
sion, the  refrigeration  charges  com- 
plained of  were  not  shown  to  be  unrea- 
sonable or  to  discriminate  unjustly 
against  the  shippers  of  less-than-carload 
lots;  but  that  the  rates  attacked  were 
unreasonable  to  the  extent  that  they 
exceeded  60c  per  crate,  Charleston  to 
New  York,  58c  to  Philadelphia,  56c  to 
Baltimore  and  Washington  and  70c  to 
Boston.  Reparation  denied.  Asparagus 
Growers  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
I.    C.   C.   423,    427,   429. 

(q)  In  Florida  Fruit  and  Vegetable 
Ass'n  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.,  14  I.  C.  C.  476, 
the  Commission  considered  the  rates 
upon  fruits  and  vegetables  from  pro- 
ducing points  in  Florida  to  eastern  des- 
tinations north  of  the  Potomac  and 
Ohio  rivers  and  east  of  the  Missouri 
River,  and  established  rates  on  citrus 
fruits  and  pineapples  to  eastern  destina- 
tions north  of  the  Potomac  and  east  of 
the  Buffalo-Pittsburgh  line,  and  approved 
existing    rates    to    the    Ohio    River.      It 


stated  in  the  opinion  that  the  rates 
to  points  north  of  the  Ohio  and  east 
of  the  Missouri  River  were  excessive, 
but  entered  no  order,  the  proper  car- 
riers not  being  made  parties.  Existing 
carload  rates  on  oranges  to  the  Ohio 
River  were  approved,  as  were  also  ex- 
isting any-quantity  rates  to  eastern 
points  north  of  the  Potomac.  The  rail- 
and-water  rates  from  points  of  produc- 
tion to  North  Atlantic  ports  were  re- 
duced in  case  of  vegetables,  and  it  was 
suggested  that  carload  rates  should  be 
established  to  eastern  territory.  The 
carriers  complied  with  the  order,  but 
not  with  the  suggestions,  made  in  that 
case.  The  present  proceeding  involves 
the  rates  on  citrus  fruits  and  pine- 
apples to  territory  north  of  the  Ohio 
River,  west  of  the  Buffalo-Pittsburgh 
line  and  east  of  the  Missouri  River; 
the  carload  rate  upon  vegetables  from 
Florida  base  points  to  points  north  of 
the  Potomac  and  east  of  Buffalo  and 
Pittsburgh,  and  the  approval  of  advances 
in  vegetable  rates  from  base  points  to 
the  Ohio  River.  In  the  former  opinion 
the  Commission  held  that  the  rates  upon 
citrus  fruits  and  pineapples  should  be 
the  same,  and  that  the  rates  from  points 
of  production  upon  the  Florida  East 
Joast  Ry.  to  Jacksonville,  when  for 
beyond,  were  reasonable.  In  this  pro- 
ceeding, however,  the  reasonableness  of 
these  rates  is  again  considered.  The 
local  rate  from  Florida  base  points, 
as  compared  with  the  proportional  rate, 
was  also  brought  in  question,  as  was 
the  rule  as  to  mixed  fruits  and  vege- 
tables in  carloads;  also  the  question  as 
to  any  change  to  be  made  in  the  rates 
for  refrigeration.  RATES  ON  CITRUS 
FRUITS  AND  PINEAPPLES  FROM 
BASE  POINTS  TO  POINTS  NORTH  OF 
THE  OHIO  RIVER  AND  EAST  OF  THE 
MISSOURI  RIVER.  In  the  former  opinion 
it  was  held  that  carload  rates  from 
base  points  to  the  Ohio  River  might 
properly  be  the  same  as  those  to  New 
York,  the  distance  being  substantially 
the  same.  HELD,  rates  to  points  north 
of  the  Ohio  River  should  not  much  dif- 
fer, distance  considered,  from  those  to 
various  eastern  destinations  north  of 
the  Potomac;  and  on  the  record  of  the 
former  case  the  rates  upon  citrus  fruits 
and  pineapples  of  59.6c,  5Gc,  58.8c,  62c, 
54c,  56c,  77.6c,  77.6c,  71.6c,  79.6c  and 
72.8c  per  box,  in  carloads,  minimum  300 
boxes,  are  unreasonable  to  the  extent 
they  exceed  53c,  50c,  53c,  55c,  50c,  50c,  66c, 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §84   (q) 


64S 


6Gc,  62c,  66c  and  62c,  respectively,  to  Chi- 
cago, Indianapolis,  Cleveland,  Milwaukee, 
St.  Louis,  Columbus,  Minneapolis,  St. 
Paul,  Kansas  City,  Omaha  and  Cedar 
Rapids,  respectively.  VEGETABLES 
FROM  FLORIDA  BASE  POINTS  TO 
POINTS  NORTH  OF  THE  POTOMAC 
AND  EAST  OF  BUFFALO  AND  PITTS- 
BURGH. In  the  former  opinion  the 
Commission  suggested  rates  of  33c,  34c, 
36c  and  42c  to  Baltimore,  Philadelphia, 
New  York  and  Boston,  respectively, 
minimum  20,000  lbs.  Defendants  estab- 
lished rates  3c  higher  than  these,  mini- 
mum 20,000  lbs.  Complainants  demand 
a  rate  of  30c  to  New  York,  minimum 
24,000  lbs.,  to  make  the  carload  earnings 
equal  those  on  oranges.  The  mini- 
mum from  southern  points  does  not 
usually  exceed  20,000  lbs.  Under  re- 
frigeration not  over  17,500  lbs.  can  be 
properly  loaded.  HELD,  the  rates  under 
ventilation,  minimum  420  crates,  21,000 
lbs.,  should  not  exceed  30c,  31c,  33c  and 
39c  to  Baltimore,  Philadelphia,  New 
York  and  Boston,  respectively,  and  un- 
der refrigeration,  minimum  350  crates, 
17,500  lbs..,  36c,  37c,  39c  and  45c  to 
these  points,  respectively.  VEGETABLE 
RATES  FROM  BASE  POINTS  TO  THE 
OHIO  RIVER.  At  the  time  of  the  de- 
cision of  the  former  case  the  rates  on 
vegetables  from  base  points  to  the 
Ohio  River  were  and  for  many  years 
had  been  25c  per  crate,  minimum  20,000 
lbs.  Rates  to  points  north  of  the  Ohio 
River  were  made  by  adding  certain 
specifics.  Since  that  decision,  defend- 
ants advanced  the  rates  to  30c,  with  the 
same  minimum,  leaving  in  effect  the 
same  specifics  as  before.  This  rate  of 
30c  to  the  Ohio  River  was  still  6c 
lower  than  the  rate  suggested  by  the 
Commission  to  apply  to  New  York  when 
it  found  in  a  former  case  that  the  or- 
ange rate  might  properly  be  the  same 
from  base  points  to  New  York  and  the 
Ohio  River.  The  25c  rate  was  estab- 
lished to  meet  competition  from  pro- 
ducing points  in  southern  Alabama  and 
Mississippi,  the  haul  being  longer  from 
l^'lorida  than  from  these  points.  In  the 
past  the  cabbage  rate,  from  Florida  base 
points  to  the  Ohio  River  had  been  42c, 
minimum  20,000  lbs.  Under  the  new 
rates  this  charge  was  left  in  effect,  but 
the  minimum  was  advanced  to  24,000 
lbs.,  which  could  be  safely  loaded.  The 
former  rate  on  potatoes  was  27c,  mini- 
mum 37,000  lbs.;  the  advanced  rate  was 
32c,    minimum    30,000    lbs.,    which    latter 


minimum  was  the  largest  that  could 
properly  be  loaded.  HELD,  that  the  25c 
rate  having  been  established  to  meet 
competition,  the  Commission  could  not 
order  it  to  be  restored;  that  the  30c 
rate  was  not  unreasonable;  that  the 
24,000  lbs.  minimum  on  cabbage  was  not 
unreasonable,  and  that  the  32c  rate  on 
potatoes,  yielding  only  $96  per  car,  was 
not  unreasonable.  RATES  ON  PINE- 
APPLES FROM  FLORIDA  COMING  IN- 
TO COMPETITION  WITH  THOSE 
PROM  CUBA.  The  cost  of  production  in 
Cuba  is  some  15c  per  crate  less  than  in 
Florida.  On  account  of  better  quality 
Florida  pineapples  bring  from  25c  to 
50c  per  crate  more.  The  cost  of  hand- 
ling Cuban  pines  from  the  country  to 
the  dock  in  Cuba,  including  the  dock 
expense,  was  7c  per  crate.  The  rate 
from  the  Cuban  dock  to  Chicago  via 
che  Florfda  East  Coast  Ry.  and  its  con- 
nections was  66^/^0,  making  a  total 
transportation  cost  from  Cuban  produc- 
ing points  to  Chicago  of  73^c.  Cuban 
pines  move  to  Chicago  via  New  York, 
Mobile  and  New  Orleans,  the  total 
charge  being  the  same,  73i/^Cu  The  aver- 
age rate  from  Florida  producing  points 
to  Jacksonville  was  "5c.  With  a  rate 
of  53c  from  Jacksonville  to  Chicago  the 
total  charge  to  Florida  producing  points 
would  be  78c,  4i/^c  higher  than  the 
Cuban  rate.  The  evidence  in  the  former 
case  and  in  the  present  proceeding  in- 
dicated that  the  Florida  East  Coast  Ry. 
had  never  earned  a  dividend  of  over 
6  per  cent,  and  that  during  much  of  the 
time  its  net  earnings  were  little  above 
its  operating  expenses.  Its  main  line 
was  477  miles  in  length,  with  106  miles 
of  branches.  About  60  per  cent  of  the 
pineapples  moved  from  Florida  points 
of  origin  in  carloads,  40  per  cent  in 
less  than  carloads.  Carload  shipments 
were  stripped  and  loaded  by  the  shipper 
and  were  not  unloaded  at  Jacksonville, 
the  carrier  being  thereby  saved  about 
2c  per  box.  The  less-than-carload  ship- 
ments were  loaded  by  the  railway,  and 
usually  unloaded  at  the  station  at  Jack- 
sonville or  South  Jacksonville.  HELD,  th  a 
rates  from  Florida  basing  points  should 
not  on  pineapples  to  Chicago  exceed  53c 
per  crate;  that  the  local  rate  from  Florida 
producing  points  to  base  points,  average 
25c,  was  not  excessive,  in  view  of  the 
net  earnings  of  the  carrier,  but  that 
the  rates  were  uneven  and  should  be 
revised,  being  too  high  from  the  more 
distant    points,    as    compared    with    the 


G44 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §84  (r)  — (t) 


rates  from  nearby  ppints;  that  carload 
rates  should  be  established  less  than 
the  present  any-quantity  rates  by  3c  per 
box.  Tabl«  of  rates  from  Florida  pro- 
ducing points  to  basing  points,  mini- 
mum carload  300  crates,  prescribed  for 
various  distances  in  the  opinion.  LO- 
CAL RATE  FROM  FLORIDA  BASE 
POINTS,  AS  COMPARED  WITH  THE 
PROPORTIONAL  RATE.  Dealers  at 
the  Florida  base  points  shipped  fruits 
and  vegetables  from  the  Florida  pro- 
ducing points  at  the  any-quantity  local 
rate  and  consolidated  them  into  car- 
loads at  the  base  points.  HELD,  a  some- 
what higher  rate  might  be  applied  to 
the  base  points  than  the  proportional 
rates  to  the  base  points  when  the  car- 
load simply  passed  through  these  points; 
the  local  rates  might  exceed  the  pro- 
portional rates  by  2c  per  crate  in  case 
of  vegetables,  3c  per  box  in  case  of 
citrus  fruits  and  pines,  and  4c*per  100 
lbs.  where  the  rate  was  named  in  that 
manner.  MIXING  OF  FRUITS  AND 
VEGETABLES.  Under  the  rates  at- 
tacked, citrus  fruits  and  vegetables 
could  be  mixed,  the  combined  carload 
taking  the  same  rate  and  minimum  as 
would  either  commodity.  Vegetables 
could  be  mixed,  the  rate  being  that  of 
the  article  taking  the  highest  rate,  and 
the  minimum  that  of  the  article  tak- 
ing the  highest  minimum.  HELD,  that 
the  mixture  of  fruits  and  vegetables 
from  Florida  points  should  bo  allowed, 
both  the  rate  and  the  minimum  to  be 
that  of  the  article  taking  the  highest 
rate.  REFRIGERATION.  In  the  former 
opinion  a  refrigeration  rate  of  $67.50 
per  car  was  approved  from  Florida 
points  of  production,  the  icing  supply 
being  at  the  base  points,  which  are  less 
distant  than  the  producing  points. 
HELD,  the  charge  from  base  points 
should  properly  be  less  than  from  the 
point  of  production.  No  order  entered, 
however,  on  account  of  the  state  of  the 
pleadings.  Florida  Fruit  &  Vegetable 
Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
552,  556,  557,  558,  563,  564,  565,  566,  568. 

(r)  The  published  tariffs  on  cabbages 
in  carload  lots  with  a  minimum  of  200 
crates  from  St,  Andrew's  Parish,  S.  C. 
to  New  York  was  60c.  Shippers  cus- 
tomarily performed  the  service  of  load- 
ing. The  published  tariffs  mad^*  no  pro- 
vision for  charges  where  the  carrier  did 
the  loading.  Defendants  loaded  the  cars 
in  question  and  collected  the  less-than- 
crload   rate,    63c.      HELD,    such   charge 


was  unlawful,  and  complainant  was  en- 
titled to  reparation  on  the  basis  of  the 
carload  rate.  Vcorhees  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  42,  43. 

(s)  At  the  time  of  shipments  of  car- 
loads of  lettuce  by  complainant  from 
St.  Andrews,  S.  C,  to  New  York  City,  the 
published  rate  was  32c  per  bushel,  box, 
basket  or  crate  of  standard  size,  and  on 
crates  above  the  standard  size  the  bar- 
rel or  double-crate  rate  of  63c  applied. 
The  baskets  shipped  by  complainant  con- 
tained one  and  one-half  bushels  and  were, 
therefore,  in  excess  of  the  standard  bas- 
ket. Defendants  charged  the  63c  rate. 
Shortly  thereafter,  defendants  estab- 
lished a  48c  rate  on  half-barrel  pack- 
ages. This  rate  yielded  about  the  same 
revenue  as  the  rate  on  lumber  between 
Charleston  and  New  York.  Shipments 
of  vegetables  required  great  expedition 
in  handling,  and  a  high  rate  of  speed, 
and  it  was  necessary  to  sidetrack  other 
traffic  to  give  them  preference.  Defend- 
ants had  constructed  branch  lines  into 
the  St.  Andrews  district  to  develop  the 
vegetable  traffic,  which  was  not  large 
from  that  point.  HELD,  complainant's 
request  for  a  reduction  of  the  rate  on 
half-barrel  packages  to  32c  was  not  justi- 
fied, but  that  the  48c  rate  on  such  pack- 
ages was  reasonable,  and  coTnplainant 
was  entitled  to  reparation  on  the  basis 
of  that  rate.  Voorhees  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  45,  48. 

(t)  The  rates  on  strawberries  and 
peaches  shipped  from  the  Ozark  country 
to  many  points  east,  west  and  north 
were  considerably  higher  than  the  rates 
on  these  commodities  shipped  from  Ten- 
nessee, Alabama,  Mississippi,  South 
Carolina  and  Georgia  points,  the  com- 
parison being  based  on  per  car  and  per 
ton  mile  earnings.  It  was  true  generally 
that  all  traffic  west  of  the  Mississippi 
River  took  somewhat  higher  rates  than 
that  east  of  the  river.  It  did  not  appear 
that  the  relation  of  rates  between  east 
and  west  of  the  river  on  the  commodities 
in  question  was  out  of  proportion  in  com- 
parison with  those  on  other  commodities. 
The  transportation  of  strawberries  and 
peaches  requires  high  speed,  special  re- 
frigeration and  special  expense  in  the 
accumulation  of  empty  cars  in  the  dis- 
trict in  question.  A  cut  of  20  per  cent 
in  the  rates  attacked  would  have  re- 
duced the  selling  price  only  l-6c  a  quart. 
HELD,  the  rates  in  question,  as  a  whole, 
were  not  unreasonable,  but  the  finding 
did  not  preclude  a  future  attack  on  rates 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §84  (u)  — (x) 


645 


between  particular  points.  Ozark  Fruit 
Growlers'  Ass'n  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  106,  114. 

(u)     Complainant    attacked    rates    on 
apples  from   the   Ozark  fruit  country  to 

(a)  St.  Louis,  Kansas  City  and  Memphis; 

(b)  Louisiana  points;  (c)  points  in  Mis- 
sissippi, Alabama,  Georgia,  South  Caro- 
lina and  Florida;  (d)  Oklahoma,  and  (e) 
Texas.  The  rates  to  group  (a)  were  much 
lower  than  to  groups  (d)  and  (e)  on  ac- 
count of  competition  from  producing  ter- 
ritory to  the  north  and  east,  and  there 
was  no  evidence  that  rates  to  group  (a) 
were  unreasonably  high.  The  same  was 
true  of  rates  to  group  (b),  which  were 
made  to  meet  water  competition.  The 
rates  to  group  (c)  were  made  by  add- 
ing the  rate  to  Memphis  and  the  rate 
from  Memphis  to  points  beyond.  The 
rates  beyond  Memphis  on  all  commodi- 
ties bore  a  fixed  relation  to  rates  from 
Louisville  and  other  Ohio  River  cross- 
ings to  the  same  destination,  being  4c 
less  in  the  case  of  apples.  To  reduce  the 
rates  to  group  (c)  would  result  in  a 
readjustment  of  rates  from  Ohio  River 
crossings.  With  respect  to  groups  (d) 
and  (e),  the  per-ton-mile  rate  from  the 
Ozark  country  to  these  group  poinds 
ranged  from  16.8  mills'  to  38.1  mills, 
whereas  the  per-ton-mile  rates  on  ship- 
ments from  Chicago,  Richmond,  Va.^ 
Huntington,  Ore.,  and  Rochester.  N.  Y., 
to  various  points  ranged  from  6.2  to  22.1 
mills.  The  apple  industry  in  the  Ozark 
country  was  of  large  proportions  and  on 
the  increase,  and  the  volume  of  traffic 
into  Oklahoma  and  Texas  was  rapidly 
increasing.  HELD,  the  rates  to  groups 
(a),  (b)  and  (c)  were  not  unreasonable; 
that  the  rates  to  groups  (d)  and  (e) 
should  be  generally  reduced,  so  as  to 
make  the  defendants'  rates  on  apples 
practically  equivalent  to  its  rates  on 
strawberries  and  peaches  shipped  from 
the  Ozark  country  to  various  destina- 
tions; such  new  rates  to  be  as  follows: 
from  Missouri  and  Arkansas  into  Okla- 
homa for  distances  in  excess  of  220  miles 
and  less  than  320  miles,  40c  and  for  320 
miles  and  over,  45c  per  100  lbs.;  from 
Missouri  producing  points  to  Texas  com- 
mon points,  55c,  instead  of  the  present 
rate  of  62c,  and  from  Arkansas,  45c,  in- 
stead of  the  present  rate  of  53c,  the  new 
rates  being  designed  to  produce  a  reve- 
nue of  16.6  mills  per  ton  mile  for  a  haul 
of  600  miles  into  Texas  from  Missouri, 
20  mills  from  Arkansas,  and  from  36.4 
to  18  mills  to  Oklahoma  destinations,  220 
to  450  miles  from  points  of  origin.    Ozark 


Fruit  Growers'  Ass'n  v.   St.  L.   &  S.   F. 
R.   R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  134,  137-141. 

(v)  Carload  rates  on  bananas  from 
Mobile  and  New  Orleans  to  Bur- 
lington, Cedar  Rapids,  Davenport,  Ot- 
tumwa,  Des  IMoines,  Fort  Dodge  and 
Waterloo,  la.,  of  52c,  60c,  5'6c,  60c,  64c,  66c 
and  62c  per  100  lbs.,  respectively,  are 
noi  unreasonable,  following  the  decision 
in  Topeka  Banana  Dealers'  Ass'n  v.  St. 
L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co..  13  L  C.  C.  620,  estab- 
lishing rates  from  these  southern  points 
to  Kansas  City  and  other  points.  La- 
gomarcino-Grupe  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  H.  Co., 
115  I.  C.  C.  151,   152. 

(w)  On  bananas  originating  in  Cen- 
tral America,  but  shipped  locally  in  car- 
loads from  New  Orleans  to  El  Paso,  a 
rate  of  82c  from  New  Orleans  was  ex- 
acted. The  Galveston  to  El  Paso  rate 
found  reasonable  by  the  Commission  was 
64c.  The  terminal  expenses  at  New  Or- 
leans were  higher.  Bananas  are  perish- 
able and  require  expedited  service.  They 
moved  from  New  Orleans  in  cars  fur- 
nished by  third  parties,  the  rate  charge 
of  the  carriers  being  $10.92  per  car.  The 
carriers  expended  on  each  car  $1.25  for 
equipping  and  slatting,  $2  for  bulkhead- 
Ing,  $6  for  false  flooring,  $1  for  weighing, 
$1  for  clerical  supervision,  a  switching 
charge  of  $2  at  New  Orleans,  and  a  load- 
ing charge  at  New  Orleans  of  $6.  Much 
of  the  country  bet\^een  New  Orleans  and 
El  Paso  is  sparsely  settled,  and  pro- 
ductive of  little  traffic.  HELD,  the  82c 
rate  was  not  unreasonable.  Payne  v. 
M.  L.  &  T.  R.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
185,  191. 

(x)  Complainant  association,  shippers 
of  oranges,  grapefruit  and  lemons  from 
Florida  to  New  York,  B(5ston  and  sur- 
rounding territory,  and  to  territory  north 
of  Ohio  River  crossings,  attacked  the 
rail-and-water  and  all-rail  rates  to  the 
former  territory  and  the  all-rail  rates  to 
the  latter  territory  as  being  unreasonable 
in  themselves  "  and  unjustly  discrimi- 
natory in  comparison  with  rates  on  such 
products  shipped  from  California  to  the 
same  territory.  Considerations  affecting 
rates  on  oranges  applied  equally  to 
grapefruit  and  lemons.  The  average  dis- 
tance from  California  to  points  in  New 
York  territory  was  2,500  miles,  and  the 
average  distance  from  Florida  points  to 
that  territory  was  1,250  miles;  whereas 
the  rates  from  California  were  some- 
what lower,  despite  the  greater  distance. 
The  rail-and-water  rate  from  base  points 
in  Florida  to  Baltimore,  Philadelphia  and 


646 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,   §84    (x) 


New  York  was  35c  per  box  on  oranges; 
to  Boston,  40c  per  box.  The  all-rail  rate 
to  Baltimore  was  47.5c;  Philadelphia, 
48.5c;  New  York,  50.5c;  Boston,  58.5c. 
The  average  local  rate  from  Florida 
base  points  to  producing  points  in 
Florida  was  25c  per  box,  making  the  joint 
all-rail  rates  from  Florida  producing 
points  75.5c  to  New  York,  83.5c  to  Bos- 
ton, 84.6c  to  Chicago,  85.4c  to  Pittsburgh, 
and  85.8c  to  Buffalo.  The  joint  rail-and- 
water  rates  from  basing  points  in  Florida 
to  the  aforesaid  territory  were  increased 
by  tha  25c  Florida  local  rate.  The  rate 
from  producing  points  to  Chicago  was 
made  up  of  the  25c  Florida  local  rate, 
plus  a  46c  base  rate  to  Ohio  River  cross- 
ings, plus  a  13.6c  rate  from  the  Ohio 
River  to  Chicago.  By  the  rail-and-water 
and  all-rail  rates  to  New  York  territory, 
the  charge  was  the  same  for  carload  as 
for  less-than-carload  lots;  to  Chicago  ter- 
ritory the  charge  on  carload  lots  was 
considerably  less.  By  the  all-rail  route 
the  traffic  was  carried  from  Florida  bas- 
ing points  over  the  Atlantic  Coast  Line 
and  the  Seaboard  Air  Line  to  northern 
lines  at  Richmond.  Of  the  58.5c  rate  from 
Florida  base  lines  to  Boston,  the  road 
south  of  Richmond  received  37.5c,  and 
those  north  of  Richmond  21c.  The  50.5c 
New  York  rate  was  divided  37.5c  to  car- 
riers south  and  13c  to  carriers  north  of 
Richmond,  and  the  Buffalo  rate.  33.6c 
south  and  27.2c  north  of  Richmond.  The 
carriers  north  of  Richmond  received  from 
Florida  oranges  a  much  larger  allow- 
ance than  for  equal  distance  hauls  of  Cali- 
fornia oranges.  The  Florida  local  rates 
from  producing  points  to  basing  points 
were  established  by  the  state  commis- 
sion and  were  reasonable  on  account  of 
the  sparsely  -settled  country  and  light 
traffic.  No  evidence  was  offered  to  show 
that  the  rail  and  water  rate  froii  Florida 
basing  points  to  said  northern  prints  was 
excessive.  As  to  the  all-rail  rafes  from 
basing  points  to  northern  points  it  ap- 
peared that  the  Seaboard  Line  was  in 
the  hands  of  receivers;  that  it  w-is  not 
paying  dividends  on  its  stock;  ani  that 
its  earnings  scarcely  enabled  it  to  pay 
interest  on  its  funded  indebtedness;  that 
the  Atlantic  Coast  Line  was  in  better 
condition,  due  largely  to  valuable  traffic 
originating  north  of  Florida,  and  that 
said  roads  on  the  orange  rate  attacked 
were  earning  about  1.38c  per  ton  mile, 
a  iigure  only  slightly  above  their  average 
per-ton-mile  earnings  on  other  products. 
Complainants  asked  a  reduction  of  10c  per 
box  on  the  all-rail  rate  in  question.    Such 


reduction  meant  a  reduction  of  less  than 
Ic  per  dozen  in  the  cost  of  oranges  at 
the  market,  and  would  not  materially 
help  complainants  to  compete  with  Cali- 
fornia oranges.  HELD,  the  rail-and- 
water  rates  in  question  were  reasonable, 
and  complainants'  request  for  rail-and- 
water  carload  rates  lower  than  any  quan- 
tity rates  should  be  denied;  that  the  all- 
rail  rates  south  of  Richmond  were 
reasonable;  that  the  rates  north  of  Rich- 
mond were  excessive,  and  should  be  re- 
duced; that  all-rail  carload  rates  upon 
a  minimum  of  300  boxes  should  be  es- 
tablished, 46c  from  Florida  base  points 
to  New  York,  43c  to  Baltimore,  44c  to 
Philadelphia,  51c  to  Boston,  and  that  the 
less-than-carload  rates  might  be  10c  per 
box  higher  than  the  carload  rates  to  all 
points,  so  long  as  the  present  any-quan- 
tity  rate  was  not  exceeded,  and  that  the 
Florida  to  Chicago  rate,  being  made  up 
of  the  base  rate  to  Ohio  River  crossings, 
plus  the  local  third-class  rate  from  said 
crossings  to  Chicago,  should  be  reduced 
to  equalize  the  California  to  Chicago  rate, 
but  no  order  should  be  entered,  the  car- 
riers north  of  Ohio  River  territory  not 
being  made  parties.  VEGETABLES: 
The  rail-and-water  rates  upon  vegetables 
were  considerably  higher  from  Florida 
points  to  Baltimore,  Philadelphia,  New 
York  and  Boston  than  those  upon  or- 
anges. The  vegetables  moving  by  water 
were  of  the  coarser,  cheaper  grades,  did 
not  require  an  expedited  service;  were 
not  more  bulky  than  oranges,  and  did  not 
exceed  oranges  in  value.  The  rail  rates 
on  the  higher  class  of  vegetables  from 
Florida  points  to  said  cities  were  much 
higher  than  upon  oranges.  But  sucti 
vegetables,  for  example,  celery,  lettuce 
and  tomatoes,  required  an  especially  ex- 
pedited service  to  avoid  the  expense  of 
refrigeration;  loaded  more  lightly  than 
oranges,  and  were  subject  to  minima 
with  respect  to  refrigeration  charges. 
The  rate  to  Boston  on  the  same  was  20c 
per  100  lbs.  higher  than  to  New  York. 
Vegetables  shipped  all-rail  from  Florida 
to  said  cities  took  only  any-quantity 
rates.  It  was  impracticable  for  small 
operators  to  ship  in  carloads,  since  vege- 
tables had  to  be  shipped  out  immediately. 
Defendants  operated  an  expensive  system 
of  themselves  assembling  the  packages 
in  the  carloads  at  different  points  in 
transit.  The  larger  operators  might,  how- 
ever, ship  in  carloads.  The  rate  on  to- 
matoes from  Mississippi  was  much  less 
to  New  York  than  from  Florida  to  that 
point  over  a  shorter  haul,  but  such  low 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §84  (y)— (bb) 


647 


rate  was  made  by  the  Illinois  Central 
and  the  Pennsylvania  lines  in  order  to 
gain  a  share  of  the  traffic.  HELD,  the 
rail-and-water  rates  on  coarser  vege- 
tables, including  cabbages  and  potatoes, 
should  be  reduced  so  as  not  greatly  to 
exceed  the  rates  on  oranges;  that  the  all- 
rail  rates  on  the  better  class  of  vege- 
tables, though  higher  than  those  upon 
oranges,  were  justified  on  account  of  the 
more  expensive  service,  except  that  the 
rate  to  Boston  should  not  exceed  the 
rate  on  vegetables  to  New  York  by  more 
than  6c  per  crate  of  50  lbs.  Defendants 
recommended  to  establish  carload  all-rail 
rates  on  vegetables.  Pineapples:  On  ac- 
count of  the  cheapness  of  water  transpor- 
tation, the  fertility  of  the  soil  and  the 
low  cost  of  labor,  Cuba  was  able  to  sell 
pineapples  at  the  Atlantic  ports  more 
cheaply  than  Florida  producers  under  the 
duties  in  force.  The  carriers  making  the 
haul  from  Florida  growing  points  to  the 
basing  line  had  developed  the  pineapple 
business  and  expended  large  sums  for 
special  sidings  and  were  largely  depend- 
ent upon  the  traffic  for  their  revenue. 
HELD,  that  the  rail-and-water  and  all- 
rail  rates  attacked  were  reasonable  and 
that  carload  rates  as  specified  in  the 
opinion  should  be  established.  Straw- 
berries: The  rate  on  strawberries  from 
Starke  and  Lawtey,  Fla.,  to  New  York 
was  $1.80  per  crate,  carload  minimum 
200  crates,  including  refrigeration.  In 
cars  loaded  to  such  minimum,  the  straw- 
berries near  the  door  were  frequently 
damaged.  The  per  car  revenue  derived 
upon  a  300-crate  minimum  from  vege- 
tables, including  refrigeration,  was  $209, 
as  against  $360  derived  from  strawber- 
ries under  the  200-crate  minimum  at- 
tacked. HELD,  the  minimum  should  be 
reduced  to  175  crates.  Refrigeration: 
The  refrigeration  charges  on  oranges  and 
vegetables  from  a  typical  Florida  point 
to  New  York  were  about  the  same  as 
those  from  California  points  to  New  York, 
the  charge  upon  vegetables  being  some  $70 
per  car.  The  cost  of  icing  and  re-icing 
was  from  $45  to  $55  per  car.  The  ex- 
pense of  loading  and  stripping  performed 
by  the  carrier  ranged  from  $3  to  $5  per 
car.  Defendants  were  subjected  at  times 
to  heavy  damages  for  failure  to  furnish 
cars.  The  actual  cost  of  refrigeration  to 
defendants  was  not  much  greater  on 
shipments  from  California  than  on  those 
from  Florida.  Defendants  were  sub- 
jected to  an  additional  expense  on  ac- 
count of  the  additional  weight  in  the 
case  of  refrigeration  shipments.     HELD, 


the  rate  attacked  was  not  unreasonable. 
Florida  Fruit  and  Vegetable  Shippers' 
Protective  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  4iu,  493,  495,  498-501,  503,  505, 
508. 

(y)  Complainant  was  charged  34i/^c 
per  100  lbs.  on  a  mixed  carload  of  cab- 
bages, potatoes  and  onions  from  Gre^n 
Bay,  Wis.,  to  Poplar  Bluff,  Mo.  Prior  to 
the  time  of  shipment,  complainant  had 
made  a  number  of  similar  shipments  be- 
tween the  same  points  via  another  car- 
rier at  a  rate  of  27c.  This  27c  rate  was 
assessed  by  mistake  of  the  carrier  and 
the  published  rate  was  35i4c.  Complain- 
ant introduced  no  evidence  to  show  the 
published  rate  unreasonable.  HELD,  on 
this  showing  complainant  was  not  en- 
titled to  reparation  on  the  basis  of  the 
27c  rate.  Platten  Produce  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  512,  513. 

(z)  Defendant  charged  complainant 
on  carload  shipments  of  apples  from 
Nooksack,  Wash.,  to  Minneapolis,  $1.00 
per  100  lbs.  At  the  time  of  the  ship- 
ment the  rate  from  other  Washington 
points  was  80c  a  100  lbs.,  and  defendant 
conceded  that  Nooksack  should  take  no 
higher  rate  than  such  other  points,  but 
contended  that  the  80c  rate  was  unrea- 
sonably low.  HELD,  under  such  admis- 
sion complainant  was  entitled  to  repara- 
tion of  20c  per  100  lbs.  Gamble-Robinson 
Commission  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.   C.  C.  523,   524. 

(aa)  Carriers  in  changing  rates,  mini- 
ma or  other  rules  which  affect  the  trans- 
nortation  charges  on  a  commodity  mov- 
ing only  at  a  particular  season,  should 
eive  consideration  to  the  shipping  and 
celling  seasons  for  that  commodity  and 
arrange  for  such  changes  to  become  ef- 
fective at  a  time  when  they  will  not 
seriously  disarrange  or  unfavorably  af- 
fect the  movement  or  sale  of  the  sea- 
son's output.  Hartville  Celery  Growers' 
Ass'n  V.  Pacific  Express  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
590,  593. 

(bb)  Bananas  from  Cuba,  Jamaica 
and  the  West  Indies  coming  through 
Baltimore  are  lighter  than  those  from 
Central  America,  coming  through  the 
gulf  ports.  The  carriers  from  Baltimore 
established  an  18,000-lb.  minimum.  De- 
fendants, on  shipments  from  New  Or- 
leans and  INIobile  to  points  east  of  the 
Mississippi  River,  adopted  the  same 
minimum  to  meet  said  18,000-lb.  mini- 
mum. On  shipments  to  Kansas  City 
and     adjacent     points     defendants     pre- 


648 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §84  (cc)— §86  (a) 


scribed  a  20,000-lb.  minimum.  No  diffi- 
culty was  experienced  in  loading  above 
both  minima.  HELD,  Kansas  City  and 
adjacent  points  were  not  unjustly  dis- 
criminated against.  Topeka  Banana 
Dealers'  Ass'n  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  620,  626. 

(cc)  Complainant  dealers  attacked 
the  rates  on  bananas,  C.  L.,  from  New 
Orleans,  La.,  and  Mobile,  Ala.,  to  Kan- 
sas City,  lola.  Parsons,  Topeka  and 
Hutchinson,  Kan.  The  rate  to  Kansas 
City  was  63c;  distance,  879  miles;  the 
ton  mile  revenue,  1.43c.  The  rate  to 
Chicago  was  46c;  distance,  922  miles; 
the  ton  mile  revenue,  Ic.  The  low  Chi- 
cago rate  was  established  by  the  I.  C 
R.  R.,  especially  for  the  purpose  of 
building  up  an  enormous  traffic  in  ba- 
nanas on  account  of  its  strategic  posi- 
tion in  directly  connecting  the  source 
of  supply  with  a  large  source  of  con- 
sumption. Bananas  from  gulf  ports 
were  loaded  on  special  trains,  which 
awaited  the  arrival  of  ships  and  hurried 
at  an  average  speed  of  21  miles  an  hour 
to  points  of  consumption.  Special 
wharfs  were  set  aside  at  gulf  ports 
for  this  traffic  and  special  unloading 
facilities  provided.  The  cars  used  re- 
quired special  cleaning  and  drying,  and 
false  floors  were  erected  therein.  Stand- 
ard ventilator  refrigerator  cars  were 
used,  and  by  careful  ventilation  the  cost 
of  icing  was  saved.  The  expedited 
service  was  maintained  at  an  embar- 
rassment to  other  traffic.  Some  80  per 
cent  of  the  cars  returned  from  Kansas 
City  empty.  The  rates  attacked  were 
higher  than  those  on  peaches  and  to- 
matoes carried  equal  distances  by  rail 
roads  moving  west  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  but  the  latter  commodities  did 
not  require  expedited  service  and  the 
shipper  was  obliged  to  pay  thereon  the 
cost  of  refrigeration.  HELD,  the  rates 
attacked  were  not  shown  to  be  unduly 
discriminatory  or  unreasonable  per  se. 
Topeka  Banana  Dealers'  Ass'n  v.  St. 
L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  620. 
630. 

(dd)  Reasonable  rates  on  citrus  fruits 
from  Jacksonville,  Fla.,  and  other  Flor- 
ida base  points  to  points  not  enumerated 
in  the  former  order  established  for  the 
future.  Florida  Fruit  and  Vegetable  Ship- 
pers' Protective  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  418. 


§85.     Fruit   Baskets  and  Tops. 

(a)  On  carloads  of  fruit  baskets, 
nested  in  bundles,  from  Wynne,  Ark.,  to 
Horatio,  Ark.,  via  Texarkana,  Tex.,  a 
distance  of  294  miles,  complainant  ob- 
jected to  the  unreasonableness  of  a 
charge  of  94c  per  100  lbs.  At  the  time 
of  the  charge  a  commodity  rate  of  30c 
for  the  haul  of  250  miles  from  Mem- 
phis to  Clarksville,  Ark.,  was  charged 
by  the  defendant,  and  in  Western  Trunk 
Line  territory,  about  a  year  after  ship- 
ment moved,  these  baskets  were  given 
double  the  lumber  rate.  The  lumber 
rate  at  time  of  shipment  was  22i^c. 
HELD,  that  the  charge  exacted  was  un- 
reasonable, and  that  50c  per  100  lbs. 
was  a  fair  rate.  Reparation  granted. 
Wells-Higman  Co..  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.   Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  288. 

(b)  Complainant  attacked  the  combi- 
nation rates  of  36c  and  37l^c  on  wooden 
covers  for  fruit  baskets  from  Brewton, 
Ala.,  to  points  in  the  fruit  growing  section 
of  southern  Michigan  to  the  esient  that 
they  exceeded  the  lumber  rate  of  28c  be- 
tween the  same  points.  Wooden  covers  for 
fruit  baskets  are  a  by-product  of  the  saw- 
mills, which  utilize  the  smaller  and  de- 
fective parts  of  the  logs  that  cannot 
profitably  be  converted  into  other  ar- 
ticles. They  are  comparatively  cheap  in 
price,  are  compact  and  easily  handled, 
and  owing  to  the  size  of  the  bundles  in 
which  they  are  packed  they  fill  in  the 
door  space  of  a  car  and  load  to  a 
greater  weight  than  is  usually  possible 
with  lumber.  The  ratio  of  weight  to 
space  occupied  is  high  for  this  class  of 
commodity  and  the  risk  of  damage  is 
slight.  The  lumber  rate  applied  on  nu- 
merous articles  manufactured  from  lum- 
ber or  the  refuse  of  sawmills,  such  as 
hoops,  shingles,  box  shooks,  picture 
backing,  cooperage  stock,  etc.  HELD, 
that  the  rates  are  unjust  and  unreason- 
able in  so  far  as  they  exceed  the  rates 
contemporaneously  applied  to  the  trans- 
portation of  lumber  of  the  kind  from 
which  the  basket  tops  are  manufac- 
tured. Lovelace  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  & 
N.   R.   R.   Co.,  21  I.   C.   C.   585. 

§86.     Furniture. 

(a)  The  carload  rate  on  furniture  and 
chairs  from  Indianapolis  to  Missouri 
River  points  was  55c,  made  up  of  the 
econd-class  rate  of  32i/4c,  minimum  10,- 
000  lbs.,  to  East  St.  Louis,  111.,  plus  a 
commodity  rate  of  22y2C  on  a  20.000-lb. 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §87   (a)— §89    (b) 


■649 


minimum  beyond.  The  rate  from  Louis- 
ville to  East  St.  Louis  was  12i^c,  which, 
added  to  the  rate  of  22i^c  beyond,  made 
a  through  rate  to  Missouri  River  points 
of  35c,  minimum  20,000  lbs.  The  rate 
from  Evansville  to  East  St.  Louis  was 
10c,  which,  added  to  the  rate  of  22i^c 
beyond,  resulted  in  a  through  rate  of 
32i^c  to  Missouri  River  points.  Com- 
modity rates  of  126  per  cent  of  the 
fourth-class  rate  of  14c  were  in  effect 
from  Grand  Rapids  to  Chicago.  The  rates 
from  Chicago  to  Missouri  River  points 
were  32c  on  a  12.000-lb.  minimum  and 
30c  on  a  20,000-lb.  minimum.  The  rate 
from  Indianapolis  via  Chicago  to  Mis- 
souri River  points  was  47i/^c  on  a  mini- 
mum of  20,000  lbs.  and  53i^c  on  a  mini- 
mum of  12,000  lbs.  Similar  rates  were 
in  force  from  Indianapolis  via  Peoria  to 
Missouri  River  points.  The  local  rates 
from  Indianapolis  to  East  St.  Louis  were 
lower  than  those  from  Grand  Rapids 
to  Chicago,  but  such  lower  rates  had  not 
resulted  in  forcing  a  reduction  in  the 
rates  from  Grand  Rapids.  Indianapolis, 
in  the  sale  of  furniture,  was  in  competi- 
tion with  Chicago,  St.  Louis,  Evansville 
and  Louisville.  The  lowest  combination 
rate  from  Indianapolis  to  Missouri  River 
points  was  47i^c  via  Chicago.  HELD, 
the  rate  of  32^/^0  from  Indianapolis 
to  East  St.  Louis,  added  to  the  22i^c 
rate  from  there  to  Missouri  River  points 
to  make  the  through  rate,  was  unrea- 
sonably high  and  should  be  reduced  to 
126  per  cent  of  the  fourth-class  rate  of 
16i^c  to  East  St.  Louis,  or  21c,  plus 
the  rate  of  22i^c  west  of  there,  making 
431^0  to  the  Missouri  River,  this  rate 
to  apply  on  a  minimum  of  20,000  lbs., 
and  that  on  a  minimum  of  12,000  lbs. 
the  Indianapolis  to  East  St.  Louis  rate 
should  be  27c,  which,  plus  the 
22V^c  rate  west,  would  make  a  rate 
of  491/^c  from  Indianapolis  to  Mis- 
souri River  points.  Burnham,  Hanna, 
Munger  case,  14  I.  C.  C.  299,  followed, 
but  no  order  entered  pending  the  review 
of  that  case  in  the  courts  (Prouty, 
Comm'r,  dissenting  as  to  class  rates). 
Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  O.  C.  C. 
&.  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  56,  69,  70, 
71. 

§87.     Gas  Machinery. 

(a)  The  distance  from  Warren,  Pa., 
to  Cadillac,  Mich.,  over  defendant's  line 
and  connecting  carriers  is  650  miles, 
which  is  80  miles  shorter  than  by  an- 
other line.  Over  defendant's  line  the 
rate    was    30c     on    gas    machinery,    as 


fifth  class,  yielding  a  revenue  of  9.02 
mills  per  ton  mile.  On  the  other  line 
the  joint  rate  was  20.5c;  on,  de- 
fendant's line,  30c.  Defendant's 
rate  from  Warren  over  a  different  con- 
necting carrier  was  20.5c  for  practically 
the  same  haul  made  under  similar  cir- 
cumstances and  conditions.  Since  the 
filing  of  the  complaint  defendant  volun- 
tarily reduced  the  30c  rate  attacked  to 
201/^c.  HELD,  the  rate  charged  was 
excessive  in  so  far  as  it  exceeded  20%c. 
Reparation  awarded.  Struthers-Wells 
Co.  V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  291, 
293. 

§88.     Go-Carts. 

(a)  On  carloads  of  go-carts  from 
Elkhart,  Ind.,  to  Tacoma,  Wash.,  com- 
plainant was  assessed  a  rate  of  $2.60. 
By  tariffs  effective  Dec.  6,  1909,  defend- 
ants established  a  commodity  rate  of 
$1.75,  minimum  20,000  lbs.,  which  was 
in  effect  at  the  date  of  hearing.  The 
evidence  indicated  that  until  a  recent 
period  shipments  of  go-carts  in  full  car- 
loads were  of  rare  occurrence,  and 
that  they  were  at  the  time  of  hearing 
made  of  metal  so  as  to  load  readily 
to  the  minimum  of  20,000  lbs.,  whereas 
formerly,  being  made  of  wood,  they 
could  not  load  to  it.  HELD,  the  $1.75 
rate  was  a  reasonable  one  and  should 
be  established  for  the  future.  Repara- 
tion denied  under  the  peculiar  facts 
of  the  case.  Harmon  &  Co.  v.  L.  S. 
&  M.  S.   Ry.  Co.,   17  I.   C.  C.  394. 

§89.     Grain    and    Hay. 

(a)  Complainant  was  assessed  24c 
per  100  lbs.  for  the  transportation  of 
wheat  in  carloads  from  Clinton,  Ky.,  to 
Huntingdon,  Ky.,  a  distance  of  61  miles. 
Clinton  is  36  miles  southeast  of  Cairo, 
III.,  which  had  a  rate  of  16c  to  Hunt- 
ingdon. Traffic  from  Cairo  to  Hunting- 
don passed  through  Clinton.  Cairo  was 
subject  to  competitive  influences,  and 
east  Tennessee  and  the  Carolinas  took 
an  arbitrary  of  3c  over  Cairo.  HELD, 
that  the  rate  was  unreasonable  to  the 
extent  it  exceeded  the  19c  rate  prescribed 
for  the  future,  without  prejudice  to  any 
investigation  which  may  be  taken  under 
the  amended  fourth  section.  Reparation 
awarded.  Huntingdon  Lumber  Co.  v. 
I.   C.    R.   R.    Co.,   23   L   C.   C.   507. 

(b)  Rates  on  grain  in  any  quantity 
and  hay  in  carloads  and  less  than  car- 
loads from   Chattanooga,   Tenn.,  to  Fort 


650 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES. 


(c)— §90   (a) 


Payne,  Collinsville  and  other  Alabama 
points  were  attacked  as  unreasonable  and 
discriminatory.  By  the  Southern  Classi- 
fication grain  in  any  quantity  and  hay 
in  carloads  were  rated  class  D.  The 
rates  on  the  same  are  lOi/^c  per  100  lbs. 
for  34  miles  to  Batelle,  UVzC  for  51 
miles  to  Fort  Payne,  15c  for  66  miles  to 
Collinsville  and  lie  for  87  miles  to 
Attalla.  The  rates  on  hay  in  less  than 
carloads  were  18,  24,  27  and  27c  to  the 
above  points,  respectively.  Chattanooga, 
336  miles  south  of  Cincinnati,  O.,  and 
316  miles  south  of  Louisville,  Ky.,  is 
a  junction  point  between  several  roads. 
The  distance  from  Nashville  is  151 
miles.  Th€  joint  rates  on  grain  and 
hay  in  carloads  from  Cincinnati,  Louis- 
ville and  Nashville  to  Collinsville  were 
24,  24  and  17c,  respectively.  The  rates 
to  Chattanooga  were  21,  21  and  16c,  re- 
spectively. On  hay  in  less  than  carloads 
the  rates  were  52.  52  and  34c  to  Col- 
linsville and  38,  38,  and  24c  to  Chatta- 
nooga. The  rate  to  Collinsville  might  be 
taken  as  fairly  representative  of  the 
rate  to  all  of  the  above  towns.  Attalla 
is  a  junction  point  between  three  rail- 
roads. Chattanooga's  proximity  to  con- 
suming points  makes  it  a  natural  sup- 
ply center.  The  evidence  showed  Chatta- 
nooga merchants  were  unable  to  com- 
pete at  the  above  points  because  of 
prohibitive  rates.  Shipments  of  grain 
and  hay  in  carloads  from  Cincinnati, 
Louisville  and  Nashville  generally  moved 
via  Chattanooga.  Rates  out  of  Chatta- 
nooga on  the  same  commodities  to 
similar  points  on  other  roads  were  con- 
siderably lower.  Chattanooga  merchants 
did  a  large  business  in  territories  served 
by  these  lines.  The  rates  complained 
of  had  been  in  effect  many  years  and 
were  adjusted  with  reference  to  the  rates 
to  other  points  on  defendant's  line.  The 
less-than-carload  rate  on  hay  and  not 
on  grain  was  explained  by  the  fact  that 
hay  weighed  less  and  occupied  more 
space.  The  evidence  showed  that  the 
defendant's  share  of  the  joint  rate  to 
above  points  was  often  more  than  its 
local  rates  from  Chattanooga  to  the 
same  points.  Rebilling  privileges  at 
Nashville  made  it  impossible  to  place 
Chattanooga  on  an  equal  footing  with 
Nashville  and  these  privileges  were  not 
properly  before  the  Commission.  A 
prior  adjudication  existed  in  which  the 
reshipping  privilege  at  Nashville  was 
declared  discriminatory  and  the  order 
entered     therein     was     pending    before 


the  Commerce  Court.  HELD,  while  it 
is  not  apparent  from  the  record  that 
the  rates  on  defendant's  line  should  be 
in  the  same  proportion  as  the  rates  on 
other  lines  out  of  Chattanooga,  yet  under 
all  circumstances  the  rates  are  unrea- 
sonable and  should  not  exceed  8i/^c  to 
Batelle,  lO^^c  to  Fort  Payne  and  lie  to 
Collinsville  on  grain  and  on  hay  in 
carloads,  and  15,  20,  23  and  25c  to 
Batelle,  Fort  Payne,  Collinsville  and 
Attalla  on  hay  in  less  than  carloads. 
Chattanooga  Feed  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R. 
Co.,   22   L   C.   C.   480,  485. 

(c)  On  snapped  corn,  C.  L.,  Laverty, 
Okla.,  to  Millican,  Tex.,  and  from  Lav- 
erty, Okla.,  to  Navasota,  Tex.,  complain- 
ant was  assessed  36i/4c.  Prior  to  the 
shipment  the  rate  jad  been  29c  and  sub- 
sequent to  it  the  29c  rate  was  restored. 
The  only  explanation  offered  by  defend- 
ant was  that  the  rate  on  snapped  and 
shelled  corn  had  been  the  same  and  it 
thought  it  was  entitled  to  a  higher  rate 
on  snapped  corn  than  on  shelled  corn. 
HELD,  the  explanation  was  not  satis- 
factory, and  the  presumption  being 
that  the  former  rate  subsequently  re 
stored  was  a  reasonable  one,  the  rate 
ipsessed  was  unreasonable.  Repara- 
tion awarded  on  the  basis  of  29c. 
Ocheltree  Grain  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F. 
R.   R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  46,  47. 

(d)  Rate  on  bulk  corn  from  Sioux 
City,  la.,  to  Lismore,  Minn.,  found  un- 
reasonable to  the  extent  that  it  exceeded 
that  in  effect  on  corn  in  sacks.  Repa- 
ration awarded.  Minnesota  &  Iowa  Ele- 
vator Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  169. 

(e)  Higher  rates  assessed  on  corn  in 
the  shuck  than  on  shelled  corn.  Repa- 
ration awarded.  Hill  &  Webb  v.  L  &  V. 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  333. 

(f)  Rates  on  timothy  seed  from  Mc- 
Veigh, la.,  to  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  should  not 
exceed  rates  in  effect  from  Stockport, 
la.  Reparation  awarded.  Graham  &  Co. 
v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  344. 

§30.     Grates. 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  mixed  car- 
oRds  of  gas  and  coal  fire-places  and 
grates,  Steubenville,  O.,  to  San  Fran- 
isco,  Cal.  On  seven  shipments  which 
oved  prior  to  Jan.  1,  1909,  charges 
were  collected  on  a  rate  of  $1.45  per 
100  lbs.,  while  a  rate  of  $1.50  was  ex- 
acted  on  the  remaining  four  shipments. 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §91   (a)— §92    (c) 


651 


which  moved  subsequent  to  that  date. 
Shipments  were  invoiced  as  gas  grates, 
but  by  stipulation  the  real  facts  were 
admitted  to  be  as  above  stated,  gas 
gratos,  coal  grates,  i.re-places.  The 
tariff  showed  two  rates,  one  of  $1.35 
and  one  of  $1.45,  on  "iron  fire-places 
and  grates  for  same,  N.  O.  S.,  made  of 
wrought  or  cast  iron."  HELD,  that 
wiit'ie  the  tariff  carries  two  rates  for 
the  same  article,  the  shipper  should 
not  be  charged  the  higher  rate;  that 
the  charges  exacted  were  unreasonable 
to  the  extent  they  exceeded  $1.35  per 
100  lbs.  on  shipments  moving  prior  to 
.  an.  1,  ly09,  and  to  the  extent  they 
exceeded  $1.40  per  100  lbs.  on  sub- 
sequent shipments.  Reparation  awarded. 
Ohio  Foundry  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L. 
Ry.   Co.,   19  L   C.   C.   65,   67. 

§91.     Gunpowder. 

(a)  On  carloads  of  gunpowder  from 
Chicago  to  Green  Bay,  Shullsburg  and 
Platteville,  Wis.,  complainant  was  as- 
sessed twice  the  first-class  rate  upon 
the  actual  weight  of  each  shipment, 
each  car  weighing  something  less  than 
6,000  lbs.  Had  the  shipments  weighed 
more  than  10,000  lbs.  but  less  than 
20,000  lbs.,  the  single  first-class  rate 
would  have  been  charged,  and  com- 
plainant was  therefore  compelled  to 
pay  on  less  than  6,000  lbs.  more  than  it 
would  have  been  required  to  pay 
under  the  tariffs  in  effect,  had  each  ship- 
ment weighed  10,000  lbs.  About  two 
years  after  the  shipment  defendant  put 
into  effect  a  tariff  providing  that  ship- 
ments weighing  less  than  10,000  lbs. 
should  be  charged  twice  the  first-class 
rate  on  the  actual  weight,  the  aggregate 
charges  not  to  exceed  the  charges  on 
10,000  lbs.  HELD,  the  charges  assessed 
were  unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded 
on  the  basis  of  the  new  tariff.  Aetna 
Powder  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
17  L  C.  C.  165. 

(b)  On  ball  cartridges  and  saluting 
powder  from  Norfolk,  Va.,  to  Annapolis, 
Md.,  rates  of  57c  and  $1.30  were  ex- 
acted, respectively.  Subsequent  to 
the  filing  of  complaint  said  rates  were 
reduced  to  36  and  74c,  respectively. 
Defendants  admitted  the  former  rates 
to  be  excessive.  HELD,  the  rates  ex- 
acted were  unreasonable.  Reparation 
awarded.  U.  S.  v.  N.  Y.  P.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,    15    L    C.   C.    233. 


§92.     Hay,  Straw  and  Alfalfa. 

(a)  Complainants  attacked  the 
classification  of  hay  and  straw  as  fifth 
class  in  the  Official  Classification.  Hay 
and  straw  took  the  sixth-class  rate  until 

KuO,  when  it  was  raised  to  the  fifth 
class.  The  Commission  ordered  it  re- 
duced again  to  the  sixth  class,  which 
order  was  disobeyed  by  defendants.  The 
Commission  filed  a  bill  in  the  Circuit 
Court  to  enforce  its  order,  but  the 
Circuit  Court  found  against  the  Commis- 
sion, which  finding  was  finally  affirmed 
by  the  Supreme  Court,  so  that  the  fifth- 
class  rate  had  been  exacted  since  1900. 
During  this  period  of  time  hay  per 
acre,  as  compared  with  wheat,  corn,  oats 
and  rye,  with  the  exception  of  three 
years  was,  on  the  average,  the  more 
valuable  crop.  During  this  period  the 
acreage  in  the  United  States  increased 
over  six  million  acres;  in  the  middle 
states  it  increased  almost  five  million 
acres.  Hay  loads  to  a  capacity  of 
22,000  lbs.  to  a  car.  The  value  of  the 
hay  per  car  ranged  from  $100  to  $200. 
HELD,  that  in  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois 
and  Michigan,  during  the  period  from 
1900  to  date,  the  value  of  hay  on  the 
farm  has  not  been  destroyed  by  unrea- 
sonable freight  rates  nor  has  hay  as 
a  commodity  been  so  discriminated 
against  in  comparison  with  the  grains  as 
to  render  it  unprofitable  as  a  farm  prod- 
uct; that  on  account  of  the  fact  that 
only  about  one-third  of  the  capacity  of 
the  car  can  be  loaded  with  hay  the 
Commission  finds  that  the  fifth-class 
rates  on  hay  yield  smaller  returns  to 
carriers  than  the  comparatively  low 
commodity  rates  on  grain,  and  are 
therefore  not  unreasonable  or  unjust. 
National  Hay  Ass'n  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
19    I.   C.   C.   34,   38. 

(b)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload  of 
hay,  Henderson,  Colo.,  to  Breaux  Bridge, 
La.,  under  the  class  rate  of  67c.  For  five 
years  previous  to  the  time  of  this  ship- 
ment a  commodity  rate  of  45c  had  been 
maintained.  At  the  time  of  shipment 
the  rate  had  been  omitted  from  the 
tariff,  and  two  months  after  the  ship- 
ment moved  a  combination  rate  of  54^c 
was  made  effective.  HELD,  the  rate 
charged  was  unjust  and  unreasonable 
in  so  far  as  it  exceeded  45c.  Repara- 
tion awarded,  and  the  rate  limited  to 
491/^0  for  the  future.  Felton  Grain  Co. 
V.  U.   P.  R.  R.   Co.,  19  I.   C.  C.  63. 

.^c)  On  a  carload  of  hay  from  Kan- 
sas City,  Mo.,  to  Seymour,  la.,  complain- 


652 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §92  (d)— §93  (a) 


ant  was  charged  the  class  rate  of  13i/^c 
per  100  lbs.  This  was  Ic  higher  than 
a  proportional  commodity  rate  of  12i^c 
per  100  lbs.  which  had  been  in  effect 
between  the  points  in  question  until  a 
short  time  prior  to  the  date  of  the 
shipment  and  was  restored  within  about 
60  days  thereafter  by  an  amendment  to 
the  defendants'  tariffs.  Said  carload 
originated  at  Tates  Center,  Ark.  De- 
fendants admitted  that  the  rate  collected 
was  unreasonable.  HELD,  following 
North  Bros.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
L  C.  C.  70,  complainant  was  entitled  to 
reparation  based  on  the  12V^c  rate. 
Arkansas  Fuel  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.   Co.,   16   I.    C.   C.   95,   99. 

(d)  Defendant  was  assessed  $6  per 
net  ton  on  alfalfa  hay  in  carloads  from 
Deming,  N.  M.,  to  Bisbee,  Ariz.,  and 
from  El  Paso,  Tex.,  to  Douglas  and 
Bisbee,  Ariz.  The  distance  from  Deming 
to  Bisbee  is  187  miles;  El  Paso  to 
Douglas,  217  miles,  and  El  Paso  to 
Bisbee,  247  miles.  HELD,  these  rates 
were  unreasonable,  and  from  Deming  to 
Bisbee  should  not  exceed  $3.80,  and 
from  El  Paso  to  Douglas  and  Bisbee, 
respectively,  should  not  exceed  $4.50. 
Reparation  awarded.  Darbyshire  & 
Evans  v.  El  Paso  &  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  435. 

(e)  On  carloads  of  hay  from  Kansas 
City  complainant  was  assessed  the  class 
rates  of  17c  to  Mississippi  River  points, 
191/^c  to  Peoria  rate  points  and  22c  to 
Chicago  rate  points.  Shortly  prior  to 
the  shipments,  commodity  rates  were  in 
effect  over  defendant's  lines  of  12i/^c, 
15c  and  17^/^0,  respectively.  Shortly 
after  the  shipments  moved  these  com- 
modity rates  were  restored  by  all  ex- 
cept one  of  defendants,  which  put  into 
effect  rates  lower  than  the  class  rates 
but  higher  than  the  commodity  rates. 
One  of  defendants  admitted  the  rate 
exacted  to  be  unreasonable.  The  cost 
of  service  upon  the  line  of  the  defend- 
ant refusing  to  restore  the  former 
commodity  rates  was  apparently  no 
greater  than  upon  the  lines  of  tne 
other  defendants.  HELD,  the  rate?  ex- 
acted were  unreasonable.  Reraration 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  the  former 
commodity  rates.  North  Brothers  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  70, 
71. 

(f)  Complainant  was  assessed  20c 
on  hay,  C.  L.,  Kansas  City  to  Cape  JGri- 
rardeau,    the   hay    having   been    shipped 


into  Kansas  City  from  Deerfield,  Mo.  For 
a  number  of  years  prior  to  the  time 
the  shipments  moved,  the  defendant  had 
in  effect  between  Kansas  City  and  Cape 
Girardeau  (the  route  passing  through 
a  part  of  the  state  of  Kansas)  a  pro- 
portional rate  of  15c  per  100  lbs.,  which 
applied  to  shipments  brought  into  Kan- 
sas City  and  from  there  consigned  East. 
Shortly  after  the  shipments  in  question, 
the  defendant  again  published  a  pro- 
portional rate  of  15c  between  the  points 
in  question.  At  the  time  the  shipments 
moved,  however,  the  legal  rate  was  20c. 
While  the  20c  rate  applied  from  Kansas 
City  to  Cape  Girardeau,  the  defendant 
applied  the  proportional  rate  of  15c  from 
Kansas  City  to  a  number  of  points  in 
the  immediate  vicinity  of  Cape  Girar- 
deau. HELD,  the  20c  rate  was  excessive. 
Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis  of  15c. 
North  Bros.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co., 
13  L  C.  C.   152. 

(g)  Rate  of  39c  charged  on  baled  hay 
from  Raynsford,  Mont.,  to  Spokane, 
Wash.,  25c  rate  in  effect  from  surround- 
ing points,  30c  subsequently  established. 
Reparation  awarded  on  basis  of  25c  rate. 
Whittaker  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
113. 

(h)  Rates  on  hay  from  Kansas  City, 
Mo.,  to  Dubuque,  la.,  originating  beyond, 
should  not  exceed  those  in  effect  from 
Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Davenport,  la.; 
Savanna,  111.;  Rock  Island,  111.:  Moline, 
111.,  and  Clinton,  la.,  on  hay  which  orig- 
inates beyond  Kansas  City,  Mo.  Arkan- 
sas Fuel  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  246. 

§93.     Hickory    Spokes. 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  hickory 
spokes  from  Ft.  Payne,  Ala.,  and  Chat- 
tanooga, Tenn.,  to  Ionia,  Mich.,  under 
a  rate  of  28c  from  Ft.  Payne  to  Cin- 
cinnati, and  23c  from  Chattanooga  to 
Cincinnati,  the  rate  from  the  river  to 
Ionia  not  being  attacked.  The  rate 
on  hardwood  lumber  was  17c  from  Ft. 
Payne,  and  13c  from  Chattanooga,  and 
the  original  contention  of  the  com- 
plainant was  that  spokes  should  be  car- 
ried for  the  same  transportation  charge. 
The  spokes  in  question  were  manufac- 
tured ready  for  use.  Their  value  was 
from  two  to  three  times  the  value  of 
the  hardwood  lumber  out  of  which  they 
were  made.  At  the  hearing  defendants 
stated  they  were  willing  to  establish  a 
rate    on    spokes,    from    the    points    at- 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §94   (a)  — (c) 


653 


tacked  to  the  river,  3c  per  100  lbs. 
above  the  lumber  rate.  HELD,  that  the 
rates  exacted  ought  not  to  have  ex- 
ce€d€d  rates  3c  per  100  lbs.  higher  than 
those  contemporaneously  in  force  upon 
hardwood  lumber  between  these  points. 
Reparation  awarded.  Ionia  Wagon  Co. 
V.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  458, 
459. 

§94.     Ice. 

(a)  The  complaint  filed  in  this  case 
was  supplemental  to  the  complaint  filed 
in  Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  305,  and  the  orders 
entered  in  this  case  were  founded  on  the 
findings  and  holdings  in  that  one  relat- 
ing to  rates  on  ice  from  New  Jersey 
lakes  and  the  Pocono  Mountains  to 
various  destinations.  HELD,  (1)  The 
rates  from  the  Pocono  Mountains  and 
the  New  Jersey  lakes  to  Brooklyn  ter- 
minals and  the  Harlem  station  of  the 
D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  are  unreasonable  and 
should  be  reduced  to  th-e  schedule  set 
forth  in  the  report.  (2)  The  rates  from 
Pocono  Mountains  to  Changewater,  Del., 
and  various  points  upon  the  Morris  & 
Essex  division  of  the  defendant  and 
upon  branch  lines  are  unreasonable  and 
should  b-e  reduced  as  specified.  (3) 
The  rates  from  Pocono  Mountains  to 
Philadelphia,  via  Phillipsburg,  requiring 
Philadelphia  &  Reading  deliveries,  and 
to  points  in  Maryland,  Delaware  and 
New  Jersey  are  unreasonable  and  should 
be  reduced  as  specified.  (4)  The  rates 
from  Sterling  Forest,  N.  Y.,  to  various 
points  in  New  York  and  New  Jersey 
are  unreasonable  and  should  be  reduced 
as  specified.  (5)  The  rate  from  Pocono 
Mountains  to  West  Newark,  N.  J.,  and 
to  various  other  New  York  and  New 
Jersey  points  are  unreasonable  and 
should  be  reduced  as  specified.  Repara- 
tion denied  in  instances  where,  although 
the  rates  were  ordered  reduced,  they 
were  not  found  to  have  been  excessive 
in  the  past.  Other  claims  for  repara- 
tion left  open  for  the  taking  of  testi- 
mony before  an  examiner.  Mountain 
Ice  Co.  V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
T.   C.   C.   447,   449-456. 

(b)  Between  April  1  and  August  4, 
1907,  complainant  shipped  carloads  of 
ice  from  Los  Angeles,  Cal.,  to  Yuma, 
Ariz.,  upon  which  a  rate  of  $3  was  as- 
sessed. Complainant  attacked  this  rate 
as  unreasonable  to  the  extent  that  it 
exceeded  $1.90.  In  March,  1907,  com- 
plainant  protested    against   the    $3    rate 


and  was  assured  by  the  defendant  that 
the  same  would  be  reduced  promptly 
to  $1.90.  April  4,  1907,  defendant's 
agents  in  California  were  instructed  to 
protect  a  rate  of  $1.25  on  ice  shipped 
from  producing  points  to  icing  points 
in  said  state.  April  8,  1907,  the  $1.25 
rate  was  applied  to  Yuma  under  the 
mistaken  idea  that  Yuma  was  a  Cali- 
fornia point.  November  27,  1907,  the 
$1.25  rate  was  for  the  first  time  law- 
fully published  and  put  into  effect.  It 
was  kept  in  effect  until  May  25,  1909, 
when  the  $3  per  ton  rate  was  re- 
stored. Complainant  contended  that  It 
made  its  contract  to  supply  the  ice 
in  question  to  defendant  in  view  of  the 
$1.90  rate  promised  it.  The  rate  asked 
by  defendant  on  most  shipments  moved 
prior  to  July  25,  1907,  was  $1.25  per 
ton.  Whenever  bills  were  rendered  at 
$3  per  ton,  payment  was  not  made  until 
Nov.  14,  1907,  and  on  that  date  these 
bills,  together  with  the  balance  of  the 
$3  rate  on  bills  first  rated  at  $1.25, 
were  paid.  Complainant  testified  that 
there  was  no  other  producer  of  ice  in 
California  that  could  have  entered  into 
a  contract  such  as  the  one  made  by 
complainant,  because  no  other  company 
was  in  possession  of  cars  and  other 
facilities  for  the  transportation  of  ice 
as  needed  by  defendant.  HELD,  no 
evidence  being  introduced  to  show  the 
$1.90  rate  to  be  reasonable,  reparation 
should  be  denied,  since  to  sanction  as 
a  just  basis  for  reparation  the  private 
understanding  prior  to  the  shipments, 
the  rate  remaining  unchanged  until  the 
shipments  were  made,  would  be  to 
establish  a  precedent  for  the  grossest 
discrimination  and  favoritism.  Armour 
Car  Lines  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
461,    462. 

(c)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
on  natural  ice  of  defendants,  the  Erie 
and  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  Rs.,  from  Green- 
wood Lake,  N.  Y.,  which  took  the  same 
rates  as  that  from  Jersey  points,  of 
60c  per  net  ton,  to  Hoboken  and  Jersey 
City,  N.  J.;  from  points  in  the 
Pocono  Mts.,  Pa.,  hereinafter  desig- 
nated as  mountain  points,  of  85c  to 
Hoboken  and  Jersey  City;  from  moun- 
tain points  to  Philadelphia  of  $1.40; 
and  rates  to  points  on  the  Long  Island 
R.  R.  hereinafter  specifically  stated.  In 
1891  the  Erie  R.  R.  established  a  rate 
from  Greenwood  Lake  to  Jersey  City 
of  40c.  At  the  same  time  the  D.  L.  & 
W.  R.  R.  established  rates  from  Jersey 


654 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §94  (c) 


points  of  31c  and  from  mountain  points 
of  41c  to  Hoboken,  and  from  mountain 
points  to  Philadelphia  of  $1.20.  Upon 
this  $1.20  rate  an  allowance  of  10 
per  cent  was  made  for  shrinkage,  there- 
by reducing  the  rate  to  $1.08  net.  In 
1899  the  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  raised  the 
rate  to  40c  from  Jersey  points  and 
to  55c  from  mountain  points  to  Hoboken, 
In  1900  it  increased  the  rates  to  65c 
from  mountain  points  and  50c  from 
Jersey  points  to  Hoboken,  and  in  1903 
further  increased  the  rate  from  moun- 
tain points  to  Hoboken  to  75c.  In 
the  meanwhile  it  had  increased  the 
Philadelphia  rate  to  $1.25  and  with- 
drawn the  shrinkage  allowance.  In 
1906  it  increased  the  rate  from  Jersey 
points  to  60c  and  from  mountain  points 
to  85c  in  shipments  to  Jersey  City  and 
Hoboken,  and  increased  the  rate  to 
Philadelphia  from  mountain  points  to 
$1.40.  The  original  rates  from  Jersey 
points  of  31c  and  from  mountain  points 
of  41c  to  Hoboken  were  unusually  low 
from  the  fact  that  the  officials  of  the 
railroad  were  interested  in  the  ice  busi- 
ness, but  the  original  40c  rate  of  the 
Erie  R.  R.  from  Greenwood  Lake  to 
Jersey  City  appeared  to  be  a  normal 
one.  Complainant's  ice  from  the  Jersey 
and  mountain  points  in  question  came 
into  competition  with  natural  ice  gath- 
ered fr6m  the  Hudson  River.  The  cost 
of  housing  and  gathering  this  Hudson 
River  ice  was  practically  the  same  as 
that  involved  at  Jersey  and  mountain 
points.  The  water  freight  from  the  ice- 
house to  the  dock  was  about  30c  per 
ton  with  an  additional  cost  of  10c  for 
handling  the  ice  from  the  barge  over 
the  dock  into  the  ice  wagons.  To  com- 
pete upon  favorable  terms,  the  com- 
plainants, other  things  being  equal, 
needed  a  rate  of  about  40c,  but  this 
did  not  apply  to  points  which  the 
Hudson  River  ice  could  not  reach  wholly 
by  water.  Complainant  had  an  advan- 
tage in  that  the  supply  in  the  Pocono 
mountain  never  failed,  whereas  during 
many  seasons  no  ice  was  frozen  upon 
the  Hudson.  The  profit  to  complainant 
on  its  ice  was  only  a  few  cents  per  ton 
and  a  continuance  of  the  rate  com- 
plained of  would  finally  result  in  the 
extinguishment  of  complainant's  busi- 
ness, by  reason  of  the  Hudson  River 
competition.  Complainant  also  met  seri- 
ous competition  with  artificial  ice  manu- 
factured at  New  York,  Brooklyn  and 
Philadelphia,   and   it   was   impossible   on 


account  of  the  low  cost  of  manufacture 
to  sell  in  competition  with  this  artificial 
ice,  which,  however,  could  not  be  suc- 
cessfully stored  and  was  unequal  to 
the  demand.  Complainant  received  at 
its  various  houses  at  Jersey  mountain 
points,  f.  o.  b.  the  cars,  an  average 
price  of  64c  per  ton.  The  price  f.  o. 
b.  the  car  at  the  Pocono  Mountains  was 
about  75c  per  ton.  In  warm  weather 
ice  transported  in  an  ordinary  box  car 
shrunk  in  weight  during  a  period  of 
from  24  to  36  hours  about  20  per  cent, 
and  when  carried  in  ice  or  refrigerator 
cars,  about  10  per  cent.  The  character 
of  the  equipment  employed  by  defend- 
ants was  not  as  good  as  formerly  and 
they  were  making  no  efforts  to  improve 
same  for  the  purpose  of  lessening  this 
shrinkage.  Ice  moving  from  Jersey 
points  to  Hoboken  and  Jersey  City  was 
usually  loaded  during  the  day  and  de- 
livered for  unloading  the  next  morning. 
As  to  ice  moving  from  mountain  points, 
both  to  Philadelphia  and  Hudson  River, 
the  cars  were  loaded  one  day,  taken  from 
the  icehouse  the  following  morning  and 
delivered  for  unloading  the  next  morn- 
ing. The  time  occupied  in  transporting  to 
Brooklyn  and  points  on  the  Long  Island 
R.  R.  was  even  longer.  From  Jersey 
points  to  the  Hudson  River  and  corre- 
sponding destinations  ice  could  there- 
fore be  handled  to  a  very  good  advan- 
tage in  box  cars,  but  when  the  move- 
ment was  from  mountain  points,  special 
equipment  was  needed.  The  icehouses 
at  mountain  points  were  usually  situated 
a  mile  or  more  from  the  main  line 
and  connected  therewith  by  switching 
lines.  The  ice  from  mountain  points 
on  the  Erie  R.  R.  was  collected  from 
the  icehouses  and  brought  Into  Strouds- 
burg,  where  it  was  made  up  into  trains 
for  Jersey  City.  The  grades  between 
Stroudsburg  and  the  icehouses  were 
severe,  often  requiring  more  than  a 
single  engine.  About  32  empty  cars 
could  be  handled  out  of  Stroudsburg  to 
the  icehouses  and  about  35  loaded  cars 
from  the  icehouses  into  Stroudsburg. 
The  ice  was  made  up  into  trains  of  30 
cars  and  hauled  to  Jersey  City,  96 
miles,  two  engines  being  required  from 
Stroudsburg  to  Paterson.  From  the 
mountain  points  on  the  D,  L.  &  W.  R. 
R.  the  ice  was  carried  from  the  houses 
to  Gouldsboro  over  switch  lines,  whence 
it  was  carried  to  Hoboken,  a  distance 
of  127  miles,  in  trains  of  from  35  to  40 
cars  made  up  of  various  kinds  of  freight 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,   §95    (a) 


655 


and   requiring  two  engines  most  of  the 
way.     Ice  from  mountain  points  on  the 
D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  moved  principally  via 
Manunka  Chunk.     The  average  distance 
from  points  of  origin  to  Manunka  Chunk 
is  40  miles.     One  engine  handles  a  train 
of    40    cars    to    this    point    and    handles 
a  train  of  35  cars  from  Manunka  Chunk 
to    Philadelphia,    100    miles,    with    slight 
assistance    at    one    point.      The    trains 
were    handled   as    solid    ice   trains   from 
Manunka  Chunk  to  Trenton,  where  cars 
intended  for  other  points  than  Philadel- 
phia   were    set    out,    the    balance    being 
carried    on    to    Philadelphia.      The    serv- 
ice  rendered  by  defendants   was   a  spe- 
cial   service,    but    not    an    expedited    or 
expensive  service.     Ice  from  Greenwood 
Lake  was  moved  by  the  Erie  R.  R.  with 
a  single  engine  and  one  train  crew,  the 
trains     averaging    14     to    18     cars     and 
handling  no   other  business.     The  reve- 
nue derived  on  this  ice  from  Greenwood 
Lake  to  Jersey  City  amounted  annually 
to  some  $20,000,  the  cost  of  maintenance 
of   way,   of  equipment   and   of  transpor- 
tation being  some  $15,000  annually.    The 
actual     expense     of     moving     ice     from 
Gouldsboro     to     Secaucus,     a     point     a 
short    distance    west    of    Hoboken,    and 
moving  the   empty  cars  back,  was  only 
$2.29   per  car,  while  the  revenue  at  the 
85c    per    ton    rate    complained    of    was 
$22.95.   No   reliable  data  were  furnished  as 
to  the  proportionate  share  of  indirect  line 
expenses  attributable  to  this  traffic,  but 
the   general   impression   of  the   Commis- 
sion was  that  the  average  cost  of  hand- 
ling a  ton  of  ice  from  Gouldsboro  to  Se- 
caucus, upon  an  average  load  of  27  tons 
to  the  car  in  solid  trains  was  much  less 
than    the    average    cost   of   handling   all 
business,    carload    and    less-than-carload, 
upon  the  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.    The  average 
haul  from  mountain   points   to  Hoboken 
and    New    Jersey    was    about    110    miles 
and    the    revenue    at    the    85c    rate    at- 
tacked was  approximately  7.7  mills.  The 
average   ton  mile   revenue  of  the  D.  L. 
&  W.   R.  R.  was  7.21   mills  and  of  the 
Erie    R.    R.,    6.28    mills.      The    average 
haul    on    all    traffic    upon    the    D.    L.    & 
W.    R.    R.    was    182    miles;     upon    the 
Erie    R.    R.,    150    miles.      On    shipments 
to    points    on    the    Long    Island    R.    R., 
from   both   Jersey   points   and   mountain 
points,   the   rates  were   made   by   taking 
the  local  rate  of  the  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R. 
to  Hoboken  and  adding  25c  per  ton  for 
lighterage    and    the    local    rate    of    the 
Long    Island    R.    R.        The    Brie    R.    R. 


in  connection  with  the  Long  Island  R. 
R.  maintained  joint  rates  from  Cooper, 
Ringwood,  Sterling  Forest  and  Char- 
lottesburg,  Jersey  points,  which  were 
10c  per  ton  higher  than  those  main- 
tained by  the  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  HELD, 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  value  of 
ice  when  taken  up  for  transportation 
is  almost  nothing,  and  that  the  cars 
readily  load  to  their  physical  capacity, 
and  of  the  fact  that  the  business  of 
the  complainant  was  built  up  under 
much  lower  rates,  voluntarily  estab- 
lished and  long  maintained  by  the  de- 
fendant, and  of  the  fact  that  the  in- 
vestment so  indufGd  must  be  largely 
destroyed  if  the  present  rate  should  be 
maintained,  and  taking  into  considera- 
tion the  other  conditions  stated,  the 
rates  attacked  were  unreasonable,  when 
the  ice  was  carried  in  ordinary  box  cars, 
to  the  extent  that  they  exceeded  50c 
from  Greenwood  LaI.e  to  Jersey  City, 
and  of  65c  from  mountain  points  to 
Hoboken  and  Jersey  City,  and  to  the 
extent  that  the  rates  from  mountain 
points  to  Philadelphia  exceeded  $1.20; 
that  the  rates  of  the  D.  L.  & 
W.  R.  R.  to  points  on  the  Long  Island 
R.  R.  should  be  reduced,  from  Jersey 
points  2Cc  per  ton,  and  from  moun- 
tain points  30c  per  ton;  that  the  rates 
complained  of  from  Cooper,  Ringwood, 
Sterling  Forest  and  Charlottesburg, 
should  be  reduced  20c  p^r  ton;  but 
that  the  carriers  might  add  to  these 
rates  above  established  5c  per  ton  from 
Jersey  points  to  Jersey  City  and  Ho- 
boken, 10c  per  ton  from  mountain  points 
to  Jersey  City  and  Hoboken,  and  15c 
per  ton  to  Philadelphia  and  Brooklyn 
and  points  on  the  Long  Island  R.  R., 
when  special  cars  were  provided.  Repa- 
ration awarded.  Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D. 
L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  305,  316, 
320,   322. 

§95.     Iron  and  Steel  Bars,  Plates,  Sheets 
and  Structural   Steel. 

(a)  On  shipments  of  iron  bars,  steel 
bars,  steel  plates,  steel  sheets  and 
structural  steel  (not  fabricated),  in  car- 
loads from  Pittsburg  to  Denver,  com- 
plainant objected  to  the  fifth-class  rate 
of  63c  per  100  lbs.  from  St.  Louis  to 
Denver,  applicable  to  through  shipments 
from  the  East.  Defendant's  rate  from 
the  Mississippi  River  to  Salt  Lake  City 
on  iron  and  steel  bars  was  82  per  cent 
of  the  fifth-class  rate,  and  on  steel 
plates,  steel  sheets  and  structural  steel 


656 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §95  (b)— §96  (g) 


(not  fabricated),  68  per  cent  of  the  fifth- 
class  rate.  A  higher  rate  was  charged 
upon  the  material  from  which  prod- 
ucts were  made,  than  upon  the  products 
themselves:  wrought  iron  or  steel  pipe 
a  rate  of  45c  per  100,  railway  material, 
37c,  etc.  HELD,  the  rates  for  the  future 
should  not  exceed  52c  on  iron  and  steel 
bars,  and  43c  on  steel  plates,  steel 
sheets  and  structural  steel  (not  fabri- 
cated). Vulcan  Iron  Works  Co.  v.  A. 
T.   &   S.   F.   Ry.   Co.,  22   L   C.  C.   477. 

(b)  Fifth-class  rate  33c,  class  B  rate 
29c.  Cast  iron  pipe  carried  fifth-class 
rate  until,  by  exceptions  subsequently 
adopted,  class  B  rate  applied.  Fifth-class 
rate  held  unreasonable.  Clow  &  Sons 
V.  Penn.  Co.,  Unrep,  Op.  3. 

(c)  Reparation  awarded  on  account 
of  unreasonable  charges  on  an  iron-work- 
ing machine  and  parts  from  Detroit, 
Mich.,  to  Madison,  Wis.  Gisholt  Machine 
Co.  V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  290. 

§96.     Iron    Ore,    Iron    Products,    Iron    Py- 
rites. 

(a)  In  December,  1907,  the  rate  on 
iron  castings,  C.  L.,  Milwaukee,  Wis.,  to 
Springfield,  111.,  should  not  via  lines  of 
defendants  exceed  8c  per  100  lbs.  Ra- 
cine-Sattley  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,   21   L    C.    C.   164. 

(b)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  of 
$1.90  per  gross  ton  on  hematite  iron 
ore.  Lakeside,  N.  Y.,  to  Earlston,  Pa., 
a  distance  of  328  miles.  The  principal 
defendant  carried  ore  from  Buffalo  to 
Earlston,  a  longer  haul,  for  $1.45.  HELD, 
the  rate  is  unreasonable  to  the  extent 
that  it  exceeds  $1.60  per  ton.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Ontario  Iron  Ore  Co.  v. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
C.  204. 

(c)  On  defendant's  admission,  the 
rate  of  $1  per  gross  ton  on  pig  iron 
from  Chicago,  111.,  to  Evansville,  Wis., 
is  found  unreasonable  to  the  extent 
that  it  exceeds  85c,  which  rate  is  pre- 
scribed for  the  future.  Baker  Mfg.  Co. 
v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  605, 
607. 

(d)  Complainant,  manufacturer  of 
windmills,  gasoline  engines,  etc.,  at 
Evansville,  Wis.,  attacked  the  rate  of  $2 
per  gross  ton  on  pig  iron  from  Duluth, 
Minn.,  to  Evansville,  Wis.,  as  unreason- 
able compared  with  the  rates  of  from  $1.50 
to  $1.75  per  gross  ton  on  the  same  com- 


modity from  Duluth  to  other  points 
such  as  Jefferson,  Johnson's  Creek, 
Watertown,  Lake  Mills  and  Fort  At- 
kinson, Wis.  Evansville  is  363  miles 
from  Duluth  and  is  a  shorter  distance 
from  there  by  from  3  to  21  miles  than 
is  any  of  the  points  mentioned.  Janea- 
ville  and  Beloit  are  still  farther  from 
Duluth  than  is  Evansville  and  take  the 
same  rate.  These  latter  points  are  the 
only  ones  which  really  compete  with 
Evansville.  The  rate  to  Evansville 
yielded  5.5  mills  per  ton  mile,  and 
since  the  hearing,  defendants  published 
a  tariff  naming  a  uniform  rate  of  $2  per 
gross  ton  to  all  the  points  mentioned 
except  Watertown,  which  rate  has  been 
increased  from  $1.50  to  $1.75  per  gross 
ton.  It  was  alleged  that  the  rate  to 
this  latter  point  was  affected  by  its  prox- 
imity to  the  lake.  HELD,  that  the  rate 
of  $2  per  gross  ton  on  pig  iron  from 
Duluth  to  Evansville  is  not  unreason- 
able or  unlawful.  .Complaint  dismissed. 
Baker  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
21  I.  C.  C.  605,  606. 

(e)  Following  Highland  Steel  &  Iron 
Co.  V.  Vandalia  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
601,  fixing  a  rate  of  lie  on  bar  iron 
in  carloads  from  Terre  Haute,  Ind.,  to 
Louisville,  Ky.,  a  rate  of  10c  from  Vin- 
cennes,  Ind.,  to  Louisville,  Ky.,  is  found 
not  to  be  unreasonable.  National  Rolling 
Mill  Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  604,  605. 

(f)  The  published  rate  on  pig  iron 
in  carloads  from  Sheffield,  Ala.,  to 
Hutchinson,  Kan.,  over  the  Santa  Fe 
lines  and  its  connections  was  $7.84  per 
ton.  The  rate  between  these  points 
over  the  lines  of  competing  carriers 
was  $6.39.  Defendant  informed  com- 
plainant shipper  that  it  would  meet  the 
$6.39  rate  and  made  this  statement 
without  consulting  its  connections.  At 
the  time  of  the  hearing,  the  rate  by 
both  routes  had  been  raised  to  $8.09. 
HELD,  such  facts  did  not  show  the 
$7.84  rate  charged  by  the  Santa  Fe 
lines  and  its  connections  to  be  unrea- 
sonable, and  complainant  should  be  de- 
nied the  reparation  sought  on  the  basis 
of  the  $6.39  rate,  especially  since  to 
allow  reparation  would  result  in  a  re- 
duction of  the  rates  throughout  the 
region  involved  without  a  proper  hear- 
ing thereon.  DeCamp  Bros.  v.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,    16  L   C.   C.   144,   145. 

(g)  On  shipments  in  carloads  of  iron 
pyrites    from    Communipaw,    N.    J.,    to 


REASONABLENESS   OF  RATES,  §96    (h)— §97    (a) 


657 


Linndale,  O.,  and  from  Weehawken,  in 
New  York  Harbor,  to  Linndale,  a  rate 
of  $3.23  per  gross  ton  was  assessed.  On 
carloads  of  the  same  commodity  from 
Communipaw  to  Cleveland,  O.,  a  rate  of 
$3.02  per  gross  ton  was  assessed.  Linn- 
dale was  a  suburb  of,  and  within  the 
switching  limits  of,  Cleveland.  Subse- 
quently defendants  reduced  the  rates 
from  New  York  and  Baltimore  to  De- 
troit on  this  commodity  to  $2.81,  and 
from  these  points  to  Cleveland  to  $2.56. 
At  about  the  same  time  the  Commis- 
sion, in  Detroit  Chemical  Works  v. 
Erie  R.  R.,  13  I.  C.  C.  363,  established 
$2.81  as  a  reasonable  rate  to  Detroit, 
but  entered  no  order  with  respect  to 
Cleveland  or  Linndale.  HELD,  the 
charges  were  unreasonable.  Reparation 
awarded  on  shipments  to  both  Linndale 
and  Cleveland  on  the  $2.56  rate.  De- 
fendants ordered  to  maintain  such  lower 
rate  only  two  years  from  the  date  of 
the  Commission's  order  with  respect  to 
Detroit  entered  in  the  former  case  on 
account  of  the  relation  of  the  Cleveland 
and  Linndale  rates  to  Detroit.  American 
Agricultural  Chemical  Co.  v.  E.  R.  R. 
Co.,    16    I.    C.    C.    320,    321. 

(h)  A  rate  of  6c  was  assessed  on 
iron  bars  in  carloads  from  East  Chi- 
cago, Ind.,  to  MoHne,  111.  Defendant 
at  the  time  had  in  effect  two  tariffs,  one 
naming  the  6c  rate  and  another  nam- 
ing a  5c  rate,  and  was  in  doubt  as  to 
which  one  was  legally  applicable.  Later 
it  amended  its  tariff  by  making  the  5c 
rate  apply.  HELD,  the  rate  exacted 
was  unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded. 
Bowman-Kranz  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.   P.   Ry.    Co.,   15   I.   C.   C.  277,   278. 

(i)  On  scrap  iron  in  carloads  from  Doug- 
las, Ariz.,  to  El  Paso,  Tex.,  the  only 
lawfully  published  rate,  63c  per  100  lbs., 
was  exacted.  None  of  this  commodity 
had  moved  prior  to  the  shipment  and 
for  that  reason  no  commodity  rate  was 
in  effect.  The  distance  was  217  miles. 
Defendant  admitted  the  rate  to  be  ex- 
cessive to  the  extent  that  it  exceeded 
$3.50  per  ton.  HELD,  the  rate  charged 
was  unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded. 
Darbyshire-Harvie  Iron  &  Machine  Co. 
v.  El  Paso  &  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  1.  C. 
C.    451,    452. 

(j)  On  shipments  of  bar  iron  from 
Fort  Wayne,  Ind.,  to  Joliet,  111.,  the 
through  rate  of  9c  per  100  lbs.  to  Peoria, 
111.,  was  applied  to  Joliet  as  an  inter- 
mediate    point.       Defendants     admitted 


that  Joliet  ought  properly  to  be  a  Chi- 
cago rate  point,  and  that  the  failure 
of  defendants  to  include  it  in  the  Chi- 
cago group  in  the  tariffs  naming  a 
through  rate  of  8c  to  Chicago  was  due 
to  an  inadvertence.  One  year  after 
the  shipment  in  question,  a  Chicago 
rate  of  7c  was  put  into  effect  by  de- 
fendants. HELD,  complainant  was  en- 
titled to  recover  as  reparation  the  differ- 
ence between  the  9c  rate  and  8c  rate, 
and  an  order  should  be  entered  requir- 
ing that  Joliet  be  maintained  as  a 
Chicago  rate  point  for  a  period  of  two 
years  from  the  date  of  the  effect  of 
the  7c  rate.  Fort  Wayne  Rolling  Mill 
Co.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
L  C.  C.  514,  515. 

(k)  On  iron  pyrites  in  carloads  mov- 
ing during  1907  from  New  York  City  to 
Detroit,  Mich.,  complainant  was  assessed 
$3.32  per  ton.  From  1902  to  1906  the 
rate  had  not  exceeded  $2.34,  except  for 
a  short  period  in  1906,  when  it  was 
$3.28,  which  rate  was  reduced  in  1906 
to  $2.34.  Shortly  after  the  shipments  In 
question  moved,  defendants  voluntarily 
established  a  rate  of  $2.81.  HELD,  the 
rate  assessed  was  unreasonable.  Repa- 
ration awarded.  Detroit  Chemical 
Works  V.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
363,    365. 

(1)  On  ground  iron  ore  from  Chicago 
and  Chicago  points,  including  Iron 
Ridge,  Wis.,  to  Pacific  Coast  terminals, 
complainant  was  assessed  a  rate  of  90c. 
Defendants  stated  at  the  hearing  they 
would  immediately  put  into  effect  a  rate 
of  60c.  HELD,  the  rate  charged  was 
unreasonable,  and  a  rate  of  60c  should 
be  established.  Winter's  Metallic  Paint 
Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C. 
C.    409. 

§97.     Iron     Roofing,     Pipe,     Nalfs,     Wire. 
Iron. 

(a)  On  pipe,  nails,  iron  and  wire  in 
carloads  from  Stockton,  Cal.,  to  Alturas, 
Cal.,  a  rate  of  $33.50  per  ton  was  as- 
sessed ($29  to  Likely,  $2  to  the  forward- 
ing company  at  Likely,  and  $2.50  local 
rate  from  Likely  to  Alturas).  Com- 
plainant demanded  the  return  of  the  $2 
charge  for  the  forwarding  service,  but 
did  not  attack  the  reasonableness  of  the 
other  rates.  No  joint  rate  was  in  effect 
from  Stockton  to  Alturas.  Without  the 
forwarding  service  complainant  would 
have  been  compelled  to  pay  $31.40  to 
Likely  and  $2.50  from  Likely  to  Alturas, 


658 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §97   (b)— §100   (a) 


and  it  therefore  saved  40c  by  reason 
of  said  service.  HELD,  the  charge  ex- 
acted was  not  shown  to  be  unreason- 
able. Reparation  denied  (Clements, 
Prouty  and  Lane,  Comm'rs,  dissenting). 
Lauer  &  Son  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C. 
109,   110. 

(b)  On  a  carload  of  iron  roofing  from 
Wheeling,  W.  Va.,  to  Nowata,  Okla., 
complainant  was  assessed  67i/^c,  being 
the  fifth-class  rate  of  22i^c  from  Wheel- 
ing to  the  Mississippi  River,  plus  a 
commodity  rate  of  -45c  thence  to  destina- 
tion. The  fifth-class  rate  from  the  Mis- 
sissippi River  to  Nowata,  in  effect  at 
the  time  of  the  shipments,  was  43c. 
Other  than  Nowata,  there  were  but  few 
points  in  Oklahoma  to  which  the  com- 
modity rate  from  the  Mississippi  River 
on  iron  roofing  exceeded  the  fifth-class 
rate.  Some  14  months  subsequent  to 
the  shipments  in  question  the  67i/^c 
rate  from  Wheeling  to  Nowata  was  re- 
duced to  54c.  HELD,  the  portion  of 
the  rate  from  the  Mississippi  River  to 
Nowata  exacted  was  unreasonable  to 
the  extent  that  it  exceeded  43c.  Repa- 
ration awarded.  Wheeling  Corrugating 
Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C. 
125,    126. 

§98.     Junk. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate 
of  $9.60  per  ton  on  junk,  C.  L.,  Hanna, 
Wyo.,  to  Salt  Lake  City,  Utah,  equiva- 
lent to  a  rate  of  48c  per  100  lbs.  At 
the  time  of  movement,  there  was  no 
specific  commodity  rate  on  junk,  but  the 
Western  Classification  provided  Class  C 
rating  on  junk  in  carloads  of  not  less 
than  30,000  lbs.  Subsequent  to  the 
time  of  movement  a  commodity  rate  of 
30c  per  100  lbs.  C.  L.'  was  made  effective 
and  specifically  applicable  to  junk  as 
described  and  limited  under  Class  C 
of  the  Western  Classification.  HELD, 
that  the  rate  exacted  was  unreasonable 
to  the  extent  it  exceeded  $6  per  ton. 
Reparation  awarded.  Radinskv  v.  O.  j. 
L.   R.   R.    Co.,   21   L    C.    C.   243* 

(b)  Rate  on  shipments  of  rags  from 
Chicago,  111.,  to  Menasha,  Wis.,  and  to 
Appleton,  Wis.,  found  unreasonable  and 
subsequently  established  lower  rate  pre- 
scribed for  the  future.  Reparation 
awarded.  Lowenthal  &  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  155. 

(c)  Rates  on  rags  from  Denver,  Colo., 
to  St.  Johns.  Ore.,  a  suburb  of  Portland, 
held    unreasonq,bly,    reduced    and    repa-  j 


ration  awarded.    Radinsky  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  492. 

(d)  Rates  on  shoddy  dust  should  not 
exceed  those  in  effect  on  rags.  Rapa- 
ration  awarded  and  lower  rates  estab- 
lished. Ford  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  & 
O.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  576. 

§99.     Kanite. 

(a)  Complainant  maniifactured  a  high 
explosive  called  kanite,  the  essential 
ingredients  of  which  were  nitrate  of  am- 
monia and  some  organic  materials. 
Complainant  contended  that  this  com- 
modity was  safe  for  transportation;  that 
it  was  invariably  incased  in  cartridges  or 
rigid  paper  tubes,  which  were  water- 
proof and  hermetically  sealed  for  ship- 
ment; that  the  rates  imposed  by  de- 
fendants on  the  commodity  were  the 
same  in  all  cases  as  those  imposed  for 
the  transportation  of  dynamite,  viz., 
first  class  C.  L.,  double  first  class  L.  C. 
L.;  and  that  kanite  should  take  the 
same  rate  as  masurite,  viz.,  not  in  ex- 
cess of  the  second  class  C.  L.  and  li/^ 
times  the  first  class  L.  C.  L.  Defend- 
ants maintained  rates  equivalent  to 
third-class  rates  on  common  black  blast- 
ing powder  C.  L.  HELD,  masurite  and 
kanite  are  proprietary  names  for  high 
explosive  powders  composed  essentially 
of  nitrate  of  ammonia  and  some  organic 
substance  akin  to  oxidized  oil,  the  exact 
composition  of  each  being  trade  secrets. 
Whatever  difference  there  may  be  be- 
tween these  explosives  in  other  re- 
spects, there  is  none  between  them 
from  a  transportation  standpoint,  it 
being  conceded  that  kanite  is  no  more 
dangerous  to  carry  than  masurite.  Or- 
der entered  reducing  the  kanite  rate  to 
the  basis  of  the  masurite  rate.  Blumen- 
stein  V.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  90. 

§100.     Lead  Ore. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate 
of  $12  per  net  ton  on  lead  ore  and 
concentrates  from  the  Coeur  d'Alene 
district,  Idaho,  to  Carnegie,  Pa.,  and 
to  Atlantic  coast  points,  though  the 
haul  to  Carnegie  was  about  440  miles 
less  than  the  haul  to  the  coast  points, 
Carnegie  being  intermediate  thereto. 
From  other  points  in  the  United  States 
the  rates  on  metalliferous  properties 
were  60c  per  ton  less  to  Carnegie  than 
to  New  York.  Complainant  had  a  com- 
petitor located  at  Perth  Amboy,  N.  J., 
which  COL  trolled  smokers  at  East  Helena, 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §101  (a)— §103  (b) 


659 


Mont.,  and  other  places.  HELD,  that 
the  rate  to  Carnegie  is  unreasonable 
to  the  extent  that  it  exceeds  $11.40  per 
ton  or  95  per  cent  of  the  rate  contem- 
poraneously charged  to  Perth  Amboy, 
N.  J.,  and  other  eastern  points  now  tak- 
ing the  $12  rate.  Reparation  awarded. 
Pennsylvania  Smelting  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  60. 

§101.     Leather,    Shoe    Material. 

(a)  Complainant  had  shipped  to  it 
L.  C.  L.  leather  and  other  materials  used 
in  the  manufacture  of  shoes,  from  points 
in  the  New  England  states  and  in  New 
York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Dela- 
ware, Ohio  and  Wisconsin  to  Jefferson 
City,  Mo.  The  charges  were  collected 
on  the  basis  of  the  second-class  rate 
to  East  St.  Louis,  111.,  plus  a  rate  of 
191/^c  from  East  St.  Louis  to  destina- 
tion, made  by  adding  a  bridge  toll  of 
2c  to  the  rate  from  St.  Louis,  Mo.  The 
rates  from  point  of  origin  to  either 
East  St.  Louis  or  St.  Louis  were  the 
same,  and  complainant  contended  that 
charges  should  have  been  assessed  on 
the  St.  Louis  instead  of  the  East  St. 
Louis  combination.  At  the  time  ship- 
ment moved,  however,  the  rates  from 
points  of  origin  to  St.  Louis  included 
delivery  only  at  the  depots  of  eastern  lines, 
and  the  rates  from  St.  Louis  to  Jeffer- 
son City  applied  only  from  the  depots 
of  the  western  lines  in  St.  Louis;  there- 
fore had  the  St.  Louis  combination  been 
used,  a  drayage  charge  of  3c  per  100 
lbs.  would  have  had  to  be  paid.  Sub- 
sequently a  tariff  was  filed  under  which 
the  eastern  line  absorbed  these  drayage 
charges.  No  evidence  was  offered  to 
show  that  the  rates  were  unreasonable 
in  themselves.  HELD,  upon  the  record 
the  rates  charged  were  not  unreason- 
able. Complaint  dismissed.  Priesmeyer 
Shoe  Co.  V.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.    C.    78. 

§102.     Lime. 

(a)  On  a  carload  of  agricultural  lime 
shipped  Sept.  12,  1908,  from  Fred- 
erick Road,  Md.,  to  Englishtown,  N.  J.,  a 
class  rate  of  17c  per  100  lbs.  was  as- 
sessed. From  Jan.  2,  1906.  to  April 
1,  1908,  a  commodity  rate  of  $1.60  per 
net  ton  was  in  force  over  the  lines  of 
defendants  for  a  distance  of  172  miles. 
Nov.  28,  1908,  defendants  established  a 
commodity  rate  of  $1.65  per  net  ton 
between  Baltimore  and  Englishtown  and 
made  this  rate  applicable  from  Frederick 


Road.  For  several  years  prior  to  the 
shipment  in  question,  Baltimore  rates 
would  have  been  applied  to  Frederick 
Road  but  for  an  oversight  in  the  tar- 
iff. Defendants  admitted  the  unreason- 
ableness of  the  charge  exacted.  HELD, 
said  17c  rate  was  excessive.  Repara- 
tion awarded  on  the  basis  of  $1.65  per 
net  ton.  Okerson  v.  Penn  R.  R.  Co., 
18   I.   C.   C.   127. 

§103.     Live    Stock    Rates. 

(a)  The  transportation  of  live  stock 
demands,  above  almost  any  other  kind 
of  freight,  expedition  in  service.  Cattle 
or  other  live  animals  should  be  gotten 
to  the  market  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment  and  with  the  least  possible  rail- 
road haul.  Considering,  therefore,  the 
nature  of  the  transportation,  almost 
any  additional  length  of  haul  will  render 
the  route  unduly  circuitous,  and  will 
justify  the  Commission  in  establishing 
a  joint  rate  over  the  direct  line  even 
when  a  two-line  haul  is  involved.  In 
Re  Investigation  of  Alleged  Unreason- 
able Rates  on  Meats,  23  I.  C.  C.  656, 
662. 

(b)  Upon  various  applications  for 
modification  of  the  conclusions  of  the 
original  report  in  22  I.  C.  C.  160,  it  is 
held  that  (1)  the  Commission  declines 
to  modify  the  mileage  scale  originally 
prescribed  for  the  movement  of  live 
stock  from  various  southwestern  points 
to  packing  houses;  (2)  it  declines  to 
change  its  ruling  to  the  effect  that 
2i^c  should  be  added  for  an  additional 
line  haul  so  far  as  shorter  distances 
are  concerned,  but  its  conclusion  is 
modified  as  to  longer  distances  to  the 
effect  that  no  addition  on  account  of 
the  two-line  haul  should  be  made  where 
the  distance  exceeds  500  miles,  and  in 
no  case  for  a  shorter  distance  should 
more  than  one  addition  be  made,  and 
there  should  be  no  addition  where  the 
two  lines  are  part  of  the  same  system; 
(3)  the  former  rate  of  38c  to  Oklahoma 
City  from  El  Paso  should  be  continued 
as  a  proportional  rate  on  movements 
of  live  stock  coming  into  El  Paso  by 
rail,  and  the  mileage  scale  should  be 
confined  exclusively  to  the  local  move- 
ment from  El  Paso;  (4)  in  the  great 
majority  of  instances  carriers  should 
establish  through  routes  and  joint  rates 
via  all  reasonably  available  direct  lines; 
if  in  any  case  they  fail  to  do  so,  the 
attention  of  the  Commission  may  be 
called   to   the  matter  by  an  intervening 


660 


REASONABLENESS    OF    RATES,    §103    (c)  — (d) 


petition  filed  in  this  proceeding,  where- 
upon investigation  will  be  made;  (5) 
rates  on  stock  cattle  ought  not  to  ex- 
ceed 75  per  cent  of  the  rates  prescribed 
by  the  Commission  for  the  movement  of 
beef  cattle;  (6)  live-stock  rates  into 
Oklahoma  City  and  from  Oklahoma 
City  to  Kansas  City,  are,  in  most  in- 
stances, higher  than  the  rate  to  Kansas 
City  and  ought  to  be  so,  since  it  seldom 
happens  that  the  direct  line  from  the 
point  of  origin  to  Kansas  City  is  through 
the  Oklahoma  market;  (7)  the  live- 
stock rates  prescribed  to  Oklahoma  City 
do  not  discriminate  against  it  in  com- 
parison with  rates  from  the  same  points 
of  origin  to  Kansas  City,  because  for 
the  shorter  distances  Oklahoma  City 
pays  somewhat  less  and  for  the  longer 
distances  pays  slightly  more  mile  for 
mile  than  does  Kansas  City,  but  on 
the  average  rates  are  substantially  the 
same;  (8)  while  it  would  be  desirable 
If  the  same  scale  of  live-stock  rates 
applied  both  to  Fort  Worth  and  to 
Oklahoma  City  from  points  in  Texas, 
Btill  the  discrimination  resulting  from 
the  difference  between  the  Texas  scale 
prescribed  by  the  Texas  commission 
and  that  prescribed  by  this  Commission 
Is  not  such  as  can  be  pronounced  undue, 
and  neither  is  the  situation  thus  created 
one  with  which  the  Commission  can 
properly  deal;  (9)  the  southeastern 
territory  to  which  the  3c  differential  on 
fresh  meats  and  packing  house  products 
from  Fort  Worth  applies  is  as  follows: 
The  territory  entitled  to  this  differential 
Is  bounded  upon  the  north  by  a  line 
beginning  at  Greenville,  Miss.,  and  ex- 
tending east  along  the  line  of  the  South- 
em  Railway  to  Birmingham,  thence  via 
the  Southern  Railway  to  Atlanta,  thence 
via  the  Georgia  Railroad  to  Augusta, 
and  thence  via  the  Southern  Railway 
to  Charleston;  to  all  points  on  and 
south  of  this  line  the  3c  differential 
from  Fort  Worth  should  apply,  but 
to  points  north  of  this  line  rates  should 
be  the  same  up  to  the  Memphis  and 
Vicksburg  gateways  from  both  Okla- 
homa City  and  Fort  Worth;  (10)  while 
still  of  the  opinion  that  rates  from  both 
Kansas  City  and  Wichita  to  Memphis 
for  these  respective  territories  ought 
to  exceed  that  from  Oklahoma  City  by 
25^c  per  100  lbs,,  the  Commission  will 
not  at  this  time  require  carriers  from 
Wichita  to  Increase  the  differential  to 
that  amount,  but  will  leave  the  present 
adjustment  in  effect;    (11)   rates  of  12c 


on  packing-house  products  and  18i/^c  on 
fresh  meats  from  Wichita  to  Kansas 
City,  17c  from  Oklahoma  City  and  21c 
from  Fort  Worth  upon  packing-house 
products,  and  26c  from  Oklahoma  City 
and  32l^c  from  Fort  Worth  on  fresh 
meats,  would  be  just  and  reasonable 
rates  and  are  prescribed  for  the  future; 
(12)  southern  carriers  may  very  prop- 
erly meet  from  both  Oklahoma  City  and 
Fort  Worth  via  Memphis  and  Vicksburg 
the  rates  established  via  St.  Louis  to 
New  York  and  other  eastern  territory; 
although  the  Commission  has  recently 
granted  its  dispensation  under  the 
fourth  section,  permitting  them  to  meet 
these  rates  and  to  maintain  at  the 
same  time  higher  rates  to  intermediate 
territory,  it  cannot  recognize  the 
force  of  the  contention  that  the  rate 
itself  should  be  established  through 
these  gateways;  (13)  carriers  should 
publish  tariffs  according  peddler-car  serv- 
ice under  a  rate  upon  packing-house  prod- 
ucts of  130  per  cent  of  the  carload  rate 
and  upon  fresh  meats  of  50  per  cent  of 
the  carload  rate,  and  a  minimum  may  be 
required  equivalent  to  the  earnings  upon 
10,000  lbs,  of  fresh  meats  to  the  most 
distant  point,  but  refrigeration  should 
be  provided  or  paid  for  by  the  shipper 
In  addition  to  the  above  rates;  (14) 
other  modifications  suggested  the  Com- 
mission denies  or  reserves  for  future 
consideration,  or  suggests  they  be  taken 
up  by  separate  complaint.  In  those  re- 
spects in  which  this  supplemental  re- 
port modifies,  adds  to,  or  interprets  the 
original  report,  the  Commission  relies 
upon  the  carriers  to  observe  the  sug- 
gestions made.  In  Re  Investigation  of 
Alleged  Unreasonable  Rates  on  Meats, 
23  L  C.  C.  656. 

(c)  The  live-stock  rates  prescribed 
to  Kansas  City  in  the  original  report, 
22  I.  C.  C.  160,  were  approved  as  a 
whole,  and  there  is  no  warrant  for 
the  assumption  that  in  those  cases 
where  the  mileage  scale  prescribed  by 
the  Commission  might  be  higher  than 
particular  rates  in  force,  such  rates 
might  be  increased  to  equal  the  mile- 
age scale.  In  Re  Investigation  of  Al- 
leged Unreasonable  Rates  on  Meats,  23 
I.   C.  C.   656,   660. 

(d)  Rates  on  cattle  and  sheep  in 
carloads  from  Phoenix,  Ariz.,  to  Los 
Angeles,  Cal.,  via  Maricopa  and  via 
Parker  were:  Cattle,  $126.85  per  36-foot 
car;  sheep,  single  deck,  $88.50;  sheep, 
double  deck,  170  per  cent  of  the  single- 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §103   (e)— (h) 


661 


deck  rate.  The  rate  from  El  Paso  to 
Los  Angeles  was  $105  for  cattle  and  $84 
for  sheep,  single  deck,  the  distance  be- 
ing 814  miles,  as  compared  with  441 
miles  from  Phoenix.  The  rates  had  in- 
creased from  1895  to  1905  from  Phoenix 
$20.15  on  cattle,  and  $20.30  on  sheep. 
Defendants  justified  comparative  high 
rates  on  the  ground  that  the  haul  from 
Phoenix  was  in  part  over  a  branch 
line  on  which  the  cost  of  operation  was 
high  and  the  tonnage  carried  light. 
HELD,  the  rates  complained  of  were  un- 
reasonable, and  the  following  rates  were 
prescribed:  Cattle,  $95;  sheep,  single 
deck,  $65;  sheep,  double  deck,  $110.50. 
Maricopa  County  Commercial  Club  v. 
S.  P.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  429. 

(e)  In  1904  the  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  can- 
celed all  joint  interstate  rates  on  live 
stock  from  points  on  its  line,  including 
a  rate  of  44c  from  Midland,  Tex.,  to 
Kansas  City,  Mo.,  via  the  T.  &  P.  and 
M.  K.  &  T.  railways.  In  May,  1907,  this 
joint  rate  of  44c  was  republished,  but 
it  was  canceled  on  June  11,  1907,  on 
account  of  disagreement  between  these 
carriers,  respecting  the  divisions  of  the 
rate.  In  December,  1907,  when  com- 
plainant's shipments  moved,  the  rates 
assessed  were  the  combination  of  inter- 
mediate rates  upon  Ft.  Worth,  Tex., 
which  exceeded  the  44c  rate  formerly  in 
force.  A  few  months  after  the  move- 
ment of  these  shipments  defendants 
agreed  upon  divisions  of  the  former 
rate  of  44c,  which  was  again  published 
and  is  still  in  force.  HELD,  that  the 
rates  assessed  upon  the  shipments  in 
question  were  unreasonable  in  so  far 
as  they  exceeded  44c  per  100  lbs.  Repa- 
ration awarded.  Opinion  expressed  that 
defendants  should  join  in  the  payment 
of  this  reparation  upon  the  basis  of  the 
present  division  of  the  44c  rate.  Young- 
blood  V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  1.  C.  C. 
569,    572. 

(f)  Complainants  shipped  eight  car- 
loads of  cattle,  Klamath  Falls,  Ore.,  to 
Tacoma,  Wash.,  via  Weed,  Cal.  Repara- 
tion was  asked  on  the  basis  of  the  rate 
in  force,  Klamath  Falls'  to  San  Fran- 
cisco, Cal.,  when  the  traffic  moved.  The 
proportional  rate,  Klamath  Falls  to  Port- 
laud,  was  also  attacked.  Shortly  prior  to 
this  shipment  class  rates  from  Klamath 
Falls  to  Portland  were  reduced  to  sub- 
stantially the  San  Francisco  basis,  and 
about  seven  months  thereafter  Portland 
was  given  the  same  commodity  rate  as 


San  Francisco  on  live  stock  from  Kla- 
math Falls.  This  reduction  was  made 
on  solicitation  of  commercial  interests 
at  Portland  and  not  because  the  former 
rates  were  considered  unreasonable.  The 
haul  from  Klamath  Falls  to  San  Fran- 
cisco was  over  a  lo"W-grade,  downhill 
route,  while  to  Portland  it  was  over  a 
mountainous  route  of  steep  grades  and 
sharp  curves,  more  expensive  to  op- 
erate. Klamath  Falls  is  436  miles  from 
San  Francisco  and  508  miles  from  Port- 
land. The  average  gross  car-mile  earn- 
ings, Klamath  Falls  to  Portland,  were 
about  27c,  and  to  San  Francisco  25c. 
HELD,  the  voluntary  reduction  of  rates 
to  Portland*  does  not  of  itself  constitute 
proof  that  the  former  rates  were  exces- 
sive, and  on  the  showing  made  respect- 
ing the  difference  in  operating  condi- 
tions the  Commission  is  not  justified  in 
finding  that  the  rate  to  San  Francisco 
was  properly  a  measure  of  reasonable- 
ness of  the  rate  to  Portland.  Carstens 
Packing  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  165, 
166. 

(g)  Complainant  attacked  defendant's 
rate  for  carriage  of  horses  in  carloads 
between  El  Paso,  Tex.,  and  Phoenix, 
Ariz.,  433  miles,  rate  per  car  $500;  be- 
tween Phoenix,  Ariz.,  and  Los  Angeles, 
Cal.,  451  miles,  rate  per  car  $400,  and 
between  Phoenix  and  San  Francisco, 
Cal.,  920  miles,  rate  per  car  $575.  The 
Commission  found  that  reasonable  mer- 
chandise rates  between  El  Paso  and 
Phoenix  and  between  Phoenix  and  Los 
Angeles  were  $3,75  and  $4  per  100  lbs., 
respectively.  HELD,  that  the  rate  on 
horses  should  be  somewhat  less  than 
the  rate  on  an  equivalent  weight  of 
merchandise,  and  that  the  rates  com- 
plained of  were  excessive  to  the  extent 
that  they  exceeded  $300  a  car  between 
El  Paso  and  Phoenix,  $320  between 
Phoenix  and  Los  Angeles  and  $470  be- 
tween Phoenix  and  San  Francisco.  Ari- 
zona Ry.  Commission  v.  Wells,  Fargo  & 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  571. 

(h)  On  a  carload  of  horses  from 
Cbambersburg,  Pa.,  to  Warwick,  N.  Y., 
228  miles,  complainant  was  assessed  42c, 
the  shipment  moving  via  Shippensburg, 
Allentown  and  Easton.  Two  of  defend- 
ant carriers  admitted  the  rate  charged 
to  be  unreasonable,  and  33c  to  be  a 
reasonable  rate.  Other  defendants  de- 
nied the  unreasonableness  of  the  rate. 
HELD,  the  rate  charged  was  unreason- 
able.    Reparation  awarded  on   the   basis 


662 


REASONABLENESS    OF    RATES,    §103    (i)  — (o) 


of  33c.     Vanness  v.  L.  &  H.  R.  Ry.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  307. 

(i)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
upon  sheep  from  Iowa  points  to  Chicago, 
and  asked  for  the  establishment  of 
rates  in  double-deck  cars.  Sheep  in 
single-deck  cars  only  load  from  12,000 
to  14,000  lbs.,  and  for  that  reason  the 
rates  are  higher  when  so  shipped  than 
those  upon  hogs  or  cattle.  In  double- 
deck  cars,  sheep  can  be  readily  loaded 
to  22,000  lbs.,  and  when  so  handled  the 
cost  of  transportation  does  not  exceed 
that  of  cattle.  Defendants  made  rates  in 
double-deck  cars  in  states  adjoining 
Iowa.  It  appeared  that  no  substantial 
burden  would  be  imposed  upon  them  to 
provide  such  facilities  for  Iowa.  HELD, 
the  rates  attacked  were  unreasonable; 
rates  in  double-deck  cars  should  be 
established;  and  where  defendants  failed 
to  provide  double-deck  cars  upon  reason- 
able notice,  double-deck  rates  should  apply 
on  all  shipments  in  single-deck  cars. 
Corn  Belt  Meat  Producers'  Ass'n  v.  C. 
B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  533,  535. 

(j)  In  Corn  Belt  Meat  Producers' 
Ass'n  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.,  14  I.  C.  C.  376,  the 
Commission  held  that  the  231^0  rate  on 
live  stock,  which  applied  from  the  Mis- 
souri River  and  points  150  miles  east 
thereof,  to  Chicago,  was  excessive,  and 
the  strip  taking  said  rate  should  not  ex- 
ceed from  50  to  75  miles  in  width  from 
the  Missouri  River.  Since  the  decision 
defendants  lowered  the  rates  on  cattle 
and  raised  the  same  on  hogs  as  an  al- 
leged compliance  with  the  order  in  said 
case,  the  result  being  that  on  the  whole 
the  charges  by  defendants  appeared  to 
be  increased,  rather  than  reduced. 
HELD,  that  the  alleged  compliance  with 
the  order  was  unsatisfactory;  that  de- 
fendants should  take  Denison,  la.,  as 
the  most  easterly  station  in  the  23^/^0 
group,  and  Lisbon  as  the  most  easterly 
station  in  the  19c  group,  and  should 
divide  the  intervening  territory  of 
about  225  miles  into  ^^c  groups,  making 
the  westerly  groups  somewhat  larger 
than  the  easterly,  but  that  this  adjust- 
ment should  not  apply  to  territory 
in  the  northwestern  portion  of  the 
state,  which  should  be  divided  into 
two  groups,  taking  rates  of  24c  and 
24i^c;  and  that  rates  on  hogs  attacked 
in  the  former  case  should  be  restored; 
but  that  the  present  decision  should  not 
be  construed  as  having  any  reference  to 
terminal  charges  at  Chicago.     Corn  Belt 


Meat  Producers'  Ass'n  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R. 
R.  Co.,   17  I.   C.  C.   533,   537,  539. 

(k)  Defendants'  tariff,  fixing  rates  on 
cattle  in  carloads  from  Anaconda,  Mont., 
to  Tacoma,  Wash.,  provided  that  for 
every  additional  foot  in  length  of  the 
car  over  36  ft.  6  in.,  ZYz  per  cent  should 
be  added  to  the  rate,  but  made  no  pro- 
vision when  cars  were  shorter  than  36 
ft.  6  in.  The  car  furnished  complainant 
was  34  ft.  and  he  was  charged  for  the 
36  ft.  and  6  in.  rate.  Subsequently  de- 
fendants inserted  a  rule  making  a  like 
reduction  per  foot  for  cars  under  36 
ft.  6  in.  HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was 
unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded.  Car- 
stens  Packing  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  431. 

(1)  Where  upon  carload  shipments 
of  stock  cattle  from  South  St.  Paul, 
Minn.,  complainant  is  charged  the  beef 
cattle  rate,  and  it  is  the  universal  prac- 
tice among  railroads  in  the  Northwest 
to  haul  stock  cattle  at  a  rate  75  per 
cent  of  the  beef  cattle  rate,  and  defend- 
ant admits  such  customary  rate  is  rea- 
sonable, and  by  a  later  tariff  puts  it 
into  effect,  complainant  is  entitled  to 
reparation  on  the  basis  of  75  per  cent 
of  the  beef  cattle  rate.  Slimmer  & 
Thomas  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co., 
14   L   C.   C.   525,   526. 

(m)  The  reasons  for  a  lower  rate 
upon  stock  cattle  than  beef  cattle  are: 
First,  the  less  value  of  the  freight;  sec- 
ond, the  heavy  loading  of  the  car,  and, 
third,  the  fact  that  the  carrier  obtains 
a  second  haul  from  the  traffic  after  its 
weight  has  been  increased  by  feeding. 
Slimmer  &  Thomas  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O. 
Ry.  Co.,  14  I.   C.  C.  525,  525. 

(n)  On  shipments  of  carloads  of  cat- 
tle from  Anaconda,  Mont.,  to  Tacoma, 
Wash.,  defendants'  published  rate  was 
$110  per  36-foot  0-inch  car.  Complainant 
ordered  36-foot  cars  and  was  furnished 
34-foot  cars.  At  the  time  of  the  shipment 
the  tariff  made  no  provision  for  a  reduc- 
tion in  the  rate  for  cars  less  than  36 
feet,  6  in.,  but  later  a  reduction  of  3i/^c 
per  foot  was  permitted.  Complainant  was 
charged  at  the  36-foot-car  rate  and  suf- 
fered a  loss  of  $15.40.  HELD,  he  was 
entitled  to  reparation  to  the  amount  of 
this  loss.  Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  577,  578. 

(o)  Defendants  prescribed  a*  mini- 
mum of  24,000  lbs.  on  36i^-foot  cars  of 
cattle  originating  west  of  a  line  drawn 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §103    (p) 


663 


from  Mandan,  N.  D.,  to  Velva,  Canada. 
This  minimum  had  been  in  force  for 
many  years  without  complaint  from 
shippers.  East  of  this  line  a  lower 
minimum  was  prescribed.  The  reason 
for  such  discrimination  was  that  the 
bulk  of  cattle  originating  west  of  the 
line  was  fatted  and  would  load  easily 
in  excess  of  the  minimum  required.  No 
evidence  was  offered  to  show  that  the 
rates,  as  practically  applied  under  the 
minimum,  were  unreasonable.  HELD, 
the  demand  for  a  lower  minimum  and 
for  reparation  should  he  denied.  Reed 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
616,  618. 

(p)  Since  the  filing  of  the  decision  in 
Cattle  Raisers'  Association  of  Texas  v. 
M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  11  I.  C.  C.  296, 
Aug.  16,  1905,  comdemning  an  advance 
on  rates  upon  live  stock  from  breeding 
pastures  of  the  Southwest  to  northern 
ranges,  and  from  various  maturing 
points  west  of  the  Missouri  River  to 
the  principal  markets  of  consumption, 
the  amendment  to  the  Act  was  adopted 
in  June,  1906,  and  a  further  hearing  in 
the  present  case  was  extended  to  the 
questions  involved  in  the  former  deci- 
sion. In  the  present  case  the  Commis- 
sion affirmed  its  findings  of  fact  in  the 
former  case  that  live  stock  from  the 
points  in  question  moved  with  regu- 
larity and  uniformity,  and  that  the  rela- 
tive amount  of  damages  paid  by  de- 
fendants for  injuries  to  live  stock  in 
transit,  in  proportion  to  the  gross  re- 
ceipts derived  from  the  business,  was 
as  found  in  the  former  decision.  De- 
fendants' expert  witness  at  the  former 
hearing  took  the  operating  divisions  of 
the  Santa  Fe  System,  over  which  the 
traffic  in  question  mostly  moved,  and 
determined  the  total  amount  of  money 
expended  in  the  maintenance  and  opera- 
tion of  each  of  these  divisions  for  a 
given  year.  He  apportioned  the  total 
amount  between  passenger  and  freight 
and  divided  the  amount  applicable  to 
freight  by  the  total  number  of  tons 
hauled  over  the  division  during  the 
year,  including  the  weight  of  the  car, 
and  determined  in  this  way  the  cost  of 
hauling  a  gross  ton.  He  then  started 
with  a  carload  of  cattle  and  determined 
the  cost  of  hauling  the  car  over  the 
various  divisions  by  multiplying  tht 
number  of  gross  tons  by  the  gross  ton 
cost  upon  each  division,  obtaining  in 
this  way  the  "operating  cost"  of  moving 
the  car  from   its  point  of  origin  to  des- 


tination. To  this  he  added  interest  and 
taxes,  distributed  upon  a  car  mileage 
basis,  thus  obtaining  what  he  termed 
the  "total  cost  of  moving  a  carload  of 
cattle."  In  arriving  at  this  cost  he  as- 
sumed that  90  per  cent  of  stock  cars 
were  returned  empty,  and  charged  upon 
the  same  gross  ton  basis  for  this  empty 
haul.  He  then  inquired  what  revenue 
the  company  received  for  the  handling 
of  the  car.  If  this  was  more  than  the 
total  cost,  he  denominated  the  differ- 
ence a  profit,  and,  if  less,  a  deficit.  In 
this  way  he  deduced  the  results  of  trans- 
porting live  stock  from  some  20  or  30 
different  points,  mostly  from  Texas  to 
Kansas  City,  Chicago  and  St.  Louis.  He 
added  together  the  profits  and  the  def- 
icits, subtracted  the  sum  of  the  profits 
from  the  sum  of  the  deficits,  divided  the 
remainder  by  the  total  number  of 
points,  and  deduced  the  conclusion  that 
there  was  a  deficit  on  the  haul  of  some 
$5  per  car.  In  reaching  its  decision 
at  the  former  hearing,  the  Commission 
ignored  the  testimony  of  this  witness 
m  the  ground  that,  by  selecting  the 
proper  points,  he  could  show  any  results 
he  desired,  and  that  such  a  basis  of 
calculation  was  worthless,  since  it  was 
based  on  the  average  expense  of  all 
kinds  of  traffic  and  irrespective  of  the 
length  of  haul  and  other  conditions.  The 
condition  of  the  cattle  industry,  while 
somewhat  improved  since  the  former 
hearing,  was  not  in  a  generally  pros- 
perous condition.  The  Texas  lines  in- 
volved showed  an  increase  of  net  earn- 
ings since  the  former  hearing.  It 
appeared  these  Texas  lines  must  be 
virtually  reconstructed  in  the  immedi- 
ate future,  that  process  to  include  re- 
grading,  ballasting  and  the  laying  of 
heavier  rails,  and  that  the  only  money 
available  for  that  purpose  must  come 
from  increased  revenues.  HELD,  that 
the  decision  of  the  Commission  at  the 
former  hearing,  condemning  the  advance 
of  rates  on  live  stock,  should  be  re- 
affirmed. Decision  reducing  from  $2  to 
$1  the  terminal  charges  at  the  Union 
Stock  Yards,  Chicago,  reaffirmed,  and  ter- 
ritory defined  to  which  the  decision  should 
apply.  (Knapp,  Comm'r,  dissenting.) 
Cattle  Raisers'  Ass'n  of  Texas  v.  M.  K. 
&  T.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  418,  433-435; 
Preliminary  injunction  to  restrain  the 
order  of  the  Commission  denied,  M.  K. 
&  T.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  L  C.  C,  164  Fed.  645, 
650. 


664 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §103   (q)— §104   (a) 


(q)  Complainant  packers  at  Seattle 
attacked  the  rate  of  $170  on  hogs  in  36- 
foot  single-deck  cars  from  St.  Paul,  Mis- 
souri River  points  and  points  lying  from 
150  to  200  miles  west  of  the  river,  to 
Seattle.  Under  the  rate  attacked  ship- 
ments of  hogs  to  complainants'  plant 
from  the  points  in  question  increased 
and  their  business  greatly  prospered. 
Except  for  a  few  brief  periods  defend- 
ants had  maintained  no  rates  during 
many  years  preceding  lower  than  the 
rate  attacked,  and  such  rate  was  on  the 
average  more  favorable.  Complainants 
admitted  that  a  rate  of  $261  for  a  36- 
foot  double-deck  car  was  reasonable, 
which  rate  was  equivalent  to  the  $170 
rate  for  a  single-deck  car.  Complain- 
ants sought  to  show  they  were  entitled 
to  a  rate  of  $148.37  by  proof  that 
through  illegal  rebates  they  had  for 
many  years  secured  that  rate.  Com- 
parison of  rates  from  points  in  Ne- 
braska, Texas,  Kansas  and  Oklahoma 
to  Seattle  and  other  coast  points  in- 
dicated that  such  rates  practically  cor- 
responded with  the  rate  attacked.  The 
rate  on  packing-house  products  from 
the  Missouri  River  to  Seattle  gave  com- 
plainants an  advantage  over  the  pack- 
ers at  such  point  of  origin,  and  while 
complainants'  shipments  of  hogs  to  Se- 
attle had  steadily  increased,  the  ship- 
ments of  packing-house  products  from 
Missouri  River  points  to  Seattle  had  not 
done  so.  HELD,  the  rate  attacked  was 
not  shown  to  be  unreasonable.  Frye 
&  Bruhn  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
501,    510. 

(r)  Complainant  demanded  the  estab- 
lishment of  double-deck  car  rates  on 
hogs  from  Missouri  River  points  to  Se- 
attle. Except  for  a  few  short  periods 
no  such  rates  had  been  in  effect  for 
many  years.  No  evidence  was  offered 
to  show  that  on  shipments  in  double- 
deck  cars  the  hogs  could  go  through 
without  unloading  for  feeding  and  rest- 
ing so  as  to  avoid  delay  and  shrinkage 
in  a  way  that  could  not  be  accom- 
plished in  single-deck  cars.  A  reason- 
able rate  was  in  effect  on  single-deck 
cars.  HELD,  the  evidence  was  not  suf- 
ficient to  warrant  the  ruling  demanded. 
Frye  &  Bruhn  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I. 
C.   C.   501,   511. 

(s)  On  carloads  of  hogs  from  Ans- 
ley,  Aurora,  Broken  Bow  and  Central 
City,  Neb.,  complainants  were  assessed 
a  rate  of  $200  for  a  30-foot  single-deck 
car,  which  rate  was  equivalent  to  a  rate 


of  $240  for  a  36-foot  single-deck  car. 
Shortly  after  shipment  moved,  a  rate 
of  $170  for  a  36-foot  single-deck  car 
was  made  effective.  HELD,  the  rate 
charged  was  unreasonable.  Reparation 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  the  new  rate. 
Frye  &  Bruhn  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I. 
C.  C.  501,  512. 

(t)  On  carloads  of  cattle  from  Leon, 
Kan.,  to  Chicago,  complainant  was  in- 
duced to  route  via  the  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  and  the  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  Ry.,  and  a  rate 
of  34c  was  charged.  There  was  in 
force  over  the  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  and  the 
C.  R.  I.  &  P.  a  rate  of  31.5c.  The  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  agent  assured  complainant 
that  he  would  be  charged  the  31.5c 
rate.  Defendant  admitted  a  rate  of  34c 
to  be  unreasonable  with  respect  to  the 
particular  shipments  in  question.  A 
31.5c  rate  yielded  8.25  mills  per  ton 
mile.  Subsequent  to  the  shipments  and 
prior  to  the  filing  of  the  complaint,  de- 
fendant put  into  effect  the  31.5c  rate 
over  the  route  shipments  moved.  HELD, 
the  rate  assessed  was  unreasonable. 
Reparation  awarded.  Morti  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  513,  515. 

§104.     Locomotives. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  rea- 
sonableness of  a  change  proposed  to 
be  made  by  the  Southern  Classification 
Committee  in  the  rating  of  locomotives 
and  locomotives  and  tenders,  live  or 
dead,  on  their  own  wheels.  The  pro- 
posed change  substituted  sixth-class 
rates  on  live  or  dead  locomotives  for 
the  previously  existing  mileage  rate  of 
35c  a  mile  on  locomotives,  dead,  and 
30c  per  mile  on  locomotives,  live.  The 
same  rate  existed  on  locomotives,  live, 
except  that  an  allowance  of  50  per 
cent  of  the  gross  weight  was  made  and 
the  locomotive  must  be  accompanied  by  an 
attendant,  who  paid  full  passenger  fare, 
and  whose  duty  it  was  to  keep  all  running 
parts  well  oiled  and  immediately  report 
any  trouble  to  the  conductor  of  the 
train.  HELD,  that  on  account  of  the 
varying  weights  of  locomotives  it  is 
not  fair  to  tax  the  lighter  locomotives 
at  the  same  rate  as  the  heavier  equip- 
ment, for  what  would  be  a  reasonable 
charge  for  a  200-ton  locomotive  mani- 
festly would  be  unreasonable  for  a 
locomotive  weighing  only  50  tons;  that 
considering  all  the  circumstances  con- 
nected with  their  transportation  loco- 
motives on  their  own  wheels  were 
much    in    the    nature    of    an    anomalous 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §105   (a)— (d) 


G65 


commodity,  particularly  susceptible  to 
Individual  treatment;  that  both  as  a 
matter  of  equity  and  expediency  it  is 
rare  indeed  that  a  flat  ton  mile  rate 
can  be  prescribed.  The  great  diversity 
in  the  characteristics  of  the  objects 
transported,  as  well  as  the  kaleidoscopic 
succession  of  the  conditions  under  which 
this  transportation  takes  place,  combine 
to  make  such  a  rate  when  universally 
applied  both  unreasonable  and  discrimi- 
natory. However,  insomuch  as  loco- 
motives stand  in  a  class  by  themselves 
and  present  a  rate  problem  in  many 
respects  different,  perhaps,  from  any 
that  has  been  heretofore  brought  to  the 
attention  of  the  Commission,  under 
all  the  circumstances,  and  accepting  as 
a  basis  the  per  ton  mile  revenue  of 
5.83  mills  arrived  at  by  applying  the 
present  mileage  rate  of  35c  to  the  aver- 
age gross  weight  of  60  tons,  a  reason- 
able rate  for  the  transportation  of  loco- 
motives and  locomotives  and  tenders, 
dead,  on  their  own  wheels,  in  Southern 
Classification  territory  should  not  exceed 
the  following  rate  per  ton  mile  applied 
to  the  gross  weight  of  locomotives  and 
locomotives  and  tenders:  distance  not 
over  200  miles,  rate  per  ton  mile  gross 
weight  on  locomotives  6  mills;  over 
200  and  under  300  miles,  5.8  mills;  over 
300  and  under  400  miles,  5.6  mills;  over 
400  and  under  500  miles,  5.4  mills;  over 
500  and  under  600  miles,  5.2  mills;  over 
600  and  under  700  miles,  5.1  mills; 
over  700  miles,  5  mills.  In  calculating 
the  total  charge  the  rate  applicable  to 
Its  respective  zone  should  be  applied 
for  the  distance  in  that  zone  only;  the 
rate  applicable  to  the  final  zone  should 
not  be  applied  to  the  entire  haul.  FUR- 
THER HELD,  no  testimony  having  been 
presented  on  the  reasonableness  of  the 
advance  over  the  present  rate  of  30c 
per  mile  on  live  locomotives,  the  bur- 
den of  proof  has  not  been  met  by  the 
carriers  and  the  proposed  change  must 
be  withdrawn.  In  Re  Advances  in 
Rates  the  Transportation  of  Locomo- 
tives and  Tenders,  21  I.  C.  C.  103. 
Ord"er  modified  to  prescribe  the  mini- 
mum charge  to  be  based  on  a  minimum 
haul  of  75  miles.     21  I.  C.  C.  252. 

§105.     Lumber    and    Products. 

See  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §34  (a); 
Classification.  §17;  Facilities  and 
Privileges,    §21    (p), 

(a)  In  Ferguson  Saw  Mill  Co.  v.  St. 
L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  396, 
the  Commission  found   the  rates  on  cy- 


press lumber  from  Little  Rock  and 
Woodson,  Ark.,  to  points  in  Oklahoma, 
Kansas  and  Missouri  to  be  unreason- 
able. The  present  proceeding  involved 
a  supplemental  complaint  assailing  the 
rates  from  the  same  points  of  origin 
to  a  large  number  of  destination  points 
to  the  northwest  of  Kansas  on  the 
lines  of  various  carriers.  HELD,  under 
the  decision  of  the  Commission  re- 
ferred to,  the  rates  complained  of  are 
unjust  and  unreasonable  and  that  the 
rate  from  Little  Rock  and  Woodson  to 
Kansas  City,  Mo.,  which  is  now  24c, 
should  not  exceed  18c  per  100  lbs.  and 
the  other  rates  to  points  other  than 
Kansas  City  should  be  adjusted  upon 
the  basis  of  the  differentials  now  in 
force  over  or  under  the  rate  fixed  for 
Kansas  City.  Reparation  awarded.  Fer- 
guson Sawmill  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  & 
S.   Ry.   Co.,   23   I.   C.   C.   229. 

(b)  A  rate  of  ll^c  per  100  lbs.  for 
the  transportation  of  oak  plank  in 
carloads  from  Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to 
Des  Moines,  la.,  held  to  be  unreason- 
able to  the  extent  that  it  exceeded  the 
rate  from  St.  Louis  to  Des  Moines  of 
91/^c,  the  adjustment  between  the  lat- 
ter points  being  admitted  to  be  the 
proper  adjustment  between  Kansas  City 
and  Des  Moines.  Reparation  awarded. 
Wheeler  Lumber  Bridge  &  Supply  Co. 
V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C. 
C.    514. 

(c)  The  transcontinental  lines  ap- 
plied a  rate  of  75c  per  100  lbs.  to  trans- 
portation of  hard  lumber  from  all  points 
on  the  Missouri  River  and  east  to  Pa- 
cific coast  terminals.  This  rate  was 
raised  to  85c  and  ordered  restored  as 
to  Chicago  and  Chicago  points  and 
Mississippi  River  points.  The  railroads 
then  applied  the  85c  rate  to  points  in 
southern  Michigan,  immediately  east  of 
the  75c  territory.  Complainants  alleged 
that  they  competed  directly  with  mills 
in  75c  territory;  that  10c  per  100  lbs. 
amounted  to  $4  per  1,000  ft.  on  rough 
hardwood  lumber  or  from  $2  to  $2.50 
on  dressed  hardwood  lumber  and  under 
this  handicap  they  could  not  sell  on  the 
Pacific  coast  in  competition  with  mills 
in  75c  zone.  HELD,  that  the  85c  rate 
was  unreasonable.  A  maximum  rate 
of  80c  prescribed.  Mich.  Hardwood 
Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v  Trans.  Freight  Bureau, 
22  L  C.  C.  387. 

(d)  Complainant  attacked  a  rate  of 
43c  per  100  lbs.  charged  by  defendant"? 


666 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,   §105    (e)  — (k) 


for  the  transportation  of  cross  ties,  C. 
L.,  Yaden,  Ky.,  to  Cincinnati,  O.  It 
appeared  there  was  no  rate  at  all  law- 
fully applicable  to  these  shipments.  At 
the  time  of  shipment  a  commodity  rate 
of  lie  was  in  effect  from  Dal  and 
Verne,  Ky.,  to  Cincinnati  points  situ- 
ated near  Yaden,  and  one  of  which  is 
further  distant.  Subsequently  the  com- 
modity rate  was  applied  to  Yaden.  HELD, 
that  the  charges  exacted  were  unreason- 
able to  the  extent  they  exceeded  lie  per 
100  lbs.  Reparation  awarded,  Wheeler- 
Holden  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C. 
237. 

(e)  On  Sept.  13,  1910,  the  Southern 
Pacific  Co.  filed  with  the  Commission 
Its  tariffs  advancing  the  rates  on  rough 
green  fir  lumber  and  lath  from  points 
in  the  Willamette  Valley  to  San  Fran- 
cisco and  bay  points  to  $5  per  ton.  In 
a  former  proceeding,  14  I.  C.  C.  61,  the 
Commission  had  reduced  these  rates  to 
$3.40  per  ton  from  points  upon  the 
main  line  of  the  Southern  Pacific  east 
of  the  Willamette  River,  and  $3.65  per 
net  ton  from  points  upon  its  line  west 
of  the  river,  and  it  was  upon  the  ex- 
piration of  its  order  that  the  proposed 
advance  is  made.  On  the  average  haul 
from  the  points  to  which  it  applied  the 
$3.40  rate  produced  a  rate  per  ton  mile 
of  5.48  mills.  HELD,  that  the  rough 
green  lumber  cannot  move  from  the 
mills  of  complainants  to  market  unless 
it  receives  a  rate  lower  than  $5  per  ton 
and  that  this  rate  in  so  far  as  it 
applies  to  rough  green  fir  lumber  and 
lath  is  unjust  and  unreasonable  to  the 
extent  that  it  exceeds  $3.50  per  net 
ton  of  2,000  lbs.  from  points  upon  the 
line  of  the  defendant  east  of  the  Wil- 
lamette River  except  from  the  Wend- 
llng  branch  so  called,  and  that  rates 
from  the  Wendling  branch  and  from 
stations  upon  the  west  bank  of  the 
Willamette  River  should  not  exceed 
$3.75  per  net  ton.  This  rate  does  not 
apply  to  Portland  mills  which  are  far- 
ther distant  and  where  conditions  are 
dissimilar.  Oregon  &  Washington  Lum- 
ber Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  I  C 
C.    389. 

(f)  Ordinarily  the  same  rate  is 
applied  to  all  lumber  without  reference 
to  its  value  or  conditions;  but  to  this 
general  rule  exceptions  are  sometimes 
made.  Oregon  &  Washington  Lumber 
Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
389,   395. 


(g)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate 
on  yellow  pine  lumber  and  the  products 
thereof  which  took  yellow  pine  lumber 
rates  from  Pine  Bluff,  Ark.,  to  Memphis, 
Tenn.,  of  14c  per  100  lbs.,  a  distance  of 
191  miles,  yielding  a  revenue  of  14.7 
mills  per  ton  mile.  HELD,  that  a  rate 
of  lie  per  100  Ids.  from  Pine  Bluff  to 
Memphis  affording  earnings  via  the 
route  of  the  defendants  of  ll^/^  mills 
per  ton  mile  and  via  the  short  line 
route  should  it  see  fit  to  publish  the 
rate  of  14  mills  per  ton  mile  would 
afford  ample  compensation  for  the  serv- 
ice rendered.  Sawyer  &  Austin  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co., 
21  I.  C.  C.  464. 

(h)  Rates  on  cross  ties  of  5c  per 
100  lbs.  from  points  iu  southeastern 
Georgia  to  Jacksonville,  Fla.,  not  found 
to  be  unreasonable.  Baxter  &  Co.  v. 
G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  647,  649. 

(i)  A  carload  of  gum  lumber  was 
shipped  from  Brilliant,  Ala.,  to  Thebes, 
111.,  under  a  rate  of  23^c.  At  time  of 
shipment  the  rate  in  effect  was  16  ^/^c, 
Brilliant  to  Cairo,  111.,  Thebes  being  only 
29  miles  farther.  Subsequent  to  shipment 
rates  from  Cairo  to  Thebes  were"  re- 
duced from  7c  to  4c.  HELD,  that  al- 
though Thebes  is  commercially  less  im- 
portant than  Cairo  and  its  rates  less 
subject  to  competitive  forces  the  jate 
was  unreasonable  to  the  extent  that 
it  exceeded  20l^c.  Beekman  Lumber 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co  ,  20  I.  C.  C.  98,  99. 

(j)  Complainants  shipped  a  carload 
of  rough  fence  posts,  Devol,  Okla.,  to 
Olney,  Tex.,  on  which  a  rate  of  lie 
per  100  lbs.  was  collected,  a  distance 
of  65  miles.  This  same  shipment  moved 
from  Tushka,  Okla.,  to  Devol,  312  miles, 
under  a  rate  of  llV4,r,.  Contemporane- 
ously defendants  maintained  a  rate  of 
31/^0,  Frederick,  Okla.,  to  Burburnett, 
Tex.,  a  distance  of  37  miles.  IIKLD, 
the  rate  from  Devol  to  Olney  should  not 
exceed  7c.  R-^paiation  awarded.  Max- 
well V.  W.  F.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I. 
C.   C.  197,   199. 

(k)  Complainants  operated  saw  mills 
at  Williams,  Flagstaff  and  Cliffs,  Ariz., 
•^nd  attacked  the  rates  on  lumber  and  tim- 
ber from  these  points  to  Red  Rock, 
306  miles;  Tucson,  339  miles;  Benson, 
387  miles;  Tombstone,  416  miles;  Bis- 
bee,  451  miles;  Naco,  440  miles;  Doug- 
las, 466  miles;  Globe,  577  miles;  IMesa, 
232  miles;  Kelvin,  298  miles,  Winkel- 
man,      313     miles.      Complainants     met 


REASONABLENESS  OP  RATES,  §105   (1)— (n) 


667 


competition  in  selling  their  products  at 
these  points  with  lumber  and  timber 
which  moved  from  the  Northwest  by 
water  to  San  Pedro  and  from  thence 
by  rail.  The  haul  from  San  Pedro  to 
any  of  these  points  was  about  200  miles 
longer  than  from  complainant's  mills, 
but  San  Pedro  took  a  lower  rate. 
HELD,  that  the  rates  from  the  mills  of 
complainant  to  the  following  destina- 
tions, via  through  routes  and  under  joint 
rates,  should  not  exceed:  Red  Rock 
and  Tucson,  28c;  Benson,  30c;  Tomb- 
stone, 33c;  Bisbee,  36c;  Naco,  36c; 
Douglas,  38c;  Globe,  44c  (timber  being 
given  a  rate  of  from  9  to  14c  lower) ; 
Mesa,  26c;  Kelvin,  27c;  Winkelman, 
28c  (timber  8c  less);  the  rates  pre- 
scribed being  about  7c  less  than 
from  San  Pedro,  and  a  reduction  to 
about  66  2-3  per  cent  of  the  former 
rates.  Saginaw  &  Manistee  Lumber 
Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I. 
C.   C.   119. 

(1)  Complainant  shipped  lumber  in 
carloads,  Victoria,  Va.,  to  Alliance,  O., 
under  the  combination  rate  of  24c, 
the  cheapest  route  in  effect  at  the 
time.  It  did  not  appear  at  the  hear- 
ing. Subsequently  defendant  established 
a  rate  of  19i^c.  HELD,  the  local  rate 
exacted  was  on  the  basis  of  locals 
along  the  lines  of  defendants  through 
this  territory.  Complaint  dismissed. 
Craig  Lumber  Co.  v.  Virginian  Ry.  Co., 
19   L  C.    C.   144. 

(m)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  on 
lumber  in  carloads  from  Omaha,  Neb., 
and  Council  Bluffs,  la.,  to  points  in 
South  Dakota  on  the  Niobrara  branch 
(a  branch  line)  of  the  C  &  N.  W.  R. 
R.,  points  in  Wyoming  on  a  branch  line 
of  the  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.,  Torrington 
to  Guernsey  and  Ironton,  inclusive, 
po'nts  on  the  U.  P.  R.  R.  from 
.Jule?burg,  Colo.,  to  LaSalle,  Colo.,  and 
from  Tracy,  Wyo.,  to  Cheyenne,  Wyo., 
and  to  points  on  the  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R. 
from  Mahaska,  Kan.,  to  Roswell,  Colo. 
The  rates  attacked  on  the  C.  &  N.  W. 
appeared  to  be  about  Ic  per  100  lbs. 
higher  than  for  similar  hauls  from 
Omaha  to  points  in  Nebraska  on  the 
same  branch;  on  the  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  the 
rates  attacked  appear  to  be  about  li^c 
higher  than  for  similar  hauls  in  Ne- 
braska on  the  same  line;  the  same 
romparison  on  the  U.  P.  showed  that  the 
Wyoming  points  paid  a  little  over  3c 
per  100  lbs.  higher  than  for  similar 
hauls   in   Nebraska  and   the  rate  to  the 


Colorado  points  showed  almost  the  same 
comparison.  On  the  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
the  rates  to  Wyoming  points  were  about 
2c  higher  than  for  hauls  in  Nebraska. 
It  appeared  that  defendants'  rates  were 
consistently  graded  out  from  Omaha 
to  the  Nebraska  state  line  and  that 
with  the  exception  of  the  C.  &  N.  W.'s 
they  increased  abruptly  as  soon  as  the 
state  line  was  reached.  HELD,  that  the 
rates  exacted  are  unreasonable  and  the 
rates  attacked  on  the  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R. 
should  be  reduced  from  Ic  to  2c;  the  rate 
to  Mahaska,  Kan.,  130  miles,  reduced  to 
9c;  and  to  Goodland,  Kan.,  384  miles, 
to  19c,  and  other  hauls  proportionately. 
Rates  on  the  U.  P.  attacked  are  reduced 
by  approximately  the  same  amount; 
thus  the  rate  to  Julesburg,  Colo.,  371 
miles,  reduced  to  IS^^c;  to  Tracy,  Wyo., 
477  miles,  to  21i/^c,  and  to  other  points 
complained  of  on  the  same  line  pro- 
portionately; on  the  C.  B.  &  Q.  the 
rates  reduced  somewhat*  over  Ic  per 
100  lbs.;  to  Vaughan,  Wyo.,  519  miles, 
to  31c;  to  Guernsey,  Wyo.,  549  miles,  to 
33c;  and  other  points  proportionately. 
These  points  being  on  a  branch  line, 
therefore  the  rates  could  be  higher  than 
on  main  lines  in  well-developed  terri- 
tory where  the  density  of  traffic  is  much 
greater.  Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  156. 

(n)  Prior  to  June  1,  1908,  the  de- 
fendant carriers  had  in  effect  joint 
rates  on  yellow  pine  lumber  and  its 
products  from  producing  territory  in 
Louisiana,  Texas,  Arkansas  and  Mis- 
souri to  Lincoln  and  Omaha,  Neb.,  of 
24c  and  23c,  respectively.  These  rates 
were  subsequently  raised  to  make  cer- 
tain rate  adjustments  on  account  of 
various  orders  of  the  Commission  to 
261/^c.  The  Nebraska  legislature  passed 
an  Act  which  compelled  these  rates 
again  to  be  lowered.  There  remained, 
however,  an  area  in  western  Nebraska 
intermediate  to  points  reached  by  the 
defendant's  lines  in  Colorado  and  Wyom- 
ing, to  which  through  rates  made  up 
of  the  Omaha  and  Lincoln  combination 
would  exceed  the  Colorado  common 
point  and  Cheyenne  rates.  HELD,  the 
rate  to  Colorado  common  points  should 
be  observed  as  maximum  to  points  in 
western  Nebraska  east  of  the  Colorado 
line,  while  the  Cheyenne  rate  should  be 
observed  as  a  maximum  to  points  on 
the  line  of  the  U.  P.  R.  R.  from  Ral- 
ton  to  Smeed,  Neb.,  inclusive.  Defend- 
ants   required    to    establish    rates    from 


668 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §105    (o)  — (t) 


the  various  producing  points  named  in 
the  complaint  to  western  Nebraska 
points   reached   by   the   lines   of   the    C. 

B.  &  Q.  and  the  U.  P.  R.  Rs.,  not  to 
exceed:  On  the  U.  P.,  Joselyn  to  Bar- 
ton, Neb.,  37c  per  100  lbs.;  Ralton  to 
Smeed,  Neb.,  40c;  on  the  C.  B.  &  Q., 
Smithfield  to  Venango,  Neb.,  and  from 
Oxford  Junction  to  Sanborn,  Neb.,  37c. 
Reparation  awarded.  Louisiana  Central 
Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
L  C.  C.  333. 

(o)  On  carloads  of  oak  ties  from 
points  in  Texas  billed  through  via 
El  Paso  to  Douglas,  Ariz.,  complainants 
were  assessed  25c  for  the  haul  to  El 
Paso  over  the  T.  &  P.  R.  R.  No  joint 
through  rates  were  in  effect  from  the 
points  of  origin  in  question  to  Douglas. 
The  average  distance  to  El  Paso  from 
said  points  of  origin  is  820  miles.  For 
many  years  a  rate  of  34c  was  exacted 
on  lumber  agd  ties  to  El  Paso.  The 
25c  rate  attacked  was  prescribed  by 
the  Railroad  Commission  of  Texas  and 
yielded  6  mills  per  ton  mile.  A  pro- 
portional rate  on  pine  ties  of  18c  was 
In  effect  at  the  time  of  shipment  to 
El  Paso  on  cars  destined  to  points 
In  Arizona  and  New  Mexico.  HELD, 
the  rate  exacted  was  not  shown  to  be 
unreasonable.  Reparation  denied.  Con- 
tinental Lumber  &  Tie  Co.  v.  T.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  129,  131. 

(p)  Following  Kindelon  v.  Southern 
Pacific  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  251,  the  rate  of 
85c  on  hardwood  lumber  in  carloads 
from  points  on  and  west  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi River  to  San  Francisco,  Cal., 
and  other  Pacific  terminals  is  held  to 
be  unreasonable  to  the  extent  that  it 
exceeds  75c.  Reparation  awarded  in 
cases  involving  pertain  points  of  origin 
and  denied  following  White  Bros.  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  288. 
in  cases  involving  Glidden,  Wis.,  and 
points  beyond  Memphis,  Tenn.,  as  points 
of  origin.     Maris  v.   S.  P.  Co.,   18   I.   C 

C.  301,    302,    306,    307. 

(q)  On  carloads  of  hardwood  lumber 
from  Black  Rock,  Ark.,  to  San  Fran- 
cisco, Cal.,  a  rate  of  85c  was  charged. 
HELD,  following  Kindelon  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
17  L  C.  C.  251,  the  rate  charged  was 
unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded  on 
the  basis  of  75c.  White  Bros.  v.  A.  T. 
&    S.  F.   Ry.   Co.,   17   I.   C.    C.   416. 

(r)  On  shipments  of  logs  in  carloads 
to  Louisville,  Ky.,  from  Dyersburg,  Hen- 
ecks,   Menglewood,  Richwood   and   Troy, 


Tenn.,  complainant  was  assessed  on 
some  of  the  carloads  a  rate  of  10c. 
The  published  rate  was  12c.  Later  de- 
fendants established  and  acknowledged 
as  reasonable  a  rate  of  8c  and  of  S^/^c. 
HELD,  the  10c  charge  exacted  was  un- 
reasonable. Reparation  awarded.  New 
Albany  Box  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  315,  317. 

(s)  On  a  carload  of  split-oak  fence 
posts  from  Asher,  Okla.,  via  Amarillo, 
Tex.,  to  St.  Vrain,  N.  M.,  complainant 
was  assessed  a  rate  of  52c;  18c,  Asher 
to  Amarillo,  and  34c  thence  to  destina- 
tion. Upon  admission  of  defendants 
that  the  34c  rate  was  unreasonable,  and 
that  16c  would  be  a  fair  rate.  HELD, 
16c  should  be  established  in  the  future 
as  the  rate  from  Amarillo  to  St.  Vrain, 
and  rates  on  a  basis  corresponding 
with  the  16c  rate  should  be  established 
by  lines  west  of  Amarillo  to  points 
west  of  St.  Vrain,  to  and  including 
Vaughan,  N.  M.,  from  Amarillo  to  Ros- 
well,  N.  M.,  and  intermediate  points, 
and  from  Amarillo  to  Plain  View,  Tex., 
and  intermediate  points.  Reparation 
awarded  on  basis  of  16c.  Snook  & 
Janes  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.   C.   356,   357. 

(t)  Complainant,  millmen  located  at 
points  in  Arkansas  and  northern  Louisi- 
ana, west  of  the  Mississippi  River,  at- 
tacked the  rates  on  yellow  pine  lumber 
from  that  region  to  Cairo,  111.,  and  St. 
Louis.  In  1903  the  rates  were  raised 
from  14c  to  16c  to  Cairo,  111.,  destined 
beyond  and  from  16c  to  18c  to  St. 
Louis  and  points  basing  thereon.  Com- 
plainants attacked  this  advance.  At 
the  time  of  the  advance  blanket  rates 
were  put  into  effect  in  all  the  territory 
west  of  the  Mississippi  River  south 
of  Little  Rock,  Ark.,  extending  to  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  and  including  the  yel- 
low pine  districts  of  Texas  and  Okla- 
homa. The  institution  of  the^e  blanket 
rates  resulted  in  the  advanced  rates 
attacked,  but  did  not  result  in  raised 
rates  generally  throughout  the  territory 
to  which  these  blanket  rates  applied. 
In  Tift  and  the  Central  Yellow  Pine 
Association  cases,  10  I.  C.  C.  548,  505, 
a  raising  of  rates  on  lumber  in  terri- 
tory east  of  the  Mississippi  River  was 
condemned  and  complainants  contended 
that  they  should  be  accorded  the  same 
ruling  with  respect  to  territory  west 
of  the  Mississippi.  Transportation  con- 
ditions in  the  territories  east  and  west 
of   the   Mississippi   River  were   very  dif- 


REASONABLENESS   OF   RATES,   §105    (u)— (x) 


669 


ferent.  Some  of  the  lines  on  the 
east  side  were  among  the  older  roads 
of  the  country  and  had '  the  advantage 
of  permanent  construction,  easier 
grades,  better  station,  yard  and  siding 
facilities  and  more  valuable  terminals. 
The  denseness  of  population  and  the 
volume  of  traffic  were  greater  on  the 
east  than  on  the  west  side  of  the 
river.  On  the  east  side  the  roads  had 
terminals  at  the  ports  on  the  Gulf,  and 
handled  the  interior  export  and  import 
trade  on  lumber,  and  their  lines  extended 
directly  through  the  timber  districts  to 
Cairo  and  St.  Louis.  The  roads  on  the 
west  side  operated  long  distances 
through  low,  swampy  territory,  subject 
to  floods  and  frequent  overflow  and  for 
considerable*  distances  over  trestles,  and 
also  did  not  have  the  benefit  of  the 
export  and  import  traflftc,  receiving  as 
compensation  only  the  rate  to  Cairo  or 
to  St.  Louis,  whereas  the  east  side 
roads  received  a  portion  of  the  charge 
for  the  haul  beyond  St.  Louis  and  Cairo. 
Complainants  did  not  attack  the  rates 
in  question  as  unreasonable  per  se, 
but  only  as  discriminating  in  favor  of 
competitors  east  of  the  Mississippi 
River.  It  appeared  the  carriers  had 
co-operated  with  the  lumbermen  and 
were  important  aids  in  opening  up 
permanent  markets  for  yellow  pine 
from  the  region  in  question  in  compe- 
tition with  woods  from  the  North  and 
Northwest..  During  1907  and  1908  there 
were  larger  percentages  of  increase  in 
the  movement  of  lumber  from  the  west 
side  of  the  river  than  from  the  east 
side.  Complainants  admitted  the  de- 
sirability of  blanket  rates  and  it  ap- 
peared the  blanket  system  could  not 
be  maintained  if  the  rates  in  question 
were  reduced.  HELD,  the  complaint 
should  be  dismissed.  Chicago  Lumber 
ft  Coal  Co.  V.  T.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
323,  331-334;  Winn  Parish  Lumber  Co. 
V.  A.   S.  Ry.   Co.,   16   L   C.  C.  335. 

(u)  On  a  carload  of  yellow  pine 
lumber  from  Lake  Charles,  La.,  to 
El  Paso,  Tex.,  complainant  was  assessed 
32i^c.  The  shipment  moved  from  Lake 
Charles  to  Alexandria  via  the  St.  Louis, 
Watkins  &  Gulf  R.  R.  and  thence  via 
the  T.  &  P.  R.  R.  to  El  Paso,  a  dis- 
tance of  1,067  miles.  The  distance  via 
the  Southern  Pacific  was  972  miles,  and 
at  the  time  the  shipments  moved  a 
rate  of  25c  was  in  effect  between  the 
points  in  question  over  that  line.  Said 
S.  P.'s  tariff,  however,  provided  that  in 


connection  with  the  St.  L.  W.  &  G. 
Ry.,  its  rate  should  be  32i^c.  About 
one  year  after  shipment  moved  defend- 
ants St.  L.  W.  &  G.  and  T.  &  P.  R.  Rs. 
reduced  their  rate  to  25c.  No  other  evi- 
dence was  submitted  as  to  the  reason- 
ableness per  se  of  the  rate  exacted. 
HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was  not  shown 
to  be  unreasonable.  Menefee  Lumber 
Co.  V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  49, 
51. 

(v)  On  a  carload  of  lumber  from 
Fostoria,  Tex.,  to  Melrose,  N.  M.,  a 
rate  of  41c  was  exacted,  made  up  of 
the  33c  rate  from  Fostoria  to  Texico 
and  of  the  8c  rate  from  Texico  to 
Melrose.  Some  four  months  after  the 
shipment  moved  defendants  voluntarily 
established  a  joint  through  rate  of 
33c.  Complainant  did  not  file  its  pe- 
tition until  after  said  reduction  was 
made.  No  other  evidence  of  the  un- 
reasonableness of  said  41c  rate  was 
offered.  HELD,  said  rate  was  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable.  Foster 
Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
15    L    C.    C.    56,    57. 

(w)  On  a  carload  of  lumber  from 
Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Canton,  S.  D.,  com- 
plainant was  charged  20c  per  100  lbs. 
At  the  time  a  rate  was  in  effect  from 
Council  Bluffs  to  Canton  of  9.03c  plus 
$5  per  car  bridge  charge.  Subsequent  to 
the  shipment  defendant  named  said  rate 
and  bridge  charge  to  apply  at  Omaha. 
HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was  unreason- 
able. Reparation  awarded.  Bowman- 
Kranz  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  277,  278. 

(x)  Complainant  was  charged  on  a 
carload  of  lumber  shipped  from  Boyd, 
Wis.,  to  Palermo,  N.  D.,  48^c  per  100 
lbs.,  based  on  the  combination  of 
locals,  no  through  rate  being  in  force 
between  these  points.  He  was  also 
charged  28c  per  100  lbs.  on  a  shipment 
of  immigrants'  movables  made  at  the 
same  time  and  between  the  same 
points.  The  rate  on  lumber  from  Se- 
attle, Wash.,  eastbound  to  Palermo,  a 
distance  of  1,255  miles,  was  48c  per 
100  lbs.,  the  distance  from  Boyd  to 
Palermo  being  703  miles.  Since  the  fil- 
ing of  the  petition  another  railway  re- 
duced its  local  rate  from  Minnesota 
Transfer  to  Palermo,  which  reduction 
was  made  to  meet  competition.  HELD, 
the  charge  of  48i/^c  was  not  unreasonable. 
Reparation  denied.  William  Patten 
V.  Wisconsin  Central  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
189,   190. 


670 


REASONABLENESS    OP   RATES,    §105    (y)  — (ee) 


(y)  Complainant  sought  to  recover 
reparation  on  shipments  of  cedar  cross 
ties  made  between  February  23  and 
March  12,  1906,  from  Wilcox  and  Ridge, 
Mich.,  to  South  Chicago,  111.,  upon  which 
charges  were  assessed  at  13c  per  100 
lbs.  By  mistake  defendants  had  al- 
lowed to  another  shipper  a  rate  of  10c 
per  cross  tie  in  carloads  shipped  from 
Wilcox  to  Chicago  in  March  and     April, 

1905.  For  some   time   prior  to  Feb.   28, 

1906,  a  rate  of  10c  per  tie  was  allowed 
by  defendants  on  shipments  from  Au 
Train,  Underwood,  White  Fish,  Rock 
River  and  Ellison,  Mich.,  to  Chicago, 
which  rate  was  cai  celed,  effective 
March  14,  1906.  After  that  date  a 
uniform  rate  of  13c  per  100  lbs.  was 
applied  from  all  stations  east  of  Mar- 
quette. Another  carrier,  not  involved 
in  this  proceeding,  was  charging  10c  per 
tie  on  shipments  from  points  about 
the  same  distance  from  Chicago  as  Wil- 
cox and  Ridge,  which  rate,  however, 
was  forced  by  water  competition.  Prior 
to  March  14,  1906,  and  thereafter,  the 
rate  on  lumber  from  above  mentioned 
towns,  including  Ridge  and  Wilcox,  to 
Chicago  was  12c  per  100  lbs.  HELD, 
the  rate  of  13c  per  100  lbs.  on  cross 
ties  from  Ridge  and  Wilcox,  Mich.,  to 
South  Chicago,  was  unreasonable;  that 
in  the  future  it  should  not  exceed  the 
12c  charge  for  lumber,  and  complainant 
was  entitled  to  reparation  for  the  ex- 
cess with  interest  on  shipments  made 
between  Feb.  23  and  March  12,  1906. 
Forster  Bros.  Co.  v.  D.  S.  S.  &  A.  Ry. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  232,  234,  235,  246. 

(z)  A  rate  of  27i^c  per  100  lbs., 
C.  L.,  on  yellow  pine  lumber  was 
charged,  Ashdown,  Ark.,  Lake  Charles, 
La.,  and  Port  Arthur,  Tex.,  to  Des 
Moines,  la.,  as  against  a  rate  of  26c 
from  these  points  over  tne  same  route 
to  Chicago.  Other  carriers  not  passing 
through  Des  Moines  were  in  competition 
with  defendants  in  shipments  from  these 
points  to  Chicago,  all  of  which  charged 
the  rate  of  26c.  HELD,  such  facts  did 
not  of  themselves  show  the  27i^c  rate 
to  Des  Moines  to  be  unreasonable. 
Greater  Des  Moines  Committee,  Inc.,  v. 
C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C  C.  294,  295. 

(aa)  The  26c  rate  on  lumber  from 
Jackson,  Miss.,  to  Chicago,  111.,  having 
been  held  in  Central  Yellow  Pine  Co. 
V.  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  10  I.  C. 
C.  505,  to  be  excessive,  to  the  extent 
of  2c,  complainant,  shipper  of  lumber 
between  said  points  since  that  decision 


having  been  charged  the  26c  rate,  is 
entitled  to  a  reparation  of  2c.  Hayden 
^  Westcott  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  &  S.  I. 
R.    R.    Co.,    14    L    C.   C.    537,    537. 

(bb)  A  charge  of  26c  per  100  lbs. 
on  a  carload  of  lumber  shipped  from 
Jackson,  Miss.,  to  Chicago,  111.,  having 
been  paid  by  complainant's  consignee 
and  debited  against  complainant,  is  ex- 
cessive under  Hayden  &  Westcott  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  G.  &  S.  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  537,  and  complainant  is  entitled 
to  reparation  for  the  excess  above  24c. 
Hayden  &  Westcott  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  & 
S.    I.    R.    R.    Co.,    14    I.    C.    C.    539. 

(cc)  A  charge  of  26c  on  a  shipment 
of  lumber  from  Jackson,  Miss.,  to  Chi- 
cago, 111.,  is  excessive,  and  under  Hay- 
den &  Westcott  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  &  S. 
L  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  537,  complain- 
ant is  entitled  to  recover  the  excess 
above  24c.  Hayden  &  Westcott  Lumber 
Co.  V.  G.  &  S.  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  540. 

(dd)  On  cross  ties  in  carloads  from 
points  on  the  Nashville  division  of  the 
Southern  Ry.  to  Pawnee  Junction  and 
Paxton,  111.,  rates  were  charged  of  37.9 
and  35.58c  per  tie,  respectively.  Shortly 
after  shipments  moved  defendants  put 
into  effect  a  rate  of  19i^c  on  said 
movements.  Defendant  admitted  that 
the  rates  charged  were  unreasonable 
and  that  19i^c  was  a  reasonable  charge. 
HELD,  the  rates  charged  were  unrea- 
sonable. Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  19i^c.  Holcomb-Hayes  Co.  v. 
I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  16,  19. 

(ee)  For  15  years  prior  to  1903,  de- 
fendants maintained  a  rate  of  10c  on 
hardwood  lumber  from  Memphis  to  New 
Orleans.  In  1903  they  raised  it  to  12c 
and  complainant  attacked  it.  Defend- 
ants, owing  to  increased  capacity  of 
cars  and  engines,  were  able,  since  1903, 
to  haul  from  20  to  25  per  cent  more 
in  a  car  and  a  much  greater  tonnage 
per  train  than  formerly.  Practically 
all  the  hardwood  lumber  from  Mem- 
phis shipped  to  New  Orleans  was  for 
export.  The  same  was  delayed  for  a 
long  period  at  New  Orleans  and  no 
demurrage  charge  was  exacted  of  ship- 
pers. Delay  was  caused  by  the  failure 
of  defendants  to  provide  wharfage  and 
dockage  facilities  at  New  Orleans. 
Lumber  constituted  the  largest  tonnage 
of  all  the  commodities  transported  by  de- 
fendants between  the  points  in  ques- 
tion; was  less  liable  to  damage;  moved 
in    any    kind    of    car,    and    moved    with 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §105   (ff)  — (jj) 


671 


greater  regularity  throughout  the  year 
than  any  other  commodity.  Although 
operating  expenses  had  increased  in 
recent  years  the  gross  receipts  and  net 
revenues  had  correspondingly  increased 
and  the  cost  of  handling  a  ton  of 
freight  had  not  increased.  The  rate 
on  gum  lumber  was  not  raised  at  the 
time  of  the  advance  attacked  and  con- 
tinued to  move  under  the  10c  rate. 
While  oak  lumber  weighed  30  per  cent 
more  than  gum  lumber,  it  yet  paid  a 
rate  of  2c  higher  and  produced  a  gross 
revenue  per  car  under  the  rates  at- 
tacked 70  per  cent  greater.  Cotton  was 
five  times  as  valuable  as  oak  and 
subject  to  damage  by  fire,  yet,  oak, 
under  the  rates  attacked,  earned  50  per 
cent  more  revenue  per  car.  The  same 
disparity  in  earnings  existed  with  re- 
spect to  molasses,  sugar  and  cotton- 
seed meal  and  cake  as  compared  with 
oak  lumber.  The  12c  rate  complained 
of  yielded  6.07  mills  per  ton  mile  as 
compared  with  5.7  mills,  the  average 
on  all  trafiic.  HELD,  following  the 
decisions  condemning  the  advanced 
rates  on  yellow  pine  from  southern 
points  to  destinations  beyond  the  Ohio 
River  in  Central  Yellow  Pine  Ass'n  v. 
I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  and  Tift  v.  S.  R.  Co., 
10  I.  C.  C.  505  and  548,  the  rate  at- 
tacked was  unreasonable  and  should  not 
exceed  10c.  Thompson  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R. 
R.    Co.,   13   I.    C.    C.    657,    664. 

(ff)  Complainants  attacked  the  rate 
of  85c  on  hardwood  lumber,  consist- 
ing of  fir  and  oak,  from  Chicago  points 
and  Mississippi  River  points,  including 
Memphis,  to  the  Pacific  coast.  For 
ten  years  prior  to  1904,  the  rate  had 
been  75c.  Complainants  contended  the 
rate  should  not  be  higher  than  the  60c 
rate  on  soft  wood  lumber  from  the 
Pacific  coast  to  Chicago.  In  actual 
practice  west  bound  fir  and  oak  was  not 
loaded  more  heavily  than  east  bound 
soft  wood  lumber,  although  it  might 
have  been  so  loaded  had  the  minima 
regulations  of  defendants  so  required. 
The  empty  car  movement  was  predom- 
inating eastward  from  San  Francisco 
and  Los  Angeles  and  points  south  there- 
of, the  principal  markets  for  complain- 
ants' products.  Complainants'  hard 
wood  lumber  was  worth  more  than  the 
soft  wood  lumber  eastward  bound  from 
the  Pacific  coast.  Pacific  coast  lumber 
moving  eastward  came  into  competition 
with  the  products  from  southern  forests 
which    tended    to   reduce   the    eastbound 


rates  on  same.  Complainants'  lumber 
shipped  to  the  Pacific  coast  came  into 
competition  with  foreign  products.  The 
price  at  which  it  was  "  S0I4  was  high 
and  the  nature  of  the  use  to  which 
it  was  put  was  such  that  in  many 
cases  a  slight  difference  in  price  did 
not  determine  the  sale.  A  rate  of  10c 
higher  did,  however,  considerably  in- 
fluence sales  on  the  Pacific  coast  to 
the  disadvantage  of  complainants.  While 
the  lower  east  bound  rates  on  soft 
wood  lumber  from  the  Pacific  coast 
were  justified  in  part  by  the  greater 
volume  than  west  bound  shipments  of 
hard  wood,  this  was  offset  somewhat 
by  the  fact  that  the  hard  wood  ship- 
Tients  could  be  moved  at  the  con- 
venience of  the  carriers  and  single 
carloads  might  be  retained  at  junction 
points  until  consolidated  into  trains. 
The  75c  rate  from  the  points  in  ques- 
tion to  the  Pacific  coast  in  effect  for 
ten  years  prior  to  1904  were  voluntarily 
established  and  maintained  and  were 
not  the  result  of  water  competition. 
HELD,  complainants'  demand  that  the 
rate  attacked  be  reduced  to  60c  was 
'^ot  justified,  but  the  rate  should  be 
lowered  to  75c.  Burgess  v.  Transcon- 
tinental Freight  Bureau,  13  1.  C.  C. 
668,    675,    678. 

(gg)  Rates  on  mixed  carloads  of 
glazed  sash,  door  and  window  screens, 
door  and  window  frames,  columns  and 
gable  ornaments,  from  Sioux  City,  la., 
to  Lemmon,  S.  D.,  should  not  exceed  rate 
in  effect  from  St.  Paul  and  Minneapolis, 
Minn.,  to  Lemmon,  S.  D.  Back  v.  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  292. 

(hh)  Rates  on  lumber  from  River 
Falls,  Ala.,  to  Waynetown,  Ind:,  should 
not  exceed  rates  in  effect  to  other  points 
in  Indiana.  Greer-Houghton  Lumber  Co. 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  303. 

(ii)  Rates  on  cordwood  from  Maiden 
Rock,  Wis.,  to  Minneapolis,  Minn.,  found 
unreasonable  and  reparation  awarded. 
Minneapolis  Bedding  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q. 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.' Op.  329. 

(jj)  Following  Burgess  v.  Transconti- 
nental Freight  Bureau,  13  I.  C.  C.  668, 
reparation  awarded  on  account  of  un- 
reasonable rates  charged  for  transpor- 
tation of  various  shipments  of  hardwood 
lumber  from  eastern  points  to  Los 
Angeles,  Cal.  Western  Hardwood  Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  463. 


672 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §105  (kk)— §106  (d) 


(kk)  Rates  on  cedar  poles  should  not 
exceed  the  rates  on  lumber  between  the 
same  points.  Reparation  awarded.  Na- 
tional Pole  Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  465. 

(11)  Rates  on  yellow  pine  box  shooks 
should  not  exceed  current  rate  on  yellow 
pine  lumber.  Reparation  awarded.  Saw- 
yer &  Austin  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M. 
&  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  478. 

(mm)  Reparation  awarded  on  ship- 
ments of  hardwood  lumber  from  Glidden, 
Wis.,  to  San  Francisco,  Cal.,  following 
Burgess  and  Kindelon  cases.  Howard 
&  Co.  V.  W.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  569. 

(nn)  Rates  on  wooden  bungs  in  bar- 
rels found  unreasonable;  lower  rate 
established  and  reparation  awarded. 
Koch  Butchers  Supply  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.   572. 

(oo)  Rate  on  hickory  logs  found  un- 
reasonable. Lower  rates  established  and 
reparation  awarded.  French  Broad  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  586. 

§106.     Malt. 

(a)  Defendant's  rates  for  transpor- 
tation of  barley  and  malt  in  carloads 
from  Minneapolis,  Minn.,  to  California 
terminals  were  55c  and  65c  per  100  lbs., 
respectively.  Malt  is  manufactured  by 
allowing  barley  to  germinate  and  then 
drying  it  in  kilns.  It  is  worth  on  the 
average  50  per  cent  more  than  barley. 
HELD,  that  carriers  may  make  a  rea- 
sonable differential  between  the  rates 
on  raw  material  and  the  -article  manu- 
factured therefrom,  but  that  the  differ- 
ential between  the  rates  on  malt  and 
barley  should  not  exceed  7c  per  100 
lbs.  Reparation  denied.  Electric  Malt- 
ing Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.   C.    C.  378. 

(b)  Complainant,  a  brewery  at  Fort 
Worth,  Tex.,  attacked  defendant's  rates 
on  malt,  C.  L.,  from  points  in  Illinois, 
Wisconsin  and  Minnesota  to  Fort 
Worth.  The  contention  of  the  com- 
plainant was  that  although  defendants 
and  other  carriers  throughout  the  coun- 
try ordinarily  applied  to  the  movement 
Of  malt,  rates  which  were  the  same  as 
the  rates  established  for  the  movement 
of  corn,  barley  and  other  grains,  de- 
fendant's Class  E  rates,  materially 
higher  than  the  commodity  rates  men- 
tioned, were  applied  to  the  movement  of 
malt  to  Texas  common  points.  The 
Class    E    rates    were    48c    per    100    lbs. 


from  Chicago  and  Milwaukee,  and  53c 
from  Minneapolis.  The  rates  from  Chi- 
cago to  Forth  Worth  were  33c  on  wheat, 
and  38c  on  flour,  29i/^c  on  corn  and 
32%c  on  cornmeal,  and  29%c  on  barley. 
Substantially  the  same  adjustment  ap- 
plied from  Milwaukee  and  Minneapolis 
from  which  the  barley  rates  were  30i/^c 
and  33c,  respectively.  Throughout  sub- 
stantially the  entire  country  the  car- 
riers applied  to  the  transportation  of 
malt,  rates  which  were  the  same  as 
those  for  the  transportation  of  barley, 
and  defendants  applied  the  barley  rate 
on  malt,  up  to  the  very  door  of  Texas 
common  point  territory.  HELD,  this 
creates  at  least  a  strong  impression, 
if  not  a  presumption  of  fact,  that  the 
rates  so  generally  applied  by  defend- 
ants to  the  transportation  of  malt  and 
which  must  be  assumed  to  be  compen- 
satory, would  afford  fair  remuneration 
for  the  carriage  of  that  commodity  to 
Texas  common  points.  That  the  rates 
on  malt  to  Fort  Worth  ought  not  to 
exceed  34i/^c  from  Chicago,  35i^c  from 
Milwaukee  and  38c  from  Minneapolis. 
FURTHER  HELD,  that  although  the 
rates  mentioned  will  be  reasonable  for 
the  future,  substantial  justice  does  not 
call  for  reparation  and  it  is  therefore 
denied.  Texas  Brewing  Co.  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.   F.   Ry.   Co.,   21  1.  C.   C.  171. 

(c)  In  an  attack  by  a  brewery  in 
Fort  Worth  upon  the  malt  rate,  C.  L., 
from  Illinois,  Wisconsin  and  Minnesota 
to  Fort  Worth,  Tex.,  it  was  contended 
by  defendants  that  to  grant  the  prayer 
of  the  petition  would  be  to  disrupt 
rates  to  a  large  expanse  of  territory, 
which  should  never  be  done  upon  the 
prayer  of  a  single  complainant  ex- 
cept in  a  case  of  most  manifest  injus- 
tice. HELD,  that  it  is  obvious  that 
the  exaction  of  an  unreasonable  rate 
upon  a  considerable  volume  of  traffic 
is  a  manifest  injustice,  and  the  com- 
plainant cannot  be  deprived  of  the  rate 
to  which  it  is  entitled,  because  all 
the  brewing  interests  in  Texas  have 
not  joined  in  the  petition.  Texas 
Brewing  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
21    I.    C.    C.    171,    175. 

(d)  Defendant's  rate  on  carloads  of 
malt  from  Chilton,  Wis.,  to  Kansas 
City  was  10c  at  the  time  complainant 
contracted  to  make  shipments  between 
those  points.  Shortly  thereafter  de- 
fendant raised  the  rate  to  13 %c  and  a 
few  months  after  complainant  completed 
shipments  at   that  higher   rate   restored 


REAS0NABLENP:SS  of  rates,  §106  (e)— §111  (a) 


673 


the  10c  rate.  HELD,  the  rate  exacted 
was  unreasonable  to  the  extent  it  ex- 
ceeded 10c.  Reparation  awarded.  Chil- 
ton Malting  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  10,  11. 

(e)  Reduction  in  rate  on  malt  and  in- 
crease in  proportional  rate  on  barley  to 
equal  local  rate  on  malt  do  not  of  them- 
selves constitute  grounds  for  reparation. 
Electric  Malting  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  504. 

§107.     Manila    Paper    Folders. 

(a)  On  manila  paper  filing  folders 
In  less  than  carloads  from  Chicago,  111., 
to  Portland,  Ore.,  a  rate  of  $3  per  100 
lbs.  was  charged.  The  tariff  on  manila 
tag  board  was  $1:10  per  100  lbs.;  on 
stationery,  $3  per  100  lbs.  There  was 
no  specific  rate  for  manila  paper  filing 
folders.  Uncertainty  had  existed  as  to 
what  rate  should  be  applied.  HELD, 
the  rate  was  discriminatory  to  the  ex- 
tent that  it  exceeded  $1.75  per  100  lbs. 
Upon  proof  of  shipments,  reparation 
will  be  ordered.  Gill  Co.  v.  O.  R.  R.  &  N. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  442. 

(b)  Rate  on  manila  wrapping  paper, 
flat  in  bundles,  should  not  exceed  the 
rate  on  manila  wrapping  paper  folded. 
Robertson  Paper  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.   Op.  206. 

§108.     Masurite. 

(a)  Masurite  and  kanite  are  propri- 
etary names  for  high  explosive  powders, 
composed  essentially  of  nitrate  of  am- 
monia and  some  organic  substance  akin 
to  oxidized  oil,  the  exact  composition  of 
each  being  trade  secrets.  Whatever  dif- 
ference there  may  be  between  these  ex- 
plosives in  other  respects,  there  is  none 
between  them  from  a  transportation 
standpoint,  it  being  conceded  that  kanite 
is  no  more  dangerous  to  carry  than 
masurite.  Blumenstein  v.  P.  &  R.  Ry. 
Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  90,  92. 

(b)  Masurite  is  exploded  by  means 
of  a  detonating  cap  imbedded  in  the 
material.  It  will  not  explode  from  con- 
cussion or  burning,  and  practically  the 
only  danger  in  its  transportation  is 
from  an  explosion  of  dynamite  carried 
on  the  same  train.  Dynamite,  as  an 
explosive,  is  preferable  to  masurite  ex- 
cept for  the  element  of  safety  in  the 
handling  of  the  latter.  Masurite  sells 
at  gi^c  per  lb.  f.  o.  b.  factory  and 
dynamite  from  9  to  14c.  HELD,  that 
defendants'    double    first-class    L.    C.    L. 


and  first-class  C.  L.  rate  being  the 
same  as  those  applied  to  dynamite, 
were  unreasonable  and  that  second- 
class  rates  for  carloads  should  be  ap- 
plied. Masurite  Explosive  Co.  v.  Pitts- 
burg &  Lake  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C. 
C.    405,    408. 

§109.     Merchandise. 

(a)  Complainant  paid  for  the  trans- 
portation of  general  merchandise  from 
certain  eastern  points  to  Yuma,  Ariz., 
a  rate  in  excess  of  the  rate  from  those 
points  to  Los  Angeles,  Cal.,  plus  the 
local  rates  from  Los  Angeles  to  Yuma. 
HELD,  the  rates  charged  complainant 
were  unreasonable  to  the  extent  that 
they  exceeded  the  rates  from  the  sev- 
eral points  of  origin  to  Los  Angeles, 
plus  the  rates  from  Los  Angeles  to 
Yuma.  Reparation  awarded.  Sanguin- 
etti  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  185, 
186. 

§110.     Metal     Furniture    Knobs. 

(a)  On  less-than-carload  shipments  of 
metal  furniture  knobs  or  trimmings 
from  Grand  Haven,  Mich.,  Rome,  N. 
Y.,  and  Waterbury,  Conn.,  to  San  Fran- 
cisco, Cal.,  complainant  was  assessed 
$3  per  100  lbs.  Shortly  after  ship- 
ments moved  defendants  established  a 
commodity  rate  of  $2.  The  $3  rate 
applied  was  the  first-class  rate  on  fur- 
niture and  trimmings.  Some  of  de- 
fendants admitted  the  unreasonable- 
ness of  the  charge  exacted.  Nothing 
was  introduced  in  evidence  to  show 
that  metal  furniture  knobs  or  trim- 
mings were  not  the  same  material  as 
brass  shelves  and  canopies  for  lighting 
fixtures  which  took  a  rate  of  $2.  HELD, 
following  Merle  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  471,  the  charge  ex- 
acted was  unreasonable.  Reparation 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  $2.  Merle 
Co.  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
17   I.   C.    C.   585,   586. 

§111.     Milk    and    Cream. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  New 
England  or  leased-car  system  as  applied 
to  transportation  of  milk  to  Boston, 
Mass.     Defendant   carrier   had   in   effect 

(1)  a  per  can  rate  based  on  distance 
under  which  the  milk  was  carried  in 
baggage    cars    and    no    icing    furnished; 

(2)  a  rate  for  a  milk  car  of  $125  per 
mile  per  year  from  one  to  75  miles, 
with  an  addition  of  $112.50  per  mile 
beyond    75   miles   and   up   to   125   miles, 


674 


REASONABLENESS  OP  RATES,  §111    (a) 


and  a  further  addition  of  $75  per  mile 
for  over  125  miles,  the  maximum  load 
being  1,050  cans,  with  an  additional 
charge  for  those  in  excess  of  that 
number;  (3)  carload  rates  for  service 
in  refrigerator  cars  upon  its  freight 
trains,  the  rate  being  75  per  cent 
of  that  for  passenger  service  when  in 
ordinary  refrigeration  cars,  and  65  per 
cent  in  tank  cars,  with  the  right  upon 
the  part  of  the  shipper  to  receive 
milk  or  creain  at  certain  designated 
points.  Under  these  rates  there  was 
no  provision  for  the  movement  of  milk 
by  the  can  under  ice  furnished  by  de- 
fendant carrier,  but  the  tariff  permitted 
any  shipper  to  transport  cans  on  the 
leased  cars  by  paying  directly  to  the 
operator  the  rate  of  transportation  and 
%c  per  car  in  addition  for  icing  facili- 
ties. The  leased  cars  were  used  by 
operators  who  purchased  the  milk  of 
the  farmers  in  a  given  section  and  as- 
sembled it  into  carloads  for  shipment. 
On  account  of  the  small  output  of  the 
average  .  dairy,  this  assembling  of  the 
milk  was  necessary  in  order  to  secure 
the  carload  rate.  As  a  single  car 
would  serve  a  given  section,  only  one 
operator  purchased  in  that  section  and 
gained  a  monopoly  of  the  business,  and 
the  entire  Boston  milk  supply  was  prac- 
tically controlled  by  two  or  three  large 
concerns.  The  leased  cars  could  be 
handled  more  economically  and  the 
rate  was  lower  than  the  per  can  rate. 
The  service  under  the  latter  rate  was 
unavailable  on  account  of  lack  of  icing 
facilities.  The  leased-car  system  was 
defended  on  the  following  grounds: 
(1)  Benefits  derived  from  the  caretaker 
provided  by  the  operator.  This  care- 
taker came  into  daily  contact  with 
the  farmers  and  received  suggestions  as 
to  the  improvement  of  the  service.  He 
saw  that  the  milk  was  properly  marked, 
thereby  preventing  friction  between  the 
farmer  and  the  contractor  or  operator. 
He  rejected  unfit  milk,  and  saw  that 
the  milk  was  loaded  in  such  a  way  as 
to  insure  the  most  convenient  removal 
of  cans  from  the  car.  (2)  Heavier 
loading  obtained  under  the  leased-car 
system.  The  cost  of  icing  and  operat- 
ing of  a  car  being  the  same,  whether 
it  contained  100  or  1,000  cans,  the  han- 
dling of  milk  by  the  operators  in  full 
carloads  made  for  economy.  (3)  The 
terminal  situation.  The  large  operators 
had  provided  in  Boston  facilities  for  re- 
ceiving and  handling  the  milk.  The 
cars  were  hauled  directly  to  the  plants 


of  the  operators,  whereas,  if  each  dealer 
received  his  milk  at  the  passenger  sta- 
tion, a  wagon  haul  of  several  miles 
would  be  involved,  increasing  the  ex- 
pense of  exposing  the  milk  to  improper 
temperatures.  (4)  The  disposition  of 
surplus  milk.  Since  the  consumption 
of  milk  at  Boston  varied  from  day  to 
day  it  was  necessary  to  provide  for 
the  disposition  of  the  surplus.  This 
was  done  advantageously  by  maintain- 
ing a  creamery  along  the  way  and 
intercepting  large  portions  on  its  way 
to  market  at  some  country  point,  where 
it  was  manufactured  into  butter  or 
condensed  milk.  (5)  The  leased  sys- 
tem had  been  in  effect  for  some  fifteen 
years  and  the  operators  had  expended 
large  sums  in  extensive  facilities.  (6) 
The  regulations  adopted  by  the  state 
of  Massachusetts  and  the  city  of  Boston 
were  such  as  would  virtually  prohibit 
the  handling  of  milk  in  small  quanti- 
ties on  account  of  the  strict  require- 
ments as  to  cleanliness,  temperature, 
delivery  in  sealed  packages,  etc.  The 
tendency  of  the  leased-car  system  was 
toward  monopoly  and  under  it  there 
was  probably  no  competition  except  in 
the  quality  of  milk  supplied.  The  evi- 
dence indicated  that  to  destroy  uio 
system  and  to  establish  an  exclusive 
per  can  rate  would  increase  the  cost 
to  the  consumer  some  20  per  cent  and 
would  result  in  poorer  sanitary  con- 
ditions. Under  the  system  attacked 
the  price  paid  the  farmer  for  the  milk  had 
been  distinctly  higher  than  that  paid 
to  the  farmer  for  supplying  any  other 
city.  The  price  charged  the  consumer 
in  Boston  had  been  about  the  average 
of  that  charged  in  other  cities.  In 
quality  the  Boston  supply  equaled  or 
exceeded  that  of  any  great  city.  The 
evidence  indicated  that  even  if  a  per 
can  system  was  established  so  as  to 
enable  the  farmer  to  ship  directly  to 
independent  dealers  in  Boston,  the 
monopolistic  tendency  would  not  there- 
by be  checked.  HELD,  that  the  ship- 
Mcr  was  entitled  to  a  per  can  rate  with 
icing  facilities,  but  that  the  defendant 
should  not  be  required  to  furnish  cars 
with  such  facilities  unless  it  was  rea- 
sonably assured  of  shipments  of  at 
•east  600  cans  of  milk;  that  the  per 
can  rate  might  be  higher  than  the 
leased-car  rate  but  must  not  be  un- 
reasonably so;  and  that  the  leased-car 
system  was  not  unlawful  in  itself  ex- 
cept in  so  far  as  the  carrier  failed 
to    furnish    a    per    can    rate    with    icing 


REASONABLENESS  OP  RATES,  §111   (b)— (d) 


675 


facilities,  with  the  result  that  the  ship- 
per was  compelled  to  pay  the  transpor- 
tation charge  to  the  operator  instead 
of  to  the  carrier  and  to  disclose  the 
secrets  of  his  business  to  the  operator 
by  the  shipment  of  his  cans  in  the 
leased  cars.  Albree  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R. 
Co.,   22   I.   C.   C.   303,   327. 

(b)  Complainants,  who  operated 
creameries,  conducting  their  business 
in  Minneapolis  and  St.  Paul,  drew  their 
supplies  of  cream  from  Minnesota  and 
neighboring  states,  and  attempted  to  have 
established  the  scale  of  rates  applicable 
to  the  transportation  of  cream  in 
cans  by  the  defendants  as  established 
by  the  Commission  in  Beatrice  Cream- 
ery Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
109.  Some  years  before  the  complaint 
the  railroad  commission  of  Minnesota 
established  a  scale  of  rates  of  which 
the  rates  of  the  defendant  were  almost 
a  reproduction.  These  rates  were  put 
into  effect  to  foster  the  local  creameries 
at  the  expense  of  the  centralizer.  The 
state  of  Minnesota  on  application  re- 
fused to  revise  its  rates  holding  that 
the  local  creameries  should  be  assisted. 
North  Dakota  objected  to  the  putting  in 
of  the  Beatrice  rates-  for  the  same  rea- 
son. HELD,  that  it  would  be  the  incli- 
nation of  the  Commission  to  leave  the 
rates  as  they  are  if  it  could  properly 
do  so,  because  there  ought  always  to 
be  harmony  between  state  and  inter- 
state rates,  but  that  the  complainants 
are  engaged  in  interstate  commerce  and 
the  very  purpose  of  the  Commission 
is  to  see  that  persons  requiring  inter- 
state transportation  shall  be  afforded 
just  and  reasonable  charges  for  their 
service,  and  the  Commission  has  no 
right  to  respect  any  policy  of  the  state 
of  Minnesota  nor  North  Dakota  which 
interferes  with  the  application  of  a 
just  and  reasonable  charge  for  an  inter- 
state transportation  service,  and  the 
rates  were  unreasonable  for  a  distance 
of  510  miles  from  St.  Paul  to  practically 
the  extent  which  they  exceeded  the 
rates  prescribed  in  the  Beatrice  case. 
Cobb  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  1.  C.  C.  100, 
103. 

(c)  Defendants'  rates  from  Poultney 
and  West  Pawlett,  Vt.,  to  Eagle  Bridge, 
N.  Y.,  on  milk  destined  thence  to 
Boston  was  $16  per  car  of  250  cans 
or  less  and  for  the  excess  over  250 
cans,  6^c  per  can.  The  less-than-car- 
load  rate  was  16c  per  can  of  40 
quarts.      The    distances    from    Poultney 


and  from  West  Pawlett,  respectively,  to 
Eagle  Bridge  were  45  miles  and  33 
miles.  The  rate  charged  for  the  haul 
between  said  points  was  in  the  nature 
of  a  proportional  of  the  longer  haul  to 
Boston,  the  milk  being  unloaded  and 
inspected  in  transit  at  Eagle  Bridge. 
HELD,  the  $16  per  car  rate  and  the 
6^/^c  per  can  rate  for  the  excess  over  250 
cans  in  the  same  car  were  reasonable; 
but  that  the  less-than-carload  rate  of 
16c  was  excessive  and  should  be  re- 
duced to  10c.  Hood  &  Sons  v.  Dela- 
ware &  Hudson  Co.,  17   L   C.  C.  15,  20. 

(d)  Local  creameries  are  those  to 
which  the  milk  and  cream  are  brought 
by  wagon.  Centralizers  receive  their 
supply  of  cream  by  railroad.  Complain- 
ant centralizers  attacked  the  rates  on 
cream  throughout  the  country,  espe- 
cially in  the  territory  within  a  radius 
of  some  500  miles  from  Chicago  and 
within  a  similar  distance  from  St. 
Joseph,  Mo.,  and  Sioux  City,  la.  For 
many  years  prior  to  1907  defendants 
maintained  a  rate  of  33c,  known  as  the 
33c  scale,  on  a  10-gallon  can  of  cream 
for  a  distance  of  300  miles  in  terri- 
tory west  of  the  Missouri  River  in  hauls 
to  points  on  said  river.  Prior  to  1906 
a  rate  of  60c,  or  60c  scale,  was  charged 
on  a  10-gallon  can  of  cream  for  a  dis- 
tance of  300  miles  in  shipments  to 
Chicago.  Complainants  invested  large 
sums  in  establishing  creameries  at  Chi- 
cago in  reliance  upon  a  38c  scale  prom- 
ised by  some  of  defendants.  In  1907 
the  38c  rate  was  withdrawn  and  the 
60c  rate  to  Chicago  restored.  Shortly 
thereafter  all  the  carriers  transporting 
cream  by  rail  to  Chicago  on  the  east 
and  the  Rocky  Mountains  on  the  west 
agreed  to  establish  in  all  the  territory 
in  question  a  70c  scale.  Complainants 
attacked  the  new  scale  and  demanded 
the  restoration  of  the  33c  scale  and 
its  application  in  all  the  territory  under 
consideration.  Local  creameries  cafl 
operate  successfully  only  where  they 
are  able  to  produce  an  annual  output 
of  at  least  100,000  lbs.  of  butter.  It  is 
impracticable  for  them  to  gather  cream 
from  the  farmers  living  over  6  or  7 
miles  from  their  plants.  The  central- 
izers gather  supplies  over  a  radius  of  ■ 
from  60  to  600  miles.  Where  the  cow 
population  is  sparse,  the  local  cream- 
eries cannot  exist.  This  is  the  condi- 
tion in  the  states  of  Kansas  and  Ne- 
braska, in  much  of  Missouri,  and  con- 
siderable of   the   territory  of  Iowa,   and 


676 


REASONABLENESS  OP  RATES,  §112    (a) 


in  a  part  of  Minnesota  and  South  Da- 
kota. It  is  impracticable  for  farmers 
in  these  states  to  make  and  sell  butter 
after  the  old-fashioned  methods  and  but 
for  the  existence  of  centralizers  the 
dairy  interests  in  these  sections  would 
be  destroyed.  Where  the  cow  popu- 
lation is  sufficiently  dense,  the  local 
creameries  can  prosper  in  competition 
with  the  centralizers  and  produce  a 
somewhat  better  grade  of  butter  and 
are  entitled  to  protection  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  consuming  public. 
Transportation  charges  on  the  cream  to 
the  centralizers  plus  those  on  the  but- 
ter to  the  points  of  consumption  are 
larger  than  those  on  the  cream  and 
butter  used  and  manufactured  by  the 
local  creameries.  This  advantage  in 
favor  of  local  creameries  is,  however, 
offset  by  the  cheaper  cost  of  manufac 
ture  to  the  centralizer.  The  profit  on 
butter  made  by  the  centralizer  was 
Bald  to  be  only  i^c  per  lb.  The  in- 
crease in  rates  attacked  was  greater 
than  this  profit.  It  appeared,  however, 
that  the  farmers  were  receiving  from 
20c  to  28c  per  lb.  for  butter  fat  and 
that  the  increase  would  be  borne  by 
the  farmers  and  not  by  the  centralizers. 
The  33c  scale  in  effect  prior  to  1907 
west  of  the  Missouri  River  was  estab- 
lished by  the  carriers  after  repeated 
crop  failures  and  for  the  purpose 
of  developing  dairy  interests  in  order 
to  prevent  the  people  from  leaving  the 
country.  The  cream  is  carried  by 
local  passenger  trains  and  in  baggage 
cars.  As  a  rule  no  special  cream  cars 
are  employed.  The  shipper  places  the 
can  of  cream  upon  the  station  platform, 
from  which  it  is  loaded  into  the  car 
by  the  carrier.  The  carrier  at  the  place 
of  delivery  unloads  the  cans  and  places 
them  upon  the  platform.  It  returns 
the  empty  cans  without  extra  charge. 
While  in  the  past  the  carrying  of 
cream  has  been  in  the  nature  of  sur- 
plus transportation,  requiring  no  addi- 
tional employes  or  equipment,  the  busi- 
ness has  so  developed  as  to  make  prob- 
able the  requirement  of  special  equip- 
ment in  the  future.  Under  the  33c 
rate  applying  west  of  the  Missouri 
River  the  Burlington  earned  about  14c 
per  car  mile  as  compared  with  about 
19c  per  car  mile  paid  to  it  under  its 
mail  contracts  with  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment. Express  rates  are  materially 
higher  than  the  rates  under  the  70c 
scale  attacked.  Freight  rates  are  lower 
for     shorter     distances     and     somewhat 


higher  for  long  distances  than  the  33c 
scale.  They  are  lower  for  all  distances 
than  the  70c  scale.  The  service  for 
which  these  freight  rates  are  charged, 
however,  is  much  less  expensive  than 
the  transportation  of  cream.  HELD, 
that  rates  must  not  be  established  so 
low  as  to  give  the  centralizers  an  un- 
natural advantage  over  the  local  cream- 
eries in  territory  suited  to  the  latter; 
that  the  70c  scale  was  unreasonable; 
that  a  rate  of  20c  per  10-gallon  can 
for  all  distances  up  to  and  including 
25  miles  should  be  established;  that  be- 
yond 25  miles  the  rates  should  increase 
Ic  for  every  5  miles,  up  to  and  includ- 
■ng  50  miles;  that  for  the  next  50 
miles  it  should  increase  Ic  for  every 
10  miles,  and  Ic  for  every  15  miles 
thereafter;  that  on  account  of  the 
greater  labor  and  smaller  economy  in 
handling  the  5  and  8  gallon  cans,  the 
rates  for  5  and  8  gallon  cans  should 
be  approximately  7-10  and  9-10,  re- 
spectively, of  the  rates  for  10-gallon 
cans.  Beatrice  Creamery  Co.  v.  I.  C. 
R.    R.    Co.,    15    I.    C.    C.    109,    124,    132. 

§112.     Mine-Prop  Logs. 

(a)  Rates  charged  for  the  trans- 
portation of  mine-prop  logs  from  points 
in  North  Carolina  to  Norfolk,  Va.,  of 
'-^c  and  31/^c  per  100  lbs.  were  attacked 
to  the  extent  they  exceeded  the  rates 
on  saw  logs  between  the  same  points  of 
$2.50  per  1,000  board  feet,  minimum 
carload  3,500  feet.  The  logs  intended 
for  mine  props  are  similar  to  those 
intended  for  conversion  into  lumber 
except  that  they  are  longer,  but  the 
loading  and  unloading  are  done  by  the 
shippers  in  both  cases.  Logs  intended 
for  mine  props  are  handled  on  single 
cars  that  must  be  switched  out  of  a 
train  at  the  loading  point,  switched 
into  another  train  when  loaded  and 
switched  to  the  track  of  a  connecting 
carrier  at  destination,  and  are  moved 
on  logging  cars,  while  sawmill  logs 
generally  move  in  solid  trains,  the  only 
service  of  the  carrier  in  addition  to 
the  road  haul  being  the  coupling  and 
uncoupling  of  the  engine  at  the  two 
ends  of  the  run.  HELD,  the  fact  that 
certain  trafllc  is  hauled  in  trainload 
lots  while  complainant's  traffic  moves 
in  carloads  cannot  be  made  the  basis 
of  a  difference  in  rates.  The  char- 
acter of  the  equipment  used  is  in  the 
discretion  and  for  the  convenience  of 
the  carrier,  and  the  conditions  surround- 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §113  (a)— §116  (a) 


677 


ing  the  transportation  of  mine  props 
are  not  so  dissimilar  as  to  justify  a 
higher  charge  thereon.  Defendant's 
rates  for  the  transportation  of  sav 
logs  in  this  territory  having  proven  to 
be  reasonable  and  compensatory,  it  is 
ordered  to  maintain  the  same  rate 
on  mine  props  as  is  contemporaneously 
applied  on  saw  logs.  Reparation  award- 
ed. Rickards  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
23   I.   C.   C.   239. 

§113.     Mohair. 

(a)  Mohair  is  prepared  for  shipment 
like  wool  in  both  sacks  and  bales.  It 
loads  somewhat  heavier  than  wool. 
The  physical  incidents  of  its  trans- 
portation are  almost  exactly  the  same 
as  with  wool.  Its  value  is  somewhat 
greater  than  that  of  wool  in  the  grease, 
in  those  regions  where  mohair  is 
produced,  although  the  lower  grades  of 
mohair  do  not  sell  for  as  much  as  the 
higher  grades  of  wool.  HELD,  there 
is  no  reason  why  mohair  should  be  re- 
quired to  pay  a  higher  rate  of  trans- 
portation than  wool.  The  rates  pre- 
scribed in  the  Wool  case,  23  I.  C.  C. 
151,  for  the  transportation  of  wool  from 
western  territory  to  eastern  destinations 
should  not  be  exceeded  for  the  trans- 
portation of  mohair,  which  should  be 
classified  as  second  class  in  less  than 
carloads,  and  as  fourth  class  in  car- 
loads, with  a  minimum  of  24,000  lbs. 
for  a  standard  36-foot  car  and  an  in- 
crease for  larger  cars.  National  I\Io- 
hair  Growers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.   Co.,   23   I.   C.   C.   180,   181. 

§114.     Motorcycles. 

(a)  Complainants  attacked  the  less- 
than-carload  rate  of  $6  per  100  lbs.  on 
motorcycles,  crated,  from  Springfield, 
Mass.,  Hammondsport  and  Angola,  N. 
Y.,  Reading,  Pa.,  Geneseo,  Chicago  and 
Aurora,  111.,  Milwaukee,  Wis.,  Minnea]> 
oils,  Minn.,  and  San  Francisco  and 
other  Pacific  coast  terminals.  Motorcy- 
cles crated  weigh  from  225  to  250  lbs. 
and  bicycles  40  to  50  lbs.  Motorcycles 
occupy  a  space  7  feet  long,  3  feet 
high,  9  inches  wide;  bicycles,  a  space 
6  feet  long,  3  feet  high,  and  7  inches 
wide.  INTotorcycles  varv  in  price  from 
$150  to  $225;  bicycles  from  $30  to  $50. 
The  profit  on  motorcycles  ranges  from 
$10  to  $50;  that  on  bicycles  from  $5  to 
$10.  Formerly  the  movement  of  bi- 
cycles was  in  excess  of  that  of  motor- 
cycles,   but    recently    the    movement    of 


motorcycles  has  equaled  or  exceeded 
that  of  bicycles.  The  less-than-carload 
rate  on  bicycles,  crated,  was  $4.50; 
completely  boxed,  $3.60.  Subsequent 
to  the  shipment  in  question  the  car- 
load rate  on  motorcycles  was  made 
$4;  that  on  bicycles  was  at  the  time  of 
the  shipment  and  at  the  time  of  the 
hearing  $2.50.  The  contention  of  de- 
fendants that  the  rates  on  motorcycles 
and  bicycles  were  both  induced  by 
water  competition  was  not  sustained 
by  evidence.  HELD,  while  it  was  not 
necessary  that  there  should  be  an  un- 
varying relation  between  rates  on  mo- 
torcycles and  bicycles  packed  in  the 
same  manner,  under  the  evidence  pre- 
sented the  rate  attacked  was  unreason- 
able to  the  extent  it  exceeded  one  and 
one-half  times  the  first-class  rate  on 
motorcycles,  less-than-carload,  boxed  or 
crated,  between  the  points  in  question. 
Reparation  denied.  Rose  v.  Boston  & 
Albany  R.   R.    Co.,   18   I.   C.   C.   427,   429. 

(b)  Commission  held  motorcycle  rates 
should  not  exceed  first-class  rate  on  car- 
loads and  one  and  a  half  times  the  first 
class  on  less  than  carloads.  Carrier  put 
in  effect  commodity  rates  equal  to  such 
reduction,  and  subsequently  Commission 
reduced  class  rates.  Reparation  awarded 
on  basis  of  subsequent  reduction.  Mead 
Auto  Cycle  Co.  v.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  435;  Whiting  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  436. 

§115.     Mussel  Shells. 

(a)  Complainant  was  assessed  a  rate 
of  17c  on  carloads  of  mussel  shells 
rrom  Terre  Haute,  Ind.,  to  Davenport.  la., 
such  rate  being  the  sixth-class  rate  law- 
fully applicable.  Shortly  after  the  ship- 
ment defendants  established  a  joint 
through  commodity  rate  of  15c  and  ad- 
mitted the  17c  rate  to  be  unreasonable. 
HELD,  the  rate  assessed  was  excess- 
ive. Reparation  awarded.  Davenport 
Pearl  Button  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  L  C.  C.   193,  194. 

§116.     Newspaper. 

(a)  On  carloads  of  newspaper 
shipped  in  the  summer  of  1907  from 
Grand  Mere,  Quebec,  to  San  Francisco, 
Cal.,  complainant  was  assessed  90c,  the 
rate  applicable  by  the  route  of  move- 
ment. The  shipments,  with  one  excep- 
tion, were  routed  by  the  shipper  via 
the  C.  P.  Ry.,  Wabash  R.  R.,  C.  B.  & 
Q.  R.  R.  and  lines  beyond.  One  car- 
load was  routed  via  C.  P.  Ry.,  Wabasb 


678 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §117   (a)— §118  (a) 


R.  R.,  C  &  N.  W.  Ry.  and  lines  beyond. 
At  the  time  of  movement  a  rate  of  75c 
was  in  effect  from  Grand  Mere  to  San 
Francisco,  through  Chicago.  The  Wa- 
bash R.  R.  carried  the  shipments  from 
Detroit  via  its  East  Hannibal  gateway 
and  delivered  the  same  to  the  C.  B. 
&  Q.  R.  R.  at  Kansas  City,  except  one 
carload,  which  was  delivered  to  the 
M.  P.  Ry.  at  Kansas  City.  Effective 
Jan.  28,  1908,  a  75c  rate  was  made  ap- 
plicable via  all  routes.  Such  rate  was 
canceled  Jan.  1,  1909,  but  re-established 
June  5,  1909.  Had  the  Wabash  R.  R. 
routed  the  same  by  the  Chicago  gate- 
way, the  rate  would  have  been  75c. 
HELD,  the  charges  assessed  were  un- 
reasonable. Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  75c,  declared  to  be  a  reason- 
able rate  for  the  future.  Williar  v  C. 
N.   Q.   Ry.   Co.,   17   L   C.   C.  304. 

§117.   on. 

(a)  On  carloads  of  fuel  oil  from 
Sapulpa,  Okla.,  to  Acme,  Tex.,  rates  of 
19c  and  22i^c  per  100  lbs.,  prior  to 
July  26,  1909,  were  charged,  at  which 
time  they  were  reduced  to  15c.  Com- 
plainant sought  reparation,  on  the  basis 
that  the  rates  charged  on  shipments 
were  unreasonable  to  the  extent  that 
they  exceeded  15c.  The  record  indi- 
cated that  the  establishment  of  the  15c 
rate  resulted  from  competition  condi- 
tions due  to  the  oil  fields  in  Texas. 
HELD,  that  complainant  be  granted  rep- 
aration for  the  charges  over  15c,  and 
that  the  present  rate  be  continued. 
Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  St.  L.  & 
S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  283. 

(b)  On  crude  petroleum  oil  shipped 
from  Sapulpa,  Okla.,  to  Humboldt,  Kan., 
in  carload  lots,  complainant  was  charged 
a  rate  of  36c  per  100  lbs.,  the  routing 
being  "Frisco  &  M.  K.  &  T.,  Vinita." 
The  rate  from  Sapulpa  to  Kansas  City 
through  Vinita  was  only  13c.  Within 
two  months  after  the  shipment  the  rate 
was  reduced  to  16c.  HELD,  the  rat«i 
of  36c  was  unreasonable  to  the  extent 
that  it  exceeded  the  present  interme- 
diate rate  of  IGc.  Reparation  awarded. 
Humboldt  Refining  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T. 
Ry.   Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  363. 

(c)  On  carloads  of  petroleum  oil 
from  Stanards,  N.  Y.,  to  Struthers,  Pa., 
a  rate  of  10c  was  collected,  the  dis- 
tance being  180  miles.  At  the  time  of 
shipments  a  rate  of  8*/^c  was  in  effect 
from    Stanards   to   Warren,   Pa.,    and   to 


other  points  in  Pennsylvania  and  Ohio 
distant  from  Stanards  from  119  to  247 
miles.  Warren  is  li^  miles  from 
Struthers.  The  shipments  moved  via 
Keating  Summit,  Pa.,  while  the  8^c 
rate  to  Warren  was  applicable  via  Buf- 
falo and  Wellsville,  N.  Y.  Shortly  after 
shipments  moved  the  8^c  rate  was 
made  applicable  from  Stanards  to 
Struthers  via  Keating  Summit,  and  at 
the  time  of  the  hearing  had  been  vol- 
untarily maintained  for  more  than  four 
months.  HELD,  that  testing  the  rate 
attacked  by  the  rate  on  the  same  or 
adjacent  lines  in  the  immediate  terri- 
tory, under  the  same  conditions,  the 
rate  complained  of  was  unreasonable 
to  the  extent  that  it  exceeded  8i/4c.  Clark 
Co.  V.  Buffalo  &  Susquehanna  Ry.  Co., 
18  I.   C.   C.   380,  381. 

(d)  On  carloads  of  redistilled  press 
oil  from  Edgewater,  N.  J.,  to  Struthers, 
Pa.,  a  local  rate  of  4c,  Edgewater  to 
Bergen  Junction,  and  a  joint  rate  of 
18c  therce  to  destination  was  exacted, 
no  through  rate  being  in  effect.  The 
Struthers  to  Edgewater  rate  was  16i^c. 
There  was  no  regular  movement  of  oil 
from  coast  points  to  the  West,  the 
movement  in  question  being  accidental 
on  account  of  fire.  Some  two  years 
after  the  movement  defendants  volun- 
tarily established  the  16i^c  rate  from 
Edgewater  to  Struthers.  HELD,  the 
rate  charged  was  not  shown  to  be  ex- 
cessive. The  fact  that  the  eastbound 
rate  was  lower  than  the  westbound  did 
not  prove  the  latter  to  be  unreasonable. 
Wilburine  O'l  Worlds,  T>td.,  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,   18   I.   C.    C.    548,   549. 

(e)  Since  the  Commission  in  Mar- 
shall Oil  Co.  V.  C.  «fe  N.  W.  Ry.  Co..  14 
L  C.  C.  210,  refusing  to  apply  fourth- 
class  rates  on  oil  in  less  than  carloads, 
it  appeared  that  almost  all  the  lines 
on  shipments  from  Minneapolis  and  St. 
Paul  to  stations  in  South  Dakota  vol- 
untarily applied  the  fourth-class  rates, 
such  rates  being  apparently  compensa- 
tory. HELD,  the  third-class  rates  on 
illuminating  oils  and  gasoline  were 
unreasonable  and  the  fourth-class  rates 
should  be  applied.  Parties  Oil  Co.  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  146, 
148. 

§118.     Packing-House    Products,    Meats. 

(a)  The  rate  on  fresh  meats  and 
packing-house  products  from  Wichita, 
Kan.,    to    southeastern    territory    oughf 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES.  §118   (b) 


679 


not  to  be  advanced  unless  that  from 
Kansas  City  is  also  increased  by  a 
corresponding  amount.  In  Re  Investi- 
gation of  Unreasonable  Rates  on  Meats, 
23  I.  C.  C.  656,  666. 

(b)  The  rates  involved  in  this  pro- 
ceeding were  those,  both  relative  and  ab- 
solute, upon  live  stock  into,  out  of,  and 
through  Ft.  Worth,  Tex.,  Oklahoma  City, 
Okla.,  and  Wichita,  Kan.,  as  compared 
with  rates  to  Kansas  City  and  to  other 
packing  houses  upon  the  Missouri  River 
and  east;  those  on  fresh  meats  and 
packing-house  products  from  Ft.  Worth, 
Oklahoma  City  and  Wichita  to  all  points 
of  consumption,  and  the  rate  on  salt  from 
the  Kansas  field  to  Oklahoma  City.  The 
raw  material  for  the  rival  slaughtering 
houses  in  these  three  cities  was  drawn  to 
a  large  extent  from  the  same  section  in 
the  Southwest,  and  where  the  rate  upon 
the  live  animal  to  the  point  of  slaughter, 
added  to  the  rate  upon  the  product  to 
the  consuming  market,  was  less  in  case 
of  one  city  than  another,  the  one  en- 
joying the  more  favorable  rate  had  an 
advantage.  Ft  Worth  drew  the  bulk 
of  its  beef  cattle  from  Texas  upon  rates 
fixed  by  the  Texas  commission.  Okla- 
homa City  and  Wichita  drew  their  sup- 
plies largely  from  the  same  source  in  the 
Southwest  as  Kansas  City.  It  was  gen- 
erally agreed  that  rates  from  the  more 
distant  points  to  Oklahoma  City  and 
Wichita  should  be  made  less  than  cor- 
responding rates  to  Kansas  City,  by  a 
fixed  arbitrary.  Live  stock  originating  in 
the  eastern  part  of  Texas  reached  Kansas 
City  largely  through  Ft.  Worth  or 
through  some  junction  east  of  Ft.  Worth. 
With  respect  to  all  such  traffic,  Okla- 
homa City  and  Wichita  both  involved  an 
out-of-line  haul,  the  distance  from  Ft. 
Worth  to  Kansas  City,  via  Wichita,  be- 
ing nearly  one-fifth  greater  than  that  by 
the  short  line.  With  respect  to  western 
Texas,  the  completion  of  the  Orient  sys- 
tem would  make  the  short  route,  with  re- 
spect to  all  points  upon  it  and  many 
points  west  of  it,  to  Kansas  City,  through 
Wichita.  In  case  of  considerable  live- 
stock territory,  the  short  line  to  St.  Louis 
was  through  Oklahoma  City.  HELD,  the 
rates  attacked  from  the  live-stock  pro- 
ducing territory  in  New  Mexico,  Texas 
and  Cklahoma  to  Wichita,  Oklahoma  City 
and  Ft.  Worth  were  unreasonable,  and 
new  rates  should  be  established  on  a 
mileage  basis;  that  with  respect  to  joint 
rates  to  these  markets,  the  rate  for  live 
stock  for  a  two-line  haul  might  properly 


exceed,  that  prescribed  for  a  one-line  haul 
by  21/^c.  New  rates  prescribed  as  speci- 
fied by  table  in  the  opinion,  LOCAL 
RATES  FOR  THE  HOME  MARKET.  It 
was  generally  agreed  that  local  rates  on 
tresh  meats  and  packing-house  products 
from  the  slaughtering  pof^ts  in  question 
should  be  established  on  a  mileage  scale. 
On  account  of  the  moving  of  live  stock 
In  very  large  quantities,  rates  upon  live 
stock  to  these  slaughtering  points  had 
been  maintained  at  a  somewhat  lower 
level  than  the  rates  obtaining  in  other 
sections  of  the  country  where  the  move- 
ment of  live  stock  was  much  less,  and 
the  general  density  of  traffic  much 
greater.  Upon  the  other  hand,  the  tend- 
ency had  been  to  maintain  somewhat 
higher  relative  rates  upon  fresh  meat  and 
packing-house  products  in  this  section 
than  in  other  portions  of  the  country 
where  traffic  was  heavier  and  the  general 
level  of  rates  lower.  HELD,  the  local 
rates  attacked  were  unreasonable,  and 
a  mileage  scale  should  be  applied  as  to 
such  rates  for  the  home  market  between 
all  points  in  New  Mexico,  Texas,  Okla- 
homa, Arkansas,  Missouri  south  of  the 
Missouri  River,  and  Louisiana  west  of 
the  Mississippi  River,  but  that  on  ac- 
count of  the  danger  of  throwing  the 
slaughtering  points  in  question  out  of 
line  with  other  competing  localities,  no 
attempt  would  be  made  to  readjust  the 
relation  between  the  rates  upon  live  ani- 
mals and  those  upon  the  products.  PRO- 
PORTIONAL RATES  TO  DISTANT 
MARKETS  FROM  FT.  WORTH,  WICHI- 
TA AND  OKLAHOMA  CITY.  The  rates 
involved  were  to  (1)  the  Southeast,  em- 
bracing Alabama,  Georgia  and  Florida; 
(2)  Carolina  territory,  including  the  two 
Carolinas  and  the  southern  portion  of 
Virginia;  (3)  trunk  line  territory  north 
of  the  Potomac  and  Ohio  rivers  and  east 
of  the  Indiana-Illinois  state  line,  includ- 
ing the  Virginia  cities;  (4)  territory  be- 
tween the  Illinois-Indiana  state  line  and 
the  Mississippi  River,  designated  as  Illi- 
nois territory.  The  rates  to  the  first 
three  territories  were  constructed  upon 
St.  Louis  and  the  lower  Mississippi  cross- 
ings by  adding  a  proportional  rate  from 
the  packing  house  to  the  Mississippi 
River  and  another  rate  from  the  Missis- 
sippi River  to  destination.  The  rate  from 
the  Mississippi  River  crossing  to  a  given 
destination  was  the  same,  irrespective 
of  the  point  at  which  the  traffic  origi- 
nated, so  that  the  only  charges  involved 
were    the    proportional    rates    from    the 


680 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §118  (b) 


packing  house  to  the  Mississippi  River 
crossings.  It  was  generally  agreed  that 
the  differences  in  distances  up  to  the 
Mississippi  River  should  be  considered 
as  fairly  indicating  proper  differences  in 
the  rates  to  be  established.  The  dis- 
tances from  Wichita,  Oklahoma  City  and 
Ft.  Worth  to  St.  Louis  and  Memphis  were, 
from  Wichita,  479  miles  and  543  miles, 
respectively;  from  Oklahoma  City,  543 
and  486  miles,  respectively,  and  from  Ft. 
Worth,  720  and  539  miles,  respectively. 
The  distance  from  Ft.  Worth  to  Vicks- 
burg  was  393  miles.  From  Ft.  Worth 
business  was  handled  for  the  Southeast 
and  for  Carolina  territory  through  Mem- 
phis, Vicksburg  and  New  Orleans,  and 
the  rate  appeared  to  be  based  sometimes 
upon  one  crossing  and  sometimes  upon 
another.  From  Oklahoma  City,  traffic 
moved  mainly  through  Memphis  to  both 
Carolina  territory  and  the  Southeast. 
From  Wichita,  Carolina  territory  was  also 
reached  through  Memphis.  While  busi- 
ness to  trunk  line  territory  was  worked 
by  southern  lines  through  Memphis,  and 
perhaps  through  Vicksburg,  the  rate 
made  in  all  cases  was  made  through  St. 
Louis.  The  distance  from  Ft.  Worth  and 
from  Oklahoma  City  to  Carolina  terri- 
tory was  substantially  the  same,  and  it 
was  agreed  that  rates  from  both  these 
points  should  be  identical.  With  respect 
to  Southeast  territory.  Ft.  Worth  had  an 
advantage  over  Oklahoma  City  in  dis- 
tance to  the  extent  that  its  mileage  to 
Vicksburg  was  less  than  from  Oklahoma 
City  to  Memphis.  The  rates  attacked 
from  Wichita  to  both  Carolina  territory 
and  the  Southeast  were  l^/^c  higher  the 
those  from  Oklahoma  City.  While  the 
short-line  distance  from  Ft.  Worth  was 
through  Vicksburg  and  that  from  Okla- 
homa City  through  Memphis,  the  tariffs 
attacked  indicated  that  lines  leading 
from  these  two  points  of  production  de- 
sired to  handle  business  through  those 
gateways,  and  also  through  New  Orleans, 
with  the  result  that  the  long  line  would 
simply  be  meeting  the  short-line  rate. 
The  rates  attacked  upon  both  fresh  meat 
and  packing-house  products  from  Wichita 
to  St.  Louis  were  24i^c.  From  Oklahoma 
City  to  St.  Louis  the  proportional  rates 
were,  upon  packing-house  products  28 %c, 
upon  dressed  meat  31i/^c,  equivalent  to  a 
differential  above  Wichita  of  iMc  upon 
packing-house  products  and  7c  upon  fresh 
meat.  Rates  from  Ft.  Worth  to  St.  Louis 
were  32?4c  on  packing-house  products 
and  ZS^c  upon  fresh  meat,  a  differential 


of  4c  upon  both  packing-house  products 
and  fresh  meat  in  favor  of  Oklahoma 
City.  While,  therefore,  the  distance  from 
Oklahoma  City  to  St.  Louis  was  but  64 
miles  greater  than  from  Wichita  to  St. 
Louis,  its  rate  increased  by  414c  and 
7c,  while  for  an  increase  in  distance 
amounting  to  177  miles  from  Ft.  Worth 
to  St.  Louis,  as  compared  with  Oklahoma 
City  to  St.  Louis,  the  rate  increased  but 
4c  in  case  of  both  fresh  meats  and  pack- 
ing-house products.  Wichita  contended 
that,  while  24i/^c  might  be  a  reasonable 
local  rate  to  St.  Louis,  it  was  excessive 
as  a  proportional  rate  applied  to  busi- 
ness for  beyond.  The  mileage  scale 
adopted  in  the  opinion  would  justify  a 
rate  of  44c  upon  packing-house  products 
and  53c  upon  fresh  meats,  and,  excluding 
competitive  conditions,  nothing  war- 
ranted the  imposing  of  as  low  a  rate  as 
24i^c  from  Wichita  to  St.  Louis.  With 
respect  to  the  rate  to  Illinois  territory, 
including  the  rate  to  Kansas  City,  it  ap- 
peared that  the  rate  attacked  from  Okla- 
homa City  to  St.  Louis  and  Chicago  upon 
fresh  meat  and  packing-house  products 
was  53c;  from  Ft.  Worth,  57c;  from 
Wichita  to  Chicago,  29i/^c.  Oklahoma 
interests  insisted  that  this  adjustment 
constituted  a  gross  discrimination  against 
Oklahoma  City.  The  Chicago  rate  from 
Wichita  was  constructed  by  adding  5c 
to  the  St.  Louis  rate,  and  this  was  done 
to  allow  lines  leading  from  Kansas  City 
through  St.  Louis  to  Chicago  to  com- 
pete for  the  business.  The  short-line 
distance  from  Oklahoma  City  to  Chicago 
is  791  miles,  and  from  Ft.  Worth,  945 
miles.  Under  the  mileage  scale  adopted 
in  the  opinion,  the  rates  from  Oklahoma 
City  would  be  62c  upon  packing-house 
products  and  74c  upon  fresh  meat.  The 
live-stock  rate  attacked  from  Oklahoma 
City  to  Chicago  was  44 %c,  and  from  Ft. 
Worth,  49 %c.  The  rate  attacked  from 
Wichita  to  Kansas  City  was  I2c  upon 
packing-house  products,  and  16i/^c  upon 
fresh  meat;  that  from  Oklahoma  Citv  to 
Kansas  City  was  53c  upon  both  fresh 
meat  and  packing-house  products,  and 
from  Ft.  Worth,  60c.  The  distances  from 
Wichita,  Oklahoma  City  and  Ft.  Worth 
to  Kansas  City  are  208,  243  and  508 
miles,  respectively.  HELD,  adopting 
the  mileage  scale,  Fort  Worth  was  en- 
titled to  a  proportional  rate  upon  busi- 
ness for  the  Southeast  3c  lower  upon 
both  packing-house  products  and  fresh 
meats  than  the  rate  in  effect  from  Okla- 
homa  City;    that  for  a   like   reason  the 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §118.(c)— (e) 


681 


rates  from  Wichita  to  both  Carolina  terri- 
tory and  the  Southeast,  which  under  the 
adjustment  attacked  were  l^^c  higher 
than  those  from  Oklahoma  City,  should 
be  made  2i^c  higher  on  both  packing- 
house products  and  fresh  meat;  that  pro- 
portional rates  from  Oklahoma  City, 
when  for  the  Southeast,  should  be  3c 
higher  through  the  gateways  of  Vicks- 
burg,  Memphis  and  New  Orleans  than 
corresponding  rates  from  Ft.  Worth;  that 
the  rate  to  St.  Louis  for  beyond  should 
be  3c  higher  from  Oklahoma  City  than 
from  Wichita  upon  packing-house  prod- 
ucts and  4c  upon  fresh  meats,  and  the 
rate  upon  packing-house  products  from 
Ft.  Worth  should  exceed  that  from  Okla- 
homa City  by  5i/4c,  and  upon  fresh  meats 
by  7c;  that  the  rate  of  24i^c  from  Wichita 
to  St.  Louis  for  beyond  was  not  excess- 
ive; that,  while  a  rate  of  53c  upon  both 
packing-house  products  and  fresh  meat 
from  Oklahoma  City  to  St.  Louis  and 
Chicago  was  not  excessive  in  itself,  it 
was  unduly  discriminatory,  as  compared 
with  the  29i^c  rate  in  effect  from 
Wichita;  that  the  rate  from  Wichita  to 
Kansas  City  of  12c  upon  packing-house 
products  and  l"6i/^c  upon  fresh  meats, 
the  rate  from  Oklahoma  City  to  Kansas 
City  of  53c,  and  the  rate  from  Ft.  Worth 
to  Kansas  City  of  60c  resulted  in  undue 
discrimination  in  favor  of  Wichita,  and 
the  rate  from  Oklahoma  City  ought  not 
to  exceed  by  more  than  40  per  cent  that 
from  Wichita,  and  the  rate  from  Ft. 
Worth  ought  not  to  exceed  that  from 
Wichita  by  more  than  75  per  cent;  that 
the  rates  to  Illinois  territory  should  be 
constructed  by  adding  to  the  trunk  line 
proportional  to  St.  Louis  the  local  rate 
from  St.  Louis  to  destination;  that  the 
rates  from  Oklahoma  City  and  Ft.  Worth 
to  St.  Paul,  Omaha  and  Duluth,  as  com- 
pared with  similar  rates  from  Wichita, 
unduly  discriminated  in  favor  of  Wichita 
and  should  be  readjusted  so  as  to  bring 
them  in  accord  with  the  rates  prescribed 
for  Kansas  City  and  Chicago,  and  that 
whatever  transit  privileges  were  ac- 
corded to  one  of  the  slaughtering  points 
In  question  should  be  extended  to  the 
others,  where  the  circumstances  and  con- 
ditions were  the  same.  RATES  ON 
SALT  FROM  THE  KANSAS  FIELDS  TO 
OKLAHOMA  CITY.  The  average  dis- 
tance involved  was  200  miles;  the  rate 
attacked,  15c  in  carloads.  The  same 
carriers  leading  from  the  Kansas  field 
to  the  Missouri  River  established  rates 
of  10c  on  salt  for  distances  of  from  200 


to  275  miles,  but  these  latter  rates  were 
made  to  meet  the  competition  of  salt 
produced  in  the  Michigan  field.  HELD, 
the  15c  rate  attacked  was  unreasonable, 
and  a  rate  not  exceeding  12c,  carload 
minimum  40,000  lbs.,  should  be  estab- 
lished on  bulk  salt  from  the  Kansas  field 
to  Oklahoma  City.  In  Re  Unreasonable 
Rates  on  Meats,  22  I.  C.  C.  160,  165,  166, 
168-174,  175. 

(c)  On  packing-house  products  and 
fresh  meats  in  carloads  from  Houston, 
Tex.,  to  Lake  Charles,  La.,  a  charge  of 
32c  and  35c,  respectively,  was  exacted. 
On  the  same  products  from  Ft.  Worth, 
Tex.,  to  Lake  Charles,  a  distance  of  405 
miles,  as  compared  with  144  miles  from 
Houston  to  Lake  Charles,  rates  of  42c 
and  40c,  respectively,  were  charged. 
HELD,  upon  the  basis  of  a  former  consid- 
eration of  the  rates  upon  the  commodi- 
ties in  question,  In  the  same  general 
territory.  In  22  I.  C.  C.  160,  the  defend- 
ants' rates  from  Houston  to  St.  Charles 
were  unreasonable,  so  far  as  they  ex- 
ceeded 20c  on  packing-house  products, 
and  25c  on  fresh  meats  In  carloads. 
Houston  Packing  Co.  v.  T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  456. 

(d)  On  packing-house  products  and 
fresh  meats  from  Houston,  Tex.,  to  New 
Orleans,  La.,  charges  of  36c  and  40c  in 
carloads  for  the  respective  ccmmoditle* 
were  exacted.  On  the  same  products 
from  Ft.  Worth,  Tex.,  to  New  Orleans,  a 
distance  of  547  miles,  as  compared  with 
359  miles  from  Houston  to  New  Orleans, 
charges  of  40c  and  48c  were  made. 
HELD,  that  defendants'  rates  from  Hous- 
ton to  New  Orleans  were  not  unreason- 
able. Houston  Packing  Co.  v.  T.  &  N. 
O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  456. 

(e)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate  of 
601/^c  per  100  lbs.  for  the  transportation 
of  fresh  meat  and  poultry  C.  L.  from  Jer- 
sey City,  N.  J.,  to  Jacksonville.  Fla.  The 
fourth-class  rate  of  51  ^^c  applied  on  this 
traffic  for  a  number  of  years  prior  to 
1909,  when  the  commodity  rate  was  estab- 
lished. The  *  all-water  rate  by  the  Clyd.3 
Line  was  33c,  and  the  water  movement 
was  entirely  feasible.  The  Seaboard  Air 
Line  carried  nearly  all  shipments  of  fresh 
meats  and  fresh  poultry  moving  to  Jack- 
sonville by  rail.  Yet  there  was  no  move- 
ment via  that  line  until  1906.  and  the 
total  movement  for  the  years  1906,  1907 
and  1908  amounted  to  but  86  cars.  The 
advance  in  the  rate  did  not  check  the 
movement,  as  was  shown  by  the  fact  that 


682 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §118  (f)— §121   (a) 


the  Seaboard  Air  Line  carried  in  1909, 
46  cars,  and  in  1910,  56  cars.  The  reve- 
nue per  ton  mile  upon  the  entire  move- 
ment from  Jersey  City  to  Jacksonville  was 
12.3  mills.  HELD,  the  fact  that  the  rail 
carriers  were  able  to  participate  in  this 
business  in  competition  with  the  Clyde 
Line  to  even  an  inconsiderable  extent 
tends  to  prove  that  the  rail  rate  is  rea- 
sonable. From  the  entire  record,  the 
rates  found  not  unreasonable.  Complaint 
dismissed.  Florida  Mercantile  Agency  v. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  85. 

(f)  Defendant's  tariff  fixed  a  15,000- 
pound  carload  minimum  on  dairy  prod- 
ucts, poultry,  fresh  meats,  etc.,  for  which 
the  carrier  would,  at  its  own  expense, 
furnish  icing.  Complainant  contended 
such  a  minimum  should  not  exceed  10,- 
000  lbs.  At  the  time  shipment  moved 
from  East  St.  Louis  destined  to  points 
east  of  the  Indiana-Illinois  line,  other  car- 
riers leading  east  from  East  St.  Louis 
had  in  effect  a  10,000-pound  minimum. 
About  one  year  after  the  movement  of 
one  of  the  shipments  in  question,  and 
simultaneously  with  the  movement  of  the 
other,  defendant  entered  into  a  joint 
tariff  with  other  carriers  establishing 
the  10,000-pound  minimum.  Complainant 
offered  no  testimony  to  show  the  15,000- 
pound  minimum  unreasonable,  and  de- 
fendant made  no  admission  to  that  effect. 
Complainant's  case  rested  entirely  upon 
the  facts  that  the  shipment  were  made, 
and  that  other  carriers,  competing  for 
the  same  business  during  the  same  pe- 
riod, furnished  icing  for  such  shipments 
on  a  minimum  carload  weight  of  10,000 
lbs.  HELD,  under  the  evidence  sub- 
mitted, the  minimum  attacked  could  not 
b«  found  to  be  unreasonable.  Reparation 
denied.  Swift  &  Co.  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 
1-6  I.  C.  C  426,  429. 

(g)  On  shiphients  of  carloads  of  fresh 
meat  and  packing-house  products  from 
Ft.  Worth,  Tex.,  to  Rocky  Mount,  N.  C, 
via  Shreveport,  Vicksburg,  Meridian, 
Birmingham  and  Selma,  complainant  was 
assessed  $1.07  on  the  fresh  -meat  and  66c 
on  the  packing-house  products.  At  the 
time  shipment  moved,  the  combination 
rates  of  77c  on  fresh  meat  and  58c  on 
packing-house  products  were  available 
via  Memphis,  and  these  lower  rates  were 
subsequently  applied  to  the  route  over 
which  shipment  moved.  HELD,  com- 
plainant was  entitled  to  reparation  on 
the  basis  of  such  lower  rates.  Swift  & 
Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  4:2,  443. 


(h)  Allegation  that  dressed  poultry 
should  take  lower  rating  than  live  poul- 
try not  sustained  by  the  facts.  Rose- 
brough  V.  P.  Exp.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  438. 

§119.     Paper  Stock. 

(a)  Defendants'  rate  on  paper  stock 
from  Chicago  to  South  Bend,  Ind.,  a  dis- 
tance of  86  miles,  was  8c  per  100  lbs.  on 
a  carload  minimum  of  20.000  lbs.  On 
manufactured  paper  from  South  Bend  to 
Chicago  the  rate  was  6c  on  a  carload 
minimum  of  24,000  lbs.  But  this  rate 
was  established  to  meet  competition  of 
manufactured  paper  shipped  by  water 
from  St.  Joseph,  Mich.,  to  Chicago.  The 
rate  on  paper  stock  from  Chicago  to  Be- 
loit.  Wis.,  a  distance  of  91  miles,  was  5c 
on  a  carload  minimum  of  3^,000  lbs. 
HELD,  under  this  evidence  the  8c  rate 
from  Chicago  to  South  Bend  could  not 
be  held  unreasonable.  La  Salle  Paper 
Co.  V.  Michigan  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  16 
L    C.   C.    149,    150. 

(b)  News  printing  paper  and  blank 
wall  paper  are  not  competitive  articles, 
and  the  existence  of  a  lower  rate  on  the 
former  commodity  did  not  prejudice  com- 
plainants in  the  sale  of  blank  wall  paper. 
Complaint  dismissed.  St.  Regis  Paper 
Co.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  Un- 
rep. Op.  368. 

§120.     Passenger  Car. 

(a)  Minimum  rates  fixed  by  the  L. 
&  N.,  C.  of  Ga.,  I.  C.  and  A.  C.  L.  R.  Rs. 
of  $25  for  each  passenger  or  combination 
car,  and  $10  for  a  baggage  car  accom- 
panying a  passenger  car  of  theatrical 
troupes,  appears  to  he  reasonable  so  far 
as  it  applies  to  transportation  in  the 
South,  where  rates  appear  to  be  gener- 
ally for  this  service  on  a  higher  basis 
than  in  other  sections  of  the  country. 
Chappelle  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
56,  59. 

§121.     Peas,  Beans,  Hominy. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  reason- 
ableness of  a  rate  of  85c  per  100  lbs.  on 
canned  peas,  beans,  homipy,  pork  and 
beans,  etc..  from  Longmont,  Loveland 
and  Greeley,  Colo.,  to  California  ter- 
minals and  a  rate  of  80c  to  north  Pacific 
coast  terminals.  It  was  contended  that  a 
rate  of  68c  should  be  established,  being 
75  per  cent  of  the  rate  from  Chicago 
to  the  coast,  and  80  per  cent  of  the  rate 
from  the  Missouri  River.  HELD,  any 
rate  in  excess  of  80c  per  100  lbs.  upon 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §121   (b)— §122   (f) 


683 


canned  goods  from  Colorado  points  to 
the  California  terminals  is  unreasonable. 
The  rate  to  the  north  Pacific  coast  ter- 
minals is  not  found  to  be  unreasonable. 
Empson  Packing  Co.  v.  Colorado  Midland 
Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  268,  270-271. 

(b)  On  carloads  of  lima  beans  from 
Montalvo.  Somis  and  Saticoy,  Cal.,  to 
Omaha,  Neb.,  defendants  collected  charges 
at  the  rate  of  85c  during  February, 
March  and  April,  1909.  Prior  to  Jan.  1, 
1909,  the  rate  to  Omaha  and  all  eastern 
territory  was  75c,  but  subsequent  to  1900, 
changes  from  time  to  time  in  the  mini- 
mum weight  had  resulted  in  an  increase 
of  earnings  per  car  on  shipments  to 
Omaha,  from  $180  to  $300.  The  increased 
rate  of  85c  yielded  earnings  of  $340  per 
car.  On  June  5,  1909,  the  rate  of  75c  was 
restored  to  Omaha,  and  points  in  Texas, 
but  in  practically  all  the  territory  east  of 
Omaha  the  85c  rate  remained  in  effect. 
HELD,  that  the  rate  was  unreasonable, 
and  for  the  future  should  not  exceed  75c. 
Reparation  awarded.  Commercial  Club 
of  Omaha  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  53,  56. 

§122.     Petroleum. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
on  petroleum  and  its  products  in  carloads 
from  Coffeyville,  Kan.,  to  Ft.  Smith  and 
Van  Buren,  Ark.,  1€3  and  165  miles,  re- 
spectively, of  23c  per  100  lbs.  Also  to 
Little  Rock  and  Pine  Bluff,  Ark.,  323  and 
365  miles,  respectively,  of  27c  per  100  lbs. 
The  Commission  had  prescribed  a  rate 
via  the  lines  of  defendants  of  19c  per 
100  lbs.  as  reasonable  for  the  haul  from 
Coffeyville  to  Memphis,  Tenn.,  a  distance 
of  469  miles  by  the  shorter  route  and 
475  miles  by  the  longer  route.  The  rates 
complained  of  produced  revenue  of  about 
27.8  mills  per  ton  per  mile  to  Ft.  Smith, 
27.2  mills  to  Van  Buren,  16.4  mills  to 
Little  Rock  and  14.5  mills  to  Pine  Bluff, 
or  an  average  of  about  21.5  mills  per  ton 
per  mile.  The  19c  rate  to  Memphis  is 
the  equivalent  of  about  8.1  mills  per  ton 
per  mile.  The  rates  into  Memphis  from 
eastern  and  southern  points  produced  in 
earnings  a  general  average  of  less  than 
8  mills  per  ton  per  mile.  HELD,  the 
rates  are  unreasonable,  and  should  not 
exceed  19c  from  Coffeyville  to  Ft.  Smith 
and  Van  Buren,  and  23c  to  Little  Rock 
and  Pine  Bluff.  Merchants  Freight  Bu- 
reau V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  573. 

(b)  Complainant  refined  oil  at  Find- 
lay,  O.,  and  attacked  the  rate  of  13i/^c  per 
100  lbs.  on  crude  petroleum  C.  L.  from 


Fla^  Rock,  111.,  to  Findlay,  a  distance 
of  357  miles,  rate  per  ton  mile  7.56  mills. 
HELD,  from  an  examination  of  the  rec- 
ord, the  revenue  per  ton  mile  is  less 
than  under  rates  to  other  points  in  com- 
parisons furnished  by  complainant.  Com- 
plaint dismissed.  National  Refining  Co. 
V.  C,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C. 
649. 

(c)  The  rate  on  petroleum  and  its 
products  of  33c  from  Coffeyville,  Kan., 
to  Enid,  Okla.,  was  found  unreasonable 
to  the  extent  that  it  exceeded  25c.  and 
reparation  awarded  following  Oklahoma 
V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  42. 
National  Refining  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  389,  390. 

(d)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates  on 
petroleum  from  Kansas  City,  Mo.,  and 
Independence,  Coffeyville,  Caney,  Cha- 
nute,  Erie  and  other  Kansas  refining 
points  to  Guthrie,  Oklahoma  City,  Med- 
ford,  Enid  and  other  points  in  Oklahoma. 
The  rates  attacked  ranged  from  typical 
points  from  27c  to  38c  on  distances  rang- 
ing from  137  to  318  miles,  as  compared 
with  rates  ranging  from  20c  to  24c  to 
Arkansas  points  ranging  from  154  to 
283  miles,  and  as  compared  with  rates 
of  from  15c  to  20c  to  Missouri  points, 
ranging  from  132  miles  to  291  miles.  The 
rates  attacked  exceeded  generally  the 
rates  charged  for  like  hauls  in  any  other 
part  of  the  country.  HELD,  the 'rates 
complained  of  were  unreasonable.  Re- 
ductions .ordered,  ranging  from  about  8c 
to  about  12c.  Oklahoma  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  42,  43. 

(e)  On  carloads  of  crude  petroleum 
from  Paola,  Kan.,  to  Kansas  City,  Kan., 
a  distance  of  43  miles,  the  traffic  pass- 
ing en  route  through  a  portion  of  Mis- 
souri, complainant  was  assessed  a  rate 
of  8c.  On  the  basis  of  the  intrastate 
rates  prescribed  by  the  Kansas  commis- 
sion, the  charge  would  have  been  5'^^c. 
The  rate  from  Nowata,  Okla.,  to  Kansas 
City,  221  miles,  was  10c;  from  Red  Fork, 
Okla.,  to  Kansas  City,  270  miles,  I7c. 
Complainant's  petroleum  conipeted  in  the 
market  at  Kansas  City  with  that  from 
Nowata.  HELD,  the  8c  rate  attacked 
was  unreasonable  to  the  extent  that  it 
exceeded  7c.  Hafey  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  245,  246. 

(f)  Rates  on  lubricating  oil  from 
Fayette,  Ky.,  to  Superior,  Wis.,  should 
not  exceed  those  in  effect  to  Duluth, 
Minn.     Reparation  awarded.     Buffalo  Oil 


684 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §122   (g)— §125   (b) 


Co.  V.  C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  289. 

(g)  Rates  on  petroleum  and  products 
from  Chanute  and  Erie,  Kan.,  to  Omaha, 
Neb.,  should  not  exceed  those  in  effect 
from  Coffeyville,  Kan.  Reparation 
awarded.  Chanute  Refining  Co.  v.  A. 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  348. 

§123.     Petroleum  Skimmings. 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  from  Musko- 
gee, Okla.,  to  Coffeyville,  Kan.,  carloads 
of  the  so-called  lighter  ends  of  petro- 
leum oil,  which  had  been  separated  from 
the  crude  oil  by  a  process  of  skimming, 
but  was  useless  for  commercial  purposes 
until  a  further  process  of  refinement  had 
been  undergone.  Defendants  assessed 
the  rates  applicable  to  refined  oil.  This 
product,  known  as  the  light-end  distillate, 
was  worth  at  Muskogee  about  S^^c  per 
gallon,  materially  lower  than  the  prices 
of  the  articles  into  which  it  was  ulti- 
mately separated.  One  of  the  roads  over 
which  some  of  the  shipments  moved  es- 
tablished a  rate  on  fuel  oil  2c  in  excess 
of  the  rate'  on  crude  oil.  Fuel  oil  was 
produced  from  the  Muskogee  crude  oil 
by  the  identical  process  which  extricated 
this  light-end  distillate.  There  was  some 
difference  in  price,  but  the  gap  between 
them  was  not  so  great  as  that  which  sepa- 
rated them  from  their  commercially  re- 
fined-products. HELD,  that  a  reasonable 
rate  on  the  commodity  shipped  would  not 
have  exceeded  by  more  than  2c  per  100 
lbs.  the  rates  contemporaneously  appli- 
cable to  crude  oil,  which  relationship 
should  be  established  for  the  future. 
Reparation  awarded.  National  Refining 
Co.  V.  M.,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C 
527,  531. 

§124.     Plaster  Boards. 

(a)  Compainant,  manufacturer  of  plas- 
ter board  at  Garbutt,  N.  Y.,  attacked  the 
carload  rate  of  $2.60  on  plaster  boards 
from  Garbutt  to  New  York  City  as  un- 
justly discriminatory,  as  compared  with 
the  $2  rate  on  plaster,  and  as  unrea- 
sonable per  se.  Prior  to  June  1,  1907, 
a  commodity  rate  of  $2  per  ton  applied 
to  both  wail  plaster  and  plaster  board. 
Defendants  justified  the  rate  attacked  on 
the  ground  that  plaster  board  was  a  more 
valuable  commodity  than  wall  plaster. 
HELD,  the  rate  attacked  was  discrimi- 
natory and  unreasonable,  and  should  not 
exceed  $2.35.  Defendants  ordered  to  ad- 
just  their   rates   to    other    Pennsylvania 


and  New  England  points  on  this  basis. 
Sackett  Plaster  Board  Co.  v.  B.  R.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  874,  375. 

(b)  No  commodity  rate  on  wall 
plaster;  class  rate  of  ll%c  applied. 
Shortly  afterward  commodity  rate  of  G^/^c 
made  applicable,  which  was  subsequently 
advanced  to  7c.  HELD,  rate  should  not 
exceed  7c,  and  that  it  be  maintained  for 
a  period  of  two  years.  Acme  Cement 
Plaster  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  30. 

(c)  Rate  on  wall  plaster  from  Mar- 
low,  Okla.,  to  Perth  Amboy,  N.  J.,  shall 
not  exceed  the  rate  to  New  York  City. 
Reparation  awarded.  Acme  Cement 
Plaster  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Un- 
rep. Op.  58. 

§125.     Poles,  Piling,  Posts. 
See  Supra,  §105. 

(a)  On  poles  and  piling  from  various 
points  in  Oregon  to  stations  on  defend- 
ant's line  in  California,  complainants 
were  charged  $1  per  ton  more  than  they 
would  have  been  charged  on  lumber.  The 
rates  on  poles  from  the  points  of  origin 
specified  to  points  in  Arizona,  New 
Mexico  and  Utah  were  the  same  as  the 
rates  on  lumber.  Defendants  claimed 
that  the  rates  were  different  because  of 
watef  competition  from  Portland,  which 
was  greater  on  lumber  than  on  poles, 
but  no  evidence  was  introduced  of  any 
substantial  difference  in  the  water  rates 
of  the  two  articles.  The  cost  of  ship- 
ment was  about  the  same,  and  poles 
were  less  valuable.  HELD,  that  the 
rates  on  poles  and  pilings  were  unreason- 
able to  the  extent  that  they  exceeded  the 
lumber  rates.  Reparation  awarded. 
California  Pole  &  Piling  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
22  L  C.  C.  507. 

(b)  On  poles  and  fence  posts  moving 
from  Beaudette  and  Warroad,  Minn.,  via 
the  Can.  N.  and  Gt.  N.  Rys.  to  Grand 
Forks  and  other  points  on  the  latter  line, 
the  rates  were  higher  than  on  lumber 
from  the  same  points.  The  rates  on  lum- 
ber appeared  to  be  sufficiently  high,  yield- 
ing a  per-ton-mile  revenue  of  1.3c.  The 
distance  from  Beaudette  to  Grand  Forks 
was  196  miles  and  from  Warroad  to 
Grand  Forks  37  miles  less.  HELD,  the 
rates  on  such  poles  and  posts  should  be 
reduced  so  as  to  practically  equal  the 
rates  on  lumber,  following  the  general 
rule  in  that  respect,  and  that  joint  rates 
should  be  established  from  Beaudette  to 
the  points  in  question.     Partridge  Lum- 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §125   (c)— §129  (a) 


685 


ber   Co.    v.   Gt.    N.   Ry.    Co.,    17   I.    C   C. 
276,  279. 

(c)  On  a  shipment  of  cedar  poles 
from  Chicago  to  Brady,  Tex.,  complain- 
ant is  entitled  to  the  rate  upon  lumber 
between  these  points,  and  may  recover 
the  excess  charged  above  such  rate,  and 
defendants  are  ordered  in  the  future  to 
maintain  a  rate  upon  poles  not  exceeding 
that  upon  lumber.  MacGillis  &  Gibbs  Co. 
V.  C.  &  E.  I.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  40,  41. 

(d)  Rates  on  poles  should  not  exceed 
rates  on  lumber.  National  Pole  Co.  v. 
C.   St.  P.   M.   &  O.   Ry.   Co.,  Unrep.   Op. 

124. 

§126.     Phosphate    Rock    and    Acid    Phos- 
phate. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
on  phosphate  rock  and  acid  phosphate 
from  Baltimore,  Md.,  Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  and 
Tennessee  phosphate  fields  and  Washing- 
ton Court  House,  O.,  to  Prairie  Switch, 
Ind.,  and  demanded  lower  rates  and 
the  application  of  single  rates  to  phos- 
phate rock,  ground  or  crude,  and  acid 
phosphate.  The  rates  attacked  were, 
on  both  phosphate  rock  and  acid 
phosphate,  from  Baltimore,  18c;  Buf- 
falo, 131/^c;  Washington  Court  House, 
lOo;  Nashville,  17i^c;  Mt.  Pleasant,  29c 
on  acid  phosphate  and  $3.45  on  phosphate 
rock.  The  crude  phosphate  rock  may  be 
transported  in  open  cars  without  injur/, 
whereas  acid  phosphate  must  be  pro- 
tected from  the  weather.  The  18c  rate 
from  Baltimore,  656  miles,  yielded  5.48 
mills  per  ton  mile.  The  10c  rate  from 
Washington  Court  House  to  Prairie 
Switch.  200  miles,  if  reduced  to  9c,  would 
yield  more  than  8  mills  per  ton  mile. 
HELD,  the  Commission  was  not  justified 
in  ordering  the  application  of  the  same 
rate  to  acid  phosphate  as  to  phosphate 
rock;  that  the  rate  from  Washington 
Court  House  should  be  reduced  from  10c 
to  9c  on  acid  phosphate  and  the  rate  of 
131/^c  from  Buffalo  should  be  reduced 
to  12c,  and  that  the  17i/^c  rate  from  Nash- 
ville should  be  adjusted  to  bring  it  into 
line  with  the  other  rates  from  Tennessee 
fields.  Other  rates  involved  not  found 
to  be  unreasonable  or  discriminatory. 
Reparation  denied  on  shipments  from 
Buffalo  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  rate 
exacted  was  the  class  rate  applying  to 
Prairie  Switch,  and  all  other  places  simi- 
larly situated,  and  in  view  of  the  hold- 
ings of  the  Commission  that  a  reduction 
of  rates  does  not  necessarily  carry  with 


it  the  right  to  reparation.  Bash  Fer- 
tilizer Co.  V.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
522,  526. 

§127.     Potatoes. 

(a)  From  May  13,  1903,  to  Oct.  12, 
1908,  the  joint  rate  on  potatoes  in  car- 
loads from  Pound,  Wausaukee  and 
Beaver,  Wis.,  was  15c  to  Painesdale, 
Mich.  This  rate  was  canceled  Oct.  12, 
1908,  leaving  in  force  a  21c  rate  until 
Nov.  10,  1908,  when  the  15c  rate  was 
restored.  The  shipments  in  question 
moved  between  Oct.  12  and  Nov.  10, 
1908,  HELD,  the  rate  charged  was  un- 
reasonable. Reparation  awarded.  Thomas 
v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I,  C.  C,  364, 

(b)  Potatoes  are  liable  to  greater 
damage  from  heating  than  from  any 
other  cause.  In  Re  Advances  on  Pota- 
toes, 23  I.  C.  C.  69,  70. 

§128.     Pulp  Wood. 

(a)  Complainant  charges  that  rates  on 
pulp  wood  of  41/^c  per  100  lbs.  from 
Casco,  Minn.,  to  Superior,  Wis.,  5c  from 
other  points  in  Mesaba  territory,  and 
7.3c  from  Deer  River  and  Ericson's  Spur 
were  unreasonable.  From  Casco  to  Su- 
perior is  84  miles;  from  points  covered 
by  the  blanket  rate  of  5c,  the  average 
distance  is  93  miles;  from  Dser  River 
and  Ericson's  Spur  the  distance  is  122 
and  125  miles,  respectively.  The  rates 
on  lumber  from  the  territory  involved  to 
Superior  were  less  than  the  rates  on  pulp 
wood.  Defendant  asserted  these  lumber 
rates  were  abnormally  low  on  account  of 
another  road.  Lumber  is  much  more 
valuable  than  pulp  wood.  HELD,  that, 
admitting  defendant's  contention  on  such 
a  low  grade  of  traffic  as  pulp  wood,  rates 
should  not  exceed  the  rates  charged  for 
lumber.  Reparation  awarded.  Wisconsin 
Pulp  Wood  Co.  V.  Gt.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L 
C.  C.  594,  595. 

§129.     Pyrites  Cinder. 

(a)  The  rate  on  pyrites  cinder  from 
Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  to  points  in  Pennsylvania 
and  New  Jersey  was  $2,  Under  this  rate 
{be  commodity  was  valued  at  $1  per 
gross  ton  at  Buffalo  and  was  unable  to 
move.  At  Bayonne,  N.  J.,  this  commodity 
was  valued  at  $2  per  ton  on  account  of 
the  difference  in  freight  rates,  as  com- 
pared with  Buffalo,  to  points  in  New  Jer- 
sey and  Pennsylvania,  The  rate  on  iron 
pyrites,  of  which  pyrites  cinder  is  the 
product,  was  but  $1.40  from  New  York, 


686 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §129  (b)— §133  (a) 


Philadelphia  and  Baltimore  to  Buffalo, 
while  the  pyrites  cinder  for  a  haul  of 
but  a  part  of  the  distance  was  assessed 
the  $2  rate,  the  cheaper  commodity 
thereby  being  charged  a  greater  amount 
for  a  shorter  haul.  The  rate  on  iron  orp 
was  $1.45  to  points  carrying  the  $2  rate 
on  pyrites  cinder.  HELD,  the  rate  at- 
tacked was  unreasonable  and  should  not 
exceed  the  rate  on  iron  ore  from  Buffalo. 
Naylor  &  Co.  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  9. 

(b)  The  rate  on  pyrites  cinder  should 
not  exceed  the  rate  on  iron  ore.  Naylor 
&  Co.  V.  L.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  168. 

§130.     Roofing   Material. 

(a)  Complainant  manufacturer  at- 
tacked the  rate  from  Carthage,  O.,  to 
Nashville,  Tenn.,  of  19c  on  mixed  car- 
loads of  roofing  material,  consisting  of 
roofing  paper  of  tarred  felt,  composition 
roofing  made  of  saturated  felt  with  a 
preparation  of  asphalt  and  other  ingredi- 
ents, sheath  paper  ingredients,  and 
sheath  paper  made  of  straw  pulp  and 
laid  underneath  the  roofing.  These  prod- 
ucts  were  wound  in  rolls  and  placed  on 
end  in  the  car.  Inside  of  each  roll  of 
composition  roofing  was  placed  a  can 
of  nails  weighing  1  lb.  and  a  pint  can  of 
roofing  cement.  Prior  to  1895  a  com- 
modity rate  of  20c  applied  on  roofing  pa- 
per and  on  printing  and  wrapping  paper. 
On  that  date  this  rate  was  reduced  to 
16c  and  then  shortly  afterwatrds  ad- 
vanced to  16*^0,  which  rate  obtained 
until  1907,  when  it  was  canceled,  as  to 
complainant's  commodity,  and  a  rate  of 
25c  put  into  effect.  In  1909  a  rate  of  19c 
was  established.  The  16^/^0  rate  still  ap- 
plied on  printing  and  wrapping  paper. 
Wrapping  paper  was  worth  from  $30  to 
$180  per  ton,  and  printing  paper  from  $50 
to  $140  per  ton.  Complainant's  products 
were  incombustible  and  impervious  to 
water.  The  rate  from  Cincinnati,  which 
took  the  same  rate  as  Carthage,  to  Nash- 
ville was,  on  iron  roofing,  15c;  roof- 
ing slate  and  tile,  13c;  shingles,  16c. 
The  rate  on  complainant's  products 
from  Cincinnati  to  New  Orleans,  925 
miles,  was  22c;  from  St.  Louis  to 
Nashville,  350  miles,  20c.  The  distance 
from  Carthage  to  Nashville  is  310  miles. 
The  value  of  complainant's  products  va- 
ried from  $20  to  $50  per  ton.  HELD,  on 
this  evidence  the  19c  rate  was  not  un- 
reasonable, but  that  defendants  should 
extend  the  privilege  of  carrying  the  ce- 
ment and  nails  included  within  the  rolls 


at   the   19c   rate.     Chatfield   Mfg.   Co.   v. 
L    &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  385,  387. 

§131.     Rosin. 

(a)  From  Louin,  Miss.,  to  Peoria,  111., 
a  rate  of  61c  was  exacted  on  a  carload 
of  rosin.  At  the  time  of  shipment  a 
rate  of  27c  was  in  effect  from  Laurel, 
Miss.,  a  point  three  miles  from  Louin,  to 
groups  of  points  near  Peoria  and  Chi- 
cago. Defendants  admitted  that  the  rate 
from  Louin  should  not  be  higher  than 
from  Laurel  and  that  the  rate  exacted 
was  unreasonable.  HELD,  the  61c  rate 
was  excessive  to  the  extent  that  it  ex- 
ceeded 27c.  Reparation  awarded.  Cen- 
tral Commercial  Co.  v.  M.,  J.  &  K.  C.  R. 
R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  25,  26. 

§132.     Sacked  Corn. 

(a)  Complainants  shipped  from  Elk- 
point,  S,  D.,  to  Anaconda,  Mont.,  one  car- 
load of  sacked  corn  half  cracked  and  half 
whole,  on  which  freight  charges  were  col- 
lected of  75c  per  100  lbs.  At  time  of 
shipment,  defendants  had  a  rate  of  55c 
per  100  lbs.  on  brewers'  meal,  brewers' 
grits,  brewers'  fiakes,  bran,  middlings, 
shorts,  cracked  or  chopped  corn,  corn- 
meal,  hominy,  in  straight  or  mixed  car- 
loads and  a  rate  of  50c  per  100  lbs.  on 
whole  corn  in  straight  carloads.  HELD, 
that  a  55c  mixed  carload  rate  could  not 
be  allowed  upon  the  commodities  men- 
tioned and  denied  upon  craclied  corn  and 
whole  corn;  that  the  charge  exacted  was 
unreasonable;  rate  of  55c  per  100  lbs. 
established  for  mixed  carloads  of  cracked 
corn  or  whole  corn  between  points  men- 
tioned, and  reparation  awarded.  Mc- 
Caull-Dinsmore  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
20  L  C.  C.  15. 

§133.     Safety  Fuse. 

(a)  On  a  carload  of  safety  fuse  from 
Avon,  Conn.,  to  Pleasant  Prairie,  Wis., 
via  rail  to  New  York,  thence  via  water  to 
Norfolk,  thence  via  rail  to  destination, 
complainant  was  assessed  69c.  The 
tariffs  actually  provided  for  this  rate,  but 
were  in  an  incomplete  and  uncertain 
condition,  and  did  not  provide  what  was 
intended  by  the  carriers.  Later  a  rate 
of  44c  was  established  via  the  route  in 
question.  HELD,  the  charge  was  un- 
reasonable. Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  44c.  Du  Pont  De  Nemours 
Powder  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  351,  352. 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §134  (a)— §136  (a) 


687 


§134.     Salt. 

(a)  On  carloads  of  salt  from  Detroit, 
Mich.,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.,  a  rate  of  16c 
was  charged.  The  only  evidence  of  un- 
reasonableness offered  by  complainant 
was  that  for  a  period  of  two  years  shortly 
prior  to  the  shipment,  a  rate  of  13  2-3c 
had  been  maintained.  The  16c  rate  at- 
tacked yielded  4  mills  per  ton  mile. 
HELD,  the  evidence  was  not  sufficient  to 
show  the  rate  attacked  to  be  unreason- 
able. Delray  Salt  Co.  v.  Detroit,  Toledo 
&  Ironton  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  245,  246. 

(b)  On  a  carload  of  salt  from  Detroit, 
Mich.,  to  Patricksburg,  Ind.,  a  rate  of 
12  l-3c  was  charged.  At  time  of  ship- 
ment a  rate  was  in  effect  via  another 
route  of  8  l-3c.  Shortly  after  the  ship- 
ment moved,  defendants  published  and 
maintained  a  rate  of  8  l-3c  for  several 
months,  when  it  was  advanced  to  lOi/^c. 
the  present  rate.  Defendants  conceded  the 
121/^c  rate  to  be  unreasonable  to  the  ex- 
tent it  exceeded  lOi^c.  Complainant  in 
attacking  the  IQi^c  rate  offered  no  evi- 
dence except  the  lower  rate  of  8  l-3c  via 
another  route.  HELD,  the  12  l-3c  late 
was  unreasonable,  but  the  lOi/^c  rate  was 
not  shown  to  be  excessive.  Reparation 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  IQi^c.  Delra^ 
Salt  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  T.  -:.  C. 
247,  247. 

(c)  Complainant  attacks  the  rates  on 
salt  in  carloads  from  Detroit,  Mich.,  to 
Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  of  8c  per  100  lbs.,  to  New 
York  City  of  IIV2C  per  100  lbs.,  and  to 
other  seaport  cities  basing  on  the  latter 
point  and  taking  the  usual  arbitraries 
over  or  under  that  rate.  Detroit  salt 
competed  with  that  produced  in  other  lo- 
calities, and  particularly  in  the  East  with 
Ohio  and  New  York  salt,  as  well  as  with 
the  imported  article.  The  selling  price 
of  bulk  salt  on  the  warehouse  floor  at 
Detroit  was  about  $1.50  per  ton,  or  7^c 
per  100  lbs.,  and  in  packages  loaded  in  a 
railroad  car,  about  10c  per  100  lbs.  or 
$2  per  ton.  From  June  1,  1903,  to  Nov. 
1,  1907,  the  rate  from  Detroit  to  Buffalo 
was  10c  per  100  lbs.  Between  the  lat- 
ter date  and  March,  1909,  salt  in  bulk 
took  a  rate  of  5c,  and  in  packages  of 
6%c.  On  March  1,  1909,  the  rate  was 
made  8c  in  packages  or  in  bulk.  Buffalo 
is  251  miles  east  of  Detroit.  The  former 
rate  on  bulk  salt  was  5c,  or  nearly  4 
mills  per  ton  per  mile,  and  the  rate  of 
6  2-3c  on  salt  in  packages  yielded  5.31 
mills,  whereas  the  present  rate  of  8c 
yielded  6.4  mills.  Since  January  15,  1906, 


defendant  had  maintained  a  rate  from 
Syracuse  to  Buffalo  of  4c  per  100  lbs., 
yielding  a  ton-mile  revenue  of  5.2  mills 
for  a  much  shorter  haul.  Since  Dec. 
14,  1906,  defendants  voluntarily  have 
maintained  a  rate  from  Detroit  to  Albany 
of  13c  per  100  lbs.,  yielding  4.71  mills  per 
ton  mile.  HELD,  the  rates  on  salt  from 
Detroit  to  New  York  City  and  points  tak- 
ing the  New  York  rptes  should  not  ex- 
ceed 15c  per  100  lbs.  Delray  Salt  Co.  v. 
M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  268,  269. 

(d)  On  a  shipment  of  rock  salt  from 
Lyons,  Kan.,  to  Lusk,  Wyo.,  via  Superior, 
Neb.,  defendant  connecting  carrier 
charged  44c  from  Superior  to  Lusk.  The 
rate  from  Superior  to  Orin  Junction, 
Wyo.,  to  which  Lusk  is  intermediate,  was 
28c.  Defendant's  practice  was  to  apply 
the  longer  distance  rat-^  to  points  inter- 
mediate, although  shortly  before  the 
shipment  its  tariff  canceled  such  pro- 
vision. HELD,  the  44c  charge  was  un- 
reasonable. Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  the  28c  rate,  but  on  stipulation 
of  complainant  a  35c  rate  from  Superior 
to  Lusk  was  established  for  the  future. 
Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  C.  «&  N.  W  Ry. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  433,  434. 

§135.     Sash  Weights. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  unrea- 
sonableness of  the  rate  of  23c  per  100  lbs. 
on  sash  weights  from  Shreveport.  La.,  to 
Marshall,  Tex.,  a  distance  of  42  miles. 
Between  the  same  points,  defendant  had 
in  effect  a  commodity  rate  of  6i/^c  per  100 
lbs.  upon  car  wheels,  axles  and  castings, 
articles  substantially  similar  in  trans- 
portation requirements,  but  of  greater 
commercial  value  than  sash  weights. 
From  Terrell,  Tex.,  to  Shreveport,  158 
miles,  defendant  maintained  a  commodity 
rate  of  17%c  on  sash  weights.  HELD, 
the  rate  of  23c  on  sash  weights  from 
Shreveport  to  Marshall  is  unlawful  and 
unreasonable,  and  defendant  ordered  to 
establish  for  the  future  a  rate  not  to 
exceed  6i^c  per  100  lbs.  Henderson  Iron 
Works  &  Supply  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  159. 


§136. 


Sawdust. 

See   §105,    Supra. 


(a)  On  sawdust  in  carloads  from  East 
Grand  Forks,  Minn.,  to  Minnewaukan, 
N.  D.,  a  commodity  rate  of  20c  was  ex- 
acted. HELD,  sawdust  being  a  low- 
grade  commodity  and  valued  at  about 
?1.50  per  ton,  the  rate  should  not  exceed 


688 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §137  (a)— §140  (b) 


8c  per  100  lbs.,  minimum  24,000  lbs.,  so 
as  to  correspond  with  the  rate  on  fuel 
wood  and  that  on  sawdust  on  the  lines 
of  other  carriers  in  the  territory  in  ques- 
tion. William  Plummer  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  530,  531. 

§137.     Second-Hand  Steel   Rails  and  Log- 
ging   Equipment. 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  second-hand 
steel  rails,  old  logging  cars,  steam 
Bkidders  and  other  equipment,  Onalaska, 
Ark.,  to  Batchelor,  La.,  under  a  combi- 
nation rate  of  from  86c  to  94c,  distance 
of  about  454  miles.  St.  Louis  is  926.5 
miles  from  Batchelor  via  the  lines  of 
defendant,  and  shipments  from  St.  Louis 
passed  through  Onalaska.  HELD,  the 
charges  exacted  should  not  exceed  the 
St.  Louis  rate  and  were  unreasonable 
to  the  extent  they  exceeded  $3.77  per 
ton  on  the  steel  rails  and  35c  per  100 
lbs.  on  the  other  equipment.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Northern  Lumber  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  54. 

§138.     Sheet-Iron     Roofing. 

(a)  Complainants  attacked  the  rate 
of  23c  per  100  lbs.  on  carload  shipments 
of  sheet-iron  roofing  from  Newport,  Ky., 
and  Cincinnati,  O.,  to  Knoxville,  Tenn. 
Contemporaneously  a  rate  of  20c  ap- 
plied on  sheet  iron,  and  both  sheet-iron 
and  iron  roofing  were  rated  sixth  class  in 
the  classification.  The  two  articles  are 
very  similar  in  that  the  material  is 
identical  and  the  price  practically  the 
same.  There  is  a  difference  in  that 
sheet  iron  would  require  painting  or 
other  preparation  to  satisfactorily  adapt 
it  for  use  as  roofing.  In  trade  there 
is  no  competition  between  the  two,  and 
roofing  is  to  a  very  slight  extent  a 
manufactured  product  of  sheet  iron.  The 
lower  rate  on  the  sheet  iron  was  due  to 
competitive  influences  absent  on  the 
roofing.  North  of  the  Ohio  River  and 
in  other  sections  of  the  country  sheet- 
iron  and  iron  roofing  took  the  same 
rate.  HELD,  as  a  general  rule  there  is 
no  objection  to  a  reasonable  differential 
between  the  rates  on  material  and  the 
manufactured  product  thereof.  The 
commodities  involved  bear  to  a  degree 
the  relation  of  raw  material  and  prod- 
ucts, and  the  difterence  in  the  rates  is 
not  found  to  be  undue.  Complaint  dis- 
missed. McClung  &  Co.  V.  L.  &  N 
R,  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  414,  416. 


§139.     Shingles. 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  shingles, 
C.  L.,  from  Monroe,  La.,  to  Crowell, 
Tex,,  under  a  joint  through  class  rate 
of  44c.  Five  days  after  this  shipment 
moved  a  commodity  rate  of  26%c  be- 
came effective.  But  a  month  later  this 
rate  was  canceled  and  there  was  estab- 
lished between  the  same  points  but  via 
a  different  route  a  26i/^c  rate.  A  part 
only  of  the  defendants  appeared  at  the 
hearing  and  admitted  the  justness  of 
the  claim  for  reparation.  HELD,  the 
charges  exacted  were  unreasonable  to 
the  extent  they  exceeded  26 %c.  Menefee 
Bros.  V.  V.  S.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C. 
117. 

§140.     Snapped    Corn. 

(a)  Complainants  shipped  a  carload 
of  snapped  corn,  or  corn  in  the  shuck, 
Erath,  La.,  to  Miles,  Tex.,  under  the 
lawful  combination  rate  of  52i/^c.  Sub- 
sequently the  rate  was  reduced  to  31c. 
The  rate  on  corn,  Miles  to  Erath,  at 
time  of  hearing,  was  25c.  One  defend- 
ant was  willing  to  apply  a  rate  of  31i/4c 
if  its  connections  would  join  in  such 
action.  An  oflficer  of  one  defendant  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  a  reasonable 
rate  would  have  been  35c.  HELD,  31c 
was  a  reasonable  rate  on  the  shipment. 
Reparation  awarded.  Browne  Grain  Co. 
V.  G.  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  163. 

(b)  On  one  carload  of  snapped  corn 
from  Ninnekah,  Okla.,  to  Clarksville, 
Tex.,  and  on  another  from  Addington, 
Okla.,  to  Clarksville,  Tenn.,  rates  of 
28%c  and  2134c,  respectively,  were  col- 
lected, being  125  per  cent  of  the  shelled 
corn  rates  of  23c  and  17c,  respectively. 
Shortly  prior  and  shortly  subsequent  to 
the  shipments  in  question  the  rates  on 
snapped  corn  and  shelled  corn  were 
the  same.  Defendants  stated  that  the 
rate  was  raised  on  snapped  corn  on  ac- 
count of  shortage  of  equipment  and  for 
the  purpose  of  inducing  shippers  to 
ship  their  corn  shelled.  The  cars  in 
question  weighed  35,030  and  37,170  lbs., 
respectively,  a  fact  showing  that 
snapped  corn  weighed  as  heavily  as 
shelled  corn.  The  minimum  for  snapped 
corn  was  the  actual  weight  when  loaded 
to  visible  capacity,  but  not  less  than 
24,000  lbs.  Complainant  offered  no 
other  evidence  except  to  rely  on  Ochel- 
tree  Grain  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  46.  HELD,  the  rates 
exacted    were    unreasonable    to    the    ex- 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §140  (c)— §144  (a) 


689 


tent  that  they  exceeded  the  rates  on 
shelled  corn.  Texas  Grain  &  Elevator 
Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
580,  581. 

(c)  A  charge  of  29.38c  on  snapped 
corn  in  carloads  from  Okemah,  Okla., 
to  Terrell,  Tex.,  is  excessive,  where  the 
shelled  corn  rate  is  23i/^c,  and  defend- 
ant shortly  after  the  shipment  in  ques- 
tion applies  that  lower  rate  to  snapped 
corn.  Reparation  awarded.  Tully  Grain 
Co.  V.  F.  S.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
28,   29. 

§141.     Stamped    Ware. 

(a)  The  carload  rate  of  $1.80  on 
stamped  ware  in  corrugated  strawboard 
boxes  shipped  from  Buffalo  to  Califor- 
nia and  North  Pacific  terminals  was  at- 
tacked as  unreasonable  and  discrimina- 
tory. The  tariffs  expressly  provided 
a  rate  of  $1.20  on  stamped  ware  in 
boxes,  barrels  and  crates.  The  pack- 
ages here  involved  were  neither  boxes, 
barrels  nor  crates,  within  the  meaning 
of  the  tariff.  The  rule  further  provided  for 
a  50  per  cent  higher  rate  if  the  articles 
were  shipped  in  bales,  bags  or  bundles. 
HELD,  the  shipment  was  governed  by 
no  published  rate,  and  inasmuch  as 
other  classifications  in  force  at  that 
time  placed  such  packages  in  the  same 
class  as  wooden  boxes,  and  the  trans- 
continental tariffs  succeeding  the  tariff 
in  effect  at  the  time  of  shipment  makes 
no  distinction,  and  considering  the 
character  of  the  commodity  and  of  the 
package,  the  rate  is  unreasonable  to 
the  amount  of  its  excess  over  $1.20  per 
100  lbs.  Republic  Metalware  Co.  v.  E. 
R.   R.    Co.,   22   L   C.    C.   565,  567. 

§142.     Staves. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates  on 
staves  from  Harrisburg,  Paragouid. 
Jonesboro,  Brinkley,  Clarendon,  Little 
Rock,  Pine  Bluff,  Fordyce,  Stephens, 
Camden,  Texarkana,  Ark.,  and  Maiden, 
Mo.,  to  Alexandria,  Mo.,  and  Keokuk. 
la.  For  15  years  prior  to  September, 
1908,  the  defendants  maintained  a  joint 
through  rate  of  17c  per  100  lbs.  between 
Harrisburg  and  Alexandria,  under  which 
the  complainant  transported  this  traffic. 
The  joint  rate  was  then  canceled,  rnd 
the  combination  local  rate  of  19c  ex- 
acted. The  distance  is  422  miles,  which 
under  a  rate  of  17c  yielded  a  ton-mile 
revenue  of  8  mills.  The  M.  P.  R.  R., 
a  defendant,  maintained  from  Alexandria 


to  Kansas  City,  a  distance  of  539 
miles,  a  rate  of  16c;  to  St.  Joe,  a  dis- 
tance of  607  miles,  a  rate  of  17c.  The 
rates  from  the  other  points  had  been 
variously  advanced,  ranging  from  2c  to 
5c  over  what  they"  had  been  for  some 
seven  years  prior  to  the  date  of  the 
advance.  HELD,  that  ordinarily  a 
through  rate  for  a  long  haul  should 
be  less  than  the  sum  of  the  locals,  snd 
that  a  ton-mile  revenue  of  8  mills  for 
this  commodity,  which  is  substantially 
lumber,  cannot  be  pronounced  low;  that 
a  through  route  and  joint  rate  should 
be  established  from  Harrisburg  to  Alex-  ; 
andria  under  a  rate  not  exceeding  17c  f 
per  100  lbs.,  and  that  the  rates  from 
Maiden,  Mo.,  Paragouid,  Ark.,  and 
Jonesboro,  Ark.,  to  Alexandria,  Mo.,  are 
unreasonable  to  the  extent  they  ex- 
ceed 15c,  17c  and  17c  per  100  lbs.,  respect- 
ively. Reparation  awarded.  Bon  Bros. 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I. 
C.    C.    136. 

§143.     Stucco. 

(a)  A  rate  of  41c  on  stucco  in  car- 
loads from  Gypsum,  la.,  to  Lemmon,  S. 
D.,  is  not  shown  to  be  unreasonable, 
the  only  evidence  presented  being  the 
mere  fact  that  a  lower  rar.e  was  sub- 
sequently established  by  defendants, 
Quammen  &  Austad  Lumber  Co.  v.  C. 
G.  W.   R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  599,  600. 

§144.     Sugar. 

(a)  Since  1901  the  rate  on  raw 
sugar  from  New  York  via  water  to  Nor- 
folk aitd  thence  by  rail  to  Martinsville 
and  Winston-Salem,  N.  C,  was  29i^c. 
\  During  that  period  the  rate  to  Reids- 
yille,  N.  C,  was  40c.  At  the  request 
of  complainant  tobacco  manufacturers 
at  Reidsville,  the  rate  was  on  May  15, 
1909,  reduced  through  an  error  to  26i^c, 
the  intention  of  the  defendants  being 
to  reduce  the  same  to  29 ^/^c,  so  as  to 
correspond  with  the  Martinsville  and 
Winston-Salem  rate.  Reidsville  is  233 
miles,  Martinsville  248  miles  and  Win- 
ston-Salem 282  miles  from  Norfolk.  De 
fendants  admitted  that  they  put  the 
new  rate  to  Reidsville  in  effect  because 
the  old  rate  was  relatively  "out  of  line" 
and  "wrong."  No  other  evidence  of 
the  unreasonableness  of  the  old  -'Oc 
rate  to  Reidsville  was  offered.  Com- 
plainants' nominal  competitors  at  Mar- 
tinsville and  Winston-Salem  were  con- 
trolled   by    the    American    Tobacco    Co., 


690 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §144  (b)— §145  (a) 


and  there  was,  in  fact,  no  real  competi- 
tion. HELD,  while  the  mere  voluntary 
reduction  by  a  carrier  of  a  rate  is  not 
of  itself  sufficient  to  prove  the  old 
rate  unreasonable  so  as  to  entitle  a 
shipper  to  reparation,  still  the  evidenje 
of  unreasonableness  is  sufficient  where 
the  defendant  admits  that  the  old  rate 
was  excessive.  Ordered  that  the  rates 
to  Reidsville  should  not  exceed  that 
to  Martinsville  and  Winston-Salem. 
Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis  of 
294c  and  not  on  the  basis  of  26i^c. 
Penn  Tobacco  Co.  v.  Old  Dominion  S.  S. 
Co.,   18   I.    C.   C.   197,   199. 

(b)  On  a  shipment  of  sugar  in  car- 
loads from  Eaton,  Colo.,  to  Decatur, 
111.,  complainant  was  assessed  a  joint 
through  rate  of  74i^c,  the  only  joint 
through  rate  to  which  one  of  the  de- 
fendants was  a  party.  At  the  time  of 
shipment  a  joint  through  rate  of  32 ^c 
was  in  effect  between  said  points,  such 
rate  not  being  applicable  over  the  line 
of  defendant.  Subsequent  to  the  ship- 
ment defendant  joined  in  a  joint  rate 
between  said  points  of  32i^c.  HELD, 
the  rate  charged  was  unreasonable 
Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis  of 
32^0.  Havemeyer  &  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  13. 

§145.     Sulphuric   Acid. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
on  sulphuric  acid  in  carloads  from  Cop- 
perhill,  Tenn.,  of  $2.60  to  Athens,  Ga., 
258  miles;  of  $3  to  Augusta,  Ga.,  356 
miles;  of  $4  to  Columbia,  S.  C.,  409 
miles;  of  $3  to  Dublin,  Ga.,  327  miles, 
as  tjrpical  points.  Sulphuric  acid  was 
used  by  the  complainant  in  large  quan- 
tities in  the  manufacture  of  fertilizer. 
The  principal  ingredients  of  fertilizer 
are  phosphate  rock  and  sulphuric  acid. 
The  process  of  acidulation  can  be  car- 
ried on  wherever  the  rock  and  the  acid 
can  be  most  cheaply  brought  together. 
The  rock  is  found  throughout  the  south- 
eastern states.  Other  ingredients  are 
usually  added  by  the  local  dealer.  The 
sulphuric  acid  used  in  this  industry 
had  until  recently  been  produced  mainly 
from  iron  pyrites,  the  bulk  of  which  was 
Imported  from  Spain.  The  cost  of  pro- 
ducing 50-degree  sulphuric  acid  from 
pyrites  was  about  $4.50  per  ton.  Re- 
cently the  copper  smelters  of  Tennessee 
had  manufactured  large  quantities  of 
sulphuric  acid  as  a  by-product.  The  com- 
plainant   corporation    was    organized    as 


a  result  of  a  contract  with  the  smelters 
to  purchase  the  entire  outfit  of  sul- 
phuric acid  at  60  degrees  of  strength 
at  about  $5  per  ton.  This  represented 
a  cost  of  about  $4  per  ton  for  the  acid 
reduced  to  the  50  degrees  basis.  The 
cost  of  sulphuric  acid  to  the  complain- 
ant's competitors  was  the  cost  of  pyrites, 
plus  the  amount  of  freight  on  the  py- 
rites to  the  interior,  plus  the  cost  of 
mg,nufacture.  One  ton  of  pyrites  makes 
two  tons  of  acid.  Complainant's  rates 
on  acid  were  higher  than  the  rates  on 
pyrites.  The  cost  per  ton  mile  on  sul- 
phuric acid  ranged  from  7  to  8  mills 
to  points  of  present  or  prospective  ship- 
ment. The  low  rates  on  pyrites  were 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  rock  situated 
in  the  interior  could  not  compete  with 
the  rock  on  the  coast,  although  the  cost 
of  distribution  of  the  fertilizer  was  less 
In  the  interior.  The  Railway  Commis- 
sion of  Georgia  established  low  rates 
on  pyrites  in  order  to  stimulate  the 
production  in  the  interior.  Fertilizer 
tonnage  was  important  to  many  southern 
railroads.  Rates  were  reduced  to  meet 
the  Georgia  rates.  The  pyrites  rates 
were  the  result  of  competition.  Sul- 
phuric acid  was  transported  in  tank  cars 
with  a  capacity  of  50  tons.  The  cars 
were  owned  by  complainant.  The  car- 
riers paid  %c  per  mile  both  ways  for 
their  use.  The  cars  were  always  re- 
turned empty.  The  traffic  did  not  re- 
quire expedited  service.  The  movement 
was  uniform.  The  liability  to  loss  and 
damage  was  small.  The  volume  of  traf- 
fic was  comparatively  large,  250,000  tons 
per  year,  with  considerable  prospective 
increase.  Considerable  negotiations  had 
taken  place  relative  to  the  rates.  The 
carriers  maintained  that  sulphuric  acid 
should  take  the  same  rate  as  fertilizer. 
Fertilizer  did  not  compete  with  the 
acid.  The  value  of  fertilizer  was  $15  to 
$20  per  ton.  Acid  is  distinctly  a  raw 
material.  The  value  of  acid  was  about 
the  same  as  that  of  phosphate  rock  in 
Tennessee  and  Florida.  The  loading  of 
acid  was  heavier  than  rock,  but  the  tank 
car  returns  empty,  while  the  rock  cars 
took  a  return  load.  The  rates  on  phos- 
phate rock  had  been  highly  competi- 
tive. HELD,  that  the  rate  on  pyrites 
should  not  be  used  as  a  standard  to  fix 
the  rate  on  acid;  that  the  rate  on  acid 
may  well  be  somewhat  higher  than  the 
rate  on  rock,  and  that  the  rates  to 
Athens,  Augusta,  Columbia  and  Dublin 
as     typical     points     should    not    exceed 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §145  (b)— §148  (c) 


691 


$2.20,  $2.80,  $3.15  and  $2.65,  respectively. 
Reparation  awarded  for  rates  charged 
in  excess  of  these  rates.  International 
Agricultural  Corporation  v.  L.  &  N.  R. 
R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.   488,  493,  494. 

(b)  On  carloads  of  sulphuric  acid 
shipped  from  Howe,  111,,  to  Aetna,  Ind., 
the  class  rate  of  13c  is,  upon  admission 
of  defendants,  held  unreasonable,  and 
reparation  is  awarded  on  the  basis  of 
10c,  the  rate  established  by  defendant 
subsequent  to  the  shipment  and  prior 
to  the  filing  of  the  complaint.     Mineral 

r     Point  Zinc  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  16 
I     I.   C.   C.   440,   441. 

(c)  Complainant  manufacturer  of  sul- 
phuric acid  at  Detroit  attacked  the  rate 
of  $2.72  per  ton  on  iron  pyrites  from 
Baltimore  to  Detroit,  as  compared  with 
the  rates  accorded  to  competitors  at 
Chicago,  St.  Louis  and  Cincinnati. 
Prior  to  the  date  of  advance,  Jan.  1, 
1907,  the  rate  to  Detroit  had  been  $1.74, 
except  for  the  years  1903  and  19o6, 
when  it  was  $1.56  and  $2.68,  respect- 
ively. Prior  to  the  advance  the  rate  to 
Detroit  averaged  44c  a  ton  less  than  to 
Chicago,  whereas  under  the  rate  at- 
tacked it  was  only  lie  less.  Over 
the  short  line  distance  from  Baltimore 
to  Detroit  the  rate  attacked  yielded  4.19 
mills  per  ton  mile  and  by  the  longer 
route  over  which  the  complainant's 
shipments  moved,  3.84  mills.  Since  the 
date  of  the  hearing  defendants  estab- 
lished rates  from  Baltimore  to  Detroit, 
Cincinnati,  St.  Louis  and  Chicago  of 
$2.21.  $2.53.  $2.86  and  $3,  respectively. 
HELD,     that    while    the    rate    attacked 

,  yielded  a  low  revenue,  still  the  defend- 
ant having  long  maintained  the  rates 
previously  in  effect  and  complainant's 
sale  contracts  and  competitive  relations 
having  been  established  on  the  basis 
of  the  former  rates,  the  rate  attacked 
was  unreasonable  and  unjust  to  the  ex- 
tent that  it  exceeded  $2.21.  Reparation 
awarded.  Detroit  Chemical  Works  v. 
Northern  Central  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
857,  362. 

§146.     Tanners'    Outfits. 

(a)  Carloads  containing  a  second- 
hand tanner's  outfit  shipped  from  Mil- 
waukee to  Tacoma,  Wash.,  was  classi- 
fied as  machinery,  and  complainant  was 
assessed  $1.40  per  100  lbs.,  24,000  lbs. 
minimum.  HELD,  this  freight  could 
not  be  classified  either  as  cooperage  or 
machinery;     and     that     the     $1.40     rate 


was  unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded 
on  $1.35  basis,  which  was  declared  to 
be  a  reasonable  rate.  Carstens  Packing 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.  C.  469,  470. 

§147.     Tent   Pins. 

(a)  Upon  a  carload  of  rough  sod 
tent  pins  from  Gleason,  Ark.,  to  Dallas, 
Tex.,  the  class  rate  of  60c  was  assessed. 
At  the  time  shipment  moved  a  rate  of 
20c  was  in  effect  on  lumber.  The  value 
of  the  shipment  was  $194.36  and  the 
freight  exacted  $180.  Defendant  ad- 
mitted the  unreasonableness  of  the 
charge.  Shortly  after  the  shipment  a 
rate  was  established  on  tent  pins  of 
21c.  HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was  un- 
reasonable. Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  21c.  Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
274,    275. 

§148.     Ties. 

See  Supra,  §105. 

(a)  The  exception  by  defendants  of 
hewn  oak  cross  ties  from  the  applica- 
tion of  the  rates  on  oak  lumber  from 
points  in  Arkansas  west  of  Pine  Bluff 
on  the  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  to  points  in 
Texas  on  the  I.  &  G.  N,  R.  R.  is  un- 
reasonable and  unjustly  discriminatory, 
and  defendants  will  be  required  to  apply 
to  hewn  oak  cross  ties  the  joint  rates 
contemporaneously  applicable  to  oak 
lumber.  Signor  lie  Co.  v.  I.  &  G.  N, 
R.  R.   Co.,   21  L   C,  C.   615,  617. 

(b)  Complainants  shipped  a  carload 
of  switch  ties,  Harvey,  Va.,  to  Mus- 
kegon, Mich.  Consignee  refused  to  ac- 
cept the  shipment  on  account  of  mis- 
routing.  The  delivering  line  used  the 
ties  itself  and  credited  the  shipper,  who 
had  paid  no  charges,  with  the  market 
price  at  destination,  which  was  less 
than  the  accrued  freight  charges.  HELD, 
the  rate  on  the  ties  should  not  exceed 
the  rate  on  lumber.  The  delivering 
line  authorized  to  refund  to  the  shipper 
the  difference  between  the  market  value 
of  the  ties  and  the  freight  rate  on  lum- 
ber, and  to  adjust  the  account  with 
connecting  carriers.  Fullerton  Powell 
Hardwood  Lumber  Co.  v.  V.  &  S.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  86. 

(c)  The  rate  for  the  transportation 
of  ties,  C.  L.,  Tennessee  Ridge,  Tenn., 
to  Louisville,  Ky.,  should  not  exceed  the 
rate  contemporaneously  in  effect  for 
carriage    between    the    same    points    for 


692 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §148   (d)— §150  (c) 


lumber  similar  in  quality  to  that  from 
which  the  ties  are  made.  Chicago  Car 
Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
L  C.  C.  438. 

(d)  Rate  on  crossties  should  not  ex- 
ceed the  rate  applicable  on  lumber  of 
the  same  kind.  Reparation  awarded. 
Preston  v.  R.  F.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  203. 

(e)  Rates  on  cedar  ties  exceeded 
those  in  effect  on  lumber.  Reparation 
awarded.  MacGillis  &  Gibbs  Co.  v.  C. 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  271. 

(f)  Rates  on  crossties  found  to  be 
unreasonable  to  the  extent  that  they 
exceed  the  rates  contemporaneously 
charged  for  the  transportation  of  lumber. 
Wheeler-Holden  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  402. 

(g)  Rates  on  crossties  found  to  have 
been  unreasonable  to  the  extent  that 
they  exceeded  the  rates  contemporan- 
eously in  effect  on  lumber  manufactured 
from  the  same  kind  of  wood.  Reparation 
awarded,  Stricklin  &  Co.  v.  L.  &.  N.  R. 
R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  533;  Gooch  Lumber 
Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
535;  Harmount  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  545;  Ohio  Valley  Tie  Co.  v. 
L.  H.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  567. 

§149.     Tin    Plate    Scrap. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate 
of  52%c  per  100  lbs.  on  "scrap  tin 
plate,"  C.  L.,  Denver,  Colo.,  to  Streeter, 
111.  Prior  to  the  movement  defendants 
maintained  a  specific  commodity  rate 
of  30c  per  100  lbs.  on  scrap  tin,  but, 
owing  to  cancelation,  the  commodity 
rate  of  525^c  on  junk  applied,  which 
was  collected.  Subsequently  a  specific 
commodity  rate  of  31  %c  on  tin  plate 
scrap  was  published.  HELD,  scrap  tin 
plate  is  refuse  of  little  intrinsic  value. 
The  invoice  price  of  the  consignment 
in  question  was  only  $5  per  ton.  It 
is  apparent  that  it  can  move  only  under 
a  rate  relatively  low  as  compared  with 
other  articles  usually  classed  as  junk. 
Tiiis  fact  was  recagnized  by  the  car- 
riers when,  after  the  junk  rate  had 
been  applicable  for  a  few  months,  they 
re-established  a  specific  commodity  rate 
substantially  as  low  as  the  one  that 
had  been  in  effect  for  several  years. 
Rate  exacted  was  unreasonable  to  the  ex- 
tent it  exceeded  31  %c.  Vulcan  Detin- 
ning  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
93. 


§150.     Vehicles,   Wagons,    Buggies. 

(a)  On  vehicles  in  carloads  from 
Elkhart,  Ind.,  to  Milwaukee,  Wis.,  com- 
plainant was  charged  a  joint  rate  of 
23i^c  per  100  lbs.  The  proportional 
rate  to  Milwaukee  on  shipments  going 
through  to  points  beyond  where  com- 
plainant's competition  exists  is  IS^/^c. 
The  rate  had  been  advanced  twice 
within  the  six  past  years.  The  evidence 
indicated  that  the  rate  from  Elkhart  was 
considerably  higher  than  from  any  other 
point  in  Central  Freight  Association 
territory  to  Milwaukee,  although  trans- 
portation was  under  similar  conditions. 
HELD,  the  rate  was  unreasonable  to 
the  extent  that  it  exceeded  18v2C  per 
100  lbs.  Reparation  awarded.  Lindsay 
Brothers  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
I.    C.    C.    516. 

(b)  Complainant  shipped  one  carload 
of  wagons  from  Wagon  Works  station, 
Toledo,  O.,  to  Tonopah,  Nev.,  under  a 
rate  of  $3.28  per  100  lbs.  On  the  date 
of  shipment  a  rate  on  farm  wagons  in 
carloads  from  Toledo  to  Pacific  coast 
terminals  was  $1.25  per  100  lbs.,  in- 
cluding Sacramento  and  Los  Angeles. 
The  rate  from  Sacramento,  Cal.,  to  Tono- 
pah, Nev.,  was  $1.46  per  100  lbs.  Two 
days  after  the  shipment  moved  the 
rate  from  Sacramento  to  Tonopah  was 
reduced  to  $1.46  per  100  lbs.  HELD, 
that  the  rate  of  $2.03  per  100  lbs.  from 
Sacramento  to  Tonopah,  when  used  as 
one  of  the  factors  in  determining  the 
rate  from  Toledo  to  Tonopah,  was  un- 
just and  unreasonable  to  the  extent 
that  it  exceeded  the  rate  of  $1.46  from 
Los  Angeles  to  Tonopah  on  the  date 
shipment  moved.  Reparation  awarded. 
Mllburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S. 
Ry.   Co.,   18   I.   C.   C.   144,   145,   146. 

(c)  Complainant  was  assessed  73c 
on  a  mixed  carload  of  buggies  and 
wagons  from  East  St.  Louis  to  Beebe, 
Ark.  Shortly  before  shipment  moved 
a  rate  of  30c  had  been  in  effect,  and 
shortly  thereafter  said  rate  of  30c  was 
restored  and  maintained  for  four  years, 
whereupon  the  73c  rate  was  restored. 
Defendant  at  the  hearing  indicated  its 
intention  of  establishing  a  39c  rate  in 
the  near  future,  but  did  not  admit  the 
73c  rate  to  be  unreasonable.  Com- 
plainant offered  no  further  proof  of 
the  unreasonableness  of  the  rate  ex- 
acted. HELD,  the  73c  rate  was  unrea- 
sonable. Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  39c.     Parlin  «&  Qrendorff  Co.  v. 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §151  (a)— §153  (b) 


693 


St.    L.    I.    M.    &    S.    Ry.    Co.,    15    I,    C.    C. 
145,   146. 

§151.     Walnut    Veneer. 

(a)  On  walnut  veneer  from  Kansas 
City  to  Chicago  and  Chicago  points, 
complainant  was  assessed  65c  in  any 
quantity.  Shortly  before  the  hearing 
the  rates  were  reduced  to  27c,  carloads, 
and  45c,  less-than-carloads.  The  better 
grade  of  veneer  sells  at  the  mill  for 
$5  and  $6  per  thousand;  it  readily  loads 
from  30,000  to  40,000  lbs.  The  rate 
attacked  was  high  as  compared  with 
that  applying  on  the  same  commodity 
in  other  localities.  It  was  higher  than 
the  rate  on  lumber,  but  did  not  com- 
pete with  same.  Its  value  was  such 
that  a  few  cents  difference  did  not  con- 
trol the  point  of  manufacture.  HELD, 
the  said  65c  rate  exacted  was  unreason- 
able, but  the  later  rates  of  27c  in  car- 
loads and  45c  in  less-than-carloads  were 
not  unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded. 
Penrod  Walnut  &  Veneer  Co.  v.  C.  B. 
&  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  326,  327. 

§152.     Watermelons. 

(a)  Complainants  in  1908  and  1909 
shipped  over  defendants'  lines  from 
Holcomb  and  Blodgett,  Mo.,  and  other 
points,  a  number  of  carloads  of  water- 
melons, consigned  to  Minneapolis  and 
St.  Paul  and  other  points,  at  a  rate  of 
29c  per  100  lbs.,  based  on  a  minimum 
of  25,000  lbs.  This  rate  was  a  combina- 
tion made  up  of  lie  from  producing 
points  to  St.  Louis  and  balance  to 
points  beyond.  It  was  alleged  that  the 
rate  was  unreasonable  in  so  far  as  lie 
exceeded  the  sum  of  7.2c,  being  the  in- 
trastate rate  to  St.  Louis  fixed  by  a 
Missouri  statute,  and  that  this  rate  dis- 
criminated in  favor  of  St.  Louis  deal- 
ers over  dealers  in  other  states.  Repa- 
ration was  asked.  Complainants  and 
defendants  each  cited  numerous  other 
rates  on  melons  to  support  their  re- 
spective contentions.  The  evidence  dis- 
closed that  the  state  rate  of  7.2c  yielded 
lower  earnings  than  the  rate  on  any 
other  commodity  moving  between  the 
same  points,  and  in  order  for  a  St. 
Louis  dealer  to  obtain  the  state  rate 
into  St.  Louis  he  would  have  to  load 
and  unload  the  shipments  and  pay 
switching  and  possible  demurrage 
charges;  that  the  lie  rate  to  St.  Louis 
returned  ton-mile  earnings  of  about  12 1/^ 
mills,  but  the  originating  carrier  of 
melons    had    an    extra    expense    of    $1.10  | 


for  slatting  cars  and  a  per  diem  charge 
of  $5  per  car  for  "parking"  cars  to  in- 
sure prompt  forwarding.  Petition  dis- 
missed. HELD,  the  rate  paid  by  com- 
plainants was  not  unreasonable  or  un- 
duly discriminatory.  Gamble-Robinson 
Commission  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  I.   C.  C.  138,  140. 

§153.     Wheat,  Corn  and  Rye. 
See  Supra,  §89,   §92. 

(a)  Complainant  attacked  the  carload 
rate  of  46c  per  100  lbs.  for  the  trans- 
portation of  bulk  corn  from  Sioux  City, 
la.,  to  Hinsdale,  Mont.,  a  distance  of 
950  miles,  yielding  a  ton-mile  revenue 
of  9.68  mills.  In  the  reverse  direction 
the  rate  was  30c,  or  6.31  mills  per  ton 
mile.  Using  an  average  haul  of  244 
miles,  the  average  rate  per  ton  per  mile 
of  the  defendant,  including  both  carload 
and  less-than-carload  rate,  for  the  year 
ended  June  30,  1910,  was  8.22  mills.  On 
this  ton-mile  basis  the  rate  charged 
would  have  been  38c.  HELD,  the  rate 
assessed  was  unreasonable  to  the  extent 
it  exceeded  38c.  Reparation  awarded. 
Black  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  402. 

(b)  The  rates  on  wheat  and  corn 
and  their  products  from  the  Joplin,  Mo., 
group  to  Little  Rock  and  Alexandria 
territories  were  attacked  as  unreason- 
able and  discriminatory  in  favor  of 
other  points  in  Kansas  City  territory, 
of  which  the  Joplin  group  was  a  part, 
and  in  favor  of  southern  Illinois  points, 
and  the  rates  from  Joplin  territory  to 
Fort  Smith,  Ark.,  were  alleged  to  be  un- 
reasonable. .  The  Kansas  City  group  ex- 
tended from  the  Missouri-Arkansas  line 
north  250  miles,  lying  mostly  in  Mis- 
souri, but  partly  in  eastern  Kansas  and 
northeastern  Oklahoma.  The  Joplin  group 
was  a  part  of  this  territory.  Joplin  mills 
obtained  90  per  cent  of  their  wheat  in 
Joplin  territory.  This  wheat  was  known 
as  "soft  wheat,"  and  the  flour  made 
therefrom  was  in  particular  demand  in 
Little  Rock  and  Alexandria  territories. 
The  average  distance  from  complain- 
ants' mills  to  these  territories  was  350 
miles.  The  average  distance  from  the 
entire  Kansas  City  group  was  450  miles. 
Southern  Illinois  produces  the  same 
kind  of  wheat  and  the  flour  therefrom 
competed  with  complainants'  flour.  Rates 
now  in  effect  from  Kansas  City  group 
to  Little  Rock,  Ark.,  were:  (a)  local 
rate  from  all  Kansas  City  territory  to 
Little  Rock  territory  of  23c  per  100  lbs., 
wheat    or    flour,    from    point    of    origin; 


694 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §153   (c)— (e) 


(b)  proportional  rates  of  18c  per  100 
lbs.  on  wheat  and  wheat  products  which 
had  moved  by  rail  into  the  point  of 
shipment;  (c)  milling-in-transit  was  per- 
mitted on  a  direct  line  haul  without 
extra  charge  at  a  total  rate  of  23c. 
This  rate,  it  is  alleged,  should  be  18c.  The 
principal  grain  shipping  points,  Kansas 
City,  St.  Joseph  and  Leavenworth,  are 
situated  in  the  northern  part  of  Kansas 
City  group.  Practically  the  entire  sup- 
ply of  wheat  for  complainants'  mills  was 
drawn  from  Joplin  territory.  The  average 
rate  established  by  state  authority  in 
wheat-producing  states  was  shown  by  a 
table  in  the  opinion  to  be  17.45c  per 
100  lbs.  for  350  miles.  The  short  line 
from  Kansas  City  to  Fort  Smith  was  328 
miles,  and  this  would  form  a  part  of  the 
through  line  from  Kansas  City  and 
points  in  Joplin  territory  to  Little  Rock. 
The  rate  voluntarily  fixed  for  this  haul 
was  19c.  The  rates  in  some  instances 
from  some  points  in  this  and  neighbor- 
ing territory  to  Texas  points  was  higher, 
but  such  rates  were  controlled  by  the 
export  rate  through  Texas  points.  The 
rate  from  Illinois  points  to  Little  Rock 
and  Alexandria  was  18c  for  an  average 
distance  of  312  miles.  The  former 
Illinois  rate  had  been  16c  and  the  Jop- 
lin rate  18c.  Milling-in-transit  privi- 
leges were  shown  to  exist  at  Illinois 
points.  HELD,  the  present  rates  on 
wheat  from  Joplin  territory  are  too 
high,  both  of  themselves  and  in  com- 
parison with  southern  Illinois  and  north- 
ern Kansas  City  group  points,  and  such 
rates  should  not  exceed  20i/^c.  The 
present  rate  on  corn,  19c,  a  differential 
of  4c,  is  not  justified  by  conditions  and 
should  not  exceed  IT^^c.  The  present 
Kansas  City  rate  of  30c  on  wheat  and 
26c  on  corn  should  not  exceed  27i/^c 
and  24i^c  for  Joplin  points.  The  23c 
rate  from  the  Kansas  City  group  to 
Fort  Smith  should  be  revised  in  view 
of  the  rates  on  shipments  from  Illinois 
through  Little  Rock.  The  method  of 
establishing  rates  in  accordance  with  this 
opinion  is  left  to  the  railroads.  The 
present  rates  are  not  unlawful,  and 
reparation  will  be  denied.  Southwestern 
Missouri  Millers'  Club  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry. 
Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  422,  427. 

(c)  On  a  carload  of  corn  from  Glid- 
den,  la.,  to  Chetek,  Wis.,  a  rate  of  25c 
was  collected.  At  the  time  of  shipment 
a  rate  of  20.1c  from  Nebraska  points 
to  Duluth,  Minn.,  was  in  effect,  and 
under     this     rate     traffic     might     move 


through  Glidden.  The  haul  under  this 
rate  would  be  from  a  rep"*esentative 
Nebraska  point  anywhere  from  548  to 
980  miles  to  Duluth.  The  distance  from 
Glidden  to  Chetek  was  about  656  miles. 
Shortly  after  shipment  moved,  defendant 
established  a  rate  of  19i/4c  between  the 
points  in  question.  HELD,  viewed  from 
the  standpoint  of  distance  and  as  evi- 
denced by  defendant's  subsequent  action, 
the  rate  exacted  was  unreasonable.  Repa- 
ration awarded  on  the  basis  of  19i/ic. 
Glavin  Grain  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  ^V.  Ry.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  241,  241. 

(d)  On  a  carload  of  corn  from  Ninne- 
kah,  Okla.,  to  Lettsworth,  La.,  a  com- 
bination rate  of  45c  was  charged,  no 
through  rate  being  in  effect.  Lettsworth 
is  less  distant  than  New  Orleans,  and 
at  the  time  of  shipment  the  rate  to  New 
Orleans  was  29i/^c.  Defendants'  tariffs 
provided  generally  on  traffic  to  Letts- 
worth  a  differential  of  2c  over  New  Or- 
leans. Before  the  shipment  reached  des- 
tination, a  through  rate  of  29c  was  made 
applicable  from  Ninnekah  to  Lettsworth, 
which  was  subsequently  increased  to  30c. 
the  30c  rate  being  in  effect  the  date  of 
the  hearing.  HELD,  the  rate  exacted 
was  excessive  to  the  extent  of  13i/^c,  a 
reasonable  rate  being  31i/^c.  Reparation 
awarded.  Ocheltree  Grain  Co.  v.  T.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  412,  413. 

(e)  Prior  to  the  decision  in  Howard 
Mills  Co.  V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.  et  al.,  12  I.  C 
C.  258,  the  rate  on  wheat  from  Belpre, 
Pawnee  Rock  and  Hutchinson,  Kan.,  to 
Phoenix,  Ariz.,  was  86c  for  wheat  and 
$1.35  for  flour.  At  the  hearing  of  that 
case.  Phoenix  was  not  represented. 
Under  the  influe'^ce  of  that  decision,  de- 
fendants raised  the  rate  on  wheat  be- 
tween the  points  mentioned  to  $1.18  and 
lowered  the  rate  on  flour  to  $1.25.  Disre- 
garding the  sale  of  offal,  bran  or  shorts, 
on  which  a  Kansas  miller  paid  no  freight 
nnder  the  raised  rates,  it  c<^^t  the  coax 
plainant  millers  at  Phoenix  $1.77  to  bring 
from  Kansas  to  Phoenix  150  lbs.  of 
wheat,  which  would  produce  100  lbs.  of 
flour,  whereas  100  lbs.  of  flour  could 
be  shipped  to  Phoenix  by  the  Kansas 
miller  for  $1.25.  On  account  of  the  soft 
condition  of  wheat  raised  for  the  Phoenix 
market  in  the  Salt  River  Valley,  it  was 
necessary  for  Phoenix  millers  to  import 
Kansas  hard  wheat  to  mix  therewith,  in 
order  to  produce  satisfactory  flour. 
Phoenix  sought  to  compete  with  Kansas 
and  California  millers  only  in  a  limited 


REASONABLENESS  OF  RATES,  §153  (f)— §156  (a) 


695 


local  area.  Under  the  higher  rates,  the 
Kansas  millers  would  drive  the  Phoenix 
millers  out  of  business.  The  rate  on 
wheat  from  Kansas  to  California  plus 
the  local  rate  hack  to  Phoenix  was  less 
than  the  rate  frcm  Kansas  t  •  Phoenix 
attacked.  Complainant  demanded  that 
the  rate  on  wheat  should  be  two-thirds  of 
that  on  flour.  To  grant  this  demand 
would  give  Phoenix  millers  a  monopoly 
of  the  trade  in  their  local  territory.  The 
rate  on  flour  from  the  Kansas  points  in 
question  to  Los  .'.ngeles  was  65c,  and  on 
wheat  58c.  The  rates  from  the  Kansas 
points  in  question  on  wheat  and  flour  to 
points  in  Arizona  and  California  ranged 
from  80c  to  $1.13  and  from  $1.12  to  $1.20, 
respectively.  HELD,  the  decision  in  the 
Howard  Mills  case  ordering  a  differential 
of  7c  in  the  rates  between  flour  and  wheat 
was  made  without  due  consideration  to 
the  conditions  at  Phoenix;  that  the  rates 
attacked  were  unreasonable  and  should 
not  exceed  $1.00  on  wheat  and  $1.12  on 
flour,  but  that  no  ground  for  reparation 
was  afforded.  Valley  Flour  Mills  v.  A. 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  73,  77,  79. 

(f)  Complainant  shipped  a  mixed  car 
of  wheat  and  rye  from  Arlington,  S.  D., 
to  Milwaukee,  the  grains  being  separated 
by  bulkhead;  weight  of  wheat,  32,900 
lbs.;  of  rye,  29,220  lbs.  The  rate  on 
wheat  was  19c;  on  rye,  18c.  Charges 
were  assessed  on  the  basis  of  19c  on 
54,000  lbs.,  and  18c  on  the  same  amount 
of  rye.  Defendant  admitting  the  charge 
to  be  unreasonable,  reparation  was 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  the  actual 
weight  and  the  19c  rate.  Hewit  &  Con- 
nor V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  431. 

(g)  On  carloads  of  corn  from  Hum- 
boldt, Neb.,  to  St.  Francis,  Kan.,  from 
Pawnee,  Neb.,  to  St.  Francis,  and  from 
Humboldt  to  Atwood,  Kan.,  rates  of  19c, 
18c  and  18c,  respectively,  were  assessed. 
The  rate  from  St.  Francis  and  Atwood 
to  Kansas  City  and  from  Kansas  City 
to  these  points  m  the  reverse  direction 
was  13.6c.  Humboldt  and  Pawnee  were 
intermediate  to  St.  Francis  and  Kansas 
City.  T:ic  rates  in  Kansas  and  Ne- 
braska for  distances  similar  to  those  in- 
volved in  the  hauls  in  question  were  be- 
tween 12c  and  13c.  The  corn  in  question 
was  shipped  to  be  used  for  feeding  pur- 
poses, so  that  defendant  obtained  the 
haul  of  the  stock  fattened  from  said 
grain.  HELD,  the  rates  exacted  were  un- 
reasonable.    Reparation  awarded  on  the 


basis  of  13.6c.  Cooper  &  Son  v.  C.  B. 
&  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  324,  325. 

§154.     Wire. 

.  (a)  The  rate  on  plain  wire  which  en- 
tered into  the  manufacture  of  spring  beds 
should  take  a  rate  under  that  applicable 
to  spring  beds.  Legget  &  Piatt  Spring 
Bed  Co.  V.  M.  P.  Ry.,  22  I.  C.  C.  513,  515. 

§155.     Wood-Pulp. 

(a)  On  carloads  of  wood-pulp  board 
from  Wabash,  Ind.,  to  St.  Louis,  Mo„ 
complainant  was  assessed  the  rate  of 
lli/^c,  in  force  for  a  considerable  period. 
Fourteen  months  later,  defendants  re- 
duced the  rate  to  9c.  HELD,  no  evidence 
being  offered  to  show  the  ll^c  rate  un- 
reasonable at  the  time  the  shipments  were 
made,  complaint  should  be  dismissed. 
Wabash  Coating  Mills  v.  Wabash  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  91. 

§156.     Wool. 

(a)  In  an  investigation  dealing  with 
the  rates,  regulations  and  practices  touch- 
ing the  transportation  of  wool  between 
points  of  origin  in  territory  west  of  the 
Mississippi  River  and  points  of  destina- 
tion upon  or  east  of  that  river,  the  Com- 
mission finds  that  the  cost  of  producing 
wool  in  the  western  territory  has  in- 
creased and  is  rapidly  increasing,  and 
that  the  increasing  cost  of  land  is  one 
of  the  most  serious  factors  contributing 
thereto;  that  since  1896  the  present  rates 
have  been  in  effect  with  but  some  slight 
variations,  although  during  that  period 
the  wool  clip  has  nearly  doubled  and  the 
business  and  earnings  of  the  transcon- 
tinental lines  enormously  developed  to 
such  an  extent  that  any  general  level  of 
rates  that  was  just  and  reasonable  in 
1896  would  be  extravagant  in  1910;  that 
from  Colorado  common  points  the  rats 
on  sheep  in  double-deck  cars  to  Chicago 
is  51c,  the  wool  rate  $1,225;  from  Idaho 
the  wool  rate  is  $1,655,  the  sheep 
rate  80c;  sheep  in  double-deck  cars  load 
approximately  22,000  lbs.,  the  wool  load- 
ing jfi  24,000  lbs.;  the  stock  car  returns 
emp'.y,  the  wool  car  may  be  availed  of 
for  a  return  load  of  almost  any  kind, 
and  therefore  the  cost  of  the  service  is 
in  every  sense  greater  in  case  of  sheep 
than  in  case  of  wool;  that  it  is  difllcult 
to  justify  any  such  difference  in  these 
rates  as  now  exists,  and  it  is  therefore 
from  the  whole  record  found  that  these 
rates  are  unjustifiable  and  should  be  re- 


696 


REBATES— REBILLING 


vised  and  reduced,  as  follows:  The  rates 
prescribed   are   in   all   cases   in  carloads 
with  a  minimum  for  sacked  wool  of  24,- 
000  lbs.  in  the  standard  36-foot  car  and 
with   a  corresponding   increase   in   mini- 
mum   if    the    carriers    elect    of    cars    of 
larger  size.     In  case  of  wool  compressed 
to  a  density  of  19  lbs.  to  the  cubic  foot, 
the  minimum  is  32,000  lbs.  for  a  36-foot 
car    with    a    corresponding    increase    for 
larger    sizes.      On    the    Northern    Pacific 
R.  R.,  the  rate  from  Mandan,  N.   C,  to 
St.  Paul  and  Duluth,  when  for  movement 
beyond,    ought   not   to    exceed    50c.     Be- 
yond  Mandan   the   rate   should   increase 
2c   for   every    25    miles.     On   the   Great 
Northern    Ry.,    the    rate    from    Mondak, 
Mont,  to  Duluth,  633  miles,  ought  not  to 
exceed   63c   per   100   lbs.   in   sacks.     Be- 
yond this  point  the  rate  should  increase 
not   exceeding    two   cents    for   every    25 
miles.    From  St.  Paul  to  New  York,  prac- 
tically   1,400    miles,    the    present  '  rates 
should  not  be  lowered  upon  either  sacked 
or  baled  wool  from  St.  Paul  and  Duluth 
to  Boston  and  New  York.    The  average 
distance   from   Colorado   common   points 
to    St.    Louis    or    the    Mississippi    River 
by      the      short      line      is      about      900 
miles.       The     present     rates     on     wool 
from    Colorado    common    points    to    St. 
Louis    ought    not    to    exceed    in    sacks 
80c  per  100  lbs.     Beginning  at  Cheyenne, 
upon  the  Union  Pacific  lines,  and  going 
west,    these    rates    should    increase    two 
cents  for   each   25   miles.     Beginning  at 
Trinidad,  upon  the  Santa  Fe  lines,  and 
going  west,  the  same  measure  of  increase 
should  be  applied.     Upon  the  Denver  & 
Rio  Grande  R.  R.  a  rate  of  90c  may  be 
applied  at  the  first  station  west  of  Pueblo, 
beyond   which   the   rate   should   increase 
at   stations   upon   its   main   line   not   ex- 
ceeding   two    cents    for    each    25    miles. 
Upon  the  line  of  the  Burlington  R.  R., 
between    Omaha    and    Billings,    the    rate 
from  Alliance,  Neb.,  to  St.  Louis  should 
not    exceed    71c,    and    beyond    Alliance 
should   increase   by   not    to    exceed    two 
cents  for  every  25  miles.     Rates  should 
be  constructed  in  this  manner  upon  both 
branch  and  main  lines  of  the  Great  North- 
ern, Northern  Pacific,  Burlington,  Union 
Pacific  R.  Rs.,  and  in  connection  with  the 
latter  upon  the  Oregon  Short  Line,  Ore- 
gon-Washington  R.   &   N.    Co.,   and  upon 
the  Santa  Fe  lines.     Upon  the  Denver  & 
Rio  Grande  R.  R.  these  ratss  should  ap- 
ply only  at  stations  upon  its  main  line. 
The   above   rates   are   in   all   cases  upon 
sacked  wool.     Rates  upon  baled  wool  of 


the  density  and  with  the  minimum  here- 
inbefore indicated  should  be  less  by  15 
per  cent  than  the  maximum  rates  named 
for    sacked    wool.      In    computing    these 
rates,  fractions  of  less  than  one-half  cent 
should    be    disregarded.      Those    of   one- 
half  cent  or  more  should  be  treated  as 
one    cent.     A    reasonable    through    rate 
from  western  points  of  origin  to  Boston 
and  New  York  would  be  constructed  by 
adding  to  the  rates  which  have  been  pre- 
scribed up  to  St.  Louis  in  case  of  sacked 
wool  52c  from  there  to  Boston  and  48c  to 
New  York;  in  case  of  baled  wool,  47c  to 
Boston  and  43c  to  New  York.     The  rate 
so  established  may  be  named  by  the  car- 
riers either  as  joint  through  rates  or  as 
proportional    rates    up   to    and    from    the 
Mississippi  River,  or  any  other  point  se- 
lected as  the  equivalent,  but  they  should 
be    applied    only    to    an    actual    through 
movement    and    should    not    be    applied 
when  the  trafllc  has  been  unloaded,  taken 
possession    of    by    the    shipper,    and    re- 
billed     from     the     intermediate     point. 
Transit  should  be  allowed  at  intermediate 
points  on  a  direct  line  upon  payment  of 
2.5c  per  100  lbs.  and  upon  the  condition 
that  it  applies   only  to  wool  originating 
west  of  the  Mississippi  River,  which  must 
be  kept  separate  from   wool  originating 
at  points  east  of  the  river.    So  far  as  ap- 
plications for  relief  from  the  operation  of 
the  fourth  section  are  concerned,  rates  to 
intermediate     territory     shall     be     con- 
structed   upon    the    mileage    scale    pre- 
scribed in   this  opinion,   increasing  with 
distance    until    they   meet    the    effect    of 
water   competition,   and   so   long   as  the 
water   competitive  rates  are  themselves 
made  by  combination  upon  the  terminal 
rates,  uniformly  and  without  discrimina- 
tion, the  rate  on  sacked  wool  not  exceed- 
ing that  on  baled  wool  by  more  than  25c 
per   100   lbs.   from  such   water-controlled 
territory,  the  entire  fabric  of  rates  is  a 
just   and   reasonable   one   and   the   inter- 
mediate  rate   with  respect  to  any  more 
distant  competitive  rate  is  just  and  rea- 
sonable.     Carriers    given    until    May    1, 
1912,  to  check  in  rates  in  substantial  ac- 
cord with  the  opinion.    In  Re  Transporta- 
tion of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,   23   I.  C. 
C.  151. 

REBATES. 

See   Crimes,   VI. 

REBILLING. 

See  Transportation,   §2   (e). 


RECIPROCAL  SWITCHING— RECONSIGNMENT,  §1  (d) 


697 


RECIPROCAL  SWITCHING. 

See  Switch  Tracks  and  Switching,  §6. 

RECONSIGNMENT. 

I.     LEGALITY. 

§1.     Right  to  grant  privilege. 
II.     DISCRIMINATION. 
§2.     In  general. 

III.  REASONABLENESS  OF  CHARGES. 

§3.     In  general. 

IV.  TARIFFS  AND  PUBLICATION. 

§4.     Necessity  of  publishing. 
§5.     Construction   in  general. 
§6.     Retroactive  application. 
V.     PROCEDURE  AND  REPARATION. 
§7.     In  general. 
§8.     Parties    to    complaint. 

I.     LEGALITY.         ♦ 

§1.     Right  to  Grant  Privilege. 

(a)  The  reconsignment  privilege  has 
grown  up  in  response  to  changes  that 
have  taken  place  in  commercial  adjust- 
ments in  comparatively  recent  years. 
Formerly  the  large  distributive  centers 
of  the  country  were  the  depots  in  which 
supplies  were  stored  by  jobbers  prepara- 
tory to  being  shipped  out  in  smaller  lots 
through  the  adjacent  territory.  As,  with 
the  spread  of  population,  this  adjacent 
territory  has  developed  smaller  distrib- 
utive centers  of  its  own,  and  as  the 
transportation  facilities  have  reached 
more  and  more  intimately  over  its  area, 
shipments  from  the  factory  have  come 
more  directly  to  the  consumer.  In  many 
lines  the  jobber  of  the  city  has  become 
largely  a  broker  who  directs  distribution 
without  directly  handling  the  goods  dis- 
tributed. In  a  sense,  this  distributive 
development  is  analogous  to  the  earlier 
transportation  development  that  came 
with  the  consolidation  into  railway  sys- 
tems and  the  establishment  of  through 
routes  in  place  of  the  separate  operation 
of  local  lines.  In  both  cases  an  economic 
saving  is  secured  through  the  elimina- 
tion of  unnecessary  handlings  of  com- 
modities. The  through  route  has  justi 
fied  itself  in  experience,  and  has  become 
firmly  fixed  as  an  essential  function  of 
the  transportation  system.  Whether  re- 
consignment  shall  ultimately  win  such 
recognition  is  for  the  future  to  prove;  at 
present  it  is  on  probation  and  is  gen- 
erally regarded  with  limited  favor  save 
by  those  who  profit  from  its  extension. 
Detroit  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  L.  S  &  M.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  21  I,  C.  C.  257,  258. 


(b)  Reconsignment  is  allowed  under 
Mie  tariffs  of  the  several  carriers  in  two 
distinct  classes  of  cases.  A  shipment 
while  in  transit  to  a  given  point  may  be 
diverted  to  another  market,  provided  the 
order  is  received  before  the  car  has 
passed  the  proper  junction  point.  A 
modification  of  this  privilege  is  seen 
where  the  final  destination  of  a  shipment 
Is  not  announced  by  the  shipper  until 
the  car  has  arrived  at  a  designated  junc- 
tion. Reconsignment  in  transit  is  usu- 
ally allowed  by  the  carrier  without  any 
additional  charge  being  made.  Recon- 
signment at  terminal  on  the  other  hand 
usually  involves  a  special  charge.  In 
most  cases  cars  for  reconsignment  are 
so  designated  at  the  time  of  shipment, 
and  upon  arrival  at  the  original  des- 
tination, they  are  placed  on  storage  or 
"hold"  tracks  awaiting  the  reconsignment 
order.  When  the  terminal  tracks  are  con- 
gested, the  carrier  often,  as  a  matter  of 
convenience,  holds  them  at  some  point 
short  of  destination,  and  provided  this 
involves  no  disadvantage  to  the  con- 
signee, such  holding  is  constructively 
equivalent  to  holding  at  destination.  De- 
troit TraflSc  Ass'n  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,   21   L   C.   C.   257,   259. 

(c)  The  primary  economic  advantage 
of  reconsignment  is  found  in  the  increase 
in  the  fluidity  and  regularity  of  the 
movement  of  commodities;  there  is  an 
important  elimination  of  economic  waste 
in  the  reduction  of  the  handling  of  goods 
between  the  producer  and  the  consumer, 
celerity  of  movement  is  increased,  the 
direction  of  commodities  to  the  point  of 
most  active  demand  is  facilitated.  In 
other  words,  reconsignment  increases  the 
efficiency  of  transportation  facilities  in 
performing  their  most  important  function 
of  bringing  together  supply  and  demand. 
The  shipper  of  perishable  products  is 
enabled  to  divert  his  shipment  from  a 
market  already  overstocked,  thus  often 
converting  a  prospective  loss  into  a  gain; 
he  is  enabled  to  take  advantage  of  his 
latest  possible  information  as  to  market 
conditions.  Similar  advantages  are  seen 
in  the  movement  of  lumber  and  grain  and 
other  commodities  of  universal  necessity. 
Detroit  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  257,  259. 

(d)  It  is  the  privilege  of  reconsign- 
ment that  enables  the  jobber  of  coal  to 
anticipate  the  orders  of  his  customers, 
and  to  direct  the  flow  of  traffic  to  the 
points  where   it  will   do   the  most  good. 


■698 


RECONSIGNMENT,  §1  (e)— §2  (c) 


Were  this  privilege  withdrawn,  he  would 
be  obliged  either  to  place  his  orders  with 
the  mines  after  instead  of  before  receipt 
of  orders  from  his  customers,  or  to  pro- 
vide storage  facilities  at  the  points  where 
such  facilities  are  necessarily  most  ex- 
pensive. The  added  expense  of  such 
service  would  be  reflected  in  the  price 
he  would  be  compelled  to  make  to  his 
customer.  Were  the  privilege  of  recon- 
signment  withdrawn,  it  would  probably 
mean  the  elimination  or  at  least  the  mini- 
mizing of  the  broker  as  a  factor  in  eco- 
nomic distribution.  The  expense  of 
storage  in  a  large  city  would  be  so  much 
greater  than  the  cost  of  storage  at  the 
point  of  consumption  that  the  small 
dealer  in  the  isolated  community  and  the 
manufacturer  would  be  compelled  to  draw 
their  supplies  direct  from  the  mine.  The 
greater  the  distance  from  which  supplies 
are  drawn,  the  greater  the  uncertainty 
as  to  the  time  of  delivery.  The  proper 
use  of  reconsignment  has  the  effect  of 
substituting  nearby  supplies  for  the  dis- 
tant supplies  at  the  mines.  Were  De- 
troit eliminated  as  a  distributive  factor, 
the  coal  purchasers  in  Michigan  would 
be  obliged  to  order  their  supplies  five  or 
six  weeks  earlier,  which  in  many  cases 
would  be  a  material  hardship.  Manufac- 
turing development  has  been  very  active 
throughout  the  state  of  Michigan,  and 
any  such  disturbance  of  the  fuel  supply 
would  be  a  serious  blow  to  those  inter- 
ests. Detroit  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  L.  S.  &  M. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  257,  260. 

(e)  The  dealer  in  a  small  community, 
who  handles  but  a  limited  number  of 
cars  of  coal  each  year,  usually  has  a 
small  capital,  and  is  unprepared  to  tie 
up  any  part  of  that  capital  in  holding 
coal  to  insure  meeting  a  prospective  de- 
mand. It  is  to  his  interest  to  postpone 
such  investment  to  the  last  possible  mo- 
ment. The  irregularity  of  seasonal 
changes,  the  uncertainty  of  transporta- 
tion on  account  of  weather  conditions, 
the  congestion  of  orders  at  the  mines 
and  of  demands  upon  the  carriers  at  the 
season  of  active  demand,  the  vastly  in- 
creased distance  from  which  supplies 
must  be  drawn— all  of  these  are  factors 
working  to  extend  the  time  during  which 
coal  must  be  held  by  the  dealer  if  he  is 
to  be  denied  the  privilege  of  reconsign- 
ment. To  the  consumer,  who  is,  after  all, 
the  person  most  vitally  interested,  recon- 
signment means  not  merely  regularity 
and  timeliness  of  supply,  but  economy  in 
securing  that  supply.  Whatever  increased 


expense  in  handling  coal  the  dealer  is 
put  to,  whatever  additional  cost  is  im- 
posed upon  the  broker  who  supplies  his 
dealer,  is  transferred  to  the  consumers' 
shoulders,  with  some  slight  additions  in 
the  way  of  insurance  and  interest  for 
the  use  of  capital.  Nor  is  the  practice 
without  its  advantages  to  the  carrier  in 
the  increased  regularity  of  movement,  in 
the  greater  efficiency  in  direction  of  sup- 
ply, both  in  quantity  and  in  kind,  in  the 
opportunity  to  relieve  congestion  at  ter- 
minals by  holding  at  points  short  of  the 
terminal,  and  in  the  economy  of  handling 
that  results  in  the  consolidation  of  ship- 
ments to  the  distributing  point,  which 
usually  means  over  by  far  the  greater 
part  of  the  haul.  Detroit  Traffic  Ass'n  v. 
L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  257,  260. 

(f)  A  carrier  can  limit  the  number  of 
free  reconsignments  permitted  on  any 
car.  Crescent  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  B. 
&  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  559,  570. 

(g)  A  petition  for  the  establishment 
of  reconsigning  privileges  at  New  Or- 
leans, La.,  on  rice  shipped  from  New  Or- 
leans to  Houston,  Tex.,  cannot  be 
Tranted  where  there  is  no  evidence  to 
■ndicate  any  considerable  movement  of 
rice  between  these  points  in  the  direction 
named,  nor  to  show  that  the  establish- 
ment of  the  privilege  requested  would 
stimulate  increased  shipments.  Bayou 
City  Rice  Mills  v.  Texas  &  New  Orleans 
R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  490,  491. 

il.     DISCRIMINATION. 
§2.     In  General. 

(a)  A  reconsignment  privilege  whereby 
the  application  of  the  joint  rate  is  secured 
is  not  one  to  be  demanded  by  the  public 
as  a  matter  of  right,  but  is  a  concession 
voluntarily  granted  by  the  carriers,  but 
its  application  must  be  uniform.  Dietz 
Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
L  C.  C.  75,  76. 

(b)  Granting  a  free  reconsignment 
privilege  to  competitors  at  another  sta- 
tion constituted  undue  prejudice  against 
complainant.  American  Hay  Co.  v.  L.  V. 
R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  166,  169. 

(c)  The  granting  of  a  reconsignment 
privilege  on  live  hogs  at  Valley  Junction 
while  no  such  privilege  is  accorded  at 
Cedar  Rapids,  la.,  does  not  subject  com- 
plainant to  an  undue  prejudice,  inasmuch 
as  he  suffers  no  loss  thereby.  Sinclair 
&  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C. 
490.  502. 


RECONSIGNMENT,  §2   (d)— §3    (b) 


G99 


(d)  Reconsignment  is  a  privilege — 
not  a  right  to  be  demanded  by  shippers 
— and  can  only  be  required  where  neces- 
sary to  correct  unjust  discrimination. 
Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  479,  487.      - 

(e)  The  Commission  has  always  re- 
garded reconsignment  as  a  privilege,  not 
a  right  to  be  demanded  by  shippers,  and 
has  consistently  refused  to  extend  the 
same  except  to  correct  unjust  discrimina- 
tion. Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v. 
Colo.  &  So.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  387,  393. 

(f)  Complainant  shippers  of  coal  from 
the  Walsenburg  district,  southern  Colo- 
rado, attacked  the  reconsignment  rule  of 
defendants  which  placed  a  72-hour  limit, 
and  asked  that  reconsignment  be  per- 
mitted at  any  time  at  the  uniform  charge 
of  $2,  plus  demurrage,  and  that  a  car 
might  be  reconsigned  where  through  rates 
were  in  effect  out  of  the  direct  route 
at  the  through  rate,  plus  i/^c  per  ton  mile 
for  the  back  haul,  subject  to  a  minimum 
of  $5  per  car.  The  evidence  indicated 
that  the  reconsignment  privilege  imposed 
very  burdensome  services  on  the  car- 
riers in  the  way  of  extra  clerical  work, 
switching  service,  etc.  HELD,  the  de- 
mand should  be  refused.  The  Commis- 
sion has  always  regarded  reconsignment 
as  a  privilege — not  a  right  to  be  de- 
manded by  shippers — and  has  consistently 
refused  extending  the  same,  except  to 
correct  unjust  discrimination.  Cedar  Hill 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.  C.  387,  393.  Colorado  Coal  Trafnc 
Ass'n  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  478. 

(g)  The  Commission  does  not  feel 
justified  in  initiating  or  extending  the 
application  of  reconsignment  privileges 
unless  deemed  necessary  to  correct  un- 
just discrimination.  Sunnyside  Coal  Min- 
ing Co.  V.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
558. 

III.     REASONABLENESS  OF  CHARGES. 

§3.     In  General. 

See  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §15  (k); 
Tariffs,   §3   (e). 

(a)  The  privilege  of  trying  the  mar- 
ket is  of  great  benefit  to  the  producer  of 
live  stock,  and  ought  to  be  continued 
under  reasonable  terms  and  conditions, 
but  as  these  marltets  multiply  it  becomes 
more  and  more  evident  that  carriers 
may  with  propriety  impose  a  reasonable 
charge  for  the  performance  of  the  serv- 
ice  granted   in   connection   with   transit 


privileges.  Investigation  of  Alleged  Un- 
reasonable Rates  on  Meats,  22  I.  C.  C. 
ICO,   174. 

(b)  Complainant  attacked  the  reason- 
ableness of  the  charge  of  $3  per  car  ex- 
acted by  defendants  at  Detroit,  Mich.. 
for  the  reconsignment  of  bituminous 
coal  originating  at  points  in  Ohio  and 
elsewhere  and  forwarded  to  various 
Michigan  points.  More  specifically  the 
defendant,  P.  M.  R.  R.,  was  alleged  to 
be  guilty  of  unjustly  discriminating 
against  Detroit  by  permitting  recon- 
signment of  coal  without  charge  at  Ply- 
mouth and  Ludington,  Mich.,  as  well  as 
at  stations  along  its  line  at  Indiana, 
Illinois  and  Wisconsin.  Similarly  the 
L.  S.  &  M.  S.  R.  R.  was  alleged  to  per- 
mit free  reconsignment  at  points  on  its 
line  south  and  east  of  Toledo,  O.,  while 
it  declined  to  extend  the  privilege  to 
Detroit.  The  privilege  of  reconsign- 
ment with  regard  to  coal  shipments 
was  quite  generally  granted  in  the  ter- 
ritory east  of  the  Mississippi  and  north 
of  the  Ohio  rivers.  Reconsignment  in 
transit  was  quite  generally  allowed 
without  any  charge  for  the  privilege 
being  made.  As  to  reconsignment  at 
terminals,  however,  a  distinction  had 
grown  up  recently,  and  the  state  of 
Michigan,  with  a  narrow  fringe  of  ad- 
joining territory  on  the  south,  been 
placed  at  a  disadvantage  as  compared 
with  the  rest  of  this  section  of  the 
country.  The  line  of  the  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
extending  from  Chicago  Junction  south 
of  Sandusky,  in  Ohio,  to  Chicago,  di- 
vided the  two  sections,  and  apparently 
the  higher  charge  did  not  apply  east  or 
west  of  these  points.  It  appeared  that 
the  charge  for  terminal  reconsignment 
at  all  points  south,  east  and  west  of 
this  division  line  was  $2,  while  north 
of  It  the  charge  had  been  made  $3,  the 
change  going  into  effect  early  in  the 
year  1910.  It  appeared  that  reconsign- 
ment at  Detroit  cost  the  carriers  about 
$1.75  per  car.  HELD,  that  the  fact  of 
$2  being  fixed  upon  as  a  charge  through- 
out the  greater  part  of  the  country 
raises  at  least  a  presumption  that  this 
rate  covers  not  only  the  cost  of  the 
service,  but  a  reasonable  profit  as  well. 
This  being  so,  there  is  a  stronger  pre- 
sumption that  the  charge  of  $3  at  De- 
troit is  unreasonable  unless  the  local 
conditions  are  such  as  to  justify  a 
higher  rate  mere  than  at  other  places. 
This  not  appearing  to  be  the  case,  no 
greater  charge  than  $2  a  car  should  be 


700 


RECONSIGNMENT,  §3    (cd)  — (n) 


imposed  for  the  reconsignment  of  cars 
of  bituminous  coal  at  Detroit.  Detroit 
Traffic  Ass'n  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
21  I.  C.  C.  257. 

(cd)  The  reconsignment  privilege  in- 
volves extra  labor  in  handling  and  in 
clerical  work  on  the  part  of  the  carrier, 
and  it  is  an  established  principle  that 
the  carrier  is  entitled  to  repayment  of 
the  cost  of  the  service,  together  with 
a  reasonable  profit  on  that  cost.  On  the 
other  hand,  while  reconsignment  may  be 
granted  or  withheld  at  the  option  of 
the  carrier,  when  the  privilege  is  vol- 
untarily granted  it  must  be  on  terms 
that  are  reasonable  and  that  do  not 
result  in  undue  discrimination.  The 
first  question  to  be  considered  in  this 
proceeding  is  whether  the  reconsign- 
ment charge  imposed  at  Detroit  is  un- 
reasonable. It  may  be  remarked  that 
the  fact  of  $2  being  fixed  upon  as  the 
charge  throughout  the  greater  part  of 
the  country  raises  at  least  a  presump- 
tion that  this  rate  covers  not  only  the 
cost  of  the  service,  but  a  reasonable 
profit  as  well.  This  being  so,  there  is 
a  stronger  presumption  that  the  charge 
of  $3  at  Detroit  is  unreasonable,  unless 
the  local  conditions  are  such  as  to 
justify  a  higher  rate  there  than  at  other 
places.  Detroit  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  L.  S. 
&  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  257,  262. 

(e)  In  fixing  a  reconsignment  charge 
each  car  Is  to  be  charged  only  with  its 
proportion  of  the  expense  of  the  move- 
ment. Detroit  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  I^.  S.  & 
M.   S.   Ry.   Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  257,  263. 

(f)  Diversion  is  costly  to  the  carrier 
and  advantageous  to  the  shipper.  Ar- 
lington Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  148,  152. 

(g)  Upon  stipulation  of  the  inter- 
ested parties,  it  is  found  that  defend- 
ant's reconsignment  charge  at  East  St. 
Louis,  111.,  on  shipments  of  hay  orig- 
inating at  points  north,  west  and  east 
thereof  and  subsequently  reconsigned 
to  southeastern  destinations  should  not 
exceed  ll^c  per  100  lbs.  Reparation 
awarded.  St.  Louis  Hay  &  Grain  Co.  v. 
M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  533,  535. 

(h)  Carriers  are  entitled  to  reason- 
able profits  on  reconsignment  service. 
St.  Louis  Hay  &  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  533,  534. 

(1)  After  the  arrival  of  a  car  at 
point  of  destination  the  shipper  ordered 
the    carrier    to    deliver    the    same    to    a 


person  other  than  the  consignee.  No 
additional  expense  was  involved.  De- 
fendant assessed  a  reconsignment  charge 
of  $5.  HELD,  such  charge  was  unrea- 
sonable and  should  not  exceed  $1. 
While  ordinarily  a  reconsignment  re- 
fers to  a  change  in  destination  rather 
than  to  a  mere  change  in  the  name  of 
the  consignee,  the  latter  change  is  rec- 
ognized by  Conference  Ruling  No.  72 
as  a  reconsignment.  The  privilege  of 
reconsignment  is  a  thing  of  value  to 
the  shipper  and  of  expense  to  the  car- 
rier; therefore,  a  charge  may  be  made, 
but  the  value  and  extent  of  that  service 
vary,  and  the  charge  should  be  in  pro- 
portion to  the  service.  Reparation 
awarded.  Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  K. 
C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  86. 

(j)  A  reconsignment  charge  of  $5 
is  excessive  where  only  the  name  of 
the  consignee  is  changed.  One  dolla;' 
per  car  is  a  reasonable  charge.  Beek- 
man Lumber  Co.  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17 
I.    C.    C.   86. 

(k)  The  reconsignment  privilege  is 
a  thing  of  value  to  the  shipper  and  of 
expense  to  the  carrier;  therefore  a 
charge  may  be  made,  but  the  value  and 
extent  of  that  service  vary,  and  the 
charge  should  be  in  proportion  to  the 
service.  Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  K.  C. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.   C.  86,  87. 

(1)  Two  carloads  of  coal  shipped 
from  Rugby,  Colo.,  to  luka,  Kan.,  under 
a  rate  of  $3  per  net  ton,  were  refused 
by  the  consignee,  and  were  reshipped 
upon  complainant's  order  back  to  Pres- 
ton, Kan.,  charges  for  the  reshipment 
being  assessed  at  3c  per  100  lbs.  for 
the  haul  of  9.6  miles.  Complainant  con- 
tended that  a  rate  based  on  i/^c  per 
ton  mile,  with  a  minimum  charge  of 
$5  per  car,  should  be  prescribed  to 
cover  reconsignment  involving  a  back 
haul.  HELD,  ignoring  the  question  of 
jurisdiction,  no  facts  were  presented 
justifying  the  order .  requested  by  the 
complainant.  Reparation  awarded.  Cedar 
Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co., 
16   I.   C.   C.   560. 

(m)  The  reasonableness  of  a  recon- 
signment charge  is  dependent  upon  the 
cost  of  that  service.  Cedar  Hill  Coal 
&  Coke  Co.  V.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  546,  549. 

(n)  For  some  time  prior  to  shipment 
of  carloads  of  coal  by  complainant  from 
Greenville   Mine,  near  Ludlow,   Colo.,  to 


RECONSIGNMENT,  §3   (o)— (s) 


701 


destinations  in  Oklahoma,  the  tariff  of 
defendant,  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  provided  for 
a  charge  of  $2  per  car  for  the  privilege 
of  changing  the  destination  of  ship- 
ment, when  the  change  was  ordered 
before  the  arrival  of  the  car  at  desti- 
nation or  within  24  hours  thereafter.  A 
few  days  before  the  shipments  moved 
by  complainants,  defendant  changed  the 
charge  to  $5  per  car.  Within  a  year 
defendant  restored  the  former  $2  charge. 
Defendant  offered  no  specific  evidence 
to  show  the  actual  cost  of  making  these 
reconsignments.  HELD,  the  former  ex- 
istence of  the  $2  rate  and  its  restora- 
tion by  defendant  created  a  presumption 
that  the  $5  charge  was  unreasonable, 
and  defendant  having  offered  no  evi- 
dence to  rebut  this  presumption,  the 
$5  rate  should  be  held  excessive  to  the 
extent  that  it  exceeded  $2.  Reparation 
awarded.  Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co. 
V.  C.   &   S.   Ry.  Co.,   15  I.  C.  C.  546,  549. 

(o)  A  published  switching  tariff  pro- 
vided for  the  absorption  of  switching 
charges  on  carload  freight  at  St.  Louis, 
Mo.,  and  East  St.  Louis,  111.  Granite 
City  was  not  a  corporate  part  of  either 
of  the  cities,  being  located  three  or 
four  miles  north  of  East  St.  Louis. 
Granite  City  took  the  East  St.  Louis 
rate  on  lumber  from  Thornton,  Ark., 
consigned  direct  to  that  place.  Com- 
plainants reconsigned  to  Granite  City 
carloads  of  lumber  consigned  to  East 
St.  Louis  and  were  charged  $5  per  car 
as  a  reconsignment  charge.  Complain- 
ant offered  no  evidence  to  show  that 
it  was  unreasonable  to  exclude  Granite 
City  from  the  free  switching  limits  of 
East  St.  Louis  and  did  not  attack  the 
reasonableness  of  the  charges  exacted. 
HELD,  complainants  were  not  entitled 
to  reparation.  Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  532, 
534. 

(p)  Where  under  the  facts  the  Com- 
mission refuses  to  forbid  the  re-estab- 
lishment of  a  reconsignment  charge, 
which  has  been  canceled  voluntarily  by 
the  carrier,  it  will  not  order  reparation 
for  such  charge  assessed  upon  ship- 
ments made  before  the  cancelation. 
Kehoe  &  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C. 
C.   541,   544. 

(q)  The  through  rate  from  points 
north  of  the  Ohio  River  via  Cairo,  111., 
was  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  locals  into 
and  out  of  Cairo.  On  local  shipments 
into   Cairo  and  local  out,  the  two  rates 


were  equal  to  the  through  rate  with  a 
maximum  free  time  of  48  hours  for  un- 
loading the  shipment  in,  and  48  hours 
for  loading  the  shipment  out.  On  ship- 
ments into  Cairo  and  there  reconsigned, 
the  rates  were  equal  to  the  sum  of  the 
locals,  with  an  additional  charge  of  $3 
for  the  privilege  of  reconsignment,  and 
with  a  maximum  free  time  of  24  hours, 
at  Cairo.  This  reconsignment  charge 
was  voluntarily  canceled  by  defendant 
carrier,  but  complainant  asked  that  it 
be  forbidden  to  re-establish  same  with- 
in a  period  of  two  years.  On  local  ship- 
ments into  Cairo  and  local  out,  the 
additional  service  consisted  in  placing 
the  car  for  unloading  and  in  making 
out  a  new  waybill.  If  the  car  was 
placed  on  the  private  siding  of  the  con- 
signee, it  had  to  be  handled  by  the  car- 
rier only  when  placed  for  unloading,  re- 
quiring the  carrier  to  take  out  the 
empty,  place  a  new  car  for  loading  and 
take  out  the  loaded  car.  If  there  were 
several  cars  on  the  team  track,  and  it 
was  necessary  to  move  any  of  those 
cars  before  the  48  hours'  free  time  had 
expired,  switching  such  cars  back  and 
forth  was  required.  In  case  of  recon- 
signment defendant  carrier  was  required 
to  obtain  instructions,  retag  the  car,  or, 
in  the  absence  of  instructions,  to  place 
same  on  the  "hold"  track.  In  case  of 
holding,  ,  considerable  correspondence 
was  required,  and  waybills  had  to  be 
changed  and  new  bills  of  lading  issued. 
The  undisputed  cost  of  such  service  was 
$3  per  car.  While  on  the  "hold"  track 
for  reconsignment  defendant  was  respon- 
sible for  the  freight.  When  delivered 
locally,  however,  it  was  not  so  respon- 
sible, and  its  cars  might  be  kept  on  'ts 
own  rails  instead  of  being  sent  to  for- 
eign roads.  HELD,  the  request  for  an 
order  forbidding  the  re-establishment  of 
such  reconsignment  charge  should  be 
denied.  Kehoe  &  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,    14    L    C.    C.    541,    544. 

(r)  Carriers  permit  reconsignment  in 
transit  at  through  rate  to  new  destina- 
tion only  when  it  is  shown  that  the 
change  was  made  necessary  by  insol- 
vency of  the  consignee  or  bona  fide  re- 
fusal of  the  original  consignee  to  accept 
the  shipment.  Follmer  &  Co.  v.  G.  N. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  510. 

(s)  A  carrier  negligently  failed  to  com- 
ply with  instructions  for  reconsignment. 
HELD,  that  the  carrier  is  responsible  for 
additional  freight  charges  incurred  as  a 


702 


RECONSIGNMENT,  §4  (a)— §5  (ab) 


result  of  its  negligence.  Reparation 
awarded.  Hathway  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  & 
N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  544. 

IV.     TARIFFS   AND   PUBLICATION. 

§4.     Necessity    of    Publishing. 
See  Tariffs,  §4   (p),    (q). 

(a)  A  reconsignment  privilege  not 
filed  with  the  Commission  cannot  afford 
a  basis  for  reparation.  Kile  &  Morgan 
Co.  V.  Deepwater  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
235,  238. 

(b)  Reconsigning  rules  required  to  be 
signed  by  shipper  and  subject  to  can- 
celation at  the  option  of  the  carrier  are 
inconsistent  with  the  law  governing  the 
establishment  and  modification  of  tariff 
schedules.  Kile  &  Morgan  Co.  v.  Deep- 
water  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  235,  238. 

(c)  A  carload  of  lumber  from  Harper, 
W.  Va.,  consigned  to  New  Haven,  Conn., 
was  routed  via  the  Harlem  River  with 
a  view  of  permitting  complainant  to 
reconsign  same  at  New  York  to  any 
New  England  point  taking  the  same 
rate  as  New  Haven.  Defendant  initial 
carrier  routed  the  shipment  via  Cin- 
cinnati, thereby  causing  same  to  reach 
New  Haven  without  going  by  way  of 
Harlem  River.  Complainant  was  sub- 
jected to  the  additional  charge  of  the 
local  rate  from  New  Haven  to  Nashua, 
N.  H.,  to  which  destination  he  intended 
to  reconsign  said  shipment  at  New  York. 
No  tariff  allowing  said  reconsignment 
privilege  was  filed  with  the  Commis- 
sion, and  the  only  authority  therefor 
was  a  circular  issued  by  one  of  defend- 
ants, which  was  not  filed  with  the  Com- 
mission, provided  for  the  cancelation  o? 
said  privilege  at  the  option  of  the  car- 
rier, and  required  the  signature  of  the 
shipper  to  entitle  the  latter  to  avail 
himself  of  said  privilege.  HELD,  while 
complainant  would  have  been  entitled 
to  reparation  for  such  extra  charge 
caused  by  the  misrouting,  had  the  re- 
consignment privilege  been  duly  pab- 
lished,  he  was  not  entitled  to  it  by 
force  of  the  circular,  which  failed  legally 
to  establish  the  same.  Kile  &  Morgan 
Co.  V.  Deepwater  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
235,  237. 

(d)  A  circular  purporting  to  author- 
ize reconsignment  is  not  a  lawful  tariff, 
but  is  more  in  the  nature  of  a  private 
contract  between  the  carrier  and 
shipper.  Kile  &  Morgan  Co.  v.  Deep- 
water  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  235,  237. 


(e)  A  special  tariff  relating  to  a 
charge  for  reconsignment  of  hay  at 
Kansas  City  was  duly  filed  by  defend- 
ant, but  in  its  tariff  naming  the  local 
rates  into  Kansas  City  there  was  no 
specific  reference  to  or  mention  of  the 
reconsignment  tariff.  Complainant  was 
assessed  $2  a  car  for  this  privilege  at 
Kansas  City  on  hay  shipped  into  Kan- 
sas City  and  thence  reconsigned  to  va- 
rious destinations.  Such  shipments  took 
place  prior  to  the  promulgation  on  April 
15,  1908,  of  Rule  10,  Tariff  Circular  15-A, 
requiring  the  initial  carrier's  tariffs  con- 
taining the  published  rates  to  show  the 
charge  for  reconsignment  privileges  or 
to  state  that  shipments  thereunder  are 
subject  to  charge  for  such  privileges 
according  to  the  tariffs  of  the  carriers 
granting  same.  HELD,  the  charge  exacted 
was  not  unlawful  by  reason  of  defend- 
ant initial  carrier's  failure  to  make  cross 
reference  to  the  special  reconsignment 
tariff  in  its  tariff  naming  the  local  rates 
into  Kansas  City.  Kansas  City  Hay  Co. 
V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
631,  633. 

(f)  Reparation  will  not  be  awarded 
on  the  basis  of  a  reconsignment  priv- 
ilege customarily  extended  by  the  car- 
rier, but  not  duly  published  in  its  tariff. 
Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  267. 

§5.     Construction     in    General. 

See  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §17 
(g),  (i):  Tariffs,  §3  (1)  (aa),  §7 
(WW),    (zz),    (aaa),   §9    (d),    §12    (a). 

(ab)  There  is  an  ever-present  tempta- 
tion before  the  shipper  to  convert  the 
reconsignment  privilege  into  a  means 
of  indefinite  storage.  So  long  as  the 
demurrage  fees  are  paid,  the  consignee 
regards  it  as  his  right  to  delay  recon- 
signment as  long  as  he  pleases.  The 
privilege  of  reconsignment  properly  car- 
ries no  such  right.  Not  a  little  con- 
sideration has  been  given  to  this  ques- 
tion of  unnecessary  detention  and  its 
relation  to  the  shortage  of  cars  that 
work  such  a  hardship  upon  the  ship- 
ping community  generally,  and  it  is  not 
among  dealers  in  coal  alone  that  prac- 
tices have  grown  up  that  do  absolute 
injustice  to  other  shippers.  This  ques- 
tion of  detention,  however,  is  one  that 
must  be  worked  out  by  itself,  and  it  is 
not  well  that  the  advantages  of  recon- 
signment should  be  thrown  away  In 
order  to  avoid  abuses  that  can  be  rem- 
edied in  other  ways.     If  the  demurrage 


RECONSIGNMENT,  §5    (c)— §6   (b) 


703 


charge  of  $1  a  day  is  not  sufficient  to 
eliminate  the  abuse  of  excessive  and  un- 
reasonable detention  the  remedy  lies  in 
increasing  the  fee  to  an  effective  amount, 
not  in  the  denial  of  a  privilege  that  has 
elements  of  extreme  value.  Detroit 
Traffic  Ass'n  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
21   I.  C.  C.   257,  261. 

(c)  Under  construction  of  tariff  G,  O. 
I.  C.  C,  No.  639,  a  carload  of  water- 
melons from  Lowell,  Fla.,  to  Pittsburgh, 
Pa.,  could  be  diverted  before  the  car 
left  Potomac  Yard,  Va.,  and  could  be 
reconsigned  once  after  leaving  Potomac 
Yard  without  extra  charge.  Wilson 
Produce  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.  1. 

(d)  Complainant  shipped  hay,  C.  L., 
Warsaw  Junction,  O.,  to  Allentown,  Pa. 
From  Allentown  it  was  sent  to  Perth 
Amboy,  and  there  refused  by  the  con- 
signee. The  car  was  reconsigned  to 
Hackensack,  N.  J.,  and  owing  to  an 
argument  with  the  carrier  as  to 
whether  complainant  had  the  right  to 
reconsign  under  the  tariff  demurrage 
charges  accrued.  HELD,  that  under  a  prop- 
er construction  of  the  tariff  complainant 
had  the  right  to  reconsign  the  shipment 
and  that  the  demurrage  accrued  as  a 
result  of  the  unlawful  act  of  the  car- 
rier. Reparation  awarded.  Hanley  Mill- 
ing Co.  V.  Penn.  Co.,  19  I.   C.  C.  475. 

(e)  A  reconsigning  privilege  permit- 
ting diversion  cannot  be  construed  to 
include  a  back  haul  of  48  miles  without 
a  reasonable  charge  therefor  being  im- 
posed. Lull  &  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste. 
M.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  355. 

(f)  The  right  of  reconsignment  in 
transit  does  not  carry  with  it  the  right 
to  remove  a  portion  of  carload  at  recon- 
signing point.  Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co. 
V.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  220,  222. 

(g)  Two  carloads  of  butter  were 
shipped  by  complainant  from  Wellington, 
O.,  and  consigned  to  itself  at  Chicago. 
The  local  rate  from  Wellington  to  Chi- 
cago was  35c,  and  from  C-  icago  to  Evans- 
ville,  Wis.,  30.8c;  the  through  rate  from 
Wellington  to  Eyansville,  71c.  Upon  the 
arrival  of  the  first  car  at  Chicago,  com- 
plainant sent  a  check  for  the  freight  at 
35c,  Wellington  to  Chicago.  It  was  in- 
formed by  defendant  of  an  icing  charge 
and  was  told  that  the  entire  charges 
might  be  paid  at  Evansville,  to  which  ar- 
rangement complainant  agreed,  and  re- 
consigned the  car  to  Evansville.     Upon 


the  arrival  of  the  second  car  at  Chicago, 
complainant  merely  reconsigned  it  to 
Evansville.  The  through  rate  of  71c  was 
assessed  on  both  cars.  Reparation  was 
claimed  on  the  basis  of  65.8c,  the  com- 
bination rate,  HELD,  while  a  shipper 
has  the  right  to  consign  a  shipment  to 
a  given  point,  pay  charges  upon  it,  as- 
sume custody  and  take  possesbion  of  the 
property,  r.nd  later  reship  it  to  another 
point  under  rates  lawfully  applicable  to 
such  shipment,  complainant  was  not  en- 
titled to  reparation  on  the  basis  of  the 
combination  rate,  since  it  did  not  reduce 
the  property  to  its  possession  at  Chicago. 
Wood  Butter  Co.  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.   C.  374,  375. 

(h)  An  intent  to  take  possession  of 
shipments  at  an  intermediate  point  and 
to  reconsign  to  avoid  the  payment  of 
higher  through  rate  cannot  be  allowed 
to  control.  What  was  actually  done  must 
govern.  Wood  Butter  Co.  v.  C.  C.  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  374,  375, 

§6.     Retroactive  Application. 

See  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §18  (I), 

(a)  The  retroactive  application  of  a 
reconsignment  privilege  cannot  be  sanc- 
tioned, even  though  the  carrier's  custom 
was  to  permit  reconsignment  without 
tariff  authority.  Cady  Lumber  Co.  v.  M. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  1.  C.  C.  12,  13. 

(b)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload  of 
lump  coal  from  Strong,  Colo.,  to  Milford, 
Neb.,  shipment  arriving  at  Milford  1:30 
p.  m.,  September  30,  and  notice  of  ar- 
rival being  given  consignee  7  a.  m.,  Oc- 
tober 1.  The  shipment  was  refused  by 
consignee  on  the  morning  of  October  2. 
and  consignor  was  immediately  notified 
of  such  refusal.  Complainant  recon- 
signed same  to  Lincoln,  Neb.,  on  October 
7.  The  tariff  permitted  reconsignment  to 
a  new  destination  in  the  same  general 
direction  as  to  the  point  to  which  the 
traffic  was  originally  consigned  if  made 
within  72  hours  after  arrival  at  first 
destination.  Consignor  received  no 
notice  of  the  refust.!  of  consignee  to  ac- 
cept same  until  after  the  expiration  of 
said  72  hours.  Complainant  claimed  the 
72-hour  limitation  was  unreasonable,  and 
that  limitation  had,  in  fact,  been  abol- 
ished at  the  time -of  hearing.  HELD,  the 
Commission  could  not  make  a  reconsign- 
ment provision  retroactive  by  ordering 
reparation  on  shipments  made  at  a  time 
when  the   same   was   not  available,   and 


'704 


RECONSIGNMENT,  §6  (c)— REDUCED  RATES.  §3  (a) 


since  complainant  had  not  complied  with 
the  72-hour  limitation  he  was  not  en- 
titled to  reparation,  nor  were  defendants 
subject  to  a  penalty  for  failure  to  notify 
the  consignor  of  refusal  of  the  shipmem 
in  time  to  admit  of  the  reconsignment 
within  the  limitation  period.  Sunny  Sid€ 
Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co. 
16  I.  C.  C.  r58,  559. 

(c)  A  reconsignment  privilege  cannot 
be  given  retroactive  effect.  Miller  &  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  60. 

(d)  A  reconsignment  privilege  will 
not  be  given  retroactive  effect  unless 
necessary  to  correct  an  unjust  discrimi- 
nation. Menefee  Bros.  v.  R.  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  359. 

V.     PROCEDURE  AND  REPARATION. 
§7.     In  General. 

See  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion, §14  (e);  Reparation,  §8  (e), 
§16  (b);  Routing  and  Misrouting, 
§4    (m),    §7    (s),    (ttt). 

(a)  Reparation  awarded  for  damages 
caused  by  failure  of  defendant  to  cancel 
reconsigning  instructions.  Pomeroy  & 
Co.  V.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  8. 

§8.     Parties  to  Complaint. 

(a)  The  Commission  cannot  enter  ar 
order  respecting  privileges  at  New  Or- 
leans on  rice  shipped  from  New  Orleans 
to  Houston,  where  the  initial  carriers  on 
whose  lines  the  reconsigning  privileges 
are  asked  are  not  made  parties.  Bayou 
City  Rice  Mills  v.  Texas  &  New  Orleans 
R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  490,  491. 

RECORDS. 

Of  Carrier— See   Evidence,   §1    (I). 

REDUCED  RATES. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 
§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
§2.     Power  to  suspend. 
n.     LEGALITY  OP  REDUCED  RATES. 
§3.     Charitable  institutions. 
§4.     Government  material. 
§5.    Returned  or  old  shipments. 

I.     CONTROL  AI:D  REGULATION. 

See  Courts,   §11    (q). 
§1.     Jurisdiction   of  Commission. 

(a)  It  is  one  thing  for  a  carrier  to 
voluntarily  reduce  rates  not  excessive 
for  the  service  performed  solely  to  meet 


competitive  and  commercial  conditions, 
but  a  different  thing  for  the  Commission 
to  compel  such  reductions  regardless  of 
tiansportation  conditions.  Chicago  Lum- 
ber &  Coal  Co.  V.  Tioga  Southwestern 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  323,  334. 

§2.     Power  to  Suspend. 

(a)  The  Commission  was  called  upon 
to  postpone  the  effectiveness  of  certain 
reductions  in  rates  because  discrimina- 
tory against  complainant,  located  at  Okla- 
homa City,  Okla.  They  consisted  of  re- 
duced proportional  rates  on  packing- 
house products  and  fresh  meats  from  Ft. 
Worth,  Tex.,  to  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  on  fresh 
meats  from  38^/^0  to  35i/^c,  and  on  pack- 
ing-house products  from  33c  to  32^c.  As 
these  commodities  from  Ft.  Worth  moved 
largely  to  points  beyond  St.  Louis,  and 
ihese  proportional  rates  were  used  in 
combination  to  make  up  through  rates 
to  such  points  beyond,  the  effect  was  to 
reduce  the  existing  rates  from  Ft.  Worth 
to  northern  and  eastern  points  generally. 
The  present  differential  in  favor  of  Okla- 
homa City  of  7c  per  100  lbs.  on  fresh  meat 
and  4i;4c  per  100  lbs.  on  packing-house 
products  on  shipments  to  points  in  Cen- 
tral Freight  Association  territory  ap- 
peared to  le  an  off-hand  adjustment  of  a 
trade  and  transportation  dispute  of  which 
the  Commission  had  no  means  of  deter- 
mining its  fairness  or  correctness  on  the 
present  hearing,  and  complainants  re- 
quested the  reductions  to  be  postponed 
until  tbe  general  investigation  now  before 
the  Commission  be  finished.  HELD,  the 
Commission  decides  that  it  has  the  power 
to  suspend  reductions  of  rates  in  any 
case  where  such  suspension  will  oper- 
ate to  prevent  an  apparent  discrimina- 
tion. However,  a  prima  facie  case  clearly 
and  affirmatively  persuasive  should  be 
presented  before  the  power  to  suspend 
is  exercised.  This,  not  having  been  done, 
the  complaint  is  dismissed.  In  Re  Sus- 
pension of  Rates  on  Packing-House  Prod- 
ucts, 21  I.  C.  C.  68,  70. 

II.  LEGALITY  OF  REDUCED  RATES. 

§3.     Charitable   Institutions. 

(a)  A  charitable  institution,  as  the 
term  bears  upon  the  right  of  carriers  to 
Issue  free  transportation,  is  one  which 
is  administered  ii.  the  public  interest,  and 
in  which  the  element  of  private  gain  is 
wanting,  and  the  definition  includes  hos- 
pitals, almshouses,  orphanages,  asylums 
and   missionary    societies.      Such   an   in- 


REDUCED  RATES,  §3  (b)— §5  (b) 


705 


stitution  does  not  necessarily  lose  its 
charitable  character  from  the  fact  that 
it  is  under  the  management  of  a  par- 
ticular denomination  or  sect,  or  because 
a  charge  is  collected  from  some  or  all  of 
those  who  enjoy  its  privileges.  It  is  only 
necessary  that  it  be  conducted  in  the 
public  interest  and  not  for  private  gain. 
In  Re  Passes  to  Clergymen  and  Others, 
15  I.  C.  C.  45,  46. 

(b)  Clergymen  acting  as  editors  of 
officially  recognized  church  papers,  as 
college  presidents  or  professors;  as  finan- 
cial agents  for  a  church,  or  other  religious 
or  charitable  institutions,  including  edu- 
cational institutions  under  church  govern- 
ment; as  workers  in  Christian  Temper- 
ance or  Y.  M.  C.  A.  work,  and  as  brothers 
of  religious  orders,  and  sisters  of  charity 
devoting  their  entire  time  to  religious 
work,  who  habitually  wear  a  garb  distinc- 
tive of  their  order,  are  not  excluded  from 
the  privilege  of  receiving  reduced-rate 
transportation.  A  clergyman  does  not  lose 
his  ministerial  standing  by  reason  of  the 
fact  that  he  leaves  the  pastorate  for 
some  other  field  of  religious  activity. 
Passes  to  Clergymen  and  Others,  15 
I.  C.  C.  45,  46. 

§4.     Government  Material. 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  eleven  car- 
loads of  anthracite  coal  from  Chicago, 
111.,  to  Sturgis,  S.  D.,  for  use  of  the 
United  States  government  at  Fort  Meade, 
S.  D.,  purchased  by  the  United  States  at 
a  price  which  included  delivery  of  the 
coal  at  Sturgis.  Defendant  operates  be 
tween  Chicago  and  Sturgis  248  miles  of 
land-grant-aided  railroad,  over  which  the 
government  is  required  to  pay  only  50 
per  cent  of  the  commercial  rate.  The 
shipments,  however,  were  assessed  the 
published  rate  of  $6.80  per  ton.  The 
carrier  through  error  quoted  to  complain- 
ant a  rate  of  $5.9915  per  ton,  the  land- 
grant  rate.  This  rate  was  established 
subsequent  to  the  shipment  of  coal  con- 
signed to  the  government  at  Sturgis.  The 
reasonableness  of  the  $6.80  rate  was  not 
questioned,  the  propriety  of  the  applica- 
tion of  the  land-grant  rate  to  the  ship- 
ment being  involved.  HELD,  that  is  im- 
proper to  permit  the  benefit  of  special 
rates  on  government  material  to  accrue 
to  anyone  other  than  the  government 
itself.  Reparation  denied.  Havens  &  Co. 
v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  156,  158. 

(b)  There  exists  no  reason  why  lower 
rates  should  be  made  for  contractors  of 


brick  paving  than  should  be  made  in 
favor  of  any  other  party  who  may  have 
contracts  for  other  work  for  public  au- 
thorities. Metropolitan  Paving  Brick  Co. 
V.  A.  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  197,  204. 

(c)  The  Commission  has  no  power 
under  the  law  to  require  reduced  rates 
for  the  United  States,  state  or  municipal 
governments.  Metropolitan  Paving  Brick 
Co.  V.  A.  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  197, 
204. 

(d)  Section  22  of  the  Act  gives  car- 
riers the  right  to  transport  traffic  for 
the  use  of  the  United  States,  state  or 
municipal  governments  at  reduced  rates 
if  they  see  fit  to  do  so.  Metropolitan 
Paving  Brick  Co.  v.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R. 
Co.,   17   I.   C.  C.   197,  204. 

§5.     Returned   or   Old   Shipments. 

See  Classification,  §11    (m);  Evidence, 
§44  (a),  §61    (g). 

(a)  In  the  proceeding  In  the  Matter 
of  Reduced  Rates  on  Return  Shipments, 
19  I.  C.  C.  409,  the  Commission  directed 
the  cancelation  of  half  or  reduced  rates 
based  upon  the  return  character  of  the 
shipments  to  which  applied.  The  pres- 
ent complainants  seek  the  re-establish- 
ment of  these  rates  upon  the  ground 
that  the  shipments  are  inherently  of 
low  value.  HELD,  to  grant  the  prayers 
of  these  complainants  would  be  to  com- 
mit the  Commission  to  the  doctrine  that 
rates  on  all  commodities  should  be 
made  with  reference  to  value  as  the 
controlling  element,  and  the  Commis- 
sion must  refuse  to  announce  any  such 
principle.  Neither  is  it  prepared  to  lay 
down  the  principle  that  old  or  second- 
hand articles  must  be  treated  differently 
from  new.  Such  of  these  articles  or 
parts  as  are  in  fact  scrap  are  entitled 
to  the  scrap  rate,  but  if  they  have  any 
value  as  the  articles  which  they  orig- 
inally purported  to  be,  the  Commission 
does  not  feel  that  it  can  require  the 
carriers  to  transport  them  at  other  than 
the  regular  tariff  rates  applicable  to 
the  new  or  originally  transported  article. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Minneapolis  Traf- 
fic Ass'n  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L 
C.  C.  432,  436,  437. 

(b)  The  Commission  is  not  prepared 
to  lay  down  the  principle  that  old  or 
second-hand  articles  must  be  treated 
differently  from  new  articles.  Minne- 
apolis Traffic  Ass'n  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,    23   I.    C.    C.    432,   437. 


706 


REDUCED  RATES,  §5   (c)  — (i) 


(c)  The  ruling  of  the  Commission 
condemning  the  tariff  rules  of  the  car- 
riers in  permitting  "returned  shipments" 
to  be  made  at  reduced  rates  at  various 
periods  up  to  four  years  after  the  orig- 
inal shipment  was  made  does  not  pre- 
vent the  carriers  from  establishing  spe- 
cial ratings  for  the  movement  of  de- 
fective or  damaged  goods,  as  rates  de- 
pend largely  upon  value.  If  this  course 
is  adopted,  however,  the  rating  should 
be  predicated  entirely  upon  the  low 
value  of  the  freight.  In  Re  Reduced 
Rates  on  Returned  Shipments,  19  I.  C. 
C.  409,  418. 

(d)  There  can  be  no  justification  for 
special  rates  on  unsalable  goods.  In 
Re  Reduced  Rates  on  Returned  Ship- 
ments,  19   I.   C.   C.   409,  418. 

(e)  A  reduced  rate  for  the  return  of 
goods  refused  by  a  consignee  at  desti- 
nation is  justified.  In  Re  Reduced  Rates 
on  Returned  Shipments,  19  I.  C.  C.  409, 
417. 

(f)  The  Commission  instituted  an  in- 
quiry into  the  legality  of  tariff  rules 
providing  for  the  application  of  reduced 
rates  to  returned  shipments  of  agricul- 
tural implements,  vehicles  and  other 
commodities.  Under  some  of  the  tariffs 
these  reduced  rates  applied  during  any 
time  up  to  four  years.  HELD,  that 
returned  shipme  t  rates  in  general 
should  be  disapproved,  but  reduced  rates 
for  the  return  of  freight  which  has 
been  refused  by  the  consignee  at  des- 
tination may  properly  be  made.  In  the 
latter  case  the  return  movement  is  prac- 
tically a  continuation  of  the  going  move- 
ment, and  may  for  that  reason  be  ac- 
corded lower  than  standard  rates.  Goods 
in  closed  packages  may  lawfully  enjoy 
return  shipment  rates  if  tendered  to 
the  carrier  within  ten  days  following 
delivery.  And  while  this  concession  xS 
a  slight  departure  from  legal  theory  it 
is  doubtless  essential  if  the  rule  is  to 
be  thoroughly  workable.  In  Re  Reduced 
ii.ates  on  Returned  Shipments,  19  I.  C. 
C.  409,  417. 

(g)  The  fact  that  freight  has  been 
shipped  once  and  paid  one  way  cannot 
be  taken  into  consideration  in  fixing 
charges  for  a  subsequent  transaction. 
The  principle  underlying  the  ordinary 
transit  privilege  cannot  be  relied  upon 
in  support  of  the  return  shipment  rule. 
Transit  arrangements  in  their  most  com- 
mon   form    at    least    are    susceptible    of 


defense  only  upon  the  theory  that  the 
inbound  and  outbound  movements  are, 
in  fact,  parts  of  a  single  continuous 
transaction.  While  the  freight  is  de- 
layed at  the  transit  point  the  shipment 
is  merely  suspended  temporarily,  the 
present  intention  of  the  shipper  being 
to  forward  the  goods  to  their  ultimate 
destination.  Once  let  it  be  conceded  that 
the  inbound  and  outbound  movements 
are  separate  and  distinct  and  the  im- 
propriety of  applying  any  rates  other 
than  the  regularly  established  locals 
would  be  self  evident.  It  is  clear  that 
there  is  no  real  connection  between  an 
outbound  shipment  to-day  and  a  "re- 
turned shipment"  one  year  hence.  There 
is  no  room  whatever  for  the  argument 
that  the  shipment  is  suspended  during 
the  period  intervening  between  the  two 
transactions,  for  there  is  no  present  in- 
tent to  accomplish  the  return  move- 
ment. It  is  therefore  impossible  to  re- 
late the  two  services  and  urge  the  one 
as  a  reason  for  granting  special  terms 
to  the  other.  In  Re  Reduced  Rates  on 
Retiwned  Shipments,  19  I.  C.  C.  409, 
417. 

(h)  Complainant  shipped  over  de- 
fendant's line  agricultural  implements 
from  Hopkins,  Minn.,  to  its  branch 
house  at  Dallas,  Tex.  These  imple- 
ments were  reshipped  over  defendant's 
line  from  Dallas  to  Kansas  City  to  be 
repaired.  Defendant's  tariff  provided 
that  shipments  which  had  paid  full 
standard  rates  might  be  returned  to 
the  shipper  at  point  of  origin  at  one- 
half  the  authorized  rate  in  direction  of 
first  movement.  One-half  the  authorized 
rate  from  Dallas  to  Hopkins  was  43l^c. 
Had  the  shipment  in  question  been  re- 
turned from  Dallas  to  Hopkins  it  would 
have  passed  through  Kansas  City,  a 
distance  of  625  miles  from  Dallas,  to 
HopkiLs,  a  distance  of  1,240  miles  from 
Dallas.  Complainant  was  assessed  the 
full  rate  of  72c  from  Dallas  to  Kansas 
City.  Subsequent  to  the  shipment  an 
amended  tariff  would  have  permitted 
tnis  return  shipment  from  Dallas  to 
Kansas  City  at  36c.  HELD,  the  rate 
charged  was  unreasonable.  Reparation 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  36c.  Minne- 
apolis xiireshing  Machine  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I. 
&  r.  Ry.  Co.,  13  1.  C.  C.  128,  130. 

(i)  Rule  permitting  return  of  ship- 
ments of  agricultural  implements  at  half 
rates  within  four  years,  while  half  rates 
were   applicable   upon   other   traffic   only 


REFRIGERATION,  §1   (a)— §3   (f) 


707 


if  returned  within  one  year,  not  found 
to  have  resulted  in  damage  to  complain- 
ants. Port  Huron  Engine  &  Thresher 
Co.  V.  G.  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
352. 

REFRIGERATION. 

I.     CONTROL  AND    REGULATION. 
§1.     Jurisdiction    of    Commission. 
II.     DUTY    TO    FURNISH. 
§2.     In   general. 

§3.     Incidental        services        and 
charges. 

III.  REASONABLENESS  OF  CHARGES. 

§4.     In  general. 

IV.  TARIFFS   AND   PUBLICATION. 

§5.     Obligation   to  file. 
§6.     Construction  in  general. 
V.     WEIGHTS. 

§7.     Minimums. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 
See   Precooling. 

I.     CONTROL   AND    REGULATION. 
§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

(a)  The  fact  that  refrigeration  serv- 
ices are  furnished  by  a  company  inde- 
pendent of  the  carrier,  but  which  while 
independent  in  theory  is  in  fact  the 
property  of  the  railroad  upon  which  it 
operates,  does  not  prevent  the  Commis- 
sion from  determining  the  reasonable- 
ness of  the  refrigeration  charge  exacted 
by  the  railroad,  but  it  should  be  deter- 
mined exactly  as  though  the  service 
were  rendered  by  the  railroad  company 
itself.  Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Ex- 
change V.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  106,  109. 

(b)  Excessive  icing  charges  exacted 
because  of  misrouting  are  not  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Commission.  Interna- 
tional Salt  Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
C.    543,    545. 

(c)  Where  there  is  no  provision  in 
a  tariff  for  assessment  of  icing  charge, 
and  the  shipper  paid  the  sum  demanded, 
the  Commission  has  jurisdiction  to  in- 
quire what  was  a  reasonable  charge 
and  to  order  repayment  of  whatever 
the  carrier  has  collected  over  and  above 
such  reasonable  charge.  Memphis 
Freight  Bureau  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  90,  92. 

M.     DUTY   TO    FURNISH. 
§2.     In    General. 

%\s'^'"or"«"'J'   ^Ki"V'    Reasonable- 

r^ii^^  T^^  ^"^^  ^^  th«  carrier  to  fur- 
nish   refrigeration    "upon    reasonable    re- 


quest" contemplates  that  it  shall  be 
paid  for  its  service,  and  that  sufficient 
traffic  be  offered  to  justify  the  furnish- 
ng  of  refrigaration.  Albree  v.  B.  &  M. 
R.  R.,  22  I.  C.  C.  303,  322. 

(b)  A  carrier  s  duty,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, is  to  furnish  refrigeration, 
and  the  carrier  may  insist  upon  fur- 
nishing that  service  exclusively.  Arling- 
ton Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
20  1.  C.   C.  106,  116. 

(c)  A  shipper  is  entitled  to  icing  of 
shipment  which  actually  weighed  less 
than  the  minimum  fixed,  provided  trans- 
portation charges  are  paid  upon  full 
amount  of  prescribed  minimum.  Swift 
&  Co.  V.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
426,  430. 

§3.     Incidental  Services  and  Charges. 

See    Switch    Tracks    and    Switching, 
§5;   Transportation. 

(a)  Refrigeration  and  pre-cooling  are 
different.  Refrigeration  is  part  of  the 
transportation  service.  In  Re  Pre-cool- 
ing and  Pre-icing,  23  I.  C.  C.  267,  269. 

(b)  Refrigeration  is,  and  pre-cooling 
is  not,  a  part  of  the  transportation 
service.  In  Re  Pre-cooling  and  Pre- 
icing,  23  I.  C.  C.  267,  269. 

(c)  Refrigeration  should  be  provided 
or  paid  for  by  the  shipper  in  addition 
to  peddler-car  service  rates.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances on  Meats  and  Packing-House 
Products,  23  L  C.  C.  656,  671. 

(d)  When  a  car  of  lemons  or  oranges 
is  pre-cooled  by  the  shipper,  and  for  any 
reason  during  transportation  the  carrier 
becomes  negligent  so  that  the  shipment 
is  delayed,  it  has  the  right  to  protect 
itself  against  the  consequences  of  its 
negligence  by  opening  the  bunkers  and 
filling  them  with  ice  in  the  same  man- 
ner as  in  case  of  a  ventilated  shipment, 
the  expense  being  borne  by  the  carrier. 
Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v. 
S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  106,  117. 

(e)  The  filling  of  the  bunkers  of  a 
refrigerator  car  with  ice  is  a  part  of 
the  preparation  of  the  car  for  shipment, 
and  is  not  a  part  of  the  transportation 
service  which  is  rendered  by  the  rail- 
road. Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Exchange 
V.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  106,  118. 

(f)  Carriers  are  entitled  to  additional 
compensation  for  keeping  ice  bunkers 
in  repair.  Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Ex- 
change V.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  106,  120. 


708 


REFRIGERATION,  §3   (g)— §4   (e) 


(g)  Where  a  tariff  provides  that  dur- 
ing certain  seasons  of  the  year  re- 
frigerator cars  will  not  be  furnished 
individual  shippers  unless  loaded  to  10,- 
000  lbs.  minimum  and  contains  another 
rule  that  an  unloading  charge  will  be 
assessed  against  separate  shippers  using 
a  car  for  a  consolidated  shipment,  it  is 
unreasonable  to  assess  an  unloading 
charge  against  that  shipper  who  orders 
a  car  and  loads  it  to  the  minimum,  even 
though  other  shippers  subsequently 
from  the  same  shipping  point  also  load 
into  the  car,  which  then  moves  as  a 
consolidated  shipment.  Davies  v.  I.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  3,  5. 

(h)  On  shipments  of  beer  from 
Olympia  and  Seattle  to  California,  Ne- 
vada and  Arizona  points,  defendants 
failed  to  provide  refrigerator  cars,  and 
complainant  was  compelled  to  make  ar- 
rangements for  the  same  with  a  private 
company.  Defendants  collected  $5  per 
car  per  trip  for  the  cars,  and  paid  the 
same  over  to  the  private  company.  De- 
fendants did  not  make  a  like  rental 
charge  on  such  cars  against  companies 
not  located  at  Puget  Sound  points,  for 
the  reason  that  the  owners  of  the  cars 
did  not  require  payment  of  such  rental 
charges  on  them  when  loaded  from 
points  other  than  Puget  Sound  points. 
Defendant,  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  contended 
that  the  rates  on  beer  were  so  low 
that  it  was  not  justified  in  permitting 
its  own  cars  for  such  traffic  to  go  off 
its  line.  HELD,  the  rental  charge  as- 
sessed was  unlawful  and  discriminatory. 
Reparation  awarded.  Olympia  Brewing 
Co.  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  178, 
181. 

(i)  Defendants'  tariffs  provided  that 
where  empty  cars  were  ordered  to  load- 
ing points  under  ice  an  additional 
charge  of  $15  a  car  would  be  added  to 
the  regular  refrigeration  charges.  Upon 
shipments  of  fruit  from  California  the 
cars  were  loaded  with  pre-cooled  fruit 
and  were  then  placed  under  ice  at  the 
icing  station  and  immediately  forwarded 
without  additional  refrigeration  service. 
The  tariff  was  intended  to  apply  on 
cars  placed  for  loading  at  "outside  load- 
ing stations,"  for  such  cars  had  not 
only  to  be  iced  before  loading,  but  after 
loading  was  completed  had  to  be  hauled 
to  an  icing  station  and  re-iced  before 
the  eastward  movement  began.  Com- 
plainant was  assessed  the  additional 
charge    of    $15    for    icing.      HELD,    such 


additional  charges  were  unreasonable. 
Reparation  awarded.  California  Fruit 
Growers'  Exchange  v.  Santa  Fe  Re- 
frigerator Despatch  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  404. 

ill.  REASONABLENESS  OF  CHARGES. 
§4.     In   General. 

See  Minimums,  §7  (f),  (r),  (s) ;  Rea- 
sonableness of  Rates,  §84  (b),  (m), 
(P),    (q),    (X). 

(a)  In  determining  the  reasonable- 
ness of  a  rate  on  lemons  from  California 
to  the  East,  moving  under  ventilation 
instead  of  refrigeration,  the  Commission 
cannot  consider  in  favor  of  the  carriers 
the  additional  cost  of  the  haul  of  ice 
involved  in  the  movement  of  oranges, 
but  such  expense  must  be  charged  only 
against  that  part  of  the  movement  un- 
der refrigeration.  Arlington  Heights 
Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
149,    153. 

(b)  No  ground  exists  upon  which  a 
shipper  who  ships  under  ventilation 
could  be  required  to  help  pay  the  trans- 
portation charge  of  the  shipper  who 
requires  refrigeration.  Arlington  Heights 
Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
149,  153. 

(c)  While  a  carrier  is  required  to 
furnish  refrigeration,  it  may  exact  fair 
compensation  for  that  service,  and  what 
is  fair  must  be  determined  with  respect 
to  its  service  as  a  whole.  Albree  v.  B. 
&  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  303,  322. 

(d)  In  determining  the  reasonable- 
ness of  a  refrigeration  charge  which 
the  shipper  who  has  the  benefit  of  re- 
frigeration should  pay,  nothing  should 
be  added  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  a 
regular  refrigerator  car  is  used  which 
is  more  expensive  than  the  ordinary 
box  car,  because  this  fact  has  been 
taken  into  consideration  in  determining 
the  rate.  Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Ex- 
change V.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  106,  108. 

(e)  Oranges  and  lemons  picked  early 
in  the  season  can  be  sent  through  under 
ventilation  in  an  ordinary  box  car, 
while  those  picked  later  must  be 
shipped  under  ice.  HELD,  that  in  de- 
termining the  additional  charge  which 
the  shipper  who  requires  the  refrigera- 
tion should  pay  in  addition  to  the 
amount  exacted  from  the  shipper  who 
does  not  receive  refrigeration,  the  cost 
of  the  additional  haul  on  the  ice  should 
be  charged  against  the  refrigerated 
shipment,     otherwise     the     grower    who 


REFRIGERATION,  §4   (f)  — (i) 


709 


ft 


picks  his  oranges  early  in  the  season, 
when  they  can  be  sent  through  under 
ventilation,  will  be  compelled  to  con- 
tribute to  th€  expense  of  transporting 
the  fruit  of  his  neighbor  who  does  not 
market  his  crop  until  later.  Arlington 
Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
20    I.    C.    C.    106,    109. 

(f)  Complainant  shipped  oranges  and 
lemons  from  California  east.  After 
loading  the  car  is  taken  to  some  gath- 
ering point,  either  San  Bernardino,  on 
the  Santa  Fe  R.  R.,  or  Colton,  on  the 
Southern  Pacific  R.  R.  The  refrigera- 
tion charges  were  $60  to  the  Missouri 
River,  $62.50  to  Chicago  and  similar 
points,  $72.50  to  Buffalo  and  Pittsburgh, 
$75  to  New  York  and  $77.50  to  Boston. 
The  Chicago  rate  was  considered  as  a 
test  of  the  others.  HELD,  that  in  fix- 
ing the  refrigeration  charge  the  elements 
to  be  considered  are  the  cost  of  the 
ice,  cost  of  repairs  to  bunkers,  expense 
of  hauling  the  ice,  the  element  of  risk 
assumed  in  the  rendering  of  the  service, 
and  a  fair  profit  on  the  transaction.  Ad- 
judged by  these  considerations,  the  re- 
frigeration charges  are  not  excessive.  Ar- 
lington Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  106,  111. 

(g)  Complainant  attacked  refrigeration 
rates  on  strawberries  shipped  from  Nor- 
folk and  Olny,  Va.,  and  Marion  and 
Pittsville,  Md.,  to  Boston.  From  Vir- 
ginia points  the  carload  rate  on  32-quart 
crates,  minimum  800  crates,  was  18c 
per  crate,  yielding  a  per  car  revenue  of 
$54;  on  48-quart  crates,  minimum  200 
crates,  rate  per  crate  27c,  revenue  per 
car  $54;  64-quart  crates,  minimum  160 
crates,  rate  per  crate  34c,  revenue  per 
car  $54.40.  The  rates  from  Maryland 
points,  a  haul  a  hundred  miles  less 
yielded  a  revenue  of  approximately  $6  a 
car  less,  the  same  minimum  being  ap- 
plied and  the  rate  per  crate  for  the  32- 
quart  crates  being  2c  less;  for  the  48- 
quart  crate  3c  less;  and  for  the  60-quart 
crate.  4c  less,  than  from  the  Virginia 
points.  Since  1905  the  rates  from  these 
points  had  been  gradually  reduced. 
HELD,  that  the  rate  from  Norfolk  on  the 
first  type  of  crate  should  not  exceed  16c, 
on  the  second  type  24c,  and  on  the  third 
30c;  the  rates  from  the  other  points  be- 
ing made  from  Ic  to  2c  lower  respectively; 
and  in  view  of  the  gradual  and  material 
concessions  the  defendants  have  made  in 
the  rates  from  time  to  time  they  must  be 
presumed  to  have  acted  in  good  faith  in 


the  exercise  of  their  judgment.  Repara- 
tion denied.  Sweeney,  Lynes  &  Co.  v.  N. 
Y.  P.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  600. 

(h)  Moving  citrus  fruits  under  refrig- 
eration is  more  expensive  than  under 
ventilation.  Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Ex- 
change V.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  148,  154. 

(i)  Complainant  asparagus  growers  in 
the  Charleston  district,  S.  C,  attacked  the 
rate  of  90c  per  crate  of  24  bunches,  weigh- 
ing 65  lbs.,  to  Boston  and  of  65c  per 
crate  to  Washington,  Baltimore,  Philadel- 
phia and  New  York.  The  refrigeration 
charges  were  21c  per  crate  on  a  mini- 
mum carload  of  230  crates  and  15c  on  a 
minimum  of  325  crates  to  New  York  and 
the  other  cities  named  except  Boston, 
and  to  Boston  were  24i^c  and  IIV2C  per 
crate,  respectively,  for  the  same  mini- 
mum carloads.  Complainants  alleged  un- 
just discrimination  against  small  shippers 
in  that  defendants  refused  to  furnish  re- 
frigeration for  less-than-carload  lots.  The 
average  net  return  to  growers  of  aspara- 
gus for  1908  and  1909  was  about  $4.50 
per  crate,  exclusive  of  transportation  and 
refrigeration  charges  and  commissions. 
Conflicting  evidence  indicated  that  the 
gross  selling  price  at  New  York  ranged 
from  about  $6  to  $8  per  crate.  The  as- 
paragus grown  around  Charleston  was 
transported  by  boats  to  the  vegetable 
wharves  in  Charleston  of  defendants 
Southern  Ry.  and  Atlantic  Coast  Line.  It 
comprised  one-third  of  all  vegetable 
traffic  moving  over  the  wharves.  De- 
fendants unloaded  the  vegetables  from 
the  boats  to  the  wharves.  The  refriger- 
ating company  loaded  them  into  the  car.^. 
The  traffic  was  forwarded  in  expedited 
trains  of  light  tonnage  that  were  given 
preference  over  all  other  trains  except 
passenger  trains.  While  defendants 
formerly  granted  refrigeration  on  less- 
than-carload  shipments,  the  evidence  in- 
dicated that  to  do  so  under  the  rates  at- 
tacked would  result  in  loss  to  both  the 
railroads  and  the  refrigeration  companies. 
The  practice  at  other  producing  points 
was  to  consolidate  small  shipments  In 
carloads.  The  minima  under  the  rates  com- 
plained of  could  be  easily  loaded.  The 
charge  for  refrigeration  from  Charleston 
to  New  York  was  over  $48  per  car  of  21,- 
125  lbs.,  when  325  crates  were  loaded.  In 
1907  on  business  over  the  A.  C.  L.,  the 
profit  from  refrigeration  was  $4.06  and 
in  1906,  $3.36  a  car,  which  profit  accrued 
entirely  to  the  refrigeration  company 
and  not  to  the  carriers.    In  Florida  Fruit, 


710 


REFRIGERATION,  §4    (j)— §7    (a) 


etc.,  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  467,  the  Commission  found  that  re- 
frigeration charges  of  $70  per  car  of  21,- 
400  lbs,  on  fruit  and  vegetables  from 
Florida  and  northern  points  were  not  un- 
reasonable. The  65c  rate  complained  of 
to  New  York  had  been  in  effect  since 
1903.  From  1894  to  1899  the  rate  was 
85c,  and  from  1900  to  1902,  80c.  Some 
7,000  cars  of  vegetables  per  year  were 
shipped  from  the  Charleston  district.  On 
account  of  the  absence  of  refrigeration 
by  water  lines  and  the  longer  time  re- 
quired to  get  to  market,  the  rates  com- 
plained of  were  but  slightly  influenced 
by  water  competition.  On  asparagus  un- 
der the  rates  attacked  the  earnings  via 
the  Atlantic  Coast  Line  for  the  year  1908 
averaged  about  $198  per  car.  Defendants' 
earnings  on  lettuce  from  Charleston  to 
New  York  were  about  $156  per  car.  In  the 
Florida  Fruit,  etc.,  Ass'n  case,  14  I,  C.  C. 
467,  a  rate  on  vegetables  of  43c  per  crate 
of  50  lbs.  from  Florida  base  points  to 
New  York  was  held  to  be  reasonable, 
which  rate  did  not,  however,  include  the 
gathering  charge  or  the  rates  up  to  the 
base  points.  The  average  loading  of 
vegetables  was  found  in  that  case  to  be 
17,600  lbs.  and  the  per  car  earnings,  $150. 
Jacksonville  is  1,000  miles  and  Charles- 
ton 740  miles  from  New  York.  A  rate  of 
60c  per  crate  from  Charleston  via  the 
Atlantic  Coast  Line  to  New  York  would 
yield  per  car  earnings  of  $180  and  one 
of  55c,  $165.  The  losses  to  the  carriers 
from  damage  and  deterioration  of  as- 
paragus were  heavy.  HELD,  that  in  view 
of  the  cost  of  the  service,  comparisons 
with  rates  in  other  localities,  and  former 
decisions  of  the  Commission,  the  refrig- 
eration charges  complained  of  were  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable  or  to  discrim- 
inate unjustly  against  the  shippers  of 
less-than-carload  lots;  but  that  the  rates 
attacked  were  unreasonable  to  the  extent 
that  they  exceeded  60c,  Charleston  to 
New  York,  58c  to  Philadelphia,  56c  to 
Baltimore  and  Washington,  and  70c  to 
Boston.  No  reparation  to  be  awarded  on 
past  shipments.  Asparagus  Growers 
Ass'n  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  423, 
427,  429. 

(j)  Non-refrigerated  freight  should  be 
hauled  at  something  less  than  refriger- 
ated products.  Ozark  Fruit  Growers' 
Ass'n  V.  St.  L.  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
106,  115. 

(k)  Refrigeration  charges  on  ship- 
ments of  strawberries  and  peaches  from 


the  Ozark  fruit  country  to  Denver,  Kan- 
sas City,  Omaha,  St.  Louis  and  Chicago 
as  representative  points,  are  considered, 
and,  in  view  of  the  cost  of  ice  placed  in 
bunkers  and  the  service  of  icing  and  re- 
Icing  and  charge  for  like  service  in  other 
sections,  are  held  not  to  be  unreasonable. 
Similar  questions  involved  in  Ozark  Fruit 
Growers'  Ass'n  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co., 
IG  I.  C.  C.  106.  Ozark  Fruit  Growers' 
Ass'n  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
C.  153. 

(1)  On  carloads  of  oranges  from  St. 
Petersburg,  Fla.,  to  Atlanta,  Ga.,  refrig 
eration  charges  of  $45.00  per  car  were 
collected.  Defendants  had  no  charge  in 
their  tariffs  between  these  points  but 
shortly  after  shipments  moved  published 
a  rate  of  $35.00,  and  offered  to  make  rep- 
aration on  that  basis.  HELD,  the  rate 
charged  was  unreasonable.  Reparation 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  $35.00.  Fain  & 
Stamps  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
529,  530. 

IV.  TARIFFS  AND  PUBLICATION. 
§5.     Obligation  to  File. 

(a)  Where  a  carrier's  tariff  makes  no 
provision  for  refrigeration  charges  and 
the  defendant  collects  an  excessive 
charge,  the  Commission  has  no  authority 
to  authorize  the  return  of  the  whole  pay- 
ment but  only  of  the  excess  above  a  rea- 
sonable charge.  (Cockrell,  Comm'r,  dis- 
senting.) Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v. 
K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  90,  92. 

(b)  The  practice  of  a  carrier  in  charg- 
'ng  for  re-icing  fish  in  transit  where  there 
is  no  tariff  provision  therefor  is  unlawful. 
Bannon  v.  Southern  Express  Co.,  13  I.  C. 
C.  516,  520. 

§6.     Construction    in    General. 

See   Classification,    §12    (a),   §15    (c). 

V.  WEIGHT. 

§7.     Minimums. 

(a)  Complainants  attacked  the  mini- 
mum weight  on  peaches  from  Georgia  to 
markets  east  of  the  Mississippi  and  north 
of  the  Ohio  and  Potomac  rivers  in  refrig- 
erator cars,  of  22,500  lbs.,  which  com- 
pelled complainants  to  load  peach  crates 
five  tiers  high.  HELD,  that  the  ordinary 
refrigeration  method  will  not  perfectly 
cool  the  two  top  tiers,  because  Georgia 
peaches  are  picked  and  packed  in  very 
hot  weather  and  moved  through  hot 
regions  of  the  country;    that  the  proper 


REFRIGERATION,  §7  (b)— RELEASED  RATES,  §3  (a) 


711 


method  of  shipping  these  peaches  would 
be  to  precool  the  crates  before  loading 
into  the  car;  that  comparisons  cannot  be 
made  with  the  transportation  of  Califor- 
nia peaches  (these  peaches  being  cooled 
bj  exposure  to  the  cool  night  air  or  in 
precooling  stations,  and  subject  to  a  cool 
mountain  haul  shortly  after  moving),  nor 
in  the  northern  states  where  there  is 
a  short  haul.  Complaint  dismissed. 
Georgia  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  623. 

(b)  The  minimum  weight  should  b« 
the  same  for  refrigeration  and  transpor- 
tation charges.  Ozark  Fruit  Growers' 
Ass'n  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
C.  106,  108. 

REGROUPING  OF  TERRITORY. 

See   Differentials,   §7    (d). 

RELATIVE  RATES. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §15;  Compara*- 
tive  Rates;  Differentials,  §2;  Equal- 
ization of  Rates,  §2  (o),  (p),  (q), 
(r),  (s),  (t),  (u),  (V),'  (w),  §8  (k). 
(I),  III;  Evidence,  §4  (a),  §13.  §20 
(g),  §28.  §31,  §65:  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission,  §1  (qq) ;  Lono 
and  Short  HsuK.  sin  (sg\-  p-^nr.f' 
lire  Before  Commission,  §2  (k),  §16 
(e);  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §2 
(sss),  (tt).  §10  (b),  §16  (r),  §28,  §47 
(a),  §66  (c),  §76  (a),  §105:  Repara- 
tion, §16  (ssss),  (wwww);  Through 
Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §8,  §15 
(oooo). 

RELEASED  RATES. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction    of    Commission. 
II.     CONSTRUCTION    AND    APPLICA- 
TION. 
§2.     Duty    to    inform    shipper. 
§3.    Intention  to  use. 

III.  LEGALITY. 

§4.    In    general. 

IV.  REASONABLENESS. 

§5.     In    general. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 

See    Loss    and    Damage,    §9;    Bills    of 
Lading,    IV. 

I.     CONTROL  AND   REGULATION. 

See  Interstate  Commerce,  §4  (o),  (w). 

§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

(a)  It  is  doubtful  whether  the  Com- 
mission has  power  to  require  carriers  to 
publish  a  rate  on  burnt  cotton  released 
to  a  valuation  of  5c  a  lb.,  such  rate  to  be 
lower  than  on  other  cotton.  Lesser  v. 
Ga.  R.  R.,  18  L  C.  C  478,  480. 


11.     CONSTRUCTION     AND     APPLICA- 
TION. 
See  Tariffs,  §7   (ff). 

§2.     Duty  to  Inform  Shipper. 

See    Routing    and    IVIisrouting,   §3   (g) ; 
Tariffs,   §7    (hhhh). 

(a)  The  quotation  of  a  released  rate 
should  be  accompanied  with  notice  of 
its  nature.  Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  180. 

(b)  On  cotton  linters  in  carloads 
from  Montgomery,  Ala.,  to  Minneapolis, 
charges  were  collected  at  a  combination 
rate  of  81c,  made  up  of  48c,  Montgom- 
ery to  Evansville,  plus  33c  thence  to 
destination.  Defendant  quoted  a  rate 
of  74c  to  complainant,  which  was  the 
combination  rate  through  Evansville 
when  released  to  a  valuation  of  2c  a 
lb.  The  defendant  omitted  to  advise 
complainant  that  the  rate  was  so  lim- 
ited and  the  bills  of  lading  tendered 
by  complainant  therefore  contained  no 
release  clause  signed  by  complainant. 
HELD,  under  Administrative  Ruling  of 
November  9,  1909,  defendant  owed  the 
duty  of  informing  complainant  and  secur- 
ing its  endorsement  on  the  bills  of  lading 
of  the  released  valuation  clause.  Repara- 
tion awarded  on  the  basis  of  74c.  The 
case  was  not  one  where  the  shipper 
was  obliged  to  pay  the  legal  rate  even 
though  an  erroneous  rate  was  quoted. 
Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R. 
R.,   18    L    C.    C.    180,    181. 

(c)  Defendants'  rates  on  cotton  lint- 
ers  from  Meridian,  Miss.,  to  New  Or- 
leans was  30c  per  100  lbs.,  value  lim- 
ited to  2c  per  lb.,  when  not  so  limited 
the  rate  was  46c,  said  rate  being  ap- 
plicable to  cotton.  Complainant  asked 
defendant's  agent  for  the  lowest  rate 
and  was  informed  that  it  was  46c. 
The  value  of  the  linters  shipped  was 
about  2c  per  lb.  It  was  not  intended 
that  linters  should  be  shipped  at  the 
46c  rate  applying  to  cotton  but  said 
rate  was  instituted  to  prevent  the 
shipment  of  cotton  as  cotton  linters. 
Complainant  in  ignorance  of  the  lower 
rate  shipped  at  the  46c  rate.  HELD, 
he  was  entitled  to  damages  on  the  basis 
of  the  lower  rate.  Salomon  Bros.  Co. 
V.  N.  O.  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C. 
332,    333. 

§3.     Intention  to   Use. 

(a)  One  I^ng  shipped  from  El 
Paso,     Tex.,     to     Bakersfleld,     Cal.,     692 


712 


RELEASED  RATES,  §3   (b)— §4  (c) 


head  of  cattle.  At  the  time  of  execu- 
tion of  the  live  stock  contract  the  ship- 
per and  the  agent  of  the  initial  line 
intended  that  the  live  stock  should 
be  shipped  at  a  released  valuation  of 
$10  per  head,  but  through  inadvertance 
on  the  part  of  the  agent  and  shipper 
the  released  valuation  of  $10  per  head 
was  not  specified  in  the  contract.  The 
cattle  were  shipped  under  valuation 
of  $30  per  head  on  account  of  this  over- 
sight. Complainant  paid  the  excess 
in  the  rate.  In  the  live  stock  contract 
the  correct  lower  rate  of  $107  per  car 
was  inserted  but  the  printed  liability 
of  $30  for  each  cow  was  not  changed. 
HELD,  in  view  of  the  fact  it  was  the 
intention  to  write  the  released  valua- 
tion of  $10  per  head  on  the  printed 
contract  in  place  of  the  value  of  $30 
printed  thereon  as  shown  by  the  in- 
sertion in  the  printed  contract  of  the  rate 
applicable  only  on  such  released  valua- 
tion, the  inadvertence  of  the  car- 
rier and  the  shipper  should  not  oper- 
ate to  deprive  complainant  of  the  speci- 
fied tariff  rate.  Reparation  awarded. 
Miller  &  Lux  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C 
129. 

(b)  Complainant  did  not  sign  bill  of 
lading  as  required  by  tariff,  although 
lower  rate  was  inserted  by  carrier's 
agent.  Reparation  awarded.  Robinson 
Clay  Product  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  250. 

(c)  Where  rates  were  based  upon  de- 
clared valuation  and  the  shipper  failed 
to  so  declare,  reparation  declined  on 
basis  of  invoice  presented  by  consignee. 
Dueber  Watch  Case  Mfg.  Co.  v.  St.  L.  & 
S.  F.  R.  R.   Co.,  Unrep.   Op.   396. 

Mi.     LEGALITY. 

§4.     In     General. 

(a)  Section  20  of  the  Hepburn  Act 
provides  that  the  carrier  shall  be  liable 
"for  any  loss,  damage  or  injury  to  such 
property  caused  by  it  .  .  .  and  no 
contract,  receipt,  rule  or  regulation 
shall  exempt  such  common  carrier,  rail- 
road or  transportation  company  from 
the    liability    hereby    imposed."      HELD, 

1.  If  a  rate  is  conditioned  upon  the 
shipper's  assuming  the  risk  of  loss 
due  to  causes  beyond  the  carrier's  con- 
trol,   the    condition    is   valid. 

2.  If  a  rate  is  conditioned  upon  the 
shipper's  assuming  the  entire  risk  of 
loss,    the    condition    is    void    as    against 


loss    due   to   the   carrier's   negligence   or 
other     misconduct. 

3.  If  a  rate  is  conditioned  upon  the 
shipper's  agreeing  that  the  carrier's 
liability  shall  not  exceed  a  certain 
specified  value 

a.  The  stipulation  is  valid  when  loss 
occurs  through  causes  beyond  the  car- 
rier's   control. 

b.  The  stipulation  is  valid,  even 
when  the  loss  is  due  to  the  carrier's 
negligence,  if  the  shipper  has  himself 
declared  the  value,  expressly  or  by 
implication,  the  carrier  accepting  the 
same  in  good  faith  as  the  real  value, 
and  the  rate  of  freight  being  fixed 
in  accordance  therewith. 

c.  The  stipulation  is  void  as  against 
loss  due  to  the  carrier's  negligence  or 
other  misconduct  if  the  specified 
amount  does  not  purport  to  be  an 
agreed  valuation,  but  has  been  fixed 
arbitrarily  by  the  carrier  without  refer- 
ence  to  the   real   value. 

d.  The  stipulation  is  void  as  against 
loss  due  to  the  carrier's  negligence 
or  other  misconduct  if  the  specified 
amount,  while  purporting  ■  to  be  an 
agreed  valuation,  is  in  fact  purely  fic- 
titious and  represents  an  attempt  to 
limit  the  carrier's  liability  to  an  arbi- 
trary amount.  In  Re  Released  Rates, 
13  I.  C.  C.  550,  561. 

(b)  It  cannot  be  expected  that  ship- 
pers will  always  be  familiar  with  the 
terms  of  the  carrier's  rate  schedule 
and  bills  of  lading  or  that  they  will 
invariably  know  their  legal  rights. 
Practically  they  often  have  no  choice 
but  to  accept  the  terms  that  are  offered 
them.  This  being  so,  it  is  essential 
that  the  carrier's  dealing  with  the 
shipper  should  be  free  from  the  sus- 
picion of  unfairness  or  imposition  of 
any  description.  The  provisions  of  tar- 
iffs and  bills  of  lading  should  be  fair 
and  unambiguous  and  free  from  sus- 
picion of  illegality.  The  shipper  should 
be  allowed  his  choice  of  rates  which 
leave  the  carrier's  liability  unlimited 
as  at  common  law,  or  lower  rates 
based  upon  such  limited  liability  as 
the  law  sanctions.  In  Re  Released 
Rates,  13  I.  C.  C.  550,  562. 

(c)  In  tariffs  concerning  the  fixing 
of  rates  on  the  basis  of  limited  liability 

the     words     "value     limited     to    " 

are  misleading.     The  phrase,  "Agreed  to 


RELEASED  RATES,  §4  (d)— REPARATION,  §1  (b) 


713 


be  of  the  value  of  ,"  is  less  ob- 
jectionable. It  is  fixed  with  ref- 
erence to  the  real  value  of  the  property, 
and  because  of  an  agreement  that  the 
amount  of  recovery  shall  be  limited  to 
an  arbitrary  specified  amount.  In  Re 
Released  Rates,  13  I.  C.  C.  560,  564. 

(d)  A  tariff  rule  stipulating  that  the 
carrier  shall  incur  no  liability  for  losses 
"from  any  cause  on  property  carried 
on  open  cars,"  is  improper,  such  a  stip- 
ulation being  legally  unenforceable.  In 
Re  Released  Rates,  13  I.  C.  C.  560, 
565. 

(e)  A  tariff  providing  that  where 
shipments  are  not  made  under  an  agree- 
ment for  limited  liability  they  shall  be 
subject  to  an  additional  charge  of 
20  per  cent,  is  unlawful,  said  increase 
being  unreasonable  and  out  of  all  pro- 
portion to  the  larger  risk  involved.  In 
Re  Released  Rates,  13  I.  C.  C.  560, 
565. 

IV.     REASONABLENESS. 
§5.     In    General. 

See  Evidence,  §12  (7)  (a). 
(a)  Defendants'  published  rates  on 
marble  from  Long  Island  City,  N.  Y., 
to  Shipman,  Va.,  were  18c  per  100 
lbs.  when  released  to  a  value  of  20c 
per  cubic  foot,  and  22c  per  100  lbs. 
when  released  to  a  value  of  40c  per  cu- 
bic foot.  Unless  released  the  first 
class  rate  of  54c  was,  as  in  the  ship- 
ment in  question,  applied.  It  appeared 
that  the  fair  average  value  of  cut 
marble  to  be  used  for  building  pur- 
poses was  from  $3  to  $5  per  cubic  foot. 
HELD,  the  classification  requiring  a 
release  to  40c  per  cubic  foot  in  order 
to  entitle  complainant  to  a  better 
than  the  first-class  rate  was  unreason- 
able and  complainant  was  entitled  to 
reparation  on  the  basis  of  the  22c 
rate.  Cohen  &  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.    C.    C.    177,    178. 

REPARATION. 

I.     JURISDICTION  OF  COMMISSION. 

§1.  Necessity  of  primary  action 
by  Commission. 

§2.  Necessity  and  effect  of  find- 
ing   of    unreasonableness. 

§3.  Power  to  award  tort  dam- 
ages. 


II.     RIGHT  TO  RECOVER. 

§4.     Necessity  of  protest. 

§5.    Necessity     of     first     paying 

tariff  rate, 
§6.     Parties   entitled  to  recover. 
§7.     Statute  of  limitations. 

III.  CIRCUMSTANCES   DETERMINING 

RIGHT. 
§8.     Erroneous  publication. 
§9.     Failure  to  post  tariff. 
§10.     Laches. 

§11.     Rate  via  competing  line. 
§12.     Readjustment  of  rates. 
§13.     Res  judicata. 
§14.     Special  rate. 
§15.     Unpublished  charges. 
§16.     Voluntary  or  subsequent  re- 
duction. 
§17.     Willingness    of    carrier    to 
pay. 

IV.  LIABILITY  FOR  REPARATION. 

§18.     Measure  of  reparation. 
§19.     Parties  to  make  refund. 
§20.     Release  of  liability. 
V.     PROCEDURE. 

§21.     Foroial  proceedings. 
§22.     Informal  proceedings. 
§23.     Court  pleadings. 

CROSS  REFERENCES. 
See  Advanced  Rates,  VII;  Allow- 
ances, VI;  Claims;  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission,  VI ;  Passenger 
Fares  and  Facilities,  IV;  Precool- 
ing,  IV;  Special  Contracts,  §4; 
Weights  and  Weighing,  V. 

I.     JURISDICTION  OF  COMMISSION. 

See  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion; Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §1 
(r),   (u),   (V). 

§1.     Necessity  of  Primary  Action  by  Com- 
mission. 

See  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §6  (a); 
Courts,  §11    (a). 

(a)  An  action  cannot  be  maintained 
against  a  carrier  in  a  state  court  under 
sections  9  and  22  of  the  Act  to  recover 
reparation  for  unjust  discrimination  in 
charging  a  published  rate  of  50c  higher 
per  ton  for  coal  loaded  from  wagons  than 
the  published  rate  when  the  coal  is 
loaded  from  tipples,  where  no  prior  ap- 
plication has  been  made  to  the  Commis- 
sion for  relief.  Robinson  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  222  U.  S.  506,  509;  32  Sup.  Ct.  114; 
5-Q  L.  ed.  114. 

(b)  Where  the  Commission  has  found 
that  a  particular  rate  is  unreasonable,  a 
shipper  seeking  reparation,  who  was  not 
a  party  to  the  complaint  before  the  Com- 
mission, cannot  bring  suit  in  a  United 
States  Circuit  Court  under  section  9  of 


714 


REPARATION,  §1   (c)  — (q) 


the  Act,  but  must  apply  to  the  Commis- 
Bion  for  reparation,  the  remedy  provided 
in  section  16  of  the  Act  being  exclusive% 
Phillips  Co.  V.  G.  T.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  195  Fed. 
12,  18. 

(c)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion has  power  to  determine  the  reason- 
ableness of  rates  and  likewise  is  author- 
ized to  award  reparation,  and  in  both  re- 
spects, where  the  reparation  arises  from 
a  readjustment  of  rates,  its  conclusions, 
being  administrative,  are  final  and  con 
elusive,  unless  the  Commission  has  in 
some  particular  matter  in  the  contro- 
versy exceeded  its  prescribed  functions. 
Fidelity  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  193 
Fed.  924,  928. 

(d)  A  shipper  cannot  maintain  an 
action  at  law  in  the  courts  for  excessive 
and  unreasonable  freight  charges  ex- 
acted on  interstate  shipments,  where  the 
rates  charged  were  those  which  had  been 
duly  fixed  by  the  carrier  according  to  the 
Act  and  had  not  been  found  to  be  un- 
reasonable by  the  Intel^state  Commerce 
Commission.  American  Union  Coal  Co. 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  159  Fed.  278,  280. 

(e)  The  Commission  can  award  dam- 
ages only  for  a  violation  of  the  Act.  Buf- 
falo Hardwood  Lumber  Co.  v.  B.  &  O. 
S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  536,  538;  Good- 
man Mfg.  Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R  Co,  21 
I.  C.  C.  583,  584. 

(f)  Damages  directly  resulting  from  a 
violation  of  the  Act  and  measurable  by  a 
difference  in  rates  may  be  awarded  by 
the  Commission.  Bowles  &  McCandless 
V.  L.  &  N.  R,  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  563,  664. 

(g)  The  Act  affords  the  shipper  a 
means  of  recovering  excessive  charges 
on  shipments  made  by  him  in  the  past 
under  rates  that  were  unjust  and  un- 
reasonable. Arkansas  Fuel  Co.  v.  C. 
M.   &    St.    P.    Ry.    Co.,    16    I.    C.    C.    95. 

(h)  The  Commission  may  award 
damages  on  past  shipments  if  proof 
shows  the  rates  under  which  shipments 
moved  were  excessive.  Arkansas  Fuel 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
C.    95,    98. 

(i)  Where  the  Commission  finds  the 
rate  exacted  to  have  been  unreasonable 
it  may  award  as  reparation  the  differ- 
ence between  that  rate  and  that  which 
is  reasonable,  notwithstanding  the  for- 
mer was  the  rate  duly  established  by 
the    carrier    for    the    time    being.      Allen 


&    Co.    V.    C.    M.    &    St.    P.    Ry.   Co.,    16 
I.  C.  C.  293,  295. 

(j)  The  Act  confers  authority  on  the 
Commission  to  investigate  complaints 
alleging  unreasonable  charges,  and,  after 
full  hearing  on  formal  complaint,  to 
condemn  such  charges  as  are  found 
to  have  been  unreasonable  and  to 
award  reparation  thereunder.  Swift  & 
Co.  V.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
426,    428. 

(k)  The  Commission  is  authorized 
to  award  reparation  to  any  person  or 
persons  found  to  be  damaged  by  any 
common  carrier  subject  to  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Act,  for  a  violation  thereof. 
Laning-Harris  Coal  &  Grain  Co.  v.  St. 
L.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  37,  39. 

(1)  Section  15  of  the  Act  clearly  con- 
templates awards  of  money  damages  to 
be  made  by  the  Commission.  Washer 
Grain  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  147,  153. 

(m)  Where  the  Commission  finds  the 
published  rate  exacted  to  have  been 
unreasonable,  it  has  jurisdiction  to 
award  reparation  by  the  difference 
between  what  was  exacted  and  what 
should  have  been  reasonably  paid. 
American  Refractories  Co.  v.  E.  J.  & 
E.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  480,  480. 

(n)  Where  the  Commission  has  found 
the  rate  exacted  to  be  unreasonable, 
it  has  jurisdiction  to  award  reparation. 
Farlev  &  Loetscher  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  M. 
&  St.^  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  602,  603. 

(o)  The  jurisdiction  and  authority 
of  the  Commission  is  well  settled  in 
respect  to  its  power  to  award  dam- 
ages where  the  published  rate  has  been 
observed  by  the  carrier,  but  such  rate 
has  been  declared  unreasonable.  To 
hold  that  the  publication  of  rates  is 
conclusive  of  their  reasonableness  would 
go  far  toward  defeating  one  of  the 
leading  purposes  of  the  Act.  Nicola, 
Stone  &  Myers  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  199,  204. 

(p)  Jurisdiction  has  been  given  this 
Commission  by  the  Act  to  award  as 
reparation  the  difference  between  a 
published  rate  and  what  is  found  would 
have  been  a  reasonable  rate,  Flint  cc 
Walling  I\Ifg.  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,   14  L   C.  C.   336,   337. 

(q)  Defendant  following  an  informal 
ruling  of  the  Commission  in  a  similar 
case     made    reparation    to     complainant 


REPARATION,  §1    (r)— §2    (g) 


715 


for  a  rate  charged  on  snapped  corn  of 
125  per  cent  of  the  shelled-corn  rate 
and  did  so  without  applying  to  the 
Commission.  HELD,  the  Commission 
disapproves  of  the  assumption  of  the 
defendant  in  applying  to  the  adjustment 
of  the  case  in  question  the  authority 
granted  it  in  an  informal  case,  which 
authority  was  in  terms  limited  to  that 
particular  case.  Ocheltree  Grain  Co. 
V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
238,    239. 

(r)  A  complainant  is  not  precluded 
from  seeking  reparation  before  the 
Commission  by  reason  of  the  fact  that 
he  instituted  suit  before  a  court  not 
having  jurisdiction  and  dismissed  suit 
without  prejudice  before  the  filing  of 
his  complaint  with  the  Commission. 
Baer  Brothers  Mercantile  Co.  v.  M.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,   13  I.  C.   C.  329,   340. 

(s)  Where  the  Commission  has  no 
jurisdiction  over  the  subject  matter  of 
a  complaint,  jurisdiction  to  award  repa- 
ration under  the  same  cannot  be  con- 
ferred by  stipulation  of  the  parties. 
La  Salle  Bureau  County  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  1.  C.  C.  610, 
613. 

§2.     Necessity   of   and    Effect   of   Finding 
of  Unreasonableness. 

See  Evidence,  §1  (h),  (k),  §64  (a); 
Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §2  (pp), 
§7   (b). 

(a)  The  question  whether  rates  are 
unreasonable  or  discriminatory  is  vitally 
related  to  all  questions  of  reparation 
for  their  exaction,  Phillips  Co.  v.  G. 
T.  W.  Ry.   Co.,  195  Fed.  12,  18. 

(b)  Where  the  Commission  has  found 
a  rate  unreasonable,  it  cannot  deny 
reparation  on  shipments  made  prior  to 
the  filing  of  the  complaint  but  within 
the  limitation  period  on  the  ground 
that  the  shipper  was  guilty  of  laches  in 
bringing  the  complaint  while  at  the 
same  time  granting  reparation  on  ship- 
ments made  subsequent  to  the  filing 
of  the  complaint.  Russe  &  Burgess  v. 
I,  C.  C,  193  Fed.  678,  680;  Thompson 
Lumber  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  193  Fed.  682, 
683. 

(c)  The  Commission  has  no  right 
to  demand  of  the  shipper,  as  a  prerequi- 
site to  an  order  of  reparation,  "con- 
clusive proof"  of  the  unreasonableness 
in  the  past  of  the  rate  complained  of, 
a    preponderance    of    the    credible    evi- 


dence being  sufficient.     Thompson  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  L  C.  C,   193  Fed.  682,  683. 

(d)  The  Commission  has  authority 
to  award  reparation  to  a  shipper  from 
whom  has  been  exacted  a  rate  in  ex- 
cess of  the  lawfully  published  schedule 
rate,  and  this  without  a  determination  on 
its  part  that  the  rate  exacted  is  un- 
reasonable. Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.    Feintuch,    191    Fed.    482,    486. 

(e)  Plaintiff  sued  at  law  in  a  United 
States  Court  and  offered  in  evidence  the 
report  of  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  in  19  I.  C.  C.  611.  Said 
report  found  the  rate  on  hardwood 
lumber  excessive  and  ordered  a  reduc- 
tion but  did  not  specifically  find  that 
plaintiff  paid  the  excessive  rate.  HELD, 
a  demurrer  to  the  declaration  should 
be  sustained  on  the  ground  that  it 
failed  to  state  a  cause  of  action.  Dar- 
nell-Taenzer  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
190  Fed.  659,  664. 

(f)  As  provided  in  the  tariffs  of  the 
defendants  charges  on  certain  shipments 
of  grain  products  were  assessed  at  the 
rates  in  effect  when  the  shipments 
moved  from  the  milling  point  and  not 
at  the  rates  in  effect  when  the  grain 
moved  from  the  point  of  origin.  Com- 
plainant paid  on  its  shipments  precisely 
the  same  basis  of  rates  as  did  its 
competitors.  HELD,  that  an  award  of 
reparation  in  its  favor  would  put  it  on 
a  preferred  basis  as  compared  with  its 
competitors  and  in  its  result  work  a 
discrimination  against  them.  Repara- 
tion denied.  Liberty  Mills  v.  L.  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  182,  186. 

(g)  In  Florida  Fruit  &  Vegetable 
Shippers'  Protective  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  476,  decided 
June  25,  1908,  the  Commission  reduced 
the  rates  for  the  transportation  of 
oranges,  grape  fruit,  pineapples,  etc., 
from  producing  points  in  Florida  to 
northeastern  cities.  In  the  discussion 
of  this  case  the  Commission  expressed 
the'  opinion  that  the  rate  from  Florida 
itself  to  the  Ohio  River  ought  to  be 
somewhat  reduced,  but  because  the 
proper  carriers  were  not  parties,  and 
the  complaint  contained  no  such  prayer, 
did  not  enter  a  formal  order  to  that 
effect.  In  a  subsequent  proceeding  by 
the  same  complainant,  17  I.  C.  C.  552, 
the  rates  from  Florida  producing  points 
to  destinations  in  Central  Freight  Asso- 
ciation territory  were  reduced.  Com- 
plainant,   not    a    party    to    the    original 


716 


REPARATION,  §2   (h)— (m) 


proceedings,  filed  a  petition  August  28, 
1911,  seeking  reparation  for  shipments 
made  prior  to  the  effective  date  of 
the  Commission's  order  in  the  second 
case.  HELD,  a  reduction  of  the  rates 
pf  the  carriers  does  not  necessarily 
imply  that  reparation  will  be  awarded 
in  all  such  cases;  under  conference 
ruling  206  (d)  reparation  is  denied. 
Byrnes  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C 
C.    251. 

(h)  Complainant  attacked  the  rate 
of  $2.53  per  ton  on  limestone  shipped 
between  Nov.  3  and  Dec.  22,  1910,  from 
Martinsburg,  W.  Va.,  to  Portsmouth, 
O.,  a  distance  of  407  miles.  At  the 
request  of  complainant  defendants  filed 
a  tariff  effective  Dec.  23,  1910,  naming 
a  rate  of  $1.85  per  gross  ton,  which 
rate  is  still  effective.  The  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  maintained  a  rate  of  65c  per  gross 
ton  from  Martinsburg  to  Munhall,  Pa., 
a  point  near  Pittsburg,  a  distance  of  221 
miles,  and  $1.40  per  gross  ton  to 
Cleveland,  389  miles.  But  these  rates, 
it  appeared,  were  put  in  to  meet  com- 
petition with  the  Penn.  R.  R.  on  lime- 
stone from  the  Tyrone  district,  130 
miles  east  of  Pittsburg.  It  appeared 
that  the  cost  of  the  stone  at  Martins- 
burg was  only  65c  per  ton.  The  rate 
of  $2.53  produced  a  revenue  of  6.2  mills 
per  ton  mile  and  that  of  $1.85,  4  mills 
per  gross  ton,  and  4.5  mills  per  net 
ton.  HELD,  the  reduction  in  the  rate 
from  Martinsburg  to  Portsmouth  was 
voluntarily  made  by  defendants  for  the 
sole  purpose  of  stimulating  movement. 
Complainant  now  has  the  benefit  of  the 
lower  rate,  and  reparation  could  not 
be  awarded  on  shipments  that  moved 
•prior  to  the  date  when  the  lower  rate 
became  effective  in  the  absence  of  a 
showing  that  the  rate  charged  was  ex- 
cessive or  unjustly  discriminatory,  of 
which  fact  no  showing  has  been  made. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Portsmouth  Steel 
Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
510. 

(i)  The  fact  that  a  rate  is  volun- 
tarily reduced  by  a  carrier  or  is 
reduced  by  order  of  the  Commission 
does  not  of  itself  entitle  shippers  to 
reparation.  Carter  White  Lead  Co.  v. 
N.   &  W.   Ry.   Co.,   21  I.   C.   C.   41,   44. 

(j)  The  Commission  reduced  the 
rates  on  plate  glass,  C.  L.  Reparation 
was  asked  in  connection  with  all  ship- 
ments which  moved  within  the  period 
of    limitation.      HELD,    the    Commission 


is  not  impressed  by  the  argument  that 
substantial  justice  requires  an  award 
of  damages.  An  award  of  damages 
in  connection  with  past  shipments  does 
not  follow  as  a  matter  of  course  on 
finding  that  an  existing  rate  is  unrea- 
sonable and  a  corresponding  reduction 
of  the  rate  for  the  future.  Memphis 
Freight  Bureau  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.,   21   I.   C.   C.   113,   118. 

(k)  Complainants  asked  for  repara- 
tion for  rates  on  cotton  seed  products 
from  points  in  Oklahoma  to  practically 
all  consuming  territories.  It  appeared 
that  some  of  the  rates  between  many 
of  the  points  involved  were  formerly 
higher  than  at  present,  but  were  re- 
duced from  time  to  time  as  the  density 
of  traffic  increased  with  that  of  popula- 
tion and  business  development  in  a  new 
and  growing  community.  HELD,  it 
would  be  a  hard  rule  to  assume  a 
rate  now  condemned  as  unreasonable 
to  have  been  so  for  a  period  of  two 
years  as  a  basis  for  the  payment  of 
money;  that  the  awarding  of  reparation 
by  no  means  necessarily  follows  the  re- 
duction of  the  rate  whether  by  action  of 
the  carriers  or  by  order  of  the  Commis- 
sion; that  when  a  rate  is  advanced  and 
the  increased  rate  is  condemned  by  the 
amount  of  the  advance  a  more  satis- 
factory basis  for  an  award  of  reparation 
is  afforded  than  in  a  case  where  such 
changes  as  have  been  made,  have  been 
in  the  nature  of  reductions.  Repara- 
tion denied.  Anadarko  Cotton  Oil  Co. 
v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
43,    50. 

(1)  When  a  rate  is  advanced  and  the 
increased  rate  is  condemned  by  the 
amount  of  the  advance  a  much  more 
satisfactory  basis  for  an  award  of  repa- 
ration is  afforded  than  in  the  present 
case,  where  so  far  as  changes  have 
occurred  they  have  been  at  least  for 
the  most  part  reductions  in  a  territory 
where  changes  in  conditions  have  taken 
place  which  contribute  in  greater  or 
less  degree  to  a  present  showing  of 
unreasonableness  in  existing  rates.  Ana- 
darko Cotton  Oil  Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
R.   R.    Co.,    20    I.    C.    C.    43,    50. 

(m)  It  would  be  a  manifestly  harsh 
rule  that  would  assume  a  rate  now 
condemned  as  unreasonable  to  have 
been  so  for  a  period  of  two  years,  or 
that  of  the  statute  of  limitations  in 
the  past  as  a  basis  for  the  payment 
of  money  by  the  carriers  on  past  ship- 


REPARATION,  §2  (n)— (oo) 


717 


ments,  especially  when  no  complaint 
had  been  made  against  them  in  that 
period.  The  law  establishes  no  such 
presumption  nor  is  it  a  necessary 
sequence  that  the  rate  has  been  un- 
reasonable for  any  period  in  the  past. 
Neither  does  it  seem  that  the  bona 
fide  action  of  the  carriers  in  the  neces- 
sary exercise  of  their  judgment  within 
reasonable  limits  should  always  be  at 
their  peril,  of  liability  for  reparation  for 
the  difference  between  rates  initiated 
upon  their  judgment  and  later  changed 
upon  the  judgment  of  the  Commission. 
The  awarding  of  reparation  by  no 
means  necessarily  follows  the  reduction 
of  a  rate  whether  by  the  voluntary  ac- 
tion of  the  carriers  or  by  order  of 
the  Commission.  Whatever  may  be  the 
nature  of  the  facts,  circumstances  and 
conditions  appearing  in  a  particular 
case  where  reparation  is  involved, 
whether  on  account  of  excessive  rates 
or  unjust  discrimination,  there  must  be 
that  degree  of  certainty  and  satisfac- 
tory conviction  in  the  mind  and  judg- 
ment of  the  Commission  as  would 
be  deemed  necessary  under  the  well 
established  principles  of  law  as  a  basis 
for  a  judgment  in  court.  Anadarko 
Cotton  Oil  Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.,    20    I.    C.    C.    43,    50,    51. 

(n)  Complainants  shipped  a  carload 
of  coiled  elm  hoops  from  Mt.  Clemens, 
Mich.,  to  Rip'plemead,  Va.,  26c  per  100  lbs. 
being  charged.  Shipment  moved  via  the 
Grand  Trunk  Western  R.  R.  and  connect- 
ing carriers.  The  N.  &  W.  R.  R.  was 
the  delivering  carrier.  The  tariff  pro- 
vided to  Ripplemead  an  arbitrary  of 
5c  over  Norfolk,  contingent  upon  ship- 
ments to  Norfolk  being  made  under 
joint  through  rates.  A  specific  rate 
from  Mt.  Clemens  to  Norfolk  was  not 
published  until  about  three  months 
after  the  shipment  when  a  rate  of 
161/^c  was  made  effective.  Reparation 
was  demanded  on  the  basis  of  the 
resulting  Ripplemead  rate  of  21i^c.  No 
evidence  was  put  in  as  to  the  reason- 
ableness of  the  rate.  HELD,  the  arbi- 
trary of  5c  could  not  be  applied  until 
the  specific  rate  was  put  in  even 
though  the  carriers  intended  it  to  apply 
to  this  shipment.  The  rate  charged 
having  been  the  correct  tariff  rate  the 
Commission  cannot  issue  an  order  for 
reparation  unless  based  upon  affirmative 
evidence  that  the  rate  complained  of 
is  unreasonable  or  unjustly  discrimina- 
tory of   which  there  is   no  evidence  in 


this    case.      Reparation    denied.      Noble 
V.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  70. 

(o)  Complainants  shipped  from  De- 
pue,  111.,  to  Hopatcong,  N.  J.,  sulphuric 
acid  upon  which  the  fifth-class  rate  of  33c 
per  100  lbs.  was  charged.  It  also  shipped 
from  the  same  point  of  origin  to  Em- 
porium, Pa.,  the  same  commodity  on 
which  was  charged  the  fifth-class  rate 
of  25c  per  100  lbs.  Shortly  before 
the  shipment  the  carriers  other  than 
the  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  a  defendant, 
established  rates  of  29i/^c  to  Hopatcong 
and  221/^c  to  Emporium  and'  the  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  stated  that  the  failure 
on  its  part  to  establish  similar  rates 
was  due  to  a  clerical  error.  Immedi- 
ately after  the  shipment  the  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  R.  R.  equalized  its  rates  to  the 
lower  basis,  kept  them  in  effect  one 
month  and  then  restored  the  fifth- 
class  rate.  Complainant  did  not  at- 
tack the  unreasonableness  of  the  rate 
and  especially  disclaimed  any  intention 
of  attacking  the  reasonableness  of  the 
present  rates  (which  were  the  same  as 
the  shipment  moved  under).  HELD, 
an  award  of  reparation  could  be  based 
only  on  a  finding  that  the  rates  charged 
were  unreasonable  for  a  very  brief 
period  prior  to  and  immediately  after 
which  the  carriers  maintained  the 
class  rate,  and  the  Commission  is  not 
justified  under  the  statute  in  basing  a 
finding  of  unreasonableness  merely  on 
a  temporary  adjustment  of  the  char- 
acter involved  in  this  proceeding.  Rep- 
aration denied.  Dupont  De  Nemours 
Powder  Co.  v.  D.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
L    C.    C.    83. 

(oo)  Complainant  shipped  April  7, 
1908,  from  Orange,  Tex.,  to  Eunice,  La., 
mixed  groceries,  C.  L.  On  this  shipment 
it  was  quoted  and  paid  a  rate  of  10c 
per  100  lbs.  But  this  rate  did  not  be- 
come effective  until  April  14,  and  sub- 
sequently the  full  legal  rate  of  55c  per 
100  lbs.  was  paid  by  complainant.  De- 
fendants joined  with  complainants  in  a 
stipulation  to  make  reparation  on  the 
basis  of  10c.  It  appeared  that  the  rate 
before  the  shipment  moved  and  about  a 
month  subsequent  was  55c.  The  present 
rate  by  one  line  is  55c  and  by  the  other 
line  70c.  The  distance  is  105  miles. 
HELD,  it  is  apparent  that  the  rate  of 
10c  was  abnormal  and  made  for  some 
special  purpose.  It  cannot  be  found  upon 
the  record  that  a  rate  of  10c  was  at  that 
time,  or  is  now,  a  just  and  reasonable 


718 


REPARATION,  §2  (p)  — (xy) 


rate  to  be  charged  for  this  service.  The 
Commission  cannot  award  reparation  un- 
less it  is  prepared  to  find  that  the  rate 
upon  the  basis  of  which  reparation  is 
given  was  a  just  and  reasonable  rate 
to  be  applied  at  the  time  the  shipment 
moved.  To  award  reparation  in  favor 
of  complainant  might  amount  to  a  gross 
discrimination  against  other  shippers. 
Reparation  denied.  Orange  Grocery  Co. 
V.  M.  L.  &  T.  R.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.  502. 

(p)  If  the  rate  exacted  is  unrea- 
sonable, carriers  had  no  right  to  charge 
It  and  have  no  right  to  proceeds  of 
such  charges  above  reasonable  rate. 
Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  A.  T. 
&  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  419,  421. 

(q)  Pursuant  to  the  decision  in  13 
I.  C.  C.  657,  holding  the  rate  of  12c  on 
hardwood  lumber  from  Memphis,  Tenn., 
to  New  Orleans,  La.,  unreasonable  to 
the  extent  it  exceeded  10c,  reparation 
Is  awarded  on  various  shipments  made 
subsequent  to  the  filing  of  the  original 
complaint,  but  no  reparation  is  awarded 
for  shipments  prior  to  that  date,  in  the 
absence  of  proof  that  the  12c  rate  was 
unreasonable  prior  to  such  date.  Thomp- 
son Lumber  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  83,  84.  Disapproved,  193  Fed. 
682,  on  the  ground  that  the  shipper,  to 
be  entitled  to  reparation,  was  not  re- 
quired to  prove  the  rate  prior  to  the  date 
of  the  complaint  unreasonable  by  con- 
clusive proof,  but  only  by  a  preponder- 
ance of  the  evidence. 

(r)  With  respect  to  claims  of  repa- 
ration the  fact  that  rates  are  found 
unreasonable  today  does  not  of  itself 
prove  that  they  have  been  unreasonable 
in  the  past,  especially  where  the  road 
runs  through  a  region  with  a  develop- 
ing traffic  and  changing  conditions. 
Acme  Cement- Plaster  Co.  v.  C.  &  N. 
W.   Ry.    Co.,   18    I.   C.   C.   105,   107. 

(s)  Reparation  in  this  case  awarded 
only  from  the  date  of  filing  of  complaint 
in  another  case,  in  which  case  repara- 
tion was  awarded  only  from  filing  of 
the  complaint.  Kindelon  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  251,  254. 

(t)  An  order  for  reparation  for  an 
unreasonable  rate  can  be  predicated 
only  upon  an  affirmative  finding  that 
the  rate  exacted  was  in  fact  excessive. 
Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,   17   I.   C.   C.   359. 


(u)  The  Commission  will  not  award 
reparation  on  the  basis  of  a  rate  that 
is  lower  than  that  which  it  would  pre- 
scribe as  reasonable.  Pacific  Elevator 
Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.   373. 

(v)  Complainant  shipped  four  car- 
loads of  hay  from  Hepler,  Kan.,  to 
St.  Louis,  Mo.,  over  defendant's  line 
and  was  charged  19c.  Defendant's  tar- 
iff provided  that  upon  reconsignment  of 
shipments  from  St.  Louis  territory  east 
of  the  Mississippi  River  and  south 
of  the  Ohio  River,  the  shipper  would 
be  entitled  to  a  refund  on  the  basis 
of  a  131/^c  rate.  The  complainant  al- 
leged that  his  four  cars  were  so  re- 
shipped  by  a  purchaser  at  St.  Louis 
from  the  complainant's  consignee.  De- 
fendant's answer  alleged  that  the  four 
cars  so  shipped  to  the  southeast  from 
St.  Louis  referred  to  by  complainant, 
did  not  originate  on  its  line  but  were 
shipped  to  St.  Louis  over  the  lines  of 
other  carriers  from  points  in  Illinois, 
Iowa  and  Missouri.  Complainant  was 
asked  by  the  Commission  to  reply  to 
this  answer,  and  by  letter  stated  that 
he  did  not  deem  the  facts  set  forth  by  de- 
fendant sufficient  to  constitute  a  de- 
fense. The  Commission  then  by  letter 
asked  for  a  more  specific  reply  and 
received  an  answer  from  complainant 
expressing  his  willingness  that  the 
case  be  decided  upon  the  pleadings. 
HELD,  under  the  pleadings  complainant 
was  not  entitled  to  reparation.  Rode- 
haver  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
C.     146,    1^7. 

(w)  Where  a  rate  exacted  is  found 
to  be  unreasonable,  the  Commission 
will  not  hesitate  to  grant  reparation 
on  the  shipment  in  question  on  the 
ground  that  the  carrier  in  order  to  pre- 
vent unjust  discrimination  will  be  com- 
pelled to  make  reparation  to  other 
shippers.  Menefee  Lumber  Co.  v.  T. 
&   P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  49,  51. 

(xy)  When  the  Commission  reduces 
a  rate,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow 
that  it  will  awari  reparation  on  the 
basis  of  the  new  rate.  There  is  no 
conclusive  presumption  that  a  rate 
reasonable  to-day  was  reasonable  a  year 
before  or  a  day  before,  since  reason- 
able rates  vary  from  time  to  time,  and 
some  point  of  division  must  be  found. 
Where,  therefore,  rates  have  been  es- 
tablished and  maintained  by  the  car- 
riers   in    good    faith,    especially    whcr^ 


REPARATION,  §2  (z)— (hh) 


719 


they  have  been  long  in  eff-ect  and 
acquiesced  in  by  shippers  without  pro- 
test, the  Commission  will  not  award 
reparation  even  though  the  rate  is  re- 
duced, unless  it  clearly  appears  that 
the  rates  paid  in  the  past  have  been 
excessive.  Penrod  Walnut  &  Veneer 
Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
826,  328. 

(z)  Under  its  original  complaint,  the 
Commission  found  the  rates  on  butter 
and  eggs  from  Granite  Falls,  Minn.,  to 
Chicago  unreasonable  to  the  extent  that 
they  exceeded  those  from  Pipestone, 
Minn.,  a  more  distant  point  on  the 
same  line.  Complainant  in  the  original 
complaint  did  not  ask  for  reparation. 
It  filed  a  petition  later  demanding  repa- 
ration The  evidence  indicated  that  de- 
fendant's rates  to  Sioux  Falls  and  other 
points  on  the  Missouri  River  were  the 
same  and  Pipestone  was  given  the  Sioux 
Falls  rate,  the  two  points  being  com- 
petitive. HELD,  complainant  should 
have  presented  his  claim  for  reparation 
in  the  original  complaint  and  reparation 
should  be  denied,  since  a  holding  that 
rates  are  unreasonable  at  the  time  of 
hearing  is  not  equal  to  a  holding  that 
they  were  thus  unreasonable  at  the 
time  shipments  moved.  Morse  Produce 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.    334,    338. 

(aa)  When  the  Commission  reduces 
a  rate  and  prescribes  what  will  be  the 
just  and  reasonable  rate  or  rates  to  be 
thereafter  observed  -in  such  a  case  as 
the  maxima  to  be  charged,  it  does  not 
necessarily  follow  that  for  any  length 
of  time  prior  to  the  date  of  the  opinion 
reparation  will  be  awarded  upon  the 
basis  of  the  rate  prescribed  to  be  ob- 
served thereafter.  Morse  Produce  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
334,  338. 

(bb)  The  Commission  will  not  award 
reparation  unless  the  rate  exacted  is 
found  to  be  unreasonable,  since  so  to 
do  would  result  in  unjust  preferences. 
American  Refractories  Co.  v.  E.  J.  &  E 
R.  R.   Co.,   15   I.    C.   C.   480,  481. 

(cc)  The  Act  authorizes  the  Com- 
mission to  condemn  an  unreasonable 
rate,  to  prescribe  a  rate  to  be  applied 
in  lieu  thereof,  and  to  award  damages 
under  the  rate  so  condemned;  but  in 
all  proceedings  before  the  Commission 
both  formal  and  informal  the  essential 
prerequisite    to   any    award    of    damages 


is  the  condemnation  of  a  rate,  rule  or 
procedure  that  is  made  the  basis  of 
such  award.  Pueblo  Transportation 
Ass'n  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  82,  84. 

(dd)  While  the  Act  requires  car- 
riers to  establish,  file  and  publish  their 
rates  and  commands  their  strict  ob- 
servance, such  publication  of  rates  is 
not  conclusive  of  their  reasonableness, 
and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Commission 
to  award  reparation  for  duly  proven 
damages  to  the  parties  injured  by  the 
exaction  from  them  of  unreasonable  and 
unjust  charges,  notwithstanding  such 
charges  may  be  in  accordance  with  the 
oublished  rates.  Nicola,  Stone  &  Myers 
lo.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  199, 
204. 

(ee)  The  Commission  has  no  juris- 
diction to  make  orders  for  reparation 
on  account  of  any  alleged  excessive 
rate  except  when,  upon  complaint,  no- 
tice to  the  defendants,  and  full  hear- 
ing, such  rate  lias  been  challenged 
and  found  to  be  unreasonable.  Nicola, 
Stone  &  Myers  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  199,  206. 

(ff)  No  orders  for  reparation  will 
be  entered  on  account  of  the  alleged 
exaction  of  excessive  charges  on  ship- 
ments from  points  of  origin  to  destina- 
tions not  involved  in  the  former  pro- 
ceedings until  the  question  of  the  rea- 
sonableness of  the  rates  shall  be  de- 
termined. Nicola,  Stone  &  Myers  Co. 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  199,  206. 

(gg)  Complainant  was  charged  34i^c 
per  100  lbs.  on  a  mixed  carload  of  cab- 
bages, potatoes  and  onions  from  Green 
Bay,  Wis.,  to  Poplar  Bluff,  Mo.  Prior 
to  the  time  of  shipment  complainant 
had  made  a  number  of  similar  ship- 
ments between  the  same  points  via 
another  carrier  at  a  rate  of  27c.  This 
27c  rate  was  assessed  by  mistake  of 
the  carrier  and  the  published  rate  was 
35 1/2 c.  Complainant  introduced  no  evi- 
dence to  show  the  published  rate  was 
unreasonable.  HELD,  on  this  showing 
complainant  was  not  entitled  to  repara- 
tion on  the  basis  of  the  27c  rate.  Plat- 
ten  Produce  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,   14   I.   C.   C.   512,   513. 

(hh)  It  does  not  follow  that  because 
a  rate  is  reduced  for  the  future,  dam- 
ages will  be  allowed  in  all  cases  where 
that  rate  has  been  exceeded  in  the  past. 
Goff-Kirby  Coal  Co.  v.  Bessemer  &  Lake 
Erie  R.   R.   Co.,   13   L   C.   C.   383,   386. 


720 


REPARATION,  §2   (ii)— §3    (f) 


(ii)  Carriers  are  not  entitled  to  re- 
sist an  award  of  reparation  for  exac- 
tions made  under  a  rate  found  to  be  un- 
reasonable on  the  ground  that  the  ship- 
pers were  not  themselves  damaged,  but 
simply  added  the  excess  to  the  selling 
price,  thereby  casting  the  damage  upon 
the  public.  Wherever  an  unlawful  and 
unreasonable  rate  is  exacted  the  ship- 
per is  entitled  to  reparation  without 
inquiring  beyond  the  fact  itself  of  the 
unreasonable  exaction.  Burgess  v. 
Transcontinental  Freight  Bureau,  13  I. 
C.  C.  668,  679,  '680. 

(jj)  Reparation  ordered  for  an  excess 
charge  made  because  of  unreasonable 
requirements  as  to  marking  shipments. 
Kessler  &  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
12. 

(kk)  No  justification  being  shown,  ad- 
vances held  unreasonable  and  reparation 
awarded.  Swift  &  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  516.     . 

§3.     Power   to   Award   Tort    Damages. 

See    Allowances,    §14    (f),    (1);    Special 
Contracts,  §4   (1)    (m). 

(a)  In  Hillsdale  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  356;  Jacoby  & 
Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  392,  and 
Bulah  Coal  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
C.  52,  the  Commission  found  that  the 
defendant  had  discriminated  against 
the  complainants  in  the  distribution  of 
coal  cars.  Subsequently  the  United 
States  Circuit  Court  for  the  Eastern 
District  of  Pennsylvania  in  Morrisdale 
Coal  Co.  V.  Penn  R.  R.  Co.,  176  Fed. 
748,  183  Fed.  929,  held  that  the  Com- 
mission could  alone  entertain  a  com- 
plaint for  damages  based  on  such  dis- 
crimination. In  order  to  prevent  a  mis- 
carriage of  justice  and  afford  an  oppor- 
tunity to  secure  a  final  ruling  by  the 
courts  the  Commission  awards  repara- 
tion to  each  complainant  based  on  the 
difference  between  the  average  selling 
price  for  the  coal  at  the  mine  for  inter- 
state markets  and  the  cost  of  produc- 
tion during  the  same  period,  upon  the 
difference  in  the  number  of  tons  of 
coal  it  would  have  mined  and  shipped 
had  its  proper  proportion  of  cars  been 
furnished,  and  the  tonnage  it  actually  did 
ship.  Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  P. 
R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  186. 

(b)  Depreciation  of  real  estate  values 
and  loss  of  tenants  on  account  of  the  dis- 
continuance of  a  passenger  station  and 
train  service  thereat,  are  not  such  dam- 


ages as  are  cognizable  by  the  Com- 
mission. Mattison  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co., 
23    I.    C.    C.    233,    235. 

(c)  On  account  of  unreasonable  and 
discriminatory  rates  charged  for  the 
transportation  of  anthracite  coal  from  the 
Wyoming  region  in  Pennsylvania  to  Perth 
Amboy,  N.  J.,  and  in  accordance  with 
the  conclusions  announced  in  the  original 
proceedings  in  21  I.  C.  C.  129,  complain- 
ant is  awarded  reparation  in  the  sum  of 
$11,009.33  with  interest  from  Aug.  1, 
1901;  to  additional  reparation  in  the  sum 
of  $58,236.45  with  interest  amounting  to 
$27,750.65  on  the  individual  charges  com- 
prising said  sum  from  the  dates  of  pay- 
ment thereof  to  Sept.  1,  1911,  together 
with  interest  on  said  sum  of  $58,236.45 
from  Sept.  1,  1911;  and  to  additional  rep- 
aration in  the  sum  of  $10,813.60  with  in- 
terest amounting  to  $1,526.53,  upon  the 
individual  charges  comprising  said  sum 
from  the  dates  of  payment  thereof  to 
Sept.  1,  1911,  together  with  interest  ou 
said  sum  of  $10,813.60,  from  the  1st  day 
of  September,  1911.  Meeker  &  Co.  v.  Le- 
high Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  480.' 

(d)  Complainant  shipped  by-  barge 
from  Brevoort,  Miss.,  to  Cincinnati^  O., 
a  cargo  of  rough  oak,  gum  and  cypress 
lumber.  Upon  arrival  at  Cincinnati,  it 
was  transferred  into  37  cars  and  charges 
based  on  a  weight  of  1,053,200  lbs.  were 
assessed.  Complainant  alleged  that 
owing  to  negligent  handling  at  Cincin- 
nati the  lumber  when  loaded  into  the 
cars  was  allowed  to  get  wet  and  absorbed 
water  to  the  extent  of  148,723  lbs.  At 
destination  complainant  weighed  dry 
1,000  feet  of  each  kind  of  lumber  shipped, 
applied  such  weights  to  the  respective 
aggregate  number  of  feet  in  the  cars  and 
obtained  an  estimated  dry  weight  of 
904,477  lbs.  Its  asked  reparation  for  the 
difference  between  such  estimated  dry 
weight  and  the  billed  weight.  HELD,  the 
Commission  is  without  authority  under 
the  Act  to  award  damages  for  negligence 
of  the  kind  here  alleged,  such  matters 
being  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
courts.  Buffalo  Hardwood  Lumber  Co. 
V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  536,  538. 

(e)  He  who  suffers  damage  by  his 
own  fault  is  not  held  to  suffer  damage. 
National  Ass'n  of  Letter  Carriers  v.  A. 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  20  1.  C.  C  6,  9. 

(f)  While  it  might  possibly  be  the 
right  of  parties  in  the  exercise  of  good 
judgment  to  resort  to  the  telegraph  as  a 


REPARATION,  §3   (g)— (p) 


721 


means  of  correspondence  in  a  dispute 
over  excessive  freight  rates,  such  ex- 
pense is  not  justified  where  the  result 
does  not  justify  the  outlay.  Schulz  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
403,  405. 

(g)  Damages  due  to  inability  to  com- 
pete in  common  market  can  not  become 
the  subject  of  reparation.  Sondheimer 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  606,  609. 

(h)  Damages  such  as  decline  in  the 
market  price  of  a  commodity  and  lost 
commissions  for  sale  of  such  commodity 
due  to  the  negligence  of  a  carrier  in  not 
obeying  reconsignment  instructions  are 
not  matters  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Commission.  Hanley  Milling  Co.  v.  Penn- 
sylvania Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  475,  476. 

(i)  Reparation  awarded  for  failure  to 
comply  with  reconsignment  instructions; 
but  the  decline  in  the  market  price  of  a 
commodity  and  commissions  for  its  sale 
are  not  within  the  Commission's  juris- 
diction. Hanley  Milling  Co.  v.  P.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  475,  476. 

(j)  No  reparation  can  be  awarded  by 
the  Commission  for  damages  in  a  matter 
of  car  supply  caused  by  the  cancellation 
of  a  rate  on  the  strength  of  which  a  con- 
tract was  made.  American  Creosote 
Works  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  212, 
214,  215. 

(k)  The  Commission  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion to  award  damages  to  a  shipper  for 
loss  of  business  and  the  cancellation  of 
contracts  of  sale  resulting  from  the 
granting  by  a  carrier  of  an  unjustly  dis- 
criminatory rate  to  the  shippers  compe- 
titor, and  resort  must  be  had  to  the 
courts.  American  Creosote  Works  v.  T. 
C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  212,  215,  216. 

(1)  Complainant  shipper  of  wall  plas- 
ter charged  its  customers  10c  each  for 
the  sacks  in  which  the  plaster  was 
shipped  and  upon  return  of  the  sacks  re- 
funded this  10c  charge.  Defendants'  tar- 
iffs provided  for  a  rate  of  one-half  fourth 
class  on  bags  tied  up  in  bundles  and 
properly  tagged  so  as  to  show  the  con- 
signor and  consignee.  The  rate  on  bags 
shipped  otherwise  was  fourth  class.  In 
practice  many  bags  without  identifica- 
tion tags  were  returned  to  complainant 
and  it  was  unable  to  determine  to  which 
customer  credit  should  be  given.  Com- 
plainant sought  to  recover  reparation  for 
the  amount  of  $8  allowed  to  a  customer 
on  80  bags,  which  it  alleged  were  prop- 


erly packed  and  tagged  by  the  customer 
and  delivered  to  defendant  on  the  ground 
that  defendants  had  failed  to  preserve 
intact  the  tags  and  marks  so  as  to  en- 
able complainant  to  know  to  what  cus- 
tomer a  particular  package  of  bags  was 
received.  HELD,  since  the  claim  was 
for  general  damages  and  not  for  damages 
measurable  by  a  rate  the  Commission 
had  no  jurisdiction  to  award  the  repara- 
tion asked.  Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v, 
Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  557,  558. 

(m)  Reparation  is  refused  for  the 
shrinkage  in  cattle  due  to  delay  in  ship- 
ment caused  by  washouts  on  defendant's 
lines,  since  the  Commission  has  no  jur- 
isdiction over  loss  and  damage  claims 
not  arising  from  any  duty  imposed  on 
the  carriers  by  the  Act,  such  as  destruc- 
tion of  property  from  accident,  loss  by 
stealing  or  fire,  etc.  Carstens  Packing 
Co.  v.  O.  R.  R.  &  Nav.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
125,  126,  127. 

(n)  An  act  of  negligence  which  de- 
prives the  shipper  of  the  enjoyment  of 
an  unlawful  rate  can  not  be  made  the 
basis  of  a  claim  for  reparation.  Folmer 
&  Co.  V.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  33,  36. 

(o)  The  Commission  has  no  power 
either  to  enforce  the  specific  perform- 
ance of  contractural  obligations  or  to 
award  damages  for  the  breach  of  such 
agreements  between  carriers  and  ship- 
pers. General  Electric  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  & 
H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  237,  242. 

(p)  During  February,  1907,  complain- 
ant shipped  seven  carloads  of  coal  from 
Marion,  111.,  consigned  to  itself  at  Minne- 
apolis, the  cars  reaching  there  on  vari- 
ous days  between  March  4th  and  18th, 
1907.  On  April  6th,  1907,  complainant 
advised  defendant  the  coal  had  been  sold 
to  the  N.  P.  R.  R.  and  requested  delivery 
to  that  company.  Defendant  was  In- 
formed by  the  N.  P.  R.  R.  that  it  would 
accept  delivery  only  upon  condition  that 
all  transportation,  switching  and  demur- 
rage charges  were  paid  by  complainant. 
Defendant  thereupon  informed  complain- 
ant of  the  amount  of  the  freight  charges 
and  of  the  demurrage  charges  of  $1  per 
day  up  to  April  17th.  Complainant  paid 
freight  charges  but  refused  to  pay  any 
demurrage  charges  accruing  after  April 
6th.  The  cars  remained  on  defendant's 
tracks  until  May  11th,  when  they  were 
sold  for  demurrage  charges.  Complain- 
ant sued  for  damages.  HELD,  if  com- 
plainant's contention  was  that  demurrage 


722 


REPARATION,  §4   (a)— §5   (b) 


charges  did  not  .constitute  a  lawful  lien 
upon  the  property  and  defendant's  act 
amounted  to  an  unlawful  conversion,  ac- 
tion should  have  been  brought  before  a 
court  and  not  before  the  Commission. 
Complaint  dismissed.  MacBride  Coal  & 
Coke  Co.  V.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  R.  Co.,  13  I. 
C.  C.  571,  572. 

II.     RIGHT  TO  RECOVER. 

§4.     Necessity  of  Protest. 
See  Infra,  §16   (g). 

(a)  In  a  suit  in  the  courts  for  dam- 
ages against  a  carrier  for  unjust  discrim- 
ination in  granting  rebates  to  a  compet- 
ing shipper,  protest  by  plaintiff  against 
the  payment  of  charges  assessed  on  his 
shipments  is  not  prerequisite  to  recov- 
ery. Mitchell  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.,  181  Fed.,  403,  410. 

(b)  In  a  suit  at  law  for  damages 
against  a  railroad  for  discriminating  in 
rates  in  favor  of  a  competitor,  the  fail- 
ure of  plaintiff  to  make  payment  under 
protest  is  not  fatal  to  recovery.  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  International  Coal  Mining 
Co.,  173  Fed.,  1,  7. 

(c)  To  maintain  a  petition  before  the 
Commission  for  the  recovery  of  excessive 
freight  charges  'it  is  not  necessary  that 
the  payment  of  freight  should  have  been 
made  under  protest.  National  Refining 
Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
389,  390. 

(d)  It  is  not  necessary  that  freight 
charges  shall  have  been  paid  under  pro- 
test in  order  to  maintain  a  petition  be- 
fore the  Commission  for  the  recovery  of 
excessive  charges.  Nollenberger  v.  M. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  595,  596. 

(e)  In  view  of  the  necessary  relations 
between  the  carrier  and  shipper,  the  de- 
pendence in  modern  business  life  of  the 
latter  upon  the  former,  the  right  and 
duty  of  the  carrier  in  the  first  instance 
to  fix  its  charges,  its  obligation  to  adhere 
to  the  same  until  altered  in  the  manner 
prescribed  by  law,  and  its  right  to  en- 
force such  charges  by  retaining  posses- 
sion of  the  freight  transported,  or  to  de- 
mand payment  of  the  freight  charges  as 
a  prerequisite  to  the  transportation, 
places  the  parties  upon  an  unequal  foot- 
ing so  as  to  relieve  the  shipper  from 
the  necessity  of  protest  against  the  paj'- 
ment  of  an  unlawful  rate.  Southern  Pine 
Lumber  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
195.  197. 


(f)  Proceedings  for  reparation  before 
the  Commission  for  indemnitory  dam- 
ages are  purely  statutory  and  correspond 
to  actions  at  law  sounding  in  tort;  the 
violation  of  the  law  produces  the  injury 
and  completes  the  offense  and  the  per- 
son injured  does  not  have  to  perform 
any  conditions  to  entitle  him  to  recover 
for  the  damage  sustained.  For  this  rea- 
son protest  upon  payment  of  the  unlaw- 
ful rate  is  unnecessary.  Southern  Pine 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Southern  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  195,  197. 

(g)  Complainant  sought  to  recover 
an  overcharge  on  a  carload  of  lumber, 
Columbus,  Miss.,  to  Moline,  111.,  of  2c 
per  100  lbs.  In  a  previous  case  before 
the  Commission  the  rate  charged  by  de- 
fendants covering  the  points  in  question 
was  condemned  and  the  rate  claimed  by 
complainant  ordered,  and  defendant  was 
a  party  in  that  case.  Complainant  paid 
the  excess  charge  in  the  present  case 
without  making  protest  to  defendant. 
HELD,  such  protest  was  not  necessary, 
and  complainant  was  entitled  to  recover 
the  excess  with  interest.  Southern  Pine 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Southern  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
195,  197. 

(h)  Protest  against  the  payment  of 
unreasonable  and  excessive  freight  rates 
Is  not  a  necessary  prerequisite  to  the 
recovery  of  damages  on  account  of  the 
exaction  of  unjust,  unreasonable 
?nd  unlawful  charges.  Nicola,  Stone  & 
Myers  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I. 
C.    C.    199,    205. 

(i)  A  protest  made  at  the  time  of 
the  payment  of  freight  money  is  not 
a  necessary  prerequisite  to  maintain- 
ing a  complaint  for  reparation  of  un- 
reasonable charges.  Baer  Brothers  Mer- 
cantile Co.  V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C 
329,    338. 

§5.     Necessity     of     First     Paying     Tariff 
Rate. 

See    Infra,   §6    (bb). 

(a)  It  is  not  the  policy  of  the  Com- 
mission to  award  reparation  where  law- 
ful charges  have  not  been  paid.  Peale, 
Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co. 
of   N.    J.,    18    I.    C.    C.    25,    33. 

(b)  Where  a  shipper  is  entitled  to 
recover  reparation  and  it  appears  that 
the  charge  complained  of  was  only 
paid  to  defendants  in  part,  no  account 
will  be  taken  of  this  fact  in  the  order 
of  the  Commission,  but  the  matter  will 


REPARATION,  §6  (a)— (ij) 


723 


be  left  to  l>e  adjusted  between  the  par- 
ties when  payment  is  made  under  the 
order.  Wilson  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,   14   I.   C.   C.   549,   550. 

§6.     Parties    Entitled    to    Recover. 

See     Procedure     Before     Commission, 
V,   §13    (h). 

(a)  In  a  suit  for  damages  against 
a  carrier  for  unlawful  discrimination, 
plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  recover  for 
the  period  during  which  he  was  him- 
self seeking  and  obtaining  unlawful 
rebates.  International  Coal  Mining  Co. 
V.    Penn.    R.    R.    Co.,   162   Fed.    996,    997. 

(b)  As  provided  in  the  tariffs  of  the 
defendants,  charges  on  certain  shipments 
of  grain  products  were  assessed  at  the 
rates  in  effect  when  the  shipments  moved 
from  the  milling  point  and  not  at  the 
rates  in  effect  when  the  grain  moved 
from  point  of  origin.  Complainant  paid 
on  its  shipments  precisely  the  same  basis 
of  rates  as  did  its  competitors.  HELD, 
that  an  award  of  reparation  in  its  favor 
would  put  it  on  a  preferred  basis  as  com- 
pared with  its  competitors  and  in  its 
result  work  a  discrimination  against 
them.  Reparation  denied.  Liberty  Mills 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  182,  186. 

(c)  Claims  for  reparation  based  upon 
a  decision  of  the  Commission  filed  by 
complainants  not  parties  to  the  case  in 
which  such  decision  was  rendered  will 
not  ordinarily  be  allowed  unless  repa- 
ration was  claimed  in  the  complaint 
upon  which  such  decision  was  based,  or 
was  awarded  by  the  Commission.  The 
Commission  may,  however,  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  its  discretion,  upon  good  cause 
shown,  and  under  unusual  circum- 
stances, specially  consider  a  particular 
claim  for  reparation  of  this  class.  No 
unusual  circumstance  being  presented 
in  this  case,  such  a  claim  must  be  dis- 
allowed. Byrnes  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
23    I.    C.    C.    251,    253. 

(d)  On  a  mixed  carload  shipment 
of  wheat  and  flaxseed  from  Esmond, 
S.  D.,  to  Minneapolis,  Minn.,  complain- 
ant was  charged  the  carload  rate  on  a 
minimum  weight  for  each  of  the  com- 
modities. Regulations  of  western  trunk 
line  tariff  did  not  allow  the  bulkheading 
of  wheat  and  flaxseed  unless  one  was 
sacked.  HELD,  that  there  was  no  au- 
thority for  the  exaction  of  rates  on  the 
flaxseed  on  basis  of  a  carload  minimum. 
Reparation  denied,  as  complainant,  en- 
gaged    in     grain     commission    business. 


had  not  paid  the  charges.  Lamb,  Mc- 
Gregor &  Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  346. 

(e)  The  law  contemplates  that  an 
award  of  reparation  shall  be  made  to 
the  party  actually  injured.  Lamb,  Mc- 
Gregor &  Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  346,  348. 

(f)  The  law  contemplates  that  an 
award  of  damages  shall  be  made  to  the 
person  actually  damaged.  Where  the 
complainant  does  not  appear  to  have 
suffered  any  injury,  and  has  no  legal  in- 
terest in  an  overcharge,  the  Commission 
can  make  no  award  of  reparation. 
Lamb,  McGregor  &  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.    Co.,    22   I.    C.    C.    346. 

(g)  The  commission  merchant  who 
has  paid  the  freight  and  charged  the 
same  back  to  his  consignor  is  not 
entitled  to  damages  for  an  overcharge. 
Lamb,  McGregor  &  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.    Co.,    22    I.    C.    C.    346. 

(h)  In  cases  involving  claims  for 
reparation  in  connection  with  ship- 
ments of  property  of,  or  intended  for 
the  use  of,  a  carrier  subject  to  the 
Act,  and  which  was  transported  by 
one  or  more  other  carriers,  against  which 
damages  had  been  claimed,  due  to 
misrouting,  misunderstandings  as  to  ex- 
pressions of  the  Commission  had  arisen. 
HELD,  carriers  may  have  the  same  privi- 
leges as  any  other  shippers.  As  the 
proportions  in  which  the  transportation 
charges  will  be  borne  by  the  vendor 
and  the  consignee  carrier  are  reflected 
in  the  contract  purchase  price,  it  is 
suggested  that  property  of  a  carrier 
should  be  consigned  to  that  carrier,  at 
the  designated  point  of  delivery.  Also 
suggested  that  the  contract  of  purchase 
and  sale  provide  that  the  vendor  bear 
a  certain  specified  part  of  the  trans- 
portation charges,  provided  the  prop- 
erty is  transported  by  a  designated 
route,  but  if  it  is  not  so  transported 
the  entire  transportation  charge  be 
borne  by  the  vendor.  In  Re  Transpor- 
tation of  Company  Material,  22  I.  C.  C. 
439. 

(ij)  Firms  and  individuals  have  an 
undoubted  right  to  enter  into  contracts 
of  purchase  and  sale  under  which  the 
consignor  pays  an  agreed  portion  of 
those  charges.  A  carrier  as  a  shipper 
has  the  same  right.  In  Re  Transporta- 
ttion  of  Company  Material,  22  I.  C.  C. 
439,    440. 


724 


REPARATION,  §6  (k)— (s) 


(k)  Ice  was  sold  for  a  delivered 
price  and  by  the  terms  of  the  contract 
of  sale  the  freight  money  was  to  be 
paid  by  the  ice  company  (the  con- 
signor). Under  an  arrangement  be- 
tween that  company  and  the  con- 
signee the  latter  in  fact  paid  the  money 
to  the  carrier  and  was  reimbursed 
by  the  ice  company;  that  is,  the  con- 
signee was  the  agent  of  the  ice  com- 
pany in  the  making  of  this  payment 
and  the  payment  upon  every  rule  of 
law  was  a  payment  by  the  principal. 
The  ice  company,  therefore,  and  not 
the  consignee,  is  entitled  to  repara- 
tion. Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  45,  51;  modified,  596. 

(1)  Where  a  consignee  carrier  de- 
ducted from  the  invoice  price  of  goods  a 
greater  sum  than  would  have  been 
deducted  had  the  shipment  moved  in 
accordance  with  routing  instructions 
pursuant  to  a  contract  with  the  con- 
signee carrier,  damages  were  awarded 
for  the  loss  thus  sustained.  Beekman 
Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  Ry.  &  N.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C 
280. 

(m)  When  by  the  terms  of  sale  the 
transportation  charges  were  to  be  paid 
by  the  purchaser  and  were  in  fact 
so  paid,  the  seller  who  was  the  shipper 
is  not  entitled  to  reparation  for  the 
exaction  of  an  unreasonable  rate.  Fond 
du  Lac  Church  Furnishing  Co.  v.  C.  M. 
&    St.    P.    Ry.    Co.,    21    I.    C.    C.    481. 

(n)  Where  freight  charges  are  actu- 
ally paid  by  the  consignee  but  deducted 
by  him  from  the  invoice  price  of  the 
shipment,  the  consignor  is  the  proper 
person  to  bring  reparation  proceedings 
for  an  overcharge  in  the  rate.  Carolina 
Carolina  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  C. 
&  O.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.   C.  533. 

(o)  The  consignor  is  entitled  to 
damages  for  an  unreasonable  rate, 
where  a  consignee  commission  merchant 
actually  paid  the  freight  charges,  but 
billed  them  back  on  the  consignor, 
who  ultimately  paid  them.  Young- 
blood  V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
569,    570. 

(p)  The  consignee  who  pays  the 
freight  is  the  proper  person  to  receive 
reparation  for  an  excessive  rate  ex- 
acted and  not  the  consignor.  Mountain 
Ice  Co.  V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  21 
I.   C.   C.   596,   597. 

(q)  Complainant,  manufacturer  of 
gasoline     engines,     windmills,     etc.,     at 


Evansville,  Wis.,  bought  pig  iron  "f.  o. 
b.  cars,  Evansville,  Wis.,  based  on  pres- 
ent freight  rate"  at  a  certain  price 
per  ton.  Complainant  paid  the  freight 
charges  and  deducted  the  amount  of  the 
same  from  the  invoice  price,  returning 
the  expense  bills  to  the  consignor. 
The  contract  of  sale  governing  the 
shipments  contained  the  following 
clause:  "This  price  is  based  on  present 
tariff  freight  rate  of  $1  per  ton.  In 
case  the  tariff  freight  rate  declines, 
the  buyer  is  to  have  the  benefit  of 
such  decline.  In  case  the  tariff  freight 
rate  advances,  the  buyer  is  to  pay  the 
advance."  While  admitting  that  the 
freight  charges  were  really  paid  by  the 
consignor,  complainant  contended  that 
in  view  of  the  foregoing  provision  in 
the  contract  it  has  paid  a  greater  price 
for  the  iron  than  it  would  have  paid 
under  a  lower  freight  rate,  and  that 
therefore  it  is  entitled  to  any  differenco 
between  the  rate  existing  at  the  dates 
of  shipment  and  the  lower  rate  which 
it  contends  would  have  been  reason- 
able. HELD,  although  the  rate  ex- 
acted was  unreasonable  and  is  reduced, 
the  complainant  is  not  the  party  en- 
titled to  reparation,  because  the  pro- 
vision in  the  contract  in  regard  to  the 
selling  price  of  the  iron,  being  based  on 
the  freight  rate,  amounts  to  no  more 
than  an  agreement  between  the  parties 
as  to  changes  which  might  occur  in 
the  rate.  Baker  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  &  N. 
W.   Ry.   Co.,   21   I.  C.   C.   605,   607. 

(r)  A  carload  of  apples  In  transit 
was  purchased  by  complainant  from 
another  firm,  and  the  freight  charges 
up  to  Chicago  deducted  from  the  amount 
paid  by  the  complainant  to  the '  vendor. 
In  a  similar  manner  the  consignee  f 
the  shipment  at  destination  deducted 
the  freight  charges  to  that  point  from 
Chicago  from  the  invoice  of  complain- 
ant. Complainant  secured  from  Its 
vendor  an  assignment  of  whatever  in- 
terest that  firm  might  have  in  the  re- 
covery of  reparation.  HELD,  reparation 
might  properly  be  awarded  to  complain- 
ant. Gibson  Fruit  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.   Co.,   21   I.   C.    C.   644,   646. 

(s)  Where  the  rate  complained  of 
was  not  paid  by  complainant  no  order 
for  reparation  will  be  entered.  Fuller- 
ton.  Powell,  Harwood  Lumber  Co.  v. 
V.  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  86,  88; 
Kaul  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  of  G.  Ry.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  450.  454. 


REPARATION,  §6  (t)— (gg) 


725 


(t)  The  court  cases  holding  that 
either  the  consignor  or  consignee  may 
sue  in  case  of  loss  or  damage  or 
breach  of  the  contract  of  affreightment 
mean  that  each  has  a  beneficial  interest 
to  the  extent  of  making  either  of  them 
a  proper  party  plaintiff  in  such  a  pro- 
ceeding. These  cases  do  not  in  any 
way  controvert  the  principle  announced 
by  the  Commission  that  the  party 
paying  the  excessive  charge  is  the  one 
entitled  to  an  award  of  reparation  on 
finding  that  the  rate  charged  is  unrea- 
sonable and  therefore  unlawful.  Sunny- 
side  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R. 
R.   Co.,   19   I.   C.  C.  20,  21. 

(u)  So  far  as  the  Commission  is 
aware,  it  has  never  knowingly  de- 
parted from  the  rule  that  reparation  is 
due  the  owner  of  property  paying  ex- 
cessive charges  or  on  whose  account 
it  was  paid.  Sunnyside  Coal  Mining 
Co.  V.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I. 
C.  C.  20,  21. 

(v)  Reparation  is  due  the  owner  of 
property  paying  excessive  charge  or 
on  whose  behalf  it  was  paid.  Gamble- 
Robinson  Commission  Co.  v.  St.  L.  & 
S.   F.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.   C.  C.   114,  116. 

(w)  The  well-settled  rule  of  the 
Commission  is  that  the  party  who  has 
been  required  to  pay  an  unlawful  rate 
is  the  party  to  whom  reparation  should 
be  awarded,  and  the  person  who  han- 
dles produce  on  consignment  is  not  en- 
titled to  reparation.  Gamble-Robinson 
Commission  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.,   19   I.   C.   C.   114,   116. 

(x)  If  a  rate  charged  is  excessive 
per  se  the  prevalence  of  competitive 
conditions  is  unimportant  with  respect 
to  the  right  of  the  shipper  to  recover 
reparation.  Southern  Timber  &  Land 
Co.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  232,  233. 

(y)  No  reparation  will  be  awarded 
for  an  unreasonable  rate  where  the 
complainant  fails  to  show  that  it  paid 
the  freight  charges.  Fathauer  Co.  v.  St. 
L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  517, 
520. 

(z)  Owner  of  freight  who  has  paid 
an  unreasonable  rate  entitled  to  repa- 
ration irrespective  of  the  profits  ac- 
cruing from  his  business.  Kindelon  v. 
S.  P.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  251,  255. 

(aa)  Reparation  in  any  given  case 
is  due  the  person  who  has  been  re- 
quired    to     pay     an     unlawful     charge, 


and  a  shipper  who  has  paid  such  a 
charge  and  is  the  owner  of  the  goods 
transported  is  entitled  to  repayment, 
without  the  imposition  of  the  impossi- 
ble task  upon  the  Commission  of  as- 
certaining the  ultimate  profits  which 
accrued  from  his  business,  since  he 
is  entitled  to  reparation  irrespective 
of  the  profits  accruing  from  his  busi- 
ness. Kindelon  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.    251,    255. 

(bb)  Even  if  rates  were  found  to  be 
unreasonable  no  order  of  reparation 
would  be  entered,  because  complainant 
has  not  paid  the  lawful  charges  on 
shipment.  Males  Co.  v.  L.  &  H.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  280,  282. 

(cc)  If  the  rate  was  in  fact  unrea- 
sonable, defendants  must  make  repa- 
ration irrespective  of  fact  that  shipper 
could  have  enjoyed  lower  rate  if  ship- 
ments had  moved  through  a  different 
gateway.  Williar  v.  Can.  Nor.  Que. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  304,  305. 

(dd)  Where  a  carrier  has  made  an 
overcharge  through  the  misapplication 
of  its  published  tariffs,  it  should  settle 
the  same  with  the  shipper  at  once  with- 
out proceedings  before  the  Commission, 
but  where  the  published  rate  has  been 
collected  but  is  alleged  to  be  unrea- 
sonable, such  cases  should  be  referred 
to  the  Commission  before  being  ad- 
justed. Tyson  &  Jones  Buggy  Co.  v. 
A.    &    A.   Ry.    Co.,    17    I.    C.    C.    330,    332. 

(ee)  As  complainant,  who  is  a  com- 
mission merchant,  was  neither  consign- 
or nor  consignee,  and  apparently  did 
not  pay  the  charges,  order  will  be 
entered  that  defendant  refund  to  such 
party  as  may  be  lawfully  entitled  to 
receive  the  same.  Jones  v.  K.  C.  S. 
Ry.    Co.,    17    I.   C.    C.    468,   470. 

(ff)  Complainant  entitled  to  repara- 
tion by  difference  between  amount  col- 
lected and  what  would  have  been  as- 
sessed under  a  reasonable  rate.  Mich- 
ael Cohen  &  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.    C.    177,    178. 

(gg)  If  the  Commission  felt  that 
thfe  rate  charged  was  unjust  and  un- 
reasonable and  that  reparation  should 
be  granted  it  would  so  declare,  regard- 
less of  whether  the  number  of  shippers 
who  had  paid  such  rate  was  large  or 
small.  All  should  be  treated  alike. 
Menefee  Lumber  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,    15   L   C.   C.   49,   51. 


726 


REPARATION,  §6  (hh)— (oopp) 


(hh)  The  fact  that  complainant  is 
neither  consignee  nor  consignor  do€S 
not  exclude  it  from  the  right  to  repa- 
ration, where  the  evidence  is  conclusive 
that  complainant  bore  th€  burden  of 
the  exc€ss  charge  and  actually  sustained 
the  loss  claimed.  Lindsay  Bros.  v.  G. 
R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  182,  183. 

(ii)  When  the  Commission  has  stated 
a  general  rule  in  regard  to  reparation, 
the  fact  that  a  particular  shipper  has 
refused  to  comply  promptly  with  his 
lawful  duty  should  not  place  him  in  a 
more  advantageous  position  than  the 
shipper  who  has  complied  with  the  law. 
Cambria  Steel  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
C,  15  I.  C.   C.  484. 

(jj)  The  fact  that  complainant's 
petition  demands  damages  on  a  speci- 
fied shipment  does  not  prejudice  his 
right  to  recover  on  all  shipments,  even 
though  the  aggregate  amount  of  such 
recovery  is  greater  than  the  sum 
claimed.  Nollenberger  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
15   I.   C.    C.    595,   598. 

(kk)  The  unreasonableness  of  the 
rates  on  the  lines  of  the  defendant  car- 
riers in  the  former  proceedings  referred 
to,  from  points  of  origin  to  points  of 
destination  embraced  within  the  orders 
of  the  Commission  therein,  has  already 
been  established.  Reparation  should 
be  awarded  to  the  parties  shown  to  be 
entitled  thereto  for  the  difference  be- 
tween the  rates  condemned  by  said  or- 
ders and  the  higher  rates  paid  since 
the  date  of  their  establishment.  The 
right  to  recover  reparation  is  not  con- 
fined to  shipments  made  by  parties 
to  the  former  proceedings,  but  ex- 
tends to  all  shipments  charged  for  on 
the  basis  indicated,  by  whomsoever 
made.  No  orders  for  reparation  wul 
be  entered  on  account  of  the  alleged 
exaction  of  excessive  charges  on  ship- 
ments from  points  of  origin  to  destina- 
tion not  involved  in  the  former  pro- 
ceedings until  the  question  of  the 
reasonableness  of  the  rates  shall  be 
determined.  The  Commission  has  no 
jurisdiction  to  make  orders  for  repara- 
tion on  account  of  any  alleged  excess- 
ive rate  except  when,  upon  complaint, 
notice  to  the  defendants,  and  a  full 
hearing,  such  rate  has  been  challenged 
and  found  to  be  unreasonable.  Nicola, 
Stone  &  Myers  Co.  v.  U  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  199,  205. 

(11)  The  Commission  is  confined  in 
the  making  of  awards  for  reparation  to 


the  injury  or  damage  sustained  by  those 
who  are  the  real  and  substantial  parties 
at  interest  in  the  transaction  in  which 
such  transportation  charges  have  been 
assessed.  Ihe  reparation  is  due  to  the 
person  who  has  been  required  to  pay 
the  excessive  charge  as  the  price  of 
transportation  and  who  was  the  true 
owner  of  the  property  transported  dur- 
ing the  period  of  transportation.  Nic- 
ola, Stone  &  Myers  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R. 
R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  199,  208,  209. 

(mm)  In  the  former  cases  of  Tift 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  10  I.  C.  C.  548,  and 
Central  Yellow  Pine  Ass'n  v.  Illinois 
Central  R.  R.  Co.,  10  I.  C.  C.  505,  the 
Commission  held  that  the  rates  on 
lumber  shipped  from  points  on  de- 
fendants' lines  in  Louisiana,  Mississippi, 
Alabama  and  Georgia,  to  points  on  and 
beyond  the  Ohio  River,  were  excessive 
to  the  extent  of  2c  per  100  lbs.  HELD, 
all  shippers  were  thereafter  entitled 
to  recover  reparation  for  shipments  of 
lumber  between  the  points  embraced  in 
these  former  decisions  whether  or  not 
they  were  parties  complainant  in  these 
cases.  Nicola,  Stone  &  Myers  Co. 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  199, 
205. 

(nn)  Where  shippers  of  lumber  have 
filed  a  complaint  and  secured  an  award 
of  reparation  for  excessive  rates  paid 
by  them  to  defendants,  the  Commission 
has  no  jurisdiction  upon  the  interven- 
tion of  the  mill  men  and  manufacturers 
selling  lumber  to  complainants  to  de- 
termine whether  they  were  the  parties 
really  injured  by  the  excessive  rates, 
and  the  Commission  can  award  repara- 
tion only  to  the  parties  paying  the  ex- 
cessive charges.  Nicola,  Stone  &  Myers 
Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  199, 
208. 

(oopp)  In  two  former  cases  the  Com- 
mission ordered  a  reduction  of  2c 
per  100  lbs.  on  lumber  shipped  over 
defendants'  lines  from  points  in  Louisi- 
ana, Mississippi,  Alabama  and  Georgia 
to  points  on  and  north  of  the  Ohio 
River.  In  the  present  proceedings  com- 
plainants sought  reparation  of  2c  per 
100  lbs.  on  lumber  shipped  from  points 
in  the  territory  embraced  in  the  former 
cases  to  points  south  of  the  Ohio  River 
not  involved  in  those  former  cases, 
and  also  for  shipments  from  Florida 
and  other  territory  not  covered  by  the 
former  decisions  to  points  on,  north, 
and  south  of,  the  Ohio  River.    Complain- 


REPARATION,  §6  (qq)— §7   (c) 


727 


ants  contended  that  on  the  face  of 
the  complaint  they  were  entitled  to 
reparation  upon  the  theory  that  the 
facts,  circumstances  and  conditions  af- 
fecting the  shipments  in  question  were 
substantially  the  same  as  those  in- 
volved in  the  previous  cases.  HELD, 
the  Commission  would  not  enter  an  or- 
der of  reparation  without  the  hearing 
of  evidence,  since  defendants  were  en- 
titled to  their  day  in  court  to  deter- 
mine the  reasonableness  of  rates,  not 
theretofore  specifically  passed  on.  Nic- 
ola, Stone  &  Myers  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R. 
R.    Co.,    14   I.   C.   C.    199,    205. 

(qq)  The  right  to  recover  repara- 
tion is  not  confined  to  shipments  made 
by  parties  to  the  former  proceedings, 
but  extends  to  all  shipments  charged 
for  on  the  basis  indicated,  by  whomso- 
ever made.  Nicola,  Stone  &  Myers  Co. 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  199,  205. 

(rr)  Relief  against  the  carrier  must 
ordinarily  be  predicated  upon  its  failure 
or  refusal  to  do  what  it  is  legally 
bound  to  do,  and  not  upon  the  fact 
that  the  complainant  shipper  has  volun- 
teered to  do  it  for  the  carrier.  Gen- 
eral Electric  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R. 
R.    R.   Co.,    14   I.    C.   C.   237,   244. 

(ss)  Where  complainant  ships  lum- 
ber to  another  corporation  as  consignee 
under  an  arrangement  by  which  such 
corporation  is  to  pay  the  freight  and 
deduct  same  from  the  purchase  price, 
and  it  is  charged  an  excessive  rate  and 
deducts  same  in  its  settlement  with 
complainant,  the  shipper  is  entitled 
to  recover  the  excess  from  defendant 
carrier.  Hayden  &  Westcott  Lumber 
Co.  V.  G.  &  S.  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C. 
C.    537,    538. 

(tt)  Record  shows  complainant  did 
not  pay  the  freight,  nor  does  it  appear 
that  it  was  otherwise  damaged.  The 
complaint  will  therefore  be  held  open  to 
give  complainant  an  opportunity  to  show 
that  it  paid  the  freight,  or  its  consignee 
charged  the  excess  to  it  and  the  amount 
has  been  paid.  Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  148. 

(uu)  Commission  erred  in  former  re- 
port. Additional  reparation  awarded. 
American  Plow  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  219. 

(vv)  Reparation  will  not  be  allowed 
on  shipments  moving  prior  to  filing 
original  complaint.  Burgess  v.  Transcon- 
tinental Freight  Bureau,  Unrep.  Op.  229. 


(ww)  Reparation  will  be  awarded 
only  in  favor  of  those  who  paid  the 
charges,  or  on  whose  account  the  same 
were  paid,  and  who  were  the  true  own- 
ers of  the  property  transported  during 
the  period  of  transportation.  Oden  & 
Elliott  v.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  Unrep.  Op.  253. 

(xx)  The  only  party  to  whom  an 
award  of  damages  can  lawfully  be  made, 
where  payment  of  an  unreasonable  rate 
is  alleged,  is  the  one  who  paid  the  rate, 
or  on  whose  account  it  was  paid.  Minne- 
apolis Threshing  Machine  Co.  v.  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  452. 

§7.     Statute   of   Limitations. 

See  Claims,  I;  Procedure  Before  Com- 
mission,  §4    (b),    (c),  §   13  (k). 

(a)  Section  16  of  the  Act  providing 
that  all  complaints  for  the  recovery 
of  damages  shall  be  filed  with  the 
Commission  within  two  years  from  the 
time  the  cause  of  action  accrues  and 
that  the  petition  for  the  enforcement 
of  an  order  for  the  payment  of  money 
shall  be  filed  in  the  Circuit  Court 
within  one  year  from  the  date  of  the 
order  does  not  apply  to  a  suit  insti- 
tuted under  section  9  of  the  Act. 
No  limitation  is  prescribed  by  the  Act 
for  such  a  suit  and  whether  the  time 
is  limited  by  the  statute  of  limitations 
of  the  state  in  which  the  case  arises, 
or  by  section  1047  of  the  Rev.  St.  U. 
S.,  quaere.  Lyne  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R. 
R.  Co.,  170  Fed.  847,  849. 

(b)  A  complaint  for  reparation  on  a 
discriminatory  freight  rate  filed  within 
one  year  from  the  passage  of  the  law 
of  June  29,  1906,  is  not  subject  to  the 
two-year  limitation  of  the  statute,  but 
if  instituted  subsequent  to  the  year,  it 
is  so  subject.  Meeker  &  Co.  v.  Le- 
high Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  480, 
482. 

(c)  In  Procter  &  Gamble  Co.  v.  C. 
H.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  9  I.  C.  C.  440,  the 
Commission  held  the  classification  of 
common  soap  in  less  than  carloads  of 
20  per  cent  less  than  third  class  unrea- 
sonable. The  Commission's  order  was 
contested  through  the  courts,  and  on 
May  13,  1907,  the  Supreme  Court  up- 
held it,  and  the  carriers  then  complied 
Aug.  1,  1907.  On  Aug.  28.  1907.  the 
complainant  filed  a  petition  inartificially 
drawn,  named  the  complainants  and  de- 
fendants, and  stated  that  the  shipments 
involved  were  less  than  carload  lots  of 
common  soap  shipped  by  them  over  de- 


728 


REPARATION,  §7  (d)— (k) 


fendants'  lines  to  Philadelphia;  the 
classification  under  which  rates  were 
charged  and  the  classification  under 
which  they  should  have  been  charged, 
and  promised  to  file  shortly  a  detailed 
description  of  each  shipment  and  a 
complete  list  of  all  overcharges.  On 
June  24,  1908,  an  amended  petition  was 
filed,  which  was  properly  drawn,  de- 
manding reparation  on  all  less-than-car- 
load  shipments  of  common  soap  by 
the  complainant  between  April  10, 
1903,  and  Aug.  1,  1907.  HELD,  that 
the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad,  having 
been  the  only  defendant  originally  a 
party  to  the  Procter  &  Gamble  case,  it 
is  the  only  one  bound  by  that  decision; 
that  while  the  original  petition  filed 
by  complainant  was  imperfect,  yet  since 
the  defendant  was  advised  by  it  that  it 
had  wrongfully  collected  sums  of  money 
from  the  complainant  and  exactly  why 
these  charges  were  wrongful,  and  had 
In  its  own  possession  a  record  of  all 
the  shipments  of  complainant  and  a 
record  of  all  the  overcharges  on  these 
shipments,  the  original  petition  must 
be  held  to  have  stated  a  good  cause 
of  action,  and  in  view  of  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case  should  be  deemed 
to  have  stopped  the  running  of  the 
statute,  and  that  reparation  on  the  basis 
of  the  fourth-class  rate  should  be 
awarded  against  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio 
Railroad.  Fels  &  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  483. 

(d)  Where  informal  complaint  cov- 
ering a  shipment  is  not  filed  within 
two  years  after  the  cause  of  action  ac- 
crued, relief  will  be  denied  by  the 
Commission.  Switzer  Lumber  Co.  v.  A. 
&  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  471,  475. 

(e)  While  the  Commission  holds 
that  it  is  not  necessary  that  a  formal 
petition  be  filed  in  order  to  stop  the 
running  of  the  statute  of  limitations, 
an  informal  letter  or  other  communica- 
tion to  accomplish  this  result  must  con- 
tain all  the  elements  of  the  claim. 
Fisk  &  Sons  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  19  I. 
C.    C.    299,   300. 

(f)  Between  Feb.  21  and  March  12, 
1907,  complainant  made  five  shipments 
of  cement  from  LaSalle,  111.,  to  Clinton, 
la.,  and  Camanche,  la.  The  carriers 
only  exacted  charges  based  upon  a 
rate  of  6.24c  per  100  lbs.  On  April  17, 
1909,  additional  charges  were  collected 
on  the  basis  of  7.83c,  the  lawful  pub- 
lished  rate   in   effect   at   the   time   ship- 


ments moved.  Petition  was  filed  June 
9,  1909.  HELD,  the  statute  of  limita- 
tions began  to  run  from  the  time  when 
it  became  the  duty  of  the  carrier  to 
collect  its  lawfully  published  rate,  and 
the  fact  that  additional  charges  might 
later  be  collected  would  not  prevent 
the  running  of  the  statute  from  the 
time  when  the  payment  should  have 
been  required.  Shoecraft  &  Son  Co.  v. 
I.   C.   R.  R.   Co.,   19  I.   C.   C.   492. 

(g)  Where  a  state  in  a  proceeding 
before  the  Commission  attacking  rates 
asks  no  reparation,  it  does  not  stop  the 
running  of  the  statute  of  limitations 
against  claims  for  reparation  for  ship- 
ments made  by  citizens  of  the  state 
under  the  rates  attacked.  National 
Refining  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
18    I.    C.    C.    389,    390. 

(h)  A  shipper  and  a  carrier  cannot 
extend  the  former's  right  to  recover 
reparation  by  delaying  the  time  of  pay- 
ment of  freight  by  the  shipper.  Blinn 
Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
430,    432. 

(i)  The  period  of  two  years  pre- 
scribed by  the  statute  within  which 
the  Commission  is  allowed  to  award 
damages  for  acts  arising  under  vio- 
lations of  the  provisions  of  the  Act 
begins  to  run  at  the  time  when  the 
shipment  is  delivered  and  when  it  be- 
comes the  legal  duty  of  the  carrier  to 
collect  its  lawful  charge,  and  not  at 
the  time  of  the  payment  of  the  freight 
by  the  shipper.  (Cockrell  &  Prouty, 
Comm'rs  dissenting.)  Blinn  Lumber 
Co.  V.   S.   P.   Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  430,  435. 

(j)  Shipments  moved  in  October  and 
November,  1906,  but  on  account  of  a 
controversy  as  to  the  rates  lawfully 
applicable  the  payment  of  charges  was 
delayed  until  June  3,  1909,  and  com- 
plaint was  not  filed  until  August  17, 
1909.  HELD,  following  Blinn  Lumber 
Co.  V.  Southern  Pacific  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
430,  more  than  two  years  having 
elapsed  between  the  delivery  of  the 
shipments  and  the  institution  of  pro- 
ceedings, the  claims  were  barred. 
(Prouty  &  Cockrell,  Comm'rs,  dissenting.) 
Blodgett  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  I.  &  S.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  439,  439. 

(k)  A  cause  of  action  for  repara- 
tion accrues  on  the  date  of  delivery  of 
the  shipment.  Blinn  Lumber  Co.  v. 
S.    P.    Co.,    18    I.    C.    C.    430;     Blodgett 


REPARATION,  §7   (1)— (s) 


729 


Milling    Co.    v.    C.    I.    &    S.    R.    R.    Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  439. 

(1)  The  Commission  has  no  Juris- 
diction to  deal  with  complaints  for  repa- 
'  ration  in  any  way  unless  filed  with  or  pre- 
sented to  it  within  the  period  specified 
in  the  statute.  Werner  Saw  Mill  Co.  v. 
I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  388,  389. 

(m)  The  Commission  cannot  sanction 
a  practice  that  would  permit  the  revival 
of  claims  barred  by  the  statute  by  subse- 
quently attaching  them  to  other  claims 
presented  within  the  prescribed  period. 
Werner  Saw  Mill  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  388,  390.  ^ 

(n)  Where  a  complaint  seeking  repa- 
ration for  certain  claims  is  filed  before 
the  expiration  of  the  limitation  period 
applicable  to  said  claims  and  upon  mo- 
tion of  complainant  is  dismissed  without 
prejudice,  the  Commission  may  in  its 
discretion  reinstate  said  original  peti- 
tion by  a  nunc  pro  tunc  order  as  of  date 
of  the  filing  of  the  complaint  in  the  first 
place,  but  it  cannot  reinstate  such  a 
complaint  when  the  same  has  been 
amended  to  include  claims  not  included 
in  the  original  complaint  and  which  are 
at  the  time  of  the  motion  for  reinstate- 
ment barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations. 
The  Commission  cannot  sanction  a  prac- 
tice permitting  the  revival  of  claims 
barred  by  the  statute  by  subsequently 
attaching  them  to  other  claims  presented 
within  the  prescribed  period,  despite  any 
promises  on  the  part  of  defendant  car- 
riers that  they  will  not  take  advantage 
of  the  statute  of  limitations.  The  Com- 
mission has  no  jurisdiction  to  deal  with 
complaints  for  reparation  in  any  way  un- 
less filed  with  or  presented  to  it  within 
the  period  specified  by  the  statute.  It  is 
not  vested  with  the  powers  of  a  court 
of  equity  to  relieve  from  hardships  re- 
sulting from  improvident  arrangements  or 
agreements  between  the  parties.  Louis 
Werner  Sawmill  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  388,  389-391. 

(o)  On  January  23,  1906,  complainant 
shipped  clothing  from  New  York  City  to 
Janesville,  Wis.,  via  the  Erie,  the  Chicago 
&  Erie,  and  the  C.  &  N.  w'.  R.  Rs.  No 
complaint,  formal  or  informal,  was  filed 
against  the  Erie  R.  R.  and  the  Erie  & 
Chicago  R.  R.  until  September  24,  1909. 
May  1,  1907,  complainant  filed  an  in- 
tended formal  complaii.t  against  the  C.  & 
N.  W.  R.  R.  alone.  The  Commission  ad- 
vised that  the  complaint  was  faulty  and 


suggested  that  it  make  informal  complaint 
to  the  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.,  which  was  im- 
mediately done.  March  12,  1908,  com- 
plainant called  the  Commission's  atten- 
tion to  the  fact  that  no  reply  had  been 
received  from  the  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R., 
and  it  was  then  discovered  that  the 
original  file  of  papers  had  been  lost. 
May  15,  1908,  complainant  furnished  du- 
plicate of  original  complaint,  which  was 
brought  to  'the  attention  of  the  C.  & 
N.  W.  R.  R.  On  May  27.  1908,  the  C.  & 
N.  W.  R.  R.  responded,  denying  liability. 
Complainant  was  advised  of  this  and  filed 
complaint  September  24,  1909.  HELD, 
with  respect  to  the  Erie  R.  R.  and  the 
Chicago  &  Erie  R.  R.  the  statute  of  limi- 
tations had  run,  but  not  so  with  respect 
to  the  C.-&  N.  W.  R.  R.  Amos  Rehberg 
&  Co.  V.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  508, 
510. 

(p)  Where  a  complaint  is  filed  July  1, 
1908,  all  damages  which  may  have  ac- 
crued prior  to  July  1,  190G,  are  barred  by 
the  statute.  Pilant  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  178,  181. 

(q)  On  a  shipment  made  May  26, 
1906,  freight  charges  were  i.aid  July  10, 
1906,  and  the  complaint  filed  June  23, 
1908.  HELD,  said  claim  was  not  barred 
since  all  claims  whether  arising  prior  or 
subsequent  to  August  28,  1906,  are  en- 
titled to  two  years  for  presentation,  the 
one  year  proviso  applying  only  to  claims 
that  accrued  more  than  two  years  prior 
to  said  date.  Kile  &  Morgan  Co.  v.  Deep- 
water  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  235,  237. 

(r)  On  account  of  misrouting  a  car- 
load of  lumber  from  Harper,  W.  Va.,  con- 
signed to  New  Haven,  Conn.,  and  intended 
by  the  shipper  to  be  reconsigned  at  New 
York  to  Nashua,  N.  H.,  complainant  ship- 
per was  subjected  to  an  extra  charge  of 
the  local  rate  from  New  Haven  to 
Nashua.  HELD,  the  cause  of  action  to 
recover  reparation  for  said  extra  charge 
arose  not  on  the  date  of  misrouting  or 
on  the  date  delivery  was  made,  but  on 
the  date  the  freight  charges  were  paid. 
Kile  &  Morgan  Co.  v.  Deepwater  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  235,  236. 

(s)  Alleged  excessive  charges  on  car- 
loads of  sawmill  machinery  from  Oge- 
maw, Ark.,  to  Sodus,  La.,  were  paid  June 
6,  1905,  and  the  complaint,  filed  Septem- 
ber 9,  1907,  alleged  the  unreasonable  and 
discriminatory  character  of  the  rate  sole- 
ly for  the  purpose  of  claiming  reparation. 
HELD,  the  claim  being  barred  by  the  stat- 


730 


REPARATION,  §7   (t)— §8   (c) 


ute  of  limitations,  the  complaint  should 
be  dismissed.  Pleasant  Hill  Lumber  Co. 
V.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  532. 

(t)  The  filing  of  a  petition  on  the  28th 
of  August,  1907,  is  within  the  proviso 
that  claims  accruing  prior  to  the  passage* 
of  the  amended  Act,  June  29,  1906,  may  be 
presented  within  one  year.  Goff-Kirby 
Coal  Co.  V.  Bessemer  &  Lake  Erie  R.  R. 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  383,  386. 

(u)  Under  the  amendatory  act  of 
June  29,  1906,  a  complaint  filed  after 
Aug.  28,  1907,  Is  barred  by  the  statute 
of  limitations  except  as  to  shipments 
made  within  two  years  immediately  pre- 
ceding the  date  of  the  filing  of  said  com- 
plaint. Missouri  &  Kansas  Shippers' 
Ass'n  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
411,  413. 

(v)  Complainant,  a  voluntary  associa- 
tion of  merchants  at  Kansas  City,  Mo., 
asked  reparation  for  switching  charges 
collected  from  members  of  the  associa- 
tion on  carload  shipments  of  hay,  coal, 
grain  and  wool  consigned  to  Kansas  City. 
The  members  of  the  association,  on 
whose  behalf  the  demands  were  made, 
were  not  named  in  the  complaints,  nor 
did  the  complaints  by  date,  weight,  car 
number,,  point  of  origin,  name  of  con- 
signor or  consignee,  amount  of  freieht 
collected,  or  otherwise,  set  up  and  de- 
scribe the  particular  shipments  on  which 
reparation  was  claimed.  The  complaint 
in  the  first  case,  filed  August  9,  1907,  de- 
manded reparation  on  all  shipments  made 
prior  to  August  28,  1906,  regardless  of 
date.  The  other  three  complaints  were 
filed  Aug.  22,  1907.  The  first  of  these 
covered  shipments  made  from  1902  to 
1906;  the  second,  shipments  during  1903- 
1904,  and  until  May  31,  1905;  and  in  the 
third  reparation  was  asked  on  shipments 
made  between  September  22,  1902,  and 
January  2,  1904.  Said  complaints  were 
filed  under  the  urgent  request  of  the  sec- 
retary of  complainant  who  advised  mem- 
bers that  the  limitation  period  was  about 
to  expire,  and  that  they  would  not  have 
time  to  institute  complaints  individually. 
HELD,  such  general  complaints,  failing 
as  they  did  to  specify  the  members  prefer- 
ring same  and  to  point  out  the  shipments 
in  question,  could  not  operate  to  stop  the 
running  of  the  statute  of  limitations. 
Complaints  dismissed.  Missouri  &  Kan- 
sas Shippers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  411,  416. 

(w)  Where  a  defendant  carrier  was 
shown  to  have  failed  to  supply  complain- 


ant coal  operators  their  just  proportion 
of  cars,  complainants  attempted  to  show 
that  it  they  had  been  properly  supplied, 
had  had  sufficient  laborers,  had  sold  all 
the  coal  so  mined  and  shipped  it  at  about 
the  average  mine  price  for  the  period  in 
question,  they  Avould  have  made  a  profit 
on  a  certain  number  of  supposed  tons  of 
coal  equal  to  the  difference  between  the 
said  average  price  i)er  ton  and  the  esti- 
mated cost  of  producing  the  coal.  On 
this  evidence  complainants  sought  repa- 
ration. HELD,  the  evidence  was  too 
vague  and  indefinite.  Reparation  denied. 
Royal  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Southern  Ry. 
Co.,   13  L   C.   C.   4-.J,   448. 

III.     CIRCUMSTANCES    DETERMINING 
RIGHT. 

§8.     Erroneous    Publication. 

See  Discrimination,  §4  (s) ;  Evidence, 
§29  (m);  Express  Companies, 
§11  (5)  (a),  §11  (9)  (b),  §22  (a); 
Facilities  and  Privileges.  §17  (k), 
§21  (bb);  Overcharges,  §8  (d),  (e); 
Special  Contracts,  §2  (dd),  (mm); 
Undercharges,   §2  (d),    (e),   (f). 

(a)  Defendant  established  a  rate  on 
sheep  of  $44  for  a  single  deck  car,  and 
$134  for  a  double  deck  car,  the  latter 
quotation  being  an  error.  Prior  to  these 
rates  the  charge  had  been  $40  for  either 
a  single  or  a  double  deck  car.  Subse- 
quently the  rates  were  reduced  to  the  old 
basis  of  $40  for  either  kind  of  a  car. 
Complainants,  who  were  in  a  position  to 
ship  sheep  in  double  deck  cars,  elected  to 
make  each  shipment  in  two  single  deck 
cars  under  the  $44  rate  rather  than  to 
ship  in  double-deck  cars  carrying  the 
erroneous  rate  of  $134.  HELD,  that  in 
electing  to  ship  in  single-deck  cars  com- 
plainants adopted  the  only  feasible  meth- 
od of  avoiding  an  unconscionable  and 
admittedly  unlawful  charge,  and  even 
then  they  were  obliged  to  pay  double  the 
amount  for  which  they  ought  to  have  ob- 
tained the  desired  transportation.  Repa- 
ration awarded.  Bowles  &  McCandless 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  563. 

(b)  A  charge  of  33c  per  100  lbs.  on 
a  shipment  of  metallic  cartridges  from 
Kings  Mills.  O.,  to  Muncie,  Ind.,  is  excess- 
ive, such  charge  being  due  to  a  typo- 
graphical error  in  the  published  tariff, 
which  should  have  read  23c,  and  which 
was  subsequently  corrected  so  to  read. 
Reparation  awarded.  Goddard  Co.  v.  C. 
C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  298,  299. 

(c)  Higher  rate  charged  because  lower 
rate    inadvertently    omitted    from    tariff. 


REPARATION,  §8   (d)  — (w) 


731 


Tariff  adjusted.  Reparation  awarded. 
Northern  Wood  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  7. 

(d)  Publication  of  higher  rate  due  to 
error.  Higher  rate  held  unreasonable. 
Stewart  Produce  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  11;  Ohio  Iron  & 
Metal  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  15;  Acme  Cement  Plaster 
Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
37,  38. 

(e)  Privilege  of  reconsignment,  con- 
centration, storage,  etc.,  omitted  from 
tariff  through  error,  subsequently  re- 
stored; reparation  awarded  on  shipments 
made  during  int€rim.  Hawkinson  v.  C. 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  25. 

(f)  Greater  minimum,  inserted  in  tar- 
iff through  error,  subsequently  corrected; 
reparation  awarded  on  basis  of  lower 
minimum.  Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v. 
C.  R.  I.  &   P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.   56. 

(ff)  Reparation  awarded  on  carload 
of  whiting  from  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  to 
San  Francisco  on  account  of  misappli- 
cation of  rates.  jNIagnew  Bros.  v.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  103. 

(g)  Point  omitted  from  tariff,  causing 
higher  rate  to  be  assessed,  subsequently 
corrected.  Reparation  awarded.  Mc- 
Caul-Webster  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  117. 

(h)  Participating  carrier  omitted  from 
tariff,  causing  higher  rate  to  be  assessed; 
tariff  corrected.  Reparation  awarded  and 
rate  ordered  to  be  maintained.  Utah- 
Idaho  Sugar  Co.  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  154. 

(i)  Intermediate  i>oint,  through  error, 
omitted  from  tariff,  causing  higher  rate 
to  be  charged.  Reparation  awarded. 
Copper  Queen  Consolidated  Mining  Co. 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  176. 

(j)  Higher  minimum  weight  inserted 
in  tariff  through  error.  Reparation 
awarded.  Marquette  Cement  Mfg.  Co. 
V.   C.   M.    &    St.    P.   Ry.   Co.,   Unrep.    Op. 

188. 

(k)  Charges  assessed  on  erroneous 
calculation  of  distance  on  shipment  of 
coal  from  Randolph  Mine,  Va.,  to  Locust 
Point,  Md.,  reconsigned  to  Laurel,  Md. 
Reparation  awarded.  Buck  Bros.  v.  B.  & 
O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  190. 

(1)  Rate  on  wood  from  Oconto,  Wis., 
to   Chicago,  Evanston  and  Elsmere,  111., 


omitted  from  tariff  through  error.  Rep- 
aration awarded.  Northern  Wood  Co.  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  193. 

(m)  Through  inadvertence  participat- 
ing carriers  omitted  from  tariff,  causing 
higher  rate  to  be  assessed.  Reparation 
awarded.  Shenkberg  Co.  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  216. 

(n)  Point  omitted  from  group  through 
error.  Subsequently  corrected.  Repara- 
tion awarded,  demons  Produce  Co.  v. 
G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  232. 

(o)  Through  error  in  publication  a 
tariff  applied  higher  rate;  subsequently 
corrected.  Reparation  awarded.  Copper 
Queen  Consolidated  Milling  Co.  v.  B.  & 
O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  242. 

(p)  Tariff  provision  omitted  through 
error;  subsequently  corrected  by  amend- 
ed tariff.  Reparation  awarded.  Menasha 
Woodenware  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  258. 

(q)  Commission  has  no  authority  to 
award  reparation  on  the  basis  of  a  rate 
lower  than  that  duly  established  solely 
on  account  of  a  misquotation  thereof  by 
the  carrier.  American  Milling  Co.  v.  M. 
St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
282. 

(r)  Through  clerical  error  application 
of  rates  to  intermediate  points  omitted 
from  tariff.  Reparation  awarded.  Wind- 
sor Milling  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  284. 

(s)  Higher  rate  in  effect  through  er- 
ror; subsequently  corrected.  Reparation 
awarded.  Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep."  Op.  259. 

(t)  "Any  quantity"  omitted  in  reissue 
of  tariff,  causing  minimum  to  be  applied. 
Reparation  awarded.  Milwaukee- Wauke- 
sha Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.   Op.   294. 

(u)  Transit  privilege  omitted  from 
tariff  through  error  at  Milwaukee,  Wis. 
Reparation  awarded.  Franke  Grain  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  296. 

(v)  Through  error  higher  class  rate 
'n  effect  than  commodity  rate  from  neigh- 
boring points.  Subsequently  corrected. 
Reparation  awarded  and  reduced  rate 
ordered  maintained.  Miller  &  Co.  v.  T. 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  331. 

(w)  Transit  privilege  on  grain  origi- 
nating on  Illinois  River,  with  privilege 
of     milling     at      Indianapolis,      omitted 


732 


REPARATION,  §8    (x)— §9    (c) 


through  error  when  carried  via  certain 
packet  line.  Subsequently  corrected  and 
reparation  awarded.  Evans  Milling  Co. 
V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
351. 

(x)  Erroneous  quotation  of  a  rate  af- 
fords no  basis  for  reparation.  Menefee 
Bros.  V.  R.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  359. 

(y)  Rates  advanced  through  error 
subsequently  reduced.  Reparation  award- 
ed on  shipments  moving  during  interim 
of  advance.  Garden  City  Grain  &  Prod- 
uce Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  394. 

(z)  Misquotation  by  agent  of  carrier 
no  ground  for  reparation.  Alabama  Lum- 
ber &  Export  Co.  V.  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  442. 

(aa)  By  reason  of  errors  in  publica- 
tion of  tariff  unreasonable  rates  were  as- 
sessed. Reparation  awarded.  Donahue- 
Stratton  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  449. 

(bb)  Tariff,  through  typographical  er- 
ror, had  higher  rate  inserted.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Hill-Ingham  Lumber  Co. 
V.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  464. 

(cc)  Higher  rate  inserted  in  tariff 
through  error.  Reparation  awarded.  Con- 
tinental Oil  Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  C.  T.  T.  T. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  517. 

(dd)  Through  a  defect  in  its  tariffs 
defendant  failed  to  properly  provide  for 
a  concentration  privilege  in  connection 
with  shipments  of  cotton.  Subsequently 
corrected.  Reparation  awarded.  Ren- 
ner-Millette  Co.  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  525. 

(ee)  Through  error  in  spelling  of 
Menominee,  Mich.,  and  Menomonie,  Wis., 
class  rate  in  effect  which  was  higher 
than  commodity  rate  intended.  HELD, 
unreasonable,  reparation  awarded  and 
lower  rate  to  be  maintained  for  two 
years.  Carpenter  Cook  Co.  v.  L  &  N 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  543. 

(ff)  Participating  carrier  omitted  from 
tariff  through  error,  causing  higher  rate 
to  be  charged.  Subsequently  corrected. 
Reparation  awarded.  Detroit  Chemical 
Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  40. 

(gg)  Commodity  omitted  from  tariff, 
causing  higher  rate  to  be  charged.  Rep- 
aration awarded.  Moore  Mercantile  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  49. 


(hh)  Rule  that,  when  larger  car  fur- 
nished than  requested,  lower  minimum 
will  be  applied  omitted  from  tariff.  Rep>- 
aration  awarded.  Laning-Harris  Coal  & 
Grain  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  51. 

(ii)  Through  inadvertence,  horse 
blankets  omitted  from  proportional  tar- 
iff from  Minneapolis,  Minn.,  to  Chicago, 
111.  Subsequently  adjusted.  Reparation 
awarded.  North  Star  Woolen  Mill  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  94. 

(jj)  Higher  rate  in  effect  as  result 
of  error  in  publishing  tariff.  Reparation 
awarded.  Miller  &  Co.  v.  G.  R.  &  I  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  518. 

§9.     Failure  to  Post  Tariff. 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  snap  corn, 
Calvin,  Okla.,  to  DeQueen,  and  Wilton, 
Ark.,  under  a  joint  rate  of  23c.  Prior  to 
date  of  shipment  the  rate  had  been  19c, 
but  was  advanced  at  time  of  shipment, 
but  tariff  not  posted  at  Calvin.  Had  this 
been  done  the  increased  rate  would  have 
been  included  in  the  price  of  the  corn, 
which  was  sold  f.  o.  b.  destination.  HELD, 
reparation  should  be  awarded  on  account 
of  the  failure  of  the  carriers  to  post  the 
tariff  changing  the  rate.  Canadian  Val- 
ley Grain  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  108. 

(b)  Between  December,  1907.  and  Oc- 
tober, 1908,  complainant  shipped  carloads 
of  logs  from  Granite  Bluff  and  other 
Michigan  points  to  Kiel,  Wisconsin. 
Prior  to  August  20  the  rate  in  force  was 
$2.50  per  1,000  ft.  without  limitation 
upon  the  size  of  the  logs.  On  that  date 
defendant  issued  a  supplement  limiting  the 
application  of  the  $2.50  rate  to  logs  10  ft. 
or  more  in  length  and  prescribed  a  rate 
of  4c  per  100  lbs.  for  logs  under  this 
length.  Defendant  failed  to  post  the 
amendment  at  Kiel.  Had  it  done  so 
complainant  would  have  sawed  the  logs 
at  the  length  required  to  secure  the  $2.50 
rate.  HELD,  defendant  having  paid  the 
4c  per  100  lb.  rate  was  entitled  to  repa- 
ration on  the  basis  of  $2.50  since  the 
Commission  has  authority  to  award  repa- 
ration to  a  shipper  for  damage  suffered 
from  a  carrier's  failure  to  post  a  tariff  in 
accordance  with  section  6  of  the  Act. 
Kiel  Woodenware  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  242,  244. 

(c)  Reparation  awarded  for  damages 
sustained  by  reason  of  failure  of  car- 
riers   to    post    tariff    advancing    a    rate. 


REPARATION,  §10  (a)— §11  (f) 


733 


Wolf  Milling  Co.   v.   A.   T.   &   S.  F.   Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.   Op.   439. 

§10.     Laches. 

(a)  Where  complaints  seeking  repa- 
ration are  filed  within  the  period  of  limi- 
tation they  cannot  he  defeated  on  the 
ground  of  laches  because  not  filed  at  an 
earlier  date.  Kindelon  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  17  I. 
C.  C.  251,  253. 

(b)  Rates  on  lumber  were  increased 
in  1903.  The  complaint  was  filed  in  1907. 
Although  the  rates  attacked  were  proved 
to  be  unreasonable  at  the  time  of  the 
hearing  no  evidence  was  offered  to  show 
them  unreasonable  prior  to  1903.  HELD, 
on  account  of  the  laches  of  complainant 
and  the  lack  of  proof,  reparation  could 
not  be  awarded  on  shipments  made  prior 
to  the  date  of  filing  the  complaint. 
Thompson  Lumber  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
13  L  C.  C.  657,  667. 

(c)  A  rate  on  lumber  was  in  1904 
raised  from  75c  to  85c  and  in  1908  was 
found  to  be  unreasonable  to  the  extent  of 
10c.  The  shippers  paying  said  excess 
were  probably  not  themselves  damaged 
since  they  simply  added  same  to  the  sell- 
ing price  and  cast  the  burden  upon  the 
public.  HELD,  the  shippers  should  not 
be  permitted  to  slumber  upon  their  rights 
and  to  accumulate  damages  against  the 
carriers  and  should  be  awarded  repara- 
tion only  for  shipments  made  since  the 
date  of  filing  the  complaint.  Burgess  v. 
Transcontinental  Freight  Bureau,  13  1.  C. 
C.  668,  680. 

§11.     Rate  via  Competing   Line. 

See    Rate    via    Competing    Line;    Spe- 
cial  Contracts,  §2  (k), 

(a)  In  a  claim  for  reparation  it  is  not 
sufficient  to  prove  the  unreasonableness 
of  a  rate  merely  to  show  that  at  the  time 
of  shipment  a  lower  rate  was  in  effect 
via  another  competing  route.  Delray 
Salt  Co.  V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
247,  247. 

• 
§12.     Readjustment  of   Rates. 

See  Advanced   Rates,   §7   (1)    (d). 

(a)  On  adjusting  lumber  rates  in  cer- 
tain zones  on  the  Pacific  coast,  the  Com- 
mission granted  reparation  in  certain 
rases  involving  coast  rates  and  denied 
it  on  shipments  from  points  in  the  Spo- 
kane groups  or  zone  on  the  ground  that 
its  order  with  reference  to  the  Spokane 
group  involved  an   initial  adjustment  of 


territory,  or  at  least  a  very  material  re- 
adjustment of  territory,  both  new  and  old, 
from  points  within  which  it  was  deemed 
proper  that  differentials  should  be  al- 
lowed upon  shipments  eastward  over  the 
coast  rates.  HELD,  the  reason  given 
was  good  and  sufficient  to  support  the 
Commission's  action  in  denying  repara- 
tion on  shipments  from  the  Spokane 
group  and  its  discretion  could  not  be  re- 
viewed by  the  court.  Fidelity  Lumber 
Co.  V.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  193  Fed.  924,  928. 

(b)  On  adjusting  lumber  rates  in  cer- 
tain zones  on  the  Pacific  coast,  the  Com- 
mission granted  reparation  in  certain 
cases  involving  coast  rates  and  denied  it 
on  shipments  from  points  in  the  Spokane 
group  zone  on  the  ground  that  its  order 
with  reference  to  the  Spokane  group  in- 
volved an  initial  adjustment  of  territory, 
or  at  least  a  very  material  readjustment 
of  territory,  both  new  and  old,  from 
points  within  which  it  was  deemed  proper 
that  differentials  should  be  allowed  upon 
shipments  eastward  over  the  coast  rates. 
HELD,  such  an  adjustment  did  not  oper- 
ate as  a  discrimination  between  shippers, 
the  award  being  simply  that  the  coast 
rates,  with  their  differential  as  fixed  by 
the  Commission,  should  continue  until 
the  time  when  the  new  schedule  from 
the  particular  zones  should  become  oper- 
ative, and  that  the  zone  shippers  were 
not  entitled  to  the  additional  reparation 
on  account  of  shipments  made  previous 
to  the  order  establishing  the  new  differ- 
entials. Fidelity  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry. 
Co.,  193  Fed.  924,  929. 

(c)  Where  a  changed  relationship  on 
which  reparation  is  demanded  was  in 
rates  which  had  long  existed  prior  to  the 
advances  complained  of  the  Commission 
does  not  think  reparation  should  be 
awarded.  Pacific  Coast  Lumber  Mfrs. 
Ass'n  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  465,  467. 

(d)  Reduction  in  connection  with  a 
general  readjustment  of  rates  made  nec- 
essary by  building  up  new  line  no  ground 
for  reparation.  Eddy  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep'.  Op.  367. 

(e)  Commission  declines  to  award 
reparation  on  basis  of  a  rate  adjustment 
prescribed  for  the  future.  Mack  Mfg.  Co. 
V.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
521. 

(f)  Reduction  in  connection  with  a 
general  readjustment  of  rates  made  nec- 
essary by  the  building  of  a  new  line  af- 


734 


REPARATION,  §12  (g)— §16   (a) 


fords  no  grounds  for  reparation.     Eddy 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  367. 

(g)  Combination  class  rate  found  to 
be  unreasonable  and  excessive  to  the  ex- 
tent that  it  exceeded  lower  commodity 
rate  formerly  in  effect.  Reparation 
awarded.  Jaekel  Bros.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R. 
R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  146. 

§13.     Res  Adjudicata. 
See  Evidence,   V. 

(a)  In  cases  before  this  Commission 
involving  rates  neither  the  plea  of  res 
adjudicata  nor  stare  decisis  as  used  at 
common  law  has  any  standing  as  affect- 
ing shipments  moving  subsequent  to  the 
decision  of  the  Commission  relied  on. 
Waco  Freight  Bureau  v.  H.  &  T.  C.  R. 
R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  22,  24. 

(b)  Rates  reasonable  at  the  present 
time  may  within  the  period  of  two  years 
become  very  unreasonable  by  reason  of 
changes  in  circumstances  and  condi- 
tions, economic  transportation,  or  the 
like.  It  should  be  just  as  apparent  that 
a  rate  which  was  unreasonable  two  years 
or  more  ago  may  become  reasonable  by 
reason  of  such  changes  in  conditions.  A 
plea  of  estoppel  by  reason  of  former  ad- 
judication is  not  good  in  so  far  as  an  in- 
vestigation of  present  rates  is  con- 
cerned, although  in  a  former  proceeding 
a  decree  of  a  court  was  a  general  finding 
for  the  defendants  on  all  the  issues  of 
fact.  National  Hay  Ass'n  v.  M.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  34,  37. 

(c)  The  Commission  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion or  authority  to  make  orders  for  rep- 
aration on  account  of  any  alleged  excess- 
ive rate  except  when,  upon  complaint, 
notice  to  defendants,  and  full  hearing, 
such  rate  has  been  challenged  and  upon 
investigation,  found  to  be  unreasonable 
and  unjust,  and  while  the  alleged  similar- 
ity of  circumstances  and  conditions,  if  es- 
tablished at  such  hearing,  might  afford  a 
basis  for  forceful  argument  for  action  by 
the  Commission  similar  to  that  taken  in 
former  cases,  it  cannot  assume  such 
similarity  on  the  face  of  the  complaint  as 
a  basis  for  an  award  of  reparation.  Ni- 
cola, Stone  &  Myers  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R  R 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  199,  206. 

§14.     Special    Rate. 

See  Special    Rates, 
(a)     The  Commission  cannot  permit  a 
refund  on  a  particular  shipment  for  the 

purpose  of  enabling  carriers  to  make  good 
a  rate  not  in  effect  when  the  shipment 


moved,  but  which  they  had  agreed  to  pro- 
tect, it  being  necessary  to  show  that  the 
rate  charged  was  unreasonable  and  to 
award  reparation  on  the  basis  of  a  rea- 
sonable rate.  Crowell  &  Spencer  Lumber 
Co.  V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  333,  334. 

(b)  The  Commission  does  not  approve 
the  practice  of  putting  a  special  rate  in 
effect  simply  for  the  purpose  of  enabling 
the  Commission  to  make  reparation  in  a* 
particular  case  and  with  a  clause  in  the 
tariff  under  which,  after  remaining  in 
force  for  a  "period  of  say  30  days,  during 
which  time  the  Commission  would  ordina- 
rily enter  its  relief  order,  the  rate  will 
expire.  In  such  cases  the  Commission 
will  in  order  to  prevent  discriminations 
require  the  rate  to  remain  in  effect  as  a 
maximum  for  a  definite  period  of  time  to 
be  designated  in  the  final  order.  Hol- 
comb-Hayes  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I. 
C.  C.  16,  19. 

§15.     Unpublished  Charges. 

See  Allowances,  §9  (dd) ;  Evidence, 
§60;  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §17 
(i). 

(a)  Demurrage  and  storage  charges 
collected  as  the  result  of  carriers  demand- 
ing rates  in  excess  of  those  in  their 
legally  filed  tariffs  must  be  refunded,  and 
this  principle  applies  to  cases  in  which 
charges  are  demanded  on  shipments  as 
to  which  no  rates  are  published,  but  on 
which  the  carrier  attempts  to  exact  an 
unreasonable  rate,  precipitating  a  con- 
troversy during  which  demurrage  ac- 
crues. Northern  Lumber  Mfg.  Co.  v.  T. 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  54,  55. 

(b)  Refund  must  be  made  of  unpub- 
lished charges  and  those  in  excess  of 
published  charges.  Northern  Lumber 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 

54,  55. 

(c)  The  Commission  cannot  award 
damages  because  a  carrier  has  ceased  to 
grant  unpublished  privileges  which 
amounted  to  nothing  less  than  rebates 
from  the  tariff  rates.  National  Lumber 
Co.  V.  S.  P.  L.  A.  &  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co,  15  I. 
C.  C.  434. 

§16.     Voluntary  Reduction. 

See  Absorption  of  Charges,  §2  (c), 
(d);  Blanket  Rates,  §7  (aa);  Evi- 
dence, §29  (m),  §64;  Voluntary 
Rates. 

(a)  The  voluntary  reduction  of  a  rate 
by  a  carrier  does  not,  in  itself,  without 
proof  that  the  former  rate  was  unreason- 


REPARATION,  §16   (aa)  — (h) 


735 


able,  furnish  a  sufficient  basis  for  rep- 
aration. Pierce  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  89,  91. 

(aa)  The  voluntary  reduction  of  a  rate 
by  a  carrier  is  not  of  itself  such  a  proo^' 
of  the  unreasonableness  of  the  former 
rate  as  to  form  a  proper  basis  for  an 
award  of  reparation.  Sunderland  Bros. 
Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
512,  513. 

(b)  The  fact  that  defendants  have 
voluntarily  canceled  a  seventy-two  hours' 
limitation  period  on  reconsignment  to 
meet  a  commercial  condition  does  not 
afford  a  just  basis  for  reparation  on  past 
shipments.  Sunnyside  Coal  Mining  Co. 
V.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  558. 

(c)  The  voluntary  reduction  of  a  rate 
by  a  carrier  does  not  conclusively  show 
that  the  former  rate  was  unjust  or  un- 
reasonable and  that  reparation  should  be 
granted  on  all  shipments  moving  there- 
under within  the  period  of  the  statute  of 
limitation.  Menefee  Lumber  Co.  v.  T.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  49,  51. 

(d)  Where  a  carrier  reduces  rates  it 
does  not  follow  that  reparation  will  be 
granted  for  that  reason  alone,  Foster 
Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  56,  57;  Harlow  Lumber  Co.  v.  A. 
C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  501,  503;  Mene- 
fee Lumber  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.  C.  49.  51;  Mose  Smith  &  Co.  v.  Mo. 
&  N.  Ark.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  449; 
Pilant  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  178. 

(e)  It  is  to  the  interest  of  the  shipping 
public  in  nowise  to  embarrass  carriers 
in  decreasing  rates  when  the  latter 
thinks  such  decrease  equitable  and  there- 
fore the  Commission  will  not  adopt  a  pol- 
icy by  which,  upon  the  voluntary  reduc- 
tion of  a  rate,  a  shipper  who  has  previ- 
ously paid  the  higher  rate  may  recover 
as  damages  whatever  difference  there 
may  be  between  the  old  and  the 
new,  where  application  has  not  been 
made  either  to  the  railroad  or  to  the 
Commission  for  a  reduction  of  the  rate 
prior  to  the  time  at  which  the  railroad 
itself  makes  such  reduction  and  where  It 
does  not  clearly  appear  that  the  rate 
complained  of  was  unreasonable.  Foster 
Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  56,  57. 

(f)  When  carriers  have  of  their  own 
volition  made  a  reduction  of  rates,  it  is 
not   the   practice   of   the    Commission    to 


award  reparation  as  a  matter  of  course 
on  all  shipments  made  previous  to  the 
reduction,  since  such  policy  would  oper- 
ate as  the  strongest  possible  deterrent 
to  the  voluntary  decrease  of  rates. 
Pilant  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
178,  181. 

(g)  Where  rates  have  been  estab- 
lished by  carriers  in  good  faith  and  ac- 
quiesced in  by  shippers  without  protest, 
this  Commission  will  not  award  repara- 
tion, even  though  the  rate  is  reduced, 
unless  It  clearly  appears  that  the  rates 
paid  in  the  past  have  been  excessive. 
Penrod  Walnut  &  Veneer  Co.  v.  C.  B.  & 
Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  1.  C.  C.  326,  328. 

(gg)  Reparation  awarded  on  basis 
of  lower  rate  voluntarily  established. 
Thompson,  Thayer  &  McCowen  v.  I.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  482;  Tuthill  Spring 
Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
495;  Moore  &  Co.  v.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  498;  Browne  Grain  Co.  v. 
M.  L.  &  T.  R.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  499;  Gamble-Robinson  Commission 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  506;  Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  M.  K. 
&  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  508;  Fort  Smith 
Wholesale  Grocery  Co.  v.  Ft.  S!  &  W.  R. 
R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  509;  Michigan  Am- 
monia Works  V.  M.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  511;  Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  K.  C. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,,  Unrep.  Op.  512;  Standard 
Oil  Co.  V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  513;  Kellogg  Switchboard  &  Supply 
Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
514;  Boyd  v.  O.  W.  R.  R.  &  Nav.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  519;  Harvey  &  Co.  v.  C.  & 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  522;  Wells- 
Higman  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  527;  Chanute  Refining  Co.  v.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  528; 
Union  Tanning  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  542;  Hardy  v.  L.  &  N. 
R  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  548;  American 
Hardwood  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 
^a.,  Unrep.  Op.  550;  Schoenhofen  Brew- 
ing Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  566;  International  Creosoting  &  Con- 
struction Co.  V.  N.  O.  T.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op,  568;  Comstock  &  Co.  v.  N. 
&  M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  575;  Central 
Commercial  Co.  v.  T.  &  M,  Ry,  Co,,  Un- 
■ep.  Op,  579;  Byrnes  v.  Wells,  Fargo  & 
3o.,  Unrep.  Op.  589. 

(h)  Reparation  awarded  on  shipments 
of  apples  on  account  of  voluntary  reduc- 
tion in  rates.  Lamb  Co.  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.   Op.   5. 


736 


REPARATION,  §1G  (i)  — (aaa) 


(1)  Reparation  awarded  on  shipment 
of  crushed  concrete  gravel  from  Fon- 
tana,  Wis.,  to  Chicago,  111.,  on  account  of 
voluntary  reduction.  American  Sand  & 
Gravel  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  13. 

(j)  Chicago  rate  formerly  applicable 
from  Sioux  City,  la.,  to  Gary,  Ind.,  in 
connection  with  the  Wabash  and  C  L. 
S.  &  E.  Ry.  Co.  was  canceled  as  to 
Wabash  R.  R.  and  thereafter  established. 
Combination  rate  charged  in  interim 
found  unreasonable  and  reparation 
ordered.  Armour  &  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  18. 

(k)  Rate  advanced  and  voluntarily  re- 
duced. Reparation  awarded  on  shipment 
made  during  period  of  advancement.  Na- 
tional Paper  Mills  &  Filler  Co.  v.  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  19;  Winona 
Malting  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  21. 

(1)  Reparation  awarded  on  shipment 
of  paper  from  Munising,  Mich.,  to  Los 
Angeles,  Cal.,  on  account  of  voluntary 
reduction  in  rates.  Blake,  Moffet  & 
Towne  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  29. 

(m)  Reparation  awarded  on  shipment 
of  coal  from  Bernice,  Pa.,  to  Newton, 
N.  J.,  on  account  of  voluntary  reduction. 
Hamilton  Grange  No.  57  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  39. 

(n)  Reparation  awarded  on  two  car- 
loads of  cemect  plaster  on  account  of 
voluntary  reduction  in  rates.  Acme  Ce- 
ment Plaster  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  41. 

(o)  Reparation  awarded  on  shipment 
of  bobsleds  from  Fond  du  Lac,  Wis.,  to 
Colville,  Wash.,  on  account  of  voluntary 
reduction.  Poison  Implement  Co.  v. 
C.    M.   &   St.   P.   Ry.    Co.,   Unrep.   Op.   42. 

(p)  Reparation  awarded  on  shipment 
of  millet  seed  from  Seymour,  la.,  to  Kan- 
sas City,  Mo.,  on  account  of  voluntary 
reduction  in  rates.  Simonds-Shields 
Grain  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  43. 

(q)  Reparation  awarded  on  various 
shipments  of  wagon  springs  from  Chi- 
cago, 111.,  to  points  in  Wisconsin  on  ac- 
count of  voluntary  reduction,  in  rates. 
Tuthill  Spring  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  44. 

(r)  Rate  on  cement  and  plaster  ad- 
vanced and  subsequently  reduced;    repa- 


ration awarded  on  basis  of  reduction. 
Union  Sand  &  Material  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.   P.   Ry.   Co.,   Unrep.   Op.   52. 

(s)  Reparation  awarded  on.  shipment 
of  iron  bridge  material  from  Clinton,  la., 
to  Durand,  Wis.,  on  account  of  voluntary 
reduction  in  rates.  Clinton  Bridge  & 
Iron  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Un- 
rep. Op.  55. 

(t)  Reparation  awarded  on  three  ship- 
ments of  oil  from  Red  Wing,  Minn.,  to 
La  Crosse,  Wis.,  on  account  of  voluntary 
reduction  in  rates.  Red  Wing  Linseed 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.   59. 

(u)  Reparation  awarded  on  shipments 
of  crushed  gypsum  rock  from  Grand 
Rapids,  Mich.,  to  Copenhagen,  Tenn.,  on. 
account  of  voluntary  reduction.  Acme 
Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  62. 

(v)  Reparation  awarded  on  ship- 
ments of  candy  from  Montgomerj-,  Ala., 
to  Lake  Charles,  111.,  on  basis  of  lower 
rate  established  shortly  after  movement. 
Dreyfus  Bros.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  63. 

(w)  Reparation  awarded  on  shipment 
of  malt  from  Davenport,  la.,  to  Omaha, 
la.,  and  present  lower  rate  subsequently 
established  ordered  to  be  maintained. 
Independent  Brewing  &  Malt  Co.  v.  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  65. 

(x)  Reparation,  awarded  on  shipment 
of  flour  from  Fargo,  N.  Dak.,  to  Miles 
City,  Mont.,  and  present  lower  rate  or- 
dered to  be  maintained  for  two  years. 
Jordan  &  Sons  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  66. 

(y)  Reparation  awarded  on  shipment 
of  watermelons  from  Cone,  la.,  to  New 
Prague,  Minn.,  on  account  of  voluntary 
reduction.  Gamble-Robinson  Commis- 
sion Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Un- 
rep. Op.  70. 

(z)  Rate  on  agricultural  implements 
increased  from  17c  to  25c  subsequently 
reduced  to  20c  and  then  to  17c;  repara- 
tion awarded  on  basis  of  17c  rate. 
Rowell  Mfg.  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  71. 

(aaa)  Reparation  awarded  on  ship- 
ments of  rock-crushing  machinery  from 
Harvey,  111.,  to  Groos,  Mich.,  on  account 
of  voluntary  reduction  in  rates.  Austin 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
72. 


REPARATION,  §16   (bb)  — (tt) 


737 


(bb)  Following  Darling  &  Co.  v.  B. 
&  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  79,  reparation 
awarded  on  shipments  of  phosphate  rock 
from  Tennessee  mines  to  Canton,  O. 
Canton  Fertilizer  &  Chemical  Co.  v.  W. 
&  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  87. 

(cc)  Reparation  awarded  on  carload 
of  flaxseed  from  Council  Bluffs,  la.,  to 
Minneapolis,  Minn.,  on  account  of  vol- 
untary reduction.  Updike  Grain  Co.  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  91. 

(dd)  Reparation  awarded  on  15  car- 
loads of  cattle  from  Granby,  Colo.,  to 
Chicago.  111.,  on  account  of  establish- 
ment of  lower  rate.  Swift  &  Co.  v.  D. 
X.  W.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  92. 

(ee)  Reparation  awarded  on  ship- 
ments of  sawmill  machinery  from  Wau- 
sau.  Wis.,  to  Cravens,  La.,  on  account 
of  establishment  of  lower  rate.  Gulf 
Lumber  Co.  v:  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  95. 

(ff)  Rates  on  beer  advanced  and  sub- 
sequently reduced  to  former  rate,  during 
interim  shipment  made;  reparation 
awarded  on  basis  of  former  rate.  Schlitz 
Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  96;  Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  97, 
98,  99,  100;  Schlitz  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M. 
&   St.  P.  Ry.   Co..  Unrep.  Op.  104,  105. 

(gg)  Reparation  awarded  on  two  car- 
loads of  paving  brick  from  Graves 
Mines,  Ala.,  to  Natchez,  ]\Iiss.,  on  ac- 
count of  establishment  of  lower  rate. 
Southern  Bitulithic  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  106. 

(hh)  Reparation  awarded  on  ship 
ments  of  mixed  carloads  of  empty  beer 
barrels  and  beer  bottles,  on  basis  of 
lower  established  rate.  Pabst  Brewing 
Co.  V.  G.  V.  G.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
111. 

(iijj)  Reparation  awarded  on  three 
carloads  of  stock  cattle  from  So.  Omaha, 
Neb.,  to  Kings,  111.,  on  basis  of  Kings 
being  accorded  same  rate  as  Chicago 
which  is  an.  intermediate  point.  Ross  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  112. 

(kk)  Reduction  in  rate  subsequent  to 
shipment  is  not  conclusive  evidence"  ot 
unreasonableness  of  rate  charged.  Ham- 
mond Packing  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  120. 

(11)  Rate  advanced,  subsequently  re- 
duced; reparation  awarded  on  basis  of 
reduction;    no    material    changes    in    cir- 


cumstances and  conditions.  Winkel  & 
Co.  V.  Spokane  International  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  122. 

(mm)  Joint  through  rate  canceled, 
leaving  higher  combination  rates  in  ef- 
r^ct;  joint  through  rate  restored.  Repa- 
ration awarded.  Swift  &  Co.  v.  A.  T. 
&   S.   F.   Ry.   Co.,   Unrep.   Op.   130. 

(nn)  No  joint  through  rate  in  effect, 
combination  charged  which  is  higher 
than  subsequently  established  joint 
through  rate.  Reparation  awarded,  and 
mairtenance  of  reduced  rate  ordered. 
Northwestern  Traffic  &  Credit  Bureau 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
131. 

(oo)  Rate  charged  on  shipment  of 
tank  blocks  from  Steubenville,  O.,  to  Los 
Angeles,  Cal.,  found  unreasonable,  and 
the  subsequently  established  lower  rate 
prescribed  for  the  future.  Reparation 
awarded.  Quartz  Glass  &  I\Ifg.  Co.  v. 
P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
140. 

(pp)  Rate  on  writing  paper  from  Ap- 
pleton.  Wis.,  to  Minnesota  Transfer, 
Minn.,  found  to  be  unreasonable,  and  the 
subsequently  established  lower  rate  pre- 
scribed for  the  future.  Reparation 
awarded.  Riverside  Fibre  &  Paper  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
141. 

(qq)  Lower  combination  now  appli- 
cable via  route  shipment  moved.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Port  Huron  Engine  & 
Thresher  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  147. 

(rr)  Rate  charged  on  shipments  of 
alum  from  New  York  City  to  Basin 
Mills,  Me.,  found  unreasonable  and  the 
subsequently  established  lower  rate  pre- 
scribed for  the  future.  General  Chem- 
ical Co.  V.  I\Ie.  S.  S.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  151. 

(ss)  Upon  a  petition  asking  for  re- 
paration, reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  rates  established  by  the  car- 
riers shortly  after  the  shipments  moved. 
American  Tobacco  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  167;  Ingersoll-Rand 
Co.  V.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  Unrep.  Op. 
210. 

(tt)  Reparation  awarded  on  basis  of 
lower  rate,  subsequently  established. 
Dakota  Cereal  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  178;  International 
Harvester  Co.  of  America  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.    P.    Ry.    Co.,    Unrep.    Op.    179;    Cai^r 


738 


REPARATION,  §16  (uu)  — (ggg) 


Mfg.  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Un- 
rep.  Op.  180;  Moline  Plow  Co.  v.  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  186;  Alex- 
ander &  Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  187;  Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co. 
Co.  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  119. 

(uu)  Intermediate  clause  canceled  by 
order  of  Commission,  leaving  higher  rate 
in  effect;  subsequently  reduced.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  International  Harvester 
Co.  of  America  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  179;  Carr  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
C,   M.  &   St.  P.  Ry.   Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  180. 

(vv)  Rate  found  unreasonable  to  the 
extent  of  the  subsequently  established! 
lower  rate.  Reparation  awarded  and 
rate  ordered  maintained.  Morris  &  Co. 
vs.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
182. 

(ww)  Reparation  awarded  on  ship- 
ment of  beer  from  Milwaukee,  Wis.,  to 
Powersville,  Mo.,  and  lower  rate  sub- 
sequently established  prescribed  for  the 
future.  Val  Blatz  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  184. 

(xx)  Rate  advanced,  then  reduced  to 
former  rate.  Reparation  awarded.  Pabst 
Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  195;  Emerson  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  212. 

(yy)  Reparation  awarded  on  ship- 
ment of  ground  limestone  from  Chicago, 
111.,  to  Omaha,  Neb.,  and  lower  rate  sub- 
sequently established  prescribed  for  the 
future.  Murphy  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  192, 

(zz)  Following  the  Darling  case,  15 
I.  C.  C.  79,  reparation  awarded  against 
initial  carrier  on  shipment  of  phosphate 
rock  from  points  in  Tennessee  to  Niag- 
ara Falls,  N.  Y.  Oldbury  Electro-Chem- 
ical Co.  V.  C.  H.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  204. 

(aaaaj  Cancellation  of  intermediate 
clause  causing  higher  rate  to  be  charged. 
Specific  rate  now  in  effect.  Reparation 
awarded.  Midland  Linseed  Co,  v.  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  205; 
Thomas  Produce  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  209. 

(bbb)  Rate  on  fuel  wood  canceled, 
leaving  higher  rate  in  effect,  subsequent- 
ly restored.  Reparation  awarded  on, 
shipments  made  during  interim.  Stange 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  207. 

(cec)  Reparation  awarded  on  basis 
ot  lower   rate    subsequently   established. 


Spartanburg  Ry.,  Gas  &  Electric  Co.  v. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  214;  Steinhardt 
&  Co.  V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
215;  Carlisle  Commission  Co.  v.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  217;  Holmes 
&  Co.  V.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
218;  Wisconsin  Pulp  &  Paper  Mfrs.  v. 
D.  &.  I.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  225;  Ra- 
cine-Sattley  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  234;  Browne  v.  Ameri- 
can Express  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  237;  Herf 
&  Frerichs  Chemical  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  244;  Jackson  Grocery  Co.  v. 
S.  P.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  245;  Terhune 
Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  247;  Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  254;  Pabst 
Brewing  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  255;  Menasha  Wooden  ware 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
258;  Rudgear-Merle  Co.  v.  Goodrich 
Transit  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  264;  Milwaukee 
Corrugating  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  273;  Robinson  Clay  Product 
Co.  V.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  275; 
Gamble-Robinson  Commission  Co.  v.  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  286; 
Wisconsin  Iron  &  Metal  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  300;  Davis 
Sewing  Machine  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  301;  Hall  &  Co.  v. 
S.  P.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  306;  Cochrane  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
307. 

(ddd)  Reparation  awarded  on  shii)- 
ments  of  fire  brick  of  various  shapes, 
the  lower  rate  on  fire  brick  and  fire- 
brick tile  having  been  made  applicable 
a  short  time  after  the  movement.  West- 
ern Gas  Construction  Co.  v.  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  230. 

(eee)  Joint  rates  canceled  to  prevent 
an  apparent  discrimination  in  favor  of 
intermediate  points;  no  evidence  tending 
to  show  combination  rate  unreasonable. 
Reparation  denied.  Isbell-Brown  Co.  v. 
L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  231. 

(fff)  Rate  advanced,  subsequently  re- 
stored. Does  not  demonstrate  the  un- 
reasonableness of  the  advanced  charge. 
Reparation  denied.  Pabst  Brewing  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R}^  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
259. 

(ggg)  Rate  advanced,  subsequently 
restored.  Reparation  awarded.  Minne- 
qua  Coal  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  268;  Arnold  v.  M.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  293;  Christian  &  Co.  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  340; 


REPARATION,  §16  (hhh)— (zzz) 


739 


Abeles   &    Co.   v.   St.   L.   S.  W.   Ry.   Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  326. 

(hhh)  Following  Rule  68,  Tariff  Cir- 
cular 17 A,  reparation  awarded  on  basis 
of  lower  rate  in  effect.     Germain  Co.  v. 

A.  B.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  2<7. 

(iii)  Reduction  due  to  competitive 
conditions.  Preclude  the  finding  as  a 
fact  that  the  rate  actually  charged  was 
unreasonable.  Reparation  denied.  Ad- 
vance Thresher  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  283. 

(jjj)  No  joint  commodity  rate  in  ef- 
fect from  intermediate  point;  subsequent- 
ly made  applicable.  Reparation  awarded. 
Cochrane  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  307. 

(kkk)  Low  commodity  rate  estab- 
lished on  brick,  during  the  course  of 
construction  of  a  number  of  buildings, 
to  meet  water  competition.  Subsequent- 
ly commodity  rate  canceled,  leaving  ini 
effect  higher  class  rate.  Reparation  de- 
nied. Hammond  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  313. 

(Ill)  Commodity  rate  canceled,  leav- 
ing higher  class  rate  in  effect.  Com- 
modity rates  restored  and  reparation 
awarded.  Hope  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  T.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  336. 

(mmm)  Rate  reduced  on  application 
of  complainant.  Former  rate  not  found 
unreasonable  and  reparation  denied. 
Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  345. 

(nnn)  No  joint  or  combination  com- 
modity rates  in  effect,  on  track  bolts, 
class  rates  prohibited  by  tariffs.  Lower 
rate  than  charged  subsequently  estab- 
lished. Reparation  awarded  on  basis  of 
lower  rate   established.     Miller   v.   T.   & 

B.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  349. 

(ooo)  Rate  voluntarily  reduced.  For- 
mer rate  not  having  been  found  unrea- 
sonable, reparation  denied.  Port  Huron 
Engine  &  Thresher  Co.  v.  G.  C.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  352;  Ralston  Purina 
Co.  V.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  354. 

(ppp)  Joint  class  rate  higher  than 
combination  of  intermediates.  Subse- 
quently joint  commodity  rate  established 
lower  than  combination.  Reparation 
awarded  on  basis  of  joint  commodity 
rate  and  rate  ordered  maintained. 
Swanson  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  356. 


(qqq)  Commodity  rate  on  beer  can- 
celed, subsequently  restored.  Reparation 
awarded  on  basis  of  cancelled  rate. 
Portner  Brewing  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Un- 
rep. Op.  361;  Hope  Cotton  Oil  Co  v. 
T.   &  P.  Ry.  Co.,   Unrep.  Op.   336. 

(rrr)  Reduction  forced  by  competi- 
tive conditions  no  ground  for  reparation. 
Western  States  Portland  Cement  Co.  v, 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  363, 

(sss)  Kates  on  apples  from  Fairbury, 
Neb.,  to  El  Reno,  Okla.,  found  unrea- 
sonable because  of  reduction  and  repara- 
tion awarded.  Moon  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,   Unrep.  Op.  364. 

(ttt)  Reparation  awarded  on  basis  of 
lower  rate  subsequently  established. 
Murphy  DiStiliing  Co.  v.  E.  &  T.  H.  R. 
R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  366;  Empson  Packing 
Co.  V.  C.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  431; 
Oshkosh  Fuel  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  432;  Sims  v.  A.  C.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  434;  Oakland 
Warehouse  Co.  v.  C.  G.  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  443;  Sunderland  Bros.  Co. 
V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  445. 

(uuu)  Reduction  made  in  connection 
with  a  general  readjustment  of  rates 
and  building  of  competitive  line.  No 
ground  for  reparation.  Eddy  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  367. 

(vvv)  Reduction  and  maintenance  of 
lower  rate  by  competing  line  to  nearby 
points  no  ground  for  reparation.  Com- 
plaint dismissed.  Swife  &  Co.  v.  G.  C. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  372. 

(www)  Reparation  awarded  on  basis 
of  lower  rate  established  and  conceded 
by  carriers  to  be  reasonable.  Haas  & 
Sons  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
373. 

(xxx)  Complainant  shipped  lumber 
via  an  indirect  route  with  class  rate. 
This  rate  subsequently  reduced  to  meet 
commodity  rate  in  effect  via  direct 
route.  Reparation  cannot  be  predicated 
upon  reduction  of  the  rate  via  the  in- 
direct route  to  meet  the  rate  via  the 
short  line.  Willson  Bros.  Lumber  Co.  v. 
P.  S.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  375. 

(yyy)  Rate  in  force  prior  to  reduc- 
tion not  having  been  shown  to  have 
been  unreasonable,  complai-nt  dismissed. 
Tremont  Lumber  Co.  v.  T.  &  G.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  383. 

(zzz)  Rates  reduced  owing  to  active 
competition  amongst  carriers,  no  ground 


740 


REPARATION,  §16  (aaaa)  — (wwww) 


for    reparation.      Bearman    Fruit    Co.    v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  395. 

(aaaa)  Rate  advanced,  subsequently 
restored.  Reparation  denied  on  ship- 
ments moving  durirg  interim.  Schlitz 
Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  405. 

(bbbb)  Combination  rate  exceeded 
joint  commodity  rate  subsequently  estab 
lished.  Reparation  awarded.  Southern 
Shuttle  &  Bobbin  Co.  v.  T.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  407. 

(cccc)  Through  combination  rate 
found  unreasonable,  reduction  ordered 
and  reparation  awarded.  Chamber  of 
Commerce  of  Houston  v.  H.  E.  &  W.  T. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  408. 

(ddddeeee)  Decrease  in  value  of  com 
ro.odity  and  increase  in  volume  thereof 
resulted  in  action  by  carrier  reducing 
rates.  No  ground  for  reparation.  Coo]^ 
Co.  V.   P.   Co.,  Unrep.   Op.   421. 

(ffff)  Reparation  awarded  on  basis  of 
joint  through  rate  with  transit  privileges 
restored.  Blackwell  Milling  &  Elevator 
Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
483. 

(gggg)  Reparation  awarded  on  basis 
of  lower  rate  subsequently  established 
and  admission  of  defendant  that  former 
rate  was  unreasonable.  Paonia  Packing 
Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Ujirep.  Op. 
487. 

(hhhh)  Rate  advanced,  subsequently 
reduced,  due  to  competitive  conditions. 
Reparation  denied  on  shipments  moving 
during  interim.  Anheuser-Busch  Brew- 
ing Co.  V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  497. 

(iiii)  Reduction  in  classification  ap- 
plicable to  jacks.  Former  rate  held  un- 
reasonable and  reparation  awarded.  Elsi- 
nore  Cattle  Co.  v.  P.  Exp.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  500. 

(jjjj)  It  is  well  settled  that  the  vol- 
untary reduction  of  a  rate,  unaccom- 
panied by  proof  that  the  higher  rate 
was  unreasonable,  is  not  sufficient  basis 
for  an  award  of  reparation.  Godfrey  & 
Sons  Co.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  503. 

(kkkk)  Reduction  in  rate  on  malt 
and  increase  in  proportional  on  barley 
to  equal  local  rate  on  malt  do  not  of 
themselves  constitute  grounds  for  repa- 
ration. Electric  Malting  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  ITnrep.  Op.  504. 


(1111)  Class  rate  on  ammoniacal 
liquor  reduced  to  lower  commodity  rate. 
Reparation  awarded.  Michigan  Ammonia 
Works  V.  M.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.   511. 

(mmmm)  Reparation  awarded  on 
basis  of  lower  rate  established  to  main- 
tain relative  adjustment.  Swift  &  Co.  v. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  516; 
Buffalo  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  573. 

(nnrn)  Rates  in  effect  prior  to  reduc- 
tion admitted  to  be  unreasonable  by  car- 
riers, f-rior  to  written  admission  rate 
advanced.  No  justification  being  shown. 
HELD,  unreasonable  and  reparation 
awarded.  Swift  &  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R. 
R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  516. 

(oooopppp)  Prior  to  date  of  shipment 
Df  small  arms  ammunition  59c  rate  in  ef- 
fect. On  date  of  shipment  66c  rate  in 
effect,  and  subsequently  reduced  to  55c. 
Reparation  awarded  on  basis  of  59c 
rate.  Reynolds-Davis  &  Co.  v.  St,  L.  I. 
M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  551. 

(qqqq)  Rate  increased,  subsequently 
reduced-.  Reparation  awarded  on  ship- 
ments moving  during  interim.  Great 
Western  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  M.  K.  & 
T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  559. 

(rrrr)  Reduction  caused  by  competi- 
tive conditions.  Reparation  denied.  Elk- 
hart Bristol  Board  &  Paper  Co.  v.  C.  C. 
C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  561. 

(ssss)  Reparation  awarded  on  basis 
of  lower  rate  established  to  maintain 
relative  adjustment.  Buffalo  Fertilizer 
Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  573. 

(tttt)  Reparation  awarded  on  basis  of 
lower  commodity  rate  established  than 
class  rate  charged.  Moore  v.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  574. 

(uuuu)  Reparation  awarded  on  basis 
of  lower  minimum  established  subse- 
quent to  movement  of  traffic.  Wiscon- 
sin Bridge  &  Iron  Co.  v.  C.  ^I.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  582. 

(vvvv)  Where  a  long-established  rate 
is  raised  for  a  short  time  and  then  vol- 
untarily reduced  to  the  former  point 
the  presumption  is  that  the  advanced 
rate  is  unreasonable,  but  this  presump- 
tion may  be  overcome  by  proof  to  the 
contrary^.  Chaffia  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  585. 

(wwww)  Rate  advanced,  subsequently 
reduced  to  former  basis  in  order  to  pre- 


REPARATION,  §16  (xxxx)— §17  (i) 


741 


serve  relative  adjustment.  Reparation 
denied  on  shipments  moving  during  in- 
terim. Peerless  Woolen  Mills  v,  C.  N.  O. 
&  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  594. 

(xxxx)  No  through  rate  in  effect  at 
time  of  shipment;  combination  rate  ap- 
plied; through  rate  subsequently  estab- 
lished, which  was  lower  than  the  com- 
bination rate  applied.  Reparation  award- 
ed. Howard  &  Co.  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  50. 

(yyyy)  Tariffs  emitted  from  Pueblo, 
Colo.,  as  a  common  Colorado  point,  which 
was  adjusted  subsequent  to  movement  of 
shipments.  Reparation  awarded.  Radin- 
sky V.  Colo.  &  So.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  88. 

(zzzz)  Reparation  awarded  on  ship- 
ment of  compressed  cotton  linters  from 
Checotah,  Okla.,  to  Los  Angeles,  Cal. 
Reparation  awarded.  Checotah  Cotton 
Oil  Co.  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
143. 

(aaaaa)  Rate  advanced  on  shipment 
of  beer  from  Milwaukee,  Wis.,  to  McCook, 
Neb.,  then  reduced  to  former  rate.  Rep- 
aration awarded.  Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  195. 

(bbbbb)  Reparation  awarded  on  ship- 
ment of  empty  mineral-water  bottles  from 
Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  to  Sheboygan,  Wis.  Repa- 
ration awarded.  Sheboygan  Mineral 
Water  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
197. 

(ccccc)  Joint  rates  established  subse- 
quent to  movement  of  shipments.  Rep- 
aration denied.  Wisconsin  Pulp  &  Paper 
Mfrs.  V.  D.  &  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  225. 

§17.     Willingress    of   Carrier    to    Pay. 

See  Equalization  of  Rates,  §4  (2) 
(k);  Evidence,  §3,  §47  (e) ;  Reason- 
ableness of   Rates,   §48   (b). 

(a)  Reparation  cannot  be  awarded 
merely  on  the  admission  of  the  defend- 
ant that  the  complainant  is  the  party 
entitled  to  such  reparation.  It  must  be 
affirmatively  shown  that  the  complainant 
is  the  proper  party  entitled  to  reparation. 
Baker  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21 
I.  C.  C.  605,  607. 

(b)  Willingness  of  a  carrier  to  pay 
reparation  does  not  form  a  basis  upon 
which  the  Commission  can  make  its  find- 
ings. Cady  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  12,  14. 

(c)  An  award  of  reparation  can  be 
predicated  only  upon  an  affirmative  find- 
ing that  a  rate  exacted  was  r\  fact  ex- 


cessive, and  not  merely  upon  a  showing 
that  the  carrier  is  willing  to  honor  the 
claim.  Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  359,  360. 

(d)  On  two  carloads  of  soft  coal  from 
Green  Bay,  Wis.,  one  to  Wetonka,  and 
one  to  Leola,  S.  D.,  rates  of  $3.85  were 
charged  to  Wetonka.  and  $3.55  to  Leola. 
Wetonka  was  773  miles  from  Green  Bay 
and  Leola  784.  Sut sequent  to  the  ship- 
ment, rates  to  Leola  and  to  Wetonka  were 
established  from  Green  Bay  of  $2.85  and 
$2.70,  respectively.  Defendants  admitted 
the  rates  charged  to  be  unreasonable. 
The  rates  yielded  in  one  instance  4  mills 
and  in  tlie  other  4.4  mills  per  ton  mile. 
HELD,  reparation  could  not  be  awarded 
merely  on  the  consent  of  the  carriers, 
and  in  view  of  the  per-ton-mile  revenue 
earned,  the  rates  in  question  were  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable.  Reparation 
denied.  Pacific  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  373. 

(e)  Where,  beyond  the  agreement  be- 
tween the  parties,  no  showing  is  made 
that  charges  exacted  were  unreasonable, 
since  a  carrier  may  voluntarily  make 
lower  rates  than  it  could  le  compelled 
to  make,  the  Commission  will  not  award 
reparation  on  the  basis  of  a  rate  lower 
than  that  which  it  would  prescribe  as 
reasonable.  Pacific  Elevator  Co.  v.  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  373,  374. 

(f)  No  basis  is  afforded  for  reparation 
merely  because  the  carrier  would  con- 
sent. Werner  Saw  Mill  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  388.  390;  Pabst  Brewing 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
?59;  Pacific  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  373. 

(g)  To  sanction  as  a  just  basis  for 
reparation  a  private  understanding  prior 
to  making  shipment,  the  rate  remaining 
unchanged  until  the  shipments  were 
made,  would  be  to  establish  a  p-recedent 
for  the  grossest  discrimination  and  fa- 
voritism. Armour  Car  Lines  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
17  1.  C.  C.  461,  462. 

(h)  Upon  admission  of  defendants 
that  a  charge  of  $1.40  per  hundred 
pounds  on  a  shipment  of  a  carload  of 
rice  from  New  Orleans,  La.,  to  Billings, 
Mont.,  was  unreasonable,  and  that  $1.07 
was  a  reasonable  rate,  complainant  is 
awarded  reparation  on  the  basis  of  the 
latter  rate.  Stone-Ordean-Wells  Co.  v. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  30.  31. 

(i)  A  charge  of  40c  on  cotton  seed  in 
carloads    from    Kilbourne,    La.,    to    Pine 


742 


REPARATION,  §17   (j)— §18   (e) 


Bluff,  Ark.,  is  unreasonable  by  defend- 
ant's admission,  and  complainant  is  en- 
titled to  reparation  on  the  basis  of  a  12c 
rate  voluntarily  established  subsequent 
to  the  shipment.  Bluff  City  Oil  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  296. 
297. 

(j)  Where  on  an  agreed  statement  of 
facts  defendant  carrier  admits  the  rate 
exacted  to  be  unreasonable,  it  cannot, 
even  after  the  Commission  has  so  ruled, 
make  reparation  until  the  rate  found  to 
be  reasonable  is  published  by  defendant. 
Venus  V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.  C.  136,  137. 

(k)  Where  upon  shipments  of  plaster 
from  Grand  Rapids,  Mi^h,  to  Milwaukee, 
Wis.,  defendant  admits  that  its  rate  of 
9c  was  published  by  mistake,  and  is  un- 
just and  unreasonable,  and  where  by  a 
supplemental  tariff  it  later  establishes  a 
rate  of  IV2C,  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  rep- 
aration on  the  basis  of  that  rate,  and 
defendant  will  be  ordered  to  maintain  it 
for  a  period  of  two  years.  Grand  Rapids 
Plaster  Co.  v.  Pere  Marquette  R.  R.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  571,  572. 

IV.     LIABILITY  FOR  REPARATION. 
§18.     Measure  of  Reparation. 

See  Procedure  Before  Commission, 
§5  (i);  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§23  (g);  Routing  and  IVIisrouting, 
§9. 

(a)  Where  a  railroad  charges  plaintiff 
shipper  a  higher  rate  than  it  charges 
a  competing  shipper  on  a  portion  of  the 
latter's  shipments  plaintiff  is  entitled  to 
recover  the  difference  between  these 
charges  on  the  whole  amount  shipped  by 
him  during  a  given  period  and  is  not  lim- 
ited to  recovering  the  difference  between 
the  charge  levied  on  plaintiff  and  the 
average  charge  levied  on  his  competitor 
during  said  period.  Penn.  R,  R.  Co.  v. 
International  Coal  Mining  Co.,  173  Fed. 
1,  6. 

(b)  Where  there  is  no  showing  that 
complainant  has  been  damaged  by  the 
payment  of  a  lower  rate  by  one  not  his 
competitor,  the  Commission  does  not 
think  complainant  is  entitled  to  repara- 
tion. Carter  White  Lead  Co.  v.  N.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  41,  44. 

(c)  The  Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  Co.  paid 
to  coal  operators  who  had  sold  their  out- 
put to  the  Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.,  which 
it  owned,  large  sums  of  money  on  ship- 
ments  which   such   operators   had   made 


between  Nov.  1,  1900,  and  Aug.  1,  1901, 
on  account  of  a  readjustment  of  freight 
rates  pending  during  that  period  and 
finally  consummated  at  the  end  of  that 
year.  Such  refunds  were  not  made  to 
complainants,  who  were  shippers  of  coal 
from  the  same  district.  HELD,  that  as 
complainants  had  paid  higher  rates  than 
other  coal  shippers  similarly  situated, 
they  were  unjustly  discriminated-  against 
and  damaged,  for  wiuch  reparation  will 
be  awarded.  Meeker  &.  Co.  v.  Lel'igh 
Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  129,  137. 

(d)  The  measure  of  damages  is  the 
difference  between  a  discriminatory  rate 
charged  and  a  rate  found  reasonable. 
Sondheimer .  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  606,  611. 

(e)  Complainant,  engaged  in  the  fab- 
rication of  structural  iron  at  Ottumwa, 
la,  shipped  five  carloads  of  same  in  the 
summer  of  1907  over  defendants'  lines 
to  Kansas  City,  Mo.,  at  the  fifth  class 
rate  of  22c  per  100  lbs.  in  carloads. 
Shortly  thereafter,  other  carriers  taking 
the  lead,  defendants  reduced  their  rate 
to  16c.  Since  1905  another  carrier  had 
in  effect  a  rate  of  16c  on  this  commodity 
from  Des  Moines  to  Kansas  City.  Ot- 
tumwa is  directly  intermediate  between 
Des  Moines  and  Kansas  City,  on  de- 
fendants' line.  Early  in  1908  defendants 
established  a  proportional  lie  rate  from 
Des  Moines  to  Kansas  City  on  traffic 
originating  east  of  the  Illinois-Indiana 
line.  Competitors  of  complainant  were 
located  at  Des  Moines  and  Clinton,  la., 
St.  Louis  and  Chicago,  and  iron  fabri- 
cated at  said  points  came  largely  from 
Pittsburgh.  The  rates  from  points  of 
fabrication  to  Kansas  City,  added  to  the 
rates  from  Pittsburgh  to  those  points, 
practically  equaled  the  through  rates 
from  Pittsburgh  direct  to  Kansas  City. 
The  22c  rate  from  Ottumwa  to  Kansas 
City  complained  of  was  established  when 
there  was  little  movement  of  structural 
iron  from  Ottumwa  to  Kansas  City. 
Complainant  purchased  the  five  carloads 
with  a  knowledge  of  the  22c  rate,  and 
made  its  bid  upon  that  basis.  After  the 
shipment  of  the  five  cars,  conplainant 
obtained  the  benefit  of  the  reduced  rate 
on  subsequent  shipments.  HELD,  that 
complainant  was  not  entitled  to  repara- 
tion on  said  five  cars.  Ottumwa  Bridge 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
121,  126. 


REPARATION,  §19  (a)— (j) 


743 


§19.     Parties  to  Make  Refund. 

See  Procedure  ^fore  Commission, 
§13  (s);  Routing  and  IVlisrouting, 
§10:  Througli  Routes  and  Joint 
Rates,  §22   (e),    (h). 

(a)  Findings  of  facts  made  by  the 
Commission  as  to  the  application  of  a 
classification  rule  by  all  carriers  in 
Official  Classification  territory  are  ap- 
propriate as  the  basis  for  the  awarding 
of  damages  only  to  the  extent  that 
they  apply  to  the  particular  carriers 
which  w^ere  before  it.  Fels  &  Co.  v. 
P.  R.   R.   Co.,    23   I.   C.   C.   483,   486. 

(b)  Where  one  factor  of  a  combina- 
tion rate  is  found  unreasonable  an 
award  of  reparation  will  issue  only 
against  the  carrier  responsible  for  the 
excessive  charge.  Wheeler  Lumber, 
Bridge  &  Supply  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  & 
S.   Ry.   Co.,   23  I.   C.   C.   514,  515. 

(c)  Where  a  carrier  published  a  joint 
tariff  offering  delivery  on  the  track 
of  one  of  its  connections,  who,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  had  not  concurred,  and 
which  refused  to  deliver  without  the 
payment  of  switching  charges,  which 
forced  the  consignee  to  dray  the  ship- 
ment, such  dmyage  charges  constituted 
the  measure  of  damages  for  which  repa- 
ration should  be  awarded  against 
the  carrier  publishing  the  unauthorized 
tariff.  Edison  Portland  Cement  Co.  v, 
D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
382. 

(d)  Where  part  of  a  joint  through 
rate  is  found  unreasonable  and  the  car- 
riers for  the  part  of  transportation 
for  which  the  rate  is  found  unreason- 
able are  parties  defendant,  reparation 
may  be  awarded  against  such  carriers, 
although  the  delivering  carrier  whose 
local  rate  formed  part  of  the  through 
joint  rate,  which  local  rate  is  not  at- 
tacked, is  not  a  party  defendant.  Wil- 
lamette Pulp  &  Paper  Co.  v.  B.  &  A. 
R.  R.  Co..  21  I.  C.  C.  178,  180. 

(e)  Where  on  a  shipment  from  Low- 
ell, Mass.,  to  Denver,  Colo.,  an  excess- 
ive charge  accrues  wholly  to  the  line 
west  of  the  river,  that  carrier  alone 
is  the  one  to  make  reparation.  Colo- 
rado Tent  &  Awning  Co.  v.  B.  &  M. 
R.  R.  Co.,   21  I.  C.  C.   565,   566. 

(f)  The  Commission  awards  repara- 
tion on  account  of  unreasonable  charges 
and  expresses  the  opinion  that  carriers 
should  join  in  its  payment  upon  the 
basis   of   their   respective   divisions,   but 


no  order  to  that  effect  made.  Young- 
blood  V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C. 
569,   572. 

(g)  Where  lake  lines  received  the 
entire  advance  of  a  joint  through  rate, 
an  order  for  reparation  condemning 
such  advance  win  be  directed  against 
the  lake  lines  alone.  Wyman,  Part- 
ridge &  Co.  V.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  19  I. 
C.    C.    551,    553. 

(h)  Roads  participating  in  collection 
of  unreasonable  rates  should  refund  on 
basis  of  agreed  divisions  of  lower  rea- 
sonable rates.  National  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  370,  371. 

(1)  On  a  carload  of  syrup  from  St. 
Joseph,  Mo.,  to  Pullman,  Wash.,  moved 
via  the  Chicago  Great  Western  R.  R., 
Soo  Line,  Can.  Pac.  R.  R.,  Spokane  In- 
ternational R.  R.  and  Oregon  R.  R.  & 
Navigation  Co.,  the  published  rate  of 
$1.2214  was  collected.  The  agent  of  the 
Soo  Line  soliciting  the  business  mis- 
takenly quoted  a  rate  of  97i/^c,  and  com- 
plainant gave  routing  instructions  ac- 
cordingly. Before  the  shipment  was  de- 
livered to  the  Soo  Line  at  Minnesota 
Transfer  the  agent  discovered  his  mis- 
take and  requested  the  Chicago  Great 
Western  R.  R.  to  divert  the  shipment  to 
the  N.  P.  Ry.  at  Minnesota  Transfer,  so 
as  to  make  the  9714c  rate  apply.  The 
request  was  made  in  time,  but  the  di- 
version was  not  accomplished.  Prior 
to  the  shipment  a  97i/^c  rate  was  appli- 
cable over  other  routes,  and  subsequent 
thereto  defendants  put  into  effect  this 
rate.  The  Chicago  Great  Western  R.  R. 
and  the  Soo  Line  admitted  that  one  of 
them  was  liable.  HELD,  the  rate  ex- 
acted being  unreasonable,  reparation 
should  fall  upon  all  the  carriers  par- 
ticipating, for  although  the  Chicago 
Great  Western  R.  R.  might  have  been 
negligent  in  failing  to  divert  the  car 
there  was  a  primary,  as  well  as  a 
greater,  duty  of  all  the  participating 
carriers  to  have  reasonable  rates  in 
effect.  National  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  G.  W. 
Ry.   Co.,   18  I.  C.  €.   370,  371. 

(j)  Where  defendant  carriers  admit 
the  unreasonableness  of  the  charge  but 
do  not  stipulate  as  to  which  one  of 
them  reparation  shall  be  assessed 
against,  the  order  will  be  entered 
against  all  of  them,  leaving  them  to 
adjust  the  division  of  reparation  among 
themselves  according  to  their  rules. 
Davenport  Pearl  Button  Co.  v.  C.  B.  & 
Q.   R.   R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.   C.  193,   194. 


744 


REPARATION,   §19    (k)  — (v) 


(k)  Wh€re  the  initial  carrier  charges 
an  excessive  rate  for  its  proportion  of 
the  haul  and  misrouting  the  shipment, 
complainant  is  entitled  to  reparation  for 
both  injuries  from  the  initial  carrier 
alone,  and  the  latter  has  no  recourse 
against  the  connecting  carrier.  Noble  v. 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  186. 
187. 

(1)  Where  upon  a  through  shipment 
the  rate  is  made  up  of  the  combination 
of  locals,  and  the  local  charge  of  the 
initial  carrier  is  reasonable  and  of  the 
connecting  carriers  is  unreasonable, 
reparation  will  be  awarded  only  against 
the  connecting  carriers.  Sunderland 
Bros.  Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.   C.  212,   213. 

(m)  Where  contrary  to  shipper's  in- 
structions, a  shipment  of  phosphate  rock 
is  diverted  to  the  wrong  intermediate 
carrier,  resulting  in  higher  charge,  the 
diverting  carrier  must  assume  responsi- 
bility for  the  overcharge.  Woodward  & 
Dickerson  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  170,  173. 

(n)  Complainant  shipped  carloads  of 
crude  phosphate  rock  from  St.  Blaise, 
Tenn.,  to  Riddlesburg,  Pa.,  and  specific- 
ally routed  the  same.  Defendant  con- 
necting carrier  had  joined  in  the  joint 
rate  and  through  route  specified  and  its 
tariffs  did  not  reserve  the  ri^ht  of  diver- 
sion to  any  other  route  over  which  a 
higher  rate  would  legally  be  applicable. 
The  bill  of  lading  furnished  to  complain- 
ant, however,  made  such  reservation.  De- 
fendant diverted  the  shipments  to  an 
other  connecting  carrier  taking  a  higher 
rate,  which  was  exacted  of  complainant. 
HELD,  reparation  should  be  awarded 
against  said  defendant  for  the  diversion. 
Woodward  &  Dickerson  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  170,  173. 

(o)  Carriers  who  received  no  part  of 
the  charges  and  who  did  not  participate 
in  the  movement  of  the  commodity  are 
not  liable  to  refund  the  whole  or  any 
part  of  the  rate  for  the  movement  of  a 
shipment  in  which  they  did  not  partici- 
pate. The  liability  is  restricted  to  those 
carriers  who  participated  in  the  trans- 
portation of  the  lumber  via  their  respec- 
tive routes  over  which  the  several  ship- 
ments moved  and  who  shared  in  the 
transportation  charges  therefor,  and  such 
carriers  are  jointly  and  severally  liable 
to  the  persons  found  to  be  entitled  to  the 
refund.  Nicola,  Stone  &  Myers  Co.  v. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  199.  209. 


(p)  Carriers  participating  in  the  trans- 
portation of  lumber  via  their  respective 
roads  over  which  the  several  shipments 
move,  and  sharing  in  the  transportation 
charges  therefor,  are  jointly  and  severally 
liable  to  refund  overcharges.  Nicola. 
Stone  &  Myers  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  199,  209. 

(q)  Where  defendants  charge  an  ex- 
cessive joint  rate,  complainant  shipper  is 
entitled  to  an  order  of  reparation  against 
both,  leaving  them  to  make  a  proper  ad- 
justment between  themselves.  Hayden 
&  Westcott  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  &  S.  I.  R 
R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  537,  538. 

(r)  On  a  carload  of  glass  fruit  jars 
from  Greenfield,  Ind.,  to  Calico  Rock, 
Ark.,  complainant  was  assessed  53i/^c. 
made  up  of  16%c  to  Cairo  and  37c  from 
Cairo  to  Calico  Rock.  Shortly  after  thr. 
movement  in  question,  defendants  low- 
ered the  37c  rate  to  29c,  making  the  total 
451/^c,  and  at  the  hearing  admitted  the 
unreasonableness  of  the  rate  charged. 
HELD,  reparation  should  be  awarded  on 
the  basis  of  45i^c  against  the  connecting 
carrier  from  Cairo  to  destination  only,  the 
initial  carriers  not  being  narties  to  the 
37c  rate  and  their  joint  rate  of  16V^c  ex- 
tending only  from  Greenfield  to  Cairo. 
American  Grocer  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L. 
Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  293,  294. 

(s)  The  rule  under  which  the  charge 
was  made  was  a  joint  regulation  of  two 
carriers,  one  operating  within  the 
United  States,  the  other  in  Canada;  the 
award  of  reparation  will  run  against  the 
domestic  carrier  alone.  Brunswick- 
Balke-Collender  Co.  v.  G.  T.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.    Op.    334. 

(t)  Reparation  awarded  against  in- 
itial line  where  shipment  moves  on  joint 
rate  when  such  initial  line  for  its  own 
convenience  furnishes  two  smaller  cars 
in  lieu  of  a  larger  car  ordered,  even 
though  the  tariff  carrying  the  joint  rate 
fails  to  contain  such  a  provision.  Mo- 
line  Plow  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  419. 

(u)  Reparation  awarded  against  in- 
itial line,  wi'-hout  contribution  from  con- 
nections, for  furnishing  two  cars  for 
shipment  of  flagpole  when  equipment 
was  available  for  loading  in  one.  Calvi 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Rv.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
461. 

(v)  It  is  well  settled  that  where  an 
unreasonable  joint  rate  has  been  col- 
lected the  liability  of  the  parties  to  such 


REPARATION,  §19  (w)— §21  (f) 


745 


action  is  joint  and  several,  and  the  Com- 
mission may  award  reparation  against 
one  of  the  roaJs  which  participated  in 
the  traffic,  even  though  other  roads 
which  performed  a  part  of  the  service 
are  not  made  parties  defendant.  West- 
ern Hardwood  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P. 
&  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  463. 

(w)  Joint  rate  exceeded  certain  com- 
bination of  commodity  rates.  Upon  ex- 
amination of  tariffs  carrying  the  com- 
modity rates,  it  is  found  that  the  lines 
on  whose  rails  the  traffic  originated  are 
not  parties  thereto.  Complaint  dis- 
missed. Carpenter  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  529. 

(x)  Intermediate  carrier  not  made 
party  defendant,  but  may  join  in  the 
payment  of  reparation.  Janesville  Barb 
Wire  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Rv.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.   537. 

§20.     Release  of  Liability. 

(a)  Complainant,  by  an  agreement 
ratified  on  May  14,  1909,  released  the  de- 
fendants from  any  liability  on  all  claims 
of  whatsoever  kind  and  nature  for  rep- 
aration on  the  advances  in  rates  of 
freight  on  yellow  pine  lumber  growing 
out  of  the  2c  advance  south  of  the  river, 
litigated  in  the  Tift  Yellow  Pine  case.  On 
July  10,  1909,  it  filed  complaint  asking 
reparation  on  the  shipments  here  in  ques- 
tion, which  claim  had  not  at  the  time  of 
executing  the  release  been  filed  with  the 
Commission  or  in  a  court  of  justice. 
HELD,  complainant  is  not  entitled  to  any 
reparation.  Deeves  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  & 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  482,  486, 

(b)  Pefendants  are  authorized  to 
carry  out  an  agreement  made  with  com- 
plainants for  the  satisfaction  of  claims 
on  shipments  of  lumber  based  on  the  de- 
cisions in  Tift  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  10  I. 
C.  C.  548  and  707;  Central  Yellow  Pine 
Ass'n  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  10  I.  C.  C.  505. 
the  cause  of  said  complaints  being  the 
same  as  in  Joice  &  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  239.  Jenks  Lumber  Co.  v.  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  58. 

V.     PROCEDURE. 

See   Cars   and   Car  Supply,   VI. 

§21.     Formal    Proceedings. 

See  Procedure  Before  Commission, 
§1  (h),  §2  (g),  (h),  (q),  (t),  (u), 
(w),  (x),  (bb),  (cc),  (nn);  Claims, 
§7. 

(a)  Reparation  will  not  ordinarily  be 
awarded  in  formal  cases  unless  intent  to 


demand  reparation  is  specifically  dis- 
closed before  submission  of  the  case.  UU- 
man  v.  American  Express  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C 
354,  355. 

(b)  Where  a  complaint  seeking  rep- 
aration is  not  supported  by  expense  bills, 
or  other  evidence,  and  there  is  nothing 
before  it  to  find  as  a  fact  that  the  ship- 
ments actually  moved  or  that  the  charges 
were  collected  as  claimed,  reparation  can- 
not be  awarded  even  though  the  allega- 
tions are  admitted  by  the  carrier.  Inter- 
national Harvester  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  222,  223. 

(c)  Where  a  shipper  claims  repara- 
tion on  the  ground  that  he  was  furnished 
a  larger  car  than  the  one  ordered,  but 
has  no  written  evidence  of  the  order 
given  by  him  and  the  evidence  as  to  the 
kind  of  car  actually  ordered  is  conflict- 
ing, reparation  will  be  denied.  Pope  Mfg. 
Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  400, 
403. 

(d)  While  a  long  course  of  dealing  be- 
tween the  shipper  and  the  carrier  involv- 
ing daily  or  frequent  shipments  of  auto- 
mobiles from  a  definite  station  might  so 
familiarize  the  carrier's  agents  at  thai 
point  with  the  requirements  of  the 
shipper  in  the  way  of  equipment  as  to 
justify  a  holding  that  an  order  for  a  car 
for  three  automobiles  was  sufficient  to 
charge  the  carrier  with  notice  that  a  36- 
ft.  car  was  wanted,  such  a  relationship 
between  shipper  and  carrier  must  be 
clearly  made  out  before  reparation  can 
be  awarded  on  that  basis  for  the  exaction 
by  the  carrier  of  the  minimum  for  a 
larger  car  than  the  one  alleged  to  be 
ordered.  Pope  Mfg.  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  400,  403. 

(e)  On  a  claim  for  reparation  based 
upon  the  alleged  unlawful  exaction  of 
demurrage,  the  charges  being  dependent 
upon  a  question  of  fact  in  each  instance, 
in  the  absence  of  specific  proof  as  to 
each  car,  the  Commission  could  not  make 
the  award.  Murphy  Bros.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  & 
H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  457,  459. 

(f)  Where  a  complaint  attacking  a 
rate  is  not  accompanied  by  a  claim  for 
reparation,  and  the  Commission  estab- 
lishes a  lower  rate  for  the  future,  its 
findings  are  not  to  be  understood  as 
forming  a  basis  for  a  subsequent  claim 
of  reparation.  Minneapolis  Thresh.  Mach. 
Co.  V.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
193.  194. 


746 


REPARATION,  §21  (g)— §23  (b) 


(g)  Where,  under  a  complaint  seeking 
reparation,  complainant  asks  leave  to 
amend  so  as  to  include  another  ship- 
ment, but  fails  to  file  its  amendment, 
and  the  record  shows  that  the  charges 
complained  of  were  in  fact  never  paid  by 
complainant,  the  matter  of  reparation  on 
such  other  carload  is  not  before  the  Com- 
mission for  determination.  Bluff  City 
Oil  Co.  V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  296,  297. 

(h)  Complainant  asked  for  an  order 
directing  defendant  suburban  railway  to 
establish  through  rates  on  its  line  run- 
ning part  of  ihe  way  from  Newfane,  N. 
Y.,  to  Pittsburg,  Pa.,  and  prayed  for 
reparation  on  a  certain  shipment  of  ap- 
ples between  said  points.  Defendant 
thereafter  filed  a  tariff  satisfactory  to 
complainant,  which  consented  to  a  dis- 
missal of  its  complaint  respecting  same. 
Complainant  stated  that  it  was  not  at 
present  prepared  to  establish  its  claim 
for  reparation  for  many  other  shipments 
over  defendant's  line,  and  defendant 
denied  the  charges  for  said  shipments 
were  excessive.  HELD,  the  complaint 
might  be  dismissed  without  prejudice  to 
complainant's  right  to  file  claim  for 
reparation  at  a  l:.ter  date.  Long  &  Co.  v. 
International  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  116,  117. 

(i)  Proceedings  for  reparation  before 
the  Commission  for  indemnitory  demages 
are  purely  statutory  and  correspond  to 
actions  at  law  sounding  in  tort.  If  an 
injury  is  sustained  on  account  of  a  viola- 
tion of  law  the  proceeding  is  in  its  nature 
ex  delicto,  and.  therefore,  carries  with 
it  none  of  the  features  or  incidents  of  an 
action  ex  contractu.  No  protest  is  neces- 
sary where  an  injury  is  inflicted  by  the 
commission  of  a  tort.  The  violation  of 
the  law  produces  the  injury  and  com- 
pletes the  offense,  and  the  person  injured 
does  not  have  to  perform  any  conditions 
to  entitle  him  to  recover  for  the  damage 
sustained.  Southern  Pine  Lumber  Co. 
V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  195. 

(j)  Where  a  shipper  in  a  proceeding 
before  the  Commission  has  proven  the 
granting  of  undue  preference  in  wharfing 
privileges  by  defendant  terminal  com- 
pany, but  has  failed  to  submit  sufficiently 
specific  evidence  of  loss  in  his  claim  for 
reparation,  the  Commission  will  allow 
him  additional  time  for  putting  in  such 
proof.  Carl  Eichenberg  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  14 
1.   C.  C.   250.   271. 


§22.     Informal    Proceedings. 
See    Claims,    II. 

(a)  No  reparation  will  be  awarded  on 
informal  proceedings  which  would  not 
be  awarded  under  the  same  set  of  facts  in 
z  contested  case,  and  in  face  of  the  de- 
fendant's opposition,  instead  of  its  ad- 
mission. The  Commission  cannot  accept 
as  conclusive  any  stipulation  of  parties 
as  to  the  reasonableness  of  a  rate  or  a 
transportation  regulation.  The  Commis- 
sion's conclusions  on  such  matters  must 
be  reached  with  a  due  consideration  for 
the  conclusions  which  it  has  already  an- 
nounced On  the  same  subject,  and  for  the 
knowledge  which  it  has  gathered  with 
relation  thereto  in  other  cases  and  in- 
vestigations. The  willingness  of  a  ship- 
per to  receive  and  of  a  carrier  to  pay 
reparation  upon  certain  traffic,  or  under 
certain  rates,  can  be  approved  by  the 
Commission  only  under  a  clear  and  de- 
cisive showing  of  facts  which  would  lead 
the  Commission  to  award  that  reparation, 
in  opposition  to  that  carri:3r's  wishes, 
and  under  which  it  would  also  award 
reparation  to  all  others  who  might  have 
shipped  during  the  same  period  under  the 
same  rate  and  under  substantially  similar 
circumstances  and  conditions.  Swift  & 
Co.  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  426, 
428. 

(b)  Proof  for  reparation  should  con- 
sist of  a  verified  statement  by  complain- 
ant, si  owing  date  and  weight  of  the 
shipmc  ,ts,  date  of  payment  and  the 
reparation  claimed.  Robertson  Bros.  v. 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  126. 

§23.     Court  Pleadings. 

See    Act   to    Regulate    Commerce,    IV 
(a). 

(a)  In  a  suit  in  a  state  court  to  re- 
cover reparation  for  unjust  discrimina- 
tion, the  court  is  not  required  by  section 
14  of  the  Act,  in  order  to  make  the  reports 
of  the  Commission  competent  evidence, 
to  take  judicial  notice  of  the  decisions  of 
the  Commission  where  they  are  not  men- 
tioned in  the  pleadings  or  in  the  agreed 
statement  of  facts.  This  provision  makes 
the  decisions  of  the  Commission  as  pub- 
lished admissible  in  evidence  without 
other  proof  of  their  genuineness,  but 
does  not  relieve  litigarts  from  the  neces- 
sity of  offering  them  in  evidenc  j.  Robin- 
son V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  2?2  U.  S.  506, 
512,  32  Sup.  Ct.  114,  56  L.  ed.  288. 

(b)  In  a  suit  in  a  United  States  Cir- 
cuit   Court    to    recover    the    excess    of 


REPARATION,  §21  (c)— RESTRICTED  RATES,  I  (a) 


747 


freight  charges  exacted  above  the  pub- 
lished rate,  the  declaration  failed  m 
terms  to  state  the  particular  rates  that 
had  been  passed  upon  by  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  but  indicated 
that  it  was  the  purpose  of  plaintiff  by 
reference  to  incorporate  the  pertinent 
facts  of  the  decisions  into  the  declara- 
tion, HELD,  in  determining  the  suffi- 
ciency of  the  declaration  upon  demurrer, 
the  court  might  examine  the  facts  set  out 
in  the  decisions  referred  to.  Phillips  Co. 
V.  G.  T.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  195  Fed.  12,  16. 

(c)  Under  section  14  of  the  Act  re- 
quiring the  Commission  in  case  damages 
are  awarded  to  include  in  its  report  the 
findings  of  fact  on  which  the  award  is 
made  and  under  section  IG  of  the  Act 
providing  that,  in  a  suit  to  recover  in  a 
United  States  Circuit  Court  the  excess 
charge,  the  suit  shall  proceed  in  all  re- 
spects like  all  civil  suits  for  damages  ex- 
cept that  the  finding  and  order  of  the 
Commission  shall  be  prima  facie  evidence 
of  the  facts  therein  stated,  any  order  of 
award,   conclusion,   opinion   or   argument 

'Of  the  Commission  must  be  eliminated 
in  determining  the  sufficiency  of  a  dec- 
laration which  includes  said  report,  since 
it  is  only  facts  found  by  the  Commission 
and  alleged  in  the  declaration  that  can 
be  considered  in  deciding  whether  or  not 
a  cause  of  action  is  stated.  Darnell- 
Taenzer  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  190  Fed. 
G59,  663. 

(d)  Where  in  an  action  at  law  for 
damages,  a  count  from  the  declaration 
sets  forth  facts  showing  a  right  of  action 
to  recover  for  unlawful  discrimination 
under  the  Act  of  Feb.  4,  1887,  and  in- 
cludes also  insufficient  allegations  for 
the  purpose  of  making  defendant  liable 
for  triple  damages  under  the  Sherman 
Act  of  July  2,  1890,  such  allegations  will 
be  treated  as  surplusage  on  demurrer, 
and  the  count  sustained  as  alleging  a 
cause  of  action  under  the  Act  of  1887. 
American  Union  Coal  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,  159  Fed.  278,  279. 


REPORTS. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 
See     Common     Carrier,     §3     (b),     (c), 
(cc);    Interstate   Commerce,   §4    (k) ; 
Procedure    Before    Commission.    §18 
(a);   Water  Carriers,   §2    (a),    (b). 

I.     JURISDICTION  OF  COMMISSION. 

(a)     In  passing  section  20  of  the  Act 
giving  the  Commission  authority  to  pre- 


scribe an  accounting  system  and  to  re- 
quire reports  of  carriers  covering  both 
interstate  and  intrastate  business.  Con- 
gress did  not  exceed  its  i-ower  under 
the  commerce  clause  of  the  Constitution. 
L  C.  C.  v.  Goodrich  Co.,  224  U.  S.  194,  214; 
32  Sup.  Ct.  436,  56  L.  ed.  729. 

(aa)  Under  section  20  of  the  Act  as 
amended  by  the  Act  of  June  18,  1910,  the 
Commission  has  power  to  require  the  car- 
riers engaged  in  interstate  commerce  to 
make  monthly  reports  of  instances  of 
service  in  excess  of  the  time  allowed, 
provided  a  separate  form  of  oath  is  ac- 
cepted in  lieu  of  such  reports  in  cases 
where  no  employe  has  been  employed  in 
excess  of  the  time  named  in  the  Act.  B. 
&  O,  R.  R.  v.  I.  C.  C,  221  U.  S.  612,  620, 
31   Sup.  Ct.   621,  55  L.  ed.  878. 

(b)  An  order  of  the  Commission  un- 
der the  Act  as  amended  requiring  the 
secretary  or  similar  officer  of  carriers  en- 
gaged in  interstate  commerce  to  make 
monthly  reports  of  violations  of  the  re- 
strictions as  to  hours  of  service  of  em- 
ployes is  not  in  violation  of  the  4th  and 
5th  amendments  of  the  Constitution  relat- 
ing to  unreasonable  search  and  seizure 
and  self-crimination.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  v.  I. 
C.  C,  221  U.  S.  612,  622,  31  Sup.  Ct.  621, 
55  L.  ed.  878. 

(c)  Section  20  of  the  Act  merely  au- 
thorizes the  Commission  to  require  re- 
ports from  common  carriers  and  owners 
engaged  in  interstate  commerce  and  in 
the  absence  of  such  an  order  by  the  Com- 
mission, mandamus  will  not  lie  to  compel 
carriers  to  make  such  reports.  U.  S.  v. 
Union  S.  &  T.  Co.,  192  Fed.  330,  343. 

(d)  Under  section  20  of  the  Act  au- 
thorizing the  Commission  to  require  re- 
ports from  owners  of  railroads,  a  lessor 
of  a  railroad  is  an  owner  within  the 
meaning  of  the  provision.  U.  S.  v.  Union 
S.  &  T.  Co.,  192  Fed.  330,  340. 

RES  ADJUDICATA. 

See    Evidence,    V. 

RESTRICTED  RATES. 


See  Discrimination, 
Privileges,    §11. 


i;  Facilities  and 


I.     LEGALITY. 

(a)  Rates  on  coal  which  are  applica- 
ble only  to  shipments  of  certain  consign- 
ors or  consignees,  condemned.  In  Re 
Restricted  Rates,  20  I.  C.  C.  426. 


748 


RESTRICTED  RATES,  I   (b)— ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING. 


(b)  A  tariff  providing  for  reduced 
rates  on  coal  used  for  steam  purposes  or 
that  the  carrier  will  refund  parts  of  the 
regular  tariff  charges  on  presentation  of 
evidence  that  the  coal  was  so  used  is  im- 
proper and  unlawful,  because  the  carrier 
has  no  right  to  attempt  to  dictate  the 
uses  to  which  commodities  transported 
by  it  shall  be  put  in  order  to  enjoy  a 
transportation  rate.  In  Re  Restricted 
Rates,  20  I.   C.   C.  426,  427. 

(c)  Where  the  stock  in  one  railway 
company  is  owned  by  another  railway 
company,  but  both  maintain  separate  or- 
ganizations and  report  separately  to 
Commission,  they  may  not  carry  freight 
free  for  each  other.  In  Re  Restrictel 
Rates,  20  I.  C.  C.  426,  427. 

(d)  A  lease  by  a  carrier  of  trackage 
rights  over  a  connecting  line  to  a  quarry 
for  hauling  ballast  for  use  on  its  own 
line  cannot  be  sanctioned,  as  such  a 
course  would  result  in  discrimination.  In 
Re  Restricted  Rates,  20  I.  C.  C.  426,  428. 

(ef)  A  carrier  may  not  lawfully  trans- 
port free  or  at  reduced  rates  materials 
for  building,  or  repairs  on,  a  refrigera- 
tion plant  built  under  contract  with  the 
carrier,  but  which  also  engages  in  com- 
mercial ice  business.  In  Re  Restricted 
Rates,  20  I.  C.  C.  426,  428. 

(g)  The  Commission  would  not  sanc- 
tion an  arrangement  for  a  lease  by  a 
carrier  of  trackage  right  over  a  connect- 
ing line  to  quarry  for  the  purpose  of  haul 
ing  from  that  quarry  with  its  own  crew 
and  equipment  ballast  for  use  on  its  line, 
such  arrangement  being  regarded  as  de- 
vice to  evade  lawful  rates.  In  Re  Re- 
stricted Rates,  20  I.  C.  C.  420,  428. 

(h)  Persons  and  commodities  trans- 
ported for  use  in  serving  others  than  pas- 
sengers and  employes  may  not  lawfully 
be  carried  except  under  regular  tariff 
rates.  In  Re  Restricted  Rates,  20  I.  C.  C. 
426,  428. 

(i)  It  is  unjustly  discriminatory 
against  dealers  on  its  line  for  an  inter- 
state carrier  to  operate  a  commissary 
car.  In  Re  Restricted  Rates,  20  I.  C.  C. 
426,  428. 

(j)  Discrimination  would  necessarily 
result  from  a  lease  by  an  interstate  car- 
rier of  the  trackage  rights  over  connect- 
ing line  to  a  quarry  for  the  purpose  of 
hauling  with  its  own  crew  ballast  for  use 
on  its  line.  In  Re  Restricted  Rates,  20 
I.  C.  C.  426,  428. 


(k)  A  carrier  has  the  unquestioned 
right  to  haul  its  own  property  on  its  own 
rails.  In  Re  Restricted  Rates,  20  I.  C.  C. 
426,  431. 

(1)  The  local  rate  to  a  junction  point 
should  be  the  same  for  all  shippers  to 
that  point,  and  the  through  charge  on 
shipments  going  beyond  that  junction 
should  be  alike  for  all  shippers  to  the 
same  destination.  In  Re  Restricted 
Rates,  20  I.  C.  C.  426,  434. 

(m)  Restricting  rates  to  a  certain  con- 
signee or  when  commodity  is  put  to  a 
particular  use  constitutes  unjust  dis- 
crimination. In  Re  Restricted  Rates,  20 
I.  C.  C.  426,  437. 

(n)  Tariffs  which  contain  rates  ap- 
plicable only  to  the  shipment  of  certain 
consignees,  or  when  a  commodity  is  put 
to  a  particular  use  and  the  rates  which 
are  so  restricted  to  the  use  of  certain 
shippers  and  not  open  to  all  shippers 
alike  are  in  violation  of  section  2  of  the 
Act,  and  unjust  discrimination  in  viola- 
tion of  section  3  of  the  Act,  and  therefore' 
unlawful.  In  Re  Restricted  Rates,  20 
I.  C.  C.  426,  437. 

RETURNED  SHIPMENTS. 

See    Reduced    Rates,   §5. 

REVENUES. 

See   Evidence,   §36. 

ROUTING   AND    MISROUTING. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
II.     CARRIER'S     DUTY     TO      TRANS- 
PORT. 
§2.     Accustomed  or  natural  route. 
§3.     Conflict   in    billing   between 

rate  and  route. 
§4.     Direct  and  reasonable  route. 
§5.     Lower    rate    via    competing 

line. 
§6.     Right  of  carrier  to  route. 
§7.     Shipper's  instructions. 
Til.     LIABILITY  FOR  MISROUTING. 
§8.     Purden  of  proof. 
§9.     Measure  of  damages. 
§10.     Parties  to  make  refund. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 

See  Branch  Lines,  §5;  Express  Com- 
panies, V;  Through  Routes  and 
Joint   Rates,  §6. 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,  §1  (a)— §2  (c) 


749 


I.     CONTROL  AND  REG^JLATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
See   Refrigeration,   §1    (b). 

(a)  The  Act  confers  upon  the  Com- 
mission jurisdiction  over  a  complaint  for 
the  recovery  of  the  damage  resulting 
from  misrouting  a  shipment,  where  such 
damage  arises  from  a  rate  or  charge  in 
excess  of  the  lawful  rate  or  charge  that 
would  have  applied  via  the  route  over 
which  the  shipment  probably  should  have 
moved,  or  movement  over  which  was 
specifically  directed  by  the  shipper. 
Reparation  awarded  on  a  carload  of 
staves  which  moved  from  Monette,  Ark., 
to  Jackson,  Mich.,  via  Thebes,  111.,  and 
Altamont,  111.,  instead  of  St.  Louis,  as 
directed  by  complainant.  Noble  v.  J.  L. 
C.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  520,  522. 

(b)  The  Commission  intervenes  in 
routing  cases  only  when  actual  trans- 
portation charges  accrue,  either  as  the 
result  of  the  failure  of  the  carrier  to 
obey  the  shipper's  routing  instructions  or 
where,  in  the  absence  of  Luch  instruc- 
tions, a  more  expensive  route  is  used  by 
the  carrier  than  is  available.  Larrowe 
Milling   Co.   v.   C.    &   N.   W.    Ry.   Co.,   17 

I.  C.   C.   443,   445. 

(c)  The  Commission  has  jurisdiction 
to  award  reparation  for  the  diversion  of 
a  shipment  by  a  connecting  carrier,  so 
as  to  inflict  upon  the  shipper  a  higher 
rate  than  the  joint  rate  by  the  route 
over  which  he  routed  his  shipment,  such 
jurisdiction  arising  by  necessity  from  the 
provisions  of  section  6  of  the  Act.  Wood- 
ward &  Dickerson  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.. 
15  I.  C.  C.  170,  172;  sustained,  187  Fed. 
874,  191  Fed.  705. 

(d)  The  Commission  has,  under  sec- 
tion 6,  jurisdiction  to  award  damages  for 
the  diversion  of  a  shipment  from  the 
route  prescribed  by  the  consignor.  Wood- 
ward &  Dickerson  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  170,  172. 

II.  CARRIER'S      DUTY      TO      TRANS- 

PORT. 

See    Discrimination,    §9    (j). 

§2.     Accustomed  or  Natural   Route. 

See  Crimes,  §11  (a). 
(a)  If  a  foreign  car  is  available,  which 
under  rules  as  to  car  service  must  be 
sent  via  a  particular  line  or  route,  over 
which  a  higher  rate  obtains,  the  agent 
must  explain  that  fact  to  the  shipper  and 
allow  him  to  elect  whether  he  will  use 


that  car  at  the  higher  rate  or  wait  for 
another  car.  If  the  shipper  elects  to  use 
the  car  at  the  higher  rate,  the  agent 
should  so  note  on  the  bill  of  lading. 
When  this  rule  is  not  complied  with,  the 
carrier  is  liable  for  misrouting.  Lord 
&  Bushnell  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I. 
C.  C.  463. 

(b)  It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  cost 
of  transportation  is  a  potent  factor  in 
determining  the  route  which  traffic  will 
t^ke.  If  confronted  by  increased  rates 
via  routes  over  which  it  has  been  accus- 
tomed to  move,  it  will  naturally  seek 
other  outlets.  Baltimore  Chamber  of 
Commerce  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C. 

C.  596,  598. 

(c)  Complainant  had  shipped  a  car- 
load of  molasses,  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  to 
Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  under  a  rate  of  16c  per 
100  lbs.  Consignor  in  the  blank  on  the 
bill  of  lading  for  the  route  noted  "D.  L. 
&  W.  R.  R."  The  initial  carrier,  the  Penn. 
R.  R.,  instead  of  delivering  the  car  to  the 

D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.,  at  Manunka  Chunk,  Pa., 
carried  it  over  its  own  line  to  Buffalo  and 
there  delivered  it  to  the  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R., 
which  switched  it  to  the  warehouse.  The 
D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  unloaded  carload  freight 
at  Buffalo  free  of  charge  when  it  had  a 
line  haul.  As  it  did  not  have  in  this  case, 
the  warehouse  company  collected  $6.50 
for  its  services.  Defendant  competed 
with  the  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  for  Buffalo 
traffic,  and  itself  gave  a  free  unloading 
service  at  Buffalo  over  the  platform  of 
another  warehouse.  HELD,  defendant 
is  fairly  chargeable  with  notice  of  the 
free  unloading  and  handling  service  at 
that  point  of  its  competitor.  The  nota- 
tion by  the  consignor  in  the  blank  of  the 
bill  of  lading  intended  for  the  naming  of 
a  route  must  be  regarded  as  an  expres- 
sion of  the  consignor's  intention  that  the 
D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  was  to  participate  in 
the  line  haul.  When  a  line  haul  by  one 
company  is  intended  and  a  terminal  de- 
livery is  desired  on  the  tracks  of  an- 
other company  the  usual  practice  is  to 
indicate  on  the  bill  of  lading  that  tho 
reference  is  for  delivery  purpose  only; 
that  the  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  should  have 
been  utilized  for  the  best  interests  of 
the  shipper;  that  the  shipment  was  mis- 
routed.  Reparation  awarded  of  unload- 
ing charges,  the  rate  exacted  having 
been  the  same  if  the  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R. 
had  participated  in  the  line  haul.  Pren- 
tiss &  Co.  V.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  68. 


750 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,  §2   (d)— (k) 


(d)  A  notation  on  the  bill  of  lading 
puts  the  carrier  under  obligation  to  use 
the  connecting  line's  facilities  to  the 
best  advantage  of  the  shipper.  Prentiss 
&  Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  68,  69. 

(e)  A  carrier  may  be  chargeable  with 
notice  of  free  unloading  and  handling 
service  of  its  competitor  at  a  terminal. 
Prentiss  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  68,  69. 

(f)  Complainant  shipped  lumber  in 
carloads  from  Hertford,  N.  C,  to  Ashland, 
O.,  with  no  routing  instructions  except 
Erie  delivery,  under  a  rate  of  27iAc;  via 
a  more  direct  route  the  rate  was  20 %c. 
The  defense  made  was  that  the  principal 
defendant  was  not  advised  of  the  rates 
of  its  connection  and  could  not  reason- 
ably be  required  to  keep  its  local  agents 
informed  of  the  through  charges  to  dis- 
tant points  of  destination.  HELD,  this 
cannot  be  accepted  as  a  sufficient  excuse 
upon  the  facts  here  disclosed.  With  re- 
spect to  this  point  of  origin  the  destina- 
tion in  question  is  not  fairly  to  be  re- 
garded as  a  distant  point,  but  is  located 
in  territory  as  to  which  the  principal  de- 
fendant ought  to  be  more  or  less  well 
informed  in  order  to  conduct  its  trans- 
portation with  reasonable  dispatch  ana 
satisfaction  to  itself  and  the  public.  Not 
being  advised  to  the  cheapest  available 
and  reasonably  direct  route  it  could  have 
demanded  instructions  from  the  con- 
signor, could  have  made  inquiry  of  the 
connecting  lines,  but  not  having  done  so 
it  assumed  the  burden  of  giving  the 
shipper  the  advantage  of  the  cheapest 
reasonably  available  route.  Reparation 
awarded.  Willson  Bros.  Lumber  Co.  v. 
N.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C  293. 

(g)  An  initial  carrier  is  not  liable  for 
misrouting  for  not  routing  via  an  Ohio 
River  crossing,  using  as  a  factor  a  spe- 
cial commodity  rate  south  of  the  river, 
the  initial  carrier  not  being  a  party  to 
the  rates  named  by  the  line  south  of  the 
river.  Isbell  &  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  448. 

(h)  Complainant  shipped  dried  beans 
L.  C.  L.  from  Springport,  Mich.,  to  An- 
niston.  Ala.,  over  lines  of  defendant  L.  S. 
&  M.  S.  and  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  railroads  to 
Cincinnati,  thence  via  the  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
to  destination,  under  a  combination  rate 
of  80c  per  100  lbs.  Between  the  points 
mentioned  no  joint  through  rate  was  ap- 
plicable nor  did  the  tarilTs  of  defendants 
provide  any  method  for  constructing  a 
through  rate.     The  shipment  could  have 


moved  either  through  Cincinnati  or  Louis- 
ville and  via  Louisville  the  ordinary  com- 
bination was  82c.  At  the  time  of  move- 
ment there  was  in  effect  from  Louisville 
to  Nashville  via  the  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  a  spe- 
cial commodity  rate  of  16c  and  from 
Nashville  to  Anniston  a  class  rate  of  41c. 
By  using  the  three  factors  of  the  local 
rate  from  Springport  to  Louisville  of  19c, 
the  special  commodity  rate  from  Louis- 
ville to  Nashville  and  the  class  rate  from 
Nashville  to  Anniston,  a  combination  of 
76c  could  have  been  made.  While  the 
shipment  was  delivered  to  the  initial  car- 
rier without  any  routing  instructions, 
complainant  or  its  agent  prepared  the  bill 
of  lading,  presented  it  to  the  agent  of 
the  carrier  at  Springport  and  desired  to 
prepay  the  freight  charges  through  to 
Anniston.  The  rate  of  80c  was  then  in- 
serted in  the  bill  of  lading,  as  were  also 
the  total  charges  based  on  this  rate.  This 
was  paid  by  the  complainant.  The  initial 
carrier  contended  that  it  sent  the  ship- 
ment via  the  cheapest  reasonable  route 
known  to  it,  and  that  it  was  not  aware  of 
the  special  commodity  rate  between 
Louisville  and  Nashville,  and  the  class 
rate  from  Nashville  to  Anniston.  The  dis- 
tances via  both  gateways  are  approxi- 
mately the  same.  HELD,  that  the  initial 
carrier  was  not  guilty  of  misrouting  the 
shipment.  Isbell  &  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  448,  450. 

(i)  Where  the  lines  are  designated 
but  the  shipment  did  not  follow  the  ac- 
customed route  via  those  lines,  a  case  of 
misrouting  is  presented.  Platten  Produce 
Co.  V.  K.  L.  S.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
249. 

(j)  Where  a  waybill  on  a  carload  of 
grapes  shipped  from  Paw  Paw,  Mich.,  to 
Green  Bay,  Wis.,  issued  by  the  Kalama- 
zoo, Lake  Shore  &  Chicago  Ry.  Co.,  speci- 
fies the  routing  as  via  the  Pere  Marquette 
and  the  Chicago,  Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul, 
the  usual  and  natural  route  for  the  ship- 
ment is  to  move  across  the  lake  by  car 
ferry.  Platten  Produce  Co.  v.  K.  L.  S.  & 
C.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  249,  249. 

(k)  A  carload  of  grapes  from  Paw 
Paw,  Mich.,  to  Green  Bay,  Wis.,  was 
routed  on  the  waybill  issued  by  the  ini- 
tial carrier  via  the  Pere  Marquette  and 
the  Chicago,  Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul  Ry. 
Co.  Under  this  routing  the  usual  and 
natural  route  was  across  the  lake  by 
ferry.  Upon  receiving  the  shipment  from 
the  initial  carrier  the  Pere  Marquette 
moved   the   same   via   Chicago   and   sub- 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,  §2   (1)— §3    (d) 


751 


jected  it  to  a  65c  rate,  whereas  by  the 
route  specified  the  rate  was  33i/^c. 
HELD,  complainant  was  entitled  to  rep- 
aration against  the  Pere  Marquette  R.  R. 
on  the  basis  of  33y2C  for  misrouting. 
Flatten  Produce  Co.  v.  K.  L.  S.  &  C.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  249,  250. 

(1)  A  carload  of  grapes  from  Mon- 
trose, la.,  to  Rochester,  Minn.,  moved 
over  the  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  to  Burlington, 
la.,  thence  over  the  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  P./.  to 
Goldfield,  la.,  and  thence  to  destination 
over  the  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  No  through 
rate  was  applicable  via  this  route  and  the 
sum  of  the  locals,  77.09c,  was  collected. 
At  the  same  time  a  through  rate  of  30c 
was  in  effect  over  the  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R., 
Montrose  to  Galena  Junction,  111.,  arid 
thence  over  the  C.  Gt.  W.  Ry.  to  Roches- 
ter, and  also  over  the  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  to 
Sterling,  111.,  and  thence  over  the  C.  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  to  Rochester.  The  original  bill 
of  lading  was  lost.  Complainant's 
copy  showed  the  shipments  billed  to 
Rochester  "via  Bur."  The  evidence  of 
complainant's  witnesses  was  that  codj- 
plainant  did  not  route  the  shipment.  De- 
fendant's agent  testified  that  against  his 
protest  complainant  insisted  on  the  rout 
ing  via  the  course  the  shipment  moved. 
Had  defendant  initial  carrier  routed  the 
shipment  by  Galena  Junction  or  Ster- 
ling, it  would  have  received  a  g -.-eater 
portion  of  the  haul  than  over  the  route 
shipment  moved.  On  other  shipments 
prior  to  this,  the  complainant  had  routed 
via  the  course  taken  by  the  shipment  in 
question.  HELD,  the  evidence  was  not 
sufficient  to  show  that  defendant  initial 
carrier,  the  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.,  misrouted 
the  shipment.  Reparation  denied.  Gam- 
ble-Robinson Commission  Co.  v.  C.  B.  & 
Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  357,  359. 

(m)  A  carload  of  posts  from  Witten- 
berg, Wis.,  to  Whittemore,  la,,  was  routed 
by  defendant,  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.,  via  Mil- 
waukee, this  route  taking  arate  of  26i/^c. 
There  were  several  other  routes  taking  a 
lower  rate,  but  the  route  selected  was  the 
nearest  and  most  convenient  junction 
point,  and  was  the  natural  and  ordinary 
one.  The  agent  at  Wittenberg,  routing 
the  shipment,  did  not  have  in  his  pos- 
session, and  could  not  be  reasonably  ex- 
pected to  have,  all  the  tariffs  showing 
other  possible  routings.  HELD,  no  duty 
rested  on  the  initial  carrier  to  hunt  up 
without  the  aid  of  an  Iowa  distance  tariff 
some  unnatural  connection  by  which  the 
traflic  might  reach  its  destination  at  a 


slightly  lower  transportation  charge. 
Reparation  denied.  Wheeler  Lumber, 
Bridge  &  Supply  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  525,  527. 

§3.     Conflict    in    Billing    Between    Route 
and   Rate. 

See  Bills  of  Lading,  §9  (1);  Export 
Rates  and  Facilities,  II;  Through 
Routes  and  Joint   Rates,    III. 

(a)  Where  the  shipper's  bill  of  lad- 
ing contains  instructions  both  as  to  route 
and  rate,  and  the  rate  is  not  applicable 
over  any  route  of  the  receiving  carrier, 
but  is  applicable  over  the  route  of  a  rival 
carrier  to  which  the  shipment  might  have 
been  delivered,  the  receiving  carrier  may 
forward  the  shipment  over  its  own  line 
at  the  lowest  rate  lawfully  applicable, 
it  not  being  obliged  to  turn  the  traffic 
over  to  its  competitor.  McLean  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  1.  C.  C. 
349. 

(b)  Where  a  shipper  has  written  spe- 
cific routing  instructions  in  the  bill  of 
lading,  and  also  inserted  a  rate  which 
does  not  apply  over  the  route  specified,  it 
is  the  duty  of  the  initial  carrier  to  send 
the  shipment  via  the  route  over  which 
such  rate  does  apply.  This  rule  does  not 
apply,  however,  so  as  to  charge  the  in- 
itial carrier  with  misrouting  where  it 
fails  to  turn  over  the  shipments  to  a 
competing  carrier  with  a  lower  rate,  Mc- 
Lean Lumber  Co.  v.  L,  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  349,  351,  352. 

(c)  Where  a  consignor  specified  both 
rate  and  route  in  the  bill  of  lading  and 
the  rate  was  not  applicable  to  the  route, 
the  initial  carrier  should  obtain  definite 
instructions  before  forwarding  or  is  liable 
for  damages  for  misrouting.  Ludowici- 
Celadon  Co.  v.  M,  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
588. 

(d)  Complainant  alleged  that  an  un- 
reasonable rate  was  charged  by  the  de- 
fendants for  the  transportation  of  one 
carload  of  roofing  tile,  roofing  felt,  ce 
ment  and  nails  from  Coffeyville,  Kan.,  to 
Spokane,  Wash.  Claim  for  reparation 
was  based  on  the  failure  by  the  initial 
carrier  to  forward  the  shipment  over  the 
route  via  which  the  rate  designated  by 
complainant  in  bill  of  lading  was  ap 
plicable.  The  rate  designated  did  not  ap 
ply  over  route  specified,  but  was  in  effect 
between  Coffeyville  and  Spokane  at  the 
time  of  shipment  via  several  other  routes 
in  connection  with  defendant.  The  car 
rier,    without   obtaining   further    instruo 


752 


ROUTING  AND   MISROUTING,  §3    (e)  — (1) 


tions,  forwarded  shipment  over  the  route 
named  in  the  bill  of  lading.  HELD,  that 
the  carriers,  having  sent  goods  over  a 
route  via  which  a  higher  rate  than  the 
one  designated  by  complainant  was  ap- 
plicable, must  be  held  responsible  for  the 
damages  resulting  from  misrouting.  Rep- 
aration awarded.  Ludowici-Celadon  Co. 
V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  588,  589. 

(e)  Where  billing  instructions  were 
given  to  protect  a  through  rate,  which, 
however,  would  not  apply  via  the  speci- 
fied route,  and  the  carrier  without  in- 
quiry forwarded  the  shipment  via  the 
route  named  whereby  the  shipper  suf- 
fered damage,  reparation  should  l-e 
awarded.  Gibson  Fruit  Co.  v.  C.  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  644. 

(f)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload  of 
apples  from  Sioux  City,  la.,  to  Chicago, 
and  thence  reconsigned  to  New  Orleans, 
La.,  which  was  assessed  a  combination 
rate  of  62c.  Contemporaneously  there 
was  in  effect  via  the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.,  the 
initial  carrier,  and  the  C.  &  E.  L  R.  R. 
conflicting  joint  through  rates  of  42c  and 
39c.  The  reconsignment  order  in  part 
r€ad:  "Route  via  Illinois  Central.  Pro- 
tect through  rate  of  42c  cwt."  HELD, 
the  obligation  rests  upon  the  carrier's 
agent  to  refrain  from  executing  a  bill  of 
lading  which  contains  provisions  that  are 
contradictory  or  impossible  of  execution. 
When,  therefore,  the  rate  and  route  are 
both  given  by  the  shipper  in  the  shipping 
instructions  and  the  rate  given  does  not 
apply  via  the  route  designated,  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  carrier's  agent  to  ascertain 
from  the  shipper  whether  the  rate  or  the 
route  given  in  the  shipping  instructions 
shall  be  followed.  This  not  having  been 
done,  reparation  is  awarded,  on  the  basis 
of  39c.  Gibson  Fruit  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  644,  645. 

(g)  Complainant  shipped  cotton  lin- 
ters,  from  Barnwell,  S.  C,  to  Pawtucket, 
R.  I.,  under  a  rate  of  78i^c  per  100  lbs. 
Prior  to  shipment  complainant  inquired  of 
initial  carrier  the  lowest  rate  and  was 
told  that  when  value  was  limited  to  2c 
per  lb.  the  rail-and-water  rate  was  53c 
and  the  all-rail  rate  54c.  Thereupon  com- 
plainant made  out  its  own  bills  of  lading 
reading  ''all-rail  53c"  and  the  bills  of  lad- 
ing were  signed  by  the  agent  of  the  car- 
rier with  full  knowledge  on  his  part  that 
the  shipper  desired  the  rate  on  cotton 
linters  released  to  a  valuation  of  2c  per 
lb.,  but  neglected  to  indorse  upon  them 
any   notation   of  the   released   valuation. 


HELD,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  defendants 
to  have  secured  the  shipper's  signature 
to  the  released  valuation  clause;  that  the 
proper  rate  to  have  applied  was  54c. 
Reparation  awarded.  Southern  Cotto'i 
Oil  Co.  V.  Sou.  Ry.  Co.,  19  1.  C.  C.  79. 

(h)  Complainant  shipped  cement  in 
carloads  from  Martins  Creek,  Pa.,  to 
Brockton,  Mass.  Complainant's  shipping 
clerk  inadvertently  noted  on  the  bill  of 
lading  directions  to  forward  the  cars  via 
the  L.  v.,  W.  S.,  and  B.  &  A.  railroads. 
In  two  places  on  the  bill  of  lading  the 
through  rate  was  stated  at  $2.25  per  net 
ton  and  this  was  the  legal  joint  rate  over 
a  through  route  composed  of  the  principal 
defendant  line  in  connection  with  the  N. 
Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  and  certain  inter- 
mediate lines.  HELD,  that  in  view  of  the 
conflict  between  the  routing  instructions 
and  the  through  rate  as  specified  on  the 
bill  of  lading  it  was  the  duty  of  the  ini- 
tial carrier  to  forward  the  shipment  by 
the  cheaper  route  or  to  obtain  further  and 
definite  directions  from  the  consignor. 
Because  of  its  failure  to  pursue  either 
course  it  must  be  held  liable  to  the  com- 
plainant for  the  additional  transporta- 
tion charges  resulting  from  the  misrout- 
ing. Alpha  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  D.  L. 
&  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C:  297,  298. 

(i)  Rate  inserted  by  the  consignor  in 
bill  of  lading  was  not  applicable  ever  the 
route  named  by  him,  but  was  applicable 
over  another  route.  HELD,  that  the  ini- 
tial carrier,  instead  of  forwarding  the 
shipment  over  the  route  specified,  which 
carried  a  higher  rate,  should  have  for- 
warded it  over  the  route  by  which  the 
specified  rate  applied.  Isbell-Brown  Co. 
V.  G.  T.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  226. 

(j)  Routing  prescribed  in  bills  of  lad- 
ing named  railroads  via  which  there  were 
two  available  routes,  one  carrying  a 
higher  rate  than  the  other,  and  initial 
carrier  routed  the  shipments  via  the  more 
expensive  route.  Reparation  awarded. 
Lair  Furniture  &  Undertaking  Co.  v.  N. 
Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  404. 

(k)  Two  points  in  state  by  same  name, 
although  in  different  counties.  Correct 
rate  and  route  inserted  in  bill  ot  lad- 
ing, but  sent  to  wrong  destination. 
Reparation  awarded.  lola  Portland  Ce- 
ment Co.  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  444. 

(1)  Lower  rate  inserted  in  bill  of  lad- 
ing, but  delivered  to  carrier  having 
higher    rate    in    effect.      No    L'l'ound    for 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,  §4   (a)  — (1) 


753 


reparation.     Wilkoff  Bros.  Co.  v.  P.  &  L. 
E.  R.  R.  Co.  Unrep.  Op.  467. 

§4.     Direct  and  Reasonable  Route. 

(a)  Where  the  initial  carrier  accepts 
a  shipment  over  a  specified  route,  it  is 
liable  for  damages  for  diverting  same  to 
another  route  taking  a  higher  rate  and 
is  not  relieved  from  such  liability  by  the 
fact  that  the  connecting  carrier  in  the 
specified  rgute  refuses  to  accept  the  ship- 
ment. L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Dickerson, 
191  Fed.  705,  710. 

(b)  Unless  a  carrier  with  a  circuitous 
route  is  willing  to  submit  to  conditions 
made  necessary  by  its  competitors  pos- 
sessing shorter  hauls,  it  should  retire 
from  the  business.  Southern  Illinois 
Millers'  Ass'n  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.  C.  672,  678. 

(c)  Where  a  rate,  formerly  applicable 
via  two  routes,  was  subsequently  limited 
to  a  single  route,  and  the  initial  carrier 
failed  to  point  out  to  complainant  that 
the  lower  rate  applied  only  via  one  route 
and  that  such  rate  had  been  withdrawn 
from  the  route  designated  by  complain- 
ant, damages  should  be  awarded.  Atlan- 
tic Refining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  492. 

(d)  On  carloads  of  watermelons  from 
Blodgett,  Mo.,  to  St.  Joseph,  Mo.,  a  rate 
of  18c  was  charged,  via  an  interstate 
route.  Had  melons  been  shipped  by  an 
intrastate  route,  the  charges  would  have 
been  considerably  less.  No  specific  rout- 
ing instructions  were  given.  HELD,  the 
defendant's  duty  was  limited  to  forward- 
ing the  shipment  via  the  cheapest  avail- 
able interstate  route,  and  that  the  rate 
complained  of  was  not  shown  to  be  un- 
reasonable. Willman  &  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M. 
&  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  405. 

(e)  In  the  absence  of  routing  instruc- 
tions it  is  the  duty  of  the  carrier  to  for- 
ward the  shipment  via  the  cheapest  avail- 
able interstate  route.  It  does  not  neces- 
sarily have  to  transport  it  via  an  avail- 
able intrastate  route  subject  to  state 
rates  the  validity  of  which  it  contests  and 
which  appear  low.  Willman  &  Co.  v.  St. 
L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  405,  406. 

(f)  On  a  carload  of  lumber  from  Sum- 
rail,  Miss.,  to  Dayton,  O.,  complainant 
was  charged  a  rate  of  27i^c  per  100  lbs. 
There  was  another  route  on  which  the 
charges  would  have  been  24c  per  100  lbs. 
No    routing   instructions   were   given   on 


the  bill  of  lading.  Defendant  explained 
that  there  was  a  shortage  of  freight  cars 
in  the  territory  which  made  it  necessary 
to  use  the  more  expensive  route.  Tariff  Cir- 
cular 15A,  Rule  70,  required  the  agent  -to 
explain  to  shipper  the  situation,  and  al- 
low him  to  choose  whether  he  will  use 
the  car  at  the  higher  rate,  or  wait  for 
another  one,  and  note  on  the  bill  of  lad- 
ing the  choice  of  the  higher  rate  that 
it  made.  Bill  of  lading  showed  no  nota- 
tion. HELD,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  car- 
rier to  forward  the  shipment  over  the 
route  by  which  the  lower  charges  would 
be  secured.  Reparation  granted.  Lord  & 
Bushnell  Co.  v.  Mississippi  Central  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  463. 

(g)  Where  more  than  one  route  is 
available  for  forwarding  a  shipment,  it  is 
the  duty  of  the  carrier,  in  the  absence  of 
routing  instructions,  to  forward  it  by  the 
route  taking  the  lowest  rate.  Lord  & 
Bushnell  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C. 
C.  463. 

(h)  It  is  the  duty  of  the  carrier  in  the 
absence  of  specific  routing  instructions 
by  the  shipper  to  transport  the  shipment 
via  the  cheapest  available  route.  Good- 
kind  Bros.  V.  C.  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
17. 

(i)  A  route  via  one  road  which  is 
about  twice  as  long  as  via  the  more  di- 
rect route  is  a  circuitous  route.  Winter- 
botham  &  Sons  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C 
C.  266,  269. 

(j)  A  route  several  hundred  iriles 
greater  than  another  available  one  be- 
tween the  same  points  canri-jt  be  con- 
sidered the  more  natural  route  for  a 
shipment  to  take.  Kenworthv  &  Son  v. 
U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  v".  515,  516. 

(k)  Complainant  shipped  lumber  from 
Dungannon,  Va.,  to  Maugansville.  Md., 
and  thence  reconsigned  to  Boston,  Mass. 
The  initial  carrier  routed  the  shipment 
via  Potomac  Yards,  Va.,  and  Harrisburi?, 
Pa.,  a  distance  of  792  miles,  as  against  a 
distance  of  3C4  miles  via  another  available 
route.  HELD,  that  a  shipment  is  misrouted 
when  it  fails  to  take  a  route  which  it 
properly  should  have  taken,  and  which 
is  the  cheaper  available  route.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Whaley-Warren  Lumber 
Co.  V.  C.  C.  &  O.  Ry.,  21  I.  C.  C.  530,  532. 

(1)  Complainants  shipped  from  sev- 
eral stations  on  line  of  defendants.  New 
Orleans,  M.  &  C.  R.  R.,  rough  yellow  pine 
lumber  consigned  to  itself  at  Cypress,  III., 
"care  of  Chicago  &  Eastern  Illinois  Rail- 


754 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,  §4  (m)— (t) 


road."  Cypress  is  reached  only  via  the 
C.  &  E.  I.  R.  R.,  and  to  that  point  through 
routes  taking  the  same  rates  are  avail- 
able, one  via  Meridian,  Miss.,  and  the 
M,  &  O.  R.  R.,  and  the  other  via  Acker- 
man,  Miss.,  and  the  I.  C.  R.  R.  No  inter- 
mediate routing  was  designated  by  the 
shippers.  The  initial  carrier  routed  via 
Ackerman  and  the  I.  C.  R.  R.,  which  road 
carried  the  shipments  to  Marion,  111.,  the 
nearest  junction  with  the  C.  &  E.  I.  R,  R., 
which  refused  to  accept  the  cars  unless 
accompanied  by  instructions  for  recon- 
signment.  It  was  complainants'  custom 
to  reconsign  its  shipments  to  Cypress  by 
giving  the  reconsignment  instructions  to 
the  agent  of  the  C.  H.  &  D.  R.  R.  at  St. 
Louis,  who  would  transmit  such  request 
to  the  C.  &  E.  I.  R.  R.  Subsequent  to 
refusal  of  these  shipments  by  the  C.  & 
E.  I.  R.  R.,  reconsignment  instructions 
were  given  by  the  agent  of  the  C.  H.  &  D. 
R.  R.  to  the  I.  C.  R.  R.  The  shipments 
were  transported,  and,  at  destination, 
charges  were  assessed  at  a  combination  of 
joint  rates  based  on  Marion.  The  tariff 
naming  the  rates  via  the  routed  move- 
ment did  not  allow  reconsignment  at  the 
through  rate.  HELD,  two  routes  taking 
the  same  rates  were  available.  The  ini- 
tial carrier  cannot  be  charged  with  knowl- 
edge of  complainants'  desire  to  reconsign 
the  shipment,  and  in  the  absence  of  spe- 
cific routing  by  shipper  the  initial  carrier 
was  justified  in  routing  these  cars  as  it 
did.  Reparation  denied.  Crescent  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  228, 
229. 

(m)  There  is  no  misrouting  to  for- 
ward an  unrouted  shipment  via  one  route, 
though  a  reconsignment  privilege  was 
permitted  over  another  available  route. 
Crescent  Lumber  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  228 

(n)  It  is  not  of  much  importance  to 
the  public  by  what  route  traffic  is  han- 
dled. Board  of  Trade  of  Chicago  v.  A.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  504,  507. 

(o)  Reparation  awarded  for  misrout- 
ing a  shipment  of  grapes.  Paw  Paw, 
Mich.,  to  Green  Bay,  Wis.,  via  K.  L.  S. 
&  C.  R.  R.  and  P.  M.  R.  R.,  Paw  Paw  to 
Chicago,  and  via  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  to 
Green  Bay  instead  of  moving  via  P.  M. 
Car  Ferry  to  Milwaukee.  Platten  Produce 
Co.  v.  K.  L.  S.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
543. 

(p)  It  is  no  misrouting  to  forward  an 
unrouted  shipment  via  one  route,  though 
terminal    delivery    more    satisfactory    to 


consignee  could  have  been  secured  over 
smother  available  route.  Bookwalter 
Wheel  Co.  v.  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C 

603,  '605. 

(q)  Complainant  shipped  one  carload 
of  rough  hickory  rim  strips  from  Four- 
teen Mile  Switch,  Tenn.,  to  Miamisburg, 
O.,  under  a  rate  of  21i/^c  per  100  lbs., 
without  specifying  the  routing.  The 
shipment  was  routed  by  the  initial  carrier 
and  delivery  tendered  by  C.  H.  &  D.  R. 
R.  The  consignee  refused  shipment  be- 
cause not  delivered  by  the  Big  Four  R.  R. 
The  shipment  was  then  switched  to  a 
point  where  connection  could  be  made 
with  the  Big  Four.  The  same  rate  applied 
from  shippdng  point  to  destination  via 
Big  Four  delivery  as  via  C.  H.  &  D.  R.  R. 
HELD,  that  in  the  absence  of  routing  in- 
structions by  the  shipper  the  carrier 
could  exercise  its  own  judgment  in  select- 
ing which  of  two  equally  available  routes 
carrying  the  samfe  rate  it  would  use.  Rep- 
aration on  switching  denied.  Bookwalter 
Wheel  Co.  v.  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
603. 

(r)  After  an  unrouted  shipment  had 
moved,  an  agent's  signing  the  bill  of  lad- 
ing containing  routing  could  not  render 
the  carrier  liable  for  misrouting.  Book- 
waiter  Wheel  Co.  v.  T  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  603,  605. 

(s)  Instructions  were  given  to  use  the 
most  direct  route  with  through  rate;  no 
rate  was  applicable  from  origin  to  desti- 
nation; the  shipment  was  sent  via  a  cir- 
cuitous route;  the  rate  via  the  route 
used  was  not  unreasonable,  but  repara- 
tion was  awarded  on  the  basis  of  a  sub- 
sequently established  rate  via  a  more 
direct  route.  Samuels  &  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S. 
W.   Ry.   Co.,   20  I.   C.   C.   646,  648. 

(t)  Complainant  directed  a  shipment 
of  cotton  linters,  England,  Ark.,  to  Hous- 
ton, Tex.,  to  be  shipped  by  "most  direct 
way  to  Houston,  so  we  are  protected  in 
through  rates."  There  was  no  lawful  rate 
in  effect  on  linters  between  these  points 
and  the  rate  assessed  was  composed  of 
a  combination  rate  of  48c  on  linters,  Eng- 
land to  New  Orleans,  plus  a  rate  of  18c 
on  compressed  cotton,  New  Orleans  to 
Houston,  a  circuitous  route.  Subse- 
quently a  rate  of  46^/^0  was  established 
over  a  shorter  route.  It  appeared  that  the 
shipment  was  held  for  three  or  four 
weeks  by  the  initial  carrier  before  being 
forwarded.  HELD,  during  that  time  the 
carrier  might  have  secured  permission 
from  the  Commission  to  publish  a  rate 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,  §4  (u)— (aa) 


755 


from  England  to  Houston  on  short  notice, 
or  by  holding  the  linters  for  a  short  addi- 
tional period  it  might  have  published  the 
rate  on  full  statutory  notice,  and  while  it 
was  under  no  legal  obligation  to  adopt 
the  former  method  it  was  certainly  its 
duty  to  provide  a  rate  via  a  reasonably 
direct  route  as  soon  as  lawful  publication 
thereof  could  be  made.  If  the  carrier 
was  willing  to  take  the  responsibility  of 
forwarding  the  shipment  via  a  route  over 
which  no  rate  was  published  it  ought  to 
have  sent  it  over  a  direct  route.  A 
reasonable  rate  having  been  subsequently 
established  over  a  direct  route,  the  ini- 
tial carrier  should  make  reparation  as  for 
a  misrouting  between  the  charges  ex- 
acted and  such  rate.  Samuels  &  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  646,  648. 

(u)  Complainant  shipped  cement  in 
carloads  from  Medicine  Lodge,  Kan.,  to 
Spokane,  Wash.,  under  the  joint  class  C 
rate  of  $1  per  100  lbs.,  but  gave  no  rout- 
ing instructions.  Two  routes  were  avail- 
able, both  carrying  the  same  through 
rate,  but  via  the  other  route  the  combina- 
tion of  locals  was  lower  than  the  through 
rate.  The  complainant  did  not  allege  that 
the  rate  exacted  was  unreasonalDle. 
HELD,  that  as  the  $1  rate  was  lawfully 
effective  via  both  routes,  the  initial  car- 
rier cannot  be  held  guilty  of  misrouting, 
but  leave  given  complainant  to  file  an 
amended  petition  to  attack  the  rate  ex- 
acted. Idaho  Lime  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  139. 

(v)  A  carrier  is  not  liable  for  mis- 
routing for  forwarding  via  a  joint  through 
route  though  a  lower  combination  existed. 
Idaho  Lime  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  139,  140. 

(w)  Complainant  shipped  lumber  in 
carloads  from  Davisville,  Tex.,  to  Santa 
Rita,  N.  M.,  without  routing  instructions 
except  "care  of  Santa  Fe  at  El  Paso." 
The  route  taking  the  lowest  combination 
was  one  via  El  Paso,  but  the  initial  car- 
rier did  not  route  it  that  way.  HELD, 
reparation  should  be  awarded.  Cattieron 
&  Co.  V.  H.  E.  &  W.  T.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
146. 

(x)  Complainant  shipped  lumber  in 
carloads  from  Saron,  Tex.,  to  Altus,  Okla., 
under  a  rate  of  33l^c.  Prior  to  move- 
ment a  joint  rate  of  28i^c  had  been  in 
effect  for  some  time,  but  was  canceled 
about  two  months  prior  to  the  shipment 
because  lines  in  Oklahoma  and  Kansas 
made   excessive  demands   upon  originat- 


ing lines  for  increased  divisions.  Sub- 
sequently the  281/^0  rate  was  restored, 
and  later  reduced  to  25c.  HELD,  that  at 
the  time  of  shipment  complainant  was  en- 
titled to  a  through  rate  of  28i/^c  via  the 
defendant  and  its  connections  over  which 
the  joint  rate  had  formerly  prevailed,  and 
now  prevails,  and  that  it  was  the  duty 
of  the'defendant  to  have  routed  the  ship- 
ment via  that  route.  In  point  of  fact  it 
sent  it  by  a  different  and  much  more  ex- 
pensive route.  Reparation  awarded. 
Cameron  &  Co.  v.  H.  E.  &  W.  T.  Ry.  Co., 
19  L  C.  C.  146. 

(y)  Complainant  shipped  lumber,  At- 
lanta, La.,  to  Detroit,  Mich.,  originally 
billed  to  Cypress,  111.,  "via  Shreveport, 
care  of  the  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  via  Thebes, 
111.,  care  of  Chicago  &  Eastern  Illinois 
Ry."  Initial  carrier  did  not  follow  rout- 
ing instructions,  but  carried  the  car  to 
Baton  Rouge,  which  resulted  in  the  exac- 
tion of  a  higher  rate  owing  to  subsequent 
misrouting  by  the  I.  C.  R.  R.  HELD,  that 
the  I.  C.  R.  R.,  which  received  from  the  Y. 
&  M.  V.  R.  R.  without  routing  instructions 
a  car  of  lumber  moving  from  Atlanta  to 
Cypress,  was  bound  to  forward  it  to  that 
destination  by  the  direct  route  over 
which  to  its  knowledge  the  cheaper  rate 
from  Atlanta  applied,  and  the  I.  C.  R.  R. 
had  this  knowledge,  for  it  was  a  party  to 
the  cheaper  joint  rate.  Beekman  Lumber 
Co.  V.  Louisiana  Ry.  &  N.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
343,  345. 

(z)  The  fact  that  a  carrier  perform- 
ing substantially  a  switching  service  for- 
wards cars  via  the  only  available  junc- 
tion point  to  destination  at  a  higher  rate 
than  it  had  in  effect  via  another  route  the 
rates  of  which,  however,  were  restricted 
to  industries  and  team  tracks  at  the  junc- 
tion point  of  such  other  route  at  which 
point  it  did  not  interchange  traffic  with 
the  connecting  carrier,  does  not  render 
it  guilty  of  misrouting  or  of  exacting  a 
charge  in  excess  of  the  combination  of 
locals.  Prahlow  v.  L  H.  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  572,  573. 

(aa)  On  gasoline  stoves  and  parts 
from  Lorain,  O.,  to  Oconomowoc,  Wis.,  a 
rate  of  86c  was  assessed,  whereas  at  the 
time  of  movement  there  was  in  effect  via 
defendants'  lines  the  combination  rate 
through  Duplainville,  Wis.,  of  61c.  On 
Iron  radiators,  hot  water  heaters,  and 
parts  from  Detroit,  Mich.,  to  Oconomo- 
woc, Wis.,  a  rate  of  51c  was  collected, 
whereas  the  combination  rate  through 
Duplainville  yielded  39i^c.     Duplainville 


756 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,   §4    (bb)  — (kk) 


is  situated  on  the  main  line  of  one  of  de- 
fendants, some  17  miles  west  of  Milwau- 
kee and  took  jMilwaukee  rates.  HELD, 
defendants  should  have  routed  the  ship- 
ment via  Duplainville  in  order  to  give 
complainant  the  lower  rates.  Reparation 
awarded.  Lorleburg  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  St 
L.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  183,  184. 

(bb)  If  a  shipper  is  in  doubt  as  to  the 
cheapest  route,  he  should  tender  his  ship- 
ment without  instructions.  Spreckels 
Bros.  Commercial  Co.  v.  Monongahela  R. 
R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  190,  191. 

(cc)  Where  the  initial  carrier  routes 
a  shipment  of  coke  so  as  to  take  a  higher 
rate  than  another  available  route,  no 
routing  instructions  being  given  by  the 
carrier,  it  must  make  reparation  for  the 
overcharge.  Spreckels  Bros.  Commercial 
Co.  V.  Monongahela  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
190,  191. 

(dd)  A  connecting  carrier  in  sending 
a  shipment  delivered  without  routing  in- 
structions by  the  consignor  over  a  route 
taking  a  higher  rate  than  the  direct  and 
reasonable  route  is  liable  to  make  repara- 
tion for  the  higher  charge  incurred  and 
is  not  excused  by  the  fact  that  the  car- 
riers had  not  at  the  time  of  shipment 
agreed  on  the  proper  divisions  of  the 
joint  rate  over  the  direct  route.  Noble  v. 
Toledo  &  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
494,  495. 

(ee)  A  carload  of  lumber  from  Pro- 
vencal, La.,  to  Santa  Rita,  N.  M.,  was 
routed  from  Provencal  to  Texarkana,  via 
the  T.  &  P.  Ry.,  Texarkana  to  Kansas 
City  via  the  Iron  Mountain  lines,  Kansas 
City  to  Santa  Rita  via  the  Santa  Fe  lines. 
The  combination  rate  was  $1.12,  made  up 
of  23c  to  Kansas  City  and  89c  to  destina- 
tion. The  distance  traveled  was  1,970 
miles.  A  more  direct  route  of  1,076  miles 
existed,  involving  a  proportional  rate  of 
18c  from  Provencal  to  El  Paso  via  the 
T.  &  P.  Ry.  plus  a  rate  of  21c,  El  Paso 
to  Santa  Rita,  via  the  Santa  Fe,  or  a  total 
of  39c.  HELD,  that  the  initial  carrier 
was  liable  for  the  incurring  of  a  higher 
charge  through  misrouting.  Cameron  v. 
T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  560,  561. 

(ff)  Where  carriers  receive  a  ship- 
ment without  routing  instructions  they 
should  forward  it  over  the  cheapest  route. 
Germain  Co.  v.  N.  O.  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  22,  25. 

(gg)  On  10  carloads  of  cattle  from 
Baker  City,  Ore.,  to  Tacoma,  Wash.,  via 


Wallula,  Wash.,  the  published  rate  was 
$104.40  per  car.  At  Pasco,  Wash.,  the 
shipment  was  stopped  on  account  of 
washouts  making  further  progress  impos- 
sible, and  was  then  hauled  back  to  Wal- 
lula for  transportation  via  Portland  to 
Tacoma.  At  Portland  similar  washouts 
prevented  a  prompt  delivery.  Ordinarily, 
the  time  of  shipment  was  three  days.  In 
the  present  instance  it  required  11  days. 
Complainant  was  charged  $93  in  excess 
of  the  freight  had  the  shipment  moved  as 
routed  by  complainant,  and  a  feeding  bill 
of  $302.65  was  assessed.  HELD,  the 
freight  charges  were  excessive  to  the  ex- 
tent of  $93  and  reparation  awarded  on 
that  basis.  Feeding  charges  held  not  to 
be  excessive.  Carstens  Packing  Co.  v. 
O.  R.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  125,  127. 

(hh)  Where  there  are  two  available 
combination  rates  over  the  route  to  be 
taken,  the  damages  assessed  should  be 
he  lowest  combination.  Contact  Process 
Co.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I. 
C.  C.   184. 

(ii)  Carloads  of  lumber  from  Caro, 
Tex.,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.,  were  routed  by 
the  shipper  over  a  route  named  in  de- 
fendants' tariffs.  Through  an  error  in 
the  tariffs  no  commodity  rates  were  ap- 
plicable by  that  route.  Complainant  was 
assessed  the  class  rate  of  41c.  HELD, 
complainant  was  entitled  to  reparation  on 
the  lowest  possible  combination  applica- 
ble to  the  shipments,  namely,  20c.  Rep- 
aration awarded.  Saner-Whiteman  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
290. 

(jj)  Shipper  in  following  routing  in- 
structions in  the  tariff  sent  five  carloads 
of  lumber  via  a  route  over  which  there 
was  no  rate  applicable  except  the  class 
rate.  HELD,  the  tariff  being  in  error,  the 
carriers'  duty  was  to  treat  the  shipments 
as  though  unrouted  and  to  forward  them 
via  the  junction  making  the  lowest  com- 
bination of  rates.  Saner-Whiteman  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.  290. 

(kkj  On  shipments  of  lumber  from 
Fostoria,  Tex.,  to  Gary,  Ind.,  complainant 
gave  routing  instructions  on  part  of  the 
cars,  directing  shipment  over  certain  car 
riers  and  delivery  by  the  M.  C.  R.  R.  It 
was,  in  fact,  impossible  to  make  connec- 
tions with  the  M.  C.  R.  R.  over  the  route 
specified,  and  the  car  had  to  be  diverted 
to  another  route  involving  additional 
charges.  Two  carloads  were  not  routed 
by  the  complainant,  and  were  sent  over 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,  §4  (11)— (ss) 


757 


routes  taking  higher  rates  than  other 
available  routes.  HELD,  reparation 
should  be  awarded  on  the  shipments 
where  no  routing  instructions  were  given, 
but  not  on  the  shipments  where  -errone- 
ous routing  instructions  were  given.  Fos- 
ter Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.. 
17  I.  C.  C.  292,  .294. 

(11)  In  absence  of  specific  through 
routing  by  the  shipper,  it  is  duty  of  the 
carrier  to  route  shipments  by  cheapest 
reasonable  route  over  which  lawfully  es- 
tablished rates  are  in  force.  Foster  Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.  292,  294. 

(mm)  If  a  shipment  moves  to  or  from 
a  point  directly  intermediate  to  the  base 
upon  which  the  lowest  combination 
makes,  such  combination  must  be  ap- 
plied; and  it  is  not  necessary  to  haul  the 
shipment  to  such  base  point  and  back 
again  to  or  through  point  of  origin  or  des- 
tination. Crutchfield  &  Woolfolk  v.  L.  & 
N.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  302,  303. 

(nn)  Carriers  charged  with  exacting 
an  unreasonable  rate  cannot  escape  lia- 
bility solely  upon  the  ground  that  the 
shipments  could  have  been  transported 
via  a  route  carrying  a  lower  rate.  If  the 
rate  was,  in  fact,  unreasonable,  defend- 
ants should  be  required  to  make  repara- 
tion irrespective  of  the  fact  that  the 
shipper  would  have  enjoyed  a  lower  rate 
if  his  shipments  had  moved  through  a 
different  gateway.  Williar  v.  C.  N.  Q. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  304. 

(oo)  When  a  carrier  has  two  or  more 
available  routes  between  two  given 
points,  the  lowest  rate  via  either  or  any 
of  them  must  be  applied  to  a  shipment 
moving  over  either  or  any  of  said  routes. 
Larrowe  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  443,  445. 

(pp)  A  carload  of  sugar-beet  pulp 
from  Janesville,  Wis.,  to  Cattaraugus, 
N.  Y.,  was  routed  by  the  complainant 
via  the  Erie  Despatch.  The  initial  car- 
rier, the  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.,  has  two 
lines  from  Janesville  to  Chicago,  the  di- 
rect line,  91  miles  in  length,  and  the  in- 
direct line  through  Waukesha  and  Mil- 
waukee, 162  miles  in  length.  The  initial 
carrier  moved  the  shipment  over  the 
direct  route  to  Chicago  and  charged 
6.09c  for  the  haul  to  Chicago  and  lie 
for  the  haul  beyond.  At  the  time  of 
shipment  an  lie  rate  from  Chicago  to 
destination  was  in  effect,  and  was  also 
applicable  to  Milwaukee  and  Waukesha. 


The  rate  from  Janesville  to  Waukesha 
was  3c,  making  a  combination  of  14c. 
Another  carload  was  shipped  by  com- 
plainant from  Janesville  to  Windber, 
Pa.,  which  moved  in  the  same  manner. 
Complainant  routed  the  car  via  Wauke- 
sha. On  this  car  it  was  assessed  on  the 
basis  of  the  distance  rate  of  4i/^c  from 
Janesville.  No  through  rates  were  in 
effect  between  the  points  in  question. 
HELD,  under  Rule  215  of  Conference 
Rulings  Bulletin  No.  4,  with  respect  to 
the  first  car,  the  charge  was  unreason- 
able and  complainant  was  entitled  to 
reparation  on  the  basis  of  14c;  with 
respect  to  the  second  car,  the  charges 
should  have  been  assessed  on  the  basis 
of  the  rate  from  Janesville  to  Wau- 
kesha and  from  Waukesha  to  destina- 
tion, the  latter  rate  being  the  same  as 
from  Chicago  to  destination.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Larrowe  Milling  Co.  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  443,  445. 
446. 

(qq)  On  a  less-than-carload  shipment 
of  clothing  from  New  York  City  to 
Janesville,  Wis.,  complainant  was  as- 
sessed a  total  charge  of  $3.31.  De- 
fendants' rates  to  Chicago  and  to  Wau- 
kesha were  the  same,  -75c.  The  pro- 
portional from  Waukesha  to  Janesville 
was  28c.  The  shipments  moved  via 
defendant's  through  line  to  Chicago 
instead  of  via  Waukesha  and  the  Wau- 
kesha and  the  Janesville-to-Chicago  di- 
rect line  rate  was  used  in  making  up 
the  charge  assessed.  HELD,  following 
Larrowe  Milling  Company  v.  C.  &  N. 
W.  Ry.,  17  I.  C.  C.  448,  the  charges 
should  have  been  assessed  on  the  Wau- 
kesha combination  of  $1.03  per  100 
lbs.  Reparation  awarded.  Amos  Reh- 
berg  &  Co.  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.  508,  510. 

(rr)  Where  upon  a  shipment  of  a 
carload  of  cullet  (broken  glass)  from 
New  York  City  to  Kane,  Pa.,  no  routing 
Instructions  were  given  by  complainant, 
and  the  defendant  shipped  the  same  by 
a  route  taking  a  23i^c  rate  Instead  of 
another  available  route  taking  an  18c 
rate,  complainant  is  entitled  to  repara- 
tion on  the  basis  of  the  total  lower 
rate.  Thatcher  Mfg.  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  & 
H.  R.   R.   R.  Co.,   16  I.   C.  C.  126.  127. 

(ss)  Where  upon  a  shipment  of  oak 
lumber  from  DuQueen,  Ark.,  to  Mem- 
phis, Tenn.,  complainant  gave  no  direc- 
tions as  to  routing  except  that  delivery 
be  made  to  the  consignee  at  destination 


758 


ROUTING  AND   MISROUTING,    §4    (tt)— (zz) 


on  the  rails  of  the  I.  C.  R.  R.,  and  de- 
fendants selected  a  route  taking  a  3uc 
rate  instead  of  another  available  one 
taking  a  22c  rate,  delivery  on  the  rails 
of  the  I.  C.  R.  R.  being  possible  by 
both  routes,  complainant  is  entitled  to 
reparation  on  the  basis  of  the  lower 
rate.  Hendrickson  Lumber  Co.  v.  K. 
C.   S.    Ry.    Co.,    16    I.    C.   C.    129,   129. 

(tt)  On  a  shipment  of  tan  bark 
from  Trenary,  Mich.,  to  Milwaukee,  the 
published  rate  of  19c  was  collected,  the 
shipment  having  moved  by  the  route 
directed  by  complainant.  Another  route 
carried  a  rate  of  12c,  and  later  de- 
fendants applied  that  rate  to  the  route 
over  which  the  shipment  in  question 
moved.  HELD,  the  19c  rate  was  un- 
reasonable. Reparation  awarded  on 
the  basis  of  12c.  Albert  Trostel  &  Sons 
V.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.   C.    C.   348. 

(uu)  Where  the  shipper  gave  no 
specific  routing  instructions,  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  carriers  to  transport  the 
shipments  via  the  route  carrying  the  low- 
est rate.  Marshall  &  ]Michel  Grain  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  385, 
386. 

(vv)  Carloads  of  corn  from  various 
points  on  the  line  of  the  St.  L.  &  S.  F. 
R.  R.  Co.  in  Missouri,  Kansas  and  Okla- 
homa, destined  to  Gulf  Port,  Miss., 
were  routed  in  the  absence  of  routing 
instructions  via  the  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
to  Memphis,  thence  via  the  G.  &  S.  I.  R. 
R.,  instead  of  via  the  Frisco  lines  to 
Memphis,  the  Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  to  New 
Orleans,  and  the  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  to  Gulf 
Port,  which  latter  route  took  a  lower 
rate  than  the  route  selected.  HELD, 
reparation  should  be  awarded  against 
the  initial  carrier  on  the  basis  of  the 
charge  over  the  lower  route.  Marshall 
&  Michel  Grain  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F. 
R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  385,  386;  modified, 
18  I.  C.  C.  228,  229. 

(ww)  The  haul  via  one  route  being 
more  circuitous,  it  is  not  just  to  force 
carriers  to  meet  a  lower  rate  cover- 
ing a  shorter  haul  via  another  route. 
Winters  Metallic  Paint  Co.  v.  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  562, 
563. 

(xx)  On  ground  iron  ore  in  carloads 
from  Iron  Ridge,  Wis.,  to  Michigan  City, 
Ind.,  and  from  Iron  Ridge  to  Louisville, 
Ky.,  the  rate  via  the  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
R.    R.    from    Iron    Ridge    to    Milwaukee 


was  5c,  from  Milwaukee  to  Michigan 
City  via  the  P.  M.  R.  R.  8 1/20  and  from 
Milwaukee  to  Louisville  15c,  making 
the  ]\Iilwaukee  combination  to  Michigan 
City  ISi/^c  and  to  Louisville  20c.  The 
joint  through  rate  from  Iron  Ridge  to 
Michigan  City  via  Milwaukee  and  the 
P.  M.  R.  R.  was  21i^c,  and  to  Louis- 
ville 251/^c.  The  rate  from  Iron  Ridge 
to  Michigan  City  via  Chicago  by  the 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  and  the  Monon 
Ry.  was  the  same  as  via  Milwaukee, 
21i^c,  but  the  combination  via  Chicago 
was  18c.  Complainant  delivered  a 
shipment  to  the  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R. 
without  routing  instructions  except 
verbal  directions  to  forward  by  the 
cheapest  route.  The  agent  forwarded 
same  via  Chicago  and  the  Monon  Ry. 
At  the  time  of  hearing  the  only  rate  in 
effect  to  Michigan  City  was  the  com- 
bination rate  of  13i/^c  via  INIilwaukee 
and  16i^c  via  Chicago.  HELD,  since 
the  lowest  rate  lawfully  applicable  from 
Iron  Ridge  to  Michigan  City  was  that 
via  the  route  over  which  the  shipments 
actually  moved,  reparation  must  be 
awarded  upon  the  rate  deemed  by  the 
Commission  reasonable  via  that  route, 
and  the  carriers  should  not  be  forced 
to  meet  the  lower  rate  covering  the 
shorter  haul  via  the  P.  M.  R.  R.  Repa- 
ration awarded  on  the  basis  of  the 
161/^c  rate  in  effect  at  the  time  of 
the  hearing,  via  Chicago.  On  the  ship- 
ment to  Louisville  reparation  awarded 
on  the  rate  in  effect  at  the  time  of 
the  hearing  made  on  INIilwaukee  com- 
bination, viz.,  14.82c.  Winters  Metallic 
Paint  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.    C.    C.    562,    563. 

(yy)  On  shipments  of  chestnut  ties 
from  Vanceburg,  Ky.,  to  Carroll  Park 
Siding,  Baltimore,  the  movement  was 
via  Huntington,  W.  Va.,  by  direction  of 
the  consignor.  A  lower  rate  was  in 
effect  via  Staunton,  Va.  HELD,  in  the 
absence  of  specific  routing  instructions 
a  carrier  is  obliged  ordinarily  to  carry 
a  given  shipment  tendered  via  the 
route  taking  the  lowest  rate,  but  where 
a  shipper  directs  the  routing,  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  carrier  to  follow  his  in- 
structions. Reparation  denied.  Preston 
V.    C.   &   O.   Ry.    Co.,   16   L   C.   C.   565. 

(zz)  Where  a  shipment  is  delivered 
without  routing  instructions,  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  initial  carrier  line  to  route 
via  a  junction  which  should  have  made 
the  lowest  combination  of  locals  between 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,  §4  (aaa)  — (jjj) 


759 


origin  and  destination.     Hill  &  Webb  v. 
M.  K.   «§:   T.  Ry.   Co.,   16  I.   C.   C.   569. 

(aaa)  Where  the  delivering  line  did 
not  concur  in  the  rate  published  under 
which  a  shipment  moved,  resulting  In 
an  overcharge,  due  to  misrouting,  and 
its  concurrence  was  filed  subsequently, 
reparation  should  be  awarded.  Grand 
Rapids  Plaster  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  68. 

(bbb)  It  does  not  seem  to  be  pro- 
vided in  the  law  that  one  party  to  a 
joint  rate  and  through  route  may  di- 
vert freight  at  the  expense  of  the  ship- 
per Woodward  &  Dickerson  v.  L.  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.   170,   174. 

(ccc)  A  carload  of  broom  corn  from 
Duncan,  Okla.,  destined  ultimately  to 
Seattle  was  received  by  the  defendant 
C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R.  and  hauled  to 
Wichita  under  a  local  bill  to  that  point. 
At  Wichita  the  consignee  reconsigned 
the  shipment  to  complainant  at  Seattle. 
The  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  delivered  the  car 
to  the  Burlington  at  St.  Joseph  instead 
of  at  Beatrice,  Neb,  A  joint  rate  ol 
$1.25  was  in  effect  from  Wichita  to 
Seattle  over  the  Beatrice  route,  but 
none  was  in  effect  over  the  St.  Joseph 
route  and  complainant  was  assessed 
$1.57i/^c,  the  sum  of  the  locals  into  and 
out  of  St.  Joseph.  A  joint  rate  of 
$1.25  was  in  effect  from  Duncan  to 
Seattle  via  St.  Joseph,  but  under  such 
rate  there  was  no  lawfully  published 
reconsignment  privilege  at  Wichita.  The 
shipment  in  question  in  fact  moved  un- 
der a  reconsignment  tariff  issued  by  the 
C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  permitting  storage  at 
Wichita,  which  tariff  contemplated  a 
local  movement  from  Wichita  to  Seattle 
via  Beatrice  and  a  refund  to  the  ship- 
per. No  routing  instructions  were  given. 
HELD,  the  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R.  was 
solely  liable  to  make  refund  of  the 
excess  charge  imposed  by  reason  of 
the  misrouting  through  St.  Joseph. 
Wash.  Broom  &  Woodenware  Co.  v.  C. 
R.   I.  &   P.  Ry.  Co.,  15   I.   C.  C.  219,' 221. 

(ddd)  Where  carload  shipments  of 
wheat  from  Farmers,  Brenner  and  Hast- 
ings, Neb.,  to  Chicago,  111.,  were  by 
mistake  of  the  initial  carrier  routed 
via  St.  Joseph,  Mo.,  at  a  rate  of  35i/4c 
instead  of  via  Omaha  at  a  rate  of  33ii,c, 
complainant  is  entitled  to  recover  on 
the  basis  of  the  rate  via  Omaha.  Mc- 
Caull-Dinsmore  Co.  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  527. 


(eee)  Complainant  was  charged  a 
rate  of  24c  on  grain  products  from 
Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Howard,  Wis. 
Defendants  had  established  a  joint 
rate  from  Kansas  City  to  Albertville, 
Wis.,  via  Waukesha  of  14c,  and  should 
have  routed  the  shipment  via  Waukesha, 
complainant  having  given  no  routing 
directions.  Howard  was  an  inter- 
mediate point.  Since  the  shipment  in 
question  defendants  established  the  14c 
rate  to  Howard.  HELD,  complainant 
was  entitled  to  reparation  on  the  basis 
of  the  14c  rate.  Wilson  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.    Ry.    Co.,    14    I.    C.    C.    549,    550. 

(fff)  A  carload  of  coal  was  loaded 
at  Cedarhurst,  Colo.,  and  delivered  to 
defendant  at  Rugby,  Colo.,  with  a  bill 
of  lading  destined  to  Carmen,  Okla.,  no 
routing  instructions  being  given.  De- 
fendant sent  same  over  a  route  calling 
for  a  $6.45  rate,  whereas  a  $4.15  rate 
was  in  effect  over  another  route.  De- 
fendant's agent  at  Rugby  testified  that 
someone,  to  him  unknown,  instructed 
him  by  telephone  to  forward  the  car 
over  the  route  he  sent  it.  HELD,  the 
agent  had  no  right  to  accept  routing 
instructions  from  an  unknown  person. 
Reparation  awardad  on  the  basis  of  the 
lower  rate.  Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke 
Co.  V.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
606,   607. 

(ggg)  A  carrier  may  in  its  own  in- 
terest, if  it  so  desires,  carry  for  a  longer 
distance  over  its  line  than  would  be 
necessary  if  carried  between  the  same 
points  over  the  line  of  its  competitors. 
In  order  to  obtain  a  portion  of  the  com- 
petitive business  upon  terms  that  will 
afford  some  profit.  It  does  not  necessar- 
ily follow,  however,  that  a  carrier 
not  competing  for  traffic  in  this  way 
thereby  subjects  itself  to  an  order  com- 
pelling it  to  do  so.  Hydraulic  Press 
Brick  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13 
I.  C.  C.  342,  347. 

(hhh)  In  absence  of  routing  instruc- 
tion, initial  carrier  routed  shipments 
via  the  more  expensive  of  two  available 
routes.  Reparation  awarded.  Caddell  & 
Sons  V.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  117. 

(iii)  Shipment  tendered  without  rout- 
ing instructions.  Forwarded  via  more 
expensive  route.  Reparation  awarded. 
Foster  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.   338. 

(jjj)  Shipment  delivered  to  carrier 
without  routing  instructions  and  sent  via 


760 


ROUTING  AND   MISROUTING,   §4    (kkk)— §6    (dd) 


route  taking  higher  rate.  Reparation 
awarded.  Wheeler  Lumber  Bridge  & 
Supply  Co.  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
469;  Denton  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  426. 

(kkk)  Complainant  selected  the 
higher  of  two  available  routes,  and  rates 
not  having  been  found  unreasonable,  com- 
plaint dismissed.  Williams  v.  G.  N.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  460. 

(Ill)  Shipment  delivered  to  carrier 
without  routing  instructions,  forwarded 
via  route  taking  higher  combination,  no 
joint  through  rate  in  effect.  Reparation 
awarded.  Mason  Fruit  Jar  <^o.  v.  M.  K. 
&  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  490. 

(mmm)  Complainant  had  a  choice  of 
two  routes,  over  one  of  which  it  might 
have  shipped  at  the  lower  rate,  but  de- 
liberately chose  the  more  expensive 
route.  The  record  does  not  in(!icate  that 
the  rates  charged  were  unreasonable. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Godfrey  &  Sons  v. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
503. 

(nnn)  Reparation  awarded  because 
shipments  forwarded  by  carrier  via 
route  taking  higher  rate.  Schuette  & 
Co.  v.  D.  &  1.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  595. 

(ooo)  Cheapest  routing  having  been 
furnished,  complaint  dismissed.  Nourse- 
Taylor  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  &  S.  I.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.   Op.    164. 

§5.     Lower  Rate  via  Competing  Line. 

See  Equalization  of  Rates,  §4  (2)  (1); 
Evidence,  §47;  Rate  via  Competing 
Line. 

(a)  On  cotton  linters  from  Memphis. 
Tjnn.,  to  Pueblo,  Colo.,  via  the  L  C,  U.  P. 
and  C.  S.  R.  Rs.,  a  rate  of  $1.25  was  col- 
lected. A  lower  combination  rate  was  in 
effect  through  Wynne,  Ark.,  via  the  St. 
L.  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  and  M.  P.  R.  R.,  a  com- 
peting and  entirely  different  route  some 
500  miles  shorter  than  that  over  which 
the  shipments  moved.  No  other  evidence 
was  submitted  to  show  the  rate  charged 
to  be  excessive.  No  routing  instructions 
were  given  by  complainant.  HELD,  the 
rate  attacked  was  not  shown  to  be  un- 
reasonable, since  the  existence  of  a  lower 
rate  via  a  competing  route  does  not  of 
itself  establish  the  unreasonableness  of 
the  rate  actually  charged.  Colorado  Bed- 
ding Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C. 
C.  403,  404. 

(b)  Where  a  shipment  is  delivered  to 
a    carrier    without    any    routing    instruc- 


tions, no  obligation  rests  upon  it  to  de- 
cline the  shipment  because  of  the  exist- 
ence of  a  lower  rate  via  a  competing 
line.  Colorado  Bedding  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q 
R.  R.  Co.  et  al.,  18  L  C.  C.  403,  404. 

(c)  No  duty  imposed  upon  carrier  to 
turn  shipment  over  to  competitor  which 
has  lower  rate  in  effect.  Paragould  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op    485. 

§6.     Right  of  Carrier  to   Route. 

See    Foreign    Commerce,   §1    (f). 

(a)  Under  a  bill  of  lading  providing 
that  the  carrier  may  in  case  of  neces- 
sity divert  the  shipment  to  a  route 
taking  a  higher  rate,  no  such  necessity 
Is  presented  by  a  congestion  of  traf- 
fic on  the  Hne  of  the  connecting  car- 
rier or  of  the  initial  carrier.  Dickerson 
V.   L.   &  N.  R.   R.   Co.,   187  Fed.  874,  879. 

(b)  The  N.  P.  Ry.  Co..  being  the 
only  line  having  rails  extending  to 
South  Tacoma,  is  entitled,  in  protection 
of  its  investment,  to  conduct  traffic 
between  South  Tacoma  and  other  points 
on  its  line  on  preferred  basis.  Public 
Service  Commission  of  Wash.  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  256. 

(c)  Where  a  tariff  names  a  joint 
through  rate  and  reserves  to  the  car- 
riers the  right  to  route  shipments  tak- 
ing such  rate  but  specifies  no  particular 
routes  over  which  such  rate  is  appli- 
cable, the  rate  is  applicable  via  any 
Junction  points  of  the  carrier's  line,  and 
Is  applicable  to  a  shipment  routed  by  a 
shipper  via  one  of  such  junctions.  Hef- 
tier Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  &  S.  L  R.  R.  Co., 
21    I.    C.    C.    14. 

(d)  Carriers  may  not  disregard  in- 
structions of  shippers  as  to  intermediate 
routing,  except  when  the  tariff  of  the 
initial  line  reserves  the  right  to  dictate 
Intermediate  routing.  Foster  Lumber 
Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.    292,    294. 

(dd)  Between  Nov.  1.  1907,  and  May 
21,  1908,  complainant  delivered  to  de- 
fendants at  Beckville,  Tex.,  shipments  of 
lumber  in  carloads  consigned  respectively 
to  Duncan,  Comanche,  Marlow  and 
Waurika,  Okla..  and  requested  the  de- 
fendant, the  initial  carrier,  to  bill  them  to 
said  points.  Defendant  refused  so  to  do 
on  the  ground  that  no  joint  rates  were  in 
effect  to  these  points,  and  complainant 
was  compelled  to  allow  defendant  to  bill 
the  same  via  Ringgold,  Tex.  For  many 
years     prior     to     the     shipments,     joint 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,  §G   (e)— §7    (d) 


761 


through  rates  from  Beckville  were  in 
effect  of  22i^c  to  Waurika  and  26^c  to 
Duncan,  Comanche  and  Marlow.  Shortly 
after  the  shipments  in  question,  these 
joint  through  rates  were  restored.  No 
evidence  of  their  unreasonableness  was 
offered.  Complainant,  by  the  routes  over 
which  the  shipments  were  moved  by  the 
carriers,  was  assessed  rates  higher  than 
such  joint  rates.  HELD,  it  was  the  duty 
of  the  initial  carrier  to  receive  the  ship- 
ments in  question,  to  issue  to  complain- 
ant a  receipt  therefor,  to  indicate  on  the 
waybills  the  final  destinations  and  to 
transport  and  deliver  them  to  its  connect- 
ing carrier,  and  that  it  was  the  duty  of 
the  connecting  carriers  to  transport  and 
deliver  at  destinations,  each  carrier 
charging  for  its  service  its  legally  pub- 
lished rate.  The  joint  through  rates  of 
221/^c  and  26i4c  were  reasonable.  Rep- 
aration awarded  on  basis  of  these  rates. 
Commission  of  Oklahoma  v.  C.  R.  I.  & 
G.    Ry.   Co.,    17    I.    C.   C.   379,   382. 

(e)  No  justification  exists  for  re- 
quiring shippers  at  one  point  to  forward 
via  circuitous  routes  to  protect  rates 
of  other  initial  carriers  from  a  farther 
distant  point.  Indianapolis  Freight  Bu- 
reau V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.   C.   C.   56,   69. 

(f)  A  carrier  has  no  right  to  insist 
that  a  shipment  shall  go  to  the  end  of 
its  rails  if  the  shipper  desires  it  to 
be  diverted  at  an  intermediate  point 
to  another  market  off  its  rails.  Cham- 
ber of  Commerce  of  Milwaukee  v.  C,  R. 
I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co..  15  I.  C.  C.  460,  464. 

(g)  Where  a  rate  is  the  same  via 
two  routes,  routing  is  a  matter  of  indif- 
ference to  the  shipper,  hence  a  railroad 
can  control  the  routing.  Florida  Fruit 
&  Vegetable  Shippers'  Protect.  Ass'n  v. 
A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  47G. 

§7.     Shipper's    Instructions. 

(a)  Where  a  carrier  diverts  a  ship- 
ment from  the  route  specified  by  the 
shipper  to  another  route  taking  a  higher 
rate,  it  is  liable  to  make  reparation  and 
cannot  escape  liability  on  the  ground  that 
the  bill  of  lading  contains  a  provision 
giving  it  the  right  of  diversion,  where 
such  right  is  not  contained  in  the  pub- 
lished tariffs.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dick- 
erson,  191  Fed.  705,  709. 

(aa)  Complain-ant  had  shipped  to  it 
a  car  of  yellow  pine  lumber  from  Brew- 
ton,   Ala.,   to   Atlanta,   Ga.,   routed    ''care 


C.  of  Ga.  Ry."  The  initial  carrier  car- 
ried the  car  to  Montgomery  and  there 
delivered  it  to  the  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.  for 
transportation  to  Atlanta,  under  a 
through  rate  of  13c  per  100  lbs.  There 
was  a  joint  commodity  rate  of  9^c 
applicable  via  the  lines  of  the  Western 
Railway  of  Alabama  and  Atlanta  & 
West  Point  roads.  The  initial  carrier 
stated  at  the  hearing  that  it  construed 
the  shipping  instructions  to  mean  that 
the  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.  was  to  have  a  line  haul, 
and  for  that  reason  the  car  was  de- 
livered to  it  at  INIontgomery  instead  of 
being  hauled  over  the  route  via  which 
the  joint  rate  of  9i^c  applied.  Com- 
plainant did  not  appear  at  the  hearing. 
HELD,  upon  the  facts  of  record  it 
cannot  be  found  that  defendant  is 
chargeable  with  misrouting,  nor  that 
the  rate  assessed  was  unreasonable. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Alabama  Lumber 
&  Export  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
I.   C.   C.   84. 

(b)  An  initial  carrier,  which  received 
a  shipment  routed  "care  of"  another 
carrier,  is  not  guilty  of  misrouting  for 
turning  over  the  shipment  to  s  .ch  car- 
rier for.  the  line  haul.  Alabama  Lumber 
and  Export  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  84. 

(c)  Between  May  12,  1909,  and  March 
30,  1910,  complainant  specifically  routed 
carloads  of  petroleum  oil  from  Phila- 
delphia to  Utica  via  the  P.  &  O.  R.  R., 
Phila.  &  Read.  Ry.,  L.  V.  R.  R.  and 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Prior  to 
May  7,  1909,  a  joint  commodity  rate  of 
13^c  was  applicable  via  the  rouie 
specified  by  complainant  and  also  via 
another  available  route.  Effective  May 
7,  1909,  the  rate  via  the  route  speci- 
fied by  complainant  was  cancelled,  but 
was  effective  via  the  other.  Complain- 
ant had  no  preference  as  to  routing 
and  through  ignorance  of  the  cancella- 
tion shipped  over  the  route  speci- 
fied, and  was  assessed  a  rate  of  15c 
per  100  lbs.  HELD,  the  case  is  different 
from  those  instances  where  the  shipper 
specified  a  certain  route  with  knowl- 
edge of  what  the  charges  were.  The 
rate  assessed  was  unreasonable  and 
reparation  awarded  on  the  basis  of 
13 1/2 c.  Atlantic  Refining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.   Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  492. 

(d)  Where  a  shipper  specifies  the 
route  the  carrier  is  not  liable  for  follow- 
ing instructions  even  though  a  higher 
charge     is    assessed    than    via    another 


762 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,  §7   (e)  — (n) 


equally  available  route,  Humbolt  Re- 
fining Co.  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I. 
C.    C.    363. 

(e)  Reparation  cannot  be  awarded 
when  by  the  routing  instructions  of  the 
•hipper  the  shipment  moves  over  a 
route  taking  a  higher  rate  than  is  in 
force  via  another  available  route.  Good- 
kind  Bros.  V.  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I. 
C.    C.    17,    18. 

(f)  Where  various  shipments  are 
delivered  to  a  carrier  for  transporta- 
tion to  the  same  destination,  and  the 
consignor  specifies  the  routing  on  the 
first  shipment  but  not  on  the  others. 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  carrier  to  trans- 
port the  ones  on  which  no  route  is 
specified,  via  the  cheaper  available  route 
and  not  via  the  one  specified  by  the  con- 
signor for  the  first  shipment.  Goodkind 
Bros.  V.  C.  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
17,  18. 

(g)  A  shipper  may  offer  his  freight 
without  routing  instructions,  in  which 
event  it  is  the  duty  of  the  carrier  to 
route  it  via  the  cheapest  available  prac- 
ticable route,  but  he  is  also  entitled 
when  for  any  reason  he  specifies  a  par- 
ticular route  to  have  his  shipments 
move  in  accordance  with  his  instruc- 
tions, at  the  established  rate  over  that 
route,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  initial 
carrier  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to 
carry  out  his  routing  instructions.  Any 
carrier  misrouting  a  shipment  in  vio- 
lation of  specific  instructions  to  the 
injury  of  the  shipper,  violates  the 
Act,  and  is  responsible  for  the  damage 
thereby  caused  to  the  shipper.  Beek- 
man  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  Ry.  Co., 
21   I.   C.   C.   280,   281. 

(h)  A  carrier  is  liable  for  damages 
resulting  from  a  disregard  of  a  ship- 
per's specific  routing  instructions,  even 
though  it  sends  the  shipment  via  a 
route  taking  a  lower  rate  to  the  original 
billed  destination.  Switzer  Lumber  Co. 
V.  T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
290. 

(i)  Damages  may  be  awarded  for  the 
loss  resulting  from  a  disregard  of  rout- 
ing instructions,  where  the  carrier  used 
a  route  taking  a  lower  rate  to  the 
original  billed  destination.  Switzer  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I. 
C.  C.   290. 

(j)  The  agent  of  the  defendant  car- 
rier   disregarded    complainant's    instruc- 


tions to  route  a  shipment  of  lumber 
from  Huntington,  Tex.,  to  Oelwein,  la., 
via  Kansas  City,  and  sent  the  ship- 
ment via  a  cheaper  route.  The  shipment 
was  company  material  of  a  connecting 
carrier  which  would  have  absorbed  the 
transportation  charge  from  Kansas  City, 
the  shipper  only  paying  the  published 
rate  to  Kansas  City,  which  would  have 
been  less  than  the  through  rate  which 
was  assessed  by  reason  of  failure  to 
observe  the  routing  instructions.  HELD, 
the  presumption  that  the  disregard  of 
complainant's  shipping  instructions  by 
the  initial  carrier  was  prompted  by  a 
desire  to  afford  the  shipper  the  lowest 
published  rate  from  the  point  of  origin 
to  destination,"  cannot  serve  to  relieve 
the  carrier  from  liability  for  any  dam- 
age caused  by  the  misrouting.  No  car- 
rier can  be  chargeable  with  misrouting 
when  it  observes  a  shipper's  express 
desire  as  to  the  route  of  movement, 
and  no  carrier  is  justified  in  assuming 
that  a  shipper  does  not  really  want 
what  he  asks.  Reparation  awarded. 
Switzer  Lumber  Co.  v.  T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,   21   L    C.    C.   290,    291. 

(k)  Where  instructions  call  for  de- 
livery by  a  certain  road  the  shipment, 
it  seems,  should  be  delivered  to  such 
road  at  a  junction  over  which  the  low- 
est rate  is  applicable.  Ryland  &  Brooks 
Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I. 
C.    C.    520. 

(1)  A  delivering  carrier  was  named 
in  the  routing  instructions.  Damages 
awarded  where  carrier  failed  to  route 
the  goods  to  a  junction  with  such  road 
over  which  a  lower  rate  was  applicable. 
Ryland  &  Brooks  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  &  O. 
Ry.   Co.,   21  L    C.    C.   520. 

(m)  Complainant  shipped  pine  lum- 
ber, C.  L.,  from  Mineral,  Va.,  to  Pas- 
saic, N.  J.,  under  bills  of  lading  which 
specified  routing  simply  as  "Erie  R.  R." 
or  "Erie  R.  R.  delivery."  Via  one 
junction  of  the  Erie  R.  R.  to  which  the 
originating  line  carried  the  shipment 
the  sum  of  the  intermediate  rates  was 
26c,  and  via  another  junction  tney  were 
20i^c.  There  was  no  through  route  and 
joint  rate  in  effect.  HELD,  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  initial  carrier  to  have 
routed  the  shipment  via  the  lower 
combination  of  rates.  Reparation  award- 
ed. Ryland  &  Brooks  Lumber  Co.  v. 
C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  520. 

(n)  Where  the  instructions  of  the 
shipper   were   to  route   from   Worcester, 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,  §7   (o)— (x) 


763 


Mass.,  to  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  via  "B.  &  M. 
Cumberland  Gap  Despatch,"  which  car- 
ried a  rate  of  53c  per  100  lbs,  and  the 
carrier  had  in  effect  a  45c  rate  between 
the  same  points,  via  the  N.  Y.  N.  H. 
&  H.  Ry.  and  Cumberland  Gap  Des- 
patch. HELD,  the  carrier  was  under  no 
duty  to  disobey  the  shipper's  specific  in 
structions  and  therefore  not  bound  to 
route  via  the  cheaper  route.  Empire 
Wall  Paper  Co.  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R. 
20   I.    C.    C.    1. 

(o)  Complainant  specifically  routed 
four  carloads  of  blacksmith  coal  from 
West  Virginia  points  to  Los  Angeles, 
Cal.,  via  a  route  which  carried  a  rate 
of  75c  per  100  lbs.  A  routing  was  pos- 
sible which  carried  a  rate  of  52i^c 
per  100  lbs.  The  agent  of  an  inter- 
mediate carrier,  the  Wabash  R.  R.,  ad- 
vised the  routing.  HELD,  the  ship- 
ments were  routed  in  accordance  with 
specific  instructions,  and  the  fact  that 
the  Wabash  R.  R.  advised  the  routing 
cannot  afford  a  basis  on  which  to  award 
reparation.  Reparation  denied.  Poor 
Grain  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  12 
I.  C  C.  418,  469,  approved.  Independent 
Supply  Co.  v.  C.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
I.    C.    C.    66. 

(p)  Where  routing  instructions  are 
followed  no  misrouting  can  arise.  Em- 
pire Wall  Paper  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R., 
20  I.  C.  C.  1;  Independent  Supply  Co. 
V.  C.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  66; 
Parfrey  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  104,  105;  West  Oregon  Lumber 
Co  V.  A.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
151,    152. 

(q)  Complainant  routed  a  carload  of 
fir  lumber,  Clatskanie  Junction,  Ore.,  to 
DeBeque,  Col.,  "A.  &  C,  O.  R.  &  N., 
O.  S.  L.,  U.  P."  Shipment  moved  via 
these  lines  by  way  of  Denver  under 
combination  rate  of  70c.  A  joint  rate 
of  40c  was  in  effect  via  Salt  Lake  City, 
Utah,  a  shorter  distance,  but  that  route 
did  not  include  any  part  of  the  line  of 
the  U.  P.  R.  R.  HELD,  where  a  ship- 
per gives  specific  instructions  as  to  the 
route  his  shipment  shall  take,  the  car- 
rier must  observe  such  instructions,  and 
is  relieved  of  the  duty  of  ascertaining 
whether  or  not  the  shipment  could  be 
forwarded  via  another  route  at  a  lower 
rate.  West  Oregon  Lumber  Co.  v.  A. 
&  C.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  151, 
152. 

(r)  A  carrier  cannot  disregard  rout- 
ing   instructions    without    incurring    lia- 


bility for  resulting  damages.  Noble  v. 
J.  L.  C.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
520,   522. 

(s)  Where  a  connecting  line  failed 
to  observe  a  reconsignment  order  it  is 
liable  in  reparation  for  misrouting. 
Noble  V.  J.  L.  C.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I. 
C.    C.    520,    522. 

(t)  A  routing  notation  puts  the  car- 
rier under  obligation  of  utilizing  a  con- 
necting line's  facilities  to  the  best  ad- 
vantage of  the  shipper.  Prentiss  &  Co. 
V.   P.   R.   R.   Co.,   19   I.  C.   C.   68,   69. 

(u)  When  carriers  follow  shipper's 
routing  instructions  and  a  higher  rate  is 
charged  than  is  available  via  another 
route  they  cannot  be  held  liable  for 
misrouting.  Sikeston  Mercantile  Co.  v. 
B.   &   M.   R.   R.,   19   I.   C.   C.   422. 

(v)  A  carrier  is  not  liable,  when 
routing  instructions  are  followed.  Fish 
&  Co.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  425. 

(w)  Where  carriers  literally  observed 
the  instructions  given  for  routing,  when 
the  shipment  is  reconsigned,  and  send 
the  shipment  via  the  route  designated, 
and  apply  the  through  rate  over  such 
route,  the  carrier  cannot  be  held  re- 
sponsible for  misrouting  because  it  did 
not  send  the  shipment  via  a  cheaper 
available  route.  Fish  &  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C. 
&    St.   L.   R.   R.  Co.,   19   I.   C.   C.   452. 

(x)  On  a  carload  of  corn  from  Daw- 
son, la.,  to  Trevor,  Wis.,  routed  by  the 
shipper  via  Waukesha,  Wis.,  complain- 
ant was  assessed  a  rate  of  17.6c  on  an 
alleged  combination  of  locals.  The  law- 
ful combination  via  this  route,  a  dis- 
tance of  405  miles,  was  18.6c  and  the 
joint  rate  between  the  same  points  via 
Chicago,  a  distance  of  401  miles,  was 
12.6c.  Shipments  via  Chicago  are  de- 
livered to  the  Wisconsin  Central  R.  R., 
now  the  Soo  line,  at  Franklin  Park, 
where  the  exchange  track  between  the 
Soo  Line  and  the  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
is  located,  and  are  subject  to  but  one 
car  transfer,  whereas  if  moved  via  Wau- 
kesha several  transfers  are  necessary. 
HELD,  following  Poor  Grain  Co.  v.  C. 
B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  C.  469,  that 
where  the  shipper  gives  instructions  to 
forward  his  goods  via  a  particular  route, 
the  carrier  is  relieved  from  the  duty  of 
ascertaining  whether  the  goods 'be  for- 
warded via  another  route  at  a  lower 
rate.  Complaint  dismissed,  and  carrier 
directed    to    collect    an    undercharge    of 


764 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,   §7    (y)  — (dd) 


Ic.     Donahue  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  92,  93. 

(y)  A  carload  of  foodstuffs  from 
Webster,  S.  D.,  was  consigned  to  order 
of  complainant  to  Manchester,  N.  H., 
with  routing  instructions:  "Care  of 
Lehigh  Valley  Transportation  Co.,  Mil- 
waukee, via  Harlem  River."  The  ship- 
ment reached  Milwaukee  after  the  last 
boat  of  the  L.  V.  T.  Co.  for  the  season 
had  departed.  Defendant,  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.,  advised  the  consignor  and  asked 
instructions,  and  was  directed  to  for- 
ward by  Reading  Despatch,  break  bulk 
across  Lake  Michigan  to  Grand  Haven, 
and  delivered  shipment  to  the  Reading 
Despatch.  Said  defendant  in  the  bill  of 
lading  omitted  the  words  "via  Harlem 
River."  As  a  result  the  shipment  moved 
via  Durand,  Suspension  Bridge,  Owego, 
and  incurred  at  Williamstown  a  recon- 
signment  charge  of  $2,  and  demurrage 
charges  of  $23,  and  was  assessed  a 
higher  rate  of  13c,  all  of  which  charges 
would  have  been  avoided  had  the  ship- 
ment moved  via  the  Harlem  River. 
HELD,  defendant  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
was  liable  for  the  extra  charges  on 
account  of  misrouting.  Cressey  &  Co. 
v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
132,    134. 

(z)  The  B.  &  O.  R.  R.,  in  connection 
with  the  Mutual  Transit  Company,  pub- 
lished a  rate  of  28c  on  canned  tomatoes 
in  carloads  from  Ridgley,  Md.,  to  Du- 
luth,  Minn.  Ridgley  was  in  fact  reached 
only  by  defendant,  the  Phila.  B.  &  W. 
R.  R.  The  Baltimore  &  Eastern  Shore 
Transportation  Co.  formerly  operated  a 
line  of  boats  reaching  a  point  near 
Ridgley,  but  had  gone  out  of  business 
before  the  shipment  in  question.  Com- 
plainant consignee  at  Duluth  ordered  a 
shipment  of  canned  tomatoes  from  Ridg- 
ley, Md.,  to  be  made  via  the  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  It  was  thereupon  advised  that 
such  a  route  was  impossible,  since  the 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  did  not  reach  Ridgley. 
Upon  receiving  this  information  com- 
plainant peremptorily  instructed  the  con- 
signor to  ship  via  the  B.  &  O. 
R.  R.  In  attempting  to  comply  the  con- 
signor shipped  via  the  defendant  Phila. 
B.  &  Wash.  R.  R.  from  Ridgley  to 
Wilmington  and  thence  via  the  B.  & 
O.  R.  R.  and  the  Mutual  Transit  Com- 
pany to  Duluth.  The  local  rate  from 
Ridgley  to  Wilmington  was  9c,  and  the 
j(  int-rail-and-lake  rate  from  Wilmington 
to  Duluth,  26c,   making  the  combination 


of  35c,  which  was  collected.  Another 
route  from  Ridgley  via  the  Pennsylvania 
Lines  gave  a  through  rate  of  28c.  HELD, 
complainant  had  no  right  to  attempt 
to  avail  itself  of  a  tariff  which  could 
not  apply.  Reparation  denied.  Stone- 
Ordean-Wells  Co.  v.  P.  B.  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co..   18  I.  C.  C.  160,  161. 

(aa)  Routing  directed  by  the  shipper 
under  erroneous  information  from  the 
carrier  affords  no  ground  for  relief. 
Spreckels  Bros.  Commercial  Co.  v.  Mo- 
nongahela  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C  190. 

(bb)  On  carloads  of  coke  from  Leck- 
rone.  Pa.,  to  Los  Angeles,  Cal.,  complain- 
ant was  assessed  $16.34  per  ton.  There 
was  evidence  that  defendant  advised 
complainant  to  route  the  shipment  via 
New  Orleans  and  stated  that  the  rate 
would  be  the  same  as  via  Chicago.  ^ 
HELD,  whether  complainant  so  advised  7 
complainant  was  immaterial  and  did  not  ' 
entitle  the  latter  to  reparation.  If 
the  shipper  is  in  doubt  about  the  rate 
he  can  tender  the  traffic  to  the  car- 
rier without  routing  instructions,  and 
thereby  be  entitled  to  the  lowest  rate. 
But  when  he  specifies  the  route  he  can- 
not recover  reparation  on  the  ground 
that  the  shipment  might  have  moved 
by  a  lower  route.  Spreckels  Bros.  v. 
Monongahela  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  190, 
191. 

(cc)  Where  a  shipper  designated 
"lowest  all-rail"  route,  while  there  was 
a  lower  "rail-and-water"  route,  no  mis- 
routing  arises  from  obeying  the  ship- 
per's instructions.  Hollingshead  &  Blei 
Co.  V.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
193. 

(dd)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload 
of  hoop  steel  from  Pittsburgh,  Pa.,  to 
Cleveland,  O.,  directed  the  delivering 
carrier,  the  D.  &  C.  Navigation  Co.,  to 
reconsign  the  car  on  its  arrival  at 
Cleveland  to  Menominee,  Mich.,  via 
boat  line.  The  Navigation  Co,  advised 
complainant  that  boat  service  to  Me- 
nominee had  been  suspended  for  the 
season.  Complainant  then  directed  de- 
fendant to  forward  the  shipment  to 
Menominee  via  all-rail  and  by  the  route 
taking  the  lowest  rate.  The  shipment 
moved  all-rail  via  Chicago  at  a  rate 
of  33i^c.  It  might  have  moved  by 
across-lake  rail  and  water  route  at 
17c.  HELD,  under  Rule  214,  Confer- 
ence Rulings  Bulletin  No.  4,  it  was  the 
duty  of  complainant  to  designate  the 
I  rail-and-water     route     specifically;     that 


ROUTING   AND   MISROUTING,    §7    (ee)  — (mm) 


765 


he  did  designate  the  shipment  to 
be  carried  all-rail;  and  that  defendant 
incurred  no  liability  for  the  higher 
charge  by  having  routed  the  shipment 
as  it  did.  Hollingshead  &  Blei  Co.  v. 
P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  193, 
194. 

(ee)  Where  the  initial  carrier  vio- 
lates routing  instructions  given  by  the 
shipper  and  by  so  doing  incurs  a  higher 
rate,  it  is  liable  to  make  reparation 
for  the  difference  between  the  rate  over 
the  route  specified  and  that  over  the 
route  by  which  the  shipment  moved. 
Delray  Salt  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
I.   C.   C.   248,   248. 

(ff)  Where  a  carrier  by  disobeying 
routing  instructions  put  the  shipper  to 
additional  expense  for  icing  a  car  of 
grapes,  it  is  liable  to  make  reparation 
for  such  expense.  Flatten  Produce  Co. 
V.  Kalamazoo,  Lake  Shore  &  Chicago 
rty.    Co.,    18    I.    C.    C.    249,    250. 

(gg)  The  initial  line  ought  to  pass 
che  shipper's  routing  instructions  along 
*to  connections.  Duluth  &  Iron  Range 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co., 
18  I.   C.  C.  485,  488. 

(hh)  The  Initial  line  by  failing  to 
transmit  the  shipper's  routing  instruc- 
tions does  not  relieve  connecting  lines 
from  the  obligation  to  carry  over  the 
cheapest  reasonable  route.  Duluth  & 
Iron  Range  R.  R.  Co.  v.  C.  St.  P.  M. 
&  O.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  485. 

(ii)  A  carload  of  lumber  from  Ely, 
Minn.,  to  St.  Charles,  Mo.,  was  routed 
on  the  through  bill  of  lading  by  the 
shipper  through  Duluth  and  thence  over 
the  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.,  the  M.  &  St.  L. 
and  the  Iowa  Central  R.  R.  to  destination, 
the  through  rate  over  this  route  being 
21c  The  complainant  initial  carrier  moved 
the  car  to  Duluth,  the  only  junction 
available  to  the  destination  in  question, 
and  turned  it  over  to  defendant  C.  St. 
P.  M.  &  O.  K.  R.,  but  neglected  to 
note  the  consignor's  routing  instructions 
on  the  transfer  Dilling.  Defendant  in- 
stead of  delivering^the  car  at  Minnesota 
Transfer  to  the  Minneapolis  &  St.  Louis 
R.  R.,  the  direct  route,  hauled  it  through 
that  point  to  Sioux  City,  delivered  it 
to  the  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.,  which  hauled 
it  to  Council  Bluffs  and  turned  it  over 
to  the  Wabash  R.  R.  The  last  named 
road  hauled  it  back  387  miles  to  des- 
tination. The  rate  over  the  route  taken 
was    34c      Complainants,    under    Ruling 


70  of  Tariff  Circular  15-A  as  amended 
by  Rule  214  of  Conference  Rulings  Bul- 
letin No.  4,  reimbursed  the  shipper  for 
misrouting.  HELD,  under  these  rules 
complainant  was  entitled  to  recoup  the 
sum  paid  the  shipper  from  the  defend- 
ant C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  alone.  The 
mere  failure  of  an  initial  carrier  to  pass 
the  shipper's  routing  instructions  along 
to  its  connection  does  not  relieve  the 
connecting  line,  as  a  matter  of  law, 
from  the  duty  of  forwarding  the  ship- 
ment over  the  reasonable  and  direct 
route  to  destination.  Duluth  &  Iron 
Range  R.  R.  Co.  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O. 
Ry.   Co.,   18   1.  C.   C.  485,   487. 

(jj)  No  claim  for  misrouting  can 
be  predicated  upon  a  failure  to  obey 
instructions  where  a  factor  in  the  des- 
ignated route  is  not  on  file  with  the 
Commission.  De  Bary  &  Co.  v.  Louisi- 
ana Western  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.   C.  527. 

(kk)  A  carload  of  alum  from  Chicago 
Heights,  111.,  to  Lebanon,  Ore.,  was 
routed  by  the  shipper  "Chicago,  Rock 
Island  &  Pacific,  care  of  Union  Pacific, 
care  of  Southern  Pacific."  HELD,  since 
under  these  instructions  the  car  might 
move  through  either  Portland  or  Sac- 
ramento, it  was  the  duty  of  the  car- 
riers to  send  the  same  through  Port- 
land, the  rate  being  lower  by  that  route. 
Reparation  awarded  for  misrouting 
through  Sacramento.  Lebanon  Paper 
Co.  V.  E.  .J.  &  E.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
691,    592. 

(11)  A  shipment  of  coal  from  the 
Big  Four  mine,  Colo.,  to  Pueblo,  Colo., 
was  ordered  reconsigned  to  Hutchinson. 
A  rate  of  $3.60  per  ton  was  collected, 
made  up  of  $3  from  the  mine  to  Medora, 
Kan.,  plus  60c  from  Medora  to  Hutchin- 
son, a  distance  of  749  miles.  The  route 
selected  was  specified  by  complainant. 
Over  another  route  the  charge  would 
have  been  $3.  No  evidence  was  offered 
that  the  charge  collected  was  unreason- 
able, except  that  it  might  have  moved 
at  the  $3  rate  over  the  other  route. 
HELD,  the  rate  charged  was  not  shown 
to  be  unreasonable.  Complaint  dis- 
missed. South  Canon  Coal  Co.  v.  C.  & 
S.   Ry.   Co.,   17  I.  C.  C.  286,  287. 

(mm)  Carriers  may  not  disregard  in- 
structions of  shippers  as  to  intermedi- 
ate routing,  except  when  the  tariff  of 
the  initial  line  reserves  the  right  to 
dictate  intermediate  routing.  Foster 
Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17 
I.   C.  C.  292,  294. 


766 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,  §7   (nn)— (tt) 


(nn)  Where  a  shipper  gives  instruc- 
tions to  forward  his  goods  by  a  partic- 
ular route  the  carrier  is  relieved  of 
duty  of  ascertaining  whether  the  goods 
could  be  forwarded  by  another  route 
at  a  lower  rate.  Foster  Lumber  ■^o. 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
292,   294. 

(oo)  Carloads  of  coal  from  Strong, 
Colo.,  to  Quinn  and  Cottonwood,  S.  D., 
were  routed  by  the  complainant  via 
the  D.  &  R.  G.,  C.  B.  &  Q.,  Missouri 
River  &  Northwestern  R.  Rs.,  in  care 
of  the  Pierre,  Rapid  City  &  Northwest- 
ern R.  R.  at  Rapid  City.  The  rate  as- 
sessed on  one  carload  from  Strong 
to  Rapid  City  was  $4  per  ton,  plus 
the  local  rate  of  $1.90  from  Rapid  City, 
a  distance  of  65  miles  to  Quinn.  On 
the  other  car,  a  rate  of  $4  from  Strong 
to  Rapid  City,  plus  the  local  rate  of 
$2.20  from  Rapid  City  to  Cottonwood, 
a  distance  of  76  miles,  was  assessed. 
At  the  time  of  shipment  joint  rates 
were  in  effect  via  the  C.  &  S.,  C.  &  N. 
W.  and  Pierre,  Rapid  City  &  N.  W. 
R.  Rs.  of  $5.41  to  Quinn,  a  distance 
of  731  miles,  and  $5.52  to  Cottonwood, 
a  distance  of  742  miles.  The  Pierre 
Rapid  City  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  is  165  miles 
in  length.  In  that  distance  are  494 
bridges  and  culverts,  and  not  to  ex- 
ceed 1^/^  miles  of  straight  track.  Sev- 
eral grades  exceed  1^/^  per  cent.  The 
maximum  haul  for  the  engines  in  use 
did  not  exceed  400  tons.  The  cost  of 
operation  of  the  road  was  17.42  mills 
per-ton-mile.  HELD,  complainant  hav- 
ing specified  the  routing,  the  rates  were 
not,  under  the  circumstances,  shown  to 
be  unreasonable.  Sunnyside  Coal  Min- 
ing Co.  V.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
I.   C.   C.   540: 

(pp)  Complainant  shipped  from  Port 
Costa,  Cal.,  to  Sacramento,  Cal.,  three 
carloads  of  barley  with  the  purpose 
of  having  the  same  inspected  at  Sac- 
ramento and  forwarded  thence  to  Mil- 
waukee, Wis.  The  shipment  was  billed 
to  Sacramento  and  rebilled  to  Milwau- 
kee. At  the  time  of  shipment  defendant 
had  no  provision  in  its  tariff  permitting 
the  diversion  of  grain  in  transit  through 
Sacramento.  Since  the  shipment  such 
provision  was  put  into  effect.  Com- 
plainant was  charged  the  sum  of  the 
local  rates.  HELD,  the  shipments  hav- 
ing been  billed  locally  from  Port  Costa 
to  Sacramento  and  rebilled  thence  to 
Milwaukee,     reparation     should     be     de- 


nied. Clemens  Horst  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
17    I.    C.    C.   576. 

(qq)  No  reason  exists  why  a  com- 
munity should  insist  upon  transportation 
by  a  more  circuitous  route  against  the 
will  of  that  carrier.  City  of  Spokane 
V.   N.  P.  Ry.,  16  I.  C.  C.  179,  180. 

(rr)  Where  shipper  routed  via  an 
expensive  route  to  test  the  market  at 
an  intermediate  point  no  claim  can  be 
sustained  for  misrouting.  Counsil  v.  St. 
L.    &    S.   F.    R.   R.   Co.,   16   I.   C.   C.   188. 

(ss)  On  a  shipment  of  cattle  in  car- 
loads from  Haverhill,  Kan.,  to  East  St. 
Louis,  111.,  complainant  directed  the 
routing  to  be  via  Kansas  City.  The  only 
legal  rate  in  force  by  that  route  was 
27i^c.  By  another  route  not  passing 
through  Kansas  City  there  was  a 
through  rate  of  22  %c.  Complainant 
chose  the  Kansas  City  route  in  order  to 
try  the  market  at  that  place.  He 
offered  no  evidence  to  show  the  un- 
reasonableness of  the  2TY2C  rate. 
HELD,  he  was  not  entitled  to  reparation 
on  the  basis  of  the  22 %c  rate.  Coun. 
sil  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.    C.    188,    189. 

(tt)  Complainant  routed  a  carload  of 
red  cedar  shingles  from  Bellingham, 
Wash.,  to  Menasha,  Wis.,  via  the  G.  N. 
Ry.  and  Minnesota  Transfer,  care  of 
the  Wisconsin  Central  Ry.  The  agent 
of  the  G.  N.  Ry.  failed  to  note  on  the 
billing  the  routing  beyond  Minnesota 
Transfer  and  the  car  was  delivered  to 
the  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  at  that  point 
and  by  it  transferred  to  Menasha.  The 
Wisconsin  Central  Ry.  had  been  accus- 
tomed to  hold  at  Menasha  shipments  of 
lumber  from  the  Pacific  coast,  to  unload 
and  reload  the  same  if  necessary  and 
rebill  and  reconsign  them  upon  receiving 
instructions  from  complainant  and  to  al- 
low the  shipments  to  move  to  Chicago 
on  the  proportional  rate  applying  be- 
tween Minnesota  Transfer  and  Chicago. 
The'  Wisconsin  Central  Ry.'s  tariffs, 
however,  contained  no  provisions  allow- 
ing these  privileges^  at  Menasha.  The 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.'  rebilled  the  ship- 
ments in  question  at  Menasha  to  De- 
troit and  collected  rates  of  10c,  Minne- 
sota Transfer  to  Menasha,  of  S^^c, 
Menasha  to  Chicago,  and  9c,  Chicago  to 
Detroit.  Had  the  agent  of  the  G.  N. 
Ry.  noted  on  the  billing  the  routing 
specified,  the  Wisconsin  Central  Ry. 
would  have  charged  only  10c  from  Min- 
nesota to   Chicago,   thereby  saving  com- 


ROUTING  AND   MISROUTING,   §7    (uu)— (aaa) 


767 


plainant  S^/^c,  but  such  a  charge  would 
have  been  unlawful.  HELD,  complainant 
could  not  recover  reparation  of  the  G. 
N.  Ry.  for  misrouting.  An  act  of  negli- 
gence on  the  part  of  the  carrier  which 
deprives  a  shipper  of  the  enjoyment  of 
an  unlawful  privilege  cannot  be  made 
the  basis  of  a  claim  for  reuaration.  Fol- 
mer  &  Co.  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co., 
15   I.   C.    C.   33,    36. 

(uu)  Where  the  shipper's  agent 
shipped  contrary  to  instructions,  the 
Commission  has  no  authority  to  grant 
relief.  Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  O.  S.  L. 
R.    R.    Co.,    15    I.    C.    C.    429. 

(vv)  On  shipments  of  cattle  from 
Nampa,  Idaho,  and  Ontario,  Ore.,  to 
Tacoma,  complainant  instructed  its 
agent  to  send  same  by  a  given  route, 
but  the  agent  upon  consultation  with 
defendant's  agent  was  persuaded  that 
no  advantage  in  rates  would  be  secured 
by  shipping  over  said  route.  As  a  re- 
sult the  cars  were  shipped  over  a 
route  taking  a  higher  rate  than  the  one 
suggested  to  its  agent  by  complainant. 
No  evidence  was  offered  of  the  unrea- 
sonableness of  the  rates  exacted.  HELD, 
the  Commission  had  no  authority  to 
grant  any  relief.  Carstens  Packing  Co. 
v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  429, 
430. 

(ww)  The  carrier's  duty  is  to  trans- 
port the  merchandise  of  shippers  in 
accordance  with  their  reasonable  in- 
structions. Chamber  of  Commerce  of 
Milwaukee  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  R  Ry.  Co.  15 
I.    C.    C.    -60,    464. 

(xx)  Generally  speaking,  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  carrier  to  transport  ship- 
ments via  the  route  designated  by  the 
consignor;  and  if  this  causes  additional 
expense  to  the  shipper  the  carrier  in- 
curs no  liability  therefor.  Bregman  & 
Co.  V.  Penn.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  478,  479. 

(xxx)  A  car  of  scrap  iron  from  Free- 
port,  111.,  to  Wheatland,  Pa.,  was  routed 
by  complainant  via  the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry. 
to  Chicago,  thence  over  the  Bl"  e  Line 
which  operated  over  the  M.  C.  R.  R. 
When  the  car  was  tendered  to  the  M.  C. 
R.  R.,  said  company  asked  defendant  ini- 
tial carrier  for  prepayment  of  charges. 
The  consignor  was  duly  informed,  but 
declined  to  prepay  the  freigh"-  and  di- 
rected that  the  car  be  sent  forward  on 
the  through  rate  via  the  C.  &  N.  W,  and 
the  Penn.  R.  Rs.  Switching  charges  at 
Chicago  of  $6.50  were  incurred.     Defend- 


ant initial  carrier  did  not  have  on  file 
at  Freeport  the  tariffs  of  the  Blue  Line 
from  Chicago  to  Wheatland,  having  no 
through  rates  over  the  route  as  specified 
by  the  shipper,  HELD,  defendants  were 
not  at  fault  and  the  switching  charge 
should  be  borne  by  the  shipper.  Breg- 
man &  Co.  v.  Pa.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.    78,  479. 

(yy)  Carloads  of  cattle  from  Ontario, 
Ore.,  and  from  Nampa,  Idaho,  to  Ta- 
coma were  specifically  routed  through 
Wallula.  On  account  of  washouts  the 
shipments  were  diverted  by  defendant 
through  Portland.  The  diversion  was 
effected  without  the  knowledge  or  con- 
sent of  the  shippers  and  was  unneces- 
sary, for  the  line  supposed  to  be  washed 
out  had  been  reopened  and  was  in 
operation.  HELD,  defendant  was  liable 
to  make  reparation  for  the  difference 
between  the  rate  over  the  route  speci- 
fied, and  over  the  one  to  which  the 
shipments  were  diverted.  Carstens 
Packing  Co.  v.  O.  R.  R.  &  Nav.  Co., 
15   I.   C.   C.   482,   483. 

(zz)  It  is  the  duty  of  the  initial 
carrier  to  obey  the  specific  instructions 
furnished  by  the  shipper.  When  a 
shipper  names  the  carriers  that  are  to 
transport  his  shipment,  it  must  be  as- 
sumed that  he  is  relying  on  his  own 
investigations,  and  that  for  some  reason 
he  considers  it  expedient  that  the  ship- 
ment move  over  the  route  indicated  by 
him.  Duluth  Log  Co.  v.  Minn.  &  Int.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  627,  628. 

(aaa)  On  a  carload  of  poles  from  La- 
porte,  Minn.,  to  Poplar  Bluff,  Mo.,  a  rate 
of  451/^0  was  collected.  Complainant 
gave  specific  routing  instructions  which 
prevented  the  shipment  from  taking  a 
route  yielding  the  lowest  rate,  33c,  but 
even  under  such  instructions  the  connect- 
ing carrier  at  Kansas  City  might  have 
sent  the  shipment  through  Springfield, 
Mo.,  to  destination  instead  of  St.  Louis, 
and  thereby  obtained  a  rate  of  39i/^c. 
This  defendant  connecting  carrier  failed 
to  do  and  routed  the  shipment  via  St. 
Louis,  thereby  inposing  the  rate  com- 
plained of.  HELD,  complainant,  having 
given  routing  instructions,  was  not  en- 
titled to  the  benefit  of  the  33c  rate  over 
a  route  contrary  to  his  instructions,  but 
was  entitled  to  the  lowest  rate  consistent 
with  them,  namely,  the  39V^c  rate  via 
Springfield.  Reparation  awarded  against 
the  connecting  carrier  on  the  basis  of 
39 1/2 c.  Duluth  Log  Co.  v.  M.  &  I.  Ry.  Co., 
15   L  C.  C.   627,  629. 


?68 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,  §7   (bbb)  — (nnn) 


(bbb)  Where  a  shipper  gives  direc- 
tions with  respect  to  the  routing  of  his 
shipment,  the  carrier  is  bound  by  his  in- 
structions and  must  charge  the  rate  ap- 
plicable to  the  designated  route,  even 
though  such  rate  is  higher  than  over 
some  other  route  between  the  same 
points.  Struthers-Wells  Co.  v.  Penn. 
R.    R.    Co.,    14    I.    C.    C.    291,    292. 

(ccc)  On  carloads  of  potatoes  from 
Wautoma,  Wis.,  to  Springfield,  Mo., 
routed  by  complainant  via  Chicago  and 
St.  Louis,  a  charge  of  SS^/^c  was  assessed. 
The  shipments  might  have  moved  upon 
a  25c  rate  over  several  other  routes.  By 
mistake  of  defendants  the  cars  were 
shipped  to  East  St.  Louis  instead  of  St. 
Louis,  and  were  subjected  for  that  reason 
to  an  unnecessary  l^^c  bridge  toll,  mak- 
ing the  charge  38y2C  instead  of  37c.  The 
charge  exacted  was  made  up  of  a  joint 
through  rate  from  Wautoma  via  Chicago 
to  East  St.  Louis  of  20c  and  a  local  rate 
from  East  St.  Louis  to  Springfield  of 
Igi^c.  The  distance  from  Wautoma  to 
East  St.  Louis  is  489  miles.  Excluding 
the  bridge  toll  of  IVaC,  the  17c  local  rate 
exacted  from  East  St.  I^uis  to  Spring- 
field was  established  by  the  Missouri 
Commission.  HELD,  complainant  was 
not  entitled  to  recover  on  the  basis  of 
the  25c  rate  over  other  routes  since  it 
routed  the  shipments  itself;  that  satis- 
factory through  routes  being  already  in 
existence  the  Commission  could  not  es- 
tablish through  routes  and  joint  rates 
between  Wautoma  and  Springfield,  and 
could  not  therefore  award  reparation  on 
the  basis  of  the  unreasonableness  of  the 
charge  exacted;  but  that  complainant 
should  be  awarded  reparation  for  the 
l^/^c  bridge  toll  unnecessarily  incurred. 
Stedman  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  13 
I.  C.  C.  167,  169,  170. 

(ddd)  Complainant  routed  carloads  of 
canned  vegetables  from  Green  Bay,  Wis., 
to  Washington,  O.,  via  the  C.  &  N.  W., 
P.  M.  and  Hocking  Valley  R.  Rs.  No  joint 
rate  was  in  effect  over  this  route  and 
the  sum  of  the  locals,  26i^c,  was  col- 
lected. Over  another  route  via  C.  &  N. 
W.,  H.  V.  and  Cincinnati  &  Mus- 
kingum Valley  R.  Rs..  a  joint  rate  of  20c 
was  in  effect.  No  evidence  was  offered 
showing  the  rate  charged  to  be  unrea- 
sonable per  se.  HELD,  defendants  were 
compelled  to  route  the  shipment  as  di- 
rected. Reparation  denied.  Larsen  Can- 
ning Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C. 
C.    286,    287. 


(eee)  In  absence  of  routing  instruc- 
tions the  initial  carrier  routed  shipment 
via  the  more  expensive  of  two  available 
routes.  Reparation  awarded.  Caddell  & 
Sons  V.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  177. 

(fff)  Although  complainant  knew  of 
an  existing  through  route  and  joint  rate, 
via  certain  lines,  it  nevertheless  routed 
the  shipments  via  connecting  lines  over 
which  a  higher  combination  of  inter- 
mediates was  applicable.  Reparation 
denied.  Utterback  Bros.  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C. 
&  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  317. 

(ggg)  Lower  rate  in  effect  than  the 
one  designated  by  shipper,  no  grounds 
for  reparation.  Ludowici-Celadon  Co.  v. 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  320. 

(hhh)  Connecting  lines  inserted  in 
bill  of  lading  by  consignor,  but  did  not 
mention  junction  point  or  name  of  de- 
livering carrier.  Instructions  followed. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Zuber  v.  C.  of  Ga. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.   Op.  327. 

(iii)  Routing  instructions  not  fol- 
lowed. While  shipment  in  transit,  con- 
signor ordered  same  diverted,  which 
caused  assessment  of  higher  rates.  Rep- 
aration awarded.  Barker  &  Co.  v.  G.  & 
S.  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  332. 

(jjj)  Carrier  disregarded  routing  in- 
structions, causing  assessment  of  higher 
rates.  Reparation  awarded.  Chicago  & 
Riverdale  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  &  E.  I.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  346. 

(kkk)  Shipment  forwarded  via  route 
selected  by  complainant,  although  route 
with  lower  rate  in  effect,  no  ground  for 
reparation.  Parafline  Paint  Co.  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  369. 

(Ill)  If  a  shipper  desires  his  ship- 
ment to  move  via  a  water-and-rail  route 
that  is  cheaper  than  the  all-rail  route, 
he  must  in  delivering  it  to  an  initial  rail 
carrier  specify  such  routing,  otherwise  it 
is  understood^  that  the  shipment  is  to 
move  via  all-rail  route.  Hirsch  v.  E.  R. 
R.   Co.,   Unrep.   Op.   381. 

(mmm)  Reparation  awarded  for  dam- 
ages caused  by  defendant's  failure  to  com- 
ply with  shipper's  instructions  as  to  rout- 
ing. Federal  Lumber  Co.  v.  S,  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  453;  La.  Sawmill  Co.  v.  L.  Ry. 
&  Nav.   Co.,  Unrep.  Op.   422. 

(nnn)  Instructions  given  by  com- 
plainant to  forward  shipment  to  wrong 
destination.  No  negligence  having  been 
shown  on   part   of   defendant,    complaint 


I 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,  §7    (ooo)— §9   (g) 


769 


dismissed.      Biddle    Purchasing    Co.     v. 
B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  430. 

(oooppp)  Failure  to  follow  routing  in- 
structions as  given  by  shipper  prevented 
reconsignment  at  balance  of  through 
rate.  Reparation  awarded.  Taylor  & 
Mason  v.  C.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  457. 

(qqq)  Shipment  forwarded  to  lake 
port  with  instructions  to  forward  all  rail 
if  navigation  closed.  No  demurrage 
should  accrue  for  detention  at  lake  port 
before  forwarding  via  all-rail  line,  be- 
cause during  all  the  time  the  car  was 
held  at  such  port  it  was  in  the  •custody 
of  the  carriers  awaiting  acceptance  by 
the  water  line.  Follmer  &  Co.  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  458. 

(rrr)  In  order  to  comply  with  recon- 
signment instructions  to  point  with 
which  carrier  had  no  connection,  it  was 
necessary  to  make  back  haul.  Charges 
therefor  not  having  been  found  unrea- 
sonable, and  instructions  followed,  com- 
plaint dismissed.  Doran  &  Co.  v.  O.  &  K, 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  491. 

(sss)  A  shipment  moving  in  accord- 
ance with  instructions  furnished  by  ship- 
per is  not  misrouted,  although  a  lower 
rate  is  available  over  another  route. 
O'Halloran  &  Jacobs  v.  B.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  494. 

(ttt)  A  carrier  negligently  failed  to 
comply  with  instructions  for  reconsign- 
ment. HELD,  that  the  carrier  is  re- 
sponsible for  additional  freight  charges 
incurred  as  a  result  of  its  negligence. 
Reparation  awarded,  fiathway  Lumber 
Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Urep.  Op.  544. 

(uuu)  Routing  instructions  disre- 
garded, causing  higher  rate  to  be  as- 
sessed. Reparation  awarded.  Milne 
Lumber  Co  v.  L.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  Urep. 
Op.   558. 

(vvv)  Instructions  having  been  fol- 
lowed, even  though  lower  rate  in  ef- 
fect, no  ground  for  reparation.  Wahl- 
gren  Furniture  Co  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  583. 

(www)  Routing  instructions  disre- 
garded, causing  higher  charges  to  be  as- 
sessed. Reparation  awarded.  Ferguson 
Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  584. 

(xxx)  Agent  of  complainant  routed 
shipment  via  route  over  which  higher 
rate  applicable,  therefore  carrier  not  liable 
for  such  higher  charge.     Complaint  dis- 


missed.    Grinnell,  Collins  &  Co.  v.  C,  B. 
&  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  139. 

III.     LIABILITY  FOR  MISROUTING. 

See  Overcharges,   §9    (cc) ;   Procedure 
Before   Commission,   §5   (k). 

§8.  Burden  of  Proof. 
See  Evidence,  \. 
(a)  Where  routing  instructions  are 
given  under  which  more  than  one  route 
may  be  selected  by  the  carriers,  the  pre- 
sumption is  that  the  lowest  rate  will  be 
applied  by  them  and  the  burden  is  upon 
the  carrier  charged  with  misrouting  to 
show  that  it  applied  such  rate.  Duluth 
Log  Co.  v.  M.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
627,  630. 

§9.     Measure  of  Damages. 

See  Reparation,  §6  (I),  §18. 

(a)  The  measure  of  damages  for  mis- 
routing  a  shipment  billed  to  a  consignee 
carrier  is  not  the  full  division  of  the 
rate,  because  it  would  have  cost  that 
carrier  something  to  perform  the  haul. 
In  Re  Transportation  of  Company  Ma- 
terial, 22  I.  C.  C.  439,  441. 

(b)  Reparation  awarded  on  shipment 
of  lumber  from  Perry,  Le  Flore  County, 
Okla.,  to  lola,  Kan.,  on  account  of  mis- 
routing.  Hill-Ingham  Lumber  Co.  v.  K. 
C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  45. 

(c)  Reparation  awarded  on  various 
shipments  of  cheese  for  misrouting  from 
Sheboygan,  Wis.,  to  Muncie,  Ind.  God- 
dard  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  83. 

(d)  Reparation  awarded  on  ten  car- 
loads of  grain  from  Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to 
Milwaukee,  Wis.,  for  misrouting.  Mason 
Gregg  Grain  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.   89. 

(e)  Reparation  awarded  on  two  car- 
loads of  lumber  misrouted  by  the  initial 
carrier.  Sterling  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  222. 

(f)  Lumber  misrouted  from  Winter- 
burn,  W.  Va.,  to  Irvington  Station,  New- 
ark, N,  J.  Reparation  awarded.  Craig 
&  Sons  V.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep,  Op. 
266. 

(g)  Reparation  awarded  on  account 
of  an  unreasonable  charge  due  to  mis- 
routing a  carload  of  lumber  from  Colfax, 
La.,  to  Calvary,  111.  Sabine  Lumber  Co. 
V.  L.  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  270. 


770 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,  §9  (h)— §10  (j) 


(h)  Reparation  awarded  for  misrout- 
ing  carload  of  corn  from  Washington, 
Okla.,  to  Arcadia,  La.     Hill  &  Webb  v. 

C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  274. 

(i)  Reparation  awarded  against  ini- 
tial ^carrier  for  misrouting  shipment  of 
oak  fence  posts  from  Mammoth  Springs, 
Ark.,  to  Grainfield,  Kan.  Benton  v.  St. 
L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  304. 

§10.     Parties  to  Make  Refund. 

See   Reparation,   §19   (k),    (m),    (n). 

(a)  Where  the  originating  carrier  is 
responsible  for  not  providing  a  routing 
for  goat  and  sheep  skins,  from  Farming- 
ton,  N.  Mex.,  to  Chicago,  111.,  via  Pueblo, 
which  carried  a  lower  rate  than  that  ex- 
acted, that  carrier  will  be  ordered  to 
make   reparation.     C.   H.   Algert   Co.   v. 

D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  93,  94. 

(b)  Where  the  initial  carrier  receives 
shipments  without  routing  instructions 
and  misroutes  them  so  as  to  incur  higher 
rates,  it  is  liable  to  make  reparation. 
Marshall  &  Michel  Grain  Co.  v.  St.  L. 
&  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  228,  230. 

(c)  Rule  214,  of  Conference  Rulings, 
Bulletin  No.  4,  relating  to  the  settlement 
of  disputes  between  carriers  as  to  the 
responsibility  for  misrouting,  is  not  con- 
fined in  its  operation  to  the  initial  car- 
rier, but  relates  to  all  the  carriers  par- 
ticipating in  the  movement.  Duluth  & 
Iron  Range  R.  R.  Co.  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O. 
Ry.  Co..  18  I.  C.  C.  485,  ^88. 

(d)  Under  Rule  70,  of  Tariff  Circular 
15-A,  as  amended  by  Rule  214,  of  Confer- 
ence Rulings,  Bulletin  No.  4,  where  a  car- 
rier adjusts  a  claim  for  misrouting  and 
later  learns  that  the  responsibility  rests 
with  a  connection,  the  two  carriers  may 
apply  to  the  Commission  to  determine  a 
dispute  between  them  as  to  the  respon- 
sibility for  the  error.  Duluth  &  Iron 
Range  R.  R.  Co.  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  485,  486. 

(e)  Larger  lines  and  systems,  when 
they  are  intermediate  or  connecting  car- 
riers, not  infrequently  relieve  small 
initial  carriers  of  the  responsibility  for 
correct  routing,  and,  from  the  nature  of 
their  larger  traffic  and  wider  opportu- 
nities for  knowing  what  are  the  reg,son- 
ably  direct  routes,  they  ought  in  many 
cases  to  be  willing  to  do  this.  With  re- 
spect to  shipments  to  distant  and  un- 
usual points  it  is  not  reasonable  to  ex- 
pect that  the  initial  line,  and  often  even 


its  immediate  connections,  will  be  able 
to  give  specific  routing,  through  to  des- 
tination; in  such  cases  they  ought  not  to 
be  held  to  any  greater  duty  than  that  of 
indicating  the  proper  or  usual  gateway  to 
destination.  Duluth  «&  Iron  Range  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I. 
C.   C.   485,   489. 

(f)  A  shipment  was  routed  from  Ant- 
werp, Belgium,  to  New  Orleans,  thence 
by  rail  to  San  Francisco,  thence  by 
ocean  carrier  to  Seattle.  When  it  reached 
El  Paso  the  S.  P.  Co.  sent  the  same  by 
rail  via  Portland  to  Seattle  instead  of 
having  it  delivered  to  the  ocean  carrier, 
via  San  Francisco,  and  as  a  result  a 
higher  charge  was  incurred.  HELD,  no 
reparation  could  be  recovered  for  mis- 
routing. To  determine  the  damages  for 
misrouting  all  factors  in  the  claimed 
route  must  be  subject  to  the  Commis- 
sion's jurisdiction  and  filed  in  the  man- 
ner prescribed  by  law,  and  since  the  San 
Francisco  to  Seattle,  port  to  port  water 
rate  was  not  filed  such  rate  could  not 
serve  as  a  measure  of  damages.  Fred- 
erick De  Barry  &  Co.  v.  Louisiana  West- 
ern R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.   C.   C.   527,  528. 

(g)  Where  the  initial ,  carrier  has 
knowledge  of  the  rates  applying  over  two 
different  routes,  it  is  solely  liable  for 
misrouting  despite  inquiries  made  by  it 
as  to  rates  over  the  lines  of  connecting 
carriers.  Cameron  &  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  560,  561. 

(h)  Where  a  higher  rate  is  exacted 
on  account  of  misrouting  through  the 
fault  of  the  initial  carrier  alone,  repara- 
tion will  be  awarded  only  against  that 
carrier.  Grand  Rapids  Plaster  Co.  v.  P. 
M.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  68,  69. 

(i)  The  demand  of  carriers  that  Ad- 
ministrative Rulings  60,  70  and  83,  requir- 
ing published  tariffs  to  be  adhered  to  and 
imposing  the  liability  for  reparation 
solely  on  the  carrier  diverting .  a  ship- 
ment intentionally  or  unintentionally  to 
a  route  involving  a  higher  rate,  be  so 
modified  as  to  permit  such  diversion  in 
cases  of  emergency  or  necessity  is  de- 
nied. Woodward  &  Dickerson  v.  L.  &  N. 
R.  R.   Co.,   15  I.  C.  C.  170,  173. 

(j)  On  a  carload  of  poles  from  La- 
porte,  Minn.,  to  Louisville,  Ky.,  complain- 
ant gave  no  routing  instructions.  The 
initial  carrier  routed  same  so  as  to  take 
the  lowest  rate.  The  connecting  carrier 
at  Minnesota  Transfer  changed  the  rout- 
ing so  as  to  impose  a  rate  of  31c  instead 


ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING,  §10  (k)— SPECIAL  CONTRACTS,  §1  (a)     771 


of  27c.  HELD,  reparation  should  be 
awarded  against  the  connecting  carrier 
alone  without  recourse  upon  any  other 
carrier.  Duluth  Log  Co.  v.  M.  &  I.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  192,  195. 

(k)  Where  the  defendant  alone  was 
responsible  for  the  misrouting  of  the 
shipment  through  a  junction  carrying  a 
higher  rate  than  was  available  through 
another  junction,  it  must  therefore  bear 
the  entire  burden  of  the  mistake.  Wash- 
ington Broom  &  Woodenware  Co.  v.  C. 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  219,  221. 

(1)  Carriers  at  fault  in  misrouting  are 
liable  for  damages  represented  by  higher 
charges  than  would  have  been  lawfully 
assessable  had  the  misrouting  not  oc- 
curred, and  their  liability  is  not  limited 
to  such  damage  as  can  be  reasonably  an- 
ticipated, since  a  shipper  cannot  be  de- 
prived through  a  carrier's  negligence  of 
any  lawful  privilege  offered  by  another 
carrier,  especially  after  due  diligence  on 
his  part  to  secure  such  advantage.  Kile 
&  Morgan  Co.  v.  Deepwater  Ry.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  235,  238. 

(m)  Where  the  responsibility  for  mis- 
routing rests  upon  a  particular  carrier 
that  carrier  is  solely  liable.  Duluth  Log 
Co.  v.  M.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  627,  629. 

(n)  A  carload  of  grain  products  from 
Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Howard,  Wis.,  was 
routed  via  Minnesota  Transfer  by  the 
initial  carrier.  No  joint  rate  being  in 
effect  over  that  route,  the  sum  of  the 
locals,  24c,  was  charged.  The  shipment 
might  have  moved  via  Chippewa  Falls 
by  the  combination  of  locals,  20V^c.  The 
joint  rate  from  Kansas  City  to  Albert- 
ville.  Wis.,  via  Waukesha  was  14c  per  100 
lbs.  Howard  was  an  in<;ermediate  point 
on  that  route  and  was  entitled  to  the 
14c  rate,  although  through  fault  of  de- 
fendants no  joint  rate  was  published  to 
Howard  via  this  route.  HELD,  complain- 
ant was  entitled  to  reparation  on  the 
basis  of  the  14c  rate;  the  initial  carrier 
was  liable  to  the  extent  of  the  difference 
between  the  24c  rate  charged  and  the 
20^c-via-Chippewa-Falls  rate;  that  the 
balance  of  the  damages  should  be  shared 
between  the  two  defendants  according  to 
their  division  of  the  through  rate.  Wil- 
son V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
549,  550. 

(o)  Reparation  awarded  against  ini- 
tial carrier  for  misrouting  complainant's 
■shipment  of  baskets  from  Traverse  City, 


Mich.,  to  Chicago,  111.    Wells-Higman  Co. 
V.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  48. 

(p)  Reparation  awarded  against  ini- 
tial carrier  for  misrouting  carloads  of 
lumber  from  New  Albany,  Miss.,  to  St. 
Charles,  Minn.  Wolter  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F. 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  132. 

RULES  AND  REGULATIONS. 

See  Transportation,  §12. 

SCHEDULE. 

See  Transportation,  §8  (a). 

SPECIAL  CONTRACTS. 

I.     CONTROL  AND   REGULATION. 

§1.     Constitutionality  of  Act. 
II.     LEGALITY    AND    EFFECT    SINCE 
PASSAGE  OF  ACT. 
§2.     In  general. 

III.  LIABILITY. 

§3.     Criminal  liability. 
§4.     Damages  for  breach. 

(1)     Jurisdiction     of     Com- 
mission. 
§5.    Discrimination    through     con- 
tract. 

IV.  ACTIONS  TO   ENFORCE. 

§6.    Defenses. 

V.  AS    EVIDENCE    OF   REASONABLE 

RATES. 
§7.     In  general. 

CROSS   REFERENCES. 

See  Auction  Company;  Baggage 
Transfer,  II;  Cars  and  Car  Sup- 
ply, IV;  Exclusive  Contracts;  Pas- 
senger Fares  and  Facilities,  §12; 
Stock  Yards  Company. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.  Constitutionality  of  Act. 
See  Constitutional  Law. 
(a)  The  Act  is  not  unconstitutional 
as  infringing  the  right  of  contract  or  as 
taking  property  for  public  use  without 
just  compensation  or  due  process  of  law 
by  reason  of  the  fact  that  it  invalidates  a 
contract  entered  into  prior  to  its  passage 
between  a  person  and  a  railroad  by 
which  the  latter,  in  consideration  of  the 
release  of  a  cause  of  action  for  personal 
injuries,  granted  to  such  person  and  his 
family  free  transportation  for  life.  L.  & 
N.  R.  R.  V.  Mottley,  219  U.  S.  467,  482, 
484,  31  Sup.  Ct.  265,  55  L.  ed.  297. 


772 


SPECIAL  CONTRACTS,   §2    (a)  — (i) 


II.     LEGALITY    AND     EFFECT    SINCE 
PASSAGE    OF  ACT. 

§2.     In  General. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §17  (a);  Allow- 
ances, §5  (c) ;  Crimes,  §7  (c),  (n); 
Demurrage,  §11  (a);  Evidence,  §64 
(w) ;  Interstate  Commerce,  §4  (w) ; 
Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §94  (b); 
Tariffs,  §3  (ff),  §3  (1)  (h),  (j),  (m), 
(n),  (o),  (p),  (q),  (s),  (u),  (V),  (w), 
§3  (2)  (d),  (I),  (p),  (q);  Through 
Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §16  (k), 
(m),   §17   (h),   §18   (c). 

(a)  A  contract  by  which,  in  consider- 
ation of  a  release  of  a  cause  of  action 
for  personal  injuries,  a  carrier  agrees  to 
furnish  free  transportation  to  the  person 
injured  and  his  family,  is  in  violation  of  the 
Act  as  amended  and  cannot  be  enforced 
despite  the  fact  that  it  was  made  before 
the  passage  of  the  Act,  since  the  Act  as 
amended  makes  no  exceptians  as  to  ex- 
isting contracts.  L.  &  N.  R,  R.  v.  Mott- 
ley,  219  U.  S.  467,  478,  31  Sup.  Ct.  265,  55 
L.  ed.  297. 

(b)  After  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act  came  into  effect  no  contract  that  was 
inconsistent  with  the  regulations  estab- 
lished by  it  could  be  enforced  in  any 
court.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  v.  Mottley,  219  U. 
S.  467,  483,  31  Sup.  Ct.  265,  55  L.  ed.  297. 

(c)  Railroad  companies  may  contract 
with  shippers  for  a  single  transportation 
or  for  successive  transportations,  subject 
though  such  contract  may  be  to  a  change 
of  rates  in  the  manner  provided  in  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act.  I.  C.  C.  v.  C. 
G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  209  U.  S.  108,  119,  28  Sup. 
Ct.  493,  52  L.  ed.  705. 

(d)  A  railroad  which  has  duly  pub- 
lished an  advance  in  rates  may  charge 
a  shipper  the  advanced  rate  despite  a 
private  agreement  with  him  to  carry 
goods  at  the  rate  in  existence  prior  to 
the  advance.  First  Trust  &  Savings 
Bank  v.  So.  Ind.  Ry.  Co.,  195  Fed.  330,  334. 

(e)  Plaintiff  lumber  company  con- 
tracted with  defendant  railway  to  build 
a  railroad  from  its  mills  to  defendant's 
right  of  way  and  also  to  construct  at  its 
own  cost  on  its  own  right  of  way  a 
switch  at  the  intersection  of  its  line  and 
that  of  defendant  for  the  placing  of  cars. 
Plaintiff  bound  itself  for  ten  years  to 
ship  all  its  lumber  over  defendant's  road. 
A  system  of  rate  making  and  freight  di- 
vision for  the  ten-year  period  was  stipu- 
lated. Plaintiff  took  no  step  to  incorpo- 
rate its  road  or  make  it  a  common  car- 
rier.    HELD,   the   contract  being  illegal 


in  toto  as  an  agreement  to  accept  less 
than  the  published  rates,  defendant  was 
not  liable  in  an  action  at  law  for  dam- 
ages for  failure  to  furnish  sufficient  cars. 
Taenzer  &  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
191  Fed.  543,  549. 

(f)  Where  no  state  law  makes  the 
giving  of  rebates  illegal,  a  contract  be- 
tween the  receiver  of  a  railroad  and  a 
shipper  by  which  the  former  agrees  to 
give  a  rebate  from  the  published  rates 
on  an  intrastate  shipment  is  not  illegal. 
Bibber-White  Co.  v.  White  River  Valley 
Elec.  R.  R.  Co.,  175  Fed.  470,  475. 

(g)  Plaintiff  lumber  company  made  a 
contract  with  defendant  carrier  by  which 
it  was  to  build  at  its  own  expense  a  tie 
hoist  at  the  river  landing  and  tracks  con- 
necting the  landing  with  defendant's  line. 
It  was  to  furnish  traffic  over  these  tracks 
to  defendant  and  was  to  receive  from 
defendant  10  per  cent  of  the  net  profits 
on  such  traffic  until  the  plaintiff  was  re- 
imbursed for  the  Cost  of  construction, 
whereupon  the  tracks  and  hoist  were  to 
become  the  property  of  defendant.  The 
agreement  did  not  provide  that  other 
shippers  might  use  the  hoist  and  tracks. 
Under  this  contract  defendant  paid  back 
to  plaintiff  much  more  than  it  actually 
expended  on  construction.  In  a  suit  by 
plaintiff  for  breach  of  contract,  HELD, 
the  contract  was  void  under  the  Act, 
since  its  purpose  was  to  give  plaintiff  a 
preferential  rate.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Standard  Lumber  Co.,  174  Fed.  107,  112. 

(h)  Although  a  carrier  gives  to  one 
transfer  company,  which  is  controlled  by 
its  officers,  the  exclusive  privilege  of 
soliciting  baggage  transfer  on  their  trains 
without  any  monetary  consideration, 
there  is  no  undue  discrimination  against 
a  competitive  company  which  is  willing 
to  pay  for  such  privilege,  because  defend- 
ants owe  no  duty  to  provide  such  service 
either  under  statute,  common  law,  or  cus- 
tom and  have  performed  what  is  required 
of  them  when  they  accept  baggage  at 
their  depot,  transport  it,  and  make  de- 
livery at  destination  upon  their  own  ter- 
minal. Cosby  V.  Richmond  Transfer  Co., 
23  1.  C.  C.  72. 

(i)  If  a  carrier  undertook  to  make 
delivery  of  passenger  baggage  and  to 
issue  baggage  checks  at  residences  for 
the  rate  of  fare  stated  in  Its  tariffs  this 
would  be  a  service  over  which  the  Com- 
mission would  have  jurisdiction,  and 
which  must  in   all  regards  become   sub- 


SPECIAL  CONTRACTS,  §2   (j)— (m) 


773 


ject  to  the  mandates  and  prohibitions  of 
the  Act,  even  though  the  service  in 
whole  or  in  part  was  not  performed  by 
the  carrier  itself,  but  was  rendered  by 
some  agency  under  contract  or  other- 
wise. But  in  merely  granting  the  exclu- 
sive privilege  of  soliciting  on  its  trains 
and  issuiiig  baggage  checks  at  residences 
to  one  baggage  transfer  company  a  car- 
rier does  not  undertake  an  additional 
service  to  the  public.  The  carrier's  duty 
to  the  public  as  to  baggage  begins-  and 
ends  in  the  baggage  room  provided  by  it. 
Baggage  transfer  is  prior  or  subsequent 
to  the  transportation  service  as  to  which 
the  carrier  owes  a  duty  to  the  public, 
and  is  therefore  outside  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Commission.  Cosby  v.  Richmond 
Transfer  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  72,  75. 

(j)  Defendant  carriers  had  promised 
complainant  that  they  would  continue  to 
make  rates  to  complainant  on  a  "fair 
basis."  HELD,  if  defendants  did,  as  is 
alleged,  agree  to  "continue  a  fair  basis," 
It  is  not  improper  to  inquire  whether  or 
not  they  have  failed  in  that  agreement, 
although  the  terms  of  any  agreement  of 
that  sort  must  always  give  way  to  the 
lawful,  reasonable  and  non-discrimina- 
tory rate.  Sinclair  &  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  490,  496. 

(k)  Complainants  shipped  carloads  of 
scrap  iron  from  Walcottville,  Ind.,  via 
Montpelier,  O.,  to  Ft.  Wayne,  Ind.,  under 
a  rate  of  $1.25  per  gross  ten.  At  the 
same  time  via  another  route  a  rate  of 
85c  per  gross  ton  was  in  effect  which 
defendant  subsequently  reduced  its  rate 
to  meet.  No  evidence  was  submitted  of 
the  unreasonableness  of  the  rate  per  se. 
Complainants  submitted  testimony  tend- 
ing to  show  that  before  shipments  were 
made  defendant  quoted  to  complainants 
the  same  rate  as  that  of  the  competing 
line.  HELD,  if  the  shipper  desires  the 
benefit  of  a  rate  published  by  a  particu- 
lar carrier  it  is  incumbent  upon  him  to 
tender  his  traffic  to  such  carrier,  and 
failing  to  do  so.  he  cannot  expect  the 
Commission  to  award  reparation  merely 
for  the  purpose  of  equalizing  the  rate  he 
was  compelled  to  pay  with  the  lower  rate 
of  the  competing  line  which  he  might 
have  used.  The  fact  complainant  was 
quoted  an  equalized  rate  can  afford  no 
relief  inasmuch  as  the  rate  shown  by  the 
tariff  in  force  at  the  time  was  the  only 
rate  that  could  be  lawfully  applied.  The 
existence  of  a  lower  rate  via  a  competing 
line  is  not  of  itself  proof  that  the  rate 


charged  was  unreasonable,  nor  can  the 
fact  that  after  the  shipments  were  made 
the  defendant  reduced  its  rates  to  the 
level  of  the  rate  via  the  competing  line 
be  accepted  as  suflEicient  ground  for  an 
award  of  reparation.  The  mere  reduction 
of  a  rate  by  a  carrier,  especially  when 
induced  by  competition,  as  seems  to  have 
been  the  case  here,  is  not  of  itself  evi- 
dence that  the  former  rate  was  unreason- 
able. Complaint  dismissed.  Cook  v.  Wa- 
bash R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  563,  564. 

(1)  Complainant  was  engaged  in  the 
city  of  Baltimore  in  conducting  an  abat- 
toir for  slaughtering  live  stock.  It  owned 
a  side  track  connecting  its  plant  with  the 
P.  B.  &  W.  R.  R.,  a  part  of  the  Penn. 
R.  R.  This  side  track  had  been  in  exist- 
ence 20  years  and  been  used  for  the  de- 
livery of  all  classes  of  freight  except  live 
stock.  In  1891  the  Union  Stock  Yards 
Co.  was  organized,  which  took  over  the 
business  of  the  Calverton  and  Claremont 
Stock  Yard  in  Baltimore.  Prior  to  that 
the  complainant  had  established  its  plant 
on  a  piece  of  land  purchased  from  the 
Claremont  Co.  and  adjacent  thereto.  The 
consolidated  company  had  yards  situated 
about  two  miles  from  the  yard  of  com- 
plainant. The  defendants  entered  into  a 
contract  with  the  Union  Stock  Yards 
whereby  they  agreed  to  make  "the  said 
stock  yards  their  live  stock  depot  for 
Baltimore  and  vicinity  and  shall  deliver 
at  said  yard  all  the  live  stock  which 
may  be  transported  over  their  line 
.  .  .  destined  to  the  Baltimore  market 
.  .  .  "  Defendants  claimed  they  had 
a  right  to  agree  to  deliver  at  one  stock 
yards  exclusively  in  Baltimore.  Com- 
plainant's live  stock  was  unloaded  at  the 
Union  Stock  Yards  and  then  driven 
through  the  streets  of  Baltimore  by  com- 
plainant two  miles  to  their  yard,  at  con- 
siderable expense  and  annoyance.  Ship- 
ments by  complainant  and  its  tenant 
over  the  side  track  was  from  50  to  60 
carloads  a  year.  If  live  stock  was  deliv- 
ered at  its  yards  complainant  estimated 
it  would  receive  15  carloads  a  week. 
HELD,  the  refusal  of  defendants  to  de- 
liver to  the  side  track  of  complainants 
live  stock  consigned  thereto  is  unreason- 
able and  a  violation  of  the  law.  Ordered 
that  such  delivery  be  hereafter  made. 
Baltimore  Butchers  Live  Stock  Co.  v.  P. 
B.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  124. 

(m)  Defendants  made  an  exclusive 
contract  to  deliver  live  stock  to  the 
Union    Stock    Yards    of    Baltimore.      Al- 


774 


SPECIAL  CONTRACTS,  §2  (n)— (u) 


though  complainant  had  its  own  side 
track  and  had  shipped  to  it  weekly  car- 
loads of  live  stock,  defendants  refused  to 
deliver  to  other  than  tiie  Union  Stock 
Yards  on  account  of  the  exclusive  con- 
tract. HELD,  railroads  may  not  make 
contracts  which  abrogate  the  Act;  they 
may  not  refuse,  because  of  their  own 
contracts,  to  furnish  a  delivery  that  is 
reasonable  upon  tracks  which  they  use 
as  a  terminal  for  complainant;  they  may 
not  discriminate  as  between  commodities 
in  the  delivery  which  they  give  where 
no  reason  exists  for  such  discrimination 
excepting  the  presence  of  a  contract 
made  with  a  private  corporation.  Balti- 
more Butchers  Live  Stock  Co.  v.  P.  B.  & 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  124,  128. 

(n)  Private  contracts  cannot  justify 
a  violation  of  the  Act.  Arizona  Ry.  Com. 
v.  Wells  Fargo  &  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  571,  574; 
Baltimore  Butchers  Live  Stock  Co.  v,  P. 
B.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  124,  128; 
Shoemaker  v.  C.  &  P.  Tel.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C 
614,  621. 

(o)  Defendant  in  August,  1902,  estab- 
lished a  small  exchange  in  Montgomery 
County,  Md.,  at  a  point  about  one  mile 
north  of  the  boundary  line  separating 
that  state  from  the  District  of  Columbia. 
Subscribers  had  to  pay  a  toll  of  10c  to 
reach  persons  in  the  District  of  Colum- 
bia, and  District  of  Columbia  calls  to  this 
exchange  paid  a  similar  toll.  In  1905  this 
exchange  was  abandoned  and  the  Chevy 
Chase  exchange  opened  in  the  District 
of  Columbia.  The  old  subscribers  still 
had  to  pay  their  tolls  to  calls  in  the  Dis- 
trict, but  calls  from  the  District  to  them 
paid  no  tolls.  Subsequently  this  ex- 
change was  abandoned  and  the  Cleveland 
exchange  opened  further  south  in  the 
city  of  Washington.  The  old  subscribers 
to  the  service  given  by  the  first  ex- 
change, the  Somerset  exchange,  and  to 
the  second  exchange,  had  their  contracts 
continued  to  the  new  exchange  on  the 
same  basis  as  originally  entered  into, 
which  gave  them  substantially  lower 
rates  than  those  charged  new  sub- 
scribers or  subscribers  in  the  District 
of  Columbia.  There  were  37  of  these 
old  subscribers.  Complainant  asked  for 
service  on  the  same  basis  as  that  given 
to  the  old  subscribers  to  the  Somerset 
exchange.  HELD,  that  there  was  no 
dissimilarity  of  circumstances  which  jus- 
tified defendants  in  preferring  one  class 
of  subscribers  over  others  similarly  situ- 
ated, and    defendant  was  unlawfully  grant- 


ing a  preference  to  the  thirty-seven  old 
subscribers;  and  the  fact  it  had  contracts 
with  such  subscribers  prior  to  the  Com- 
mission's being  vested  with  jurisdiction 
over  telephone  companies  could  not  ex- 
cept such  special  contracts  from  the  oper- 
ation of  the  law  which  forbids  undue 
discrimination  and  preferences.  Shoe- 
maker V.  C.  &  P.  Telephone  Co.,  20  I. 
C.  C.  614. 

(p)  The  right  to  contract  in  reference 
to  demurrage  charges  is  removed  by  the 
Act.  Peale,  Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  C.  R.  R. 
of  N.  J.,  18  I.  C.  C.  25,  33. 

(q)  It  is  not  for  the  Commission  in  a 
search  for  justification  of  an  award  con- 
sented to  by  the  carrier  to  inquire  in  re- 
spect to  every  such  transaction  as  to 
whether  or  not  actual  preference  or  prej- 
udice have  resulted  in  harm  to  any  partic- 
ular person.  It  would  be  a  vain  attempt 
in  many  cases  to  undertake  to  ascertain 
with  reasonable  certainty  just  what  has 
resulted  and  who  has  been  injured  by 
transactions  of  the  kind.  The  lawmakers, 
assuming  that  such  practice  would  nat- 
urally result  in  many  instances  in  favor- 
itism and  irreparable  wrong,  have  en- 
acted the  law  which  adjudges  the  prac- 
tice itself  to  be  wrong  and  forbids  it. 
Armour  Car  Lines  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
461,  463. 

(r)  Congress  has  power  to  regulate 
commerce  among  the  states,  and  no  con- 
tract between  a  corporation  which  han- 
dles that  commerce  and  a  party  for 
whom  it  is  handled  can  interfere  with 
the  complete  exercise  of  that  power.  In 
Re  Contracts  of  Express  Companies,  16  I. 
C.  C.  246,  253. 

(s)  Private  contracts  can  have  no 
effect  upon  the  application  of  the  lawful 
tariff  governing  a  shipment.  Interstate 
Remedy  Co.  v.  American  Express  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  436,  437. 

(t)  If  a  contract  was  made  with  the 
defendants  for  a  lower  charge  than  the 
legally  established  rate,  such  contract 
was  not  binding,  and  its  violation  fur- 
nishes no  ground  for  redress  under  the 
Act.  Ames  Brooks  Co.  v.  Rutland  R.  R. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  479. 

(u)  All  local  regulations,  private  con- 
tracts, terms  of  franchises,  or  charters 
must  give  way  when  they  conflict  with 
F'ederal  regulations  of  interstate  com- 
merce duly  prescribed  by  the  Congress. 


SPECIAL  CONTRACTS,  §2  (v)— (z) 


775 


American    Bankers'    Ass'n    v.    American 
Express  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  15,  21. 

(v)  Railroads  should  not  be  allowed 
to  so  divide  and  diversify  themselves  by 
contract  and  traffic  agreements  as  to 
work  a  practical  discrimination.  Cedar 
Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  73,  77. 

(w)  Complainant's  coal  mine  was  lo- 
cated on  the  C.  &  S.  Ry.,  which  line  ran 
in  a  southerly  direction  to  Trinidad  and 
connected  with  the  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  The 
Victor  Fuel  Co.,  complainant's  competi- 
tor, was  engaged  in  mining  in  the  same 
district  at  points  on  the  C.  &  S.  E.  Ry., 
which  ran  east  and  west  through  Ludlow. 
The  stock  of  this  line  was  owned  by  the 
Victor  Fuel  Co.  and  it  had  a  trackage 
contract  with  the  C.  &  S.  Ry.  by  which  it 
might  send  coal  originating  on  its  line 
and  destined  to  points  on  the  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.  Ry.  over  the  tracks  of  the  C.  &  S.  Ry. 
The  C.  &  S.  E.  Ry.  under  the  contract 
was  not  permitted,  however,  to  haul  over 
the  tracks  of  the  C.  &  S.  Ry.  traffic  origi- 
nating at  points  on  the  line  of  the  C.  &  S. 
Ry.  The  Victor  Fuel  Co.  was  given  by 
the  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  the  same  rate  on 
coal  from  points  on  the  C.  &  S.  E.  Ry.  to 
points  on  the  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  as  the 
rate  from  Trinidad,  and  the  C.  &  S.  E.  Ry. 
was  allowed  ]0c  per  ton  as  its  division  of 
this  through  rate.  Complainant  at  Lud- 
low was  obliged  to  pay  the  full  local  rate 
of  40c  per  ton  from  Ludlow  to  Trinidad 
in  addition  to  the  rate  from  Trinidad  to 
points  on  the  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  The 
Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co.,  another  com- 
petitor of  complainant,  owned  the  Colo. 
&  Wyo.  R.  R.  running  from  Jansen,  a 
point  located  a  short  distance  southwest 
of  Trinidad,  in  a  southwesterly  direction 
and  connecting  with  the  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
at  Jansen.  This  competitor  was  given, 
from  its  mines  located  on  the  lines  of 
the  Colo.  &  Wyo.  R.  R.,  to  points  on  the 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.,  the  same  rate  as  the 
rate  from  Trinidad  to  points  on  the  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  and  the  Colo.  &  Wyo.  R.  R. 
was  allowed  10c  per  ton  as  its  division 
of  this  through  rate.  HELD,  this  rate 
adjustment  resulted  in  an  unlawful  pref- 
erence against  complainant.  Railroads 
should  not  be  allowed  to  so  divide  and 
diversify  themselves  by  contract  and 
traffic  agreements  as  to  work  a  practical 
discrimination.  The  rate  of  40c  from  the 
mine  of  the  complainant  to  Trinidad, 
when  the  coal  was  for  points  upon  the 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.,  was  unreasonable  to 


the  extent  it  exceeded  25c,  and  it  should 
apply  to  this  coal  at  Trinidad  a  rate  10c 
per  ton  less  than  the  local  Trinidad  rate. 
Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  73,  77. 

(x)  There  can  be  no  valid  contract 
between  a  railway  and  a  shipper  that  a 
certain  rate  shall  be  charged,  for  the  rail- 
way rate  is  a  matter  of  public  concern. 
Beatrice  Creamery  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  L  C.  C.  109,  128. 

(y)  Contracts  with  single  shippers  are 
of  doubtful  legality.  Western  Oregon 
Lumber,   etc.,   v.   S.   P.   Co.,   14   L    C.   C. 

61,   70. 

(z)  A  terminal  company  was  given 
authority  by  an  act  of  the  Texas  legis- 
lature to  conduct  a  wharfing  business  and 
acquired  certain  grants  of  land  at  Galves- 
ton made  to  one  Huntington.  The  grants 
authorized  Huntington  to  construct  and 
maintain  terminal  facilities  thereon  for 
the  use  of  the  S.  P.  R.  R.  and  S.  S.  Sys- 
tems. The  terminal  company  entered 
into  an  agreement  with  one  Young,  an 
exporter  of  cottonseed  products,  under 
which  it  allowed  him  the  exclusive  use 
of  a  certain  dock  and  warehouse,  with 
the  shed,  platform  and  tracks  thereon, 
located  on  the  land  granted  as  aforesaid. 
Young  was  to  pay  a  certain  annual  rental 
in  lieu  of  the  published  wharfage  charge  of 
leper  100  lbs.  imposed  upon  other  shippers. 
Young  agreed  to  route  his  shipments  over 
the  lines  controlled  by  the  S.  P.  Co., 
which  owned  a  controlling  interest  in  the 
terminal  company.  Under  the  terms  and 
by  force  of  the  agreement,  Young  was 
given  room  at  the  wharf  for  sacking, 
grinding  and  storing  his  products.  He 
controlled  space  on  the  pier  1,370  feet 
long,  erected  at  a  cost  to  the  terminal 
company  of  some  $65,000;  placed  on  the 
dock  20  hydraulic  cake  sacking  machines 
capable  of  sacking  1.500  tons  of  cake  per 
day,  and  grinding  machines  capable  of 
grinding  and  sacking  20  tons  of  meal  per 
day;  and  employed  upon  the  dock  some 
200  men.  Through  these  advantages  he 
was  able  to  appropriate  to  himself  char- 
terer's commissions  and  the  compensa- 
tion for  loading  and  unloading  steamers 
and  cars.  No  other  shipper  was  able  to 
secure  like  advantages  on  the  wharf  in 
question.  In  less  than  two  years  under 
the  contract  he  controlled  nine-tenths  of 
all  the  export  cottonseed  business  of  the 
port  of  Galveston.  HELD,  the  agreement 
with     Young     constituted     an     unlawful 


776 


SPECIAL  CONTRACTS,   §2    (aa)  — (jj) 


preference.  Eichenberg  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  250;  decision  of  Commission  sus- 
tained, S.  P.  Terminal  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  219 
U.  S.  498,  31  Sup.  Ct.  279,  55  L.  ed.  310. 

(aa)  Whatever  power  under  its  char- 
ter a  terminal  company  may  have  to  con- 
vey or  lease  its  property  generally  does 
not  give  it  authority  to  enter  into  a  con- 
tract under  the  operation  of  which  one 
shipper  is  preferred  over  another,  and 
such  preference  cannot  be  secured  by 
making  a  contract  in  the  form  of  a  lease 
of  property.  Eichenberg  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  250,  269;  decision  of  Commission 
sustained,  S.  P.  Terminal  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C, 
219  U.  S.  498,  31  Sup.  Ct.  279,  55  L.  ed. 
310. 

(bb)  If  a  carrier  and  a  mine  owner 
make  a  contract  for  the  fuel  supply  of  the 
carrier  which  does  violence  to  the  Act  or 
to  the  decisions  of  the  courts,  or  is  op- 
posed to  public  policy,  they  are  in  no  bet- 
ter position  than  the  parties  to  any  other 
contract  which  violates  the  legal  prin- 
ciples relating  thereto.  Traer  v.  C.  &  A. 
R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  451,  457. 

(cc)  Plaintiff,  a  successful  bidder  for 
construction  work  on  defendant  carrier's 
line,  specified  in  the  construction  con- 
tract for  a  lower  rate  than  the  published 
interstate  rate  for  the  transportation  of 
the  materials,  supplies  and  men  to  be 
used  in  carrying  out  the  contract.  HELD, 
the  concession  was  not  unlawful  under 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  and  plain- 
tiff was  not  prevented  by  reason  thereof 
from  recovering  for  the  loss  of  materials 
occasioned  by  defendant's  negligence. 
Santa  Fe,  P.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Grant  -Bros. 
Const.  Co.  (Ariz.  1910),  108  P.  467,  470. 

(dd)  A  carrier  will  not  be  estopped, 
by  the  act  of  its  agent  in  quoting  a  rate 
less  than  the  published  rate,  from  re- 
pudiating an  unlawful  contract  for  the 
transportation  of  interstate  commerce  at 
such  lower  rate;  and  where  a  shipper  re- 
lies upon  an  agreement  of  the  carrier, 
made  either  purposely  or  inadvertently, 
no  estoppel  will  arise,  for  the  reason  that 
the  agreement  upon  which  the  shipper  re- 
lies is  in  itself  illegal  and  void,  and  estop- 
pel can  never  be  founded  upon  an  illegal 
act  or  contract.  Baltimore  &  O.  S.  W. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  New  Albany  Box  &  Basket  Co. 
(Ind.  1911),  94  N.  E.  906,  909. 

(ee)  The  right  of  private  contract  be- 
tween the  shipper  and  the  carrier  has 
been  wholly  abrogated  by  the  enactment 
of  the  interstate  commerce  law.     Balti- 


more &  O.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  V.  New  Albany 
Box  and  Basket  Co.  (Ind.  1911),  94  N.  E. 
906,  909. 

(ff)  Where  a  private  contract  for  an 
interstate  rate  was  entered  into  in  Sep- 
tember, 1901,  and  after  it  was  performed 
the  shipper  commenced  an  action  to  re- 
cover from  one  of  the  railroad  companies 
a  sum  claimed  to  be  overcharges  paid  to 
such  company  upon  its  proportion  of  the 
rate  agreed  upon,  and  the  railroad  com- 
pany, to  avoid  payment,  claimed  that  the 
contract  was  unlawful  and  void,  the  bur- 
den of  proof  was  upon  it  to  establish  the 
facts  which  constituted  such  invalidity. 
K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Albers  Commission  Co.. 
79  Kan.  59,  99  P.  819,  824. 

(gg)  In  September,  1901,  it  was  not 
unlawful  for  connecting  railroad  lines  to 
make  a  joint  rate  with  a  shipper  for  the 
transportation  of  grain  from  one  state  to 
another,  and  a  contract  of  this  character 
was  valid  and  binding  upon  the  parties 
thereto  if  there  was  no  established  rate 
under  the  provisions  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act  in  force  which  applied  to 
such  traffic.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Albers 
Comm.  Co.,  79  Kan.  59,  59,  99  P.  819. 

(hh)  The  general  rule  that  where  con- 
necting roads,  each  having  a  legally  es- 
tablished local  rate,  but  no  joint  rate 
which  has  been  filed  and  published  as  re- 
quired by  law,  cannot  by  contract  make 
a  joint  rate  for  less  than  the  sum  of  the 
two  locals,  has  no  application  where  such 
roads  have  no  established  local  rates. 
Kansas  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Albers  Comm. 
Co.,  79  Kan.  59,  59,  99  P.  819. 

(ii)  Where  connecting  railroads  enter 
into  a  valid  contract  with  a  shipper  to 
transport  grain  from  one  state  to  another 
at  a  stipulated  joint  rate,  in  which  agree- 
ment the  proportion  of  such  rate  to  be  re- 
ceived by  each  road  is  specified,  one  of 
such  roads  cannot  afterwards  change  the 
amount  which  it  is  to  receive  under  such 
contract  by  joining  with  other  connecting 
lines  in  establishing  a  joint  rate  with 
them,  by  which  it  secures  a  larger  sum 
for  the  transportation  of  similar  freight 
between  the  same  points  named  in  the 
former  agreement.  Kansas  C.  S.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Albers  Comm.  Co.,  79  Kan.  59,  59,  99 
P.  819. 

(jj)  In  September,  1901,  certain  con- 
necting railroads  entered  into  a  contract 
with  a  grain  dealer,  whereby  they  agreed 
to  transport  grain  for  him  from  Omaha, 
Neb.,  to  Texarkana,  Tex.,  through  Kansas 


SPECIAL  CONTRACTS,  §2  (kk)  — (tt) 


777 


City,  Mo,,  at  a  stipulated  joint  rate.  No 
legally  established  joint  rate  was  then  in 
force  on  these  roads  between  the  points 
named.  The  contract  specified  the  pro- 
portion of  the  stipulated  rate  each  road 
was  to  receive.  A  large  amount  of  grain 
was  shipped  over  these  roads  at  this  rate. 
The  rate  was  not  established  as  required 
by  law.  Afterward  the  shipper  com- 
menced an  action  against  one  of  the 
roads  to  recover  overcharges  paid  to  it 
upon  its  proportion  of  such  rate  for  such 
shipment.  HELD,  that  the  failure  to 
€.stablish  the  rate  as  required  by  law 
could  not  be  interposed  as  a  bar  to  the 
action.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Albers  Comm. 
Co.,  79  Kan.  59,  69,  99  P.  819. 

(kk)  Where  a  private  contract  with 
the  carrier  provides  for  refund  to  the 
shipper  of  a  portion  of  a  published  inter- 
state rate,  the  contract  is  in  violation  of 
section  6  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act 
as  amended  June  29,  1906,  forbidding  the 
acceptance  by  the  carrier  of  a  greater  or 
less  or  different  compensation  than  that 
provided  in  the  published  schedules  and 
prohibiting  refunds,  and  such  contract 
cannot  be  enforced,  even  though  the  ship- 
per may  not  have  known  that  he  was 
violating  the  law.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Coquillard  Wagon  Works,  Assignees, 
(Ky.  1912),  144  S.  W.  1080,  1082. 

(11)  Under  section  6  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act,  prohibiting  a  carrier  from 
deviating  from  its  published  tariff  rate, 
when  a  carrier  contracts  for  a  less  rate 
than  its  legal  tariff  rate,  and  subsequently 
charges  its  regular  rate,  the  shipper  has 
no  cause  of  action  for  a  breach  of  con- 
tract. Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mays- 
ville  Brick  Co.,  132  Ky.  643,  654,  116  S.  W. 
1183. 

(mm)  A  carrier  may  recover  its  law- 
fully published  interstate  rate  despite  the 
fact  that  an  officer  or  agent  may  have 
quoted  to  the  shipper  a  lower  rate.  Louis- 
iana Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Holly,  127  La.  615. 
53  So.  882. 

(nn)  A  shipper,  who  has  obtained 
from  a  common  carrier  a  special  lower 
rats  than  the  published  schedule,  has  no 
ground  upon  which  he  can  maintain  a 
claim  to  the  special  rate  in  opposition  to 
the  schedule  rate.  Foster,  Glasse]  Co.  v 
K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  121  La.  1053,  1055,  46 
So.  1014. 

(00)  In  a  suit  against  a  carrier  for 
breach  of  contract  in  failing  to  observe 
the  interstate  rates  from  plaintiff's  plant 


specified  in  an  agreement  and  in  refusing 
a  shipping-in-transit  privilege  provided 
for  therein,  it  is  a  good  plea  that  at  the 
time  of  the  making  of  the  contract  the 
carrier  had  already  published  and  filed  a 
tariff  covering  the  hauls  in  question,  as 
required  by  section  '6  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act,  and  naming  higher  rights 
than  those  stipulated  in  the  contract,  and 
plaintiff  cannot  recover  on  the  theory 
that  the  defendant  might  lawfully  have 
amended  its  tariffs  so  as  to  enable  it  to 
k€ep  its  agreement.  Gulf  &  S.  I.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Laurel  Cotton  Mills,  91  Miss.  166. 
194,  45  So.  982. 

(pp)  The  carrier  of  an  interstate  ship- 
ment has  the  right  to  the  rate  published 
and  filed  with  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission,  and  this  despite  a  contract 
made  either  intentionally  or  mistakenly 
between  the  shipper  and  the  carrier's 
agent  for  a  lower  rate.  Sutton  v.  St.  L. 
&  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  (Mo.  App.,  1911),  140 
S.  W.  76,  76. 

(qq)  It  is  beyond  the  power  of  either 
a  railroad  company  or  a  shipper  to  make 
a  valid  contract  for  a  less  rate  than  the 
published  schedules  filed  with  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission,  and  not- 
withstanding a  contract  of  this  kind,  the 
measure  of  liability  of  the  shipper  is  the 
rate  so  published  and  filed.  Pecos  Val- 
ley &  N.  E.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Harris  (N.  M. 
1908),  94  P.  951,  951. 

(rr)  Where  the  carrier  has  published 
and  filed  interstate  rates  with  the  Inter- 
^tate  Commerce  Commission  it  must  ob- 
serve and  collect  them  according  to  the 
schedule  despite  the  fact  that  it  makes  a 
private  contract  with  a  shipper  for  lower 
rates.  Houseman  v.  Fargo  (N.  Y.  1910), 
124  N.  Y.  Supp.  1086,  1088. 

(ss)  A  shipper  cannot  enforce  a  prior 
private  agreement  with  a  carrier  calling 
for  lower  rates  than  those  published  and 
filed  with  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission. Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  La 
Due,  128  App.  Div.  594,  596,  112  N.  Y. 
Supp.  964. 

(tt)  Plaintiff  carrier  sued  to  recover 
the  published  charges  made  up  of  a  com- 
bination of  local  rates.  Defendant  ship- 
per set  up  a  counter  claim  based  on  a 
private  agreement,  undisputed  by  plain- 
tiff, by  which  the  plaintiff  contracted  to 
charge  the  through  rates.  There  was  no 
evidence  to  show  that  the  through  rates 
agreed  upon  were  less  than  the  published 
through  rates,  nor  did  plaintiff  show  that 


778 


SPECIAL  CONTRACTS,  §2  (uu)— (bbb) 


there  was  no  through  rate  filed  with  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission.  HELD, 
plaintiff  having  failed  to  meet  the  burden 
of  proving  that  the  through  rates  speci- 
fied in  the  private  agreement  were  illegal, 
defendant  could  not  recover  on  his 
counter  claim  the  excess  collected  above 
the  private  contract-rate.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  La  Due,  57  Misc.  614,  616, 108  N.  Y. 
Supp.  659;  reversed  128  App.  Div.  594, 
112  N.  Y.  Supp.  964. 

(uu)  The  agent  of  an  initial  carrier 
quoted  to  defendant  shipper  a  rate  on  an 
interstate  shipment  lower  than  the  two 
published  interstate  rates  of  the  initial 
and  connecting  carriers,  which  consti- 
tuted the  lawful  rate  from  point  of  origin 
to  destination,  no  joint  through  rate 
being  in  effect.  Plaintiff  connecting  car- 
rier upon  receiving  the  goods  paid  to  the 
initial  carrier  the  published  interstate 
rate  covering  the  initial  carrier's  portion 
of  the  haul.  HELD,  the  plaintiff,  under 
section  6  of  the  Act  as  amended  June 
29,  1906,  could  recover  of  the  shipper 
both  the  money  advanced  to  the  initial 
carrier  and  also  the  published  charge 
covering  its  portion  of  the  haul,  irrespect- 
ive of  whether  it  had  or  had  not  notice  of 
the  contract  rate  quoted  to  defendant. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bell  (Okla.  1912), 
120  P.  987. 

(vv)  A  carrier  of  an  interstate  ship- 
ment must  collect  charges  according  to 
the  class  and  rate  filed  in  compliance  with 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  irrespect- 
ive of  any  agreement  between  it  and  the 
shipper  as  to  the  class  or  rate  to  be  ap- 
plied. Hardaway  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co. 
(S.  C.  1912),  73  S.  E.  1020,  1021. 

(ww)  The  Interstate  Commerce  Act 
has  no  bearing  upon  the  right  of  a  state 
to  refuse  to  enforce  a  special  contract 
limiting  the  liability  of  a  carrier,  though 
made  in  a  foreign  state.  Louisville  & 
N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Smith  (Tenn.  1911),  134 
S.  W.  866,  872. 

(xx)  Plaintiff  shipper  made  a  contract 
with  defendant  rail  carrier  for  the  car- 
riage of  goods  from  points  in  the  United 
States  to  domestic  ports  and  thence  to 
European  ports  at  a  specified  rate  for  the 
entire  haul.  Plaintiff  had  no  negotiations 
with  the  ocean  carriers.  HELD,  even 
though  the  defendant  was  compelled  to 
pay  the  ocean  carriers,  for  their  portion 
of  the  haul,  a  rate  that  would  make  the 
compensation  received  by  defendant  less 
than  the  published  interstate  rate  to  the 


domestic  ports,  the  contract  was  not  in- 
valid, since  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act 
ioes  not  apply  to  the  rate  contracted  for. 
St.  L.  S.  F.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Birge-Forbes 
Co.  (Tex.  1911),  139  S.  W.  3,  4. 

(yy)  Where  in  a  suit  by  a  shipper 
against  a  carrier  for  breach  of  a  contract 
granting  a  specified  rate,  the  contract  set 
out  is  legal  on  its  face,  the  burden  is  on 
the  carrier  to  show  that  it  violates  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act.  St.  L.,  S.  F.  & 
T.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Birge-Forbes  Co.  (Tex. 
1911),  139  S.  W.  3,  5. 

(zz)  Prior  to  the  passage  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act,  defendant  carrier, 
in  consideration  of  a  tract  of  land  deeded 
by  plaintiff  to  it,  contracted  to  issue  and 
deliver  annual  passes  to  plaintiff  and  his 
wife,  for  and  during  their  natural  life, 
entitling  them  to  free  transportation  over  • 
defendant's  entire  system  of  railway  and 
steamship  lines,  and  to  issue  like  passes 
to  their  five  children  for  a  period  of  five 
years.  HELD,  the  land  conveyed  having 
greatly  increased  in  value,  plaintiff  could 
not  rescind  the  contract  and  get  back  the 
land,  since  the  performance  of  the  agree- 
ment by  the  defendant  was  prevented  by 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  as  amended 
June  29,  1906,  forbidding  carriers  from 
acceptng  a  greater  or  less  or  different 
compensation  than  that  provided  for  in 
their  published  schedules.  Cowley  vs. 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Wash.  1912),  123  P.  998, 
1000. 

(aaa)  Prior  to  the  passage  of  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Act,  defendant  car- 
rier, in  consideration  of  a  tract  of  land 
deeded  by  plaintiff  to  it,  contracted  to 
issued  and  deliver  annual  passes  to  plain- 
tiff and  his  wife,  for  and  during  their 
natural  life,  entitling  them  to  free  trans- 
portation over  defendant's  entire  system 
of  railway  and  steamship  lines,  and  to 
issue  like  passes  to  their  five  children  for 
a  period  of  five  years.  HELD,  plaintiff 
could  not  recover  damages  for  the  re- 
fusal of  the  defendant  to  perform  the 
contract,  since  defendant  was  prevented 
from  so  doing  by  operation  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act  as  amended  June  29, 
1906,  forbidding  carriers  from  accepting 
a  greater  or  less  or  different  compensa- 
tion than  that  provided  for  in  their  pub- 
lished schedules.  Cowley  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.  (Wash.  1912),  123  P.  998,  1001. 

(bbb)  Prior  to  the  passage  of  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Act,  defendant  car- 
rier, in  consideration  of  a  tract  of  land 


SPECIAL  CONTRACTS,  §2   (ccc)— §3   (b) 


779 


deeded  by  plaintiff  to  it,  contracted  to 
issue  and  deliver  annual  passes  to  plain- 
tiff and  his  wife  for  and  during  their  nat- 
ural life,  entitling  them  to  free  trans- 
portation over  defendant's  entire  system 
of  railway  and  steamship  lines,  and  to 
issue  like  passes  to  their  five  children  for 
a  period  of  five  years.  HELD,  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act  as  amended  June  29, 
1906,  forbidding  carriers  from  accepting 
a  greater  or  less  or  different  compensa- 
tion than  that  provided  for  in  their  pub- 
lished schedules,  prevented  the  perform- 
ance of  the  contract  by  defendant.  Cow- 
ley V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Wash.  1912),  123  P. 
998,  999. 

(ccc)  The  published  schedules  of  de- 
fendant Great  Northern  Ry.  named  a  rate 
of  85c  from  Stavanger,  Norway,  to  Seat- 
tle, Wash.,  with  the  proviso  that  the  de- 
fendant should  have  75c  for  its  portion 
of  the  haul  from  the  Atlantic  Seaboard 
to  Seattle,  and  in  case  the  best  ocean  rate 
obtainable  brought  the  total  charge 
above  85c,  the  total  rate  should  be  75c, 
plus  the  best  ocean  rate  to  be  secured. 
Defendant  contracted  with  plaintiff  ship- 
per to  transport  for  the  entire  distance  ai 
85c.  Defendant  procured  of  the  ocean 
carrier  a  rate  of  38.7c  and  adding  this  to 
the  75c  minimum  exacted  a  charge  of 
$1,137.  Plaintiff  shipper  sued  on  the  con- 
tract to  recover  the  excess  exacted  above 
85c.  HELD,  in  the  absence  of  proof  by 
defendant  that  the  conditions  of  ocean 
transportation  were  such  as  to  make  the 
contract  rate  of  85c  unlawful  under  the 
tariff  schedules  mentioned,  it  was  not 
proved  that  the  contract  was  unlawful, 
and  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  the  posses- 
sion of  the  property  upon  paying  the  con- 
tract rate  to  the  defendant.  (Rudkin,  .T.. 
dissenting).  Fisher  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  49 
Wash.  205,  211,  95  P.  77. 

(ddd)  When  a  rate  has  been  fixed  and 
properly  posted  and  published  within  the 
meaning  of  the  provisions  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act,  it  must  prevail 
without  regard  to  any  agreement  fixing  a 
different  rate.  Fisher  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  49 
Wash.  205,  210,  95  P.  77. 

(eee)  Defendant  carrier's  line  ex- 
tended from  Kansas  City  to  Spokane. 
The  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  extended  from  St.  Louis 
to  Kansas  City.  Defendant  contracted 
with  plaintiff  railroad  to  transport  free  of 
charge  some  newly  built  cars  from  St. 
Louis  to  Spokane.  The  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  did 
not  join  in  this  contract.  The  de- 
fendant  and   the   Mo.   Pac.   Ry.   did   not 


publish  any  joint  rate  from  St.  Louis 
to  Spokane.  Defendant's  rate  from  Kan- 
sas City  to  Spokane  was  $90  per  car.  Be- 
fore the  shipment  moved  defendant 
learned  that  the  rate  contracted  for  was 
contrary  to  its  tariff  filed  with  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  and  so  noti- 
fied plaintiff.  HELD,  defendant,  despite 
the  contract  to  the  contrary,  was  obliged 
and  entitled  to  collect  the  published 
charges.  Coeur  D'Alene  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  (Wash.  1908),  95  P.  71,  75. 

(fff)  Rates  agreed  upon  between  the 
parties  have  no  standing  in  law.  The 
rate  which  was  collected  was  the  law- 
fully established  rate  in  effect  at  the  time 
of  movement  via  the  line  of  the  carrier 
and  it  would  have  been  a  violation  of 
law  to  have  collected  any  other  rate. 
Wilkoff  Bros.  Co.  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  467. 

§3.     Criminal     Liability. 

(a)  Defendant  initial  carrier  made  a 
contract  with  a  shipper  to  haul  goods 
destined  for  export  from  Kansas  City 
to  New  York  City  at  the  published  rate 
then  in  effect  over  the  lines  of  defend- 
ant and  its  connecting  carriers.  Sub- 
sequent to  the  making  of  the  con- 
tract, the  connecting  carriers,  without 
the  consent  of  the  initial  carrier,  raised 
the  rates  for  their  portion  of  the  haul 
and  duly  published  them,  so  as  to  make 
the  lawfully  published  rate  from  Kan- 
sas City  to  New  York  City  higher  than 
that  specified  in  defendant's  contract 
with  the  shipper.  HELD,  in  an  indict- 
ment under  the  Elkins  Act  for  grant- 
ing concessions  defendant  was  guilty, 
despite  the  existence  of  its  contract 
with  the  shipper,  for  accepting  less  than 
the  duly  published  increased  rates. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  157  Fed. 
831,  835. 

(b)  Where  a  carrier,  under  a  private 
contract  with  a  shipper,  pays  back  from 
the  published  interstate  rate  to  the 
shipper  a  sum  of  money  as  an  allow- 
ance for  the  service  rendered  by  the 
shipper  in  bringing  carloads  of  its  prod- 
ucts from  its  plant  over  its  private 
plant  tracks  to  the  tracks  of  defendant 
carrier,  it  is  guilty  of  a  violation  of 
the  Elkins  law  forbidding  a  carrier 
from  granting  a  rate  less  than  the 
published  rate.  C.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S., 
156  Fed.  558,  561. 


780 


SPECIAL  CONTRACTS,   §4    (1)    (a)  — (k) 


§4.     Damages    for    Breach. 

§4     (1)     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

See  Allowances,  §2  (ff),  §14  (g);  In- 
terstate Commerce  Commission, 
§14   (aa);   Reparation,   §3   (o). 

(a)  Where  a  shipper  makes  a  spe- 
cial contract  of  transportation,  thereby 
gaining  special  advantages  not  open 
to  the  public  generally,  he  cannot  re- 
cover daixiages  against  the  carrier  for 
breach  thereof,  despite  the  fact  that 
he  did  not  know  that  the  published 
rates  and  schedules  made  no  provision 
for  the  services  contracted  for.  C.  &  A. 
R.   R.   Co.   V.   Kirby,  225   U.    S.   155,   166, 

«2  Sup.  Ct.  648,  56  L.  ed.  1033. 

(b)  A  carrier  is  bound  to  collect  tae 
legally  published  rate,  and  a  shipper 
cannot  recover  in  a  suit  for  overcharge 
on  the  basis  of  a  rate  agreed  upon  by 
special  contract  with  the  carrier  where 
the  special  agreement  is  not  filed  with 
the  Commission.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  v.  Albers 
Comm.  Co.,  223  U.  S.  573,  596,  32  Sup.  Ct. 
316,  56  L.  ed.  556. 

(c)  The  power  of  the  Commission  to 
require  switch  connections  is  not  found- 
ed upon  any  contractual  relationship 
existing  between  carriers  and  those 
entitled  to  invoke  the  benefit  of  the 
statute,  and  the  Commission  is  without 
jurisdiction  to  compel  defendant  to  spe- 
cifically perform  a  contract  in  respect 
thereto  or  to  award  damages  for  the 
breach  thereof.  Ralston  Townsite  Co. 
v.    M.    P.   Ry.    Co.,    22   I.   C.    C.    354,    3.5. 

(d)  An  unpublished  agreement  be- 
tween a  shipper  and  carrier  cannot  be 
the  basis  of  award  of  damages  by  the 
Commission.  The  Commission  has  no 
authority  to  administer  a  remedy  in 
applications  for  relief  based  solely  upon 
a  contractual  relationship  between  the 
parties,  and  whatever  may  be  the  rights 
and  equities  of  the  parties  in  the  courts 
the  Commission  can  only  award  dam- 
ages where  there  has  been  a  violation 
of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  Wood- 
Mosaic  Flooring  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  & 
N.  R.   R.   Co.,  22   I.  C.   C.   458,   459. 

(e)  Where  a  complainant  has  a  con- 
tract with  a  carrier  for  the  spotting 
of  cars  which  it  is  able  to  break,  it 
must  do  so  before  it  complains  it  is 
unjustly  discrirninated  against  by  the 
manner  in  which  cars  are  spotted  for 
its  competitors.  Alan  Wood  Iron  & 
Steel  Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
540,  547. 


(fg)  The  Commission  has  no  author- 
ity to  approve  or  enforce  a  private 
agreement  made  between  shippers  and 
carriers  concerning  charges  for  transpor- 
tation, nor  is  it  bound  by  such  agree- 
ment, when  the  reasonableness  of  such 
charges  are  challenged  in  the  mode 
prescribed  in  the  Act.  The  Commis- 
sion will  not  undertake  to  interfere 
or  construe  an  agreement,  nor  to  de- 
termine its  legal  effect,  nor  to  see  that 
a  tariff  shall  be  issued  in  compliance 
therewith.  But  such  an  agreement  may 
be  regarded  as  an  admission  as  between 
the  parties  executing  it  of  strong  evi- 
dentiary value  that  the  rate  agreed 
upon  is  reasonable  and  such  evidence 
will  be  considered  by  the  Commission 
together  with  all  other  facts,  circum- 
stances and  conditions  that  may  reason- 
ably apply  to  the  matters  under  investi- 
gation. Hood  &  Sons  v.  D.  &  H.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  15,  18. 

(h)  Allowances  for  handling  cars  to 
and  from  an  industry  are  mere  matters 
of  contract  between  the  shipper  and  the 
carrier,  over  which  the  Commission  has 
no  primary  control.  Crane  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
P.   &   R.   Ry.   Co.,   15  I.  C.   C.  248,  254. 

(i)  The  Commission  cannot  under- 
take by  its  orders  to  ratify  the  agree- 
ment of  parties  as  to  past  or  future 
rates.  Holley  Matthews  Mfg.  Co.  v  Y. 
&  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  436, 
437. 

(j)  Where  a  carrier  agrees  with  a 
shipper  that  a  rate  exacted  shall  be 
conceded  to  be  unreasonable  providea 
the  Commission  will  agree  not  to  es- 
tablish the  lower  rate  for  the  future, 
such  agreement  cannot  be  ratified  by 
the  Commission  or  reparation,  awarded 
thereon  without  a  finding  by  the  Com- 
mission that  the  rate  exacted  was 
unreasonable.  Holley  Matthews  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  y.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.    436,    437. 

(k)  Where  a  defendant  railroad  has 
agreed  with  a  shipper  to  allow  it  a  cer- 
tain sum  for  services  performed  by  the 
shipper  in  moving  cars  over  switching 
tracks  connecting  the  storage  tracks 
with  the  shipper's  buildings  and  fac- 
tories, the  Commission  has  no  authority 
to  enforce  a  specific  performance  of 
such  a  contract,  or  to  award  damages 
for  the  breach  thereof.  General  Elec- 
tric Co.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co., 
14   I.    C.   C.   237,   242. 


SPECIAL  CONTRACTS,  §4  (1)— §5  (f) 


781 


(1)  The  Commission  has  no  juris- 
diction to  award  damages  against  a 
railroad  for  its  failure  to  carry  out  a 
contract  to  maintain  a  station  at  a  cer- 
tain point.  Eddleman  v.  M.  V.  R.  R. 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  103,  104. 

(m)  Complainant,  a  short  line  rail- 
road, carried  traffic  between  LaSalle, 
III,  and  LaSalle  Junction,  111.,  6i/^  miles, 
making  connection  at  the  latter  point 
with  defendant.  November  1,  1906,  de- 
fendant informed  complainant  that  it 
would  not  pay  complainant  the  allow- 
ances previously  in  effect,  except  on 
traffic  on  which  complainant  named 
through  rates  to  or  from  LaSalle.  No 
provision  for  allowances  to  complainant 
was  made  in  defendant's  tariffs.  Com- 
plainant asked  an  order  compelling  de- 
fendant to  pay  it  for  traffic  hauled  be- 
tween such  points  upon  which  no  joint 
through  rates  were  established  and 
asked  that  allowances  be  made  to 
it  on  the  basis  of  the  agreed  compensa- 
tion in  effect  prior  to  November  1, 
1906.  HELD,  the  power  of  the  Commis- 
sion to  award  reparation  does  not  ex- 
tend to  the  division  of  rates  between 
connecting  carriers.  Claims  ex  con- 
tractu are  not  recognized  by  the  Com- 
mission; it  cannot  order  the  payment  of 
money  for  services  performed,  nor  for 
a  debt  due  one  carrier  from  another 
on  account  of  joint  rates  for  a  joint 
service.  Reparation  deried.  LaSalle  & 
Bureau  County  R.  R.  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.    Co.,    13   I.    C.    C.    610,    612. 

(n)  The  agreement  of  carriers  to 
establish  with  a  shipper  certain  rates 
cannot  be  enforced  by  the  Commission, 
since  its  duty  is  to  prevent  the  exten- 
sion of  unreasonable  rates  and  unjust 
discriminations,  Rhinelander  Paper  Co. 
V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  633,  636. 

§5.     Discrimination    Through    Contract. 

See  Allowances,  §7  (d),  §8  (1)  (c),  §8 
(5)  (a);  Baggage  Transfer,  §1  (b); 
Passenger  Fares  and  Facilities, 
§13     (c),     (d),     (f);    Reparation,    §17 

(g). 
(a)  Defendant  carrier  made  a  special 
contract  with  plaintiff  for  the  transpor- 
tation of  horses  by  which  it  agreed  to 
make  the  haul  within  a  particular  time, 
to  make  a  particular  connection,  and  to 
carry  by  a  particular  train.  The  ship- 
ment was  to  move  at  the  regular  rate. 
This  expedited  service  was  not  provided 
for  in  its  published  tariffs  and  was  not 
open   to   all.     HELD,    the   contract   was 


in  violation  of  sections  3  and  6  of  the 
Act  forbidding  unreasonable  preferences 
in  rates  or  regulations.  Plaintiff  could 
not  recover  damages  for  a  breach  there- 
of for  delay  of  the  shipment  in  transit. 
C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Kirby,  225  U.  S. 
155,  165,  32  Sup.  Ct.  648,  56  L.  ed.  1033. 

(b)  Contracts  cannot  justify  unjust 
discrimination.  Baltimore  Butchers  Live 
Stock  Co.  v.  P.  B.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  124,  128;  Shoemaker  v.  C.  &  P. 
Tel.   Co.,    20    I.   C.    C.    614,    621. 

(c)  No  violation  of  the  Act  can  be 
predicated  upon  the  fact  that  a  carrier 
makes  with  one  independent  company 
a  contract  more  favorable  than  with  an- 
other for  a  service  which  the  carrier 
is  bound  or  undertakes  to  perform. 
Merchants  Cotton  Press  &  Storage  Co. 
V.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  98,  104. 

(de)  A  contract  between  a  religious 
association  and  a  carrier  by  which  the 
latter  agrees  not  to  stop  trains  on 
Sunday  cannot  in  any  degree  justify 
undue  or  unreasonable  discrimination 
between  stations  on  its  line.  Lock 
Lynn  Construction  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  396,  399. 

(f)  Between  April  1  and  Aug.  4,  1907, 
complainant  shipped  carloads  of  ice 
from  Los  Angeles,  Cal.,  to  Yuma,  Ariz., 
upon  which  a  rate  of  $3  was  assessed. 
Complainant  attacked  this  rate  as  un- 
reasonable to  the  extent  that  it  ex- 
ceeded $1.90.  In  March,  1907,  com- 
plainant protested  against  the  $3  rate 
and  was  assured  by  the  defendant 
that  the  same  would  be  reduced  prompt- 
ly to  $1.90.  April  4,  1907,  defendant's 
agents  in  California  were  instructed 
to  protect  a  rate  of  $1.25  on  ice  -shipped 
from  producing  points  to  icing  points 
In  said  state.  April  8,  1907,  the  $1.25 
rate  was  applied  to  Yuma  under  the 
mistaken  idea  that  Yuma  was  a  Cali- 
fornia point.  Nov.  27,  1907,  the  $1.25 
rate  was  for  the  first  time  lawfully 
published  and  put  into  effect.  It  was 
kept  in  effect  until  May  25,  1909,  when 
the  $3  per  ton  rate  was  restored.  Com- 
plainant contended  that  it  made  its 
contract  to  supply  tne  ice  in  question  to 
defendant  in  view  of  the  $1.90  rate 
promised  it.  The  rate  asked  by  de- 
defendant  on  most  shipments  moved 
prior  to  July  25,  1907,  was  $1.25 
per  ton.  Whenever  bills  were  rendered 
at  $3  per  ton  payment  was  not  made 
until    Nov.    14,    1907,   and    on   that   date 


782 


SPECIAL  CONTRACTS,  §5    (g)— §7    (a) 


these  bills,  together  with  the  balance  of 
the  $3  rate  on  bills  first  rendered 
at  $1.25,  were  paid.  Complainant  tes- 
tified that  there  was  no  other  pro- 
ducer of  ice  in  California  that  could 
have  entered  into  a  contract  such 
as  the  one  made  by  complainant  be- 
cause no  other  company  was  in  posses- 
sion of  cars  and  other  facilities  for 
the  transportation  of  ice  as  needed  by 
defendant.  HELD,  no  evidence  being 
Introduced  to  show  the  $1.90  rate  to 
be  reasonable,  reparation  should  be  de- 
nied, since  to  sanction  as  a  just  basis 
for  reparation  the  private  understanding 
prior  to  the  shipments,  the  rate  remain- 
ing unchanged  until  the  shipments  were 
made,  would  be  to  establish  a  prece- 
dent for  the  grossest  discrimination  and 
favoritism.  Armour  Car  Lines  v.  S. 
P.   Co.,  17  I.   C.  C.   461,   462. 

(g)  In  1903  complainant  established 
a  starch  manufacturing  plant  at  Cedar 
Rapids,  la.,  and  in  1908  had  $500,000 
invested  in  it  and  $150,000  working  cap- 
ital. For  many  years  a  large  cereal  mill 
had  been  located  in  Cedar  Rapids  and 
enjoyed  milling-in-transit  privileges  on 
grain.  Before  establishing  its  plant 
complainant  consulted  with  defendant 
carriers  and  was  assured  that  it  would 
be  granted  as  liberal  transit  privileges 
as  were  allowed  to  other  manufacturers 
of  grain  products  at  Cedar  Rapids.  In 
1908  defendants  withdrew  from  com- 
plainant the  milling-in-transit  privileges 
on  grain  manufactured  into  starch  and 
established  starch  rates  resulting  in 
increases  of  from  25  to  100  per  cent. 
Milling-in-transit  privileges  were  not 
withdrawn  from  other  manufacturers 
located  at  Cedar  Rapids  who  made 
products  other  than  starch  from  corn. 
Complainant  had  no  competitors  in  the 
manufacture  of  starch  located  at  Cedar 
Rapids,  but  on  account  of  the  withdraw- 
al of  the  privileges  complainant  was  at 
a  serious  disadvantage  in  the  purchase 
of  corn  at  various  points  on  defendants' 
lines.  HELD,  complainant  was  unduly 
discriminated  against  by  the  withdrawal 
of  such  privileges  and  defendants  should 
adjust  their  rates  so  as  to  remove  such 
discrimination.  Douglas  &  Co.  v.  C.  R. 
I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  232;  rehearing 
denied,  21  I.  C.  C.  541. 

(h)  If  a  terminal  company  may  make 
a  contract  with  a  shipper  of  cotton- 
seed products  and  give  him  thereby 
certain    privileges    which    it    does    not 


give  to  other  shippers  of  the  same  com- 
modities, it  may  also  make  similar 
contracts  with  regard  to  cotton  or  other 
products,  and  thus  secure  to  favored 
shippers  the  control  of  the  export  busi- 
ness of  the  port  of  Galveston.  The 
giving  of  undue  preference  to  any 
shipper  is  condemned  by  the  statute, 
and  it  can  make  no  difference  that  such 
preference  is  given  by  a  contract  which 
purports  to  be  a  lease  of  property.  To 
hold  otherwise  would  in  effect  sanction 
a  device  to  evade  the  law.  Eichenberg 
V.  S.  P.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  250,  269;  decision 
of  Commission  sustained,  S.  P.  Terminal 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  219  U.  S.  498,  31  Sup.  Ct. 
279,  55  L.  ed.  310. 

IV.  ACTIONS    TO    ENFORCE. 

§6.     Defenses. 

See  Courts,  §2. 
(a)  Where  a  contract  with  a  railroad 
company  is  in  contravention  of  the 
Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  by  reason 
of  granting  the  shipper  rates  lower  than 
those  lawfully  published,  defendant  can- 
not be  estopped  from  setting  up  such 
illegality  as  a  defense  to  a  suit  at 
law  for  damages  for  breach  thereof. 
Taenzer  &  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
191   Fed.   543,    551. 

V.  AS    EVIDENCE    OF    REASONABLE 

RATES.  ^ 

§7.     In    General. 

(a)  On  shipments  during  September 
and  October,  1906,  of  stacked  chimney 
brick  from  Brazil,  Ind.,  to  Minnesota 
Transfer,  complainant  was  assessed  on 
two  carloads  19c  and  on  one  carload 
231/^c.  The  combination  of  locals  be- 
tween these  points  via  Arthur,  111.,  was 
13c.  December  10,  1906,  pursuant  to  a 
promise  made  August  6,  1906,  to  com- 
plainant, defendant  established  the  13c 
rate.  June  3,  1908,  it  canceled  it  and 
established  a  through  rate  of  $2.35  per 
ton,  the  13c  rate  amounting  to  $2.60  a 
ton.  No  evidence  was  offered  by  de- 
fendants to  rebut  the  presumptive  un- 
reasonableness of  the  231/^c  rate.  HELD, 
the  charges  assessed  were  unreasonable. 
Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis  of 
13c.  No  order  entered  as  to  future 
rates  in  view  of  the  reduction  to  $2.35 
per  ton.  Alphons  Custodis  Chimney 
Construction  Co.  v.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 
I.   C.   C.   600,   601. 


SPECIAL  CONTRACTS,  §7  (b)— STORAGE,  (a) 


783 


(b)  A  contract  between  an  express 
company  and  railroad  companies  over 
whose  lines  it  operates  providing  that 
the  former  shall  not  charge  less  than 
a  certain  percentage  over  the  railroad 
rate  applying  on  the  same  commodity 
between  the  same  points,  cannot  be  con- 
sidered as  a  controlling  factor  in  pass- 
ing upon  the  reasonableness  of  the  ex- 
press rates.  The  Commision  will,  of 
course,  notice  the  railroad  rate  as  af- 
fording a  basis  of  comparison,  but  the 
law  requires  the  fixing  of  just  and  rea- 
sonable charges  and  the  authority  of 
the  Commission  to  prescribe  a  reason- 
able rate  is  not  restricted  by  the 
terms  of  any  agreement  between  the 
express  company  and  the  railroad  com- 
pany. Reynolds  v.  Southern  Express 
Co.,   13   I.   C.   C.   536,  539. 

SPECIAL. 

Damages — See  Loss  and  Damage,  §13. 
Rates — Advanced  Rates,  §5  (4)  (a), 
§8  (1)  (bb),  §8  (2)  (a):  Crimes, 
§7  (I);  Equalization  of  Rates,  §8 
(f) ;  Evidence,  §64  (cc) ;  Passenger 
Fares  and  Facilities,  §1  (f) ;  Repa- 
ration, §2  (00),  §14;  Tariffs,  §3  (1) 
(m).  Services — See  Expedited  Ser- 
vice; Facilities  and  Privileges,  §5 
(a),  §6  (a),  §9,  §10;  Reasonableness 
of  Rates,  §31;  Tariffs,  §4  (a),  (m); 
Transportation,  §8. 

SPOTTING  CARS. 

See  Allowances,  §8   (5). 

STATE  RATES. 

See  Evidence,  §13  (6). 

STATE  REGULATION. 

See   Interstate  Commerce,  §4. 

STOCK  YARDS  COMPANIES. 

CROSS   REFERENCES. 
See  Common   Carrier,   §2   (a),   §3   (a); 
Exclusive     Contracts     (b);     Special 
Contracts,   §2    (I);   Terminal    Facili- 
ties, §3  (h),    (i). 

I.     STATUS. 

(a)  A  stock  yards  company  which  is 
not  engaged  in  the  railroad  business 
except  that  it  leases  tracks  owned  by 
It  to  an  independent  railroad  corporation 
is  not  a  common  carrier,  since  a  carrier 
must  actually  engage  in  the  transporta- 
tion of  goods  or  persons  from  point 
to  point.  United  States  v.  Uniou  S,  & 
T.   Co.,   192   Fed.   330,   341. 


(b)  Complainant  is  engaged  in  the 
city  of  Baltimore  in  conducting  an  abat- 
toir for  slaughtering  live  stock.  It  owns 
a  side  track  connecting  its  plant  with  the 
P.  B.  &  W.  R.  R.,  a  part  of  the  Pa. 
R.  R.  This  side  track  has  been  in  ex- 
istence 20  years  and  been  used  for 
the  delivery  of  all  classes  of  freight 
except  live  stock.  In  1891  the  Union 
Stock  Yards  Co.  was  organized,  which 
took  over  the  business  of  the  Calver- 
ton  and  Claremont  Stock  Yard  in  Balti- 
more. Prior  to  that  the  complainant 
had  established  its  plant  on  a  piece  of 
land  purchased  from  the  Claremont  Co. 
and  adjacent  thereto.  The  consolidated 
company  had  yards  situated  about  two 
miles  from  the  yard  of  complainant. 
The  defendants  entered  into  a  contract 
with  the  Union  Stock  Yards  whereby 
they  agreed  to  make  "the  said  stock 
yards  their  live  stock  depot  for  Balti- 
more and  vicinity  and  shall  deliver  at 
said  yard  all  the  live  stock  which  may 
be  transported  over  their  line  .  .  . 
destined  to  the  Baltimore  market 
.  .  ."  Defendants  claim  they  had  a 
right  to  agree  to  deliver  at  one  stock 
yards  exclusively  in  Baltimore.  Com- 
plainant's live  stock  was  unloaded  at 
the  Union  Stock  Yards  and  then  driven 
through  the  streets  of  Baltimore  by 
complainant  two  miles  to  their  yard,  at 
considerable  expense  and  annoyance. 
Shipments  by  complainant  and  its  ten- 
ant over  the  side  track  amounted  to 
from  50  to  60  carloads  a  year.  If  live 
stock  was  delivered  at  its  yards  com- 
plainant estimated  it  would  receive  15 
carloads  a  week.  HELD,  the  refusal 
of  defendants  to  deliver  to  the  side 
track  complainant's  live  stock  con- 
signed thereto  was  unreasonable  and  a 
violation  of  the  law.  Ordered  that  such 
delivery  be  hereafter  made.  Baltimore 
Butchers  Live  Stock  Co.  v.  P.  B.  &  W. 
R.   R.   Co.,   20    I.    C.    C.   124. 

STORAGE. 

(a)  On  shipments  of  flour  upon  the 
domestic  rates  to  the  ports  of  Phila- 
delphia and  New  York,  defendants  al- 
lowed four  days'  free  storage  in  Phila- 
delphia, while  ten  days  were  allowed 
in  Jersey  City,  when  destined  to  New 
York,  and  three  days  additional  to  that 
city,'  with  one  additional  day  for  light- 
erage from  Jersey  City  to  the  New 
York  docks,  thus  making  substantially 
fourteen   days   from   the   time   the   flour 


784 


SUBSTITUTION  OF  TONNAGE,  §1   (a)— §2   (c) 


arrived  at  Jersey  City  to  the  time  of 
delivery.  Other  carriers  at  New  York, 
comFeting  with  defendants,  had  refused 
to  reduce  the  free  storage  time  at 
New  York,  but  these  carriers  did  not 
enter  Philadelphia.  Under  the  plead- 
ings the  sole  question  was,  whether 
Philadelphia  was  discriminated  against, 
as  compared  with  New  York,  and  no 
question  was  raised  as  to  the  reason- 
ableness of  the  free  storage  time  at 
either  city.  HELD,  on  account  of  com- 
petition, Philadelphia  was  not  unduly 
discriminated  against.  Brey  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.   Co.,  16   I.  C.  C.  497,  500-501. 

SUBSTITUTION  OF  TONNAGE. 

I.  CONTROL  AND   REGULATION. 

§1.    Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

II.  LEGALITY  OF  SUBSTITUTING. 

§2.     In  general. 
III.     POLICING  BY  CARRIERS. 
§3.     In  general. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 
See  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §15,  §20. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 
§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

(a)  The  Commission  will  not  under- 
take to  frame  a  code  of  transit  rules  gov- 
erning privileges  at  transit  points.  The 
traffic  officials  of  the  carriers  have  the 
duty  and  the  responsibility  under  the  law 
of  initiating  rates.  In  Re  Substitution  of 
Tonnage  at  Transit  Points,  18  I.  C.  C. 
280,  296. 

(b)  On  account  of  the  abuses  incident 
to  the  present  privilege  at  transit  points 
accorded  by  carriers,  the  Commission  re- 
fuses to  suspend  its  rule  of  June  25,  1908, 
providing  that  while  it  is  not  expected 
the  identity  of  each  carload  of  grain,  lum- 
ber, etc.,  can  or  will  be  preserved,  it  is 
unlawful  to  substitute  at  the  transit 
point,  or  forward  under  the  transit  rate, 
tonnage  or  commodities  that  do  not 
move  into  that  point  upon  that  rate.  In 
Re  Substitution  of  Tonnage  at  Transit 
Points,  18  I.  C.  C.  R.  280,  296. 

(c)  On  account  of  difficulties  incident 
to  the  present  privileges  accorded  to  car- 
riers at  Detroit  the  Commission  recom- 
mends the  adoption  of  a  flat-rate  system 
by  which  the  full  local  rates  are  paid  to 
the  Detroit  points  regardless  of  the  final 
disposition  of  the  commodity  shipped  and 
by  which  outbound  shipments  of  grain 
from  these  points  are  carried  at  a  flat- 


rate  regardless  of  the  point  of  origin, 
provided  the  grain  be  "from  beyond."  In 
Re  Substitution  of  Tonnage  at  Transit 
Points,  18  I.  C.  C.  280,  297. 

II.     LEGALITY  OF  SUBSTITUTING. 
§2.     In  General. 

(a)  The  Commission  by  the  views  it 
has  expressed  in  this  case  does  not  in- 
tend to  modify  in  any  respect  its  opinion 
expressed  In  the  Matter  of  Substitution 
of  Tonnage  at  Transit  Points,  18  I.  C.  C. 
280.  In  Re  Transportation  of  Wool, 
Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151,  174. 

(aa)  It  is  impracticable  to  preserve 
the  identity  of  inbound  and  outbound 
lumber  at  a  yarding-in-transit  point. 
Sondheimer  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I. 
C.  C.  606,  608. 

(b)  Defendant's  tariff  provided  for  a 
concentration  and  compression  privilege 
at  Fort  Smith,  Ark.,  which  might  be  ex- 
ercised during  the  season  from  Sept,  1  to 
Aug.  31.  Between  Sept.  9,  1908,  and 
April  28,  1909,  complainants  shipped  cot- 
ton to  Fort  Smith  for  compression  and 
the  same  was  destroyed  by  fire  in  the 
compress  on  May  17,  1909.  They  were 
unable  to  secure  other  cotton  until  after 
the  expiration  of  the  season  on  Aug.  31. 
Defendant's  tariff  made  no  provision 
as  to  the  contingency  of  fire.  Shortly 
afterwards  the  tariff  was  amended  and 
provided  that  where  cotton  was  burned 
in  compress  other  cotton  secured  in  the 
following  season  might  be  shipped  out 
at  the  balance  of  the  through  rate.  Com- 
plainants paid  the  full  local  rate  to  Fort 
Smith,  which  was  not  shown  to  be  un- 
reasonable. HELD,  the  tariff  before  its 
amendment  was  not  unreasonable  so  as 
to  entitle  complainant  to  reparation  to 
the  net  amount  due  from  their  expense 
bills.  The  amendment  to  the  concentra- 
tion rule  was  improper  in  encouraging 
unlawful  substitution  of  local  cotton. 
Following  Conference  Ruling  of  June  29, 
1909,  FURTHER  HELD,  no  transit  priv- 
ilege should  extend  beyond  one  year. 
Henderson  &  Barkdull  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  & 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  514,  515. 

(c)  Under  evidence  indicating  that 
burnt  cotton  is  often  fully  as  valuable 
as  low  grade  cotton;  that  bales  burned 
slightly  on  the  outside  may  contain  per- 
fect cotton  on  the  inside;  and  that  a 
lower  rate  on  burnt  cotton  would  prob- 
ably induce  fraudulent  substitution,  the 
public  interest  is  held  not  to  require  the 


SUBSTITUTION  OF  TONNAGE,  §2   (d)— (k) 


785 


establishment  of  a  lower  rate  on  burnt 
cotton  than  on  other  cotton  in  view  of 
the  small  amount  of  the  same  actually 
transported.  Lesser  v.  Georgia  R.  R.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  478,  480. 

(d)  Under  the  transit  practices  at 
Montgomery,  Ala.,  expense  bills  for  in- 
bound shipments  were  frequently  loaned 
by  one  shipper  to  another  without  the 
transfer  of  the  commodity  to  which  the 
bills  related.  A  shipper  having  a  carload 
of  cotton  to  forward  was  able  to  get  a 
lower  rate  by  reason  of  the  favor  of  one 
of  his  neighbors  than  could  be  secured 
under  the  published  tariff.  HELD,  such 
practice  was  an  unlawful  substitution. 
In  Re  Substitution  of  Tonnage  at  Transit 
Points,  18  I.  C.  C.  280,  293. 

(e)  Tariffs  permitting  privileges  in 
transit  should  recognize  the  obvious  fact 
that  loss  of  wheat  at  the  milling,  clean- 
ing, or  drying  point  will  result  and  should 
not  permit  a  shipment  from  said  point 
of  a  weight  equal  to  the  weight  of  the 
raw  material  shipped  into  such  point, 
since  the  local  shipper  at  the  transit 
point  may  by  adding  new  material  to 
the  shipment  defeat  the  through  rates.  In 
Re  Substitution  of  Tonnage  at  Transit 
Points,   18  I.  C.  C.  280,  288. 

(f)  A  local  shipper  at  a  point  where 
transit  privileges  are  allowed  should  not 
be  permitted  to  ship  out  from  the  transit 
point  a  shipment  equal  in  weight  to  that 
received  at  the  transit  point  for  the  pur- 
pose of  enabling  such  local  shipper  to 
be  placed  on  an  equal  footing  with  his 
competitors  at  the  point  of  origin  and 
the  point  of  destination.  In  Re  Substitu- 
tion of  Tonnage  at  Transit  Points,  18  I. 
C.  C.  280,  289. 

(g)  The  practice  by  jobbers  of  send- 
ing forward  to  retailers  from  transit 
points  mixed  carloads  of  various  com- 
modities as  transit  of  solid  carloads  of 
such  commodities  is  not  unlawful  where 
there  is  no  local  supply  at  the  transit 
point,  the  billing  is  canceled  or  all  ton- 
nage disposed  of  locally  and  the  tonnage 
and  billing  on  hand  are  checked  at  rea- 
sonably frequent  intervals,  and  billing  in 
excess  of  tonnage  on  hand  is  canceled, 
selecting  for  such  cancelation  the  oldest 
billing,  but  in  so  far  as  there  may  be 
local  supply  of  any  of  the  commodities 
sent  forward  on  this  transit  arrangement, 
the  carrier  must  look  out  that  substitu- 
tion of  the  local  supply  is  not  made  to 
complete  the  deficiency  caused  by  local 


consumption.  In  Re  Substitution  of  Ton- 
nage at  Transit  Points,  18  I.  C.  C.  R.,  280, 
291,  292. 

(h)  Where  jobbers  at  transit  points 
in  shipping  to  dealers  make  up  mixed 
carloads  of  grain  received  in  part  on 
transit  rates  and  in  part  on  non-transit 
rates,  the  shipments  represent  the  av- 
erage of  the  various  shipments  received, 
and  corresponding  billing  should  be  can- 
celed by  the  carrier  instead  of  permit- 
ting the  entire  mixed  carload  to  be 
charged  against  a  solid  carload  from 
which  it  could  not  properly  be  produced. 
In  Re  Substitution  of  Tonnage  at  Transit 
Points,  18  I.  C.  C.  280,  292. 

(i)  Makers  of  mixed  feed  milled  to- 
gether at  a  transit  point  a  number  of 
grains  and  sometimes  cottonseed  meal 
and  molasses,  producing  what  was  prac- 
tically a  new  commodity  from  various 
substances,  some  received  upon  transit 
rates  and  others  secured  either  locally  or 
upon  non-transit  rates.  The  cars  of  the 
mixture  thus  produced  were  forwarded 
from  the  transit  point  in  solid  cars  of 
grain.  HE5LD,  the  practice  was  improper 
and  should  be  forbidden  where  there  is 
such  a  process  of  manufacture  and  such 
a  loss  of  identity  of  the  inbound  com- 
modity that  the  shipment  forwarded  may 
be  said  to  be  a  new  creation.  In  Re  Sub- 
stitution of  Tonnage  at  Transit  Points. 
18  I.  C.  C.  280,  292. 

(j)  Certain  tariffs  provided  that  non- 
transit  commodities  (such  as  stone,  grit, 
or  molasses)  might  be  added  to  transit 
commodities  (such  as  grain  or  seeds)  at 
transit  points,  and  a  weight  of  the  mix- 
ture equal  to  the  weight  of  the  inbound 
transit  commodities  forwarded  as  prod- 
uct. HELD,  the  tariff  was  unlawful  in 
that  a  less-than-carload  lot  of  the  non- 
transit  commodity  went  forward  at  a 
lower  rate  than  the  less-than-carload  rate 
properly  applicable,  and  even  lower  than 
the  carload  rate  from  the  transit  point 
proper.  In  Re  Substitution  of  Tonnage 
at  Transit  Points,  18  I.  C.  C.  280,  292. 

(k)  Mixed  feeds  and  like  products 
must  go  forward  from  the  transit  points 
in  amounts  containing  at  least  the  car- 
load minimum  weights  of  transit  com- 
modities taking  the  transit  rates,  and 
with  the  proper  local  rate  (either  car- 
load or  less-than-carload  as  the  weight 
may  be)  imposed  upon  the  non-transit 
commodities  in  the  mixture.  This  rule 
must    be    followed    wherever    the    non- 


786 


SUBSTITUTION  OF  TONNAGE,  §2  (1)— §3  (a) 


transit  property  added  is  sufficient 
in  amount  to  form  a  really  calcu- 
lable portion  of  the  mixture.  A  like  rule 
must  be  applied  where  the  dealer  desires 
to  include  a  load  of  non-transit  grain  or 
other  commodity  in  a  carload  of  transit 
property.  If  the  transit  portion  of  the 
shipment  is  to  move  upon  the  balance 
of  a  carload  rate  it  must  be  of  itself  not 
less  than  the  carload  minimum  in  weight, 
and  the  non-transit  tonnage  in  the  car 
must  be  charged  with  the  proper  local 
rate.  In  Re  Substitution  of  Tonnage  at 
Transit  Points,  18  I.  C.  C.  280,  293. 

(1)  At  certain  transit  points  the  price 
of  commodities  was  frequently  dependent 
upon  the  expense  bill  for  the  inbound 
shipment  furnished  by  the  seller,  a 
higher  price  being  paid  if  such  bill  was 
peculiarly  valuable  for  outbound  ship- 
ment. HELD,  the  additional  price  paid 
in  consideration  of  expense  bills  of  a  cer- 
tain character  amounted  to  a  purchase  of 
the  bills  and  the  practice  should  be  pre- 
vented by  the  carriers.  In  Re  Substitu- 
tion of  Tonnage  at  Transit  Points,  18  I. 
C.  C.  280,  293. 

(m)  Under  transit  privileges  at  Mem- 
phis, Tenn.,  the  rates  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  cotton  to  that  city  were  higher 
than  net  rates,  a  refund  being  given  upon 
proof  of  shipment  of  a  like  weight  of 
cotton  via  the  line  of  the  same  carrier. 
Expense  bills  for  inbound  shipments 
were  held  by  the  cotton  factors  or  com- 
mission merchants  representing  the 
growers.  Expense  bills  for  outbound 
shipments  were  held  by  the  buyers  rep- 
resenting the  consumers.  No  refund 
could  be  secured  without  the  presenta- 
tion of  the  expense  bills  for  each  move- 
ment. The  result  was  that  many  ex- 
pense bills  were  sold  b>'  the  buyers  to 
the  factors  for  an  amount  equal  to  one- 
half  of  the  refund  to  be  gained.  Some 
factors  remitted  the  refund  to  their 
principals;  some  were  able  to  remit  only 
a  portion  through  having  to  buy  out- 
bound express  bills.  Other  factors  re- 
tained the  refunds,  leaving  their  prin- 
cipals to  pay  the  gross  rates  to  Memphis. 
HELD,  the  entire  system  was  unsatisfac- 
tory and  should  be  cured  by  the  install- 
ation of  a  system  of  flat  rates.  In  Re 
Substitution  of  Tonnage  at  Transit 
Points,  18  L  C.  C.  280,  294. 

(n)  Dealers  at  certain  transit  points 
frequently  have  billing  in  hand  without 
having  an  equivalent  amount  of  the  com- 
modity represented  by  the  same.     The 


practice  was  to  retain  the  billing  until  a 
non-transit  supply  of  the  commodity 
could  be  secured,  and  then  to  send  the 
non-transit  supply  forward  upon  the  tran- 
sit bill.  HELD,  the  practice  was  unlaw- 
ful. To  be  absolutely  lawful  the  cancel- 
lation of  billing  should  be  automatic,  so 
that  when  the  commodity  represented 
by  the  billing  is  disposed  of,  either 
locally  or  to  a  non-transit  point  or  to  a 
transit  point,  the  inbound  billing  cover- 
ing it  should  be  canceled.  In  Re  Substi- 
tution of  Tonnage  at  Transit  Points,  18 
I.  C.  C.  280,  294. 

(o)  Outbound  shipments  from  transit 
points  at  balances  of  through  rates  made 
Defore  the  receipt  of  the  inbound  ship- 
ments depended  upon  for  the  transit 
privilege  are  unlawful.  In  Re  Substitu- 
tion of  Tonnage  at  Transit  Points,  18  I. 
C.  C.  280,  294. 

(p)  Billing  covering  the  commodity 
disposed  of  should  be  canceled  to  prevent 
substitution  of  tonnage  at  transit  points. 
In  Re  Substitution  of  Tonnage  at  Transit 
Points,  18  I.  C.  C.  280,  294. 

(q)  The  northwestern  transit  tariffs 
provided  that  upon  receipt  of  grain  at 
the  transit  point  the  through  rate  to  the 
final  destination  should  be  paid  and  that 
such  destinatioin  should  be  indicated. 
The  rates  to  various  milling  points  be- 
tween Minneapolis  and  Chicago  were 
higher  than  those  from  Minneapolis  to 
Chicago.  Shippers  had  the  grain  deliv- 
ered to  the  milling  point  and  there  paid 
the  Minneapolis  to  Chicago  rate.  They 
were  then  able  to  secure  oats  from  a 
transit  point  enjoying  a  different  rate 
and  forward  them,  or  forward  oats  from 
a  non-transit  point,  or  refrain  altogether 
from  completing  the  transit  transaction. 
HELD,  the  practice  was  unlawful.  In  Re 
Substitution  of  Tonnage  at  Transit 
Points,  18  I.  C.  C.  280,  295. 

(r)  A  tariff  providing  for  the  forward- 
ing at  a  transit  point  of  agricultural  im- 
plements, vehicles,  etc.,  as  the  transit  of 
inbound  shipments  of  logs,  is  improper. 
In  Re  Substitution  of  Tonnage  at  Transit 
Points,  18  I.  C.  C.  280,  296. 

III.     POLICING  BY  CARRIERS. 

§3.     In  General. 

(a)  Shippers  at  points  enjoying  tran- 
sit privileges  on  wheat  were  accustomed 
to  blend  different  kinds  and  grades  of 
wheat  received  from  different  points  of 


SUBSTN.  OF  TONNAGE,  §3  (b)— SWITCH  TRKS.  AND  SWITCH'G,  §2  (a)  787 


origin  and  at  varying  rates  and  to  dispose 
of  a  portion  of  the  flour  made  therefrom 
in  the  local  market  at  the  transit  point. 
They  then  shipped  out  the  remainder  on 
the  bills  of  lading  which  would  give  them 
the  lowest  through  rate  from  point  of 
origin  to  point  of  destination.  HELD,  the 
local  supply  and  local  disposition  should 
be  kept  separate  from  the  transit  supply 
and  product  by  the  carrier;  the  billing 
should  be  properly  canceled  for  all  local 
disposition;  proper  and  frequent  check 
should  be  made  of  grain  and  product  and 
billing  on  hand;  and  billing  in  excess  of 
grain  and  product  on  hand  should  be  can- 
celed, the  oldest  billing  being  selected  for 
that  purpose.  In  Re  Substitution  of  Ton- 
nage at  Transit  Points,  18  I.  C.  C.  280, 
290. 

(b)  Certifications  by  the  shippers  do 
not  excuse  carriers  for  determining  for 
themselves  and  at  their  peril  that  ship- 
ments carried  at  other  than  the  regular 
local  rates  from  the  point  of  shipment  are 
entitled  to  exceptional  or  transit  rates. 
They  will  not  be  allowed  to  put  in  tran- 
sit privileges  either  through  competition 
with  each  other  or  through  the  desire  to 
hold  local  rates  up  to  the  highest  pos- 
sible point,  without  taking  entire  respon- 
sibility for  the  results  of  such  privileges 
and  the  uses  made  of  the  same.  In  Re 
Substitution  of  Tonnage  at  Transit 
Points,  18  I.  C.  C.  280,  297. 

(c)  It  is  the  duty  of  shippers  to  sub- 
mit to  all  necessary  policing  of  their  ship- 
ments if  they  desire  to  enjoy  transit  priv- 
ileges. They  may  also  fairly  be  required 
to  certify  that  shipments  offered  by  them 
are  entitled  to  go  forward  upon  the  tran- 
sit rates.  In  Re  Substitution  of  Tonnage 
at  Transit  Points,  18  I.  C.  C.  280,  297. 

SUSPENSION  OF  RATES. 


See     Interstate 
sion,    §11. 


Commerce     Commis- 


SWITCH  TRACKS  AND 
SWITCHING. 


I. 


CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 
§1.     In  general. 

§2.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
II.     ABSORPTION  OF  SWITCHING. 
§3.     In  general. 
III.     DISCRIMINATION   AND   REASON- 
ABLENESS   OF   CHARGES. 
§4.    In  general. 
§5.    Incidental  services. 


§6.     Reciprocal  switching. 
§7.    Right  to  connection. 
§8.    Validity  of  regulations. 
§9.     Reparation. 
§10.  Tariffs  and  publication. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 
See  Allowances,  §8  (5);  Tap   Lines. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 
§1.     In  General. 

See  Courts,  §11  (c) ;  Interstate  Com- 
merce, §3  (c),  §4  (n);  Tap  Lines, 
§9  (b),   (g),   (i). 

(a)  A  spur  used  or  necessary  exclu- 
sively in  the  transportation  of  persons  is 
as  much  subject  to  the  Act  as  are 
"freight  depots,  yards  and  grounds"  used 
or  necessary  "in  the  transportation  or 
delivery  of  property."  West  End  Im- 
provement Club  V.  O.  &  C.  B.  R.  &  B.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  239,  244. 

(b)  The  Hepburn  Act,  placing  inter- 
state railroads,  including  switches,  spurs, 
tracks  and  terminal  facilities  of  every 
kind,  under  the  control  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission,  does  not  inter- 
fere with  state  control  of  the  road  and  its 
appurtenances  so  far  as  it  is  engaged  in 
intrastate  commerce.  State  v.  M.  P.  R. 
Co.,  81  Neb.  15,  21,  115  N.  W.  614. 

§2.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

See  Allowances,  §2  (ff ) ;  Commerce 
Court,  §6  (c),  (d),  §7  (a);  Courts, 
§9  (d);  Special  Contracts,  §4  (1)  (c), 
(k). 

(a)  Complainant  alleged  that  defend- 
ant had  entered  into  an  oral  agreement 
with  it  that  complainant  should  grade 
and  prepare  a  roadbed  upon  which  de- 
fendant agreed  to  lay  and  construct  a 
sidetrack,  furnish  all  the  material  neces- 
sary therefor,  connect  said  sidetrack 
with  its  main  line  and  operate  and  main- 
tain the  same.  This  was  an  application 
to  the  Commission  to  require  defendant 
to  perform  the  alleged  agreement  which 
was  denied  by  defendant.  HELD,  that 
(1)  the  Commission  has  no  jurisdiction 
to  enforce  the  specific  performance  of  an 
agreement  of  this  nature;  (2)  while  sec- 
tion 1  of  the  Act  gives  the  Commission 
power  upon  complaint  to  investigate  and 
determine  all  questions  as  to  the  safety, 
practicability,  justification  and  compensa- 
tion involved  in  the  construction,  mainte- 
nance and  operation  of  a  switch  connec- 
tion with  a  lateral  branch  line  of  rail- 
road or  private  sidetrack  when  the 
same  has  been  constructed,  it  is  a  condl- 


788 


SWITCH  TRACKS  AND  SWITCHING,  §2  (b)— §4   (b) 


tion  precedent  to  the  exercise  of  the 
power  of  the  Commission  that  such  pri- 
vate track  should  be  actually  constructed 
in  sach  a  manner  that  a  physical  connec- 
tion is  practical  and  safe.  The  Commis- 
sion cannot  order  the  construction  of  a 
private  sidetrack  by  a  railroad  company. 
Ralston  Townsite  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  354,  356. 

(b)  The  Commission  has  no  power  to 
order  the  installation  of  a  sidetrack;  its 
function  goes  to  determining  questions 
concerning  switch  connections  with  ex- 
isting sidetracks.  Ralston  Townsite  Co. 
V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  354,  355,  356. 

(c)  Cars  of  coal  from  Gallup,  N.  M., 
were  carried  by  the  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  to 
its  terminals  at  El  Paso,  Tex.,  upon  in- 
structions received  from  the  consignee. 
The  A.  T.  &  S.  P.  Ry.  switched  the  cars 
about  one-half  a  mile  to  an  exchange  track 
owned  by  the  T.  &  P.  Ry.  The  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.  Ry.  thereupon  issued  a  transfer  bill  to 
the  T.  &.  P.  Ry.  and  advised  the  latter 
as  to  the  name  of  the  consignee.  The 
latter  without  any  instructions  from  the 
consignee  switched  the  car  from  the  ex- 
change track  to  the  consignee's  ware- 
house located  on  a  spur  of  the  T.  &  P. 
Ry.  Both  carriers  published  an  inter- 
state switching  charge  of  $5.  HELD,  the 
shipment  was  interstate  so  as  to  give  the 
Commission  jurisdiction  over  the  switch- 
ing charge,  since  it  did  not  at  any  time 
before  arrival  at  the  consignee's  ware- 
house pass  into  his  possession.  West 
Texas   Fuel  Co.   v.   T.   &   P.   Ry.   Co.,   15 

I.  C.  C.  443,  446. 

(d)  Where  a  railroad  has  agreed  with 
a  shipper  to  allow  it  a  certain  sum  for 
services  in  moving  cars  over  switching 
tracks  connecting  the  storage  tracks  with 
the  shipper's  buildings  and  factories,  the 
Commission  has  no  authortity  to  enforce 
specific  performance  of  such  a  contract, 
or  to  award  damages  for  the  breach 
thereof.  General  Electric  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C. 
&  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  237,  242. 

II.  ABSORPTION    OF   SWITCHING. 

§3.     In    General. 

See  Absorption  of  Charges,  §1  (b); 
Allowances.  §5  (a);  Blanket  Rates, 
§10  (a);  Discrimintion,  §15  (e) ; 
Reconsignment,   §3    (o). 

(a)  Where  a  carrier  having  the 
line  haul  formerly  switched  cars  to  a 
shipper's  plant  without  charge,  but  was 
forced    to    discontinue    such    free    serv- 


ice by  the,  delivering  road  which  es- 
tablished a  switching  charge  of  $3,  its 
failure  to  absorb  such  charge  is  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable  or  discrim- 
inatory. Curtis  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,    23    I.    C.    C.    372. 

(b)  The  general  rule  seems  to  be 
that  carriers  absorb  switching  charges 
of  connecting  lines  at  points  of  origin 
or  destination  and  upon  competitive 
traffic.  Curtis  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
23    I.    C.    C.    372,    373. 

(c)  A  switching  charge  is  not  un- 
lawful because  nine  months  later  it  was 
absorbed.  Deeves  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  & 
N.    W.    Ry.    Co.,    19    I.    C.    C.    482,    483. 

(d)  The  cancellation  of  a  joint  rate 
and  the  absorption  of  switching  charges, 
in  order  to  remove  discrimination,  will 
not  be  disturbed.  Minneapolis  Thresh- 
ing Machine  Co.  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  189,  190,  192. 

(e)  Where  a  carrier  absorbs  switch- 
ing charges  on  carload  shipments  and 
furnishes  two  cars,  under  the  rule 
making  the  rate  the  same  as  on  one  car, 
the  switching  charge  should  be  absorbed 
on  both  cars.  Milwaukee  Falls  Chair 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
217,   218. 

III.     DISCRIMINATION    AND    REASON- 
ABLENESS OF  CHARGES. 

§4.     In     General. 

See  Allowances,  §11  (c),  §12  (2)  (dd); 
Discrimination,  §3  (aa),  §7  (e) ; 
Routing  and  Misrouting,  §4  (z) ; 
Tariffs,  §7  (e);  Terminal  Facilities, 
§3    (e). 

(a)  Complainant  built  a  spur  track 
2.71  miles  long  to  the  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
tracks  from  its  mines  at  Thayer  to 
Thayer  Junction.  The  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
built  and  operated  spur  tracks  to  other 
mines  in  the  Springfield  group  in  which 
Thayer  is  located  but  refused  to  build 
or,  after  construction,  to  operate  the 
connection  between  its  rails  and  com- 
plainant's mine.  At  other  mines  ex- 
cept Thayer,  the  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  had 
operated  spurs  without  extra  charge 
above  the  group  rate  applicable  from 
stations  on  its  own  rails.  HELD,  that 
such  a  practice  created  a  case  of  unjust 
discrimination.  C.  W.  &  V.  Coal  Co.  v. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  13,  16. 

(b)  A  belt  line  haul,  necessary  to 
make  delivery,  may  justify  a  greater 
rate  for  delivery  in  one  part  of  the  same 


SWITCH  TRACKS  AND  SWITCHING,  §4  (c)— (i) 


789 


town   than   in    another.     Pierce   v.    P.   & 
L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  89,  90. 

(c)  Fuel  oil  switched  at  St.  Louis 
was  assessed  2c  per  100  lbs.  on  an 
arbitrary  weight  of  7.4  lbs.  per  gallon. 
The  estimated  weight  of  the  shipments 
which  moved  from  Wood  River,  111.,  as 
assessed  by  the  carriers  having  the 
line  haul  was  7,867,837  lbs.  Under  the 
estimated  weight  on  which  the  switch- 
ing charges  were  assessed,  the  ship- 
ments would  have  weighed  8,914,106  lbs. 
There  was  no  switching  tariff  providing 
for  estimated  weight,  but  one  issued 
subsequent  to  the  time  the  shipments 
moved  based  the  switching  charges  on 
the  estimated  weights  provided  in  the 
classification  or  tariffs  governing  the 
road  haul.  HELD,  the  switching  charges 
assessed  were  unreasonable  to  the  ex- 
tent the  weight  on  which  they  were  as- 
sessed exceeded  the  weight  on  which 
charges  for  the  line  haul  were  made. 
Reparation  awarded.  Standard  Oil  Co. 
V.  I.   T.   R    R.  Co.,   23   I.   C.   C.   369. 

(d)  Complainant,  operating  a  factory 
for  the  manufacture  of  sash,  doors  ana 
blinds  near  Sisson,  Cal.,  was  connected 
with  the  S.  P.  Co.  by  a  spur  track 
owned  by  the  McCloud  River  R.  R.  Co. 
For  several  years  prior  to  Oct.  5,  1910, 
the  S.  P.  Co.,  which  received  the  line 
haul  on  traflBc  to  and  from  complainant's 
plant,  performed  free  of  charge  the 
switching  service  involved  in  handling 
cars  over  the  spur  track.  On  the  date 
mentioned  this  privilege  was  withdrawn 
and  the  McCloud  River  R.  R.  Co.  estab- 
lished a  charge  of  $3  per  car  for  the 
switching  service  and  entered  upon  the 
performance  thereof.  The  S.  P.  Co.  only 
absorbed  switching  charges  on  competi- 
tive traffic.  HELD,  the  complainant  is 
not  subjected  to  discrimination  as  com- 
pared with  other  shippers  similarly  situ- 
ated. Complaint  dismissed.  Curtis  Bros. 
&  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  372. 

(e)  A  delivering  road  performing 
only  a  switching  service  is  entitled  to 
compensation  therefor.  Curtis  Bros.  & 
Co.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  372,  373. 

(f)  While  almost  universally  the 
charge  for  switching  service  is  on  a  per 
car  basis,  the  assessment  of  class  rates 
for  switching  at  Baltimore  is  not  found 
to  be  unlaw^ful.  Merchants'  &  Mfrs. 
Ass'n  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  474. 

(g)  Complainant  attacked  the  switch- 
ing charges  on  interstate  traffic  at  Balti- 


more. These  switching  charges  were 
not  assessed  upon  the  usual  basis  of  a 
certain  charge  per  car,  but  were  class 
rates,  ranging  from  lie,  first  class,  to  5c, 
sixth  class.  The  fifth-class  rate  of  6c 
applied  to  a  weight  of  40,000  lbs.,  and 
resulted  in  charges  of  from  $24  to  $40 
per  car.  The  defendants  proposed,  and 
to  some  extent  executed,  a  scheme  of 
joint  commodity  rates,  which  appeared 
to  reduce  the  existing  charges  about 
two-thirds.  Such  rates  applied  only 
from  certain  specified  territory  and  added 
various  differentials  to  the  local  rates, 
and  were  not  attacked  by  complainant. 
HELD,  the  carriers  have  opened  chan- 
nels of  interchange  between  their  re- 
spective terminals,  and  as  to  traffic  from 
some  territories  have  provided  charges 
which  are  not  shown  to  be  unreasonable 
for  the  interchange  service.  On  traffic 
from  other  territories  they  have  fixed 
charges  which  obviously  are  intended  to 
be  prohibitory.  This  is  unduly  dis- 
criminatory. The  method  in  force  of 
assessing  switching  charges  at  Balti- 
more is  not  unduly  discriminatory  as 
compared  with  cities  where  the  per  car 
basis  obtains,  but  except  where  joint 
through  rates  are  in  effect  the  class 
rates  collected  for  the  switching  of  in- 
terstate traffic  in  carloads  are  unreason- 
able, and  should  not  exceed  the  flat 
Baltimore  rate  by  more  than  the  fol- 
lowing: On  first  and  second  classes, 
5c  per  100  lbs.;  on  third,  fourth,  fifth 
and  sixth  classes,  and  upon  commodities 
not  moving  under  class  rates,  2c  per 
100  lbs.  Carriers  given  30  days  to 
amend  their  tariffs.  Merchants  &  M'f'rs 
Ass'n  V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co,  23  L  C.  C. 
474,   478,   479. 

(h)  The  proposed  substitution  of 
class  and  commodity  rates  for  a  switch- 
ing charge  imposed  by  a  wharf  com- 
pany for  moving  traffic  over  piers  at  Gal- 
veston is  found  unreasonable,  the  prior 
charge  of  $1.75  a  car  appearing  to  be  con- 
sistent with  charges  for  switching  and 
terminal  services  at  other  points  in 
Texas.  In  Re  Wharfage  Charges  of  the 
Galveston  Wharfage  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  535, 
546. 

(i)  A  carrier  may  not  perform  a 
switching  service  for  one  plant  and  de- 
cline to  perform  it  at  a  competing  plant 
in  the  same  general  territory  on  the 
ground  that  it  is  more  convenient  to  per- 


790 


SWITCH  TRACKS  AND  SWITCHING,  §4  (j)  — (n) 


form  the  service  at  the  one  plant  than  at 
the  other,  or  because  it  has  been  cus- 
tomary to  do  it  at  one  and  not  at  another. 
Alan  Wood  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  540,  545. 

(j)  The  destination  or  the  construction 
of  an  interchange  track  at  one  plant  does 
not  justify  the  carrier  in  refusing  to  per- 
form at  that  plant  the  same  service  which 
it  performs  at  a  competing  plant,  where 
such  interchange  has  not  been  designated 
or  provided.  Alan  Wood  Iron  &  Steel  Co 
V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  540,  545. 

(k)  The  "local  import  tariff"  and 
practices  covering  the  transportation  of 
imported  sugar  from  New  Orleans  or  Port 
Chalmette,  La.,  to  Gramercy,  La,,  was 
attacked  as  discriminatory  against  New 
Orleans  and  Port  Chalmette  refineries. 
The  rate  from  shipside  to  Gramercy  was 
l^/^c  per  100  lbs.  on  carload  lots.  The 
tariff  provided  for  absorption  of  switch- 
ing charges  and  the  cost  of  loading  cars 
not  to  exceed  ^c  per  100  lbs.  Complain- 
ant introduced  expert  evidence  to  the 
effect  that  the  rate  would  not  cover  the 
actual  cost  of  the  service.  The  refinery 
located  at  Port  Chalmette  contended  that 
the  cost  of  getting  the  sugar  into  the  re- 
finery at  Gramercy  was  less  than  the 
cost  of  handling  the  sugar  from  boats  to 
the  former  refinery  by  machinery.  De- 
fendant's officer  testified  that  the  actual 
loading  cost  was  less  than  7-lOc;  that 
the  switching  charge  was  $2  per  car, 
leaving  $3.29  per  car  for  the  38-mile  haul 
to  Gramercy,  and  that  the  average  cost 
of  operation  between  these  points  was 
less  than  $1.84  per  freight  train  mile.  It 
was  also  stated  that  defendant  received 
more  revenue  from  refined  sugar  to  in- 
terstate destinations;  that  the  refinery  at 
Gramercy  had  increased  other  traffic  and 
encouraged  the  growth  of  sugar  cane 
along  the  line;  that  the  Gramercy  refin- 
ery could  construct  a  wharf  and  receive 
sugar  by  boat;  that  the  normal  move- 
ment by  empty  cars  is  toward  Gramercy. 
and  that  the  rates  on  refined  sugar  from 
New  Orleans  and  Gramercy  are  the  same, 
HELD,  the  present  tariff  does  not  effect 
undue  discrimination,  especially  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  the  refinery  at  Port  Chal- 
mette is  not  located  upon  and  ships  no 
sugar  over  defendant's  line;  and  that  the 
defendant  is  not  transporting  sugar  to 
Gramercy  at  less  than  cost.  In  Re  Trans- 
portation of  Sugar,  22  I.  C.  C.  558,  563. 

(kk)  Because  a  spur  track  is  included 
in  service  of  one  carrier,  it  does  not  fol- 


low that  servics  of  another  carrier  with- 
out a  spur  track  is  inadequate.  South- 
ern California  Sugar  Co.  v.  S,  P.  L,  A. 
&  S.  L.  R,  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  6,  11. 

(1)  The  practice  of  naming  specific 
consignors  and  consignees  as  entitled  to 
a  certain  service,  such  as  a  switching 
service,  is  objectionable,  not  alone  on 
account  of  form,  but  because  it  may  of- 
ten effect  an  actual  discrimination  as  be- 
tween persons  similarly  situated  and 
equally  entitled  to  the  carrier's  service. 
This  complaint  is  not  likely  to  arise,  if 
the  service  is  effective  within  a  certain 
defined  area.  Pierce  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  & 
H.  R.  R,  R,  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  579,  581. 

(m)  The  granting  of  free  transfer 
service  to  the  private  sidings  of  some 
consignees  and  refusing  such  service  to 
complainant  is  held  to  be  unjust  discrim- 
ination. Pierce  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  579,  581. 

(n)  Coal  from  Bernice,  Pa.,  to  Utica. 
N.  Y.,  was  carried  under  a  joint  rate  of 
$1.50  per  gross  ton  and  this  rate  included 
$5  per  car  of  the  switching  charge  for 
delivery  from  the  tracks  of  the  N.  Y.  C. 
&  H.  R.  R.  R.  at  Utica  to  trestles  and 
yards  of  coal  dealers  and  industries  lo- 
cated within  the  yard  limits  on  the 
switching  lines  of  defendant,  N.  Y.  O.  & 
W.  R.  R.  As  a  result  of  the  absorption 
of  a  portion,  30c  per  ton,  of  the  switch- 
ing charge,  the  net  switching  charge  to 
complainant's  industry  averaged  $2.95  per 
car.  The  average  distance  covered  was 
1%  miles.  Two  engines  each  carrying 
a  crew  of  five  men  were  required  to  do 
the  switching  service.  The  switching 
movements  in  the  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R. 
yards  were  subject  to  the  train  opera- 
tions of  that  company.  The  switching 
tracks  ran  almost  the  entire  distance  on 
public  streets,  crossing  at  grade  19 
streets,  two  street  car  lines,  and  a  swing 
bridge.  Complainant's  industry  siding 
was  reached  by  a  sharp  grade.  The 
switching  was  performed  under  difficult 
conditions  and  at  large  expense.  The 
switching  charge  for  dressed  meat  and 
live  stock  was  $5  per  car,  and  for  cotton, 
machinery,  lumber,  stone,  brick,  lime,  ce- 
ment, etc.,  $3.50  per  car.  HELD,  as  com- 
pared with  the  charge  on  other  commodi- 
ties and  taking  into  view  the  difficulties 
involved  the  charge  attacked  was  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable.  Utica  Traffic 
Bureau  v.  N.  Y.  O.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I. 
C.  C.  168,  170. 


SWITCH  TRACKS  AND  SWITCHING,  §4   (o)— §5    (b) 


791 


(o)  Where  a  tariff  in  naming  a  rate 
from  Bernice,  Pa.,  to  Utica,  N.  Y.,  in- 
cludes therein  $5  per  car  of  the  switch- 
ing charge  assessed  at  Utica  for  hauling 
the  coal  from  the  tracks  of  the  carrier 
to  the  industries  located  on  the  defend* 
ant  switching  line,  the  tariffs  of  the 
Bernice  to  Utica  carrier  should  be  read 
together  with  the  charge  of  the  defend- 
ant switching  carrier  at  Utica  in  order  to 
determine  the  reasonableness  of  the  lat 
ter's  charge,  Utica  Traffic  Bureau  v.  N. 
Y.  O.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  168,  171. 

(p)  Following  the  decision  in  West 
Texas  Fuel  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  443,  defendants'  switching  charges  of 
$5  per  ear  for  switching  carloads  of  vari- 
ous commodities  from  industries  located 
near  the  industries  involved  in  the 
former  case  to  the  tracks  of  other  car- 
riers in  El  Paso,  Tex.,  are  held  to  be  un- 
reasonable to  the  extent  that  they  ex- 
ceed $3  per  car,  and  this  rule  is  applied 
where  the  defendant  performs  a  service 
■^  placing  empty  cars  at  the  plants  of 
these  industries  to  be  loaded  and  switches 
the  cars  back  to  the  tracks  of  the  car- 
riers to  be  transported  to  interstate 
points.  West  Texas  Fuel  Co.  v.  T.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  491,  493,  494. 

(q)  Complainant  attacked  the  switch- 
ing charge  of  $5  per  car  on  coal  from 
the  terminals  of  the  Santa  Fe  lines  at 
El  Paso  to  the  spur  track  of  the  T.  & 
P.  Ry.  The  distance  was  one  mile  and 
the  grade  very  slight.  Formerly  the 
switching  charge  was  only  .$1.50,  and 
complainant  located  his  business  on 
the  spur  track  of  the  T.  &  P.  R.  R.  in 
reliance  upon  that  charge.  The  State 
Railroad  Commission  of  Texas  estab- 
lished switching  charges  of  $1.50,  $2  and 
$2.50  for  one  mile  and  less,  two  miles 
and  over  one  mile,  and  over  two  miles, 
respectively.  The  service  involved  the 
movement  of  a  loaded  car  in  one  direc- 
tion and  an  empty  in  the  opposite  di- 
rection; but  when  a  loaded  car  was 
switched  in  both  directions,  the  charge 
was  exacted  for  each  movement.  In 
over  30  cities  in  Texas  the  maximum 
switch  charge  was  $2.50.  Defendants 
charged  $2  and  $3  per  car  to  two  oiher 
points  in  El  Paso  on  non-competitive 
interstate  traffic  and  involving  more  dif- 
ficult switching  hauls.  HELD,  the  evi- 
dence showed  the  $5  rate  exacted  to  be 
excessive  to  the  extent  it  exceeded  $3. 
West  Texas  Fuel  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
15   I.    C.    C.    443,    447. 


(r)  Where  switching  for  another 
shipper  was  much  larger  than  that  done 
for  complainant,  it  could  naturally  be 
done  at  a  less  cost  per  car.  West 
Texas  Fuel  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  443,  447. 

(s)  An  action  was  brought  to  recover 
for  the  amount  paid  defendant  for 
switching  cars  to  plaintiff's  elevator,  on 
the  alleged  ground  that  the  exaction 
thereof  was  a  discrimination.  Upon  the 
facts  found  the  trial  court  ordered 
judgment  for  $1.  HELD,  a  carrier  is 
bound  to  treat  all  shippers  with  equality 
and  without  discrimination.  It  is  also 
bound,  unless  there  be  custom  or  con- 
tract to  the  contrary,  when  it  receives 
shipments  in  carload  lots,  to  make  fle- 
livery  at  the  consignee's  place  of  busi- 
ness when  located  on  its  industrial 
tracks,  or  to  connecting  carriers  and 
switching  roads,  when  the  consignee's 
business  is  located  thereon.  It  is  not, 
however,  bound  at  its  own  charge  to 
make  such  delivery  beyond  its  own  or 
leased  tracks.  Banner  Grain  Co.  v.  G. 
N.  Ry.  Co.  (Minn.,  1912),  137  N.  W.  161, 
161. 

(t)  Where  movement  amounted  to 
switching,  switching  charges  should  have 
been  assessed.  Block-Pollak  Iron  Co.  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  520. 

§5.     Incidental   Services. 

See  Alowances,  §12  (2)  (e),  (f);  Re- 
frigeration, §3;  Reparation,  §6  (rr); 
Tap  Lines,  §4;  Terminal  Facilities, 
§3  (I);  Through  Routes  and  Joint 
Rates,  §14  (c). 

(a)  Order  of  the  Commission  in  18 
I.  C.  C.  310  temporarily  enjoined,  on  the 
ground  that  the  defendants  were  not 
bound  to  perform  the  industrial  track 
service  ordered  by  the  Commission,  as 
part  of  their  transportation  service,  it 
appearing  that  the  industrial  plants 
were  located  from  one-fifth  of  a  mile  to 
seven  miles  from  defendant's  main  tracks 
and  the  cost  of  drayage  would  amount 
to  from  $7.50  to  $25  a  car.  Ftirther  held, 
that  where  defendants  voluntarily  per- 
formed such  service  under  an  arrange- 
ment with  the  industrial  plant,  they 
might  make  a  reasonable  charge  there- 
for. (Mack,  J.,  dissenting.)  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.  Ry.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  229,  239, 
S.  P.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  241. 

(b)  The  carrier  having  the  line  haul 
should  deliver  traffic  so  handled  with- 
out additional  charge  to  industries  lo- 
cated upon  its  tracks  within  its  switch- 


792 


SWITCH  TRACKS  AND  SWITCHING,  §5   (c)  — (d) 


ing  limits.     Curtis  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,  28  I.  C.  C.  372,  372. 

(c)  Complainant  built  a  spur  track 
to  connect  its  factory  with  the  main 
line  of  defendant.  Defendant  refused 
to  operate  the  same  unless  its  standard 
form  of  industrial  switch  track  agree- 
ment was  signed,  one  clause  of  which 
required  the  industry  to  indemnity  it 
from  liability  and  claim  from  loss  and 
damage  by  fire  caused  by  the  sparks 
of  burning  coal  from  its  locomotive  on 
Its  spur  track.  The  spur  track  ran  be- 
tween lumber  piles  and  there  were 
shaving  and  sawdust  and  other  inflam- 
mable material  on  the  premises.  hxOLD, 
It  is  no  part  of  the  duty  of  the  carriers 
either  at  common  law  or  under  the  Act 
to  spot  cars  at  a  warehouse  or  factory, 
or  to  do  more  than  set  them  on  the 
spur  track  and  off  its  own  right  ot 
way.  If  it  undertakes  to  do  so,  with 
or  without  additional  compensation, 
there  is  no  reason  why  it  may  not  predi- 
cate its  undertaking  upon  the  condition 
that  it  shall  not  be  liable  to  the  indus- 
try for  fire  losses  of  the  nature  pre- 
sented. Imperial  Wheel  Co.  v.  St.  L. 
I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  56,  58. 

(d)  Complainant  jobbers  of  Los  Ange- 
les, Cal.,  attacked  the  switching  charge 
of  $2.50  per  car,  as  unduly  discriminatory, 
(made  by  defendants  at  Los  Angeles)  for 
delivering  or  receiving  interstate  carload 
freight  to  or  from  industries  located  upon 
spurs  or  sidetracks  within  the  switching 
limits,  whether  the  charge  was  incident 
to  a  system-line  haul  or  to  a  foreign-line 
haul.  They  offered  no  evidence  of  the 
unreasonableness  of  the  charge  per  se. 
Defendants  designated  a  territory  extend- 
ing for  6  or  7  miles  as  comprising  the 
switching  limits  and  had  constructed 
therein  numerous  tracks,  main  lines, 
branch  lines,  industry  spurs,  classifica- 
tion tracks,  team  tracks,  freight-shed 
tracks,  hold  tracks,  and  repair  tracks, 
and  also  stations,  freight-sheds,  derricks, 
roundhouses,  etc.  Freight  moving  in  car- 
loads was  delivered  at  team  tracks, 
freight  sheds,  or  industry  spurs.  The 
charge  complained  of  was  not  imposed 
for  deliveries  at  team  tracks  and  freight- 
sheds,  but  only  at  industry  spurs.  These 
spurs  varied  in  length,  some  leading  di- 
rectly from  the  main  track  into  or  along- 
side of  the  industries  served,  while  oth- 
ers were  of  greater  length  and  branched 
at  one  or  more  points,  short  spurs  run- 
ning off  from  the  "lead"  to  serve  other 


industries  in  the  immediate  neighbor- 
hood. These  spurs  were  constructed  of 
material  furnished  by  the  carriers  at  the 
expense  of  the  shippers  and  were  de- 
signed to  give  to  the  carrier  constructing 
same  the  control  of  the  traffic  from  the 
industries  located  thereon.  None  of  the 
industries  furnished  motive  power  for  the 
switching,  which  was  done  from  the  inter- 
change tracks  to  the  industry  by  the  loco- 
motives of  the  delivering  line.  Cars 
destined  to  industry  spurs  were  not 
placed  first  at  a  spur  depot,  or  on  the 
team  tracks,  or  at  the  sheds,  and  later 
switched  to  oblige  the  consignee.  A  train 
of  freight  cars  went  to  the  breakmg- 
up  yards  which  lay  at  the  entrance  to 
the  city,  and  there  was  divided  up  with 
respect  to  the  character  of  the  freight  in 
the  various  cars  and  their  destination. 
No  one  had  access  to  the  cars  at  this 
point.  This  yard  was  purely  a  railroad 
facility.  After  the  cars  were  segregated 
they  were  taken  to  the  tracks  to  which 
they  were  ordered — some  to  the  various 
team  tracks,  distributed  along  the  line, 
some  to  different  industries,  some  to  the 
railroad  jobbers  or  to  freight-sheds  or 
other  stock-yards.  Before  the  cars  were 
placed  the  consignees  were  given  notice 
of  the  tracks  to  which  they  were  to  be 
sent,  so  that  there  was  no  confusion,  and 
the  switch  engines  which  placed  the  cars 
on  one  track  also  served  to  haul  the 
"loads"  in  and  "empties"  out  at  the  other 
tracks.  This  service  was  not  more  ex- 
pensive to  the  carrier  than  if  on  all  cars 
there  had  been  given  team  track  delivery. 
Where  a  system-line  haul  was  involved, 
the  car  was  switched  to  or  from  the  in- 
dustry by  the  same  carrier  that  made 
the  haul  from  or  into  Los  Angeles. 
Where  a  foreign-line  haul  was  involved, 
the  car  was  shipped  from  or  into  Los  An- 
geles by  one  carrier  and  hauled  from  or 
to  the  industry  on  the  spur  track  by 
another  carrier.  In  the  latter  case  the 
switching  carrier  received  a  portion  of 
the  through  rate  in  addition  to  the  $2.50 
switch  charge  involved.  HELD,  the 
charge  attacked  with  respect  to  a  system- 
line  haul  was  unlawful  since  the  carrier 
made  no  team  track  delivery  but  simply 
substituted  therefor  the  spur  track  deliv- 
ery to  the  industry.  Having  performed 
no  service  in  addition  to  the  delivery  re- 
quired by  it  under  its  general  freight  rate 
it  could  not  lawfully  make  an  extra 
charge.  But  as  to  the  foreign-line  haul 
the  charge  complained  of  was  not  unlaw- 
ful, since  the  delivery  was  made  upon  the 


SWITCH  TRACKS  AND  SWITCHING,  §5   (e)— §7   (e) 


793 


tracks  of  a  separate  carrier  which  had 
the  right  to  impose  a  reasonable  separate 
charge  therefor  in  addition  to  the  divis^ 
ion  of  the  regular  rate  received  by  it. 
(Knapp,  chairman,  dissenting.)  Asso- 
ciated Jobbers  of  Los  Angeles  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  310,  322;  order 
respecting  system-line  haul  enjoined 
(Mack,  J.,  dissenting),  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  229;  S.  P.  Co.  v. 
I.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  241.  Pacific  Coast  Job- 
bers and  MTrs  Ass'n  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I. 
C.  C.  33. 

(e)  Common  carriers  are  under  no 
duty  to  extend  their  transportation  obli- 
gations with  the  extension  of  great  in- 
dustrial plants,  and  to  accept  and  deliver 
car  within  the  inclosure  over  a  network 
of  interior  switching  tracks  constructed 
as  plant  facilities  to  meet  the  require- 
ments of  the  industry.  General  Electric 
Co.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  237,  242. 

§6.     Reciprocal  Switching. 

(a)  Where  a  carrier  has  entered  into 
a  reciprocal  switching  arrangement,  it 
must  accept  shipments  for  delivery  to 
the  extent  of  its  capacity.  Crescent  Coal 
&  Mining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  559,  565. 

§7.     Right  to  Connection. 

See  Infra,  §7  (gg) ;  Common  Carrier, 
§1  (aa),  §3  (f);  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission,  §14  (Pi); 
Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 
§11    (2)    (f). 

(a)  Under  the  Act  as  amended  June 
29,  1906,  authorizing  the  Commission  to 
order  a  main  line  to  establish  in  proper 
cases  a  switch  connection  with  a  branch 
line,  the  application  can  only  be  made  by 
a  shipper  and  not  by  a  carrier.  I.  C.  C. 
v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  216  U.  S.  531,  537, 
30  Sup.  Ct.  415,  54  L.  ed.  605. 

(b)  A  road  is  a  lateral  branch  road 
within  the  meaning  of  section  1  of  the 
Act  as  amended  June  29,  1906,  requiring 
the  installation  of  a  switch  connection, 
when  it  is  tributary  to  and  dependent  up- 
on another  for  an  outlet;  where  it  is  es- 
sentially a  feeder,  contributing  traffic 
and  capable  of  exchanging  such  traffic 
with  the  other  road  It  is  not  such  where 
it  is  in  effect  an  independent  and  com- 
peting line.  Nor  is  this  any  less  the  case 
because  it  may  not  compete  as  to  a  por- 
tion of  the  territory  involved.  The  ques- 
tion is  to  be  determined  according  to  the 
relation  which  the  branch  line  bears  to 


the  railroad  with  which  a  switch  connec- 
tion is  asked.  This  relation  is  one  of 
road  to  road,  and  not  of  shippers  or  terri- 
tory. A  road  does  not  have  the  charac- 
ter of  a  branch  or  lateral  road  as  to  some 
shippers  in  that  territory,  and  not  have  it 
as  to  others.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
U.  S.,  195  Fed.  962,  967. 

(c)  Under  section  1  of  the  Act  to 
Regulate  Commerce  authorizing  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Commission  to  order 
the  installation  of  switching  connections, 
the  Commission  has  no  authority  to  enter 
such  an  order  where  the  applicant  is  not 
a  shipper  but  is  a  lateral  branch  line. 
D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  le^  Fed. 
498. 

(d)  Section  3  requires  every  common 
carrier  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the 
Act  to  accord  all  reasonable,  proper  and 
equal  facilities  for  the  interchange  of 
traffic  between  their  respective  lines,  and 
provides:  "But  this  shall  not  be  con- 
strued as  requiring  any  such  common  car- 
rier to  give  the  use  of  its  tracks  or  ter- 
minal facilities  to  another  carrier  en- 
gaged in  like  business."  If  carriers  are 
allowing  such  use  of  their  tracks  or  ter- 
minal facilities  the  proviso  of  section  3 
can  have  no  application.  Terminals  are 
either  open  or  they  are  not;  and  if  a  car- 
rier holds  itself  out  as  ready  to  permit 
the  use  of  its  tracks  at  a  certain  charge 
the  fact  that  such  charge  may  be  pro- 
hibitive does  not  mean  that  the  terminals 
are  not  open.  On  the  contrary,  it  would 
seem  to  be  a  potent  argument  for  the  re- 
duction of  charges  for  the  use  of  tracks 
or  terminal  facilities  already  extended. 
That  carriers  offer  each  to  the  other  the 
use  of  their  respective  tracks  or  termi- 
nals is  shown  by  the  fact  that  freight  is 
actually  interchanged  after  its  arrival  at 
the  terminal,  and  for  this  service  charges 
are  provided  in  tariffs  published  and  filed. 
It  follows  that  having  elected  to  perform 
this  service  the  charge  therefor  must  be 
reasonable.  Merchants  &  Mfr'rs.  Ass'n  v. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  474,  476. 

(e)  Complainant  asked  that  the  de- 
fendant be  required  under  section  1  of 
the  Act  to  accord  it  a  switch  connection 
with  its  coal  mine  some  8  miles  south  of 
Wilkes-Barre,  Pa.  This  connection  was 
demanded  with  a  mountainous  grade  of 
the  main  line  of  the  defendant.  This 
track  had  been  in  continuous  operation 
for  many  years  and  not  a  single  accident 
had  occurred  which  could  be  attributed 
to  the  operation  of  switchings  and   sid- 


794 


SWITCH   TRACKS  AND   SWITCHING,   §7    (f)— (m) 


ings  during  the  entire  period  of  its  opera- 
tion. It  was  shown  that  numerous  switch- 
ings and  sidings  in  the  anthracite  regioii 
are  constructed  on  grades,  many  of  which 
are  greater  than  the  one  involved  in 
complainant's  demand.  Complainant  had 
actually  mined  about  50  tons  of  coal,  but 
showed  by  the  testimony  of  engineers 
that  500,000  tons  is  a  conservative  esti- 
mate of  the  coal  deposits  on  its  land,  and 
that  its  breaker  under  construction  would 
be  capable  of  releasing  this  tonnage  at 
the  rate  of  300  to  500  tons,  or  about  ten 
carloads  a  day.  Complainant  had  con- 
structed its  siding  and  made  an  applica- 
tion in  writing  for  a  switch  connection 
therewith.  HELD,  the  interstate  traffic 
has  been  tendered  hjy  the  complainant 
within  the  meaning  of  section  1  of  the 
Act;  that  there  is  sufficient  business  to 
justify  the  construction  and  maintenance 
of  the  proposed  connection;  and  that  the 
proposed  connection  is  "reasonably  prac- 
ticable and  can  be  put  in  with  safety" 
and  should  he  installed.  With  reference 
to  alleged  damages  sustained  under  sec- 
tion 3  of  the  Act,  the  complainant  is  left 
to  its  remedy  in  the  courts.  Ridgewood 
Coal  Co.  V.  L.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C 
183. 

(f)  An  electric  line  is  entitled  to  a 
switch  connection  with  a  steam  road. 
Cincinnati  &  Columbus  Traction  Co.  v.  B. 
&  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  486,  494. 

(g)  A  local  law  under  which  an  elec- 
trically operated  railway  may  have  no 
right  to  demand  a  switch  track  connec- 
tion and  interchange  of  traffic  with  a 
steam  railway  may  be  controlling  in  so 
far  as  it  relates  to  traffic  moving  wholly 
within  the  state,  but  it  cannot  be  per- 
mitted to  operate  as  an  impediment  to 
the  movement  of  interstate  traffic  after 
Congress  has  legislated  upon  the  subject 
by  specifying  the  grounds  upon  which 
interstate  shippers  may  demand  such  con- 
nection and  interchange  of  traffic.  C.  & 
C.  Traction  Co.  v  B.  &  o.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co  , 
20  I.  C.  C.  486,  488. 

(gg)  For  forty  years  and  more  it  has 
been  the  policy  of  the  railroads  to  de- 
velop traffic  and  facilitate  a  movement 
by  the  construction  of  spur  lines  leading 
to  industries,  and  so  extensive  has  be- 
come this  method  of  direct  delivery  by 
rail  that  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of 
any  system  which  might  be  devised  for 
conducting  the  vast  volume  of  traffic 
without  the  spur  track.  In  view  of  these 
conditions,  the  industrial  spur  cannot  be 


treated  as  a  plant  facility,  a  shipper's 
convenience;  it  is  in  fact  a  necessity  to 
both  the  carrier  and  the  shipper  under 
modern  conditions  of  business  and 
transportation.  Associated  Jobbers  of 
Los  Angeles  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  310,  313. 

(h)  The  safety  of  main-line  traffic 
must  be  considered  in  locating  switches. 
Reiter,  Curtis  &  Hill  v.  N.  Y.  S.  &  W.  R. 
R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  290,  292. 

(i)  Complainant,  a  manufacturer  of 
ground  iron  ore  at  Iron  Ridge,  Wis., 
prayed  for  an  order  commanding  defend- 
ant carrier  to  construct  and  maintain  a 
private  sidetrack  from  its  main  line  to 
complainant's  mills,  a  distance  of  425  ft. 
HELD,  under  section  1  of  the  amended 
Act,  the  Commission  had  no  authority  to 
order  the  construction  of  a  private  side 
track  by  a  railroad  company,  but  that  its 
authority  was  limited  to  ordering  a  car- 
rier to  make  a  switch  connection  with  a 
private  sidetrack.  Winters  Metallic  Paint 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  1.  C.  C. 
587,  589. 

(j)  In  determining  whether  a  switch 
connection  should  be  ordered  between 
complainant  and  defendant  railroads,  the 
Commission  need  not  require  the  reason 
of  the  preference  of  shippers  to  ship  over 
defendant's  road  if  complainant's  re- 
quest appears  to  be  a  proper  one  under 
the  circumstances.  Rahway  Valley  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
191,  193. 

(k)  The  provisions  in  the  Hepburn 
Act  relating  to  switching  connections  be- 
tween roads  is  based  upon  the  "open- 
gateway  policy,"  and  was  intended  for 
the  benefit  of  the  shipper  who  wishes  to 
market  his  product  in  the  widest  prac- 
ticable field  and  have  the  most  direct 
connection  therewith.  Rahway  Valley  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  D.  L.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
191,  194. 

(1)  In  determining  whether  a  switch 
connection  between  a  small  line  reaching 
several  industries  and  defendant  trunk 
lines  should  be  ordered,  a  fair  test  is 
whether  such  complaint  would  be  granted 
were  it  an  application  for  a  sidetrack  to 
an  industry.  Rahway  Valley  R.  R.  Co,  v. 
D.  L.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  191,  193. 

(m)  Complainant,  a  local  railway, 
with  its  terminus  at  Summit,  N.  J.,  sup- 
plied 50  carloads  of  traffic  a  year  to  be 
transported  over  defendant's  line  run- 
ning out  from  Summit.  The  industries  on 


SWITCH  TRACKS  AND  SWITCHING,  §7  (n)— §8  (b) 


795 


complainant's  line  had  found  it  advan- 
tageous to  route  their  freight  over  de- 
fendant's line,  even  at  the  expense  to 
themselves  of  making  transfer  at  Summit 
by  wagon.  It  took  30  days  for  a  carload 
of  freight  to  go  from  a  point  on  com- 
plainant's line  to  Buffalo  by  a  connection 
other  than  with  the  line  of  defendant. 
Defendant's  line  at  Summit  was  a  branch 
line  used  largely  for  passenger  service. 
A  switch  connection  could  be  made  with 
defendant  at  Summit  without  danger  to 
defendant's  traffic  and  without  practical 
engineering  difficulties.  HELD,  under 
the  Hepburn  Act  the  requested  switch 
connection  should  be  granted,  the  ex- 
pense to  be  borne  by  complainant.  Rah- 
way  Valley  R.  R.  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  191,  193,  194. 

(n)  Defendant's  road  ran  through 
complainant's  farm  of  800  acres,  which 
was  located  about  a  mile  from  Peru,  111. 
Complainants  demanded  the  installment 
of  a  switch  on  their  farm  for  the  purpose 
of  carrying  away  grain.  They  shipped 
from  10  to  12  cars  per  year.  No  sufficient 
evidence  was  offered  to  show  that  the 
proposed  switch  could  be  safely  installed 
or  operated.  The  proposed  switch  could 
be  reached  only  by  the  private  way  over 
complainants'  land  and  complainants 
gave  no  indication  that  they  would  grant 
to  other  farmers  a  right  of  access  to  the 
same.  Complainants  intimated  that  they 
might  discontinue  the  business  of  farm- 
ing in  the  near  future  and  use  the  farm 
for  manufacturing  purposes.  Their  farm 
was  only  about  a  mile  from  the  team 
tracks  of  defendant  at  Peru,  and  1  and  4 
miles  respectively  from  other  shipping 
points  on  defendant's  lines  provided  with 
elevators  and  grain  dumps.  HELD,  the 
complaint  should  be  dismissed.  McCor- 
mick  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
Gil,  612. 

(o)  A  state  railroad  commission  or- 
dered plaintiff  carrier  to  construct  an  in- 
terchange track  between  another  rail- 
road's exchange  track  at  a  junction  point. 
The  interchange  track  ordered  was  to  be 
500  ft.  in  length,  400  ft.  of  which  would 
be  upon  the  land  of  the  plaintiff.  Plain- 
tiff purchased  this  land  to  be  used  for 
terminal  facilities  and  had  expended 
large  sums  of  money  in  constructing 
tracks,  platforms,  sheds,  buildings  and 
other  terminal  facilities.  HELD,  the  or- 
der was  not  in  violation  of  section  3  of 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  providing 
that  no  common  carrier  should  be  required 


to  give  the  use  of  its  track  or  terminal 
facilities  to  another  carrier  engaged  in 
like  business.  Pittsburgh,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  R.  R.  Comm.,  171  Ind.  189,  210.  86  N.  E. 
328. 

(p)  Although  an  order  of  a  state  rail- 
road commission,  requiring  a  carrier  to 
construct  an  interchange  track  may  of 
necessity,  include  cars  moving  in  inter- 
state commerce  and  inure  to  the  benefit 
of  such  commerce,  the  order  is  not  void 
as  a  regulation  of  interstate  commerce 
where  it  specifically  applies  only  to  the 
transportation  of  passengevs  and  prop- 
erty between  points  within  the  state,  and 
to  the  receiving,  switching,  delivering, 
storing  and  handling  of  such  propercy. 
Pittsburgh,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Comm., 
171  Ind.  189,  212,  86  N.  E.  328. 

§8.     Validity  of  Regulations. 

(a)  Complainant  built  a  spur  track  to 
connect  its  factory  with  the  main  line  of 
defendant.  Defendant  refused  to  operate 
the  same  unless  its  standard  form  of  in- 
dustrial switch  track  agreement  was 
signed,  one  clause  of  vvrhich  required  the 
industry  to  indemnify  it  from  liability 
and  claim  from  loss  and  damage  by  fire 
caused  by  the  sparks  of  burning  coal 
from  its  locomotive  on  its  spur  track. 
The  spur  track  runs  between  lumber 
piles  and  it  appeared  shavings  and  saw 
dust  and  other  inflammable  material  ac- 
cumulated on  the  premises.  HELD,  it  is 
no  part  of  the  duty  of  the  carriers  either 
at  common  law  or  under  the  Act  to  spot 
cars  at  warehouses  or  factory,  or  to  do 
more  than  set  them  on  the  spur  track 
and  off  its  own  right  of  way.  If  it  under- 
takes to  do  so  with  or  without  additional 
compensation  there  is  no  reason  why  it 
may  not  predicate  its  undertaking  upon 
the  condition  it  shall  not  be  liable  to  the 
industry  for  fire  losses  of  the  nature  pre- 
sented. Imperial  Wheel  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I. 
M.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  1.  C.  C.  56,  58. 

(b)  The  operation  of  a  private  side- 
track by  a  carrier  is  a  different  matter 
from  the  operation  by  it  of  the  connec- 
tion. If  the  prerequisite  statutory  con- 
ditions exist  the  connection  must  be 
made  whether  desired  by  the  carrier  or 
not,  but  in  undertaking  a  service  on  a 
spur  track  off  its  own  right  of  way,  the 
carrier  may  attach  reasonable  conditions 
to  the  undertaking,  and  a  condition  re- 
quiring the  owner  of  the  spur  track  to  in- 
demnify it  against  liability  for  fire  while 
operating  on  the   spur   track  is  not  un- 


796       SWITCH  TRACKS  AND  SWITCHING,  §8  (c)— TAP  LINES,  §3  (1)    (b) 


reasonable.    Imperial  Wheel  Co.  v.  St.  L. 
I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co,  20  I.  C.  C.  56,  59. 

(c)  Billing  at  marked  capacity  in 
switching  service  is  not  condemned. 
Prahlow  v.  I.  H.  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
572,  574. 

(d)  A  railroad  company  may  enter 
into  an  agreement  as  to  the  term;3  and 
conditions  upon  which  a  spur  track  for  a 
private  customer  shall  be  installed,  and 
such  terms  and  conditions  are  not  invalid 
under  the  interstate  commerce  statutes, 
unless  they  do  in  fact  involve  or  contem- 
plate some  discrimination  against  other 
persons  seeking  or  enjoying  like  priv- 
ileges. Cedar  Rapids,  etc.,  Light  Co.  v. 
C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  145  la.  528,  538,  124 
N.  W.  323. 

§9.     Reparation. 

See  Claims,  §8  (f),  (g);  Courts,  §11 
(cc) ;  Reparation,  §19  (c) ;  Routing 
and   IMisrouting,  §4  (q). 

§10.     Tariffs  and  Publication. 

See  Tariffs,  §4  (1),   (w),  §11    (c). 

TANK  CARS. 

See  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §10,  §17. 

TAP  LINES. 

L     CONTROL    AND    REGULATION. 
§1.     Definition  of  tap  line. 
§2.     Jurisdiction    of    Commission. 
§3.     Test   of   status. 

(1)  In    general. 

(2)  Effect    of    incorpora- 
tion. 

§4.    When  plant  facility. 

§5.     Scope    of    tap-line    investiga- 
tion. 
II.     POWERS   AND  DUTIES. 

§6.     As   common    carriers. 

§7.     Legality  of  divisions  or  prac- 
ticss. 

§8.     Passes    to   officers. 

§9.     Right  to  allowances. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 
See     Allowances;     Common      Carrier; 
Divisions. 

I.     CONTROL  AND    REGULATION. 

§1.     Definition   of  Tap   Line. 

(a)  Originally  it  was  usual  to  refer 
to  all  the  rails  used  in  a  lumber  mill 
operation  as  a  "logging  road,"  but  since 
the  practice  of  making  allowances  to  the 
lumber  companies  west  of  the  Missis- 
sippi    Riv€r     has     crept     in,     the     rails 


leading  from  the  mill  to  or  through 
the  timber,  and  usually  to  a  logging 
camp  or  company  town,  have  come  to 
be  known  as  the  main  line  or  "tap 
line."  The  spurs  radiating  into  the  for- 
est from  the  point  or  from  other  points 
along  the  main  line  are  now  usually  re- 
ferred to  as  the  "logging  road."  The 
Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.   C.  277,  285. 

§2.     Jurisdiction    of    Commission. 

(a)  The  maximum  division  allowed 
to  tap  line  is  prescribed  by  Commission. 
Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  549,  561. 

(b)  Carriers  are  expected  to  submit 
for  approval  of  the  Commission  the 
basis  of  allowances  to  lumber  companies 
under  section  15,  where  such  allowances 
must  be  published.  Tap-line  Case,  23 
I.   C.   C.   549,   G50. 

(c)  Where  joint  through  class  and 
commodity  rates  are  in  effect  or  are 
hereafter  made  effective  to  or  from 
points  on  tap  lines,  trunk  lines  and  tap 
lines  will  be  expected  to  submit  to  the 
Commission  for  approval  the  basis  of 
their  divisions.  Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C. 
C.  549,  651. 

(d)  Carriers  are  expected  to  submit 
to  the  Commision  for  approval  reason- 
able and  nondiscriminatory  rates  on 
forest  products,  when  shipped  from  tap- 
line  points  other  than  the  mills  of  the 
controlling  companies,  and  also  to  sub- 
mit the  basis  of  the  division  thereof. 
Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  549,  651. 

§3.     Test   of   Status. 

§3     (1)      In  General. 

See  Allowances,  §10,  §11;  Transporta- 
tion,   I. 

(a)  Whether  a  tap  line  is  a  common 
carrier  .cannot  be  determined  by  mere 
ownership.  Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C. 
277,   292. 

(aa)  The  fact  that  the  larger  part  of 
the  traffic  handled  is  from  a  single  mine 
does  not  determine  the  carrier's  char- 
acter to  be  that  of  a  plant  facility  rather 
than  a  common  carrier.  Stonega  Coke  & 
Coal  Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
17,  23. 

(b)  What  is  a  plant  facility  cannot 
also  be  a  common  carrier  for  the  plant 
and  what  is  an  industrial  service  can- 
not also  be  a  service  of  transportation. 
The  Tap-line  Case,  23   I.  C.  C.  277,  298. 


TAP  LINES,   §3    (2)— §4   (d) 


797 


§3.     (2)      Effect  of   Incorporation. 

See    Common    Carrier,    §1     (a),     (aa); 
Facilities    and    Privileges,    §1    (n). 

(a)  The  Act  specifically  applies  "to 
any  corporation  or  any  person  or  per- 
sons" engaged  in  the  transportation  of 
passengers  or  property  by  rail  from 
a  point  in  one  state  to  a  point  in  an- 
other state.  So  far  as  interstate  trans- 
portation is  concerned  incorporation  is 
not  a  condition  preced-ent  to  the  right 
to  be  a  common  carrier  by  rail.  The 
Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  277,  291. 

(b)  The  fact  that  the  rails,  locomo- 
tives and  cars  of  an  industry  have  been 
turned  over  to  an  incorporated  railroad 
company,  owned  and  operated  by  the 
industry  or  in  its  interest,  does  not 
divest  those  appliances  of  their  charac- 
ter as  a  plant  facility  if  such  in  fact  is 
the  case.  If  the  rails  were  laid  and 
the  equipment  acquired  for  the  use  of 
the  industry  as  a  facility  in  the  pro- 
cess of  manufacture  and  production, 
and  are  so  used,  the  fact  that  some 
outside  traffic  may  be  carried  over  the 
same  rails  does  not  modify  the  character 
of  what  is  done  over  them  for  the  in- 
dustry. If  in  such"  a  case  the  tracks 
and  equipment  are  a  facility  of  the 
plant  and  are  so  used  in  tue  process 
of  manufacture,  what  is  thus  done  for 
the  controlling  industry  cannot  be  re- 
garded as  a  service  of  transportation. 
A  division  allowed  by  a  public  carrier 
out  of  the  rate  under  such  circum- 
stances is  a  rebate  to  the  industry. 
The  test  is:  What  is  the  real  rela- 
tion to  the  industry  By  the  tap  line? 
The  Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  277,  292. 

(c)  The  mere  interposition  between 
the  lumber  mill  and  the  carrier  of  a 
paper  railroad  incorporation  that  calls 
itself  a  common  carrier  and  complies 
with  the  Act  in  those  respects,  but  is 
owned  by  the  mill  or  its  proprietors, 
does  not  give  legality  to  the  so-called 
tap-line  allowances  or  meet  the  re- 
quirements of  the  Commission.  Star 
Grain  &  Lumber  Co.  y.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  338. 

§4.     When    Plant    Facility. 

See    Infra,    §6;    Advanced    Rates,    §22 
(b);   Common   Carrier. 

(a)  With  few  exceptions,  the  tap 
lines  in  the  lumbering  regions  in  the 
southwest  are  purely  plant  facilities. 
Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  277,  297. 


(b)  The  common  ownership  of  an  in- 
dustry and  a  short  line  serving  it  is  not 
in  itself  sufficient  to  divest  the  railroad 
of  its  status  as  a  common  carrier.  On 
the  other  hand  the  fact  that  the  rails, 
locomotives  and  cars  of  an  industry 
have  been  turned  over  to  an  incorpo- 
rated railroad  company  owned  and  op- 
erated by  the  industry  or  in  its  in- 
terest does  not  divest  those  appliances 
of  their  character  as  a  plant  facility, 
if  such  in  fact  is  the  case.  A  line 
must  be  drawn  at  some  point  between 
what  is  transportation  and  a  plant  fa- 
cility or  tool  of  the  industry.  Each 
case,  however,  must  stand  on  its  own 
facts.  On  the  facts  shown  of  record 
the  service  performed  for  the  proprie- 
tary lumber  companies  by  the  following 
tap  lines  is  not  a  service  of  transporta- 
tion by  a  common  carrier:  Malvern 
&  Freeo  Valley  Ry.,  Wilmar  &  Saline 
Valley  R.  R.,  Arkansas  &  Gulf  R.  R., 
Little  Rock,  Maumelle  &  Western  R.  R. 
Beirne  &  Clear  Lake  R.  R.,  Mississippi, 
Arkansas  &  Western  R.  R.,  Bearden  & 
Ouachita  River  R.  R.,  Arkansas  Eastern 
R.  R.,  Blytheville,  Burdette  &  Missis- 
sippi River  Ry.,  Brookings  &  Peach 
Orchard  R.  R.,  Crossett  Ry.,  Fordyce  & 
Princeton  R.  R.,  Homan  &  Southeastern 
Ry.,  Little  Rock,  Sheridan  &  Saline 
River  Ry.,  L'Anguille  River  Ry.,  Oua- 
chita Valley  Ry.,  Southern  Pine  System, 
Black  Bayou  R.  R.,  Bodcaw  Valley  Ry., 
Mill  Creek  &  Little  River  Ry.,  Red 
River  &  Rocky  Mount  Ry.,  Woodworth 
&  Louisiana  Central  Ry.,  Freeo  Valley 
R.  R.,  Natchez,  Urania  &  Ruston  Ry., 
Bernice  &  Northwestern  Ry.,  Dorcheat 
Valley  R.  R.,  Mangham  &  Northeastern 
Ry.,  Peach  River  Lines,  Jefferson  & 
Northwestern  Ry.,  Beaumont  &  Sara- 
toga, Angelina  &  Neches  River  R.  R. 
The  Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  277. 

(c)  Tap  lines  do  not  perform  a 
transportation  service.  Tap-line  Case, 
23  L   C.   C.  277,  289. 

(d)  In  the  cases  of  the  following 
tap  lines  it  is  held  that  they  are  mere 
plant  facilities  and  not  entitled  to  al- 
lowances either  as  divisions  or  switch- 
ing charges;  Missouri  &  Louisiana  R. 
R.,  Saginaw  &  Ouachita  River  R.  R., 
Warren,  Johnsville  &  Saline  River  R.  R., 
Blytheville,  Leachville  &  Arkansas 
Southern  R.  R.,  Gould  Southwestern 
Ry.,  Memphis,  Dallas  &  Gulf  R.  R.,  as 
to  the  switch  movement  from  Graysonia, 
Ark.,  only;   Louisiana  &  Pine  Bluff  Ry., 


798 


TAP  LINES,   §4    (e)— (g) 


Mansfield  Ry.,  Louisiana  &  Pacific  Ry., 
Roosevelt  &  Western  R.  R.,  Louisiana 
Central  R.  R.,  North  Louisiana  &  Gulf 
R.  R.,  as  to  all  yellow  pine  mills  only; 
Monroe  &  Southwestern  Ry.,  Victoria, 
Fisher  &  Western  R.  R.,  Ouachita  & 
Northwestern  R.  R.,  Lake  Charles  Ry., 
Louisiana  Ry.,  Zwolle  &  Eastern  Ry., 
Sabine  &  Northern  R.  R.,  Nacogdoches 
&  Southeastern  R.  R.,  as  to  allowances 
from  the  T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  only;  Gideon 
&  North  Island  R.  R.,  Poplar  Bluff  & 
Dan  River  Ry.,  Kentwood  &  Eastern 
Ry.,  Kentwood,  Greensburg  &  South- 
western R.  R.,  Liberty-White  R.  R., 
Natchez,  Columbia  &  Mobile  R.  R.  The 
Tap-line   Case,  23   I.   C.   C.   549-560. 

(e)  Complainant,  a  large  lumber  cor- 
poration, operated  a  lumber  road  con- 
necting its  timber  tract  with  the  C. 
of  Ga.  Ry.  under  a  contract  whereby 
it  received  a  division  of  2c  per  100 
lbs.  upon  all  traffic  delivered  to  the 
trunk  line.  It  also  carried  freight  for 
small  competitors  located  on  the  tap 
line.  Eventually  an  advance  was  made 
in  the  lumber  rate  of  2c  per  100  lbs. 
by  the  trunk  line  and  the  division  to 
the  tap  line  was  increased  to  5c  per 
100  lbs.  The  reasonable  cost  of  haul- 
ing the  lumber  of  the  tap  line  was  2c 
per  100  lbs.  The  advance  in  rate  by 
the  trunk  line  was  unreasonable.  HELD, 
that  the  tap  line  so  far  as  it  was  oper- 
ated in  the  interests  of  the  complainant 
was  a  plant  facility  and  not  a  common 
carrier.  That  on  account  of  the  in- 
crease in  the  division  of  rates  with  the 
tap  line  it  was  apparent  complainant 
did  not  pay  the  increased  rate.  Repa- 
ration denied.  Kaul  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  of 
Ga.  Ry.,  20  I.  C.  C.  450. 

(f)  At  Blissville,  Ark.,  a  lumber  com- 
pany constructed  a  tap  line  connecting 
with  defendant  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R. 
and  having  8  miles  of  main  line  and  20 
miles  of  spurs.  The  stock  in  the  tap 
line  road  was  owned  entirely  by  the 
lumber  company.  It  was  used  exclus- 
ively by  the  lumber  company  to  move 
logs  from  the  timber  tapped  to  its  mill 
at  Blissville.  From  only  one  point 
on  the  tap  line,  Shults,  2i/^  miles  from 
Blissville,  was  any  rate  published.  From 
Shults  to  Blissville  a  rate  of  Ic  per 
100  lbs.  was  established.  At  neither 
Shults  nor  Blissville  did  the  tap  line 
maintain  freight  or  passenger  stations 
or  agents.  Complainant  at  Chicago  pur- 
chased   lumber    from    the    lumber    com- 


pany which  was  loaded  upon  the  cars 
of  defendant  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R. 
at  Blissville  and  which  had  been  con- 
structed from  logs  brought  to  Blissville 
over  the  tap  line.  The  lumber  was 
billed  from  Shults  and  a  charge  of  Ic 
was  made  in  addition  to  the  published 
rate  from  Blissville.  HELD,  the  tap 
line  was  not  a  common  carrier  but  a 
mere  plant  facility  of  the  lumber  com- 
pany and  the  exaction  by  the  defend- 
ants, the  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.,  and 
the  tap  line,  was  unlawful  to  the  ex- 
tent that  it  exceeded  the  amount  of  the 
rate  from  Blissville.  Reparation  award- 
ed. Fat^auer  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S. 
R.   R.,   18  L    C.    C.   517,   5^. 

(g)  Tap  lines  connecting  lumber 
mills  with  the  Cotton  Belt  Lines  were 
being  allowed  from  2c  to  6c  for  hauls 
varying  from  practically  nothing  to 
150  miles,  leaving  the  net  earnings  of 
the  Cotton  Belt  lines  as  low  as  4c  to 
8c  for  their  haul  to  Fort  Worth.  It  ap- 
peared that  these  tap  lines  were  formerly 
owned  by  the  mill  owners,  but  were  sub- 
sequently incorporated  and  given  the 
form  of  common  carriers;  that  for  the 
most  part  they  reached  only  the  forests 
owned  by  their  stockholders;  that  while 
they  held  themselves  out  to  serve  the 
public  as  common  carriers,  there  was  in 
fact  no  public  reached  by  them  except  a 
negligible  amount  of  incidental  traffic; 
that  they  did  not  publish  and  file  tar- 
iffs as  required  by  law,  join  in  through 
rates  with  the  railroads,  file  schedules 
of  divisions  of  rates,  or  keep  accounts 
in  accordance  with  the  system  of  ac- 
counts prescribed  by  the  Commission 
for  carriers  participating  in  interstate 
commerce.  These  conditions  were  true 
with  respect  to  tap  lines  generally  over 
the  country.  HELD,  that  any  allow- 
ance or  division  made  to  or  with  a  tap 
line  that  is  owned  or  controlled,  directly 
or  indirectly,  by  the  lumber  mill  or  by 
its  officers  or  proprietors  and  that  has 
no  traffic  beyond  the  logs  that  it  hauls 
to  the  mill,  except  such  as  it  may 
pick  up  as  a  mere  incident  to  its  efforts 
to  serve  the  mill  as  an  adjunct  or 
plant  facility,  is  an  unlawful  departure 
from  the  published  rates.  Readjustment 
of  rates  suggested,  calculated  to  elim- 
inate unlawful  practices  and  give  ship- 
pers reasonable  rates.  (Separate  opinion 
by  Prouty,  Comm'r.)  Star  Grain  & 
Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  338,  345. 


TAP  LINES,  §4   (h)— §7  (a) 


799 


(h)  Formerly  defendant  delivered 
loaded  cars  to  complainant's  exchange 
tracks  at  Catasauqua,  Pa.  Complainant 
constructed  tracks  leading  from  said  ex- 
change tracks  into  its  yards  and  sup- 
plied locomotives  to  draw  the  loaded 
cars  into  its  yards  and  to  return  loaded 
cars  of  its  products  from  its  yards 
to  the  exchange  tracks.  Later  other 
industri-es  grew  up  beyond  complainant's 
plant  and  complainant  extended  its 
tracks  to  such  industries  and  charged 
them  a  stipulated  price  per  car  for 
moving  cars  to  and  from  defendant's 
terminal,  "^hese  others  industries  were 
allowed  compensation  for  this  service 
which  they  secured  from  complainant. 
Subsequently  complainant  incorp  rated 
its  private  railroad  and  demanded  that 
defendant  make  it  an  allowance  for 
hauling  cars  back  and  forth  between 
complainant's  yards  and  its  team  trad  s. 
HELD,  the  service  was  not  one  which 
the  defendants  owed  complainant  a  duty 
to  perform;  that  defendants  might  prop- 
erly allow  to  other  industries  compensa- 
tion for  the  hauling  of  cars  to  their 
plants,  since  such  service  was  merely 
the  equivalent  of  the  service  rendered 
by  defendants  in  placing  cars  on  com- 
plainant's exchange  tracks,  and  that 
complainant  was  not  entitled  to  compen- 
sation for  the  services  rendered  by  its 
railroad,  the  service  being  in  the  nature 
of  a  plant  facility.  Crane  Iron  Works 
V.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  17  I.  C 
C.    514,    518-520. 

§5.     Scope  of  Tap  Line  Investigation. 

(a)  Matters  of  this  nature  (the  tap 
line  Fituation)  cannot  be  dealt  with 
in  a  wholesale  manner,  but  must  be  con- 
sidered separately  and  in  the  light 
of  the  surrounding  circumstances.  The 
findings  in  this  investigation  relate 
specifically  to  conditions  found  to  ex- 
ist in   this   territory.     Tap-line   Case,  23 

I.  C.  C.  549,  550. 

II.  POWERS    AND   DUTIES. 
§6.     As    Common    Carriers. 

See  Supra,  §4;  Common  Carrier, 
(a)  If  tnere  is  a  holding  out  as  a 
common  carrier  for  hire,  and  if  there  is 
an  ostensible  and  actual  movement 
of  traffic  for  the  public  for  hire,  the 
status  of  a  common  carrier  exists, 
whether  the  holding  out  is  by  a  com- 
pany or  by  an  individual.  But  such 
a  holding  out  and   the   existence   of   an 


actual  traffic  is  not  conclusive  in  all 
cases.  Where  the  holding  out  is  in 
furtherance  of  a  plan  to  secure  un- 
lawful advantages  and  the  alleged  car- 
rier is  able  to  pick  up  some  traflfic  that 
is  incidental  to  that  purpose,  it  must 
be  regarded  simply  as  a  cloak  or  device 
to  effect  unlawful  results.  Tne  Tap-line 
Case,   23   I.   C.   C.  277,   292. 

(b)  A  tap  line  recognized  as  a  com- 
mon carrier  by  the  Commission  must 
itself  recognize  its  obligations  as  such 
by  conforming  its  accounting  method  to 
the  requirements  of  the  Commission,  by 
filing  annual  reports  and  lawful  tar- 
iffs, by  obeying  the  hours  of  service 
law  and  the  safety-appliance  acts  so 
far  as  they  are  applicable,  and  other- 
wise fulfilling  the  obligations  and  duties 
imposed  by  the  Act  on  carriers  engaged 
in  interstate  commerce.  Any  omission 
of  its  duty  in  this  regard  will  be  re- 
garded as  tending  to  show  that  the 
claim  of  the  tap  line  to  be  a  common 
carrier  is  a  mere  device  to  justify  al- 
lowances or  divisions.  The  Tap-line 
Case,   23   L   C.    C.   277,   295. 

(c)  A  tap  line  carrier  cannot  trans- 
port for  a  proprietary  lumber  company 
free  of  charge.  Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C. 
C.   277,  297. 

vd)  No  tap  line  that  is,  in  fact,  a 
common  carrier  engaged  in  interstate 
commerce  may  haul  the  logs  to  the  mill 
of  the  proprietary  company  free  of 
charge.  A  free  service  is  inherently  un- 
lawful. Nor  may  a  trunk  line  set  up 
a  milling-in-transit  privilege  with  a 
common  carrier  tap  line  by  which  the 
lumber  rate  is  extended  back  through 
the  mill  point  to  the  tree  in  the  for- 
est, unless  it  pursues  the  same  course 
with  respect  to  forests  on  its  own 
line  as  such  practice  would  otherwise 
grant  an  unlawful  preference.  The  Tap- 
line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  277,  297,  298. 

§7.     Legality  of  Divisions  or  Practices. 

See  Allowances,  §9  (a),  (b),  §12  (2), 
(a),  (c),  (d);  Crimes,  §7  (g);  Divi- 
sions, IV. 

(a)  It  would  be  an  unlawful  pref- 
erence for  a  trunk  line  to  set  up  a 
milling-in-transit  privilege  with  a  com- 
mon carrier  tap  line  by  which  the 
lumber  rate  is  extended  back  through 
the  mill  point  to  the  trees  in  the  for- 
est while  not  pursuing  the  same  course 
with  respect  to  forests  on  its  qwn 
line.     Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  277,  298. 


800 


TAP  LINES,  §7  (b)— §9  (b) 


(b)  Whether  a  tap  line  is  a  common 
carrier  is  a  question  of  fact,  but  if 
it  is  a  common  carrier  it  cannot  haul 
for  the  proprietary  company  free  of 
charge.  Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  292, 
297. 

(c)  While  it  is  not  uncommon  for 
one  railroad  to  give  the  use  of  its 
rails  to  another  railroad  under  a  track- 
age agreement,  a  shipper  may  not  law- 
fully enjoy  such  privilege  over  rails  of 
a  common  carrier,  particularly  when  the 
compensation  for  such  privilege  is  not 
published  and  the  privilege  is  not  open 
equally  to  all  other  shippers.  Tap-line 
Case.  23  I.  C.  C.  549,  550. 

(d)  A  shipper  may  not  have  a  pref- 
erence over  other  shippers  in  the  use 
of  a  line  that  claims  to  be  a  common 
carrier.     Tap-line   Case,   23  I.  C.   C.   549, 

577. 

(e)  A  trunk  line  may  not  give  track- 
age rights  to  a  lumber  company  for  a 
small  toll.  Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C. 
549,    550. 

(ee)  Wherever  an  abnormal  division 
is  allowed  to  a  railroad  which  is  tied 
up  with  an  industry  there  results  an 
indirect  and  hidden  rebate  to  the  shipper 
because  of  his  ownership  of  the  railroad. 
In  Re  Divisions  of  Joint  Rates  on  Coal, 
22  I.  C.  C.  51,  55. 

(f)  The  discrimination  caused  by  tap- 
line  allowances  will  not  be  removed  by 
ordering  a  reduction  of  the  rate.  In- 
dustrial Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  L.  W.  &  G. 
Ry.   Co.,    19   I.    C.   C.   50,   53. 

(g)  Any  allowance  to  or  division  with 
a  tap  line  which  is  an  adjunct  or  plant 
facility  is  a  preference  and  discrimina- 
tion and  an  unlawful  departure  from 
the  published  rate.  Star  Grain  &  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I. 
C.  C.  338,  344. 

(h)  The  C.  &  S.  E.  Ry.  was  owned 
by  a  coal  compai  y  competing  with  com- 
plainants. Joint  rates  were  in  effect 
between  the  C.  &  S.  E.  Ry.  and  the 
Santa  Fe.  lines  from  points  upon  the 
C.  &  S.  E.  Ry.  to  points  unon  the 
Santa  Fe  lines  east  and  south  to  Trini- 
dad, which  took  the  same  rates  as  to 
Trinidad.  Complainant's  competitor  had 
a  tr  ckage  contract  with  the  C.  &  S.  E. 
Ry.  under  which  its  coal  moved  from 
Ludlow  to  Trinidad,  Complainant  was 
located  at  Ludlow.  No  joint  rates 
were  in   effect  between   the   C.   &   S.  E. 


Ry.  and  the  Santa  Fe  lines  and  the  local 
rate  from  Ludlow  to  Trinidad  for  ship- 
ment beyond  was  such  as  to  give  the 
competing  company  an  advantage  of 
40c  per  ton  over  complainants  upon 
shipments  to  points  on  the  Santa  Fe 
lines  although  the  competing  coal  moved 
by  the  mines  of  complainants.  HliiLD, 
the  rates  were  unduly  discriminatory. 
Defendants  ordered  to  desist  from  ac- 
cording to  coal  originating  upon  the 
C.  &  S.  E.  Ry.,  for  points  upon  the 
Santa  Fe  lines,  lower  rates  than  were 
given  to  complainants  at  Ludlow  and 
that  defendants  should  state  the  divi- 
sion of  the  joint  rate  allowed  to  the 
C.  &  S.  E.  Ry.  in  order  that  the  com- 
peting coal  company  should  not  gain  an 
advantage  in  that  respect.  Cedar  Hill 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,    16    I.    C.    C.    402,    403,   404. 

§8.     Passes  to   Officers. 
See  Crimes,  III. 

(a)  The  affairs  of  the  proprietary 
lumber  company  may  be  so  inter- 
woven with  the  affairs  of  the  tap  line 
as  to  make  it  impossible  to  admit  the 
right  under  the  law  of  an  officer  of  the 
tap  line  to  use  free  transportation. 
Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  277,  298. 

§9.     Right    to    Allowances. 
See  Divisions,  §6. 

(a)  Trunk  lines  are  permitted  to 
cancel  allowances  to  tap  lines  found 
by  the  Commission  not  to  be  common 
carriers.  Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  277, 
295. 

(b)  Under  their  tariffs  the  public 
carriers  interpret  the  lumber  rate  as 
applying  from  mills  west  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi River  as  far  as  three  miles  from 
their  own  lines.  If  a  lumber  company 
having  a  mill  within  that  distance  of 
a  trunk  line  undertakes  by  arrangement 
with  the  trunk  line  to  use  its  own 
power  to  set  the  empty  car  at  the 
mill  and  to  deliver  it  when  loaded 
to  the  trunk  line,  it  is  doing  for  itself 
what  the  trunk  line  under  its  tariffs 
offers  to  do  under  the  rate.  In  such 
a  case  the  lumber  company  may  there- 
fore fairly  be  said  to  furnish  a  facility 
of  transportation  for  which  it  may  rea- 
sonably be  compensated  under  section 
15,  whether  its  tap  line  is  incorporated 
or  unincorporated.  But  an  allowance 
under  such  circumstances  is  lawful 
only    when    the    trunk    line    prefers    for 


TAP  LINES,  §9  (O— (h) 


801 


reasons  of  its  own  and  without  discrim- 
ination to  have  the  lumber  company  per- 
form the  service.  It  is  not  lawful 
when  the  lumber  company  refuses  to 
permit  the  trunk  line  to  do  the  work. 
No  allowance,  however,  ought  to  be 
made  by  a  trunk  line  to  a  lumber  com- 
pany where  the  mill  is  within  a  thou- 
sand feet  of  the  trunk  line.  An  allow- 
ance under  such  circumstances  would 
be  a  mere  device  to  effect  an  unlaw- 
ful payment  to  the  lumber  company. 
The  same  rule  would  apply  where  a 
short  switch  track  to  the  mill  has  been 
torn  out  or  is  still  available,  but  not 
used,  in  order  to  give  the  appearance  of 
a  longer  haul  to  the  mill  over  a  spur 
or  switch  track  constructed  by  the 
lumber  company  or  by  its  tap  line,  for 
the  purpose  of  securing  an  allowance. 
Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C  C.  277,  294. 

(c)  Where  a  mill  is  distant  more 
than  three  miles  from  a  trunk  line  and 
is  connected  with  the  latter  by  a  tap 
line  not  recognized  by  the  Commission 
as  a  common  carrier,  no  allowance  or 
division  may  lawfully  be  made  by  a 
trunk  line  either  to  the  lumber  com- 
pany or  to  its  tap  line.  Such  a  lum- 
ber company,  although  using  rails, 
stands  in  no  better  position  under  the 
law  with  respect  to  its  lumber  than 
does  a  lumber  company  that  uses  other 
means  of  delivering  its  lumber  to  a 
public  carrier.  Where  a  mill  is  more 
than  three  miles  distant  from  a  trunk 
line  and  is  connected  with  it  by  a  tap 
line  organized  as  a  common  carrier 
and  so  recognized  by  the  Commission, 
the  mill  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  ship- 
ping point  equally  with  all  other  mill 
points  in  its  rate  group;  and  the  lum- 
ber rate  is  to  be  regarded  as  in  effect 
from  the  mill,  the  tap  line  being  en- 
titled to  a  division  thereof  according  to 
the  extent  of  its  participation  in  the 
through  service  under  the  through  rate. 
The   Tap-line  Case,   23  I.  C.  C.  277,  295. 

(d)  No  allowance  may  be  made 
where  the  mill  of  the  controlling  com- 
pany is  within  a  few  hundred  feet 
of  the  trunk  line.  Tap-line  Case,  23 
I.    C.    C.    549,    569. 

(e)  The  lumber  rate  west  of  the 
Mississippi  River  applies  from  the  mill. 
In  those  cases  where  the  mill  is  situ- 
ated a  reasonable  distance  of  not  less 
than  1,000  feet  from  the  trunk  line  that 
carrier  may  arrange  with  the  lumber 
company   to   perform   the   service   for   it 


of  transporting  the  loaded  cars  from 
the  mill  to  the  trunk  line  and  may 
make  a  reasonable  allowance  to  the 
lumber  company  for  such  service  under 
section  15.  The  Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C. 
C.  549,  552,  553,  559,  568,  596,  599,  603, 
605,  607,  608,  611. 

(f)  The  lumber  rate  west  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi River  applies  from  the  mill.  In 
those  cases  where  the  mill  is  situated 
less  than  1,000  feet  from  the  trunk  line 
that  carrier  may  not  lawfully  make  any 
allowance  to  the  lumber  company  for 
hauling  the  loaded  cars  from  the  mill 
to  the  trunk  line.  The  Tap-line  Case,  23 
I.  C.  C.  549,  552,  569,  576,  594,  597, 
599,  601,  606,  608,  611,  618,  632,  641, 
645,    646. 

(g)  The  lumber  rate  west  of  the 
Mississippi  River  applies  from  the  mill. 
In  those  cases  where  a  short  switch 
track  to  the  mill  from  a  trunk  line 
has  been  torn  out  or  is  still  available 
but  not  used,  in  order  to  give  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  longer  haul  to  the  mill 
over  a  spur  or  switch  track  constructed 
by  the  lumber  company  or  by  its  tap 
line  to  secure  an  allowance,  any  com- 
pensation allowed  for  such  service  by 
the  trunk  line  to  the  lumber  company  or 
its  tap  line  is  unlawful.  The  Tap-line 
Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  549,  586,  589,  632, 
646. 

(h)  In  the  cases  of  the  following  tap 
lines  it  is  held  that  they  may  receive  as 
maximum  allowances  the  divisions  men- 
tioned and  the  switching  charges  pre- 
scribed. Saline  River  Ry.,  2c  per  100 
lbs.;  Warren  &  Ouachita  Valley  Ry.,  a 
switching  rate  of  $2.50  per  car  from  the 
Iron  Mountain  R.  R.,  and  2c  per  100  lbs. 
from  the  Rock  Island  R.  R.;  El  Dorado 
&  Wesson  Ry.,  2c  per  100  lbs.;  Thornton 
&  Alexandria  Ry.,  Ic  per  100  lbs.;  Doni- 
phan, Kensett  &  Searcy  Ry.,  a  switching 
charge  of  $2.50  per  car  from  the  Iron 
Mountain,  and  Ic  per  100  lbs,  from  the 
Rock  Island  R.  R.;  Fourche  River  Valley 
&  Indian  Territory  Ry.,  a  switching 
charge  of  $1.50  per  car;  Prescott  & 
Northwestern  R.  R.,  $1.50  per  car;  Caddo 
&  Choctaw  R.  R.,  $1.50  per  car;  Mem- 
phis, Dallas  &  Gulf  R.  R.,  over  the  Nash- 
ville Division  only,  the  Iron  Mountain 
may  allow  it  a  switching  charge  of  $2 
per  car,  the  connecting  carriers  at  Ash- 
down  may  allow  it  2c  per  100  lbs.;  Crit- 
tenden R.  R.,  2c  per  100  lbs.  from  the 
Rock  Island  R.  R.  and  $3  per  car  switch- 
ing from   the  Iron   Mountain  R.  R.;    De 


802 


TAP  LINES,  §9    (i)— TARIFFS,  §1   (a) 


Queen  &  Eastern  R.  R.,  $1.50  per  car; 
Central  Ry.  of  Arkansas,  li^c  per  100 
lbs.;  Gulf  &  Sabine  River  R.  R.,  Ic  per 
100  lbs.;  Sibley,  Lake  Bisteneau  &  South- 
ern Ry.,  Ic  per  100  lbs.;  North  Louisiana 
&  Gulf  R.  R.,  2c  per  100  lbs.  on  the  prod- 
ucts of  the  hardwood  mill  only,  except 
when  again  milled  or  planed  at  Hodge, 
La.;  Arkansas,  Southeastern  R.  R.,  2c 
per  100  lbs.  from  the  Iron  Mountain  R.  R 
only;  Red  River  &  Gulf  R.  R.',  $2  per  car 
for  switching  from  the  Iron  Mountain 
line  and  2c  per  100  lbs.  from  the  Rock 
Island  and  other  trunk  lines  on  the  prod- 
uct of  the  mill  at  Long  Leaf,  La. ;  Tre- 
mont  &  Gulf  Ry.,  from  the  Iron  Mountain 
R.  R.  and  the  products  of  the  Rochelle 
mill,  a  switching  charge  of  $1.50  per  car, 
and  on  the  product  of  various  mills,  di- 
visions of  l^/^c  to  2c  per  100  lbs.;  Nacog- 
doches &  Southeastern  R.  R.,  $1.50  per 
car  for  switching  only  from  the  Houston 
East  &  West  Texas  R.  R.;  Texas  South- 
eastern R.  R.,  $2  per  car  for  switching, 
from  the  Houston  East  &  West  Texas 
R.  R.,  and  2c  per  100  lbs.  from  other 
trunk  lines;  Timpson  &  Henderson  Ry., 
2c  per  100  lbs.;  Shreveport,  Houston  & 
Gulf  R.  R.,  iy2C  per  100  lbs.;  Groveton, 
Lufkin  &  Northern  Ry.,  from  the  M.  K. 
&  T.  Ry.  only,  a  switching  charge  of  $2 
per  car,  and  from  other  trunk  lines  2c 
per  100  lbs.;  Moscow,  Camden  &  San 
Augustine  Ry.,  l^/^c  per  100  lbs.;  Trinity 
Valley  &  Northern  Ry.,  Ic  per  100  lbs.; 
Trinity  Valley  Southern  R.  R.,  Ic  per  100 
lbs.;  Caro  Northern  Ry.,  $2  per  car;  But- 
ler County  R.  R.,  $1.50  per  car;  Deering 
Southwestern  Ry.,  li/^c  per  100  lbs.;  Mis- 
sissippi Valley  Ry.,  l^^c  per  100  lbs.; 
Paragould  &  Memphis  Ry.,  switching 
charges  of  from  $2  to  $3  per  car;  Salem, 
Winona  &  Southern  R.  R.,  li^c  per  100 
lbs.;  Fernwood  &  Gulf  R.  R.,  a  switching 
charge  of  $2.50  a  car  from  the  Illinois 
Central  R.  R.  only,  and  2c  per  100  lbs. 
from  the  New  Orleans  Great  Northern 
R.  R.;  New  Orleans,  Natalbany  & 
Natchez  Ry.,  $1.50  per  car  for  switching 
from  two  mills  only;  Alabama  Central 
R.  R.,  li/^c  per  100  lbs.;  Washington  & 
Choctaw  Ry.,  $1.50  per  car.  The  Tap-line 
Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  549-650. 

(i)  It  is  unlawful  for  a  tap-line  to  re- 
ceive divisions  in  excess  of  a  reasonable 
switching  charge.  Tap-line  Case,  23  I. 
C.  C.  549,  582. 

(j)  Where  a  tap-line  is  merely  a  plant 
facility  hauling  logs  to  the  mill,  and  the 
mill   itself  is   situated   on   a  trunk  line. 


any  allowance  or  division  of  rates  made 
by  the  trunk  line  to  the  lumber  company 
or  the  tap-line  is  an  unlawful  rebate. 
The  Tap-line  Case,  23  L  C.  C.  549,  552, 
555,  587,  597,  599,  602,  606,  613,  635,  641, 
642,  645,  646,  649. 

(k)  No  rate  reduction  will  be  ordered 
to  remove  the  discrimination  caused  by 
tap-line  allowances.  Industrial  Lumber 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  W.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 

50,  53. 

TARIFFS. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction    of    Commission. 

§2.     Power  of  Congress. 
II.     PUBLICATION. 

§3.    Effect  in  general. 

(1)  Adherence  to  published 

rate. 

(2)  E  r  r  o  n  e  ous  quotation 

by  carrier. 

(3)  Notice  to  shipper. 
§4.     Necessity   of   publication. 
§5.     Purpose  of  publication. 

III.  POSTING. 

§6.     In  general. 

IV.  CONSTRUCTION. 

§7.  In   general. 

§8.  Ambiguity. 

§9.  Cancellation. 

§10.  Concurrence. 

§11.  Conflict. 

§12.  Cross  reference. 

§13.  Index. 

§14.  Legality. 

§15.  Reasonableness. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 

See  Classification;  Demurrage,  MI; 
Divisions,  II;  Express  Companies, 
VI;  Land  Grant  Railroads;  Recon- 
signment,  IV;  Refrigeration,  IV; 
Reparation;  Through  Routes  and 
Joint  Rates,  V;  Water  Carriers, 
III;  Weights  and  Weighing,  VI. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

See  Common  Carrier,  §3  (b),  (c), 
(cc),   §4. 

(a)  The  Act  authorizes  the  Commis- 
sion in  its  discretion  and  for  good  cause 
shown  to  permit  changes  in  tariffs  or 
fares  on  less  than  statutory  notice.  The 
Commission  seeks  to  limit  the  exercise 
of  this  discretionary  power  to  cases 
where  actual  emergency  and  real  merit 
are  shown.  The  power  is  not  to  be  lightly 
regarded,  and  it  will  not  be  exercised  to 
aid  a  carrier  in  any  strategic  endeavor 
or  to  aid  shippers  in  any  ordinary  com- 


TARIFFS,  §1   (b)— §3   (f) 


803 


mercial  exigency.  Acme  Cement  Plaster 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
283,  285. 

(b)  A  tariff  cannot  be  used  until  the 
Commission's  rules  are  complied  with. 
Noble  V.  G.  T.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
70,  71. 

(c)  It  is  within  the  exclusive  power 
of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
and  the  Federal  courts  to  determine 
whether  the  tariffs  or  joint-tariffs  filed 
under  the  provisions  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act  are  reasonable  or  not. 
Brantley  Co.  v.  Ocean  S.  S.  Co.,  5  Ga. 
App.  844,  845,  G3  S.  E.  1129: 

(d)  The  Commission  must  deal  with 
any  rate  question  from  the  standpoint  of 
the  lawful  tariff  rates.  The  Act  prohibits 
the  dismissal  of  any  complaint  because 
it  is  not  shown  that  the  complainant  is 
damaged.  Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  567,  571. 

§2.     Power  of  Congress. 

(a)  Congress  has  the  constitutional 
power  to  adopt  the  policy  of  requiring 
the  sale  of  transportation  by  carriers 
only  for  cash  at  the  published  rates  and 
to  prescribe  appropriate  means  to  give 
it  effect.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  v.  Mottley,  219 
U.  S.  467,  478,  31  Sup.  Ct.  265,  55  L.  ed. 
297. 

II.     PUBLICATION. 

See  Allowances,  II;  Demurrage,  III; 
Divisions,  II;  Export  Rates  and 
Facilities,  IV;  Facilities  and  Privi- 
leges,  III;  Terminal   Facilities,  §4. 

§3.     Effect  in  General. 

See  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  II 
(e). 

I  (a)  The  Act  imposes  upon  common 
i  carriers  subject  to  its  provisions  the  duty 
of  establishing  in  a  prescribed  mode  the 
rates,  whether  individual  or  joint,  to  be 
charged  for  the  transportation  in  inter- 
state commerce  of  property  over  their 
lines,  and  the  rates  so  established  are 
obligatory  upon  carrier  and  shipper  and 
must  be  strictly  observed  by  both  until 
changed  in  the  mode  prescribed.  U.  S. 
V.  Miller,  223  U.  S.  599,  602,  32  Sup.  Ct. 
323,  56  L.  ed.  568. 

(b)  Where  a  carrier  files  a  tariff  stat- 
ing that  the  rate  between  certain  points 
shall  be  governed  by  a  state  classifica- 
tion, no  rate  is  established  by  the  car- 
rier within  the  meaning  of  section  4  of 
the  Act,  since  the  rates  fixed  by  the  state 


railroad  commission  may  be  changed 
without  reference  to  the  methods  of 
changing  rates  prescribed  by  the  Act. 
U.  S.  V.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  170  Fed.  988, 
1000. 

(c)  Rates  filed  and  published  as  re- 
quired by  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce 
are  in  force  immediately  and  before  any 
transportation  takes  place  thereunder. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  166 
Fed.  267,  269. 

(d)  The  law  will  not  permit  deviation 
from  the  services,  facilities  and  priv- 
ileges offered  in  the  tariffs  any  more 
than  from  the  amount  of  the  rates,  fares, 
or  charges  therefor.  In  Re  Mileage,  Ex- 
cursion and  Commutation  Tickets,  23  I. 
C.  C.  95. 

(e)  A  carload  of  lumber  was  con- 
signed to  the  complainant  at  Arkansas 
City,  Kan.,  where  it  arrived  Aug.  27, 
1907.  On  Aug.  29,  the  freight  auditor 
of  the  defendant  telegraphed  the  con- 
signee at  Omaha  for  instructions  as  to 
the  disposition  of  the  shipment.  On  ac- 
count of  a  strike  of  the  telegraph  opera- 
tors, complainant  was  unable  to  tele- 
graph instructions  until  Sept.  4,  when 
it  ordered  the  car  diverted  to  Upland, 
Neb.  The  joint  rate  from  Dearborn,  the 
initial  point  of  shipment,  to  Upland  was 
34c  per  100  lbs.  Under  the  tariff  then 
in  force,  however,  more  than  48  hours 
having  expired  after  the  arrival  of  the 
car  at  Arkansas  City  before  orders  for 
further  movement  were  received,  the 
carriers  charged  the  combination  of  in- 
termediate rates,  amounting  to  64i4c  per 
100  lbs.  Reparation  for  the  difference 
between  the  amount  actually  collected 
and  the  amount  at  the  joint  rate  was 
demanded.  HELD,  carriers  cannot  law- 
fully depart  from  the  terms  of  their  tar- 
iffs to  meet  the  emergencies  that  arise 
in  the  affairs  of  their  patrons.  A  limita- 
tion of  the  reconsignment  privilege  under 
the  through  rate  to  the  first  48  hours 
after  the  arrival  of  a  car  at  destination 
is  not  unreasonable.  Dietz  Lumber  Co. 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  75,  76. 

(f)  On  carloads  of  bulk  acid  phos- 
phate shipped  from  Charleston,  S.  C.,  to 
Gainesville,  Fla.,  a  charge  of  $3.10  per 
ton,  the  commodity  rate  on  fertilizers, 
was  exacted.  A  commodity  rate  of  $2.25 
on  fertilizer  material  was  also  main- 
tained. The  classification  schedules  con- 
tained a  list  of  articles  entitled  to  be 
shipped  as  fertilizers,   but  contained  no 


804 


TARIFFS,  §3   (g)— (y) 


list  of  articles  that  might  be  shipped  as 
fertilizer  material.  Prior  to  the  ship- 
ment a  rate  of  $2.25  per  ton,  applicable 
on  fertilizer  "when  consigned  to  fertil- 
izer factories"  had  been  charged.  HELD, 
that  the  rate  of  $3.10  was  the  rate  legally 
applicable  to  complainant's  shipments, 
and  that  it  was  not  unreasonable.  Vir- 
ginia-Carolina Chemical  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R. 
R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  394. 

(g)  A  tariff  filed  by  the  authorized 
agent  of  a  carrier  has  the  same  legal 
status  as  though  separately  published 
and  filed  by  the  carrier.  Johnson  &  Co. 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  637, 
639. 

(h)  The  terms  of  tickets  and  the  pro- 
visions of  the  tariffs  and  of  the  law  de- 
termine the  obligations  of  the  parties. 
National  Ass'n  of  Letter  Carriers  v.  A. 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  6,  9. 

(i)  A  published  rate  must  be  paid  and 
collected  regardless  of  the  rate  quoted. 
Scott  V.  T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
167,  168. 

(j)  A  tariff  must  be  applied  regard- 
less of  the  use  to  which  a  commodity  is 
put.  Pacific  Coast  Biscuit  Co.  v.  O.  R.  R. 
&  N.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  178,  180. 

(k)  The  law  requires  the  publication, 
observance,  and  maintenance  of  definite 
transportation  charges.  In  Re  R'estricted 
Rates,  20  1.  C.  C.  426,  429. 

(1)  The  lawfully  established  rate  re- 
mains in  force  until  specifically  can- 
celed. Ohio  Foundry  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  65,  67. 

(m)  A  shipper  is  entitled  to  no  rate 
except  that  shown  in  the  carrier's  sched- 
ule for  the  transportation  of  the  com- 
modity as  tendered  for  shipment.  Ford 
Co.  V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  507,  511. 

(n)  A  carrier  is  prohibited  from  ac- 
cepting either  a  greater  or  less  or  dif- 
ferent compensation  than  that  stated  in 
the  tariff.  Ford  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
19  L  C.  C.   507,   511. 

(o)  The  naming  by  the  carrier  either 
in  the  bill  of  lading  or  otherwise  of  a 
rate  less  than  that  published  and  filed 
with  the  Commission  affords  no  proper 
basis  for  a  departure  from  the  legal  rate 
or  the  payment  of  damages  for  a  loss 
alleged  to  have  been  sustained  as  a  re- 
sult of  the  error.  Ala.  Lumber  &  Export 
Co.  V.  P.  B.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
295. 


(p)  No  power  is  vested  in  the  Com 
mission  to  enjoin  the  collection  of  lawfu: 
tariff  charges  for  services  rendered 
Peale,  Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co 
of  N.  J.,  18  I.  C.  C.  25,  33. 

(q)  There  can  be  no  waiver  on  the 
part  of  the  common  carrier  of  its  right  tc 
collect  its  tariff  rates.  Blinn  Lumber  Co 
V.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  430,  432. 

(r)  The  published  schedules  mus1 
govern,  though  the  carrier's  agent  maj 
have  made  statements  at  variance  there 
with.  Snyder-Malone-Donahue  v.  C.  B 
&  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  498,  499. 

(s)  Rates  charged  and  collected  musi 
be  in  accordance  with  the  tariff  legallj 
effective  whether  the  same  is  issued  ir 
compliance  with  any  private  agreemeni 
with  the  shipper  or  not.  Hood  &  Sons 
V.  D.  &  H.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  15,  19. 

(t)  There  can  be  but  one  lawful  rat€ 
between  two  i>oints  and  the  law  takes  nc 
cognizance  whatever  of  the  distinctioE 
made  by  express  companies  between  pre 
paid  and  collect  shipments.  Boise  Com 
mercial  Club  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  115,  121. 

(u)  The  collection  of  the  lawful  rate 
is  a  duty  imposed  on  the  carrier  by  law, 
and  it  is  given  a  lien  on  property  trans 
ported  to  enforce  the  payment  ol 
charges.  Boise  Commercial  Club  v. 
Adams  Express  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  115,  121, 

(v)  Only  by  faithful  application  of 
tariffs  can  discrimination  and  injustice 
be  prevented.  By  the  law  there  is  placed 
upon  the  accounting  officers  of  carriers 
special  individual  responsibility  in  this 
respect  which  they  cannot  ignore  with- 
out incurring  liabilities.  Old  Dominion 
Copper  &  Smelting  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  309,  312. 

(w)  The  purpose  of  section  6  of  the 
Act  was  to  prevent  discrimination  by 
making  it  possible  to  obtain  from  tariffs 
just  what  the  charges  are.  Voorhees  v. 
A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  42,  44. 

(x)  While  the  published  rate  is  the 
legal  rate,  the  mere  publication  cannot 
make  a  rate  lawful  that  is  unreasonable 
and  excessive.  Arkansas  Fuel  Co.  v.  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  95,  97. 

(y)  A  rate  once  in  effect  continues  to 
be  the  lawful  rate  until  it  has  been  con- 
celed.  New  Albany  Box  &  Basket  Co.  v. 
I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  315,  316. 


TARIFFS,  §3  (z)— (nn) 


805 


(z)  A  tariff  is  as  much  a  part  of  the 
law  as  though  it  were  read  into  the  law 
itself.  Interstate  Remedy  Co.  v.  Ameri- 
can Express  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  436,  437. 

(aa)  The  responsibility  rests  upon 
the  carrier  to  have  the  lawful  rates  and 
rules  in  effect,  and  every  shipper  may 
with  safety  rely  upon  such  rates  with- 
out fear  that  they  will  be  withdrawn  as 
illegal  after  he  has  made  shipment 
thereon,  and  he  may  rest  in  the  confi- 
dence that  they  are  lawful  so  long  as 
they  are  in  force.  Interstate  Remedy 
Co.  V.  American  Express  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
436,  439. 

(bb)  A  tariff  fixing  a  rate  having 
been  legally  established,  the  duty  of  the 
carrier  is  to  apply  the  rate  so  published 
and  in  effect.  Ames  Brooks  Co.  v.  Rut- 
land R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  479,  481. 

(cc)  The  statute  requires  carriers  to 
publish  their  tariffs  and  to  adhere  to 
those  tariffs.  In  no  other  way  can  dis- 
criminations which  have  existed  be  pre- 
vented. In  the  enforcement  of  that 
statute  the  Commission  has  no  discre- 
tion. Ames  Brooks  Co.  v.  Rutland  R.  R. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  479,  481. 

(dd)  As  against  the  carrier,  its  pub- 
lished tariff  rate  is  conclusive  of  the 
fact  that  any  higher  rate  is  unreason- 
able. Laning-Harris  Coal  &  Grain  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  37,  39. 

(ee)  Carriers  are  required  by  law  to 
charge  their  published  rate,  and  when 
they  do  so,  unless  the  rate  published  is 
unreasonable  and  thereby  unlawful,  they 
entail  no  liability  Palmer  &  Miller  v. 
L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  107. 

(ff)  Under  the  governmental  pre- 
scribed system  of  publishing  rates,  the 
carrier  is  not  free  to  contract  with  re- 
spect to  the  rate,  but  is  required  by  law 
to  perform  the  service  for  the  public  un- 
der the  tariff  charges,  which,  though  fur- 
nished by  it,  are  legally  enforceable,  not 
by  reason  of  any  contract,  but  by  virtue 
of  the  legal  prescription.  Woodward  & 
Dickerson  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co..  15  I.  C. 
C.  170,  173. 

(gg)  Carriers  and  shippers  must  take 
the  specific  rates  and  fares  provided  in 
tariffs,  regardless  of  any  long  and  short 
haul  clauses,  maxima  rules,  alternative 
rate  or  fare  provisions,  etc.,  contained  in 
tariffs.  Williamson  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  228,  229. 


(hh)  Carriers  are  required  by  law  to 
charge  their  published  rate  and  when 
they  do  so,  unless  the  rate  published  is 
unreasonable  and  thereby  unlawful,  they 
entail  no  liability.  Palmer  &  Miller  v. 
L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  107,  108. 

(ii)  A  carrier's  own  published  tariffs 
are  the  measure  of  its  obligations  to 
shippers;  it  cannot  be  controlled  by  the 
terms  of  the  separate  tariffs  of  its  con- 
nections. Falls  &  Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  269,  272. 

(jj)  While  a  carrier  in  accepting  a 
shipment  ought  to  consider  the  conve- 
nience and  interests  of  the  shipper, 
nevertheless,  as  a  matter  of  law,  it  is 
under  an  obligation  only  of  satisfying 
the  requirements  of  its  own  tariffs.  Falls 
&  Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
269,  272. 

(kk)  The  mere  fact  that  there  has 
been  a  series  of  unlawful  departures 
from  a  rule  does  not  necessarily  prove 
the  rule  unreasonable,  nor  does  the 
granting  of  a  rebate  raise  a  presumption 
that  the  lawfully  established  rate  is  un- 
reasonable by  the  amount  of  the  conces- 
sion. Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C. 
C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  370,  373. 

(11)  The  provisions  of  the  Hepburn 
Act  and  the  Elkins  Act,  forbidding  a  car- 
rier to  evade  the  collection  or  payment 
of  its  fixed  tariff  rates,  are  not  intended 
to  extend  the  jurisdiction  of  the  carrier 
over  matters  outside  of  its  province  as  a 
common  carrier,  nor  are  they  intended 
to  limit  and  prescribe  the  use  which 
shall  be  made  of  the  rates  which  the 
carrier  puts  into  effect.  California  Com- 
mercial Ass'n  v.  Wells  Fargo  &  Co.,  14 
[.  C.  C,  422,  428. 

(mm)  Rates  duly  established .  as  re- 
quired by  the  Act  are  absolutely  binding 
upon  carriers  and  shippers  alike  until 
lawfully  changed  as  provided  in  the  Act, 
but  this  does  not  render  nugatory  the 
provision  of  section  1  that  all  rates  must 
be  reasonable  and  just  or  the  subsequent 
provisions  authorizing  the  Commission 
upon  proper  showing  to  award  damages 
resulting  from  violations  of  the  Act. 
Coomes  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I. 
C.   C.   192,   194. 

(nn)  By  requiring  the  fixing  and  pub- 
lication of  rates  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act  supplies  prima  facie  evidence  of  the 
contract  rate,  which  can  only  be  over- 
come by  averment  in  avoidance  thereof. 


806 


TARIFFS,  §3    (00)— §3  (1)    (g) 


B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  LaDue,  57  Misc.  614, 
615,  108  N.  Y.  Supp  659. 

(oo)  Where  the  carrier's  charge  con- 
forms to  the  published  schedule  of  rates, 
it  is  prima  facie  a  reasonable  one.  B.  & 
O.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  LaDue,  57  Misc.  614, 
615,  108  N.   Y.   Supp.   659. 

§3.     Effect  in  General. 

§3.     (1)     Adherence  to  Published   Rate. 

See  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  II 
(hh);  Allowances,  §16  <'c) ;  Crimes. 
§7  (f);  Equalization  of  Rates,  §4  (2) 
(o);  Passenger  Fares  and  Facilities, 
§4  (a);  Through  Routes  and  Joint 
Rates,   §22. 

(a)  Carriers  cannot  lawfully  depart 
from  the  terms  of  their  tariffs  to  meet 
emergencies  that  arise  in  the  affairs  of 
their  patrons.  Dietz  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  75,  76. 

(aa)  A  carload  of  fuller's  earth  was 
shipped  from  Jamieson,  Fla.,  and  con- 
signed by  a  mistake  of  the  shipper  to 
Hamburg,  Germany,  via  Savannah,  Ga. 
After  the  car  moved,  but  before  arrival 
at  Savannah,  the  error  was  discovered 
and  instructions  given  to  forward  the 
car  to  Buffalo,  N.  Y,,  on  the  joint  through 
rate  from  Jamieson  to  Buffalo.  Defend- 
ants collected  the  sum  of  the  interme- 
diate rates  and  complainant  sought  rep- 
aration on  the  basis  of  the  through  joint 
rate.  The  tariff  carried  no  reconsign- 
ment  privilege.  HELD,  the  initial  car- 
rier could  not  nullify  the  original  trans- 
action and  deviate  from  the  published 
tariff  on  account  of  the  erroneous  bill- 
ing. Reparation  denied.  Floridin  Co.  v. 
Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.,  21  I.  C.  C.  610. 

(b)  A  shipper  who  orders  and  uses 
a  car  of  a  certain  size  must  pay  the  rate 
lawfully  applicable  thereto.  Had  ship- 
ment been  delivered  to  the  carrier  for 
loading,  the  carrier  would  have  been 
under  duty  of  loading  in  such  manner  as 
would  result  in  the  lowest  rate.  Clinton 
Bridge  &  Iron  Works  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  416,  417. 

(bb)  The  duty  of  shippers  to  pay  pub- 
lished rates  is  precisely  the  same  as  the 
duty  of  the  carriers  to  collect  such  rates. 
In  Re  Substitution  of  Tonnage  at  Transit 
Points,  18  I.  C.  C.  280,  29'6. 

(c)  The  fact  that  a  charge  is  grossly 
unjust  and  unreasonable  affords  no  ex- 
cuse either  to  the  shipper,  carrier,  or 
the  Commission  for  disregarding  the  ap- 
plication of  lawfully  published  and  estab- 


lished tariffs.  The  law  plainly  provide: 
for  but  one  method  of  getting  rid  of  th( 
unreasonableness  or  injustice  of  duly  es 
tablished  rates,  and  that  is  by  their  con 
denmation  upon  complaint  and  investiga 
tion.  They  cannot  lawfully  be  ignorec 
without  making  the  parties  to  such  trans 
action  incur  the  penalties  of  the  law.  Oh 
Dominion  Copper  Mining  &  Smelting  Co 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  309,  312. 

(cc)  Section  6  of  the  Act  requires  tha 
carriers  subject  to  Act  shall  in  all  casei 
publish  rates  at  which  they  afford  trans 
portation  services  and  that  the  rates 
specified  shall  in  every  case  be  observed 
In  Re  Contracts  of  Express  Companies 
16  L  C.  C.  246,  249. 

(d)  Unquestionably  the  affirmative 
and  mandatory  obligations  of  the  lav 
impose  upon  a  carrier  subject  to  its  pro 
visions  the  utmost  diligence  to  apprise 
itself  that  the  rates  are  lawfully  applied 
It  must  safeguard  against  so  carelesslj 
shutting  its  eyes  to  what  it  was  put  upoi 
inquiry  as  to  constitute  criminal  disre 
gard  of  the  law's  requirement  anent  ob 
servance  of  the  tariff,  rates  and  rules 
California  Commercial  Ass'n  v.  Welh 
Fargo  &  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  458,  461. 

(e)  The  statute  requires  carriers  tc 
publish  thei"r  tariffs  and  to  adhere  tc 
those  tariffs.  In  no  other  way  could 
discriminations  which  have  existed  be 
prevented.  In  the  enforcement  of  that 
statute  the  Commission  has  no  discre- 
tion. Ames  Brooks  Co.  v.  Rutland  R.  R, 
Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  479,  481. 

(f)  A  tariff  cannot  be  varied  from, 
even  though  it  may  be  for  the  interest 
in  a  particular  case  of  both  the  shipper 
and  the  railway  that  it  should  be.  Ne- 
braska-Iowa Grain  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  90,  98. 

(ff)  Rates  not  shown  to  have  been 
unreasonable  and,  legal  rate  having  been 
applied,  complaint  dismissed.  Miller  & 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  588. 

(g)  Plaintiff,  a  successful  bidder  for 
construction  work  on  defendant  carrier's 
line,  specified  in  the  construction  con- 
tract for  a  lower  rate  than  the  published 
interstate  rate  for  the  lransportaMf»n  of 
the  materials,  supplies  and  men  to  be 
used  in  carrying  out  the  contract.  HELD, 
the  concession  was  not  unlawful  under 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  and  plaintiff 
was    not    prevented    by    reason    thereof 


TARIFFS.  §3    (1)    (h)— (s) 


807 


from  recovering  for  the  loss  of  materials 
occasioned  by  defendant's  negligence.  S. 
F.  P.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Grant  Bros.  Const. 
Co.  (Ariz.  1910),  108  P.  467,  470. 

(h)  The  general  rule  that  where  con- 
necting roads,  each  having  a  legally  es- 
tablished local  rate,  but  no  joint  rate 
which  has  been  filed  and  published  as  re- 
quired by  law,  cannot  by  contract  make 
a  joint  rate  for  less  than  the  sum  of  the 
two  locals,  has  no  application  where  such 
roads  have  no  established  local  rates.  K. 
C.  S.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Albers  Comm.  Co.,  79 
Kan.  59,  59,  99  P.  819. 

(i)  When  a  common  carrier  makes  its 
schedules  or  rates  and  files  them  witn  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  and 
that  body  approves  and  promulgates 
them  as  the  Act  requires,  the  parties,  the 
carrier  and  the  shipper,  must  observe 
them,  and  any  known  departure  there- 
from will  subject  them  to  the  penalty  pre- 
scribed in  the  Act.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hen- 
derson Elevator  CO.,  138  Ky.  220,  225,  127 
S.  W.  779. 

(j)  Under  section  6  of  the  Intersiate 
Commerce  Act,  prohibiting  a  carrier 
from  deviating  from  its  published  tariff 
rate,  when  a  carrier  contracts  for  a  less 
rate  than  its  legal  tariff  rate,  and  sub :5e- 
quently  charges  its  regular  rate,  the  ship- 
per has  no  cause  of  action  for  a  breach 
of  contract.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Maysville 
Brick  Co.,  132  Ky.  G43,  654,  110  S.  W. 
1183. 

(k)  The  fact  that  the  line  of  a  deliver- 
ing carrier  lies  wholly  within  one  state 
does  not  prevent  it  from  suing  to  recover 
the  lawfully  published  interstate  rate  on 
an  interstate  shipment,  in  which  such 
carrier  participates.  La.  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co. 
V.  Holly,  127  La.  615,  618,  53  So.  882. 

(1)  A  carrier  cannot  estop  itself  from 
the  right  to  collect  the  published  inter- 
state rate.  La.  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Holly, 
127  La.  615,  619,  53  So.  882. 

.  (m)  A  shipper,  who  has  obtained 
from  a  common  carrier  a  special  lower 
rate  than  the  published  schedule,  has  no 
ground  upon  which  he  can  maintain  a 
claim  to  the  special  rate  in  opposition  to 
the  scheduled  rate.  Foster,  Glassel  Co. 
V.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  121  La.  1053,  1055  46 
So.  1014. 

(n)  In  a  suit  against  a  carrier  for 
breach  of  contract  in  failing  to  observe 
the  imer-tate  rates  from  plaintiff's  plant 
specified  in  an  agreement  and  in  refusing  | 


a  shipping-in-transit  privilege  provided 
for  therein,  it  is  a  good  plea  that  at  the 
time  of  the  making  of  the  contract  the 
carrier  had  already  published  and  filed  a 
tariff  covering  the  hauls  in  question,  as 
required  by  section  6  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act,  and  naming  higher  rights 
than  those  stipulated  in  the  contract,  and 
plaintiff  cannot  recover  on  the  theory 
that  the  defendant  might  lawfully  have 
amended  its  tariffs  so  as  to  enable  it  to 
keep  its  agreement.  Gulf  &  S.  I.  R.  Co. 
V.  Laurel  Cotton  Mills,  91  Miss.  166,  194, 
45  So.  982. 

(o)  The  carrier  of  an  interstate  ship- 
ment has  the  right  to  the  rate  published 
and  filed  with  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission,  and  this  despite  a  contract 
made  either  intentionally  or  mistakenly 
between  the  shipper  and  the  carrier's 
agent  for  a  lower  rate.  Sutton  v.  St.  L. 
&  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  (Mo.  App.  1911),  140 
S.  W.  76,  76. 

(p)  It  is  beyond  the  power  of  either  a 
railroad  company  or  a  shipper  to  make  a 
valid  contract  for  a  less  rate  than  the 
published  schedules  filed  with  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  and  not- 
withstanding a  contract  of  this  kind,  the 
measure  of  liability  of  the  shipper  is  the 
rate  so  published  and  filed.  Pecos  Val- 
ley &  N.  E.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Harris  (N.  M. 
1908),  94  P.  951,  951. 

(q)  Where  the  carrier  has  published 
and  filed  interstate  rates  with  the  Inter- 
State  Commerce  Commission,  it  must  ob- 
serve and  collect  them  according  to  the 
schedule,  despite  the  fact  that  it  makes 
a  private  contract  with  a  shipper  for 
lower  rates.  Houseman  v.  Fargo  (N.  Y. 
1910),  124  N.  Y.  Supp.  1086,  1088. 

(r)  Where  a  carrier  has  published 
and  filed  interstate  rates  with  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  and  has 
posted  a  card  at  a  station  to  the  effect 
that  the  rates  are  in  charge  of  the  agent 
Dnd  may  be  seen  at  any  time  by  asking 
for  them,  the  schedule  rates  are  lawfully 
established  and  must  be  collected  by  the 
carrier.  Houseman  v.  Fargo  (N.  Y. 
1910),  124  N.  Y.  Supp.  1086,  1088. 

(s)  A  shipper  cannot  enforce  a  prior 
private  agreement  with  a  carrier  calling 
for  lower  rates  than  those  published  and 
filed  with  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission. B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  La  Due, 
128  App.  Div.  594,  596,  112  N.  Y.  Supp. 
964. 


808 


TARIFFS,  §3   (1)    (t)— §3   (2)    (hh) 


(t)  A  delivering  carrier  has  a  right  to 
collect  from  the  consignee  the  lawful 
charges  made  hy  the  forwarding  carrier 
and  paid  by  the  delivering  carrier  in  the 
course  of  the  shipment.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Bell  (Okla.  1912),  120  P.  987, 
988. 

(u)  A  carrier  of  an  interstate  ship- 
ment must  collect  charges  according  to 
the  class  and  rate  filed  in  compliance 
with  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  irre- 
spective of  any  agreement  between  it  and 
the  shipper  as  to  the  class  or  rate  to  be 
applied.  Hardaway  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co. 
(S.  C.  1912),  73  S.  E.  1020,  1021. 

(v)  When  a  rate  has  been  filed  and 
properly  posted  and  published  within  the 
meaning  of  the  provisions  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act,  it  must  prevail  with- 
out regard  to  any  agreement  fixing  a  dif- 
ferent rate.  Fisher  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  49 
Wash.  205,  210,  95  P.  77. 

(w)  Defendant  carrier's  line  extended 
from  Kansas  City  to  Spokane.  The  Mis- 
souri Pacific  R.  R.  extended  from  St. 
Louis  to  Kansas  City.  D€fendant  con- 
tracted with  plaintiff  railroad  to  trans- 
port free  of  charge  some  newly  built 
cars  from  St.  Louis  to  Spokane.  The 
Missouri  Pacific  R.  R.  did  not  join  in 
this  contract.  The  defendant  and  the 
Missouri  Pacific  R.  R.  did  not  publish 
any  joint  rate  from  St.  Louis  to  Spokane. 
Defendant's  rate  from  Kansas  City  to 
Spokane  was  $90  per  car.  Before  the 
shipment  moved  defendant  learnod  that 
the  rate  contracted  for  was  contrary  to 
its  tariff  filed  with  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  and  so  notified  plain- 
tiff. HELD,  defendant,  despite  the  con- 
tract to  the  contrary,  was  obliged  and 
entitled  to  collect  the  published  charges. 
Coeur  D'Alene  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R. 
R.  Co.  (Wash.  1908),  95  P.  71,  75. 

§3.     (2)      Erroneous  Quotation  by  Carrier. 

See    Passenger    Fares    and    Facilities, 
§15. 

(a)  No  reparation  may  be  awarded 
on  the  basis  of  a  misquoted  rate.  Reno 
Whilesale  Liquor  Store  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.  C.  516,  517;  Oster  Bros.  v.  M.  L.  &  T. 
R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  511,  512;  Simon  Cook 
Co.  V.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  563,  564; 
Newding  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
29;  Alabama,  L.  &  E.  Co.  v.  P.  B.  &  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  295;  Forster  Bros. 
Co.  V.  D.  S.  S.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
232. 


(aa)  The  law  requires  that  tariffs 
shall  be  open  to  public  inspection, 
and  therefore  shippers  are  themselves 
charged  with  notice  of  the  rate  law- 
fully applicable,  and  the  Commission  can- 
not consider  an  erroneous  rate  qi.otation 
made  by  an  agent  of  a  carrier  as  the  basis 
for  an  award  of  reparation  to  a  shipper 
who  thereby  suffers  damage.  Forster 
Bros.  Co.  V.  D.  S.  S.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I. 
C.  C.  232,  236;  O'Brien  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  227. 

(b)  It  is  immaterial  whether  or  not 
the  agent  of  the  carrier  quotes  a  lower 
rate  as  being  applicable  since  the  law- 
fully established  rate  must  be  applied 
notwithstanding.  McLean  Lumber  Co.  v. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  349,  352; 
Scott  v.  T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
167,  168;  Dunne  &  Grace  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  W. 
Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  App.  1912),  148  S.  W.  997, 
999. 

(c)  The  fact  that  an  erroneous  state- 
ment of  rates  by  a  carrier's  agent  results 
in  a  shipment  moving  over  its  lines  at  a 
rate  higher  than  that  in  force  via  another 
route  does  not  entitle  the  shipper  to  an 
award  of  reparation.  Ohio  Iron  &  Metal 
Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  299, 
300. 

(d)  Neither  misquotation,  contract,  or 
the  decision  of  a  court  on  the  reasonable- 
ness thereof  can  alter  the  legal  rate  to 
be  charged.  Blinn  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  430,  433. 

(e)  Where  the  wrong  rate  is  quoted, 
every  consideration  of  justice  demands 
that  the  charge  should  be  repaid,  but 
such  an  order  cannot  be  enforced.  Ames 
Brooks  Co.  v.  Rutland  R.  R.  Co.,  10  I.  C. 
C.  479,  481. 

(f)  Although  an  agent  quoted  an  in- 
correct rate,  yet,  as  the  law  stands,  there 
is  no  remedy  before  the  Commission. 
Whitcomb  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  27,  28. 

(g)  The  lawfully  published  rates  of  a 
carrier  must  be  applied  despite  the  mis- 
taken representations  as  to  lower  rates 
made  by  the  carrier's  agents.  AVhitcomb 
V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  27,  28. 

(h)  An  error  of  the  carrier's  agent 
does  not  alter  the  tariff  rate.  Flatten 
Produce  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  512. 

(hh)  A  penalty  applies  against  the 
carrier  who  misquotes  a  rate,  although 
the  Commission  cannot  afford  redress  to 


TARIFFS,  §3   (2)    (i)— (s) 


809 


the  shipper.     O'Brien  &  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  227. 

(i)  Although  an  agent  of  a  carrier 
mistakenly  quotes,  either  by  parol  or  in 
the  bill  of  lading,  an  interstate  rate  based 
on  the  minimum  carload  weight  instead 
of  on  the  marked  capacity,  which  rate  is 
lower  than  the  published  charge,  and  al- 
though the  shipper  is  ignorant  of  the 
scheduled  charge,  the  carrier  must,  under 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  as  amended 
June  29,  1906,  collect  the  published  rate. 
St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wolf  (Ark. 
1911),  139  S.  W.  53G,  537. 

(j)  Under  the  Act  as  amended  June 
29,  1906,  the  rates  published  and  filed 
with  the  Commission  must  prevail,  and 
although  a  carrier  has  quoted  and  col- 
lected a  lower  rate,  it  may  sue  to  recover 
the  difference  between  the  quoted  and 
the  lawful  rate.  Ga.  R.  R.  v.  Creety,  5 
Ga.  App.  424,  426,  63  S.  E.  528. 

(k)  While  good  faith  will  doubtless 
save  the  agent  of  a  carrier  quoting  less 
than  the  lawful  rate,  and  the  shipper, 
from  the  charge  of  criminal  intent,  the 
fact  that  a  loss  is  suffered  by  the  ship- 
per in  relying  on  such  lower  rate  cannot 
result  in  binding  the  company  making  it, 
nor  can  it  result  in  protecting  the  shipper 
receiving  its  benefits.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  New  Albany  Box  &  Basket  Co. 
(Ind.,  1911),  94  N.  E.  906,  909. 

(1)  A  carrier  will  not  be  estopped,  by 
the  act  of  its  agent  in  quoting  a  rate 
less  than  the  published  rate,  from  repudi- 
ating an  unlawful  contract  for  the  trans- 
portation of  interstate  commerce  at  such 
lower  rate;  and  where  a  shipper  relies 
upon  an  agreement  of  the  carrier,  made 
either  purposely  or  inadvertently,  no  es- 
toppel will  arise,  for  the  reason  that  the 
agreement  upon  which  the  shipper  relies 
is  in  itself  illegal  and  void,  and  estoppel 
can  never  be  founded  upon  an  illegal  act 
or  contract.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  New 
Albany  Box  &  Basket  Co.  (Ind.  1911), 
94  N.  E.  906,  909. 

(m)  Interstate  rates  of  transporta- 
tion named  by  a  carrier's  agent  are  in- 
valid if  inconsistent  with  tariff  sched- 
ules filed  with  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission.  McManus  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry. 
Co.    (Iowa  1912),   136   N.   W.   769,  774. 

(n)  Where  an  agent  of  a  carrier  un- 
intentionally quotes  plaintiff  shipper  an 
Interstate  rate  less  than  published  rate, 
and  the  latter  buys  and  ships  in  reliance 


thereon,  plaintiff  cannot  recover  dam- 
age in  an  action  in  the  nature  of  tort 
for  the  misrepresentation,  since  under 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  the  pub- 
lished rate  must  govern.  (West,  J., 
dissenting.)  Schenberger  v.  U.  P.  R.  R. 
Co.,   84   Kan.   79,    81,   113   P.   433. 

(o)  A  carrier  may  recover  its  law- 
fully published  interstate  rate  despite 
the  fact  that  an  officer  or  agent  may 
have  quoted  to  the  shipper  a  lower 
rate.  Louisiana  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v. 
Holly,  127  La.  615,  618,  53  So.  882. 

(p)  The  agent  of  an  initial  carrier 
quoted  to  defendant  shipper  a  rate  on 
an  interstate  shipment  lower  than  the 
two  published  interstate  rates  of  the 
Initial  and  connecting  carriers,  which 
constituted  the  lawful  rate  from  point 
of  origin  to  destination,  no  joint  through 
rate  being  in  effect.  Plaintiff  connect- 
ing carrier  upon  receiving  the  goods 
paid  to  the  initial  carrier  the  published 
interstate  rate  covering  the  initial  car- 
rier's portion  of  the  haul.  HELD,  the 
plaintiff,  under  section  6  of  the  Act  as 
amended  June  29,  1906,  could  recover 
of  the  shipper  both  the  money  advanced 
to  the  initial  carrier  and  also  the  pub- 
lished charge  covering  Its  portion  of 
the  haul,  irrespective  of  whether  it  had 
or  had  not  notice  of  the  contract  rate 
quoted  to  defendant.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Bell   (Okla.  1912),   120  P.  987. 

(q)  A  mistake  of  the  agent  of  a  car- 
rier, in  quoting  to  a  shipper  a  rate  on 
an  interstate  shipment  lower  than  the 
authorized  published  rate,  does  not  au- 
thorize the  shipper  to  receive  from  the 
delivering  carrier  the  shipment  upon 
payment  of  the  contract  rate,  or  where 
he  has  paid  the  tariff  rate,  exceeding 
the  rate  agreed  upon,  to  recover  the  ex- 
cess paid  over  the  contract  rate.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Bell  (Okla.  1912),  120 
P.   987,   989. 

(r)  Where  the  rate  quoted  by  the 
carrier's  agent  is  less  than  the  sched- 
ule rate  approved  by  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  and  published, 
the  shipper  is  liable  for  the  full  rate, 
whether  he  actually  knows  that  the  rate 
quoted  is  less  than  the  schedule  rate  or 
not.  Baldwin  Land  Co.  v.  Columbia 
Ry.  Co.,  58  Or.  285,  289,  114  P.  469. 

(s)  A  shipper  cannot  recover  of  a 
carrier  the  difference  between  the  Inter- 
state rate  erroneously  quoted  to  him 
by  the  carrier's  agent  and  the  lawfully 


810 


TARIFFS,  §3   (2)    (t)— §3  (3)   (j) 


published  rate  exacted  of  him.  T.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Leslie  (Tex  1910),  131  S.  W. 
824,  827. 

(t)  Where  a  carrier  has  not  pub- 
lished or  filed  an  interstate  rate  with 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
and  quotes  a  rate  to  a  shipper,  who 
ships  in  reliance  thereon,  the  carrier 
can  recover  only  the  quoted  rate.  Free- 
man V.  Kemendo  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1912), 
148    S.    W.    605,    606. 

§3.     (3)     Notice  to  Shipper. 

(a)  A  shipper  is  presumed  to  know 
the  published  rates  of  a  carrier  however 
difficult  they  may  be  to  understand.  C. 
&  A.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Kirby,  225  U.  S.  155, 
166,  32  Sup.  Ct.  648,  56  L.  ed.  1033. 

(b)  Tariffs  on  file  with  the  Commis- 
sion are  notice  to  shippers  of  their 
provisions.  Follmer  &  Co.  v.  B.  B.  & 
B.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  617,  619. 

(c)  Complainant  shipped  lumber,  C. 
L.,  Woolam,  Miss.,  to  Owensburg,  Ind., 
under  a  combination  rate  of  27c  per  100 
lbs.  At  the  time  of  shipment  a  jomi 
rate  of  24c  applied  between  these  points 
but  via  another  gateway.  Via  the  route 
shipment  moved  the  carriers  had  not 
agreed  on  any  division.  HELD,  as  the 
joint  tariff  established  a  24c  rate  via 
all  junctions  of  the  carriers  parties 
thereto,  the  shipper  could  not  be  as- 
sumed to  know  via  which  gateway  di- 
visions had  been  agreed  upon  and  on 
that  account  could  not  be  assessed  a 
higher  rate.  Reparation  awarded.  Heft- 
ier Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  &  S.  I.  R.  R.  Co., 
21  L   C.   C.   14. 

(d)  A  car  of  shingles  arrived  at  Su- 
perior Dock,  Wis.,  on  November  2, 
consigned  via  the  Mutual  Transit  Co.,  a 
lake  line.  The  tariff  of  the  boat  line 
provided  that  shipments  arriving  after 
Nov.  1  would  be  subject  to  forwarding 
all-rail  at  all-rail  rates  if  in  excess  of 
available  vessel  capacity.  The  car  was 
not  accepted  by  the  lake  line  and  went 
forward  all-rail.  HELD,  the  tariffs  of 
the  boat  line  being  on  file  with  the 
Commission  were  notice  to  shipper  of 
their  provisions.  When  the  water  car- 
rier was  designated  in  the  routing  of 
the  car,  complainant  assumed  all  the 
consequences  of  the  possible  failure  of 
the  lake  line  to  take  the  shipment. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Follmer  &  Co.  v. 
B.  B.  &  B.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  617, 
619. 


(e)  The  fact  that  a  shipper  misun- 
derstands the  application  of  the  rate 
and  the  conditions  attached  thereto 
are  errors  of  an  unfortunate  nature,  but 
do  not  afford  a  basis  for  reparation. 
Running  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co., 
19    I.    C.    C.    565. 

(f)  Shippers  are  presumed  to  know 
the  rates  and  to  have  access  to  tariffs, 
which  are  required  to  be  kept  in  rail- 
road offices.  Ohio  Iron  &  Metal  Co.  v. 
Wabash   R.  R.   Co.,   18   L   C.   C.   299,  300. 

(g)  While  a  shipper  is  put  upon 
notice  of  a  rate  by  the  publication  of 
the  tariff,  it  is  not  held  that  the  ship- 
per must  determine  for  himself  the 
lawfulness  of  rates,  regulations  or  prac- 
tices, upon  his  peril.  Interstate  Rem- 
edy Co.  V.  American  Express  Co.,  16  I. 
C.   C.   436,   439. 

(h)  The  responsibility  rests  upon  the 
carrier  to  have  lawful  rates  and  rules 
in  effect  and  every  shipper  may,  with 
safety,  rely  upon  such  rates  without 
fear  that  they  will  be  withdrawn  as 
illegal  after  he  has  made  shipment 
thereon,  resting  in  confidence  that  they 
are  lawful  so  long  as  they  are  in  force. 
If  subsequently  found  to  be  unlawful 
the  carrier  is  subject  to  penalty  for 
the  institution  and  maintenance  of  such 
rates  or  rules,  but  the  law  does  not 
contemplate  that  the  shipment  shall 
move  under  any  other  theory  than  that 
the  provisions  of  the  carrier's  tariff 
are  in  full  compliance  with  the  law's 
demands.  The  carrier  may  not  plead 
the  unlawfulness  of  its  tariff  to  avoid 
extending  the  benefit  thereof  to  a  ship- 
per. Interstate  Remedy  Co.  v.  American 
Express   Co.,   16  I.  C.   C.   436,  439. 

(i)  It  is  contended  by  complainant 
that  it  had  no  knowledge  of  what  the 
charges  were  to  be.  This  cannot  be 
assumed  to  be  so  for  the  reason  that 
the  charges  were  duly  published  in  the 
tariffs  of  the  defendant.  Gough  &  Co. 
v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  280,  282. 

(j)  By  mistake  the  agent  of  plain- 
tiff carrier  informed  defendant  shipper 
that  a  rate  was  lower  than  the  pub- 
lished rate,  and  defendant  sold  goods 
and  shipped  the  same  in  reliance  there- 
on. The  official  tariff  showing  the  law- 
ful rate  between  the  points  in  question 
was  on  file  at  plaintiff's  office  and  was 
accessible  for  public  inspection.  HELD, 
defendant  was,  as  a  matter  of  law, 
charged    with    notice   and    knowledge    of 


TARIFFS,  §4   (a)— (j) 


811 


the  legal  rate.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  New  Albany  Box  &  Basket  Co.  (Ind. 
1911),  94  N.  E.  906,  909. 

§4.     Necessity    of    Publication. 

See  Alowances,  §4;  Demurrage,  §11; 
Discrimination,  §6  (c);  Divisions, 
§2;  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §10 
(w),  §17;  Lighterage,  §4  (c) ;  Refrig- 
eration, §5;  Through  Routes  and 
Joint  Rates,  §2  (m). 

(a)  Defendant  carrier  made  a  spe- 
cial contract  with  plaintiff  for  the 
transportation  of  horses  by  which  it 
agreed  to  make  the  haul  within  a 
particular  time,  to  make  a  particular 
connection,  and  to  carry  by  a  particular 
train.  The  shipment  was  to  move  at 
the  regular  rate.  This  expedited  service 
was  not  provided  for  in  its  published 
tariffs  and  was  not  open  to  all.  HELD, 
the  contract  was  in  violation  of  sec- 
tions 3  and  6  of  the  Act  forbidding  un- 
reasonable preferences  in  rates  or  regu- 
lations. Plaintiff  could  not  recover 
damages  for  a  breach  thereof  for  delay 
of  the  shipment  in  transit.  C.  &  A.  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Kirby,  225  U.  S.  155,  165,  -6^ 
Sup.  Ct.  648,  56  L.  ed.  1033. 

(b)  To  prevent  discrimination  and 
promote  equality  of  treatment  in  charges 
and  services,  the  law  requires  not  only 
a  definite  statement  of  the  amount  of 
the  rates,  fares  and  charges  of  carriers 
in  their  established  schedules,  but  an 
equally  definite  statement  therein  of  all 
privileges  and  facilities  granted  or  al- 
lowed in  connection  therewith,  and  any 
rules  or  regulations  which  in  any  wise 
affect  or  determine  any  part  or  the 
aggregate  of  the  rates,  fares  or  charges, 
or  the  value  of  the  service  rendered  to 
the  passenger,  shipper  or  consignee.  It 
is  clear  that  no  schedule  complies  with 
the  requirements  of  the  law  which  does 
not  definitely  and  fully  state  the  charges 
on  the  one  hand  and  the  services  to 
be  rendered  therefor  on  -the  other.  In 
Re  Mileage,  Excursion  and  Commuta- 
tion   Tickets,    23   I.   C.   C.   95. 

(c)  The  rules  affecting  rates  or  the 
value  of  the  service  should  be  stated 
in  the  tariff.  In  Re  INIileage,  Excursion 
and  Commutation  Rates,  23  I.  C.  C. 
95. 

(d)  Terminal  charges  for  services  to 
be  rendered  in  connection  with  ship-side 
delivery  need  not  be  stated  separately  in 
the  tariff.  Mobile  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce V.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
417,    424. 


(e)  Transit  privileges  and  charges 
must  be  stated  in  the  tariff.  Red  River 
Oil  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
438,   444. 

(f)  A  rate  between  two  points  in  a 
state  to  be  applicable  to  a  shipment 
beyond  out  of  the  state  must  be  filed 
with  the  Commission.  Johnson  v.  M. 
St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
255,    257. 

(g)  The  attempt  to  connect  outbound 
interstate  movements  with  inbound 
movements  to  a  concentrating  point 
under  rates  not  on  file  with  the  Commis- 
sion is  unlawful.  St.  Paul  Board  of 
Trade  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  285,  289. 

(h)  The  duty  rests  upon  the  carrier 
to  clearly  and  definitely  state  its  rates 
and  charges  in  its  tariffs,  and  it  is 
prohibited  from  accepting  either  more 
or  less  or  different  compensations  for 
transportation  than  that  so  stated.  The 
duty  rests  upon  the  shipper  to  clearly 
state  and  truly  represent  the  character 
of  his  shipment,  and  he  is  entitled 
to  no  rate  except  that  shown  in  the 
carrier's  schedule  for  the  transportation 
of  the  commodity  as  tendered  for  ship- 
ment. Ford  Co.  V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
19    I.    C.    C.    507,    511. 

(i)  Under  section  6  of  the  Act  re- 
quiring schedules  to  be  published  and 
filed  with  the  Commission  and  providing 
that  they  "shall  also  state  separately 
all  terminal  charges,  storage  charges, 
icing  charges  and  all  other  charges 
which  the  Commission  may  require,  and 
all  privileges  or  facilities  granted  or 
allowed,"  it  was  not  intended  that  the 
carrier  should  be  required  to  state 
separately  the  hauling  charge  between 
the  stations  and  the  charge  for  the  use 
of  the  terminal  at  both  ends  of  the  line. 
The  terminal  charges  referred  to  in  sec- 
tion 6,  and  which  must  be  expressly 
set  forth  in  the  carrier's  tariff,  are 
those  for  other  services  at  the  terminal 
which  the  carrier  may  furnish,  such 
as  storage,  elevation,  switching  and  cart- 
age. Associated  Jobbers  of  Los  An- 
geles V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I. 
C.  C.  310,  315. 

(j)  State  rates  not  on  file  with  the 
Commission  are  not  a  lawful  factor  in 
a  combination  through  interstate  charge. 
Hagar  Iron  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C. 
C.    529. 


812 


TARIFFS,   §4   (k)— §5    (b) 


(k)  Where  an  elevator  charge  is 
included  in  a  rate,  the  tariff  invariably 
should  so  specify  according  to  the  sixth 
section.  Ames  Brooks  Co.  v.  Rutland 
R.  R.  Co.,   16  I.   C.   C.  479,  481. 

(1)  All  tariffs  showing  rates,  fares 
and  charges  and  all  privileges  or  facil- 
ities which  in  anywise  change  or  affect 
rates  or  the  value  of  the  service  ren- 
dered, must  be  published  and  filed.  The 
holding,  storing,  unloading  and  reloading 
of  shingles  is  such  a  privilege  and  re- 
quires publication  to  be  lawful.  Folmer 
&  Co.  V.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  33,  36. 

(m)  Defendant  charged  on  carloads 
of  cattle  from  Anaconda,  Mont.,  to  Ta- 
coma,  Wash.,  $20  in  excess  of  the  pub- 
lished rates,  said  excess  being  charged 
by  agreement  with  complainant  for 
hauling  the  cattle  on  other  than  the 
regular  shipping  days.  HELD,  these 
charges,  not  having  been  lawfully  pub- 
lished, were  illegal  and  must  be  re- 
funded. Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  B.  A. 
&  P.  Ry.   Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  432,  433. 

(n)  The  rules  and  regulations  of  a 
carrier  issued  in  circulars  and  filed  in- 
dependently of  its  rate  schedules,  un- 
less referred  to  in  such  schedules,  are 
not  lawfully  in  force.  Kansas  City  Hay 
Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I. 
C.    C.    631,    632. 

(o)  A  tariff  governing  storage  and  in- 
surance charges  which  fails  to  fix  their 
amount  or  to  establish  by  reference  to 
other  tariffs  or  otherwise  any  specific 
basis  for  estimating  them,  is  unlawful. 
England  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
614,    619. 

(p)  Reparation  will  not  be  awarded 
on  the  basis  of  a  reconsignment  privilege 
customarily  extended  by  the  carrier,  but 
not  duly  published  in  its  tariff.  Sunder- 
land Bros.  Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  267. 

(q)  Custom  of  notifying  shippers 
when  diversion  will  result  in  increased 
charges  not  adhered  to  and  not  provided 
for  in  tariffs,  no  ground  for  reparation. 
Hull  Co.  V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  459. 

(r)  Joint  rate  found  unreasonable  as 
compared  with  combination  rate  between 
same  points,  one  factor  of  which  not 
being  applicable.  Thorp  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q. 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  466. 

(s)  State  rate,  not  filed  with  Commis- 
sion, not  applicable  to  interstate  traffic. 


Thorp  Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  466. 

(t)  Shipment  made  to  certain  point 
and  reconsigned  to  point  within  same 
state  without  taking  possession  of  car, 
joint  rate  applicable,  state  rate  not  being 
on  file  with  Commission.  ]Mayer  Fertilizer 
Co.  V.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  472. 

(u)  State  rates  not  filed  with  the 
Commission  cannot  be  used  as  factor  in 
through  rate.  Young  &  Vann  Supply  Co. 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  480. 

(v)  Shipment  moved  soon  after  the 
line  had  been  opened  for  traffic  and  be- 
fore rates  were  established.  HELD, 
charges  assessed  were  unreasonable  to 
the  extent  that  they  exceeded  what 
would  have  been  collectible  under  a  rate 
subsequently  established.  Reparation 
awarded.  Kennedy  &  Co.,  Ltd.,  v.  V.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  530. 

(w)  No  provision  in  tariff  applicable 
to  switching  of  interstate  shipment.  In- 
trastate rate  applied.  HELD,  inapplicable 
and  unreasonable  to  the  extent  of  a 
lower  rate  subsequently  established. 
Deeves  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  &  I.  W.  R.  R., 
Unrep.  Op.  540. 

(x)  Tariff  providing  for  storage  not^ 
concurred  in.  Charges  assessed  there- 
under should  be  refunded  without  order 
of  Commission.  West  Coast  Shingle  Co. 
V.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  596. 

(y)  The  carrier  has  the  right  at  the 
outset  to  establish  its  ra':es  without 
previous  application  to  the  m'-erstaie 
Commerce  Commission.  O.  Li.  &  N.  Co. 
V.  Coo.idge   (Or.  1911),  116   P.  93,  95. 

§5.     Purpose  of   Publication. 

(a)  The  objects  of  the  Act  are  to 
prevent  favoritism  and  to  secure  equal 
rights  to  all  in  interstate  transportation, 
and  to  apply  one  legal  rate  publis  'eJ, 
posted  and  accessible  to  all  alike.  N.  Y. 
C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  V.  U.  S.,  212 
U.  S.  481,  495,  29  Sup.  Ct.  304,  53  L.  ed. 
613. 

(b)  The  publication  of  gross  and  net 
rates  would  needlessly  add  to  the  com- 
plexity of  tariffs.  Wherever  it  is  possible 
for  carriers  to  file  a  net  rate  as  such,  it 
is  their  duty  to  do  so.  In  Re  Allowances 
for  Transfer  of  Sugar,  14  I.  C.  C.  619,  630. 


TARIFFS,  §«  (a)— (j) 


813 


III.     POSTING. 
§6.     In    General. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §22  (c);  Courts, 
§11  (I);  Crimes,  §10,  §22;  Repara- 
tion, §9. 

(a)  The  posting  of  rates  as  required 
by  section  6  of  the  Act  is  not  essential 
to  make  them  legally  operative,  and  is 
required  only  as  a  means  of  afforaing 
special  facilities  to  the  public  for  as- 
certaining the  rates  actually  in  force. 
K.  C.  S.  Ry.  V.  Albers  Comm.  Co..  223 
U.  S.  573,  594,  32  Sup.  Ct.  316,  56  L. 
ed.  556. 

(b)  Publication  and  posting  within 
the  meaning  of  the  Act  are  essentially 
distinct.  U.  S.  v.  Miller,  223  U.  S.  599, 
604,  32  Sup.  Ct.  323,  56  L.  ed.  568. 

(c)  The  publication  intended  by  the 
Act  consists  in  promulgating  and  dis- 
tributing the  tariff  in  printed  form  pre- 
paratory to  putting  it  into  effect,  while 
the  posting  is  a  continuing  act  enjoined 
upon  the  carrier  while  the  tariff  remains 
operative  as  a  means  of  affording  spe- 
cial facilities  to  the  public  for  as- 
certaining the  rates  in  force  thereunder. 
U.  S.  V.  Miller,  223  U.  S.  599,  604,  32 
Sup.  Ct.  323,  56  L.  ed.  568. 

(d)  Publication  is  a  step  in  estab- 
lishing rates,  while  posting  is  a  duty 
arising  out  of  the  fact  that  they  have 
been  established,  and  therefore  post- 
ing is  not  a  condition  to  making  a 
tariff  legally  operative;  neither  is  it  a 
condition  to  the  continued  existence  of 
a  tariff  once  legally  established.  U.  S. 
v.  Miller,  223  U.  S.  599,  604,  32  Sup.  Ct. 
323,  56  L.  ed.  568. 

(e)  Under  section  8  of  the  Act  mak- 
ing a  carrier  liable  for  damages  result- 
ing to  a  shipper  from  the  carrier's  vio- 
lation of  the  Act,  a  shipper  may,  for  the 
carrier's  failure  to  post  and  keep  open 
for  inspection  its  established  rates 
whereby  the  shipper  is  compelled  to 
pay  a  higher  rate  than  that  in  effect 
over  a  competing  line,  recover  the  dif- 
ference between  the  rate  paid  and  the 
competitive  rate,  and  this  despite  the 
fact  that  the  shipper  would  thereby 
be  charged  less  than  the  defendant's 
published  charge.  St,  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Lewellen  Bros.,  192  Fed.   540,  542. 

(f)  Complainant  shipped  snapped 
corn,  Calvin,  Okla.,  to  DeQueen  and 
Wilton,  Ark.,  under  a  joint  rate  of  23c. 
Prior  to  date  of  shipment  the  rate  had 


been  19c,  but  was  advanced  at  time 
of  shipment,  but  the  tariff  not  posted 
at  Calvin.  Had  this  been  done  the  in- 
creased rate  would  have  been  included 
in  the  price  of  the  corn,  which  was  sold 
f.  o.  b.  destination.  HELD,  reparation 
should  be  awarded  on  account  of  the 
failure  of  the  carrier  to  post  the  tar- 
iff changing  the  rate.  Canadian  Valley 
Grain  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.   C.  108. 

(g)  In  the  absence  of  a  joint  rate 
from  a  local  station  on  one  line  to  a 
point  on  another  line,  it  is  not  incum- 
bent on  the  initial  line  to  post  at  the 
point  of  origin  a  tariff  showing  the  com- 
bination of  locals.  Canadian  Valley 
Grain  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  509,  510. 

(h)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload 
of  snapped  corn  from  Calvin,  Okla.,  to 
Arkadelphia,  Ark.  The  shipment  moved 
via  the  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R.  to  Little 
Rock  and  thence  via  the  St.  L.  I.  M. 
&  S.  R.  R.  to  destination.  No  through 
route  and  joint  rate  was  in  effect.  The 
C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R.  agent  at  Calvin 
quoted  a  rate  of  24i^c  to  destinafion. 
The  lawfully  published  local  rates  from 
Calvin  to  Little  Rock  and  from  Little 
Rock  to  destination  were  collected, 
amounting  to  29y2C.  The  rate  of  the 
C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R.  from  Calvin  to  Little 
Rock  was  duly  posted  at  Calvin.  Com- 
plainant sought  to  recover  damages 
under  section  6  of  the  Act  for  the  fail- 
ure of  the  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R.  to  post  the 
local  rates  involved  in  the  shipment  in 
question.  HELD,  the  defendant  was  not 
liable  since  nowhere  in  the  Act  is  one 
carrier  required  to  post  at  a  local  sta- 
tion on  its  line  a  tariff  naming  a  local 
rate  applicable  over  the  line  of  another 
carrier.  Rutland  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  509,  510. 

(i)  Although  the  delay  in  a  particular 
case  in  posting  a  tariff  may  be  due  to  un- 
foreseen causes,  the  Commission  is  not  to 
be  understood  as  intimating  that  neglect 
to  post  tariffs  or  willful  failure  so  to  do 
can  with  impunity  be  resorted  to  by  car- 
riers. Pueblo  Transp.  Ass'n  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  82,  85. 

(j)  A  tariff  filed  with  the  Commission 
in  the  manner  prescribed  by  law  and  on 
statutory  notice  is  a  lawful  tariff  and 
lawfully  binding  upon  both  carriers  and 
shippers,  though  it  is  not  posted  at  sta- 
tions fully  thirty  days  prior  to  its  effect- 


814 


TARIFFS,   §6    (k)— §7 


ive  date.    Pueblo  Transp.  Ass'n  vs.  S.  P. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  82,  85. 

(k)  Prior  to  Jan.  31,  1907,  under  its 
published  tariff  defendant's  rates  on 
sugar  in  carloads  from  Pacific  Coast  ter- 
minals to  intermediate  Colorado  points 
were  based  on  a  specified  carload  mini- 
mum of  24,000  lbs.  By  a  supplemental 
tariff,  effective  Jan.  31,  1907,  this  mini- 
mum was  increased  to  30,000  pounds. 
This  supplemental  tariff  was  regularly 
and  lawfully  filed  with  the  Commission, 
Copies  of  the  same  for  California  points 
were  delayed  and  defendant's  agents 
were  able  to  post  them  at  San  Francisco 
and  other  points  only  twenty-five  or 
twenty-six  days  before  the  supplemental 
rate  became  effective.  Subsequent  to 
Jan.  31,  1907,  a  shipper,  after  a  copy  of 
the  supplement  had  been  mailed  to  him, 
shipped  sugar  from  San  Francisco  to  an 
intermediate  Colorado  point.  HELD, 
citing  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cisco  Oil  Mill,  204 
U.  S.  449,  that  defendant  could  not  allow 
the  shipper  the  original  rate  based  on 
the  24,000  minimum,  the  supplemental 
tariff  being  effective,  although  not  posted 
the  full  30  days  prescribed  by  statute. 
Pueblo  Transportation  Ass'n  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  82.  83. 

(I)  Under  section  6  of  the  Act,  relat- 
ing to  the  filing  and  posting  of  rates,  the 
tariff  of  rates  is  established  and  in  force 
when  the  same  has  been  published  and 
filed  with  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission, and  has  been  approved  and  pro- 
mulgated by  the  Commission,  and  the 
posting  of  the  schedules  in  the  oflEice  or 
station  of  the  carrier  is  not  a  condition 
precedent  to  the  taking  effect  of  such 
rates.  Baltimore  &  O.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
New  Albany  Box  &  Basket  Co.  (Ind. 
1911),  94  N.  E.  906,  908. 

(m)  A  carrier  filed  an  interstate  rate 
with  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion but  failed  to  post  the  same  in  the 
depot  at  the  point  of  origin  in  question 
as  required  by  section  6  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act,  as  amended  June  29, 
1906.  Plaintiff  shipper  and  the  carrier's 
agent  searched  the  tariff  files  of  the 
depot  for  a  possible  increase  in  rates 
and  the  agent  made  further  inquiries  of 
the  ofllcers  of  the  carriers.  Plaintiff  pur- 
chased grain  in  reliance  on  a  10c  rate 
posted  at  the  depot.  A  13i/^c  rate  had, 
in  fact,  been  previously  filed  with  the 
Commission  and  gone  into  effect,  and 
plaintiff  was  compelled  to  pay  same. 
HELD,  plaintiff  could  recover  in  an  ac- 


tion in  a  state  court  for  damages  for  the 
failure  of  the  carrier  to  post  its  rates  at 
the  depot,  and  his  right  so  to  recover 
was  not  defeated  by  the  contention  that 
to  permit  recovery  would  render  nuga- 
tory the  provisions  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act  requiring  carriers  to 
charge  the  scheduled  rates.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Henderson  Elevator  Co.,  138  Ky. 
220,   227,   127   S.   W.   779. 

(n)  A  carrier  failed  to  post  an  inter- 
state rate  in  the  depot  at  the  point  of 
origin,  as  required  by  section  6  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  as  amended 
June  29,  1906.  A  shipper  purchased 
grain  and  relied  on  the  lower  rate  pre- 
viously in  effect  and  on  file  at  the  depot. 
He  was  compelled  to  pay  the  higher  rate, 
unposted,  but  filed  with  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission.  HELD,  a  state 
court  had  jurisdiction  to  entertain  an 
action  for  damages  for  a  failure  to  post 
the  rate,  under  section  22  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act,  providing  that 
"nothing  in  this  Act  contained  shall  in 
any  way  abridge  or  alter  the  remedies 
now  existing  at  common  law  or  by 
statute,  but  the  provisions  of  this  Act 
are  in  addition  to  such  remedies,"  I.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Henderson  Elevator  Co.,  138 
Ky  220,  229,  127  S.  W.  779. 

(o)  The  mere  fact  that  an  interstate 
carrier  fails  to  post  the  schedules  and 
tariff  sheets  at  the  depot  does  not  nec- 
essarily render  nugatory  the  rate  promul- 
gated and  filed  with  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  and  deposited  with 
the  station  agent.  The  provision  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  to  the  effect 
that  the  schedules  and  tariff  sheets  shall 
be  published  and  posted  in  two  conspic- 
uous places  in  every  depot,  is  not  a  con- 
dition precedent  to  the  establishment  of 
the  tariff  rates;  they  are  valid,  even 
though  not  posted.  Mires  v.  St.  L.  &  S. 
F.  R.  R.  Co.,  134  Mo.  App.  379,  390,  114 
S.  W.  1052,  1056. 

(p)  Reparation  awarded  for  damages 
sustained  by  reason  of  failure  of  carriers 
to  post  tariff  advancing  a  rate.  Wolf 
Milling  Co,  v,  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.   Op.   439. 

IV.     CONSTRUCTION. 

See   Construction. 

§7.      In  General. 

See    Cars    and    Car    Supply,  §34    (a); 

Commodity      Rates,       II,  §4      (a); 

Compress    Companies    and  Charges, 

§2   (c),   (d);    Evidence,  §64  (g);   Fa- 


TARIFFS,  §7   (a)— (h) 


815 


cilities  and  Privileges,  §19  (d); 
Import  Traffic,  I  (a),  (b);  Through 
Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §18,  §21; 
Track    Storage,    II    (j). 

(a)  The  word  "tariffs"  as  used  in 
section  6  of  the  Act  as  amended  in  1906, 
forbidding  carriers  from  refunding  or  re- 
mitting any  portion  of  the  published 
rates  or  from  extending  to  any  shipper 
any  privileges  or  facilities  except  such 
as  are  specified  in  the  tariffs,  is  used  in 
the  sense  of  schedules,  rates,  and 
charges.  U.  S.  v.  H.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  194  Fed. 
234,  237. 

(b)  Showcases  come  within  the  com- 
modity designation  in  a  tariff,  "furniture 
(new),  all  kinds."  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Feintuch,  191  Fed.  482,  488. 

(c)  Complainant  shipped  three  car- 
loads of  boilers  with  attachments,  includ- 
ing plates,  front  pieces,  bars,  doors  and 
frames,  smoke  stacks  in  sections,  guys 
and  hooks,  tied  and  loose  pieces,  and  rods 
and  other  parts  in  boxes.  The  tariff  pro- 
vided for  a  rate  of  $1.50  on  machinery  and 
machines,  boilers  and  steam  boilers  under 
30  feet  in  length.  This  rate  was  intended 
to  apply  to  high  pressure  boilers  of  the 
kind  shipped  by  complainant.  The  tariff 
carried  a  rate  of  $1.40  per  100  lbs.  on 
stoves: — boilers,  including  range  boilers 
with  gas  heating  attachment.  It  ap- 
peared that  the  $1.40  rate  was  intended 
to  apply  to  low  pressure  boilers.  It  was 
contended  that  if  this  was  the  case  then 
the  higher  rate  was  discriminatory  be- 
cause based  on  the  use  to  which  a  com- 
modity was  to  be  put.  The  evidence 
showed  that  the  high  and  low  pressure 
boilers  were  not  interchangeable  in  use; 
for  while  the  high  pressure  boiler  might 
be,  and  sometimes  was,  installed  as  a 
part  of  a  heating  plant  in  large  buildings, 
such  use  seemed  to  be  an  added  one  to 
which  the  latter  was  adaptable.  The 
low  pressure  type  could  not  be  used  in 
place  of  the  high  pressure  type.  HELD, 
the  boilers  shipped  by  complainant  could 
not  be  deemed  entitled  to  the  rating  for 
steam  or  hot  water  boilers  limited  under 
"stoves;"  the  principle  which  prohibits 
applying  a  rate  according  to  the  use 
to  which  a  commodity  is  to  be  devoted 
was  not  shown  to  have  been  contravened, 
nor  had  the  rate  charge  been  shown  to 
be  unreasonable,  as  complainant  failed 
to  establish  that  the  articles  were  the 
same  or  even  approximately  identical. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Smith-B'ooth-Usher 
Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Cp.,  33  I.  C.  C. 
242. 


(d)  For  transporting  a  carload  of 
heavy  rough  grate  bars  (as  they  came 
from  the  sand  without  hand  or  machine 
finish)  for  power  boilers  from  Chatta- 
nooga, Tenn.,  to  Oakland,  Cal.,  defend- 
ants collected  charges  based  upon  a  rate 
of  $1.41  per  100  lbs.  applicable  to  "fur- 
nace castings."  The  tariff  carried  a  rate 
of  80c  applicable  to  "castings,  n.  o.  s. 
plain  as  from  the  sand."  HELD,  the 
lower  rate  was  properly  applicable. 
Reparation  awarded.  Casey-Hedges  Co. 
V.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  249. 

(e)  Fuel  oil  switched  at  St.  Louis  was 
assessed  2c  per  100  lbs.  on  an  arbitrary 
weight  of  7.4  lbs.  per  gallon.  The  esti- 
mated weight  of  the  shipments  which 
moved  to  Wood  River,  111.,  as  assessed 
by  the  carriers  having  the  line-haul  was 
7,807,837  lbs.  Under  the  estimated  weight 
on  which  the  switching  charges  were  as- 
sessed, the  shipments  would  have  weighed 
8.914,106  lbs.  There  was  no  switching 
tariff  providing  for  estimated  weight,  but 
one  issued  subsequent  to  the  time  the 
shipments  moved  based  the  switching 
charges  on  the  estimated  weights  pro- 
vided in  the  classification  or  tariffs  gov- 
erning the  road  haul.  HELD,  the  switch- 
ing charges  assessed  were  unreasonable 
to  the  extent  the  weight  on  which  they 
were  assessed  exceeded  the  weight  on 
which  charges  for  the  line-haul  were 
made.  Reparation  awarded.  Standard 
Oil  Co.  V.  1.  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  369. 

(f)  Tariffs  are  to  be  construed  accord- 
ing to  their  language  and  not  by  the  arbi- 
trary practice  or  intention  of  the  carrier. 
Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  I.  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C. 
C.  369,  370. 

(g)  The  commodity  shipped  from 
New  York  City  to  Pearsall,  Tex.,  was 
granulated  cork  and  the  first-class  rate 
of  $1.72  per  100  lbs.  should  have  been  ap- 
plied instead  of  the  rate  of  $3.44  per  100 
•bs.  applicable  to  cork  shavings.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Wolf  Co.  v.  Mallory  Steam- 
ship Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  490. 

(h)  In  July,  1908,  complainant  shipped 
from  Detroit,  Mich.,  to  Seattle.  W^ash.. 
over  defendant's  line,  two  carloads  of 
showcases  on  which  charges  were  col- 
lected at  the  rate  of  $4.50  per  100  lbs., 
being  one  and  one-half  times  the  first- 
class  rate.  Under  the  Western  Classifi- 
'^ation,  if  the  showcases  were  "boxed." 
*^he  first-class  rate  of  $3  would  apply;  if 
not  "boxed,"  the  rate  charged  was  proper. 
"Boxed"  under  the  rule  meant  completely 


816 


TARIFFS,  §7   (i)— (n) 


enclosed.  The  evidence  disclosed  that 
the  showcases  were  enclosed  completely 
on  top  and  at  both  ends,  but  that  open 
spaces  2  or  3  inches  in  width  extended 
the  whole  length  of  both  sides,  and  pro- 
vided handholds  for  use  in  loading  and 
unloading  the  showcases.  HELD,  the 
higher  rate  was  applicable,  for  the  show- 
cases were  not  completely  enclosed  and 
therefore,  under  the  rule,  were  not  boxed. 
Wadell  Showcase  &  Cabinet  Co.  v.  M.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  106,  107. 

(1)  In  1908,  complainant  shipped  from 
Marion,  Ind.,  to  Oakland,  Cal.,  a  carload 
of  iron  beds  and  wire  mattresses,  weigh- 
ing 36,200  lbs.  upon  which  charges  based 
upon  the  mixed-carload  rate  of  $1.25  per 
100  lbs.  were  assessed.  Complainant  al- 
leged that  the  charges  were  unreasonable 
to  the  extent  that  they  exceeded  charges 
based  upon  a  rate  of  $1.10  per  100  lbs. 
on  the  iron  beds  and  $1.60  on  the  wire 
mattresses.  Complainant  prayed  for  the 
alternative  use  of  such  rates.  HELD,  in 
the  absence  of  evidence  that  the  rate 
upon  the  mixed  shipment  was  unreason- 
able, the  defendants  would  not  be  re- 
quired to  establish  the  alternative  rule. 
Complaint  dismissed.  Marion  Iron  & 
Brass  Bed  Co.  v.  T.  St.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
22  1.  C.  C.  272,  273. 

(j)  Five  carloads  of  parts  of  an  old 
bridge  that  were  shipped  from  New  Or- 
leans, La.,  to  Richmond,  Va.,  were 
charged  a  rate  of  41c  per  100  lbs.,  which 
was  the  rate  applicable  to  bridge  mate- 
rial. Complainant  contended  that  the 
rate  on  scrap  iron  of  $4.50  per  ton  should 
have  been  applied.  The  evidence  was 
clear  that  the  material  was  to  be  used  for 
scrap  iron.  Defendant  called  attention 
to  the  rule  that  under  the  Southern  Clas- 
sification the  ratings  on  scrap  iron  "will 
not  apply  on  old  or  second-hand  ma- 
chinery, engines,  boilers  or  similar  ar- 
ticles unless  same  are  broken  into  scraps 
or  pieces  at  the  point  of  shipment  before 
being  tendered  to  the  carrier,"  and 
showed  that  this  material  had  not  been 
broken  into  pieces.  HELD,  that  parts  of 
bridges  were  not  "similar"  articles  with- 
in the  meaning  of  the  rule,  and  that  it 
was  physically  impossible  to  break 
bridges  into  scraps  at  the  point  where 
they  were  dismantled.  Complainant  was 
entitled  to  the  scrap  iron  rates.  Conti- 
nental Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  281. 

(k)  Where  an  article  is  shipped  both 
in  carload  and  less  than  carload  lots  the 


carrier  must  provide  a  less  than  carload 
rate  and  cannot  confine  the  movement  to 
carloads.  Albree  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  303,  320. 

(1)  On  carloads  of  farm  wagons  from 
Toledo,  O.,  to  Gordo,  Ala.,  a  rate  of  51c 
per  100  lbs.  was  charged.  Complainant 
alleged  that  the  lawful  published  rate 
was  42c.  By  the  Southern  Classification 
"wagons  and  carts,  farm  or  lumber," 
were  rated  sixth  class.  There  were  cer- 
tain exceptions  to  the  classification, 
among  them  the  following:  "Wagons, 
farm:  See  agricultural  implements."  Un- 
der this  reference  appeared  the  provi- 
sions: "Agricultural  implements,  n.  o.  s., 
class  K.  Agricultural  implements,  etc., 
and  farm  wagons  without  springs,  in 
mixed  c.  1.,  etc.,  sixth  class."  From 
Cairo  to  Gordo  the  sixth-class  rate  was 
41c,  and  the  class  K  rate  32c.  No  evi- 
dence of  unreasonableness  of  rates  was 
offered.  HELD,  the  wagons  were  prop- 
erly rated  as  sixth  class.  The  word  "see" 
following  the  name  of  an  article  is  used 
only  to  direct  attention  to  another  item 
in  some  way  related  thereto.  The  refer- 
ence to  "agricultural  implements"  under 
"farm  wagons"  showed  that  farm  wagons 
might  be  shipped  in  mixed  carloads  with 
certain  other  articles  at  the  sixth-class 
rate.  Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  460. 

(m)  Complainant  contracted  to  fur- 
nish ties  from  points  in  Alabama,  Missis- 
sippi, Louisiana  and  Texas  to  the  U.  P.  R. 
R.  Co.,  f.  o.  b.  Kansas  City,  Mo.  The 
billed  destination,  Linwood,  Kan.,  was  a 
local  U.  P.  R.  R.  station,  28  miles  west  of 
Kansas  City.  The  joint  rate  to  Linwood 
was  24c.  The  U.  P.  R.  R.  refused  to  ac- 
cept cars  at  Kansas  City  on  through  bill- 
ing to  Linwood  and  at  their  demand  Lin- 
wood expense  bills  were  corrected  to 
read  Kansas  City,  and  the  published  rate 
of  23c  was  applied.  Complainant  sought 
reparation  on  the  basis  of  the  unpub- 
lished division  of  the  joint  rate  applying 
through  Kansas  City  to  Linwood,  alleg- 
ing that  in  the  division  19c  accrued  to  the 
carriers  to  Kansas  City,  and  5c  to  the 
U.  P.  R.  R.  for  the  haul  to  Linwood.  All 
of  the  cars  were  afterward  reconsigned 
by  the  U.  P.  R.  R.  to  various  other  points. 
HELD,  the  published  tariff  rate  from 
points  of  origin  to  Kansas  City  was  prop- 
erly imposed.  Switzer  Lumber  Co.  v.  A. 
&  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C  C.  471,  473. 

(n)  Corrugated  strawboard  boxes  are 
held  not  to  come  within  the  meaning  of  a 


TARIFFS,  §7  (o)— (ss) 


817 


tariff  providing  for  goods  in  boxes,  bar- 
rels or  crates,  in  view  of  the  expressed 
definition  of  these  terms.  Republic 
Metalware  Co.  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C. 
C.  565,  566. 

(o)  On  go-carts  shipped  from  Elk- 
hart, Ind.,  to  Los  Angel-es,  Cal.,  in  car- 
loads a  rate  of  $2.62 1/^  upon  a  minimum 
of  20,000  lbs.  was  charged.  They  were 
boxed.  The  tariff  named  a  rate  of  $1.75 
per  100  lbs.  on  "go-carts,  wood  or  metal, 
boxed  or  crated."  It  carried  a  rule 
making  the  rate  25  p-er  cent  higher  on 
commodities  shipped  in  crates,  and  50 
per  cent  higher  when  shipped  in  bales, 
bags,  or  bundles.  "Boxed"  was  defined 
to  mean  packages  made  entirely  of 
lumber.  "Crated"  was  defined  to  mean 
inclosed  on  all  sides  with  framework. 
A  charge  of  50  per  cent  was  added  to 
the  commodity  rate.  HELD,  on  the  basis 
of  the  decision  in  Republic  Metalware 
Co.  V.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  565,  that 
the  tariff  furnished  no  authority  for 
the  additional  charge,  and  that  the  im- 
position of  the  additional  charge  was  un- 
reasonable. Reparation  granted.  Sid- 
way  Mercantile  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  570. 

(p)  Defendants'  tariffs  provided  for 
standard  and  pony  crates  of  certain 
dimensions  for  the  shipment  of  canta- 
loupes from  Colorado  upon  estimated 
weights  of  66  and  53  lbs.,  respectively. 
Complainant  shipped  in  so-called  one- 
third  sized  crates,  for  which  there  was 
no  tariff  provision  for  estimating  weight, 
but  whose  dimensions  and  cubical  capac- 
ity was  greater  than  the  dimensions  and 
cubical  capacity  of  a  standard  crate. 
In  the  absence  of  tariff  provision  the 
agent  of  the  initial  carrier  tested  the 
weight  by  weighing  at  intervals  a  stated 
number  of  crates,  it  being  impractical 
to  weigh  all.  The  crates  were  billed  at 
30  lbs.  and  25  lbs.,  respectively.  Com- 
plainant acquiesced  in  this.  HELD,  that 
the  weight  of  the  shipments  on  the  basis 
on  which  defendants  collected  their 
charges  was  not  shown  to  have  been 
excessive  or  discriminatory.  Taking  into 
consideration  the  dimensions  of  the 
small  crates  and  the  additional  tare  for 
these  packages,  the  estimated  weight  for 
the  smaller  package  based  on  one-third 
of  the  weight  of  the  standard  package 
was  not  sufficient  to  overcome  defend- 
ants' evidence  respecting  the  actual 
weight  of  the  shipments.  Byrnes  v.  A. 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  585,  587. 


(q)  The  petition  alleged  that  un- 
reasonable rates  were  charged  by  the 
defendant  for  the  transportation  of  cer- 
tain carload  shipments  of  counters  and 
shelving  from  Fort  Scott,  Kan.,  to  Mem- 
phis, Tenn.,  and  Lawton,  Okla.  The  west- 
ern classification  provided  a  third-class 
rating  of  45c  per  100  lbs.  on  "lumber  and 
manufactures  of"  from  Fort  Scott  to 
Memphis.  On  furniture,  enumerating  va« 
rious  classes,  there  was  a  rate  of  32i^c, 
minimum  weight  20,000  lbs.  Shelving 
was  not  enumerated  under  the  head  of 
furniture.  HELD,  that  counters  and 
shelving,  being  essentially  store  furni- 
ture and  as  desirable  traffic  as  the  other 
articles  mentioned  in  the  classification 
under  the  item  "furniture,"  should  not 
take  a  higher  rate.  Ireland  &  Rollings  v. 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  590, 
591. 

(r)  Counters  and  shelving  are  essen- 
tially store  furniture  and  are  as  desirable 
traffic  as  other  articles  in  the  classifica- 
tion under  the  item  "furniture;"  the 
transportation  risk  and  service  are  prac- 
tically the  same,  and  they  should  not 
take  higher  rates  than  those  applicable 
to  other  articles  of  store  furniture  spe- 
cifically mentioned.  Ireland  &  Rollings 
V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  590, 
591. 

(s)  Leland's  tariff  established  a  com- 
modity rate  of  60c  on  all  articles  on 
which  ratings  were  carried  under  the 
heading  of  "furniture"  in  the  Western 
Classification;  and  also  a  commodity  rate 
of  73c  on  a  large  list  of  articles,  most  of 
which  were  included  in  the  60c  rate. 
HELD,  that  shelving  should  be  included 
under  furniture  and,  if  so,  would  be  en- 
titled to  the  60c  rate  under  Conference 
Ruling  239,  providing  that  where  a  tariff 
contains  conflicting  rates  the  lower  shall 
be  applied.  Reparation  awarded.  Ire- 
land &  Rollings  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  590,  592. 

(ss)  Complainant  shipped  new  beer 
kegs,  C.  L.,  Milwaukee,  Wis.,  to  Sacra- 
mento, Cal.,  under  a  specific  commodity 
rate  of  $1.35  per  100  lbs.  At  the  same 
time  there  was  a  class  rate  applicable  of 
$1.00  per  100  lbs.  HELD,  that  where  a 
commodity  rate  is  named  in  a  tariff  for 
movement  of  an  article  between  specified 
points,  such  commodity  rate  is  the  lawful 
rate,  and  the  only  one  that  may  used 
with  relation  to  that  traffic  between 
those  points,  even  though  a  class  rate  or 
some  combination  may  make  lower.  How- 


818 


TARIFFS,  §7  (t)— (y) 


ever,  upon  authority  of  R.  R.  Comm.  v. 
S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  238,  rate  held  un- 
reasonable to  the  extent  it  exceeded  $1.00 
per  100  lbs.  Reparation  awarded. 
Goerres  Cooperage  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  5. 

(t)  Complainant  attacked  the  fifth- 
class  rate  of  $1.65  per  100  lbs.  on  a  car- 
load of  incinerator  parts,  Hopkins,  Minn., 
to  Sacramento,  Cal.  The  shipment  con- 
sisted of  a  Decarie  garbage  incinerator 
knocked  down,  which,  with  its  parts  and 
accessories,  were  loaded  upon  two  cars. 
Upon  one  car  were  the  main  refuse 
burner  and  certain  of  ihe  more  bulky 
parts;  upon  the  other  were  a  considerable 
number  cf  parts  and  accessories,  such 
as  plate  iron,  angle  bars,  rivets,  cast- 
ings with  wheels  attached,  a  steam  gauge 
and  caps,  etc.  A  rule  in  the  tariff  stateB 
that  "when  parts  or  pieces  constituting 
one  or  more  complete  articles  are  offered 
to  carriers  for  transportation  at  one  time 
by  one  shipper,  to  one  consignee  and 
destination,  the  rating  provided  for  the 
complete  article,  whether  set  up  or 
knocked  down,  as  specified  in  the  tariff, 
will  be  applied."  A  commodity  rate  of 
95c  per  100  lbs.  applied  to  "refuse  burner 
material,  viz.:  castings  for  grate  bars; 
stands,  draft  doors  and  frames,  and  spelt 
bottom  (opening  for  refuse) ;  plate  iron, 
rolled  and  punched;  angle  bars,  rivets, 
bolts,  sprocket  wheels,  chains;  and  not 
to  exceed  4,000  lbs.  wire  cloth  to  each 
burner."  HELD,  that  the  fifth-class  rate 
was  properly  assessed  and  that  upon  the 
record  no  opinion  was  expressed  whether 
the  maintenance  of  the  commodity  rate 
upon  certain  kinds  of  refuse  burner  ma- 
terial discriminated  against  complain- 
ant. Complaint  dismissed.  Decarie  In- 
cinerator Co.  V.  M.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
21  I.  C.  C.  71. 

(u)     Tariffs  are  to  be   interpreted   ac 
cording    to    the    reasonable    constructio' 
of  the  language;    the  intention     of     the 
framers  and  the  practice  of  the  carriers 
do  not  control.     Bon  Marche  v.  C.  R.  h 
Co.  of  N.  J.,  21  I.  C.  C.  195,  196. 

(v)  Complainant  shipped  enameled 
ware  and  granite  iron  ware  L.  C.  L.,  New- 
ark, N.  J.,  to  Seattle,  Wash.  Charges  of 
$1.80  per  100  lbs.  were  collected.  The 
tariff  provided  a  commodity  rate  of  $1.20 
on  "stamped  ware  agate  or  enameled,  n. 
o.  s.;  also  granite  iron,  n.  o.  s.;  in  boxes, 
barrels  or  crates."  Complainant  argued 
that  the  phrase  "in  boxes,  barrels  oi 
crates"  in  the  commodity  item  modified 


only  the  term  "granite  iron  ware,  n.  o.  s." 
and  did  not  relate  to  the  words  "agate 
or  enameled,  n.  o.  s."  The  rate  of  $1.80 
was  exacted  under  a  tariff  which  read: 
"When  commodity  rates  provide  for 
articles  boxed  and  do  not  provide  for 
the  same  in  crates,  racks,  bails,  bags,  or 
bundles,  they  will  take,  when  shipped  in 
bags,  bails,  or  bundles,  a  50  per  cent 
higher  rate  than  in  boxe§  (when  the 
same  rate  is  provided  for  articles  in 
crates  as  in  boxes;  when  shipped  in  bags^ 
bails,  or  bundles,  they  will  take  50  per 
cent  higher  rates)."  HELD,  that  in  view 
of  the  way  in  which  the  commodity  item 
was  punctuated,  the  phrase  "in  boxes, 
barrels  or  crates"  referred  to  and  mod- 
ified both  of  the  items  which  preceded 
that  phrase;  and  that  under  the  language 
of  the  tariff  the  commodity  rate  applied 
to  a  shipment  packed  in  pulpboard  boxes. 
Reparation  av^arded.  Bon  Marche  v.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  21  I.  C.  C.  195. 

iw)  Where,  on  a  newly  constructed 
line,  the  published  class  rates  contain 
the  provision  that  for  rates  to  and  from 
stations  not  named  therein  rates  to  and 
from  stations  next  beyond  shall  be  ap- 
plied, and  where  between  two  given 
points  from  which  commodity  rates  have 
been  published  there  is  a  point  from 
which  no  rates  are  named,  such  provision 
in  the  class  tariff  cannot  be  extended 
to  the  commodity  tariff.  Wheeler-Holden 
Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  237. 

(x)  Complainant,  a  ranchman,  shipped 
a  mixed  carload  containing  36  spools  of 
barbed  wire  from  Portland,  Ore.,  to 
Chester,  Mont.  The  fourth-class  rate  of 
$1.25  was  assessed  on  the  spool,  but  the 
rate  of  85  cents  on  emigrants'  movables 
was  assessed  on  the  balance  of  the  ship- 
ment. HELD,  that  complainant  was  en- 
titled to  include  in  his  shipment  of  emi- 
grants' movables  a  reasonable  quantity 
of  barbed  wire,  and  the  36  spools  in 
question  were  not  in  excess  of  such  a 
quantity.  Reparation  awarded.  Hood  v. 
G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  246. 

(y)  Even  assuming  that  a  consign- 
ment of  metal  automobile  parts  could 
reasonably  be  described  for  transporta- 
tion purposes  as  machinery,  the  fact  that 
it  is  specifically  described  in  another 
part  of  the  classification  renders  im- 
proper the  application  of  a  rate  limited 
to  machinery  not  otherwise  specified. 
Auto  Vehicle  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Jo.,   21   L   C.   C.  286,   287. 


TARIFFS,  §7  (z)— (ee) 


819 


(z)  A  tariff  carrying  a  rate  on  lum- 
ber, Tiger,  Ga.,  to  Hoboken,  N.  J.,  for  de- 
livery within  the  New  York  lighterage 
limits  does  not  apply  to  a  point  on  the 
"Hoboken  Shore  road,"  so  distant  from 
the  nearest  lighterage  point  that  it  would 
invclve  drayage  if  the  delivery  should 
be  made  by  lighter.  C.  &  W.  Lumber  Co. 
V.  T.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  462. 

(aa)  Reparation-  was  asked  on  a  ship- 
ment of  10,000  lbs.  of  new  furniture  and 
G,600  lbs.  of  framed  wall  looking-glasses 
in  boxes  shipped  from  Rockford,  111.,  to 
San  F'rancisco,  Cal.  Charges  were  col- 
lected on  the  furniture  on  the  minimum 
weight  of  12,000  lbs.  and  on  the  actual 
weight  of  the  looking-glasses.  The  tariff 
contained  the  carload  rating  for  both 
new  furniture  and  looking-glasses.  The 
tariff  provided  that  articles  having  a  car- 
load rate  should  be  shipped  in  mixed 
carloads  at  the  carload  rate  unless  so 
provided.  The  looking-glasses  were  not 
a  part  of  or  to  be  used  in  connection 
with  any  of  the  other  articles  of  furni- 
ture in  the  car.  HELD,  whether  or  not 
the  looking-glasses  were  furniture,  they 
were  separate  and  distinct  articles  for 
which  a  specific  rate  was  provided  and 
the  rates  were  correctly  applied.  O'Brien 
Commercial  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
20  L  C.  C.  68. 

(bb)  Defendants  made  effective  a 
special  commodity  rate  reducing  the 
fifth-class  rate  on  sulphuric  acid  in  or- 
der, evidently,  to  secure  a  large  ship- 
ment. After  one  month  the  class  rate 
was  restored.  HELD,  the  circumstance 
of  the  application  of  a  short  term  com- 
modity rate,  both  before  and  after  which 
the  higher  class  rates  are  assessed,  is 
strongly  suggestive  of  the  old  evil  of 
"midnight  tariffs."  Dupont  De  Nemours 
Powder  Co.  v.  D.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I. 
C.  C.  83,  85. 

(cc)  Complainant  shipped  11  carloads 
of  anthracite  coal,  Chicago,  111.,  to  Stur- 
gis.  S.  D.,  for  use  of  the  United  States 
government  at  Fort  Meade,  S.  D.,  pur- 
chased by  the  United  States  at  a  price 
which  included  delivery  of  the  coal  at 
Sturgis.  Defendant  operates  between 
Chicago  and  Sturgis  248  miles  of  land- 
grant  aided  railroad  over  which  the  gov- 
ernment is  required  to  pay  only  50  per 
cent  of  the  commercial  rate.  The  ship- 
ments, however,  were  assessed  the  pub- 
lished rate  of  $6.80  per  ton.  The  carrier, 
through  error,  quoted  to  complainant  a 
rate   of   $5.9915   per   ton,   the   land-grant 


rate.  This  rate  was  established  subse- 
quent to  the  shipment  of  coal  consigned 
to  the  government  at  Sturgis.  The  rea- 
sonableness of  the  $6.80  rate  was  not 
questioned,  the  propriety  of  the  applica- 
tion of  the  land-grant  rate  to  the  ship- 
ment being  involved.  HELD,  that  it  was 
improper  to  permit  the  benefit  of  special 
rates  on  government  material  to  accrue 
to  anyone  other  than  the  government 
itself.  Reparation  denied.  Havens  & 
Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
156,  158. 

(dd)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload 
of  plows,  Evansville,  Ind.,  to  Huntsville, 
Ala.  Freight  charges  based  on  the  sixth- 
class  rate  of  30c  per  100  lbs.  were  as- 
sessed. The  shipment  contained  1,600 
lbs.  of  plow  handles  and  33,400  lbs.  of 
steel  beam  plows  set  up,  except  that  the 
handles  and  braces  were  removed.  The 
tariff  provided  rates  on  agricultural  im- 
plements sixth  class,  C.  L.,  30c,  plow 
handles,  L.  C.  L.,  fourth  class,  47c;  "spe- 
cial iron,"  a  special  rate  of  23c,  C.  L., 
minimum  24,000  lbs.,  plow  bases  being 
defined  as  special  iron.  The  tariff  also 
provided  that  when  parts  constituting 
complete  articles  were  shipped  they 
would  be  rated  as  provided  for  the  com- 
plete article,  except  when  rated  sep- 
arately in  the  classification.  Subsequent 
to  the  shipment  the  classification  was 
amended  to  provide  that  plow  bases  with 
beams  attached,  L.  C.  L.,  would  take 
fourth-class  rates,  while  plow  bases 
would  take  the  special  iron  rate.  No 
evidence  was  offered  concerning  the  un- 
reasonableness per  se  of  the  charges 
assessed.  HELD,  had  the  beams  been 
detached,  the  L.  C.  L.  rate  could  have 
been  assessed  on  the  handles  and  beams 
and  the  special  iron  rate,  C.  L.,  on  the 
bases,  but  inasmuch  as  there  was  no 
separate  rating  for  bases  with  beams  at- 
tached, the  agricultural  implement  rate 
was  properly  applicable,  and  the  rate 
assessed  was  not  unreasonable.  Repara- 
tion denied.  Thompson  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  161,  162. 

(ee)  Complainant  had  shipped  to  it 
two  carloads  of  news  printing  paper,  Los 
Angeles,  Cal.,  to  Grand  Rapids,  Wis., 
under  a  rate  of  75c  per  100  lbs.  The 
first  car  weighed  about  51,000  lbs.,  the 
second  car  about  2C,000  lbs.,  shipped  dif- 
ferent days  under  separate  bills  of  lading. 
The  minimum  weight  for  each  car  was 
30.000  lbs.  Rule  8  of  Transcontinental 
Freight  Bureau  tariff,  I.  C.  C.  889,  in  force 


820 


TARIFFS,  §7  (ff)— (kk) 


when  shipments  were  made,  provided  that 
when  the  minimum  carload  weight  or 
more  was  shipped  in  one  day  by  one 
consignor  to  one  consignee  covered  by 
one  bill  of  lading,  the  established  rate 
for  a  carload  should  apply  on  the  entire 
lot,  although  it  might  be  less  than  two 
or  more  full  carload  lots.  The  consignor 
was  notified  of  this  rule,  but  loaded  the 
cars  in  the  manner  he  did  instead  of 
loading  two  cars  to  the  full  minimum 
or  shipping  them  on  the  same  day  under 
one  bill  of  lading.  HELD,  complainant 
was  not  entitled  to  reparation  on  the 
second  car  for  the  difference  between  the 
actual  weight  and  the  minimum  weight. 
Consolidated  Water  Power  Co.  v.  S.  P., 
L.  A.  &  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  169. 

(ff)  Complainants  shipped  a  carload  of 
paper  waxed  with  paraffin  and  used  as 
an  inside  lining  for  cartons  containing 
crackers,  and  as  an  outside  wrapper  for 
,  protection  against  moisture,  Bennington, 
Vt.,  to  Portland,  Ore.  The  tariff  carried 
a  rate  of  $1.20  per  100  lbs.  on  wax  or 
gummed  paper  and  75c  on  wrapping  pa- 
per, carriers'  liability  limited  to  5c  per 
lb.  The  shipment  was  released  to  a 
valuation  of  5c  per  100  lbs.  and  billed 
as  wrapping  paper  by  the  initial  line. 
HELD,  the  rate  of  $1.20  was  correctly 
applied.  Complaint  dismissed.  Pacific 
Coast  Biscuit  Co.  v.  O.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  178. 

(gg)  Complainant  shipped  news  print 
paper,  not  printed,  Combined  Locks,  Wis., 
to  Dallas,  Tex.,  under  a  rate  of  85c  on 
printing  paper,  "invoice  value  exceeding 
3^c  per  lb.  or  invoice  value  not  re- 
ceipted for."  The  tariff  carried  a  rate 
of  69c  on  printing  paper,  "invoice  value 
not  exceeding  S^/^c  per  lb.  and  so  re- 
ceipted for."  The  shipment  was  not  re- 
ceipted for  at  a  particular  value,  but 
it  was  worth  less  than  S^/^c  per  lb.  Its 
value  was  unknown  to  the  carrier. 
HELD,  value  is  one  of  the  factors  upon 
which  rates  are  based,  and  where  a  tar- 
iff provides  different  rates  for  property 
dependent  upon  the  value  thereof,  and 
requires  that  the  invoice  value  shall  be 
stated  and  receipted  for  in  order  to  se- 
cure the  lower  rate,  the  complainant 
must  show  compliance  with  the  require- 
ment of  the  tariff  or  that  such  require- 
ment is  unreasonable  before  reparation 
will  be  awarded  on  account  of  the  ex- 
action of  higher  rates  on  a  shipment 
whose  value  does  not  exceed  that  upon 
which  a  lower  rate  would  have  applied 


had  the  value  been  disclosed  to  the  car- 
rier. In  the  absence  of  any  claim  or 
evidence  that  the  condition  in  the  tariff 
is  unjust,  the  mere  fact  that  the  value 
of  the  paper  was  less  than  3i/^c  per  lb. 
is  no  ground  for  awarding  reparation. 
Dells  Paper  &  Pulp  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  419. 

(hh)  Complainant  shipped  materials 
for  use  in  the  manufacture  of  gas 
mantles,  Chicopee  Falls  and  Springfield, 
Mass.,-  to  Portland,  Ore.  The  rate  ex- 
acted was  $3  per  100  lbs.  under  a 
tariff  applying  on  "dry  goods,  N.  O.  S., 
in  bales  or  in  cases."  The  commodity 
shipped  was  cotton  knit  fabrics  or  knit- 
ting f:-:tory  products,  made  by  circular 
knitting  machines,  and  shipped  in  mixed 
lots,  packed  in  boxes  or  cases,  partly 
in  rolls  or  bolts  of  50  to  100  yds.  in 
length,  and  partly  in  parc€ls  cut  to 
lengths  of  eight  inches.  HELD,  that 
the  rate  was  properly  applied  and  that 
the  goods  could  not  be  rated  as  "netting, 
cotton,  N.  O.  S."  Western  Mantle  Co.  v. 
S.  P.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  643. 

(ii)'  The  rate  on  "dry  goods,  N.  O.  S.," 
is  properly  indexed  when  the  term  "dry 
goods"  is  indexed  and  immediately  under 
that  item  in  the  tariff  appears  the  item 
"dry  goods,  N.  O.  S."  Western  Mantle 
Co.  V.  S.  P.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
643,  645. 

(jj)  Complainant  was  the  owner  of 
a  theatrical  and  minstrel  troupe  of  from 
25  to  40  negroes,  who  gave  their  per- 
formances under  a  tent.  To  accommo- 
date the  movement  of  the  members  of 
the  troupe  with  their  paraphernalia  com- 
plainant provided  two  cars,  one  a  Pull- 
man sleeper,  the  other  a  baggage  car. 
The  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  imposed  the  rate  of 
$25  applicable  to  "combination  cars"  as 
a  minimum  charge  upon  the  baggage 
car,  because  it  contained  a  stove  on 
which  cooking  for  the  troupe  was  some- 
times done.  HELD,  that  this  car  was 
generally  treated  by  railroads  of  the 
South  as  a  baggage  car;  that  its  prime 
purpose  was  to  carry  the  baggage  of 
the  troupe,  and  in  the  absence  of  a 
specific  limitation  as  to  its  use  for  re- 
freshment purposes,  it  should  be  trans- 
ported at  the  baggage  car  rate  of  a  $10 
minimum  charge.  Jhappelle  v.  L.  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  56,  58. 

(kk)  A  declaration  by  the  shipper  in 
the  invoice  as  to  what  the  shipments 
are  is  not  conclusive  of  that  question. 
The  tariff  application  is  to  be  construed 


TARIFFS,  §7  (11)— (tt) 


821 


with  reference  to  what  articles  actually 
comprised  the  shipment.  Ohio  Foundry 
Co.  V.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.  65,  67. 

(11)  Complainant  shipped  mixed  car- 
loads of  gas  and  coal,  fireplaces  and 
grates,  Steubenville,  O.,  to  San  Fran- 
cisco, Cal.  On  seven  shipments  which 
moved  prior  to  Jan.  1,  1909,  charges 
were  collected  under  a  rate  of  $1.45  per 
100  lbs.,  while  a  rate  of  $1.50  was  ex- 
acted on  the  remaining  four  shipments 
which  moved  subsequent  to  that  date. 
The  shipments  were  invoiced  as  gas 
grates,  but  by  stipulation  the  real  facts 
were  admitted.  The  tariff  showed  two 
rates,  one  of  $1.35  and  one  of  $1.45  on 
"iron  fireplaces  and  grates  for  same, 
N.  O.  S.,  made  of  wrougnt  or  cast  iron." 
HELD,  that  where  the  tariff  carries 
two  rates  for  the  same  article  the  ship- 
per should  not  be  charged  the  higher 
rate;  that  the  charges  exacted  were  un- 
reasonable to  the  amount  they  exceeded 
$1.35  per  100  lbs.  on  shipments  moving 
prior  to  Jan.  1,  1909,  and  in  excess  of 
$1.40  per  100  lbs.  on  subsequent  ship- 
ments. Reparation  awarded.  Ohio  Foun- 
dry Co.  V.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
I.   C.   C.   65,   67. 

(mm)  A  declaration  by  the  shipper 
in  the  invoices  that  the  shipments  were 
"gas  grates"  is  not  conclusive  of  the 
question  of  what  the  shipments  actually 
are.  The  tariff  application  is  to  be  con- 
strued with  reference  to  what  articles 
actually  compris-e  the  shipments.  Ohio 
Foundry  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  65,  67. 

(nn)  Complainant  shipped  cotton  lin- 
ters,  Barnwell,  S.  C,  to  Pawtucket,  R.  I., 
under  a  rate  of  78^/4c  per  100  lbs.  Prior 
to  the  shipment  complainant  inquired 
of  the  initial  carrier  the  lowest  rate 
and  was  told  that  when  the  value  was 
limited  to  2c  per  lb.  the  rail-and-water 
rate  was  53c  and  tne  all-rail  rate  54c. 
Thereupon  complainant  made  out  its  own 
bills  of  lading  reading  "all-rail  53c," 
and  they  were  signed  by  the  agent  of 
the  carrier,  with  full  knowledge  on  his 
part  that  the  shipper  desired  the  rate 
on  cotton  linters  released  to  the  valua- 
tion of  2c  per  lb.,  but  neglected  to  in- 
dorse upon  them  any  notation  of  the 
released  valuation.  HELD,  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  defendants  to  secure  tue 
shipper's  signature  to  the  released 
valuation  clause,  and  that  the  proper 
rate     to     apply     was     54c.       Reparation 


awarded.      Southern    Cotton    Oil    Co.    v. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  79. 

(oo)  Rockhouse,  Ky.,  is  four  miles 
farther  from  Brockwayville,  Pa.,  than 
Marrowbone,  Ky.,  which  carried  a  rate  of 
18.5c  per  100  lbs.  to  that  point  on  oak 
cross-ties,  C.  L.  The  rate  from  Rockhouse 
was  20.5c.  Shipments  were  billed  from 
Marrowbone,  notwithstanding  their 
origin  at  and  movement  from  Rock- 
house, and  complainant  contended  that, 
owing  to  that  fact,  the  Marrowbone 
rate  was  applicable.  HELD,  the  con- 
tention was  untenable.  Preston  v.  C. 
&   O.  Ry.   Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  406,  407. 

(pp)  The  actual  point  of  origin,  and 
not  the  point  from  which  the  shipment 
was  billed,  determined  the  rate.  Pres- 
ton V.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  406, 
407. 

(qq)  No  through  route  and  joint 
rate  exists  where  one  of  the  connecting 
roads  does  not  file  the  tariff  with  the 
Commission.  Fish  &  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C. 
&   St.  L.  R.   R.   Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  452,  453. 

(rr)  A  combination  cannot  be  applied 
to  shipments  moving  via  one  carrier 
which  is  effective  only  via  the  line  of 
a  competing  carrier.  Webster  Grocer 
Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
493,  495. 

(ss)  Complainant  purchased  an  ex- 
change scrip  book  under  a  tariff  provi- 
sion that  provided  for  redemption  of 
the  cover  or  unused  tickets  within  a 
specified  time.  The  tariff  carrying  these 
provisions  was  not  filed  in  that  time 
and  was  also  defective  in  other  par- 
ticulars. Complainant  mislaid  the  book 
and  could  not  tender  it  for  redemption 
within  the  time  limit.  HELD,  complain- 
ant was  entitled  to  redemption  for  the 
unused  tickets  in  the  book,  since  the 
error  in  the  tariff  made  the  time  limit 
invalid.  Rickel  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,   19   I.   C.  C.  499. 

(tt)  Complainant  shipped  whole  and 
ground  chile  pepper  from  various  Cali- 
fornia points  to  El  Paso,  Tex.,  under 
the  second-class  rate  of  $2  per  100  lbs.. 
Western  Classification.  At  the  same 
time  there  was  in  effect  a  commodity 
rate  of  $1.25  per  100  lbs.  upon  pepper. 
Western  Classification  specifically  ap- 
plied second-class  rating  on  pepper,  also 
upon  chile,  ground  or  in  the  natural 
state,  and  upon  chile  powder.  HELD, 
the  commodity  rate  should  be  applied 
strictly,  and  where  in  the  original  clas- 


822 


TARIFFS,  §7  (uu)— (aaa) 


sification  provision  is  separately  made 
for  two  articles  closely  resembling  each 
other  in  form  and  nature,  and  a  com- 
modity rate  is  subsequently  established 
naming  one  of  such  articles,  the  com- 
modity rate  so  established  cannot  be 
applied  on  the  similar  article  specifically 
named  in  the  classification,  but  not  spe- 
cifically named  in  the  commodity  tariff. 
Crombie  &  Co.  v.  S".  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
561,  562. 

(uu)  Complainant  shipped  iron  dry- 
ing racks,  C.  L.,  1V2  ft.  long,  31/2  ft. 
wide,  5y2  ft.  high,  consisting  merely  ol 
a  framework  divided  in  the  middle  by 
a  vertical  skeleton  partition  into  two 
compartments,  into  each  of  which,  rest- 
ing upon  narrow  ledges,  might  be  placed 
a  number  of  shallow  pans  for  use  in 
drying  or  otherwise  treating  articles. 
The  Official  Classification  rated  "drying 
racks"  double  first  class,  L.  C.  L..,  no 
provision  being  made  for  C.  L.  ship- 
me-ts.  It  alpo  rated  "racks,  n.  o.  s.," 
C.  L.,  second  class.  HELD,  complain- 
ant was  entitled  to  the  second-class  rate 
on  the  shipment.  Day  Co.  v.  B.  &  O. 
S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  577. 

(vv)  On  Nov.  3,  1906,  a  tariff  fixed 
a  rate  of  $1.10  on  "glass,  rough  rolled, 
vault  or  sidewalk  and  skylight,  and 
similar  rough  rolled  glass,  n.  o.  s."  Aug. 
10,  1907,  this  tariff  was  amended,  fixing 
a  rate  of  $1.25  on  "rough  rolled  glass, 
ribbed  or  wired."  HELD,  the  term 
"skylight  glass"  in  the  tariff  of  Nov. 
3  was  not  so  specific  as  that  of  "wired 
or  ribbed  glass"  in  the  tariff  of  Aug.  10, 
and  that  shipments  of  rough  rolled 
ribbed  and  wired  skylight  glass  should 
take  the  $1.25  rate,  since  the  Aug,  10 
tariff  took  these  articles  out  of  the 
operation  of  the  tariff  of  Nov.  3.  The 
term  "skylight"  being  descriptive  and 
having  relation  to  the  use  to  which  the 
glass  was  to  be  put  by  the  consignee 
could  not  be  considered  controlling  over 
the  specific  provisions  of  the  tariff  mak- 
ing rates  applicable  to  separate  kinds 
of  glass.  Fuller  &  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18 
I.   C.   C.   202,   204. 

(ww)  Where  cars  are  consigned  to 
a  certain  point  and  then  reshipped  and 
there  is  no  tariff  provision  for  a  recon- 
signment  privilege  at  that  point,  the 
full  combinations  on  that  point  must 
be  applied.  Marshall  &  Michel  Grain 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C. 
C.  228,  230. 


(xx)  On  a  carload  of  folding  chairs 
from  Chicago,  111.,  to  St,  Joseph,  Mo., 
defendant  collected  the  third-class  rate 
of  45c.  Defendant's  assistant  general 
freight  agent  and  the  officials  of '  the 
Western  Ry.  Ass'n  and  Inspection  Bu- 
reau stated  that  the  fourth-class  rate 
applying  to  furniture  should  have  been 
applied  to  the  shipments  in  question. 
HELD,  error  in  applying  the  class  rate 
having  been  made,  complainant  was 
entitled  to  reparation  on  the  basis  of 
the  lower  rate.  Royal  INIetal  Mfg.  Co. 
V.  C.  G.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  255, 
256. 

(yy)  On  a  less-than-carload  shipment 
from  Fort  Wayne,  Ind.,  to  Beloit,  Wis., 
of  "triplex  cloth"  or  "triplex  covert,"  a 
manufactured  article  composed  of  cot- 
ton cloth  and  cotton  shoddy  held  to- 
gether with  a  composition  of  rubber, 
the  rate  on  cotton  piece  goods  was  ap- 
plied. The  goods  in  question  differed 
altogether  from  cotton  piece  goods  in 
appearance,  weight,  texture  and  use. 
HELD,  the  rate  applied  was  improper, 
and  the  first-class  rate  governing  "dry 
goods,  n.  o.  s,,"  should  have  been  ap- 
plied. Rosenblatt  &  Rosenblatt  v.  C.  & 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  261,  263. 

(zz)  The  rates  on  bran  from  Minne- 
apolis to  Marshfield,  Amherst  and  other 
Wisconsin  points  was  10c.  The  tariffs 
provided  that  a  reconsignment  of  the 
car  might  be  made  to  a  point  beyond 
on  the  direct  line  without  additional 
charge.  Complainant  on  a  car  from 
Minneapolis  to  Amherst  reconsigned  the 
same  upon  arrival  at  Amherst  to  Marsh- 
field,  so  as  to  call  for  a  back  haul,  and 
was  charged  an  additional  rate  of  10c 
for  the  haul  from  Amherst  to  Marsh- 
field.  No  evidence  was  offered  to  show 
the  reconsignment  tariffs  or  the  pub- 
lished rates  exacted  to  be  unreasonable. 
HELD,  under  the  tariff  as  published 
complainant  was  not  entitled  to  the  re- 
consignment privilege.  The  charges  be- 
ing collected  in  accordance  with  the 
published  rate,  the  complaint  should  be 
lismissarl.  Lull  v.  M.  St.  P,  &  S.  Ste. 
M.  Ry.  Co.,  18  1.  C.  C,  355,  356. 

(aaa)  The  tariff,  naming  the  inbound 
rate  to  the  point  where  reconsignment 
is  availed  of,  must  be  used  to  ascertain 
what  privileges,  if  any,  are  extended  in 
the  way  of  reconsignment.  Townley 
Metal  &  Hardware  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &•  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  378.  379. 


TARIFFS,   §7    (bbb)  — (kkk) 


823 


(bbb)  It  is  necessary  to  specifically 
provide  in  tariffs  that  cement  and  nails 
going  with  roofing  material  may  be  in- 
cluded in  making  shipments  of  the  latter 
so  as  to  make  the  mixed  shipment  take 
the  roofing  material  rate.  Chatfield  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  385. 
387. 

(ccc)  The  Southern  Classification  ap- 
plied the  sixth  class  rate  upon  "chains." 
Under  the  head  of  "machinery,"  conveyor 
chains,  sprocket  chains,  etc.,  were  rated 
sixth  class.  A  special  commodity  rate 
of  26c  between  East  Moline,  111.,  and 
New  Orleans,  La.,  the  points  in  question, 
was  included  in  the  published  tariffs  and 
applied  to  "chains,  packed,"  in  carloads. 
The  sixth  class  rate  of  41c  was  exacted. 
HELD,  the  special  commodity  rate  pub- 
lished did  not  apply  to  a  shipment  of 
"iron  conveyor  chains,  sprocket,  some- 
times called  link  belting,"  since  sprocket 
chains,  being  used  for  an  entirely  dif- 
ferent purpose  and  of  much  greater  value 
than  ordinary  chains,  could  not  be  held 
by  the  commodity  tariff  to  be  separated 
from  the  general  machinery  rate.  Wood- 
ward, Wight  &  Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  500,  501. 

(ddd)  A  combination  rate  may  not 
be  used  where  the  factors  are  not  filed 
with  the  Commission.  Hagar  Iron  Co. 
V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  529. 

(eee)  On  a  carload  of  electrical  hoist- 
ing machinery  and  elevator  controllers, 
which  were  parts  of  the  hoisting  ma- 
chinery, complainant  was  assessed  on  a 
shipment  from  Yonkers,  N.  Y.,  to  San 
Francisco,  Cal.,  $1.40  on  the  machinery 
and  $3  per  100  lbs.  on  the  elevator  con- 
trollers, the  latter  rate  being  the  first- 
class  rate  on  less  than  carload  shipments 
of  electrical  appliances  and  supplies, 
n.  o.  s.,  in  boxes  or  barrels.  The  tariff 
provided  that  the  $1.40  rate  should  apply 
on  hoisting  machines,  s.  u.  or  k.  d.,  also 
parts  th-ereof  as  named  and  parts  n.  o.  s., 
straight  or  mixed  carloads.  HELD,  the 
whole  shipment  should  have  taken  the 
$1.40  rate.  Reparation  awarded  on  that 
basis.  Otis  Elevator  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  & 
H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  3,  5. 

(fff)  Where  the  language  of  a  tariff 
is  ambiguous  in  its  specifications,  and 
when  there  is  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to 
its  true  import  and  meaning,  a  private 
agreement  may  be  examined  and  em- 
ployed   as    a   medium    of    explanation    of 


the  tariff  to  remove  the  ambiguity.   Hood 
&  Sons  v.  D.  &  H.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  15,  19. 

(ggg)  Under  a  published  tariff  fixing 
a  rate  on  milk  of  "$16  per  car  of  250 
cans  or  less,  excess  over  250  cans  to  be 
charged  for  at  6i/^c  per  can,"  the  6i/^c 
per  can  rate  applies  only  on  cans  in 
excess  of  250  shipped  in  the  same  car 
and  not  to  those  shipped  in  a  second  car. 
Hood  &  Sons  v.  D.  &  H.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
15,  19. 

(hhh)  The  So.  Ry.  Eastern  Vegetable 
Tariff  No.  6,  I.  C.  C.  No.  10067,  estab- 
lishing a  rate  of  32c  on  vegetables,  does 
not  apply  on  traffic  handled  by  the  At- 
lantic Coast  Despatch,  but  only  to  traffic 
originating  on  the  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  and 
handled  in  connection  with  the  So.  Ry. 
Voorhees  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
45,  46. 

(iii)  The  through  commodity  rate  on 
sawdust  in  carloads  from  Duluth,  Minn., 
to  Andover,  S.  D.,  was  16c.  The  com- 
modity rate  from  Duluth  to  St.  Paul  was 
4c,  and  the  distance  tariff  rate  from  St. 
Paul  to  Andover  8i/^c.  At  the  time  of 
shipment  there  was  no  published  tariff 
authorizing  the  application  of  the  dis- 
tance tariff  rates  to  local  shipments. 
HELD,  on  the  shipment  in  question  the 
distance  tariff  could  not  be  applied,  and 
the  only  lawful  charge  was  the  through 
commodity  rate  of  16c.  Diehl  v.  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  190,  191. 

(jjj)  Defendant  carrier  had  no  line 
from  Duluth  to  St.  Paul  and  no  arrange- 
ment for  running  its  trains  over  other 
lines  between  these  points.  Its  through 
rate  on  sawdust  in  carloads  from  Duluth 
via  St.  Paul  to  Andover,  S.  D.,  was  16c. 
Its  distance  tariff  rate  from  St.  Paul  to 
Andover  was  8i/^c.  Defendant  filed  a 
supplemental  tariff  applying  the  distance 
tariff  rate  between  stations  on  its  line 
in  an  endeavor  to.  lower  the  Duluth  to 
Andover  rate.  HELD,  the  publication  of 
the  supplemental  tariff  did  not  effect  the 
result  desired,  and  the  only  lawful 
through  rate  from  Duluth  to  Andover  was 
the  rate  of  16c.  Diehl  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  190,  191. 

(kkk)  Starch  is  an  uncooked  product 
of  porn  and  cannot,  except  by  specific 
exception,  properly  be  excluded  from  i», 
cariff  list  which  includes  "all  uncooked 
manufactured  products  of  corn,"  nor 
from  a  list  which  includes  "all  uncooked 
grain    or    cereal    products    manufactured 


824 


TARIFFS,  §7  (111)— (sss) 


from   corn.     Douglas   &   Co.   v.   C.   R.   I- 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  232,  244. 

(Ill)  Tarilfs  are  to  he  construed  ac 
cording  to  their  language.  The  intent 
of  the  framers  does  not  control.  New- 
ton Gum  Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 
16  I.   C.  C.  341,  346. 

(mmm)  The  law  compels  carriers  to 
publish  and  post  their  schedules  of 
charges  upon  the  theory  that  they  will 
be  informative.  The  shipper  who  con- 
sults them  has  a  right  to  rely  upon  the 
obvious  meaning.  He  cannot  be  charged 
with  knowledge  of  the  intention  of  the 
framers,  or  the  carrier's  canons  of  con- 
struction, or  of  some  other  tariff  not 
even  referred  to  in  the  one  carrying 
the  rate.  The  public  posting  of  tariffs 
will  be  largely  useless  if  the  carrier's 
interpretation  is  to  be  dependent  upon 
tradition  and  the  arbitrary  practices  of 
a  general  freight  office.  Newton  Gum  Co. 
V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
341,   346. 

(nnn)  A  shipper  cannot  be  charged 
with  knowledge  of  the  intent  of  the 
framers  of  schedules  or  the  carrier's 
canons  of  construction.  Newton  Gum 
Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  O. 
341,    346. 

(ooo)  On  carloads  of  show  cases 
from  Quincy,  111.,  to  San  Francisco,  Cal., 
complainants  were  assessed  $3  per  100 
lbs.,  which  was  the  first-class  rate,  and 
was  set  forth  as  applying  to  showcases 
In  the  Western  Classification.  The 
Transcontinental  Freight  Bureau  west- 
bound tariff  provided  that  "Furniture 
(new),  all  kinds,"  should  take  a  rate 
of  $2.20.  Defendants  contended  that 
showcases,  being  provided  for  sepa- 
rately in  the  Western  Classification, 
were  not  included  in  the  heading  of 
furniture  in  the  commodity  tariff.  De- 
fendants recognized  liquor  cases  and 
grocery  display  counters  as  furniture  by 
listing  them  under  that  caption,  under 
the  Western  Classification.  HELD,  il 
defendants  desired  that  the  application 
of  the  commodity  rate  on  furniture,  as 
carried  in  the  commodity  tariff,  should 
be  restricted  to  the  carload  list  of  fur- 
niture in  the  current  classification  tar- 
iff, they  should  so  stipulate  in  their 
tariffs,  but  that  the  $2.20  commodity 
rate  applied  to  the  shipments  in  ques- 
tion. Reparation  awarded.  Newton  Gum 
Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
341,    346,    347. 


(ppp)  A  distance  tariff  is  to  be  ap- 
plied only  when  no  other  rates  are  pro- 
vided, or  when,  under  a  special  provi- 
sion in  the  tariff  therefor,  it  makes 
lower  than  the  specific  rate  shown  in 
the  same  tariff.  Lee-Warren  Milling  Co. 
V.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  422, 
423. 

(qqq)  Defendants'  rates  on  animal 
traps  from  Niles,  Mich.,  to  Chicago 
were,  in  bundles,  first-class  rate  of  22c; 
in  barrels  or  boxes,  third-class  rate 
of  17c.  On  a  shipment  in  crates  com- 
plainant was  assessed  the  22c  rate. 
HELD,  the  published  tariff  did  not  au- 
thorize the  shipment  to  be  rated  as 
third  class,  so  as  to  take  the  17c  rate, 
but  it  should  be  amended  to  include 
crates,  and  the  17c  rate  established  for 
the  future.  Reddick  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
16  L   C.   C.   492. 

(rrr)  On  carload  shipments  of  tee 
rails,  or  elevator  guides,  from  Chicago 
to  Portland,  Ore.,  complainant  was  as- 
sessed the  $1.40  rate  applicable  to  ma- 
chinery and  machines.  At  the  time  of 
shipment  the  published  tariff  provided 
a  rate  of  75c  on  tee  rails  and  other  iron 
and  steel  articles.  About  one  year 
after  shipment  a  supplemental  tariff 
was  filed  naming  a  rate  of  75c  on  ele- 
vator guides.  There  was  evidence  this 
supplemental  tariff  was  intended  to  con- 
firm the  application  of  the  iron  and 
steel  tariff  to  elevator  guides.  HELD, 
the  shipments  should  have  taken  the 
75c  rate.  Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  that  rate..  Otis  Elevator  Co.  v. 
C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  502,  504. 

(sss)  Complainant  constructed  a 
dredging  machine,  except  the  spud  and 
ladder  frame  belonging  to  same,  the 
construction  of  which  parts  was  sublet 
to  another  company,  which,  at  the  di- 
rection of  complainant,  shipped  same 
separately  on  four  cars  from  Chicago  to 
Oroville,  Cal.  The  spud  was  61  ft.  3 
in.  long,  weighing  23,295  lbs.,  the  ladder 
being  66  ft.  long,  weighing  53,575  lbs. 
The  spud  and  ladder  were  fitted  and 
shipped,  ready  to  be  fastened  into  place 
in  the  dredging  machine.  Ine  descrip- 
tion of  articles  included  in  the  bridge 
material  and  iron  and  steel  articles  tar- 
iffs did  not  fit  the  spud  and  ladder,  and 
no  tariff  description  fitted  same  except 
class  A  rate  of  the  machinery  and  ma- 
chines tariff,  which  called  for  a  rate  of 
$1.53  per  100  lbs.  HELD,  complainant 
was  properly  assessed  the  $1.53  rate  and 


TARIFFS,  §7   (ttt)— (aaaa) 


825 


was  not  entitled  to  reparation  on  the 
basis  of  the  75c  rate  included  in  the 
iron  and  steel  articles  tariff.  Link-Belt 
Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
566,   568. 

(ttt)  Carriers  and  shippers  must 
take  the  specific  rates  and  fares  pro- 
vided in  the  tariffs,  regardless  of  any 
long-and-short-haul  clauses,  maxima 
rules,  alternative  rate  or  fare  provisions, 
etc.,  contained  in  them.  Williamson  v. 
O.   S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  228. 

(uuu)  A  tariff  fixing  a  rate  on  "emi- 
grant movables,"  and  including  as  such 
household  goods  limited  quantities  of 
lumber,  and  "property  included  in  the 
outfit  of  intended  settlers,"  permits  the 
shipper  to  include  in  his  carload  of 
household  goods  5,165  lbs.  of  cord  wooKi 
intended  for  fuel  and  not  intended  for 
sale  or  speculation.  Place  v.  T.  P.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  543,  545. 

(vw)  It  is  as  necessary  and  proper 
to  include  fuel  wood  in  emigrant  mov- 
ables as  to  include  fence  posts.  Place 
V.  T.  P.  &.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  543, 

545. 

(www)  Tariffs  reading  "between"  are 
always  understood  to  apply  in  either  di- 
rection. Advance  Thresher  Co,  v.  O.  & 
N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  599,  600. 

(xxx)  A  tariff  appeared  upon  its 
face  to  make  a  joint  rate  of  20.5c  per 
100  lbs.  on  gas  plant  machinery,  Warren, 
Pa.,  to  Cadillac  and  Jennings,  Mich., 
via  Buffalo.  In  a  note  appearing  on 
the  tariff  to  which  reference  was  made 
by  the  letter  "f"  opposite  Warren,  it 
was  stated  that  unless  covered  by 
agreed  percentages  through  rates  must 
not  be  quoted  from  Warren.  The  points 
between  which  percentages  had  been 
agreed  upon  by  the  connecting  carriers 
were  not  named  in  the  tariff  or  filed 
with  the  Commission.  HELD,  such 
method  of  tariff  construction  violated 
section  6  of  the  Act,  and  the  same  must 
be  reissued  by  defendants  so  as  to  ac- 
cord with  the  rules  prescribed  by  the 
Commission.  Struthers-Wells  Co.  v. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  291,  292. 

(yyy)  Where  a  tariff  duly  filed  with 
the  Commission  bears  an  I.  C.  C.  num- 
ber and  states  that  the  rates  contained 
therein  will  apply  between  Louisville, 
Ky.,  and  New  Albany,  Ind.,  on  through 
business,  and  another  local  tariff  apply- 
ing   to    freight    between    Louisville    and 


New  Albany  is  in  force,  the  former  tar- 
iff governs  through  business  destined 
to  New  Albany  from  points  south  of 
Louisville  and  business  originating  north 
of  New  Albany  and  destined  to  Louis- 
ville. R.  R.  Com.  of  Ind.  v.  K.  &  I.  B. 
&  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  563,  565. 

(zzz)  On  a  carload  of  coal  from 
Springfield,  111.,  to  Leona,  Kan.,  a  rate 
of  10.0013c  was  assessed.  Springfield 
took  the  same  rate  as  Peoria.  The  tar- 
iffs provided  that  the  rates  from  St. 
Louis  should  be  10c  per  100  lbs.  except 
on  shipments  originating  beyond.  In 
such  case  the  rates  from  Mississippi 
River  points  would  be  Ic  per  100  lbs. 
less  than  such  10c  rate.  The  same  tar- 
iff on  another  page  also  provided  that 
in  making  rates  from  Peoria  to  points 
listed  on  a  certain  page  a  differential  of 
.0013c  should  be  added  to  the  rates  apply- 
ing from  St.  Louis.  HELD,  under  such 
tariff  the  rate  from  Springfield  and  Pe- 
oria was  in  the  nature  of  a  specific 
rate  and  was  10.0013,  not  9.0013.  Lan- 
ing-Harris  Coal  &  Grain  Co.  v.  St.  Jo- 
seph &  Grand  Island  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C. 
C.  317,  318. 

(aaaa)  In  every  instance  where  a 
commodity  rate  is  named  in  a  tariff  upon 
a  commodity  and  between  specified 
points,  such  commodity  rate  is  the  law- 
ful rate  and  the  only  rate  that  can  be 
used  with  relation  to  that  traffic  between 
those  points  even  though  a  class  rate  or 
some  combination  may  make  lower.  The 
naming  of  a  commodity  rate  on  any  arti- 
cle or  character  of  traffic  takes  such  ar- 
ticles or  traffic  entirely  out  of  the  classi- 
fication and  out  of  the  class  rates  be- 
tween the  points  to  which  such  com- 
modity rate  applies.  Porter  v.  St.  L.  & 
S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  1,  5. 

(aaaaa)  On  an  emigrant  outfit  from 
Fletcher,  Okla.,  to  Bovina,  Tex.,  over  the 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  to  Quanah,  Tex., 
thence  via  the  F.  W.  &  D.  C.  Ry.  to 
Amarillo,  Tex.,  and  thence  over  the  P. 
&  N.  T.  Ry,  to  Bovina,  complainant  was 
assessed  68c  per  100  lbs.  No  through  rate 
was  applicable  from  Fletcher  to  Bovina. 
The  undisputed  rate  from  Fletcher  to 
Amarillo  was  35c.  The  tariff  named  a 
commodity  rate  from  Amarillo,  Tex.,  to 
Roswell,  N.  M.,  and  intermediate  points, 
of  25c.  Bovina  was  an  intermediate  point. 
This,  added  to  the  37c  rate,  made  a  total 
charge  of  62c  from  Fletcher  to  Bovina. 
The  same  tariff  provided  that  on  ship- 
ments received  from  connecting  lines  at 


826 


TARIFFS,  §7  (bbbb)  — (eeee) 


Amarillo,  when  coming  from  or  destined 
to  points  without  the  state  of  Texas,  a 
rate  of  31c  should  be  applied  for  dis- 
tances over  80  miles.  Bovina  is  80  miles 
from  Amarillo.  HELD,  the  lawfully  ap- 
plicable rate  was  62c,  made  up  of  37c 
from  Fletcher  to  Amarillo  and  25c  from 
Amarillo  to  Bovina  under  the  following 
rules  of  the  Commission:  (1)  Rule  5.  If 
no  specific  rate  from  point  of  origli 
to  destination  pending  a  through  ship- 
ment is  provided,  and  no  specific  manner 
of  constructing  a  combination  rate  for 
it  is  prescribed,  the  lowest  combination 
of  rates  applicable  via  the  route  over 
which  the  shipment  moves  is  the  lawful 
rate  for  that  shipment.  (2)  Rule  7.  The 
naming  of  a  commodity  rate  on  any  ar- 
ticle or  character  of  traffic  takes  such 
article  or  traffic  entirely  out  of  the  classi- 
fication and  out  of  the  class  rates  be- 
tween the  points  to  which  such  com- 
modity rate  applies.  (3)  Rule  10.  It  is 
permissible  for  a  carrier  to  issue  a  dis- 
tance tariff  for  use  in  determining  the 
rates  on  its  own  lines,  but  only  in  cases 
where  no  other  rates  are  provided.  Por- 
ter V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
1,  4. 

(bbbb)  After  the  passage  of  the  Hep- 
burn Act  the  rule  of  the  Commission 
was  not  that  clauses  applying  rates  to 
intermediate  points  should  be  eliminated 
from  tariffs  and  the  specific  points  be 
mentioned,  but  that  indefinite  and  un- 
certain "intermediate"  and  "maxima" 
rules  should  be  amended  so  as  to  make 
their  application  affirmative  and  definite 
and  to  state  plainly  what  rates  should 
be  applied  at  intermediate  points  instead 
of  saying  that  certain  rates  "should  not 
be  exceeded"  at  said  points.  White 
Water  Farms  Co.  v.  P.  B.  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 
13  I.   C.   C.  526,  527. 

(bbbbb  On  rye  originating  at  Mani- 
towoc, Wis.,  and  delivered  to  the  de- 
fendant at  West  Fairport,  O.,  for  trans- 
portation to  Baltimore  complainant  was 
assessed  storage  and  insurance  charges 
on  the  grain  at  West  Fairport.  Defen- 
dant's tariffs  provided  that  when  grain 
was  left  at  West  Fairport  for  immedi- 
ate shipment  the  storage  or  insurance 
charges  should  be  borne  by  defendant; 
but  that  when  ordered  stored  by  the 
shipper  to  be  later  moved  at  the  ship- 
per's direction,  they  should  be  borne  by 
the  shipper.  Complainant  and  defend- 
ant misunderstood  each  other,  and  their 
minds  never  met  on  the  question  as  to 


whether  the  rye  was  to  be  detained  at 
West  Fairport  or  shipped  out  immedi- 
ately. On  account  of  the  shortage  of 
cars  it  was  stored  for  some  time  at 
that  point.  The  tariffs  provided  that 
"grain  will  be  considered  as  for  imme- 
diate shipment  (as  promptly  as  car  sup- 
ply will  permit),  unless  otherwise  or- 
dered." HELD,  in  the  absence  of  spe- 
cific directions  from  complainant  order- 
ing the  detention  at  West  Fairport,  th€ 
rye  must  be  considered  as  destined  for 
immediate  shipment  from  that  point, 
Reparation  awarded.  England  v.  B.  & 
O.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  614,  618. 

(cccc)  Defendants  had  in  effect  two 
tariffs  on  nitrate  of  soda  from  New  Or- 
leans, La.,  to  Fort  Smith  and  Fenn, 
Ark.,  one  naming  a  rate  of  20c  when 
this  commodity  was  to  be  used  exclu- 
sively in  the  manufacture  of  fertilizer, 
and  the  other  naming  a  rate  of  27c 
when  it  was  to  be  used  in  the  manufac- 
ture of  powder.  No  fertilizer  was,  in 
fact,  manufactured  at  either  Fenn  or 
Fort  Smith.  The  27c  rate  was  applic- 
able to  many  other  points  where  powder 
was  made.  Complainant,  being  assessed 
the  27c  rate,  asked  for  reparation  on  the 
basis  of  the  20c  rate.  HELD,  the  2iC 
rate  was  the  only  one  lawfully  applic- 
able to  the  shipments  in  question.  Repa- 
ration denied.  Fort  Smith  Traffic  Bu- 
reau V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I. 
C.    C.   651,   656. 

(ccccc)  A  shipment  consisted  of  a 
traction  engine,  pump  and  hose,  and  tank 
wagon.  The  tank  wagon,  being  the  con- 
tainer of  the  fuel  of  the  engine,  should 
have  been  considered  a  part  of  the  en- 
gine shipment  and  charges  assessed  ac- 
cordingly. Minneapolis  Threshing  Ma- 
chine Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  452. 

(dddd)  Where  there  are  no  through 
rates,  local  published  rates  suffice — lo- 
cals and  proportionals.  Foster,  Glassel 
Co.  V.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  121  La.  1053, 
1057,  46  So.  1014. 

(eeee)  If  there  is  no  through  rate 
provided  from  point  of  origin  to  destina- 
tion of  a  through  shipment,  the  lowest 
combination  of  local  rates  via  the  route 
over  which  the  shipment  moves  is  the 
lawful  rate,  despite  the  erroneous  rating 
given  by  the  railroad  clerk  or  agent. 
Foster,  Glassel  Co.  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
121  La.  1053,  1057,  46  So.  1014. 


TARIFFS,  §7   (ffff)— §8   (b) 


827 


(ffff)  A  shipment  was  billed  by 
plaintiff's  agent  as  emigrant  movables. 
HELD,  that  the  designation  covered 
plaintiff's  goods,  consisting  of  typewriter, 
dictionary,  wearing  apparel,  trunk  and 
personal  effects,  and  was  not  a  falsifica- 
tion or  misrepresentation  which  estopped 
plaintiff  from  claiming  the  value  of  those 
goods;  nor  w^as  such  designation  of  the 
goods  a  violation  of  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Act,  as  amended  June  18,  1910. 
O'Connor  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  (Minn.,  1912), 
136   N.    W.   743,   745. 

(gggg)  An  interstate  rate  filed  and 
published  with  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  named  a  charge  of  $1.20 
for  peaches  in  carloads,  contained  in 
baskets  covered  with  gauze  netting,  and 
a  charge  of  90c  in  baskets  with  wood 
covers,  in  crates  or  in  boxes.  A  layer 
of  peach  baskets  was  placed  by  the 
shipper  on  the  floor  of  the  car;  cross- 
pieces  were  nailed  to  the  upright  posts, 
and  then  a  new  floor  was  nailed  to 
these  cross-pieces  just  above  the  first 
tier  of  baskets;  then  another  tier  of 
baskets  was  placed  on  this  new  floor; 
then  new  cross-pieces  were  nailed  to 
the  upright  posts  and  a  new  floor  laid 
over  the  second  course  of  baskets,  and 
so  on  to  the  top  of  the  car.  Each  end 
of  the  car,  when  so  filled  in,  was 
boarded  up  and  nailed,  so  as  to  form 
a  sort  of  box  at  each  end  of  the  car. 
HELD,  the  $1.20  rate  applying  to  baskets 
with  gauze  netting  was  properly  col- 
lected. Houseman  v.  Fargo  (N.  Y., 
1910),  124  N.  Y.  Supp.  1086,  1088. 

(hhhh)  A  shipper,  ignorant  of  a 
classification  giving  a  lower  rate  for  an 
interstate  shipment  upon  a  limited  valu- 
ation, who  ships  a  horse  at  such  rate 
without  being  informed  that  a  special 
valuation  has  been  made,  and  who  after- 
wards sues  to  recover  for  injury  to  the 
horse  on  the  basis  of  its  true  value,  is 
not  thereby  rendered  guilty  under  sec- 
tion 10  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act, 
as  amended  March  2,  1889,  which  makes 
it  a  misdemeanor  for  a  shipper  to  ob- 
tain a  preference  in  freight  rates  by 
knowingly  and  wilfully  sending  a  ship- 
ment under  a  false  billing,  false  repre- 
sentation of  contents  of  package,  etc. 
Kissinger  v.  Fitzgerald,  152  N.  C.  247, 
251,   67  S.  E.  588. 

(iiii)  Plaintiff  carrier  sued  to  collect, 
as  the  published  interstate  rate,  a 
charge  of  60c  on  cement  from  Portland, 
Colo.,   to   La   Grande,   Ore.      The   supple- 


ment to  the  Transcontinental  Freight 
Bureau  westbound  tariff  stated  that  "the 
following  special  commodity  rates  will 
apply  only  from  and  to  points  desig- 
nated, except  that  rates  applying  from 
Missouri  River  common  points  will  ap- 
ply as  maxima  from  Colorado  terminals 
and  Colorado  common  points."  It  gave 
the  rate  from  Portland,  Colo.,  to  Port- 
land, Ore.,  as  35c.  Plaintiff's  tariff 
named  a  special  commodity  rate  on  ce- 
ment from  Portland,  Ore.,  to  La  Grande 
of  25c.  A  transcontinental  circular  pro- 
vided that  "rates  applicable  to  or  from 
intermicdiate  Pacific  coast  points,  as 
published  in  current  eastbound  and  west- 
bound tariffs,  will  apply  to  or  from  sta- 
tions named  herein  on  the  lines  of  the 

0.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  in  Oregon,  Washington 
and  Idaho — west  bound;  where  lower 
through  rates  can  be  made  by  use  of 
the  terminal  rate  to  Portland  plus  the 
local  rate  from  Portland  to  destination, 
such  lower  through  rate  will  govern." 
It  appeared  that  Portland,  Ore.,  took 
a  terminal  rate  and  La  Grande  took 
rates  applicable  to  or  from  intermediate 
points.  Plaintiff  offered  no  evidence  of 
any  through  rate  from  Portland,  Colo., 
to  La  Grande  or  of  the  several  local 
rates  between  such  points.  HELD,  the 
evidence  did  not  entitle  plaintiff  to  col- 
lect a  rate  of  60c,  or  the  35c  rate  from 
Portland,  Colo.,  to  Portland,  Ore.,  plus 
the  25c  local  rate  from  Portland,  Ore., 
to  La  Grande.  O.  R.  &  N.  Co.  v. 
Coolidge    (Or.  1911),  116  P.  93,  95. 

(jjjj)  Where  the  facts  are  such  that 
it  is  not  clear  that  the  conditions  are 
so  similar  as  to  render  the  Act  to 
Regulate  Commerce  or  the  rate  pub- 
lished thereunder  inapplicable,  such 
rate  will  be  held,  in  a  civil  proceeding, 
to  control.  Coeur  d'Alene  &  S.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  (Wash.,  1909),  95  P. 
71,  77. 

§8.     Ambiguity. 

See  Commutation  Fares  (a);  Re- 
leased Rates,  §4  (b);  Through 
Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (qqqq). 

(a)  A  tariff  should  not  be  ambiguous 
and  uncertain  and  place  upon  some 
clerk  the  burden  of  construing  it. 
Standard   Oil   Co.  v.  I.   T.   R.   R.  Co.,  23 

1.  C.    C.    369,    371. 

(b)  It  is  not  just  or  fair  to  the 
shipping  public  to  promulgate  as  a  basis 
for  determining  rates  a  classification 
the    terms    of    which    are    indefinite    or 


828 


TARIFFS,  §8    Cc)— (1) 


impracticable  of  application  either  in 
whole  or  in  part.  Shippers  must  neces- 
sarily be  more  or  less  misled  thereby, 
and  any  effort  on  the  part,  of  the  car- 
riers to  apply  the  classification  by  a 
lax  interpretation  thereof  must  result 
in  inextricable  confusion.  The  classi- 
fication of  an  article  of  commerce  should 
be  plainly  and  clearly  stated  in  terms 
that  the  shipping  public  may  readily 
understand.  Tariffs  are  to  be  construed 
according  to  their  language  and  the 
intention  of  the  person  who  framed  the 
tariff  and  the  arbitrary  practice  of  the 
carriers  thereunder  may  not  be  looked 
to  as  an  authoritative  construction  there- 
of. Pacific  Coast  Biscuit  Co.  v,  S.  P. 
&  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  546,  549. 

(c)  Carriers  should  not  publish  am- 
biguous tariffs,  but  their  intent  as  evi- 
denced by  their  present  practice  should 
be  definitely  expressed.  Sweeney,  Lynes 
&  Co.  V.  N.  Y.  P.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
I.   C.  C.  600,   601. 

(d)  The  duty  rests  upon  a  carrier 
to  clearly  state  its  rates  and  charges 
in  its  tariff.  Ford  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,     19  I.  C.  C.  507,  511. 

(e)  A  carrier  should  not  carry  in  its 
tariff  a  rule  that  on  its  face  is  vague 
and  misleading.  Ponchatoula  Farmers' 
Ass'n  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
513,     520. 

(f)  The  publication  of  a  tariff  for 
any  one  shipper  which  does  not  apply 
to  all  is  clearly  a  violation  of  the  law. 
American  Creosote  Works  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,   18  I.   C.  C.  212,  215. 

(g)  The  commodity  rate  of  30c  ap- 
plicable from  New  Orleans  and  other 
points,  including  Tallulah,  La.,  to  Texas 
points,  including  Lime  City,  was  carried 
in  defendant's  tariff,  which,  however, 
provided  that  this  rate  did  not  apply 
from  points  specified  in  certain  tariff 
publications  of  the  individual  lines. 
HELD,  the  tariff  was  improperly  con- 
structed, since  a  person  consulting  it 
could  not  be  informed  of  the  provisions 
in  the  tariffs  of  the  individual  lines, 
and  it  must  be  reconstructed  so  as  to 
show  clearly  and  definitely  its  application. 
Noble  V.  V.  S.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
224,   225. 

(h)  A  tariff  providing  that  the  des- 
tination of  any  interstate  carload  ship- 
ment may  be  changed  after  it  has 
reached   the   first  destination,   when   the 


substituted  destination  is  a  point  where 
through  rates  and  divisions  are  in 
effect  via  the  route  of  movement,  is 
vague  and  uncertain  and  not  in,  accord- 
ance with  the  requirements  of  the 
Commission  for  the  publication  of  tar- 
iffs. Townlev  Metal  &  Hardware  Co. 
V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.^Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C  C. 
378,    379. 

(i)  Ambiguous  and  indefinite  tariffs, 
susceptible  of  and  resulting  in  conflict- 
ing interpretations,  are  objectionable. 
Old  Dominion  Copper  &  Smelting  Co. 
V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  309,  311. 

(j)  On  shipments  of  coke  from  vari- 
ous points  in  Colorado,  New  Mexico, 
Alabama,  Tennessee,  Virginia,  West 
Virginia  and  Pennsylvania  to  Globe, 
Ariz.,  defendants  demanded  payment  on 
the  basis  of  the  capacity  weight  of  the 
cars  and  presented  bills  to  complainant 
on  that  basis,  which  insisted  that  the 
charges  should  be  assessed  on  the 
actual  weight  based  upon  the  minimum 
of  30,000  lbs.  and  paid  the  charges  on 
that  basis.  The  published  tariffs  were 
ambiguous  as  to  whether  the  charges 
should  be  assessed  on  the  capacity 
weight  or  actual  weight  with  a  minimum 
of  30,000  lbs.  HELD,  defendants  prop- 
erly refused  to  concede  the  charges 
asked  for  by  complainant  in  view  of 
the  confusion  of  their  tariffs  since  they 
could  lawfully  assess  charges  only  on 
the  basis  of  such  tariffs;  that  they 
were  reprehensible  in  permitting  such 
confusion  to  exist;  that  the  complaint, 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  complainant 
did  not  actually  pay  the  excess  charges 
objected  to,  should  be  dismissed  with  the 
understanding  that  defendants  would 
clear  up  their  tariffs  so  as  to  fix 
charges  on  the  basis  of  the  30,000 
lbs.  minimum;  and  that  they  might 
omit  to  collect  the  charges  based  upon 
assumed  weights  in  excess  of  the  actual 
weights.  Old  Dominion  Copper  Mining 
&  Smelting  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
I.    C.    C.    309,    312. 

(k)  A  tariff  restricting  the  applica- 
tion of  a  rate  to  beet  pulp  when  in- 
tended for  the  manufacture  of  sugar 
carries  a  meaningless  restriction,  which 
is  to  be  ignored  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  beet  pulp  is  what  is  left  of  beets 
after  the  sugar  has  been  extracted. 
Larrowe  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  548,  549,  550. 

(1)  Where  the  published  tariff  names 
a  joint  through  rate  of  25c  on  packing 


TARIFFS,  §8  (m)— §10  (a) 


829 


house  products  and  a  joint  through  rate 
of  29.1c  on  grease  in  carloads,  it  leaves 
ambiguous  the  proper  rate  to  be  charged 
on  non-edible  grease  and  should  be 
amended.  Dayton  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.  C.  82,  83. 

(m)  The  law  compels  carriers  to  pub- 
lish and  post  tariffs  on  the  theory  that 
they  will  be  informative.  Newton  Gum 
Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
341,  346. 

(n)  A  rate  or  tariff  published  and 
filed  with  the  Commission  cannot  be 
held  to  be  legal  merely  because  of  that 
fact;  it  must  be  also  plain  and  intelligi- 
ble. Porter  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  1,  4. 

(o)  Carelessly  worded  items  in  a 
tariff  offer  opportunity  to  misconstrue 
its  application.  Payne  v.  M.  L.  &  T. 
R.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  185,  188. 

(p)  The  application  of  a  tariff  should 
he  stated  so  clearly  as  to  prevent  mis- 
interpretation, misunderstanding  or  mis- 
representation. Payne  v.  M.  L.  &  T. 
R.  R.  &  S.   S.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  185,  190. 

(q)  The  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce 
contemplates  not  only  just  and  reason- 
able rates,  but  plain  and  intelligible  rates. 
Complication,  intricacy  and  involution  in- 
vite, if  they  do  not  intend,  injustice,  in- 
equality and  discrimination.  Porter  v. 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  1,  4. 

(r)  Defendant  carriers  are  criticized 
for  the  practice  of  inserting  obscure  and 
general  clauses  in  voluminous  tariff  pub- 
lications to  the  effect  that  where  a  com- 
bination of  locals  will  make  a  lower  ag- 
gregate through  rate  than  the  specific 
joint  rate  therein  stated,  the  former  will  be 
used,  since  concern:;  employing  a  traffic 
expert  are  able  to  secure  combinations 
resulting  in  lower  aggregate  charges  than 
can  be  secured  by  the  smaller  or  occa- 
sional shipper,  who  is  not  able  to  em- 
ploy such  an  expert  and  who  is  required 
to  pay  the  joint  through  rate  appearing 
on  the  face  of  the  tariff.  Specific  joint 
through  rates  should  be  published  and 
adhered  to,  and  only  in  rare  instances 
and  under  peculiar  circumstances  should 
said  through  rates  be  made  higher  than 
the  sum  of  the  locals.  Hydraulic  Press 
Brick  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13 
I.  C.  C.  342,  347. 


§9.     Cancellation. 

(a)  Where  the  initial  carrier's  ad- 
vanced rate  tariff  does  not  cancel  the 
lower  commutation  rate  named  in  the 
tariff  of  another  line  to  which  the 
initial  line  is  a  party,  the  lower  rate  is 
the  legal  rate.  Stilwell  v.  L.  &  H.  R. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  I.   C.  C.  404. 

(b)  The  lawfully  established  rate  re- 
mains in  force  until  specifically  can- 
celed. Stilwell  V.  L.  &  H.  R.  Ry.  Co., 
19   I.    C.    C.   404,  405. 

(c)  A  rate,  once  lawfully  published, 
continues  to  be  the  lawful  rate  until 
it  has  been  lawfully  cancelled.  A  sub- 
sequent tariff,  naming  other  rates  with- 
out cancelling  the  previous  rates,  can- 
not carry  the  new  rates  into  lawful  ef- 
fect. The  silence  of  a  subsequent  tar- 
iff with  respect  to  rates  lawfully  in 
effect  cannot  be  accepted  as  a  law- 
ful cancellation  of  the  previous  rates, 
nor  will  vague  references  in  subse- 
quent tariffs  as  to  the  cancellation  of 
previous  tariffs  have  that  effect.  The 
law  and  the  requirements  of  the  Com- 
mission provide  a  method  by  which 
existing  rates  may  be  cancelled,  and 
other  rates  put  into  effect,  and  these 
requirements  must  be  fulfilled  in  order 
to  give  legal  effect  to  a  new  rate  in- 
tended to  take  the  place  of  an  existing 
one.  The  Albany  Box  &  Basket  Co.  v. 
I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  315,  316. 

(d)  A  cancellation  of  a  schedule  of 
rates  is  not  to  be  construed  as  a  with- 
drawal of  all  rights  arising  under  such 
schedule  to  those  who  have  availed 
themselves  of  its  provisions  prior  to 
the  date  that  such  schedule  dies.  If 
there  is  offered  to  the  shipper  under  the 
tariff  a  right  of  stopping-in-transit,  re- 
consignment,  storage  or  return  of 
freight,  he  is  entitled  to  the  use  of  such 
privilege  even  though  it  may  later  be 
cancelled  out  of  the  tariff  before  the 
time  allowed  for  the  exercise  of  such 
right  has  expired.  The  date  of  original 
shipment  determines  the  rights,  privi- 
leges and  obligations  attaching  to  that 
shipment  throughout  its  transportation. 
Interstate  Remedy  Co.  v.  American  Ex- 
press   Co.,    16    I.    C.    C.    436,    438,    439. 

§10.     Concurrences. 

See  Proportional  Rates,  I  (b); 
Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 
§2. 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  carloads  of 
cement  from  New  Village,  N.  J.,  to  Ak- 


830 


TARIFFS,  §10   (b)— §11   (e) 


ron,  O.,  by  way  of  the  defendant,  B.  & 
O.  R.  R.  Co.,  relying  upon  the  published 
tariff  of  defendant,  which  represented 
that  the  carrier  would  make  a  certain 
terminal  delivery  on  the  tracks  of  the 
Erie  R.  R.  at  Akron,  O.,  and  absorb  the 
switching  charge.  This  tariff  was  pub- 
lished without  the  consent  of  the  Erie  R. 
R.,  which  company  refused  to  make 
the  delivery  mentioned.  Complainant 
was  damaged  to  the  extent  of  $12.60, 
the  cost  of  hauling  the  cement  to  the 
consignee.  HELD,  complainant  was  en 
titled  to  the  damages  caused  by  the 
defendant's  publication  of  a  tariff  show- 
ing that  it  could  make  delivery  on  the 
track  of  a  carrier  from  which  it  had 
not  obtained  concurrences.  Edison  Port- 
land Cement  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  382. 

(b)  Where  there  is  concurrence  in 
the  guide  book,  but  no  concurrence  in 
rate,  though  such  was  intended,  there  is 
no  legal  rate  or  basis  of  reparation,  tariff 
rate  charged  not  being  unlawful.  Noble 
V.  G.  T.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  70,  71. 

(c)  Participating  carrier  not  properly 
concurring  in  tariff  caused  higher  rate  to 
be  charged.  Tariff  adjusted.  Reparation 
awarded.  Wisconsin  Bridge  &  Iron  Co, 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  185. 

(d)  Tariff  providing  for  storage,  not 
concurred  in.  Charges  assessed  there- 
under should  be  refunded  without  order 
of  Commission.  West  Coast  Shingle  Co. 
V.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
596. 

§11.     Conflict. 

See  Supra,  §7  (II);  Bills  of  Lading, 
§9  (2);  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§90   (a). 

(a)  From  Nov.  15,  1909,  to  Jan.  1, 
1910,  complainant  shipped  over  defend- 
ant's line  from  Laurinburg,  N.  C,  to 
Birmingham,  Ala.,  five  carloads  of  cot- 
tonseed hulls,  for  which  he  was  charged 
$3.40  per  ton.  Supplement  No.  42  to  Sea- 
board Air  Line  cottonseed  products  tariff, 
effective  Aug.  25,  1909,  named  a  rate 
of  $2.50  per  ton.  Supplement  No.  50  to 
the  same  tariff  named  a  rate  of  $3.40 
per  ton  without  specifically  stating  that 
the  $2.50  rate  was  thereby  canceled.  A 
rule  of  the  Commission  provides:  "If  a 
tariff  or  supplement  to  a  tariff  is  issued 
which  conflicts  with  a  part  of  another  tar- 
iff Or  supplement  to  a  tariff  which  is  in 
force  at  the  time,  and  which  is  not 
thereby  canceled  in  full,  it  shall  specifi- 


cally state  the  portion  of  such  other 
tariff  which  is  thereby  canceled  .  .  ." 
Complainant  claimed  reparation  for  the 
difference  between  $3.40  and  $2.50  per 
ton.  HELD,  the  rule  applied  to  a 
case  where  a  supplement  conflicted  with 
a  part  of  its  original  tariff  or  with  a 
part  of  a  previous  supplement  to  such 
original  tariff.  In  view  of  the  fact  that 
the  tariff  was  published  prior  to  the 
issuance  of  the  rule  relied  upon,  and 
later  reissued  in  conformity  with  the 
rules,  complaint  will  be  dismissed. 
Veitch  V.   S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  22  I.  C.   C.  4,  6. 

(b)  Rule  8  (a)  Tariff  Circular  No. 
18-A,  directing  that  if  a  supplement 
to  a  tariff  is  issued  which  conflicts 
with  a  part  of  a  previous  supplement, 
which  is  not  thereby  canceled  in  full, 
that  such  newly  issued  supplement 
should  specifically  state  the  portion  of 
the  previous  supplement  intended  there- 
by to  be  canceled.  HELD,  to  apply  to 
successive  supplements  to  the  same  tar- 
iff, as  well  as  to  other  and  different  tar- 
iffs. Veitch  V.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
4. 

(c)  Switching  charges  were  collected 
from  complainants  on  carloads  of  grain 
at  Chicago.  Three  tariff  provisions,  ef- 
fective the  same  day,  Aug.  28,  1906,  were 
the  basis  of  the  complaint.  HELD,  where 
there  are  confiicting  rules  of  different 
tariffs  which  become  effective  on  the 
same  date,  the  lower  of  the  rates  so 
published  is  the  legal  rate.  Badenoch 
Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
30,  37. 

(cc)  Where  the  tariff  carries  two 
rates  for  the  same  article  the  shipper 
should  "not  be  charged  the  higher  rate. 
Ohio  Foundry  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  65,  67. 

(d)  From  1899  to  Nov.  10, 1908,  a  rate 
of  17c  was  in  effect  on  agricultural  im- 
plements. Another  tariff  of  defendant 
effective  in  1905  and  remaining  in  effect 
until  Nov.  10,  1908,  established  a  con- 
flicting rate  of  20c  without  specifically 
cancelling  the  17c  rate.  HELD,  the  17c 
and  not  the  20c  rate  was  in  effect  be- 
tween 1905  and  Nov.  10,  1908.  Van 
Brunt  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
17  L  C.  C.  195,  196. 

(e)  Where  the  rate  of  the  delivering 
carrier  conflicts  with  the  rate  previously 
established  by  the  initial  line,  the  for- 
mer  is   not  the  legal  rate.     Sunderland 


TARIFFS,  §11   (f)— §14  (e) 


831 


Bros.  Co.  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I. 
C.  C.  425,  426. 

(f)  A  lawfully  established  rate  re- 
mains In  effect,  and  is  the  only  lawful 
rate  until  canceled,  notwithstanding  a 
subsequently  published  conflicting  rate. 
The  latter  do-es  not  supersede,  nor  can  it 
be  substituted  for,  the  prior  existing  rate 
except  by  proper  tariff  provision  to  that 
effect.  Virginia-Carolina  Chemical  Co.  v. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  555. 

§12.     Cross-References. 

(a)  The  provisions  of  a  storage  and 
reconsigning  tariff  issued  separately  by 
one  carrier,  to  which  two  other  connect- 
ing carriers  are  not  named  as  parties, 
cannot  be  applied  to  through  movements 
under  the  joint  tariff  of  the  three  car- 
riers unless  the  latter  tariff  by  express 
reference  to  the  former  so  provides. 
Wash.  Broom  &  Woodenware  Co.  v.  C. 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  219,  221. 

§13.     Index. 

See   Supra,  §7  (ii). 

(a)  Defendant's  tariff  in  the  index 
contained  the  following  item:  "Hague,  N. 

D 4913-818D."     Complainant's 

traffic  manager,  desiring  to  make  a  ship- 
ment to  Hague,  Emmons  County,  exam- 
ined item  4913  and  found  a  rate  via  the 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  of  46c  per  100  lbs.,  and 
by  reference  to  item  8186  found  a  rate 
via  the  G.  N.  Ry.  of  40c.  He  therefore 
routed  ,the  car  via  the  G.  N.  Ry.  It 
developed  that  in  North  Dakota  there 
were  two  stations  of  the  same  name,  one 
in  Emmons  County,  local  to  the  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.,  while  the  one  on  the  G.  N.  Ry. 
was  in  Traill  County.  On  account  of 
this  error  the  shipment  moved  to  its 
proper  destination  by  a  circuitous  route 
under  a  rate  of  53i^c.  HELD,  that  as 
defendant  indexed  in  its  tariff  only  one 
station  named  Hague  and  did  not  indi- 
cate in  the  rate  tables  that  there  was 
more  than  one  station  of  that  name,  the 
only  natural  inference  therefrom  was 
that  the  tariff  offered  two  rates  via  the 
different  routes  to  Hague,  N.  D. ;  and 
that  defendant  was  therefore  liable  for 
the  damage  caused  through  its  defective 
tariff.  Reparation  awarded.  Larson 
Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
474. 

(b)  Where  there  are  two  stations  of 
the  same  name  in  the  same  state  in  dif- 
ferent counties  a  tariff  which  does  not 
in    its    index    contain    such    information, 


but  leads  a  reader  to  suppose  there  is 
but  one  station  of  that  name  in  the  state, 
does  not  comply  with  section  6  of  the  Act 
to  the  effect  that  "schedules  .  .  . 
shall  plainly  state  the  places  between 
which  property  and  passengers  shall  be 
carried.  .  .  ."  Larson  Lumber  Co.  v. 
G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  474,  475,  476. 

(c)  Point  given  number  in  index,  but 
no  rate  applicable  to  that  number.  Rejv 
aration  awarded.  Arkansas  Fuel  Co.  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  246. 

§14.     Legality. 

See  Proportional  Rates,  III. 

(a)  A  tariff  is  not  unlawful  on  the 
ground  that  it  is  in  effect  an  exclusive 
service  for  the  benefit  not  of  the  general 
public  but  of  a  single  shipper,  where  the 
result  arises  merely  from  the  fact  that 
one  shipper  is  in  a  position  to  avail 
himself  of  the  tariff,  while  others  are 
not.  Albree  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I. 
C.  C.  303,  319. 

(b)  A  tariff  of  milk  rates  offered  cer- 
tain carload  rates  for  a  specified  distance. 
HELD,  that  to  sustain  the  contention 
that  the  tariff  provided  carload  rates  con- 
structed upon  a  mileage  basis,  a  provision 
should  be  inserted  specifically  so  stating, 
in  order  to  avoid  the  objection  that  the 
tariff  is  discriminatory  upon  its  face.  Al- 
bree V.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
303,  319. 

(c)  A  tariff  is  unlawful  under  the 
15th  section  of  the  Act  which  compels  a 
shipper  to  load  his  milk  into  a  car  leased 
by  another  shipper  in  such  a  way  as  to 
disclose  the  secrets  of  his  business  and 
which  compels  him  to  pay  the  transpor- 
tation rate  to  such  other  shipper.  Al- 
bree V.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  1.  C.  C. 
303,  321. 

(d)  Tariffs  which  contain  rates  appli- 
cable only  to  the  shipments  of  certain 
consignees,  or  applicable  only  when  8 
commodity  is  put  to  a  particultr  use 
and  which  are  restricted  to  the  use  o^ 
certain  shippers  and  not  open  to  all 
shippers  alike,  are  in  violation  of  section 
2  of  the  Act  and  unjustly  discriminatory 
in  violation  of  section  3  of  the  Act,  and 
are  therefore  unlawful.  In  Re  Restricted 
Rates,  20  I.  C.  C.  426,  437. 

(e)  A  tariff  is  contrary  to  law  which 
provides  that  the  rate  in  effect  at  the 
time  of  reshipment  shall  govern.  South- 
ern Cotton  Oil  Co.  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
19  L  C.  C.  434.  435. 


832 


TARIFFS,   §14    (f)— TELEPHONE    COMPANIES,   §1    (a) 


(f)  The  Commission  will  not  sanction 
a  tariff  rate  published  only  for  articles 
to  be  employed  in  a  special  undertaking. 
American  Creosote  Works  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  212,  215. 

(g)  The  law  does  not  contemplate 
that  the  shipper  shall  move  upon  any 
other  theory  than  that  the  provisions  of 
the  carrier's  tariff  are  in  full  compliance 
with  the  law's  demands.  Interstate  Rem- 
edy Co.  V.  American  Express  Co.,  16  I.  C 
C.  436,  439. 

(h)  Every  rate  is  presumed  to  be 
lawful.  Banner  Milling  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C. 
&  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  398,  408. 

(i)  As  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act 
stood  prior  to  the  amendment  of  June  18, 
1910,  the  Commission  could  not  be  held 
to  have  approved  rate  schedules  merely 
from  the  fact  that  the  same  were  filed 
with  that  body.  Cramer  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.   Co.    (la.  1911),   133  N.  W.   387,   390. 

(j)  Charges  according  to  published 
rates  with  the  sanction  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  are  prima  facie 
correct.  Foster,  Glassel  Co.  v.  K.  C.  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  121  La.  1053,  1058,  46  So.  1014. 

(k)  It  is  permissible  for  a  carrier  to 
issue  a  distance  tariff  for  use  in  determin- 
ing rates  on  its  own  lines,  but  only  in 
cases  where  no  other  rates  are  provided. 
Porter  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  1. 
C.  C.  1,  5. 

(1)  A  rate  or  tariff  published  and  filed 
with  the  Commission  cannot  be  held  to 
be  legal  merely  becauso  of  that  fact;  it 
must  also  be  plain  and  intelligible.  Por- 
ter V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
1,  4. 

§15.     Reasonableness. 

(a)  The  rule  requiring  the  consignee 
to  secure  a  berth  for  unloading  is  not 
unreasonable.  Mosson  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  30,  32,  33. 

(b)  On  carloads  of  sheep  from  points 
in  California  to  Tacoma,  Wash.,  com- 
plainant ordered  double-deck  cars  and 
was  furnished  single-deck  cars.  Defend- 
ant's tariff  provided  that  on  double-deck 
cars  a  charge  of  170  per  cent  of  the  rate 
on  single-deck  cars  would  be  assessed, 
and  that  if  the  company  could  not  fur- 
nish the  double-deck  equipment  the  sin- 
gle-deck car  rates  would  be  charged.  De- 
fendant, at  the  time  of  the  shipments  in 
question,  had  no  double-deck  cars  avail- 
able and  the  evidence  indicated  that  on 


account  of  curves,  tunnels  and  grades 
its  line  the  use  of  double-deck  cars  \ 
not  practicable.  Complainant  also 
tacked  the  rates  charged  as  unreasona 
and  offered  in  evidence  comparative  ra 
on  shipments  of  sheep  westbound  i 
Tacoma,  and  of  cattle  northbound  ii 
Tacoma.  HELD,  the  provision  in  the  1 
iff  relating  to  single-deck  charges  y 
not  unreasonable,  and  the  evidence 
comparative  rates  was  not  sufficient 
establish  the  unreasonableness  of  defe 
ant's  rates.  Carstens  Packing  Co.  v. 
P.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  6. 

(c)  The  published  tariffs  in  Tru 
Line  territory  provided  that  the  rates 
shipments  of  oil  should  be  on  the  ba 
of  90  per  cent  of  fifth-class  rates  as 
all  points  from  which  there  was  a  mo 
ment  of  oil,  but  there  was  no  provis: 
as  to  destinations  not  specifically  nan 
and  such  destinations  would,  therefc 
under  the  tariffs  take  fifth-class  rat 
The  tariffs  in  Central  Freight  Assoc 
tion  territory  contained  a  general  pre 
sion  that  shipments  of  oil  should  t£ 
90  per  cent  of  fifth-class  rates.  HEI 
carriers  in  Trunk  Line  territory  shoi 
include  in  their  tariffs  a  regulation  p 
viding  for  the  application  of  90  per  c< 
of  fifth-class  rates  to  the  transportat; 
of  oil  in  carloads  between  all  points 
to  which  no  specific  commodity  ra 
were  in  force.  National  Petroleum  As 
V.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  2 
282. 

(d)  Where  the  published  intersti 
rate  is  proved,  its  reasonableness  cam 
be  questioned  by  the  shipper  in  an  acti 
by  the  carrier  in  a  state  court  to  colL 
same.  O.  R.  &  N.  Co.  v,  Coolidge  (Oi 
1911),  116  P.  93,  C5. 

TELEGRAPH  COMPANY. 

See  Terminal  Facilities,  §3  ( 
Transportation,  $1    (g). 

TELEPHONE  COMPANIES. 

L     DISCRIMINATION    IN    SERVICE. 
§1.     In  general. 

I.     DISCRIMINATION  IN   SERVICE. 
§1.     In  General. 

See  Special  Contracts,  §2  (o) ;  Ti 
minal  Facilities,  §3  (j);  Transpi 
tation,  §1   (n). 

(a)  Defendant  in  August,  1902,  esU 
lished  a  small  exchange  in  Montgome 
County,  Md.,  at  a  point  about  one  m 


TELEPHONE  COMPANIES,  §1  (b)— TERMINAL  FACILITIES,  §1  (b) 


833 


north  of-  the  boundary  line  separating 
that  state  from  the  District  of  Columbia. 
Subscribers  had  to  pay  a  toll  of  10c  to 
reach  persons  in  the  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, and  District  of  Columbia  calls 
to  this  exchange  paid  a  similar  toll.  In 
1905  this  exchange  was  abandoned,  and 
the  Chevy  Chase  exchange  opened  in 
the  District  of  Columbia.  The  old  sub- 
scribers still  had  to  pay  their  tolls  to 
call  in  the  District,  but  calls  from  the 
District  to  them  paid  no  toll.  Subse- 
quently this  exchange  was  abandoned 
and  the  Cleveland  exchange  opened  fur- 
ther south,  in  the  city  of  Washington. 
The  old  subscribers  to  the  service  given 
by  the  first  exchange,  the  Somerset 
exchange,  and  to  the  second  exchange, 
had  their  contracts  continued  to  the  new 
exchange,  on  the  same  basis  as  orig- 
inally entered  into,  which  gave  them 
substantially  lower  rates  than  those 
charged  new  subscribers  or  subscribers 
in  the  District  of  Columbia.  There  were 
37  of  these  old  subscribers.  Complain- 
ant asked  for  service  on  the  same  basis 
as  that  given  to  the  old  subscribers  to 
the  Somerset  exchange.  HELD,  that 
there  was  no  dissimilarity  of  circum- 
stances which  justified  defendants  in 
preferring  one  class  of  subscribers  to 
complainant,  and  that  it  had  no  right 
to  prefer  one  class  of  subscribers  over 
others  similarly  situated,  and  was  un- 
lawfully granting  a  preference  to  the  37 
old  subscribers;  and  the  fact  it  had 
contracts  with  such  subscribers  prior  to 
the  Commission's  being  vested  with 
jurisdiction  over  telephone  companies 
could  not  except  such  special  contracts 
from  the  operation  of  the  law  which  for- 
bids undue  discrimination  and  prefer- 
ences. Shoemaker  v.  C.  «S:  P.  Telephone 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  614. 

(b)  A  telephone  company  being  a 
public  servant,  subject  to  the  provisions 
of  a  law  that  forbids  undue  preferences 
and  unjust  discriminations  on  any 
grounds  whatsoever,  it  is  manifest  that 
nothing  but  a  difference  in  the  service 
rendered  or  in  the  facilities  furnished 
will  justify  any  difference  in  the  charges 
exacted.  Shoemaker  v.  C.  &  P.  Tele- 
phone  Co.,  20  I.   C.   C.   614,   621. 

(c)  A  difference  in  telephone  charges 
for  the  same  service  is  not  justified  by 
the  fact  that  lower  rates  were  accorded 
old  subscribers;  nothing  but  a  difference 
in  services  rendered  or  facilities  fur- 
nished will  justify  a  difference  in  rates. 


Shoemaker  v.  C.  &  P.  Tel.  Co.,  20  I.  C 
C.  614,  621. 

(d)  Demanding  higher  charges  of  new 
telephone  subscribers  than  demanded  of 
old  subscribers  for  the  same  service  and 
facilities  may  constitute  unlawful  dis- 
crimination and  preference.  Shoemaker 
V.  C.  &  P.  Tel.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  614,  621. 

TERMINAL  FACILITIES. 

I.     CONTROL  AND   REGULATION. 
§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
§1/2-  Jurisdiction   of  courts. 
n.     DUTY   TO   PERFORM    TERMINAL 
SERVICE. 
§2.     In    general. 
§3.     Duty   to  allow  use. 
§4.     Publication   of   terminal 

charges. 
§5.     Reasonableness  of  charges. 
§6.     What  are  public  terminals. 
III.     STATUS    OF    TERMINAL    ROADS. 
§7.     In  general. 

§8.     Definition     of     "terminal 
charges." 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 

See  Allowances,  §8  (4);  Commodities 
Clause,  11  (f ) ;  Exclusive  Contracts; 
Facilities  and  Privileges,  §16;  Rea- 
sonableness of  Rates,  §34;  Trans- 
portation,  §10. 

I.     CONTROL   AND    REGULATION. 

See  Switch  Tracks  and  Switching, 
§7    (o),    (p). 

§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

See  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion,  §9    (k);    Reparation,    §21    (j). 

(a)  Where  a  terminal  company  is  a 
part  of  a  system  of  transportation  be- 
tween the  states  and  foreign  states 
it  cannot  escape  the  control  of  the  Com- 
mission on  the  ground  that  it  is  desig- 
nated as  a  wharfage  company.  S.  P. 
Terminal  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  219  U.  S.  498, 
521,  31   Sup.  Ct.  279,  55  L.  ed.  310. 

(b)  The  Southern  Pacific  Terminal 
Co.  was  created  by  an  act  of  the  legis- 
lature for  the  purpose  of  furnishing  ter- 
minal facilities  at  the  port  of  Galveston 
for  use  in  connection  with  the  Southern 
Pacific  Railroad  and  Steamship  Systems. 
It  was  controlled  through  stock  owner- 
ship by  the  S.  P.  Co.  HELD,  the  Com- 
mission had  jurisdiction  to  regulate  its 
charges  on  trafllc  handled  in  connection 
with  these  systems,  since  the  Terminal 
Co.  was  a  part  of  these  systems  and  was 
not  merely  a  distinct  wharfage  com- 
pany.    S.  P.  Terminal  Co.  v.  L  C.  C,  219 


834 


TERMINAL  FACILITIES,  §1  (c)— (h) 


U.  S.  498,  521,  31  Sup.  Ct.  279,  55  L.  ed. 
810. 

(c)  One  Young  obtained  the  lease  of 
a  wharf  at  Galveston  from  the  S.  P.  Ter- 
minal Co.,  which  company  was  controlled 
through  stock  ownership  by  the  S.  P.  R. 
R.  and  S.  S.  Systems.  The  cake  and 
meal  purchased  by  Young  were  bought 
by  him  in  various  states,  but  chiefly  in 
Texas,  and  shipped  to  him  on  bills  of 
lading  and  waybills  showing  the  points 
of  origin  in  those  states  and  the  destina- 
tion at  Galveston.  The  purchases  were 
made  for  export.  His  sales  to  foreign 
country  were  sometimes  for  immediate 
and  sometimes  for  future  delivery,  irre- 
spective of  whether  he  had  the  product 
on  hand  at  Galveston.  At  times,  there- 
fore, orders  must  be  filled  on  cake  to  be 
purchased  in  the  interior  or  shipped  in 
transit  to  him.  When  the  cake  reached 
Galveston  it  was  ground  into  meal  and 
sacked  by  Young,  and  new  shippers'  bills 
of  lading  were  made  out  to  his  order  for 
foreign  parts.  HELD,  the  manufacture 
or  concentration  on  the  wharves  of  the 
Terminal  company  were  but  incidents  in 
the  shipment  of  the  product  in  export 
trade  and  the  regulation  of  the  Terminal 
company  in  the  handling  of  its  wharves 
was  within  the  power  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission.  S  P.  Terminal 
Co.  V.  Int.  Com.  Comm.,  219  U.  S.  498,  526, 
31  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  279,  55  L.  ed.  310. 

(cc)  While  a  common  carrier  must 
serve  the  traveling  and  the  shipping 
public  upon  equal  terms  and  without  dis- 
criminations and  preferences  in  under- 
taking to  perform  certain  duties  for 
those  who  travel  or  ship  their  merchan- 
dise over  its  lines,  it  does  not  assume 
any  obligation  to  those  who  do  neither 
the  one  nor  the  other.  If  any  such  obli- 
gation exists  they  are  not  to  be  found 
in  the  Act,  and  are  beyond  the  power 
of  the  Commission  to  enforce  or  regu- 
late. To  a  certain  extent  the  public 
stations,  depots  and  grounds  of  carriers 
are  their  private  property,  subject  to 
their  own  control  with  respect  to  any 
private  business,  carried  on,  in  or  upon 
them,  provided  that  what  is  thus  done 
for  the  public  is  in  itself  a  reasonable 
use  of  the  property,  and  contributes  to 
the  public  convenience  or  to  the  advan- 
tage of  the  carrier.  Southwestern  Prod- 
uce Distributers  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  458,  461. 

(d)  The  duty  of  regulating  terminal 
charges,  when  relating  to  traffic  between 


states,  has  been  lodged  with  the  Com- 
mission. Peale,  Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  18  I.  C.  C.  25,  33. 

(e)  Under  sections  1  and  6  of  the 
Act  the  duty  of  regulating  terminal 
charges  when  relating  to  interstate  trans- 
portation is  lodged  with  the  Commission, 
and  a  Pennsylvania  statute  conflicting 
with  these  provisions  must  give  way. 
Wilson  Produce  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co., 
14  L  C.  C.  170,  174. 

(f)  The  duty  of  regulating  terminal 
charges,  when  related  to  traffic  between 
the  states,  has  been  lodged  with  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Commission.  A  state 
statute  fixing  terminal  charges  is  not 
controlling,  with  respect  to  interstate 
transportation.  Wilson  Produce  Co.  v. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C  170,  174. 

(g)  Complainant  alleged  that  a  lease 
by  the  Southern  Pacific  Terminal  Co.  to 
one  Young,  an  exporter  of  cottonseed 
products,  of  a  portion  of  its  wharf  to 
Galveston,  Tex.,  gave  him  undue  prefer- 
ence and  advantage  and  resulted  in  un- 
reasonable prejudice  to  competing  ex- 
porters. The  Southern  Pacific  Co.  urged 
that  it  is.  a  holding  company,  and  the 
Terminal  Company  that  it  is  a  wharfage 
company,  and  both  asserted  that  they 
are  not  common  carriers  within  the 
meaning  of  the  Act,  and  challenged  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Commission.  HELD, 
that  as  the  railroad  and  steamship  lines 
forming  the  so-called  Southern  Pacific 
System  are  one  in  control  and  opera- 
tion, are  owned  by  the  Southern  Pacific 
Co.,  and  are  identical  in  officers  and 
interests,  and  that  as  the  Terminal  Co. 
was  organized  to  furnish  terminal  fa- 
cilities for  the  Southern  Pacific  System 
at  Galveston,  and  through  shipments  on 
the  system  line  pass  and  repass  over 
the  docks  of  the  Terminal  Co.,  the  lat- 
ter forms  a  necessary  link  in  the  chain 
of  interstate  commerce  and  is  subject 
to  the  Act.  Eichenberg  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  14 
1.  C.  C.  250,  sustained,  219  U.  S.  498, 
521,  31  Sup.  Ct.  279,  55  L.  ed.  310. 

(h)  In  determining  whether  a  ter- 
minal company  controlling  a  wharf  is  a 
common  carrier,  it  makes  no  difference 
that  the  connecting  railway  company 
does  not  own  the  terminal  company  di- 
rectly, where  the  ownership  of  both  is 
vested  in  the  same  holding  corporation, 
and  since  control  is  an  incident  of 
ownership,  the  terminal  company  is  to 
be   deemed  a   common   carrier.     Eichen- 


TERMINAL  FACILITIES,  §1    (i)— §3    (c) 


835 


berg  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  250,  264, 
sustained  219  U.  S.  498,  521,  31  Sup.  Ct, 
279,   55   L.  ed.   310.     ' 

(i)  Where  a  terminal  company  is 
part  and  parcel  of  the  system  engaged 
as  a  whole  in  the  transportation  of  in- 
terstate commerce,  the  Commission  has 
jurisdiction  to  supervise  and  control  it; 
since  to  hold  otherwise  would,  in  effect, 
permit  carriers  generally,  through  the 
organization  of  separate  corporations,  to 
exempt  all  their  terminals  and  terminal 
facilities  from  the  regulating  authority 
of  the  Commission.  Eichenberg  v.  S.  P. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  250,  265,  sustained,  219 
U.  S.  498,  521,  31  Sup.  Ct.  279,  55  L.  ed. 
310. 

§1^.     Jurisdiction  of  Courts. 

See   Commerce   Court,   §3   (c),   §6   (d), 
(j),    (k):   Courts,   §9   (k). 

II.     DUTY    TO    PERFORM    TERMINAL 
SERVICE. 

§2.     In    General. 

See    Export    Rates    and    Facilities,    111 
(m). 

(a)  Defendant  carrier's  terminals  are 
located  at  Jersey  City  and  all  shipments 
made  over  its  lines  from  across  New 
York  Harbor  must  be  lightered  to  its 
docks  at  that  point.  This  service  is 
performed  by  the  defendant  without  cost 
to  shippers.  Complainant  found  it  nec- 
essary to  fill  all  the  orders  of  its  cus- 
tomers on  the  day  on  which  they  were 
received,  and  defendant  was  unable  to 
furnish  barges  and  boats  promptly 
enough  to  accomplish  this  purpose,  some- 
times compelling  complainant  to  wait 
three  or  four  days.  Complainant  took 
the  matter  of  lighterage  into  its  own 
hands  and  performed  the  service  on  its 
own  boats.  It  sought  to  recover  3c  per 
100  lbs.  for  this  service.  Some  years 
after  the  shipments  in  question  the  de- 
fendant provided  in  its  tariffs  for  the 
payment  of  3c  for  this  lighterage  service 
when  performed  for  the  convenience  of 
defendant,  but  at  the  time  of  shipment 
no  tariff  was  in  effect  authorizing  de- 
fendant to  pay  for  lighterage  performed 
by  the  shipper.  HELD,  under  the  facts 
disclosed,  the  complainant  having  per- 
formed such  lighterage  service  for  its 
own  convenience,  and  to  meet  the  spe- 
cial requirements  of  its  business,  was 
not  entitled  to  reparation.  Barrett  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  Central  R.  R.  of  N.  J.,  17  I.  C.  ^. 
464,  466. 


§3.     Duty  to  Allow   Use. 

See  Differentials,  §6  (d);  Facilities 
and  Privileges,  §1  (hi),  §2  (aa),  (r), 
§16  (c),  (d),  (e);  Special  Contracts, 
§2  (aa),  (m),  (z),  §5  (h);  Water 
Carriers,   §3    (e). 

(a)  Section  3  requires  every  common 
carrier  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the 
Act  to  accord  all  reasonable,  prOper  and 
equal  facilities  for  the  interchange  of 
traffic  between  their  respective  lines, 
and  provides:  "But  this  shall  not  be 
construed  as  requiring  any  such  com- 
mon carrier  to  give  the  use  of  its  tracks 
or  terminal  facilities  to  another  carrier 
engaged  in  like  business."  But  if  car- 
riers are  allowing  such  use  of  their 
tracks  or  terminal  facilities  the  proviso 
of  section  3  can  have  no  application. 
Terminals  are  either  open  or  they  are 
not,  and  if  a  carrier  holds  itself  out  as 
ready  to  permit  the  use  of  its  tracks  at 
a  certain  charge,  the  fact  that  such 
charge  may  be  prohibited  does  not  mean 
that  the  terminals  are  not  open.  On  the 
contrary,  it  would  seem  to  be  a  potent 
argument  for  the  reduction  of  charges 
for  the  use  of  tracks  or  terminal  fa- 
cilities already  extended.  That  carriers 
offer  each  to  the  other  the  use  of  their 
respective  tracks  or  terminals  is  shown 
by  the  fact  that  freight  is  actually  in- 
terchanged after  its  arrival  at  the  ter- 
minal, and  for  this  service  charges  are 
provided  in  tariffs  published  and  filed. 
It  follows  that,  having  elected  to  per- 
form this  service,  the  charge  therefor 
must  be  reasonable.  Merchants'  & 
Mfr'rs'  Ass'n  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.   C.  474,  476. 

(b)  The  proviso  in  section  3  of  the 
Act  that  a  carrier  shall  not  be  required 
to  give  the  use  of  its  tracks  or  terminal 
facilities  to  another  carrier  engaged  in 
like  business  can  have  no  application 
where  carriers  are  already  allowing  such 
use  of  their  tracks  or  terminal  facilities. 
Merchants'  &  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  Penn.  R. 
R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  474,  476. 

(c)  A  carrier  (the  Iron  Mountain) 
whose  rails  are  for  the  most  part  con- 
fined to  the  bank  of  the  Mississippi 
River  does  not  furnish  adequate  terminal 
facilities  for  the  southern  section  of  in- 
dustrial St.  Louis,  containing  many  in- 
dustries a  considerable  distance  .from 
the  river,  and  therefore  the  facilities 
furnished  by  the  Manufacturers'  Rail- 
way, organized  to  serve  such  industries, 
are     both     reasonable     and     necessary. 


836 


TERMINAL  FACILITIES,  §3   (d)  — (i) 


Mfr'rs'  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  304,  309. 

(d)  Carriers  cannot  spot  cars  for  one 
industry  and  refuse  to  perform  the  same 
service  for  another  similarly  situated, 
Buffalo  Union  Furnace  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  -620,  627. 

(e)  An  undue  disadvantage  resulted 
from  the  failure  of  defendant  to  accord 
a  terminal  switching  allowance  to  com- 
plainant while  granting  it  to  competing 
industries  performing  similar  services. 
Buffalo  Union  Furnace  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  620,  630. 

(f)  While  at  common  law  no  obliga- 
tion rested  upon  carriers  to  do  or  pay 
for  the  spotting  of  cars  at  any  industry, 
yet  a  different  question  is  presented .  if 
carriers  voluntarily  undertake  to  per- 
form for  some  and  refuse  to  perform 
for  others  under  substantially  similar 
circumstances  and  conditions.  Buffalo 
Union  Furnace  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  620,  627. 

(g)  At  Cleveland,  O.,  and  Buffalo,  N. 
Y.,  various  terminal  railroads  were  al- 
lowed by  defendants  $2.50  per  car  when 
the  freight  rate  was  50c  per  ton  or  more, 
for  spotting  cars  at  certain  blast  fur- 
naces. No  allowance  for  this  service 
was  made  by  defendants  to  the  Buffalo 
Union  Terminal  Railroad,  a  terminal 
railway  serving  the  Buffalo  Union  Fur- 
nace Co.  at  Buffalo,  N.  Y.  HELD,  that 
while  at  common  law  no  obligation 
rested  upon  defendant  carriers  to  do  or 
pay  for  the  spotting  of  cars  at  any  of 
the  furnaces  mentioned,  yet  a  different 
question  is  presented  if  the  carriers  vol- 
untarily undertake  to  perform  for  some 
and  refuse  to  perform  for  others  the 
same  service  under  substantially  similar 
circumstances  and  conditions;  that  the 
Buffalo  Union  Furnace  Co.  should  be 
placed  on  an  equality  with  other  fur- 
naces. Reparation  awarded.  Buffalo 
Union  Furnace  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  620,  627,  630. 

(h)  Complainant  is  engaged  in  the 
city  of  Baltimore  in  conducting  an  abat- 
toir for  slaughtering  live  stock.  It  owns 
a  sidetrack  connecting  its  plant  with 
the  P.  B.  &  W.  R.  R.,  a  part  of  the 
Penn.  R.  R.  This  sidetrack  has  been  in 
existence  20  years  and  been  used  for  the 
delivery  of  all  classes  of  freight  except 
live  stock.  In  1891  the  Union  Stock 
Yards  Co.  was  organized,  which  took 
over  the  business  of  the  Calverton  and 


Claremont  Stock  Yard  in  Baltimore. 
Prior  to  that  the  complainant  had  estab- 
lished its  plant  on  a  piece  of  land  pur- 
chased from  the  Claremont  Co.  and  ad- 
jacent thereto.  The  consolidated  com- 
pany had  yards  situated  about  two  miles 
from  the  yard  of  complainant.  The  de- 
fendants entered  into  a  contract  with 
the  Union  Stock  Yards  whereby  they 
agreed  to  make  "the  said  stock  yards 
their  live  stock  depot  for  Baltimore  and 
vicinity  and  shall  deliver  at  said  yard 
all  the  live  stock  which  may  be  trans- 
ported over  their  line  ♦  ♦  *  des- 
tined to  the  Baltimore  market  *  *  *." 
Defendants  claim  they  had  a  right  to 
agree  to  deliver  at  one  stock  yards  ex- 
clusively in  Baltimore.  Complainant's 
live  stock  was  unloaded  at  the  Union 
Stock  Yards  and  then  driven  through 
the  streets  of  Baltimore  by  complainant 
two  miles  to  their  yard,  at  considerable 
expense  and  annoyance.  Shipments  by 
complainant  and  a  tenant  of  it  over  the 
sidetrack  was  from  50  to  60  carloads  a 
year.  If  live  stock  was  delivered  at  its 
yards  complainants  estimate  it  would 
receive  15  carloads  a  week.  HELD,  the 
refusal  of  defendants  to  deliver  to  the 
sidetrack  of  complainant  live  stock  con- 
signed thereto  is  unreasonable  and  a 
violation  of  the  law.  Ordered  that  such 
delivery  be  hereafter  made.  Baltimore 
Butchers'  Live  Stock  Co.  v.  P.  B.  &  W. 
R.   R.   Co.,   20   I.   C.  C.   124. 

(i)  Defendants  made  an  exclusive 
contract  to  deliVer  live  stock  to  the 
Union  Stock  Yards  of  Baltimore,  al- 
though complainant  had  its  own  side- 
track, and  had  shipped  to  it  weekly  car- 
loads of  live  stock,  but  defendants  re- 
fused to  deliver  to  other  than  the  Union 
Stock  Yards,  on  account  of  the  exclu- 
sive contract.  HELD,  railroads  may  not 
make  contracts  which  abrogate  the  Act 
to  Regulate  Commerce;  they  may  not 
refuse,  because  of  their  own  contract, 
to  furnish  a  delivery  that  is  reasonable 
upon  tracks  which  they  use,  as  a  ter- 
minal for  complainant;  they  may  not 
discriminate  as  between  commodities  in 
the  delivery  which  they  give  where  no 
reason  exists  for  such  discrimination  ex- 
cepting the  presence  of  a  contract  made 
with  a  private  cori>oration,  as  in  this 
case.  The  amended  Act  to  Regulate  Com- 
merce provides  that  it  is  the  "duty  of  all 
common  carriers  to  establish,  observe 
and  enforce  just  and  reasonable  regu- 
lations and  practices  affecting  all  mat- 
ters  relating   to   or   connected   with   the 


TERMINAL  FACILITIES,    §3    (j)— §4    (a) 


837 


receiving,  handling,  transporting,  storing 
and  delivery  of  property."  Baltimore 
Butchers'  Live  Stock  Co.  v.  P.  B.  &  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  124,  128. 

(j)  Defendant  granted  the  exclusive 
right  to  a  company  to  conduct  its  busi- 
ness as  an  auctioneer  of  fruit  and  vege- 
tables on  its  terminal  premises  at  St. 
Louis.  Complainant,  a  rival  company, 
asked  for  the  same  facilities.  HELD, 
that  the  granting  of  the  exclusive  right 
to  maintain  a  fruit  auction  company 
was  somewhat  analogous  to  the  station 
restaurant,  news  stand,  barber  shop  and 
other  conveniences  which  travelers  ar- 
riving at  a  station  may  make  use  of  if 
they  so  desire.  They  are  enterprises 
that  outsiders  are  frequently  permitted 
to  engage  in  at  railroad  terminals,  not 
as  a  part  of  the  service  that  the  carrier 
renders  to  the  public,  but  as  something 
that  adds  to  the  general  convenience  of 
the  public.  The  telegraph,  telephone, 
transfer  and  cab  offices  ordinarily  found 
in  passenger  stations  rest  upon  the  same 
basis.  They  add  to  the  convenience 
of  the  passenger  before  the  transporta- 
tion by  the  carrier  has  commenced  or 
after  it  has  been  completed  without  add- 
ing to  the  service  undertaken  by  the 
carrier  for  the  traveler  under  its  pub- 
lished rates.  It  is  a  matter  that  is 
wholly  outside  and  apart  from  the  serv- 
ice of  transportation  performed  by  de- 
fendant, and  is  a  reasonable  use  for  the 
defendant  to  make  of  its  property.  Com- 
plaint dismissed.  Southwestern  Produce 
Distributers  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I. 
C.  C.  458,  460,  462. 

(k)  Defendants  carry  a  rule  in  their 
tariffs  that  shipments  of  lumber  to  New 
York  may  be  consigned  "New  York  light- 
erage free;"  and  that  upon  arrival  of 
cars  the  consignee  shall  specify  a  par- 
ticular lighterage  destination,  and  upon 
the  arrival  of  the  lighter  at  such  desti- 
nation provide  a  dock  berth  for  such 
lighter.  Complainant,  who  had  lumber 
delivered  at  Wallabout  Basin,  was  as- 
sessed demurrage  charges  whenever  the 
pier  he  designated  for  delivery  was  occu- 
pied, thus  compelling  the  lighter  to  tie 
up  to  another  boat,  and  wait  until  a 
berth  was  made.  The  public  berths  with- 
in the  free  lighterage  limits  of  New 
York  are  329  in  number,  and  about  3,600 
boats,  excluding  steamers  and  schooners, 
are  engaged  in  making  deliveries  with 
in  the  harbor.  HELD,  if  the  obligation 
were   imposed   upon   the   carrier   to   find 


a  berth  before  the  free  time  began  to 
run  against  the  consignee  it  would  be 
possible  for  consignees  who  desired  stor- 
age of  their  shipment  to  regularly  desig- 
nate the  more  congested  piers,  and 
thereby  obtain  the  use  of  the  carrier's 
equipment.  The  present  practice  of 
consigning  lumber  "New  York  lighterage 
free"  is  of  value  to  the  consignee  in 
that  it  enables  him  to  find  a  purchaser 
while  the  car  is  en  route  or  before  ulti- 
mate delivery.  On  account  of  the  natu- 
ral congestion  of  the  New  York  harbor 
and  the  extent  of  the  free  delivery  lim- 
its, the  regulations  of  the  defendant 
must  be  held  reasonable,  and  defendants 
not  required,  when  a  designated  pier  is 
occupied,  to  deliver  to  an  adjacent 
wharf.  Mosson  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C.  30. 

(1)  In  this  country  the  railroads  have 
recognized  by  universal  custom  that  it 
is  but  fair,  where  their  team  tracks  are 
not  used,  to  give  delivery  without  ex- 
tra charge  at  an  industry  track  as 
equivalent  service,  although  where  the 
shipper  provides  tracks,  land  and  facil- 
ities the  mere  switching  furnished  by 
the  carrier  is  in  many  cases  by  no 
means  equivalent  in  cost  to  the  expense 
attaching  to  delivery  upon  its  own 
tracks.  Associated  Jobbers  of  Los  An- 
geles V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C. 
C.  310,  316. 

(m)  The  carrier  must  hold  itself 
impartially  as  between  shippers  and  give 
to  each  equal  terminal  facilities  and 
service.  Enterprise  Fuel  Co.  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  219,  224. 

§4.     Publication  of  Terminal  Charges. 

See   Demurrage,  §11    (b),   (c) ;  Tariffs, 
II,  §4   (d),   (1). 

(a)  Although  a  terminal  charge  col- 
lected by  a  carrier  for  services  rendered 
by  another  line  when  just  and  reason- 
able cannot  be  condemned  on  the 
ground  that  when  coupled  with  the  car- 
riers' rates  for  transportation  the  total 
charge  is  unreasonable,  another  carrier 
in  order  to  avail  itself  of  the  benefit 
of  this  rule  must  separately  state  its 
terminal  or  other  special  charge  com- 
plained of,  for  if  many  matters  are 
lumped  in  a  single  charge  it  is  impos- 
sible for  either  the  shipper  or  the  Com- 
mission to  determine  how  much  of  the 
lump  charge  is  for  the  terminal  or  spe- 
cial services.  I.  C.  C.  v.  Stickney,  215 
U.  S.  98,  105,  30  Sup.  Ct.  66,  54  L.  ed. 
112. 


838 


TERMINAL  FACILITIES,  §4   (b)— §7   (c) 


(b)  Carriers  are  not  required  to 
state  separately  in  their  tariffs  their 
terminal  charges  in  connection  with 
shipside  delivery.  Mobile  Chamber  of 
Commerce  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.   C.  417,   424. 

(c)  Services  of  loading  and  unload- 
ing and  charges  therefor  are  analogous  to 
other  terminal  charges  and  must  be  pub- 
lished. Schultz-Hansen  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
18  L   C.    C.    234,   237. 

§5.     Reasonableness    of    Charges. 

See  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §28  (p), 
§60   (a). 

(a)  For  services  that  a  carrier  may 
render  or  procure  to  be  rendered  off  its 
own  line,  or  outside  the  mere  matter 
of  transportation  over  its  own  line,  it 
may  charge  and  receive  compensation. 
If  a  terminal  charge  be  in  and  of  it- 
self just  and  reasonable  it  cannot  be 
condemned  or  the  carrier  required  to 
change  it  on  the  ground  that  it,  taken 
with  prior  charges  of  transportation 
over  the  lines  of  the  carrier  or  of  con- 
necting carriers,  makes  the  total  charge 
to  the  shipper  unreasonable.  That  which 
must  be  corrected  and  condemned  is 
not  the  just  and  reasonable  terminal 
charge,  but  those  prior  charges  which 
must  of  themselves  be  unreasonable  in 
order  to  make  the  aggregate  of  the 
charge  from  the  point  of  shipment  to 
that  ol  delivery  unreasonable  and  un- 
just. I.  C.  C.  V.  Stickney,  215  U.  S.  98, 
105,  109,  30  Sup.  Ct.  66,  54  L.  ed.  112. 

(b)  A  carrier  is  •under  no  obligations 
to  charge  for  terminal  services.  Busi- 
ness interests  may  justify  it  in  waiving 
any  such  charge,  and  it  will  be  con- 
sidered therefore  to  have  waived  it  un- 
less it  makes  plain  to  both  the  shipper 
and  the  Commission  that  it  is  insisting 
upon  it.  I.  C.  C.  V.  Stickney,  215  U.  S. 
98,  105,  30  Sup.  Ct.  66,  54  L.  ed.  112. 

§6.     What  Are  Public  Terminals. 

See  Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  III 
(b);  Switch  Tracks  and  Switching, 
§4  (g),  §7  (d). 

(a)  Railroads  may  secure  and  main- 
tain freight  depots  by  contract  with  in- 
dependent concerns,  and  such  depots 
thereby  become  legally  and  to  all  in- 
tents and  purposes  the  freight  depots 
of  the  railroads.  Federal  Sugar  Refin- 
ing Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
40,    47. 


Ml.     STATUS    OF    TERMINAL   ROADS. 
§7.     In   General. 

(a)  The  fact  that  the  stock  of  the 
Union  Stock  Yards  Co.,  an  independent 
corporation  and  terminal  company  at 
Chicago,  is  owned  by  the  several  rail- 
road companies  entering  into  Chicago 
does  not  make  its  line  or  property  part 
of  the  lines  or  property  of  the  separate 
railroad  companies  with  respect  to  the 
question  of  the  reasonableness  of  the 
terminal  charges  imposed  by  it.  I,  C.  C. 
V.  Stickney,  215  U.  S.  98,  108,  30  Sup. 
Ct.    66,   54    L.   ed.    112. 

(b)  The  Northern  Pacific  terminal 
lines  are  for  all  practical  purposes  a 
part  of  the  railroad  of  each  of  the  three 
companies  owning  it.  Portland  Lumber 
Co.  V.  O.-W.  R.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
292,    294. 

(c)  The  Manufacturers  Railway  Co. 
of  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  and  a  number  of 
shippers  located  on  its  lines  asked  that 
through  routes  be  established  to  and 
from  points  on  its  lines  of  railway  in 
St.  Louis,  Mo.,  from  and  to  points  on 
the  lines  of  each  of  the  defendant  rail- 
way companies  and  points  beyond;  also 
for  the  fixing  of  reasonable  divisions  or 
absorptions  out  of  the  St.  Louis  rates 
to  be  paid  to  the  Manufacturers  Rail- 
way Co.  for  terminal  services  rendered 
by  it  and  for  reparation.  This  company 
was  incorporated  in  1887  to  furnish  ter- 
minal facilities  for  the  southern  section 
of  industrial  St,  Louis,  which,  owing  to 
the  physical  conditions  existing  there, 
seem  both  reasonable  and  necessary. 
The  Terminal  Railroad  Association  domi- 
nates entirely  the  terminal  facilities  of 
St.  Louis,  and  the  stock  of  this  com- 
pany is  owned  equally  by  the  fourteen 
carriers  running  into  that  city.  The 
only  terminal  fj^cilities  in  the  southern 
section  are  furnished  by  the  Manufac- 
turers Railway  and  by  the  lines  of  the 
St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.  The  latter's 
tracks,  however,  follow  the  bank  of  the 
Mississippi  River  and  reach  such  indus- 
tries as  are  adjacent  thereto.  For  a  con- 
siderable distance  along  the  river  there 
is  a  steep  grade  to  be  overcome  in 
reaching  industries  back  from  the  river, 
and  it  was  to  afford  service  to  these 
that  the  Manufacturers  Railway  was 
constructed.  The  Manufacturers  Rail- 
way leased  its  tracks  to  the  St.  L.  I.  M. 
&  S.  R.  R.  until  1908,  since  when  it  was 
operated  independently.  The  majority  of 
its    stock    is    owned    by    the    Anheuser- 


TERMINAL   FACILITIES,    §7    (d)— §8    (a) 


839 


Busch  Brewing  Ass'n.  For  the  year  end- 
ing April  30,  1910,  it  handled  42,970 
cars,  of  which  37,546  cars  were  handled 
for  the  Brewing  Association  and  5,424 
cars  were  handled  for  some  87  other  in- 
dustries or  patrons,  of  which  35  shipped 
or  received  10  cars  or  more.  The  traffic 
of  the  Brewing  Association  constitutes 
one-thirtieth  of  the  total  traffic  of  St. 
Louis.  The  complainant  operates  about 
20  miles  of  track,  of  which  2^^  miles 
are  classed  as  main  track,  and  the  re- 
mainder as  sidetrack,  switches  and  yard 
track.  Of  this  total,  six  miles  are  leased 
from  the  Brewing  Association  and  are 
used  in  part  both  for  the  services  of 
the  brewery  and  the  public.  The  only 
physical  connection  other  than  that  with 
the  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.  is  with  the 
St.  Louis  Transfef  Co.,  one  of  the  con- 
stituent properties  of  the  Terminal  Rail- 
road Association.  Two-thirds  of  the 
track  of  the  Manufacturers  Railway 
has  been  constructed  solely  for  the 
purpose  of  serving  the  public,  while  the 
remaining  one-third  is  used  in  serving 
both  the  brewery  and  the  public.  Prior 
to  March  1,  1910,  there  existed  through 
routes  and  joint  rates  over  the  lines  of 
defendant  carriers  and  complainant  car- 
rier to  and  from  points  on  the  line  of 
the  complainant  company.  Since  that 
date  the  defendants  declined  to  absorb 
the  charges  for  the  services  of  the 
Manufacturers  Railway.  While  the  Manu- 
facturers Railway  was  operated  by  the 
St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.  during  21  years, 
and  also  when  operated  under  the  tar- 
iffs which  permitted  an  allowance  to  the 
Manufacturers  Railway  itself,  in  1909, 
until  March  1,  1910,  delivery  has  been 
made  to  the  public  served  by  it  at  the 
St.  Louis  rates.  HELD,  in  view  of  all 
the  facts,  circumstances  and  conditions 
bearing  upon  the  question,  there  is  no 
doubt  that  the  Manufacturers  Railway 
Co.  is  in  fact  a  common  carrier  at 
common  law,  notwithstanding  any  modi- 
fication thereof,  and  therefore  within 
the  provisions  of  the  first  section  of 
the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  and  that 
the  payment  to  it  of  a  reasonable  and 
just  portion  of  the  St.  Louis  rates  for 
the  terminal  services  rendered  by  it  is 
not  unlawful,  and  that  it  is  not  a  mere 
plant  facility.  FURTHER  HELD,  that 
the  action  of  defendants  in  canceling 
the  divisions  and  absorptions  with  the 
Manufacturers  Railway,  which  have 
been  for  many  years  included  in  the  St. 
Louis   rates,   has   subjected   complainant 


shippers  and  a  considerable  portion  of 
the  public  of  South  St.  Louis  to  the  pay- 
ment of  unjust  and  unreasonable  trans- 
portation charges,  and  to  undue  discrimi- 
nation and  disadvantage.  Question  of 
what  are  reasonable  divisions  and  the 
reparation  to  be  awarded  reserved  for 
further  investigation.  (Lane,  Comm'r, 
concurring  opinion;  Harlan,  Comm'r,  dis- 
senting.) Manufacturing  Ry.  Co.  v.  St. 
L.,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  304. 

(d)  The  contention  that  inasmuch  as 
a  terminal  company  operating  in  Gal- 
veston, Tex.,  is  not  owned  by  the  rail- 
road company  with  which  the  track  on 
its  dock  connect,  it  cannot  be  held  to 
be  a  part  of  that  or  any  other  railroad 
is  rejected.  It  makes  no  difference 
whether  or  not  the  connecting  railroad 
company  owns  the  terminal  company 
if  the  ownership  of  both  is  vested  in 
the  same  corporation,  especially  where 
it  appears  that  the  interests  and  offi- 
cers of  the  railroad  and  steamship  lines 
of  the  system  transporting  shipments  to 
and  from  Galveston  are  identical.  Eich- 
enberg  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  250,  164; 
sustained  219  U.  S.  498,  31  Sup.  Ct.  279, 
55  L.  ed.  310. 

(e)  Where  a  terminal  company  holds 
land  granted  to  be  used  for  wharfage 
purposes  by  the  general  public,  and  is 
given  charter  power  to  lease  and  con- 
vey its  warehouse,  docks  and  wharves, 
such  power  cannot  be  exerted  to  divert 
the  land  granted  from  a  public  to  a 
private  use.  Eichenberg  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  250,  267;  sustained,  219  U.  S. 
498,  31  Sup.  Ct.  279,  55  L  ed.  310. 

(f)  Where  a  terminal  company  exe- 
cutes to  a  shipper  an  instrument  pur- 
porting to  be  a  lease  of  a  portion  of 
a  wharf  but  the  shipper  is  to  receive 
the  revenue  arising  from  the  use  of 
the  tracks  on  the  dock  and  is  not  to 
pay  for  switching  cars  upon  such  tracks, 
it  is  doubtful  whether  the  instrument  is 
in  any  proper  sense  a  lease  of  the 
premises.  Eichenberg  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  14  I. 
C.  C.  250,  267;  sustained,  219  U.  S.  498,  31 
Sup.  Ct.  279,  55  L.  ed.  310. 

§8.     Definition   of   "Terminal   Charges." 

(a)  "Terminal  charges,"  as  used  in 
section  6,  refers  to  the  American  metn- 
od  of  making  rates,  and  comprehends 
services  rendered  after  delivery.  As- 
sociated Jobbers  of  Los  Angeles  v.  A.  T. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  310,  315. 


840 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §1   (a)  — (f) 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND 
JOINT  RATES. 

I.     CONTROL    AND    REGULATION. 
§1.     Jurisdiction  of   Commission. 
§2.     What    is     through    route    or 

"common   arrangement." 
§3.    What  is  joint  rate. 
§35/2.     Participation      in      through 
traffic. 

II.  ESTABLISHMENT    BY    CARRIER. 

§4.     In  general. 

§5.     Dispute   over   divisions. 

§6.     Circuitous    routes. 

§7.     Obligation  to  carry, 

§8.     Relation    of    similar    points. 

§9.     Right  to  favor  own  line. 
§10.     Stc'^us    of    intermediate    car- 
rier. 
§11.     What  is  satisfactory  through 
route. 

(1)  In   general. 

(2)  When    through    route 

ordered  or  denied. 

III.  BILLS   OF   LADING. 

§12.     Issuance  in   general. 

IV.  REASONABLENESS  OF  THROUGH 

RATES. 

§13.     In    general. 

§14.     Divisions. 

§15.    Exceeding     combinations     of 
intermediates. 

§t6.     Reparation. 
V.     TARIFFS   AND  CONSTRUCTION. 

§17.    In  general. 

§18.     Application    of     proportional 
rate. 

§19.     Breaking  transit. 

§20.     Change    in    rate    while    ship- 
ment at  transit  point. 

§21.     Intermediate  clause. 

§22.    What   is   legal   rate. 

§23.     Procedure. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 

See  Differentials,  §4;  Electric  Lines, 
II;  Foreign  Commerce;  Passenger 
Fares  and  Facilities,  §14;  Routing 
and   IVIisrouting;   Water  Carriers. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

See  Courts,  §3  (b) ;  Crimes,  §1  (b), 
§2   (d). 

§1.     Jurisdiction   of  Commission. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §1  (1)  (e) ;  Ex- 
press Companies,  §1  (d);  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission,  §2  (g),  §9 
(m);  Passenger  Fares  and  Facili- 
ties, §1  (e):  Procedure  Before  Com- 
mission, §13  (I);  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,  §3  (u) ;  Routing  and  Mis- 
routing,    §1    (c). 

(a)     Under    the    amendment    of    June 
29,    1906,    the    Commission    has    jurisdic- 


tion over  a  complaint  demanding  a  filing 
with  the  Commission  and  publishing  of 
rates  for  transportation  of  passengers 
and  property  between  points  in  Alaska 
and  points  in  the  Dominion  of  Canada 
and  other  places,  and  the  establishment 
of  through  routes  and  joint  rates  be- 
tween points  in  Alaska  and  points  in 
the  state  of  Washington,  said  amend- 
ment having  superseded  the  authority 
conferred  upon  the  Secretary  of  Interior 
by  section  2  of  the  Act  of  May  14, 
1898.  I.  C.  C.  V.  H.  S.  S.  Co.,  224  U.  S. 
474,  483,  32  Sup.  Ct.   556,   56  L.  ed.  849. 

(b)  The  Commission  is  expressly 
empowered  to  determine  the  reasonable- 
ness of  any  part  or  the  aggregate  of 
charges  for  interstate  transportation  and 
to  establish  joint  rates.  Sunderland 
Bros.  Co.  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
L  C.  C.  259,  261. 

(c)  It  is  not  clear  that  the  Commis- 
sion has  jurisdiction  to  deal  with  divi- 
sions under  a  rate  not  fixed  by  the 
Commission,  but  that  question  is  not 
decided.  In  Re  Wharfage  Charges  at 
Galveston,  23  I.  C.  C.  535,  546. 

(d)  The  statute  provides  that  in  es- 
tablishing joint  rates  and  through  routes, 
each  carrier  against  which  the  order  is 
made  shall  be  given  the  benefit  of 
the  long  haul  by  its  own  line  "unless 
to  do  so  would  make  such  through 
route  unreasonably  long  as  compared 
with  another  practicable  through  route 
which  could  otherwise  be  estab- 
lished." The  Commission  cannot  there- 
fore establish  in  every  case  a  through 
route  and  a  jo.int  rate,  but  must  work 
under  the  limitation  imposed  by  the 
Act  of  Congress  as  above  set  forth. 
In  Re  Investigation  of  Alleged  Un- 
reasonable Rates  on  Meats,  23  I.  C. 
C.    656,    662. 

(e)  Carriers  are  required  under  sec- 
tion 1  to  make  reasonable  rules  and 
regulations  with  respect  to  the  inter- 
change, exchange  and  return  of  cars  used 
upon  through  routes  and  for  operation  of 
such  through  routes,  and  where  they 
have  failed  in  this  respect  the  Commis- 
sion is  empowered  by  section  15  to 
determine  the  individual  or  joint  regu- 
lation or  practice  that  is  just,  fair  and 
reasonable.  Missouri  &  Illinois  Coal  Co. 
V.    I.    C.    R.    R.    Co.,    22    I.    C.    C.    39,    49. 

(f)  The  Commission  may  after  hear- 
ing establish  through  routes  and  joint 
classifications    and    rates,    when    one    of 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §1  (g)— (m) 


841 


the  connecting  carriers  is  a  water  line, 
but  not  when  the  transportation  is 
wholly  by  water.  (Lane,  Comm'r,  concur- 
ring opinion.)  In  Re  Transportation  by 
C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.   C.  207,  209. 

(g)  With  respect  to  the  transporta- 
tion of  persons  and  property  by  rail, 
the  Act  has  not  undertaken  to  specify 
in  terms  what  shall  for  the  purpose 
of  that  statute  be  considered  to  be  a 
common  carrier,  but  has  proceeded  upon 
the  foundation  of  the  common  law  as 
to  public  callings.  It  is  not  therefore 
within  the  authority  of  the  Commission 
to  pronounce  any  carrier  by  raii  not  to 
be  in  fact  or  in  law  a  common  carrier, 
if  by  the  tests  and  principles  cf  the 
common  law,  coupled  with  such  require- 
ments as  may  have  b€en  imposed  by 
constitutional  or  legislative  authority, 
it  would  be  held  to  be  such.  The  right 
of  such  a  carrier  to  participate  in 
through  routes  and  joint  rates  and  saare 
in  the  earnings  of  such  rates  with  others 
is  a  wholly  different  question  and  one 
clearly  within  the  purview  of  the  stat- 
ute and  under  the  jurisdiction  and  con- 
trol of  the  Commission,  as  exp.-essly 
provided  in  the  Act.  The  purpose  of 
the  Act  in  this  respect  must  be  ful- 
filled by  action  appropriate  lo  \he  end 
in  view,  and  at  the  same  time  effective 
to  prevent  unjust  discrimination  in  any 
form,  enforcing  reasonable  requirements 
and  limitations  in  respect  to  the  es- 
tablishment of  through  routes  and  jomt 
rates,  and  the  sharing  of  the  earnings 
thereunder,  consistently  with  all  other 
provisions  of  the  statute,  in  such  man- 
ner as  will  result  in  substantial  justice 
to  all  the  parties  in  interest  and  the 
observance  of  the  standards  of  the  law 
in  the  public  interest.  Mfr'rs  Ry.  Co. 
V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
304,  312,  313. 

(h)  Formerly  the  Commission  under 
section  15  had  authority,  after  hearing 
on  a  complaint,  to  establish  through 
routes  and  maximum  joint  rates  hnd  to 
prescribe  the  divisions  thereof,  "provided 
no  reasonable  or  satisfactory  through 
route"  existed.  In  the  amendment  of 
June  18,  1910,  this  limitation  was  omit- 
ted. As  the  section  now  reads  the  only 
limitations  on  the  authority  of  the  Com- 
mission to  establish  through  routes  and 
joint  rates  that  are  pertinent  in  this 
case  are:  (a)  It  may  not  require  any 
railroad  involuntarily  to  embrace  in  a 
through    route    substantially    less    than 


the  entire  length  of  its  road  between 
the  termini  of  the  proposed  through 
route.  (b)  It  may  not  establish  through 
routes  and  joint  rates  between  a  steam 
railroad  and  a  street  electric  passenger 
railway  that  does  not  transport  fT-eight 
in  addition  to  its  passenger  and  express 
business.  The  first  of  these  limitations 
must  be  observed  in  all  cases.  C.  & 
C.  Traction  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  486,  490;  order  of  Commis- 
sion enjoined,  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
U.  S.,  195  Fed.  962. 

(i)  The  Commission's  power  to  re- 
quire the  institution  of  through  routes 
and  joint  rates  is  expressly  condition^-d 
upon  there  being  no  reasonable  or  satis- 
factory through  route  in  existence. 
Southern  California  Sugar  Co.  v.  S.  P. 
L.  A.  &  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
6,   10. 

(j)  The  Commission  cannot  estab- 
lish a  through  route  and  joint  rate 
where  a  reasonable  or  satisfactory 
through  route  and  joint  rate  already 
exist.  Spring  Hill  Coal  Co.  v.  Erie  R. 
R.   Co.,   18   I.   C.  C.   508,  509. 

(k)  The  law  does  not  require  the 
Commission  in  all  cases  where  no 
through  route  and  joint  rate  exists  to 
establish  a  route  and  fix  a  rate  appli- 
cable thereto,  but  only  empowers  it 
to  do  so  in  a  proper  case  for  the  pur- 
pose of  giving  effect  to  the  Act.  Baer 
Bros.  Mercantile  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
17    I.   C.  C.   225,   228. 

(1)  Where  an  intermediate  carrier 
participates  in  a  shipment  without  filing 
its  concurrence  to  the  through  rate,  the 
Commission  is  not  ousted  of  jurisdiction 
to  pass  upon  the  reasonableness  of  the 
through  rate  and  to  award  reparation. 
Kindelon  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  251, 
266. 

(m)  While  at  common  law  a  com- 
mon carrier  may  not  have  been  com- 
pelled to  accord  traffic  coming  off  the 
rails  of  other  carriers  and  not  originat- 
ing on  its  own  lines  the  necessary  fa- 
cilties  for  through  movement,  under  the 
Act,  as  amended  June  29,  1906,  this  is 
no  longer  the  law  with  regard  to  inter- 
state carriers.  The  only  limitation 
placed  upon  the  exercise  of  the  power 
of  the  Commission  to  establish  a  through 
route  is  where  there  is  already  a  rea- 
sonable or  satisfactory  through  route  in 
existence,  and  the  question  as  to  whether 
or  not  an  existing  through  route  is  rea- 


842 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §1  (n)— §2  (a) 


sonable  or  satisfactory  is  one  of  fact 
for  the  determination  of  the  Commission. 
Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  479,  480. 

(n)  The  Commission  has  no  authority 
to  establish  a  rate  in  Mexico,  nor  to 
order  the  maintenance  of  a  future  rate 
from  points  in  the  United  States  to 
points  in  Mexico,  but  it  may  require 
American  carriers  to  discontinue  apply- 
ing a  joint  through  rate,  and,  where 
such  a  rate  has  been  voluntarily  main- 
tained, may  inquire  into  its  reasonable- 
ness and  award  damages.  Black  Horse 
Tobacco  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.  588,  590. 

(o)  The  Commission  may  establish 
a  through  route  and  joint  rate,  provided 
no  reasonable  or  satisfactory  through 
route  exists.  Enterprise  Fuel  Co  v. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  219,  220. 

(p)  The  first  section  gives  the  ship- 
per a  right  to  a  through  route  and  a 
reasonable  rate,  but  the  rate  open  to 
him  need  not  be  a  j  int  rate,  and  the 
mere  fact  that  no  joint  rate  already 
exists  does  not  lay  upon  the  Commis- 
sion any  absolute  requirement  to  es- 
tablish one.  Chamber  of  Commerce  of 
Milwaukee  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
(Prouty,  Comm'r,  concurring  opinion.) 
15   I.    C.   C.    460,   467. 

(q)  The  Commission  has  power  to 
establish  a  through  route.  Pacific  Coast 
Lumber  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  51,  53. 

(r)  The  Commission  is  allowed  to 
establish  a  through  route  and  a  joint 
rate  only  when  the  carriers  themselves 
have  neglected  to  provide  a  reasonable 
and  satisfactory  one.  Pacific  Coast 
Lumber  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.   C.   C.  51,  53. 

(s)  With  respect  to  the  authority 
of  the  Commission  to  order  through 
routes  and  joint  rates  the  Act  makes 
no  discrimination  between  railroads 
that  are  operated  by  electricity  and 
those  that  use  steam.  Both  are  subject 
to  the  Act  when  engaged  in  the  inter- 
state transportation  and  are  entitled 
to  equal  consideration  in  any  contro- 
versy. The  progress  in  the  science  of 
electricity  and  the  rapid  increase  of 
new  devices  for  its  application  have 
led  many  practical  railroad  men  to 
think  that  we  may  be  measurably  near 
its    general    use    as    the    chief    motive 


power  in  transportation.  Chicago  & 
Milwaukee  Electric  R.  R.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R. 
R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  20,  27. 

(t)  Section  1  of  the  Act  requiring 
carriers  to  establish  routes  and  just 
and  reasonable  rates  applicable  thereto 
must  be  read  in  connection  with  sec- 
tion 15,  under  which  latter  section  the 
Commission  cannot  grant  relief  when 
a  reasonable  or  satisfactory  route  or 
rate  exists.  Cardiff  Coal  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.    P.   Ry.   Co.,   13   I.   C.  C.   460,   466. 

(u)  Coal  was  carried  from  points  in 
Arkansas  over  the  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  to 
Dodson,  Mo.,  a  point  formerly  outside 
Kansas  City,  and  thence  over  defend- 
ant Westport  Belt  Ry.  from  Dodson  to 
Westport,  a  point  within  the  limits  of 
Kansas  City.  The  shipping  receipt  speci- 
fied Westport  as  the  ultimate  destina- 
tion. The  car  was  waybilled  by  the 
K.  C.  S.  Ry.  to  Dodson,  transported  to 
that  point  and  there  placed  upon  side 
tracks,  from  which  it  was  taken  with- 
out further  instructions  by  the  Belt 
Railway  and  carried  to  Westport.  Com- 
plainant consignee  at  Westport  paid  the 
K.  C.  S.  Ry.  its  full  rate  to  Dodson  and 
the  Belt  Railway  its  full  rate  of  20c 
per  ton  for  the  haul  from  Dodson  to 
Westport.  HELD,  defendant  Belt  Rail- 
way in  said  shipments  was  engaged  in 
interstate  commerce  and  was  subject  to 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commission  with 
respect  to  through  routes  and  joint 
rates.  A  movement  from  a  point  in  one 
state  to  a  point  in  another  is  to  be 
treated  as  an  entirety  and  cannot  be 
split  up  into  separate  movements  for 
the  purpose  of  exempting  one  of  the 
carriers  operating  wholly  between  points 
within  a  state  from  the  regulations  of 
interstate  commerce.  Leonard  v.  K.  C. 
S.  Ry.  Co.  and  K.  C.  &  Westport  Belt 
Ry.    Co.,   13   L   C.   C   573,   579. 

§2.     What    is    Through    Route    or    "Com- 
mon   Arrangement." 

•See  Supra,  §1  (I);  Infra,  §11  (1) 
(a),  §16  (g),  §17  (b),  §22  (b),  (c), 
(d),  (f),  (h),  (i);  Absorption  of 
Charges,  §1  (a);  Allowances,  §8  (4) 
(c);  Crimes,  §11;  Interstate  Com- 
merce, §3  (f)  (i);  Proportional 
Rates,  §1  (b);  Reparation,  §19  (c); 
Routing  and  IVIisrouting,  §4  (aaa); 
Tariffs,  §4   (x),  §10. 

(a)  The  phrase  "common  arrange- 
ment" means  an  agreement  or  under- 
standing between  connecting  carriers 
with  respect  to  the  transportation  of 
merchandise   and   the   charges   and  divi- 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §2  (b)— (1) 


843 


sions     to     be     made     therefor.       Mutual 
Transit  Co.   v.   U.   S.,  178   Fed.  664,  666. 

(b)  Defendant  steamship  company 
operated  on  the  Great  Lakes  from  Buf- 
falo, N.  Y.,  to  West  Superior,  Wis.  It 
contracted  with  a  shipper  to  protect  a 
rate  of  45c  on  iron  from  Emaus,  Pa.,  to 
Winnipeg,  Manitoba.  The  rate  published 
by  the  initial  and  delivering  rail  car- 
riers was  491/^c.  Defendants  did  not 
concur  in  such  rate.  The  rail  carriers 
were  not  informed  of  the  agreement 
between  the  shipper  and  defendant  for 
the  45c  rate  and  the  bills  of  lading, 
shipping  receipts  and  the  other  docu- 
ments called  for  a  rate  of  49i^c  and 
specitled  the  divisions  which  defendants, 
the  initial  and  delivering  carriers,  were 
to  receive,  which  rate  was  collected. 
Defendant  rebated  the  difference  be- 
tween the  49i/4c  and  the  45c  rates.  No 
proof  was  offered  of  any  further  under- 
standing or  arrangement  between  de- 
fendant and  the  other  rail  carriers. 
HELD,  defendant,  carrying  wholly  by 
water,  was  not  shown  to  have  entered 
into  a  "common  arrangement"  with  the 
rail  carriers  so  as  to  make  it  subject 
to  the  Act,  and  could  not  be  convicted 
of  rebating  under  the  Elkins  Act.  Mut- 
ual Transit  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  178  Fed.  664, 
667. 

(c)  A  mere  agreement  by  an  inde- 
pendent water  carrier  to  accept  freight 
from  a  connecting  railroad  and  to 
transport  it  for  its  own  particular  rate, 
may  be  an  "arrangement"  for  continu- 
ous carriage,  but  it  is  not  a  "common 
arrangement"  within  the  meaning  of 
the  Act.  Mutual  Transit  Co.  v.  U.  S., 
178   Fed.   664,   667. 

(d)  In  the  concert  of  action,  in  the 
successive  receipt  and  movement  of  the 
traffic  by  the  connecting  carriers  under 
through  bills  of  lading  for  continuous 
carriage,  is  manifested  the  "common  ar- 
rangement" contemplated  by  the  Act 
of  Congress.  No  previous  formal  con- 
tract is  necessary.  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  U.  S.,  157  Fed.   831,  833. 

(e)  By  failing  to  establish  or  concur 
in  a  joint  through  rate  for  traffic  ac- 
cepted for  interstate  transportation,  each 
participating  carrier  impliedly  asserts 
that  the  rate  which  it  has  duly  estab- 
lished, published  and  filed  for  its  own 
line  shall  be  a  component  part  of  the 
through  rate  to  be  charged.  C.  B.  &  Q. 
Ry.    Co.   V.   U.    S.,    157   Fed.   831,   833. 


(f)  Where  passengers  are  transported 
by  continuous  carriage  over  the  lines 
of  several  interurban  railways  between 
interstate  points,  a  through  route  exists 
over  which  passengers  are  actually 
transported  by  continuous  carriage,  and 
the  fact  that  through  tickets  are  not 
used,  or  joint  rates  or  fares  may  not 
be  in  force,  does  not  prove  that  the 
transportation  is  not  interstate  in  char- 
acter. Citizens  of  Somerset  v.  Wash- 
ington Ry.  &  Electric  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
187,   191. 

(g)  Shipments  of  flour  were  accepted 
by  defendants  for  transportation  from 
Hays,  Kan.,  to  South  Tacoma,  Wash., 
and  bills  of  lading  were  issued  for 
the  through  movement  from  point  of 
origin  to  point  of  desired  destination, 
and  shipments  were  duly  transported  in 
accordance  therewith.  HELD,  it  cannot 
be  said  that  there  was  no  through  route 
in  effect,  and  under  the  circumstances 
the  prayer  of  the  complaint  for  the 
establishment  of  a  through  route  is 
denied.  Kenworthy  &  Son  v.  U.  P.  R. 
R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  515,  517. 

(h)  Carriers  engaged  in  a  through 
route  in  law  constitute  one  line.  R.  R. 
Commission  of  Nev.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.   C.  238,  252. 

(i)  A  shipment  sent  through  to  des- 
tination without  the  intervention  of  the 
shipper  at  junctions  moves  on  a  through 
route.  Baer  Bros.  Mercantile  Co.  v.  M. 
P.   Ry.   Co.,   17   L   C.   C.   225,   226. 

(j)  A  rate  formed  by  a  combination 
of  separate  rates  over  connecting  lines 
has  every  substantial  feature  of  a 
through  rate,  and  separately  established 
rates  over  a  through  route  are  expressly 
recognized  in  section  6  of  the  Act. 
Baer  Bros.  Mercantile  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,   17  I.  C.   C.  225,  228. 

(k)  When  traffic  from  two  territories 
served  by  different  lines  is  carried  to 
a  point  on  a  common  connecting  line 
under  joint  rates  published  in  a  single 
tariff  to  which  all  three  lines  are  par- 
ties, a  through  line  or  group  of  lines 
is  formed  which  serves  both  territories 
and  makes  discrimination  possible.  In- 
diana Steel  &  Wire  Co.  v.  C.  R.  L  & 
P.  Ry.   Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  155. 

(1)  The  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.,  the  deliv- 
ering line  on  shipments  from  St.  Louis, 
Mo.,  to  Leadville,  Colo.,  advanced  to  the 
M.  P.  Ry.  the  full  amount  of  its  charges 


844 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §2  (m)— §4  (a) 


and  collected  the  same  from  the  con- 
signee. These  facts,  together  with  other 
facts  of  record,  constitute  an  arrange- 
ment which  clearly  brings  the  trans- 
portation within  the  scope  of  the  Act. 
Nollenberger  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  595,  598. 

(m)  A  through  route  is  a  continuous 
line  formed  by  agreement,  express  or 
implied,  between  connecting  carriers 
over  which  shipments  are  to  be  made, 
and  all  services  in  connection  therewith 
from  origin  to  destination  must  be  per- 
formed by  said  carriers  at  their  lawfully 
established  rates  applicable  thereto.  The 
service  must  be  continuous  for  every 
part  of  the  journey  over  the  continuous 
line.  When  a  through  rate  is  estab- 
lished the  shipper  should  not  be  called 
upon  at  any  point  therein  to  assume 
possession  or  control  of  his  shipment  or 
do  any  service  in  forwarding  it  to  its 
final  destination,  such  as  loading  and 
unloading  in  transit,  although  carriers 
may  provide  for  unloading  and  trans- 
ferring at  stated  junction  points  as  a 
part  of  the  through  service  if  their 
tariffs  also  specify  the  kind  of  service 
required  in  transferring  at  such  points 
and  the  separate  rates  and  charges  to 
be  exacted  therefor.  Memphis  Freight 
Bureau  v.  F.  S.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  13 
I.    C.    C.    1,    8. 

(n)  A  shipment  reconsigned  before 
arrival  at  the  original  point  of  distribu- 
tion constitutes  a  through  movement. 
Miller  &  Co.  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  249. 

(o)  The  voluntary  making  of  new 
rates  constitutes  a  common  control, 
management  or  arrangement  for  a  con- 
tinuous carriage  or  shipment.  Pitts- 
burgh, etc.,  Ry.  Co.  V.  Mitchell  (Ind. 
1910),   91   N.  E.  735,   740. 

(p)  Section  1  of  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Act  as  amended  June  29,  1906, 
provides  "that  the  provisions  of  this 
Act  shall  apply  to  any  common  carrier 
or  carriers  engaged  in  the  transporta- 
tion of  passengers  or  property  wholly 
by  railroad  (or  partly  by  railroad  and 
partly  by  water,  when  both  are  used 
under  a  common  control,  management 
or  arrangement  for  a  continuous  car- 
riage or  shipment)  and  also  to  the 
transportation  in  like  manner  of  prop- 
erty shipped  from  a  foreign  country  to 
any  place  in  the  United  States  or  an 
adjacent    foreign    country."      Section    2 


of  the  Act  requires  the  filing  and  post- 
ing of  charges  for  transportation  be- 
tween points  on  the  line  of  the  carrier 
and  points  on  the  route  of  any  other 
carrier  (by  railroad,  by  pipe  line  or  by 
water,  when  a  through  route  and  joint 
rate  have  been  established).  Defendant 
Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  established  a 
rate  of  85c  on  canned  goods  from  Stav- 
anger,  Norway,  to  Seattle,  Wash.,  with 
the  provision  that  it  was  to  receive  75c  for 
its  portion  of  the  haul  and  if  the  best 
ocean  rate  should  make  the  total 
charge  exceed  85c,  the  charge  for  the 
entire  haul  was  to  be  75c  plus  the  best 
ocean  rate  obtainable.  HELD,  the 
shipment  covered  by  such  rate  was 
subject  to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act. 
Fisher  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  49  Wash.  205, 
209,  95  P.  77. 

§3.     What   Is  Joint   Rate. 

(a)  The  "joint  rate"  referred  to  in 
section  6  of  the  Act  relating  to  the 
publishing  of  rates  does  not  apply  to 
the  combined  rates  on  shipments  from 
United  States  inland  points  through 
Atlantic  ports  via  ocean  carriers  to 
European  points,  since  the  Commission 
has  no  jurisdiction  over  ocean  carriers. 
To  permit  the  making  of  joint  rates,  in 
the  strict  sense  used  in  the  section  be- 
tween such  points,  would  open  the  way 
for  rebates  and  other  discriminatory  prac- 
tices, since  in  publishing  a  joint  rate 
under  section  6  the  carriers  are  not 
compelled  to  publish  their  divisions  of 
the  same  and  by  a  manipulation  of 
divisions  the  ocean  carriers  might  ob- 
tain an  inequitable  portion  thereof 
wherewith  to  "induce"  traffic.  The 
rail  carriers  must,  therefore,  on  such 
traffic  publish  their  rates  from  inland 
points  to  Atlantic  ports.  Cosmopolitan 
Shipping  Co.  v.  Hamburg-American 
Packet   Co.,    13    I.    C.    C.   266,   280. 

§3'/2.     Participation    in    Through    Traffic. 

See  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  II 
(f). 

II.     ESTABLISHMENT    BY    CARRIER. 

§4.     In   General. 

See  Branch  Lines,  §2  (i);  Discrimina- 
tion, §7  (w),  (z);  Evidence,  §20 
(o) ;    Reconsignment,    §1    (a). 

(a)  The  Act  imposes  upon  common 
carriers  subject  to  its  provisions  the 
duty  of  establishing  in  a  prescribed 
mode  the  rates,  whether  individual  or 
joint,  to  be  charged  for  the  transporta- 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §4   (b)— §5  (d) 


845 


tion  in  interstate  commerce  of  property 
over  their  lines;  the  rates  so  estab- 
lished are  obligatory  upon  carrier  tuiu 
shipper  and  must  be  strictly  observed 
by  both  until  changed  in  the  mode  pre- 
scribed. U.  S.  V.  Miller,  223  U.  S.  599, 
G02,  32  Sup.  Ct.  323,  56  L.  ed.  568. 

(b)  Undue  preference  results  from 
failure  to  establish  through  routes  and 
joint  rates  to  complainant's  mines  which 
are  reached  by  industrial  lines.  Ston- 
€ga  Coke  &  Coal  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  17,  26. 

(c)  A  carrier  cannot  impose  an  un- 
reasonably high  local  rate  upon  any 
community  because  it  enjoys  low  in- 
bound rates.  R.  R.  Comm.  of  La.  v. 
St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  31,  34. 

(d)  When  conditions  admit,  rates 
should  be  established  from  the  larger 
grain  markets,  applicable  to  all  grain 
handled  at  and  shipped  from  the  market, 
irrespective  of  its  point  of  origin. 
Southern  Illinois  Millers'  Ass'n  v.  G.  H. 
&  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  512,  513. 

(e)  Where  the  withdrawal  of  a 
joint  through  rate  via  a  certain  route 
left  a  higher  combination  in  effect,  and 
the  carrier  cannot  justify  the  increase, 
through  routes  and  joint  rates  will  be 
ordered  to  be  established.  In  Re  Ad- 
vances  on   Coal,    23   I.    C.   C.    618. 

(f)  Where  application  is  made  to 
have  a  rate  constructed  through  one 
gateway  rather  than  via  the  present 
gateway,  it  is  not  enough  to  show  that 
in  miles  the  distance  is  less  via  the 
proposed  route;  it  must  be  shown  that 
the  cost  of  transportation  is  less,  or 
rather,  that  the  combination  of  rates  is 
less  as  estimated  by  the  general  level 
of  rates  in  the  territory  involved.  In 
Re  Advances  on  Meats  and  Packing- 
house   Products,    23    I.    C.    C.    656,    669. 

(g)  The  commerce  of  the  country  is 
regarded  as  national,  not  local,  and  the 
railroads  are  required  to  serve  the 
routes  which  they  have  established,  or 
which  they  may  have  been  required  to 
establish,  in  connection  with  other  car- 
riers, without  respect  to  the  fact  that 
this  may  carry  their  equipment  beyond 
their  own  lines.  Missouri  &  Illinois 
Coal  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
39,    44. 

(h)  The  full  burden  of  the  obligation 
to  establish  through  routes,  furnish  the 
necessary     facilities     for    transportation 


and  make  reasonable  and  proper  rules 
of  practice  as  between  themselves  and 
the  shippers,  rests  in  the  first  instance 
upon  the  carriers.  Missouri  &  Illinois 
Coal  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
39,  46.. 

(i)  Through  rates  should  not  be  con- 
structed by  using  the  full  combination. 
Bluefield  Shippers'  Ass'n  v.  N.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  519,  532. 

(j)  A  road  is  built  and  operated  as 
a  whole  and  local  rates  are  not  to 
be  made  with  reference  to  difficulties 
of  each  particular  portion,  heavy  grades 
and  tunnels  add  to  cost  of  operation. 
Traffic  Bureau  of  Merchants'  Exchange 
of  San  Francisco  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.   259,    261. 

(k)     Divisions    are  not    essential    to 

legalize  a  joint  rate.  Germain  Co.  v.  N. 

O.    &    N.    E.    R.    R.  Co.,    17    I.    C.    C. 

22,    24. 

(1)  A  joint  rate  having  been  can- 
celed, and  no  evidence  having  been 
offered  tending  to  show  the  combination 
rate  unreasonable,  reparation  will  be 
denied.  Isbell-Brown  Co.  v.  L.  S.  & 
M.    S.   Ry.   Co.,   Unrep.   Op.   231. 

(m)  Volume  of  business  may  not  be 
sufficient  to  justify  carriers  in  maintain- 
ing through  service.  Hamilton  v.  Amer- 
ican  Express   Co.,   Unrep.   Op.   355. 

§5.     Dispute    Over    Divisions. 
See    Divisions,   §4. 

(a)  Joint  through  rates,  canceled  be- 
cause of  disagreement  over  divisions, 
ordered  to  be  established.  Chamber  of 
Commerce  of  Newport  News  v.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  345,  356. 

(b)  A  through  rate  regularly  pub- 
lished between  two  points  and  available 
under  the  tariff  over  several  different 
routes  is  not  nullified  as  to  one  such 
route  by  failure  of  participating  carriers 
to  agree  upon  divisions  over  that  route. 
Germain  Co.  v.  N.  O.  &  N.  E.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  22,  24. 

(c)  Unwillingness  to  divide  revenue 
on  traffic  originating  off  line  that  de- 
fendant could  originate  on  its  line  un- 
tenable as  a  reason  for  the  withdrawal 
of  joint  rates.  Delray  Salt  Co.  v.  C.  St. 
P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  507, 
511. 

(d)  Establishment  of  through  routes 
ought  not  to  be  delayed  by  any  disagree- 


846 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §5  (e)— §8  (a) 


ment  among  carriers  with  respect  to 
divisions.  Celina  Mill  &  Elevator  Co.  v. 
St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  138, 
142. 

(e)  Formerly  one  joint  route  from 
Ashland,  Tex.,  to  Nash,  Okla.,  was  in 
effect  via  Winsboro  and  Oklahoma  City, 
and  another  via  Marshall,  Ft.  Worth  and 
Purcell,  with  a  rate  of  28i^c  over  each 
route  upon  lumber,  lath  and  shingles. 
This  rate  was  canceled  over  both  routes, 
the  reason  being  the  inability  of  defend- 
ants to  agree  on  divisions.  No  other 
satisfactory  through  route  or  joint  rate 
existed  between  the  points  in  question. 
HELD,  a  through  route  with  a  joint 
rate  of  28i^c  should  be  established  over 
the  second  route.  Gentry  v.  A.  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  171,  172. 

§6.     Circuitous    Routes. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §18  (8);  Dis- 
crimination, §3  (ee);  Reasonable- 
ness of   Rates,   §103   (a). 

(a)  In  transporting  live  animals,  al- 
most any  additional  length  of  haul 
renders  the  route  unduly  circuitous  and 
justifies  the  Commission  in  establish- 
ing a  joint  rate  over  the  direct  line 
even  when  a  two-line  haul  is  involved. 
In  Re  Advances  on  Meats  and  Packing- 
house Products,  23  I.  C.  C.  656,  662. 

(b)  Distance  is  an  important  element 
in  determining  whether  a  routing  is  sat- 
isfactory, since  a  circuitous  route  involv- 
ing a  longer  haul  acd  therefore  greater 
delay  would  not  be,  ordinarily,  as  desir- 
able as  a  direct  one.  Pacific  Coast 
Lumber  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
14  I.   C.  C.  51,  54. 

§7.     Obligation   to   Carry. 

(a)  Between  Nov.  1,  1907,  and  May 
21,  1908,  complainant  delivered  to  de- 
fendants at  Beckville,  Tex.,  shipments 
of  lumber  in  carloads  consigned  re- 
spectively to  Duncan,  Comanche,  Mar- 
low  and  Waurika,  Okla.,  and  requested 
the  defendant,  initial  carrier,  to  bill 
them  to  said  points.  Defendant  refused 
so  to  do  on  the  ground  that  no  joint 
rates  were  in  effect  to  these  points,  and 
complainant  was  compelled  to  allow  de- 
fendant to  bill  the  same  via  Ringgold, 
Tex.  For  many  years  prior  to  the  ship- 
ments joint  through  rates  from  Beck- 
ville were  in  effect  of  221/20  to  Waurika, 
and  26 1/4 c  to  Duncan,  Comanche  and 
Marlow.  Shortly  after  the  shipments 
in    question    these    joint    through    rates 


were  restored.  No  evidence  of  their  un- 
reasonableness was  offered.  Complain- 
ant, by  the  routes  over  which  the  ship- 
ments were  moved  by  the  carriers,  was 
assessed  rates  higher  than  such  joint 
rates.  HELD,  it  was  the  duty  of  the 
initial  carrier  to  receive  the  shipments 
in  question,  to  issue  to  complainant  a 
receipt  therefor,  to  indicate  on  the  way- 
bills the  final  destinations,  and  to  trans- 
port and  deliver  them  to  its  connecting 
carrier,  and  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the 
connecting  carriers  to  transport  and  de- 
liver at  destinations,  each  carrier  charg- 
ing for  its  service  its  legally  published 
rate.  The  joint  through  rates  of  22i^c 
and  26 1/4 c  were  reasonable.  Reparation 
awarded  on  that  basis.  Corporation 
Commission  of  Oklahoma  v.  C.  R.  I.  & 
G.   ity.   Co.,   17   I.   C.   C.   379,   382. 

(b)  A  common  carrier,  in  order  to 
build  up  and  foster  industries  on  its 
own  lines,  cannot  lawfully  refuse  to 
carry  the  products  located  on  connect- 
ing lines.  Standard  Lime  &  Stone  Co. 
V.  Cumberland  Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.    C.    620. 

§8.     Relation    of    Siir.ilar    Points. 

See   Equalization  of   Rates,   §2   (I). 

(a)  Complainant  purchased  a  loco- 
motive from  the  L.  V.  R.  R.,  which,  as 
agent  for  complainant,  delivered  the 
same  to  defendant  at  Easton,  Pa.,  with 
a  card  bill  showing  it  consigned  to 
Lake  View,  N.  J.,  and  routed  via  Sparta 
Junction  and  Hawthorne.  The  rate  from 
Easton  to  Lake  View  via  the  route  of 
shipment  was  13c.  A  joint  through  rate 
of  10c  was  in  effect  fom  South  Eastom, 
a  station  one  mile  more  distant 
from  Lake  View  than  Easton,  to 
Lake  View  via  Sparta  Junction  and 
Hawthorne.  No  joint  through  rate  was 
in  effect  from  Easton  via  this  route, 
but  there  was  one  of  10c  in  effect  be- 
tween Easton  and  Lake  View  via  Sparta 
Junction  and  Greycourt.  No  evidence 
was  offered  to  show  the  13c  rate 
charged  unreasonable,  except  the  10c 
rate  between  tha  points  in  question  via 
Greycourt,  and  no  question  on  this  point 
was  raised  in  the  pleadings  or  at  the 
hearing.  HELD,  the  rate  charged  was 
not  shown  to  be  unreasonable,  and 
reparation  denied;  that  even  if  unrsa- 
sonable,  no  reparation  could  be  awarded, 
complainant  not  having  paid  the 
charges;  but  that  unless  warranted  by 
unusual  conditions  the  through  rate 
from    Easton   to   Lake   View   should   not 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §8  (b)— §9  (f) 


847 


exceed  the  rate  from  South  Easton. 
Males  Co.  v.  L.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 
I.   C.  C.   280,  281,  282. 

(b)  Complainant  is  a  short  line  rail- 
way extending  from  Cedar  Rapids  to 
Iowa  City,  a  distance  of  some  21  Vz 
miles.  Under  the  complaint  asking  for 
the  establishment  of  through  routes  and 
joint  rates  from  points  on  its  line  to 
Chicago  and  other  points,  via  Cedar 
Rapids,  over  the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.,  it 
appeared  that  towns  on  the  other  lines 
in  the  territory  ranging  from  6  to  30 
miles  in  distance  away  from  Cedar 
Rapids  Avere,  generally  speaking,  grouped 
and  given  about  the  same  rate  as  Cedar 
Rapids.  HELD,  that  the  joint  rates  to  be 
established  should  be  such  as  to  place 
the  points  on  the  complainant's  line 
as  nearly  as  possible  on  an  equality 
with  the  points  in  such  groups,  but 
that  recognition  should  be  given  to 
the  rule  that  joint  rates  over  two  or 
more  connecting  lines  should  be  higher 
than  the  rates  on  one-line  movements, 
and  that  the  rates  should  be  10  per  cent 
higher  than  the  rates  from  Cedar  Rap- 
ids. Cedar  Rapids  &  Iowa  City  Ry.  & 
Light  Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I. 
C.    C.    250,    255. 

(c)  Where  a  joint  rate  was  in  effect 
from  a  competitive  point,  but  none  from 
point  of  shipment,  reparation  awarded, 
and  the  establishment  of  a  joint  rate 
ordered.  Shelby  County  Washed  Coal 
Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.    565. 

§9.     Right   to    Favor   Own    Line. 

See     Discrimination,     §10;     Equaliza- 
tion of   Rates,  §2   (n). 

(a)  A  carrier  may  so  construct  tariffs 
as  to  hold  traffic  to  its  own  line  so 
long  as  the  Act  is  not  violated.  Van 
Natta  Bros.  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,   23   I.   C.   C.  1,   5. 

(b)  On  traffic  originating  at  Willi- 
mansett,  Holyoke,  Brightwood,  Chicopee 
and  Chicopee  Falls,  Mass.,  on  the  rails 
of  the  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  and  moving  to 
New  York  City  in  connection  with  the 
Boston  &  Albany  R.  R.  through  Chat- 
ham or  Rensselaer,  a  distance  of  213 
miles,  the  former  road  got  a  haul  of 
about  six  or  eight  miles,  but  if  this 
traffic  moved  through  Troy,  a  distance 
of  268  miles,  it  had  a  haul  of  120  miles. 
The  traffic  to  New  York  City  was  not 
large.  In  order  to  get  the  long  haul 
it    canceled    its    joint    rates    with    the 


Boston  &  Albany  R.  R.,  thus  closing 
the  Chatham  and  Rensselaer  route  and 
compelling  the  traffic  to  move  through 
Troy.  HELD,  it  is  scarcely  to  be  ex- 
pected that  a  carrier  that  may  have  a 
haul  of  120  miles  would  be  satisfied 
with  a  haul  of  but  six  miles  with  the 
meager  earnings  accruing  under  its  es- 
tablished division.  Nor  is  it  a  reason- 
able attitude  by  a  shipper  to  demand 
that  a  carrier  should  be  so  short-hauled 
except  upon  a  clear  showing  that  the 
service  over  the  other  route  was  noi 
satisfactorily  maintained  and  reasonably 
prompt.  Without  announcing  any  gen- 
eral rule  or  principle  the  B.  &  M.  R.  R. 
is  entitled  to  an  opportunity  to  demon- 
strate the  efficiency  of  the  Troy  route. 
In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  From  Chico- 
pee,   Mass.,   23  I.   C.   C.   263. 

(c)  It  is  unlawful  to  add  anything  to 
reasonable  rates  by  way  of  a  penalty 
to  be  forfeited  if  the  outbound  shipment 
does  not  move  over  the  same  line  which 
hauled  the  inbound  shipment.  Red 
River  Oil  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  438,  447;  Tai>-line  Case,  23  I.  C. 
C.  549,   650. 

(d)  The  Commission  cannot  make  a 
general  order  requiring  carriers  of  live 
stock  to  establish  through  routes  and 
joint  rates  via  all  reasonably  direct 
routes,  whereby  some  carriers  would  be 
deprived  of  the  benefit  of  the  lon.^ 
haul  by  their  own  lines.  Each  case 
must  be  presented  and  considered  on 
its  own  merits.  In  Re  Advances  on 
Meats  and  Packing-house  Products,  23 
I.    C.    C.    656,    662. 

(e)  The  statute  provides  that  in  es- 
tablishing joint  rates  and  through  routes 
each  carrier  against  which  the  order 
is  made  shall  be  given  the  benefit  of  the 
long  haul  by  its  own  line  "unless  to  do 
so  would  make  such  through  route  un- 
reasonably long  as  compared  with  an- 
other practicable  through  route  which 
could  otherwise  be  established."  The 
Commission  cannot  therefore  establish 
in  every  case  a  through  route  and  a 
joint  rate,  but  must  work  under  the 
limitation  imposed  by  the  Act  of  Con- 
gress as  above  set  forth.  In  Re  In- 
vestigation of  Alleged  Unreasonable 
Rates    on    Meats,    23    I.    C.    C.    656,    662. 

(f)  The  Commission  has  little  sym- 
pathy with  and  will  not  ordinarily  lend  its 
aid  to,  an  effort  by  one  road  to  secure 
traffic    that    is    reasonably    tributary    to 


848 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §9   (g)— §11   (1)    (h) 


another  road  by  compelling  the  lat- 
ter to  join  with  it  in  through  routes  and 
rates,  but  will  not  permit  the  theory 
as  to  what  traffic  is  tributary  to  a  road 
to  be  pushed  to  such  an  extreme  as 
to  impose  an  undue  burden  upon  ship- 
pers. C.  &  C.  Traction  Co.  v.  B.  &  O. 
S.    W.    R.    R.    Co.,    20   I.    C.    C.    486,    492. 

(g)  A  trunk  line  carrier  which  pur- 
chases a  branch  line  road  is  justified  in 
canceling  through  joint  rates  with  an- 
other carrier  when  such  cancellation 
will  tend  to  move  traffic  entirely  over 
its  own  line  under  reasonable  and  non- 
discriminatory rates  to  the  exclusion  of 
the  former  two-line  haul.  In  Re  Pro- 
posed Rates  on  Lumber,  20  I.  C.  C.  575, 
580. 

(h)  A  carrier  may  in  its  own  interest, 
if  it  so  desires,  carry  for  a  longer  dis- 
tance over  its  own  line  than  would  be 
necessary  if  carried  over  the  line  of  its 
competitors,  in  order  to  obtain  a  portion 
of  the  competitive  business  upon  terms 
that  will  afford  some  profit.  It  does  not 
necessarily  follow,  however,  that  a  car- 
rier not  competing  for  traffic  in  this  way 
thereby  subjects  itself  to  an  order  com- 
pelling it  to  do  so.  Hydraulic  Press 
Brick  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co., 
13  I.  C.  C.  342,  347. 

§10.     Status    of    Intermediate    Carrier. 

(a)  There  is  nothing  in  the  plea  that 
defendant  operates  a  circuitous  route 
which  excuses  discrimination  in  transit 
privileges  to  mills  on  its  own  line.  When 
defendant  publishes  a  specific  rate  from 
St.  Louis  it  makes  itself  a  link  in  the 
through  transportation  of  grain  or  the 
product  from  point  of  origin  to  point 
of  destination  and  whatever  privileges 
are  accorded  to  mills  at  St.  Louis  by 
way  of  milling  this  grain  in  transit 
ought  to  be  accorded  to  mills  on  own 
line.  It  is  no  hardship  to  require  that  this 
be  done,  whether  its  line  be  direct  or 
circuitous,  and  unless  it  is  willing  to 
submit  to  this  condition  it  ought  to  re- 
tire from  the  business.  Southern  Illinois 
Millers'  Ass'n  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  672,  677,  678. 

§11.     What      Is      Satisfactory      Through 
Route. 

§11.     (1)     In    General. 

See  Routing  and  Misrouting,  §7  (ccc). 
(a)     South  Tacoma,  adjacent  to  Ta- 
coma,    Wash.,    is     entitled    to    through] 


routes  and  joint  rates,  which  rates  may 
properly  be  somewhat  higher  than  rates 
accorded  Taoma.  Public  Service  Comm. 
of  Wash.  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
256. 

(a)  In  the  majority  of  instances  in- 
volved in  the  transportation  of  live  stock 
carriers  should  establish  through  routes 
and  joint  rates  via  all  reasonably  avail- 
able direct  routes.  In  Re  Advances  on 
Meats  and  Packing-house  Products,  23 
I.    C.    C.    656,    662. 

(c)  Railroads  of  the  country  are 
called  upon  to  so  unite  themselves  that 
they  will  constitute  one  national  system; 
they  must  establish  through  routes, 
keep  these  routes  open  and  in  operation, 
furnish  necessary  facilities  for  such 
transportation,  make  reasonable  and 
proper  rules  of  practice  as  between 
themselves  and  the  shippers  and  as  be- 
■tween  each  other.  Missouri  &  Illinois 
Coal  Co.  V.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C. 
C.  39,  46. 

(d)  Railroads  are  required  under  the 
Act  to  serve  the  through  routes  which 
they  have  established  with  other  car- 
riers without  respect  to  the  fact  that 
in  rendering  such  service  their  equip- 
ment may  be  carried  beyond  their  own 
lines.  Missouri  &  Illinois  Coal  Co.  v. 
I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  39,  44. 

(e)  Where  a  reasonably  satisfactory 
route  on  transcontinental  business  to 
points  in  Oregon  is  afforded  by  a  car- 
rier serving  those  points  via  short  lines, 
another  route  will  not  be  opened  via 
a  much  more  circuitous  line  controlled 
by  direct  lines  which  formerly  were 
competitors.  Gile  &  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
22  L  C.  C.  298,  301. 

(f)  The  responsibilities  and  liabilities 
of  each  carrier  in  the  line  composing  a 
through  route  under  the  law  cannot 
be  evaded  by  it.  Mfgrs.  Ry.  Co.  v.  St. 
L.  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  304, 
315. 

(g)  No  importance  is  attached  to  the 
suggestion  that  undue  burden,  under  the 
Carmack  amendment,  would  be  placed 
upon  the  defendant  if  compelled  to  join 
in  through  routes  and  rates.  Cincinnati 
&  Columbus  Traction  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  S. 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  486,  494. 

(h)  The  obligation  to  establish 
through  routes  and  joint  rates  is  im- 
posed by  section  1.     Florida  Cotton  Oil 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §11  (1)   (i)— (s) 


849 


Co.  V.  C.  of  G.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  336, 
338. 

(i)  A  water  carrier,  owned  by  the 
shipper,  is  not  entitled  to  through  routes 
and  joint  rates,  though  incorporated  as 
a  common  carrier.  Gulf  Coast  Naviga- 
tion Co.  V.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
544,  548. 

(j)  Carloads  of  beer  were  delivered 
to  the  M.  P.  Ry.  at  St.  Louis  to  be 
transported  to  Leadville,  Colo.,  via  Pu- 
eblo, over  the  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  The 
property  moved  through  from  St.  Louis 
to  Leadville  in  the  cars  in  which  it  was 
originally  loaded  under  the  shipping  re- 
ceipt issued  at  St.  Louis,  the  trans- 
portation sheets  issued  by  the  M.  P.  Ry. 
being  accepted  by  the  Denver  &  Rio 
Grande  R.  R.  Neither  the  shipper  nor  th^ 
consignee  interfered  at  Pueblo  or  else- 
where. The  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  advanced 
to  the  M.  P.  Ry.  the  full  amount  of  its 
charges  and  collected  same  from  the 
consignee.  The  rate  charged  was  made 
up  of  47c  to  Pueblo  and  45c  thence  to 
Leadville.  The  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  did 
not,  generally  speaking,  participate  in 
joint  rates  to  points  on  its  lines  in 
Colorado,  but  business  offered  by  its 
connections  was  moved  on  combination 
rates.  HELD,  the  Commission  would  not 
order  the  establishment  of  a  joint 
through  rate  from  St.  Louis  to  Leadville, 
since  a  through  route  was  practically 
in  effect,  and  to  make  such  an  order 
might  disturb  the  system  of  rate  mak- 
ing in  effect,  but  that  the  Commission 
would  limit  its  order  compelling  the  D. 
&  R.  G.  R.  R.  to  make  a  reasonable 
charge  from  Pueblo  to  Leadville,  so  as 
to  give  to  shippers  a  reasonable  combin- 
ation rate  from  St.  Louis  to  Leadville. 
Baer  Bros.  Mercantile  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  225,  228;  decision  of  Com- 
mission holding  that  the  D.  &  R.  G.  R. 
R.  Co.  was  subject  to  the  Act,  and  that 
the  carriers  by  their  dealings  with  each 
other  had  established  joint  through 
routes  from  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Leadville, 
Colo.,  sustained.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.   L   C.   C,   195  Fed.   968,   973. 

(k)  If  a  reasonable  and  satisfactory 
through  route  between  two  points  does 
exist,  another  route  cannot  be  compelled. 
Enterprise  Fuel  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  219,  222. 

(1)  There  may  be  a  through  route 
from  a  given  point  of  origin  to  a  city 
which  is  satisfactory,  and  yet  another 
through   route   from   the   same   point   to 


another  section  of  the  same  city  may 
be  necessary.  A  railroad  may  not  say 
that  it  can  retain  a  monopoly  of  certain 
traffic  no  matter  what  its  service  or 
what  the  public  necessities  require.  A 
shipper,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  enti- 
tled to  a  through  route  because  he  may 
not  be  as  conveniently  served  by  one 
railroad  as  another.  Enterprise  Fuel 
Co.  V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  219, 
222. 

(m)  It  cannot  be  said  that  railroads 
must  unite  in  through  routes  between 
all  points.  Enterprise  Fuel  Co.  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.   Co.,  16  I.   C.  C.  219,  222. 

(n)  A  shipper  by  locating  its  yard 
on  another  line  of  railroad  but  at  the 
same  transportation  point  may  not  com- 
pel the  establishment  of  a  new  through 
route.  Enterprise  Fuel  Co.  v.  Penn  R. 
R.   Co.,  16  I.   C.  C.  219,  224. 

(o)  In  the  amended  Act  authorizing 
the  Commission  to  establish  through 
routes  unless  the  carrier  has  in  effect  "a 
reasonable  or  satisfactory"  route,  the 
words  "reasonable  or  satisfactory"  are 
equivalent  to  "reasonably  satisfactory." 
In  the  Matter  of  Through  Passenger 
Routes  via  Portland,  Ore.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
300,   302. 

(p)  A  route  satisfactory  to  one  kind 
of  freight  might  not  be  satisfactory 
with  respect  to  another.  In  Re  Through 
Passenger   Routes,   16  L   C.   C.   300,  303. 

(q)  While  a  railroad  is  competent  to 
demand  an  order  establishing  through 
routes  and  rates  with  its  connections, 
its  right  to  such  order  is  to  be  tested 
by  various  considerations,  including  the 
needs  and  convenience  of  the  commun- 
ity which  it  seeks  to  serve.  Crane  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
248,  254. 

(r)  Where  in  demanding  the  estab- 
lishment of  through  routes  and  joint 
rates  the  complainant  fails  to  include 
the  necessary  parties  defendant  and  to 
show  that  the  commodity  in  question 
does  not  already  enjoy  the  benefit  of  a 
satisfactory  through  route,  the  complaint 
must  be  dismissed.  Anthony  v.  Phila. 
&  Reading  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  581,  584. 

(s)  A  carrier  cannot  establish  a 
through  route  and  joint  rate  except 
under  concurrence  of  the  other  carriers 
that  form  parts  of  such  route,  and  in 
the  absence  of  agreement  no  connect- 
ing carrier  is  obliged  to  furnish  cars  tq 


850 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §11   (1)    (t)— §11   (2)    (b) 


take  shipments  from  points  of  origin  on 
another  carrier's  line.  Memphis  Freight 
Bureau  v.  F.  S.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  13 
I.    C.    C.    1,    8. 

(t)  The  purpose  of  section  15  of  the 
Act  relating  to  the  establishment  of 
through  routes  and  joint  rates  is  to 
afford  relief  to  a  shipping  community 
and  not  to  aid  carriers  to  acquire 
strategic  advantages  in  their  contests 
with  one  another.  While  a  railroad  com- 
pany is  competent  to  file  a  complaint 
under  the  clause  in  question  and  to  de- 
mand an  order  establishing  said  routes 
and  rates  with  its  connections,  its  right 
to  such  relief  is  to  be  tested  by  the 
needs  of  the  community  which  it  seeks 
thus  to  serve  and  not  by  the  fac:  that 
stations  on  its  line  in  such  community 
have  not  been  accorded  such  routes  and 
rates  by  connecting  lines.  Chicago  & 
Milwaukee  Electric  R.  R.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R. 
R.  Co.,  13  I.   C.   C.  20,  26. 

§11.     (2)     When  Through  Route  Ordered 
or  Denied. 

(2)     When    Through    Route    Ordered    or 
Denied. 

See  Differentials,  §7  (e) ;  Lighterage, 
§4  (a);  Narrow-Gauge  Railroads, 
I  (c). 
(a)  Complainant  sought  the  estab- 
lishment of  through  routes  and  joint 
rates  from  its  mines  in  the  Walsenburg 
district,  Colo.,  to  certain  points  in  Kan- 
sas, Oklahoma  and  Texas;  these  points, 
including  (1)  the  77  junction  points  in 
Kansas  to  which  the  Commission,  in 
Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  479,  found  that  satis- 
factory through  routes  were  already  in 
existence,  and  (2)  the  points  in  Texas 
and  Oklahoma  to  which,  in  that  opinion, 
the  Commission  held  that  it  was  impos- 
sible to  decide  via  what  junction  points 
the  rates  should  be  established.  On 
point  (1)  complainant  introduced  testi- 
mony to  show  (a)  that  it  is  impossiblo 
for  dealers  at  the  junction  points  whose 
bins  are  on  the  Santa  Fe  tracks  to 
successfully  handle  coal  from  the  Wal- 
senburg district  because  of  the  expense 
of  the  extra  haul;  (b)  that  the  rate  of 
the  Santa  Fe  on  nut  coal  from  mine>^ 
in  the  Canon  City  district  of  Colorado  to 
points  in  southern  Kansas  is  $2.75  per 
ton,  while  from  the  Walsenburg  dis- 
trict mines  the  rate  is  $3  per  ton  via 
the  Rock  Island  or  the  Missouri  Pacific 
lines.  On  point  (2)  it  appeared  from 
the    testimony   that   it  would   make    no 


difference  to  the  St^nta  Fe  via  which 
gateway  through  routes  and  joint  rates 
from  the  Walsenburg  district  are  estab- 
lished. HELD,  the  prayer  for  through 
rates  to  the  junction  points  in  Kansas 
is  denied.  Defendants  should  establish 
through  routes  and  joint  rates  in  Texas 
and  Oklahoma  via  Pueblo,  Colo.,  the 
joint  rates  not  to  exceed  rates  on  the 
Santa  Fe  from  the  Canon  City  district. 
Colorado  Coal  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  A,  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.   C.  264,  26G,  267. 

(b)  The  Manufacturers  Railway  Com- 
pany of  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  and  a  number  of 
shippers  located  on  its  lines  asked  that 
through  routes  be  established  to  and 
from  points  on  its  lines  of  railway  in 
St.  Louis,  Mo.,  from  and  to  points  on 
the  lines  of  each  of  the  defendant  rail- 
way companies  and  points  beyond;  also 
for  the  fixing  of  reasonable  divisions 
or  absorptions  out  of  the  St.  Louis  rates 
to  be  paid  to  the  Manufacturers  Rail- 
way Company  for  terminal  services  ren- 
dered by  it  and  for  reparation.  This 
company 'Was  incorporated  in  1887  to 
furnish  terminal  facilities  for  the  south- 
ern section  of  industrial  St.  Louis  which, 
owing  to  the  physical  conditions  exist- 
ing there,  seem  both  reasonable  and 
necessary.  The  Terminal  Railroad  Asso- 
ciation dominates  entirely  the  terminal 
facilities  of  St.  Louis  and  the  stock  of 
this  company  is  owned  equally  by  the 
fourteen  carriers  running  into  that  city. 
The  only  terminal  facilii.es  in  the  south- 
ern section  are  furnisbel  by  the  Manu- 
facturers Railway  and  by  the  lines  of 
the  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  H.  R.  The  lat- 
ter's  tracks,  however,  follow  the  bank 
of  the  Mississippi  River  and  reach  such 
industries  as  are  adjacent  thereto.  For 
a  considerable  distance  along  the  river 
there  is  a  steep  grade  to  be  overcome 
in  reaching  industries  back  from  the 
river  and  it  was  to  afford  service  to 
these  that  the  Manufacturers  Railway 
was  constructed.  The  ^Manufacturers 
Railway  leased  its  tracks  to  the  St.  L. 
I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.  until  1908,  since  when 
it  was  operated  independently.  The  ma- 
jority of  its  stock  is  owned  by  the  An- 
heuser-Busch Brewing  Ass'n.  For  the 
year  ending  April  30,  1910,  it  handled 
42,970  cars,  of  which  37,546  cars  were 
handled  for  the  Brewing  Association, 
and  5,424  cars  were  handled  for  some 
87  other  industries  or  patrons  of  which 
35  shipped  or  received  10  cars  or  more. 
The  traffic  of  the  Brewing  Association 
constitutes  one-thirtieth  of  the  total  traf- 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §11  (2)    (c)— (e) 


851 


fie  of  St.  Louis.  The  complainant  oper- 
ates about  20  miles  of  track,  of  which 
21^  miles  are  classed  as  main  track  and 
the  remainder  as  side  track,,  switches  and 
yard  track.  Of  this  total  six  miles  are 
leased  from  the  Brewing  Association 
and  are  used  in  part  both  for  the  serv- 
ices of  the  brewery  and  the  public. 
The  only  physical  connection  o--her  than 
that  with  the  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.  is 
is  with  the  St.  Louis  Transfer  Co.,  one 
of  the  constituent  properties  of  the 
Terminal  Railroad  Association.  Two- 
thirds  of  the  tracks  of  the  Manufacturers 
Railway  has  been  constructed  solely  for 
the  purpose  of  serving  the  public,  while 
the  remaining  one-third  is  used  in  serv- 
ing both  the  brewery  and  the  public. 
Prior  to  March  1,  1910,  there  existed 
through  routes  and  joint  rates  over 
the  lines  of  defendant  carriers  and  com- 
plainant carriers  to  and  from  points  on 
the  line  of  the  complainant  company. 
Since  that  date  the  defendants'  decline 
to  absorb  the  charges  for  the  services 
of  the  Manufacturers  Ry.  While  the 
Manufacturers  Ry..  was  operated  by 
the  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.  during  21 
years  and  also  when  operated  under 
the  tariffs  which  permitted  an  allowance 
to  the  Manufacturers  Ry.  itself  in 
1909  until  March  1,  1910,  delivery  has 
been  made  to  the  public  served  by  it 
at  the  St.  Louis  rates.  HELD,  in  view 
of  all  the  facts,  circumstances  and  condi- 
tions bearing  upon  the  question  there  ^'s 
no  doubt  that  the  Manufacturers  Rail- 
way Company  is  in  fact  a  common  car- 
rier at  common  law,  notwithstanding  any 
modification  thereof,  and  therefore  with- 
in the  provisions  of  the  first  section  of 
the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  and  that 
the  payment  to  it  of  a  reasonable  and 
just  portion  of  the  St.  Louis  rates  for 
the  terminal  services  rendered  by  it  Is 
not  unlawful,  and  that  it  is  not  a  mere 
plant  facility.  FURTHER  HELD,  that 
the  action  of  defendants  in  canceling 
the  division  and  absorptions  with  the 
Manufacturers  Railway  which  have  been 
for  many  years  included  m  the  St. 
Louis  rates,  has  subjected  complainant 
shippers  and  a  considerable  portion  of 
the  public  of  south  St.  Louis  to  the 
payment  of  unjust  and  unreasonable 
transportation  charges,  and  to  undue 
discriminations  and  disadvantages.  Ques- 
tion of  what  are  reasonable  divisions 
and  the  reparation  to  be  awarded  re- 
served for  further  investigation.  (Lane, 
Comm'r,     concurring     opinion;     Harlan, 


Comm'r,  dissenting  opinion.)  Mfr'rs.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  St.  L.  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I. 
C.    C.    304. 

(c)  The  Tacoma  Eastern  Railroad 
extends  southeasterly  from  Tacoma  into 
the  Cascade  Range  and  for  10  years 
had  in  effect  from  points  on  its  line  to 
points  on  the  N.  P.  Ry.  east  of  Gleudive, 
Mont,  and  to  points  on  the  C.  B.  &  Q. 
R.  R.  and  the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  southeast 
of  Billings,  Mont.,  through  rates  ard 
joint  tariffs  covering  lumber,  shingles 
and  other  forest  products.  The  Chicago, 
Milwaukee  &  Puget  Sound  Ry.  Co.  hav- 
ing, completed  its  road  to  the  Pacific 
Coast  obtained  control  of  the  Tacoma 
Eastern  Company  and  thereupon  the  de- 
fendants canceled  the  joint  rates,  thus 
compelling  the  shippers  to  pay  a  com- 
bination of  locals  to  the  territory  cov- 
ered by  the  former  rates.  HELD,  the 
Commission  cannot  recognize  the  right 
of  a  railroad  to  deprive  shippers  of  ac- 
cess to  markets  at  reasonable  rates  be- 
cause of  a  change  in  relationship  be- 
tween railroads.  Inasmuch  as  by  the 
cancellation  of  these  through  rates  the 
total  rate  from  point  of  origin  to  desti- 
nation would  be  increased,  this  case  falls 
into  the  general  category  of  cases  gov- 
erned by  the  amendment  of  1910  to 
section  15  in  which  the  burden  of  proof 
to  show  that  the  increased  rate  or  pro- 
posed increased  rate  is  just  and  reason- 
able is  placed  upon  the  carrier.  No 
evidence  having  been  offered  to  show 
that  the  through  rates  now  existing 
were  not  reasonabxe  or  that  the  in- 
creased rates  would  be  reasonable  the 
present  rates  are  ordered  kept  in  effect. 
If  the  carriers  cannot  agree  upon  divi- 
sions appeal  may  be  made  to  the  Com- 
mission. (Prouty,  Comm'r,  concurring 
opinion.)  In  Re  Rates  on  Lumber  and 
Other  Forest  Products,  21  I.  C-  C.  455, 
456,   457. 

(d)  A  through  route  and  joint  rate 
established  on  lumber  of  16c  per  100  lbs. 
from  West  Edmeston,  N.  Y.,  to  New 
Britain,  Conn.,  via  the  Unadilla  Valley 
R.  R.  Co.,  the  N.  Y.  O.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
the  Central  New  England  Ry.  Co.  and 
the  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  unless 
defendants  desire  to  put  in  a  separately 
established  rate  between  New  Berlin, 
N.  Y.,  and  New  Britain,  Conn.,  of  13c 
per  100  lbs.  Burton  v.  U.  V.  R.  R.  Co., 
20    T.    C.    C.    75. 

(e)  Complainant  shipped  cement  in 
paper    sacks    from    New    Village,    N.    J., 


852 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT. RATES,  §11   (2)    (f)  — (h) 


to  Williamstown,  Vt.,  via  the  D.  L.  & 
W.,  D.  &  H.  and  Rutland  R.  Rs.  to 
Burlington,  Vt.,  thence  by  the  Central 
Vermont  R.  R.  to  destination,  under  the 
joint  through  rate  to  Burlington  plus 
its  local  to  Williamstown.  It  also 
shipped  the  same  commodity  from  New 
Village  to  Enosburg  Falls,  Vt.,  via  the 
D.  L.  &  W.,  D.  &  H.,  B.  &  M.,  St. 
Johnsbury  &  Lake  Champlain  R.  Rs.  to 
Sheldon  Junction,  and  the  Central  Ver- 
mont R.  R.  from  Sheldon  Junction, 
under  a  joint  through  rate  to  Sheldon 
Junction  plus  a  local  from  thence  to 
destination.  Subsequent  to  shipment  a 
joint  through  rate  was  established  via 
the  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Prior 
to  shipment  complainant  applied  to  the 
D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  for  a  through  route  and 
joint  rate  and  that  company  tried  to 
make  such  arrangements  with  the  Cen- 
tral Vermont  R.  R.  via  the  lines  over 
which  these  shipments  moved  but  with- 
out success.  HELD,  no  evidence  is  in  the 
record  from  which  the  Commission  can 
find  that  a  through  route  ought  to  be 
in  effect  at  the  time  of  these  ship- 
ments, and  the  fact  that  the  Central 
Vermont  R.  R.  declined  to  make  such 
arrangements,  and  the  fact  that  the 
present  through  route  is  via  a  different 
line,  rather  indicates  that  that  company 
may  have  been  justified  in  refusing  the 
proposition  of  the  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R. 
for  such  through  arrangements;  that  it 
cannot  be  said  that  any  of  defendants 
were  guilty  of  negligence  in  not  having 
been  able  to  establish  a  through  route 
and  joint  rate  at  time  of  shipment. 
Damages  refused  and  complaint  dis- 
missed. Edison  Portland  Cement  Co.  v. 
D.   L.    &   W.   R.   R.    Co.,   20   I.    C.    C.   95. 

(f)  Complainant,  an  electric  interur- 
ban  railroad  extending  from  Norwood,  a 
suburb  of  Cincinnati,  to  Hillsboro,  en- 
tirely within  the  state  of  Ohio,  a  dis- 
tance of  53  miles,  prayed  for  an  order 
requiring  the  defendants  to  establish 
connections  and  joint  rates  for  the  in- 
terchange of  interstate  traffic.  Under 
the  local  law  it  could  not  have  com- 
pelled this  connection.  Subsequent  to 
the  hearing  the  petitioner  filed  with  the 
Commission  two  letters  addressed  to 
the  complainant  from  shippers  on  its 
line  giving  it  authority  to  use  their 
names  as  co-plaintiffs.  The  line  of 
complainant  parallels  the  lines  of  defend- 
ants at  several  points  and  many  of  the 
towns  served  by  complainant  are  within 
a  short   and   reasonably  convenient  dis- 


tance of  stations  on  one  or  the  other 
of  defendant  lines.  Defendants  claimed 
that  complainant's  equipment  was  old 
and  that  it  could  not  handle  the  modern 
cars  of  defendants.  HELD,  that  the 
local  law  could  not  bar  complainant's 
right  to  a  connection  under  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act;  that  the  general 
practice  of  the  Commission  is  not  to 
take  a  technical  view  of  the  record,  but 
to  get  at  the  substance  of  things  when 
possible,  and  that  therefore  the  proper 
parties  were  before  it;  that  defendants 
would  not  be  required  to  make  a  con- 
nection with  complainant  at  points 
served  reasonably  by  the  defendants,  but 
that  defendants  be  required  to  join  with 
the  complainant  in  opening  through 
routes  and  establishing  joint  rates  be- 
tween  interstate  points  and  certain 
towns  on  the  line  of  complainant  that  are 
from  5  to  10  miles  by  the  country  roads 
from  any  station  on  the  defendants' 
lines;  and  that  the  Commission  finds 
that  complainant  will  be  able  to  handle 
the  equipment  of  the  defendants  and  as- 
sumes it  will  make  improvements  should 
any  be  found  necessary.  C.  &  C.  Trac- 
tion Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  486;  order  of  the  Commission 
ordering  the  establishment  of  a  switch 
connection  and  through  route  enjoined 
on  the  ground  that  the  Cincinnati  & 
Columbus  Traction  Co.  is  not  a  "lateral" 
branch  line  of  railroad  within  the  mean- 
ing of  section  1  of  the  Act  as  amended 
June  29,  1906.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  U.   S.,   195   Fed.   962,  967. 

(g)  The  Commission  holds  with  re- 
spect to  the  establishment  of  through 
routes  and  joint  rates  via  the  U.  P. 
lines  and  their  connections  to  Baker 
City,  La  Grande  and  Pendleton,  Ore., 
and  Walla  Walla,  Wash.,  that  where 
joint  through  rates  do  not  now  exist 
from  points  upon  these  lines  to  the 
destinations  named  there  is  no  reason- 
able and  satsfactory  through  route,  and 
that  such  through  routes  and  joint  rates 
ought  to  be  established.  The  rates 
specified  in  Schedule  A  will  be  reason- 
able rates  to  be  charged  as  joint  rates 
applicable  over  the  through  routes  thus 
established  and  ought  not  to  be  ex- 
ceeded for  the  future.  City  of  Spokane 
V.  N.   P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  162,  177. 

(h)  The  lines  east  of  Chicago,  parties 
to  this  proceeding,  were  the  L.  S.  &  M. 
S.,  the  P.  F.  W.  &  C,  the  Penn.,  the 
N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.,  the  B.  &  M.  and  the 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §11  (2)   (i)— (j) 


853 


N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Rs.  Where  joint 
through  rates  do  not  now  exist  from 
points  upon  these  lines  to  Spokane  the 
Commission  finds  there  is  no  reasonable 
and  satisfactory  through  routes  and 
that  such  through  route  and  joint  rate 
ought  to  be  established.  The  rate  speci- 
fied in  Schedule  A  from  these  points  to 
Spokane  will  be  reasonable  rates  to  be 
charged  as  joint  rates  applicable  over 
the  through  routes  thus  established  and 
ought  not  to  be  exceeded  for  the  future. 
City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.,  19  I.  C. 
C.   162,   175. 

(i)  Complainant  asked  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  through  routes  and  joint 
rates  on  cotton  seed  from  284  points  in 
the  state  of  Georgia  and  1  point  in  the 
state  of  Alabama  to  Jacksonville,  Fla., 
the  fixing  of  reasonable  rates  on  that 
traffic  for  the  future  and  reparation.  In 
1901  the  average  price  of  cotton  seed 
was  about  $12  a  ton;  now  it  is  over 
$30  a  ton  owing  to  competition  in  the 
purchase  of  the  raw  product.  Complain- 
ant situated  in  Jacksonville  at  the  pres- 
ent time  gets  less  than  half  its  seed 
in  Florida  and  notwithstanding  the 
wider  territory  to  which  it  has  extended 
its  buying  operations,  its  purchases  have 
fallen  from  12,000  tons  in  1905  to  7,000 
tons  in  1907.  The  carriers  appear  dis- 
inclined to  move  cotton  seed  to  mills 
that  are  not  on  their  own  line.  On 
account  of  the  many  points  to  which 
combination  rates  to  Jacksonville  may 
be  based  complainant  has  had  imposed 
upon  it  unnecessary  difficulties  and  em- 
barrassments in  overcharges.  HELD, 
there  is  a  general  obligation  laid  upon 
carriers  under  the  terms  of  section  1 
of  the  Act  to  establish  through  routes 
and  joint  rates,  and  that  complainant's 
contention  that  it  is  entitled  to  through 
routes  and  joint  through  rates  from  pro- 
ducing points  to  Jacksonville  is  sus- 
tained. Florida  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  C.  of 
Ga.   Ry.   Co.,    19   I.    C.   C.   336,   338. 

(j)  Complainant  coal  miners  in  the 
Walsenburg  district,  in  southern  Colo- 
rado, located  on  the  line  of  the  C.  &  S. 
R.  R.  asked  for  the  establishment  of 
through  routes  and  joint  rates  via  the 
Fort  Worth  «&  Denver  City  Railway  to 
points  in  the  Panhandle  of  Texas  and 
eastern  New  Mexico,  along  the  lines  of 
the  Southern  Kansas  Ry.  of  Texas,  Pe- 
cos &  Northern  Texas  Ry.,  Eastern  Ry. 
Co.  of  New  Mexico  and  the  Pecos  River 
R.   R.,   these   lines   being  known   as   the 


Pecos  lines  and  owned  by  the  Santa  Fe. 
Dealers  located  on  the  Pecos  lines  in 
Texas  could  only  get  Walsenburg  coal 
by  maintaining  an  agent  at  Amarillo, 
Tex.,  to  receive  the  coal  and  rebill  same 
to  Texas  points.  Dealers  on  the  Pecos 
lines  in  New  Mexico  were  entirely  cut 
off  from  Walsenburg  coal  on  account 
of  the  prohibitive  interstate  distance  tar- 
iffs purposely  put  into  effect  by  the 
Santa  Fe  to  prevent  such  movements. 
Complainants  also  sought  through  routes 
and  joint  rates  via  Pueblo  to  points  on 
the  Santa  Fe  in  Kansas,  and  via  Trini- 
dad to  points  on  the  line  of  the  Santa 
Fe  and  on  the  Eastern  Railway  of  New 
Mexico  in  New  Mexico  and  Texas.  The 
only  way  traffic  could  move  was  by  bill- 
ing locally  to  Trinidad  and  rebilling  at 
the  local  rate  from  Trinidad  to  point 
of  destination.  Through  routes  and 
joint  rates  were  formerly  in  effect  from 
the  Walsenburg  districts  to  such  Texas 
and  New  Mexico  points,  but  were  with- 
drawn by  the  Santa  Fe  to  enable  that 
line  to  supply  this  territory  with  coal 
from  Trinidad  and  Canon  City,  Colo., 
and  from  Gallup,  N.  M.,  from  which 
points  the  Santa  Fe  was  able  to  secure 
a  longer  haul  and  thereby  enhance  its 
revenues.  Trafl[ic  from  the  Walsenburg 
mines  actually  moved  into  the  Texas 
territory  via  Amarillo,  from  which  point 
it  took  the  low  Texas  commission  rates, 
and  the  total  charge  by  this  arrange- 
ment to  any  point  on  the  lines  in  Texas 
was  exactly  the  same  as  that  from 
Canon  City,  plus  the  rebilling  charge  at 
Amarillo  of  shipper's  agent.  This  move- 
ment was  not  possible  to  points  in  New 
Mexico,  because  the  Texas  commission 
rates  did  not  apply,  and  the  rates  which 
did  apply  were  prohibitive.  Complain- 
ants asked  for  rates  to  points  on  the 
Pecos  lines,  south  of  Amarillo,  equal  to 
the  rates  in  effect  to  those  points  from 
the  Gallup  mines;  and  for  rates  to 
points  on  the  Southern  Kansas  Railway, 
north  of  Amarillo,  equal  to  the  rates  in 
effect  from  the  southern  Kansas  mines 
to  such  points,  on  the  ground  that  thxs 
Walsenburg  mines,  being  nearer  than 
the  other  districts,  the  rate  requested 
would  be  reasonable.  The  rates  asked 
for  were  lower  than  those  from  the 
Canon  City  district  and  were  demanded 
on  the  ground  that  the  traffic  from 
Canon  City  moved  by  way  of  Hutchin- 
son, Kan.,  over  a  route  twice  as  long 
as  the  haul  from  the  Walsenburg  dis- 
trict    via     Amarillo.     Walsenburg     and 


854 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §11  (2)    (k)— (m) 


Canon  City  coals  were  about  on  a  par 
in  quality,  and  for  competitive  reasons 
it  was  necessary  that  they  take  the 
same  rates.  The  long  haul  from  Canon 
City  via  Hutchinson  was  voluntarily 
established  by  the  carrier  in  order  to 
enable  it  to  participate  in  the  traffic. 
The  initial  carriers  in  the  Walsenburg 
district  encountered  great  difficulties  in 
handling  the  traffic  from  the  mines  in 
said  district.  The  lower  rate  on  coal 
from  Gallup  to  the  points  in  question 
was  influenced  by  the  movement  of 
empty  cars  eastward  from  California 
and  by  the  fact  that  a  down  grade  ex- 
isted from  Gallup.  HELD,  joint  through 
routes  should  be  established  from  the 
Walsenburg  district  to  the  points,  as 
requested;  that  joint  rates  should  be 
accorded  on  coal  from  the  Walsenburg 
district  to  points  on  the  Santa  Fe  lines 
in  Kansas  and  those  points  in  Texas 
east  of,  but  not  including,  Joel,  which 
should  not  exceed  the  rates  in  effect  be- 
tween Canon  City,  Colo.,  and  those 
points;  that  to  points  in  Texas  and  New 
Mexico  west  of  and  including  Joel,  Tex., 
but  not  including  points  in  New  Mexico 
on  the  line  running  north  of  Belen,  the 
rates  should  not  exceed  the  rates  in 
effect  from  Trinidad,  plus  a  differential 
of  30c  per  ton;  and  that  to  points  north 
of  Belen  the  rates  should  not  exceed 
the  rates  in  effect  to  such  points  from 
Trinidad,  plus  a  differential  of  25c  per 
ton.  Request  for  a  differential  on  slack 
from  the  Walsenburg  mines  refused  for 
lack  of  sufficient  data  in  the  record. 
Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  479,  481,  485. 

(k)  Defendants  canceled  certain  joint 
tariffs  providing  for  through  routes  and 
joint  rates  on  lumber  from  the  Kalispell 
district  to  points  located  on  the  M.  St. 
P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.,  the  junction  point 
being  at  Minot,  N.  D.  Complainants  de- 
manded the  restoration  of  these  routes 
and  rates,  and  defendants  made  no  de- 
fense against  granting  such  relief.  HELD, 
the  defendants,  Great  Northern  Ry.  and 
M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.,  should  estab- 
lish a  through  route  from  Leonia,  Idaho, 
and  lumber  producing  points  on  the 
Great  Northern  Ry.  in  Montana  via  Mi- 
not, N.  D.,  to  points  in  North  Dakota 
located  upon  the  lines  of  said  Minne- 
apolis Ry.  between  Minot  and  Hankin- 
son,  including  Hankinson,  and  between 
Hankinson  and  Drake,  and  that  said 
defendants  should  apply  to  such  through 
route  the  rates   prescribed   in  the  opin- 


ion.     Kalispell    Lumber     Co.     v.    Great 
Northern  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  164,  172. 

(1)  The  Pennsylvania  Railroad  de- 
livered coal  from  the  Alden  colliery,  in 
the  Wyoming  coal  district  of  Pennsyl- 
vania, to  its  Bolton  coal  yards  in  Balti- 
more. Complainant  coal  company  had 
coal  yards  in  Walbrook,  a  suburban  sta- 
tion within  the  limits  of  Baltimore, 
about  four  miles  from  Bolton,  and  at 
Hillen  station,  in  the  heart  of  the  city, 
about  one  mile  from  the  Bolton  yards. 
Walbrook  and  Hillen  stations  were 
reached  only  by  the  Western  Maryland 
R.  R.,  which  connected  with  the  Penn- 
sylvania Lines  at  Hanover,  50  miles 
from  Baltimore;  no  joint  through  routes 
from  Alden  to  Walbrook  or  Hillen  sta- 
tion existed  over  the  Pennsylvania  and 
Western  Maryland  R.  Rs.  Complainant 
demanded  such  joint  through  route  be 
established.  HELD,  under  sections  1, 
3  and  15  of  the  Act,  the  Pennsylvania 
R.  R.  should  be  ordered  to  establish 
joint  routes  to  Walbrook,  since  that  sta- 
tion must  be  treated  from  a  transporta- 
tion point  of  view  as  a  distinct  and  sep- 
arate community,  but  that  Hillen  sta- 
tion," being  in  the  heart  of  the  city, 
should  not  be  treated  as  a  distinct  point, 
and  the  Pennsylvania  having  established 
proper  coal  yards  and  complainant  hav- 
ing deliberately  chosen  to  place  his 
yard  on  the  line  of  another  carrier,  joint 
rates  should  not  be  established  to  Hillen 
station.  Enterprise  Fuel  Co.  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.   Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  219,  223,  224. 

(m)  Complainant  railroad  connected 
defendants'  lines  with  the  Crane  Iron 
Works,  a  plant  owned  by  the  corpora- 
tion controlling  complainant  and  five 
other  industries  at  Catasauqua,  Pa.  Com- 
plainant demanded  through  routes  and 
joint  rates  on  shipments  from  and  to 
the  plant  of  the  Crane  Iron  Works  and 
the  plants  of  said  five  other  industries, 
and  that  $2  per  car  for  the  haul  be- 
tween these  various  industries  and  the 
exchange  tracks  of  defendants  be  fixed 
as  its  share  of  the  through  rate.  Com- 
plainant's line,  including  branches,  was 
1.9  miles  long.  The  equipment  com- 
prised 5  engines  and  11  wooden  dump 
cars,  which  were  not  designed  for  use 
in  general  traffic  and  were  not  per- 
mitted to  pass  from  complainant's 
tracks.  The  right  of  way  was  10  ft. 
wide  and  was  located  mostly  on  land 
owned  by  the  Crane  Iron  Works.  Com- 
plainant   did    not    maintain    a    place    of 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §11  (2)    (n)— (o) 


855 


any  sort  for  the  receipt  or  delivery  of 
freight  for  the  public,  nor  did  it  bill 
freight  from  any  point  on  its  line.  De- 
fendants had  for  some  years  made  cer- 
tain allowances  for  switching,  and  the 
industries  other  than  the  said  iron 
works  had  paid  so  much  per  car  for 
switching.  Complainant  was  incorpo- 
rated as  a  railroad  company  under  the 
laws  of  Pennsylvania  relating  to  com- 
mon carriers.  It  filed  a  tariff  with  and 
made  reports  to  the  Commission,  but 
said  tariff  showed  on  its  face  that  the 
rates  named  therein  yvere  for  car  switch- 
ing services  to  certain  industries  only. 
No  rates  were  published  from  point  to 
point  on  its  own  line,  or  from  a  point 
on  its  line  to  any  point  on  another 
line.  Complainant  never  held  itself  out 
as  a  common  carrier  of  freight  for  the 
general  public.  The  needs  of  the  com- 
munity served  by  complainant  were  al- 
ready satisfactorily  provided  for.  No 
other  industry  tnan  said  iron  works 
complained  of  the  situation.  HELD,  un- 
der the  showing  made,  complainant  was 
not  entitled  to  the  relief  demanded. 
Crane  Railroad  Co.  v.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.   C.  C.  248,   253. 

(n)  The  Burlington,  Cedar  Rapids  & 
Northern  Ry.,  running  through  the 
grain-producing  districts  of  northern 
Iowa,  southwestern  Minnesota  and  South 
Dakota,  had  no  rails  of  its  own  into 
Milwaukee  or  Chicago,  but  prior  to  its 
acquisition  by  defendant  Rock  Island 
Lines,  it  maintained  joint  through  rates 
on  grain  to  Milwaukee  and  Chicago  in 
connection  with  the  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  ana 
the  C.  &  N.  W.  Rys.  The  Rock  Island 
Lines,  after  acquiring  the  Cedar  Rapids 
road,  in  1902,  withdrew  all  joint  grain 
rates  from  local  non-competitive  points 
on  the  Cedar  Rapids  R.  R,  to  Milwaukee, 
except  on  wheat  and  barley.  Complain- 
ant grain  dealers  and  millers  at  Mil- 
waukee demanded  their  restoration.  The 
purpose  of  the  Rock  Island  Lines  in 
withdrawing  the  rates  was  to  compel 
the  shipment  of  coarse  grains  to  Chi- 
cago, whereby  it  would  secure  for  itself 
the  entire  haul.  The  Rock  Island  was 
tne  only  one  of  several  railroad  systems 
that  did  not  make  Milwaukee  a  common 
point  with  Chicago  in  the  transportation 
of  coarse  grains.  It  made  Milwaukee  a 
common  point  with  Chicago  as  to  traffic 
moving  under  class  and  commodity  rates 
from  the  local  points  on  the  Cedar 
Rapids  and  with  respect  to  rates  on  all 
grains     from     competitive     or     junction 


points  on  the  Cedar  Rapids.  The  terri- 
tory served  by  the  Cedar  Rapids  R.  R. 
was,  in  geographical  location,  tributary 
to  Milwaukee  as  much  as,  if  not  more 
than,  to  Chicago,  and  before  the  cancella- 
tion of  the  rates  complained  of  a  con- 
siderable volume  of  grain  reached  Mil- 
waukee from  points  on  its  rails  which, 
since  the  cancellation,  went  to  Chicago. 
The  distance,  through  the  nearest  junc- 
tion with  the  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.,  was 
some  70  miles  less  from  the  majority  of 
stations  on  the  Cedar  Rapids  R.  R.  than 
that  from  these  stations  to  Chicago  over 
the  Rock  Island.  The  mileage  from  the 
great  majority  of  the  stations  on  the 
Cedar  Rapids  R.  R.,  when  traffic  goes 
to  Milwaukee  through  Clinton,  la.,  is 
substantially  the  same  as  through  Dav- 
enport, la.,  over  the  Rock  Island  Lines 
to  Chicago,  the  distance  against  Mil- 
waukee being  only  three  miles.  Under 
the  adjustment  complained  of  the  low- 
est combination  of  local  rates  on  grain 
to  Milwaukee,  namely,  that  based  on 
Chicago,  made  the  Milwaukee  rate,  from 
local  points  on  the  Cedar  Rapids  R.  R., 
3c  higher  than  the  Chicago  rate,  this 
difference  being  prohibitive  against  Mil- 
waukee. HELD,  that  the  complainants 
were  entitled  to  reasonable  rates  from 
the  points  of  origin  in  question,  and  that 
the  Rock  Island  Ry.  had  no  right,  for 
the  purpose  of  building  up  its  business, 
to  force  its  services  upon  a  shipper  or 
insist  upon  carrying  his  shipments  to 
one  market  when  he  desired  to  reach 
another,  or  that  a  shipment  should  go 
to  the  end  of  its  rails  if  the  shipper 
desired  it  to  be  diverted  at  an  inter- 
mediate point  to  another  market  off  its 
rails;  that  under  the  adjustment  at- 
tacked no  reasonable  or  satisfactory 
through  routes,  within  the  meaning  of 
section  15  of  the  Act,  existed  to  Mil- 
waukee, and  defendant  should  create 
such  routes;  and  that  the  rates  on  all 
grain  from  local  points  on  the  Cedar 
Rapids  R.  R.  to  Milwaukee  should  not 
exceed  those  to  Chicago.  Chamber  of 
Commerce  of  Milwaukee  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  460,  464. 

(o)  Defendant  Kansas  Southwestern 
R.  R.  extends  from  Arkansas  City,  Kan., 
westerly  some  60  miles.  Defendant  Mid- 
land Valley  R.  R.  extends  from  Arkan- 
sas City  southeasterly  through  Fort 
Smith,  and  Muskogee,  Okla.,  is  located 
thereon.  Complainant  grain  dealer  and 
miller  at  Muskogee  demanded  the  estab- 
lishment   of    through    routes    and    joint 


856 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §11   (2)    (p)  — (q) 


rates  from  points  on  the  defendant  Kan- 
sas Southwestern  R.  R.  to  all  points  on 
the  lines  of  defendants  Kansas  City 
Southern  R.  R.  and  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  of 
Texas  and  their  connections,  for  the 
purpose  of  enabling  complainant  to  buy 
grain  at  points  on  the  Kansas  South- 
western R.  R.,  mill  same  in  transit  at 
Muskogee  and  ship  it  to  its  trade  in 
the  south  and  southwest.  Joint  rates 
were  in  effect  on  all  points  on  the  Kan- 
sas Southwestern  R.  R.  to  all  points  on 
the  Midland  Valley  R.  R.,  including 
Muskogee.  They  were  in  effect  also 
via  the  lines  of  other  carriers  than  the 
Midland  Valley  R.  R.  to  all  points  on 
said  railroads  leading  into  the  south  and 
southwest.  No  shipper  on  the  Kansas 
Southwestern  R.  R.  or  on  any  of  said 
roads  leading  into  the  South  and  South- 
west complained  against  said  joint  rates. 
Complainant  did  not  attack  the  reason- 
ableness of  the  rates  to  points  on  the 
Midland  Valley  R.  R.  Defendant  Kan- 
sas Southwestern  R.  R.  was  being  oper- 
ated at  a  loss,  and  upon  all  through  and 
joint  rates  in  effect  was  being  allowed 
as  its  portion  its  full  local  rates.  HELD, 
the  relief  prayed  for  should  be  denied. 
Midland  Mill  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  K.  S.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  610,  614. 

(p)  Complainant  lumber  and  shingle 
producing  and  shipping  interests  of 
western  Washington  sought  to  compel 
the  N.  P.  Ry.  and  the  Great  Northern 
Ry.  to  establish  a  through  route  and  a 
joint  rate  from  points  on  their  lines  via 
Portland  to  eastern  destinations.  The 
defendants  reached  eastern  destinations 
through  gateways  at  Spokane,  Wash., 
and  Silver  Bow  and  Billings,  Mont. 
From  the  points  of  origin  in  question  a 
rate  of  50c  upon  lumber  was  in  effect 
over  the  N.  P.  Ry.  and  the  Great  North- 
ern Ry.  to  all  Missouri  River  points  and 
to  many  points  east  and  west  of  that 
river.  With  respect  to  shipments  from 
the  points  of  origin  in  question  to  desti- 
nations east  of  Colorado  common  points 
the  distances  were  less  through  said 
gateways  than  through  Portland,  and 
the  transportation  operations  were  fully 
as  easy.  In  1906  complainants  had  been 
unable  to  move  their  products  over  the 
routes  in  effect  on  account  of  congestion 
of  traffic.  For  this  congestion  defend- 
ants N.  P.  Ry.  and  G.  N.  Ry.  were  partly 
to  blame,  but  since  that  date  had  made 
great  efforts  to  relieve  the  situation 
and  prevent  its  recurrence.  The  N.  P. 
Ry.  and   G.   N.   Ry.   at  a  great  expense 


extended  their  lines  into  complainants' 
territory  for  the  purpose  of  developing 
same,  and  their  enterprise  in  so  doing 
would  not  be  profitable  unless  they 
obtained  the  benefit  of  the  long  haul  to 
points  eastward.  To  compel  them  to 
deliver  the  traffic  to  the  Union  Pacific 
lines  at  Portland  would  deprive  them 
of  the  large  portion  of  the  compensation 
of  traffic  developed  and  originated  by 
them.  With  respect  to  Colorado  com- 
mon points,  the  distance  via  the  Billings 
gateway  was  some  1,728  miles;  via  the 
Portland  gateway,  some  1,535  miles.  The 
service  by  the  former  gateway  was  as 
satisfactory  as  by  the  latter.  With  re- 
spect to  Utah  points  traffic  moving  by 
the  Spokane,  Silver  Bow  or  Portland 
gateway  all  passed  through  Pocatello. 
The  distance  from  a  typical  point  of 
origin  to  Pocatello  via  Portland  is  875 
miles;  via  Spokane,  1,328  miles;  via  Sil- 
ver Bow,  1,209  miles.  The  service  by 
the  Spokane  and  Silver  Bow  gateway 
was  unsatisfactory.  HELD,  that  with 
respect  to  Colorado  common  points  and 
destinations  east  thereof,  the  through 
routes  already  in  effect  via  Spokane, 
Silver  Bow  and  Billings  were  satisfac- 
tory, and  the  Commission  had  no  juris- 
diction to  establish  a  new  route  through 
Spokane;  but  that  as  to  Utah  points  a 
through  route  through  Portland  should 
be  opened,  and  that  the  rates  to  Utah 
points  from  the  Washington  territory  in 
question  should  not  exceed  the  rate 
from  Portland  by  more  than  2^c.  Pa- 
cific Coast  Lumber  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  N.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  14  1.  C.  C.  51,  58. 

(q)  The  lumber  interests  in  western 
Washington  were  served  by  the  N.  P. 
Ry.  and  the  Great  Northern  Ry.,  the  in- 
dustries having  been  developed  by  those 
carriers.  The  Oregon  lumber  interests 
were  served  by  the  Oregon  Railway  & 
Navigation  Co.  in  connection  with  the 
Union  Pacific  lines,  these  carriers  hav- 
ing developed  the  industries  in  that 
state.  In  1906,  on  account  of  congestion 
of  traffic,  the  Washington  lumber  inter- 
ests were  unable  to  move  their  products 
over  the  N.  P.  Ry.  and  the  G.  N.  Ry. 
through  the  gateways  of  Spokane,  Silver 
Bow  and  Billings,  and  demanded  the 
establishment  of  a  through  route  via 
Portland,  where  the  traffic  would  be 
taken  from  the  N.  P.  Ry.  and  the  G.  N.  Ry. 
and  delivered  to  the  U.  P.  R.  R.  and  its 
connections,  for  the  long  haul  to  eastern 
destinations.  At  that  date  the  Oregon 
lumber    interests    were   meeting   with   a 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §11   (2)    (r)— (v) 


857 


like  difficulty  of  congested  traffic.  HELD, 
the  requests  for  the  establishment  tem- 
porarily of  a  through  route  through 
Portland  for  the  purpose  of  relieving 
these  Washington  interests  should  be 
denied.  Pacific  Coast  Lumber  Mfrs.' 
Ass'n  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  51,  60. 

(r)  Defendant  carrier  tapped  the 
long-leaf  pine  lumber  section  in  the 
southern  part  of  that  district,  and 
reached  much  more  of  such  lumber  than 
it  did  of  the  short-leaf  pine.  It  canceled 
its  joint  rates  with  carriers  reaching 
the  principal  short-leaf  supply;  claimed 
to  be  able  to  supply  all  of  both  kinds 
of  pine,  and  sought  to  compel  retail 
dealers  located  at  Oklahoma,  Missouri, 
Kansas  and  Colorado  points  to  obtain 
from  the  districts  reached  by  it  all  their 
lumber  supplies.  HELD,  the  opportunity 
to  buy  in  a  widely  extended  market  be- 
ing a  valuable  one  to  merchants  in 
that  it  presented  a  larger  field  of  com- 
petition, defendant  should  be  ordered  to 
restore  its  joint  rates.  Star,  Grain  & 
Lumber  Co.  et  al.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  14  I.   C.  C.  364,  367. 

(s)  The  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  and  the 
K.  C.  S.  Ry.  meet  at  DeRidder,  La., 
an  important  mill  point  for  yellow  pine. 
To  restore  through  rates  from  DeRidder 
over  the  latter  road  would  give  to  it  a 
very  long  haul,  and  to  the  former  a 
very  short  one,  from  the  junctions  of  the 
two  roads  at  Pittsburgh  and  Kansas 
City.  The  two  lines  were  in  general 
physical  proximity.  HELD,  such  joint 
rates  would  not  be  restored  except  upon 
a  very  full  and  convincing  complaint 
and  record.  Star  Grain  &  Lumber  Co. 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  364, 
373. 

(t)  Complainant  manufacturer  of  cot- 
tonseed products  at  Memphis  attacked 
the  rates  on  cottonseed  from  points  on 
the  defendant  Ft.  Smith  &  Western  R. 
R.  to  Memphis,  the  rates  ranging  from 
47c  to  58c  on  distances  from  324  to  514 
miles,  and  demanded  that  the  rates 
should  not  exceed  those  on  corn  from 
the  same  points  of  origin  to  Memphis, 
ranging  from  17c  to  20c,  and  should  not 
exceed  the  rates  on  cottonseed  from 
points  of  origin  on  the  Rock  Island,  a 
similar  distance  from  Memphis.  The 
rates  attacked  were  higher  'than  the 
combination  of  locals  based  on  Fort 
Smith.  The  F.  S.  &  W.  R.  R.  was  a 
new  road,  217  miles  long,  extending  from 
Fort   Smith  to   Guthrie.     It   ran  through 


a  sparsely  settled  and  little  cultivated 
country,  and  was  being  operated  at  a 
loss.  Its  equipment  was  barely  suffi- 
cient to  deliver  the  local  traffic  on  its 
line.  Corn  moves  during  the  greater 
part  of  the  year,  while  cottonseed  moves 
only  a  short  portion  thereof.  The  Rock 
Island  was  an  old  road  running  through 
developed  territory  and  operating  at  a 
profit.  HELD,  complainant's  demand 
that  the  defendant  F.  S.  &  W.  R.  R. 
establish  the  same  joint  through  rates 
on  cottonseed  as  on  corn,  and  that  said 
rates  should  not  exceed  those  in  effect 
on  the  Rock  Island,  should  be  denied; 
but  that  joint  through  rates  should  be 
published  by  it  not  in  excess  of  the  com- 
bination of  locals  based  on  Fort  Smith. 
Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v.  F.  S.  &  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  1,  9. 

(u)  Complainant  electric  railroad 
paralleled  the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  from 
Milwaukee,  Wis.,  to  Chicago,  the  aver- 
age distance  between  said  lines  not  ex- 
ceeding 41/^  miles.  Piper's  Siding  and 
Hanche's  Siding  were  constructed  by 
complainant  on  the  cabbage  farms  of 
two  shippers  in  southern  Wisconsin. 
The  former  point  is  about  one  mile  from 
the  siding  of  the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  and 
the  latter  from  1%  to  2  miles  from  said 
siding.  Complainant  demanded  the  es- 
tablishment of  through  routes  and  joint 
rates  from  these  points  via  the  Elgin, 
Joliet  &  Eastern  Ry.,  a  belt  line,  and 
the  I.  C.  R.  R.  to  points  on  the  line 
of  the  latter  carrier  and  its  connections. 
Complainant  was  equipped  to  handle 
traffic  except  that  it  had  no  refrigerator 
cars,  and  would  have  been  obliged  to 
obtain  same  from  the  I.  C.  R.  R.  For 
many  years  the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  had  de- 
livered the  cabbage  traffic  from  this  ter- 
ritory in  an  apparently  satisfactory  man- 
ner, and  the  industries  had  greatly  pros- 
pered before  the  construction  of  com- 
plainant's line.  HELD,  the  demand 
should  be  denied  since  satisfactory 
routes  and  joint  rates  via  the  C.  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  were  already  in  effect  from  the 
points  in  question,  and  it  was  not  neces- 
sary in  order  to  prove  that  a  satisfac- 
tory joint  route  under  section  15  of  the 
Act  was  already  in  effect  to  show  that 
the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  reached  the  very 
door  of  the  farmers  whom  it  served.  C. 
&  M.  Electric  R.  R.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,   13   I.   C.   C.  20,  26. 

(v)  On  carloads  of  potatoes  from 
Wautoma,     Wis.,     to     Springfield,     Mo., 


858 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §11  (2)   (w)— (x) 


routed  by  complainant  via  Chicago  and 
St.  Louis,  a  charge  of  SS'^c  was  as- 
sessed. The  shipments  might  have 
moved  upon  a  25c  rate  over  several 
other  routes.  By  mistake  of  defendants 
the  cars  were  shipped  to  East  St.  Louis 
instead  of  St.  Louis,  and  were  subjected 
for  that  reason  to  an  unnecessary  l^^c 
bridge  toll,  making  the  charge  38i/^c 
instead  of  37c.  The  charge  exacted  was 
made  up  of  a  joint  through  rate  from 
Wautoma  via  Chicago  to  East  St.  Louis 
of  20c,  and  a  local  rate  from  East  St. 
Louis  to  Springfield  of  18  ^c.  The  dis- 
tance from  Wautoma  to  East  St.  Louis 
is  489  miles.  Excluding  the  bridge  toll 
of  l^c,  the  17c  local  rate  exacted  from 
East  St.  Louis  to  Springfield  was  estab- 
lished by  the  Missouri  commission. 
HELD,  complainant  was  not  entitled  to 
recover  on  the  basis  of  the  25c  rate 
over  other  routes  since  it  routed  the 
shipments  itself;  that  satisfactory 
through  routes  being  already  in  exist- 
ence the  Commission  could  not  estab- 
lish through  routes  and  joint  rates  be- 
tween Wautoma  and  Springfield,  and 
could  not  therefore  award  reparation 
on  the  basis  of  the  unreasonableness  of 
the  charge  exacted;  but  that  complain- 
ant should  be  awarded  reparation  for 
the  l%c  bridge  toll  unnecessarily  in- 
curred. Stedman  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  13  I.   C.   C.  167,  169,  170. 

(w)  Complainant  manufacturers  at 
Little  Rock,  Ark.,  asked  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  through  routes  and  joint 
rates  on  cottonseed  in  carloads  from 
points  on  the  Midland  Valley  R.  R.,  in 
Oklahoma,  to  Little  Rock,  via  the  M.  V. 
and  the  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Rys.  Under  the 
arrangement  attacked,  cottonseed  was 
carried  over  the  M.  V.  R.  R.  to  Hart- 
ford at  the  local  rate.  Complainants 
were  there  compelled  to  unload,  trans- 
fer and  reload  same,  and  pay  the  local 
rate  over  the  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  to  Little 
Rock.  Defendant  M.  V.  R.  R.  opposed 
the  establishment  of  through  routes  and 
joint  rates  on  the  ground  that  manu- 
facturers of  cottonseed  products  were 
located  upon  its  line  at  Fort  Smith, 
Ark.,  and  Muskogee,  Okla.,  and  that  by 
carrying  the  products  to  those  cities  it 
also  obtained  the  outbound  s^upments 
of  the  manufactured  products.  Defend- 
ant M.  V.  R.  R.'s  course,  while  beneficial 
to  the  manufacturers  at  Muskogee  and 
Fort  Smith,  was  detrimental  to  tiie  pro- 
ducers of  cottonseed  who  would  be  bene- 
fited   by    the    competition    of    manufac- 


turers at  Little  Rock.  HELD,  joint 
through  rates  and  routes  should  be  es- 
tablished between  the  points  in  ques- 
tion at  a  rate  not  to  exceed  the  sum 
of  the  locals,  since  a  carrier  owed 
duties  to  any  persons  offering  goods  for 
shipment,  whether  living  on  or  off  its 
lines.  Merchants'  Freight  Bureau  of 
Little  Rock,  Ark.,  v.  Midland  Valley  R. 
R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  243,  245. 

(x)  The  excess  output  of  coal  from 
Illinois  fields  was  largely  limited  to 
western  and  southern  Wisconsin,  south- 
ern Minnesota,  eastern  Nebraska,  Souin 
Dakota  and  northern  Iowa.  The  Wil- 
mington field  lies  about  50  miles  south- 
west of  Chicago.  The  other  fields  in 
the  northern  Illinois  group  of  mines 
are  the  Third  Vein  and  Peoria  fi#lds, 
the  former  lying  about  50  miles  west 
of  the  Wilmington  field,  and  the  latter 
about  60  miles  southwest  of  the  Third 
Vein.  In  the  Wilmington  and  Third 
Vein  fields  coal  was  mined  under  sub- 
stantially similar  conditions  and  at 
about  the  same  cost.  The  cost  of  min- 
ing in  the  Peoria  field  was  about  25c 
per  ton  less  than  in  either  of  the  other 
two  fields.  Cardiff,  at  which  point  com- 
plainant conducted  its  mining  opera- 
tions, was  at  the  extreme  south  end  of 
the  Wilmington  field  and  was  reached 
by  the  Wabash  and  the  Chicago,  Indi- 
ana &  Southern  R.  Rs.  Six  or  eight 
miles  north  of  Cardiff  was  the  town  of 
Wilmington,  served  by  the  Elgin,  Joliet 
&  Eastern  Ry.  The  mines  of  Wilming- 
ton enjoyed  the  benefit  of  through 
routes  and  joint  rates  via  the  E.  J.  & 
E.  Ry.  to  all  points  on  the  line  of  the 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Neither  of  the  two 
last  mentioned  roads  reached  complain- 
ant's mine  at  Cardiff.  But  a  reasonably 
direct  outlet  to  points  on  the  line  of 
the  St.  Paul  could  be  had  over  the  C. 
I.  &  S.  R.  R.,  connecting  with  the  St. 
Paul  at  McNab  and  Seatonville.  Like 
routes  could  be  had  over  the  Wabash 
R.  R.  through  Chicago.  Formerly 
through  routes  and  joint  rates  were  in 
effect  through  Seatonville  to  points  on 
the  line  of  the  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  During 
that  period  complainant  was  able  to  mar- 
ket its  coal  to  points  on  the  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Such  routes  and  rates  were  can- 
celed, and  thereafter  complainant  was 
unable  to  market  its  coal  at  these 
points,  and  asked  that  they  be  re-estab- 
lished over  both  the  C.  I.  &  S.  R.  R. 
and  the  Wabash  R.  R,  The  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.     Ry.     opposed    such    course     on    the 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §11  (2)    (y)— §13 


859 


ground  that  it  was  able  to  supply  such 
points  on  its  line  from  mines  located 
at  Seatonville  on  shipments  from  which 
it  received  the  entire  revenue  of  the 
haul,  whereas  if  the  routes  and  rates 
requested  were  established  it  would  be 
obliged  to  divide  the  revenue  with  the 
C  I.  &  S.  R.  R.  Every  mine  in  the 
Wilmington  field,  if  not  every  mine  in 
the  Third  Vein  field,  enjoyed  the  routes 
and  rates  to  the  points  on  the  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  which  complainant  desired  to  reach. 
HELD,  through  routes  and  joint  rates 
should  be  established  over  one  of  the 
two  routes  as  demanded.  An  interstato 
carrier  may  not,  in  order  to  build  up 
enterprises  on  its  own  line  and  prevent 
the  trade  of  its  local  industries  from 
being  displaced  by  the  competition  of 
commodities  on  connecting  lines,  deny 
to  industries  on  connecting  lines  the 
benefit  of  through  routes  and  joint  rates 
nor  may  it  deny  such  routes  and  rates 
in  order  to  prevent  a  division  of  rev- 
enue with  the  connecting  carrier.  The 
granting  of  the  routes  and  rates  prayed 
for  is  not  in  violation  of  section  3  of 
the  Act  providing  that  no  carrier  shall 
be  required  to  give  the  use  of  its 
equipment  to  another  carrier  engaged  in 
like  business.  Cardiff  Coal  Co.  v.  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  P.  C.  C.  460, 
465,  470. 

(y)  Following  the  decision  in  Cardiff 
Coal  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13 
I.  C.  C.  460,  the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  is  or- 
dered to  join  with  the  C.  I.  &  S  Ry.  in 
establishing  through  routes  from  coal 
mines  at  Cardiff,  111.,  to  all  strictly  local 
points  on  the  line  of  the  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry. 
in  the  states  of  Michigan,  Wisconsin, 
Iowa,  Minnesota,  South  Dakota  and  Ne- 
braska, no  order  being  entered  with  re- 
spect to  competitive  points  on  said  line. 
Cardiff  Coal  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
13  I.   C.    C.   471,   472. 

(z)  Complainant,  a  steamship  com- 
pany plying  between  Benton  Harbor, 
Mich.,  and  Chicago,  received  fruit  at 
Benton  Harbor  from  defendant  railway 
and  carried  the  same  on  a  through 
route  and  joint  rate  from  the  fruit 
growers'  farms  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Benton  Harbor  to  Chicago.  Defendant 
canceled  said  route  and  rate  with  com- 
plainant, refused  to  renew  same,  and 
made  an  exclusive  arrangement  for  such 
a  route  and  rate  with  complainant's 
competitor  plying  between  such  points. 
Complainant  and  its  competitor  had  di- 


vided the  fruit  traffic  to  Chicago  almost 
equally  between  them.  The  boats  of 
the  competitor  on  reaching  Chicago 
came  up  at  right  angles  to  the  end  of 
competitor's  wharf,  and  the  packages 
had  to  be  carried  the  full  length  of  the 
wharf,  some  310  ft.,  to  the  wagons  of 
the  fruit  dealers  at  Chicago.  This  situ- 
ation had  resulted  in  congestion,  delay- 
ing the  delivery  of  fruit  to  the  dealers 
and  occasioning  losses.  Complainant's 
wharf  was  further  off  from  the  whole- 
sale houses  of  the  dealers,  but  was  situ- 
ated more  conveniently  for  unloading 
into  the  dealers'  wagons.  Complainant 
demanded  the  re-establishment  of  a 
joint  rate  and  through  route.  To  deny 
same  would  have  destroyed  complain- 
ant and  resulted  in  throwing  its  traffic 
entirely  to  its  competitor,  which  would 
have  been  unable  to  deliver  the  same 
expeditiously  to  the  Chicago  dealers. 
HELD,  the  rate  and  route  demanded 
should  be  established.  Benton  Transit 
Co.  V.  Benton  Harbor,  St.  Joe  Ry.  & 
Light  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  542,  548. 

III.    BILLS    OF    LADING. 

See  Bills  of  Lading,  II,  §3  (a);  Ex- 
port Rates  and  Facilities,  II;  Rout- 
ing and   MIsrouting,  §3. 

§12.     Issuance    in    General. 

(a)  No  legal  obligation  rests  on  a 
rail  carrier  to  give  a  through  bill  of 
lading  covering  movement  by  water  be- 
yond its  line,  but  the  practice  of  with- 
holding through  bills  of  lading,  except 
as  to  certain  preferred  water  lines,  is 
illegal  discrimination.  Mobile  Chamber 
of  Commerce  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
I.    C.    C.   417,   424. 

(b)  A  bill  of  lading  issued  by  a  rail 
carrier,  covering  the  inland  rail  and  also 
the  ocean  haul,  is  not  strictly  a  through 
bill  of  lading.  Mobile  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce V.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
417,    425. 


IV.     REASONABLENESS 
THROUGH   RATES. 


OF 


13.     In    General. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §3  (a),  (c),  §5 
(2)  (f):  Any-Quantity  Rate,  I  (c) ; 
Blanket  Rates,  §7  (i),  §10  (a),  §11 
(a);  Brancli  Lines,  §1  (Ki);  Classi- 
fication, §18  (5)  (a);  Commutation 
Fares  (a);  Evidence,  §13  (6)  (m), 
§64  (t) ;  Proportional  Rates,  IV 
(i),  (k);  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§7  (a),  §10  (b),  §28  (ff),  (q),  §56 
(a). 


860 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §13   (a)  — (e) 


(a)  While  southern  carriers  may 
properly  meet  from  both  Oklahoma  and 
Fort  Worth  via  Memphis  and  Vicksburg 
the  rates  on  packing-house  products  and 
fresh  meats  established  via  St.  Louis 
to  New  York  and  other  eastern  terri- 
tory, the  Commission  cannot  recognize 
the  force  of  the  contention  that  the 
rate  itself  should  be  established  through 
these  gateways.  In  Re  Advances  on 
Meats  and  Packing-House  Products,  23 
I.  C.  C.  656,  669. 

(aa)  Defendants'  tariffs  named  a  pro- 
portional rate  of  18c  per  100  pounds  from 
Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Little  Rock,  Ark.,  on 
grain  and  grain  products  destined  to 
Conway  and  Morrilton,  points  lying  be- 
tween Little  Rock  and  Memphis,  Tenn., 
with  a  milling-in-transit  privilege  at  Lit- 
tle Rock.  The  tariffs  provided  for  an 
additional  charge  for  out-of-line  hauls  of 
Ic  per  100  pounds  for  40  and  over  5 
miles;  li^c  for  60  and  over  40  miles. 
The  distance  from  Little  Rock  to  Con- 
way is  30  miles,  and  to  Morrilton,  50 
miles.  Defendants  under  this  tariff  ex- 
acted extra  charges  of  l^^c  to  Conway 
and  21/^c  to  Morrilton,  under  a  provi- 
sion in  the  tariffs  that  in  assessing  these 
extra  charges  the  difference  between  the 
mileage  a  shipment  actually  traveled  via 
a  transit  point  and  the  mileage  via  the 
shortest  route  from  point  of  origin  to 
destination  should  be  considered  the 
mileage  of  the  out-of-line  haul.  The 
short-line  distance  from  Omaha  to  Con- 
way is  695  miles  via  Coffeyville,  Kan., 
while  the  distance  via  Little  Rock  is  738 
miles,  a  difference  of  43  miles,  for  which 
the  out-of-line  charge  was  l^/^c,  according 
to  the  tariff.  By  a  similar  test  the  out- 
of-line  haul  from  Omaha  to  Morrilton  is 
83  miles,  for  which  the  out-of-line  charge. 
acocrdance  with  the  tariff  and  were  not 
HELD,  that  the  charges  exacted  were  in 
acordance  with  the  tariff  and  were  not 
shown  to  be  unreasonable.  Brook-Rauch 
Mill  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  St.  L.,  I  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  249. 

(b)  Complainant  alleged  that  there 
was  undue  discrimination  against  Reno, 
in  that  the  rates  charged  from  Reno 
to  the  several  points  on  defendant's 
lines  were  higher  than  the  division  of 
the  joint  rate  from  San  Francisco  and 
from  Sacramento  received  by  defendant 
for  the  same  hauls.  The  bulk  of  the 
northbound  trafiic  of  the  defendant  is 
through  traffic  originating  in  San  Fran- 
cisco and  destined  to  a  competitive  ter- 


ritory served  by  the  Southern  Pacific 
and  Western  Pacific  R.  Rs.  as  well  as 
defendant.  The  greater  part  of  defend- 
ant's business  was  traffic  given  it  by 
the  Southern  Pacific  R.  R.,  and  it  was, 
therefore,  compelled  to  receive  from  the 
Southern  Pacific  R.  R.  whatever  pro- 
portional rates  that  road  would  give  it,  as 
otherwise  the  Southern  Pacific  R.  R. 
could  deprive  it  of  the  haul.  The  West- 
ern Pacific  R.  R.,  recently  built,  was 
also  a  very  serious  competitor  to  de- 
fendant. HELD,  that  good  reasons  ex- 
ist why  the  through  rate  may  be  less 
than  the  combination  rate  via  Reno, 
and  that  the  proportional  rate  therefore 
affords  no  criterion  as  to  the  reason- 
ableness of  the  local  rate,  and,  there- 
fore, no  discrimination  was  shown  to 
exist.  On  account  of  the  severe  compe- 
tition of  the  Western  Pacific,  recently 
completed,  and  the  fact  that  defendant 
has  from  time  to  time  appeared  to 
reduce  its  rates  to  suit  new  conditions, 
any  further  reduction  by  the  Commis- 
sion at  present  seems  unwarranted, 
especially  as  local  rates  in  Nevada  and 
other  small  roads  were  on  an  excep- 
tionally high  scale.  Therefore,  the  rates 
cannot  be  held  to  be  unreasonable.  Rail- 
road Commission  of  Nevada  v.  N.  C.  O. 
Ry.  and  S.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  205. 

(c)  Complainant  shipped  lumber,  C. 
L.,  Woolam,  Miss.,  to  Owensburg,  Ind., 
under  a  combination  rate  of  27c  per  100 
lbs.  At  the  time  of  shipment  a  joint 
rate  of  24c  applied  between  these 
points,  but  via  another  gateway.  Via 
the  route  shipment  moved  the  carriers 
had  not  agreed  on  any  division.  HELD, 
as  the  joint  tariff  established  a  24c 
rate  via  all  junctions  of  the  carriers 
parties  thereto,  the  shipper  could  not 
be  assumed  to  know  via  which  gateway 
divisions  had  been  agreed  upon,  and  on 
that  account  could  not  be  assessed  a 
higher  rate.  Reparation  awarded.  Heft- 
ier Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  &  S.  I.  R.  R.  Co., 
21  I.  C.  C,  14. 

(d)  Where  the  cancelation  of  joint 
through  rates  will  result  in  higher 
charges  from  origin  to  destination,  the 
burden  is  on  the  carrier  to  prove  the 
reasonableness  of  the  increased  rate. 
In  Re  Investigation  and  Suspension 
Docket  28,  21  I.  C.  C.  455,  456. 

(e)  The  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  published 
a  rate  of  93c  per  100  lbs.  on  carloads 
of  mixed  furniture  from  Evansville,  Ind., 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §13    (f)— (m) 


861 


to  El  Paso,  Tex.  The  connecting  car- 
riers had  not  consented.  Connecting 
carriers  had  participated  in  the  tariff 
of  southwestern  lines  that  carried  the 
93c  rate  between  the  points  mentioned, 
but  the  L.  &  N.  had  not  concurred  in 
that  tariff.  The  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  admitted 
the  reasonableness  of  the  93c  rate. 
Charges  were  collected  on  a  combina- 
tion aggregating  $1  per  100  lbs.  Sub- 
sequent to  date  of  shipment  defendants 
filed  a  specific  joint  commodity  rate  of 
89c  per  100  lbs.  HELD,  the  combina- 
tion of  rates  exacted  to  have  been  un- 
reasonable and  reparation  awarded,  as 
prayed,  for  the  amount  collected  in  ex- 
cess of  93c  per  100  lbs.  Texico  Trans- 
fer Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
17. 

(f)  A  carrier  may  not  lawfully  make 
rates  to  a  given  point  on  its  line  on 
traffic  going  beyond  by  wagon  or  other 
similar  conveyance  which  are  lower 
than  its  established  rates  to  that  point 
as  a  final  destination.  Bayou  City  Rice 
Mills  V.  T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C. 
C.  490,   493. 

(g)  On  the  question  of  the  reason- 
ableness of  through  lumber  rates  from 
the  yellow  pine  district  in  the  South  to 
Omaha,  to  sustain  which  the  local  fac- 
tors at  the  St.  Louis  combination  were 
advanced  so  as  to  make  the  combination 
as  high  as  the  through  rate  in  question, 
it  is  immaterial  that  there  has  been  a 
reduction  in  the  Nebraska  state  rates 
by  the  state  commission  and  that  to 
any  Nebraska  points  the  rates  make 
the  combination  on  Omaha,  since  the 
rate  dealt  with  is  the  rate  from  the 
points  of  origin  in  question  to  Omaha 
and  not  the  combination  rates  to  Ne- 
braska points.  Commercial  Club  of 
Omaha  v.  Anderson  &  Saline  River  Ry, 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  532,  536. 

(h)  On  a  carload  of  buckwheat 
shipped  from  Gobies,  Mich.,  to  Janes- 
ville.  Wis.,  complainant  was  assessed 
21i^c.  The  combination  of  locals 
through  Chicago  was  14c.  Shortly  after 
the  shipment  moved  defendants  estab- 
lished a  through  rate  of  14c.  Defend- 
ants admitted  the  rate  charged  to  be 
unreasonable  and  that  14c  was  a  rea- 
sonable rate.  HELD,  the  21i^c  rate  was 
unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded  on 
the  basis  of  14c.  Blodgett  Milling  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
587. 


(i)  On  through  shipments  differences 
in  distance  are  not  important  in  con- 
sidering rates.  Avery  Manufacturing 
Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C. 
20,   22. 

(J)  On  shipments  of  sundry  groceries 
in  less-than-carload  packages  from  St. 
Paul,  Minn,,  to  Lemmon,  S.  D.,  and  from 
St.  Paul  to  Hettinger,  N.  D.,  complain- 
ant was  charged  the  combination  of 
local  rates  based  on  the  Missouri  River, 
and  amounting,  from  St.  Paul  to  Lem- 
mon, to  167c,  144c,  119c,  98c  for  classes 
1,  2,  3,  4,  respectively,  and  from  St. 
Paul  to  Hettinger,  to  176c,  151c,  124c  and 
101c.  Shortly  after  the  shipments  in 
question  defendant  established  through 
rates  from  St.  Paul  to  Lemmon  of  117c, 
100c,  80c,  64c  for  these  classes,  and 
from  St.  Paul  to  Hettinger  125c, '  106c, 
87c,  69c.  The  charges  assessed  were 
the  regular  published  rates,  and  the 
only  rates  that  could  have  been  law- 
fully collected.  HELD,  the  rates  ex- 
acted were  unreasonable  and  should  not 
have  exceeded  the  through  rates  sub- 
sequently established.  Reparation 
awarded.  Allen  &  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  293,  294. 

(k)  Defendant  initial  carrier  pub- 
lished a  joint  rate  of  16i/4c  from  Grand 
Rapids  to  Houghton,  Mich.  It  received 
from  complainant  without  routing  in- 
structions carloads  of  plaster  and  routed 
same  via  a  carrier  which  had  not  joined 
in  said  joint  rate.  As  a  result  the  only 
lawful  published  rate  was  20c,  which 
was  exacted  of  complainant.  Subse- 
quent to  the  shipments  in  question  tar- 
iffs were  corrected  so  as  to  make  a 
161/^c  rate  over  the  route  the  snipment 
moved.  Defendant  initial  carrier  might 
have  secured  said  16  ^/^c  rate  by  sending 
the  shipment  over  another  route.  HELD, 
the  rate  exacted  was  unreasonable.  Rep- 
aration awarded.  Grand  Rapids  Plaster 
Co.  V.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  68,  69. 

(1)  On  a  carload  of  sacked,  shelled 
oats  from  Durant,  Okla.,  to  Hope,  Ark., 
thence  to  011a,  La.,  the  sum  of  the 
locals  was  applied,  13c,  Durant  to  Hope, 
and  51c,  Hope  to  011a.  Defendant  ad- 
mitted said  51c  charge  was  unreason- 
able to  the  extent  it  exceeded  31c. 
HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was  unreason- 
able. Reparation  awarded.  Venus  v. 
St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
136,    137. 

(m)  The  unreasonableness  of  a  through 
rate  upon  an  Interstate  shipment  via  a 


862 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §13  (n)— (v) 


given  route  cannot  be  determined  by 
a  mere  comparison  therewith  of  a  lower 
aggregate  of  rates,  consisting  of  a  local 
intrastate  rate  '  plus  an  independent  in- 
terstate rate  based  upon  a  junction 
through  which  the  carriers  have  no  joint 
route  and  no  basis  of  division.  Marble 
Falls  Insulator  Pin  Co.  v.  H.  &  T.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  167,  169. 

(n)  On  carloads  of  paper-mill  ma- 
chinery from  Pittsfield,  Mass.,  to  Mil- 
linocket,  Me.,  a  rate  of  36.32c  was  ex- 
acted. Prior  to  the  shipments  defend- 
ants intended  to  establish  a  23c  rate, 
but  their  effort  was  rendered  ineffective 
through  the  omission  from  the  tariff  of 
one  of  the  many  carriers  involved  in 
the  through  route.  Defendants  admitted 
the  rate  exacted  to  be  unreasonable, 
HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was  unreason- 
able. Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis 
of  23c.  Jones  &  Sons  Co.  v.  B.  &  A. 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  226. 

(o)  On  a  carload  of  vegetables  from 
Green  Bay,  Wis.,  to  Pattonsburg,  Mo., 
via  Ottumwa,  a  combination  charge 
made  up  of  O^^c  to  Milwaukee  and  22c 
thence  to  destination  was  exacted.  No 
through  rate  was  applicable  over  the 
lines  of  defendants,  but  a  joint  through 
rate  of  22c  was  in  effect  over  competing 
lines.  About  a  year  subsequent  to  the 
shipment,  defendants  established  the 
said  22c  rate  and  admitted  the  rate  ex- 
acted to  be  unreasonable.  HELD,  the 
rate  charged  was  excessive.  Reparation 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  22c.  Thomas  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  584, 
585. 

(p)  It  is  fair  to  assume  that  when  91 
miles  of  the  96  of  a  certain  haul  is  cov- 
ered by  a  25c  rate,  transportation  for 
the  remaining  5  miles  is  not  under  such 
dissimilar  circumstances  and  conditions 
as  to  warrant  the  exaction  of  34c  more 
in  charges.  Advance  Thresher  Co.  v. 
O.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  599, 
601. 

(q)  Upon  a  shipment  of  water  tanks 
and  sub-structures  from  Kendallville, 
Ind.,  via  Chicago  to  Beaver  Dam,  Wis., 
complainant  was  charged  the  established 
joint  rate  over  lines  of  the  defendants 
of  28c  per  100  lbs.  Contemporaneously 
defendants  maintained  a  joint  through 
rate  from  Kendallville  to  Milwaukee  of 
121/^c,  and  from  Milwaukee  to  Beaver 
Dam  of  9c,  totaling  21i^c.  Since  tlie 
filing    of    the    complaint    defendants    re- 


duced the  Kendallville  to  Beaver  Dam 
rate  to  21i^c.  HELD,  the  28c  rate  was 
excessive  and  complainant  entitled  to 
reparation  based  on  the  rate  of  21i/^c. 
Flint  &  Walling  Mfg.  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M. 
S.   Ry.,  14   L   C.   C.  336,   337. 

(r)  On  shipments  of  cottonseed  cake 
from  Shreveport,  La.,  via  Sherman, 
Tex.,  to  Kansas  City,  no  through  rate 
was  published.  The  combination  of  lo- 
cals was  42i^c.  The  published  tariff 
via  Jonesboro  was  18c.  Defendants  ad- 
mitted that  25c  via  Sherman  was  a  rea- 
sonable rate.  Defendants  charged  53c. 
HELD,  a  through  rate  via  Sherman  should 
be  established  not  to  exceed  25c,  and 
complainants  were  entitled  to  reparation 
on  the  basis  of  25c.  Stock  Yards  Cot- 
ton &  Linseed  Meal  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  530,  531. 

(s)  Where  joint  rates  charged  are 
found  to  be  unreasonable  and  reparation 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  tne  lower  rate 
against  the  initial  carrier,  no  order  will 
be  entered  prescribing  the  lower  rate 
as  the  future  joint  rate  where  the  con- 
necting carrier  is  not  a  party  to  the 
proceeding.  Morti  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  513,  515. 

(t)  Where  connecting  railroads  en- 
ter into  a  valid  contract  with  a  shipper 
to  transport  grain  from  one  state  to 
another  at  a  stipulated  joint  rate,  in 
which  agr3ement  the  proportion  of  such 
rate  to  be  received  by  each  road  is 
specified,  one  of  such  roads  cannot  after- 
wards change  the  amount  which  it  is 
to  receive  under  such  contract  by  join- 
ing with  other  connecting  lines  in  es- 
tablishing a  joint  rate  with  them,  by 
which  it  secures  a  larger  sum  for  the 
transportation  of  similar  freight  between 
the  same  points  named  in  the  former 
agreement.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Albers 
Comm.  Co.,  79  Kan.  59,  59,  99  P.  819. 

(u)  A  rate  on  cement  from  lola, 
Kan.,  to  Gila,  Ariz.,  is  found  unreason- 
able to  the  extent  that  it  exceeded  a 
lower  subsequently  established  rate  to 
that  point,  at  the  time  of  shipment  a 
lower  combination  based  on  Los  Angeles 
being  available.  lola  Portland  Cement 
Co.  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  1. 

(v)  A  through  rate  on  plow  parts 
from  Columbus,  Ga.,  to  points  in  Cali- 
fornia found  unreasonable  and  ordered 
reduced.  Columbus  Iron  Works  v.  C. 
of  Ga.  Ry.   Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  265. 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §13  (w)— §14  (i) 


863 


(w)  A  complaint  against  the  class  A 
rates,  applying  from  Mississippi  River 
crossings  to  the  Missouri  River  cities 
as  part  of  the  through  rates  on  laundry 
machinery  and  cream  separators  moving 
from  Atlantic  seaboard  territory  to  the 
Missouri  River,  and  praying  for  repara- 
tion, dismissed.  Southwestern  Laundry 
Machinery  Co.  v.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.   477. 

(x)  Rates  found  unreasonable  because 
joint  through  rate  in  effect  from  stations 
on  either  side  of  station  from  which  ship- 
ment moved  and  none  from  which  ship- 
ment moved  Reparation  awarded,  Jef- 
ferson Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  B.  &  A.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  534. 

§14.     Divisions  of  Through  Rates. 

See  Discrimination,  §5  (d);  Divisions, 
§1  (a),  (d),  §4  (c);  Evidence,  §13 
(2);  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §2 
(n);  Tap   Lines,  §9  (c). 

(a)  It  is  not  intended  to  intimate  tbat 
a  short  line  should  be  confined  in  its 
division  of  joint  rate  to  merely  the 
amount  which  an  application  of  the  mile- 
age scale  would  produce.  What  is  a 
fair  division  between  carriers  is  to  be 
determined  upon  the  merits  of  each  par- 
ticular case.  In  Re  Advances  on  Meats 
and  Packing-house  Products,  23  I.  C  C. 
656,   661. 

(b)  A  joint  through  rate,  canceled  as 
result  of  disagreement  over  divisions,  or- 
dered to  be  established.  Chamber  of 
Commerce  of  Newport  News  v.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
23  L  C.  C.  345,  346. 

(c)  Payment  of  allowances  or  divi- 
sions to  a  boat  line,  which  is  mere  plant 
facility,  held  to  be  an  unlawful  rebate. 
Colonial  Salt  Co.  v.  M.  I.  &  I.  L.,  23  I. 
C.  C.  358,  368. 

(d)  It  is  the  aggregate  charge  with 
which  the  shipper  is  concerned  and  it  is 
of  little  interest  to  him  whether  that  ag- 
gregate be  determined  by  joint  rates  or 
by  combination  of  rates.  Merchants'  & 
Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C 
474,  478. 

(e)  Divisions  of  a  through  rate  should 
be  somewhat  less  than  the  local  rate  and 
cannot  be  used  as  a  conclusive  standard 
by  which  to  measure  the  reasona'jleness 
of  intermediate  rates.  Southern  Illinois 
Millers'  Ass'n  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  "I.  Co.,  23 
L  C.  C.  672,  673. 

(f)  Complainants  sought  reparation 
for  damages  assessed  on  coke  in  carloads 


from  points  in  West  Virginia  and  Penn- 
sylvania to  El  Paso,  Tex.,  and  Globe,  Ariz. 
The  rates  collected  were  the  joint 
through  rates  to  El  Paso  and  Globe  and 
were  not  themselves  complained  of  as  un- 
reasonable. Complainants  sought  to  re- 
cover on  the  ground  that  the  carriers 
east  of  Chicago  received  as  their  divi- 
sion of  the  through  rates  a  larger  sum 
than  they  received  on  coke  hauled  from 
the  points  of  origin  in  question  to  Chi- 
cago as  a  destination,  HELD,  a  joint 
through  rate  is  a  unit,  an  entirety,  with 
the  divisions  or  component  parts  of 
which  the  public  is  not  concerned,  unless 
the  joint  rate  as  a  whole  is  illegal.  Only 
when  the  public  or  a  shipper  complains 
of  the  illegality  of  a  joint  through  rate 
as  a  whole  can  one  or  more  of  the  divi- 
sions of  such  rate  be  inquired  into  to  de- 
termine if  the  illegality  of  the  whole  rate 
is  traceable  to  the  illegality  of  a  specific 
part  thereof.  Copper  Queen  Consolidated 
Mining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C. 
C.  154,  156. 

(g)  Where  the  Commission  orders  a 
carrier  to  establish  through  routes  and 
joint  rates,  it  will  not  specify  the  con- 
necting carriers,  but  will  leave  defendant 
to  negotiate  with  the  various  connecting 
carriers  in  such  a  manor  as  will  enable  it 
to  best  protect  its  own  interest  in  se- 
curing divisions,  so  long  as  the  rates 
and  routes  put  into  effect  by  it  are  rea- 
sonable. Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Mil- 
waukee V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L 
C.  C.  460,  467. 

(h)  It  is  the  duty  of  the  Commission 
in  fixing  the  division  of  joint  rates  be- 
tween carriers  under  section  15  of  the 
Act  to  take  into  consideration  all  the  cir- 
cumstances, conditions  and  equities  that 
are  necessary  to  arrive  at  what  is  a  fair 
and  proper  adjustment,  and  the  division 
must  not  be  made  on  a  mileage  or  any 
other  fixed  basis.  Star  Grain  &  Lumber 
Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
364,  370. 

(i)  Where  a  carrier  not  only  reaches 
the  lumber  forests  of  a  district,  but  also 
furnishes  the  local  market  which  another 
carrier  desires  to  reach,  justice  requires 
that  no  division  of  joint  rates  should  be 
made  that  does  not  fully  protect  the  reve- 
nues of  the  former,  in  so  far  as  that 
can  be  done  reasonably  and  without  alto- 
gether overlooking  the  earnings  of  the 
latter,  or  withdrawing  complainant  retail- 
ers from  their  right  of  access  to  the  mills 
of  said  district.     Star  Grain  &  Lumber 


864 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §15   (a) 


Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
364,  370. 

§15.     Exceeding     Combination     of     inter- 
mediates. 

See  Comparative  Rates;  Discrimina- 
tion, §7  (n);  Evidence,  §13  (3),  §13 
(5),  §28  (a),  (c),  (f),  (g),  (h);  Mln- 
imums,  §7  (ww) ;  Passenger  Fares 
and  Facilities,  §14  (li);  Proportional 
Rates,  I  (j),  IV  (h),  (I);  Reason- 
ableness  of  Rates,  §142  (a);  Repara- 
tion, §16  (bbbb);  Tariffs,  §6  (g), 
(h). 

(a)  A  joint  through  rate  in  excess  of 
the  combination  of  locals  published  by  the 
same  carrier  or  carriers  between  the  same 
points  is  prima  facie  unreasonable.  R.  R. 
Com.  of  Nev.  v.  N.  C.  O.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  205,  210;  McLean  Lumber  Co.  v. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  349,  352; 
National  League  of  Commission  Mer- 
chants V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
C.  132,  134;  Caldwell  v.  C.  L  &  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  412;  Rosenblatt  &  Sons  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  447; 
Hartman  Furniture  &  Carpet  Co.  v.  C. 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  496;  Alpha 
Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  Penn  R.  R. 
Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  640,  643;  Bott  Bros. 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I. 
C.  C.  136;  Greater  Des  Moines  Commit- 
tee V.  C.  M.  «&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
73,  80;  Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  144,  145;  Stevens 
Grocer  Co.  v.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
147,  148;  Windsor  Turned  Goods  Co.  v. 
C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  162;  Noble  v. 
V.  S.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  224,  225; 
Ryan  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  226,  227; 
Rosenblatt  &  Sons  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  261,  262;  Winona  Carriage  Co. 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  1.  C.  C.  334,  335; 
Gund  &  Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18 
L  C.  C.  364,  369;  Contact  Process  Co. 
V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
184;  Awbrey  &  Semple  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A. 
Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  267,  271;  White  Bros. 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  288, 
289;  Kimberly  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  17 
L  C.  C.  335,  336;  Lindsay  Bros.  v.  B.  & 
O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  6,  8;  Day- 
ton Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  82,  83;  Gilchrist 
V.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  318, 
319;  Wells-Higman  Co.  v.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  339;  Scully  Steel  &  Iron 
Co.  V.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C 
358;  Stock  Yards  Cotton  &  Linseed  Meal 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C- 
C.  366,  3«7;  Blodgett  Milling  Co.  v  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  16  L  C.  C.  384; 
Barrett   Mfg.    Co.   v.   Graham    &    Morton 


Transportation  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C  399;  Em- 
pire Oil  Works  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
16  L  C.  C.  401;  Kurtz  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  410;  Lindsay  Bros.  v.  G. 
R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  441,  442; 
Smith  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  G.  Ry.  Co., 
16  L  C.  C.  447,  448;  Humbird  Lumber 
Co.  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  449;  Car- 
lin's  Sons  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 
L  C.  C.  477;  Williams  Co.  v.  V.  S.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  482,  485;  Lindsay  Bros. 
V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  40,  41;  Lind- 
say Bros.  V.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C. 
C.  182,  183;  Keich  Mfg  Co.  v.  St.  L.  & 
S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  230,  231;  Michi- 
gan Buggy  Co.  V.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  297,  299;  Lindsay  Bros.  v.  L.  S. 
&  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  284,  285;  Mat- 
thews Mfg.  Co.  V.  Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  436,  438;  Hartman  Furniture 
f&  Carpet  Co.  v.  W.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C, 
530,  531;  Kindel  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co,  15  I.  C.  C.  555,  558;  American  Cigar  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  618; 
Oshkosh  Logging  Tool  Co.  v.  C.  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  109;  Montgomery 
Freight  Bureau  v.  Western  Ry.  of  Ala., 
14  L  C.  C.  150;  Flaccus  Glass  Co.  v.  C. 
C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  333, 
334;  Montgomery  Freight  Bureau  v. 
M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  374,  375; 
Minneapolis  Threshing  Machine  Co.  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Rv.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  536; 
Wilson  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L 
C.  C.  549;  Sylvester  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co. 
14  L  C.  C.  573;  Hardenberg,  Dolson  & 
Gray  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  579; 
Momsen  &  Co.  v.  Gila  Valley,  Globe  & 
Northern  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  614,  615; 
Laning-Harris  Coal  &  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  154, 158;  Coomes  v.  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  192,  194;  Hy- 
draulic Press  Brick  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S. 
F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  342,  347;  Marshall- 
Wells  Hardware  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  10;  American  Cigar  Co. 
V.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  17; 
American  Hide  &  Leather  Co.  v.  Pa.  Co.,  j 
Unrep.  Op.  22;  Anderson  Vehicle  Co.  v.  J 
L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  23; 
Clinton  Bridge  &  Iron  Works  v.  C.  M  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  24;  Interna- 
tional Harvester  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  26;  Delray  Salt  Co. 
V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  27;  Minne- 
apolis Dry  Goods  Co.  v.  Wis.  Cent.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  31;  Armour  Car  Lines  v. 
St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  32; 
Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  46;  Kingman 
&  Co.  V.  C.  H.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §15  (a) 


865 


53;  Southern  Sewer  Pip€  Co.  v.  L.  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  54;  Virginia-Caro- 
lina Chemical  Co.  v.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  Unrep. 
Op.  57;  Menasha  Woodenware  Co.  v.  Wis. 
Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  73,  74,  76; 
Menasha  Woodenware  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  75,  77;  Seattle  Frog 
&  Switch  Co.  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
79;  Union  Match  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  80;  Clemens  Produce 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  101;  Wilson  v.  O.  R.  &  Nav.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  107;  Shadbolt  &  Boyd  Iron 
Co.  V.  C.  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  108; 
Vaughn  Mfg.  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  121;  Pioneer  Pole  & 
Shaft  Co.  V.  C.  H.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  123;  Ryan  &  Newton  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  127;  National  Sewing  Machine 
Co.  V.  C.  C.  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
129;  Barlow  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
134;  Heinz  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  136;  American  Plow  Co. 
V.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  144;  Farm- 
ers' Handy  Wagon  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  149;  Scully  Steel  &  Iron  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep  Op.  156; 
Nitrate  Agencies  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  163;  Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  165; 
Vote-Berger  Co.  v.  Ft.  W.  C.  &  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  183;  Stock  Yards  Cotton 
&  Linseed  Meal  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  213;  American  Plow 
Co.  V.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  219; 
Stockbridge  Elevator  Co.  v.  A.  A.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  221;  Michael  Bros.  v.  I. 
C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  228;  Jordan  Co. 
V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  233; 
Copper  Queen  Consolidated  Mining  Co.  v. 
M.  L.  &  T.  R.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
235;  Heinz  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  236;  Nehrbass  Casket  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C. 
&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  238;  Watson 
Co.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  240;  Miller  &  Co.  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  249;  Menasha  Wood- 
enware Co.  V.  W.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
252;  Medberry  Findeisen  Co.  v.  C.  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  263;  Noble  v. 
T.  St.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
272;  Fuller  &  Johnson  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  & 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  278;  Dreyfus 
Bros.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
281;  Fitzsimmons-Palmer  Co.  v.  L. 
&  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  295; 
Fleisher  (Inc.)  v.  L.  H.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  297;  Red  Wing  Sewer 
Pipe  Co.  V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  302; 
Benton  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  304;  Johnston  &  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 


Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  308;  Manitou  Mineral 
Springs  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  Un- 
rep. Op.  312;  Rosenblatt  v.  O.  R.  R.  & 
Nav.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  314;  Rassman  v.  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  316;  Ber- 
lin Machine  Works  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  321;  Fuller  &  Johnson 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  C.  H.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  324;  Rosenblatt  &  Sons  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  325;  Standard 
Oil  Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  C.  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  335;  Stacy  &  Sons  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R. 
R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  343;  Dian  Lumber 
Co.  V.  P.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
347;  Northern  California  Lumber  Co.  v. 
S.  P.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  353;  International 
Purchasing  Co.  v.  N.  O.  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  374;  Underwood  Veneer  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  376; 
Ludowici-Celadon  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  386;  Voss-Barbee  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  388; 
Galesburg  Grocery  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  393;  Southern  Iron  & 
Equipment  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Un- 
rep. Op.  397;  Marion  Guano  Co.  v.  C.  C. 
C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  406; 
Humboldt  Brick  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q. 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  409;  Williams  & 
Voris  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  413;  Old  Dominion  Copper 
Mining  &  Smelting  Co.  of  Ariz.  v.  N.  O- 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  416;  Menasha  Wood- 
enware Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  424;  Chesnutt  Lumber  Co.  v. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  440;  Ludo- 
wici-Celadon Co.  V.  A,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  447;  Central  Commercial  Co. 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  448; 
Western  Lime  &  Cement  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  & 
S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  456; 
American  Lumber  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  L.  Ry.  & 
Nav.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  470;  Rehberg  &  Co. 
V.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  479; 
Young  &  Vann  Supply  Co.  v.  L.  C:  N.  R. 
R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  480;  Dawson  Bros.  v. 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  486; 
Lindsay  Bros.  v.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  Un- 
rep. Op.  489;  Gund  Brewing  Co.  v.  C  M. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  501,  Stand- 
ard Oil  Co.  V.  E.  J.  &  E.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  502;  Arkansas  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  B.  & 
O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  507;  American 
Milling  Co.  v.  L.  H.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  515;  Dowd  Knife  Works  v. 
M.  C.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  523; 
Arizona  Ry.  Com.  v.  E.  P.  &  S.  W.  Co., 
Unrsp.  Op.  526;  Gulf  Coast  Cotton  Oil  & 
Refining  Co.  v.  N.  O.  &  N.  E.  11.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  532;  Hunt  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.    Op.    536;    Janesville    Barb    Wire 


866 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §15   (b)— (j) 


Co.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  537; 
Anheuser-Busch  Brewing  Ass'n  v.  E.  P. 
&  S.  W.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  547;  Baiid  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
549;  De  Camp  Fuel  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  556;  Columbian  Iron 
Works  V.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
557;  Dickinson  &  Co.  v.  K.  &  M.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  587;  Phillips  Co.  v.  G.  T.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  590;  Vincennes 
Bridge  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  597;  Walsh  &  Weidner  Brew- 
ing Boiler  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  598. 

(b)  Complainants  in  January,  1908, 
shipped  one  carload  of  oats  weighing 
40,990  lbs.  from  Hurley,  S.  D.,  to  Chi- 
cago, 111.,  routing  the  same  via  Sioux 
City,  la.,  for  cleaning  in  transit  there. 
For  such  a  shipment  there  was  a  joint 
rate  of  18c  per  100  lbs.  After  arrival 
of  the  car  at  Sioux  City  complainants 
ordered  defendants  to  ship  the  oats 
through  to  Chicago  without  cleaning 
at  Sioux  City.  At  Chicago  charges 
were  assessed  on  the  basis  of  a  rate  of 
14c  to  Sioux  City  plus  a  rate  of  17c 
from  Sioux  City  to  Chicago.  HELD,  the 
total  charges  collected  should  have  been 
upon  the  basis  of  18c  per  100  lbs.,  Hur- 
ley to  Chicago,  plus  a  reconsignment 
charge  of  $2.  Reparation  awarded.  In- 
terstate Grain  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,   22  L  C.  C.   34,   35. 

(c)  A  through  rate  may  properly  be 
less  than  the  sum  of  the  locals,  although 
the  cDst  of  the  service  is  the  same,  if 
the  lower  through  rate  is  forced  by  com- 
petition which  does  not  affect  the  local 
rates.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Nev.  v.  N.  C.  O. 
Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C  205,  210. 

(d)  It  is  a  matter  of  every-day  obser- 
vation that  a  through  rate  may  prop- 
erly be  less  than  the  sum  of  the  locals. 
Railroad  Commission  of  Nevada  v.  N.  C. 
O.  Ry.  &  S.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  205, 
210. 

(e)  Carload  rates  of  37c  and  39c  on 
hardwood  lumber  from  North  Birming- 
ham, Ala.,  to  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  and  New 
Brunswick,  N.  J.,  were  alleged  unreason- 
able and  discriminatory  in  so  far  as  the 
rate  on  yellow  pine  was  29c  and  31c. 
The  local  rates  from  Cincinnati  to  Phila- 
delphia and  New  Brunswick  were  17c 
and  19c,  and  these  rates  applied  to  both 
woods  without  distinction.  The  rate 
from  North  Birmingham  to  Cincinnati 
was  18c  for  yellow  pine  and  20c  for 
hardwood.     HELD,   since   carriers  north 


of  Cincinnati  made  no  distinction,  and 
defendant  carrier  made  a  difference  of 
only  2c  in  its  local  rate  to  Cincinnati, 
the  carriers  cannot  make  the  joint  rate 
higher  by  more  than  the  difference  in 
the  locals  south  of  Cincinnati.  McLean 
Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I. 
C.   C.   349,   352. 

(f)  Through  rates  should  not  be  con- 
structed by  using  the  full  combination 
of  locals.  Bluefield  Shippers'  Asso.  v. 
N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  519,  532. 

(g)  Through  rates  on  perishable 
produce  from  Charlestown  to  Buffalo  or 
to  Pittsburgh  which  are  higher  than  tho 
aggregate  of  the  intermediate  rates 
based  upon  Baltimore  are  not  justified. 
League  of  Commission  Merchants  v.  A. 
C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  132,  134. 

(h)  A  through  rate  in  excess  of  the 
combination  of  locals  is  not  justified  by 
water  competition.  National  League  of 
Commission  Merchants  of  U.  S.  v.  A.  C. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  132,  134. 

(i)  Complainant  shipped  wooden  tank 
material  from  Louisville,  Ky.,  to 
Shawano,  Wis.  Also  from  Louisville, 
Ky.,  to  Combined  Locks,  Wis.  Also 
from  Louisville,  Ky.,  to  West  Port  Ar- 
thur, Tex.  The  rate  collected  exceeded 
the  sum  of  the  combined  intermediate 
rates.  HELD,  the  charges  exacted  were 
unjust,  and  the  through  rate  should  not 
have  been  in  excess  of  the  contempo- 
raneous combination  of  intermediate 
rates.  Reparation  awarded.  Caldwell 
Co.  V.  C.  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
412. 

(j)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload  of 
triplex  cloth  from  Ft.  Wayne,  Ind.,  to 
Beloit,  Wis.,  billed  as  "cotton  piece 
goods,"  under  the  through  first-class  rate 
of  76c  per  100  lbs.  applicable  under  the 
Official  Classification  on  dry  goods,  n.  o.  s. 
Triplex  cloth  is  frequently  made  up  of 
woolen  or  silk  material,  or  partly  of 
wool  and  partly  of  cotton.  This  par- 
ticular cloth  consisted  of  a  fabric  made 
up  of  a  layer  of  cotton  goods  and  a 
layer  of  cotton  shoddy  lining,  held  firmly 
together  by  means  of  an  intermediate 
layer  of  reclaimed  rubber.  The  through 
rate  exacted  was  greater  than  the  sum 
of  the  intermediate  rates.  HELD,  that 
triplex  cloth,  generally  speaking,  need 
not  take  the  same  rate  as  applied  on 
cotton  piece  goods,  but  may  properly 
take  the  rate  applied  to  other  dry  goods, 
n.  o.   s.     Reparation  awarded  to  the  ex- 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §15  (k)— (s) 


867 


tent  that  the  charges  exacted  exceeded 
the  combination  of  the  intermediate 
rates.  The  Commission  again  suggests 
that  the  through  class  rates  of  the  de- 
fendant in  this  general  territory  stand 
in  need  of  revision,  because  in  many  in- 
stances they  exceed  the  Chicago  com- 
bination. Rosenblatt  &  Sons  v.  C.  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  447. 

(k)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload 
of  chairs  from  Malvern,  Ark.,  to  Mil- 
waukee, Wis.,  under  a  rate  of  49c  per 
100  lbs.  The  shipment  could  have 
moved  via  Cairo  on  a  combination  of 
local  rates  of  39c  instead  of  via  Thebes. 
Subsequently  a  through  rate  of  39c  v^as 
established  via  either  Cairo  or  Thebes. 
HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was  unjust  to  the 
extent  it  exceeded  39c  per  100  lbs. 
Reparation  awarded.  Hartman  Furniture 
&  Carpet  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  496. 

(1)  A  joint  rate,  filed  with  the  Com- 
mission, but  not  posted,  held  unreason- 
able to  the  extent  it  exceeded  the  com- 
bination rate.  Alpha  Portland  Cement 
Co.  V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  640,  648. 

(m)  A  joint  through  rate  in  excess 
of  the  combination  of  locals  will  be  pre- 
sumed unreasonable,  though  variable 
minima  are  applicable  to  the  locals.  Lull 
Carriage  Co.  v.  C.  K.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
L  C.  C.  15. 

(n)  Complainant  shipped,  all  rail,  a 
carload  of  cutters  from  Kalamazoo, 
Mich.,  to  Fond  du  Lac,  Wis.,  under  the 
through  joint  class  rate  of  55c  per  xOO 
lbs.  via  Chicago.  Contemporaneously 
there  was  a  rate  from  Kalamazoo  to 
Fond  du  Lac  via  Milwaukee  of  24i^c  via 
the  ''across  lake  route"  (Lake  Mich- 
igan). HELD,  this  case  does  not  pre- 
sent a  combination  of  locals  lower  than 
the  througix  rate  on  which  the  presump- 
tion obtains  that  the  through  rate  was 
unreasonable.  Reparation  denied.  Lull 
Carriage  Co.  v.  C.  K.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  15,  17. 

(o)  Ordinarily  a  through  rate  for  a 
long  haul  should  be  less  than  the  sum 
of  the  locals.  Bott  Bros.  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  136,  137. 

(p)  Complainant  attacked  the  rates 
on  staves  from  Harrisburg,  Paragould, 
Jonesboro,  Brinkley,  Clarendon,  Little 
Rock,  Pine  Bluff,  Fordyce,  Stephens, 
Camden,  Texarkana,  Ark.,  and  Maiden, 
Mo.,  to  Alexandria,  Mo.,  and  Keokuk,  la. 
For   15  years  prior   to   September,   1908, 


the  defendants  maintained  a  joint 
through  rate  of  17c  per  100  lbs.  between 
Harrisburg  and  Alexandria,  under  which 
the  complainant  transported  this  traffic. 
The  joint  rate  was  then  canceled,  and 
the  combination  local  rate  of  19c  ex- 
acted. The  distance  is  422  miles,  which, 
under  a  rate  of  17c,  yields  a  ton-mile 
revenue  of  8  mills.  The  M.  P.  R.  R.,  a 
defendant,  maintained  from  Alexandria 
to  Kansas  City,  a  distance  of  539  miles, 
a  rate  of  16c;  to  St.  Joe,  a  distance  of 
607  miles,  a  rate  of  17c.  The  ratea 
from  the  other  points  have  been  vari- 
ously advanced,  ranging  from  2c  to  5c 
over  what  they  had  been  for  some  seven 
years  prior  to  the  date  of  the  advance. 
HELD,  that  ordinarily  a  through  rate 
for  a  long  haul  should  be  less  than 
the  sum  of  the  locals,  and  that  a  ton- 
mile  revenue  of  8  mills  for  this  com- 
modity, which  is  substantially  lumber, 
cannot  be  pronounced  low,  and  that  a 
through  route  and  joint  rate  should  be 
established  from  Harrisburg  to  Alex- 
andria under  a  rate  not  exceeding  17c 
per  100  lbs.;  that  the  rates  from  Maiden, 
Mo.,  Paragould,  Ark.,  and  Jonesboro, 
Ark.,  to  Alexandria,  Mo.,  are  unreason- 
able to  the  extent  they  exceed  15c,  17c 
and  17c  per  WO  lbs.,  respectively.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Bott  Bros.  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  136. 

(q)  Complainant  shipped  one  top 
freight  wagon  and  springs,  knocked 
down  and  crated,  but  with  standing  top, 
weighing  1,300  lbs.,  from  Wagon  Works 
station,  Toledo,  O.,  to  Watertown,  Wis., 
under  a  joint  through  rate  of  $2.31  per 
100  lbs.  At  the  same  time  the  combina- 
tion rate  on  Chicago  was  $1.8432  per 
100  lbs.  HELD,  reparation  should  be 
awarded  for  the  amount  assessed  in 
excess  of  the  combination  rates  via  the 
same  routes.  Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L. 
S.  &  M.   S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  144,  145. 

(r)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload  of 
farm  wagons  from  Toledo,  O.,  to  Cedar- 
burg,  Wis.,  under  a  joint  rate  of  28c  per 
100  lbs.  At  the  same  time  the  combina- 
tion on  Milwaukee  was  23(f  per  100  lbs. 
HELD,  the  joint  rate  was  unjust  and 
unreasonable  to  the  extent  that  it  ex- 
ceeded the  combination  rate.  Combina- 
tion rate  prescribed  for  the  future  as  a 
reasonable  rate.  Reparation  awarded. 
Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry. 
Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  144,  145. 

(s)  On  100  bags  of  beans  from  Grand 
Rapids,    Mich.,    to    Newport,    Ark.,    com- 


868 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §15  (t)— (y) 


plainant  was  charged  the  through  rate 
of  82c  per  100  lbs.  The  shipment  moved 
via  East  St.  Louis.  The  through  rate 
between  the  points  in  question  was  the 
same  via  either  St.  Louis,  East  St. 
Louis,  Memphis  or  Cairo.  The  combina- 
tion of  locals  based  on  Cairo  was  68c 
at  the  time  shipment  moved.  Some  of 
defendants  admitted,  and  none  of  them 
denied,  that  the  rate  assessed  was  un- 
reasonable. HELD,  the  through  rate 
exacted,  being  in  excess  of  the  sum  of 
the  locals  and  unexplained,  was  unrea- 
sonable. Reparation  awarded.  Stevens 
Grocery  Co.  v.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L 
C.  C.  147,  148. 

(t)  Some  time  since  the  Commission 
announced  the  rule  that  it  would  con- 
sider a  joint  through  rate  prima  facie 
unreasonable  if  it  exceeded  the  ship- 
ment of  the  local  rates  between  the 
same  points.  It  has  since  become  nec- 
essary, in  order  to  do  more  complete 
justice,  to  extend  the  application  of  the 
rule  so  that,  except  in  special  and  un- 
usual circumstances,  and  respecting 
fully  the  limitations  placed  in  tariffs 
upon  the  use  of  basing,  proportional  or 
arbitrary  rates,  the  fair  measure  of  the 
reasonableness  of  a  joiEt  through  rate 
that  exceeds  the  combination  between 
the  same  points  via  the  same  route  is 
the  lowest  combination  that  would  law- 
fully apply  if  the  joint  through  rate 
were  canceled.  Windsor  Turned  Goods 
Co.  V.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  162, 
164. 

(u)  Defendant  carriers  had  in  effect 
joint  rates  on  hardwood  lumber  from 
various  points  in  West  Virginia  and 
Kentucky  to  Detroit,  and  arbitrary  rates 
of  2c  to  be  added  to  the  Detroit  rates 
on  through  shipments  of  lumber  to 
Windsor,  which  were  available  in  the 
absence  of  a  joint  through  rate  from 
point  of  origin  to  Windsor.  The  joint 
through  rates  to  Windsor  exceeded  the 
combinations  of  the  joint  rates  to  De- 
troit plus  the  arbitrary  from  Detroit  to 
Windsor.  Defendants  offered  no  evi- 
dence to  justify  this  situation.  Subse- 
quent to  the  shipments  in  question  joint 
through  rates  were  voluntarily  estab- 
lished equal  to  the  combination  of  rates 
to  Detroit  plus  the  arbitrary  to  Wind- 
sor. HELD,  the  joint  through  rates  to 
Windsor  were  unreasonable  to  the  ex- 
tent that  they  exceeded  the  rates  to  De- 
troit plus  the  arbitrary  of  2c  from  De- 
troit  to   Windsor.     Reparation   awarded. 


Windsor   Turned   Goods    Co.   v.   C.    &   O. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  162,  164. 

(v)  On  coiled  elm  hoops  in  carloads 
from  Tallulah,  La.,  to  Lime  City,  Tex., 
a  rate  of  30c  was  collected.  The  com- 
bination of  locals  based  on  Shreveport 
in  effect  at  the  time  of  the  shipment 
was  26%c.  About  a  year  prior  to  the 
shipment  a  rate  of  20c  was  in  effect, 
which  was  canceled.  HELD,  the  rate 
charged  was  unreasonable  because  in  ex- 
cess of  the  combination  rate.  Reparation 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  26%c,  carload 
minimum  30,000  lbs.  Noble  v.  V.  S.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  224,  225. 

(w)  On  a  carload  of  dried  fruit  in  boxes, 
weighing  26,320  lbs.,  from  San  Francisco, 
Cal.,  to  Chinook,  Mont.,  complainant  was 
assessed  the  fourth  class  rate  of  $1.59, 
minimum  30,000  lbs.  At  the  time  of 
shipment  a  combination  rate  of  $1.15  was 
in  effect,  made  up  of  $1,  minimum  24,- 
000  lbs.,  from  San  Francisco  to  Havre, 
Mont.,  and  of  15c,  minimum  30,000  lbs., 
Havre  to  Chinook.  Subsequent  to  the 
shipment,  defendants  published  a  through 
rate  of  $1.10,  minimum  30,000  lbs.,  from 
San  Francisco  to  Mondak,  Mont.,  a  local 
point  on  the  same  line  265  miles  farther 
distant  from  Chinook  than  San  Francisco. 
HELD,  the  rate  attacked  was  unreason- 
able to  the  extent  that  it  exceeded  the 
combination  rate  of  $1.15.  Reparation 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  $1.15.  Carriers 
ordered  to  maintain  the  $1.10  rate,  mini- 
mum 30,000  lbs.,  for  the  future.  Ryan  v. 
Gt.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  226,  227. 

(x)  On  cotton  overalls  and  jackets 
from  Michigan  City  to  Beloit,  Wis.,  in 
less  than  carloads  a  joint  through  class 
rate  of  67c  was  collected.  At  the  same 
time  a  combination  rate  of  51.16c  was  in 
effect,  based  on  Chicago.  No  evidence 
was  offered  by  defendant  to  justify  the 
rate  exacted.  HELD,  the  rate  charged 
being  in  excess  of  the  sum  of  the  locals, 
was  presumed  to  be  unreasonable.  Rep- 
aration awarded.  Rosenblatt  v.  C.  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  261,  262. 

(y)  On  less-than-carload  shipments  of 
cotton  duck  cloth  from  Cincinnati  to  Be- 
loit, Wis.,  the  through  class  rate  of  60c 
was  collected.  At  the  time  a  local  rate 
from  Cincinnati  to  Chicago  of  29c  added 
to  a  rate  of  15c  beyond  made  a  com- 
bination of  44c.  HELD,  the  through  rate, 
being  in  excess  of  the  combination  of 
locals,  was  unreasonable.  Reparation 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  44c.  Rosenblatt 
V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  261,  262. 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §15  (z)  — (gg) 


(z)  On  less-than-carload  shipments  of 
cotton  drills  from  Wheeling,  Va.,  to  Be- 
loit.  Wis.,  a  joint  through  class  rate  of 
63c  was  collected.  The  combination  of 
locals  based  on  Chicago  was  48c,  one 
factor  of  which  being  a  local  commodity 
rate  of  15c  from  Chicago  to  Beloit,  which, 
however,  was  applicable  on  "cotton  ducks, 
denims  and  shirtings,"  but  did  not  spe- 
cifically apply  to  cotton  drills.  About 
two  years  after  the  shipments  in  ques 
tion,  defendants  being  uncertain  as  to 
whether  the  said  15c  rate  should  apply 
to  cotton  drills,  revised  their  tariffs  so 
as  to  make  the  through  rate  correspond 
exactly  with  the  combination  rate  from 
Wheeling  to  Beloit.  HELD,  the  through 
rate  charged,  being  in  excess  of  the  lo- 
cals, was  unreasonable.  Reparation 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  the  combination 
rate.  Rosenblatt  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C.  R.  261,  263. 

(aa)  A  through  L.  C.  L.  rate,  equal  to 
the  combination  of  L.  C.  L.  rates,  but 
higher  than  the  combination  of  C.  L.  and 
L.  C.  L.  rates  is  not  unlawful.  Winona 
Carriage  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
334. 

(bb)  Complainant  attacked  the  less- 
than-carload  rate  on  bar  steel  from  Johns- 
town. Pa.,  to  Winona.  Wis.,  shipments 
weighing  22.060  lbs.  and  21,105  lbs.  The 
less-than-carload  rate  from  Johnstown 
to  Chicago  was  23c  and  from  Chicago  to 
Winona  23c,  making  the  combination  of 
46c.  Under  this  rate,  defendants  were 
required  to  unload  the  traffic  in  Chicago, 
transfer  from  the  eastern  to  the  western 
car  and  reload.  The  carload  rate  was 
made  up  of  a  combination  rate  of  lO^/^c. 
3G,000  lbs.  minimum,  from  Johnstown  to 
Chicago,  and  10c,  30,000  lbs.,  from  Chi- 
cago to  Winona.  Under  the  carload  rate 
the  shipper  must  load  his  traffic  at  Chi- 
cago. Complainant  contended  the  rate 
exacted  to  be  unreasonable  to  the  ex- 
tent that  it  exceeded  the  combination  of 
33c  made  up  of  the  less-than-carload  rate 
of  23c,  Johnstown  to  Chicago,  and  the 
carload  rate  of  10c,  Chicago  to  Winona. 
No  evidence  was  offered  of  the  unreason- 
ableness of  the  rate  attacked.  HELD. 
the  rate  exacted  was  not  shown  to  be 
unreasonable.  A  through  charge  on  the 
shipment  based  on  a  less-than-carload 
rate  between  points  of  origin  and  destina- 
tion is  not  shown  to  be  unreasonable  by 
the  fact  that  it  exceeds  the  sum  of  The 
charges  on  a  similar  shipment  based  on 
a   less-than-carload   rate   from   the   point 


of  origin  to  an  intermediate  junc- 
tion point  plus  the  charge  based  on  a 
carload  rate  from  such  intermediate 
junction  point  to  destination.  Winona 
Carriage  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C. 
C.  334,  335. 

(cc)  In  the  absence  of  a  justifying  ex- 
planation a  through  rate  in  excess  of  the 
sum  of  the  locals  applicable  to  the  same 
traffic  over  the  same  route  is  unreason- 
able. Winona  Carriage  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  334,  335. 

(dd)  Where  traffic  is  shipped  over  a 
certain  routes  to  a  point,  and  shipped  out 
from  that  point,  moving  from  point  of 
origin  to  destination  under  substantially 
similar  circumstances  and  conditions 
with  respect  of  the  through  rate  and  the 
combination,  the  lower  combination  rate 
than  the  through  rate  is  prima  facie  un- 
reasonable. Winona  Carriage  Co.  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  334,  335. 

(ee)  Unless  the  service  is  the  same, 
the  locals  cannot  constitute  the  measure 
of  the  through  charge.  Winona  Carriage 
Co.  V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  334,  336. 

(ff)  A  through  rate  regularly  pub- 
lished between  two  points  and  available 
under  the  tariff  over  several  different 
routes  is  not  nullified  as  to  one  such 
route  by  the  failure  of  participating  car- 
riers to  agree  upon  divisions  over  that 
route.  Germain  Co.  v.  N.  O.  &  N.  E.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  22,  24. 

(gg)  On  a  tank  car  of  sulphuric  acid 
from  Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  to  Tulsa,  Okla.,  com- 
plainant was  assessed  85c  per  100  lbs., 
based  upon  a  local  rate  of  20c  from  Buf- 
falo to  East  St.  Louis,  and  the  joint 
through  rate  of  65c  from  Fast  St.  Louis  to 
Tulsa.  After  the  date  of  shipment  the  65c 
rate  was  reduced  to  30c.  At  the  time  of 
shipment  there  was  in  effect  a  local  rate  of 
10c  from  East  St.  Louis  to  Kansas  City, 
and  a  local  rate  of  20c  from  Kansas  City  to 
Tulsa,  making  a  total  rate  of  50c  from 
point  of  origin  to  destination.  Defend- 
ants' rule  provided  that  if  no  specific  rate 
from  point  of  origin  to  destination  of  a 
through  shipment  was  named,  and  no  spe- 
cific manner  of  constructing  a  combina- 
tion rate  for  it  was  prescribed,  the  low- 
est combination  of  rates  applicable  via 
the  route  over  which  the  shipment  moved 
was  the  lawful  rate.  Defendants  did  not 
provide  in  their  tariffs  the  method  of 
constructing  the  combination  rate  be- 
tween the  points  in  question,  and  no  spe- 
cific   joint    through    rate    was    in    effect. 


870 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §15    (hh)— (oo) 


HELD,  th€  charges  assessed  were  un- 
reasonable Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  the  combination  of  50c.  Con- 
tact Process  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  184. 

(hh)  In  absence  of  a  joint  through 
rate,  the  lowest  combination  should  be 
applied  on  shipments  into  Mexico.  Au- 
brey &  Semple  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  267,  272. 

(ii)  Even  though  a  given  combination 
is  brought  about  by  competitive  condi- 
tions inducing  the  establishment  of  the 
factors  constituting  the  same,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  facts  to  the  contrary  there  would 
seem  to  be  but  little  ground  for  claiming 
that  a  through  rate  should  exceed  that 
combination.  Awbrey  &  Semple  v.  G. 
H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  267,  271. 

( jjkk)  On  carloads  of  cement  from  Gal- 
veston, Tex.,  to  Magdalena,  Mexico,  com- 
plainant was  assessed  a  rate  of  $1.00  per 
100  lbs.  Guaymas,  Mexico,  is  located  on 
the  Gulf  of  California;  Magdalena  is  an 
intermediate  point  between  Nogales, 
Ariz.,  and  Guaymas,  Mex.  At  the  time 
of  shipments,  no  through  rate  was  in  ef- 
fect from  Galveston  to  Magdalena.  The 
rate  from  Galveston  to  Los  Angeles,  Cal., 
was  75c  and  applied  to  Guaymas,  but  not 
to  intermediate  points.  The  rate  from 
Guaymas  to  Magdalena  was  made  by  add- 
ing the  local  rate,  Guaymas  to  Mag- 
dalena, to  the  through  rate  to  Guaymas. 
The  local  rates  from  Guaymas  to  Mag- 
dalena were  not  on  file  with  the  Com- 
mission. About  the  .  time  shipments 
moved,  the  75c  rate  from  Galveston  to 
Los  Angeles  was  changed  to  353,  leaving 
the  75c  rate  in  force  to  Guaymas.  At  the 
time  of  the  hearing,  Los  Angeles  and 
Guaymas  took  the  same  rates  on  many 
commodities  from  Galveston.  The  Santa 
Fe  lines  and  S.  P.  Co.,  on  shipments  from 
Kansas  City  and  lola,  Kan.,  and  other 
points  to  Los  Angeles,  were  compelled 
to  cut  the  75c  rate  to  35c  in  order  to 
meet  the  competition  of  another  carrier. 
The  35c  rate  was  also  forced  by  the 
ocean  carriers  operating  from  New  York 
to  the  Pacific  coast.  The  rate  from  New 
York  to  Guaymas  and  Los  Angeles  was 
40c  all-rail  and  rail-and-water.  No  water 
competition  existed  between  Galveston 
and  Guaymas  and  the  75c  rate  between 
said  point  appeared  to  be  free  from  com- 
petitive influences.  The  rate  from  Napa 
Junction,  Cal.,  through  Nogales  to  Guay- 
mas, was  50c,  due  to  steamship  compe- 
tition.    Defendants   published   a  rate   of 


621/^c  from  Galveston  to  Nogales,  Ariz. 
The  local  rate  from  Nogales  to  Magda- 
lena was  6c,  established  by  the  Mexican 
government,  but  not  on  file  with  the 
Commission.  Complainant  might  have 
shipped  to  Nogales  at  62i^c,  and  then 
reshipped  to  Magdalena  for  6c,  making 
a  combination  of  68i/^c.  Defendants  of- 
fered no  evidence  to  show  the  €c  rate 
from  Nogales  to  Magdalena  was  unremu- 
nerative.  Complainant  contended  that  it 
should  be  allowed  a  35c  through  rate  to 
Guaymas  plus  a  25c  local  rate  from 
Guaymas  to  Magdalena,  making  a  total 
rate  from  Galveston  to  Magdalena  of  60c. 
HELD,  the  evidence  did  not  warrant  the 
application  of  a  35c  rate  from  Galveston 
to  Guaymas,  but  the  charge  should  not 
have  exceeded  the  combination  of  68V2C 
on  Nogales.  Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  the  62i^c  rate  to  Nogales.  Aw- 
brey &  Semple  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  267,  271. 

(11)  Complainant  attacked  the  through 
rate  of  85c  on  hardwood  lumber  from 
points  east  of  the  Mississippi  River  to 
San  Francisco  as  exceeding  the  com- 
bination of  locals.  No  other  evidence  of 
unreasonableness  was  offered.  HELD, 
that  while  through  rates  between  points 
should  not  exceed  the  combination  of  lo- 
cals ordinarily,  this  is  not  a  universal 
rule,  especially  in  the  case  of  common 
rates  from  points  in  each  of  contiguous 
group  territories,  and  that  the  case  was 
not  controlled  by  Burgess  v.  T.  F.  B.,  13 
I.  C.  C.  668.  Reparation  denied.  White 
Bros.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
288,  289. 

(mm)  A  carrier  voluntarily  establish- 
ing a  through  rate  less  than  the  sum  of 
the  locals  after  shipment  has  moved  does 
not,  ipso  facto,  become  liable  for  the 
difference  between  the  amount  charged 
and  the  amount  which  would  have  been 
collected  if  the  through  rate  had  been  in 
effect  at  the  time  of  the  movement.  Stock 
Yards  Cotton  &  Linseed  Meal  Co.  v. 
M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  295. 

(nn)  The  through  rate  should  seldom, 
if  ever,  for  competitive  reasons,  exceed 
the  combination.  Kimberly  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry. 
Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  335,  336. 

(00)  Complainant  was  assessed  15c 
per  100  lbs.  on  carloads  of  corn  from 
Cincinnati  to  Morehead,  Ky.,  via  the  de- 
fendant C.  &  O.  Ry.  Defendant's  main 
line  extends  from  Cincinnati  in  a  south- 
easterly direction  to  Ashland.  A  branch 
extends  from  Ashland  in  a  southwesterly 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,   §15    (pp)— (uu) 


871 


direction  to  Winchester.  Morehead  lies  on 
it  between  Ashland  and  Winchester,  and 
Mount  Sterling  lies  between  Morehead 
and  Winchester.  The  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  extends 
from  Cincinnati  to  Winchester,  thus  form- 
ing, with  the  lines  of  defendant,  a  rough 
triangle,  Cincinnati,  Ashland  and  Win- 
chester being  the  vertices  of  same.  The 
sum  of  the  locals  over  defendant's  line 
between  the  points  in  question  was  14c. 
Defendant  contended  that  the  local  rate 
of  71/^c  from  Cincinnati  to  Ashland  was 
forced  by  water  competition,  not  appli- 
cable at  Morehead.  Defendant's  rate  to 
Mt,  Sterling  was  10c.  The  rate  over  the 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.,  via  Winchester  to  Mount 
Sterling,  was  12c.  Defendant  contended 
that  it  was  compelled  to  maintain  the  10c 
rate  to  Mount  Sterling  in  order  to  meet 
competition  over  the  L.  &  N.  R.  R.,  the 
rate  over  the  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  from  Cincin- 
nati to  Winchester  being  8c  and  wagon 
competition  being  in  effect  between  Win- 
chester and  Mount  Sterling.  HELD,  the 
rate  between  the  points  in  question 
should  not  have  exceeded  the  combina- 
tion of  the  locals  of  14c.  Reparation 
awarded.  Kimberly  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co., 
17  I.  C.  C.  335,  336. 

(pp)  Complainant  was  assessed  29c 
on  vehicles  shipped  from  Lawrenceburg, 
Ind.,  via  Chicago  to  Milwaukee,  Wis.  The 
sum  of  the  locals  was  25i/^c.  The  local 
to  Chicago  was  17c,  and  there  was  a  5c 
proportional  from  Chicago  to  Milwaukee 
on  a  through  published  rate  of  22c  on 
shipments  to  Milwaukee  originating  east 
of  the  Illinois-Indiana  state  line.  The 
22c  rate  did  not,  however,  apply  to  Law- 
renceburg. HELD,  complainant  was  en- 
titled to  reparation  on  the  basis  of  the 
251/^0  rate  and  not  on  the  basis  of  the 
22c  rate,  despite  the  fact  that  shortly 
after  the  shipment  in  question  defend- 
ants temporarily  established  a  joint 
through  rate  of  22c  between  the  points 
in  question,  which  was  subsequently  can- 
celed. Lindsay  Bros.  v.  B.  &  O  S.  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  6,  8. 

(qq)  Where  the  through  rate  exceeds 
the  sum  of  the  locals,  the  sum  of  the  lo- 
cals then  in  effect  is  the  true  and  proper 
measure  of  the  reasonableness  of  the 
through  rate  then  in  effect.  Lindsay 
Bros.  V.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
C.  6,  9. 

(rr)  Where  the  combination  of  local 
rates  from  Austin,  Minn.,  to  Dayton,  O., 
on  non-edible  grease  is  29.1c  per  100  lbs., 
and    defendant    carriers   admit   that   25c 


per  hundred  pounds  is  a  reasonable  rate, 
a  through  charge  of  33i^c  is  excessive; 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  reparation  on  the 
basis  of  the  25c  rate;  and  it  is  found  to 
b€  a  reasonable  rate  for  the  future.  Day- 
ton Chamber  of  Commerce  vs.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  82,  83. 

(ss)  On  a  carload  of  oil  well  supplies 
and  pipe  from  Fishers,  Ind.,  to  Bartles- 
ville,  Okla.,  complainant  was  assessed 
74c,  the  published  through  rate  between 
these  points.  A  rate  of  45c  was  in  effect 
from  St.  Louis  to  Bartlesville.  A  fifth 
class  rate  of  13%c  was  in  effect  from 
Fishers  to  St.  Louis,  but  the  tariff  estab- 
lishing it  did  not  include  pipe  as  fifth 
class.  This  fifth  class  rate,  however, 
applied  on  iron  pipe  in  carloads,  and  the 
classification  rules  provided  that  articles 
taking  the  same  rating  might  be  carried 
in  mixed  carloads,  and  the  rate  applied 
to  the  actual  weight  thereof,  if  not  less 
than  the  minimum  prescribed  for  the  re- 
spective shipments.  The  same  minimum 
applied  to  both  oil  well  supplies  and 
iron  pipe,  and  the  shipment  in  question 
exceeded  such  minimum.  HELD,  the 
rate  assessed  was  unreasonable  as  ex- 
ceeding the  combination  of  locals 
amounting  to  58i^c.  Reparation  award- 
ed. Gilchrist  vs.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
16  L  C.  C.  318,  319. 

(tt)  Complainant  being  charged  a  rate 
of  301/^0  on  fruit  baskets  from  Trav- 
erse City,  Mich.,  to  Montrose,  la.,  the 
combination  of  locals  being  19c  via  Chi- 
cago, and  defendants  offering  no  evi- 
dence to  show  the  rate  charged  reason- 
able, it  is  declared  to  be  unreasonable. 
Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis  of  19c. 
Wells-Higman  Co.  v.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co., 
16  L  C.  C.  339. 

(uu)  December  7,  1907,  complainant 
shipped  carloads  of  steel  from  Buffalo, 
N.  Y.,  to  Watertown,  Wis.,  and  was  as- 
sessed the  published  through  rate  of  30c. 
At  the  same  time  the  combination  rate 
was  211/^c  between  these  points;  16^c 
Buffalo  to  Chicago,  5c  Chicago  to  Water- 
town.  January  9,  1907,  defendants  estab- 
lished a  through  rate  of  21i^c  between 
Buffalo  and  Watertown.  July  1,  1907, 
the  rate  from  Bi^ffalo  to  Chicago  was  ad- 
vanced from  16%  to  18c,  and  the  joint 
through  rate,  Buffalo  to  Watertown,  in- 
creased to  23c,  this  advance  being  due  to 
a  general  increase  in  rates  on  steel  prod- 
ducts  from  the  east  to  Chicago.  HELD, 
following  the  general  rule  that  in  the 
absence    of    satisfactory    explanation    a 


872 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §15    (vv)— (eee) 


through  rate  in  excess  of  the  combina- 
tion of  the  locals  is  unreasonable,  repa- 
ration should  be  awarded  on  the  basis  of 
21i^c.  Scully  Steel  &  Iron  Co.  vs.  L.  S. 
&  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  358. 

(vv)  On  a  shipment  of  oil  meal  from 
Minneapolis  to  Milo,  Mo.,  via  Kansas 
City,  complainant  attempted  to  secure 
the  combination  rate,  which  was  lower 
than  the  through  joint  rate,  by  billing 
the  shipment  first  to  Kansas  City,  and 
then  requesting  the  initial  carrier  to  col- 
lect the  charges  up  to  Kansas  City,  de- 
liver the  car  to  the  connecting  carrier  for 
carriage  to  Milo,  and  to  secure  a  new  bill 
of  lading  from  Kansas  City  to  Milo.  The 
initial  carrier  corrected  the  billing  to 
read  from  Kansas  City  to  Milo,  and  ap- 
plied the  through  rate.  HELD,  defend- 
ant initial  carrier's  action  was  proper, 
as  a  shipper  cannot  defeat  the  applica- 
tion of  a  joint  through  rate  by  consti- 
tuting the  carrier  its  agent  to  collect 
charges  up  to  the  junction  point  and  re- 
ship  the  traffic  to  final  destination.  Stock 
Yards  Cotton  &  Linseed  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  366,  367. 

(ww)  On  a  carload  of  oil  meal  from 
Minneapolis  to  Milo,  Mo.,  complainant 
was  assessed  the  only  joint  through  rate 
applicable,  33i/^c.  The  combination  of 
local  rates  based  on  Kansas  City  via  the 
same  route  over  which  the  shipment 
moved  was  18c.  HELD,  the  rate  charged 
was  unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded 
on  the  basis  of  18c.  Stock  Yards  Cot- 
ton &  Linseed  Meal  Co.  vs.  C.  M.  &.  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  366,  367. 

(xx)  On  a  carload  of  buckwheat  from 
Cattaraugus,  N.  Y.,  to  Janesville,  Wis., 
complainant  was  assessed  27l^c,  the 
combination  of  local  rates  in  effect  at 
the  same  time  over  the  same  route  being 
20c.  HELD,  the  charge  was  unreason- 
able. Reparation  awarded.  Blodgett 
Milling  Co.  vs.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
16  L  C.  C.  384. 

(yy)  On  a  shipment  of  building  paper 
from  St.  Joseph,  Mich.,  to  Wausau,  Wis., 
defendants  assessed  the  joint  rate  of  21c 
under  a  misapprehension  of  their  tariffs, 
whereas  the  legal  rate  in  effect  at  the 
time  was  the  combination  of  local  rates, 
14c,  which  rate  was  in  effect  via  another 
route.  HELD,  the  rate  charged  was  un- 
reasonable. Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  14c.  Barrett  Mfg.  Co.  vs.  Gra- 
ham &  Morton  Transportation  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  399. 


(zz)  On  a  carload  of  gasoline  shipped 
from  Reno,  Pa.,  to  Milton  Junction,  Wis., 
complainant  was  charged  a  rate  of  33i/^c, 
that  being  the  established  joint  rate. 
The  combination  of  locals  on  Milwaukee 
via  this  route  at  the  date  of  shipment 
was  21c.  Shortly  after  the  shipment,  de- 
fendants established  a  joint  through  rate 
of  21c.  HELD,  the  rate  charged  was  un- 
reasonable. Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  the  21c  rate.  Empire  Oil  Works 
vs.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  401. 

(aaa)  It  is  the  almost  invariable  rule 
of  the  Commission  that  the  throueh 
charge  must  not  exceed  the  combination 
of  locals.  Kurtz  vs.  Penn.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
410. 

(bbb)  No  reason  why,  if  $1  is  a 
just  charge  from  New  Castle,  Pa.,  to 
Pittsburgh  for  local  service,  a  higher 
rate  should  be  charged  for  through 
transportation.  Kurtz  v.  Penn.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  410,  415. 

(ccc)  On  shipments  of  boilers  and 
parts  from  Kalamazoo,  Mich.,  to  Blue 
Mounds,  Wis.,  and  to  Mount  Horeb, 
Wis.,  complainants  were  assessed  the 
joint  through  class  rate  of  65c.  The 
combination  of  locals,  based  upon  Chi- 
cago or  Milwaukee,  was  52i/^c.  One 
shipment  moved  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.,  G.  T. 
W.  Ry.  ard  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.;  the  other 
G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.,  P.  M.  R.  R.  and  C.  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  HELD,  the  charge  was  unrea- 
sonable. Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  52i^c.  Lindsay  Bros.  v.  G.  R. 
&  L  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  441,  442. 

(ddd)  On  shipments  of  carloads  of 
manure  spreaders  from  De  Kalb,  111., 
to  Olivia,  Minn.,  complainant  was 
charged  33c.  The  combination  of  locals 
was  30.3c.  On  shipments  from  De 
Kalb  to  Hutchinson,  Minn.,  the  rate 
assessed  was  29c  per  hundred  pounds. 
The  combination  of  locals  was  27.2c. 
Defendants  offered  no  evidence  to  jus- 
tify the  higher  rates.  HELD,  they  were 
unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded. 
Ordered  to  maintain  the  lower  rates 
in  the  future.  Smith  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  M. 
&  G.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  447,  448. 

(eee)  On  carloads  of  cedar  posts 
from  Humbird,  Idaho,  to  Basin,  Wyo., 
complainant  was  assessed  the  joint 
rate  of  56c.  On  a  carload  of  lumber 
from  Kootenay  Spur,  Idaho,  to  Basin 
Wyo.,  it  was  assessed  the  same  rate. 
At  the  time  of  shipment  the  combina- 
tion   of    locals    via    Billings    was    46i/^c. 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §15   (fff)— (jjj) 


873 


On  a  carload  of  cedar  posts  from  Sagle, 
Ida.,  to  Garland,  Wyo.,  complainant  was 
assessed  53c,  At  the  time  of  ship- 
ment the  combination,  of  locals  via 
Sand  Point  and  Billings  of  ilVzC  was 
in  effect.  Since  these  shipments  th€ 
carriers  published,  as  the  result  of  an 
order  of  the  Commission  in  Potlatch 
Lumber  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 
C.  41,  a  rate  of  50c  on  lumber  other 
than  cedar  from  Kootenay  to  Basin; 
54c  on  cedar  posts,  Humbird  to  Basin, 
and  52c,  Sagle  to  Garland.  HELD,  the 
rates  assessed  were  unreasonable.  Rep- 
aration awarded  on  the  basis  of  the 
newly  established  rates.  Humbird  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
449. 

(fff)  On  a  carload  of  machinery 
from  Allegheny,  Pa.,  to  Victoria  Mines, 
Ont.,  Canada,  via  Painesville,  O.,  and 
Buffalo,  a  rate  of  48c  was  assessed. 
At  the  time  of  shipment  the  combina- 
tion of  locals  between  these  points  via 
Buffalo,  and  over  other  carriers,  was 
40c.  One  year  after  the  shipment  in 
question  defendants  published  a  joint 
through  rate  between  the  points  in 
question  of  40c.  HELD,  the  48c  rate 
was  unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded 
on  the  basis  of  the  4uc  rate.  Car- 
lin's  Sons  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co., 
16  1.  C.  C.  477. 

(ggg)  That  the  through  rate  should 
not  exceed  the  sum  of  the  locals  is 
a  doctrine  well  established,  but  it 
does  not  follow  as  a  corollary  that  the 
sum  of  the  locals  should  always  be 
reduced  to  equal  the  through  rates. 
Williams  Co.  v.  V.  S.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
L    C.    C.    482,    485. 

(hhh)  On  ground  iron  ore  in  car- 
loads from  Iron  Ridge,  Wis.,  to  Mich- 
igan City,  Ind.,  and  from  Iron  Ridge 
to  Louisville,  Ky.,  the  rate  via  C.  M. 
&  St.  P.  R.  R.  from  Iron  Ridge  to  Mil- 
waukee was  5c,  from  Milwaukee  to 
Michigan  City  via  the  P.  M.  R.  R.  S^^c 
and  from  Milwaukee  to  Louisviiie  15c, 
making  the  Milwaukee  combination  to 
Michigan  City  13i^c  and  to  Louisville 
20c.  The  joint  through  rate  from  Iron 
Ridge  to  Micnigan  City  via  Milwaukee 
and  the  P.  M.  R.  R.  was  211^c  and  to 
Louisville  25i/^c.  The  rate  from  Iron 
Ridge  to  Michigan  City  via  Chicago  by 
the  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  and  the 
Monon  Ry.  was  the  SL.me  as  via  Mil- 
waukee, 211/^c,  but  the  combination 
via   Chicago   was   18c.     Complainant  de- 


livered a  shipment  to  the  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  R.  R.  without  routing  instructions, 
except  verbal  directions,  to  forward  by 
the  cheapest  route.  The  agent  for-- 
warded  same  via  Chicago  and  the 
Monon  Route.  At  the  time  of  hearing  the 
only  rate  in  effect  to  Michigan  City 
was  the  combination  rate  of  13i/^c  via 
Milwaukee  and  16i/^c  via  Chicago. 
HELD,  since  the  lowest  rate  lawfully 
applicable  from  Iron  Ridge  to  Michigan 
City  was  that  via  the  route  over  which 
the  shipments  actually  moved,  repara- 
tion must  be  awarded  upon  the  rate 
deemed  by  the  Commission  reasonable 
via  that  route,  and  the  carriers  should 
not  be  forced  to  meet  the  lower  rate 
covering  the  shorter  haul  via  the  P. 
M.  R.  R.  Reparation  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  the  16i^c  rate  in  effect  at 
the  time  of  the  hearing  via  Chicago, 
On  the  shipment  to  Louisville  repa- 
ration awarded  on  the  rate  in  effect  at 
the  time  of  the  hearing  made  on  Mil- 
waukee combination,  viz.,  14.82c.  Win- 
ters Metallic  Paint  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  562,  563. 

(iij)  If  no  specific  rate  from  point 
of  origin  to  destination  of  a  through 
shipment  is  provided  and  no  specific 
manner  of  constructing  combination 
rate  for  it  is  prescribed,  the  lowest 
combination  of  rates  applicable  via  the 
route  over  which  the  shipment  moves 
it  the  lawful  rate  for  that  shipment. 
Porter  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co., 
15    I.    C.    C.    1,    4. 

(iii)  On  an  emigrant's  outfit  from 
Fletcher,  Okla.,  to  Bovina,  Tex.,  337 
miles,  a  rate  of  68c  was  exacted,  which 
amounted  to  $13.60  per  ton  or  over  4c  per 
ton  mile.  The  legal  rate  was  '62c,  which 
amounted  to  $12.40  per  ton,  or  over  3^c 
per  ton  mile.  Since  the  shipment  moved 
defendants  canceled  the  62c  rate  and  ap^ 
plied  the  local  rates  of  the  Railroad  Com- 
mission of  Texas,  resulting  in  a  rate  of 
41c,  or  $8.20  per  ton,  or  something  less 
than  21^0  per  ton  mile.  HELD,  the  68c 
rate  was  unreasonable  to  the  extent  it  ex- 
ceeded 41c,  the  latter  rate  being  the  com- 
bination of  locals.  Reparation  awarded. 
Porter  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 
C.  1,  6. 

(jjj)  On  less  than  carload  ship- 
ments of  boilers  from  Kalamazoo,  Mich., 
to  New  Glarus,  South  Wayne,  Monti- 
cello  and  Monroe,  Wis.,  complainant 
was  assessed  a  joint  through  rate  of 
65c,    the    combination    rate    on    Chicago 


874 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §15  (kkk)— (sss) 


being  52c  to  three  of  said  points  and 
51.5c  to  the  other.  Defendant  offered 
no  evidence  justifying  the  rate  exacted. 
HELD,  said  rate  being  in  excess  of  the 
combination  of  locals,  and  defendants 
having  offered  no  evidence  to  sustain 
the  burden  of  proof  cast  upon  them, 
the  rate  was  shown  to  be  unreason- 
able. Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis 
of  said  lower  rates.  Lindsay  Bros.  v. 
M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  1.  C.  C.  40,  41. 

(kkk)  On  engines  and  boilers  from 
Kalamazoo,  Mich.,  to  Woodford,  Wis., 
and  from  said  point  of  origin  to 
Argyle,  Wis.,  a  through  rate  was  as- 
sessed in  excess  of  the  sum  of  the 
locals.  Prior  to  the  ruling  by  the  Com- 
mission that  carriers  must  apply 
through  joint  rates  when  published, 
although  the  sums  of  the  locals  may 
result  in  a  lower  rate,  defendants  pub- 
lished in  their  tariffs  that  when  the 
sum  of  the  locals  was  less  than  the 
through  rate  the  former  would  apply, 
thereby  practicallly  admitting  the  sum 
of  the  local  rates  in  question  to  be  a 
reasonable  charge  for  the  haul.  HELD, 
reparation  should  be  awarded  on  the 
basis  of  the  sum  of  the  locals.  Lind- 
say Bros.  V.  G.  R.  &  L  Ry.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.    C.    182,   183. 

(Ill)  To  a  carload  of  lumber  shipped 
from  Lake  City,  Ark.,  to  Springfield, 
Mo.,  a  joint  rate  of  17c  was  appli- 
cable. Defendant  connecting  carrier  at 
Koshkonong,  Ark.,  under  a  mistaken  im- 
pression, that  no  joint  rate  was  in 
effect  between  said  points,  collected 
the  local  from  Lake  City  to  Koshkonong 
and  the  local  from  said  latter  point  to 
Springfield,  the  amount  exacted  being 
5c  per  100  lbs.  in  excess  of  said  17c 
joint  rate.  HELD,  reparation  should 
be  awarded  on  the  basis  of  17c.  Keich 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co., 
15  L  C.  C.  230,  231. 

(mmm)  As  the  defendant  carriers 
have  a  right  to  increase  their  separate 
local  rates,  an  order  that  the  joint 
through  rate  may  not,  for  a  stated 
period,  exceed  the  sum  of  the  local 
rates,  could,  by  such  increase  in  local 
rates,  be  made  ineffective.  Michigan 
Buggy  Co.  V.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
L    C.    C.    297. 

(nnn)  If  carriers  participating  in  a 
joiht  through  rate  desire  to  reduce  or 
increase  the  separately  established  local 
rates   via   the   same   route   the   order   ol 


the  Commission  requiring  the  mainte- 
nance of  a  joint  through  rate  is  no  bar 
to  their  doing  so.  Michigan  Buggy  Co. 
V.  G.  R.  &  1.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  297,  299. 

(ooo)  There  are  instances  in  which 
the  circumstances  might  justify  the  high- 
er through  rate,  and  it  is  for  the  carrier 
to  demonstrate  their  potency  in  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  through  rate  that  ex- 
ceeds the  sum  of  the  locals.  Michigan 
Buggy  Co.  V.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
297,  299. 

(PPP)  A  joint  through  rate  exceeding 
the  sum  of  the  locals  is  not  conclusively 
presumed  to  be  unreasonable;  it  has 
simply  placed  upon  the  carriers  the  bur- 
den of  showing  such  a  joint  through  rate 
to  be  reasonable.  Michigan  Buggy  Co.  v. 
G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  .15  L  C.  C.  297,  299. 

(qqq)  On  carloads  of  vehicles  (cut- 
ters) from  Kalamazoo,  Mich.,  to  St.  Paul, 
Minn.,  a  rate  of  49.5c  was  charged,  the 
sum  of  the  locals  being  33.5c.  No  evi- 
dence was  submitted  by  defendants  of 
any  special  circumstances  justifying  said 
rate.  HELD,  the  charge  was  unreason- 
able. Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis 
of  the  sum  of  the  locals.  Michigan  Buggy 
Co.  V.  G.  R.  &  L  Ry  Co.,  15  I.  C  C,  297, 
299. 

(rrr)  On  steel  tanks  from  Groshen, 
Ind.,  to  Sullivan,  Wis.,  and  from  Goshen 
to  Sheboygan,  Wis.,  complainant  was  as- 
sessed rates  in  excess  of  the  sum  of  the 
locals.  Defendants  admitted  that  under 
the  old  form  of  applying  tariffs  the  lower 
combination  would  have  been  accorded 
to  complainant  and  the  rates  complained 
of  were  only  charged  because  the  de- 
fendants had  not  had  time  to  check  over 
the  tariffs  in  accordance  with  the  regula- 
tions imposed  by  the  Commission.  De- 
fendant insisted  that  complainant  was 
not  entitled  to  reparation  since  he 
should  have  called  the  attention  of  the 
initial  line  to  the  rate  complained  of. 
HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was  unreason- 
able. Reparation  awarded.  Lindsay 
Bros.  V.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C 
284,  285. 

(sss)  On  carloads  of  cottonwood  box 
shooks  from  Greenville,  Miss.,  to  Cedar 
Rapids,  la.,  a  rate  of  27c  was  assessed. 
At  the  time  of  shipment  the  rate  from 
Greenville  to  Cairo  was  10c  and  from 
Cairo  to  Cedar  Rapids,  14c,  making  a 
combination  of  24c.  Said  rate  to  Cairo 
was  established  to  develop  the  cotton- 
wood    lumber    industry    and    induce    the 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §15  (ttt)— (cccc) 


875 


movement  of  said  wood  to  market  and 
was  3c  lower  than  that  of  other  kinds  of 
lumber,  except  gum.  Under  said  rate  cot- 
tonwood  became  worth  $5  to  $6  per 
thousand  and  sold  at  the  mill  at  from  $16 
to  $18.  The  shooks  were  worth  from  $26 
to  $27.  The  distance  from  Greenville  to 
Cedar  Rapids  is  856  miles.  The  lumber 
rate  was  27c.  Box  shooks  do  not  load 
as  heavily  as  lumber.  HELD,  while 
reparation  should  be  granted  on  the  basis 
of  24c,  the  evidence  did  not  justify  the 
establishment  of  said  24c  rate  for  the 
future.  Matthews  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Y.  &  M. 
V.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  436,  438. 

(ttt)  On  carloads  of  stoves  from  Fre- 
mont, O.,  to  Minneapolis,  a  rate  of  33c 
was  exacted,  the  sum  of  the  locals  being 
28c.  The  tariff  naming  said  33c  rate 
provided  that  the  sum  of  the  local  rates 
should  apply  where  less  than  the  through 
rate,  but  defendants  were  unable  to  apply 
said  lower  rate  on  account  of  the  rulings 
of  the  Commission.  Subsequent  to  the 
shipments  defendants  established  a  29 ^^c 
rate,  being  the  sum  of  the  locals  in  effect 
at  the  time.  Defendants  admitted  the 
rate  exacted  to  be  unreasonable  to  the 
extent  that  it  exceeded  29i^c.  HELD, 
said  33c  rate  was  excessive.  Reparation 
awarded  on  the  basis  of  29i/^c.  Hartman 
Furniture  &  Carpet  Co.  v.  W.  C.  Ry  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C,  530,  531. 

(uuu)  The  rate  for  a  long  through 
haul  should  ordinarily  be  less  than  the 
combination  of  two  or  more  local  rates 
that  are  included  within  that  distance 
over  the  same  lines.  Kindel  v.  N.  Y.  N. 
H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C  555,  558. 

(vvv)  On  a  carload  of  leaf  tobacco 
from  Stoughton,  Wis.,  to  Passaic,  N.  J., 
a  rate  of  52 %c  was  exacted,  of  which  de- 
fendant initial  carrier  received  17i/4c  for 
its  portion  of  the  haul  and  the  connecting 
carrier  35c  for  the  haul  to  destination. 
At  the  time  of  shipment  defendant  initial 
carrier  had  a  local  tariff  of  15c  applicable 
to  its  portion  of  the  haul,  which  was  not, 
however,  applicable  to  interstate  ship- 
ments. Later  said  tariff  was  filed  with 
the  Commission,  making  said  rate  of  15c 
effective  on  interstate  traffic.  HELD, 
defendant  initial  carrier's  charge  of  nV2C 
was  unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded 
on  the  basis  of  15c.  American  Cigar  Co. 
V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C,  618. 

(www)  Defendants'  joint  through 
rates  on  shipments  of  complainants'  ar- 
ticles from  points  in  Central  Freight  As- 


sociation territory  to  points  in  the  Fox 
River  Valley,  Wis.,  are  unreasonable  and 
unjust,  as  they  are,  as  a  rule,  higher 
than  the  combination  of  locals.  Oshkosh 
Logging  Tool  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
14  L  C.  C.  109,  114. 

(xxx)  A  through  rate  which  is  higher 
than  the  sum  of  the  locals  between  the 
same  points  is  prima  facie  unreasonable, 
and  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  car- 
rier to  defend  such  higher  rate.  Oshkosh 
Logging  Tool  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  109.  112. 

(yyy)  Complainants  alleged,  and 
the  evidence  showed,  that  defendants' 
through  rates  on  various  commodities 
from  points  in  Central  Freight  Associa- 
tion territory,  including  Buffalo,  Erie  and 
Pittsburgh,  Pa.,  Cincinnati  and  Columbus, 
O.,  to  points  in  the  Fox  River  Valley, 
Wis.,  including  Oshkosh,  Neenah,  Fond 
du  Lac  and  Appleton,  were  in  excess  of 
the  combined  local  rates  between  those 
points.  The  through  rate  complained  of 
permitted  dealers  at  basing  points,  such 
as  Milwaukee,  to  reship  goods  to  more 
distant  points  at  an  advantage  over  local 
dealers  charged  the  through  rate  on  their 
shipments.  Defendants  offered  no  trans- 
portation reason  to  justify  the  through 
rates.  HELD,  the  through  rates  were  un- 
reasonable and  unjust  and  should  not 
exceed  the  combination  charge  of  local 
rates.  Oshkosh  Logging  Tool  Co.  v.  C. 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  109,  113,  114. 

(zzz)  To  prevent  unjust  discrimina- 
tions the  through  rate  should  not  exceed 
the  combination  of  locals,  and  when  this 
Commission  can,  without  doing  violence 
to  its  convictions,  establish  a  through 
rate  not  in  excess  of  the  sum  of  the  lo- 
cals, it  would  be  disposed  to  do  so.  Mont- 
gomery Freight  Bureau  v.  Western  Ry.  of 
Ala.,  14  I.  C.  C.  150,  152. 

(aaaa)  Where  the  sum  of  the  local 
rates  established  by  state  authority  is 
less  than  a  reasonable  interstate  rate, 
the  higher  rate  may  be  charged.  Mont- 
gomery Freight  Bureau  v.  W.  Ry.  of  Ala., 
14  L  C.  C.  150,  151. 

(bbbb)  Ordinarily  a  through  rate 
ought  not  to  exceed  the  sum  of  the  lo- 
cals. Montgomery  Freight  Bureau  v. 
W.  Ry.  of  Ala.,  14  L  C.  C.  150,  151. 

(cccc)  It  is  not  enough  to  entitle  a 
complainant  to  reparation  to  show  merely 
that  since  certain  shipments  were  made 
a  joint  rate  has  been  established  which 


876 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §15  (dddd)— (mmmm) 


is  lower  than  tlie  former  combination  of 
locals,  and  such  fact  of  itself  creates  no 
presumption  against  the  carriers.  Flac- 
cus  Glass  Co.  vs.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  333,  334. 

.  (dddd)  Between  September  1,  1906 
and  June  30,  1907,  complainant  shipped 
carloads  of  lime  at  13.5c  per  100  lbs., 
McVittys,  O.,  to  Tarentum,  Pa.,,  via 
Columbus,  a  distance  of  333  miles,  the 
rate  equaling  the  combination  of  locals, 
no  joint  rate  being  in  force  during  that 
period.  The  distance  via  Forest,  Pa., 
is  255  miles.  Effective  Feb.  4,  1907,  the 
local  rates  between  said  points  via  For- 
est were  so  reduced  as  to  make  the  com- 
bination of  locals  12.5c.  July  8,  1907, 
defendant  established  a  through  rate  of 
10c  from  McVittys  to  Tarentum  by  both 
routes.  HELD,  in  the  absence  of  evi- 
dence that  the  former  local  rates  were 
unreasonable,  complainant  was  not  en- 
titled to  reparation.  Flaccus  Glass  Co. 
V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
333,  334,  335. 

(eeee)  It  cannot  be  conclusively  pre- 
sumed that  the  sum  of  the  locals  is  a 
reasonable  through  rate  if  the  locals 
themselves  are  reasonable.  Randolph 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  338,  339. 

(ffff)  It  may,  in  exceptional  cases, 
happen  that  the  through  rate  may  prop- 
erly be  even  greater  than  the  sum  of  the 
locals,  but  if  rates  were  to  be  established 
de  novo  upon  correct  principles,  it  would 
generally  be  less.  Randolph  Lumber  Co. 
V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.,  14  L  C.  C  338, 
339. 

(gggg)  Upon  shipments  from  Chester 
via  Richmond  to  Ohio  points,  defendant 
running  from  Chester  to  Richmond  con- 
tended that  it  cost  it  just  as  much  for 
its  share  of  the  through  shipment  as  if 
it  delivered  same  locally.  Upon  a  local, 
but  not  upon  a  through,  shipment  it  was 
required  to  let  its  cars  stand  at  Rich- 
mond three  days  on  its  team  track  for 
unloading.  HELD,  defendant's  conten- 
tion was  erroneous  and  the  through  rate 
of  17.5c  ordered  by  the  Commission  to 
replace  the  former  18.3c  joint  rate  es- 
tablished by  defendants  should  not  be 
disturbed  on  a  petition  for  rehearing. 
Randolph  Lumber  Co.  v.  Seaboard  Air 
Line  Ry.,  14  I.  C.  C.  338,  338,  339. 

(hhhh)  Where  a  local  rate  from  Mont- 
gomery, Ala.,  to  West  Point,  Miss.,  is 
lower  in  proportion  to  the  distance  than 


a  rate  from  Montgomery  to  Meridian,  ap- 
proved in  a  former  decision  of  the  Com- 
mission, a  joint  rate  from  Montgomery 
via  West  Point  to  the  nearer  points  upon 
the  connecting  carrier,  running  from 
West  Point,  may  exceed  the  combination 
of  locals.  Montgomerv  Freight  Bureau  v 
M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14^1.  C.  C.  374,  375. 

(iiii)  A  joint  rate  from  Montgomery, 
Ala.,  via  West  Point,  Miss.,  to  points 
on  the  connecting  carrier  running  from 
West  Point  which  exceeds  the  combina- 
tion of  local  rates  is  unreasonable. 
Montgomery  Freight  Bureau  v.  M.  &  O. 
R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  374,  374. 

(jjjj)  Where,  upon  a  carload  of  ma- 
chinery shipped  from  Hopkins,  Minn.,  via 
Kansas  City  to  Abbyville,  Kan.  the  sum 
of  the  locals  is  54c,  complainant  is  en- 
titled to  reparation  for  the  excess 
charged  above  that  amount,  and  the  joint 
through  rate  of  56c  is  unreasonable  and 
should  be  reduced  to  54c  for  the  future. 
Minneapolis  Threshing  Machine  Co.  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  536. 

(kkkk)  On  oranges  from  Mcintosh, 
Fla.,  to  Pottsville,  Pa.,  complainant  was 
assessed  a  through  rate  higher  than  the 
combination  of  locals  based  on  Reading, 
Pa.  Through  a  misconception  of  th3 
long  and  short  haul  clause  of  the  Act, 
Reading,  being  intermediate  to  Philadel- 
phia, was  given  the  same  rate,  and  for 
this  reason  the  rate  from  Mcintosh  to 
Reading  was  lower  than  that  to  other 
points  in  Reading  territory.  Subsequent 
to  the  filing  of  the  complaint,  defendants 
raised  the  rate  to  Reading  so  as  to  make 
the  combination  of  locals  to  Pottsville 
exceed  the  through  rate  attacked.  IIFLD, 
the  demand  for  the  reduction  of  the 
through  rate  should  be  refused,  but  since 
the  dealers  at  Reading  had  been  accorded 
a  material  advantage  over  complainant, 
complainant  was  entitled  to  reparation 
on  the  basis  of  the  sum  of  the  locals  for- 
merly in  effect.  Sylvester  v.  Penn.  R. 
R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  573,  574. 

(1111)  A  through  rate  or  fare  which  is 
higher  than  the  sum  of  the  locals  be- 
tween *the  same  points  is  prhTis  facie  un- 
reasonable, and  the  burden  of  ')roof  is 
upon  the  carrier  to  defend  such  higher 
rate.  Hardenberg,  Dolson  &:  Gray  v, 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  579,  579. 

(mmmm)  The  rate  on  hay  ^rom  Port- 
land to  Seattle  and  from  Portland  fo  la- 
coma  was  10?.  The  local  rate  from  Ta- 
coma  to  Auburn,  a  point   nterincdiate  be- 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §15  (nnnn)— (yyyy) 


877 


tweea  Seattle  and  Tacoma,  was  3c,  and 
the  local  rate  from  Seattle  to  Auburn 
was  3c.  The  low  10c  rate  from  Portland 
to  Tacoma  and  Seattle  were  brought 
about  by  water  competition.  Auburn 
was  not  located  on  water.  HELD,  the 
defendant's  through  rate  from  Portland 
to  Auburn  of  14c  was  unreasonable,  as 
exceeding  the  sum  of  the  locals,  13c,  and 
complainant  was  entitled  to  reparation 
on  the  basis  of  the  13c  rate.  Harden- 
berg,  Dolson  &  Gray  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  579,  580. 

(nnnn)  On  a  carload  of  corrugated 
iron  from  Newport,  Ky.,  to  Globe,  Ariz., 
complainant  was  assessed  a  through  rate 
of  $2.08  per  100  lbs.,  minimum  30,000  lbs. 
The  combination  of  locals  was  $1.68, 
minimum  30,000  lbs.  Subsequent  to  the 
shipment  in  question,  defendants  estab- 
lished a  joint  through  rate  of  $1.'68,  mini- 
mum 36,000  lbs.  Complainant  offered  no 
evidence  that  36,000  lbs.  minimum  was 
unreasonable.  Defendants  admitted  the 
$2.08  rate  to  be  unreasonable,  but  did 
not  admit  the  same  with  respect  to  the 
36,000  lb.  minimum.  HELD,  the  $2.08 
rate  was  excessive,  but  reparation  on 
the  basis 'of  $1.68  rate  must  be  com- 
puted on  the  36,000  and  not  on  the  30,- 
000  lb.  minimum.  Momsen  &  Co.  v. 
Gila  Valley,  Globe  &  Northern  Ry,  Co., 
14   L    C.   C.   614,   615. 

(oooo)  The  joint  through  rates  from 
Springfield,  111.,  to  Salina  and  Kipp, 
Kan.,  were  in  excess  of  the  combination 
of  locals  based  on  Kansas  City,  this  re- 
lation of  rates  apparently  being  main- 
tained for  the  purpose  of  making  Kansas 
City  a  center  of  distribution  for  points 
farther  west.  HELD,  in  the  absence  of 
justifying  circumstances,  such  a  relation 
of  rates  was  improper.  Carriers  generally 
criticized  for  failure  to  make  joint  rates 
not  to  exceed  the  combination  of  locals. 
Laning-Harris  Coal  &  Grain  Co.  v.  M. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  154,  158. 

(pppp)  On  carloads  of  broom  corn 
from  Elk  City,  Okla.,  via  Omaha  to  Sioux 
City,  la.,  complainant  was  assessed  joint 
rates  in  excess  of  combination  of  locals 
based  on  Omaha.  No  justification  for 
said  charge  was  offered  by  defendants. 
HELD,  the  rate  exacted  was  unreason- 
able. Reparation  awarded  on  the  basis 
of  the  sum  of  said  locals.  Coomes  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  1.  C.  C.  192, 
194. 

(qqqq)  Defendant  carriers  are  criti- 
cized   for   the   practice   of   inserting  ob- 


scure and  general  clauses  in  voluminous 
tariff  publications  to  the  effect  that  where 
a  combination  of  locals  will  make  a  lower 
aggregate  through  rate  than  the  specific 
joint  rate  therein  stated,  the  former  will 
be  used;  since  concerns  employing  a 
traffic  expert  are  able  to  secure  combina- 
tions resulting  in  lower  aggregate 
charges  than  can  be  secured  by  the 
smaller  or  occasional  shipper  who  is  not 
able  to  employ  such  an  expert  and  who 
is  required  to  pay  the  joint  through 
rate  appearing  on  the  face  of  the  tariff. 
Specific  joint  through  rates  should  be 
published  and  adhered  to  and  only  in 
rare  instances  and  under  peculiar  cir- 
cumstances should  through  rates  be 
made  higher  than  the  sum  of  the  locals. 
Hydraulic  Press  Brick  Co.  v.  St.  L.  & 
S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  342,  347. 

(rrrr)  Through  rate  on  turnips  from 
Delavan,  Wis.,  to  Terre  Haute,  Ind.,  26c, 
canceled,  leaving  combination  rate  in 
effect  of  18c.  Reparation  awarded  on 
basis  of  18c  rate.  Anguish  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.-  Ry,  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  64. 

(ssss)  Through  rate  exceeded  sum 
of  locals.  Under  circumstances  of  case, 
HELD,  not  unreasonable.  White  Bros. 
V.  S.  P.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  84. 

(tttt)  No  through  rate  in  effect,  com- 
bination higher  than  subsequently  es- 
tablished joint  through  rate.  Bayou 
City  Rice  Mills  v.  H.  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.    Op.   90. 

(uuuu)  Joint  through  rate  in  excess 
of  combination  of  locals  and  commodity 
rate  subsequently  established.  Repara- 
tion awarded.  Hartman  Furniture  Co.  v. 
C.  Gt.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  115. 

(vvvv)  Joint  through  rate  canceled, 
leaving  higher  combination  rates  in  ef- 
fect; joint  through  rate  subsequently  re- 
stored; reparation  awarded  on  basis  of 
joint  tnrough  rate.  Swift  &  Co.  v.  A. 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  130. 

(wwwwxxxx)  Sums  of  locals  instead 
of  through  rates  applied  to  certain  ship- 
ments because  tariff  did  not  make  spe- 
cific application  of  the  through  rates  to 
intermediate  points.  Tariff  amended. 
Reparation  awarded.  American  Smelting 
&  Refining  Co.  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  162. 

(yyyy)  Through  class  rate  unreason 
able  to  the  extent  of  a  lower  commodity 
rate  subsequently  established.    Minneap- 


878 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §15  (zzzz)— §16  (d) 


olis  Iron  Store  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  172. 

(zzzz)  Through  class  rates  subse- 
quently established  lower  than  combina- 
tion rate  charged.  Reparation  awarded. 
Bamble  Bros.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  173. 

(aaaaa)  Lower  combination  in  effect 
than  charged.  Reparation  awarded.  New 
England  Furniture  &  Carpet  Co.  v.  M. 
C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  243. 

(bbbbb)  Reparation  awarded  on  basis 
of  lower  combination  in  effect  at  time  o*' 
movement.  Medberry  Findeisen  Co.  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  263. 

(ceccc)  Through  rate  exceeded  locals. 
Reparation  awarded.  Joint  rate  subse- 
quently filed,  which  was  lower  than  com- 
bination. No  order  entered  maintain- 
ing rate  for  the  future.  Berlin  Machine 
Works  V.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Un- 
rep. Op.  321. 

(ddddd)  Joint  commodity  rate  ex- 
ceeded class  rate  in  effect.  Reparation 
awarded.  Crabtree  v.  O.  R.  &  Nav.*  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  357. 

(eeeee)  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
joint  rate  did  not  exceed  the  combination 
of  intermediates,  and  that  it  has  not 
been  shown  to  have  been  unreasonable, 
the  complaint  must  be  dismissed.  Lu- 
dowici-Celadon  Co.  v.  C.  &  M.  V.  R.  R. 
Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  385. 

(fffff)  Combination  rate  exceeded 
joint  rate  in  effect  prior  to  date  of  ship- 
ment. Reparation  awarded.  McCord 
Mercantile  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.   Op.   398. 

(ggggg)  Combination  rate  found  un- 
reasonable to  the  extent  of  a  lower  joint 
rate  subsequently  established  over  the 
same  route.  Reparation  awarded.  Sun- 
derland Bros.  Co.  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  400;  Chattanooga  Wagon  Co. 
V.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  429. 

(hhhhh)  Combination  rate  which  ex- 
ceeded joint  rate  with  transit  privilege 
formerly  in  effect  not  found  unreasonable. 
Pierce  v.  D.  M.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 
401. 

(iiiii)  Combination  rate  exceeded  joint 
commodity  rate  subsequently  established. 
Reparation  awarded.  Southern  Shuttle 
&  Bobbin  Co.  v.  T.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  407. 

(jjjjj)  Tariff  did  not  provide  joint 
rate,    and    the    combination    of    interme- 


diates is  higher  than  the  rate  from  towns 
in  the  same  section.  HELD,  unreason- 
able. Torrey  Cedar  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  420. 

(kkkkk)  Lower  combination  of  inter- 
mediate commodity  rates  in  effect.  Rep- 
aration awarded,  Idaho  Lime  Co.  v.  A. 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Nnrep.  Op.  553. 

(11111)  The  claim  in  this  case  is  based 
on  the  ground  that  the  rate  charged  ex- 
ceeded the  aggregate  of  the  intermediate 
rates.  Combination  rate  applied  via  a 
different  route.  Dismissed.  Franke 
Grain  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  554. 

§16.     Reparation. 

See  Absorption  of  Charges,  §2  (c) ; 
Claims,  §8  (g);  Procedure  Before 
Commission,  V,  §11  (dd),  (f) ;  Repa- 
ration, §16  (mm),  (nn),  (jjj),  (ppp), 
§19   (b),    (c),    (d),    (g),    (I),    (q),   (r), 

(V). 

(a)  Where  a  connecting  carrier  re- 
ceives carloads  of  oil  consisting  of  tank 
cars  and  carloads  made  up  of  barrel 
packages  from  the  initial  carrier  and 
merely  joins  with  the  initial  carrier  in  a 
joint  rate  in  itself  reasonable,  .it  is  not 
liable  for  the  alleged  discriminatory  acts 
of  the  initial  carrier  in  charging  for  the 
weight  of  the  barrel  package  used  in 
shipments  made  by  one  class  of  shippers, 
while  at  the  same  time  making  no  charge 
for  the  weight  of  the  tank  cars  against 
a  competing  class  of  shippers  using  such 
method  of  shipment.  Penn,  Refining  Co. 
V.  W.  N.  Y.  &  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  208  U.  S. 
208,  222,  28  Sup.  Ct.  268,  52  L.  ed.  456. 

(b)  Where  an  unreasonable  joint  rate 
has  been  collected,  the  liability  of  the 
parties  to  such  action  is  joint  and  sev- 
eral, and  the  Commission  may  award 
reparation  against  one  of  the  roads 
which  participated  in  the  traffic,  even 
though  other  roads  which  performed  a 
part  of  the  service  are  not  made  parties 
defendant  to  the  formal  complaint  ask- 
ing reparation.  Webster  Grocer  Co.  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  20,  21. 

(c)  The  joint  through  rate  over  an- 
other road  is  not  a  proper  basis  for  rep- 
aration, lola  Portland  Cement  Co.  v. 
M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  91,  92. 

(d)  Carriers  under  a  joint  rate  are 
severally  liable  for  damages  for  the 
violation  of  the  law  in  which  they  par- 
ticipate. Sondheimer  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  60«,  610. 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §16   (e)— (1) 


879 


(e)  Withdrawal  of  joint  through  rates, 
resulting  in  application  of  higher  locals, 
condemned,  and,  joint  rates  having  been 
subsequently  re-established,  reparation 
awarded  on  shipments  upon  which 
charges  had  been  assessed  at  the  higher 
rate.  Corporation  Commission  of  Okla- 
homa V.  C.  R.  I.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C 
C.  379. 

(fg)  Where  the  initial  line  publishes 
a  joint  rate  not  concurred  in  by  connect- 
ing lines,  and  the  shipper  is  compelled 
to  pay  a  greater  charge  than  that  named 
in  the  tariff,  he  may  recover  from  the 
initial  line  the  difference  if  the  rate 
posted  is  found  reasonable.  Black  Horse 
Tobacco  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
588,   592. 

(h)  On  carloads  of  tobacco  from  Ken- 
tucky points  to  Laredo  and  thence  over 
the  lines  of  a  Mexican  railroad  to  Mon- 
terey, Mexico,  complainant  was  assessed 
on  the  basis  of  a  car  minimum  of  33,- 
069  lbs.  All  the  American  lines  over 
which  the  shipments  moved,  except  the 
initial  carrier,  the  L.  &  N.  Ry.,  were  mem- 
bers of  a  tariff  committee,  which  on  June 
27,  1907,  by  tariff  No.  491,  established  a 
■minimum  weight  on  tobacco  from  said 
Kentucky  points  to  Monterey  of  22,046 
lbs.  The  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  was  named  as  a 
party  to  this  tariff,  but  did  not  file  its 
concurrence.  October  5,  1907,  said  com- 
mittee, by  supplement  3,  increased  the 
minimum  to  33.069  lbs.  Effective  October 
11,  1907,  the  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  established  said 
tariff  No.  491  as  its  tariff,  but  made  no 
reference  to  supplement  3.  Effective  De- 
cember 23,  1907,  the  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  pub- 
lished supplement  3  as  its  own  supple- 
ment No.  4.  The  said  committee  did  not 
concur  in  either  of  these  tariffs  when  filed 
by  the  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  The  shipments 
moved  between  October  11  and  December 
•23,  1907.  HELD,  there  was  no  joint 
through  rate  in  effect  between  the  points 
in  question  between  the  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
and  said  other  carriers,  since  the  minds 
of  the  parties  never  met  upon  any  tariff; 
but  all  the  defendants  having  assumed  at 
the  time  the  shipments  moved  to  have  in 
effect  a  joint  through  rate,  and  accepted 
and  transported  the  merchandise  in  ques- 
tion under  that  rate,  the  Commission 
having  found  said  rate  to  be  unreason- 
able, might  award  reparation  against  all 
the  defendants.  Black  Horse  Tobacco 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  588,  592. 

(i)  Shipments  of  tobacco  from  points 
in  Kentucky  to  Monterey,  Mexico,  were 


carried  by  American  lines  to  Laredo,  and 
from  Laredo  to  Monterey  by  a  Mexican 
line.  The  American  carriers  in  connec- 
tion with  the  Mexican  carrier  established 
a  joint  charge  for  the  entire  service  from 
the  Kentucky  points  to  the  Mexican  point 
and  gave  no  information  as  to  the  part 
of  that  charge  which  would  accrue  to  the 
American  roads.  HELD,  the  carriers  who 
actually  participated  in  the  transporta- 
tion under  a  joint  rate  are  jointly  and 
severally  liable  in  damages  for  the  un- 
reasonableness of  that  rate,  and  the 
same  rule  applies  where  the  transporta- 
tion is  partly  in  a  foreign  country  and 
where  one  of  the  carriers  participates  in 
the  joint  rate  for  a  foreign  rail- 
way which  has  not  concurred  in  the 
tariff  establishing  that  rate.  Reparation 
awarded.  Black  Horse  Tobacco  Co.  v.  I. 
C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  588,  590. 

(j)  Where  an  excessive  joint  rate  has 
been  exacted  solely  by  the  initial  car- 
rier an  order  may  be  entered  against 
it  for  reparation,  even  though  the  con- 
necting carrier  is  not  made  a  party,  leav- 
ing to  the  carriers  the  right  to  adjust  the 
matter  between  themselves.  Morti  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  513, 
515. 

(jj)  Sum  of  local  rates  charged  found 
unreasonable  to  the  extent  that  it  ex- 
ceeded the  joint  rate  subsequently  estab- 
lished. Reparation  awarded.  Lemmon 
Hardware  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  171,  174;  Payne  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  175;  Wolfe  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  198; 
Hettinger  Hardware  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  199;  Wiprud  v.  C. 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  201. 

(k)  In  September,  1901.  it  was  not 
unlawful  for  connecting  railroad  lines  to 
make  a  joint  rate  with  a  shipper  for 
the  transportation  of  grain  from  one 
state  to  another,  and  a  contract  of  this 
character  was  valid  and  binding  upon  the 
parties  thereto  if  there  was  no  estab- 
lished rate  under  the  provisions  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  in  force  which 
applied  to  such  traffic.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Albers  Com.  Co.,  79  Kan.  59,  59,  99 
P.  819. 

(1)  Where,  in  a  suit  by  a  carrier  to 
recover  the  balance  of  the  published  rate 
consisting  of  the  combination  of  locals, 
defendant  shipper  sets  up  a  counter 
claim,  defendant  has  the  burden  of  prov- 
ing that  the  sum  exacted  was  in  excess 


880 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §1€  (m)— §18  (c) 


of  the  published  rate.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  La  Due,  128  App.  Div.  594,  599;  re- 
versed 57  Misc.  614,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  659. 

(m)  Plaintiff  carrier  sued  to  recover 
the  published  charges  made  up  of  a 
combination  of  local  rates.  Defendant 
shipper  set  up  a  counter  claim  based  on 
a  private  agreement,  undisputed  by 
plaintiff,  by  which  the  plaintiff  con- 
tracted to  charge  the  through  rates. 
There  was  no  evidence  to  show  that  the 
through  rates  agreed  upon  were  less  than 
the  published  through  i-ates,  nor  did 
plaintiff  show  that  there  was  no  through 
rate  filed  with  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission.  HELD,  plaintiff  having 
failed  to  meet  the  burden  of  proving  that 
the  through  rates  specified  in  the  private 
agreement  were  illegal,  defendant  could 
not  recover  on  his  counter  claim  the  ex- 
cess collected  above  the  private  contract- 
rate.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  La  Due,  57 
Misc.  614.  61-6;  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  659;  re- 
versed 128  App.  Div.  594,  112  N.  Y.  Supp. 
964. 

V.     TARIFFS   AND   CONSTRUCTION. 

§17.     In  General. 

See  Alternative  Rates,  I  (e) ;  Bills  of 
Lading,  §9  (1)  (a);  Demurrage,  §17 
(e) ;  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §2 
(I);  IVIinimums,  §8  (n);  Tariffs,  §3 
(I),  §12  (a);  Undercharges,  §6  (a), 
(b). 

(a)  Local  rates  and  joint  through 
rates  are  placed  by  the  Act  on  the  same 
level,  both  being  required  to  be  openly 
published  and  uniformly  applied,  and  al- 
though the  carriers  are  obliged  to  estab- 
lish local  rates  and  are  left  to  agree  upon 
joint  througn  rates,  or  not,  as  they 
choose,  still  if  they  do  agree  therein,  the 
rates  can  become  legally  operative  only 
by  being  established  as  prescribed  in  the 
Act.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  v.  Albers  Comm.  Co., 
223  U.  S.  573,  597,  32  Sup.  Ct.  316,  56 
L.  ed.  556. 

(b)  Concurrence  with  others  in  joint 
rates  that  effect  unjust  discrimination  or 
undue  preference  is  the  voluntary  action, 
of  the  carriers  at  the  point  where  the 
unjust  discrimination  or  the  undue  pref- 
erence exists.  Chamber  of  Commerce, 
Ashburn,  Ga.,  v.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.   C.   C.    140,   149. 

(c)  Where  an  initial  line  publishes 
and  maintains  one  joint  tariff,  which  is 
not  properly  concurred  in  by  its  con- 
nections, and  at  the  same  time  another 
joint  tariff  naming  the  higher  rates  and 


properly  concurred  in,  the  latter  tariff  is 
the  legal  one  and  must  be  applied,  Ken- 
nedy &  Co.  V.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  277. 

(d)  Combinations  of  joint  rates  not 
filed  with  the  Commission  are  not  lawful 
factors  to  be  considered  by  it  in  the  de- 
termination of  the  reasonableness  of  the 
joint  rate.  Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S. 
&  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  144,  146. 

(e)  A  through  rate  may  not  be  con- 
structed of  factors  not  on  file  with  the 
Commission.  Hagar  Iron  Co.  v.  Penn. 
R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  529. 

(f)  Where  port  to  port  rates,  recon- 
signments  and  intrastate  rates  are  not  on 
file  with  the  Commission  they  cannot  be 
used  as  a  basis  for  determining  in  a 
claim  for  reparation  the  legality  and  rea- 
sonableness of  the  lawfully  published 
through  rate  exacted.  Hager  Iron  Co.  v. 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  529,  529. 

(g)  Where  a  through  rate  is  con- 
structed on  a  combination,  each  factor 
must  be  published  and  filed  with  the  Com- 
mission. Without  the  filing  of  each  fac- 
tor, there  is  no  oflficial  measure  of  the 
rate.  Awbrey  &  Semple  v.  G.  H.  &  S. 
A.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  267,  271. 

(h)  Where  through  rates  agreed  upon 
by  private  contract  are  less  than  those 
duly  published  and  filed  with  the  Com- 
mission, they  are  illegal  and  cannot  be 
enforced  by  the  shipper.  B.  &  O.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  La  Due,  57  Misc.  614,  016,  108  N. 
Y.  Supp.  -659;  reversed  128  App.  Div. 
594,  112  N.  Y.  Supp.  964. 

§18.     Application    of    Proporticnal     Rate. 
See    Proportional    Rates,   §18. 

(a)  A  joint  through  rate  takes  prec- 
edence over  a  combination  of  a  pro- 
portional and  local.  Delray  Salt  Co.  v. 
D.  T.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  245. 

(b)  Although  a  proportional  rate  is 
published,  this  does  not  make  it  a  legal 
rate,  if  there  exists  a  published  through 
rate.  Lindsay  Bros.  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  6.  8. 

(c)  The  published  schedules  of  de- 
fendant Ureat  Northern  R.  R.  named  a 
rate  of  85c  from  Stavanger,  Norway,  to 
Seattle,  Wash.,  with  the  proviso  that 
the  defendant  should  have  75c  for  its 
portion  of  the  haul  from  the  Atlantic 
seaboard  to  Seattle,  and  in  case  the  best 
ocean  rate  obtainable  brought  the  total 
charge  above  85c,  the  total  rate  should 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §18  (d)— §19  (e) 


881 


he  75c  plus  the  best  ocean  rate  to  be 
secured.  Defendant  contracted  with 
plaintiff  shipper  to  transport  for  the  en- 
tire distance  at  85c.  Defendant  pro- 
cured of  the  ocean  carrier  a  rate  of 
38.7c,  and,  adding  this  to  the  75c  mini- 
mum, exacted  a  charge  of  $1,137. 
Plaintiff  shipper  sued  on  the  contract 
to  recover  the  excess  exacted  above  85c. 
HELD,  in  the  absence  of  proof  by  de- 
fendant that  the  conditions  of  ocean 
transportation  were  such  as  to  make  the 
contract  rate  of  85c  unlawful  under  the 
tariff  schedules  mentioned,  it  was  not 
proved  that  the  contract  was  unlawful, 
and  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  the  pos- 
session of  the  property  upon  paying  the 
contract  rate  to  the  defendant.  (Rud- 
]\in,  J.,  dissenting.)  Fisher  v.  Gt.  N. 
Ry.  Co.,  49  Wash.  205,  211,  95  P.  77. 

(d)  The  mere  fact  that  the  proportion  of 
the  through  contract  rate  from  a  Euro- 
nean  point  to  a  point  in  the  United 
States,  allowed  for  the  carriage  from  the 
port  of  entry  to  the  destination  in  the 
United  States,  may  be  less  than  the 
rate  scheduled  for  freight  originating  at 
the  port  of  entry  and  carried  to  the 
same  destination,  does  not  necessarily 
render  the  lesser  rate  unlawful.  Fisher 
V.  Gt.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  49  Wash.  205,  212,  95 
P.    77. 

§19.     Breaking  Transit. 

See   Interstate  Commerce,   §1;   Recon- 
signment,   §3   (r),   §5   (g),    (h). 

(a)  The  combination  of  locals,  and 
not  the  joint  through  rate,  was  properly 
collected  on  a  shipment  which  was  or- 
dered reshipped  before  it  reached  its 
original  billed  destination,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  reconsignment  privilege. 
Ploridin  Co.  v.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
610. 

(b)  A  carload  of  woven-wire  fence 
from  Richmond,  Ind.,  to  Billings,  Okla., 
was  reconsigned  after  arrival  at  Billings 
to  Wichita  and  a  local  rate  of  32c  was 
collected  for  the  back  haul  to  Wichita. 
The  tariff  containing  the  joint  rate  to 
Billings  provided  for  reconsignment 
after  reaching  destination  when  the 
substituted  destination  was  a  point 
where  through  rates  and  divisions  were 
in  effect  via  routed  movement.  The 
published  tariffs  contained  no  joint 
rates  in  effect  from  Richmond  and 
Wichita.  HELD,  since  the  tariff  con- 
taining joint  rates  to  Billings  extended 
no  reconsignment  privilege  to  Wichita 
the   local   rate   of   32c   from   Billings   to 


Wichita  was  properly  assessed.  Town- 
ley  Metal  &  Hardware  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  & 
P.    Ry.    Co.,   18   I.   C.   C.   378,   379. 

(c)  On  a  shipment  of  oil  meal  from 
Minneapolis  to  Milo,  Mo.,  via  Kansas 
City,  complicinant  attempted  to  secure 
the  combination  rate,  which  was  lower 
than  the  through  rate,  by  billing  the 
shipment  first  to  Kansas  City,  and  then 
requesting  the  initial  carrier  to  collect 
the  charges  up  to  Kansas  City,  deliver 
the  car  to  the  connecting  carrier  for 
carriage  to  Milo,  and  to  secure  a  new 
bill  of  lading  from  Kansas  City  to  Milo. 
The  initial  carrier  corrected  the  billing 
to  read  from  Kansas  City  to  Milo,  and 
applied  the  through  rate.  HELD,  de- 
fendant initial  carrier's  action  was 
proper,  as  a  shipper  cannot  defeat  the 
application  of  a  joint  through  rate  by 
constituting  the  carrier  its  agent  to  col- 
lect charges  up  to  the  junction  point 
and  reship  the  traffic  to  final  destina- 
tion. Stock  Yards  Cotton  &  Linseed 
Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
366,  367. 

(d)  Complainant  consigned  a  car- 
load of  dressed  pine  from  Warsaw,  N. 
C,  to  itself  at  New  York  City,  "within 
lighterage  limits."  Complainant  had  no 
place  of  business  in  New  York  City  and 
by  letter  directed  defendant  carrier  to 
forward  the  car  from  New  York  to  Chap- 
paqua.  The  joint  through  rate  of  32c 
was  exacted.  The  local  rate  to  New 
York  of  21c  plus  the  7c  local  from  60th 
Street  Station,  New  York,  to  Chappaqua 
made  a  combination  of  28c,  but  there  was 
a  gap  between  the  two  said  movements 
which  had  to  be  filled,  by  unloading, 
draying  and  reloading  at  New  York. 
Complainant  offered  no  evidence  of  the 
unreasonableness  per  se  of  the  32c  rate 
exacted,  except  that  a  27c  rate  was  es- 
tablished subsequent  to  the  shipment  in 
question.  HELD,  the  facts  did  not  pre- 
sent a  case  where  a  through  rate  in  ex- 
cess of  the  combination  of  locals  was 
unreasonable.  Reparation  denied.  Har- 
low Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  501,  503. 

(e)  A  shipper  may  transport  mer- 
chandise to  a  given  point,  take  posses- 
sion of  it  at  that  point  and  reship  it, 
even  though  the  effect  of  the  transac- 
tion is  to  secure  transportation  from  a 
point  in  one  state  to  a  point  in  another 
at  a  less  cost  than  the  published  through 
interstate  rate.  Montgomery  Freight  Bu- 
reau V.  W.  Ry.  of  Ala.,  14  I.  C.  C.  150,  152. 


882 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §19  (f)— §22   (b) 


(f)  Defendant  published  a  joint  rate 
and  through,  route  on  cotton  seed  via 
Fort  Smith  to  Memphis,  but  provided  that 
shipments  must  be  loaded  in  the  cars  of 
connecting  carriers  and  if  the  shipper 
used  defendant's  cars  it  should  be  re- 
quired at  its  own  risk  and  expense  and 
subject  to  demurrage  charges  to  unload 
and  transfer  same  at  Fort  Smith.  HELD, 
such  provision  was  unlawful,  as  opening 
the  way  for  unjust  discrimination  be- 
tween shippers.  Memphis  Freight  Bu- 
reau V.  Ft.  S.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
1,  9. 

§20.     Change     in     Rate    While    Shipment 
at  Transit  Point. 

See     Facilities     and     Privileges,     §18; 
Reparation,   §2   (f). 

(a)  Although  the  rate  is  advanced 
while  oil  was  at  a  refining-in-transit 
point,  the  legal  rate  is  the  rate  in  ef- 
fect at  the  time  of  original  movement. 
Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R, 
R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  434,  435. 

(b)  The  through  rate  on  the  fin- 
ished product  is  applicalDle  from  origin 
to  destination.  Monarch  Milling  Co.  v. 
C.  R.  I.  &   P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  1. 

(c)  Tariffs  provided  that  on  reship- 
ment  from  concentration  point  the 
through  rate  from  origin  to  final  desti- 
nation would  be  protected.  Consign- 
ment was  destroyed  by  fire  while  at 
transit  point.  Claim  for  refund  of  local 
rate  from  origin  to  transit  point  denied. 
Anderson,  Clayton  &  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S. 
F.   R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.   C.  C.  12. 

(d)  Where  grain  is  shipped  under 
a  niilling-in-tra-sit  privilege  and  the 
through  rate  is  changed  after  shipment 
from  the  point  of  origin  and  before 
shipment  at  the  point  of  milling,  the 
rate  in  effect  at  the  time  of  the  ship- 
ment at  point  of  origin  governs  under 
the  rule  that  rates  cannot  be  changed 
while  shipments  are  in  course  of  trans- 
portation. In  Re  Milling-in-Transit 
Rates,  17  I.  C.  C.  113,  114. 

(e)  Whenever  by  any  transit  ar- 
rangement through  rates  are  applied, 
such  through  rates  must  be  as  of  date 
of  first  movement  from  point  of  origin 
under  such  through  rates.  In  Re  Mill- 
Ing-in-Transit  Rates,  17  I.  C.  C.  113. 

(f)  Cotton-seed  oil  from  points  in 
Georgia  and  Alabama,  with  stop-over 
privileges  at  Savannah,  Ga.,  for  refining. 
Rates  increased  while  in  transit  and  such 


rates  applied.  Rates  in  effect  when  ship- 
ment delivered  to  carriers  should  have 
been  applied.  Reparation  awarded.  South- 
ern Cotton  Oil  Co.  V.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  Unrep. 
Op.  358. 

§21.     Intermediate   Clause. 

See  Crimes,  §5  (a);  Reparation,  §16 
(uu). 

(a)  On  a  carload  of  wheat  shipped 
July  17,  1907,  from  Wooley's  Spur,  Idaho, 
to  McKinney,  Tex.,  complainant  was  as- 
sessed 88i^c.  A  joint  through  rate  of 
60c  was  in  effect  at  the  time  of  ship- 
ment from  Idaho  Falls  to  McKinney, 
between  which  Wooley's  Spur  is  di- 
rectly intermediate.  Defendants  were 
accustomed  to  apply  the  through  rate 
from  intermediate  points,  from  which 
no  specific  through  rate  was  published. 
HELD,  the  case  was  one  designed  to 
be  relieved  by  Special  Circular  No.  6 
of  the  Commission  allowing  defendants 
for  a  specific  period  to  apply  through 
rates  to  intermediate  points  from  which 
no  through  rates  were  published.  Repa- 
ration awarded  on  the  basis  of  60c. 
Williamson  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I. 
C.    C.    228,    229. 

§22.     What  Is  Legal  Rate. 

See  Crimes,  §5  (f),  §7  (f) ;  Evidence, 
§3  (a),  §40  (a),  §60  (a);  Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §2  (ttt) ;  Reparation, 
§8  (x),  (z);  Special  Contract,  §2 
(d),  (gg),  (hh),  (ii),  (tt);  Tariffs, 
§3  (1),  §3  (2),  §7  (qq),  (ill),  (jjj), 
(yyy)»  (dddd);  Through  Routes  and 
Joint  Rates,  §15  (ill),  §17  (c),  §18, 
§20,  §22  (m),  (o);  Transporta- 
tion,  §3   (a). 

(a)  If  an  initial  carrier  accepts  traf- 
fic for  transportation  and  issues  its  bill 
of  lading  over  a  route  made  up  of  con- 
necting roads  for  which  no  joint  through 
rate  has  been  published  and  filed  with 
the  Commission,  the  lawful  rate  to  be 
charged  is  the  sum  of  the  established 
local  rates  published  and  filed  by  the 
individual  roads;  or  if  there  is  a  local 
rate  over  one  road  and  a  joint  rate 
over  the  others  for  the  remainder  of 
the  route,  all  published  and  filed  witii 
the  Commission,  the  lawful  through 
rate  to  be  charged  is  the  sum  of  the 
local  and  joint  rates.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  v. 
Albers  Comm.  Co.,  223  U.  S.  573,  597, 
32  Sup.  Ct.  316,  56  L.  ed.  556. 

(b)  Concurrence  with  others  in  joint 
rates  that  effect  unjust  discrimination 
or  undue  preference  is  the  voluntary 
action  of  the  carriers  at  the  point  where 
the  unjust   discrimination   or   the   undue 


THROUGH  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §22  (c)— (o) 


883 


preference  exists.  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce, Ashburn,  Ga.,  v.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  23   I.  C.   C.  140,  149. 

(c)  Initial  line  publishing  a  joint 
rate  lower  than  combination  without 
securing  its  connection's  concurrence 
must,  nevertheless,  protect  such  rate  to 
a  shipper  who  made  a  contract  based 
on  the  lower  rate.  DeCamp  Bros.  &  Yule 
Iron,  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  V.  &  S.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,   22   I.  C.  C.  274,  276. 

(d)  A  joint  rate  over  several  lines 
not  concurred  in  by  such  connecting 
lines  is  in  direct  contravention  of  the 
rules  of  the  Commission  made  under 
section  6.  DeCamp  Bros.  &  Yule  Iron, 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  V.  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
22  I.  C.  C.  274,  276. 

(e)  The  V.  &  S.  W.  Ry.  published, 
in  a  tariff  effective  July  13,  1906,  and 
continued  in  effect  until  Nov.  19,  1908, 
what  purported  to  be  a  joint  through 
rate  of  $4.85  per  ton  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  coke  in  carloads  from  Appa- 
lachia,  Va.,  to  Rusk,  Tex.  In  contra- 
vention of  the  rules  of  the  Commission, 
the  tariff  did  not  show  concurrences  of 
connecting  lines.  No  concurrences  had, 
in  fact,  been  obtained,  but  the  rate  pub- 
lished was  the  then  existing  combina- 
tion rate.  In  August,  1908,  complainant 
made  two  contracts  for  delivery  of  a 
quantity  of  coke  at  Rusk,  Tex.,  basing 
its  bid  on  the  joint  rate.  Later  the  combi- 
nation rate  was  raised  to  $5.85.  HELD, 
that,  following  Rule  68,  Tariff  Circular 
18-A,  complainant  is  entitled  to  repara- 
tion from  the  initial  carrier  upon  the  basis 
of  the  rate  improperly  published  in  its 
tariff.  The  initial  carrier  is  liable  for 
the  careless  manner  in  which  it  pub- 
lisned  this  rate.  DeCamp  Bros.  &  Yule 
Iron,  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  V.  &  S,  W. 
Ry.,  22  I.  C.  C.  274,  276. 

(f)  As  between  two  joint  tariffs, 
naming  different  rates  between  the  same 
points,  the  one  properly  concurred  in  is 
the  legal  rate,  though  it  names  higher 
charges  than  the  other.  Kennedy  &  Co. 
V.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  277. 

(g)  On  carloads  of  apples  from  St. 
Louis,  Mo.,  to  Monroe,  La.,  complainant 
charged  that  a  joint  rate  of  40c  per  100 
lbs.  was  unreasonable  and  showed  that 
a  schedule  had  been  filed  by  defendant, 
the  initial  carrier,  of  34c.  Defendant 
showed  that  connecting  carrier  had  not 
concurred  in  the  lower  rate.  HELD, 
that   the   complainant   was   charged   the 


legal  rate,. and  there  being  no  evidence 
of  its  unreasonableness  complaint  was 
dismissed.  Kennedy  &  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  277. 

(h)  Initial  line  publishing  what  pur- 
ports to  be  a  joint  tariff,  but  which  is 
not  a  legal  tariff,  because  not  concurred 
in  by  connections,  is  liable  in  damages 
for  whatever  amount  the  shipper  suf- 
fers. Edison  Portland  Cement  Co.  v. 
D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  382,  383. 

(i)  A  joint  through  rate  was  held  to 
be  the  legal  rate,  although  all  the  car- 
riers had  not  filed  concurrences,  the 
movement  having  occurred  prior  to  the 
order  of  the  Commission  under  which 
all  tariffs  not  properly  concurred  in 
were  declared  invalid.  Robertson  Paper 
Co.  V.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
254,  255. 

(j)  An  initial  carrier  is  liable  in  dam- 
ages to  a  shipper  where  it  named  a  joint 
through  rate  in  which  connecting  lines 
had  not  concurred,  a  combination  rate 
legally  applicable  being  held  unreason- 
able. Texico  Transfer  Co.  v.  L.  &  N. 
R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  17,  18. 

(k)  The  joint  through  rate  is  the 
legal  rate,  though  a  lower  combination 
exists.  Idaho  Lime  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  139. 

(1)  Where  initial  carrier's  advanced 
rate  tariff  did  not  cancel  lower  com- 
mutation fare  named  in  tariff  of  another 
carrier  to  which  initial  carrier  was  a 
party,  such  lower  rate  was  the  legal 
rate.  The  lawfully  established  rate  re- 
mains in  force  until  specifically  can- 
celed. Stilwell  V.  L.  &  H.  R.  Ry.  Co., 
19  I.   C.  C.  404,  405. 

(m)  Where  no  joint  through  rate  is 
in  effect,  the  combination  of  separately 
established  rates  via  the  route  of  move- 
ment constitutes  the  through  rate.  Fish 
&  Co.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  452. 

(n)  The  joint  through  rate  on  any 
commodity  between  two  given  points  is 
an  entirety  and  is  the  only  rate  that 
lawfully  can  be  applied.  Copper  Queen 
Consolidated  Mining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R. 
R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  154,  156. 

(o)  In  the  absence  of  a  published 
specific  through  rate  between  two 
points,  the  tariff  indicating  no  specific 
way  of  making  up  a  through  rate,  the 
lowest  combination  of  local  rates  over 
the  route  of  the  ^loveme^t  is  the  lawful 


884     THRO  ROUTES  AND  JOINT  RATES,  §22  (oo)— TRACK  STORAGE,  I  (c) 


through  charge.  Contact  Process  Co.  v. 
N.  Y.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
184. 

(oo)  If  no  specific  rate  from  point  of 
origin  to  destination  on  a  through  ship- 
ment is  provided,  and  no  specific  manner 
of  constructing  a  combination  rate  for  it 
is  prescribed,  the  lowest  combination  of 
rates  applicable  via  the  route  over  which 
the  shipment  moves  is  the  lawful  rate 
for  thp*^  shipment.  Porter  v,  St.  L.  &  S. 
F.  R    d.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  1,  4. 

(pj  Notwithstanding  the  presumption 
of  unreasonableness  attaching  to  through 
rate  in  excess  of  combination  of  locals, 
so  long  as  such  rate  remains  In  effeci 
it  must  be  applied.  Momsen  &  Co.  v. 
Gila  Valley,  Globe  &  Northern  Ry.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  614. 

(q)  Carloads  of  coal  from  Springfield, 
111.,  were  consigned  to  complainant 
dealers  at  Kansas  City.  Upon  tneir  ar- 
rival at  that  point  they  were  rebilled 
by  defendant's  agent  to  Salina  and 
Kipp,  Kan.,  the  direction  so  to  rebill 
being  given  by  telephone  and  in  writing 
by  complainant.  Complainant  was  as- 
sessed the  joint  through  rate  from 
Springfield  to  Salina  and  Kipp,  which 
was  in  excess  of  the  local  rates  based 
on  Kansas  City  to  said  destinations. 
HELD,  the  shipments  to  and  from  Kan- 
sas City  were  separate  shipments  and 
the  local  rates  should  have  been  charged 
for  each  shipment.  Reparation  awarded 
on  the  basis  of  the  sum  of  the  locals. 
Laning-Harris  Coal  &  Grain  Co.  v.  M. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  154,  157. 

(r)  Where  a  joint  rate  is  in  effect 
between  points  it  is  the  only  lawful 
rate  applicable,  and  it  is  illegal  to  apply 
the  sum  of  the  locals.  Laning-Harris 
Coal  &  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13 
L   C.   C.  154,   158. 

(s)  Complainant  shipped  wheat  from 
Smolen  and  Falun,  Kan.,  via  Coffey- 
ville  to  Little  Rock,  Ark.,  the  same  be- 
ing manufactured  into  bran  at  Salina, 
Kan.,  where  a  milling-in-transit  privilege 
applied.  The  rate  from  Smolen  to  Lit- 
tle Rock  was  32c  and  from  Falun  to 
Little  Rock  30.75c.  From  Smolen  to 
Kansas  City,  where  a  milling-in-transit 
privilege  was  granted,  and  from  Falun 
to  Kansas  City,  the  rates  were  15c  and 
15 %c,  respectively,  with  a  proportional 
rate  on  the  bran  from  Kansas  City  to 
Little  Rock  of  12.75c.  Defendant's  tar- 
iffs provided  that  the  proportional  rates 


should  not  apply  from  points  where  the 
effect  would  be  to  gain  a  rate  less  than 
the  through  rate,  and  these  proportional 
rates  were  applied  only  where  the  mill- 
ing-in-transit privilege  was  exercised  at 
Kansas  City.  No  evidence  was  offered 
of  the  unreasonableness  of  the  rates 
charged.  HELD,  complainant  was  not 
entitled  to  reparation  on  the  basis  of 
the  lower  rates  from  Smolen  and  Falun 
via  Kansas  City  to  Little  Rock,  since 
such  rates  did  not,  by  the  terms  of  the 
tariffs,  apply  to  his  shipments,  and  the 
rates  charged  were  not  unreasonable 
as  being  in  excess  of  an  alleged  com- 
bination on  Kansas  City.  Marshall 
Michel   Grain   Co.   v.   M.   P.   Ry.   Co.,   13 

I.  C.   C.   566,   568. 

§23.     Procedure. 

See  Procedure  Before  Commission, 
§2  (ii),  §4  (d),  §11  (dd),  (f),  (r),  §13 
(c),    (j),    (u). 

TICKETS. 

See  Passenger  Fares  and  Facilities, 
§15. 

TRACING  SHIPMENTS. 

See  Interstate  Commerce,  §4  (v) ; 
Loss   and    Damage,   §3   (I). 

TRACK  STORAGE. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

II.  REASONABLENESS    AND    LEGAL- 

ITY. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

See  Demurrage,  §1  (e) ;  Procedure 
Before  Commission,  §19  (f). 

(a)  A  state  law  reducing  track-storage 
charges  is  not  applicable  to  interstate 
business.  Wilson  Produce  Co.  v.  Pa.  R. 
R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  116,  121. 

(b)  Since  cartage  charges  may  be  re- 
garded as  a  proper  subject  for  national 
regulation,  Federal  authority  over,  demur- 
rage and  track  storage  charges  in  connec- 
tion with  interstate  commerce  cannot  be 
challenged  and  is  exclusive.  Wilson 
Produce  Co  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
170,  173. 

(c)  Track  storage  charges  when  asso- 
ciated with  an  interstate  movement  ap- 
pertain directly  to  interstate  commerce; 
they  represent  the  carrier's  compensation 
for  services  rendered  in  connection  with 
the  transportation;  a  shipment  is  not 
completed  until  arrival  at  destination  and 
delivery  to  the  consignee;  and  the  au- 
thority vested  in  Congress  by  the  com- 


TRACK  STORAGE,  I  (d)— II  (e) 


885 


merce  clause  of  the  Constitution  covsrs 
everything  relating  to  the  delivery  of 
freight  transported  between  the  states, 
Wilson  Produce  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 

I.  C.  C.  170,  173. 

(d)  Where,  after  the  Commission  has 
ordered  track  storage  charges  to  be  im- 
posed, shippers  are  guilty  of  unnecessary 
delay  in  unloading  their  cars  or  improp- 
erly insist  upon  using  icars  for  storage 
purposes,  the  Commission  will,  upon  ap- 
plication and  showing  to  this  effect,  mod- 
ify its  order  and  increase  such  charges. 
N.  Y.  Hay  Exchange  Assn.  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  178,  186. 

II.  REASONABLENESS    AND    LEGAL- 

ITY. 

(a)  Complainants  attacked  the  reason- 
ableness of  defendant's  rules  in  New  York 
City  for  assessing  track-storage  charges 
in  that  they  did  not  permit  any  refund  of 
charges  collected  for  track  storage  in  the 
event  the  weather  conditions  interfered 
with  loading  or  unloading.  These  charges 
are  primarily  for  the  use  of  the  track 
space  occupied  by  cars  in  the  yards  and 
justified  on  the  ground  that  they  are 
necessary  in  order  to  bring  about  prompt 
release  of  track  space  in  the  interest  of 
the  general  shipping  public  at  certain 
points  where  business  is  very  active  and 
the  track  space  correspondingly  limited. 
On  the  other  hand,  car  demurrage  is  as- 
sessed for  the  purpose  of  proper  regula- 
tion of  the  car  equipment  of  the  carriers 
and  has  a  general  application  to  the  car 
supply  of  the  country  uniformly.  The  de- 
murrage rules  provided  for  a  waiver  of 
charges  thereunder  when  weather  condi- 
tions were  such  as  to  prevent  loading  or 
unloading  without  serious  injury  to  the 
freight,  on  the  ground  that  the  public  is 
entitled  to  a  reasonable  time  in  which  to 
load  or  unload,  which  should  not  be  short- 
ened because  of  serious  adverse  weather 
conditions.  HELD,  that  the  same  pro- 
viso should  apply  with  respect  to  track 
storage  and  the  complainants  are  entitled 
to  reparation  for  the  amount  of  track- 
storage  charges  collected  for  the  deten- 
tion of  cars  on  days  during  which  weather 
conditions  were  such  that  deduction  has 
been  made  from  demurrage  charges  on 
account  thereof.  Murphy  Bros.  v.  N.  Y. 
C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  176. 

(b)  Complainants  attacked  the  track 
storage  charges  of  defendants  in  its  pro- 
duce yards  at  Pittsburg  of  $1  per  car  per 
day  for  the  second  48  hours  after  deliv- 
ery;  $3  per  car  per  day  for  the  third  48 


hours  and  $4  per  caii  for  each  succeeding 
day  or  fraction  thereof,  imposed  in  ad- 
dition to  the  demurrage  charges.  HELD, 
such  charges  are  reasonable,  but  defend- 
ant's track  storage  tariffs  should  be 
amended  so  as  to  waive  such  charges  on 
account  of  weather  interference.  Joynes 
V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  458,  459. 

(c)  Cars  are  primarily  for  transporta- 
tion and  not  for  storage  or  warehouse  pur- 
poses, and  the  public  as  well  as  carriers 
are  vitally  interested  in  the  prompt  re- 
lease of  cars.  Turnbull  Co.  v.  Erie  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  123,  125. 

(d)  Following  the  decision  in  N.  Y.  H 
E.  Assn.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
178,  establishing  track  storage  charges  on 
hay  at  New  York,  defendant  allowed  48 
hours'  free  time  computed  from  the  first 
7  a.  m.  after  the  car  is  placed  on  the  team 
track;  for  the  next  succeeding  two  days, 
$1.00  per  car  per  day  or  fraction  thereof; 
for  each'  succeeding  day,  $2  per  day 
or  fraction  thereof.  Oats  were  bagged 
and  weighed  in  the  car  after  arrival, 
and  it  required  about  three  days  on 
the  average  to)  unload  a  car.  The  job- 
ber purchasing  of  complainant  shipper 
was  given  three  days  to  load  and  cart 
away  the  oats.  The  unloading  service 
performed  by  shippers  was  paid  for  by 
the  jobber.  Track  storage  grain  com- 
peted with  elevator  grain,  from  which 
grain  could  be  taken  without  track  stor- 
age charges.  A  part  of  the  two  days' 
free  time  was  consumed  in  lightering  the 
oats  from  the  Jersey  side  to  the  Manhat- 
tan side  of  the  Hudson  River.  HELD, 
that  in  view  of  the  fact  that  cars  are  pri- 
marily for  transportation  and  not  for  stor- 
age or  warehouse  purposes,  and  that  the 
public  is  vitally  interested  in  the  prompt 
release  of  cars,  the  charges  were  not  un- 
reasonable. Turnbull  Co.  v.  E.  R.  R.  Co  , 
17  I.  C.  C.  123,  125. 

(e)  The  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  after  the  ex- 
piration of  48  hours'  free  time,  charged  on 
fruit  and  produce,  track  storage  on  car- 
load freight,  at  the  Pennsylvania  Lines' 
Produce  Yards,  Pittsburg,  as  follows:  For 
the  first  two  days,  $1.00  per  car;  for  the 
next  succeeding  two  days,  $3.00  per  car 
per  day;  for  each  succeeding  day,  $4.00 
per  car.  The  reasonableness  of  such 
rates  was  raised  in  Wilson  Produce  Com- 
pany V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  170. 
Upon  rehearing,  it  appeared  that  these 
yards  at  Pittsburg  were  used  by  produce 
traders  for  selling  purposes,  and  that 
about  95  per  cent  of  all  fruit  and  produce 


886 


TRACK  STORAGE,  II   (f)— (I) 


received  at  Pittsbift'g  was  received  there. 
The  track  storage  charges  were  instituted 
to  prevent  the  congestion  of  traffic  and 
to  release  defendant's  cars.  The  practice 
of  using  these  yards  hy  produce  traders 
for  selling  purposes  was  permitted  in 
their  interest  and  it  would  injuriously  af- 
fect them  if  it  were  forbidden.  In  Balti- 
more, Philadelphia  and  other  cities,  in 
the  same  territory,  fruit  and  prodi»ice  were 
consigned  to  many  different  yards  and 
conditions  of  ^congestion  did  not  exist 
there.  HELD,  the  track  storage  charges 
were  reasonable  and  proper  to  enable  de- 
fendant to  clear  its  yards,  release  its  cars 
and  relieve  it  from  the  burden  of  furnish- 
ing warehouse  facilities.  Wilson  Produce 
Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.C.  116,  121, 
122. 

(f)  The  fact  that  other  railroads  do 
not  impose  track  storage  charges  at  Pitts- 
burg on  fruit,  does  not  constitute  a  cri- 
terion by  which  to  test  their  legitimacy, 
for  if  they  are  neither  unreasonable  nor 
discriminatory  defendant  cannot  be  en- 
joined from  imposing  them  merely  be- 
cause its  competitors  do  not  see  fit  to  do 
so.  Wilson  Produce  Co.  v.  Penn  R  R. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  170,  175. 

(g)  The  value  of  the  service  rendered 
by  a  railroad  in  supplying  track  storage  is 
not  conclusive  of  the  reasonableness  of 
the  schedule;  it  must  be  judged  in  the 
light  of  its  general  purpose;  and  the  fact 
that  warehousemen  in  the  city  in  ques- 
tion are  content  with  a  lower  charge  for 
storage  service  is  not  conclusive  since 
the  railroad  does  not  hold  itself  out  as  a 
warehousman  with  respect  to  its  cars  and 
tracks.  Wilson  Produce  Co.  v.  Penn.  R. 
R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  170,  175. 

(h)  Defendant  allowed  at  Pittsburg 
48  hours'  free  time  for  track  storage.  For 
the  second  48  hours  a  charge  of  $1  a  day 
was  exacted;  for  the  third  48  hours  $3 
per  day;  and  for  each  succeeding  day  or 
fraction  thereof  $4,  until  the  car  was  re- 
leased. HELD,  such  charges  being  for 
the  purpose  of  inducing  consignees  to  re- 
lease cars  were  legitimate.  Wilson  Pro- 
duce Co.  V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  170. 

(i)  Defendant  assessed  track  storage 
charges  on  fruit  at  Pittsburg  in  one  of  its 
yards.  At  its  other  yards  in  that  city 
where  fruit  was  not  regularly  received,  no 
such  charge  was  made  on  fruit  or  other 
icommodities,  and  defendant  made  no 
charge  for  storage  at  Baltimore  or  Phila- 
delphia, where  there  was  water  competi- 
tion, and  where  it  did  not  appear  there 


was  competition  with  Pittsburg,  nor  did 
it  make  such  charge  at  other  cities  in 
Pennsylvania.  HELD,  such  facts  did  not 
indicate  that  the  practice  constituted 
a  discrimination  between  localities,  com- 
modities and  citi€S,  since  it  may  have 
been  forced  upon  the  carrier  by  controll- 
ing circumstances.  Wilson  Produce  Co. 
V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C  170. 

(j)  Where  its  track  storage  tariff  ap- 
plies only  to  produce  yards,  a  carrier 
must  refund  charges  for  track  storage  col- 
lected for  detention  of  cars  in  its  "metal" 
yards.  Wilson  Produce  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  170,  176. 

.  (k)  In  most  of  the  railroad  yards  in 
New  York  to  which  hay  is  consigned  no 
storehouses  are  provided,  and  it  has  long 
been  the  custom  for  consignees  to  use 
the  cars  for  storage  purposes  and  sell  the 
hay  therefrom.  Storage  charges,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  regular  demurrage  charges, 
were  assessed  by  defendant  railroads.  It 
appeared  that  such  charges  were  neces- 
sary in  order  fairly  to  compensate  the  rail- 
roads for  the  cost  of  maintaining  their 
yards  and  to  expedite  the  conduct  of  busi- 
ness. Storage  charges  were  assessed  in 
San  Francisco  and  Oakland,  Cal.,  and  in 
Pittsburg,  Pa.,  but  not  elsewhere.  No 
competitive  conditions  existed  which 
would  divert  the  marketing  of  hay  from 
New  York  on  account  of  these  charges. 
The  practical  result  was  simply  to  impose 
a  larger  burden  upon  the  consumer. 
HELD,  such  charges  did  not  constitute  an 
unlawful  discrimination  as  to  localities. 
N.  Y.  Hay  Exchange  Ass'n  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  178,  187. 

(1)  The  regular  demurrage  charges  on 
hay  consigned  to  defendants'  yards  in 
New  York  was  $1  a  day,  allowing  for  a 
free  period  of  48  hours,  beginning  at  7 
o'clock  a.  m.  on  the  day  next  following 
that  upon  which  the  car  was  placed  for 
unloading.  The  commission  dealers  in 
complainant  association  were  accustomed 
to  bring  their  buyers  to  the  cars  in  the 
yards  and  makes  sales  therefrom.  Acting 
with  reasonable  diligence  they  paid  on  an 
average  of  from  $1  to  $2  per  ear  for  de- 
murrage charges.  The  total  of  such 
charges  each  year  yielded  to  the  defend- 
ants less  than  the  interest  upon  the  cap- 
ital invested  in  the  yards.  Defendants  es- 
tablished, in  addition  to  the  regular  de- 
murrage charges,  the  following  track 
storage  charges.  For  the  first  two  days, 
nothing;  for  the  third  day,  $1;  for  the 
fourth  day,  $2;  for  the  fifth  day,  $3;  for 


TRACK  STORAGE,  II  (m)— TRANSPORTATION,  §1  (i) 


887 


the  sixth  day,  $4,  and  for  the  seventh  day 
and  each  succeeding  day,  $5.  It  appeared 
that  shippers  had  been  unnecessarily  de- 
taining cars  under  load  in  the  yards  and 
that  some  1,000  cars  were  so  detained  for 
ten  days  and  over  in  New  York  and 
Brooklyn.  HELD,  the  storage  charges 
were  excessive  and  should  be  reduced  to 
$1  per  day  for  the  third  and  fourth  days 
and  $2  per  day  for  the  fifth  and  subse- 
quent days,  in  addition  to  the  regular  de- 
murrage charges.  N.  Y.  Hay  Exchange 
Ass'n  V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  178, 
186. 

(m)  Demurrage  charges  are  imposed 
as  a  penalty  to  influence  shippers  prompt- 
ly to  unload  and  release  the  equipment  of 
the  railroad,  and  track  storage  charges, 
in  addition  to  regular  demurrage  charges, 
are  allowable  as  are  reasonably  required 
to  prevent  unnecessary  delay  in  the  dis- 
charge of  carload  freight.  N.  Y.  Hay  Ex- 
change V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
178,  185. 

TRAIN   MILE  REVENUE. 

See   Evidence,   §8. 

TRANSIT. 

See    Facilities    and    Privileges,    §15. 

TRANSPORTATION. 

I.     WHAT       IS       TRANSPORTATION 
SERVICE. 
§1.     In  general. 
II.     DUTY    OF    CARRIER    TO    TRANS- 
PORT. 

§2.     In  general. 
§3.     Company  material. 
§4.     Collection  of  charges. 
§5.     Delivery. 

§6.     Notifying  iconsignor  of  re- 
jection. 
§7.     Prompt  and   safe   carriage. 
§8.     Special  service. 
§9.     State  interference. 
§10.     Unloading  at  terminal. 
§11.     When  transit  ends.      * 
III.     OPERATION   OF   RAILROAD. 

§12.     Right   of   carrier    to    make 

regulations. 
§13.     Economy    of    management. 
§14.     What     are     operating     ex- 
penses. 

CROSS  REFERENCES. 
See  Assorting  Packages;  Crimes,  §12; 
Exclusive  Contract;  Facilities  and 
Privileges;  Refrigeration,  §13;  Tap 
Lines;  Track  Storage;  Water  Car- 
riers. 


I.     WHAT  IS  TRANSPORTATION  SER- 
VICE. 

§1.     In  General. 

See  Allowances,  §10,  §11,  §12;  Bag- 
gage Transfer,  I  (d);  Tap  Lines, 
§3  (1)    (b),  §3  (2)   (b). 

(a)  The  Commission  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion over  local  baggage  transfer  agencies, 
their  business  not  being  a  transportation 
service,  but  merely  incidental  thereto. 
Cosby  V.  Richmond  Transfer  Co.,  23  1.  C. 
C.  72,  74. 

(b)  Whether  a  company  or  person 
claiming  to  be  a  common  carrier  is  a  com- 
mon carrier  at  all  and  for  all  purposes  is 
a  question  of  fact,  and  whether  the  ser- 
vice performed  for  a  particular  person  is 
a  service  of  transportation  or  an  indus- 
trial service  is  also  a  question  of  fact. 
The  Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  277,  292. 

Cc)  What  is  a  plant  facility  cannot 
also  be  a  common  carrier  for  the  plant, 
and  what  is  an  industrial  service  cannot 
also  be  a  service  of  transportation.  The 
Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  277,  298. 

(d)  Trimming  or  leveling  coal  in  tCe^ 
holds  of  ships  is  a  necessary  service  in 
connection  with  the  transportation  of  coal 
by  water,  and,  where  performed  by  the 
rail  carriers,  it  must  be  regarded  as  a 
part  of  the  delivery.  Whether  or  not  de- 
fendants might  legally  be  compelled  to 
render  such  service,  when  they  undertake 
to  do  so,  any  charge  therefore  is  subject 
to  regulation  by  the  Commission.  New 
England  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  398,  400. 

(e)  The  dumping  and  "trimming"  or 
leveling  of  coal  in  a  vessel  are  regarded 
as  a  part  of  the  transportation  service 
where  such  acts  are  contracted  to  be  per- 
formed by  the  railroads.  New  England 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22 
I.  C.  C.  398,  401. 

(f)  Transportation  includes  the  fur- 
nishing of  a  car.  Arlington  Heights 
Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 
106,  117. 

(g)  A  telegraph  office  at  a  station  is 
no  part  of  the  transportation  service. 
Southwestern  Produce  Distributers  v.  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  458,  460. 

(h)  A  telephone  office  at  a  station  is 
no  part  of  the  transportation  service. 
Southwestern  Produce  Distributers  v.  W. 
R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  458,  460. 

(i)  A  barber  shop  at  a  station  is  not 
part  of  the  transportation  service.    South- 


888 


TRANSPORTATION,  §1   (j)— §2   (g) 


western  Produce  Distributers  v.  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  458,  460. 

(j)  The  transfer  service  at  a  station 
is  no  part  of  the  transportation  service. 
Southwestern  Produce  Distributers  v. 
W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  458,  460. 

(k)  A  restaurant  at  a  station  is  no 
part  of  the  transportation  service.  South- 
western Produce  Distributers  v.  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  458,  460. 

(1)  Cab  offices  at  stations  are  no  part 
of  the  transportation  service.  Southwest- 
ern Produce  Distributers  v.  W.  R.  R.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  458,  460. 

(m)  A  news  stand  at  a  station  is  not 
part  of  the  transportation  service.  South- 
western Produce  Distributers  v.  W.  R.  R. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  458,  460. 

(n)  Transportation  from  a  seaport  of 
the  United  States  or  an  adjacent  foreign 
country  to  an  interior  American  destina- 
tion in  completion  of  a  through  movement 
of  freight  from  a  port  of  a  foreign  but  not 
adjacent  country,  whether  upon  a  joint 
through  rate  or  upon  a  separately  estab- 
lished or  proportional  inland  rate  appli- 
cable only  to  imports  moving  through,  is 
not  a  "like  service"  to  that  of  the  trans- 
portation independent  and  complete  with- 
in itself  of  traffic  starting  at  such  do- 
mestic port,  though  bound  for  the  same 
destination.  Pittsburg  Plate  Glass  Co. 
V.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
87,  100. 

N.     DUTY    OF    CARRIER    TO    TRANS- 
PORT. 

§2.     In  General. 

See  Common  Carrier,  §6;  Equaliza- 
tion of  Rates,  §3  (s) ;  Facilities  and 
Privileges,  §1    (g). 

(a)  Railroad  icompanies  may  contract 
with  shippers  for  a  single  transportation 
or  for  successive  transportations,  subject 
though  it  may  be  to  a  change  of  rates  in 
the  manner  provided  in  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act.  I.  C.  C  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  209  U.  S.  108,  119,  28  Sup.  Ct.  493, 
52,  L.  ed.  705. 

(b)  Under  Section  1  of  the  Act  as 
amended  June  29,  1906,  providing  that 
"it  shall  be  the  duty  of  every  carrier  sub- 
ject to  the 'Provisions  of  the  Act  to  pro- 
vide and  furnish  such  transportation  upon 
a  reasonable  request  therefor,"  the  term 
transportation  includes  all  kinds  of  in- 
strumentality of  shipment  and  carriage. 
United  States  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  1«5 
Fed.  113.  121. 


(c)  Transportation  does  not  fail  to 
constitute  interstate  commerce,  within 
the  meaning  of  the  Act  as  amended,  from 
the  fact  that  the  carrier  performs  the 
service  gratuitously.  United  States  v. 
Wells  Fargo  Express  Co.,  161  Fed.  606, 
613. 

(d)  The  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  being  the  only 
line  having  rails  extending  to  South  To- 
coma,  is  entitled,  in  protection  of  its  in- 
vestment, to  conduct  traffic  between 
South  Tacoma  and  other  points  on  its  line 
on  a  preferred  basis;  and  shippers  who 
desire  to  use  a  competing  line  ought  not 
to  object  to  paying,  in  addition  to  the 
Tacoma  rate,  a  reasonable  charge  to  the 
N.  P.  Ry.  Co.  for  its  local  haul  between 
Tacoma  and  South  Tacoma.  Public  Ser- 
vice Co.  of  Wash.  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.  C.  256. 

(e)  A  shipper  may  not  use  a  carrier 
subject  to  the  Act  or  its  agent  as  his 
agent  for  the  purpose  of  receiving  con- 
signments of  property  and  rebilling  the 
same  in  order  to  break  an  interstate 
journey  or  make  an  intrastate  one. 
The  Commission's  authority  is  confined 
to  carriers  subject  to  the  Act,  and  until  a 
carrier  becomes  subject  to  the  Act  vol- 
untarily or  as  a  matter  of  law,  the  Com- 
mission's rule  as  to  a  shipper  availing 
himself  of  such  carrier  as  his  agent  does 
not  apply.  (Lane,  comm'r,  concurring 
opinion.)  In  Re  Transportation  by  the 
C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  207,  209. 

(f)  The  Act  does  not  contemplate  that 
movements  of  interstate  traffic  may  de- 
pend merely  upon  the  willingness  of  car- 
riers to  accommodate  shippers.  Brook- 
Rauch  Mill  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M. 
&  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  651,  653. 

(g)  Complainant  shipped  a  carload  of 
corn  from  Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Little  Rock, 
Ark.,  over  the  Iron  Mountain  R.  R.,  to  be 
there  milled  and  reshipped  to  Fordyce, 
Ark.,  over  the  Cotton  Belt  R.  R.  The  ship- 
ment moved  under  a  tariff  naming  a 
through  rate  from  Omaha  to  Fordyce  via 
Argenta,  Ark.,  to  which  the  inbound  and 
outbound  carriers  were  parties,  in  connec- 
tion with  a  later  tariff  granting  transit 
privileges  at  Little  Rock,  a  point  not  on 
the  Cotton  Belt's  line,  its  junction  with 
the  Iron  Mountain  R.  R.  being  at  Argenta. 
To  this  later  tariff  the  Cotton  Belt  R.  R. 
was  not  a  party.  Both  carriers  refused 
to  furnish  transportation  equipment  for 
the  outbound  movement  from  Little  Rock, 
each  claiming  it  was  the  duty  of  the  other 
to  do  so.  HELD,  that  the  Cotton  Belt's 
obligation  under  the  tariff  to  which  it  was 


TRANSPORTATION,  §2   (h)  — (q) 


889 


a  party  does  not  accrue  until  delivery  to 
its  own  rails  and  the  duty  to  furnish 
equipment  for  outbound  movements  from 
complainant's  mill  rests  upon  the  inbound 
carrier,  the  Iron  Mountain.  Brook-Rauch 
Mill  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  651,  656. 

(h)  If  a  carrier  transports  private  cars 
of  any  class,  it  must  in  like  manner  and 
upon  like  terms  transport  all  private  cars 
used  for  the  same  or  similar  purposes. 
Chappelle  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 
56,  59. 

(i)  A  road  is  built  and  operated  as  a 
whole.  Traffic  Bureau  of  Merchants'  Ex- 
change of  San  Francisco  v,  S.  P.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  259,  261. 

(j)  It  is  the  duty  of  an  interstate  car- 
rier to  receive  interstate  shipments,  issue 
receipts  therefor,  indicate  on  waybills  the 
final  destinations,  and  transport  and  de- 
liver to  its  connecting  carriers;  and  it  is 
the  duty  of  connecting  carriers  to  trans- 
port and  deliver  at  destinations,  each  car- 
rier charging  for  its  service  its  legally 
published  rate.  Corporation  Commission 
of  Oklahoma  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17 
I.  C.  C.  379. 

(k)  The  chief  function  of  a  common 
carrier  is  to  carry,  at  reasonable  rates 
traffi'3  tendered  to  it.  As  a  general  rule, 
an  interstate  carrier  has  no  right,  at  least 
under  ordinary  circumstances,  to  choose, 
or  in  any  way  to  control,  the  markets  in 
which  its  shippers  may  buy  or  sell  their 
wares.  Its  duty  is  to  transport  the  mer- 
chandise of  shippers  in  accordance  with 
their  reasonable  instructions,  and  it  may 
demand  nothing  beyond  a  reasonable  com- 
pensation for  the  services  rendered.  It 
cannot  force  its  services  upon  a  shipper 
or  insist  upon  carrying  his  shipment  to 
one  market  when  he  desires  to  reach  an- 
other. It  has  no  right  to  insist  that  a 
shipment  shall  go  to  the  end  of  its  rails 
if  the  shipper  desires  it  to  be  diverted  at 
an  intermediate  point  to  another  market 
off  its  rails.  Nor  may  a  carrier  accom- 
plish these  results  indirectly  by  any  un- 
reasonable adjustment  of  its  rate  sched- 
ules with  that  end  in  view.  It  cannot 
lawfully  compel  the  shipping  public  to 
contribute  to  its  revenues  on  any  such 
grounds.  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Mil- 
waukee V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
460,  464. 

(1)  The  operation  of  a  rule  that  inflam- 
mable oils  will  be  delivered  but  one  day 
in  a  week  unduly  prefers  large  shippers 
with  tank  stations  from  which  they  make 


deliveries  by  wagon.  National  Petroleum 
Ass'n  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  1.  C.  C. 
473,  476. 

(m)  The  questions  of  the  use  of  ad- 
ditional equipment  and  the  expense  in- 
volved to  the  carriers  are  not  controlling 
in  determining  whether  the  operation  of 
a  railroad  limiting  shipments  to  certain 
days  of  the  week  is  unjustly  discrimina- 
tory against  any  class  of  shippers.  Na- 
tional Petroleum  Ass'n  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  473,  477.      * 

(n)  A  carrier  cannot  be  compelled  to 
make  free  out-of-line  hauls  in  order  to 
serve  the  interests  of  grain  dealers  of  a 
particular  city.  Kansas  City  Transporta- 
tion Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  491,  496. 

(o)  It  is  the  duty  of  a  common  carrier 
to  receive  and  carry,  upon  reasonable 
terms,  all  goods  tendered  in  suitable  con- 
dition, and  it  can  not  lawfully  discrim- 
inate in  favor  of  any  person,  product  or 
'ocality.  Standard  Lime  &  Stone  Co.  v. 
Cumberland  Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
620,  622,  623. 

(p)  The  relations  between  shipper  ani 
carrier  are  different  from  those  between 
private  enterprises.  Piieblo  Transp. 
Ass'n  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  82,  85. 

(q)  A  state  statute  prescribed  a  pen- 
alty against  carriers  for  refusal  to  accept 
freight  for  shipment.  Plaintiff  tendered 
to  defendant  in  such  state  goods  for  ship- 
ment to  another  state.  Defendant's  line 
did  not  reach,  and  it  had  not  filed  with 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  a 
joint  rate,  to  the  destination  in  question. 
The  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  section  6, 
requires  a  carrier  to  file  with  the  Commis- 
sion rates  to  all  points  on  its  own  line 
and,  where  joint  rates  have  been  estab- 
lished with  other  carriers,  to  file  such 
rates.  HELD,  defendant  was  liable  under 
the  state  statute  for  failure  to  accept  th9 
goods.  If  it  had  failed  to  comply  with 
the  Federal  statute  in  filing  rates,  this 
did  not  relieve  it  of  its  duty  to  receive  the 
freight.  It  could  not  be  expected  that  a 
freight  rate  to  every  railroad  section  in 
the  Union  must  be  established  and  pub- 
lished before  defendant  could  receive 
freight  for  any  point  outside  the  state. 
The  Federal  statute  does  not  prohibit  the 
receipt  or  forwarding  of  a  single  ship- 
ment, but  forbids  the  carrier  to  "engage 
or  participate  in  the  transportation  of 
passengers  or  property"  interstate,  with- 
out filing  its  rates.  It  is  the  business  of  a 
common  carrier,  which  the  defendant  is 


890 


TRANSPORTATION,  §3  (a)— §5  (a) 


forbidden  to  exercise  without  filing  rates. 
Defendant  could  have  received  the  goods 
to  he  shipped  to  the  end  of  its  line,  there 
to  be  delivered  to  other  carriers  to  be 
transported  to  destination,  and  a  hill  of 
lading  made  out  showing  such  fact, 
(Brown  and  Walker,  J.  J.,  dissenting.) 
Reid  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  153  N.  C.  490, 
493;  69  S.  E.  -GIS. 

§3.  Company  Material. 
See  Evidence,  §46. 
(a)  Carriers  buying  what  would  ulti- 
mately become  company  material,  con- 
tracted with  shippers  located  off  their 
lines  and  agreed  that  if  the  vendor  would 
bill  the  shipment  beyond  a  designated 
junction  point,  at  which  their  own  lines 
and  the  lines  of  the  initial  carriers  meet, 
the  purchasing  carrier  would  absorb  its 
own  division  of  the  joint  through  rate,  and 
the  shippers  assume  only  that  portion  of 
the  joint  through  rate  which  accrued  to 
the  initial  carriers  as  their  division  of  the 
rate  up  to  the  junction  point  designated 
in  the  billing.  HELD,  this  practice  re- 
sults in  the  application  of  a  portion  of  a 
joint  rate  from  the  point  of  origin  to  the 
junction  point  for  the  benefit  of  a  par- 
ticular shipper,  which  is  not  published 
for  the  public  a*  large  nor  filed  with  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  under 
section  6  of  the  Act.  Nor  is  it  material 
whether  the  contractor  for  a  carrier,  or 
the  purchasing  carrier  itself,  is  the  con- 
signor. In  either  case  the  shipment 
should  be  billed  and  continuously  trans- 
ported from  point  of  origin  through  the 
junction  point  of  the  purchasing  car- 
rier and  to  the  point  of  final  desti- 
nation on  the  purchasing  carrier's  line. 
The  purchasing  carrier  is  then  clearly 
entitled  to  its  division  of  the  joint 
rate  and  the  charge  which  it  must  pay  on 
its  shipment  of  material  to  the  junction 
point  is  the  division  of  the  rate  accruing 
to  the  initial  carrier  and  connections,  if 
any,  up  to  the  junction  point  in  question. 
If  the  shipment  is  billed  or  is  actually  car 
ried  only  to  the  junction  point  of  the  pur- 
chasing carrier,  whether  the  carrier  or  it? 
contractor  or  other  private  party  acts  a? 
consignor,  the  division  of  a  joint  rate  can- 
not apply  unless  this  division  has  been 
lawfully  published  as  applicable  to  move- 
ments to  such  junction  point  for  ship 
ment  beyond.  The  Act  to  Regulate  Com- 
merce gives  no  indication  that  either  car- 
riers or  contractors  who  furnish  company 
materials  and  supplies  are  to  be  preferred 
over  other  individuals  so  far  as  rates  are 
concerned.     The    published    rate    is   the 


only  lawful  rate  and  is  applicable  to  all 
alike  without  distinction.  If  one  shippsr 
is  to  have  the  advantage  of  such  a  di- 
vision of  a  through  rate  then  all  other 
shippers  should  have  the  same  advantage, 
and  the  only  way  to  secure  this  advantage 
to  one  is  to  publish  it  available  for  all.  A 
carrier  acting  in  the  capacity  of  shipper 
or  consignor  stands  upon  a  footing  of  ab- 
solute equality  with  every  other  shipper 
with  respect  to  the  application  of  pub- 
lished rates  to  such  shipments  except  in 
regard  to  that  part  of  a  joint  rate  which 
accrues  upon  the  purchasing  carrier's  own 
line.  Practice  condemned  and  complaint 
dismissed.  Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  St. 
L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  270,  272, 
273,  275. 

(b)  The  local  haul  to  a  junction  point 
is  a  different  service  from  that  performed 
to  the  same  point  as  part  of  a  through 
haul  to  a  destination  beyond,  and  the  fact 
that  fictitious  billing  may  be  resorted  to 
to  secure  the  unlawful  application  of  the 
division  of  a  joint  rate  for  that  service  is 
no  reason  for  condemning  the  lawful  prac- 
tice of  billing  bona  fide  through  ship- 
ments to  ultimate  destination  at  the 
through  rate.  False  or  fictitious  billing 
of  company  material  with  intent  to  de- 
feat the  application  of  the  lawful  rate  for 
the  service  actually  performed  like  other 
fraudulent  practices  with  like  intent 
would  subject  the  guilty  party  to  the  pen- 
alties of  the  law  for  offenses  of  this  sort 
in  general.  Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  L. 
Ry.  &  N.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  280,  282. 

§4.     Collection  of  Charges. 

(a)  Under  the  law  and  the  long  es- 
tablished custom  a  carrier  has  the  right 
to  require  prepayment  of  its  charges,  or  to 
transport  the  freight  and  collect  all  of 
such  charges  on  delivery  thereof,  or  to 
accept  part  of  the  charges  in  prepayment 
and  collect  the  remainder  upon  delivery. 
In  re  Transportation  of  Company  Mate- 
rial, 22  L  C.  C.  439,  440. 

§5.     Delivery. 

See      Express      Companies,      §1      (I); 
Routing  and  IVIisroutlng,  §3  (k). 

(a)  In  the  absence  of  special  contract 
or  usage  to  the  contrary,  under  the  com- 
mon law,  carriers  by  land  are  bound  to 
deliver  or  tender  goods  to  consignee  at 
his  residence  or  place  of  business,  and 
until  this  is  done  they  are  not  relieved 
from  responsibility  as  carriers.  This  rule, 
however,  never  has  applied  to  railroads. 
They  are  exempt  from  personal  delivery 
and  bound  only  to  carry  the  goods  to  the 


TRANSPORTATION,  §6  (a)— §11  (a) 


891 


depot  or  station  to  which  they  were  con- 
signed and  there  haul  or  place  them  in  a 
warehouse  ready  for  delivery  whenever 
the  consignee  or  owner  calls  for  them, 
after  notifying  the  consignee  or  owner  of 
their  readiness  to  deliver.  A.  T.  &  S,  F. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  229,  237;  S.  P. 
Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  241. 

§6.     Notifying  Consignor  of  Rejection. 
See  Notice. 

(a)  It  is  to  the  interest  of  the  public 
that  the  consignor  should  be  promptly 
notified  when  a  shipment  is  not  delivered. 
Kehoe  &  Co.  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  555,  556. 

(b)  The  Commission  will  not  impose 
on  the  carrier  the  duty  of  telegraphing 
to  consignor  in  the  event  that  shipment 
is  refused  by  consignee  or  latter  cannot 
b-e  found.  Present  practice  not  unreason- 
able. Kehoe  &  Co.  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  555. 

§7.     Prompt  and  Safe  Carriage. 

(a)  The  prompt  and  safe  carriage  of 
goods  is  an  obligation  enforced  upon  car- 
rier by  the  common  law  and  not  by  the 
Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  Blume  &  Co. 
V.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  53,  54. 

§8.     Special  Service. 

See   Express  Companies,   §2;   Tlirough 
Routes   and   Joint   Rates,   §15   (vv). 

(a)  A  speed  of  between  ten  and  eleven 
miles  an  hour,  including  stops  at  divi- 
sional points,  is  nothing  more  than  ordi- 
nary merchandise  schedule.  Arlington 
Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co  19 
I.  C.  C.  148,  152. 

(b)  Ice  moved  from  Jersey  points  to 
Hoboken  and  Jersey  City  and  was  loaded 
during  the  day  and  delivered  for  unload- 
ing the  next  morning.  From  Mountain 
points,  Pennsylvania,  to  Philadelphia  and 
the  Hudson  River,  it  was  loaded  one  day, 
taken  from  the  ice-house  the  following 
morning  and  delivered  for  unloading  the 
next  morning.  The  ice  was  brought  in  from 
the  ice  houses  over  switching  lines  a  mile 
or  more  in  length  by  the  carriers  and 
usually  moved  in  solid  trains  to  point  of 
destination.  From  Mountain  points  to 
Hoboken  and  New  Jersey  the  distance 
was  110  miles.  To  Philadelphia  from 
mountain  points  the  distance  was  140 
miles.  The  traffic  was  loaded  for  the 
most  part  into  ordinary  box  cars.  HELD, 
while  the  service  rendered  might  properly 
be  styled  "special"  service,  it  was  not  an 


"expedited"  service.     Mountain  Ice  Co.  v. 
D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  305,  316. 

§9.     State  Interference. 

See  Express  Companies,  §1!/2;  Inter- 
state Commerce,  §4. 

(a)  Section  5258,  Rev.  Stat,  of  the  U. 
S.,  authorizes  every  railroad  company  to 
carry  upon  and  over  its  road  freight  and 
property  from  any  state  to  another  state 
and  to  connect  with  roads  of  other  states 
so  as  to  form  continuous  lines  for  the 
transportation  of  the  same  te  the  place  of 
destination.  HELD,  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Act,  taken  in  connection  with  this 
statute,  does  not  forbid  the  enforcement 
of  a  state  statute  providing  for  an  attach- 
ment within  the  state  of  a  freight  car, 
not  in  actual  use,  owned  by  a  foreign  rail- 
road company  and  sent  to  the  state  in 
prosecution  of  interstate  traffic.  De 
Rochemont  v.  Railroad,  75  N.  H.  158,  163, 
71  A.  868. 

§10,     Unloading  at  Terminal. 

See  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §10; 
Tariffs,  §15  (a);  Terminal  Facili- 
ties. 

(a)  Duty  of  loading  and  unloading  car- 
load freight  rests  on  shipper.  Commer- 
cial Club  of  Omaha  v.  B.  &  "O.  R  R.  Co., 
19  1.  C.  C.  397,  401. 

(b)  A  carrier  should  grant  reasonable 
time  after  arrival  to  unload.  Peale.  Pea- 
cock &  Kerr  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  25,  35. 

§11.     When  Transit  Ends, 

See  Interstate  Commerce,  §1;  Track 
Storage,  I   (c), 

(a)  Complainants  shipped  stock  sheep 
Dryden  and  Sanderson,  Tex.,  to  Soldani, 
Okla.,  via  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  R.  to  San  An- 
tonio, Tex.,  thence  via  M.  K.  &  T.  R.  R. 
to  Fort  Worth,  Tex.,  563  miles  from  Dry- 
den and  584  miles  from  Sanderson,  thencs 
via  G.  C.  &  Santa  Fe  and  A.  T.  &  Santa 
Fe  Rys.  to  Soldani,  314  miles  further. 
Charges  to  Fort  Worth  were  paid  of  30c 
per  100  lbs.  There  the  sheep  were  un- 
loaded, fed,  watered  and  reloaded  and 
transported  under  new  bills  of  lading  to 
destination  under  a  rate  of  2414c  per  100 
lbs.  Complainant  asked  reparation  to  the 
extent  the  charges  exacted  exceeded  the 
rate  on  stock  cattle.  HELD,  that  the 
freight  charges  up  to  Fort  Worth  having 
been  paid  at  that  point,  the  property  was 
delivered  into  the  possession  of  the  ship- 
per and  a  new  contract  with  another  car- 
rier was  executed,  although  it  was  the  in- 
tention undoubtedly  of  the  shipper  to  for- 
ward the  sheep  from  point  of  origin  to 


892 


TRANSPORTATION,  §11    (b)— §12    (b) 


Soldani.  His  intention  was  immaterial 
and  the  question  whether  a  particular 
shipment  is  subject  to  state  or  federal 
laws  must  be  determined  by  examination 
of  the  contract  for  transportation.  The 
sheep  were  consigned  to  an  agent  of 
the  complainants  at  Fort  Worth  and  the 
original  bills  of  lading  issued  to  that 
point.  As  to  the  movement  to  Fort 
Worth  the  charges  therefor  were  for  an 
intrastate  movement  and  not  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Commission.  Upon 
the  record  as  it  stands  the  rate  from 
Fort  Worth  to  Soldani  not  found  un- 
reasonable. Complaint  dismissed.  Big 
Canon  Ranch  Co.  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co. 
20  I.  C.  C.  523. 

(b)  Complainant  shipped  from  Metrop- 
olis, 111.,  to  itself  at  Chicago,  via  I.  C.  R.  R. 
"care  Pere  Marquette  Railway  at  River- 
dale,  111.,"  one  carload  of  grape  baskets. 
Before  arrival  of  the  car  at  Riverdale  com- 
plainant instructed  the  Pere  Marquette 
to  forward  it  to  C.  W.  Harper,  Lawton 
Mich.  At  Riverdale  the  P.  M.  Ry.  took 
possession  of  the  car,  advanced  the 
charges  thereon  to  the  I.  C.  R.  R.  and  re- 
billed  the  shipment  via  its  own  line, 
Hartford,  Mich.,  and  the  K.  L.  S.  &  C.  R. 
R.  The  charges  exacted  were  19i/4c  to 
Riverdale  and  15c  Riverdale  to  Lawton. 
Complainant  contended  the  rates  lawfully 
in  effect  were  10c  Metropolis  to  Chicago, 
and  10c  Chicago  to  Lawton.  HELD,  by 
the  terms  of  the  bill  of  lading  issued  by 
defendant  I.  C.  R.  R.  only  a  movement 
from  Metropolis,  111.,  to  Chicago,  111.,  was 
contracted  for  and  there  was  nothing  to 
indicate  that  the  shipment  would  ulti- 
mately find  its  way  outside  the  state. 
Complainant's  instructions  to  send  the 
car  to  Lawton  were  not  given  to  the  I.  C. 
R.  R.,  which  performed  the  haul  to  Chi- 
ca2:o,  but  were  given  to  the  P.  M.  Ry., 
which  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with 
the  haul  to  Chicago.  Two  separate  and 
distinct  movements  comprised  this  trans- 
portation— an  intrastate  movement  from 
Metropolis  to  Chicago  and  an  interstate 
movement  from  Chicago  to  Lawton.  The 
shipment  did  not  begin  to  move  in  inter- 
state commerce  until  delivered  to  the 
P.  M.  Ry.  at  Riverdale.  Over  the  intra- 
state movement  the  Commission  has  no 
jurisdiction,  and  the  carriers  who  per- 
formed the  interstate  movement  are  not 
parties  to  the  complaint.  Complaint  dis- 
missed. Wells-Higman  Co.  v.  G.  R  &  I. 
Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  487,  489,  490. 

(c)  Where  grain  is  shipped  on  a  local 
bill  of  lading  and  upon  local  rates  to  an 


elevation  point,  it  is  not  in  transportation 
during  the  time  of  elevation,  nor  does 
transportation  again  begin  until  the  grain 
has  been  loaded  in  the  cars  for  outbound 
shipment  in  accordance  with  the  tariff 
publications  of  the  carriers  governing 
such  carload  shipments.  Gund  &  Co.  v. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  364,  368- 

(d)  Complainant  billed  lumber  from 
points  in  Washington  to  Aberdeen,  S.  D., 
which  was  intended  for  complainant's 
lumber  yard  at  Scranton,  N.  D.  At  the  time 
of  shipment  a  line  in  process  of  construc- 
tion from  Aberdeen  to  Scranton  was  not 
yet  opened  up  for  traffic  and  no  physical 
connection  existed  between  the  line  of  the 
initial  carrier  and  the  proposed  line. 
Complainant  drayed  the  lumber  from  the 
station  of  the  initial  carrier  at  Aberdeen 
and  then  piled  it  up  at  the  proposed  sta- 
tion of  the  new  line.  Later  the  two  lines 
were  connected  and  a  through  rate  estab- 
lished to  Scranton.  Complainant  paid  the 
local  rate  to  Aberdeen  and  several  months 
elapsed  before  shipments  moved  from 
Aberdeen  to  Scranton  on  the  new  line. 
HELD,  the  movement  was  local  from 
point  of  origin  to  Aberdeen  and  local  from 
Aberdeen  to  Scranton,  and  complainant 
was  not  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the 
'ower  through  rate  subsequently  estab- 
lished. Central  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  495,  497. 

III.     CONTROL  OF  RAILROAD. 

§12.     Right   of   Carrier   to    Make    Regula- 
tions. 

See  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §18  (f), 
(g);  Import  Traffic,  II  (a);  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission,  §1 
(CO);  Minimums,  §8  (b) ;  Reason- 
ableness of  Rates,  §84  (aa) ;  Switch 
Tracks  and  Switching,  §8;  Trans- 
portation,   §2    (m). 

(a)  The  Northern  Pacific  Railway, 
being  the  only  line  having  rails  extending 
to  South  Tacoma,  Wash.,  a  point  just  out- 
side the  Tacoma  switching  district,  is  en- 
titled, in  the  protection  of  its  investment, 
to  conduct  traffic  between  South  Tacoma 
and  other  points  on  its  line  on  a  preferred 
basis,  and  shippers  who  desire  to  use  com- 
peting lines  ought  not  to  object  to  paying 
in  addition  to  the  Tacoma  rate  a  reason- 
able charge  to  the  N.  P.  Ry.  for  its  local 
haul  between  Tacoma  and  South  Tacoma. 
Public  Service  Commission,  Wash.,  v.  N. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  256. 

(b)  Rules,  regulations  and  charges  af- 
fecting the  ultimate  cost  of  transportation 
must  be  made  with  a  reasonable  regard 
for  the  nature  of  the   commodity  trans- 


TRANSPORTATION,  §12  (c)— UNDERCHARGES 


ported  and  without  undue  discrimination 
as  between  localities  or  shippers.  Sunder- 
land Bros.  Co.  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  259,  262. 

(c)  The  rule  enforced  by  defendant 
restricting  the  receipt  and  shipment  of 
L.  C.  L.  lots  of  coal  oil  and  products  of 
petroleum  to  one  day  in  each  week  sub 
jects  complainants  to  unreasonable  preju- 
dice. Any  rule  which  restricts  shipments 
in  question  to  less  than  two  days  in  any 
week  is  unreasonable,  and  the  days  se- 
lected should  be  separated  by  at  least  two 
intervening  days.  National  t*etroleum 
Ass'n  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
473,  477. 

(d)  Carriers  have  the  right  to  trans- 
port certain  commodities  under  reason- 
able rules  and  regulations  respecting  their 
receipt,  carriage  and  delivery.  National 
Petroleum  Ass'n  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  473,  476. 

(e)  More  or  less  contamination  results 
where  shipments  of  petroleum  and  its 
products  are  transported  with  miscella- 
neous freight,  especially  to  food  products. 
Despite  precautions,  leakage  results  and 
gives  rise  to  damage  claims  to  food  and 
other  commodities  injured  by  odor  or 
contamination.  HELD,  that  reasonable 
regulations  may  be  made  by  the  carriers 
for  the  transportation  of  said  commodity, 
including  a  reasonable  limitation  of  the 
time  when  such  shipments  will  be  re 
ceived.  National  Petroleum  Ass'n  v.  L. 
&  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  473,  476. 

(f)  Where  carload  shipments  of  fruits 
and  vegetables  are  made  to  a  consignee 
in  Chicago,  who  is  the  owner  of  the  en 
tire  contents  of  the  car,  and  where  de- 
livery is  made  upon  the  team  tracks  of 
the  defendant  carriers,  defendants  must 
furnish  the  necessary  help  to  bring  the 
packages  making  up  said  carloads  to  the 
car  door  and  there  make  delivery  to  the 
consignee,  and  the  rule  of  defendants  re- 
quiring consignees  to  take  these  pack- 
ages inside  the  car  is  unjust  and  unrea- 
sonable. Wholesale  Fruit  &  Produce  Ass'n 
v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  410, 
420. 

§13.     Economy  of  Management. 

See   Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §12. 

(a)  It  is  for  the  public  interest  that 
every  transportation  service  should  be 
performed  by  the  most  economical 
method  since  that  must  ultimately  result 
in  the  lowest  transportation  charge.     Al- 


bree  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  303, 
310. 

(b)  It  is  not  apparent  that  the  public 
should  stand  responsible  for  mistakes 
made  in  the  management  of  railroads.  In 
re  Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20 

I.  C.  C.  243,  267;  Arlington  Heights  Fruit 
Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  106,  122. 

(c)  It  is  a  false  theory  of  transporta- 
tion which  seeks  to  force  a  shipper  to 
avail  himself  of  a  less-than-carload  serv- 
ice, which  is  more  expensive  for  the 
purpose  of  increasing  the  gross  revenues 
of  the  carrier.  The  true  object  should  be 
to  perform  the  service  in  the  most  eco- 
nomical manner  and  to  charge  for  the 
service  a  reasonable  compensation.  Flor- 
ida Fruit  &  Vegetable  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  552,  564. 

§14.     What  Are  Operating  Expenses. 

(a)  Interest  upon  funded  debt  is  a 
fixed  charge  in  nature  of  operating  ex- 
pense. In  re  Advances  in  Rates — Eastern 
Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  251. 

(b)  Permanent  improvements  are  not 
part  of  the  operating  expense.  In  re  Ad- 
vances in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C. 
243,  266. 

TRANSHIPMENT. 

See  Demurrage,  §15  (f ) ;  Long  and 
Short   Hauls,   §12  (2)    (e). 

TRIMMING. 

See    Transportation,    §1     (d),    (e). 

TRUCKMEN. 

See   Common   Carrier,  §3   (ff). 

UNEARNED    INCREMENT. 

See  Advanced   Rates,   §6   (5)    (b). 

UNDERCHARGES. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
§1'/2.  Jurisdiction  of  courts. 

II.  DUTY  OP  CARRIER  TO  COLLECT. 

§2.     In  general. 
§3.     Defences. 
III.     EVIDENCE. 

§4.     Admissibility  of  tariff  copies. 

§5.     Burden  of  proof. 

§6,     Testimony  as  to  rate. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

See  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion, §12;  Procedure  Before  Com- 
mission,  §14   (a). 


894 


UNDERCHARGES,   §1    (a)— §3    (d) 


(a)  The  Commission  is  without  au- 
thority to  adjudicate  a  claim  of  a  railroad 
company  against  a  shipper.  Laning-Har- 
ris  Coal  &  Grain  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R. 
R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  37,  38. 

(b)  The  Commission  is  without  au- 
thority to  enter  an  order  requiring  a  ship- 
per to  make  good  an  undercharge,  but 
shippers  must  understand  their  liability 
under  the  law  for  the  failure  or  refusal 
to  pay  the  published. rates.  Falls  &  Co.  v. 
C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  269,  273. 

§1^.     Jurisdiction   of  Courts. 
See  Courts,  §11    (g). 

II.     DUTY  OF  CARRIER  TO  COLLECT. 

§2.     In  General. 

(a)  Settlement  with  the  complainant 
by  one  defendant  on  the  erroneous  basis 
of  a  19c  division  of  the  24c  rate  to  Lin- 
wood  was  held  an  undercharge  and  com- 
plainant ordered  to  return  the  same. 
Switzer  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co., 
22  L  C.  C.  471,  476: 

(b)  A  carrier  may  waive  its  right  to 
demand  prepayment  and  accept  a  ship- 
ment with  the  understanding  that  it  will 
collect  from  the  consignee;  but  if  it  does 
not  collect  from  the  consignee  it  must 
look  to  the  consignor  for  payment.  Boiss 
Commercial  Club  v.  Adams  Express  Co., 
17  L  C.  C.  115,  121. 

(c)  Where  a  carrier  has  by  mistake 
accepted  payment  of  a  rate  lower  than  the 
published  rate,  it  is  its  duty  to  demand  of 
the  shipper  the  balance  due.  Bovaird 
Supply  Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C. 
C.  56,  67. 

(d)  While  good  faith  will  doubtless 
save  the  agent  of  a  carrier,  quoting  less 
than  the  lawful  rate,  and  the  shipper, 
from  the  charge  of  criminal  intent,  the 
fact  that  the  loss  is  suffered  by  the  ship- 
per in  relying  on  such  lower  rate  cannot 

.result  in  binding  the  company  making  it, 
nor  can  it  result  in  protecting  the  shipper 
receiving  its  benefits.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  New  Albany  Box  &  Basket  Co. 
(Ind.  1911),  94  N.  E.  906,  909. 

(e)  Where  the  agent  of  a  carrier  has 
by  mistake  quoted  and  collected  a  charge 
less  than  the  published  rate,  the  carrier 
may  sue  to  collect  the  difference  between 
the  rate  collected  and  the  lawful  rate. 
B.  &  O.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  New  Albany  Box 
&  Basket  Co.  (Ind.  1911),  94  N.  E.  906, 
909. 

(f)  A  carrier  cannot  estop  itself  from 
the  right  to  collect  the  published  inter- 


state rate.     Louisiana  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v 
Holly,  127  La.  615,  619,  53  So.  882. 

(g)  A  carrier  collected  and  a  shipper 
paid  freight  charges  on  the  supposed 
weight,  neither  having  knowledge  of  the 
actual  weight  of  the  shipment.  Later  the 
carrier  learned  the  shipment  weighed 
more  than  it  was  estimated.  HELD,  un- 
der sections  2  and  6  of  the  Act,  the  car- 
rier could  sue  to  collect  the  deficiency,  on 
the  basis  of  the  published  rates,  although 
neither  it  nor  the  shipper  intended  to 
base  the  charges  on  other  than  the  true 
weight.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mogi,  71  Misc. 
412,  415,  128  N.  Y.  Supp.  643. 

(h)  Where  the  published  interstate 
rate  is  proved,  its  reasonableness  cannot 
be  questioned  by  the  shipper  in  an  action 
by  the  carrier  in  a  state  court  to  collect 
the  same.  Oregon  R.  &  Nav.  Co.  v  Cool- 
idge  (Ore.  1911),  116  P.  93,  95. 

§3.     Defenses. 

See  Courts,  §2. 

(a)  Where  a  carrier  delivers  an  inter- 
state shipment  to  the  consignee  without 
collecting  the  charges  and  later  brings 
suit  to  recover  the  same  according  to  the 
published  schedule,  nothing  in  the  amend- 
ment of  June  29,  1906,  to  the  Act,  pro- 
viding that  the  carrier  shall  not  collect 
a  greater  or  less  compensation  from  one 
shipper  than  from  another,  prevents  the 
consignee  from  recouping  in  the  suit  for 
damages  suffered  by  the  goods  in  transit 
through  the  carrier's  negligence.  Battle 
V.  Atkinson,  9  Ga.  App.  488,  492,  71  S.  E. 
775. 

(b)  Where  the  consignee  of  an  inter- 
state shipment  has  been  quoted  and  has 
paid  less  than  the  published  rate,  the  de- 
livering 'Carrier  may  sue  to  recover  the 
deficiency  despite  the  fact  that  the 
initial  carrier  may  have  misrouted  the 
shipment,  since  the  shipper's  remedy  for 
such  misrouting  is  against  the  initial 
carrier.  Louisiana  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v. 
Holly,  127  La.  615,  619,  53  So.  882. 

(c)  In  a  suit  by  a  carrier  to  recover 
the  published  interstate  rate,  the  defend- 
ant cannot  set  up  as  a  valid  plea  the  un- 
reasonableness of  such  rate,  since 
original  jurisdiction  over  the  question  of 
reasonableness  in  establishing  interstate 
rates  is  vested  with  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission.  B,  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
La  Due,  128  App.  Div.  594,  596;  112  N.  Y. 
Supp.  964. 

(d)  In  a  suit  at  law  in  a  state  court 
by  a  carrier  to  collect  its  lawfully  pub- 


UNDERCHARGES,   §4   (a)— WATER  CARRIERS 


895 


lished  rate,  the  defendant  shipper  set  up 
in  its  answer  that  the  rate  demanded  was 
greater  for  the  shorter  than  for  the  longer 
haul  made  under  the  same  circumstances 
and  alleged  that  there  existed  no  reason, 
by  way  of  peculiar  geographical  position, 
competition  of  other  transportation  facili- 
ties or  trade,  or  other  peculiar  conditions, 
why  a  greater  charge  should  be  made  for 
transporting  the  coal  for  the  haul  in  ques- 
tion than  the  charge  exacted  for  a  haul 
from  the  same  point  of  origin  in  the  same 
direction  to  a  point  more  distant.  It  ap- 
peared by  the  pleadings  that  the  plaintiff 
carrier  had  obtained  no  permission  from 
the  Commission  to  charge  the  rate  de- 
manded. HELD,  the  answer,  upon  de- 
murrer, stated  a  good  defense  to  the  suit. 
Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Loonan  Lum- 
ber Co.  (S.  D.  1910),  125  N.  W.  644,  646. 

III.     EVIDENCE. 

§4.     Admissibility  of  Tariff  Copies. 

(a)  In  an  action  in  a  state  court  by  a 
carrier  to  recover  the  published  rate, 
plaintiff  offered  copies  of  portions  of  the 
schedules  filed  with  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  for  the  purpose  of 
proving  the  lawful  rate.  ,The  secretary 
of  the  Commission,  in  addition  to  reciting 
his  custody  of  the  schedules  and  tariffs, 
stated  that  the  copies  had  been  compared 
by  him  with  the  originals  in  his  custody 
and  were  correct  transcripts.  HELD,  the 
copies  were  properly  admitted  in  evidence 
under  a  state  statute  governing  the  ad- 
mission of  certified  copies.  Oregon  R.  & 
Nav.  Co.  V.  Coolidge  (Oreg.  1911),  116  P 
93,  94. 

§5.     Burden  of  Proof. 
See  Evidence,   I. 

(a)  Where  a  carrier  sues  to  collect  of 
a  shipper  charges  based  on  an  alleged 
agreement  to  pay  the  freight  at  the  legal 
rate  established  in  pursuance  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act,  and  defendant  de- 
nies both  the  agreement  and  the  rate,  it 
is  incumbent  on  plaintiff  to  prove  them. 
Oregon  R.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Coolidge  (Oreg. 
1911),  116  P.  93,  94. 

§6.     Testimony  as  to  Rate. 

(a)  In  a  suit  by  a  carrier  to  collect  the 
published  rates,  a  statement  in  a  certifi- 
cate by  the  secretary  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission,  that  there  were 
no  through  joint  rates  on  file  with  the 
Commission  from  and  to  the  points  of 
origin  and  destination  applicable  to  the 
shipments  in  question,  is  not  admissible, 


the  construction  of  the  legal  effect  of  the 
tariffs  being  for  the  court.  Oregon  R.  & 
Nav.  Co.  V.  Coolidge  (Oreg.  1911),  116  P. 
93,  94. 

(b)  In  a  suit  by  a  carrier  to  collect  its 
published  interstate  rate,  an  expert  wit- 
ness is  properly  refused  permission  to  de- 
clare from  the  tariff  sheets  the  legal  rate 
in  effect,  such  construction  being  for  the 
court.  Oregon  R.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Coolidge 
(Oreg.  1911),  116  P.  93,  94. 

UNITED  STATES  COURTS. 

See  Courts,   §3,    IV. 

UNPUBLISHED   RATES. 

See   Evidence,   §60. 

VALIDATION. 

See  Passenger  Fares  and  Facilities. 
§8. 

VENUE. 

See  Crimes,   §7   (d). 

VERDICT.. 

See    Crimes,    §31. 

VOLUNTARY  RATES. 

See  Advanced  Rates,  §8  (1);  Differ- 
entials, §5  (e);  Discrimination,  §3 
(ff) ;  Equalization  of  Rates,  §3  (oo), 
§4  (2)  (a),  <n),  §8  (f) ;  Evidence, 
§28  (h),  (j),  §64;  Minimums,  §7 
(oo);  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §16, 
§33!/2,  §49  (a),  §66  (-bb),  §84  (h), 
(i),  §103  (f),  §144  (a),  §145  (c); 
Reparation,   §2   (i),   §16. 

WAGES. 

See  Evidence,  §641/2. 

WAREHOUSEMAN. 

See  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §21   (a). 

WATER  CARRIERS. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 
§1.     In  general. 
§2.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

II.  DISCRIMINATION  AND  REBATES. 

§3.     In  general. 

III.  TARIFFS  AND  PUBLICATION. 

§4.     In  general. 
§5.     Reparation, 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 
See   Bill  of  Lading,  §3;   Foreign  Com- 
merce;  Water  Competition. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 

§1.     In  General. 

See  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  II 
(jj). 


896 


WATER  CARRIERS,  §1   (a)— §2  (a) 


(a)  Broadly  speaking,  the  Act  does 
not  apply  to  carriers  by  water  and  to 
make  such  carriers  subject  to  the  Act  it 
must  be  shown  that  transportation  partly 
by  railroad  and  partly  by  water  is  made 
under  a  common  control,  management,  or 
arrangement  for  a  continuous  carriage  or 
shipment  from  one  state  or  territory  to 
another  state  or  territory.  Mutual  Tran- 
sit Co.  V.  U.  S.,  178  Fed.  664.  C3-6. 

(b)  Interstate  commerce  wholly  by 
railroad  is  subject  to  the  Act;  wholly  by 
water  not  subject;  partly  by  water  and 
partly  by  railroad,  under  a  common  con 
trol,  management,  or  arrangement  for  a 
continuous  carriage  or  shipment,  is  sub- 
ject to  the  Act.  In  re  Jurisdiction  Over 
Water  Carriers,  15  I.  C.  C.  205,  207. 

(c)  Water  carriers  are  subject  to  the 
law  only  as  to  such  traffiic  as  is  trans- 
ported under  a  common  control,  manage- 
ment, or  arrangement  with  a  rail  carrier, 
and  as  to  that  traffic  not  so  transported 
they  are  exempt  from  its  provisions.  In 
re  Jurisdiction  Over  Water  Carriers,  15 

1.  C.  C.  205,  211. 

(d)  Traffic  wholly  by  water  is  not  sub- 
ject to  the  Act,  for  the  reason  that  Con- 
gress did  not  in  that  statute  exercise  its 
admitted  authority  over  interstate  trans- 
portation by  water.  In  re  Jurisdiction 
Over  Water  Carriers,  15  I.  C.  C.  205,  208. 

(e)  The  main  purpose  of  the  Act  is  to 
regulate  transportation  by  railroad;  ths 
regulation  of  water  lines  is  merely  inci- 
dental and  collateral  and  was  included  in 
order  that  the  regulation  of  railroads 
might  be  effective  and  not  virtually  nulli- 
fied by  arrangements  between  railroads 
and  water  lines.  In  re  Jurisdiction  Over 
Water  Carriers,  15  I.  C.  C.  205,  207. 

(f)  Carriers  of  interstate  commerce  by 
water  are  subject  to  the  Act  only  in  re- 
spect of  traffic  transported  under  a  com- 
mon control,  management,  or  arrange- 
ment with  a  rail  carrier,  and  in  respect 
of  traffic  not  so  transpprted  they  are  ex- 
empt from  its  provisions.  In  Re  Juris- 
diction Over  Water  Carriers,  15  I.  C.  C. 
205,    211. 

(g)  Conference   Rulings,   Bulletin   No. 

2,  under  date  of  May  4,  1908,  holding  that 
a  steamboat  line  cannot  unite  with  a 
railroad  company  in  making  a  through 
route  and  joint  rate  on  a  particular  traffic 
without  subjecting  all  its  interstate  traf- 
fic to  the  provisions  of  the  Act  and  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Commission,  is  modi- 
fied so  as  to  hold  that  water  carriers  are 


subject  to  the  law  only  as  to  such  traffic 
as  is  transported  under  the  common  con- 
trol and  management  of,  or  an  arrange- 
ment with,  a  rail  carrier,  and  that  as  to 
traffic  not  so  transported  they  are  ex- 
empt from  its  provisions.  (Clark,  Clem- 
ents and  Harlan,  Comm'rs,  dissenting.) 
In  re  Jurisdiction  Over  Water  Carriers,  15 
I.  C.  C.  205,  211. 

(h)  A  pooling  of  ocean  freights  or  of 
water  freights  of  any  character  was  not 
in  the  mind  of  Congress  when  it  adopted 
section  5  prohibiting  pools.  Cosmopolitan 
Shipping  Co.  v.  Hamburg-American  Pack- 
et Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  266,  274. 

(i)  While  restriction  and  control  are 
essential  to  the  inland  carriers  of  foreign 
commerce,  the  ocean  carriers  of  such 
commerce  should  remain  unrestrained 
and  free.  The  ocean  is  a  highway  free  to 
all.  No  franchise  is  needed  to  sail  the 
seas,  nor  is  the  estalDlishment  of  a  line 
of  ships  founded,  either  in  law  or  in  eco- 
nomics, upon  the  theory  of  a  highway- 
serving  monopoly  which  underlies  the  re- 
lation of  the  railroad  to  the  state.  It  may 
well  be,  therefore,  that  without  regulation, 
and  the  reason  of  natural  competitive  con- 
ditions, the  public  will  be  best  served,  and 
in  the  end  treated  more  equitably,  by 
leaving  the  water  carriers  to  foreign  lands 
entirely  unhampered  by  legal  restrictions, 
such  as  the  people  of  this  and  other 
lands  have  found  it  necessary  to  impose 
upon  the  railroads.  Cosmopolitan  Ship- 
ping Co.  V.  Hamburg-American  Packet 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  266,  281. 

§2.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

See  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 
§1    (f)- 

(a)  An  order  of  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  required  statistical 
information  of  defendant  water  carriers 
covering  the  routes  of  the  carrier  and 
their  mileage;  the  description  of  the 
equipment  owned,  leased  or  chartered  by 
the  carrier;  the  amount  of  traffic,  both 
passenger  and  freight,  and  mileage  and 
revenue  statistics,  together  with  a  sepa- 
ration of  freights  into  the  quantity  of 
the  various  products  transported,  show- 
ing whether  originating  on  the  carrier's 
line  or  received  from  a  connecting  line, 
and  a  general  description  of  any  separate 
business  carried  on  by  the  carrier.  HELD, 
the  Commission  did  not  exceed  its  au- 
thority as  to  the  form  of  the  reports  and 
the  system  of  accounting  described.  I. 
C.  C.  V.  Goodrich  Co.,  224  U.  S.  194,  211, 
32  Sup.  Ct.  436,  56  L.  ed.  729. 


WATER  CARRIERS,  §2  (b)  — (f) 


897 


(b)  Defendant  water  carriers  on  th3 
Great  Lakes  were  engaged  in  carrying 
goods  from  one  port  to  another  in  the 
same  state,  from  a  port  in  one  state  to 
ports  in  another  state,  and  also  from 
ports  in  one  state  to  destinations  in  an- 
other state  in  connection  with  rail  car- 
riers. They  were  also  interested  in  op- 
erating amusement  parks.  HELD,  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  had 
power  under  section  20  of  the  Act  as 
amended  to  order  a  universal  system  of 
bookkeeping  and  accounting  and  to  re- 
quire reports  on  all  the  business  of  de- 
fendants, whether  interstate  or  intrastate, 
since  the  intrastate  business  was  so  in- 
extricably bound  up  with  the  interstate 
business  that  to  limit  the  provisions  of 
the  Act  to  interstate  business  would  de- 
feat the  purpose  sought  to  be  accom- 
plished by  reports  and  accounting  sys- 
tems. I.  C.  C.  V.  Goodrich  Co.,  224  U.  S. 
194,  213,  32  Sup.  Ct.  436,  56  L.  ed.  729. 

(c)  Where  steamship  companies  op- 
erating on  the  Great  Lakes  file  with  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  their 
joint  tariffs,  or  their  concurrence  in  tar- 
iffs filed  by  the  railroad  companies,  and 
•carry  for  hire  passengers  and  freight 
under  said  joint  tariffs  over  the  water 
portion  of  the  through  routes,  there  is 
engagement  in  transportation  in  so  far 
as  both  water  and  rail  are  used  to  carry 
from  one  state  to  another,  and  there  is, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Act  as 
amended  June  29,  1906,  a  common  ar- 
rangement made  for  a  continuous  ship- 
ment of  passengers  and  freight,  whereby 
such  companies  have  brought  themselves 
within  the  terms  of  the  Act  and  are  sub- 
ject to  such  of  its  provisions  as  are 
applicable  to  carriers  under  such  arrange- 
ment. Goodrich  Transit  Co  v  I.  C.  C, 
190   Fed.   943,   959. 

(d)  The  sixth  clause  of  section  9,  arti- 
cle 1,  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
that  "no  preference  shall  be  given  any 
regulation  of  commerce  or  revenue  to 
the  ports  of  one  state  over  those  of  an- 
other" does  not  prevent  the  exercise  of 
the  power  of  Congress  by  delegated  au- 
thority to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission to  regulate  commerce  between 
ports  of  different  states  simply  because 
such  regulation  may  incidentally  affect 
the  commerce  of  a  port  in  still  another 
state.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  L  C.  C.  184 
Fed.  118,  123. 

(e)  Ashland,  Wis.,  is  approximately  75 
miles  east  of  Duluth  by  rail.  In  1896 
the  defendant  lake  carriers  discontinued 


their  service  to  Ashland,  which  for  many 
years  had  been  a  port  of  call.  Prior  to 
this,  and  for  two  years  thereafter,  Ash- 
land took  the  samo  rail  and  lake  rates 
from  eastern  points,  such  as  New  York 
and  Pittsburgh,  as  Duluth.  Since  1898 
traffic  from  the  East  to  Ashland  via  the 
lake  lines  was  -carried  to  Duluth  by  water, 
and  thence  by  rail  under  joint  rail-lake- 
and-rail  rates  higher  than  the  lake  and 
rail  rates  to  Duluth.  The  eastern  rail 
line  of  the  lake  line  received  less  than 
its  division  of  the  rail  and  lake  rates  to 
Duluth  on  its  Ashland  shipments.  Canal- 
lake-and-rail  rates,  New  York  to  Ashland, 
were  less  than  the  rail-and-lake  rates  to 
Duluth.  The  marine  commerce  of  Ash- 
land during  1909  was  490,878  tons  of 
coal  received  and  3,834,285  tons  of  iron 
ore  shipped  out.  The  modern  boats 
ranged  in  capacity  from  3,000  to  5,000  tons, 
while  those  operated  when  Ashland  was 
a  port  of  call  were  of  900  tons  capacity. 
To  enter  the  harbor  of  Ashland  involves 
a  detour  of  47  miles  on  the  part  of  ves- 
sels plying  on  the  Soo  to  Duluth.  To 
dock,  discharge  and  receive  cargo  would 
take  from  ten  to  twenty-four  hours.  It 
costs  $400  a  day  to  operate  one  of  the 
modern  boats.  It  is  estimated  that  about 
1,500  tons  of  freight  a  month  would  be 
removed  from  and  to  Ashland  by  the  lake 
line.  HELD,  that  under  the  Act  the  Com- 
mission has  no  authority  to  compel  the 
lake  lines  to  run  boats  to  Ashland,  and 
hence  defendants  may  lawfully  exact 
higher  rates  to  Ashland  than  to  Duluth 
as  compensation  for  the  additional  rail 
haul  to  the  former  point.  City  of  Ash- 
land V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  et  al.. 
20  I.  C.  C.  3. 

(f)  On  July  2,  3  and  4,  1908,  through 
bills  of  lading  were  issued  by  defendant 
Southern  Pacific  Co.  at  Hamburg  via  New 
Orleans  to  California  terminal  points  and 
charges  prepaid  according  to  joint 
through  rates  then  in  effect.  Before  the 
arrival  of  the  steamer,  the  tariff  carry- 
ing these  rates  was  canceled  and  new 
rates  from  the  ports  of  entry  in  this  coun- 
try to  the  points  of  destination  were 
established,  and  upon  the  arrival  of  the 
goods  at  New  Orleans  additional  charges 
were  collected  in  accordance  with  the 
new  schedule.  HELD,  following  Rule  No. 
Ill,  Conference  Ruling,  Bulletin  No.  4, 
the  Commission  could  grant  no  relief 
since,  being  without  jurisdiction  over 
ocean  carriers  from  ports  in  foreign  coun- 
tries to  ports  of  entry  in  this  country,  it 
could  not  recognize  joint  through  rates 
from    such    ports    to    points   of    ultimate 


898 


WATER  CARRIERS,   §2    (g)— (k) 


destination  within  the  United  States. 
George  Borgfeldt  &  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C.  552,  553. 

(g)  The  Commission  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion of  ocean  carriers  from  ports  in 
foreign  countries  to  ports  of  entry  in 
United  States,  and  joint  through  rates  to 
inland  points  are  not  recognized  as  legal. 
Borgfeldt  &  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C 
552,  553. 

(h)  The  Commission  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion over  a  water  carrier  operating  be- 
tween a  port  of  export  or  import  in  the 
United  States  and  a  foreign  country  not 
adjacent.  Joseph  Ullman  v.  Adams  Ex- 
press Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  340,  345. 

(i)  Complainant  operated  a  line  of 
steamships  from  Philadelphia  to  Euro- 
pean ports.  Defendants  were  ocean  car- 
riers from  various  Atlantic  to  European 
ports.  The  complaint  alleged  that  de- 
fendants carried  traffic  on  through  bills 
of  lading  between  interior  points  in  the 
United  States  and  European  ports  and 
European  interior  points;  that  defendants 
had  formed  a  pooling  agreement  as  to  all 
such  traffic,  whereby  each  defendant 
ocean  carrier  received  a  certain  percent- 
age; that  under  the  pool  the  traffic  was 
divided  up  among  the  carriers,  and  ship- 
pers from  interior  United  States  points 
were  directed  to  so  consign  traffic  to  the 
various  Atlantic  ports  as  to  maintain  each 
of  the  ocean  carrier's  stipulated  percent- 
age; that  as  a  result  of  the  pool,  complain- 
ant was  unable  to  compete  with  defend- 
ant foreign  ocean  carriers,  and  by  the  de- 
struction of  competition  between  defend- 
ants unjust  and  arbitrary  rates  were  ex- 
acted from  United  States  shippers.  The 
complaint  prayed  that  the  pool  be  de- 
clared illegal  and  the  Commission  pre- 
scribe just  rules  and  regulations  against 
defendants  to  prevent  the  evils  com- 
plained of.  HELD,  the  demurrer  to  the 
complaint  should  be  sustained,  since  the 
Commission  under  the  Act  had  no  juris- 
diction over  defendant  ocean  carriers,  its 
jurisdiction  being  limited  to  railroads 
with  respect  to  their  rates  from  the  in- 
land United  States  points  to  Atlantic 
ports  and  from  such  ports  to  said  inland 
points.  Cosmopolitan  Shipping  Co.  v. 
Hamburg-American  Packet  Co.,  13  I.  C. 
C.  2-66,  279. 

(j)  Defendant  commercial  union  was 
organized  under  the  laws  of  Cuba  and  was 
composed  of  Havana  merchants  buying 
goods  in  the  United  States.  The  purpose 
of  the  union  was  to  operate  a  steamship 


line  between  Galveston  and  Havana.  By 
the  provisions  of  its  organization,  Ha- 
vana merchants  buying  goods  from  the 
United  States  and  shipping  the  same  over 
the  defendant  United  States  carriers  and 
over  the  steamship  line  operated  by  the 
union  were  given  shares  of  stock  in  the 
union  for  specified  amounts  of  freight 
so  shipped.  When  defendant  United 
States  railroads  learned  of  this  practice 
they  ordered  defendant  union  to  cease 
same,  and  after  such  requests  the  union 
desisted  from  issuing  further  shares. 
Complainant  rival  steamship  line  operat- 
ing from  Galveston  to  Havana  asked  tbat 
the  holding  of  stock  so  issued  to  mem- 
bers of  defendant  union  be  declared  un- 
lawful and  a  continuing  violation  of  the 
Act.  HELD,  the  Commission  had  no  au- 
thority to  enter  the  order  requested,  since 
the  allotment  of  shares  was  legally  made 
to  citizens  of  Cuba  by  a  company  or- 
ganized under  the  laws  of  that  country 
and  in  consideration  of  freight  carried  by 
the  ocean  carrier,  and  since  no  rail  car- 
rier subject  to  the  Act  joined  in  the  allot- 
ments of  stock  and  such  allotments  were 
not  made  dependent  on  the  rail  carrier's 
proportion  of  the  freight  paid,  but  only 
on  the  proportion  received  by  the  ocean 
carrier.  Lykes  Steamship  Line  v.  Com- 
mercial Union,  13  I.  C.  C.  310,  316. 

(k)  Defendant  railway  hauling  fruit 
to  Benton  Harbor,  Mich.,  and  delivering 
same  to  a  lake  steamship  company,  com- 
plainant's competitor,  for  carriage  to  Chi- 
cago, at  the  close  of  the  season  of  1907 
canceled  its  joint  route  and  through  rate 
with  the  ship  company,  with  the  purpose, 
however,  of  renewing  same  at  the  open- 
ing of  the  season  in  the  spring.  During 
the  winter  period  complainant  filed  a  com- 
plaint to  compel  defendant  to  establish 
a  joint  rate  and  through  route  with  com- 
plainant's steamship  lines.  Defendant 
duly  re-established  its  joint  rate  and 
through  route  with  the  competitor  of  com- 
plainant at  the  opening  of  the  season  in 
1908,  and  thereafter  permitted  the  cause 
to  be  set  down  and  to  come  on  for  hear- 
ing. Defendant  operated  wholly  within 
the  state  of  Michigan  and  had  no  rela- 
tion with  any  other  carrier  except  with 
complainant's  competitor.  HELD,  the 
cancellation  during  the  winter  was  in  the 
nature  of  a  suspension,  and  defendant  did 
not  thereby  cease  to  be  engaged  in  inter- 
state commerce  so  as  to  escape  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Commission.  Benton 
Transit  Co.  v.  Benton  Harbor,  St.  Joe  Ry. 
&  Light  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  542,  545. 


WATER  CARRIERS,  §3  (a)— (h) 


899 


II.     DISCRIMINATION  AND  REBATES. 

§3.     In  General. 

See  Allowances,  §12  (2)  (bb);  Evi- 
dence,  §20  (k);  Export  Rates  and 
Facilitites,  Ml  (h);  Facilities  and 
Privileges,  §16  (c),  (d),  (e) ; 
Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 
§2  (b),  (c),  §11  (1)  (i),  §11  (2)  (z), 
§12  (a),  (b). 

(a)  A  boat  line  incorporated  as  a  com- 
mon carrier  obtained  its  facilities  from  a 
salt  company  by  which  it  is  owned  and  in 
whose  interest  it  is  operated;  it  pub- 
lished no  rates  except  upon  salt  in  cargo 
lots;  its  rates  were  manipulated  for  the 
benefit  of  the  salt  company,  and  it  used 
as  terminal  facilities  the  docks  and  ware- 
houses of  the  salt  company  by  whose 
agents  and  employees  all  shipments  had 
to  be  handled.  HELD,  that  the  boat  line 
is  a  mere  device  to  defraud  the  law,  and 
payments  made  to  it  by  connecting  rail 
carriers  in  the  guise  of  divisions  are 
rebates.  Colonial  Salt  Co.  v.  M.  I.  &  I. 
Line,  23  I.  C  C.  358. 

(b)  A  shipper  of  salt  does  not  have  to 
deliver  his  shipments  to  a  boat  line  con- 
trolled by  a  competitor,  and  such  boat 
line,  although  it  publishes  rates  on  salt 
in  cargo  lots,  cannot  be  considered  a  com- 
mon carrier,  but  a  private  facility  of  the 
salt  company  by  which  it  is  owned. 
Colonial  Salt  Co.  v.  M.  I.  &  I.  Line,  23 
I.  C.  C.  358,  366. 

(c)  A  railroad  line  has  the  right  to 
reserve  for  certain  boat  lines  certain  of 
its  water  terminals,  provided  such  reser- 
vations do  not  effect  discrimination 
against  traffic  destined  to  such  waterside 
terminals  and  to  be  carried  therefrom  by 
other  boat  lines.  Mobile  Chamber  of 
Commerce  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C. 
C.  417,  427. 

(d)  It  is  illegal  discrimination  for  a 
rail  carrier  to  refuse  to  issue  through 
bills  of  lading,  except  as  to  certain  pre- 
ferred water  carriers.  Mobile  Chamber 
of  Commerce  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I. 
C.  C.  417,  423. 

(e)  A  railroad  may  not  have  a  pre- 
ferred line  of  steamships  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  other  ships.  But  a  railroad  has 
the  right  to  reserve  wharves  for  its  own 
use  and  for  the  use  of  such  water  car- 
riers as  it  prefers,  provided  it  affords  to 
the  public  access  to  equal  facilities  else- 
where at  equal  rates.  Mobile  Chamber  of 
Commerce  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C 
C.  417,  424. 

(ee)  Free  wharfage  is  a  legitimate 
means    of   making   a   port    attractive   to 


ocean  lines,  and  the  Texas  City  interests 
in  pursuing  that  policy  will  be  protected 
against  coercion  by  carriers.  In  Re 
Wharfage  Charges  at  Galveston,  23  I.  C.  C. 
535,  545. 

(f)  A  water  port  is  entitled  to  what- 
ever advantage  it  can  obtain  through 
transportation  by  water,  but  its  location 
does  not  entitle  it  to  lower  rates  by  rail, 
and  although  such  preference  may  law- 
fully be  accorded  by  a  carrier  in  the  pro- 
tection of  its  own  interests,  it  should  not 
be  required  except  in  cases  where  mani- 
fest wrong  would  otherwise  result. 
Darling  &  Co.  v.  B.  &.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 
I.  C.  C.  79,  87. 

(g)  The  Commission  does  not  favor 
the  existence  of  lower  rates  at  ports  put 
into  effect  by  rail  carriers  to  meet  water 
competition.  Darling  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R. 
R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  79,  87. 

(h)  A  rail  carrier  may  control  or  con- 
nect with  a  line  of  steamships  engaged  in 
foreign  commerce,  with  which  it  may 
interchange  business  as  freely  as  with 
another  rail  carrier,  and  it  may  quote  a 
combined  rate  for  the  through  movement, 
the  agent  of  the  railroad  company  acting 
as  the  agent  of  the  steamship  company 
in  so  doing.  An  inland  carrier  may  go 
into  the  foreign  shipping  business  without 
contravening  any  provision  of  the  Act; 
nor  is  there  anything  in  such  statute 
which  denies  to  a  rail  carrier  the  right 
to  quote  a  rate  from  an  inland  point  to 
a  foreign  destination  over  its  own  through 
route  or  by  any  other  route.  But  as  to 
such  carriers  engaged  in  foreign  business, 
the  rail  carrier  has,  so  far  as  this  law 
is  concerned,  a  i^urely  contractual  or  pro- 
prietary relation,  not  a  relation  related 
or  controlled  in  any  manner  by  this  Act. 
On  foreign  commerce  the  rate  to  be  pub- 
lished with  the  Commission  should  be 
the  rate  to  the  port  and  from  the  port — 
an  open  rate,  which  any  who  desire  to 
do  so  may  use  with  equal  advantage.  The 
publication  of  such  rate  does  not  in  any 
manner  limit  the  very  valuable  privilege 
of  through  billing.  Such  through  billing 
should  clearly  separate  the  liability  of  the 
rail  and  the  ocean  carrier  and  show  the 
published  rate  of  the  inland  carrier.  The 
routing  of  the  freight,  however,  should  re- 
main with  the  shipper,  and  upon  him 
may  be  imposed  no  greater  charge  to  the 
port  when  his  freight  goes  by  one  ocean 
line  than  by  another.  Cosmopolitan  Ship- 
ping Co.  V.  Hamburg-American  Packet 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  266,  281. 


900 


WATER  CARRIERS,  §3  (i)— WEIGHTS  AND  WEIGHING,  §3  (a) 


(i)  There  is  no  transportation  exclu- 
sively by  water  from  Texas  common 
points  to  North  Pacific  coast  terminals. 
Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry. 
Co.  of  Tex.,  Unrep.  Op.  323. 


TARIFFS  AND  PUBLICATION. 


§4.     In  General. 

(a)  Complainant  sLipped  two  spring 
delivery  wagons  from  Toledo,  O.,  to  Sa- 
vannah, Ga.,  via  the  line  of  defendants, 
Hocking  Valley,  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  and  the 
Merchants  and  Miners  Transportation 
Co.,  under  a  joint  through  rate  of  $2,865 
per  100  lbs.  The  complaint  alleged  that 
a  rate  of  57c  per  100  lbs.  was  in  effect  as 
one  of  the  combinations  of  the  rate  via 
the  Merchants  &  Miners  Transportation 
Co.  This  rate  was  based  on  a  letter  re- 
ceived from  the  commercial  agents  of 
that  defendant.  HELD,  as  the  rates  of 
this  water  carrier  are  not  filed  with  the 
Commission  they  are  not  therefore  law- 
ful factors  to  be  considered  by  the  Com- 
mission in  the  determination  of  the  rea- 
sonableness of  the  rates.  Milburn  Wagon 
Co.  V.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 
144,  146. 

§5.     Reparation. 

See    Reparation,   §19   (g). 

WATER   COMPETITION. 

See    Evidence,    §14    (5). 

WEIGHTS   AND    WEIGHING. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 
§1.     In  general. 

§2.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 
II.     METHODS     OF     COMPUTING 
CHARGES. 
§3.    Actual  weight. 
§4.     Capacity  weight. 
§5.     Estimated  weight. 
§6.     Reweighing. 
§7.     Scaleage  and  Shrinkage. 

III.  DISCRIMINATION. 
.    §8.     In  general. 

IV.  EVIDENCE      AND      BURDEN      OF 

PROOF. 
§9.     In  general. 
V.     REPARATION. 

§10.     In  general. 
VI.     TARIFFS  AND  PUBLICATION. 
§11.     In  general. 

CROSS    REFERENCES. 
See    Evidence,    §65;    IVIinimums;    Rea- 
sonableness of  Rates,  §41;  Refriger- 
ation,  V. 

I.     CONTROL  AND  REGULATION. 


§1.     In   General. 

See  Allowances,   §12   (1)    (d). 

(a)  Wherever  the  transportation 
charge  is  by  weight  and  the  weight  of 
the  cheaper  grade  commodity  is  substan- 
tially the  same,  the  poor  man  pays  more 
freight  in  proportion  to  the  value  of  the 
service  than  he  who  consumes  the  cost- 
lier article.  Association  of  Union  Made 
Garment  Manufacturers  v.  C  «&  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  405,  406. 

(b)  The  question  of  the  loss  of  weight 
of  grain  during  elevation  is  one  of  prop- 
erty rights  that  must  be  disposed  of  in 
the  courts  under  the  general  law.  Bal- 
timore Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  Pa.  R. 
R.,  15  I.  C.   C.   341,  346. 

§2.     Jurisdiction  of  Commission. 

(a)  The  Commission  has  jurisdiction 
over  rates  collected  in  excess  of  actual 
weight,  such  charges  being  mere  over- 
charges. Wheeler  L.  B.  &  S.  Co  v.  A. 
&  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  10. 

(b)  The  Commission  may  order  a  re- 
fund of  charges  based  on  weight  in  ex- 
cess of  actual  weight.  Noble  v.  St.  L  S. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  62;  Peters  v."  O. 
S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  598,  598; 
Wheeler  Lumber,  Bridge  &  Supply  Co. 
V.  A.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  10,  11. 

II.     METHODS      OF      COMPUTING 
CHARGES. 

§3.     Actual  Weight. 

See   Alternative   Rates,    I    (d);   Switch 
Tracks   and   Switcliing,   §4   (c). 

(a)  Complainant  shipped  coaP  C.  L. 
Diamondville,  Wyo.,  to  Anaconda,  Mont., 
under  a  rate  of  $3.25  per  ton,  based  on 
the  weight  stated  in  the  waybill  issued  by 
the  initial  carrier.  The  shipments  were 
reweighed  at  destination  by  the  deliver- 
ing carrier  and  a  shortage  was  disclosed 
as  to  each  car,  which  amounted  in  the 
aggregate  to  90,940  pounds.  The  initial 
carrier  denied  liability  because  the  tariff 
provided  that  "shipments  covered  by  such 
way  bills  must  not  be  reweighed."  HELD, 
that  complainant  is  not  bound  by  the 
weights  given  at  the  point  of  origin  and 
stated  in  the  way  bill,  but  that  the  actual 
weight  of  shipments  constitutes  the  true 
basis  upon  which  to  assess  transporta- 
tion charges,  and  that  the  provision  in 
the  tariff  is  manifestly  unjust  and  un- 
reasonable. Reparation  awarded.  Peters 
V.  O.   S.  L.  R.  R.  Co..  20  L  C.  C.  598. 


WEIGHTS  AND  WEIGHING,  §3   (b)— §4    (c) 


901 


(b)  On  a  shipment  of  corn  from  Bates, 
111.,  to  Detroit,  Mich.,  complainant  applied 
for  a  40,000-lb.  car,  and  was  furnished 
a  60,000-lb.  car  instead.  The  actual 
weight  of  his  shipment  was  46,440  pounds. 
He  was  assessed  upon  60,000  pounds. 
HELD,  following  American  Lumber  & 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  561,  and 
General  Chemical  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  349,  complainant  should  have 
been  assessed  upon  the  actual  weight, 
and  was  entitled  to  reparation  on  that 
basis.  Beggs  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I. 
C.  C.  208. 

(c)  A  package  of  plate  glass  capable 
of  being  loaded  into  a  box  car  should  not 
have  assessed  against  it  an  estimated 
weight,  but  should  be  transported  at 
actual  weight.  Bennett  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P 
&  S.  Ste.  Marie  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  301. 

(d)  Theoretically,  a  shipper  should 
not  pay  freight  on  more  than  the  actual 
weight  of  the  commodity  shipped,  and 
under  the  same  principle,  the  carriers 
should  receive  a  revenue  on  the  actual 
weight  carried.  By  reason  of  the  vary- 
ing conditions,  however,  it  is  almost  im- 
possible to  accurately  follow  that  theory 
or  principle.  The  best  that  can  be  done 
is  to  make  a  regulation  that,  in  the  light 
of  experience,  will  come  nearest  doing 
substantial  justice  between  all  shippers 
and  carriers  on  all  kinds  of  commodities. 
Rice  V.  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C  C. 
75,  79. 

(e)  Actual  weighing  of  the  articles 
making  up  a  carload  is  the  only  way  by 
which  their  actual  weight  can  be  ascer- 
tained to  a  certainty,  but  this  practice 
is  not  always  convenient,  practicable,  or 
even  advisable.  Where  the  commodity 
is  not  susceptible  of  a  reasonably  accur- 
ate estimated  weight,  there  should  be 
sufficient  margin  between  the  minimum 
and  the  maximum  weights  to  allow  for 
reasonable  variation  between  the  esti- 
mated and  the  actual  weights.  Georgia 
Rough  &  Cut  Stone  Co.  v.  Georgia  R  R 
Co.,   13,  I.  C.  C.  401,  403. 

(f)  Charges  in  excess  of  actual  weight 
unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded.  Kaye 
&  Carter  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  St. 
Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  159. 

(g)  When  more  of  an  article  is 
shipped  on  one  day  to  one  consignee  than 
can  be  loaded,  the  balance,  if  loaded  in 
a  box  car,  will  be  carried  at  the  carload 
rate  on  the  actual  weight.    Hartford  Can- 


ning Co,  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  288. 

(h)  Charges  assessed  on  weight  in 
excess  of  the  actual  weight.  Reparation 
awarded.  Miller  &  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  377. 

(i)  Actual  weight  of  shipment  lower 
than  prescribed  minimum,  not  found  un- 
reasonable. Kaye  &  Carter  Lumber  Co. 
V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  392. 

(j)  Rates  assessed  on  basis  of  net  ton 
for  part  of  haul  and  gross  ton  for  re- 
mainder. HELD,  rates  should  have  been 
based  on  gross  ton  for  entire  haul.  Rep- 
aration awarded.  Central  Iron  &  Coal 
Co.  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  441. 

(k)  Larger  car  furnished  than  one  or- 
dered, and  rates  based  on  minimum  of 
larger  car.  HELD,  rates  should  have 
been  based  on  actual  weight  of  shipment, 
which  was  more  than  minimum  of  car 
ordered,  but  less  than  car  furnished.  Rep- 
aration awarded.  Torrey  Cedar  Co.  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  420. 

§4.     Capacity  Weight. 

(a)  Where  complainant  is  charged  on 
a  carload  of  coal  on  the  basis  of  80,500 
lbs.,  and  it  appears  that  the  weight  at 
destination  was  66,760  lbs.,  and  the  car 
►was  physically  capable  of  carrying  not 
over  70,500  lbs.,  complainant  is  entitled 
to  reparation  on  a  weight  basis  of  70,500. 
lbs.  Katzmaier  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C.  528,  529. 

(b)  On  shipments  of  stone  from  Ro- 
mona,  Ind.,  defendant  was  accustomed 
to  mark  on  the  waybills  the  capacity 
weight  of  the  car,  there  being  no  scales 
at  Romona,  with  a  view  of  having  the 
cars  weighed  in  transit  and  said  marked 
weights  corrected  according  to  the  scale 
weight.  As  a  result  of  such  practice, 
the  consignee,  where  there  was  a  failure 
to  make  said  correction,  was  often  com- 
pelled to  pay  for  the  capacity  weight 
in  excess  of  the  minimum  weight  or  else 
refuse  the  car.  HELD,  defendant  should 
desist  from  indicating  the  weight  of  ship- 
ments upon  its  waybills  until  the  weight 
had  been  actually  determined,  but  that 
complainant's  request  that  the  cars  be 
billed  at  the  carload  minimum  should  be 
denied  as  being  unjust  to  defendant.  Ro- 
mona Oolitic  Stone  Co.  v.  Vandalia  R  R. 
Co.,  13  1.  C.  C.  115,  117. 

(c)  Case  governed  by  the  decision  in 
Romona  Oolitic  Stone  Co.  v.  Vandalia  R. 
R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  115,  the  shipment  being 


902 


WEIGHTS  AND  WEIGHING,  §4    (d)— §5    (h) 


one  of  stone  from  Romona,  Ind.,  and  de- 
fendant being  ordered  to  desist  from  bill- 
ing carload  shipments  at  the  marked  ca- 
pacity of  the  cars.  Romona  Oolitic  Stone 
Co.  V.  C.  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
568,    570. 

(d)  On  stone  paving  blocks  from  Li- 
thonia,  Ga.,  to  Chicago,  complainant  was 
assesseid  $3.10  per  ton.  If  the  actual 
weight  of  the  load  was  less  than  the 
marked  capacity  of  the  car,  the  charges 
were  based  on  the  marked  capacity;  if 
it  exceeded  the  marked  capacity,  charges 
were  collected  on  the  actual  weight.  It 
appeared  that  complainant  could  have 
easily  loaded  on  cars  received  to  their 
marked  capacities.  In  ordering  cars, 
complainant  made  no  demand  for  cars 
of  any  specific  capacity,  although  cars 
ranging  from  40,000  lbs.  to  100,000  lbs. 
capacity  were  available.  HELD,  com- 
plainant was  not  entitled  to  reparation 
on  the  ground  that  the  marked  capacity 
used  as  a  minimum  was  unreasonable. 
Georgia  Rough  &  Cut  Stone  Co.  v. 
Georgia  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  401,  404. 

§5.     Estimated  Weight. 

(a)  Fuel  oil  switched  at  St.  Louis  was 
not  weighed,  and  there  was  no  tariff  pro- 
vision for  estimated  weights;  HELD,  that 
charges  collected,  based  on  an  arbitrary 
estimated  weight,  were  unreasonable  so 
far  as  they  exceeded  estimated  weights 
provided  in  tariffs  governing  the  road 
haul  to  St,  Louis.  Standard  Oil  Co.  v 
I.   T.  R.  R.   Co.,  23  L  C.   C.  369. 

(b)  Complainant  shipped  400  cases  of 
eggs,  each  case  containing  30  dozen  eggs, 
from  Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Los  Angeles, 
via  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  which  collected 
charges  thereon  in  the  sum  of  $660,  based 
on  a  rate  of  $3  per  100  lbs.  applied  to  a 
total  weight  of  22,000  lbs.,  which  is 
equivalent  to  an  estimated  weight  of  55 
lbs.  per  case.  Freight  classifications  gen- 
erally estimate  the  weight  of  a  case  of 
30  dozen  eggs  at  53  lbs.,  and  defendant 
admitted  that  this  was  approximately  the 
correct  weight  per  case  of  the  shipment 
in  question,  but  contended  that  its  rule 
estimating  the  weight  at  55  lbs.  has  been 
in  effect  for  some  years,  and  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  showing  that  the  estimated 
weight  is  too  high,  it  should  not  now  be 
disturbed.  HELD,  the  establishment  of 
estimated  weights  is  of  material  advan- 
tage to  both  the  shipper  and  carrier  in 
expediting  movements,  and  provided  such 
estimated   weights   are   just  and   reason- 


able, there  is  no  objection  to  their  main- 
tenance. In  this  case  the  estimated 
weight  rule  of  the  defendant  should  pro- 
vide for  an  estimated  weight  of  53  lbs. 
on  a  case  of  30  dozen  eggs,  which  weight 
is  prescribed  as  a  maximum  for  the  fu- 
ture. Reparation  awarded.  Simpson 
Fruit  Co.  V.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  23  I.  C. 
C.  412. 

(cd)  Tariff  provision  estimating  weight 
of  a  case  of  30  dozen  eggs  to  be  55  lbs. 
found  unreasonable.  Simpson  Fruit  Co. 
V.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  412. 

(e)  Complainant  asked  reparation  on 
a  carload  of  coiled  elm  hoops  shipped 
from  Bell  City,  Mo.,  to  Jacksonville,  Fla. 
The  car  was  weighed  on  the  track  scale 
at  Dexter,  Mo.,  and  Jacksonville.  At  the 
latter  place  the  car  was  reported  4,500 
lbs.  heavier  than  at  the  former.  HELD, 
a  reasonable  estimate  based  upon  the 
available  facts  marks  the  limit  of  en- 
deavor in  dealing  with  the  weight  of  past 
shipments.  Where  there  is  a  conflict 
in  actual  scaling,  the  Commission  must 
be  aided  by  the  other  facts  of  record, 
which  show  that  similar  shipments  aver- 
aged lower  than  the  weight  claimed  on 
this  car.  Charges  assessed  on  the  Dexter 
weight,  and  reparation  awarded.  Noble  v. 
St.  L.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  62. 

(f)  There  is  no  objection  to  specific 
or  estimated  package  rates.  National 
League  of  Commission  Merchants  of  U. 
S.  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  132,  135. 

(g)  Complainant  alleged  that  the  esti- 
mated weight  of  packages  of  apples  upon 
which  defendants  assessed  charges  was 
in  excess  of  the  actual  weight,  but  gave 
no  evidence  to  support  this  contention, 
except  testimony  showing  that  the  esti- 
mated weight  of  barrels  of  apples  was 
in  excess  of  the  actual  weight.  The 
tariffs  provided  an  estimated  weight  of 
50  lbs.  for  packages  of  apples  and  no 
estimated  weight  for  barrels.  HELD, 
carriers  could  not  legally  charge  for 
estimated  weights  of  apples  and  a  ship- 
per might  demand  that  apples  so  shipped 
be  weighed,  and  that  complainant's 
proper  remedy  was  to  demand  that  apples 
be  weighed.  No  order  entered  as  to  esti- 
mated weight  of  packages.  Ozark  Fruit 
Growers'  Ass'n  v.  St  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co., 
16  I.  C.  C.  134,  136. 

(h)  On  cabbages  from  Louisiana  and 
Mississippi  points  to  Chicago,  defendant's 
tariff  provided  for  rates  based  on  weight, 
and  specified  certain  standard  crates  with 


WEIGHTS  AND  WEIGHING,  §5  (i)— §6  (d) 


903 


estimated  weights.  For  many  years 
charges  were  assessed  by  this  method  of 
computing  weight  and  without  actually 
weighing  the  shipments.  At  a  certain 
period  many  different  sizes  of  crates  be- 
gan to  be  used,  and  defendant  then 
adopted  the  practice  of  weighing  a  few 
of  the  crates  of  each  shipment  and  es- 
timating the  weight  of  the  shipment  from 
the  weight  of  these  crates.  Defendant 
apparently  acted  in  good  faith  in  attempt- 
ing to  arrive,  as  far  as  practicable,  at 
the  actual  weight  of  shipments,  and  the 
method  employed  was  for  the  purpose  of 
avoiding  the  delay  and  expense  of  ac- 
tually weighing  the  entire  shipment. 
Complainant,  on  shipments  made  while 
the  latter  method  of  estimating  weights 
was  in  effect,  sought  reparation  on  the 
basis  of  estimating  weights  according  to 
the  former  method.  HELD,  while  defend- 
ant was  to  be  criticized  for  not  putting 
into  effect  the  latter  method  as  soon  as 
crates  began  to  vary  in  size  from  the 
standard  crates  specified  in  its  tariff,  the 
method  of  estimating  as  finally  adopted 
was  a  proper  one.  Reparation  denied. 
Davies  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co,,  16  I.  C.  C  376, 
380. 

(i)  A  weighing  association  of  shippers 
adopted  5.8  lbs.  per  brick  as  an  estimated 
weight,  and  defendant  carriers  had  ac- 
cepted same  without  question.  Complain- 
ant ceased  to  be  a  member  of  the  asso- 
ciation just  before  making  the  shipments 
in  question.  HELD,  this  fact  did  not 
preclude  complainant  from  the  right  of 
having  charges  assessed  on  the  weight 
arrived  at  on  the  basis  of  said  estimated 
weight  per  brick.  Hydraulic  Press  Brick 
Co.  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I  C.  C. 
342,  345. 

(j)  The  estimated  weights  of  a  cord 
of  hickory  wood  is  6,700  lbs.  French 
Broad  Mfg.  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  586. 

§6.     Reweighing. 

(a)  The  rule  of  the  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
providing  for  the  reweighing  of  coal  at 
Omaha,  Neb.,  considered.  HELD,  follow- 
ing Rice  v.  Georgia  R.  R.,  14  I.  C.  C.  75, 
that  the  present  rule  is  unreasonable  and 
should  be  amended  to  provide  that  if  re- 
weighing of  coal  discloses  a  variation  of 
more  than  one  per  cent  with  a  minimum 
of  500  lbs.  from  the  original  shipping 
weight,  the  original  weight  and  charges 
will  be  corrected  accordingly,  and  the  re- 
weighing charge  refunded  to  consignee. 


but  if  reweighing  fails  to  disclose  such 
variation  of  one  per  cent  with  a  mini- 
mum of  500  lbs.,  the  original  weight  and 
charges  will  not  be  changed,  and  the 
reweighing  charge  will  be  retained  by 
the  carrier.  Reparation  awarded.  Sun- 
derland Bros.  Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co., 
21  I.  C.  C.  632,  636. 

(b)  The  complainant  shipped  a  car- 
load of  fir  lumber  which  was  weighed  as 
an  entirety  and  a  weight  of  75,800  lbs. 
reported.  The  car  was  reweighed  dur- 
ing transit  and  a  weight  of  78,300  lbs. 
was  shown.  The  rate  was  assessed  on 
the  latter  weight.  The  first  weighing 
was  that  of  the  car  as  an  entirety.  At 
the  second,  the  trucks  were  weighed 
separately.  HELD,  the  first  weight  should 
apply  Reparation  awarded.  Wheeler  L. 
B.  &  S.  Co.  V.  A.  &  C.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
I.  C.  C.  10. 

(c)  A  tariff  provided  that  the  rate 
should  be  assessed  upon  the  actual  weight 
and  the  bill  of  lading  was  conditioned 
that  the  weight  stated  was  subject  to 
correction.  Defendant  proved  that  the 
weight  obtained  on  shipments  of  poles 
from  Washburn,  Wis.,  to  Winside,  Neb., 
and  from  Northome,  Minn.,  to  James,  O., 
at  the  point  of  origin  and  stated  in  the 
bill  of  lading  was  erroneous,  and  that  the 
weight  obtained  upon  reweighing  was 
correct.  HELD,  defendant  was  entitled 
to  charge  on  the  basis  of  the  latter 
weight,  and  that  the  reweighing  at  points 
of  destination  was  correct.  Duluth  Log 
Co.  V.  C.  St  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  16 
I.  C.  C.  38,  39. 

(d)  On  coal  shipped  from  the  Jellico 
mines,  Tennessee,  to  Augusta,  Ga.,  and 
reweighed  in  transit,  no  change  was  made 
in  the  original  weights  or  in  the  charges 
if  the  reweighing  weight  was  not  2  per 
cent  more  or  less  than  the  original  weight, 
with  a  minimum  variation  of  1,000  lbs. 
Where  the  reweighing  weight  was  more 
than  2  per  cent  and  not  less  than  1,000 
lbs.  higher  or  lower  than  the  original 
weight,  the  carrier  corrected  the  weight 
and  charges  and  refunded  the  $2  charge 
for  reweighing.  The  carrier  assessed  its 
charges  on  the  original  weight  obtained 
by  subtracting  the  stenciled  weight  of 
the  car  from  the  total.  Cars  and  the 
products  loaded  in  them  vary  according 
to  the  age  of  the  cars  and  weather  con- 
ditions. An  experiment  on  316  cars  indi- 
cated a  variation  of  an  average  of  67  lbs. 
per  car  between  the  original  weight  and 
the  reweighing  weight.     Reweighing  in- 


904 


WEIGHTS  AND  WEIGHING,  §6    (e)— §8    (b) 


volved  the  switching  of  the  cars  to  the 
scales  and  back  to  the  delivery  tracks, 
and  was  done  under  the  supervision  of  an 
inspection  bureau.  HELD,  the  charge  of 
$2  for  reweighing  cars  of  coal  was  not 
unreasonable;  that  wherever  upon  re- 
weighing  the  new  weight  was  1  per  cent 
and  a  minimum  of  500  lbs.  either  higher 
or  lower  than  the  original  weight,  the 
charges  should  be  corrected  on  the  basis 
of  the  new  weight  and  the  shipper  should 
not  be  compelled  to  pay  the  reweighing 
charge;  that  where  the  reweighing  weight 
was  less  than  1  per  cent  or  a  minimum  of 
500  lbs.  higher  or  less  than  the  original 
weight,  the  original  charges  should  not 
be  corrected  and  the  shipper  should  bear 
the  cost  of  reweighing;  that  where  the  re- 
weighing shows  less  than  the  original 
weight,  no  change  should  be  made  in  the 
weight  or  charges  so  as  to  result  in 
charges  less  than  upon  the  tariff  mini- 
mum provided  for  that  car,  and  that  the 
shipper  should  in  all  cases  advance  the 
reweighing  charge  to  the  carrier  subject 
to  refund,  as  above  indicated.  P.  J.  Rice 
V.  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  75,  80. 

(e)  Under  a  complaint  by  a  jobber 
shipping  coal,  which  questions  the  rea- 
sonableness of  reweighing  charges,  it  is 
Immaterial  to  the  determination  of  the 
question  whether  the  jobber  pays  the 
mine  owner  on  the  basis  of  the  original 
weight  or  the  reweighing  rate.  Rice  v. 
Georgia  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  75,  80. 

§7.     Scaleage  and  Shrinkage. 

See  Infra,  §11   (a),   (b);  Evidence,  §65 
(d);   Facilities  and   Privileges,  §12. 

(a)  The  weight  obtained  by  weighing 
both  trucks  at  a  time  preferred  to  scaling 
obtained  by  weighing  trucks  separately. 
Wheeler  Lumber,  Bridge  &  Supply  Co.  v. 
A.  &  C.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  10,  11. 

(b)  Absolute  precision  in  the  adjust- 
ment of  a  schedule  of  scalage  deductions 
so  as  to  meet  all  varying  conditions  is 
beyond  a  reasonable  possibility,  Balti- 
more Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  Pa.  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  341,  344. 

(c)  Bananas  shipped  from  New  Or- 
leans and  Mobile  to  Kansas  City  and  ad- 
jacent points  were  weighed  at  the  point 
of  origin  by  an  official  weigher  selected 
by  the  consignor  and  by  a  representative 
of  a  weighing  association  composed  of 
defendants  and  other  carriers.  The 
empty  cars  were  taken  to  the  scales  and 
weighed  singly,  each  being  uncoupled 
from  the  rest.     The  empty   weight  was 


written  on  a  tag  and  attached  to  the  car. 
After  being  loaded,  each  car  was  again 
weighed  separately  and  the  net  weight 
ascertained.  The  scales  were  officially 
inspected  twice  a  month  by  the 
city  of  New  Orleans.  Bananas  shipped 
to  the  destinations  in  question  shrunk 
some  2  per  cent  in  weight.  Under 
the  method  of  shipment  adopted  by  the 
consignor,  the  destination  of  each  car 
was  not  determined  until  after  the  train 
was  on  its  way.  Shrinkage  varied  ac- 
cording to  distance,  thus  making  it  im- 
possible to  deduct  at  the  points  of  origin 
an  estimated  shrinkage.  HELD,  shrink- 
age was  an  element  to  be  considered  in 
the  fixing  of  the  rate,  and  complainant's 
demand  that  the  cars  be  weighed  at 
destination  should  be  denied,  as  the 
method  of  weighing  at  the  points  of 
origin  was  reasonable.  Topeka  Banana 
Dealers'  Ass'n  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R. 
Co.,   13   L   C.   C.   620,   625,   626. 

III.     DISCRIMINATION. 

§8.     In    General. 

See   Allowances,   §13   (b),    (c). 

(a)  Where  a  connecting  carrier  re- 
ceives carloads  of  oil  consisting  of  tank 
cars  and  carloads  made  up  of  barrel 
packages  from  the  initial  carrier,  and 
merely  joins  with  the  initial  carrier  in  a 
joint  rate  in  itself  reasonable,  it  is  not 
liable  for  the  alleged  discriminatory  acts 
of  the  initial  carrier  in  charging  for  the 
weight  of  the  barrel  package  used  in 
shipments  made  by  one  class  of  ship- 
pers, while  at  the  same  time  making  no 
charge  for  the  weight  of  the  tank  cars 
against  a  competing  class  of  shippers 
using  such  method  of  shipment.  Pa.  Re- 
fining Co.  V.  W.  N.  Y.  &  Pa.  R.  R.  Co., 
208  U.  S.  208,  222,  28  Sup.  Ct.  268,  52  L. 
ed.  456. 

(b)  The  Official  Express  Classification 
charged  arbitrary  weights  on  shipments 
of  liquor  by  express.  Packed  in  a  wooden 
box  a  gallon  of  liquor  weighed  18  lbs., 
in  a  paper  box  a  gallon  of  liquor  weighed 
three  or  four  pounds  less,  but  the  ex- 
press companies  based  their  charge  on 
the  former  weight  of  18  lbs.  These  ar- 
bitrary weights  applied  only  to  bottles 
and  stone  jugs.  When  the  glass  con- 
tainers came  into  use,  which  they  did 
recently,  they  were  carried  at  actual 
weight,  and  this  created  a  discrimination 
in  their  favor  of  three  or  four  pounds. 
HELD,  that  the  charging  of  arbitrary 
weights  was  not  justified.    In  Re  Advance 


WEIGHTS  AND  WEIGHING,  §8  (c)— §9  (e) 


905 


in  Rates  for  Transportation  of  Liquor,  21 
I.  C.  C.  199. 

(c)  Complainant  attacked  the  follow- 
ing rule  of  defendants,  applying  to  ship- 
ments of  dressed  poultry  packed  in  ice 
from  Kansas  to  points  in  Arizona,  New 
Mexico,  Colorado,  California  and  other 
western  states:   "Poultry  Dressed,  G.  S.: 

B.  Charge  upon  the  actual  gross  weight, 
except  that  an  allowance  of  25  per  cent 
from  the  gross  weight  may  be  made  when 
it  is  necessary  to  use  ice  for  preserva- 
tion, and  it  is  used  for  that  purpose  only. 
The  charge  on  a  shipment  packed  with 
ice  must  not  be  less  than  the  charge  on 
the  net  weight,  with  25  per  cent  added, 
unless  the  gross  weight  at  the  time  of 
shipment  is  less."  HELD,  from  any  point 
of  view  the  rule  is  ambiguous  and  sus- 
ceptible of  more  than  one  meaning;  that 
it  is  unreasonable  and  should  be  modified 
to  provide  that  shipments  of  dressed 
poultry  when  packed  in  ice  shall  be  billed 
at  25  per  cent  less  than  their  gross 
weight,  but  in  no  case  at  less  than  the  net 
weight  of  the  poultry  as  invoiced  by  the 
shipper,  plus  the  weight  of  the  container. 
R.  R.  Commissioners  of  Kansas  v.  Adams 
Express  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  283,  284,  285. 

(d)  A  tariff  rule  providing  that  coal 
should  not  be  weighed  except  at  point  of 
origin,  unreasonable.  Peters  v.  O.  S,  L. 
R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  598,  599. 

(e)  Charging  on  actual  weight  to  com- 
plainant and  estimated  weight  to  com- 
petitors found  discriminatory.  American 
Creosote  Works  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I. 

C.  C.  212. 

(f)  On  ties  from  Mississippi  and  Louis- 
iana producing  points  to  Southport,  La., 
average  distance  142  miles,  a  rate  of  8.4c 
per  tie,  or  6c  per  tie  per  100  miles,  was 
assessed  against  complainant.  At  the 
same  time  complainant's  competitor  at 
Carbondale,  an  average  distance  of  465 
miles,  was  accorded  a  rate  of  12c  per  tie, 
or  2i^c  per  tie  per  100  miles,  which  rate 
was  equivalent  to  3.55c  per  tie  for  142 
miles.  The  conditions  surrounding  the 
movement  to  Carbondale  and  that  to 
Southport  were,  however,  substantially 
dissimilar.  The  Carbondale  rate  was  as- 
sessed upon  an  estimated  weight  of  100 
lbs.  per  tie,  whereas  the  Southport  rate 
was  assessed  upon  actual  weight.  Sub- 
sequent to  the  filing  of  the  complaint, 
defendants  changed  their  practice  and  as- 
sessed the  charges  on  shipments  to  Car- 
bondale at  the  actual  weight.    HELD,  the 


rate  itself  assessed  against  complainant 
was  not  shown  to  be  unreasonable  or  dis- 
criminatory, but  the  practice  of  according 
to  complainant's  competitor  an  estimated 
weight  was  unduly  discriminatory.  Rep- 
aration awarded  for  charges  exacted  on 
a  weight  in  excess  of  100  lbs.  per  tie. 
American  Creosote  Works,  Ltd.,  v.  I.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.^  C.  C.  212,  218,  219. 

(g)  Rule  providing  for  the  assessment 
of  freight  charges  on  the  basis  of  a  mini- 
mum weight  of  5,000  lbs.  on  packages  of 
plate  glass  loaded  into  box  cars  found 
unreasonable.  Reparation  awarded.  Bam- 
ble  Bros.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 
Op.  173. 

IV.  EVIDENCE      AND      BURDEN      OF 

PROOF. 

§9.     In  General. 

See  Bills  of  Lading,  §7. 

(a)  Positive  evidence  of  the  incorrect- 
ness of  a  carrier's  scaling  is  necessary 
before  another  weight  can  be  substituted. 
Browne  Grain  Co.  v.  G  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  163,  164;  Noble  v  D  &  T.  S. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  60,  61. 

(b)  Disputes  as  to  weights  of  past 
shipments  raise  questions  of  fact  which 
are  quite  difllicult  of  determination,  as 
reweighing  is  ordinarily  impossible,  and 
evidence  of  a  very  positive  character  as 
to  the  incorrectness  of  the  scaling  by  the 
carrier  is  necessary  before  another 
weight  can  be  substituted  therefor. 
Browne  Grain  Co.  v.  G.  C.  &  S  F.  Ry.  Co. 
20  I.  C.  C.  163,  164. 

(c)  The  weight  of  an  article  is  con- 
sidered in  determining  the  classification. 
Barrett  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  79,  80;  W.  E.  Caldwell  Co. 

V.  C.  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  412,  415. 

(d)  Complainant  alleged  that  defend- 
ants exacted  charges  upon  a  weight  in 
excess  of  the  true  weight  of  his  shipment. 
The  evidence  offered  does  not  rebut  the 
presumption  of  accuracy  that  must  at- 
tach to  the  scale  weights  of  defendants 
and  the  complaint  is  dismissed.  Allen  v. 
Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  415. 

(e)  Complaint  alleged  that  charges 
were  based  upon  a  weight  in  excess  of 
the  actual  weight  of  shipment.  Evidence 
insufficient  to  rebut  the  presumption  of 
accuracy  attaching  to  defendants'  scale 
weights.  Reliance  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S. 
R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  562. 


906 


WEIGHTS  AND  WEIGHING,  §10    (a)— ZONE  RATES 


V.     REPARATION. 
§10.     In  General. 

(a)  Reparation  on  the  basis  of  ex- 
icessive  weight  on  yellow  pine  crossties 
is  denied  inasmuch  as  the  shipments 
originated  at  many  different  points,  the 
consignors  being  mere  agents  of  com- 
plainant, and  no  evidence  of  any  personal 
knowledge  of  actual  weights  having  been 
introduced.  Switzer  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  & 
M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  471,  473. 

(b)  Reparation  awarded  on  shipment 
of  cement  from  Chanute,  Kan.,  to  White- 
wood,  S.  D.,  on  account  of  unreasonable 
minimum.  Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  C 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  148. 

(c)  Reparation  denied  on  shipment  of 
baled  straw,  as  car  could  have  been 
loaded  to  the  prescribed  minimum.  Rich- 
mond Co.  V.  G.  T.  Ry.  Co.  of  Can.,  Unrep. 
Op.  161. 

(d)  Reparation  awarded  on  a  ship- 
ment of  oats  from  Elk  Oity,  Okla.,  to 
Columbus,  Ga.,  on  account  of  a  charge 
for  overweight.  Joseph  Co.  v.  C.  of  Ga. 
Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  166. 

(e)  Reparation  awarded  because  rates 
were  charged  on  larger  cars  than  those 
ordered.  Bentley  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
Unrep.  Op.  181. 


(f)  Higher  minimum  weight  inserted 
in  tariff  through  error.  Reparation 
awarded.  Marquette  Cement  Mfg.  Co  v. 
C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  188. 

VI.     TARIFFS  AND  PUBLICATION. 

§11.     In  General. 

See   Substitution   of  Tonnage,    §2   (e), 
(f);  Tariffs,  §3   (2)    (i). 

(a)  As  practice  of  making  sicaleage  de- 
ductions is  not  a  matter  of  rates,  the 
Commission  sees  no  reason  why  the 
amount  of  the  weight  deductions  should 
be  published  in  tariffs.  Baltimore  Cham- 
ber of  Commerce  v.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  1. 
C.  C,  341. 

(b)  The  practice  of  making  scaleage 
deductions  based  on  estimated  weights 
does  not  present  a  question  of  rates;  it 
is  a  question  of  bailment  only.  Balti- 
more Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  Pa.  R.  R. 
Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  341,  346. 

WHARFAGE. 

See   Facilities   and   Privileges,   §16. 

WITNESSES. 

See     Interstate    Commerce     Commis- 
sion, §6. 


ZONE    RATES. 

:ee    Blanket   Rates. 


INDEX  OF  CASES. 

References  are  to  pages.  Star  denotes  case  appears  more  than  once 
on  that  page.     Black  type  refers  to  fact  point. 

Name.  -  Page 

A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  194  Fed.  449 158,  170*  171,*  432* 

A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Macon  Grocery  Co.,  166  Fed.  206 49 

A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Riverside    Mills,   219   U.  S.  186,  31  Sup.  Ct. 

164,  55  L.  ed.  167 73,  476,  477,*  482,*  490* 

A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Ward  (Ala.,  1912),  58  So.  677 483,  491 

A.  G.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McCleskey,  160  Ala.  630,  49  S.  433 7 

A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bell  (Okla.,  1912),  120  P.  987 778,  808,  809* 

A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Foster  Lumber  Co.  (Okla.,  1911),  122  P. 

139 175,  430 

A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  190  Fed.  591 285,  564,    44 

A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  229 791,  793,  891,  158 

A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  182  Fed.  189 44 

A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rodgers  (N.  M.,  1911),  113  P.  805 480 

A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State  (Okla.,  1912),  123  P.  1065 424 

A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  The  Superior  Refining  Co.,  83  Kan.  732,  112 

p   5Q4  429 

A.  T.  &  S.  F."  Ry.'co.'v.  U.S.*  170  Fed.  '250 /.V.V.V.V/.V.V.'.V.  187, 1*91*  192 

A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  191  Fed.  856 442,  443,  468 

Abeles  &  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  326 360,  610,  739 

Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  283. .  547 
Acme     Cement     Plaster   Co.  vs.  C.  &   N.  W.  Ry.    Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 

105 1,  104,  105, 

131,  132,  247,  294,  303,  307,  312,  324,  355,  404,  419,  456,  507,  516, 

541,  570,  594,  597,  603,  612,  678,  684,  703,  718,  721,  731,  736,  739,  803 
Acme     Cement     Plaster     Co.    v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 

C.  30 317,  326,  596 

Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  37. . . .  731 
Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  46. .  864 

Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Green  (Va.,  1911),  72  S.  E.  102 482 

Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Charlottesville  Woolen  Mills  (Va.,  1908),  63 

S.  E.  8 194,  425 

Advance    Thresher    Co.    v.    O.  &   N.  W.    R.    R.    Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 

599 535,  613,  739,  812,  825,  862 

Advance  Thresher  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  283 330 

Aetna  Powder  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  165 150,  651 

Ala.  Lumber  &  Export  Co.  v.  P.  B.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  295.804,  808 
Alabama  Lumber  &  Export  Co.,  v.  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

442    517    532 

Alabama  Lumber  &  Export  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.*  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  84. .'  761 

907 


908  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Alabama  Coal  Operators'  Association  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  230. 

208,  213,  306 

Alan  Wood  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  540 780,  790 

Alaska  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  564 360,  607 

Albany  Box  &  Basket  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  315 829 

Albree  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  303 108,  111,  136,  286, 

335,  339,  361,  427,  584,  585,  589,  593,  611,  675,  707,  708,  816,  831,  893 

Alexander  &  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  187 738 

Algert  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  93 147,  150,  770 

Algert  Co.  v.  C,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  379 148 

Allen  &  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  293 714,  861 

Allen  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  415 361,  905 

Allender  v.  C,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  103 531 

Alpha     Portland     Cement     Co.    v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 

446 84,  88,  240,  315 

Alpha  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  640. . .  .864,  867 
Alpha  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  D.,  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  297. .  752 
Alphons  Custodis  Chimney  Construction  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C, 

584 186,  359,  607 

Alphons  Custodis  Chimney  Construction  Co.  v.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 

C.  600  782 

Amarillo  Gas  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  240 630 

American  Agricultural  Chemical  Co.  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 

320 90,  657 

American  Asphalt  Ass'n  v.  Uintah  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  196.  .336,  513,  584 
American  Bankers'  Association  v.  American  Express  Co.,  15  I.  C. 

C.  15 373,  375,  376,  378,  554,  775 

American  Beet  Sugar  Co.  v.  C,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  288. . .  454 
American  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  C,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

285  507 

American  Cigar  Co.'v.  P.  &  R.'Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  81.248*  358,  516,  606,  622 

American  Cigar  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  17 864 

American  Cigar  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  618 7,  864 

American  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  149 82,  89,  457 

American     Creosoting     Works,    v.    111.    Cent.    R.    R.    Co.,  15    I.  C. 

160 112,  203,*  204* 

American  Creosote  Works  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  212 

141,  232,*  333,  382,  721,*  828,  905* 

American  Express  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  212    U.    S.    522,    29    Sup.  Ct.  315, 

53  L.  ed.  635 185,  373 

American  Grocer  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  293. . . .  744 
American  Hardwood  Co.  v.  St.  L.,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  550.   735 

American  Hay  Co.  v.  L.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  166 399,  698 

American  Hide  &  Leather  Co.  v.  Pa.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  22 864 

American  Lumber  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  561 499 

American  Lumber  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  153 516 

American  Lumber  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  L.  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  470.  865 
American  Mfg.  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  483 153 


INDEX   OF   CASES  909 


Name.  Page. 

American  Milling  Co.  v.  M.,  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

282   349,  731 

American  Milling  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  384.  .114,  349 

American  Milling  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  328 595 

American  Milling  Co.  v.  L.  H.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  515 865 

American  Plow  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  144 865 

American  Plow  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  219 727,  865 

American     Refractories     Co.    v.  E.  J.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 

480  617,  714,  719 

American  Sand  &  Gravel  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.    13 736 

American  Smelting  &  Refining  Co.  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  162 877 

American  Tie  &  Timber  Co.  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  175  Fed.  28 125 

American  Tobacco  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  167 937 

American  Trust  &  Savings  Bank  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 

C.  11   621 

American  Union  Coal  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  159  Fed,  278 714,  747 

Ames-Brooks    Company    v.    Rutland    R.    R.    Co.,   16  I.   C.  C.  479. 

54,  223,  774,  805,*  806,  808,  812 

Anaconda     Copper     Mining     Co.    v.  C.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 

592 127,  351,  598,  612 

Anadarko  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  43. 

50,  316,  324,  331,  357,*  358,  410,  542,  568,*  576,  606,  633,  716,*  717 
Anderson,     Clayton     &     Co.    v.  C,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 

340  54,  55,  167,  168,  169 

Anderson,    Clayton    &    Co.   v.    St.  L.    &   S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  17   I.  C. 

C.   12   404,  882 

Anderson-Tully  Co.  v.  C,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  48 635 

Anderson  Vehicle  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  23 864 

Andy's  Ridge  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  405 

209,*  218,*  268,*  289,*  308,  570,  586,  587,  594 

Anguish  v.  C.  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  580 290,  '^77 

Anheuser-Busch  Brewing  Ass'n  v.  E.  P.  &  S.  W.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  547.  866 
Anheuser-Busch  Brewing  Ass'n  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  497.457,  740 
Anthony  Wholesale  Grocery  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 

605 103,  595 

Anthony  v.  Philadelphia  &  Reading  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  581 

101,  144,  320,*  849 

Arizona  Ry.  Comm.  v.  E.  P.  &  So.  W.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  526 130,  865 

Arizona  Ry.  Comm.  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  571 661,  774 

Arkansas  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  193  Fed.  667 4,  126,  127,  157 

Arkansas  Fuel  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  95 

553,  570,  652,  714,*  804 

Arkansas  Fuel  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  246 652,  831 

Arkansas  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  507 865 

Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  175  Fed.  141 9,  49* 

Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  149 

79,  81,  82,  95,  100,  285,  337,  340,  567,  586,  592,  638,  708* 


910  INDEX   OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 
Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  106 

Ill,  532,*  533,*  534,*  707,*  708,  709,*  887,  893 

Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  148 

44,  50,  640,  700,  709,  891 

Armour  Car  Lines  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  461 

227,  359,  607,  653,  741,  774,  782 

Armour  Car  Lines  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  32 864 

Armour  &  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  18 736 

Armour  Packing  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  56,  82,  28  Sup.  Ct.  428,  52  L. 

ed.  681 181,  182,  185,  186,  189,  191,  193 

Arnold  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  293 738 

Arrow    Lumber    &   Shingle  Co.  v.  M.,  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co., 

Unrep.  Op.  145  516,  544 

Ashgrove  Cement  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  519.352,  602,  608 
Ashland  Fire  Brick  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  115. .  .224,  245,  246,  285* 
Asparagus    Growers'    Ass'n  v.   A.   C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  423. 

642,  710 

Associated  Jobbers  of  Los  Angeles  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C. 

C.  310 5,  8,  126,  410,  569,  793,  794,  811,  837,  839 

Association  of  Union-Made  Garment  Manufacturers  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 

Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  405 241,  343,  350,  598,  900 

Atchison  v.  St.  L.,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  131 616 

Atlantic  Refining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  492 753,  761 

Austin  Mfg.  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  72 736 

Auto  Vehicle  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  286 

567,  610,  614,  818 

Avery  Manufacturing  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  20. . . . 

79,  227,  264,  295,  299,  309,*  594,  861 

Awbrey  &  Semple  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  267 

552,  864,  870,*  880 

B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  221  U.  S.  612,  31    Sup.   Ct.   Rep.  621, 

55  L.  ed.  878 283,  284,  425,  747 

B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  La  Due,  57  Misc.  614,  616,  108  N.  Y.  Supp.  659; 

reversed  128  App.  Div.  594,  122  N.  Y.  Supp.  964 

430,  177,  77^,  806,*  807,  880,*  894 

B.  &  O.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  New  Albany  Box  &  Basket  Co.  (Ind.,  1911), 

94  N.  E.  906 809,*  811,  894* 

B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  195  Fed.  962 793,  841,  852 

Back  V.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  292 671 

Badenoch  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  36 420,  830 

Baer  Bros.  Mercantile  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  18 614 

Baer  Bros.  Mercantile  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  225 

269,  312,  420,  615,  841,  843* 

Baer  Bros.  Mercantile  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  329 

421,  458,  715,  722 

Bainbridge  Board  of  Trade  v.  L.,  H.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  586. . 

237,  258,  259,  304,*  333,*  584* 


INDEX    OF    CASES  911 


Name.  Page. 

Baird  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  549 866* 

Baker  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  605   656,*  724,  741 

Baker  v.  Cumberland  Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  568 221,  541 

Baldwin  Land  Co.  v.  Columbia  Ry.  Co.,  58  Or.  285,  114  P.  569.. 

172,  419,  514,  809 

Balfour,  Guthrie   &  Co.  v.  O.  W.  R.  R.  &  Nav.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  539, 

56,  67,  111 

Ballin  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  503 525,  531 

Baltimore  Butchers*  Live  Stock  Co.  v.  P.  B.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C. 

124 364,  7n,  774,*  781,  783,  836,  837 

Baltimore  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C. 

596 286,  323,*  327,  368,  476,  556,  749 

Baltimore  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  341. 

395,  900,  904,  906* 

Baltimore  &  O.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  New  Albany   Box   &   Basket   Co. 

(Ind.,  1911),  94  N.  E.  906 776,*  814 

Bamble  Bros.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  173. . .  .150,  878,  905 
Banner  Grain  Co.  v.  Great  N.  Ry.  Co.  (Minn.,  1912),  137  N.  W.  161, 

228  791 
Banner  *MiiliAg*Co*.  V.N.Y*.  C*  &  h!  R.*  iR.*R.  Co'.,'i9  Y.  C*  C.*i28. .!.  14 
Banner  Milling  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  398. . . . 

29,  36,  554,*  591,  832 

Banner  Milling  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  31 

215,  265,  604 

Bannon  v.  Southern  Express  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  516 184,  380,  710 

Barker  &  Co.  v.  G.  &  S.  L  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  332 768 

Barlow  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  134 865 

Barnum  Iron  Works  v.  C,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  94. . 

33    333    503* 

Barr  Chemical  Works  v.  P.  &  R.R.  R.  Co.*,  20  I.  C.'c.  'H'.. ....'..  142,  550 

Barr  Chemical  Works  v.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  473 508 

Barrett  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  79 139,  905 

Barrett  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  R.  R.,  etc.,  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  464 64,  441,*  835 

Barrett  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Graham  &  Morton  Transportation  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 

399   864,  872 

Barrett  Mfg.  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  196 630 

Bartles  Oil  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  146 

328,  342,  573,  593,  678 

Bartling  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  494 103 

Barton,  Reisinger,  Davis  Co.  v.  St.  L.,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C. 

222  301 

Bascom  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  354 233,  557,  559* 

Bash  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  522 

324,  338,  407,  591,  603,  685 

Battle  V.  Atkinson,  9  Ga.  App.  488,  71  S.  E.  775 894 

Baxter  &  Co.  v.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  647 327,  502,  572,  666 

Bayou  City  Rice  Mills  v.  T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  490 

461,  469,  556,  698,  704,  861 


912  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Bayou  City  Rice  Mills  v.  H.  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  90 877 

Beall  V.  W.  A.  &  M.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  406 280,  283 

Bearmon  Fruit  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  395 740 

Beatrice  Creamery  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  109 

33,  228,  287,  335,  594,  676,  775 

Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  Ry.  &  N.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  280..  184,  724,  762,  890 
Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  270. . . . 

275   129,  242,  890 

Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  276 128,  275,  276 

Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C  98 556,  666 

Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  Louisiana  Ry.  &  N.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  343.  .202,  755 

Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  86 700* 

Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  C,  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  528 143 

Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  532 

200,*  203,  701 

Beekman  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.,  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  274. . . 

130,  551,  610,  691 

Beggs  V.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  208 499,  901 

Bennett  v.  M.,  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  301 

135,  505,  541,  551,  901 

Bentley  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  181 113,  499,  906 

Bentley  &  Olmsted  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C  56.71,  351,  612 

Benton  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  304 770,  865 

Benton  Transit  Co.  v.  Benton  Harbor,  St.  Joe  Ry.  &  Light  Co.,  13 

I.  C.  C.  542 859,  898 

Berlin    Machine    Works    v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.    R.    Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

321    865,  878 

Bernard  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  205  Mass,  254,  91  N.  E.  325 488 

Betus  V.  C,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  (la.,  1911),  129  N.  W.  962 480 

Bewsher  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  146 131 

Bibber-White  Co.  v.  White    River  Valley    Electric  R.  R.  Co.,  175 

Fed.  470 772 

Biddle  Purchasing  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  430 769 

Big  Blackfoot  Milling  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  173. . .  .89,  220,  317 

Big  Canon  Ranch  Co.  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  523 

. '       418,  435,  892 

Billings  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  C,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  71. 

104,  306,  344,  569,  589,  597,  622 

Bituminous  Coal  Operators  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  385 

269,  273,  285,  289,  291,  317,  355,  361 

Black  V.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  402 693 

Black  Horse  Tobacco  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  588 

504,  570,  842,  879* 

Blackmer  &  Post  Pipe  Co.  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  (Mo.   App.,  1909), 

119  S.  W.  1 488 

Black  Mountain  Coal  Land  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  286 

33,  98,  105,  209,  221,  228,*  235,*  270,  295, 

309,*  313,*  317,*  338,*  344,  350,  362,*  428,  571,  587,  588,  589,  596,  606 


INDEX    OF    CASES  913 


Name.  Page. 

Blackwell  Milling  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  483  361,  389,  412,  740 

Blair  &  Jackson  v.  Wells-Fargo  Co.  (la.,  1912),  135  N.  W.  615.... 

73,  177,  480 

Blake,  Moffet  &  Towne  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  29 736 

Blake  &  Son  Hardware  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 

139  248 

Blankenship  v.  Big  Sandy  &  Cumberland  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  569. . .  512 
Blinn  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  430 

77,  128,  728,*  804,  808 

Block  &  Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  372 407 

Block-Pollak  Iron  Co.  v.  H.  E.  &  W.  T.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  505 77 

Block-Pollak  Iron  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  520 791 

119  S.  W.  1 488 

Blodgett  Milling  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  448. . . . 

243,*  291,  317,  388,  409,  728,*  861,  864,  872 

Bluefield  Shippers'  Ass'n  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  519 

132,  346,  351,  442,*  444,*  450,*  459,*  475,*  580,  600,  845,  866 

Bluff  City  Oil  Co.  v.  St.  L.,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  296. . .  .742,  746 

Blume  &  Co.  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  53 427,  438,*  481,  891 

Blumenstein  v.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  90 140,  658,  673 

Board  of  Bristol,  Tenn.,  v.  V.  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  453 251 

Board  of  Mayor  and  Aldermen  v.  V.  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 

453 242,  269,  319,  326,  328,  346,  420,  573,  600,  629 

Board  of  Trade  of  Chicago  v.  A.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  504 

240,  303,  306,  321,  330,  372,  567,  754 

Board  of  Trade  of  Laredo,  Tex.,  v.  I.  &  G.  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  28  259 
Board  of  Trade  of  Winston-Salem  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  12. 

103,  105,  268,  295,  317,  326,  336,  353,  561,  584,  589,  596,  603,  628 

Boileau  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  640 

10,  217,  292,  293,*  311,  315, 

317,  335,*  336,  344,  349,  360,*  361,  427,  584,  585,  590,  597,*  605,  612* 
Boise  Commercial  Club  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  115 

5,  179,*  342,  376,  Z7%^  383,  570,  804,*  894 

Bollman  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  318 153 

Bon  Marche  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  21  I.  C.  C.  195 818* 

Bookwalter  Wheel  Co.  v.  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  603 754* 

Borgfeldt  &  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  552 898,*  413 

Bott  Bros.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  136 

325,  689,  864,  867* 

Bovaird  Supply  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  56 

100,  288,  297,  298,  325,  455,*  456,  596,  894 

Bowles  &  McCandless  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  563 714,  730 

Bowman-Kranz  Lumber  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 

277  637,  657,  669 

Boyd  V.  O.  W.  R.  R.  &  Nav.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  519 735 

Bradford-Kennedy  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  455 114,  511 

Brantley  Co.  v.  Ocean  S.  S.  Co.,  5  Ga.  App.  844,  63  S.  E.  1129.  . 

514,  803 


914  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Breese-Trenton  Mining  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  598 

297,  342,*  593,  594,  626 

Bregman  &  Co.  v.  Pa.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  78 767* 

Brey  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  497 392,*  784 

Bridgeman-Russel  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Exp.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  573 381,  419 

Brooklyn  Cooperage  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  358 204* 

Brook-Rauch  Mill  &  Elevator  Co  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I. 

C.  C.  249 587,  860 

Brook-Rauch  Mill  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  158. 

54,  56,  388,  399 

Brook-Rauch  Mill  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  St.  L.,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I. 

C.  C.  651  75,  114,*  387,  888,  889 

Brown  Bros.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  513 345 

Browne  v.  American  Express   Co.,   Unrep.   Op.  237 383 

Browne  v.  American  Express  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  237 738 

Browne  Grain  Co.  v.  F.  W.  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  410 631 

Browne  Grain  Co.  v.  G.  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  163.. 360,  688,  905* 
Browne  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  L.  &  T.  R.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  499 

517,  735 

Brunswick-Balke-Collender  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 

395  110,  148,  502 

Brunswick-Balke-Collender  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 

165    146,  149 

Brunswick-Balke-Collender  Co.  v.  G.  T.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  334 

146,  744 

Buck  Bros.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  190 731 

Buffalo  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  573 740* 

Buffalo  Hardwood  Lumber  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 

C.  536 437,  480,  714,  720 

Buffalo  Oil  Co.  v.  C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  289. . .  .290,  683 
Buffalo  Union  Furnace  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  620, 

630 60,  836* 

Bulah  Coal  Co.  v.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  52 115* 

Bulte  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  351 

295,  303,  310,  326,*  343,  353,  369,  428,  457,  561,  580,  595,  596,  609 

Bunch  &  Tussey  v.  Nevada-California-Oregon  Ry.,  17  I.  C.  C.  506. . .   512 

Bunch  &  Tussey  v.  Nevada,  C.  &  O.  Ry.,  17  I.  C.  C.  490 641 

Bunch  Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  377 546 

Burgess  v.  Transcontinental  Freight  Bureau,  13  I.  C.  C.  668 

29,  51,  342,  593,*  595,  612,  671,  720,  727,  733 

Burke  V.  Piatt,  172  Fed.  717 374 

Burnham,  Hanna,  Munger  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 

299 296,  304,  317,  326,  346,  584,  586,  596,  600,  604 

Burno  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  488 456,  607 

Burton  v.  U.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  75 104,  851 

Butters  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  521 546 

Byrnes  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  589 735 

Byrnes  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  251 549,  716,  723 

Byrnes  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  585 817 


INDEX    OF    CASES  915 


Name.  Page. 

C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Kirby,  225  U.  S.  155,  32  Sup.  Ct.  648,  56  L.  ed. 

1033 780,  781,  810,  811 

C.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  156  Fed.  558 779 

C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  173  Fed.  930 117 

C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  157  Fed.  831 186,  192,  779,  843* 

C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Feintuch,  191  Fed.  482 715 

C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Feintuch,  191  Fed.  482 73,  173,*  815 

C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  209  U.  S.  90,  28  Sup.  Ct.  439,  52  L.  ed. 

698  181,*  182,*  185,*  186,  189,*  191,  193 

C.  &  C.  Traction  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  486 

281,   794,   841,   848 

C.  &  M.  Electric  R.  R.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  20 857 

C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Standard  Lumber  Co.,  174  Fed.  107 772 

C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Maysville    Brick    Co.,  132    Ky.  643,  116  S.  W. 

1183   807 

C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Planters'  G.  &  O.  Co.,  88  Ark.  77,  113  S. 

W.  352  492 

C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Miles,  92  Ark.  573,  123  S.  W.  775 483 

C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Rich  (Tex.  1911),  138  S.  W.  223 491 

C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  171  Fed.  680 78,  173 

C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Lena  Lumber  Co  (Ark.,  1911),  137  S.  W. 

562  176,  514,  515 

C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Williams  (Ark.  1912),  142  S.  W.  826. . .  .169,*  491 

C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.  V.  Hite,  166  Fed.  976 194 

C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  162  Fed.  835 69,*  191 

C.  &  W.  Lumber  Co.  v.  T.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C  462 819 

C.  W.  &  V.  Coal  Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  13 788 

Caddell  &  Sons  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  177 197,  759,  768 

Cady  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  12 406,  703,  741 

Caldwell  Co.  v.  C.  L  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  412. . . .  133,  152,  864,  866,  905 
California  Commercial  Ass'n  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  422. . 

6,*  72,  133,  137,  145,*  310,  373,  383,  388,  414,  415,*  805 

California  Commercial  Ass'n  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  458. 

6,  72,  415,  806 

California  Fruit  Growers'  Exchange  v.  Santa  Fe  Refrigerator  De- 
spatch Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  404 708 

California  Commercial  Ass'n  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  300. .   414* 

California  Pole  &  Piling  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  507 393,  684 

California  Sugar  Co.  v.  S.  P.  L.  A.  &  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  6 

262,  281,  294,  596 

Calvi  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  461 114,  744 

Cambria  Steel  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  484 201,  223,  726 

Camden  Iron  Works  v.  U.  S.,  158  Fed.  561 188 

Cameron  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  560 756,  770 

Cameron  &  Co.  v.  H.  E.  &  W.  T.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  146  755* 

Canadian  Valley  Grain  Co.  v.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  509. . .  813 
Canadian  Valley  Grain  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  108 

50,  732,  813 


916  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Cannon  Mfg.  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  387 153 

Canton  Fertilizer  &  Chemical  Co.  v.  W.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

87' 737 

Cardiff  Coal  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  460,  470. . .  .842,  859 

Cardiff  Coal  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  460 842,  859 

Carlin's  Sons  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  477 864,  873 

Carlisle  Commission  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  217. . .  738 
Carlton  Produce  Co.  v.  Velasco  B.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.   (Tex.  Civ.  App. 

1910),  131  S.  W.  1187 486,  492* 

Carolina  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  533 

620,    724 

Carpenter  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  529 551,  745 

Carpenter  Cook  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  543 732 

Carr  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  180 738* 

Carrizzo  v.  N.  Y.  S.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  66   Misc.   243,   123  N.  Y.  Sup. 

173   201 

Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  577 662 

Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  429 767 

Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  431 662 

Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  B.  A.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  432 812 

Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  O.  R.  R.  &  Nav.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  482 767 

Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  469.. . .   691 

Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  6 112,  503,  832 

Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  O.  R.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  125 721,  756 

Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  324 

136,  137,  453,  475,  612 

Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  165 661 

Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  165 358,  606 

Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  8 315,  347 

Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  O.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  77 

211,  286,  291,  317,  335,  584,  585 

Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  236 112,  502 

Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  of  Tex.,  Unrep.  Op.  323 

360,   607,   900 

Carter  White  Lead  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  41 

226,  357,  606,  716,  742 

Casey-Hedges  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  249 516,  815 

Cattle  Raisers'  Ass'n  of  Texas  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  418 

24,  335,  584,  592,  610,  663 

Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  606. . . . 

501,    551,    759 

Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  73 

: 162,  242,  266,  551  775* 

Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  546. . .  .700,  701 
Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  387. . .  .96,  584 
Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Colo.  &  So.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  387 

335,  353,  609,  699 

Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  402 

455,  551,  800 


INDEX    OF    CASES  917 


Name.  Page. 

Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  560 700 

Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  479 

219,  354,  609,  699,  842,  854 

Cedar  Rapids  and  Iowa  City  Ry.  &  Light  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

13  I.  C.  C.  250 281,  847 

Cedar  Rapids,  etc..  Light  Co.  v.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  145  la.  528,  538, 

124  N.  W.  323 796 

Celina  Mill  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  138. 

391,  392 

Central  Commercial  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  571 349 

Central  Commercial  Co.  v.  T.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  579 735 

Central  Commercial  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  448 865 

Central  Commercial  Co.  v.  M.,  J.  &  K.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  25. .   686 

Central  Commercial  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  166 614 

Central  Commercial  Co.  v.  G.  &  S.  L  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  532 201 

Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dowe,  6  Ga.  App.  858,  65  S.  E.  1091 490 

Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chicago  Varnish  Co.,  169  Ala.  287,  53  So. 

832  483 

Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sims,  169  Ala,  295,  53  So.  826 

477,*  481,  483,*  487 

Central  Iron  &  Coal  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  441 901 

Central  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  495.. 391,  556,  892 

Central  Phosphate  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  446 605 

Central  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.  v.  Hite,  166  Fed.  976 175,  200 

Chaffin  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  585 342,  363 

Chaffin  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  585 740 

Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Ashburn,  Ga.,  v.  G.  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I. 

C.  C.  140 225,  243,  247,*  248,  291,  297,  317,  329,*  593,  880,  883 

Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Augusta,  Ga.,  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  233 

315,  535,  536,  625 

Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Houston  v.  H.  E.  &  W.  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  408 740 

Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Houston  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C. 

C.  214 20,  216,  357,  606 

Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Milwaukee  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I. 

C.  C.  460.. 276,  289,  310,  323,  324,  571,*  603,  761,  767,  842,  855,  863, 889 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Newport  News  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  345. 

46,  223,*  225,  229,  240, 

243,*  246,  259,  269,  311,  323,  329,  331,  339,  361,  366,  388,  582,  845,  863 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Newport  News  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 

345    339,  243 

Chandler  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Ft.  Smith  &  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C. 

C.  473   435 

Channon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  551 144 

Chanute  Refining  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  348.  .605,  684 
Chanute  Refining  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  528. .. .  735 
Chappelle  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  56 

109,  124,*  141,  569,  682,  820,  889 


918  INDEX    OF    CASES 


J 


Name.  Page. 

Chappelle  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  456 166 

Chatfield  Mfg.  Co.  v.  L  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  385 686,  823 

Chattanooga  Feed  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  480 592,  650 

Chattanooga  Feed  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  480.224,  341,  536* 

Chattanooga  Medicine  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  546 349 

Chattanooga  Wagon  Co.  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  429 878 

Checotah  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  143 741 

Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Maysville  Brick    Co.,    132    Ky.    643, 

116  S.  W.  1183 777 

Chesttnut  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  440 865 

Chicago  Car  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  438 692 

Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Comm.,  173  Ind.  469,  87,  N.  E.  1030. .  423 
Chi.  Ind.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  219,  U.  S.  486,  31,  Sup.  Ct.  272,  55  L. 

ed.   305    51,*  185* 

Chicago  Lumber  &  Coal  Co.  v.  Tioga  Southeastern  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C. 

C.  323  ...  .6,  30,  82,  96,  246,  287,  295,  317,  356,  553,  596,*,  612,  669,  704 
Chicago  Sash  and  Door  Ass'n  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  594. . . .  541 
Chicago  &  Milwaukee  Electric  R.  R.  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C. 

C.  20   842,  850 

Chicago  &  Riverdale  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  &  E.  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  346    768 

Chickasaw  Compress  Co.  v.  G.  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  187. .  271 

Chilton  Malting  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  10 673 

Christian  &  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  340 738 

Cincinnati  &  Columbus  Traction  Co  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 

L  C.  C.  486 535,  794,  848 

Citizens  of  Somerset  v.  Washington  Ry.  &  Elec.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  187 

12,  280,*  315,  420,  843 

City  of  Ashland  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  et  al.,  20  L  C.  C.  3.246,  897 
City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  376 

8,  106,  137,  139,  295,  317,  318,*  344,*  346,  349,*  351,  359, 

471,*  472,*  495,  539,  562,  565,*  571,  574,*  589,*  595,*  596,  605,*  606,  608* 

City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  179 470,  548,  766 

City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  162 

. . .  .31,  82,  104,  303,  306,  307,*  317,  331,  332,*  334,  338,  344,  345, 

347,  349,  452,*  469,'^538,*  554,  582,  583,  584,  589,  597,*  601,  603,  852,  853 
City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  400 

297,  330,  431,  442,*  443,*  447,*  448,*  450,  460,  466,  467,*  474 

City  of  Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  454 544,  545,  547,  554 

Clark  Co.  v.  Buffalo  &  Susquehanna  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  380.342,  593,  678 

Clearfield  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  211 212 

Cleary  Bros.  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  588 614 

Clemens  Horst  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.  17  I.  C.  C.  576 766 

Clemons  Horst  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  291 90 

demons  Produce  Co.  v.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  232 731 

Clemons  Produce  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  101 865 

Clinton  Bridge  &  Iron  Works  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  416 

148,   806 


INDEX   OF    CASES  919 


Name.  Page. 

Clinton  Bridge  &  Iron  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  55. .  736 
Clinton  Bridge  &  Iron  Works  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  416..  806 
Clinton  Bridge  &  Iron  Works  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  24.  864 

Clover  Leaf  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  311 517 

Clow  &  Sons  V.  Penn.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  3 656 

Clyde  Coal  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  135 82,    87 

Cobb  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  100 327,  378,  572,  675 

Cochrane  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  307 738,  739 

Coeur  D'Alene  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  (Wash.  1908),  95  P. 

71   7,  779,  808,  827 

Cohen  &  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  177 539,  713,  725 

Cohen  &  Co.  v.  Mallory  Steamship  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  374 

303   329   331  *  516   582* 

Colonial  Salt  Co.*  v.  M.'l.  &  LLine,  23  I.C.  C.  358.  .64,  108,  278,  863^  899* 
Colorado  Bedding  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  401,  403. . 

348,*    631,    760* 

Colorado  Coal  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  264,  850 
Colorado  Coal  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 

458  109,  110,  115,  121,  122,  124 

Colorado  Coal  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  478.  .459,  699 
Colorado  Coal  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  572 

250,  294,  298,  317,  596 

Colorado  Tent  &  Awning  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  21  I.  C.  C.  565.  .147,  743 
Columbia  Grocery  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  502 

227,  255,  303,  311,  318 

Columbian  Iron  Works  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  557 866* 

Columbus  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  Kanawha  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  171  Fed.  713. .  49 
Columbus  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  Kanawha  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  178  Fed.  261..     48 

Columbus  Iron  Works  v.  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  265 862 

Commercial  Club  of  Duluth  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  288 392 

Commercial  Club  of  Hattiesburg  v.  Ala.  Gt.  So.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 

534  603 

Commercial  Club  of  Hattiesburg  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  534, 

81,  257,  535 

Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  Anderson  &  Saline  River  Ry.  Co.,  18 

I.  C.  C.  532 14,  20,  217,  305,  573 

Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  397. . . .  891 
Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  Anderson  &  Saline  River  Ry.  Co.,  18 

I.  C.  C.  532 593,  861 

Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  A.  &  S.  R.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  419. . 

20,  347,  601,  718 

Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  631.  .27,  100,  341,  592 
Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  156. . 

104,  306,  344,  597,  667 

Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  53 683 

Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  397. . . . 

71,  321,  322,  324,  336,  350,  356,  584,  603,  611,  619 


920  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Commercial  Club,  Salt  Lake  City,  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 

C.  218 24,  79,  95,  97,  106,  324,  336,  337, 

350,  351,  356,*  452,  518,*  519,*  554,  584,  586,*  589,  597,  606,  611,  613,  620 

Commercial  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  11 301,  359,  607 

Commercial  Exchange  of  Philadelphia  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  1 .  .  204 
Commission  of  Oklahoma  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  379. .   761 

Commutation  Rate  Case,  21  I.  C.  C.  428 436,  518,*  520,*  521,*  522* 

Comstock  &  Co.  V.  N.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  575 735 

Connolly-Fanning  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  283 641 

Consolidated  Water  Power  Co.  v.  S.  P.,  L.  A.  &  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 

I.  C.  C.  169 76,  508,  820 

Consumers'  Ice  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  277.  .246,  593,  627 
Contact  Process  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  184. . 

756,  864,  870,  884 

Continental  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  281 ... .  816 
Continental  Lumber  &  Tie  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  129. . .   66^ 

Continental  Lumber  &  Tie  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  129 321 

Continental  Oil  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  C.  T.  T.  T.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  517 732 

Cook  V.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  563 298,  347,  593,  773,  808 

Cook  Co.  V.  P.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  421 740 

Coomes  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  192 199,  805,  864,  877 

Cooper  &  Son  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  324 695 

Coors  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  352 359,  616 

Copper  Queen  Consolidated  Milling  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co., 

Unrep.  Op.  242 731 

Copper  Queen  Consolidated  Mining  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  176 731 

Copper  Queen  Consolidated  Mining  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  279 513,  517 

Copper  Queen  Consolidated  Mining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I. 

C.  C.  154  325,  863,  883 

Copper  Queen  Consolidated  Mining  Co.  v.  M.  L.  &  T.  R.  R.  &  S.  S. 

Co.,  Unrep  Op.  235 865 

Corporation  Commission  of  North  Carolina  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19 

I.  C.  C.  303 82,  85,  247,  249,  261, 

294,  317,*  324,  329,*  337,  339,  362,  580,  586,  587,  591,  596,*  600,  624 
Corporation  Commission  of  Oklahoma  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  17 

I.  C.  C.  379 846,  879,  889 

Corn  Belt  Meat  Producers'  Ass'n  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  376 

92,  99,  266,  328,*  401,  571,*  572,  573,*  604 

Corn  Belt  Meat  Producers'  Ass'n  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 

533   662* 

Cosby  V.  Richmond  Transfer  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  72 

74,*  364,  426,  518,  772,  773,  887 

Cosmopolitan  Shipping  Co.  v.  Hamburg-American  Packet  Co.,  13  I. 

C.  C.  266 366,  413,*  844,  896,  898,  899 

Counsil  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  188 766* 

Cowley  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Wash.  1912),  123  P.  998 527,*  778,*  779 


INDEX    OP    CASES  921 


Name.  Page. 

Cox  Bros.  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  464 119 

Cozart  V.  S.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  226 227,  525,  526 

Crabtree  v.  O.  R.  &  Nav.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  357 878 

Craig  &  Sons  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  266 769 

Craig  Lumber  Co.  v.  Virginian  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  144 667 

Crane  Brothers  v.  C.  H.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  571 636 

Crane  Railroad  Co.  v.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  248 

61,  68,  162,  166,  780,  849,  855 

Crane  Iron  Works  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  17  I.  C.  C.  514. . .  .65,  799 
Cramer  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (la.  1911),  133  N.  W.  387.  .480,  488,  832 

Crescent  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  230 406 

Crescent  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  559. . . . 

200,  202,  208,*  698,  793 

Crescent  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  81 . .  196,*  225 

Crescent  Lumber  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  228 754* 

Cressey  &  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  132 764 

Crocker  Co  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  588 155 

Crombie  &  Co  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  561 822 

Crombie  &  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  57 340 

Crosby  &  Meyers  v.  Goodrich  Transit  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  175 54,  279* 

Crowell  &  Spencer  Lumber  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  333 

289,  620,  734 

Crutchfield  &  Woolfolk  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  558 325,  541 

Crutchfield  &  Woolfolk  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  558 541 

Crutchfield  &  Woolfolk  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  302. . .  .561,  757 
Curtis  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  372 2,*  788,*  789,*  792 

D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  L  C.  C,  195  Fed.  968 4,  420,  615,  849 

D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  L  C.  C,  169  Fed  894 175 

D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  L  C.  C.  166  Fed.  498 793 

Dakota  Cereal  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  178 737 

Danville  Brick  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  239. . .  .352,  608,  617 

Darbyshire  &  Evans  v.  E.  P.  &  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  435 652 

Darbyshire-Harvie  Iron  &  Machine  Co.  v.  E.  P.  &  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  15 

I.   C.   C.  451 657 

Darling  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  79 228,  235,  237, 

247,  258,  289,  303,*  324,*  332,  333,  342,*  355,  362,  470,  593,  606,  610,  899* 

Darnell  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  190  Fed.  656 174,  514 

Darnell-Taenzer  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  190  Fed.  659 374,  715,  747 

Davenport  Commercial  Club  v.  Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 

19    48,     88 

Davenport   Commercial    Club    v.  Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 

209 453,  454 

Davenport   Pearl    Button    Co.    v.    C,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 

193  535,  677,  743 

Davies  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  186 72,*  394 

Davies  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  3 144,  149,  393,  708 

Davies  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  376 903 


922  INDEX   OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Davies  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  540 394,*  539 

Davis  V.  W.  J.  Exp.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  214 380,  570,  598 

Davis  Sewing  Machine  Co.  v.  P.  C'  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 

291    12,  320 

Davis  Sewing  Machine  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  301  738 

Dawson  Bros.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  486 865 

Day  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  577 822 

Dayton  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 

C.  82 829,  864,  871 

De  Bary  &  Co.  v.  L.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  527 765,  770 

De  Camp  Bros.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  144 656,  299,  348 

De  Camp  Bros.  &  Yule  Iron,  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  V.  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

22  I.  C.  C.  274 883* 

De  Camp  Fuel  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  556 866* 

De  Rochement  v.  Railroad,  75  N.  H.  158,  71  A.  868 891 

DeWinter  &  Co.  v.  Tex.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (N.  Y.  1912),  135  N.  Y.  Supp. 

893    484* 

Decarie  Incinerator  Co.  v.  M.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  71 818 

Deeves  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  482. ..  .1,  745,  788 

Deeves  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  &  I.  W.  R.  R.,  Unrep.  Op  540 812 

Degentesh  Bros.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  365 605 

Dells  Paper  &  Pulp  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  419 820 

Delray  Salt  Co.  v.  C,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  507. . .  .266,  845 

Delray  Salt  Co.  v.  D.,  T.  R.  &  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  245 559,  687,  880 

Delray  Salt  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  247,  248 

348,  538,  539,  733,  765 

Delray  Salt  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  268 352,  687* 

Delray  Salt  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  259 262 

Delray  Salt  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  27 864 

Denton  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  426 760 

Detroit  Chemical  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep  Op.  40 732 

Detroit  Chemical  Works  v.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  363 657 

Detroit  Chemical  Works  v.  N.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  357 

29,*  41,  48,  271  691 

Detroit  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  257 

403,  416,  697,*  698,*  700,*  703 

Diamond  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C,  129 620 

Dian  Lumber  Co.  v.  P.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  347 865 

Dickerson  v.  L.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  187  Fed.  874 130,  760 

Dickinson  &  Co.  v.  K.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep  Op.  587 866* 

Dickinson  Co.  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  82 516 

Diehl  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  190 359,  607,  823* 

Dietz  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  75.  .698,  803,  806 

Dobbs  V.  L.  8z  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  210 436* 

Dodds  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  14 200 

Dodge  V.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  (Minn.  1910),  126  N.  W.  627.478,  484 

Donahue  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  92 764 

Donahue-Stratton  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep  Op.  449 732 


INDEX    OF    CASES  923 


Name.  Page. 

Doran  &  Co.  v.  O.  &  K.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  491 769 

Douglas  &  Co.  V.  C,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  232 

33,  227,  388,  321,  340,  411,*  591,  782,  824 

Douglas  &  Co.  V.  C,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  97. . .  .398,*  537,*  547 
Douglas  &  Co.  V.  C,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  541 

286,  387,  537,  542,  547,  782 

Douglas  Shoe  Co.  v.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  539.  .227,  373,*  383,  385 

Douville  V.  G.  F.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  342 517 

Dowd  Knife  Works  v.  M.  C.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  523 865 

Drake  v.  Nashville,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  (Tenn.  1911),  148  S.  W.  214 

485,  490 

Dreyfus  Bros.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  63 736 

Dreyfus  Bros.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  281 865 

Dueber  Watch  Case  Mfg.  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

396   712 

Dunne  &  Grace  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  App.  1912),  148  S.  W. 

997  808 

Drummond  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  C,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 

567   197 

Duluth  &  Iron  Range  R.  R.  Co.  v.  C,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  18 

I.  C.  C.  485 106,  770,*  765* 

Duluth  Log  Co.  V.  C,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  38. . .  .17^  903 

Duluth  Log  Co.  V.  M.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  192 66,  455,  771 

Duluth  Log  Co.  V.  M.  &  L  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  627.  .60,*  129,  767,*  769,  771 

DuMee,  Son  &  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  575 104,*  632 

Duncan  &  Co.  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  590 

6,  57,  71,  137,  210,  266,  309,  336,  400,  408,*  584 

Duncan  &  Co.  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  186 356,  403 

Du    Pont   de   Nemours    Powder  Co.  v.  D.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C. 

C.  83  717,  819 

Du  Pont  de  Nemours  Powder  Co.  v.  N.  Y.,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  16 

I.  C.  C.  351 686 

Du  Pont  de  Nemours  Powder  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  544. ....  89 
DuPre  Co.  v.  B.  R.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  226 254,  494,  501 

Eagle  White  Lead  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  256 157,*  158 

Earnest  v.  D.,  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.    (N.   Y.,  1912),    134  N.  Y.  Supp. 

323   484,*  485 

East  St.  Louis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  37. 

261,  317,  343,  595,  596,  603 

East  St.  Louis  Walnut  Co.  v.  C,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  575. . .  303 

East  St.  Louis  Walnut  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C  553 548 

East  St.  Louis  Walnut  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  of  Texas,  17  I.  C. 

C.    582 96,    128,  542 

Eastern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Montgomery  (Tex.  1911),  139  S.  W.  885 485 

Eddleman  v.  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  103 528,  781 

Edison  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  D.,  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  382. 

743,  830,  833 


924  INDEX   OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Edison  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  D.,  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  95 . . 

515,  852 

Eichenberg  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  250 

412,  428,  746,  776,  782,  834,*  835,  839* 

El  Dorado  Oil  Mills  &  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  C,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C. 

C.  286 340,  635 

Electric  Malting  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  378.343,  595,  672 
Elk  Cement  &  Lime  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  84 

240,  245,  285,  291,  317,  352,  596 

Ellsworth  Produce  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  182 148 

Empire  Oil  Works  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  401 864,  872 

Empire  Wall  Paper  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  20  I.  C.  C.  1 163* 

Empson  Packing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  268 286,  683 

England  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  614 812,  826 

Enterprise  Fuel  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  219 

6,  344,  394,  837,  842,  849,*  854 

Erie  Preserving  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  118 239,  619 

Eschner  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  60 522* 

Edison  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  D.,  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

538 360,  607 

Eddy  V.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  367 733,  734,  739 

Eichenberg  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  219  U.  S.  498,  31  Sup.  Ct.  279,  55  L.  ed.  310. 

834,*  835,  839* 

Electric  Malting  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  504. .. . 

389,  673,  740 

Elkhart   Bristol    Board   &   Paper  Co.  v.  C,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 

Unrep.  Op.  561  740 

Elsinore  Cattle  Co.  v.  P.  Exp.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  500 740 

Emerson  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  212 738 

Emery,  Bird  &  Thayer  Dry  Goods  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  310 517 

Empson  Packing  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  431 739 

Erie  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wanaque  Lumber  Co.,  75  N.  J.  L.  878,  69  A.  168. .  429 
Evans  Milling  Co.  v.  C,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  351.  .240,  732 
Export  Shipping  Co.  v.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  437 145,  415 

Fairmont  Creamery  Co.  v.  Pacific  Express  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  134 379 

Fairmont  Creamery  Co.  v.  C,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  252 

17,  26,  29,  38,  226,  341,  357,  593,  606 

Fain  &  Stamps  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  529 710 

Falls  &  Co.  V.  C,  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  269 

71,*  436,  511,  805,*  894 

Farley  &  Loetscher  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 

602   634,  714 

Farmers'  Co-Operative  &  Educational  Union  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L 

C.  C.  406 215,  276 

Farmers'  Handy  Wagon  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  149. .. .  865 
Fathauer  Co.  v.  St.  L.,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.,  18  L  C.  C.  517 129,  725,  798 


INDEX    OF    CASES  925 


Name.  Page. 

Federal  Cigar  Co.  v.  I.  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  322 153 

Federal  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  453 768 

Federal  Sugar  Refining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  40 

5,  54,  59,  61,  162,  439,  440,*  441,*  838 

Federal  Sugar  Refining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  20  I.  C.  C.  200 

54,  59,*  64,  108,  223,  224,  227,  388,  440* 

Fels  &  Co.  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  483 

127,  130,  363,  541,  547,  549,  728,  743 

Felton  Grain  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  63 651 

Ferguson  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  584 769 

Ferguson  Saw  Mill  Co.  v.  St.  L.,  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  396. . 

79,  81,  85,  86,  97,*  100,  553,  665 

Fidelity  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  193  Fed.  924 733,*  714 

Field  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  298 518,  523,  549 

Fielder  &  Turley  v.  Adams  Express  Co.  (W.  Va.,  1911),  71  S.  E.  99. .  490 

First  Trust  &  Savings  Bank  v.  So.  Ind.  Ry.  Co.,  195  Fed.  330 38,  772 

Fish  &  Co.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  452. . .  .763,*  821,  883 
Fisher  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  49  Wash.  205,  95  P.  77,..  .421,  779,*  808,  881,*  844 

Fisk  &  Sons  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  19  I.  C.  C.  299 131,  199,  461,  625,  728 

Fitzsimmons-Palmer  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  295 865 

Flaccus  Glass  Co.  v.  C,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  333 

516,   864,   876* 

Fleisher  (Inc.)  v.  L.  H.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  297 865 

Flint  &  Walling  Mfg.  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.,  14  L  C.  C.  336. . .  .714,  862 
Flint  &  Walling  Mfg.  Co.  v.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  520. . . . 

330,*  474,  580* 

Florida  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  C.  of  G.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  336 

321,  324,  329,  337,  580,  586,  587,  634,*  848,  853 

Florida  Fruit  and  Vegetable  Shippers'  Protective  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L. 

R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  470 96,  326,  572,  576,*  647,  648,  761 

Florida  Fruit  and  Vegetable  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.,  17  L  C.  C.  552. . 

26,  137, 

295,  298,  309,  317,  330,  339,  347,  350,  417,*  539,*  580,*  596,  602,  644,  893 
Florida  Fruit  and  Vegetable  Shippers'  Protective  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L. 

R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  11 95,  285,  318,  346,  361,  586,  600,  638 

Florida  Mercantile  Agency  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  85 567,  580,  682 

Floridin  Co.  v.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.,  21  I.  C.  C.  610 806,  881 

Florman  v.  Dodd  &  Childs  Express  Co.,  79  N.  J.  L.  63,  74  A.  446.  .484,  489 
Folmer  &  Co.  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  33 

402,  721,  767,  812 

Follmer  &  Co.  v.  B.  B.  &  B.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  617 810* 

Follmer  &  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  458 195,  769 

Follmer  &  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  510 701 

Fond  du  Lac  Church  Furnishing  Co.  v.  C.,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21 

L  C.  C.  481 135,  136,  724 

Ford  Co.  V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  507 

134,  140,  142,  151,  152,  184,  323,  804,*  811,  828 


926  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Ford  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  576 658 

Forest  City  Freight  Bureau  v.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  109. 

144,    551 

Forest  City  Freight  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  295.  155 
Forest  City  Freight  Bureau  v.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  118. . 

72,  156 

Forest  City  Freight  Bureau  v.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  205. . 

134,  140,  142 

Forster  Bros.  Co.  v.  D.  S.  S.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  232 

515,  516,  543,  548,  670,  808 

Fort  Dodge  Commercial  Club  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  572 

241,  254,  320,  328,  338,  363,  455,  573,  586,  588,  594,  629 

Fort  Scott  Sorghum  Syrup  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  339 456 

Smith  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Chandler  Cotton  Oil  Co.,  25  Okla.,  82,  106  P.  10.  436 
Fort   Smith  Traffic   Bureau  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 

651 141,  826 

Fort  Smith  Wholesale  Grocery  Co.  v.  Ft.  S.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  509 1,  735 

Fort  Wayne  Rolling  Mill  Co.  v.  N.  Y.,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 

C.  514 657 

Foster  Glassel  Co.  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  121  La.  1053,  46  So.  1014. . . . 

777,  807,  826,*  832 

Foster  Lumber  Co.  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  68 456 

Foster  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  338 759 

Foster  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  56.  .571,  669,  735* 
Foster  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  385.  .359,*  461,  607 
Foster  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  292 

757,*  760,  765,  766 

Franke  Grain  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  296 731 

Franke  Grain  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  554 878 

Franklin,  Stiles  &  Franklin  v.  Southern  Express  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  88. . 

380,  385* 

Frederich  &  Kempe  Co.  v.  N.  Y.,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C. 

481  89,*  298,  593 

Freeman  v.  Kemendo  (Tex.,  Civ.  App.,  1912),  148  S.  W.  605 810 

Freeman  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  348. . . .     17 

Freeman  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  612 538 

Fremont  Commercial  Club  v.  C,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  74 211 

French  Broad  Mfg.  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  586. . .  .903,  672 
Friend  Paper  Co.  v.  C,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  178. . .  .196,  246 

Frye  &  Bruhn  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  501 664* 

Fuller  &  Co.  v.  P.  C.  &  Y.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  594 332,  583 

Fuller  &  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  202 822 

Fuller  &  Johnson  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  278. . .  865 
Fuller  &  Johnson  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C,  H.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  324. . .  865 
Fullerton  Lumber  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  150.  .438,  481 


INDEX   OF    CASES  927 


Name.  Page. 

Fullerton-Powell  Hardwood  Lumber  Co.  v.  V.  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20 

I.  C.  C.  86 691,  724 

Furnace  Run  Saw  Mill  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  20  I.  C.  C. 

586    327,  417 

G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Kalispell  Lumber  Co.,  165  Fed.  25 49 

Gaines  v.  S.  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  471 526 

Galesburg  Grocery  Co.  v.  C,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  393 865 

Galveston   Commercial   Ass'n  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C. 

512   343,  602 

Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Piper  Co.,  52  Tex.  Civ.  App.  568, 

115  S.  W.  107 178,478,*  482 

Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Crow  (  Tex.,  1909),  117  S.  W.  170. . 

179,  478,  482 

Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Johnson  (Tex.,  1911),  133  S.  W. 

725 478,  486 

Galveston,  H,  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wood  (Tex.,  1912),  146  S.  W.  538.  .3,  419 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wallace,  223  U.  S.  481,  32  Sup. 

Ct.  205,  56  L.  ed.  516. 476,  478,*  481,  482,  492 

Gamble-Robinson  Commission  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  168  Fed. 

161  179 

Gamble-Robinson  Commission  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  70 736 

Gamble-Robinson     Commission    Co.  v.  St.   L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co., 

Unrep.  Op.  211   640 

Gamble-Robinson  Commission  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  286 738 

Gamble-Robinson  Commission  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  506  290,  735 

Gamble-Robinson    Commission    Co.    v.    N.    P.    Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 

523 540,  647 

Gamble-Robinson  Commission  Co.  v.  C,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C. 

C.  357 751 

Gamble-Robinson  Commission  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I. 

C.  C.  114 131,  329,  341,  461,  580,  592,  593,  640,  725* 

Gamble-Robinson  Commission  Co.  v.  St.  L.,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22 

L  C.  C.  138 693 

Gamble-Robinson  Fruit  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  421 88 

Garden  City  Grain  &  Produce  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  394 732 

Gay  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  471 545 

General  Electric  Co.  v.  N.  Y.   C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  237. 

53,  54,  61,  66,  67,  721,  727,  780,  788,  793 

General  Chemical  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  439 499* 

General  Chemical  Co.  v.  Me.  S.  S.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  151 737 

Gentry  v.  C,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  257 629 

Gentry  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C  171 846 

George's  Creek  Basin  Coal  Co  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  127. . 

213,*  296,*  458,*  551,  596 


928  INDEX    OP    CASES 


Name.  Page. 
GeorgiarCarolina  Brick  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  148 

299,  348,*  516,  593 

Georgia  R.  R.  v.  Creety,  5  Ga.  App.  424,  63  S.  E.  528 809 

Georgia  Rough  &  Cut  Stone  Co.  v.  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  401 . 

516,*  901,*  902 

Georgia  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  623 

360,  494,  502,  534,  613,  711 

Georgetown  Ry.  &  Light  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  144. . . . 

329,  331,  578,  581,  582 

Germain  Co.  v.  A.  B.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  277 739,  517 

Germain  Co.  v.  N.  O.  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  22 

203,  208,  276,  277,  317,  756,  845,*  869 

Germain  Co.  v.  P.  B.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  96 207 

Gibson  &  Draughn  v.  Little  Rock  &  H.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Ark.,  1910), 

124  S.  W.  1033 487* 

Gibson  Fruit  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  318 77,  724,  752* 

Gilchrist  V.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  318 864,  871 

Gile  &  Co.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  298 286,  459,  848 

Gill  Co.  V.  O.  R.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  442 613,  673 

Gill  V.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.  (N.  Y.,  1912),  135  N.  Y.  Sup.  355 527 

Gisholt  Machine  Co.  v.  C,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  290.154,  656 

Glavin  Grain  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  241 694 

Godfrey  &  Son  v.  T.  A.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  65 301 

Godfrey  &  Sons  v.  N.  Y.,  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  503 

360,  607,  740,  760 

Goddard  Co.  v.  C,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  298 730 

Goddard  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  83 769 

Goerres   Cooperage   Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  5.. 

159  *  343    gig 

Gofr-KirbyCoai'Co.'  v.  B.*  &  L*  E.'rVr.  Co.",  13  I*.  C.C  383*.  .630,  719,'  730 

Goldenberg  v.  Clyde  S.  S.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  527 188,  434,  436 

Goldfield  Consolidated  Mines  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  593.  ..351,  605 

Gooch  Lumber  Co.,  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  535 692 

Goodkind  Bros.  v.  C.  L  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  17 753,  762* 

Goodman  Mfg.  Co.  v.  P.,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  95 70 

Goodman  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C  583. . .  .76,  508,  714 

Goodman  Mfg.  Co.  v.  P.,  B.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  362 134,  572 

Goodman  Mfg.  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  570 330,  605 

Goodrich  Transit  Co.  v.  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  190  Fed. 

943  3,  431,  897 

Gorman  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  613 530,  531 

Gough  &  Co.  V.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  280 400,  810 

Graham  &  Co.  v.  C,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  344 650 

Grand  Junction  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L 

C.  C.  115 337,  420,*  435,  443,  448,*  458,  474,  534,  549 

Grand  Junction  Mining  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  C.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  452. . 

103,  224,  353,  628 

Grand  Rapids  Plaster  Co.  v.  Pere  Marquette  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  571.   742 


INDEX    OF    CASES  929 


Name.  Page. 

Grand  Rapids  Plaster  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  68.  .759,  770,  861 
Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Loonan  Lumber  Co.  (S.  D.,  1910),  125 

N.  W.  644 178,  430,  895 

Great  Western  Oil  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  505 90 

Great  Western  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  454 2,  297,  347,  620 

Great  Western  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  M.,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  559  90,  740 

Great  Western  Sugar  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  157 604 

Greater  Des  Moines  Committee  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  294, 

266,  296,  596,  670 

Greater  Des  Moines  Committee  v.  C,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  54.  560 
Greater  Des  Moines  Committee  v.  C,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  57.  233 
Greater  Des  Moines  Committee  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 

7Z 241,  340,  552,  864 

Greater  Des  Moines  Committee  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  98. . .  273 
Green  Bay  Business  Men's  Ass'n  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  59. 

257  342  593    594 

Green  Bay  Soap  Co.' v.*  C.i  M.  &  St.R  Ry.'  Co.*  14  I.*  C.  C.  609. ..!... .'  140 

Greenwald  v.  Weir,  59  Misc.  431,  111  N.  Y.  Sup.  235 478 

Greenwald  v.  Weir,  130  App.  Div.  696,  115  N.  Y.  Supp.  311 489 

Greenwald  v.  Weir,  130  App.  Div.  696,  701,  115  N.  Y.  Supp.  311 430 

Greenwald  v.  Barrett,  199  N.  Y.  170,  175,  92  N.  E.  218 489 

Greer-Houghton  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  303. .  671 
Greer-Wilkinson  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

541   457 

Grinnell,  Collins  &  Co.  v.  C,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  139 769 

Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Nelson  (Tex.  1911),  139  S.  W.  81 485 

Gulf  &  S.  L  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Laurel  Cotton  Mills,  91  Miss.  166,  45  So. 

982    777,  807 

Gulf  Coast  Cotton  Oil  &  Refining  Co.  v.  N.  O.  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co., 

Unrep.   Op.   532 865 

Gulf  Coast  Navigation  Co.  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  544 163,  849 

Gulf  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  95 737 

Gumm  V  E.  P.  &  R.  I.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  237 102 

Gump  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  98 463 

Gund  &  Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  364. . .  .57,  64,  431,  864,  892 
Gund  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  501. . .  .615,  865 
Guthrie  V  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  425 543 

Haas  &  Sons  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep,  Op.  373 739 

Haas  h  Sons  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  578 517 

Hafey  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  245 

295,  317,  328,  573,  596,  610,  683 

Hagar  Iron  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  529 811,  823,  880* 

Haines  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  214 434,  439,. 624,  629* 

Hall  &  Co.  V.  S.  P.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  306 738 

Hamilton  v.  American  Express  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  355 335,  383,  845 


INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Pag( 

Hamilton  Grange  No.  57  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  39 736 

Hammond  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  313 73[ 

Hammond  Packing  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  120 

349  35Q  507  731 

Haniey  Milling' Co*  v.*  F.  Co.*,'  19  L *C.*  *C.* 475 '.  \  *. '.  *. '. 208*  437,  480,  703,  721? 

Hanna  Coal  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  289 499 

Harbor  City  Wholesale  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  323 

262,  294,  310,  329,  344,  351,  469,  596 

Hardaway  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (S.  C,  1912),  73  S.  E.  1020 

174,  178,*  430,  514,*  515,*  778,  808 

Hardenberg,  Dolson  &  Gray  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  579 

459,  864,  876,  877 

Hardy  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  548 735 

Harlow  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  501 

360,  441,  607,  735,  881 

Harmon  &  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  394 649 

Harmount  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  545 692 

Harrah  &  Stewart  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  484. .  618 
Harriman  v.  I.  C.  C.  211  U.  S.  407,  29  Sup.  Ct.  115,  53  L.  ed.  253. .  431 
Hartford  Canning  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  288.  .198,  901 
Hartman  Furniture  and  Carpet  Co.  v.  W.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  530, 

129,  864,  875 

Hartman  Furniture  and  Carpet  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 

C.  496 864,  867 

Hartman  Furniture  Co.  v.  C.  Gt.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  115 877 

Hartville  Celery  Growers'  Ass'n  v.  Pac.  Ex.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  590.. 

29  379  608  647 

Harvey  '&  Co.'  v'.  C.  '&*  isf.*  W.  'Py.'  Co'.,'  'Unrep!  o'p.  * 522 .*..'....  .\  .. .'  735 

Hathway  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  544 702,  769 

Havemeyer  &  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  13 690 

Havens  &  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  156 439,  705,  819 

Hawkinson  v.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  25 731 

Hayden  &  Westcott  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  &  S.  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 

537  670,  727,  744 

Hayden  &  Westcott  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  &  S.  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C. 

539  670 

Hayden  &  Westcott  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  &  S.  L  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  540 

541 ,  670 

Heath  Hardware  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  223 154 

Hecker-Jones-Jewell  Milling  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C. 

356 296,  370,*  372,  596 

Heil  Chemical  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  518 154 

Heil  Chemical  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  471 153 

Heileman  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  396. . .  .454* 

Heinz  Co  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  170 153 

Heinz  Co  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  136 865 

Heinz  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op  236 865 

Hellstrom  v  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  580 256 


INDEX    OF    CASES  931 


Name.  Page. 

Henderson  Elevator  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  573 557* 

Henderson  Elevator  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  538 557 

Henderson  &  Barkdull  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C  514.. 407,  784 
Henderson  Iron  Works  &  Supply  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 

159  687 

Hendrickson  Lumber  Co.  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  129 758 

Hendrie  &  Bolthoff  Mfg.  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  380 513 

Henley  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  382 131,  436 

Henry  v.  E.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  171 405,*  451 

Herbeck-Demer  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  88 223,  525 

Herf  &  Frerichs  Chemical  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  244 738 

Hettinger  Hardware  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  199. .  879 
Hettler  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  &  S.  L  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  14. . .  .760,  810,  860 

Hewitt  &  Connor  v  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  431 501,  695 

Highland  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  Vandalia  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  601 263 

Hill  &  Co.  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  225 341,*  25,  330,  582,  592,  593 

Hill-Ingham  Lumber  Co.  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  45 769 

Hill-Ingham  Lumber  Co.  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  464 732 

Hill  Nursery  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  524 151,  153 

Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  356 

109,*  111,  115,*  116,  117,  119,  120,*  121,  123,  125,  388,  437,*  480,  553* 

Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  186 720 

Hill  &  Webb  V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  569 300,  759 

Hill  &  Webb  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  274 770 

Hill  &  Webb  V.  I.  &  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  333 343,  650 

Hill  &  Webb  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  451 343 

Hinton  Fruit  &  Produce  Co.  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  578 461 

Hirsch  v.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  381 768 

Hirsch    v.    New    England    Nav.    Co.,    129  App.  Div.  178,  113  N.  Y. 

Supp.  395   166,  479 

Hitchman  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  512 

33^  227   242  *  347  *  602 

Hitchman  Coal&Coke  Co.  v.  B.  &  6.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  473 '.   544 

Hite  V  Central  R.  of  N.  J.,  171  Fed.  370 175 

Holcomb-Hayes  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  16 670,  734 

Holland  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  139  Mo.  App.  702,  123  S.  W.  987. .  490 
Holley  Matthews  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C  C.  436. . 

565,  780* 

Hollingshead  &  Blei  Co.  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  193.  .764,  765 

Holmes  &  Co.  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  218 738 

Holverscheid  &  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  158 456 

Hood  v  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  246 818 

Hood  &  Sons  v.  Del.  &  Hud.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  15 

146,  387,  419,  612,  675,  780,  804,  823* 

Hooker  v.  I.  C.  C,  188  Fed  242 157,*  158,  256,  566,  588 

Hooker  v.  Knapp,  225  U.  S.  302,  32  Sup.  Ct.  769,  56  L.  ed.  1099 201 

Hope  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  336 739* 

Houseman  v.  Fargo  (N.  Y.  1910),  124  N.  Y.  Supp.  1086. . .  ,777,  807,*  827 


932  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Houston  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  171  Fed.  723 49 

Houston  E.  &  W.  Tex.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Inman  (Tex.  1911),  134  S.  W.  275  479 

Houston  Packing  Co.  v.  T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  456 681* 

Houston  Structural  Steel  Co  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  208 149 

Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lewis  (Tex.  1910),  129  S.  W.  594. . . . 

478,  482,  486 

Howard  &  Co.  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  50 741 

Howard  &  Co.  v.  W.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  569 672 

Howard  Supply  Co.  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  162  Fed.  188 175 

Huerfano  Coal  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  390 517 

Hull  &  Co.  V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  486 498 

Hull  Co.  V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  459 812 

Humbird  Lumber  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  449 864,  873 

Humboldt  Brick  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  409. ...  865 
Humbolt  Refining  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  363.  .678,  762 
Humboldt  S  S.  Co.  v.  White  Pass  &  Yukon  Route,  19  L  C.  C.  105. .   52* 

Humboldt  S.  S.  Co.  v.  L  C.  C,  37  App.  Cas.,  D.  C,  266 52,  172 

Hunt  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  536 865 

Huntingdon  Lumber  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  507.  .337,  448,  649 

Hussey  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  366 435,*  566 

Hussey  v  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  215 544 

Hutchison-McCandlish  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  360.  197 

Hutcheson  &  Co.  v.  Central  of  Georgia  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  523 619 

Hydraulic  Press  Brick  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  342 

581,  618,  759,  829,  848,  864,  877,  903 

Hydraulic  Press  Brick  Co.  v.  Vandalia  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  175 

49,  87,*  548 

Hydraulic-Press  Brick  Co.  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  530. . . . 

142,  356,  611 

Hydraulic-Press  Brick  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  532. .  617 
Hydraulic-Press  Brick  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  554. .  617 

L  C.  C.  V.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  215  U.  S.  479,  30  Sup.  Ct.  163,  54  L.  ed. 

291    173* 

I.  C.  C.  V.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  218  U.  S.  88,  30  Sup.  Ct.  651,  54  L.  ed. 

946 4,  172,*  222,  223,  304,  426,  432 

L  C.  C.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  225  U.  S.  326,  32  Sup.  Ct.  742,   56   L. 

ed.  1107 157,  171,  241 

L  C.  C.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  218  U.  S.  113,  30  Sup.  Ct.  660,  54  L.  ed. 

959  426 

L  C.  C.  V.  Chicago  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  209  U.  S.  108,  28  Sup.  Ct.  493, 

52  L.  ed.  705 26,*  248,  566,  581,  772,  888 

I.  C.  C.  V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  216  U.  S.  531,  30  Sup.  Ct.  415, 

54  L.  ed.  605 793 

I.  C.  C.  V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.,  220  U.  S.  235,  31  Sup.    Ct.    392,    55 

L.  ed.  448 373,  413,*  414,*  415,*  598 

L  C.  C.  V.  Diffenbaugh,  222  U.  S.  42,  32  Sup.  Ct.  22,  56  L.  ed.  83 

4,  58,  290 


INDEX   OF    CASES  933 


Name.  Page. 

I.  C.  C.  V.  Goodrich  Co.,  224  U.  S.,  194,  32  Sup.  Ct.  436,  56  L.  ed. 

729  2,*  3,  747,  896,  897 

I.  C.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Henderson  Elevator  Co.,  138  Ky.  220,  127  S. 

W.  779 177,*  807,  814* 

I.  C.  C.  V.  H.  S.  S.  Co.,  224  U.  S.  474,  32  Sup.  Ct.  556,  56  L.  ed. 

849 8,  52,*  172,  840 

I.  C.  C.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.,  215  U.  S.,  452,  30  Sup.  Ct.  155,  54  L.  ed.  280 

108,  109,*  117,  118,  173* 

I.  C.  C.  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  216  U.  S.,  538,  30  Sup.  Ct.  155,  54  L.  ed. 

608 528,  529* 

I.  C.  C.  V.  Stickney,  215  U.  S.  98,  105,  30  Sup.  Ct.  66,  54  L.  ed. 

112 4,  566,  837,  838* 

I.  C.  C.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  222  U.  S.  541,  32  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  108,  56 

L.  ed.  308 28,  34,  35,  172,*  174,  288,  338,  345,  430,*  566,  586 

I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Fleming  (Ky.  1912),  146  S.  W.  1110 531 

Idaho  Commercial  Clubs  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  562 

101,  104,  105,  587,  609 

Idaho  Lime  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  553 875 

Idaho  Lime  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C  139 755,*  883 

Imperial  Candy  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  412. . .  .151,  517 
Imperial  Wheel  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  56. . . . 

.792,  795,  796 

In  the  Matter  of  Allowances  for  the  Transfer  of  Sugar,  14  I.  C.  C. 

619 61,  389 

In  the  Matter  of  Allowances  to  Elevators  by  the  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 

I.  C.  C.  315 58*,  64,  68,  400 

In  the  Matter  of  Bills  of  Lading,  14  I.  C.  C.  346 75* 

In  the  Matter  of  Demurrage  Charges  on  Privately  Owned  Tank  Cars, 

13  I.  C.  C.  378 114 

In  the  Matter  of  Free  Transportation,  16  I.  C.  C.  246 376 

In  the  Matter  of  Released  Rates,  13  I.  C.  C.  550 355,  610 

In  the  Matter  of  Through  Passenger  Routes  via  Portland,  Ore.,  16 

I.  C.  C.  300 529,*  530,  849 

In  Re  Accrual  of  Cause  of  Action,  15  I.  C.  C.  201 127,*  128 

In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — Eastern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243 

5,   10,*   11,   12,  13,*  18,*  19,  22, 

24,  30,*  31,  36,*  41,  318,*  330,  334,*  336,  339,  344,  350,  352,  362,  431, 

433,  568,*  574,*  581,  584,  489,  592*,  597,  600,*  606,  607,  608,*  611,*  893* 
In  Re  Advances  in  Rates — Western  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307 

12,  17,*  18,*  19,*  22,  23,  24,  31,  36,  105,  306,  318,*  334,  339,  350,* 

354,  431,*  433,*  434,  537,  565,*  568,*  569,*  574,*  588,  592,  601,  610 

In  Re  Advances  on  Bituminous  Coal,  22  I.  C.  C.  341 42 

In  Re  Advances  on  Cattle  and  Sheep,  23  I.  C.  C.  7 315 

In  Re  Advances  on  Cement  Originating  in  Central  Freight  Associa- 
tion Territory,  22  I.  C.  C.  90 42 

In  Re  Advances  on  Cement,  20  I.  C.  C.  588 44 

In  Re  Advances  on  Cement  Plaster,  21  I.  C.  C.  591 15,  84,    95 


934  INDEX   OF    CASES 


Name.                                                                                                     Page. 
In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  by  Carriers  Operating  Between  the  Mis- 
sissippi and  Missouri  Rivers,  21  I.  C.  C.  546 

12,  22,  268,  311,  547,  560,  567,  572,  576 

In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  From  Chicopee,  Mass.,  23  I.  C.  C.  263. . . .  847 

In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  on  Flaxseed,  23  I.  C.  C.  272 

16,  321,  331,  356,*  581 

In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  on  Locomotives  and  Tenders,  21  I.  C.  C. 

103 38,  133,  137,  360,*  537,  549,  613* 

In  Re  Advances  of  Rates  on  Meats,  22  I.  C.  C.  160 317,  596 

In  Re  Advances  in  Class  Rates,  22  I.  C.  C.  338 45,  277 

In  Re  Advances  on  Coal  to  Lake  Ports,  22  I.  C.  C.  604 

9,  12,  14,  40,  133,*  286,  292,  306,  315,  317,  318, 

333,*  335,*  352,  363,  427,*  433,  565,  567,*  574,*  585,  589,  607,  608,  610 

In  Re  Advances  on  Coal,  23  I.  C.  C.  618 845 

In  Re  Advances  on  Cotton  and  Cotton  Linters,  23  I.  C.  C.  404 

46,  335,  371,  602 

In  Re  Advances  on  Fresh  Meats  and  Packinghouse  Products,  23  I. 

C.  C.  652 10,  225,  346,  593,  600 

In  Re  Advances  on  Grain,  21  I.  C.  C.  22 21,*     37 

In  Re  Advances  on  Iron  and  Steel  Articles,  22  I.  C.  C.  486 12 

In  Re  Advances  on  Lemons,  23  I.  C.  C.  27 315,  336,  355,  493 

In  Re  Advance  in  Rates  for  Transportation  of  Liquor,  21  I.  C.  C. 

199   150,  905 

In  Re  Advances  of  Rates  on  Live  Stock,  21  I.  C.  C.  119 325,  327 

In  Re  Advance  on  Live  Stock  and  Packing  House  Products,  22  I. 

C.  C.  656 224,  268,  289,  291,  337,  353* 

In  Re  Advances  on  Locomotives,  21  I.  C.  C.  103 12,  315 

In  Re  Advances  on  Lumber  and  Forest  Products,  21  I.  C.  C.  455.  .12,  316 
In  Re  Advances  on  Meats  and  Packing  House  Products,  23  I.  C.  C. 

656 224,  268,  289,  291,  337,  353,* 

365,  532,*  572,  609,  659,  660,*  679,  707,  840,  845,  846,  847,*  848,  860,  863 

In  Re  Advances  on  Milk,  23  I.  C.  C.  500 11,  20,  23,  44,  136,  319,  323 

In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  on  Packages,  22  I.  C.  C.  328 584 

In  Re  Advances  on  Potatoes,  23  I.  C.  C.  69 38,  685 

In  Re  Advance  in  Rates  on  Rice  and  Rice  Products,  21  I.  C.  C.  124. .  337 

In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  on  Soft  Coal,  23  I.  C.  C.  518 11,  315 

In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  for  the  Transportation  of  Cotton  and  Cot- 
ton Linters,  23  I.  C.  C.  404 337,  365,  366,  586 

In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  for  the  Transportation  of  Locomotives  and 

Tenders,  21   I.  C.  C.  103 665 

In  Re  Advances  in  Rates  for  the  Transportation  of  Freight  in  Sin- 
gle Packages  and  Small  Lots,  22  I.  C.  C.  328 20,  23,  292,  585 

In  Re  Advances  on  Staves  and  Other  Articles,  23  I.  C.  C.  382.  .19,  43,  315 

In  Re  Advances  on  Stock  Cattle  and  Sheep,  23  I.  C.  C.  7 45,  352 

In  Re  Advances  on  Vehicles,  22  I.  C.  C.  124 30 

In  Re  Alleged  Unreasonable  Rates  on  Meats,  23  I.  C.  C.  656 14* 

In  Re  Allowances  to  Elevators  by  the  Union  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
I.  C.  C.  315  58 


INDEX   OF   CASES  935 


Name.  Page. 
In  Re  Allowances  for  Transfer  of  Sugar,  14  I.  C.  C.  619 

53,   54,  61,  68,  812 

In  Re  the  Application  of  the  Georgia  Southern  &  Florida  Ry.  Co.,  13 

I.  C.  C.   134 284 

In  Re  Application  of  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  366 

226,*  303,  442,  444,*  449,*  450* 

In  Re  Carriers  Operating  Between  the  Mississippi  and  Missouri  Riv- 
ers, 21  I.  C.  C.  546 223 

In  Re  Commutation  Tickets  to  School  Children,  17  I.  C.  C.  145 521 

In  Re  Contracts  of  Express  Companies,  16  I.  C.  C.  246.  .373,  376,  774,  806 

In  Re  Demurrage  Investigation,  19  I.  C.  C.  496 195 

In  Re  Demurrage  Charges  on  Privately  Owned  Tank  Cars,  13  I.  C. 

C    378    202 

In  Re  Divisions  of  Joint  Rates  on  Coal,  22  I.  C.  C.  51 .  .61,  68,  275,  278,  800 
In  Re  Investigations  and  Suspension  of  Advances  in  Rates  for  the 

Transportation  of  Barley,  Bran  and  Wheat,  22  I.  C.  C.  216 38 

In  Re  Investigations  of  Advances  in  Rates  on  Cement,  20  I.  C.  C.  588.  43 
In  Re  Investigation  of  Advances  in  Rates  on  Grain,  21  I.  C.  C.  22. . 

.  .12,  315,  333,*  337,  347,  350,  352,*  354,  584,  585,  586,  601,  608,  609 
In  Re  Investigation  of  Alleged  Unreasonable  Rates  on  Meats,  22  I. 

C.  C.  160. 260,  337,  409,  572,  586,  596,  699 

In  Re  Investigation  of  Proposed  Rates  on  Lumber,  21  I.  C.  C.  16.  .10,  436 

In  Re  Investigation  of  Rates  on  Meats,  22  I.  C.  C.  160 609 

In  Re  Investigation  and  Suspension  Docket  28,  21  I.  C.  C.  455 860 

In  Re  Investigation  and  Suspension  Docket  24,  21,  I.  C.  C.  546 315 

In  Re  Investigation  of  Unreasonable  Rates  on  Meats,  23  I.  C.  C.  656.  586 

In  Re  Jurisdiction  in  Alaska,  19  I.  C.  C.  81 52,  427 

In  Re  Jurisdiction  Over  Water  Carriers,  15  I.  C.  C.  205 6,*  186,  896* 

In  Re  Mileage,  Excursion  and  Commutation  Tickets,  23  I.  C.  C.  95 

166,*  167,  402,  519,  520,  522,  524,  525,*  529,*  803,  811* 

In  Re  Milling-in-Transit  Rates,  17  I.  C.  C.   113 404,  882 

In  Re  Passes  to  Clergymen  and  Others,  15  I.  C.  C.  45 705* 

In  Re  Petitions  for  Extension  Under  Hours  of  Service  Law,  13  I. 

C.  C.  140 284* 

In  Re  Pre-cooling  and  Pre-icing,  23  I.  C.  C.  267 707* 

In  Re  Proposed  Rates  on  Lumber,  20  I.  C.  C.  575 33,  848 

In  Re  Rates,  etc.,  of  the  Louisiana  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  558 

413,  557 

In  Re  Rates  on  Cream  and  Condensed  Milk,  21  I.  C.  C.  522 33,    47 

In  Re  Rates  on  Hardwood  Lumber,  21  I.  C.  C.  397 23,  322 

In  Re  Rates  on  Lumber  and  Other  Forest  Products,  21  I.  C.  C.  455. .  851 
In  Re  Rates,  Practices,  Accounts  and  Revenues  of  Carriers,  13  I.  C. 

C.  212 184 

In  Re  Rates  for  Single  Packages,  etc.,  22  I.  C.  C.  328 289 

In  Re  Rates  for  Transportation  of  Potatoes,  23  I.  C.  C.  69 501 

In  Re  Reduced  Rates  on  Returned  Shipments,  19  I.  C.  C.  409 

346,  354,  399,  610,  706* 

In  Re  Regulations  and  Practices  With  Regard  to  Pre-cooling  and 

Pre-icing,  23  I.  C.  C.  267 532 


936  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

In  Re  Released  Rates,  13  I.  C.  C.  550 712* 

In  Re  Released  Rates,  13  I.  C.  C.  560 713* 

In  Re  Restricted  Rates,  20  I.  C.  C.  426 

223,*  227,  242,  276,*  282,  371,  393,  557,  748,*  804,  831 

In  Re  Substitution  of  Tonnage  at  Transit  Points,  18  I.  C.  C.  280 

407,  784,*  785,*  786,*  787,*  806 

In  Re  Suspension  of  Rates  on  Packing  House  Products,  21  I.  C.  C. 

68 10,  450,  704 

In  Re  Through  Passenger  Routes,  16  I.  C.  C.  300.  .326,  389,  518,  529,  849 
In  Re  Transportation  of  Company  Material,  22  I.  C.  C.  439 

241,  723,*  769,  890 

In  Re  Transportation  of  Cotton  and  Cotton  Linters,  23  I.  C.  C.  404 

370,  371,  397 

In  Re  Transportation  of  Fresh  Meats,  23  I.  C.  C.  652 46 

In  Re  Transportation  by  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  207 841,  888 

In  Re  Transportation  of  Rice  and  Rice  Products,  21  I.  C.  C.  124. . . .   212 

In  Re  Transportation  of  Sugar,  22  I.  C.  C.  558 420,  790 

In  Re  Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts,  23  I.  C.  C.  151 

19,  20,  70,  79,  81,  90,  94,  145,  391,  315,  318,  322,*  323,*  327,  329, 

331,*  333,  335,  337,  346,  349,*  354,  355*,  386,  388*,  397,*  408,  409,* 

433,  443,*  466,  493,  494,*  512,  566*,  593,  600,  601,  602,  609,  696,  784 

In  Re  Unreasonable  Rates  on  Meats,  22  I.  C.  C.  160 681 

In  Re  Wharfage  Charges  at  Galveston,  23  I.  C.  C.  535 

4,  163,  186,*  275,  365,  427,  789,  840,  899 

Indiana  Steel  &  M^ire  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  155.264,  843 
Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 

367 134,  159 

Indianapolis    Freight    Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 

C.  370 146,  349,  400,  573,  805 

Indianapolis    Freight    Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 

C.  504 27,  98,  252,  271,  455,  476,  501,  511,  556,  558,  559,  561 

Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  567 

238,  298,  330,  544,  580,  581,  803 

Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  «&  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C  C.  56. 

87,  160,  235,  241,  338,  495,  509,  548,  558,  594,  649,  761 

Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 

142 545 

Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 

254  92,  216,  234,  454,  510 

Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 

276 265,  332,  583* 

Indianapolis  Freight  Bureau  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 

195 208,  209,*  288,*  297,  311,  323,  329,  336,  361,*  576,  586,  599,  602 

Independent  Brewing  &  Malt  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  65 736 

Independent  Supply  Co.  v.  C.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  66.  .358,  606,  763* 
Industrial  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  W.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  50. . . 

15,  800,  802 


INDEX    OF   CASES  937 


Name.  Page. 

Ingersoll-Rand  Co.  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  Unrep.  Op.  210 737 

Ingrid,  The,  195  Fed.  598 365 

International  Agricultural  Corporation  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C. 

C.  488  286,  322,  691 

International  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  162  Fed.  996. .  .172,  723 
International  Creosoting  &  Construction  Co.  v.  N.  O.  T.  &  M.  R.  R. 

Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  568 735 

International  Harvester  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  222.  743 
International  Harvester  Co.  of  America  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 

Unrep.  Op.  179 7Z7 ,  738 

International  Harvester  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  26.  864 
International  Purchasing  Co.  v.  N.  O.  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  374 865 

International  Salt  Co.  v.  G.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  530 254 

International  Salt  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  539 274 

International  Salt  Co  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  543 707 

International  Watch  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  80   N.  J.  L.   553, 

78  A.  49 484 

Interstate  Grain  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  34 517,  866 

Interstate  Remedy  Co.  v.  American  Express  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  436. . . . 

383,*  405,  774,*  805,*  810,*  829,  832 

lola  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  1 862 

lola  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  444. . . .  752 
lola  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  91. . 

299,    348,  878 

Ionia  Wagon  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  458 653 

Iowa  Paint  Mfg.  Co.  v.  M.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  477 138 

lovira  Soap  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  444 139 

Ireland  &  Rollings  v  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  590 817* 

Isbell  &  Co.  V.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  448 750* 

Isbell-Brov^n  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  616 516,  543 

Isbell-Brown  Co.  v.  G.  T.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  226 77,  752 

Isbell-Brown  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  231. .  .456,  738,  845 

Jackson  Grocery  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  245 738 

Jacoby  &  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  392 116,  120 

Jaekel  Bros.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  146 734 

James  &  Abbot  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  273 

132,  159,  320,  354,  503,  610,  617 

Janesville  Barb  Wire  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  537.. 

745,  865,  866 

Jefferson  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  B.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  534 863 

Jenks  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  58 745 

Jennison  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  113 

298,  308,*  325,*  326,  347,  538,  560,  602 

Jobbins  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  297 509 

Johnson  Co.  v.  Clyde  S.  S.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  512 632 

Johnson  &  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  637 245,  410,  804 


938  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Johnson  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste  M.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  255 418,*  811 

Johnston  &  Co.,  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  308 865 

Johnston  &  Larimer  Dry  Goods  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C. 

C.   388 465 

Joice  &  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  239 546 

Jones  V.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  468 161,  725 

Jones  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  150 149,  496 

Jones  Bros.  Co.  v.  Central  Vermont  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  141 505 

Jones  Bros.  Co.  v.  Central  Vermont  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  142 505 

Jones  Bros.  Co.  v.  Central  Vermont  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  143 506 

Jones  Bros.  Co.  v.  M.  &  W.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  577. . .  .140,  141,  198 
Jones  Bros.  Co.  v.  Montpelier  &  Wells  River  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 

139  505 

Jones  Bros.  Co.  v.  Montpelier  &  Wells  River  R.  R.,  14  I.  C.  C.  140. . .  505 
Jones  Bros.  Co.  v.  Montpelier  &  Wells  River  R.  R.,  14  I.  C.  C.  144. . .  506 
Jones  Bros.  Co.  v.  Montpelier  &  Wells  River  R.  R.,  14  I.  C.  C.  145. . .   506 

Jones  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  427 90 

Jordan  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  233 865 

Jones  &  Sons  Co.  v.  B.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  226 862 

Jordan  &  Sons  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  66 736 

Joseph  Co  V.  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  166 516,  906 

Jouannet  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  392 70,  363,  637 

Joynes  v.  Penn.  R.  C.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  361 

5,*  7,  224,  274,  362,  427,  437,*  481,  535 

Joynes  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  458 885 

K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Carl,  91  Ark.  97,  121  S.  W.  932 488 

K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Albers  Comm  Co.,  79  Kan.  59,  99  P.  819 

174,  514,*  776,"^  777,  807,  862,  879 

K.  C.  S.  Ry.  V.  Albers  Comm.  Co.,  223  U.  S.  573,  32  Sup.  Ct.  316, 

56  L.  ed.  556 555,  556,  780,  813,  880,  882 

Kalispell  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  164 92,  854 

Kansas  City  Cotton  Mills  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 

468   324,  632 

Kansas  City  Hay  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  100 561 

Kansas  City  Hay  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  631.  .702,  812 
Kansas  City  Hay  Dealers'  Ass'n  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  597. . . . 

495,*  506,  554,  571 

Kansas    C.    S.    Ry.    Co.    v.    Albers    Comm.    Co.,    79    Kan.   59,  99 

P.  819 776* 

Kansas  City  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tonn  (Ark.,  1912),  143  S.  W.  577 

73,  176,  513,  515 

Kansas  City  So.  Ry.  v.  Albers  Comm.  Co.,  223  U.  S.  573,  32  Sup. 

Ct.  316,  56  L.  ed.  516 176,  345,  514 

Kansas  City  Transportation  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 

C.  491 10,  103,  270,  296,  317,  335,  434,  596,  889 

Kansas  City  Transportation  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C. 

C.  195 82,  251,  556,  586,  587* 


INDEX    OP    CASES  939 


Name.  Page. 

Kansas  Millers'  Commercial  Club  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 

Q   507  546* 

Katzmaier  v.  A.  T.  &  S.*  F.  Ry .  Co.',  14  V.  C .'  c' S2s/^V////^ '/, '.'.,'.'.  901 

Kaul  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  of  G.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  450 50,  65,  724,  798 

Kay  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  239 198,  437,  480 

Kaye  &  Carter  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  604.  66 
Kaye  &  Carter  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  285..113,  129,  510 
Kaye  &  Carter  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  159   114,901 

Kaye  &  Carter  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  &  L  ]4y.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  209. . .  .113,  499* 
Kaye  &  Carter  Lumber  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  392.. 495,  508,  901 

Kehoe  &  Co.  v.  L  C.  C.  R.  R.  Co,  14  L  C.  C.  541 701* 

Kehoe  &  Co.  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  555 395,  891* 

Keich  Mfg.  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  230. . .  .459,  864,  874 

Keller  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  488 135,  136 

Kellogg  Switchboard  &  Supply  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  514 735 

Kemendo  v.  Fruit  Dispatch  Co.  (Tex.,  1910),  131  S.  W.  73 486* 

Kendel  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  555 596 

Kennedy  &  Co.  v.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  530 96,  812 

Kennedy  &  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  277 880,  883* 

Kent  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  439 

10,  235,  417,  434,  571,  618 

Kentucky  Wagon  Mfg.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  360 

303,*  332,  359,  583,*  607 

Kenworthy  &  Son  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  515 450,  753,  843 

Kessler  &  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  12 148,  720 

Ketchum  &  Gaston  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  28 349 

Kiel  Woodenware  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  242 732 

Kilburn  Mills  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  21 200 

Kile  &  Morgan  Co.  v.  Deepwater  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  235 

128,  402,   702,*  729,*  771 

Kimberly  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  335 461,  864,  870,  871 

Kindel  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  475.  .377,*  378,  384,*  385,*  386* 
Kindel  V.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  555 

269,  289,  296,  315,  317,  434,  584,  586,  603,  875 

Kindelon  v,  S.  P.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  251. . .  .453,  541,  542,  718,  725,*  733,  841 

Kingman  &  Co.  v.  C.  H.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  53 864 

Kirby  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  242  111.  418,  90  N.  E.  252 483 

Kiser  Co.  v.  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  430 

30,  43,  48,  134,  143,  342,  539,*  593 

Kiser  Co.  v.  Central  of  Ga.  Ry.,  Elec,  158  Fed.  193 49 

Kiser  Co.  v.  C.  of  K.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  430 169 

Kissinger  v.  Fitzgerald,  152  N.  C.  247,  67  S.  E.  588 480,  489,  827 

Kleibacker  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  420 148 

Klyce  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  567 406,*  407 

Knox  V.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  185 149 

Koch  Butchers'  Supply  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  572. .  672 


940  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Koch  Secret  Service  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  523 523* 

Kruth  &  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  539 151 

Kulm  Mill  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  305 153 

Kurtz  V.  Penn.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  410 519,  523,*  530,*  570,  864,  872* 

L.  &  N.  R.  R.  V.  Cook  Brewing  Co.,  223  U.  S.  70,  32  Sup.  Ct.  189, 

56  L.  ed.  355 429 

L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Coquillard  Wagon  Works,  Assignees  (Ky.,  1912), 

144  S.  W.  1080 777 

L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Dickerson,  191  Fed.  705 127,  753,  761 

L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  195  Fed.  541 

3,  4,  31,  51,  185,*  340,  343,  425,  432,  563,  593,  771,  772,*  803 

L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  184  Fed.  118. .. .  173,*  426,  432,  541,  564,*  897 

L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Mottley,  133  Ky.  652,  118  S.  W.  982 526* 

L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Scott,  133  Ky.  724,  118  S.  W.  990 

178,  428,  478,  481,  482,  492 

L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Smith  (Tenn.,  1911),  134  S.  W.  866 424 

L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Warfield,  6  Ga.  App.  550,  65  S.  E.  308. .  177,  479,*  481 
La  Crosse  Implement  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  220. .  343 
Lagomarcini-Grupe  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  269.  .290,  604 
Lagomarcino-Grup  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  151. . .  .346,  600,  645 
Lair  Furniture    &   Undertaking   Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co., 

Unrep.  Op.  404 752 

Lamb  Co.  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  5 735 

Lamb  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  133 604 

Lamb  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  279 359,  607 

Lamb,  McGregor  &  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  346 723* 

Landers,  Frary  &  Clark  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  511 154 

Langdon  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  186  Fed.  237 174,*  429 

Langdon  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  194  Fed.  486 171,*  189,  224 

Langenberg  Bros.  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  6 456 

Laning-Harris  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  11 41 

Laning-Harris  Coal  &  Grain  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  51  732 

Laning-Harris  Coal  &  Grain  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I. 

C.  C.  148 67 

Laning-Harris  Coal  &  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  154. . 

864,  877,  884* 

Laning-Harris  Coal  &  Grain  Co.  v.  St.  Joseph  &  Grand  Island  Ry. 

Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  317 825 

Laning-Harris  Coal  &  Grain  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C. 

C.  37 174,  437,  481,  513,  552,  714,  805,  894 

Larrowe  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  443 749,  757* 

Larrowe  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  548.  .130,  557,  828 

Larsen  v.  Oregon  Short  Line  R.  Co.  (Utah,  1910),  110  P.  983 490 

Larsen  Canning  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  286 768 

Larson  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  474 831* 

La  Salle  Paper  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  149. .  .299,  495,  593,  682 


INDEX   OF    CASES  941 


Name.  Page. 

La  Salle  &  Bureau  County  R.  R.  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  13 

I.  C.  C.  610 67,  277,  542,  715,  781 

Latta  V.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  172  Fed.  850 479 

Lauer  &  Son  v.  Nevada-California-Oregon  Ry.,  17  I.  C.  C.  488 512 

Lauer  &  Son  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  109 \..  .233,  658 

Lautz  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  L.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  167 16* 

Lawrence-Hensley  Fruit  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  189 290 

Lawrence- Wardenburg  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  638 79 

Lazarri  &  Barton  Co.  v.  Montpelier  &  Wells  River  R.  R.,  14  I.  C. 

C.  146  506 

League  of  Commission  Merchants  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 

132 102,  104,  214,  293,  866 

League  of  Southern  Idaho  Commercial  Clubs  v.  Oregon  Short  Line 

R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  562 105,  354,  452,  627 

Learned-Haynes  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  152 546 

Lebanon  Paper  Co.  v.  E.  J.  &  E.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  591 765 

Lee- Warren  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  422.  .233,  824 
Leggett  &  Piatt  Spring  Bed  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C. 

513 475,  695 

Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  188  Fed.  879 202* 

Lemmon  Hardware  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  171 879 

Leonard  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  573 421,  435,  566,  842 

Lesser  v.  Ga.  R.  R.,  18  I.  C.  C.  478 711,  785 

Lewis  V.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  138 546 

Liberty  Mills  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  182 

7,  129,  131,  402,  403,  715,  723 

Liebold  V.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  503 594 

Lilly  Co.  V.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Wash.,  1911),  117  P.  401. .  .179,*  223,  274,*  275 
Lincoln  Commercial  Club  v.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  319. .  240 
Lindauer  Pulp  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  D.  R.  L.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  251.  290 
Lindsay  Bros.  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I  C.  C.  6 

332,  556,  583,  864,  871,*  880 

Lindsay  Bros.  v.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  182 726,  864,  874 

Lindsay  Bros.  v.  G.  R.  &  L  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  441 864,  872* 

Lindsay  Bros.  v.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  489 865 

Lindsay  Bros.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  284 131,  864,  874 

Lindsay  Bros.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  516 

112,  325,  327,   559,692 

Lindsay  Bros.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  40 864,  874 

Lininger  Implement  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  414.  .113,  499 

Link-Belt  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  566 825 

Lipman  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co.  (S.  C,  1912),  73  S.  E.  1026 178 

Littell  V.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  187 232,  519 

Liverpool  Salt  &  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  51 560 

Lock  Lynn  Construction  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  396 

223  525  528  *  781 
Loftus'v.*  PuliniaA  Co.,  19  I.  C.  *C.  102.  .!..!.!!.*.*!!.*!.  .316,  431,  542,  547 
Long  &  Co.  v.  International  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  116 746 


942  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Loomis  V.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  Co.  (N.  Y.,  1911),  132  N.  Y.  Supp. 

138  178,  395,  482 

Lord    &   Bushnell    Co.   v.  Mississippi  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 

463    749,  753* 

Lorleburg  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  183 756 

Louisiana  Central  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co,  19  L  C.  C.  333.  668 
Louisiana  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Holly,  127  La.  615,  53  So.  882 

177,  807,*  809,  894* 

Louisiana  Sawmill  Co.  v.  L.  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  422 768 

Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Coquillard  Wagon  Works,  Assignees  (Ky., 

1912),  144  S.  W.  1080 186,  419 

Louisville  &  Nashville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dickerson,  191  Fed.  705 73 

Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  L  C.  C,  195  Fed.  541 26 

Louisville  &  N.  R.  R,  Co.  v.  Smith  (Tenn.,  1911),  134  S.  W.  866 778 

Lovelace  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  585 321,  648 

Lowenthal  &  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  155 658 

Ludowici-Celadon  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  386 865 

Ludowici-Celadon  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  447 865 

Ludowici-Celadon  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  588 751,  752 

Ludowici-Celadon  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  320 768 

Ludowici-Celadon  Co.  v.  C.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  385 878 

Lull  Carriage  Co.  v.  C.  K.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  15 

340,*  494,  503,  569,  867* 

Lull  &  Co.  V.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  355 703,  822 

Lum  V.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  558 427,  541,  550,  552,  599 

Lykes  Steamship  Line  v.  Commercial  Union,  13  L  C.  C.  310 8,  898 

Lynah  &  Read  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  38 195,  196,  204,*  205 

Lyne  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  170  Fed.  847 175,  727 

M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jarmon  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1911),  141  S.  W.  155. .  491 
M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  of  Tex.  v.  Carpenter,  52  Tex.  Civ.  App.  585, 

114  S.  W.  900 486 

M.  K.  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  L  C.  C,  164  Fed.  645.  .173,*  433,  564,*  565,  663 
M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Demere  (Tex.  Civ.  App.  1912),  145  S.  W.  623.  .  485 
M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  of  Texas  v.  Stark  Grain  Co.,  103  Tex.,  542, 

131  S.  W.  410 487 

M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  New  Era  Milling  Co.,  80  Kan.  141,  101    P. 

1011   419,  429 

m-.  K.   &  T.  Ry.  Co.  V.  The  New  Era  Milling  Co.,  79  Kan.  435, 

100  P.  273 177,  228,  274 

MacBride  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  571 .  722 
MacGillis  &  Gibbs  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  329. . .  .470* 

MacGillis  &  Gibbs  Co.  v.  C.  &  E.  L  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  40 684 

MacGillis  &  Gibbs  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  271 692 

MacMurray  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  531 119 

McCaull-Dinsmore  Co.  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  527 759 

McCaull-Dinsmore  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  15 686 

McCaul-Webster  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

117   731 


INDEX    OF    CASES  943 


Name.  Page. 

McClung  &  Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  414 595,  688 

McClung  &  Co.  V.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  582 133,  138 

McCord  Mercantile  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  398 878 

McCormick  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  611 795 

McElvain  v.  Railroad,  151  Mo.  App.  126,  131  S.  W.  736 

7,*  178,  423,  479,  480  488 

McKinstry  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  1911),  134  S.  W.  1061 491 

McLaughlin,  Gormley,  King  Co.  v.  Maine  Steamship  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 

108   134 

McLean  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  349 

347,  751,*  808,  864,  866 

McManus  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa  1912),  136  N.  W.  769 809 

Mack  Mfg.  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  521 733 

Macon  Grocery  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  163  Fed  738 175 

Magnew  Bros.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  103 731 

Maldonado  &  Co.  v.  Ferrocarril  de  Sonora,  18  L  C.  C.  65 496 

Males  Co.  v.  L.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  280 289,  725,  847 

Manahan  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  95 325,  326 

Manitou  Mineral  Springs  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  312.  865 

Manning  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  125 438,  481 

Mfrs'  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  L.  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  304 

165,  166,  276,  836,  839,  841,  848,  851 

Marble  Falls  Insulator  Pin  Co.  v.  H.  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 

305,  328,  573,  862 

Maricopa  County  Commercial  Club  v.  S.  F.  P.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 

C.  257 294,  555,  596,  624 

Maricopa  County  Commercial  Club  v.  Maricopa  &  Phoenix  R.  R.  Co., 

22  I.  C.  C.  279 586,  622 

Maricopa  County  Commercial  Club  v.  Phoenix  &  Eastern  R.  R.  Co., 

22  I.  C.  C.  221 624 

Maricopa  County  Commercial  Club  v.  P.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 

218 244,  631 

Maricopa  County  Commercial  Club  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  429 

353,  609,  661 

Maricopa  County  Commercial  Club  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  16  I.  C. 

C.  182 104,  378,  386 

Marion  Guano  Co.  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  406 865 

Marion  Iron  &  Brass  Bed  Co.  v.  T.  St.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 

272 69,  138,  816 

Maris  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  301 668 

Maritime  Exchange  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  81 

319,  334,  354,  560,  584,  608,  609,  620 

Marquette  Cement  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

188 731,  906 

Marshall  Oil  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  210 

306,  322,  328,  434,  571,  573,  595 

Marshall  Michel  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  566 884 

Marshall  &  Michel  Grain  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 

385    128,*  758* 


944  INDEX   OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Marshall  &  Michel  Grain  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 

228    770,  822 

Marshall- Wells  Hardware  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

10  864 

Martin  v.  Oregon  R.  &  Nav.  Co.  (Ore.,  1910),  113  P.  16 424 

Mason  City  Brick  &  Tile  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

287   456 

Mason  Fruit  Jar  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  490 760 

Mason  Gregg  Grain  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  89 769 

Massee  &  Felton  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  110 

225,  291,  317,  343 

Masurite  Explosive  Co.  v.  Pittsburg  &  Lake  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C. 

C.   405    673 

Masurite  Explosive  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  530 545 

Matthews  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  436. . .  .864,  875 

Mattison  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  233 426,  436,  527,  480 

Maxwell  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  609 543 

Maxwell  v.  W.  F.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  197 

188,  345,  358,  434,  436,  606,  666 

Mayer  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  472 812 

Mead  Auto  Cycle  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  474 153 

Mead  Auto  Cycle  Co.  v.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  435 607,  677 

Medberry  Findeisen  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  263.  .865,  878 

Medford  Traffic  Bureau  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  701 567,  585 

Meeker  v.  Lehigh  Valley  Co.,  162  Fed.  354 171 

Meeker  &  Co.  v.  L.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  129 

102,  183,  227,  320,  334,  584,  592,  625,  742 

Meeker  &  Co.  v.  L.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  480 127,  274,  720,  727 

Meetze  v.  Southern  Express  Co.  (S.  C,  1912),  74  S.  E.  823 424,  480 

Melody  V.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  25  S.  D.  606,  127  N.  W.  543 531 

Memphis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  313 

.  .23,  27,  41,  44,  330,*  338,  342,  346,  355,  570,  580,  586,  587,  593,  600,  610 
Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v.  Ft.  S.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  1. . . . 

266,  844,  850,  857,  882 

Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v.  K.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  90 

434  436,  641,  707,  710 

Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  67 

129,*    535,   634 

Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  33.  .214,  550 
Memphis    Freight    Bureau   v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C. 

113    155,  716 

Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  537. .  .  231 
Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  548. 

232,  323,  602  633 

Menasha  Woodenware  Co.  v.  Wis.  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  7Z.,  865 
Menasha  Woodenware  Co.  v.  C.  &  U.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  75. .  865 
Menasha  Woodenware  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

258    731.  738 


INDEX    OF    CASES  945 


Name.  Page. 

Menasha  Woodenware  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  424.  865 

Menasha  Woodenware  Co.  v.  W.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  252 865 

Menasha  Woodenware  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  476. . .     16 

Menefee  Bros.  v.  R.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  359 406,  704,  732 

Menefee  Bros.  v.  V.  S.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  117 688 

Menefee  Lumber  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  49 

301,  348,*  669,  718,  725,  735* 

Merchants'  Coal  Co.  v.  Fairmont  Coal  Co.,  160  Fed.  769 126 

Merchants'  Cotton  Press  &  Storage  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 

C.  98  5,  10,  55,*  66,  167,*  168,  227,*  387,  388,  390,  434,  781 

Merchants'  Freight  Bureau  of  Little  Rock,  Ark.,  v.  Midland  Valley 

R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  243 858 

Merchants'  Freight  Bureau  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  573.  .457,  552,  683 
Merchants  &  Manufacturers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C. 

467 134,   145,  318,  574 

Merchants  &  Manufacturers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 

129 337,  355,  522,  525 

Merchants  &  Manufacturers'  Ass'n  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  474. . 

388,  789,*  793,  835,*  863 

Merchants'  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  283.  .135,  154 
Merchants'  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C. 

225    507,  551 

Merchants'  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  Pacific  Express  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  131....  381 
Meredith  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  31 . . .  .267,*  291,  317,  390,  596 
Meridian  Fertilizer  Factory  v.  V.  S.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  554.  .586,  635 

Merle  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  475 616 

Merle  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co,  17  L  C.  C.  471 141 

Merle  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  585 673 

Merriam  &  Homquist  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  337 67 

Metropolitan  Paving  Brick  Co.  v.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  197. 

135,  137,  141,  143,*  151,  152,*  298,  320,*  587,  617,  705* 

Michael  Bros.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  228 865 

Michigan  Ammonia  Works  v.  M.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

511  735  740 

Michigan  Buggy  Co.  v.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  297. .  .10,  864,  874* 
Michigan  Hardwood  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  Trans.  Freight  Bureau,  22  I.  C. 

C.  387  665 

Midland  Linseed  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  205 738 

Midland  Mill  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  K.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  610. ...  856 
Milburn  Wagn  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  144 

354,  692,  864,  867,*  880,  900 

'Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  93 

226,  229,  230,  267,  277,*  292,  306,  311,  319,  361,  494,  535,  567,  593,  600 

Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  460 816 

Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  511 498 

Mill  Creek  Cannel  Coal  Co.  v.  Coal  &  Coke  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  306. . .  627 

Millar  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  78 341,  592,  640 

Miller  &  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  60 406,  704 


946  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Miller  &  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  331 731 

Miller  &  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  377 901 

Miller  &  Co.  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  249 507,  844,  865 

Miller  &  Co.  v.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  518 732 

Miller  &  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  588 806 

Miller  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  85  Neb.  458,  123,  N.  W.  449 488 

Miller  v.  T.  &  B.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  349 739 

Miller  &  Lux  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  129 712 

Miller  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  590 503 

Miller  Walnut  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  43 252 

Millinery  Jobbers'  Ass'n  v.  American  Express  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  498.  .  .151* 

Milne  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  558 769 

Milwaukee  Beer  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  61 507 

Milwaukee  Corrugating  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

273  738 

Milwaukee  Electric  Ry.,  etc.,  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C. 

C.   468    457,  458 

Milwaukee  Falls  Chair  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  217. . 

1 ,  454,  509,  788 

Milwaukee-Waukesha  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  L 

C.  C.  28  140 

Milwaukee- Waukesha  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C. 

C.  472  42 

Milwaukee-Waukesha  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  294 .507,  731 

Mineral  Point  Zinc  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  440 691 

Minneapolis  Bedding  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  329 671 

Minnequa  Coal  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  268 738 

Minneapolis  Dry  Goods  Co.  v.  Wis.  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  31. . .  864 
Minneapolis  Iron  Store  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  172.   877 

Minneapolis  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  259 622 

Minneapolis  Traffic  Ass'n  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  432, 

437   354,  705* 

Minneapolis  Threshing  Machine  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L 

C.   C.   536 864,  876 

Minneapolis  Threshing  Machine  Co.  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co., 

16  L  C.  C.  193.. 372,  745 

Minneapolis  Threshing  Machine  Co.  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co., 

17  L  C.  C.  189. 274,  350,*  589,  788 

Minneapolis  Threshing  Machine  Co.  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co., 

21  L  C.  C.  181 112,  508 

Minneapolis  Threshing  Machine  Co.  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co., 

Unrep.  Op.  452 727,  826 

Minnesota  &  Iowa  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

169 650 

Minneapolis  Threshing  Machine  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C. 

C.  128 224,  706 


INDEX    OF    CASES  947 


Name.  Page. 

Mires  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  134  Mo.  App.  379,  144  S.  W.  1052. . 

419,  814 

Missouri  &  Kansas  Shippers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C. 

C.  411   730* 

Missouri  &  Illinois  Coal  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  39 

115,  124,*  283,*  840,  845,*  848* 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  v.   Larabee  Mills,  211  U.  S.  612,  29  Sup.  Ct. 

214,  53  L.  ed.  352 176,  426 

Mitchell  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  181  Fed.  403 

53,  66,  68,  222,  273,*  722 

Mitchell  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  183  Fed.  908 174,  429 

Mobile  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  417. . 

4,  75,*  222,  366,*  367,*  386,  401,*  402,  426,  811,  838,  859,*  899* 

Moise  Bros.  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C  550 

82,  327,  455,  462,  474,*  475,*  612 

Moline  Plow  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  186 738 

Moline  Plow  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  419 511,  744 

Momsen  &  Co.  v.  Gila  Valley,  Globe  &  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 

C.  614 506  516,  864,  877,  884 

Monarch  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  1 636,  882 

Monroe  Progressive  League  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 

534 96,  459,  472,*  473 

Monroe  &  Sons  v.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  27 203 

Montague  &  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  72 

146,  361,  494,*  495,  500,*  507,  613 

Montgomery  Freight  Bureau  v.  W.  Ry.  of  Ala.,  14  I.  C.  C.  150 

302,  310,  321,  864,  875,*  881 

Montgomery    Freight    Bureau    v.    M.    &    O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 

374   864,  876* 

Montgomery  Freight  Bureau  v.  W.  Ry.  of  Ala.,  15  I.  C.  C   199 546 

Montgomery    Freight    Bureau    v.    L.    &    N.    R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 

521    247,  257 

Montpelier  &  W.  R.  R.  R.  v.  U.  S.,  187  Fed.  271 184 

Moon  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  364 739 

Moore  v.  N.  Y.  &  L.  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  557 531 

Moore  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  574 607,  740 

Moore  Mercantile  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  49 732 

Moore  &  Co.  v.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  498 735 

Morgan  Grain  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  460 

14,  41,  102,  330,  339,  341,  351,  431,  569,  581,  592* 

Morrell  &  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  400 635 

Morris  &  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  182 738 

Morris  &  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  411 513 

Morrisdale  Coal  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  176  Fed.  748 110 

Morrisdale  Coal  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  183  Fed.  929 110,  125,  429 

Morse  Produce  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  334 

428,  434  539  565    719* 

Morti  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  513. ......' '.  .664,  862,  879 


948  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Mosson  Co.  V.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  30 440,  832,  837 

Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  305 

24,  321,  339,  353,  355,*  586,  592,  610,  655,  891 

Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  447 605,  653 

Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  45 

357,  476,  536,  537,  549,  603,  724 

Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  596 724 

Munroe  &  Sons  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  27 200 

Murphy  Bros.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  457 

207  *  539   745 

Murphy  Bros.' v.*  N*  Y.*  C.'  &  H*.  R.  r!  R.'  Co.',  21  *I.'c.  C.  *176.\  .204,'  885 

Murphy  Distilling  Co.  v.  E.  &  T.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  366 739 

Murphy  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  192 738 

Muse  Bros  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  235 147* 

Muskogee  Traffic  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  169. . 

98,  101,  338,  353,  570,  587,  608 

Mutual' Rice  Trade  &  Devel.  Ass'n,  Houston,  v.  I.  &  G.  N.  R.  R., 

23  I.  C.  C.  219   70,*  79,  83,  100 

Mutual  Transit  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  178  Fed.  664 843,*  896 

N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.,  195  Fed.  953.  .249,  261,  310,  311,  431,  535,  566* 

N.  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Pacific  Coast  Lumber  Mfrs.*  Ass'n,  165  Fed.  1 49 

N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Freeholders  of  Hudson,  76  N.  J.  L. 

664,  74  A.  954 412 

N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  168  Fed.  131 

365,  370,*  386,  433,  547* 

N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  V.  U.  S.,  212  U.  S.   481,  29  Sup.  Ct.  304,  53 

L.  ed.  613 4,  181,  189,  190,  191,  192,  425,  812 

N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  V.  U.  S.,  212  U.  S.  500,  29  Sup.  Ct.  309,  53 

L.  ed.  624 181 

N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  166  Fed.  267 188,  193,  803 

Nashville  Grain  Exchange  v.  U.  S.,  191  Fed.  37 48,  71,  158,  400 

National  Ass'n    of    Letter    Carriers  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I. 

C.  C.  6 520,  720,  804 

National  Hay  Ass'n  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  34 

133,  318,  350,*  352,  354,  355, 

356,  364,  387,  431,  434,  553,*  569,  575,  576,  588,  608,  610,*  611,  651,  734 
National  League  of  Commission  Merchants  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 

20  I.  C.  C.  132 ; .  .568,  864,  866,  902 

National    Lumber   Co.   v.  S.  P.  L.  A.  &  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 

434   406,*  734 

National  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  86 291,  596 

National  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co,  18  I.  C.  C.  370 743* 

National  Mohair  Growers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 

180  677 

National  Paper  Mills  &  Filler  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  19 736 

National  Petroleum  Ass'n  v.  Ann  Arbor  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  272. . 

362,  428,  540,*  571,  832 


INDEX    OF    CASES  949 


Name.  Page. 

National    Petroleum   Ass'n   v.    C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 

284 540,  551 

National    Petroleum   Ass'n   v.    C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 

287 239,  269 

National  Petroleum  Ass'n  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  473 

133    140   227    41 1    889  *  893* 

National  Petroleum' Ass'n  v.M.RRy.C^    18'l.  C.'c.  593.. 246,  298,  308 

National  Pole  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  465 672 

National  Pole  Co.  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  124 684 

National  Refining  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  389. . . . 

683,  722,  728 

National  Refining  Co.  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  649. . . . 

294,  317,  596,  610,  683 

National  Refining  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  527 

352,  357,*  606,  684 

National  Refrigerator  &  Butcher  Supply  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I. 

C.  C.  64 516,  517 

National  Rolling  Mill  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  604. .  656 
National  Sewing  Machine  Co.  v.  C.  C.  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

129  865 

National  Wholesale  Lumber  Dealers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 

14  I.  C.  C.  154 6,  137,  146,  392,  394,  396 

Nay  lor  &  Co.  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  188  Fed.  860 7 

Nay  lor  &  Co.  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  9 686 

Naylor  &  Co.  v.  L.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  168 686 

Nebraska  Material  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  89. . .  .459,  460 
Nebraska   Transfer   Co.   v.    C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  (Neb.,  1912),  134 

N.  W.  163 196,  201 

Nebraska  State  Railway  Comm.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 

121 244,  335,  352,  584,  608 

Nebraska    State    Railway    Comm.    v.    U.    P.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 

349   99,  247 

Nebraska  Casket  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  238. .  865 
Nebraska-Iowa  Grain  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  90 

61,  67,  117,  400,  427,  548,  806 

Neilson  Co.  v.  La.  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  254 210 

Neosho  Milling  Co.  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  433 403 

Neosho  Milling  Co.  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  450 517 

Neufeld  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  26 453 

New  Albany  Box  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  315 668,  804 

New  Albany  Furniture  Co.  v.  M.  J.  &  K.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 

594  253,  310,  326 

New    England   Coal    &   Coke    Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 

398 391,*  887* 

New  England  Furniture  &  Carpet  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

243  878 

New  Orleans  Board  of  Trade,  Ltd.,  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I. 

C.  C.  210 270 


950  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 
New  Orleans  Board  of  Trade  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  465 

365,  367,  368,  370 

New  Orleans  Board  of  Trade  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  496. .  .206,  207 
New  Orleans  Board  of  Trade  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  429. . 

259,  566,  602 

New  Orleans  Board  of  Trade  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  231.  .25,  251 
New  York  Hay  Exchange  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  178 

195,*  389,  395,*  555,  885,  886,  887* 

Newark  Machine  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  291 ...  .   372 

Newding  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  29 615,  808 

Newton  Gum  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  341. . .  .160,  824,*  829 
Nicola,  Stone  &  Myers  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  199. . . . 

7,*  50,  127,  714,  719,*  722,  726,*  727,*  734,  744* 

Nitrate  Agencies  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  163 865 

Noble  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  432 496,*  498,  508 

Noble  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  72 112,  498* 

Noble  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  420 504 

Noble  V.  D.  &  T.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  60 360 

Noble  V.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  70 717,  803,  830 

Noble  V.  J.  L.  C.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  520 749,  763* 

Noble  V.  D.  &  T.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  60 360,  905 

Noble  V.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  62 900,  902 

Noble  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  186 558,  744 

Noble  V.  T.  St.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  272 865 

Noble  V.  Toledo  &  Western  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  494 756 

Noble  V.  V.  S.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  224 603,  828,  864,  868 

Nollenberger  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  595.  .127,  535,  615,  722,  726,  844 

Non- Validation  of  Limited  Excursion  Tickets,  19  I.  C.  C.  440 524 

Norfolk  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Stuart  Draft  Co.,  109  Va.  184,  63  S.  E.  415.  487 
Norman  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  239. . .  .276,  292,  596 

North  Bros.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  70 298,  652 

North  Bros.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  152 652 

North  Star  Woolen  Mill  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  94.  732 

Northern  California  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  353 865 

Northern  Anthracite  Coal  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  549.  626 

Northern  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  369 234 

Northern    Lumber    Mfg.    Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  54... 

199,  688,  734* 

Northern  Mercantile  Co.,  Ltd.,  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  581 114 

Northern  Wisconsin  Produce  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co., 

21  L  C.  C.  197 203,  207* 

Northern  Wood  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  7 731 

Northern  Wood  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  193 731 

Northwestern  Iron  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  9 456 

Northwestern  Leather  Co.  v.  O.  R.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  66 79,     95 

Northwestern  Traffic  &  Credit  Bureau  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 

Unrep.  Op.  131 7Z7 

Nourse-Taylor  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  &  S.  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  164. . .  760 
Nucoa  Butter  Co.  v.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  174 151,  154 


INDEX   OF    CASES  951 


Name.  Page. 

O.  &  C.  B.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  v.  I.  C.  C,  179  Fed.  243 282 

Oak  Grove  Farm  Creamery  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  454. . 

139,  379,  384 

Oakland  Warehouse  Co.  v.  C.  G.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  443 739 

O'Brien  Commercial  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  68.  .550,  819 

O'Brien  &  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  227 809 

Ocean  County  Coal  Co.  v.  Central  R.  R.  of  N.  J.,  17  I.  C.  C.  383 253 

Ocheltree  Grain  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  412 542,  551,  694 

Ocheltree  Grain  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  46 650 

Ocheltree  Grain  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  238 549,  715 

O'Connor  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  (Minn.,  1912),  136  N.  W.  743 488,  827 

Oden  «&  Elliott  v.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  Unrep.  Op.  253 727 

O'Halloran  &  Jacobs  v.  B.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  494 769 

Ohio  Allied  Milk  Products  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  522 12,  315 

Ohio  Face  Brick  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  582. 

378,  382,  385* 

Ohio  Foundry  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  65 

101,  331,  582,  651,  804,  821,*  830 

Ohio  Iron  &  Metal  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  299.  .348,  808,  810 
Ohio  Iron  &  Metal  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  15. . . .  731 
Ohio  R.  R.  Comm.  v.  Worthington,  225  U.  S.  101,  32  Sup.  Ct.  653,  56 

L.  ed.  1004 419,  422* 

Ohio  Valley  Tie  Co.  v.  L.  H.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  567 692 

Okerson  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  127 659 

Oklahoma  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  147 546 

Oklahoma  &  Arkansas  Coal  Traffic  Bureau  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 

14  I.  C.  C.  216 302,  571 

Oklahoma  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  42 683 

Old  Dominion  Copper  &  Smelting  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  309. 

570,  804,  806,  828* 

Old  Dominion  Copper  Mining  &  Smelting  Co.  of  Ariz.  v.  N.  O.  Ry. 

Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  416 865 

Old  Dominion  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Flanary  &  Co.  (Va.,  1911),  69  S.  E.  1107. 

478,  487 

Oldbury  Electro-Chemical  Co.  v.  C.  H.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  204.  738 
Olive-Sternenberg    Lumber    Co.    v.    T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  2  349,  588 

Olympia  Brewing  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  178 708 

Omaha  Grain  Exchange  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  424 

299,  338,  586,  587 

Omaha  &  C.  B.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  191  Fed.  40 4,*  280,*  282,*  518 

Ontario  Iron  Ore  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  204.  . 

: 353,  609,  656 

Orange  Grocery  Co.  v.  M.  L.  &  T.  R.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  502. .   718 

Oregon  Lumber  Co.  v.  O.  R.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  582 500 

Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Campbell,  180  Fed.  253 418 

Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Coolidge  (Ore.,  1911),  116  P.  93 

430,  827,  832,  894,  895* 


952  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Oregon  R.  R.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Dumas,  181  Fed.  781 123 

Oregon  &  Washington  Lumber  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 

389 32,*  100,  101,  142,  322,  339,  567,*  591,  666* 

Oregon  &  Washington  Lumber  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I. 

C.  C.  1 12,  20,  34,  90,  144,  320,  336,*  580,  584,  602 

Oregon  &  Washington  Lumber  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  18..  356 

Orford  Copper  Co.  v.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  468 153 

Oshkosh  Logging  Tool  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  109. . 

504,  540,*  548,  864,  875* 

Oshkosh  Fuel  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  432 739 

Oster  Bros.  v.  M.  L.  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  511 150,  808 

Otis  Elevator  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  3 823 

Otis  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  502 129,  824 

Otrich  V.  St.  L.  L  M.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  App.,  1911),  134  S.  W. 

665  487 

Ottumwa   Commercial   Ass'n   v.    C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C. 

413 561,  624 

Ottumwa  Bridge  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  121 .. . 

360,  607,  742 

Ottumwa  Box  Car  Loader  Co.  v.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  382 517 

Ottumwa  Pickle  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  368 300 

Ouerbacker  Coffee  Co.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  566.  .139,  387,  410* 

Overly  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  360 144 

Ozark  Fruit  Growers'  Ass'n  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 

106 319,  495,  501,  504,*  575,  645,  710,  711 

Ozark  Fruit  Growers'  Ass'n  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C. 

134 356,  495,  612,  645,  902 

Ozark  Fruit  Growers'  Ass'n  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C. 

153 710 

Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  584.... 

341,  358,  593,  607 

Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  359.... 

23,  316,  319,  575,  615,  718,  741* 

Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  97,  98,  99, 

100  737 

Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  E.  P.  &  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  109,  110.   507 

Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  G.  V.  G.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  Ill 117 

Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  125 605 

Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  195 738,  741 

Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  254 738 

Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  255 738 

Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  259 

360,   507,  604,  731,  738 

Pacific   Coast   Biscuit   Co.   v.    O.  R.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  178. 

160,  804,  830 

Pacific   Coast   Biscuit   Co.   v.    S.  P.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  546. 

136,  516,  828 


INDEX    OF    CASES  953 


Name.  Pag6. 

Pacific  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  373. . .  .718,  741* 

Pacific  Coast  Jobbers  &  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  33 793 

Pacific  Coast  Lumber  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  465. . 

28,  434,  733 

Pacific  Coast  Lumber  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  23.  .12,  28 
Pacific  Coast  Lumber  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  51. . . 

571,  842,*  846,  856,  857 

Paducah  Cooperage  Co.  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  226 

319,  398,  409 

Palmer  &  Miller  v.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  107. . .  .301,  348,  805* 
Pankey  &  Holmes  v.  Central    New    England    Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C. 

578 348,  641 

Paola  Refining  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  29 

328,*  462,  571,  573* 

Paonia  Packing  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  487. . .  .607,  740 

Parafiine  Paint  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  369 768 

Paragon  Plaster  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  480. 

249,  346,  459 

Paragould  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  485 349,  760 

Parfrey  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  104 621,  763 

Parker-Bell  Lumber  Co.  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  (Wash.,  1912), 

124  P.  389 487 

Parlin  &  Orendorff  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  145. . .  692 

Partridge  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  276 322,  684 

Partridge  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

138 456,  604 

Pate  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  417 113,  511 

Patten  v.  Wis.  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  189 343,  543,  597,  669 

Patton  V.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Tex.  1911),  137  S.  W.  721 485 

Payne  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  175 879 

Payne  v.  M.  L.  &  T.  R.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  185.  .415,  416,*  645,  829* 

Payne-Gardner  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L.  C.  C.  638 305,  310 

Pease  Bros  Furniture  Co.  v.  S.  P.  L.  A.  &  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C. 

223  495    503 

Peavey  &  Co.'  V.  u!  P.*  R.  Co!,'  176  Fed*  409 . '. '. '.  *. '. ' '. '. '. '.  S3*  '58,  '71,'  172,  175 
Peale,  Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  18  L  C.  C.  25 

Ill,  117,  194,  195,*  201,  202,*  203,*  206,*  283,*  722,  774,  804,  834,  891 
Pecos  &  N.  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Crews  (Tex.  1911),  139  S.  W.  1049. . .  .485,  492 

Pecos  Mercantile  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  173 463 

Pecos  River  R.  Co.  v.  Reynolds  Cattle  Co.  (Tex.  1911),  135  S.  W.  162.  515 
Pecos  Valley  &  N.  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Harris  (N.  M.  1908),  94  P.  951.  .777,  807 
Peerless  Agencies  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  218. . .  .496,  499 
Peerless  Agencies  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  33,  34,  35  507 
Peerless  Woolen  Mills  v.  C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  594.  741 
Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  International  Coal  Mining  Co.,  173  Fed.  1 

222,  228,  274,  290,  595,  722,  742 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  193  Fed  81 110 

Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mogi,  71  Misc.  412,  128  N.  Y.  Supp.  643 894 


954  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Penn.  Refining  Co.  v.  W.  N.  Y  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  208  U.  S.  208,  28  Sup. 

Ct.  268,  52  L.  ed.  456 118,*  878,  904 

Pennsylvania  Smelting  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  60 659 

Penn.  Tobacco  Co.  v.  Old  Dominion  S.  S.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  197 

247,  345,  358,  607,  690 

Penrod  Walnut  &  Veneer  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  326 

363,  693,  719,  735 

Pepperell  Mfg.  Co.  v.  T.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  353 299 

Perry  &  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  247 31,  314 

Peters  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  598 900,*  905 

Phila.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  174  Fed.  687 89,  432,  564 

Phillip  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  418 90,  558,  586,  587 

Phillips  Co.  V.  G.  T.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  195  Fed.  12 714,  715,  747 

Phillips  Co.  V.  G.  T.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  590 70,  865,  866 

Phillips  V.  N.  Y.  &  B.  D.  Express  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  631 374,  377 

Phillips-Trawick-James  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  644 466 

Pierce  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.,  23  I.  C.  C.  89 84,  228,  357,  606,  735,  789 

Pierce  Co.  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  189  Fed.  561 78 

Pierce  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  579 435,  790* 

Pierce  v.  D.  M.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  401 878 

Pilant  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  178. . .  .462,  463,  615,  729,  735* 
Pioneer  Pole  &  Shaft  Co.  v.  C.  H.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  123.  .130,  865 
Pittsburgh,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mitchell  (Ind.,  1910),  91  N.  E.  735.... 

228,  477,*  482,  484,  488,  844 

Pittsburg,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Comm.,  171  Ind.  189,  86  N.  E.  328. . . . 

7   389   423  *  795* 

Pittsburg,' etc.,'  'r.  Co. 'v.*  State,'  i72'ind.'  147',  87  N.  E.'i634. ...'....'..  423 
Pittsburg  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Knox  (Ind.  1912),  98  N.  E.  295. . . . 

177,  438,  481,  484 

Pittsburg  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wood  (Ind.,  1908),  84  N.  E.  1009 

125,    174 

Pittsburg  Plate  Glass  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  87 

241,  288,  888 

Place  V.  T.  P.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  543 825* 

Piano  Milling  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  360 409* 

Planters'  Gin  &  Compress  Co.  v.  Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  131 

247,  257,*  457 

Platte  Bros  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  493 607 

Platten  Produce  Co.  v.  K.  L.  S.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  543 754 

Flatten  Produce  Co.  v.  K.  L.  S.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  249 

515,  750,*  751,  765 

Platten  Produce  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  512.. 647,  719,  808 
Pleasant  Hill  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  532.128,  730 

Plummer  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  530 688 

Poison  Implement  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  42 736 

Pomeroy  &  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  8. 704 

Ponchatoula  Farmers'  Ass'n  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  513 

146,*  287,  294,*  317,  363,  393,  437,  480,  494,  501,  569,  596,  640,  828 


INDEX    OF    CASES  955 


Name.  Page. 

Pons  V.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  Unrep.  Op.  330 343 

Poor  Grain  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  C.  418 763 

Pope  Manufacturing  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  400 

114,  345,  497,*  745* 

Port  Huron  Engine  &  Thresher  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.    147    737 

Port  Huron  Engine  &  Thresher  Co.  v.  G.  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  352  707,  739 

Porter  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  1 

161,  199  *  427,  434,  565,  825,  826,  829,*  832,*  873,*  884 

Portland  Lumber  Co.  v.  O.  W.  R.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  292. . .  .93,  838 
Portland  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  O.  R.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 

640  132,  159 

Portland  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  O.  R.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  265 

345,  347,  555,  592,  601,  623 

Portner  Brewing  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  361 153,  615,  739 

Portsmouth  Steel  C.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  510.. 357,*  606,  716 

Post  Co.  V.  D.  L.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  425 355,  605 

Potlatch  Lumber  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  41 213,  221 

Powhatan  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  69.  .116,*  120 

Prahlow  v.  L  H.  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  572 755,  796 

Prentiss  &  Co.  v.  Pa.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  68 749,  750,*  763 

Preston  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  406 461,  821* 

Preston  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  565 758 

Preston  v.  R.  F.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  203 692 

Priesmeyer  Shoe  Co.  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  78 516,  659 

Proctor  &  Gamble  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  225  U.  S.  282,  32  Sup.  Ct.  761,  56  L. 

ed.   1091    : 156 

Proctor  &  Gamble  Co.  v.  C.  H.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  556 201 

Proctor  &  Gamble  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  188  Fed.  221 156,  201 

Public  Service  Commission,  Wash.,  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  256 

566,  760,  848,  888,  892 

Pueblo  Commerce  Club  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  427 100 

Pueblo  Transportation  Ass'n  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  82.  .719,  813,  814,*  889 
Pyro  Art  Club  v.  United  States  Express  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  37 374 

Quammen  &  Austad  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  G.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C. 

599   689 

Quammen  &  Austad  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 

110   316,  542,  552 

Quartz  Glass  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

140    153,  7Z7 

Quimby  v.  Maine  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  246 296,  317,  401,  408 

Racine-Sattley  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  164 656 

Racine-Sattley  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  142 147 

Racine-Sattley  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  488 510 

Racine-Sattley  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  234 738 


956  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Radinsky  v.  Colo.  &  So.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  88 741 

Radinsky  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  492 658 

Radinsky  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  243 184,  321,  658 

Rainey  &  Rogers  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  88 

319,  329,  332,  352,*  575,  580,  583,  603,  626 

Rahway  Valley  R.  R.  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  191 ... . 

104,  794,*  795 

Rail  and  River  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  86 

6,  109,*  116,*  117,  118,  119,  121,  122,  133,  233 

Railroad  Commission  of  Ind.  v.  K.  &  I.  B.  &  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 

563  107,  825 

Railroad  Commission  of  Texas  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 

463  19,  30,*  37,*  338 

Railroad  Commissioners  of  Iowa  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  181. . . . 

107,*  344,  350,  588,  597,  605 

Railroad  Commission  of  Kentucky  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 

300 319,  456,  464,  612 

R.  R.  Com.  of  La.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  31 . . .  .222,*  225,  845 
R.  R.  Com.  of  Nev.  v.  N.  C.  O.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  205 

102,  340,  344,  449,  596,  860,  864,  866* 

R.  R.  Com.  of  Nev.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  456 554 

Railroad  Commission  of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  329 

. . .  .4,*  159,  265,  286,  330,  331,  445,*  446,*  447,  450,  459,  460,  468,  601 
Railroad  Commission  of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  238 

70,  79,  85,  100,  159,  294,  325,  332,*  452,  468,  469,  555,  583,  596,  624,  842 
Railroad  Commission  of  Tennessee  v.  A.  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  418 

91,  223,  246 

Railroad  Commission  of  Tex.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Tex.  1911),  140  S. 

W.  829  3,*  424,  425* 

Railroad  Commission  of  Wisconsin  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 

C.  85  169,  328,*  356,  434,  565,  570,  573,*  612,  621 

Railroad  Commissioners  of  Florida  v.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  16  I.  C.  C.  1 

87,  223,  264,  338,  345,  589,  597 

R.  R.  Commissioners  of  Kansas  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  283.  905 
R.  R.  Commissioners  of  Kansas  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 

407 159,  244,*  286,  289,  346,*  347,  354,  475,  559,  577,  601,*  609 

R.  R.  Commissioners  of  Kan.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  24 371 

Ralston  Purina  Co.  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  354 739 

Ralston  Townsite  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  354.  .436,  480,  780,  788* 
Randolph  Lumber  Co.  v.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.,  14  I.  C.  C.  338. . .  .876* 
Randolph  Lumber  Co.  v.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.,  13  I.  C.  C.  601 ....  254 

Rassman  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  316 865 

Raven  Red  Ash  Coal  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  230 214 

Receivers  &  Shippers'  Ass'n  of  Cincinnati  v.  C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co., 

18  I.  C.  C.  440 102,  105,*  227,  256, 

265,  308,  330,  332,  338,  351,  353,  356,  434,  553,*  570,*  583,  586,  592,  606 

Record  Oil  Refining  Co.  v.  M.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  132 261 

Redpath-Vawter  Chautauqua  System  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I. 

C.  C.  135   621 


INDEX   OP    CASES  957 


Name.  Page. 
Red  River  Oil  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  438 

169,*  289,  291,  317,  365,  367,  370,  371,  390,  397,  402,  403,  409,*  811,  847 

Red  Wing  Linseed  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  47 636 

Red  Wing  Linseed  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  59. . . .  736 

Red  Wing  Sewer  Pipe  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  302 865 

Reddick  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  492 363,  824 

Reed  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  616 507,  663 

Rehberg  &  Co.  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  508 130,  515,  729,  757 

Rehberg  &  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  479 865 

Rhinelander  Paper  Co.  v.  N.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  633.  .99,  101,  325,  781 

Reid  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  153  N.  C.  490,  69  S.  E.  618 490,  890 

Reid  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  153  N.  C.  490,  69  S.  E.  618 424 

Reid  &  Beam  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  150  N.  C.  753,  64  S.  E.  874 424 

Reinhardt  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  &  N.  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  591 290 

Reiter,  Curtis  &  Hild  v.  N.  Y.,  S.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  290. .  197,  794 

Reliance  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  562 905 

Reliance  Textile  &  Dye  Works  v.  Sou.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  48 267,  436 

Rennert-Millette  Co.  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  525. . .  .403,  732 

Rentz  Brothers  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  7 546 

Reno  Grocery  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  400 275,  325,  535,  549 

Reno  Wholesale  Liquor  Store  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  516 138,  808 

Riverside  Mills  v.  C.  &  W.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  153 196 

Republic  Metalware  Co.  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  565 689,  817 

Reynolds  v.  Southern  Express  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  536.  .376,  382,  385,  604,  783 
Reynolds-Davis  &  Co.  v.  St.  L.  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  551. .  740 

Rice  V.  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  75 474,  901,  904* 

Richards  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  468 500 

Richmond  Co.  v.  G.  T.  Ry.  Co.  of  Can.,  Unrep.  Op.  161 501,  906 

Rickards  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  239 

133,  338,  351,  355,  494,  591,  611,  677 

Rickel  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  499 821 

Ridgewood  Coal  Co.  v.  L.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  183 794 

Riter  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  443 51,  524* 

Rivers  Bros.  Co.  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  496 438,  481* 

Riverside  Fibre  &  Paper  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

141    738 

Riverside  Mills  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  168  Fed.  990 73,  477 

Riverside  Mills  v.  G.  R.  R.,  20  L  C.  C.  423 131,  358,  516,  576,  606 

Roach  &  Seeber  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  172.420,  551,  618 
Roberts  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  248.. 245,  357,  435,  606 

Robertson  v  S.  Ry.  Co.  (Ala.  1912),  59  So.  232 483 

Robertson  Bros.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  126 131,*  604,  746 

Robertson  Paper  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  254 150,  883 

Robertson  Paper  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  206 673 

Robinson  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  222  U.  S.  506,  32  Sup.  Ct.  114,  56  L. 

ed.  288 176,*  713,  746 

Robinson  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  64  W.  Va.  406,  63  S.  E.  323 

179,  430,*  514,  515 


958  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Robinson  Clay  Product  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  250 712 

Robinson  Clay  Product  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  276  516 

Robinson  Clay  Product  Co.  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  275 738 

Rodehaver  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  146 718 

Roden  Grocery  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  469 198* 

Rogers  v.  Ore.  R.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  424 470* 

Romona  Oolitic  Stone  Co.  v.  C.  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  568 902 

Romona  Oolitic  Stone  Co.  v.  Vandalia  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  115 901 

Roper  Lumber-Cedar  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  382. . .  .404* 

Roper  Lumber-Cedar  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  397 542 

Rose  V.  B.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  427 322,  677 

Rosebrough  v.  P.  Exp.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  438 290,  682 

Rosedale  Foundry  &  Machine  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  370 372 

Rosenbaum  Bros.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  62 229,  559 

Rosenbaum  Grain  Co.  v.  C.  &  E.  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  298 61 

Rosenbaum  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  499 505 

Rosenblatt  v.  O.  R.  R.  &  Nav.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  314 865 

Rosenblatt  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  261 .. .  .822,  864,  868,*  869 
Rosenblatt  &  Sons  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  447. . . .  155,  864,  867 

Rosenblatt  &  Sons  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  325 865 

Ross  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  112 1^7 

Rossie  Iron  Ore  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  392.  .207* 

Rotsted  Co  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C  257 636 

Rowell  Mfg.  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  71. ...... .   736 

Royal  Brewing  Co.  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  255.  .375,*  438,  481 
Royal  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  440..  122,*  126,  730 

Royal  Metal  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  G.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  255 822 

Rudgear-Merle  Co.  v.  Goodrich  Transit  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  264 738 

Running  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  565 810 

Russe  &  Burgess  v.  I.  C.  C,  193  Fed.  678 715 

Rutland  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  509 813 

Ruttle  V.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  179 110,  117 

Ryan  v.  Gt.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  226 864,  868 

Ryan  &  Newton  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  127 865 

Ryland  &  Brooks  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  520.347,  762* 

S.  F.  P.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Grant  Bros.  Const.  Co.  (Ariz.  1910),  108  P. 

467  807 

S.  P.  Co.  V.  Campbell,  189  Fed.  696 422 

S.  P.  Co.  V.  Crenshaw,  5  Ga.  App.  675,  63  S.  E.  865 

479,  480,  481,  488,  492 

S.  P.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  C,  188  Fed.  241 158,*  791,  793,  891 

S.  P.  Co.  V.  L  C.  C,  177  Fed.  963 34,  35,  432 

S.  P.  Co.  V.  Int.  Com.  Comm.,  219  U.  S.  433,  31  Sup.  Ct.  288,  55 

L.  ed.  283 176,  290,  331,  430,  432,  563,  582 

S.  P.  Co.  V.  Lyon  &  Co.  (Miss.,  1911),  54  So.  784 484 

S.  P.  Co.  V.  Meadors  &  Co.  (Tex.,  1910),  129  S.  W.  170 479,  486* 

S.  P.  Terminal  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  219  U.  S.  498,  31  Sup.  Ct.  279,  55  L. 

ed.  310 176,  401,  418,  776,*  833,*  834 


INDEX   OF    CASES  959 


Name.  Page. 

S.  P.  Terminal  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  219  U.  S.  498,  31  Sup.  Ct.  279,  55  L. 

ed.  310  782 

St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Heyser  (Ark.,  1910),  130  S.  W.  562 

177,  477,*  481* 

St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Keller,  90  Ark.  308,  119  S.  W.  254 491 

St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  State  of  Okla.  62,  107  P.  929 424 

St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Furlow,  89  Ark.  404,  117  S.  W.  517.. 
433    491 

St.  L.*  i.'  M*.  &  S.*Ry.  Co*  V.Woif  (Ark.*  1*9*1*1),*  i39*S.*  W.*  536  .'.*.*.'. . . !  809 

St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jones  (Ark.  1910),  125  S.  W.  1025 483 

St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Edwards  (Ark.,  1910),  127  S.  W.  713.  .422,  423 

St.  L.  1.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Pape  (Ark.  1911),  140  S.  W.  265 488 

St.  L.  S.  F.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Birge-Forbes  Co.  (Tex.,  1911),  139  S.  W. 

3    366,  778* 

St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lewellen  Bros.,  192  Fed.  540 171 

St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  of  Tex.  v.  Ray  (Tex.  1910),  127  S.  W.  281 486 

St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gramling,  97  Ark.  353,  133  S.  W.  1129 1  17 

St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lewellen  Bros.,  192  Fed.  540 813 

Sabine  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  270 769 

Sackett  Plaster  Board  Co.  v.  B.  R.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  374. . . .  684 

Sage  &  Co.  V.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  195 180,  198 

Saginaw  &  Manistee  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C. 

119  246,  667 

Samuels  &  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  646 754,  755 

Saginaw  Board  of  Trade  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  128 

87,  98,  287,  295,  317,  596* 

Sallisaw  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  St.  L.  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  484 

349,  508 

Salomon  Bros.  Co.  v.  N.  O.  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  332 711 

Saner-Whiteman  Lumber  Co.  v.  T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  290.  756 
Sanford  v.  Western  Express  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  32.362,  380,  384,*  385,*  548,  552 

Sanguinetti  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  185 673 

Santa  Fe,  P.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Grant  Bros.  Const.  Co.  (Ariz.  1910),  108 

P.    467    776 

Saunders  &  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  1.  C.  C.  415 268,*  328,  373,  378,  573 

Sawyer  &  Austin  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C. 

141    : 364,   616 

Sawyer  &  Austin  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C. 

C.  464  81,  97,  666 

Sawyer  &  Austin  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  L.  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  478 \ 672 

Schenberger  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  84  Kan.  79,  113  P.  433 809 

Scheuing  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  550 159,  451,  599,  614,  622 

Schlitz  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  C,  Unrep.  Op.  96 737 

Schlitz  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op(  104 737 

Schlitz  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  405 740 

Schmidt  &  Sons  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  535.  .71,  95,  246,  387,*  396 
Schmidt  &  Sons  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  684 

79,  94,  97,  361,  363,  547,  593,  602 


960  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Schoenhofen  Brewing  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  329.25,  581 
Schoenhofen  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  566. .  735 

Schuette  &  Co.  v.  D.  &  I.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  595 760 

Schultz-Hansen  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  234. . .  .204,  393,*  394,  402,  838 

Schulz  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  403 199,  721 

Schulz  Chemical  Co.  v.  M.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  137 153 

Schutte  V.  Weir,  59  Misc.  438,  111  N.  Y.  Supp.  240 489* 

Schuyler  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  37  Utah  581,  109  P.  458 526 

Schwartz  v.  Panama  R.  R.  Co.,  155  Cal.  742,  103  P.  196 479 

Scott  V.  T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  167 450,  804,  808 

Scudder  V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  60 198,  410,  508 

Scudder  V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  60 76* 

Scully  Steel  &  Iron  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  358,.  .864,  872 

Scully  Steel  &  Iron  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  156 865 

Seattle  Frog  &  Switch  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  79 865 

Serry  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  554 16,  558 

Shadbolt  &  Boyd  Iron  Co.  v.  C.  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  108 865 

Shaffer  &  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  8 75,    78 

Sheboygan  Mineral  Water  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  116.. 152,  605 
Sheboygan  Mineral  Water  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  197. .. .  741 
Shelby  County  Washed  Coal  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

565 847 

Shenkberg  Co.  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  216 731 

Shidlovsky  V.  Mallory  S.  S.  Co.,  60  Misc.  67,  111  N.  Y.  Supp.  778. . 

485,  491 

Shippers*  and  Receivers'  Bureau  of  Newark  v.  N.  Y.  O.  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 

15  I.  C.  C.  264 24,  27,  302,  584,  585,  589 

Shoecraft  &  Son  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  492 128,*  728 

Shoemaker  v.  C.  &  P.  Tel.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  614 339,*  774,*  781,  833* 

Shultz  V.  Skaneateles  R.  Co.,  66  Misc.  9,  122  N.  Y.  Supp.  445 485* 

Sidway  Mercantile  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  570 817 

Signor  Tie  Co.  v.  I.  &  G.  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  615 691 

Sikeston  Mercantile  Co  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  19  I.  C.  C.  422 763 

Silvester  v.  City  &  Suburban  Ry.  of  Wash.,  22  I.  C.  C.  201 283 

Simonds-Shields  Grain  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  43. .  736 

Simpson  Fruit  Co.  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  412 902* 

Sims  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  434 739 

Sinclair  &  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  490 

261,  293,  317,  537,  596,  698,  773 

Sioux  City  Commercial  Club  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  110. . 

227,  260,  337,  586 

Sioux  City  Terminal  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C. 

C.  98 225,  246,  272,  285,  291,  317,  328,  361,  557,  576 

Sligo  Iron  Store  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  139 

141,  144,  320,*  552,  599,  627* 

Sligo  Iron  Store  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  527 626* 

Slimmer  &  Thomas  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  525. . .  .662* 
Slimmer  &  Thomas  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  531 113,  497 


INDEX    OF    CASES  961 


Name.  Page. 

Smeltzer  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  158  Fed.  649 477,  483 

Smith  &  Co.  V.  M.  &  N.  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  449 619,  735 

Smith-Booth-Usher  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  242. . . .  815 

Smith  Mfg.  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  447 864 

Smith  Mfg.  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  447 872 

Snook  &  Janes  v  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  356 668 

Snook  V.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  17  I.  C.  C.  375 427,  528 

Snyder-Malone-Donahue  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  498. . 

348,  353,  354,  609,*  804 

Solvay  Process  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  246 66 

Sondheimer  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  60 233,*  241,  404,  411 

Sondheimer  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  606. 127,  410,  721,  742,  784,  878 

Sonneland  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  399 517 

South  Atlantic  Waste  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  293. . .  .331,  582,  634 
South  Canon  Coal  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  286. . .  .289,  348,  765 

Southern  Bitulithic  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  106 737 

Southern  Bitulithic  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  300. . .  .130,  233,  309 
Southern  Bitulithic  Co.  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  588. .  630 
Southern  California  Sugar  Co.  v.  S.  P.  L.  A.  &  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I. 

C.  C.  6 790,  841 

Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.,  18  I.  C.  C.  180 711* 

Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  275. . .  .215,  348 

Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Sou.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  79 752,  821 

Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  434.. 403,  831,  882 

Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  119 607,  738 

Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  Unrep.  Op.  358 882 

Southern  Illinois  Millers'  Ass'n  v.  G.  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 

512  845 

Southern  Illinois  Millers'  Ass'n  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  672 

226,*  229, 

326,'  35*2*  *36lV 388,' 397i  *4*09',*  448,* 458,*  475*  '556',  * 586,' 636,  753,  848^  863 
Southern  Illinois  Millers'  Ass'n  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  673. .  169 
Southern  Kansas  Millers'  Commercial  Club  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 

15  I.  C.  C.  604 546 

Southern  P.  Co.  v.  Weatherford  Cotton  Mills  (Tex.  1911),  134  S.  W. 

778  485 

Southern  Pine  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  195 722,*  746 

Southern  Queen  Range  Co.  v.  C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  608.  150 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,   193  Fed.  664;  Arkansas  Fertilizer  Co. 

V.  U.  S.,  193  Fed.  667 157 

Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Burlington  Lumber  Co.,  225  U.  S.  99,  32  Sup.  Ct. 

657   422 

Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Reid,  222  U.  S.  424,  32  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  140,  56 

L.  ed.  257 422 

Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Reid  &  Beam,  222  U.  S.  445,  32  Sup.  Ct.  145. .. .  422 

Southern  Sewer  Pipe  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  54 865* 

Southern  Shuttle  &  Bobbin  Co.  v.  T.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  407.  .740,  878 
Southern  Timber  &  Land  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  232.. 469,  581,  635,  725 


962  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Southwestern  Laundry  Machinery  Co.  v.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

477    863 

Southwestern  Missouri  Millers'  Club  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 

422 97,*  98,*  352,  602,  694 

Southwestern  Produce  Distributers  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C. 

458 74,  364,  387,  427,  834,  837,  887,*  888* 

South  Western  Smelting  &  Refining  Co.  v.  E.  P.  &  N.  E.  Ry.  Co., 

Unrep.  Op.  280 128 

Spartanburg  Ry.,  Gas  &  Electric  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  214. .   738 

Spiegle  &  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  522 297,  399,  603 

Spiegle  &  Co.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  82 397 

Spreckels  Bros.  Commercial  Co.  v.  Monongahela  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C. 

C.  190 324,  756,*  764* 

Spring  Hill  Coal  Co.  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  508 841 

Springer  v.  E.  P.  &  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  322 509 

Sprunt  &  Son  v.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  251 311 

St.  Louis  Blast  Furnace  Co.  v.  V.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  215.  .128,  246,  340* 
St.  Louis  Hay  &  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  533. . .  .700* 
St.  Paul  Board  of  Trade  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C. 

285 390,  391,*  402,  560,  811 

St.  Regis  Paper  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  368. . 

153,  372,  561,  682 

Stacy  Mercantile  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C. 

550 262 

Stacy  &  Sons  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  343 507,  865 

Stacy  &  Sons  v.  E.  &  T.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  69 456 

Stacy  &  Sons  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  136.  .276,  365,  502,  638,*  639 
Standard  Lime  &  Stone  Co.  v.  C.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  620. . . . 

123,  227,  266,  846,  889 

Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  C.  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  335 865 

Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  C.  T.  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  460 128 

Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  E.  J.  &  E.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  502 865 

Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  513. . .  .457,  735 

Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  I.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  319 456 

Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  L  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  369 789,  815,*  827,  902 

Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  K.  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  512 735 

Standard  Oil  Co.  of  Indiana  v.  U.  S.  164  Fed.  376 187,  190,*  194 

Standard  Oil  Co.  of  New  York  v.  U.  S.,  179  Fed.  614.187,  188,  189,  191,  193 

Stange  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  207 738 

Star  Grain  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  364.  . 

276,*  279,  289,  857,*  863* 

Star  Grain  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  388. . .  . 

65,  166,  797,  798,  800 

Starks  Co.  v.  Grand  Rapids  &  L  Ry.  Co.  (Mich.,  1911),  131  N.  W. 

143    178,  429 

State  V.  Adams  Express  Co.,  171  Ind.  138,  85  N.  E.  337  and  966 

8,  177,  228,  374* 

State  V.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.,  81  Neb.  15,  115  N.  W.  614 423,  787 


INDEX    OF    CASES  963 


Name.  Page. 

State  of  Oklahoma  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  516 629 

Stedman  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  167 768,  858 

Steinfeld  &  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  12 357,  576,  582,  606 

Steinhardt  &  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  215 738 

Sterling  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  222 769 

Sterling  &  Son  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  451 53,  279,  427 

Stevens  Grocery  Co.  v.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  147 864,  868 

Stewart  Produce  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  11 731 

Stickney  v.  I.  C.  C,  164  Fed.  638 175,  433 

Stilwell  V.  L.  &  H.  R.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  404 829,*  883 

Stiritz  V.  N.  O.  M.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  578 98,  99,  325 

Stockbridge  Elevator  Co.  v.  A.  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  221 865 

Stock  Yards  Cotton  &  Linseed  Meal  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 

Unrep.  Op.  213 865 

Stock  Yards  Cotton  &  Linseed  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16 

L  C.  C.  530 862 

Stock  Yards  Cotton  &  Linseed  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L 

C.  C.  366 864,  872,*  881* 

Stock  Yards  Cotton  &  Linseed  Meal  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  17 

L  C.  C.  295 359,  607,  870 

Stone-Ordean-Wells  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  30.  .548,  741 

Stone-Ordean-Wells  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  313 457 

Stone-Ordean-Wells  Co.  v.  P.  B.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  160. .. .   764 

Stone-Ordean-Wells  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  13 619 

Stone-Ordean-Wells  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  15 634 

Stonega  Coke  &  Coal  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  17. ..:... . 

115,  164,*  265,  534,  796,  845 

Stott  V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  582 263 

Stover  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  114 152,  605 

Strasburg  Steam  Flouring  Mills  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  531 412 

Strauss  v.  American  Express  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  112 374 

Stricklin  &  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  533 692 

Struthers-Wells  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  291 649,  768,  825 

Sturges  V.  D.  G.  H.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  (Mich.  1911),  131  N.  W.  706 478 

Suffern  Grain  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  178 

54,*  56,  81,  306,  310,  329,*  387*,  598 

Superior  Charcoal  Iron  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  86 456 

Sun  Co  V.  L  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  194 95 

Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  512 627,  735 

Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  128 456,  604 

Sunderland  Bros  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  148 

.131,  507,  604,  727,  906 

Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  165 865 

Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op  267 

4Q2    702   812 

Sunderland  Bros  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  445. .  .'.355,'  739 

Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  400 878 

Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  425 496,  830 


964  INDEX    OP    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  508 735 

Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  212. . .  .628,  744 

Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  433 455,*  687 

Sunderland  Bros  Co.  v.  P.  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  450 

27,*  342,  363,  561,  593,  628 

Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  545 503 

Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I  C.  C.  632 903 

Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  141 616 

Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  259... . 

133,  225,  354,  433,  494,  567,  840,  893 

Sunflower  Glass  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  391 244,  586,  590 

Sunnyside  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  558. . 

699,  704,  735 

Sunnyside  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  540 

324,  766 

Sunnyside  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  20 

525,    725* 

Sutton  v.*  St.*  L.*&  S.  F.'r.  R*.  Co.*  (Mo.'  App.Vl911),'i46*S.*  W.  7(^,777,  807 

Swanson  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  356 739 

Sweeney,  Lynes  &  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  P.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  600.709,  828 

Swift  &  Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  130 737,  877 

Swift  &  Co.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  241 416 

Swift  &  Co.  V.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  426 

6,  287,  300,*  552,  580,  682,  707,  714,  746 

Swift  &  Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  516 720,  740 

Swift  &  Co.  V.  D.  N.  W.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  92 737 

Swift  &  Co.  V.  G.  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  372 739 

Swift  &  Co.  V.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  385 1 

Swift  &  Co.  V.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  442 682 

Switzer  Lumber  Co.  v.  T.  &  N.  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  290 762* 

Switzer  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  471 

321,  450,  547,  728,  816,  894,  906 

Sylvester  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  573 864,  876 

T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Leslie  (Tex.,  1910),  131  S.  W.  824 810 

T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  R.  R.  Comm.  of  La.,  183  Fed.  1005 412,  422 

Taenzer  &  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  191  Fed.  543 772,  782 

The  Tap-line  Case,  23  I.  C.  C.  277 61,  62* 

63,  68,  163,*  165,  166,  186,  277,  196,*  796,*  797,*  799,*  800,*  801,*  887* 
Tap-line  Case,  23  L  C.  C.  549 

62,  63,  64,*  68,  186,  796,*  798,  799,  800,*  801,*  802,*  847 

Taylor  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  165 316,  535.  543* 

Taylor  &  Mason  v.  C.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  457 769 

Tayntor  Granite  Co.  v.  Montpelier  &  Wells  River  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L 

C.  C.  136  505* 

Tennessee  Lumber  Mfg.  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  371 . .   598 

Terhune  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  247 738 

Texas  Brewing  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  21  L  C.  C.  171 

321,  567,  672* 


INDEX    OP    CASES  965 


Name.  Page. 

Texas  Grain  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  580. .  689 
Texas  Seed  &  Floral  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  504  135 

Texico  Transfer  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  17 861,  883 

Thacker   Coal   &   Coke  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  67  W.  Va.  448,  68 

S.   E.   107 49,  179 

Thatcher  Mfg.  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  126. ...  757 

Thistle  Mfg.  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co,  Unrep  Op  299 501,  507 

Thomas  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  584 862 

Thomas  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  364 685 

Thomas  Produce  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  209 738 

Thompson  Lumber  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  657 

51,  316,  370,  671,  733 

Thompson  Lumber  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  566 541 

Thompson  Lumber  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  83 718 

Thompson  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  161 160,  819 

Thompson  Lumber  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  193  Fed.  682 .715* 

Thompson,  Thayer  &  McCowen  v.  L  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  482. .  735 
Thornton  &  Chester  Milling  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C. 

C.  37  637 

Thorp  Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  466 812* 

Thropp  V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  497 79,  97,  323,  535 

Tioga  Coal  Co.  v.  G.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  414 198,  202 

Topeka  Banana  Dealers'  Ass'n  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C. 

620   303,  458,  648,*  904 

Torrey  Cedar  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  420..114,  500,  878,  901 
Townley  Metal  &  Hardware  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C. 

378  822,  828,  881 

Tradewell  v  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Wis.,  1912),  136  N.  W.  794 487 

Traerv.  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  1.  C.  C.  451 118,  123,*  776 

Traer  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  165 6,*  109,*  119,*  123 

The  Traffic  Bureau,  St.  Louis,  v.  M.  P.  Ry.,  13  L  C.  C.  11 252 

The  Traffic  Bureau  of  St.  Louis  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  L  C.  C.  105 216 

Transportation  Bureau  of  Wichita  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  L  C. 

C.  679 79,  337 

Traffic  Bureau,  Merchants'  Exchange  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C. 

C.  317 53,  58,*  388,  400,  412* 

Traffic  Bureau,  Merchants'  Exchange  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L 

C.  C.  510   53,*    58 

Traffic  Bureau,  Merchants'  Exchange  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I. 

C.  C.  551  58,  548 

Traffic  Bureau  of  Merchants'  Exchange  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  259 

334,  335,  623,  845,  889 

Traffic  Bureau,  Merchants'  Exchange  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  L 

C.  C.  496 56,  57,  410* 

Travis  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  79  N.  J.  L.  83,  74  A.  444 489 

Tremont  Lumber  Co.  v.  T.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  383 739 

Trinity  &  B.  V.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Geppert  (Tex.,  1911),  135  S.  W.  164....  425 
Tritch  Hardware  Co.  v.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  71 70 


966  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Tritch  Hardware  Co.  v.  Rutland  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  542 504 

Trostel,  Albert,  &  Sons  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 

348    758 

Truck  Growers'  Ass'n  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  190 

137,  261,  286,  294,  331,  347,  582,*  596 

Turnbull  Co.  v.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  123 885* 

Tully  Grain  Co.  v.  F.  S.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  28 363,  547,  689 

Tuthill  Spring  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  44 736 

Tuthill  Spring  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  495 735 

Tyler  Commission  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  490. ...  561 
Tyson  &  Jones  Buggy  Co.  v.  A.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  330 

513,  515,  516,*  517,  725 

U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Updike  Grain  Co.,  222  U.  S.,  215,  32  Sup.  Ct.  39, 

56  L.  ed.  171 53,  57,  67 

U.  P.  Tea  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  545 138,  144,  287,  610 

U.  S.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  163  Fed.  Ill 190 

U.  S.  V.  Adams  Express  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  394 380 

U.  S.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  470 519,  530* 

U.  S.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  225  U.  S.  306,  56  L.  ed  1100,  32  Sup.  Ct. 

817  157,*  176 

U.  S.  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  165  Fed.  113.  .115,  116,  117,  120,*  122,  125,  126,  888 

U.  S.  V.  Bethlehem  Steel  Co.  184  Fed.  546 193,  194 

U.  S.  V.  Bunch,  165  Fed.  736 • 182,  187,  189,*  190 

U.  S.  V.  C.  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.,  163  Fed.  114 51 

U.  S.  V.  Central  Vt.  Ry.,  157  Fed.  291 190,  191,  193 

U.  S.  V.  D.  &  H.  Co.,  164  Fed.  215 162 

U.  S.  V.  D.  &  H.  Co.,  213  U.  S.  366,  29  Sup.  Ct.  527,  53  L.  ed.  836. . 

161,*  162* 

U.  S.  V.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  7 202,  203 

U.  S.  V.  Gt.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  157  Fed.  288 182,*  190,  192,  193 

U.  S.  V.  Hocking  Valley  Ry.  Co.,  194  Fed.  234 180,*  182,  183,  815 

U.  S.  V.  I.  T.  R.  R.  Co.,  168  Fed.  546 188,  193 

U.  S.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  195  Fed.  88 156 

U.  S.  V.  L.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  220  U.  S.  257,  31  Sup.  Ct.  387,  55  L.  ed. 

458 162* 

U.  S.  V.  Lehigh  Valley  Ry.  Co.,  184  Fed.  546 193,  194 

U.  S.  V.  Martin,  176  Fed.  110 183 

U.  S.  V.  Merchants'  &  Miners'  Transp.  Co.,  187  Fed.  363 187* 

U.  S.  V.  Miller,  223  U.  S.  599,  32  Sup.  Ct.  323,  56  L.  ed.  568 

803,  813,*  845 

U.  S.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  157  Fed.  293 192 

U.  S.  V.  Miller,  187  Fed.  375 191 

U.  S.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  212  U.  S.  509,  29  Sup.  Ct.  313, 

53  L.  ed.  629 190 

U.  S.  V.  N.  Y.  P.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  233 651 

U.  S.  V.  Oregon  R.  R.  &  Navigation  Co.,  159  Fed.  975 132,  222,  408 

U.  S.  V.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  184  Fed.  543 193,  194 


INDEX    OF    CASES  967 


Name.  Page. 

U.  S.  V.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  170  Fed.  988 187,  188,  189,  192,  803 

U.  S.  V.  Standard  Oil  Co.  of  Indiana,  183  Fed.  223 186 

U.  S.  V.  Standard  Oil  Co.  of  New  York,  192  Fed.  438 193 

U.  S.  V.  Stearns  Salt  &  Lumber  Co.,  165  Fed.  735 189 

U.  S.  V.  Sunday  Creek  Co.,  194  Fed.  252 180,  183,*  191 

U.  S.  V.  Texas  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  185  Fed.  820 184,*  187 

U.  S.  V.  Union  S.  &  T.  Co.,  192  Fed.  330 

123,  163,  164,*  166,  418,  420,  747,*  783 

U.  S.  V.  Vacuum  Oil  Co.,  158  Fed.  536 182,  190,  191,  192* 

U.  S.  V.  Wells-Fargo  Express  Co.,  161  Fed.  606 222,  373,  375,  888 

U.  S.  V.  Williams,  159  Fed.  310 183 

U.  S.  Cast  Iron  Pipe  &  Foundry  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  67 507 

U.  S.  Leather  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  323 

12,  15,  26,*  132,  141,  159,  315,  537* 

Ullman  V.  Adams  Express  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  340 

369,*  375,  382,  383,  413,  898 

Ullman  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  585. 377,  378,  543,*  544 

Ullman  v.  American  Express  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  354 358,  538,*  606,  745 

Underwood  Veneer  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  376. .. .  865 
Union-Made  Garment  Mfrs.'  Ass'n  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 

C.  405 152,  269 

Union  Match  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  80 865 

Union  Sand  &  Material  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  52.  736 
Union  Tanning  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  542 735 


737 
731 
768 


Updike  Grain  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  91 

Utah-Idaho  Sugar  Co.  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  154 

Utterback  Bros.  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  317. 
Utica  Traffic  Bureau  v.  N.  Y.  O.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  168 

1,  2,  790,  791 

Utica  Traffic  Bureau  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &   H.    R.    R.    R.    Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 

271  246  394* 

Val  Blatz  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  184.  .289,  738 

Valley  Flour  Mills  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  73 

287   309   453   469   695 

Van  Brunt  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  1*7  I.  C.'c.  195. .  .'.613!  830 
Van  Natta  Bros.  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  1,  5 

228,  306,  388,  408,  847 

Vanness  v.  L.  &  H.  R.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  307 662 

Vaughn  Mfg.  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  121 865 

Veitch  V.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  22  I.  C.  C.  4 830* 

Venus  V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  136 130,*  742,  861 

Victor  Fuel  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  119 54 

Victor  Mfg.  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  222 

12,  212,  315,  317,  324,  357,  362,  625 

Vigouroux  V.  Piatt,  62  Misc.  364,  115  N.  Y.  Supp.  880 489,  491 

Vincennes  Bridge  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  597. .  .866* 


968  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Virginia-Carolina  Chemical  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  394. 

226,*  598,  804 

Virginia-Carolina  Chemical  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  3.   542 

Virginia-Carolina  Chemical  Co.  v.  S.  A.  L.  Ry.,  Unrep.  Op.  57 865 

Virginia-Carolina  Chemical  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I. 

C.  C.  1 128,  351,  542,  612,  635 

Virginia-Carolina  Chemical  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I. 

C.  C.  5 542 

Virginia-Carolina  Chemical  Co.    v.    St.  L.    S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 

C.  49 287,*  321 

Virginia-Carolina  Chemical  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  555 831 

Voorhees  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  42 137,  644,  804 

Voorhees  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  45 644,  823 

Voss-Barbee  Mfg.  Co.  v.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  388 865 

Vote-Berger  Co.  v.  Ft.  W.  C.  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  183 865 

Vulcan  Detinning  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  93 692 

Vulcan  Iron  Works  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  477 656 

Vulcan  Steam  Shovel  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  265 77 

Wabash  Coating  Mills  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  91.  .358,  607,  695 
Waco  Freight  Bureau  v.  H.  &  T.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  22 

324,  327,  363,  417,  553,  572,  640,  734 

Wadell  Show  Case  &  Cabinet  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 

106 150,  816 

Wagner,  Zagelmeyer   &  Co.  v.  Detroit  &  Mackinac  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 

160 1 1 9,  267 

Wahlgren  Furniture  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  583. .  769 
Wakita  Coal  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  533. .   543 

Walsh  &  Weidner  Boiler  Co.  v.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  560 153 

Walsh  &  Weidner  Brewing  Boiler  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  598 866* 

Walter  &  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  350 507 

Washburn-Crosby  Co.  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  38 637 

Washburn-Crosby  Co.  v.  L.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  39 637 

Washburn-Crosby  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  40 216 

Washburn-Crosby  Milling  Co.  v.  Sou.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  465 203 

Washer  Grain  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  147 

58,  67,  73,*  400,  411,  428,*  429,  544,  548,  549,  551,  565,  714 

Washington  Broom  &  Woodenware  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15 

I.  C.  C.  218 402 

Washington  Broom  &  Woodenware  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15 

I.  C.  C.  219 759,  771,  831 

Watson  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  124 545 

Watson  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  240 865 

Weber  Club  &  Intermountain  Fair  Ass'n  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  17 

I.  C.  C.  212 519,  521,  522,  523,  525 

Webster  Grocery  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  493 

324,  340,  348,  821 


INDEX    OP    CASES  969 


Name.  Page. 

Webster  Grocer  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  20. . .  .340,  547,  878 

Weis  Mfg.  Co.  V.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  142 544 

Weld  &  Co.  V.  Ocean  S.  S.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  581 71,  440 

Wellington  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  534 1 

Wells-Higman  Co.  v.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  339 864,  871 

Wells-Higman  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  175 

353,  419,  435,  609,  614 

Wells-Higman  Co.  v.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  487 340,  435,  892 

Wells-Higman  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  288 648 

Wells-Higman  Co.  v.  G.  R.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  48 771 

Wells-Higman  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  527 131,  735 

West  Coast  Shingle  Co.  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

596 812  830 

West  End  Improvement  Club  v.  O.  &  C.  B.  R.  &  B.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 

239 5,*  8,*  72,  107,  280,*  518,*  787 

West  Oregon  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  151 763* 

West  Texas  Fuel  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  491 539,  791 

West  Texas  Fuel  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  443. . .  .128,  788,  791* 

Western  Gas  Construction  Co.  v.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  230 738 

Western  Hardwood  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co., 

Unrep.  Op.  463 671,  745* 

Western  Lime  &  Cement  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  20.  607 
Western  Lime  &  Cement  Co.  v.  M.  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep. 

Op.  456 865 

Western  Mantle  Co.  v.  S.  P.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  643 820* 

Western  Oregon  Lumber,  etc.,  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  61 

29,*  35,  321,  608,  775 

Western  States  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

363 330,  739 

Werner  Sawmill  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  388 

437,  481,  542,  729,*  741 

Whaley-Warren  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  C.  &  O.  Ry.,  21  I.  C.  C.  530 753 

Wheeler-Holden  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  237. . .  .198,  666,  818 

Wheeler-Holden  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  402 692 

Wheeler  &  Motter  Mercantile  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 

C.  141   160* 

Wheeler  Lumber,  Bridge  &  Supply  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  Co., 

16  L  C.  C.  525 751 

Wheeler  Lumber,  Bridge  &  Supply  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  547. . 

113,  316,  497 

Wheeler  Lumber,  Bridge  &  Supply  Co.  v.  A.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  L 

C.  C.  10 159,  900,*  903,  904 

Wheeler  Lumber,  Bridge  &  Supply  Co.  v.  St.  L.  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co., 

23  I.  C.  C.  514 665,  743 

Wheeler  Lumber,  Bridge  &  Supply  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

469  760 

Wheeling  Corrugating  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  125 

159,*  452,  658 


970  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Whitcomb  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  27 144,  808* 

White  Bros.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  288 864,  870 

White  Bros.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  416 668 

White  Bros.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  84 877 

White  Water  Farms  Co.  v.  P.  B.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  526. .  .636,  826 
Whiteland  Canning  Co.  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  261. 

32,  544,*  549 

Whiting  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  436 607,  677 

Whittaker  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  113 652 

Wholesale  Fruit  &  Produce  Ass'n  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C. 

C.  410 73,  109,  134,  137,  146,*  388,  395,*  893 

Wholesale  Fruit  &  Produce  Ass'n  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 

C  596 72,  151,  411 

Wickwire  Steel  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  181  Fed.  316 48 

Wilburine  Oil  Works,  Ltd.,  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  548. . .  .343,  678 

Wilkoff  Bros.  Co.  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  467 753,  779 

Willamette  Pulp  &  Paper  Co.  v.  B.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  178. . 

161,  547,  743 

Willamette  Pulp  &  Paper  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  383. . . . 

262,  277,  570 

Williams  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  460 760 

Williams  v.  W^ells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  17 434,*  373 

Williams  &  Voris  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  413.  865 
Williams  Co.  v.  V.  S.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C  482 

93,  101,  209,  270,  309,  864,  873 

Williamson  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  L  C.  C.  228 805,  825,  882 

Williar  V.  C.  N.  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  304 678,  725,  757 

Willman  &  Co.  v.  St.  L.  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  L  C.  C.  405 

327  419  572    753* 

Willson  Bros.  Lumber  Co.  v.  N.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  293. ...... .'.   750 

Willson  Bros.  Lumber  Co.  v.  P.  S.  &  N.  R.  R.    Co.,    Unrep,    Op. 
375   297    739 

Wilson  V.  C.'  M.*  &  sV.  P.*  Rv.Co*.,'  ULC.  'c''S49. '...'. .' .'  !723,'  759*  77l',  864 

Wilson  V.  O.  R.  &  Nav.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  107 865 

Wilson  Produce  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  170 

195,*  422,  611,  834,*  884,  885,  886* 

Wilson  Produce  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  116 

195,*  265,  389,  884,  886 

Wilson  Produce  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  L  C.  C.  1 703 

Wilson  Saddlery  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  220 581 

Windsor  Milling  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  349. .  636 
Windsor  Turned  Goods  Co.  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  162.. 

210,  864,  868* 

Windsor  Milling  &  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  284. .   731 

Winkel  &  Co.  v.  Spokane  International  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  122 737 

Winn  Parish  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  16  L  C.  C.  335 669 

Winn  V.  American  Express  Co.  149  la.  259,  128  N.  W.  663 488,  490 

Winona  Carriage  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  L  C.  C.  334 864,  869* 


INDEX    OF    CASES  971 


Name.  Page. 

Winona  Malting  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  21 736 

Winterbotham  &  Sons  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  266 45,  341,  753 

Winter's  Metallic  Paint  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  409. .  657 
Winter's  Metallic  Paint  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C. 

596  24,*  43,  607 

Winter's  Metallic  Paint  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 

562  300,  758,*  873 

Winter's  Metallic  Paint  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  et  al.,  16  I.  C. 

C    587  143    794 

Wiprud  V.  C.  M.  &*St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  201 .'879 

Wisconsin  Bridge  &  Iron  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

185  830 

Wisconsin  Bridge  &  Iron  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

582  353,  508,  740 

Wisconsin  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  169  Fed.  76 69* 

Wisconsin  Iron  &  Metal  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

300 738 

Wisconsin  Pearl  Button  Co.  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 

C.  80  621 

Wisconsin  Pulp  Wood  Co.  v.  Gt.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  594 322,  685 

Wisconsin  Pulp  &  Paper  Mfrs.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  , 

224  507 

Wisconsin  Pulp  &  Paper  Mfrs.  v.  D.  &  I.  R.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op. 

225 456,  507,  738,  741 

Wisconsin  State  Millers'  Ass'n  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 

494  47   315  *  329    557 

Wolf  Milling  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  439. . . .'.  .733^  814 

Wolf  Co.  V.  Mallory  Steamship  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  490 815 

Wolfe  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  198 879 

Wood  Butter  Co.  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L,  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  374 703* 

Wood  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  540 60 

Wood-Mosaic  Flooring  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C. 

C.  458 405,  437,  480,  780 

Woodward  &  Dickerson  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  170 

78,  129,  428,  744,*  749,*  759,  770,  805 

Woodward  &  Dickerson  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  9 127* 

Woodward,  Wight  &  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  500 823 

Wolter  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  132 771 

Wright  Wire  Co.  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  64 460* 

Wright  V.  Adams  Express  Co.,  230  Pa.  635,  79  A.  760 480,  490 

Wyman,  Partridge  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  551.  . .  .50,  743 
Wyman,  Partridge  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  577.  .71,  402,  493 
Wyman,  Partridge  &  Co.,  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  258 20 

Yawman  &  Erbe  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  260. 

134    322 

Youngblood  v!  T.*  &  P."  RyVco'.,'  21  iVc'.  C."  569*. '. '.  *. '.  *. '. '.  129,**  6*61 ,724',  743 


972  INDEX    OF    CASES 


Name.  Page. 

Young  &  Cutsinger  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  1 405,  409 

Young  &  Vann  Supply  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  480.  .812,  865 

Zang  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  337 136,  143 

Zellerbach  Paper  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  128 545 

Zuber  v.  C.  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  Unrep.  Op.  327 768 


INDEX  TO  COMMODITIES. 

References  are  to  pages. 

ACID  PHOSPHATE.  Page 

Facilities    and    Privileges,    §20    (g) 407 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §126   (a) 685 

Tariffs,    §3    (f) 803 

ADVERTISING  MATTER. 

Classification,  §7   (d) , 139 

Classification,  §7   (dd) 139 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §1   (1) 387 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §21  (n) 410 

Overcharges,   §9    (w) 517 

AGRICULTURAL  IMPLEMENTS   (See  also  Plows). 

Alternative  Rates,   §1    (d) 70 

Discrimination,  §9   (r) 264 

Equalization  of  Rates,   §4   (2)    (e) 299 

Evidence,   §51    (f ) 350 

Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  V.  (e) 372 

Minimums,    §7    (o) 503 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §43  (a)   (b) 613 

Reduced  Rates,  §5   (f)    706 

Reduced  Rates,  §5   (h) 706 

Reduced   Rates,   §5    (i) 706 

Reparation,  §16  (z)    736 

Substitution  of  Tonnage,  §2   (r) 786 

Tariffs,   §11    (d) 830 

ALFALFA. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §92   (d) 652 

ALTARS,  CHURCH. 

Classification,    §4y2     (c) 135 

ALUM. 

Reparation,    §16    (rr) 737 

Routing   and   Misrouting,   §4    (kk) 765 

AMMONIACAL  LIQUOR. 

Reparation,   §16    (1111) 740 

AMMUNITION. 

Reparation,    §16    (oooopppp) 740 

ANTIMONY  WARE. 

Reasonable  Rates,   §44    (a) 613 

APPLES. 

Bills  of  Lading,  §9  (1)   (a) 77 

Discrimination,  §8  (5)    (a)    254 

Discrimination,    §9     (m) 262 

Evidence,  §29   (h) 341 

973 


974  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

APPLES — Continued.  Page 

Loss  and  Damage,  §6   (y) 484 

Minimums,  §1   (m)    495 

Minimums,  §7   (e) 502 

Narrow  Gauge  Railroads,  I.  (b) 512 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §28  (w) 604 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §84    (f ) 639 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84  (i)  (1) 640 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84    (u) 645 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,  §84    (z) 647 

Reparation,    §6    (r) 724 

Reparation,   §16    (h) 735 

Reparation,    §16    (sss) 739 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §3   (f ) 752 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §22   (g) 883 

Weights  and  Weighing,  §5  (g) 902 

ARTICLES. 
Old: 

Reduced  Rates,   §5   (a) 705 

Second-Hand : 

Reduced  Rates,  §5   (a)    (b) 705 

ASHES. 

Demurrage,   §9    (d) 200 

ASPARAGUS  (See  Vegetables). 

ASPHALTUM. 

Reasonable  Rates,   §45    (a) 614 

AUTOMOBILES. 

Classification,   §11    (m) 143 

Evidence,   §39    (a) 345 

Minimums,    §3    (g) 496 

AUTOMOBILE  PARTS. 

Reasonable   Rates,   §46    (a) 614 

Tariffs,   §7    (y) 818 

AXLES. 

Classification,   §14    (f ) 147 

Overcharges,  §9   (b) 516 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §28   (jj) 605 

BAGGAGE. 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §32   (c) 124 

Passenger   Fares   and   Facilities,    10    (a) 525 

BAGGAGE  CAR. 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §32  (a)   (b) 124 

BAGS. 

Discrimination,    §8    (3)    (j) 251 

Reparation,   §3    (d) 721 

Burlap: 

Discrimination,    §4    (o) 235 

Minimums,    §7    (aaa) 508 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §54  (a) 618 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  975 

BALLAST.  Page 

Restricted  Rates,  1  (d)    (g)   (j) 748 

BANANAS  (See  also  Fruit). 

Advanced  Rates,  §7   (4)    (a) 24 

Evidence,   §29    (f ) 341 

Import  Traffic,  I   (c) 416 

Import  Traffic,   II    (d) 417 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §6   (i) 458 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §84    (g) 639 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84   (v)    (w) 645 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84  (bb) 647 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §84    (cc) 648 

Weights    and   Weighing,    §7    (c) 904 

BARLEY  (See  Grain  and  Products). 

BAND  IRON  (See  Iron). 

BAR  IRON  (See  Iron). 

BARRELS. 

Blanket   Rates,   §8    (ff) 90 

Classification,    §4    (a) 134 

Demurrage,   §14    (g) 204 

Long  and   Short  Hauls,   §5    (s) 454 

Reparation,  §16   (hh) 737 

BAR  STEEL  (See  Steel). 

BASKETS. 

Classification,  §16   (n) 151 

Evidence,  §28    (g) 340 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §44   (a)    (b) 613 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §85    (a) 648 

Routing    and    Misrouting,    §10    (o) 771 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (tt) 871 

Transportation,    §11    (b) 892 

BASKET    COVERS. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §85  (b) 648 

BATH  TUBS. 

Steel  Minimums,  §5   (d) 500 

BEANS  (See  Vegetables). 

BEDS. 

Alternative  Rates,  I   (a) 69 

Classification,    §7    (aa) ^ 138 

Discrimination,    §8    (3)    (j) 251 

Minimums,    §5    (d) 500 

Tariffs,  §7   (i)    816 

BED  SPRINGS. 

Express    Companies,    §8     (f) 377 

BEDSTEADS. 

Minimums,    §7    (xx) 507 

BEER  AND  PRODUCTS. 

Advanced  Rates,  §18  (2)   (a) 42 

Classification,   §7    (f) 140 


976  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

BEER  AND  PRODUCTS— Cont'd  Page 

Evidence,  §29  (j)   341 

Interstate    Commerce,    §3    (k) 420 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (v) 454 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §6  (h) 458 

Jjong  and  Short  Hauls,  §9   (o) 462 

Minimums,  §7   (oo) 507 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §16  (k) 594 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §47  (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   (e)   (f)   (h) 614 

Refrigeration,    §3    (h) 708 

Reparation,    §16    (ff ) 737 

Reparation,    §16     (ww) 738 

Reparation,   §16    (qqq) 739 

Reparation,  §16   (aaaaa) 741 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11   (1)    (j) 849 

BEER  KEGS. 

Commodity  Rates,   §3    (a) 159 

Minimums,  §7  (h)  503 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §8  (2)  (f) 581 

Tariffs,    §7    (ss) 817 

BEER  PACKAGES. 

Evidence,    §1    (k) 316 

Minimums,    §7    (uu) 507 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §28   (ff ) 605 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §48  (b) 615 

BEET  FINAL  MOLASSES. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §17  (e) 595 

BEET  PULP. 

Tariffs,   §8    (k) 828 

BEET  SUGAR. 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  5   (t) 454 

BICYCLES. 

Evidence,  §12   (3)    (a) 320 

Evidence,  §12   (18)    (a) 321 

BLANKETS. 

Classification,  §11  (f)    142 

Reparation,    §8    (ii) 732 

BLINDS  (See  Lumber  and  Forest  Products). 

BOBSLEDS. 

Reparation,   §16    (o) 736 

BOILERS. 

Tariffs,   §7    (c) 815 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (ccc) 872 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (jjj) 873 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (kkk) 874 

BOILER  IRON  (See  Iron). 

BOILER  STEEL  (See  Steel). 

BOLTS. 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §15  (h) 398 

Reparation,    §16    (nnn) 739 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  977 

BOOTS.  Page 

Advanced  Rates,  §18   (3)    (a) 42 

Advanced  Rates,  §19   (ee) 48 

Any    Quantity    Rate,    I    (i) 71 

Classification,    §11    (j) 143 

Express    Companies,    §12    (a) 382 

BOTTLES. 

Branch   Lines,   1    (d) 102 

Classification,    §17    (h) 152 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §28    (ee) 605 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §48  (a) 615 

Reparation,  §16   (hh) 737 

Reparation,  §16  (bbbbb)    741 

BOTTLE  CAPS. 

Reasonable  Rates,   §49    (a) 615 

BOX  SHOCKS  (See  Lumber  and  Forest  Products). 

BUTTER  BOXES. 

Reasonable  Rates,  §55  (a) 618 

BRAN. 

Advanced   Rates,    §17    (c) 38 

Discrimination,   §4    (jj) 233 

Evidence,    §65    (h) 361 

Tariffs,    §7    (zz) 822 

BRANDY. 

Classification,   §7   (a) ; . . . ; 138 

BREAD. 

Express  Companies,   §11    (1)    (a) 378 

Express  Companies,  §16  (a) 384 

BRICK. 

Classification,    §11    (i) 143 

Classification,   §17    (e) 152 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §4  (2)  (c) 299 

Evidence,   §12    (5)    (a)    (b)    (c) 320 

Evidence,    §47    (f) 348 

Evidence,   §61    (1) 354 

Evidence,  §63   (o)    356 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5   (oo) 456 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §9    (d) 460 

Minimums,    §4    (c) 498 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §28    (v) 604 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §40   (i) 611 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §52  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)   (g)   (h)  (i) 616,  617 

Reparation,  §16   (kkk) 739 

Weights   and  Weighing,   §5    (i) 903 

Chimney: 

Evidence,   §64   (y) 359 

Special   Contracts,   §7    (a) 782 

Enameled: 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §52   (e)    (h) 617 


978         •  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

BRICK— Cont'd  Page 

Face: 

Evidence,    §61    (i) 354 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §52  (g) 617 

Fire: 

Classification,   §11    (h) 143 

Discrimination,   §7    (j) 244 

Evidence,  §12   (5)    (a) 320 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §52  (a) 616 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §52    (h) 617 

Reparation,  §16   (ddd) 738 

Paving: 

Discrimination,  §4   (rr) 239 

Evidence,    §12    (5)    (a) 320 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §52   (c) 616 

Reduced  Rates,  §4  (b) 705 

Reparation,  §16   (gg) 737 

Pressed: 

Blanket  Rates,   §7    (i) 87 

Classification,    §11     (e) 142 

Sample: 
Express  Companies,  §11   (11)    (a) 382 

BRIDGE  MATERIAL. 

Classification,  §15   (b)    148 

Reparation,   §16    (s) 736 

Tariffs,    §7    (j) 816 

BREWERS'  REFUSE. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §28   (hh) 605 

BROODERS. 

Classification,  §4i^    (a) 135 

BROOMS. 

Classification,    §11    (r) 144 

BROOM  CORN. 

Reasonable   Rates,   §53    (a) 618 

Routing   and    Misrouting,    §4    (ccc) 759 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (pppp) 877 

BRUSHES. 

Classification,    §11    (r) 144 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §44  (a) 613 

BUCKWHEAT  (See  Grain  and  Products). 

BUGGIES  AND  WAGONS. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §150   (c) 692  ' 

BUGGY  BODIES.  l 

Wooden.  Minimums,  §7  (g) 502  j 

BUILDING  MATERIAL.  v 

Restricted  Rates,  I   (ef) 748 

BUILDING  PAPER  (See  Paper). 

BULLION. 

Procedure  Before  Commission,  §10   (2)    (g) 546 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  979 

BUNGS.  Page 

Classification,   §11    (g) 142 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105    (nn) 672 

BUTTER. 

Advanced  Rates,  §18  (10)   (a) 45 

Evidence,    §63    (n) 356 

Express    Companies,    §24    (c) 385 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §4    (c) 390 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §4    (d) 390 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §40    (h) 611 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §56  (a) 618 

Reconsignment,   §5    (g) 703 

Reparation,    §2    (z) 719 

CABBAGES  (See  Vegetables). 

CAKE. 

Express   Companies,   §11    (1)    (a) " 378 

Express  Companies,  §16   (a) 384 

CAMERAS. 

Classification,    §4    (f ) 135 

CAMERA  STANDS. 

Classification,   §4    (f) 135 

CAMPHOR. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §44  (a) 613 

CANDLES. 

Advanced  Rates,  §13   (aa) 31 

Evidence,   §1    (a) 314 

CANDY. 

Reparation,   §16    (v) 736 

CANNED  GOODS. 

Classification,   §15   (aa) 148 

Demurrage,  §7  (b)   198 

Discrimination,    §4    (r) 239 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §4  (2)   (p) 301 

Interstate    Commerce,    §3    (m) 421 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  §10  (f ) '. 435 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §9    (p) 462 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §9   (t) 465 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §57  (a)   (b)  (c) 619 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §12   (a) 682 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §4  (z) 764 

CANTALOUPES. 

Tariffs,   §7    (p) 817 

CANVAS. 

Old.    Classification,    §11    (n) 144 

CAR  WHEEL  AND  AXLES. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §57  (a)   (b) 620 

CARDS. 

Overcharges,   §9    (w) 517 


980  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

CARS.  Page 

Special  Contracts,  §2   (eee) 779 

CARTRIDGES. 

Differentials,  §5   (a) 210 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §91  (b) 651 

Reparation,   §8    (b) 730 

CARTS. 

Discrimination,    §4    (dd) 229 

CASTINGS. 

Advanced  Rates,   §8    (1)    (g) 27 

Discrimination,    §8    (3)    (j) 251 

Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  V  (h) 372 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §96  (a) 656 

CATSUP. 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (k) 451 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §59   (a) 620 

CATTLE  (See  also  Livestock). 

Advanced  Rates,   §18    (9)    (a) 45 

Blanket   Rates,    §8    (g) 90 

Cars  and   Car  Supply,   §8    (g) 113 

Claims,   §6    (b) 129 

Discrimination,    §2     (bb) 224 

Discrimination,    §10    (c) 268 

Evidence,    §13    (2)    (c) 325 

Evidence,    §13    (5)    (b) 327 

Evidence,  §59   (g) 353 

Expedited   Service,    (a) 364 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §15    (u) 400 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (nn) 453 

Loss  and  Damage,  §6  (k)    (1) 483 

Loss  and  Damage,  §12  (b) 491 

Loss  and  Damage,  §11  (g) 491 

Loss  and  Damage,  §14   (a) 492 

Minimums,   §3    (i) 497 

Minimums,    §7    (c) 501 

Minimums,  §7  (ii) 506 

Proportional   Rates,   II    (k) 558 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §37    (g) 609 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §103   (d) 660 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §103  (f) 661 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §103  (k)  (1)   (m)   (n)   (o) 662 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §103  (t) 664 

Released  Rates,  §3   (a) 711 

Reparation,    §3    (m) 721 

Reparation,  §16   (dd)    (iijj) 737 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §4   (gg) 756 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §7  (ss) 766 

Routing  and  Misrouting,   §7    (w)    (yy) 767 

Tariffs,    §4    (m) 812 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  981 

CEDAR  (See  Lumber  and  Forest  Products).  Page 

CELERY  (See  Vegetables). 

CEMENT. 

Advanced  Rates,   §18    (1)    (b) 41 

Advanced  Rates,  §18   (4)    (aa) 43 

Advanced   Rates,   §18    (7)    (b) 44 

Blanket  Rates,  §8   (aa) 87 

Blanket  Rates,  §8  (j) 90 

Demurrage,  §11   (k) 202 

Discrimination,  §4    (rr) 239 

Discrimination,    §5    (c) 240 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §4  (2)   (b) 298 

Evidence,    §10    (a) 319 

Evidence,  §12   (6)    (a) 320 

Evidence,    §17    (d) 333 

Evidence,   §47   (e) 347 

Evidence,    §45    (j) 347 

Evidence,  §61   (d) 354 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §18   (e) 404 

Interstate  Commerce,  §1  (h) 419 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (ii) 456 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §9  (p) 463r 

Minimums,    §2    (a) 495 

Minimums,    §7    (pp) 507 

Proportional  Rates,  IV   (d) 559 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §28    (y) 604 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §60  (a)   (b)   (c) 620 

Reparation,    §7    (f ) 728 

Reparation,    §16    (r) 736 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §3  (d) 751 

Routing   and    Misrouting,    §3    (h) 752 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §4  (u) 755 

Tariffs,  §7   (bbb) 823 

Tariffs,    §7    (ilii) 827 

Tariffs,   §10    (a) 829 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11   (2)    (e) 851 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §13  (u) 862 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (jjkk) 870 

Weight  and  Weighing,  §10  (b) 906 

CEMENT  PLASTER. 

Advanced    Rates,    §5    (2)     (d) 15 

Blanket  Rates,   §7    (bb) 84 

Branch   Lines,   §3    (c) : 104 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §6  (1) 307 

Reparation,   §16    (n) 736 

CHAINS. 

Tariffs,    §7    (ccc) 823 


982  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

CHAIRS.  Page 

Discrimination,  §8   (3)    (j) 251 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5   (r)    (s) 454 

Minimums,    §5    (d) 500 

Minimums,  §8   (h) 509 

Minimums,    §8    (j) 509 

Minimums,  §8   (o) 511 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §86  (a) 648 

Tariffs,    §7    (xx) 822 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (k) 867 

CHAIR  STOCK. 

Minimums,    §5    (d) 400 

CHARCOAL. 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5   (nn) 456 

CHAUTAUQUA  OUTFITS. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §61    (a) 620 

CHEESE  (See  also  Dairy  Products). 

Allowances,  §5   (a) 54 

Evidence,  §47   (g) 348 

Evidence,   §63    (q) 356 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §40    (o) 612 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §62  (a) 621 

Routing  and   Misrouting,  §9    (c) 769 

CHEESE   BOXES. 

Reasonable  Rates,  §63  (a) 621 

CHILE  PEPPER. 

Tariffs,    §7    (tt) 821 

CHINA  WARE. 

Classification,  §6   (d) 137 

Equalization  of  Rates,   §1    (aa) 287 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §38    (1) 610 

CHIP  BOARD. 

Demurrage,   §8    (c) 199 

CHURCH  ALTARS  (See  Altars). 

CINDERS. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §64  (a) 621 

CITRUS  FRUITS   (See  Fruit). 

CLAM   SHELLS. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §65  (a) 621 

CLOTHING. 

Claims,    §6    (f ) 129 

Reparation,    §7    (o) 729 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §4  (qq) 757 

CLOVER  HULLERS. 

Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  V   (f ) 372 

COAL. 

Absorption  of  Charges,  §1   (a) 1 

Absorption  of  Charges,  §2  (d) 1 

Advanced   Rates,    §3    (a) 11 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  983 

COAL— Cont'd  Page 

Advanced  Rates,  §5   (2)    (bb) 14 

Advanced   Rate,    §17    (e) 38 

Allowances,  §2   (b) 53 

Allowances,    §6    (a) 54 

Allowances,  §16   (a) 68 

Blanket  Rates,  §4   (c) 82 

Blanket  Rates,  §6  (b) 82 

Blanket   Rates,    §7    (aa) 83 

Blanket   Rates,   §8    (a) 87 

Blanket  Rates,  §8   (d) 89 

Blanket   Rates,   §8    (h) 90 

Blanket  Rates,  §11   (g) 96 

Blanket   Rates,   §13    (f)    (g) 98 

Branch    Lines,    §1    (b) 102 

Branch  Lines,  1  (h) 103 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,   §1    (b) 108 

Cars  and  Oar  Supply,  §1  (c)   (d)   (e)   (f) 109 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §2  (a) 109 

Cars   and   Car   Supply,   §3    (a) 109 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §3   (b)    (c)    109 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §6   (b) 110 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §12  (aa)   (bb) 115 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,   (b)    (d)    (e)    (f) 115 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §12  (g) 116 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §13  (a)   (b)    (d)   (e)    (f)    (g) 116 

Cars   and   Car  Supply,   §15    (a) 117 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §15   (aa)    (bb)    (c) 117 

Cars  and   Car   Supply,   §16    (a) 118 

Cars   and   Car   Supply,   §18    (a) 118 

Cars  and   Car  Supply,   §20    (b) 119 

Cars  and   Car  Supply,   §21    (a) 119 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §21^^  (a) 120 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §22   (a) 120 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §23   (a)    (b)    (c) 120 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §23   (d) 121 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §24   (a)    (b) 121 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §25  (a)   (b) 122 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §26  (a)   (b) 122 

Cars   and   Car   Supply,   §27    (a) 122 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §28   (b)    (c)    (d) 123 

Cars  and   Car  Supply,  §30   (a)    (d) 124 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §33  (a)   (c) 125 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §35  (b) 126 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §36   (a) 126 

Commerce   Court,   §1    (a) 156 

Commerce   Court,   §3    (a) 157 

Commodities   Clause,   II    (a) 162 

Common   Carrier,   §3    (c) 164 


984  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

COAL— Cont'd  Page 

Courts,  §1   (g)    (k) 171 

Courts,    §11    (a) 176 

Credit  Account,  §3   (a)    (d) 180 

Crimes,   §3    (b)    (d) 182 

Crimes,  §5   (a) 183 

Demurrage,   §2    (e) 195 

Demurrage,   §4    (a)    (aa)    (d) 196 

Demurrage,    §5     (b) 197 

Demurrage,  §9    (a)    (c) 200 

Demurrage,   §9    (e) 201 

Demurrage,   §14   (h) 204 

Demurrage,    §15    (f) 204 

Demurrage,   §15    (g) I 205 

Demurrage,  §16   (d)    (e) 207 

Differentials,    §1    (b) 208 

Differentials,  §1   (c) 209 

Differentials,    §1    (de) 209 

Differentials,    §5    (c) 211 

Differentials,  §5   (f)    (g) 212 

Differentials,    §5    (i)     (j) 213 

Differentials,    §7    (c) 217 

Differentials,   §17   (b)    (d)    (e) 218 

Differentials,     §17     (ff) 220 

Discrimination,    §1    (c) 222 

Discrimination,     §2     (b) 224 

Discrimination,     §3     (ii) 226 

Discrimination,    §4    (k) 233 

Discrimination,    §4    (rr) 239 

Discrimination,    §6    (a) 241 

Discrimination,   §6    (e)    (g) 242 

Discrimination,    §7    (e) 244 

Discrimination,   §8   (3)    (f) 249 

Discrimination,   §8   (3)    (i) 251 

Discrimination,   §8    (4)    (a) 253 

Discrimination,    §10    (d)     (e) 268 

Discrimination,    §13,    (bb) 270 

Divisions,  IV  (d) 278 

Electric  Lines,   II    (c) 281 

Embargo     (aa) 283 

Equalization   of  Rates,   §3    (j) 292 

Equalization   of   Rates,   §3    (vw) 294 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §3   (ii) 296 

Equalization   of   Rates,   §4    (2)    (u) 302 

Equalization    of   Rates,    §6    (p) 308 

Equalization    of   Rates,    §8    (k) 313 

Evidence,     §8     (d) 318 

Evidence,    §12    (2)    (b) 320 

Evidence,    §34    (a) 344 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  985 

COAI^-Cont'd  Page 

Evidence,    §36     (b) 344 

Evidence,    §58    (h) 352 

Evidence,    §61     (h) 354 

Evidence,    §61     (p) Si 355 

Evidence,    §64     (v) 359 

Evidence,    §64%    (a)    (b) 360 

Evidence,     §66     (m) 361 

Evidence,    §66     (q) 362 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §6    (a) 390 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §6    (b) 391 

Facilities    and    Privileges,    §10    (p) 394 

Interstate   Commerce,    §3    (j) 420 

Interstate    Commerce,    §3    (1) 421 

Interstate    Commerce,    §4    (a) 422 

Long   and   Short  Hauls,    §5    (ii) 450 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5   (w) 454 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §6   (b) , 457 

Long  and   Short  Hauls,   §6    (g) 458 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §10   (dd) 473 

Overcharges,    §9    (r) 517 

Procedure   Before   Commission,    §8    (b) 544 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §8  (3)    (c) 581 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §10    (g) 587 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §20    (b) 597 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §23    (g) 598 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §24  (d) 599 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §40^^  (a) 612 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §66    (h) 624 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §67 624 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §67  (c) 625 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §67    (r) 627 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §67    (v) 628 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §67    (x) 629 

Reconsignment,   §6    (b) 703 

Reconsignment,   §1    (d) 697 

Reconsignment,    §1     (e) 698 

Reconsignment,    §2    (f ) 699 

Reconsignment,    §3    (1)    (m) 700 

Reparation,    §1    (a) 713 

Reparation,   §3    (a) 720 

Reparation,  §3  (p)   721 

Reparation,     §7     (v) 730 

Reparation,    §16    (m) 736 

Restricted   Rates,   I    (a) 747 

Restricted  Rates,   I    (b)    748 

Routing  and  Misrouting,   §4   (fff ) 759 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §4    (11) 765 

Routing  and   Misrouting,   §4    (oo) 766 


986  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

COAL^-Cont'd  Page 

Special    Contracts,    §2    (w) 775 

Special   Contracts,   §2    (bb) 776 

Switch  Tracks  and   Switching,   §2    (c) 788 

Switch  Tracks  and   Switching,   §4   (n) 790 

Switch  Tracks  and  Switching,  §4  (o)   (q) 791 

Switch  Tracks  and  Switching,  §7   (e) 793 

Tap    Lines,   §7    (h) 800 

Tariffs,    §7    (zzz) 825 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §1   (u) 842 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11   (2)    (a) 850 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  -  (2)    (j) 853 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  11   (2)    (1) 854 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11   (2)    (x) 858 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11  (2)   (y) 859 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §22  (q) 884 

Transportation,    §1    (d)    (e) 887 

Weights    and   Weighing,    §3    (a) 900 

Weights  and  Weighing,  §4,   (a) 901 

Weights  and  Weighing,  §6   (a)    (d) 903 

Weights  and  Weighing,  §6   (e) 904 

Weights  and  Weighing,  §8   (d) 905 

Anthracite: 

Advanced    Rates,    §17     (h) 41 

Evidence,    §12     (2)     (a) 319 

Evidence,    §13    (2)     (i) 325 

Land    Grant    Railroads     (a) 439 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §9   (f ) 461 

Minimums,    §4     (i) 499 

Reduced  Rates,   §4    (a) 705 

Reparation,     §3     (c) 720 

Tariffs,     §7     (cc) 819 

Bituminous: 

Advanced  Rates,  §18   (1)    (c) 42 

Differential,     §7     (aa) 216 

Discrimination,   §10    (k)    268 

Discrimination,    §14    (b) 272 

Equalization    of   Rates,    §3    (k) 292 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §4   (2)    (n) 300 

Evidence,  §12  (2)   (a) 319 

Evidence,  §12  (2)   (a) 319 

Evidence,   §13    (2)    (i) 325 

Evidence,    §39     (k) 341 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,  §12i^    (a) 590 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §12^^    (h) 593 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §67    (g) 625 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §67   (r) 627  ■'> 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §76  (s)   (t) 628 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §67  (w)  (x) 629 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  987 

COALr— Cont'd  Page 

Reconsignment,    §3     (b) 699 

Reparation,    §17     (d) 741 

Blacksmith: 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §67    (h) 626 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §67   (o)    (p) 627 

Evidence,   §12    (4)    (a)    (b) 320 

Procedure    Before    Commission,    §15    (b) 552 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §7  (o) 763 

Cannel: 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §67    (q) 627 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §67    (aa) 629 

Slack: 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,    §67    (1) 626 

Reasonableness  of   Rates,    §67    (x)    (y) 629 

COAL-TAR   PAVING   CEMENT. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §68  (a) 630 

COALrTAR   PAVING    PITCH. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §69  (a) 630 

COBALT-NICKEL  HYDRATE. 

Classification,    §17    (q) 153 

COCOANUT    OLEINE. 

Classification,   §18   (2)    (a) 153 

COCOANUT   STEARIN. 

Classification,   §18    (2)    (a) 153 

COFFEE. 

Classification,    §7     (d) 139 

Discrimination,   §4    (1) 234 

Discrimination,    §4    (q) 237 

COFFEEPOTS. 

Classification,    §18    (3)     (a) 154 

COKE. 

Common  Carrier,  §3   (c) 164 

Demurrage,    §15     (g) 205 

Discrimination,    §3     (i) 226 

Discrimination,    §7    (n) 245 

Evidence,    §13    (1)    (p) 324 

Evidence,    §28     (d) 340 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,  §23    (d) . . . : 598 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §70  (a) 630 

Routing  and   Misrouting,   §4    (cc) 756 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §4   (bb) 764 

Tariffs,  §8   (j) .828 

Througb  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §14  (f ) 863 

Through   Routes    and    Joint   Rates,    §22    (e) 883 

COLUMNS. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105  (gg) 671 

COMBINATION  CAR. 

Tariffs,  §7   (jj) 820 


988  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

COMPANY  MATERIAL.                                                                                                     Page 
Transportation,  §3  (a)   890 

COMPO-BOARD. 

Evidence,    §1    (j) 316 

CONDENSED  MILK  (See  Milk). 

CONDUIT. 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §6  (e)   (f) 457 

COPPER. 

Evidence,  §12  (7)  (a)   320 

CORK. 

Tariffs,  §7  (g) 815 

CORN  (See  Grain  and  Products). 

CORN  SHUCKS. 

Reasonable    Rates,    §72    (a) 631 

CORRUGATED  IRON  (See  Iron). 

CORRUGATED  STRAWBOARD  BOXES. 

Tariffs,   §7    (n) 816 

COTTON. 

Advanced   Rates,    §19    (a) 45 

Allowances,  §7   (d) 54 

Allowances,    §8    (1)    (a)    (b)    (c) 55 

Allowances,  §13   (a) 66 

Any  Quantity  Rate,  I  (f ) 70 

Blanket  Rates,  §9   (aa) 90 

Compress   Companies  and   Charges,  I   (a)    (b)    (c)    (d) 167 

Compress  Companies  and  Charges,  II  (a) 167 

Compress  Companies  and  Charges,  II   (b)    (c) 168 

Compress  Companies  and  Charges,  II  (d) 169 

Crimes,    §7    ( j) 186 

Demurrage,  §9    (b) 200 

Discrimination,    §9    (p) 263 

Discrimination,    §13    (e) 271 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §4   (2)    (h) 299 

Equalization   of   Rates,    §4    (2)    (r) 301 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §8   (f ) 311 

Evidence,    §20    (d) 337 

Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  III  (aa) 366 

Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  IV  (a) 370 

Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  V   (a)    (b) 371 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §2    (ee) 388 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §3   (a) 389 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §4  (a) 390 

Facilities    and    Privileges,    §15    (c) 397 

Facilities    and    Privileges,    §17    (k) 403 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §18   (cc) 403 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §20   (f) 407 

Lighterage,    §2     (a) 439 

Compressed.     Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §6   (c) 457 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §28  (b) 602 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  989 

COTTON— Cont'd  Page 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §73  (a)  (b) 631 

Substitution  of  Tonnage,  §2  ,(b)   (c) 784 

Substitution  of  Tonnage,  §2   (d) 785 

Substitution   of    Tonnage,    §2    (m) 786 

COTTON   DRILLS. 

Through    Routes    and    Joint    Rates,    §15    (z) 869 

COTTON  DUCK. 

Classification,    §14    (a) 146 

COTTON  FACTORY  PRODUCTS. 

Classification,   §14    (e) 147 

Classification,  §17   (p)    153 

Demurrage,  §4  (b) 196 

COTTON   GARMENTS. 

Classification,   §17    (f)    152 

Evidence,  §32   (b)    343 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (x) 868 

COTTON  GOODS. 

Classification,    §14    (d) 147 

Classification,   §17    (f ) 152 

Classification,  §17   (p)    153 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  §10   (h) 436 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §10  (u) 471 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (y) 868 

COTTON  LINTERS. 

Branch    Lines,    §2    (d) 104 

Evidence,    §47    (k) 348 

Minimums,  §8   (n) 510 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §74  (a)  (b) 632 

Reparation,    §16    (zzzz) 741 

Released  Rates,  §2   (b)    (c) 711 

Routing  and  Misrouting,   §3    (g) 752 

Routing  and  Misrouting,   §5    (a) 760 

Tariffs,    §7    (nn) 821 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §4   (t) 754 

COTTON  PIECE  GOODS. 

Commodity  Rates,  §3  (d) 160 

Discrimination,    §10    (k) 266 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §9    (p) 463 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §9  (s) 464 

Minimums,    §7    (jj) 507 

COTTON-SHODDY  LINING. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §74  (a) 632 

Evidence,    §64     (m) 358 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §76  (a) 634 

COTTONSEED  AND  PRODUCTS. 

Concentrating  Rates  and  Privileges    (aa) 169 

Differential,    §6    (a) 214 

Discrimination,   §4    (e)    (ee) 231 


990  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

COTTONSEED   AND   PRODUCTS— Cont'd  Page 

Discrimination,    §9    (e) 261 

Discrimination,   §10    (j) 266 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §4    (b) 390 

Facilities    and    Privileges,    §21    (w) 411 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  §9  (gg) 435 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §75 632 

Reparation,    §2     (k) 716 

Reparation,    §17    (i) 741 

Special   Contracts,   §2    (z) 775 

Special   Contracts,   §5    (h) 782 

Terminal  Facilities,  §1   (c)    (g) 834 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11  (2)  (i) 853 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11  (2)  (t) 857 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11  (2)    (w) 858 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §19  (f) 882 

Cake: 

Evidence,    §64    (t) 359 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §16   (a) 401 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §13  (r). 862 

Hulls: 

Claims,   §6    (c) 129 

Differential,  §6   (c) 214 

Evidence,  §12   (8)    (a) 320 

Tariffs,    §11     (a) 830 

Meal: 

Claims,   §6    (c) 129 

Evidence,  §12   (8)    (a) 320 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §16   (a) 401 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §32i^    (c) 607 

Oil: 

Advanced  Rates,   §17    (i) 41 

Advanced  Rates,  §18   (5)    (a) 43 

Discrimination,  §7    (m) 245 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §18    (c) 403 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §20  (f) 882 

COUNTERS. 

Tariffs,   §7    (q)    (r) 817 

CREAM  (See  also  Dairy  Products). 

Advanced  Rates,  §5   (4)    (a) 17 

Advanced  Rates,  §13   (e) 32 

Advanced   Rates,    §19    (dd) 47 

Evidence,  §17   (n) 335 

Express   Companies,   §11    (3)    (a) 379 

Express  Companies,   §11    (9)    (b)    (c) 381 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §111  (a) 673 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §111    (b)    (d) 675 

CREAM  CANS. 

§11    (3)    (a) 379 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  991 

CROSS-TIES  (See  Lumber  and  Forest  Products).  Page 

CUCUMBERS  (See  Vegetables). 

CULLET. 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §4   (rr) 757 

CUTTERS. 

Evidence,   §28    (f) 340 

Through   Routes   and   Joint  Rates,   §15    (n) 867 

CYPRESS  (See  Lumber  and  Forest  Products). 

DAIRY   PRODUCTS. 

See  also  Cream,  Cheese,  Butter,  Milk. 

Evidence,    §12    (10)    (a) 320 

Evidence,    §12    (22)    (a) 322 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §118  (f) 682 

DOORS  (See  Lumber  and  Forest  Products). 

DOOR  FRAMES. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105    (gg) 671 

DREDGING   MACHINE   PARTS. 

Tariffs,    §7    (sss) 824 

DRYGOODS. 

Equalization   of   Rates,    §4    (4)    (h) 303 

Express   Companies,   §11    (4)    (a) 379 

Tariffs,   §7    (ii) 820 

DRYING  RACKS. 

Tariffs,   §7    (uu) 822 

DYNAMITE  (See  also  Explosives). 

Explosives     (a) 365 

EARTHENWARE. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §44  (a) 613 

EARTHENWARE  CRUCIBLES. 

Classification,  §18   (4)    (a) 154 

EGGS. 

Advanced  Rates,  §18  (10  (a) 45 

Classification,    §14    (g) 147 

Evidence,    §63    (n) 356 

Express  Companies,  §11   (5)    (a) 380 

Express    Companies,    §24    (c) 385 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §4  (c)    (d) 390 

Loss   and   Damage,   §6    (u) 484 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §56  (a)   (b) 618 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §40    (h) 611 

Reparation,    §2    (z) 719 

Weights   and   Weighing,   §5    (b)    (cd) 902 

EGG-CASE   FILLERS. 

Discrimination,   §4    (rr) 239 

EGG  CASE  MATERIAL. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §79  (a) -634 

ELEVATOR  GUIDES. 

Tariffs,  §7   (rrr) 824 


992  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

ELM  HUB  BLOCKS.  Page 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §80    (a) 635 

EMIGRANTS'  MOVABLES. 

Demurrage,    §8    (ff ) 199 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §22  (c) 597 

Tariffs,    §7     (x) 818 

Tariffs,  §7   (uuu)    (vw)    (aaaaa) 825 

Tariffs,     §7     (ffff ) 827 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15    (iii) 873 

ENAMELED  WARE. 

Tariffs,    §7    (v) 818 

ENGINES. 

Discrimination,     §15     (e) 274 

Tariffs,   §7    (ccccc) 826 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,   §15    (kkk) 874 

EXPLOSIVES  (See  also  Dynamite,  Gunpowder,  Kanite,  Masurite). 

Classification,   §9    (a) 140 

Narrow    Gauge    Railroads,    I    (c) 512 

EXPRESS  COMPANY  MEN  AND  SUPPLIES. 

Express  Companies,  §8   (a) 376 

FEED,  MIXED. 

Substitution  of  Tonnage,  §2   (h)    (i) 785 

FELT. 

Classification,   §7    (c) 138 

FENCING. 

Classification,    §18    (5)     (a) 154 

Discrimination,     §4     (hh) 233 

Discrimination,    §9    (q) 264 

Minimums,    §7     (i) 503 

Proportional  Rates,  III   (d) 559 

FERTILIZER. 

Equalization  of  Rates,   §1    (v) 287 

Equalization   of  Rates,   §4    (2)    (t) 302 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §6    (dd) 310 

Evidence,    §12    (10)     (a)     (b) 321 

Evidence,  §12   (26)    (a) 322 

Evidence,  §54  (c) 351 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §20    (g) 407 

Procedure  Before  Commission,  §10   (2)    (h) 546 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §40    (k) 612 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §81 635 

FILING   FOLDERS. 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §107    (a).. 673 

FIR  (See  Lumber  and  Forest  Products). 

FIRE   PLACES. 

Tariffs,    §7     (11) 821 

FISH. 

Express    Companies,    §9    (a) 377 

Express    Companies,    §11    (6)     (a) 380 

Refrigeration,     §5     (b) 710 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  993 

FLAG  POLES.  Page 

Cars  and  Car  Supplies,   §8   (m) 114 

Reparation,    §19     (u) 744 

FLAXSEED. 

Advanced   Rates,   §5    (3)    (a) 16 

Evidence,    §12    (11)    (a) 321 

Overcharges,    §9    (g) 516 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §82    (a)    (b) 636 

Reparation,    §6     (d) 723 

Reparation,    §16    (cc) 737 

FLESHINGS. 

Minimums,    §7    (zz) 508 

FLOUR  (See  also  Grain  and  Products). 

Advanced  Rates,  §5   (1)    (a) 14 

Advanced    Rates,    §13    (m) 35 

Differential,     §6     (f ) 215 

Discrimination,    §9    (n) 262 

Equalization    of   Rates,    §3    (ee) 295 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §4  (1)   (e) 298 

Equalization  of  Rates,   §6    (n) 308 

Equalization   of   Rates,    §6    (bb) 309 

Evidence,    §12    (12)    (a) 321 

Procedure  before  Commission,  §2  (v) 538 

Reasonableness  of  rates,  §12^^  (c) 590 

Domestic: 

Evidence,    §13    (2)     (1) 326 

Evidence,   §45    (g) 347 

Evidence,  §58   (aa) 352 

Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  §1   (a) 365 

Export: 

Evidence,  §13   (3)    (a)    (1) 326 

Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  III  (ff) 368 

Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  III  (i)    (j)    (k)   (1) 370 

Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  V    (bb) 371 

Facilities    and    Privileges,    §7    (b) 391 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §8    (b) 392 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §15    (d) 397 

Interstate    Commerce   Commission,    §1    (s) 428 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5   (bb) 448 

Long  and   Short   Hauls,   §5    (i) 450 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §12   (2)    (a) 475 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,    §27    (h) 601 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §83 636 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §153    (e) 694 

Reparation,    §16     (x) 736 

Storage      (a) 783 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §2  (g) 843 

Rye  Flour: 
Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §84    (d) 637 


994  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

FOODSTUFFS,  Page 

Classification,    §17     (a) 151 

Routing  and   Misrouting,   §7    (y) 764 

FOREST  PRODUCTS   (See  Lumber  and  Forest  Products). 

FRUIT  (See  also  Apples,  Bananas,  Cantaloupes,  Grapes,  Grape  Fruit,  Lemons, 
Oranges,  Peaches,  Pineapples,  Strawberries). 

Assorting    Packages     (d) 73 

Assorting   Packages     (b)    (c) 72 

Auction    Company     (a) 73 

Blanket   Rates,    §2    (g) 79 

Blanket   Rates,    §8    (b) 88 

Blanket  Rates,  §11   (bb)    (dd) 95 

Branch  Lines,   §4    (b) 105 

Discrimination,    §15     (f ) , 274 

Exclusive     Contracts      (c) 364 

Expedited    Service      (b) 365 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §1   (q) 388 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §10    (v) 395 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  §14   (i)    (k) 437 

Interstate   Commerce    Commission,    §14    (r) 438 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,   §5   (k) 451 

Long  and   Short  Hauls,   §6    (d) 457 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §9   (t) 465 

Precooling,   II    (d) 532 

Precooling,    II     (e) 533 

Precooling,   III    (b) 533 

Precooling,     III     (d) 534 

Procedure  Before  Commission,   §2   (y) 539 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84 637 

Procedure  Before  Commission,  §2   (v) 538 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §12^^    (c) 590 

Refrigeration,    §3    (i) 708 

Refrigeration,   §4   (h) 709 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11  (2)   (z) 859 

Track  Storage,  II  (e) 885 

Track  Storage,  II  (i) 886 

Track  Storage,  II  (f ) 886 

Transportation,  §12   (f) 893 

Water  Carriers,  §2  (k) 898  ; 

Dried :  i 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §78  (a) 634  j 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (w) 868  j 

FRUIT  JARS. 

Reparation,  §19  (r) 744 

FRUIT  TREES. 

Loss  and  Damage,  §9  (v) 490 

FULLER'S  EARTH. 

Tariffs,  §3  (1)   (aa) 806  | 

■a 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  995 

FUEL.  Page 

Electric  Lines,  III  (a) 281 

Evidence,  §17  (i) 334 

FURNITURE. 

Absorption  of  Charges,  §1  (b) 1 

Classification,  §10  (e) 141 

Discrimination,  §4  (1) 234 

Discrimination,  §8   (3)    (j) 251 

Discrimination,  §8   (3)    (m) 252 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (s) 454 

Minimums,  §1   (k) 495 

Minimums,  §5  (c)    (d) 500 

Minimums,   §7    (m) 503 

Minimums,   §8    (f) 508 

Minimums,  §8   (h)    (j) 509 

Minimums,  §8   (o) 511 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §86    (a) 648 

Tariffs,  §7  (aa) 819 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §13  (e) 860 

FURNITURE   KNOBS. 

Classification,   §10    (e) 141 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §110  (a) 673 

FURNITURE  TRIMMINGS. 

Classification,   §10    (e) 141 

FURS. 

Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  III  (g) 369 

Express  Companies,  §4   (a) 375 

Express  Companies,  §11  (10)  (a) 382 

Procedure  Before  Commission,  §2  (u) 538 

GABLE    ORNAMENTS. 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §105    (gg) 671 

GARBANZO. 

Minimums,     §3     (d) 496 

GAS  GRATES    (See  Grates). 

GAS  MACHINERY    (See   Machinery). 

GASOLINE. 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §117    (e) 678 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15    (zz) 872 

GILSONITE. 

Narrow    Gauge    Railroads,    I    (d) 512 

GIRDERS    (See  Steel). 

GLASS. 

Classification,    §15     (e) 149 

Classification,     §15     (i) 150 

Classification,    §18    (9)     (a) 155 

Discrimination,     §3     (a) 225 

Discrimination,    §4     (rr) 239 

Equalization    of    Rates,    §1     (cc) 288 

Minimums,     §7     (u) 504 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 


GLASS— Cont'd  Page 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §12^^    (b) 590 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §38    (o) 610 

Reparation,      2    (j) 716 

Routing   and   Misrouting,   §4    (rr) 757 

Tariffs,     §7     (vv) 822 

Weights  and  Weighing,  §3    (c) 901 

Weight  and  Weighing,   §8    (g) 905 

GLASSWARE. 

Discrimination,    §4     (rr) 239 

GLUE   STOCK. 

Classification,     §11     (c) 142 

Procedure  Before  Commission,   §13    (9) 570 

Minimums,    §7     (zz) 508 

GOAT  SKINS. 

Classification,   §14    (c) 147 

Routing  and  Misrouting,   §10    (a) 770 

GO-CARTS. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §88  (a) 649 

Tariffs,     §7     (o) 817 

GRAIN  AND  PRODUCTS    (See  also  Flour,   Malt,  Rice,  Seed). 

Allowances,    §16    (c)     (d) 69 

Advanced  Rates,  §5   (d) 13 

Advanced   Rates,    §7    (1)    (c) 20 

Advanced   Rates,   §13    (m) 35 

Advanced    Rates,    §16     (b) 37 

Advanced    Rates,    §19    (d) 46 

Allowances,   §2    (c)    (d)    (g) 53 

Allowances,    §5     (b) 54 

Allowances,    §8     (1)     (d) 55 

Allowances,    §8     (2)     (a) 56 

Allowances,    §8    (3)    (a)    (aa)    (b) 56 

Allowances,   §8    (3)    (bb)    (c)    (d)    (e) 57 

Allowances,  §8   (3)    (ee)    (f)    (g) 58 

Allowances,    §9    (dd) 61 

Allowances,   §12    (1)    (b)    (d) 64 

Allowances,     §14      (b) 66 

Allowances,    §14    (d)    (e)    (f) 67 

Allowances,   §15    (f),   §16    (b) 68 

Blanket    Rates,    §2    (j) 79 

Cars   and   Car   Supply,   §11    (a) 114 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §14  (b) 117 

Cars   and  Car   Supply,   §20    (e) 119 

Claims,    §8     (b) 130 

Courts,  §11  (n) 177 

Courts,     §11     (r) 178 

Crimes,    §5     (e) 184 

Demurrage,    §13     (a) 203 

Differentials,     §3     (a) 209 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  997 

GRAIN  AND  PRODUCTS— Cont'd  Page 

Differentials,    §6     (e) 215 

Differential,    §6    (g) 216 

Discrimination,    §3    (e) 226 

Discrimination,    §4    (cc) 229 

Discrimination,    §4    (s) ,    §5    (d) 240 

Discrimination,     §7     (b) 243 

Discrimination,    §8     (3)     (d) 249 

Discrimination,   §8    (3)    (h) 251 

Discrimination,   §8    (3)    (k) 252 

Discrimination,    §10    (d) 265 

Discrimination,     §13     (c) 270 

Discrimination,    §14    (a) 271 

Electric    Lines,    II    (c) 281 

Equalization    of   Rates,    §3    (gg) 295 

Equalization   of   Rates,    §3    (11) 296 

Equalization   of   Rates,    §4    (2)    (d) 299 

Equalization   of    Rates,    §6    (u) 309 

Equalization  of   Rates,   §6    (cc) 310 

Evidence,   §12    (11)    (a),   §12   (12)    (a),  §12   (13)    (a) 321 

Evidence,    §13     (3)     (a) 326 

Evidence,  §14  (1)   (ff)*. 329 

Evidence,    §14    (2)    (d) 330 

Evidence,    §14    (4)    (b) 331 

Evidence,     §31      (c) 343 

Evidence,    §52     (a) 350 

Evidence,    §58    (aa)    (d) 352 

Evidence,    §63     (h) 355 

Evidence,    §66     (g) 361 

Export   Rates   and   Facilities,   §i    (a) 365 

Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  III   (f) 368 

Export  Rates  and  Facilities,   III    (i) 369 

Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  III   (j)    (k)    (1) 370 

Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  V  (d) 371 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §1    (p) 388 

Facilities   and    Privileges,    §2    (m) 389 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §8   (9)    (a) 392 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §10   (w),  §12   (a) 395 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §15    (d) 397 

Facilities    and   Privileges,    §15    (n)    (o) 399 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §15  (p)    (s)    (t) 400 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §18    (a)    (b) 403 

Facilities   and   Privileges,    §20    (a) '. 406 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §20    (h) 407 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §20   (j),  §21   (a)    (b) 408 

Facilities    and    Privileges,    §21    (j) 409 

Facilities   and  Privileges,   §21    (jj) 410 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §21    (r)    (s) 411 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §21    (y) 412 


998  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

GRAIN  AND  PRODUCTS— Cont'd  Page 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5   (bb) 448 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,   §12    (2)    (a) 475 

Loss    and    Damage,    §5    (i) 482 

Minimums,    §6    (b) 501 

Overcharges,    §5     (a) 514 

Procedure   Before    Commission,    §10    (2)    (k)    (1) 546 

Proportional    Rates,   I    (b) 555 

Proportional    Rates,    II    (a) 556 

Proportional   Rates,   II    (aa)    (g) 557 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §8    (1)    (cc) 578 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §8    (3)    (a) 581 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §10    (bb) 586 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §12i^    (c) 590 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §17    (c) 595 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §89    (b) 649 

Reconsignment,    §1    (c) 697 

Reparation,    §2    (f ) 715 

Reparation,    §6     (b) '. 723 

Reparation,     §7     (v) 730 

Reparation,    §8    (w) : 731 

Routing    and    Misrouting,    §4    (eee) 759 

Routing   and   Misrouting,    §9    (d) 769 

Routing  and   Misrouting,   §10    (n) 771 

Special    Contracts,    §2     (ii) 776 

Substitution   of   Tonnage,    §2    (h) 785 

Substitution   of   Tonnage,    §2    (q) 786 

Switch  Tracks  and   Switching,   §7    (n) 795 

Tariffs,    §11    (c) 830 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11   (2)    (n)    (o) 855 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §13   (aa) 860 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §20   (d) 882 

Transportation,    §11    (c) 892 

Weights   and   Weighing,    §1    (b) 900 

Barley: 

Advanced    Rates,    §17    (c) 38 

Evidence,    §12    (17)     (a) 321 

Evidence,    §12    (29)     (a) 323 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §106    (a) 672 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §106    (e) 673 

Reparation,    §16    (kkkk) 740 

Routing   and    Misrouting,    §4    (pp) 766 

Buckwheat: 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §13   (h) 861 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (xx) 872 

Corn: 

Advanced   Rates,   §22    (c) 50 

Blanket    Rates,    §3    (a) 81 

Branch  Lines,  §1   (i) 103 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  999 


GRAIN  AND  PRODUCTS— Cont'd  Page 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §11   (b) 114 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §2    (w) 290 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §3   (mm) 296 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §4   (2)    (m) 300 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §4   (2)    (q) 301 

Evidence,    §12    (29)    (a) 323 

Evidence,     §30     (f) 343 

Facilities   and  Privileges,   §15    (i) 398 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §20    (d) 407 

Facilities    and    Privileges,    §20    (j) 408 

Facilities    and    Privileges,    §21    (hh) 409 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §21    (kk) 410 

Long   and    Short  Hauls,    §5    (jj) 456 

Procedure   Before   Commission,   §10    (2)    (1) 546 

Procedure   Before   Commission,   §11   (v) 549 

Proportional   Rates,   II    (d)    (h) 557 

Reasonableness   of    Rates,    §28    (u) 604 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §89  (c)  (d)   (e) 650 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §132    (a) 686 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §140    (a) 688 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §140    (c) 689 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §153   (a)    (b) 693 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §153   (c)    (d) 694 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §153    (g) 695 

Reparation,    §1    (q) 714 

Reparation,    §9    (a) 732 

Routing  and  Misrouting,   §4    (vv) 758 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §7  (x) 763 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §9    (h) 770 

Tariffs,   §6    (f )    (h) 813 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (oo) 870 

Transportation,    §2    (g) 888 

Weights  and  Weighing,   §3    (b) 901 

Oats: 

Evidence,   §12    (29)    (a) 323 

Overcharges,     §9     (j) 516 

Proportional    Rates,    II    (h) 557 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §82   (a) 636 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §13  (1) 861 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (b) 866 

Track   Storage,  II   (d) 88f 

Weight   and   Weighing,    §10    (d) 906 

Rye: 

Evidence,    §12    (29)     (a) 323 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §153   (f) 695 

Tariffs,    §7    (bbbbb) 826 


1000  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

GRAIN  AND  PRODUCTS— Cont'd 
Wheat:  Page 

Advanced  Rates,  §5   (1)    (a) 14 

Advanced  Rates,  §7   (1)    (c) 20 

Advanced    Rates,    §16    (b) 37 

Advanced  Rates,   §17   (c) 38 

Branch  Lines,  §1   (i) 103 

Demurrage,   §6    (a) 198 

Differential,    §6    (d) 215 

Discrimination,    §9    (n) 262 

Discrimination,    §9     (t) 265 

Discrimination,    §14    (a) 271 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §3  (ee) 295 

Equalization   of   Rates,    §4    (1)    (e) 298 

Equalization  of  Rates,   §6    (n) 308 

Equalization   of  Rates,   §6    (x)    (bb) 309 

Evidence,    §12    (29)     (a) 323 

Evidence,    §45     (g) 347 

Evidence,    §65     (h) 361 

Export  Rates   and   Facilities,  V   (d) 371 

Facilities    and   Privileges,   §7    (b) 391 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §20    (d) 407 

Facilities  and  Privileges,   §21    (hh) 409 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  §1   (s) 428 

Interstate   Commerce   Commission,   §14    (c) 437 

Minimums,    §7    (v) 505 

Procedure  Before  Commission,  §2   (v) 538 

Procedure  Before  Commission,  §10   (2)    (j)    (1) 546 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §27    (h) 601 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §28    (u) 604 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §89    (a) 649 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §153    (b) 693 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §153    (e) 694 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,    §153    (f ) 695 

Reparation,   §6    (d) 723 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §4   (ddd) 759 

Substitution  of  Tonnage,  §2   (e) 785 

Substitution  of  Tonnage,  §3   (a) 786 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §21   (a) 882 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §22   (s) 884 

GRANITE. 

Classification,     §10     (b) 140 

Minimums,  §7   (aa)    (bb)   (ff)   (z)   (x)    (y) 505 

Minimums,   §7    (cc)    (dd)    (ee) 506 

GRANITE   IRON  WARE, 

Tariffs,    §7     (v) 818 

GRAPE  FRUIT. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84   (x) 646 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  1001 

GRAPES.  Page 

Evidence,    §64    (r) 358 

Minimums,    §7    (b) 501 

Overcharges,    §9     (p) 517 

Procedure    Before    Commission,    §2    (pp) 541 

Proportional   Rates,   IV    (j) 560 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §84    (n) 641 

Reparation,     §2     (g) 715 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §2   (j)    (k) 750 

Routing  and  Misrouting,   §2    (1) 751 

Routing  and  Misrouting,   §4    (o) 754 

Routing   and   Misrouting,    §4    (ff ) 765 

GRAPE  BASKETS  (See  Baskets). 

GRATES. 

Reasonable   Rates,   §90    (a) 650 

Tariffs,   §7   (11)    (mm) 821 

GRATE    BARS. 

Tariffs,    §7    (d) 815 

GRAVEL. 

Interstate  Commerce,  §4   (j) 423 

Reparation,    §16    (1) 736 

GREASE. 

Tariffs,    §8    (1) 828 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (rr) 871 

GROCERIES. 

Branch   Lines,   §1    (k) 103 

Reparation,     §2     (oo) 717 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §13   (j) 861 

GROUND   IRON   ORE    (See  Ore). 

GROUND  LIMESTONE    (See  Limestone). 

GUINEA   PIGS. 

Express   Companies,   §11    (7)    (a) 380 

GUM    OLIBANUM. 

Classification,     §17     (i) 153 

GUMS. 

Reasonable    Rates,    §44    (a) 613 

GUNPOWDER. 

Classification,    §15     (h) , 150 

Reasonable    Rates,    §91    (a)    (b) 651 

GYPSUM   ROCK. 

Equalization    of   Rates,    §8    (h) 311 

Evidence,     §61      (n) 355 

Reparation,    §16     (u) 736 

HAY. 

Advanced  Rates,  §5  (d) 13 

Allowances,  §8  (3)  (c) 57 

Allowances,   §14    (h) , 67 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §13   (h) 116 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §20   (c) 119 


1002  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

HAY— Cont'd  Page 

Commodity  Rates,  §4  (b) 161 

Differentials,  §3   (a) 209 

Discrimination,  §8   (3)    (d) 249 

Discrimination,  §10   (d) 265 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §6  (u) 309 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §10    (r) 394 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §15   (k) 398 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §15   (o) 399 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §18  (b) 403 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §20  (h) 407 

Minimums,  §5   (a) 500 

Minimums,    §7    (gg) 506 

Overcharges,  §2   (a) 513 

Proportional  Rates,  IV  (m)    (o) 561 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §89   (b) 649 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §92  (a)   (b)  (c) 651 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §92  (e)   (f)   (g)   (h) 652 

Reconsignment,   §3    (g) 700 

Reconsignment,   §4    (e) 702 

Reconsignment,  §5    (d) 703 

Reparation,   §2    (v) 718 

Reparation,   §7    (v) 730 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (mmmm) 876 

Track  Storage,  II  (a)  (k)  (1) 886 

HEMATITE  IRON  ORE  (See  Ore). 

HEMLOCK  (See  Lumber  and  Forest  Products). 

HEMP. 

Discrimination,  §8   (5)    (e) 256 

HICKORY  (See  Lumber  and  Forest  Products). 

HIDES   (See  also  Goat  Skins,  Sheep  Skins). 

Blanket  Rates,  §11   (cc) 95 

HOGS  (See  also  Livestock). 

Discrimination,  §9   (d) 260 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §3  (1) 293 

Evidence,  §13  (2)   (c) 325 

Evidence,  §13   (5)    (b) 327 

Loss  and  Damage,  §3  (f) 480 

Loss  and  Damage,  §10  (d) 490 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §103  (q)    (r)   (s) 664 

Reconsignment,    §2    (c) 698 

HOISTING. 

Tariffs,   §7    (eee) 823 

HOOPS. 

Advanced  Rates,  §6  (6)  (b) 19 

Advanced  Rates,  §18   (4)    (a) 43 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §8  (c) 112 

Classification,   §41/^    (f) 136 

Evidence,   §65    (c) 360 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  1003 

HOOPS— Cont'd  Page 

Minimums,  §4   (a) 497 

Minimums,  §4   (d) 498 

Minimums,   §7    (t) 504 

Proportional  Rates,  II  (j) 558 

Reparation,   §2    (n) 717 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (v) 868 

Weights  and  Weighing,  §5   (e) 902 

HOOP  STEEL  (See  Steel). 

HOPS. 

Evidence,  §12  (27)   (a) 322 

Evidence,  §14  (1)  (e) 329 

HORSES   (See  also  Livestock). 

Loss  and  Damage,  §6   (n) 483 

Loss  and  Damage,  §6  (mm) 486 

Loss  and  Damage,  §11  (e) 491 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §103  (g)   (h) 661 

Special  Contracts,  §5  (a) 781 

Tariffs,   §4    (a) 811 

Tariffs,    §7    (hhhh) 827 

HORSE  BLANKETS   (See  Blankets). 

HOUSES. 

Overcharges,    §5    (e) 515 

HOUSE  BLOCKING. 

Evidence,  §38    (a) 345 

HOUSEHOLD  GOODS   (See  also  Furniture). 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §10  (o) 470 

HUMUS. 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §20  (g) 407 

ICE. 

Car  and  Car  Supply,  §20  (d) 119 

Discrimination,    §10    (1) 267 

Evidence,  §12   (14)    (a) 321 

Evidence,  §61  (k)   (1) 355 

Evidence,  §64   (dd) 357 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §12  (2)   (f) 476 

Procedure  Before  Commission,  §2   (g) 536 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §9  (i) 585 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §28  (e) 602 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §94  (a)   (b)   (c) 653 

Reparation,   §6    (k) 724 

Special  Contracts,  §5   (f ) 781 

Transportation,   §8    (b) 891 

INCINERATOR  PARTS. 

Tariffs,  §7  (t) 818 

INCUBATORS. 

Classification,  §4^^    (a) 135 

INSULATOR  PINS. 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §5  (b) 305 


1004  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

INTOXICATING  LIQUORS    (See   Liquors).  Page 

IRON. 

Classification,     §18     (1)     (a) 153 

Classification,  §18  (5)  (a) 154 

Discrimination,  §8   (3)    (j) 251 

Discrimination,  §9   (a) 259 

Discrimination,  §9   (o) 263 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §4  (2)   (a) 298 

Evidence,  §12   (15)    (a) 321 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §15   (r) 400 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (kk) 456 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §9   (a) 460 

Minimums,  §7  (hh) 506 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §28    (ba) 602 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §95  (a) 655 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §96  (c)    (d)    (e)    (f ) 656 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §96  (h)  (i)  (j)  97  (a) 657 

Reparation,  §6   (q)    724 

Reparation,   §18    (e) 742 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §7   (xxx) 767 

Special  Contracts,  §2  (k) 773 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (nnnn) 877 

IRON  ARTICLES. 

Discrimination,  §4   (1) 234 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §9  (1)    (cc) 578 

IRON  AXLES   (See  Axles). 

IRON  BARS  (See  Iron). 

IRON  ORE  (See  Ore). 

IRON  PYRITES. 

Advanced  Rates,  §8  (1)   (m) 29 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §96    (g) 656 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §96   (k) 657 

IRON  RODS  (See  Iron). 

IRON-WORKING  MACHINE  AND  PARTS. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §95  (c) 65 

Classification,    §18    (5)    (b) 154 

IRON  ROLLS. 

Commodity  Rates,  §4  (a) 161 

JACKS. 

Classification,   §11    (s) 144 

Reparation,    §16    (iiii) 740 

JAPANNED  CASTINGS  (See  Castings). 

JEWELERS'  SWEEPINGS. 

Procedure  Before  Commission,  §10   (2)    (g) 546 

JXJNK. 

Crimes,  §5   (b)    184 

Evidence,  §12   (15)    (a) 321 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §98  (a) 658 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  1005 

KANITE.  Page 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §99  (a) 658 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §108  (a) 673 

KAINIT. 

Import  Traffic,  II   (a) 416 

KITCHEN  SAFES. 

Discrimination,  §4   (1) 234 

KNIT  GOODS. 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §9  (s) 464 

KRAUT. 

Classification,  §17   (k) 153 

KRAUT  BRINE. 

Classification,  §17    (k) 153 

LABORATORY  SUPPLIES. 

Classification,   §17    (r) 153 

LADDERS. 

Classification,  §13    (h) 146 

Discrimination,  §8   (3)    (j) 251 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (s) 454 

Minimums,   §8    (j) 509 

Minimums,  §8   (o) 511 

LAMPBLACK. 

Classification,  §7   (bb) 138 

LAMPS. 
Autocycle: 

Classification,   §17    (s) 153 

LARCH    (See  Lumber   and  Forest  Products). 

LATH   (See  Lumber  and  Forest  Products). 

LAUNDRY  MACHINERY    (See  Machinery). 

LEAD  ORE  AND  CONCENTRATES   (See  Ore). 

LEATHER. 

Advanced  Rates,  §5   (2)    (c) 14 

Advanced  Rates,  §8  (1)   (cc) 26 

Classification,  §11    (a) 141 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §8  (2)   (d) 581 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §101  (a) 659 

LEMONS. 

Advanced  Rates,  §18   (6)    (a) 44 

Advanced  Rates,  §20    (e) 49 

Advanced  Rates,  §22   (d) 50 

Blanket  Rates,  §4   (bb) 81 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §1  (a) 285 

Evidence,    §20    (ff) 337 

Precooling,  II  (f) ; 533 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84  (c) 638 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84  (x) 645 

Refrigeration,  §3-  (d) 707 

Refrigeration,  §4   (a)    (e) 708 

Refrigeration,   §4    (f ) 709 


1006  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

LETTER  COPIERS.                                                                                                              Page 
Evidence,  §12   (21)    (a) 322 

LETTUCE  (See  Vegetables). 

LIMA  BEANS   (See  Beans). 

LIME. 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §29   (b) 123 

Crimes,   §8    (e) 187 

Minimums,  §7  (k) 503 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §102  (a) 659 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (dddd) 876 

LIMESTONE. 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §29  (b) 123 

Differential,    §17    (g) 221 

Evidence,   §64   (a) 356 

Reparation,   §2    (h) 716 

Reparation,   §16   (yy) 738 

LINK   BELTING. 

Tariffs,   §7    (ccc) 823 

LIQUORS  (See  also  Beer,  Near  Beer,  Wine). 

Classification,  §16   (b) 150 

Express  Companies,  §3  (a)    (b) 374 

Express  Companies,  §3  (d)    (e) 375 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  §2   (a) 429 

Narrow  Gauge  Railroads,  I   (c) 512 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §28   (bb) .602 

Weight  and  Weighing,  §8  (b) 904 

LIVESTOCK.     (See  also  Cattle,  Hogs,  Horses,  Sheep.) 

Advanced  Rates,   §5    (2)    (a) 14 

Blanket  Rates,  §9   (c) 92 

Common  Carrier,  §3  (a)   (b) 163 

Differentials,  §5   (b) 210 

Discrimination,    §10    (bb) 268 

Electric   Lines,   II    (c) 281 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §3   (ff ) 291 

Evidence,  §1   (cc)    (d) 315 

Evidence,    §20    (g) 337 

Evidence,  §59   (b) 353 

Exclusive   Contracts,    (b) 364 

Expedited   Service,    (a) 364 

Loss  and  Damage,  §3   (g) 480 

Loss  and  Damage,  §6  (m) 483 

Loss  and  Damage,  §6  (ff ) 485 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §3   (a) 572 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §37  (b) 609 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §103  (a)   (b) 659 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §103  (c) 660 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §103  (e) 661 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §103    (j) 662 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §103   (p) 663 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  1007 

LIVESTOCK— Cont'd  Page 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §118    (b) 679 

Reconsignment,   §3    (a) 699 

Special  Contracts,   §2    (1)    (m) 773 

Stock  Yards   Companies,  I    (b) 783 

Terminal  Facilities,  §3   (h)    (i) 836 

LOCOMOTIVES. 

Advanced    Rates,    §16    (c) 37 

Classification,  §6   (a) 137 

Evidence,  §65   (b) 360 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §104   (a) 664 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §8  (a) 846 

LOCOMOTIVE  TIRES. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §28  (jj) 605 

LOGS   (See  Lumber  and  Forest  Products). 

LOGGING  EQUIPMENT. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §137   (a) 688 

LOOKING-GLASSES. 

Tariffs,   §7    (aa) 819 

LUMBER  AND  FOREST  PRODUCTS. 

Absorption  of  Charges,  §2  (b) 1 

Advanced  Rates,   §5    (1)    (b) 14 

Advanced  Rates,  §5   (2)    (e) 15 

Advanced  Rates,  §5  (3)    (b) 16 

Advanced  Rates,  §7  (2)  (b) 23 

Advanced  Rates,   §8    (1)    (i) 28 

Advanced  Rates,  §13  (f)   (k) 33 

Advanced  Rates,  §19  (e) 47 

Advanced    Rates,    §22     (d) 50 

Advanced  Rates,  §22  (g)    (h) 51 

Allowances,   §10    (c) 61 

Allowances,   §11    (a)    (b)    (c) 62 

Allowances,    §11    (d) 63 

Allowances,  §12   (2)    (a)    (b)    (c)    (cc) 64 

Allowances,  §12   (2)    (d) 65 

Allowances,   §13   (c) 66 

Allowances,  §15   (b) 68 

Blanket  Rates,  §8   (e) 89 

Blanket  Rates,   §8    (h)    (gg) 90 

Blanket   Rates,   §9    (b) 91 

Blanket  Rates,  §10   (a) 92 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §8  (f ) 113 

Classification,  §11    (b) 141 

Classification,   §11    (o) 144 

Commodities   Clause,   §1    (a)    (f) 161 

Commodities  Clause  II   (e) 162 

Courts,   §9    (b) 174 

Demurrage,    §8     (h) 199 

Demurrage,    §14    (b) 203 


1008  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

LUMBER  AND  FOREST  PRODUCTS— Cont'd  Page 

Demurrage,   §15    (k) 206 

Demurrage,    §16    (f) 207 

Demurrage,   §17    (e) 208 

Differential,     §7     (b) 217 

Differential,  §5   (h) 213 

Differential,     §5     (e) 212 

Differential,   §17    (f) 219 

Differential,   §17,    (h) 221 

Discrimination,  §4   (rr) 239 

Discrimination,  §8  (3)   (d) 249 

Discrimination,  §8   (3)    (1) 252 

Discrimination,   §8    (4)    (c) 254 

Discrimination,    §10    (h) 266 

Divisions,  V  (b) 278 

Electric  Lines,  II  (c) 281 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §3   (i) 292 

Equalization  of  Rates,   §3   (oo) 297 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §6  (b) 306 

Evidence,  §2   (c) 317 

Evidence,  §12   (7)    (a) 320 

Evidence,  §12  (9)   (a)   (b),  §12  (16)   (a)   (b) 321 

Evidence,  §12  (20)  (a),  §12  (23)  (a),  §12  (24)  (a),  §12  (25)  (a) 322 

Evidence,  §13   (4)    (aa) 327 

Evidence,   §58    (d) 352 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §8  (9)  (a) 392 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §10  (a) 393 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §13   (a) 396 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §15   (m) 399 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §18  (d)   (g) 404 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §19  (f )   (h) 406 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §20   (d) 407 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §21  (11)   (p) 410 

Import   Traffic    II    (c) 417 

Interstate   Commerce,  §1    (d) 418 

Interstate   Commerce   Commission,   §9    (k) 433 

Lighterage,    §3    (e) 440 

Long  and   Short  Hauls,  §5    (n) 452 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (11)   (pp) 456 

Minimums,   §4    (m) 499 

Minimums,  §5  (d) 502 

Minimums,  §8    (kl) 510 

Overcharges,  §5   (e) 515 

Overcharges,     §9     (1) 516 

Procedure  Before  Commission,  §2   (q) 537 

Procedure    Before   Commission,    §2    (oo) 540 

Procedure  Before  Commission,  §3    (c) 541 

Procedure  Before  Commission,  §10  (2)   (p) 546 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §28   (x) 604 

I 
i 

I: 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  1009 

LUMBER  AND  FOREST  PRODUCTS— Cont'd  Page 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §36    (c) 608 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105  (c) 665 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105   (f)    (g)    (k) 666 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105  (1)    (m) 667 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105  (p)   (q) 668 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105   (v)   (w)    (x) 669 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105   (aa)    (bb)    (cc)    (ee) 670 

Reasonablenesss  of  Rates,  §105  (ff)   (hh)   (jj) 671 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105   (mm) 672 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §125   (a) 684 

Reconsignment,   §1    (c) 697 

Reconsignment,   §3    (o) 701 

Reconsignment,   §4    (c) 702 

Reparation,   §2    (e) • 715 

Reparation,   §2    (q) 718 

Reparation,   §4    (g) 722 

Reparation,  §6   (mm)    (nn)    (eepp) 726 

Reparation,    §6    (ss) 727 

Reparation,    §7    (r) 729 

Reparation,  §10  (b)   (c),  §12  (a)   (b) 733 

Reparation,  §16   (xxx) 739 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §2   (f ) 750 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §4  (f)    (k) 753 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §4  (w)   (x)   (y) 755 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §4  (ee)   (ii)    (jj)   (kk) 756 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §6   (dd) 760 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §7  (j) 76^ 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §4  (ii) 765 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §9  (e)    (f)    (g) 769 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §10   (p) 771 

Special  Contracts,  §2  (e)    (g) 772 

Substitution   of   Tonnage,   §2    (aa) 784 

Tap  Lines,  §2  (c) 796 

Tap   Lines,    §4    (a) 797 

Tap  Lines,   §4    (e)    (f)    (g) 798 

Tap   Lines,   §6    (c),   §7    (a) 799 

Tap  Lines,  §8   (a)    §9   (b) 800 

Tap  Lines,   §9    (c)    (e) 801 

Tariffs,     §3     (e) 803 

Tariffs,    §3    (3)     (c) 810 

Tariffs,     §7     (z) 819 

Terminal    Facilities,    §3    (k) 837 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §5  (e)  §7  (a) 846 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11  (2)   (c)    (d) 851 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11   (k) 854 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11  (2)   (p)   (q) ; 856 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11   (2)    (r)    (s) 857 

Through   Routes   and   Joint  Rates,   §13    (c) 860 


1010  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

LUMBER  AND  FOREST  PRODUCTS— Cont'd  Page 

Through   Routes   and   Joint   Rates,   §13    (g) 861 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,   §14    (i) 863 

Through   Routes   and   Joint   Rates,   §15    (e) 866 

Through   Routes   and   Joint  Rates,   §15    (u) 868 

Through  Routes   and  Joint  Rates,   §15    (11) .870 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15    (HI) 874 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §19   (d) 881 

Transportation,    §11     (d) 892 

Weights  and  Weighing,   §6    (b) 903 

Blinds: 

Absorption  of  Charges,   §3    (a) 2 

Classification,    §11    (b) 141 

Evidence,    12    (24)    (a) 322 

Box   Shooks : 

Reasonable    Rates,    §50    (a) 616 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §105    (11) 672 

Through   Routes   and   Joint  Rates,   §15    (sss) 874 

Cedar: 

Advanced  Rates,   §8    (1)    (i) 28 

Advanced   Rates,    §13    (k) 33 

Crossties: 

Blanket    Rates,    §13    (bb) 97 

Cars   and  Car  Supply,   §33    (b),   §34    (a) 125 

Courts,    §9    (m) 175 

Discrimination,    §4    (f)     (ff ) 232 

Evidence,   §12    (9)    (a)    (b) 321 

Evidence,    §13    (6)    (c) " 327 

Evidence,     §17     (i) .334 

Interstate    Commerce    Commission,    §9    (ee) 434 

Long  and   Short  Hauls,  §5   (ee) 450 

Long  and   Short  Hauls,  §9    (g) 461 

Long  and   Short  Hauls,   §10    (r) 470 

Mlnimums,     §5     (d) 502 

Overcharges,    §8     (e) 515 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §3    (e) 572 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §105    (d) 665 

Reasonableness   of    Rates,    §105    (h) 666 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §105    (o) 668 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105  (dd)  (y) 670 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §148    (a)    (b)    (c) 691 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §148   (d)    (f)    (g) 692 

Routing  and   Misrouting,  §4    (yy) 758 

Tariffs,     §7     (m) 816 

Tariffs,    §7     (oo) 821 

Weights  and  Weighing,  §8  (f ) 905 

Weights  and  Weighing,  §10   (a) 906 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  1011 

LUMBER  AND  FOREST  PRODUCTS— Cont'd  Page 

Cypress: 

Advanced   Rates,   §5    (3)    (b) 16 

Blanket    Rates,    §7    (e) 85 

Blanket   Rates,   §8    (bb) 88 

Blanket   Rates,    §12    (d) 97 

Interstate   Commerce   Commission,   §14    (d) 437 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,   §5    (q) 453 

Reasonableness   of    Rates,    §105    (a) 665 

Reparation,    §3     (d) 720 

Doors: 

Absorption    of    Charges,    §3    (a) 2 

Classification,    §11    (b) 141 

Evidence,    12    (24)    (a) 322 

Procedure  Before  Commission,   §2    (ss) 541 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §77  (a) 634 

Fir: 

Advanced  Rates,   §5   (2)    (f ) 15 

Advanced  Rates,   §8   (1)    (i) 28 

Advanced    Rates,    §13    (c) 32 

Advaned   Rates,    §13    (k) 33 

Advanced    Rates,    §13    (1) 34 

Equalization    of    Rates,    §3    (aa) 290 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  §9   (a) 431 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §105    (e) 666 

Routing    and    Misrouting,    §7    (q) 763 

Gum: 

Classification,     §11     (k) 143 

Interstate    Commerce    Commission,   §14    (d) 437 

Proportional    Rates,   I    (e) 556 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §105     (i) 666 

Reparation,    §3    (d) 720 

Heading: 

Advanced   Rates,   §6    (6)    (b) 19 

Advanced   Rates,   §18    (4)    (a) 43 

Advanced    Rates,    §18    (8)     (a) 44 

Classification,     §4%     (f ) 136 

Evidence,    §12    (25)     (a) 322 

Hemlock: 

Advanced   Rates,   §8    (1)    (i) 28 

Advanced    Rates,    §13    (k) 33 

Hickory : 

Routing    and    Misrouting,    §4    (q) 754 

Weights   and   Weighing,   §5    (j) 903 

Larch: 
Advanced  Rates,   §8    (1)    (i) : 28 

Lath: 

Advanced  Rates,  §13   (c) 32 

Advanced    Rates,    §13    (1) 34 


1012  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

LUMBER  AND  FOREST  PRODUCTS— Cont'd  Page 

Equalization    of    Rates,    §3    (aa) 290 

Evidence,    §13    (4)    (aa) 327 

Import    Traffic,    II    (c) 417 

Interstate   Commerce   Commission,    §9    (a) 431 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5    (o) 453 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §105    (e) 666 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §5   (e) 846 

Logs: 

Blanket   Rates,    §11    (ee) 95 

Demurrage,   §5    (a) 197 

Equalization  of  Rates,   §4   (2)    (v) 302 

Evidence,    §13    (4)    (aa) 327 

Evidence,    §22     (a) 338 

Facilities    and   Privileges,    §19    (a)    (b) 405 

Interstate   Commerce,   §4    (f) 422 

Minimums,     §1     (ee) 494 

Procedure   Before    Commission,   §11    (2)    (u) 548 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §40    (a) 611 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §105    (r) 668 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §105    (oo) 672 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §112    (a) 676 

Reparation,     §9     (b) 732 

Tap    Lines,    §6    (d) 799 

Maple: 

Facilities   and  Privileges,   §20    (d) 407 

Oak: 

Interstate   Commerce   Commission,    §14    (d) 437 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §105    (b) 665 

Reparation,    §3     (d) 720 

Routing    and    Misrouting,    §4    (ss) 757 

Pine:  =«■ 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105    (n) 67 

Advanced  Rates,   §8    (1)    (i) 28 

Blanket   Rates,    §12    (d) 97 

Divisions,     V     (b) 278 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §3    (jj) 296 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §19    (e) 405 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105   (g) 666 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §105    (t) 668 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105    (u) 669 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §105    (z) 670 

Reparation,     §20     (a) 745 

Routing   and   Misrouting,   §4    (1) 753 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §7   (aa) 761 

Routing   and   Misrouting,   §7    (m) 762 

Pine  Cones: 

Classification,    §16    (m) 151 

Classification,    §17     (t) 153 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  1013 

LUMBER  AND  FOREST  PRODUCTS— Cont'd  Page 

Poles : 

Allowances,    §8    (6)    (a) 60 

Allowances,     §13     (b) 66 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §32  (c) ; 124 

Classification,    §10     (c) 141 

Evidence,  §12   (23)    (a) 322 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §10    (a) 393 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §18    (g) ■. 404 

Long   and    Short   Hauls,   §5    (bb) 455 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §105    (kk) 672 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §125   (a)    (b) 684 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,    §125    (c)    (d) 685 

Routing  and   Misrouting,  §7    (aaa) 767 

Routing   and   Misrouting,    §10    (j) 770 

Weights    and    Weighing,    §6     (c) 903 

Posts  (Cedar  Fence): 

Cars   and   Car   Supply,   §8    (o) 114 

tariffs,    §7     (wv) 285 

Evidence,    §12    (23)     (a) 322 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §18    (g) 404 

Minimums,    §4     (f) 498 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §105    (j) 666 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §105    (s) 668 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §125    (b) 684 

Routing   and   Misrouting,   §2    (m) 751 

Routing   and   Misrouting,   §9    (i) 770 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (eee) 872 

Sash: 

Absorption  of   Charges,   §3    (a) 2 

Classification,    §11    (b) 141 

Evidence,    §12     (24)     (a) 322 

Procedure    Before    Commission,    §2    (ss) 541 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §105    (gg) 671 

Shingles : 

Advanced  Rates,   §8    (1)    (i) 28 

Advanced    Rates,    §13    (k) 33 

Facilities    and    Privileges,    §17    (f) 402 

Facilities    and    Privileges,    §18    (g) 404 

Loss    and    Damage,    §6    (uu) 487 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §139    (a) 688 

Routing   and   Misrouting,    §7    (tt) 766 

Tariffs,     §3     (3)     (d) 810 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §5   (e) 846 

Through   Routes   and  Joint  Rates,   §11    (2)    (c) 851 

Through  Routes   and  Joint  Rates,   §11    (2)    (p) 856 

Spruce: 

Advanced  Rates,  §8  (1)  (i) 28 

Advanced  Rates,  §13  (k) 33 


1014  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

LUMBER  AND  FOREST  PRODUCTS— Cont'd  Page 

Evidence,    §13    (4)    (aa) 327 

Import    Traffic,    II    (c) 417 

Staves: 

Advanced   Rates,   §6    (6)    (b) 19 

Advanced  Rates,  §18   (4)    (a) 43 

Advanced  Rates,  §18   (8)    (a) 44 

Classification,    §4^^    (f) 136 

Evidence,    §12     (25)     (a) 322 

Interstate   Commerce,    §4    (f ) 422 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §142    (a) 689 

Routing    and    Misrouting,    §1    (a) 749 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (p) 867 

Veneer: 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §151    (a) 693 

Wood: 

Absorption  of  Charges,   §2    (d) 1 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §105    (ii) 671 

Reparation,     §8,     (1) 731 

Reparation,    §16    (bbb) 738 

Tariffs,    §7     (vvv) 825 

MACHINERY. 

Alternative   Rates,   I    (b) 69 

Bills   of  Lading,    §5    (c) 76 

Cars  and  Supply,  §8    (b) 112 

Discrimination,    §4     (1) 234 

Minimums,    §8    (d) 508 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,    §87    (a) 649 

Reparation,    §7     (s) 729 

Reparation,    §16     (aaa) 736 

Reparation,    §16     (ee) 737 

Tariffs,    §7     (xxx) 825 

Through   Routes   and   Joint  Rates,   §13    (n) 862 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,   §13    (w) 863 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (fff) 873 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (jjjj) 876 

MALT, 

Evidence,    §12    (17)    (a) 321 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §106    (a)    (b)    (c)    (d) 672 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §106    (e) 673 

Reparation,     §16     (w) 736 

Reparation,     §16     (kkkk) 740 

MALT   LIQUORS    (See  Liquors). 

MANHEADS. 

Classification,    §17    (u) 153 

MANTELS. 

Minimums,     §3      (f ) 496 

Minimums,     §5     (d) 500 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  1015 

MANTEL   MATERIAL.                                                                                                         Page 
Tariffs,    §7     (hh) 820 

MANURE. 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §81    (e) 635 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §81    (f ) 636 

MANURE    SPREADERS. 

Through  Routes   and  Joint  Rates,  §15    (ddd) 872 

MAPLE    (See  Lumber  and  Forest  Products). 

MARBLE. 

Procedure    Before    Commission,    §2    (eee) 539 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §8    (4)    (d) 582 

Released   Rates,    §5    (a) 713 

MASURITE. 

Procedure   Before    Commission,   §10    (2)    (f) 545 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §108    (a)    (b) 673 

MATTRESSES. 

Alternative    Rates,    I    (a) 69 

Classification,    §7     (aa) 138 

Express    Companies,    §8    (f ) 377 

Minimums,    §5    (d) 500 

Tariffs,     §7     (i) 816 

MEATS   (See  also  Packinghouse  Products). 

Advanced   Rates,   §1    (5)    (a) 10 

Advanced    Rates,    §5     (d) 13 

Advanced   Rates,   §5    (2)    (b) 14 

Advanced    Rates,    §19    (c) 46 

Discrimination,   §8    (3)    (a) 248 

Discrimination,    §9    (d) 260 

Peddler    Car    Service,    (a)    (b) 532 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §118    (a) 678 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §119    (b) 679 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §118   (c)    (d)    (e)    (f) 681 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §118    (f )    (g) 682 

Reduced    Rates,    §2     (a) 704 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §13   (a) 860 

MEDICAL  PACKAGES. 

Express    Companies,    §13    (a) 383 

MEDICINE. 

Express   Companies,   §11    (4)    (a) 379 

MERCHANDISE. 

Discrimination,    §9    (c) 259 

Equalization   of   Rates,   §6    (1) 306 

Express   Companies,    §11    (4)    (a) 379 

Express    Companies,    §11    (8)    (a) 380 

Express    Companies,    §15    (b) 384 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §8    (c) 392 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §109    (a) 673 

MILEAGE    BOOK. 

Tariffs,     §7     (ss) 821 


1016  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

MILK.  Page 

Advanced    Rates,    §3    (aa) 11 

Advanced   Rates,   §7    (2)    (a) 23 

Advanced    Rates,    §13    (b) 31 

Advanced    Rates,    §13    (e) 32 

Advanced    Rates,    §18    (7)    (a) 44 

Advanced    Rates,    §19     (dd) 47 

Business    Secrets,    I    (b)     (bb) 108 

Cars  and   Car  Supply,   §7    (b) 110 

Classification,     §5     (c) 136 

Classification,     §13      (f) 146 

Evidence,     §9     (a) 319 

Express    Companies,    §11    (9)    (a) 380 

Express    Companies,    §11    (9)    (b) 381 

Interstate    Commerce,     §1     (g) 418 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §40    (1) 612 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §71    (a) 630 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §111    (a) 673 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §111    (c) 675 

Tariffs,     §7     (ggg) 823 

Tariffs,     §14      (b) 831 

MILLET    SEED    (See   Seed). 

MILLINERY. 

Classification,     §16     (h) 151 

MINE-PROP    LOGS    (See    Lumber   and   Forest   Products). 

MINERAL  WATER. 

Classification,     §7      (f) 140 

MOHAIR. 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §113    (a) 677 

MOLASSES. 

Routing    and    Misrouting,    §2    (c) 749 

MONEY. 

Express    Companies,    §6     (a) 375 

Express     Companies,     §6     (c) 376 

MOTORCYCLES. 

Classification,     §18     (6)      (a) 154 

Evidence,     §12     (18)      (a) 321 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §32^^     (d) 607 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §114    (a)    (b) 677 

MULTIGRAPHS. 

Classification,     §18     (7)     (a) 155 

MUSSEL    SHELLS. 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,    §115    (a) 677 

MUSTARD    SEED. 

Classification,     §17     (e) 153 

NAILS. 

Discrimination,    §4     (gg)     (hh) 233 

Discrimination,     §9     (q) 264 

Proportional    Rates,    III     (d) 559 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  1017 

NAILS— Cont'd  Page 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §97    (a) 657 

Routing   and    Misrouting,    §3    (d) 751 

Tariffs,    §7     (bbb) 823 

NEAR   BEER. 

Classification,     §17     (v) 153 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §47    (g) 615 

NEWSPAPER. 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §116    (a) 677 

NEWS    PRINTING    PAPER    (See    Paper). 

NITRATE  OF   SODA. 

Classification,     §10     (f ) 141 

Tariffs,  §7  (cccc) 826 

NUCOA  BUTTER. 

Classification,    §18     (2)     (a) 153 

NUCOLINE. 

Classification,    §18     (2)     (a) 153 

OAK    (See   Lumber   and   Forest   Products). 

OATS    (See   Grain  and   Products). 

OILS  (See  also  Cottonseed  Oil,  Grease,  Petroleum  and  Products). 

Cars   and    Car   Supply,   §17    (a)    (b) 118 

Crimes,     §7     (e) 185 

Crimes,    §14    (a) 190 

Discrimination,     §4     (qq) 238 

Equalization    of    Rates,    §2    (s) 290 

Evidence,    §12     (19)     (a) 322 

Evidence,    §14     (5)     (r) 332 

Evidence,     §29     (n) 342 

Long  and   Short  Hauls,  §5    (uu) 456 

Procedure    Before    Commission,    §2    (11)    (mm) 540 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §8    (4)    (r) 583 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §117   (a)    (d)    (e) 678 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §122    (f ) 683 

Reparation,     §16     (t) 736 

Switch   Tracks    and    Switching,    §4    (c) 789 

Tariffs,     §7     (e) 815 

Tariffs,      §17      (c) 832 

Through   Routes   and  Joint  Rates,   §16    (a) 878 

Through   Routes   and   Joint  Rates,   §20    (a) 882 

Transportation,     §2     (1) 889 

Weights    and    Weighing,    §5    (a) 902 

Weights    and    Weighing,    §8    (a) 904 

OIL  MEAL. 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (vv)    (ww) 872 

Through   Routes   and  Joint  Rates,   §19    (c) 881 

OIL   WELL   SUPPLIES. 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (ss) 871 

OLD  SHIPMENT, 

Reduced    Rates,    §5    (f ) 706 


1018  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

ONIONS    (See    Vegetables).  Page 

ORANGES    (See   also  Fruit). 

Blanket   Rates,    §11    (i) 96 

Evidence,    §12     (27)     (b) 322 

Evidence,     §20     (ff) 337 

Precooling,     II     (a) 532 

Precooling,   II    (f),    III    (b) 533 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,    §84    (j) 640 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,    §84    (x) 645 

Refrigeration,     §3     (d) 707 

Refrigeration,     §4     (e) 708 

Refrigeration,     §4      (f) 709 

Refrigeration,      §4      (1) 710 

Reparation,      §2      (g) 715 

Through   Routes   and   Joint   Rates,   §15    (kkkk) 876 

ORE. 

Advanced   Rates,    §7    (2)    (d) 24 

Blanket   Rates,    §13    (a) 97 

Classification,     §11      (1) 143 

Equalization  of  Rates,   §4    (2)    (1) 300 

Interstate    Commerce    Commission,    §1    (g) 427 

Procedure    Before    Commission,    §13    (f) 549 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §24    (b) 598 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §32^^    (aa) 607 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §96    (b) 656 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §96     (1) 657 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §100    (a) .7. 658 

Routing    and    Misrouting,    §4    (xx) 758 

Switch   Tracks   and   Switching,   §7    (i) 794 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,   §15    (hhh) 873 

PACKAGE  FREIGHT— 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §10   (j) 393 

PACKING  HOUSE  PRODUCTS   (See  also  Meats). 

Absorption  of  Charges,   §2    (a) 1 

Advanced  Rates,  §1   (5)    (a) 10 

Advanced  Rates,  §5   (d) 13 

Advanced  Rates,  §5   (2)    (b) 14 

Advanced  Rates,  §19   (c) 46 

Blanket  Rates,   §2    (j) 79 

Crimes,  §5   (e) 184 

Differentials,  §5   (b) 210 

Discrimination,  §8  (3)    (a) 248 

Discrimination,   §8    (3)    (d) 249 

Discrimination,    §9    (cc) 260 

Evidence,  §20   (g) 337 

Peddler  Car  Service,  (a)  (b) 532 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §118    (a) 678 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §118    (b) 679 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §118   (c)    (d) 681 


J 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  1019 

PACKING  HOUSE  PRODUCTS— Cont'd  Page 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §118    (g) 682 

Reduced  Rates,   §2    (a) 704 

Tariffs,   §8    (1) 828 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §13  (a) 860 

PAINT. 

Classification,    §7    (bb) 138 

PAPER. 
Bills  of  Lading: 

Basing  Points  and  Lines,  §5  (d) 76 

Classification,   §7    (c) 138 

.Classification,   §16   (c) 150 

/  Classification,   §17    (o) 153 

^  Commodity  Rates,  §3  (f ) 160 

Divisions,    §4    (b) 277 

Minimums,  §8   (e) '. 508 

Procedure  Before  Commission,  §10  (2)   (c) 545 

Proportional  Rates,  IV  (r) 561 

Reasonable   Rates,   §42    (a) 613 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §107  (b) 673 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §119  (b) 682 

Reparation,    §16    (1) 736 

\     Reparation,   §16    (pp) 737 

^    Tariffs,   §7    (ee)., 819 

Tariffs,  §7  (ff)    (gg) 820 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (yy) 872 

PAPER  MILL  ROLLS. 

Commodity  Rates,  §4  (a) 161 

PAPER  PAILS. 

Procedure  Before  Commission,  §10  (2)  (d) 545 

PAPER  STOCK. 

Equalization  of  Rates,   §4   (2)    (g) 299 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §119  (a) 682 

PARTITIONS. 

Classification,   §15    (e) 149 

PASSENGER  CAR. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §120    (a) 682 

PAVING  BLOCKS. 

Overcharges,   §9    (f ) 516 

Weights  and  Weighing,  §4  (d) 902 

PEACHES  (See  also  Fruit). 

Loss  and  Damage,  §5   (c) 481 

Loss  and  Damage,  §11  (c) 491 

Minimums,    §7    (f) 502 

Minimums,    §7    (q)     (r)     (s) 504 

Precooling,     III     (c) 534 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §84    (m) 641 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84   (t) 644 

Refrigeration,  §4   (k) 710 


1020  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

PEACHES— Cont'd  -  Page 

Refrigeration,   §7    (a) 710 

Tariffs,  §7    (gggg) 827 

PEANUT  ROASTERS. 

Classification,  §4^^    (e) 136 

PEAS   (See  Vegetables). 

PERCOLATORS. 

Classification,  §18   (3)    (a) 154 

PERISHABLE  PRODUCE    (See  Produce). 

PERSULPHATE   OP  IRON. 

Minimums,    §8    (g) 509 

PETROLEUM   AND   PRODUCTS. 

Claims,    §3    (c) 128 

Crimes,  §11  (a)    (b) 188 

Crimes,   §27    (a) 193 

Discrimination,  §7   (rs) 246 

Discrimination,    §9     (b) 261 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §5  (c) 305 

Equalization  of  Rates,  §6   (r) 308 

Evidence,    §56    (a) 351 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §21   (u) 411 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §6  (a) 457 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §9   (m) 462 

Procedure  Before  Commission,  §2  (kk)   (11)   (mm) 540 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §28    (gg) 605 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §38   (f ) 610 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §117  (b)   (c) 678 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §122  (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   (e) 683 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §122    (g),  §123   (a) 684 

Routing  and  Misrouting,  §7  (c) 761 

Transportation,   §12    (c)    (e) 893 

PHOSPHATE  ROCK. 

Discrimination,  §4  (oo) 235 

Facill  ties  and  Privileges,  §20   (g) 407 

Reas(vnableness   of  Rates,   §28   (cc) 604 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §126    (a) 685 

Repa?  ation,   §16    (bb) 737 

Repaj  ation,    §16    (zz) 738 

Repanvtion,   §19    (m)    (n) 744 

PICKLES. 

Equalisation  of  Rates,  §4  (2)    (i) 300 

PIG  IRON  (See  Iron). 

PINE    (See   Lumber    and   Forest   Products). 

PINBAPPL1^<S    (See   also   Fruit). 

Blanket  Rate,   §11    (bb) 95 

Equaliza  tion  of  Rates,  §6   (t) 309 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84    (b) 637 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84  (q) 642 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84  (q) 643 

Reparation,  §2  (g)   715 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 


PINE   CONES    (See   Lumber  and  Forest  Products). 

PINS    (See   Insulator   Pins). 

PIPE. 

Discrimination,    §8    (3)    (c) 

Minimums,    §7    (nn) 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §95   (b) 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §97    (a) 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,   §15   (ss) 871 

PLASTER. 

Reparation    ,§16    (r) '. 736 

Reparation,     §17     (k) 742 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §13   (k) 861 

PLASTER  BOARDS. 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §124    (a) 684 

PLOWS    (See  also  Agricultural  Implements). 

Commodity   Rates,   §3    (a) 160 

Tariffs,     §7     (dd) 819 

PLOW   HANDLES. 

Commodity   Rates,   §3    (e) 160 

PLOW  PARTS. 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §13   (v) 862 

POLES   (See  Lumber  and  Forest  Products). 

POSTCARDS. 

Classification,  §18    (8)    (a) 155 

POSTS   (See  Lumber  and  Forest  Products). 

POTASH    SALT   MINERAL. 

Import   Traffic,  II    (a) 416 

POTATOES    (See   Vegetables). 

POULTRY. 

Equalization  of   Rates,   §2    (t) 290 

Evidence,   §63    (n) 356 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §40    (h) 611 

Reasonable   Rates,    §56    (a) 618 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §118   (e) 681 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §118    (h) 682 

Weight  and  Weighing,  §8    (c) 905 

POWDER. 

Blanket   Rates,    §8    (dd) 89 

PRINT   PAPER    (See   Paper). 

PRODUCE. 

Classification,    §13    (c) 145 

Classification,    §13     (d) 146 

Evidence,    §12    (22)     (a) 322 

Interstate    Commerce   Commission,    §14    (o) 438 

Reconsignment,    §1    (c) 697 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (g) 866 

Track   Storage,  II    (e) 885 


1022  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

PULPWOOD.  Page 

Blanket    Rates,    §13    (h) 99 

Evidence,    §12    (20)    (a) 322 

Minimums,    §7    (qq)    (rr) 507 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §128   (a) 685 

PYRITES,    CINDER. 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §129    (a) 685 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §129  (b) 686 

RABBITS. 

Express   Companies,   §11    (7)    (a) 380 

RAGS. 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §98    (b)    (c)    (d) 658 

RAILROAD    MATERIALS   AND    SUPPLIES. 

Discrimination,    §6    (c) 242 

Evidence,  §17   (i) 334 

Special    Contracts,    §2    (cc) 776 

Tariffs,    §3    (1)     (g) 806 

RAILROAD   CONTRACTORS. 

Demurrage,   §4    (b) 196 

RATS. 

Express   Companies,   §11    (7)    (a) '. 380 

REFRIGERATOR. 

Classification,    §15     (e) 149 

RETURNED   SHIPMENT, 

Reduced    Rates,    §5 705 

RICE. 

Blanket   Rates,    §7    (a) 83 

Differential,   §5   (d) 211 

Products  of  Differential,  §7  (a) 216 

Discrimination,   §4    (rr) 239 

Discrimination,    §13    (a) 269 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §15   (q) 400 

Long  and   Short  Hauls,   §9    (h) 461 

Reconsignment,    §1    (g) 698 

Reconsignment,   §8    (a) 704 

Reparation,    §17     (h) 741 

ROCK    SALT    (See   Salt). 

ROD   IRON    (See  Iron). 

ROOFING. 

Discrimination,    §4    (gg) 233 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §97   (b) 658 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §138    (a) 688 

Routing  and  Misrouting,   §3    (d) 751 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §130    (a) 686 

Tariffs,    §7    (bbb) 832 

ROOFING    COATING. 

Discrimination,    §4    (gg) 233 

ROOFING  PAPER. 

Procedure  Before  Commission,  §10   (2)    (c) 545 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  1023 

ROPE.  Page 

Equalization  of  Rates,   §3   (nn) 297 

ROSIN. 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §131    (a) 686 

ROWBOATS. 

Classification,   §4    (c) 134 

Classification,   §4^^    (d) 136 

RUGS. 

Reasonable   Rates,   §44    (a) 613 

RYE    (See   Grain   and   Products). 

SACKS. 

Classification,    §16     (o) 151 

SAFETY    FUSE. 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §133    (a) 686 

SAFETY    PINS. 

Classification,    §7    (dd) .139 

SAGO. 

Reasonable   Rates,   §44    (a) 613 

SALT. 

Blanket   Rates,    §17    (c) 100 

Business   Secrets,   I    (a) 107 

Discrimination,   §4    (rr) 239 

Discrimination,  §8   (5)    (b) 254 

Discrimination,    §9    (k) 262 

Discrimination,    §10    (e) 266 

Discrimination,    §15    (d) 274 

Divisions,    IV    (b) 277 

Evidence,    §61    (bb) 354 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §20   (d) 407 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §12   (1)    (a) 475 

Proportional   Rates,  III   (aa) 558 

Proportional  Rates,  IV   (g) 560 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §8   (1)    (bb) 576 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §118    (b) 679 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §134   (a)    (b)    (c)    (d) 687 

Water   Carriers,   §3    (a)    (b) 899 

SAND. 

Evidence,    §61    (p) 355 

SASH   (See  Lumber  and  Forest  Products). 

SASH    WEIGHTS. 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §135    (a) 687 

SAWDUST. 

Evidence,   §64    (x) 359 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §136    (a) 687 

Tariffs,   §7    (iii)    (jjj) 823 

SCRAP  IRON   (See  Iron), 

SEATS. 

Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §32   (c) 124 

Classification,   §10    (c) 141 


1024  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

SEA  FOODS.                                                                                                                       Page 
Express  Companies,  §24   (c) 385 

SEPARATORS. 

Through  Routes  'and  Joint  Rates,  §13   (w) 863 

SCREENS. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §105    (gg) 671 

SEED. 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §89    (f ) 650 

Reparation,    §16     (p) 736 

SHEEP   (See  also  Livestock). 

Advanced  Rates,  §18   (9)    (a) 45 

Car  and  Car  Supply,  §8   (d) 112 

Evidence,    §1     (cc) 315 

Evidence,    §12    (28)     (a) 322 

Evidence,    §12    (28)    (bb) 323 

Evidence,    §13    (2)     (c) 325 

Evidence,    §13    (5)    (b) 327 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §19   (d) 405 

Long  and  Short  Haul,  §5   (j) 451 

Minimums,    §7     (c) 501 

Minimums,     §7     (1) 503 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §103    (d) 660 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §103    (i) 662 

Reparation,    §8    (a) 730 

Tariffs,    §15    (b) 832 

Transportation,    §11    (a) 891 

SHEEP  SKINS. 

Classification,    §14     (c) 147 

Routing  and   Misrouting,   §10    (a) 770 

SHEET   IRON    (See  Iron). 

SHELVING. 

Tariffs,   §7    (q)    (r)    (s) 817 

SHINGLES    (See  Lumber  and  Forest  Products). 

SHODDY   DUST. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §98    (d) 658 

SHOES. 

Advanced  Rates,  §18   (3)    (a) 42 

Advanced    Rates,    §19    (ee) 48 

Any  Quantity  Rate,  I   (i) 71 

Classification,    §11    (j) 143 

Express  Companies,  §12   (a) 382 

SHOE  MATERIAL. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §101   (a) 659 

SHOWCASES. 

Classification,    §16     (a) 150 

Tariffs,  §7    (b)    (h) 815 

Tariffs,    §7    (ooo) 824 

SIGNBOARDS. 

Classification,    §15    (f ) 149 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  1025 

SKINS    (See  Goat   Skins,   Sheep   Skins).  Page 

SMOKESTACKS. 

Classification,   §15    (d) 149 

SOAP. 

Advanced  Rates,  §5   (2)    (h) 16 

Classification,    §7     (dd) 139 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §8   (4)   (ee) 582 

Reparation,      §7      (c) 727 

SODA  ASH. 

Evidence,     §12     (30)      (a) 323 

SODA    PRODUCTS. 

Allowances,     §12     (2)     (f ) 66 

SODA    WATER    FOUNTAINS. 

Classifications,     §16     (1) 151 

Overcharges,     §9      (t) 517 

SODIUM     PEROXIDE. 

Evidence,      §52      (f ) 351 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §28    (kk) 605 

SPIKES. 

Classification,     §7      (b) -.-  138 

SPOKES. 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §93     (a) 652 

SPRING    WAGONS     (See    Wagons). 

SPRUCE    (See    Lumber    and    Forest    Products. 

STAMPED    WARE. 

Reasonableness     of     Rates,     §141     (a) 689 

STAPLES. 

Discrimination,     §4     (gg)     (hh) 233 

Proportional    Rates,    III     (d) 559 

STARCH. 

Facilities    and    Privileges,    §15    (i) 398 

Facilities    and    Privileges,     §21     (s) 411 

Special     Contracts,     §5     (g) 782 

Tariffs,     §7     (kkk) 823 

STAVES    (See   Lumber   and   Forest  Products). 

STEAM    SHOVELS. 

Bills    of    Lading,    §5    (e) 76 

STEEL. 

Classification,    §13     (b) 145 

Classification,     §15      (g) 149 

Classification,     §16      (e) 150 

Discrimination,     §8     (3)     (j) 251 

Discrimination,     §9      (o) 263 

Facilities    and    Privileges,    §15    (r) 400 

Long   and    Short   Hauls,    §9    (a) 460 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §95     (a) 655 

Routing    and    Misrouting,    §4    (dd) 764 

Through   Routes   and  Joint  Rates,   §15    (bb) " 869 

Through   Routes  and   Joint  Rates,   §15    (uu) 871 


1026  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

STEEL    ARTICLES.  Page 

Discrimination,     §4      (1) 234 

STEEL  PLATE  (See  Steel). 

STEEL  RAILS. 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §137    (a) 688 

STEEL    RODS     (See    Steel). 

STEEL  SHEETS  (See  Steel). 

STONE    (See   also    Granite,   Marble,   etc.). 

Equalization    of    Rates,    §4    (2)     (s) 301 

Equalization    of    Rates,    §6     (s) 309 

Minimums,     §7      (w) 505 

Weights   and  Weighing,   §4    (b)    (c) 901 

STOVES, 

Discrimination,    §4     (1) 234 

Gasoline: 

Routing   and   Misrouting,    §4    (aa) 755 

Through   Routes   and  Joint  Rates,   §15    (ttt) 875 

STRAW. 

Minimums,    §5    (h),    §6    (h) 501 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §92     (a) 651 

Weight    and    Weighing,    §10    (c) 906 

STRAWBERRIES    (See   also   Fruit). 

Facilities    and    Privileges,    §10    (n) 394 

Facilities    and    Privileges,    §20    (e) 407 

Minimums,    §7     (q)     (r)     (s) 504 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §84    (k) 640 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §84     (t) 644 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §84    (x) 647 

Refrigeration,     §4     (g) 709 

Refrigeration,    §4    (k) 710 

STRUCTURAL  IRON  (See  Iron). 

STRUCTURAL  STEEL  (See  Steel). 

STUCCO. 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,     §143     (a) 689 

SUGAR. 

Allowances,    §8     (4)     (a) 58 

Allowances,    §8    (4)     (b)     (c) 59 

Allowances,    §8     (7)     (a) 60 

Allowances,    §12     (1)     (a) 63 

Allowances,     §15      (e) 68 

Bills   of   Lading,    §5    (a)    (b) 76 

Business     Secrets,     I     (c) 108 

Commerce     Court,     §3     (c) 157 

Crimes,     §28      (b) 193 

Discrimination,     §4      (gg) 233 

Discrimination,     §4      (q) 237 

Discrimination,     §4     (rr) 239 

Discrimination,    §8     (5)     (c) 254 

Discrimination,     §9      (j) 262 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  1027 

SUGAR— Cont'd  Page 

Electric    Lines,    II    (b) 281 

Equalization   of   Rates,    §4    (4)    (k) 304 

Interstate   Commerce,   §3    (g) 420 

Lighterage,    §3    (b)    (c)    (d) 440 

Lighterage,     §4     (a) 441 

Long    and    Short    Hauls,    §5    (t) 454 

Minimums,    §8    (b) 508 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §28    (z) 604 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §144    (a) 689 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §144    (b) 690 

Switch   Tracks   and   Switching,  '§4    (k) 790 

Tariffs,    §6     (k) 814 

SUGAR  BEET  PULP. 

Proportional    Rates,     II     (f ) 557 

Routing    and    Misrouting,    §4    (pp) 757 

SUGAR    BUTTER. 

Evidence,     §61     (o) 355 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §28    (ii) 605 

SULPHATE    OF   IRON. 

Minimums,     §4      (j) 499 

SULPHURIC   ACID. 

Evidence,    §12     (26)     (a) 322 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §145     (a) 690 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,    §145    (b)    (c) 691 

Reparation,     §2      (o) 717 

Tariffs,     §7     (bb) 819 

Through    Routes   and   Joint   Rates,    §15    (gg) 869 

SYRUP. 

Discrimination,      §4      (gg) 233 

Divisions,     §1     (a) 275 

Equalization    of    Rates,    §3    (c) 291 

Reparation,     §19     (i) 743 

TABLES. 

Minimums,    §5    (d) 500 

TALLOW. 

Classification,     §9      (c) 140 

TAN    BARK. 

Routing    and    Misrouting,    §4    (tt) 758 

TANK    BLOCKS. 

Classification,     §17      (j) 153 

Reparation,     §16      (oo) 737 

TANK    CARS. 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §16   (a) 878 

Weight   and    Weighing,    §9    (a) 904 

TANK   MATERIAL. 

Classification,     §17     (b) 151 

Through    Routes    and   Joint   Rates,    §15    (i) 866 


1028  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

TANKS    AND    SUBSTRUCTURES.  Page 

Long   and    Short    Hauls,    §10    (ee) 474 

Through   Routes   and   Joint   Rates,   §13    (q) 862 

Through   Routes    and   Joint   Rates,    §15    (rrr) 874 

TANK    WAGONS. 

Tariffs,      §7      (ccccc) 826 

TANNERS'    OUTFITS. 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §146    (a) 691 

TAPIOCA. 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §44    (a) 613 

TEA. 

Reasonable    Rates,     §44     (a) 613 

TEA    DUST. 

Reasonable    Rates,    §44    (a) 613 

TEE   RAILS. 

Tariffs,     §7     (rrr) 824 

TENDERS. 

Advanced    Rates,    §16     (c) 37 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §104    (a) 664 

TENT    PINS. 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §147     (a) 691 

TENTS. 

Cars   and    Car   Supply,   §32    (c) 124 

Classification,    §10     (c) 141 

THEATRICAL    EQUIPMENT. 

Cars    and    Car    Supply,    §32    (c) 124 

Classification,     §10      (c) 141 

TIES    (See   Lumber   and   Forest  Products). 

TIMBER. 

TIMOTHY  SEED  (See  Seed). 

TIN  PLATE  SCRAP. 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §149    (a) 692 

TOBACCO. 

Export    Rates    and    Facilities,    III    (e) 367 

Minimums,     §7     (p) 504 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §66    (bb) 622 

Through   Routes   and  Joint  Rates,   §15    (vvv) 875 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §16   (h)    (i) 879 

TOBACCO   JARS. 

Classification,    §17     (n) 153 

TOMATOES    (See   Vegetables). 

THRESHING    MACHINES. 

Discrimination,    §15    (e) 274 

TOOLS. 

Evidence,    §40     (c) 345 

TOYS. 

Classification,    §7     (d) 139 

TRACK  BOLTS    (See  Bolts), 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  1029 

TRAPS.                                                                                                                               Page 
Tariffs,     §7     (qqq) 824 

TRIPLEX   CLOTH. 

Classification,    §18    (10)     (a) 155 

Tariffs,    §7     (yy) 822 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (j) 866 

TRUCKS. 

Classification,    §17    (m) 153 

TUBING. 

Reasonable   Rates,   §51    (a) 616 

TURNIPS    (See   Vegetables). 

TYPEWRITERS. 

Procedure  Before   Commission,   §5   (1) 543 

VEGETABLES. 

Assorting  Packages,    (c) 72 

Assorting    Packages,    (d) 73 

Auction   Company    (a) 73 

Blanket  Rates,  §11   (bb) 95 

Branch   Lines,    §1    (c) 102 

Branch   Lines,    §2    (b) 104 

Differential,     §6     (b) 214 

Equalization  of  Rates,   §1    (s) 286 

Equalization   of  Rates,    §3    (m) 293 

Exclusive    Contracts,    (c) 364 

Facilities    and   Privileges,    §1    (q) 388 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §10   (cc) 393 

Facilities   and   Privileges,    §10    (v) 395 

Procedure    Before    Commission,    §2     (y) 539 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84 637 

Routing  and  Misrouting,   §7    (ddd) 768 

Tariffs,    §7     (hhh) 823 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §13   (o) 862 

Track   Storage,  II   (e) 885 

Transportation,    §12    (f ) 893 

Asparagus: 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84    (p) 641 

Refrigeration,    §4    (i) 709 

Beans: 

Blanket   Rates,    §16    (a) 99 

Discrimination,    §9     (f ) 261 

Equalization   of   Rates,    §3    (mm) 293 

Procedure    Before    Commission,    §5    (m) 543 

Reasonableness  of   Rates,   §121    (b) 863 

Routing  and   Misrouting,   §2    (h) 750 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (s) 867 

Cabbages: 

Branch   Lines,    §1    (c) 102 

Discrimination,    §8    (5)    (a) 254 

Discrimination,    §9     (f) 261 


1030  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

VEGETABLES— Cont'd  Page 

Equalization  of  Rates,   §3    (mm) 293 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §10   (n) 394 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §84    (h) 640 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §84    (r) 644 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §84    (y) 647 

Reparation,    §2     (gg) 719 

Through   Routes   and   Joint  Rates,   §11    (2)    (u) 857 

Weights  and  Weighing,  §5   (h) 902 

Celery: 

Express   Companies,    §11    (2)    (a) 379 

Cucumbers : 

Discrimination,    §9     (f) 261 

Equalization  of  Rates,   §3   (mm) 2il3 

Lettuce: 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §84    (s) 644 

Onions : 

Discrimination,    §8    (5)    (a) 254 

Narrow   Gauge   Railroads,   I    (aa) 512 

Reasonableness  of  Rate,   §84    (o) 641 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §84    (j) 647 

Reparation,    §2     (gg) 719 

Peas: 

Discrimination,    §9     (f) 261 

Equalization  of  Rates,   §3    (mm) 293 

Minimums,    §3    (d) 496 

Potatoes : 

Advanced  Rates,  §17    (b) 38 

Blanket   Rates,    §18    (d) 101 

Branch    Lines,    §1    (c) 102 

Discrimination,    §8    (5)    (a) 254 

Discrimination,    §9     (f) 261 

Equalization  of  Rates,   §3   (mm) 293 

Evidence,    §12    (a)    (b) 320 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §9    (k) 461 

Minimums,    §7    (a) 501 

Minimums,    §7     (ss) 507 

Narrow   Gauge   Railroads,  I    (aa) 512 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §84    (o) 641 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §84    (y) 647 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §127   (a)    (b) 685 

Reparation,    §2     (gg) 719 

Routing  and   Misrouting,   §7    (ccc) 768 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11   (2)    (v) 857 

Tomatoes : 

Facilities   and   Privileges,   §10    (n) 394 

Turnips: 

Through  Routes   and  Joint  Rates,   §15    (rrrr) , 877 


INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES  1031 

VEHICLES    (See   also   Buggies,   Wagons,   etc.).  Page 

Advanced  Rates,  §8   (2)    (b) 29 

Discrimination,    §4    (d)     (dd) 229 

Equalization  of  Rates,   §3    (h) 291 

Long  and   Short  Hauls,   §5    (s) 454 

Minimums,    §8     (j) 509 

Minimums,    §8    (o) 511 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §150  (a) 692 

Substitution  of  Tonnage,  §2    (a)    (r) 786 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (pp) 871 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (qqq) 874 

VEHICLE    WHEELS. 

Classifications,     §14     (f ) 147 

VENEER    (See   Lumber   and   Forest  Products). 

WAGONS    (See   also   Tank  Wagons,   Vehicles). 

Classification,    §16     (d) 150 

Discrimination,     §4     (dd) 229 

Minimums,    §4    (b) 498 

Minimums,    §8     (m) 510 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §8   (4)    (p) 583 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §150    (b) 692 

Tariffs,    §7    (1) 816 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (q)    (r) 867 

Water    Carriers,    §4    (a) 900 

WAGON  AXLES    (See  Axles). 

WAGON    SPRINGS. 

Reparation,     §16     (q) 736 

Through   Routes   and  Joint  Rates,   §15    (q) 867 

WALL   PLASTER. 

Discrimination,    §8    (3)    (e) 249 

Long  and   Short  Hauls,  §5   (hh) 456 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §124   (b)    (c) 684 

Reparation,    §3    (1) 721 

WASHING   POWDER. 

Advanced  Rates,  §5   (2)    (h) 16 

Evidence,  §12    (30)    (a) 323 

WASHING   MACHINE   TUBS. 

Minimums,    §7    (vv) 597 

WATERMELONS. 

Long  and   Short  Hauls,  §5   (mm) 456 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §152    (a) 693 

Reconsignment,    §5    (c) 703 

Reparation,    §16     (y) 736 

Routing    and    Misrouting,    §4    (d) 753 

WAX  PAPER  (See  Paper). 

WHEAT    (See  Grain   and   Products). 

WHITING. 

Reparation,     §8     (ff) 731 


1032  INDEX    TO    COMMODITIES 

WINDMILL    TOWERS.  Page 

Classification,    §17    (g) 152 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §28   (dd) 605 

WINDOW  FRAMES. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105    (gg) 671 

WINE    (See   also  Liquors). 

Classification,  §7,   (a) 138 

Evidence,      30     (aa) 343 

WIRE. 

Discrimination,   §4    (gg)    (hh) 233 

Long  and   Short  Hauls,   §12    (2)    (b) 475 

Proportional    Rates,    III    (d) 559 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §97    (a) 657 

Reasonableness   of  Rates,  §154   (a) 695 

Tariffs,    §7    (x) 818 

WIRE   ARTICLES. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §28   (jj) 605 

WIRE    COAT    HOOKS. 

Classification,    §18    (11)    (a) 155 

WIRE   PRODUCTS. 

Discrimination,    §9    (q) 264 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §19  (b) 881 

WOODENWARE. 

Discrimination,    §4     (1) 234 

Long  and   Short  Hauls,   §5    (s) 454 

WOOD   PULP   BOARD. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §155    (a) 695 

WOOL    (See   Lumber   and   Forest  Products). 

Advanced  Rates,  §7   (1)    (a) 20 

Blanket   Rates,   §2    (e) 79 

Blanket   Rates,    §9    (a) 90 

Blanket   Rates,    §11    (a) 93 

Blanket   Rates,    §11    (aa) 94 

Blanket   Rates,    §13    (aa) 97 

Equalization  of  Rates,   §3    (dd) 291 

Evidence,  §12  (27)    (a)    (b),  §12   (28)    (a) 322 

Evidence,    §12    (28)     (b)     (bb) 323 

Evidence,     §14     (1)     (e) 329 

Evidence,    §16     (a) 333 

Evidence,    §61     (a) 354 

Facilities  and  Privileges,  §14   (a) 396 

Facilities   and   Privileges,    §15    (bb) 397 

Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §4    (b) 443 

Minimums,    §1    (c)     (cc) 494 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §38    (a) 609 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §156    (a) 695 

Reparation,    §7     (v) 730 

WOOL    GARMENTS. 

Evidence,    §32     (b) 343 

WRITING   PAPER    (See   Paper). 


■'V^ 


INDEX  OF  LOCALITIES. 

References  are  to  pages. 

Page 

Aberdeen,  S.  D.,  from  Washington  points.     Lumber.     Transportation,  §11  (d).  892 

Acme,  Tex.,  to  Braidwood,  111     Cement.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §18   (e) . . .  404 
Addington,    Okla.,   to   Clarkesville,   Tex.     Snapped    Corn.     Reasonableness   of 

Rates,   §140    (b) 683 

Afton,  Okla.,  to  Missouri  and  Arkansas  Points.    Hay.    Cars  and  Car  Supplies, 

§20  (c) 119 

Alabama  to  New  York  City.    Cotton.    Any-Quantity  Rates,  I  (f ) 70 

Alaska  and  Adjacent  Countries.    Adjacent  Foreign  Country,  (a) 8 

Alaska  to  Canada  and  other  points.    Alaska,  I  (a)  (b)  (c)   (d)  (e)  (f)   (g)..51,  52 

Albuquerque,  N.  M.,  to  and  from  El  Paso,  Tex.    Class  Rates.    Evidence,  §28  (i) .  340 

Alexandria,  La.     Concentration,  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §4  (b) 390 

Alexandria,  La.,  from  Louisiana  points.     Concentration.     Concentrating  Rates 

and  Privileges,   (aa) 169 

Alexandria,  La.,  to  Brownwood,  Tex.    Corn  Shucks.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§72  (a) , 631 

Alexandria,  Minn.    Concentration.    Facilities  and  Privileges  §4  (c) 390 

Alexandria,  Mo.,  from  Arkansas  and  Missouri  points.    Staves.    Reasonableness 

of  Rates,  §142  (a) 689 

Alexandria,  Mo.,  from  Arkansas  and  Missouri  points.    Staves.    Through  Routes 

and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (p) 867 

Aliceville,  Ala.,  to  Philadelphia,  Pa.    Cotton  Linters.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§74  (b) 632 

Allegheny,  Pa.,  to  Victoria  Mines,  Ont.    Machinery.    Through  Routes  and  Joint 

Rates,  §15  (fff) 873 

Alva,  Okla.,  to  Ft.  Worth  and  Dallas,  Tex.     Cement  plaster.    Advanced  Rates, 

§5  (d).  Blanket  Rates,  §7  (bb) 15,  84 

Amsterdam,  Mo.,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.    Hay.     Commodity  Rates,  §4  (b) 161 

Anaconda,  Mont.,  to  Tacoma,  Wash.     Cattle.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §103 

(k)   (n).  Tariffs,  §4  (m) 662,  812 

Ansley,  Neb,,  to  various  points.    Hogs.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §103  (s) 664 

Anthony,  Kans.,  from  the  South.    Groceries.     Branch  Lines,  §1  (k) 103 

Antwerp,  Belgium,  to  San  Francisco,  Cal.    Reparation,  §10  (f ) 770 

Apalachia  field  to  Carolina  territory.    Coal.    Differentials,  §7  (c) 217 

Appleton,  Wis.,  from  Minnesota  points.     Pulp  Wood.     Minimums,  §7  (qq) 507 

Appleton,  Wis.,  to  Minnesota  Transfer.    Writing  paper.    Reparation,  §16  (pp) . .  737 
Arkansas  from  and  to  various  points.     Live  Stock,  fresh  meats  and  packing- 
house products.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §118  (b) 679 

Arkansas  to   Cairo  and  Thebes,  111.     Staves  and  Heading.     Advanced  Rates, 

§18    (8)    (a) 44 

Arkansas  to  Louisiana  points.     Staves,  hoops  and  heading.     Advanced  Rates, 

§6   (6)    (b) 19 

1033 


1034  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 


Page 

Arkansas  to  Omaha,  Neb.,  and  Council  Bluffs,  la.    Lumber  and  forest  products. 

Advanced  Rates,  §5   (1)    (b) 14 

Arkansas  City,  Kans.    Reconsignments.     Tariffs,  §3  (e) 803 

Arkansas  points  to  E.  St.  Louis,  111.    Walnut  logs.    Blanket  Rates,  §11  (ee) . . .     95 

Arkansas  points  to  Fremont,  Neb.     Coal.    Differentials,  §5  (c) 211 

Arkansas  points  to  Memphis,  Tenn.     Cottonseed.     Differentials,  §6  (a) 214 

Arkansas  points  to  Texas  points.    Ties.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §148  (a) . . .  691 

Arkansas  points  to  various  Louisiana  points.  Staves,  hoops  and  headings.  Ad- 
vanced Rates,  §18  (4)    (a)    43 

Arkansas  points  to  Westport,  Kansas  City,  Mo.  Coal.  Interstate  Commerce 
§3  (1) 421 

Arlington,  S.  D.,  to..  Milwaukee,  Wis.  Wheat  and  rye.  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,   §153   (f) 695 

Armour,  S.  D.,  to  Hettinger,  N.  D.  Rebilling.  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion, §10   (g) 436 

Ashburn,  Ga.,  to  and  from  Eastern,  Western  and  Northern  points.  Rates.  Dis- 
crimination, §8   (2)    (b) 247 

Ashcr,  Okla.,  to  St.  Vrain,  N.  Mex.     Fence  posts.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§105  (s) 668 

Ashgrove,  Mo.,  to  Pine  Bluffs,  Wyo.,  and  Laramie,  Wyo.  Lime.  Minimums, 
§7  (k) 503 

Ashland-Olive  Hill  district,  Kan.,  to  Birmingham,  Ala.,  and  Southern  points. 
Fire  brick.    Discrimination,  §7  (j) 244 

Ashland,  Tex.,  to  Nash,  Okla.     Divisions.     Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 

§5  (e) 846 

Ashland,  Wis.,  Vessel  service.    Water  Carriers,  §2  (e) 897 

Ashtabula  Harbor,  O.,  from  Pittsburg,  Pa.,  district.  Bituminous  coal.  Equaliza- 
tion of  Rates,  §3  (k) 292 

Atchison,  Kans.    Elevation.    Allowances,  §8  (3)  (e),  §14  (f) 67 

Atchison,  Kans.,  to  Milwaukee,  Wis.  Beer  packages.  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§28  (ff) 605 

Atlanta,  Ga.,  to  Washington,  D.  C.  Passenger  facilities.  Passenger  Fares  and 
Facilities,  §11   (a) 525 

Atlanta,  La.,  to  Detroit,  Mich.    Lumber.    Reparation,  §4  (y) 755 

Atlanta,  Tex.,  to  Chicago,  111.,  and  Kansas  City,  Mo.  Canned  peaches.  Equaliza- 
tion of  Rates,  §4  (2)   (p) 301 

Atlantic  Coast  territory  to  Saginaw  Valley  territory,  Mich.  Class  and  com- 
modity Rates.    Blanket  Rates,  §7  (f) 86 

Atlantic  Seaboard  from  Southern  Illinois.  Flour  and  grain.  Long  and  Short 
Hauls,  §5   (bb) 448 

Atlantic  Seaboard  territory  from  the  West.  Grain  and  products.  Evidence, 
§62  (h)    355 

Atlantic  Seaboard  territory  to  the  Missouri  River.  Cotton  piece  goods.  Com- 
modity Rates,  §3  (d) 160 

Atlantic  Seaboard  territory  to  Missouri  River  crossings.  Rates.  Equalization 
of  Rates,  §4  (4)   (h) 303 

Atlantic  Seaboard  territory  to  New  York,  N.  Y.,  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  and  Balti- 
more, Md.    Local  rates.    Absorption  of  Charges,  §2  (e) 1 


INDEX    OP    LOCALITIES  1035 


Page 
Atlantic   Seaboard   territory  to   Southern  points.     Rates.     Reasonableness  of 

Rates,  §8   (4)    (q) 583 

Atlantic  Seaboard  territory  to  the  West    Grain.    Evidence,  §14  (4)  (b) 331 

Atlantic  Seaboard  to  the  West.  Rail  and  Lake  Rates.  Advanced  Rates,  §22  (e)  50 
Augusta,  Ga.,  to  Calhoun  Falls,  S.  C.    Brick.    Equalization  of  Rates,  §4  (2)  (c). 

Evidence,  §47   (f) 299,  348 

Augusta,  Ga.,  to  Tonopah,  Nev.    Cotton  waste.    Evidence,  §64  (m) 358 

Austin,  Minn.,  to  Dayton,  O.  Grease.  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (rr)  871 
Avon,  Conn.,  to  Pleasant  Prairie,  Wis.    Safety  fuse.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§133  (a)    686 

Barnwell,  S.  C,  to  Pawtucket,  R.  I.    Cotton  linters.     Routing  and  Misrouting, 

§C  (g)    752 

Beatrice,  Neb.,  to  Kenosha,  Wis.    Automobiles.    Classification,  §11  (m) 143 

Beaudette,  Mich.,  o  Chicago,  111.    Lumber.    Absorption  of  Charges,  §2  (b) 1 

Beaudette,  Minn.,  to  Grand  Forks,  N.  D.    Poles  and  Posts.    Reasonableness  of 

Rates,   §125    (b) 684 

Beaumont,  Tex.,  to  the  North  Atlantic  Seaboard.    Rice.    Differentials,  §5  (d) . .  211 

Beckville,  Tex.,  to  Oklahoma  points.    Lumber.    Reparation,  §6  (dd) 760 

Beckville,   Tex.,   to   Oklahoma   points.     Lumber.     Through   Routes   and  Joint 

Rates,   §7    (a) 846 

Beecher  Lake,  Wis.,  to  Chicago,  111.    Lath.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (o) 453 

Bell  City,  Mo.,  to  Jacksonville,  Fla.  Elm  hoops.  Weights  and  Weighing,  §5  (e) .  902 
Bellingham,  Wash.,  to  Denver,  Colo.    Apples.    Equalization  of  Rates,  §2  (p) . . .  289 

Bellingham,  Wash.,  to  Menasha,  Wis.,     Shingles.     Reparation,  §7   (tt) 766 

Bellows  Falls,  Vt.,  to  Chattanooga,  Tenn.    Manila  wrapping  paper.    Classifica- 
tion, §16   (c)    150 

Bennington,  Vt.,  to  Portland,  Ore.    Waxed  paper.    Tariffs,  §7  (ff) 820 

Benton  Harbor,  Mich.,  to  Chicago,  111.    Fruit.    Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 

§11    (2)    (z) 859 

Benton  Harbor,  Mich.,  to  Chicago,  111.    Fruit.    Water  Carriers,  §2  (k) 898 

Bernice,  Pa.,  to  Newton,  N.  J.    Coal.    Reparation,  §16  (m) 736 

Bemice,    Pa.,     to     Utica,     N.    Y.       Coal.      Switch    Tracks    and     Switching, 

§4     (n)     (o) 790,  791 

Bickford,    Okla.,    to    Fort    Worth    and    Dallas,    Tex.      Cement    plaster.     Ad- 
vanced Rates,  §5    (2)    (d).     Blanket  Rates,  §7   (bb) 15,     84 

Billings,   Mont.,  and  Wyoming  points  to  Montana  and  Wyoming  branch  line 

points.      Class    rates.     Reasonableness   of   Rates,    §66    (d) 622 

Billings,    Mont,    to   Wyoming.     Rates.     Branch   Lines,    §3    (a) 104 

Billings,  Mont.,  to  Wyoming  branch  line  points.  Rates.  Evidence,  §37  (b) .  344 
Billings,    Mont.,   to   Wyoming  points.     Rates.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §11 

(e),     §20      (d) 588,  597 

Bingham,  la.,  to  St  Charles,  Mo.     Corn,     Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5   (jj)...  456 
Birmingham,    Ala.,    from    Mt    Ross    and    Elizaville,    N.    Y.      Apples.      Rea- 
sonableness   of    Rates,    §84    (1) 640 

Birmingham,    Ala.,     to    New    Orleans,    La.      Pig    iron.      Discrimination,    §9 

(a).     Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §28    (ba) 259,602 

Birmingham    district    Ala.,    to    Georgia,    South    Carolina   and   Florida    points. 

Coal.      Differentials,     §5     (g) 212 


1036  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 

Page 
Bismarck,    N.    D.,    from    Pacific    coast    terminals.      Hemp.      Discrimination, 

§8      (5)      (e) 256 

Black    Mountain    district,    Va.,    to    Carolina    territory.      Coal.      Differentials, 

§7     (ff ) 220 

Black    Rock,    Ark.,    to    San    Francisco,    Cal.      Lumber.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,      §105      (q) 668 

Blissville,    Ark.     Divisions.      Tap    Lines,    §4    (f ) 798 

Blodgett,   Mo.,   to   St.   Joseph,   Mo.     Watermelons.     Reparation,    §4    (d) 753 

Bloomfield,   la.,    to    Ogden,    Utah.      Passenger    fares.      Passenger    Fares    and 

Facilities,      §15      (d) 531 

Bluefield,  W.  Va.,  from  New  York,  N.  Y.,  Philadelphia,  Pa.,   Baltimore,  Md., 

Cincinnati,    O.,   Columbus,    O.,    Chicago,    111.,   and   Pittsburgh,   Pa.     Rates. 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §8    (1)     (cc) 578 

Boardman,    N.    C,    to    Pottsville    and    Schuylkill    Haven,    Pa.     Lumber.     Pro- 
cedure   Before    Commission,    §10    (2)     (p) 546 

Boston,   Mass.,   from   New   England   points.     Milk.     Reasonableness  of   Rates, 

§111      (a) 673 

Boston,    Mass.,   from    Southern   Illinois.     Flour   and    grain.     Long   and    Short 

Hauls,    §12     (2)     (a) 475 

Boston,    Mass.,    from    Southern,    111.      Flour    and    grain    products.      Evidence, 

§13      (3)      (a) 326 

Boston,    Mass.,    from    Southern    Illinois.      Flour.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§83      (,a) 636 

Boston,     Mass.,     from     Southern     Illinois.      Grain     products.      Facilities    and 

Privileges,     §15      (d) 397 

Boston,   Mass.,    from   Virginia   and    Maryland    points.     Strawberries.     Refrig- 

eration,     §4     (g) , 709 

Boston,    Mass.,    to    Atlanta,    Ga.      Boots.      Advanced    Rates,    §18     (3)     (a), 

§19      (ee) 42,     48 

Boston,   Mass.,   to   Bristol   Ferry,   R.   I.     Rates.     Express   Companies,   §8    (d)  376 

Boston,   Mass.,   to  Chicago,   111.     Glue   stock.     Classification,   §11    (c) 142 

Boston,   Mass.,   to   Des   Moines,   la.     Boots.     Any-Quantity  Rates,   I    (i) 71 

Boston,  Mass.,  to  Lewiston,  Me.  Brick.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §52  (g) .  617 
Boston,    Mass.,    to    New    England    points.      Leased    car    system.      Cars    and 

Car    Supply,    §7     (b) 110 

Boston,   Mass.,  to  New   York,   N.  Y,     Boots  and  shoes.     Express   Companies, 

§12      (a) 382 

Boston,    Mass.,    to    Portland    and    Albina,    Ore.      Rubber   covered    iron    paper 

mill   rolls.     Commodity   Rates,   §4    (a) 161 

Boston,  Mass.,   to  Toledo,   O.     Lumber  and   lath.     Import  traffic,  II    (c) 417 

Boston,    Mass.,    to    Toledo,    O.      Lumber    and    spruce    lath.      Evidence,    §13 

(4)      (aa) 327 

Boston,  Mass.,  to  various  states.  Cake.  Express  Companies,  §11  (1)  (a) . .  878 
Boyd,  Wis.,  to  Palermo,  N.  D.  Lumber,  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105  (x)  669 
Brackenridge,     Pa.,     to     Chattanooga,     Tenn.       Steel     sheets.       Classification, 

§16,     '(e) 150 

Brainerd,   Minn.,   to   Tampa,   Fla.     Hay.     Minimums,   §5    (a) 500 

Brazil,    Ind.,    to    Minnesota    Transfer.      Chimney    brick.      Special    Contracts, 

§7     (a) 782 


INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES  1037 


Page 
Brazil,    Ind.,    to    Racine,    Wis.      Clay    conduit.      Long    and    Short   Hauls,    §6 

(e)      (f ) 457 

Braznell,  Pa.,  to  Buffalo,  N.  Y,     Coal.     Blanket  Rates,  §7   (aa) 83 

Brevoort,   Miss.,   to    Cincinnati,    O.     Lumber.     Interstate   Commerce   Commis- 
sion,    §14     (d) 437 

Brevoort,   Miss.,   to  Cincinnati,   O.     Lumber.     Reparation,   §3    (d) 720 

Brewton,  Ala.,  to  Atlanta,  Ga.     Lumber.    Reparation,  §7  (aa) 761 

Brewton,     Ala.,    to    Michigan    points.      Fruit    baskets.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,     §85      (b) 648 

Bridgeport,   Cocn.,  to  Alexandria,  La.     Cartridges.     Differentials,  §5   (a) 210 

Brighton,   O.,   to   Tombstone,   Ariz.     Iron   fences.   Minimums,   §7   (i) 503 

Brilliant,   Ala.,   to   Clinton,   la.     Gum  lumber.     Proportional  Rates,  I   (e) 556 

Brilliant,  Ala.,  to  Thebes,  111.  Lumber.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105  (i) .  666 
Bristol,   Tenn.,    from   Apalachia   field,    Va.      Coal.     Reasonableness   of   Rates, 

§67      (w) 629 

Bristol,  Tenn.,  from  Eastern  points.     Rates.     Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §9   (p).  463 
British    Columbia    to    other    States.      Common    lumber,    cedar,    fir,    etc.     Ad- 
vanced  Rates,    §8    (1)    (i) 28 

British    Columbia    to    St.   Paul,    Minn.,    Chicago,    111.,    Mississippi   River,   Mis- 
souri   River,    Southeastern    Kansas,    Denver,    Colo.,    and    similar    points. 

Shingles  and  forest  products.     Advanced  Rates,  §13   (k) 33 

Britton,    S.    D.,    to    Red    Wing,    Minn.     Flaxseed.     Reasonableness   of   Rates, 

§82      (b) 636 

Brock,  Neb.,  to  St.  Louis,  Mo.  Corn  and  Wheat.  Branch  Lines,  §1  (i) . . .  103 
Broken    Bow,    Neb.,    to    various    points.      Hogs.      Reasonableness    of    Rates 

§103     (s) 664 

Brooklyn,  N.  Y.,  to  Jersey  City,  N.  J.     Lighterage.    Allowances,  §8  (4)    (a) . .     58 

Buffalo,  N.  Y.     Spotting  cars.     Allowances,  §8   (5)    (b) 60 

Buffalo,    N.    Y,      Switching.      Terminal   Facilities,    §3    (g) 836 

Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  to  Boston,  Mass.     Grain.     Discrimination,  §5  (d) 240 

Buffalo,   N.    Y.,   to    California   and   Pacific   Coast   terminals.     Stamped   Ware. 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §141    (a) 689 

Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  to  Irvington,  N.  J.  Flour.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §83  (g)  637 
Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  to  Mount  Dallas  and  Saxton,  Pa.  Ore.  Blanket  Rates,  §13  (a)  97 
Buffalo   to   New   England   and   New   York   points.     Flour  and  grain  products. 

Advanced    Rates,    §13     (m) 35 

Buffalo   to   New  England  points  and  New  York.     Plour  and  wheat  products. 

Advanced    Rates,    §5     (1)     (a) 14 

Buffalo    to    New    England    and    New    York    points.      Grain    products.      Rea- 
sonableness   of    Rates,    §12l^     (c) 590 

Buffalo,    N.    Y.,    to    New   York    and    New    England    points.     Wheal    products. 

Discrimination,     §9      (t) 265 

Buffalo,    N.    Y.,    to    New   York,   N.    Y.     Grain.     Export  Rates   and   Facilities 

V     (d) 371 

Buffalo,    K    Y.,    to    Pennsylvania    and    New    Jersey    points.     Pyrite   cinders. 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §129     (a) 685 

Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  to  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  and  Baltimore,  Md.    Flour.    Differentials. 
§6      (f) 2J15 


1038  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 


Page 
Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  to  points  north  of  Whitehall,  N.  Y.     Soap  and  washing  pow- 
der.     Advanced    Rates,    §5    (2)     (h) 16 

Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  to  Providence,  R.  I.  Flour.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §83  (e)  637 
Buffalo,    N.    Y.,    to    Sheboygan,    Wis.      Mineral-water    bottles.      Reparation, 

§16     (bbbbb) 741 

Buffalo,    N.    Y.,    to    Tulsa,    Okla.      Sulphuric    acid.      Through    Routes    and 

Joint     Rates,     §15      (gg) 869 

Buffalo,    N.    Y.,    to    Unionville,    Conn.      Flour.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§83      (f)      637 

Buffalo,    N.    Y.,    to    Watertown,    Wis.      Steel.      Through    Routes    and    Joint 

Rates,    §15     (uu) 871 

Buff  City,  Kan,,   to  Iowa  points.     Brick.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §52   (b) .  616 
Bunker    Hill,    W.    Va.,    to    Pennsylvania    and    Ohio    points.      Furnace    lime- 
stone.     Differentials,    §7    (g) 221 

Burkburnett,   Tex.,   to   Devol,    Okla.     House   blocking.     Evidence,    §38    (a) . . .  345 
Burlington,  la.,   from  Gulf  ports.     Bananas.     Long  and   Short  Hauls,   §6   (i) .  458 
Baden,   Miss.,   to  Davenport,   la.     Lumber.     Long  and   Short  Hauls,   §5   (q) . .  453 
Bainbridge,    Ga.,    from    St.    Louis,    Mo.      Glass    and    commodity    rates.     Dis- 
crimination,    §8      (5)      (1) 258 

Baker    City,     Ore.,    from    Eastern    points.      Commodity    rates.      Long    and 

Short    Hauls,     §5     (1) 452 

Baker  City,   Ore.,  to  Tacoma,  Wash.     Cattle.     Reparation,   §4   (gg) 756 

Bakerton,  W.  Va.,  to  various  points.  Lime.  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §29  (b) . .  123 
Baltimore,     Md.,    from    Indiana    and    Illinois.      Grain.      Export    Rates    and 

Facilities,     HI     (f ) 368 

Baltimore,  Md.     Scaleage  deductions.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §12   (a) 395 

Baltimore,  Md.    Stock  yard.    Exclusive  Contracts,  (b) 364 

Baltimore,  Md.    Switching.    Special  Contracts  §2  (1)   (m) 773 

Baltimore,  Md.    Switching.    Stock  Yards  Companies,  I  (b) 783 

Baltimore,  Md.    Switching.    Switch  tracks  and  Switching,  §4  (g) 789 

Baltimore,  Md.    Switching.    Terminal  Facilities,  §3  (h),  §3  (i) 836 

Baltimore,  Md.,  to  Atlantic  City,  N.  J.    Passenger  fares.    Passenger  Fares  and 

Facilities,   §9    (d) 525 

Baltimore,  Md.,  to  Denver,  Col.  Bottle  caps.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §49  (a) .  615 
Baltimore,  Md.,  to  Detroit,  Mich.  Iron  pyrites.  Advanced  Rates,  §8  (1)  (m) . .  29 
Baltimore,   Md.,   to   Detroit,   Mich.     Iron   pyrites.     Reasonableness   of   Rates, 

§145   (c)    691 

Baltimore  to  North  and  South  Carolina.    Steel  Girders.    Classification,  §13  (b) .  145 

Baltimore,  Md.    Unloading.    Facilities  and  Privileges,  §10  (p) 394 

Bancroft,  Tex.,  to  Crowley,  La.    Agricultural  implements.     Reasonableness  of 

Rates,  §43   (b) 613 

Bangor,  Me.,  from  the  West.    Corn.    Equalization  of  Rates,  §3  (mm) 296 

Bamett,  Ind.  Ter.,  to  McAlester,  Ind.  Ter.     Interstate  Commerce  Commission, 

§9  (ee)    434 

Barnwell,  S.  C,  to  Pawtucket,  R.  I.     Cotton  linters.     Tariffs,  §7  (nn) 821 

Barre,  Vt.,  to  Buchwick  Junction,  N.  Y.     Granite.    Minimums,  §7  (aa)   (bb) ...  505 

Barre,  Vt,  to  Chesaning,  Mich.    Granite.    Minimums,  §7  (y)  (dd) 505,  506 

Barre,  Vt.,  to  Lestershire,  N.  Y.    Granite.    Minimums,  §7  (x) 505 

Barre,  Vt.,  to  Paducah.    Granite.    Classification,  §10  (b) 140 


INDEX   OF   LOCALITIES  1039 


Page 

Barre,  Vt,  to  Scranton,  Pa.    Granite.    Minimums,  §7  (cc) 506 

Bane,  Vt.,  to  Springfield,  Mass.    Granite.    Minimums,  §7  (ee) 506 

Baire,  Vt.,  to  Troy,  N.  Y.    Granite.    Minimums,  §7  (z) 505 

Barre,  Vt.,  to  Woodlawn,  N.  Y.    Granite.    Minimums,  §7  (ff ) 506 

Bartlett,  Tex.,  to  Winchester,  Kan.    Cottonseed  cake.    Evidence,  §64  (t) 359 

Bates,  111.,  to  Detroit,  Mich.     Corn.    Weights  and  Weighing,  §3  (b) 901 

Batesville,  Kans.,  to  Clinton,  la.    Hay.    Proportional  Rates,  IV  (o) 561 

Baybridge,  O.,  to  Detroit,  Mich.    Cement.    Advanced  Rates,  §18  (1)  (b) 41 

Bay  City,  Mich.,  to  Norfolk,  Va.    Ashes.    Demurrage,  §9  (d) 200 

Caddo  Oil  field.  La.,  to  Texas  points.    Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates.    Com- 
mon Carrier,  §1  (bb) 163 

Cady  Switch,  La.,  to  Omaha,  Neb.  Lumber.  Facilities  and  Privileges,  §19  (f) . .  406 
Care,  111.,  from  Arkansas  and  Louisiana  points.     Lumber.    Reasonableness  of 

Rates,  §105  (t) 668 

Cairo,  111.     Reconsignment,  §3   (q) 701 

Cairo,  111.,  to  Chicago,  111.    Cottonseed  oil.    Discrimination,  §7  (m) 245 

Cairo,  m.,  to  Louisville,  Ky.,  and  Cincinnati,  O.     Cottonseed  oil.     Discrimina- 
tion,  §7    (m) 245 

Cairo,  111.     Transit.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §21   (11) 410 

CaMfornia  points  to  Chicago,  111.    Oranges,    Precooling,  III  (b) 533 

California  points  to  the  East.     Oranges  and  lemons.     Equalization  of  Rates, 

§1  (a)   285 

California  points  to  the  East.    Oranges.    Precooling,  II  (a) 532 

California  points  to  Hamburg,  Germany.    Through  Transportation,  Water  Car- 
riers,   §2    (f) 897 

California  points  to  Miles  City,  Mont.  Citrus  fruits.  Blanket  Rates,  §8  (b) . . .  88 
California  to  Eastern  territory.  Lemons.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84  (c) . .  638 
California  to  the  East.    Lemons.    Advanced  Rates,  Blanket  Rates,  §18  (6)  (a), 

§4-  (bb)    44,     81 

California  to  Eastern  points.    Lemons.    Advanced  Rates,  §22  (d) 50 

California  to  the  East.    Oranges.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84  (j) 640 

California  to  the  East.    Oranges  and  lemons.    Refrigeration,  §4  (f) 709 

California  to  New  York.     Lemons.    Advanced  Rates,  §20  (e) 49 

California  to  Omaha,  Neb.    Beans.    Blanket  Rates,  §16  (a) 99 

California   to  various   points.     Citrus    and   deciduous   fruits.     Blanket  Rates, 

§2   (g)    79 

California  to  Tacoma,  Wash.    Sheep.    Cars  and  Car  Supply  §8  (d) 112 

California   to   Utah   common   points.     Citrus   and   deciduous   fruits.     Blanket 

Rates,  §11   (dd).  Branch  Lines,  §4   (b) 95,  105 

California  to  Utah  common  points.    Fruit.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (k) 451 

Calvin,  Okla.,  to  Arkadelphia,  Ark.    Snapped  corn.     Tariffs,  §6  (h) 813 

Calvin,  Okla.,  to  DeQueen  and  Wilton,  Ark.  Snap  corn.  Reparation,  §9  (a) . .  732 
Calvin,  Okla.,  to  DeQueen  and  Wilton,  Ark.    Snap  corn.    Advanced  Rates,  §22 

(c).   Tariffs,   §6    (f) 50,  813 

Cambridge,  N.  Y.,  to  Eagle  Bridge,  N.  Y.    Fluid  milk.    Advanced  Rates,  §3  (aa), 

§18  (7)   (a) 11,    44 

Cameo,    Col.,    to    Utah,    Nevada,    California,    Oregon,   Washington,    Idaho   and 
Montana.    Coal.    Branch  Lines,  §1  (h) 103 


1040  INDEX    OP    LOCALITIES 


Page 

Cameo,  Col.,  to  Western  points.    Coal.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §67  (u) 628 

Caue  Break,  Tex.,  to  St.  Louis,  Mo.    Potatoes,    Minimums,  §7  (ss) 507 

Caney,  Kans.,  to  Minneapolis,  Minn.     Asphaltum.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§45  (a)    614 

Canton,  O.,  from  Tennessee  points.    Phosphate  rock.    Reparation,  §16  (bb) 737 

Capjtan,  N.  Mex.,  to  El  Paso,  Tex.    Beer  Bottles.    Branch  Lines,  §1  (d) 102 

Carbon  Hill,  Ala.,  to  Herbert  Switch,  Tex.    Coal.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (ii).  550 
Carbon  Hill,  Ala.,  to  New  Albany,  Miss.     Coal.     Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§67   (k)    626 

Cardiff,  111.,  to  Michigan,  Wisconsin,  Iowa,  Minnesota,  South  Dakota  and  Ne- 
braska.    Coal.     Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11  (2)    (y) 859 

Cardiff,  111.,  to  various  points.     Coal.     Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11 

(2)   (X) 858 

Cardington,  O.,  to  Green  Bay,  Wis.    Coiled  elm  hoops.    Minimums,  §7  (t) 504 

Caio,  Tex.,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.    Lumber.    Reparation,  §4  (ii) 756 

Carolina  cities,  from  Chicago,  111.,  East  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  Louisville,  Ky.,  Colum- 
bus, O.,  and  Cincinnati,  O.  Class  rates  and  certain  commodity  rates.  Dis- 
crimination, §8  (3)   (d) 249 

Carthage,  O.,  to  Birmingham,  Ala.     Coal  tar  paving  pitch.     Reasonableness  of 

Rates,  §69  (a) 630 

Carthage,  O.,  to  Nashville,  Tenn.    Roofing  material.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

?130    (a)    686 

Carthage,  N.  Y.,  to  New  York  City.    Proportional  Rates,  IV  (r) 561 

Catasauqua  district,  Pa.     Through  routes.     Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 

§11   (2)    (m) 854 

Catasauqua,  Pa.    Switching.    Tap  Lines,  §4  (k) 799 

Cattaraugus,  N.  Y.,  to  Janesville,  Wis.    Buckwheat.    Through  Routes  and  Joint 

Rates,   §15    (xx) 872 

Cedar  Gap,  Mo.,  to  Minneapolis  and  St.  Paul,  Minn.    Apples.    Evidence,  §29  (h) .  341 

Cedarhurst,  Colo.,  to  Carmen,  Okla.    Reparation,  §4  (fff) 759 

Cedar  Rapids,  la.    Joint  rates.    Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §8  (b) 847 

Cedar  Rapids,  la.    Reconsignment,  §2  (c) 698 

Cedar  Bluffs,  Ky.,  to  Baton  Rouge,  La.    Crushed  stone.    Equalization  of  Rates, 

§6  (s) 309 

Cedar  Rapids,   la.,  to   Boston,   Mass.,   and   New   York,   N.   Y.     Packing-house 

products.     Discrimination,  §9   (d) 260 

Cedar  Rapids,  la.,  to  the  East.    Hogs.    Equalization  of  Rates,  §3  (1) 293 

Cedar  Rapids,  la.    Transit.    Facilities  and  Privileges,  §15  (i),  §21  (s) 398,  411 

Cedar  Rapids,  la.     Transit.     Special  Contracts,  §5    (g) 782 

Celina,  Tex.     Back-haul.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §7  (b) 391 

Cement,   Okla.,  to  Ft.   Worth  and   Dallas,   Tex.     Cement  plaster.     Advanced 

Rates,  §5  (2)   (d).  Blanket  Rates,  §7  (bb) 15,     84 

Centerville   district,    Tenn.,    to    Chicago,    111.,    Indianapolis,    Ind.,    Dayton,    O., 
Columbus,  O.,  Cleveland,  O.,  Canton,  O.,  Sandusky,  O.,  Detroit,  Mich.,  Buf- 
falo, N.  Y.,  and  Pittsburg,  Pa.    Phosphate  rock.    Discrimination,  §4  (oo) ...   235 
Central  City,  Neb.,  to  various  points.    Hogs.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §103  (s)  664 
Central   Freight   Association    territory.     Evaporated    milk.     Advanced    Rates, 
§13   (b)    31 


INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES  1041 


Page 

Central  Freight  Association  territory,  from  Lehigh  Valley  district.  Cement. 
Discrimination,   §5    (c) 240 

Central  Freight  Association  territory.    Local  Rates.    Evidence,  §66  (c) 361 

Central  Freight  Association  territory  to  Missouri  River  cities.  Class  rates. 
Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §7  (a) 575 

Central  Freight  Association  territory  to  Trunk  Line  territory.  Reasonableness 
of  Rates,  §52  (f) 617 

Chalfant  Mines,  Pa.,  to  Buffalo,  N.  Y.    Coal.    Blanket  Rates,  §7  (aa) 8& 

Chambers,  Okla.,  to  Ft.  Worth  and  Dallas,  Tex.  Cement  plaster.  Advanced 
Rates,  §5  (2)   (d).  Blanket  Rates,  §7  (bb) 15,     84 

Chambersburg,   Pa.,  to  Warwick,   N.   Y.     Horses.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§103    (h)    661 

Chanute,  Kans.,  to  Dennison,  la.  Portland  cement.  Long  and  Short  Hauls. 
Minimums,  §2   (a) 495 

Chanute,  Kans.,  to  Whitewood,  S.  D.    Cement.    Minimums,  §7  (pp) 507 

Charleston,  S.  C,  branch-line  points  to  Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  and  Pittsburg,  Pa.  Veg- 
etables.    Differentials,   §6    (b) 214 

Charleston,  S.  C,  to  Augusta,  Fla.    Bananas.    Advanced  Rates,  §7  (4)   (a) 24 

Charleston,  S.  C,  to  Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  and  Pittsburg,  Pa.  Vegetables.  Branch 
Lines,  §1  (c)   102 

Charleston,  S.  C,  to  Augusta,  Ga.     Bananas.     Evidence,  §29  (f ) 341 

Charleston,  S.  C,  to  Buffalo,  N.  Y.  Perishable  produce.  Through  Routes  and 
Joint  Rates,   §15    (g) 866 

Charleston,  S.  C,  to  Gainesville,  Fla.    Acid  phosphate.    Tariffs,  §3  (f ) 803 

Charleston,  S.  C,  to  New  York,  N.  Y.  Vegetables.  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§84    (a)    637 

Charleston,  S.  C,  to  Pittsburg,  Pa.  Perishable  produce.  Through  Routes  and 
Joint   Rates,    §15    (f) 866 

Charleston,  S.  C,  to  Washington,  D.  C,  Baltimore,  Md.,  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  and 
New  York,  N.  Y.    Asparagus.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84  (p) 641 

Charleston  district,  S.  C,  to  Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  and  Pittsburg,  Pa.  Vegetables. 
Branch  Lines,  §2  (b) 104 

Charleston  district,  S.  C,  to  Eastern  and  Northern  points.  Asparagus.  Re- 
frigeration, §4   (i)    709 

Charleston  district,  S.  C,  to  Eastern  and  Northern  points.  Vegetables.  Dis- 
crimination, §9   (f)    261 

Charleston  district,  S,  C,  to  the  North  and  East.  Vegetables.  Equali- 
zation  of   Rates,    §3    (mm) 293 

Charlotte,  N.  C,  to  New  York,  N.  Y.  Cotton  waists.  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,     §76     (a) 634 

Chattanooga,    Tenn.,   to    Alabama    points.     Grain.     Reasonableness   of  Rates, 

§89      (b) 649 

Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  from  Cincinnati,  O.,  and  Chicago,  111.  Numbered 
Rates.      Discrimination,    §8     (5)     (d) 255 

Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  to  Huntsville,  Ala.     Smoke  stack.     Classification,  §15  (d)  149 

Chattanooga,    Tenn.,    to   Oakland,    Cal.     Grate   bars.     Tariffs,   §7    (d) 815 

Checotah,    Okla.,    to    Los    Angeles,    Cal.      Cotton    linters.      Reparation,    §16 

(zzzz) 741 

Cheltenham,   Mo.,  to  Chicago,  111.     Brick.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §52   (e)  617 


1042  INDEX    OP    LOCALITIES 


Page 
Cheltenham,  Mo.,  to  New  Iberia,  La.  Brick.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §52  (i)  617 
Cheltenham,  Mo.,  to  Tuscaloosa,  Ala.  Pressed  brick.  Classification,  §11  (e)  142 
Chester,   Va.,   to    Columbus,    O.,   and   Ohio   Points.     Lumber.     Discrimination, 

§8     (4)     (c) 254 

Chester,   Mo.,  to  Kansas   City,   Mo.,  Wood  and  coal.     Absorption  of  Charges, 

§2      (d) 1 

Chester,    Va.,    to    Ohio    points.      Rates.      Through    Routes    and    Joint    Rates, 

§15      (gggg) 876 

Chicago,    111.      Assorting    Packages,    (b)     (d) 72,     73 

Chicago,  111.,  from  Iowa  points.  Sheep.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §103  (i)  662 
Chicago,    111.,    from   Louisiana    and    Mississippi    points.      Cabbages.      Weights 

and    Weighing,     §5     (h) 902 

Chicago,    111.,   from    Missouri   River.     Live    stock.     Reasonableness    of  Rates, 

§103      (j) 662 

Chicago,    111.,    from    Missouri    River    Points.      Dressed    meats    and    packing 

house    products.      Discrimination,    §8    (3)     (a) 248 

Chicago,  111.,  from  Nebraska  points.     Wheat.     Reparation,   §4    (ddd) 759 

Chicago,   111.,   from   various   points.     Cream.     Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §111 

(d) 675 

Chicago,  111.,  from  West  Virginia  and  Pennsylvania  points.  Coke,  Rea- 
sonableness   of    Rates,    §23    (d) 598 

Chicago,    111.,    from    Wisconsin    points.      Cheese.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§62    (a) 621 

Chicago,    111.     Switching   charges.     Tariffs,    §11    (c) 830 

Chicago,   111.     Switching.     Interstate   Commerce    Commission,    §9    (k) 433 

Chicago,   111.,   to   Akron,   Colo.     Coal.     Advanced   Rates,   §17    (h) 41 

Chicago,   111.,  to  Atlanta,  Ga.     Grain.     Discrimination,   §4    (cc) 229 

Chicago,  111.,  to  Brady,  Tex.  Poles.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §125  (c) . . .  685 
Chicago,    111.,    to    Chisholm,    Minn.      Refrigerator    and    glass.      Classification 

§15    (e) 149 

Chicago,    111.,    to    Cincinnati,    O.      Proportional    Rates,    IV    (q) 561 

Chicago,   111.,   to   CoHinsville,   111.     Machinery.     Alternative   Rates,   I    (b) 69 

Chicago,   111.,   to   Denver,   Colo.     Auto   cycle  lamps.     Classification,   §17    (s) . .  153 

Chicago,    111.,   to   Denver,   Colo.     Rates,     Express    Companies,   §15    (a) 383 

Chicago,   111.,   to   Des  :^Ioines,  la.     Class  rates.     Discrimination,  §4   (h) 233 

Chicago,  111.,  to  the  East.     Wool.     Blanket  Rates,  §11    (aa) 94 

Chicago,  111.,  to  Evansville,  Wis.  Pig  iron.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §96  (c)  656 
Chicago,  111.,  to  Fort  Dodge,  la.  Coal.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §67  (v) .  628 
Chicago,  111,,  to  Houston,  Tex.  Structural  steel.  Classification,  §15  (g) . . .  149 
Chicago,    111.,    to    Menasha    and    Appleton,    Wis.      Rags.      Reasonableness   of 

Rates,     §98      (b) 658 

Chicago,    111.,   to   Mississippi   and   Missouri   Rivers.     Rates.     Long   and   Short 

Hauls,     §5      (k) 451 

Chicago,   111.,   to   Mississippi  and   Missouri  Rivers  and   Utah  common  points. 

Class    rates.      Branch    Lines,    §4    (b) 105 

Chicago,    111.,    to    Missouri    River   points.     Furniture   and   chairs.     Minimums, 

§8      (h) 509 

Chicago,   111.,  to  New  York,   N.   Y.     Grain   and   products.     Reasonableness  of 

Rates,     §8      (3)      (a) 581 


INDEX   OF    LOCALITIES  1043 


Page 
Chicago,    III.,    to    New    York,    N.    Y.      Paper.     Export    Rates    and    Facilities, 

V    (i) 372 

Chicago,  111.,  to  Omaha,  Neb.     Cinders.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §64   (a) . .  621 

Chicago,   111.,  to   Omaha,   Neb.     Limestone.     Reparation,   §16    (yy) 738 

Chicago,    111.,   to    Omaha,   Neb.     Oil.     Discrimination,    §4    (qq) 238 

Chicago,   111.,   to   Omaha,   Neb.     Rates.     Express   Companies,   §15    (a) 383 

Chicago,  111.,  to  Oroville,  Cal.     Dredgicg  machinery.     Tarifts,  §7   (sss) 824 

Chicago,    111.,    to    Ottumwa,    la.      Class    rates.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§66      (gg) 624 

Chicago,  111.,  to  Portales,  N.  Mex.     Blacksmith  coal.     Procedure  Before  Com- 
mission,   §15    (b) 552 

Chicago,  111.,  to  Portales,  N.  Mex.     Coal.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §67    (p)  627 

Chicago,   111.,   to   Portland,    Ore.     Elevator   guides.     Tariffs,   §7    (rrr) 824 

Chicago,    111.,    to   Portland,    Ore.     Manila    paper   folders.      Reasonableness   of 

Rates,     §107     (a) 673 

Chicago,  111.,  to  Portland,  Ore.     Paper.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §42   (a) . . .  613 
Chicago,   111.,   to    San   Francisco,   Cal.     Paper   pails.     Procedure   Before   Com- 
mission,   §10    (2)     (d) 545 

Chicago,  111.,   to  South  Bend,  Ind.       Paper  stock.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§119     (a) 682 

Chicago,  111.,  to   St.  Joseph,  Mo.     Folding  chairs.     Tariffs,  §7   (xx) 822 

Chicago,    111.,    to    St.    Louis,    Mo.      Combination    rates.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,    §28    (aa) 602 

Chicago,    111.,    to    Sturgls,    S.    D.      Coal.      Land    Grant    Railroads,    (a).      Red- 
wood  Rates,   §4    (a).     Tariffs,   §7    (cc) 430,   705,  819 

Chicago,  111.,  to  Toledo,  O.     Manure.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §81    (e) 635 

Chicago,  111.,  to  Utah  common  points.     Commodity  rates.     Branch  Lines,  §4 

(b).      Long    and    Short    Hauls,    §5    (k) 105,451 

Chicago,  111.,   to  Wabash,   Ind.     Signboard.     Classification,   §15    (f) 149 

Chicago,    111.,    to   Williamson,    W.    Va.     Sash    and   doors.     Procedure    Before 

Commission,     §2     (ss) 541 

Chicago,   111.,   to   Wisconsin   points.     Gun   powder.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§91      (a) 651 

Chicago,   111.,  to  Wisconsin   points.     Wagon   springs.     Reparation,   §16    (q) . . .  736 

Chicago  Heights,  111.,  to  Lebanon,  Ore.     Alum.     Reparation,  §7   (kk) 765 

Chicago,  111.,  territory  to  Pacific  coast.     Hardwood  Lumber.    Advanced  Rates, 

§7     (2)     (b) 23 

Chicago,   111.     Transit.     Facilities   and   Privileges,   §21    (b) 408 

Chicago,  111.     Transit  Privileges.     Discrimination,   §4    (aa) 228 

Chickasha,  Okla.     Transit.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §18   (cc) 403 

Chilton,  Wis.,  to  Kansas  City,  Mo.    Malt.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §106   (d)  672 
Christopher,    111.,   to   Ainsworth   and   Valentine,   Neb.     Coal,     Reasonableness 

of   Rates,    §67    (m) 627 

Christopher,  111.,  to  Wausa,  Neb.     Coal.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §67   (s) . .  628 
Cincinnati,    O.,    to    Beloit,    Wis.      Cotton    duck    cloth.      Through    Routes    and 

Joint  Rates,    §15    (y) 868 

Cincinnati,  O.,  to  Chattanooga,  Tenn.     Rates.     Evidence,  §63  (p) 356 

Cincinnati,   O.,   to   Chicago,   111.     Cotton   fabrics.     Interstate   Commerce   Com- 
mission,   §10    (h) 436 


1044  INDEX    OP    LOCALITIES 


Page 
Cincinnati,   O.,   to   Morehead,   Ky.     Corn.     Througli   Routes  and   Joint  Rates, 

§15     (00) 870 

Clarendon,  Ark.,  to  Willow  Springs,  111.  Rowboat  Classification,  §4l^  (d) . .  136 
Clatskanie  Junction,  Ore.,  to  DeBeque,  Colo.  Lumber.  Reparation,  §7  (q) . .  763 
Clearwater,  S.  C,  to  Chicago,  111.  Cotton-piece  goods.  Discrimination,  §10  (k)  266 
Cleveland,  O.,  to  San  Francisco,  Cal.  Brass  bedsteads.  Minimums,  §7  (xx)  507 
Cleveland,  O.,  to  San  Francisco,  Cal.,  and  Seattle,  Wash.  Oil.  Reasonable- 
ness  of   Rates,    §8    (4)    (r) 583 

Cliffs,  Ariz.,  to  Arizona  points.     Lumber.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105   (k)  666 

Clinton,  la.,  to  Durand,  Wis.     Iron  bridge  material.     Reparation,   §16   (s) 736 

Clinton,  la.,  to  St.  Marys,  la.  Iron  bridge  material.  Classification,  §15  (b) .  148 
Clinton,  Ky.,  to  Huntingdon,  Ky.  Wheat.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §89  (a)  649 
Clyde    Siding,    Fredericktown,    Pa.,    to    Lake    Ports.      Coal.      Blanket    Rates, 

§8    (a) 87 

Coal  Creek,  Tenn.,  to  Augusta,  Ga.  Coal.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §67  (b)  624 
Coal  Creek,   Tenn.,   to   Spartansberg,   S.   C.     Coal.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§67     (d) 625 

Coal  Creek  district,   Tenn.     Mine  rating.     Cars  and  Car  Supply,   §26   (a) . . .  122 
Coal  Creek  field,   Tenn.,  to   Carolina  territory.     Coal.  Differentials,   §7    (c) . . .  217 
Coal  Creek  field,  Tenn.,  to  Georgia  and  Florida  territory.     Coal.     Discrimina- 
tion,  §7    (d) 218 

Coalgate,    Okla.,    to    Texas    and    Louisiana    points.      Coal.      Equalization    of 

Rates,   §4    (2)    (u) 302 

Coeur  d'Alene,   Ida.,   to   Carnegie,   Pa.,   and  Atlantic  coast  points.     Lead  ore 

and    concentrates.     Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §100    (a) 658 

Coffeyville,    Kans.,    to    Arkansas    points.      Petroleum.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,    §122    (a) 683 

Coffeyville,    Kans.,    to    Enid,    Okla.      Petroleum.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§122     (c) 68J 

Coffeyville,  Kans.,  to  Iowa  points.  Brick.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §52  (b)  61( 
Coffeyville,  Kan.,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.  Petroleum.  Discrimination,  §7  (rs) ...  2H 
Coffeyville,    Kan.,    to    Memphis,    Tenn.,    and    Omaha,    Neb.      Petroleum    and 

products.     Equalization  of   Rates,   §6    (r) 301 

Coffeyville,    Kans.,    to    Memphis,    Tenn.      Relative    rate.      Long    and    Short 

Hauls,    §6     (a) 457 

Coffeyville,    Kans.,   to   Mississippi   River   crossings.     Window   glass.     Reason- 
ableness   of    Rates,    §12^^     (b) 190 

Coffeyville,  Kans.,  to  Spokane,  Wash,    Roofing  material.    Reparation,  §3  (d) . .  751 

Coffeyville,  Kans.,  to  Toledo,  O.    Steam  shovel.    Bills  of  Lading,  §5  (e) 76 

Colfax,  La.,  to  Calvary,  111.    Lumber.    Reparation,  §9  (g) 769 

Collins,  Mo.,  to  Kansas  City,  Mo.     Wood  and  coal.     Absorption  of  Charges, 

§2   (d)    1 

Collinsville,  111.,  to  Galveston,  Tex.    Brick.    Blanket  Rates,  §7  (i) 87j 

Colorado   common   points,   intermediate   to.     Rates.     Long   and   Short  Hauls, 

§5    (XX)    45'i 

Colorado  points  to  the  East.    Cantaloupes.    Tariffs,  §7  (p) 811 

Colorado  points  to  Fremont,  Neb.    Lump  coal.     iDfferentials,  §5  (c) 211j 

Columbia,  S.  C,  from  New  York  points.    Grapes.    Minimums,  §7  (b) 503 


INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES  1045 

Page 
Columbia,  S.  C,  from  Rochester,  Albion  and  Appleton,  N.  Y.    Apples,  potatoes, 

etc.    Discrimination,  §8  (5)   (a) 254 

Columbia,  S.  C,  to  Jacksonville,  Fla.    Rates.    Evidence,  §30  (e) 343 

Columbia,   Tenn.,   to   Jacksonville,    Fla.      Cream.      Express    Companies,    §11 

(9)    (c)    381 

Columbia,  Tenn,,  to  various  points,  and  from  New  Orleans,  La.     Sugar.     Dis- 
crimination,  §8    (5)    (c) 254 

Columbus,  Ga.,  to  California  points.     Plow  parts.     Through  Routes  and  Joint 

Rates,   §13    (v) 862 

Combined  Locks,  Wis.,  to  Dallas,  Tex.    News  print  paper.    Tariffs,  §7  (gg) ....   820 
Communipaw,  N.  J.,  to  Cleveland,  O.    Iron  pyrites.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§96    (g)    656 

Communipaw,  N.  J.,  to  Linndale,  O.     Iron  pyrites.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§96   (g)    656 

Concordia,  Kan.,  to  Crete,  Neb.    Cream.    Advanced  Rates,  §5  (4)  (a) 17 

Cone,  la.,  to  New  Prague,  Minn.    Watermelons.    Reparation,  §16  (y) 736 

Copperhill,  Tenn.,  to  Grcorgia  and  South  Carolina  points.    Sulphuric  acid.    Rea- 
sonable of  Rates,  §145   (a) 690 

Cook,  Neb.,   to   St.  Louis,  Mo.     Corn   and  wheat.     Reasonableness   of  Rates, 

§28   (u)    604 

Council  Bluffs,  la.    Elevation.    Allowances,  §8  (3)   (d) 57 

Council  Bluffs,  la.     Elevation.    Allowances,  §8  (3)   (b),  §14  (d)   (e) 56,    67 

Council  Bluffs,  la.,  from  Arkansas,  Louisiana,  Mississippi  and  Texas  points. 

Lumber  and  forest  products.     Differentials,  §7   (b) 217 

Council  Bluffs,  la.,  from  Dakota,  Minnesota  and  Iowa  points.    Grain.    Equaliza- 
tion of  Rates,  §4  (2)   (d) 299 

Council  Bluffs,  la.,  to  Minneapolis,  Minn.    Flaxseed.    Reparation,  §16  (cc) 737 

Council  Bluffs,  la.,  to  South  Dakota  and  North  Dakota  points.    Cement.    Equali- 
zation of  Rates,  §6   (1) 307 

Council  Bluffs,  la.,  to  Wisconsin  points.    Grain  and  grain  products.    Advanced 

Rates,  §19  (d).  Proportional  Rates,  II   (a) 46,  556 

Council  Bluffs,  la.,  to  Wyoming,  Col.,  and  Kansas  points.     Reasonableness  of 

Rates,  §105   (m)    667 

Council  Bluffs,  la.     Transit.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §21  (j) 409 

Courtenay,  N.  D.,  from  St.  Paul,  Minn.,  and  New  York,  N.  Y.     Merchandise. 

Express  Companies,  §11   (4)    (a) 379 

Creamery,  Ariz.,  to  Arizona,  New  Mexico,  Nevada  and  California  points.     Con- 
densed milk.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §71  (a) 630 

Creston,  O.,  to  Windsor  Shades,  Va.    Coiled  elm  hoops.    Cars  and  Car  Supply, 

§8    (c),  Minimums,   §4   (d) 112,  498 

Cuba.     Adjacent  Foreign  Country,   (b) 8 

Cuylerville,  N.  Y.,  to  Central  Freight  Association  territory.    Salt.    Discrimina- 
tion, §8   (5)    (b) 254 

Cuylerville,  N.  Y.,  to  Detroit,  Mich.    Salt.    Discrimination,  §9  (k) 262 

Cypress,  111.,  from  the  South.    Lumber.    Reparation,  §4  (1) 753 

Danville,  111.,  to  Cedar  Rapids,  la.    Brick.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §52  (c) . . .  616 

Davenport,  la.,  to  Omaha.    Malt.    Reparation,  §16  (w) 736 

Davisville,  Tex.,  to  Santa  Rita,  N.  M.    Lumber.    Reparation,  §4  (w) 755 


1046  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 


Page 

Dawson,  la.,  to    Trevor,  Wis.    Corn.    Reparation,  §7  (x) 763 

Dayton,  O.,  to  Chicago,  111.     Bicycles.     Evidence,  §12  (3)    (a) 320 

Decatur,  111.    Elevation.    Allowances,  §8  (3)  (a) 56 

Deepwater,  W.  Va.,  to  St.  Louis  and  Carondelet,  Mo.    Coke.    Evidence,  §28  (d) .  340 
De  Kalb,  111.,  to  Olivia,  Minn.    Manure  spreaders.     Through  Routes  and  Joint 

Rates,  §15   (ddd)    872 

Delavan,   Wis.,   to   Terre   Haute,   Ind.     Turnips.     Through   Routes   and   Joint 

Rates,    §15    (rrrr) 877 

Deming,  N.  Mex.,  to   Bisbee,  Ariz.    Alfalfa.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §92  (d) . .   652 
Denver,  Colo.,  from  and  to  Salt  Lake  City,  Ogden  and  Provo,  Utah.    Passenger 

Fares  and  Facilities,  §2   (d) 518 

D€nver,   Col.,   from   California   points.     Harness   leather.     Reasonableness   of 

Rates,  §8  (2)    (d) 581 

Denver,  Colo.,  from  the  East  and  to  the  West.     Mattresses  and  bed  springs. 

Express    Companies,    §8    (f) 377 

Denver,   Colo.,  from  New   England   points.     Cotton  piece  goods.     Minimums, 

§7  (jj)    507 

Denver,  Colo.,  to  and  from  various  States.     Mattresses  and  bed  springs.    Ex- 
press Companies,  §15   (b) 384 

Denver,  Colo.,  to  St.  Johns,  Portland,  Ore.     Rags.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§98    (c)    658 

Denver,   Colo.,   to  Streator,   111.     Tin  plate   scrap.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§149    (a)    692 

Depue,  111.,  to  Hopatcong,  N.  J.,  and  Emporium,  Pa.     .Sulphuric  acid.    Repara- 
tion, §2   (o) 717 

DeRidder,  La.,  to  various  points.    Lumber.     Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 

§11    (2)    (s) 857 

Des  Moines,  la.,  from  Arkansas,  Louisiana  and  Texas  points.    Equalization  of 

Rates.     Lumber,  §3   (jj) 296 

Des  Moines,  la.,  from  Ashdown,  Ark.,  Lake  Charles,  La.,  and  Port  Arthur,  Tex. 

Lumber.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105  (z) 670 

Des  Moines,  la.,  from  the  East.    Rates.    Proportional  Rates,  IV  (i) 560 

Des  Moines,  la.,  from  Southern  territory.     Lumber.     Discrimination,  §10  (h) . .  266 
Des  Moines,  la.,  from  West  of  the  Missouri  River.    Hay.     Proportional  Rates, 

IV  (m)    561 

Des  Moines,  la.,  to  Minnesota,  North  and  South  Dakota  points.     Rates.     Dis- 
crimination, §5   (e) 241 

Des  Moines,  la.,  to  points  South  and  West.    Rates.    Discrimination,  §14  (c) . . .  273 

Detroit,  Mich.    Rates.    Equalization  of  Rates,  §3  (y) 295 

Detroit,  Mich.     Reconsignment,  §3  (b) 699 

Detroit,  Mich.,  to  the  East.    Wool.    Blanket  Rates,  §13  (aa) 97 

Detroit,  Mich.,  to  Madison,  Wis.     Iron  working  machine.     Reasonableness  of 

Rates,  §95   (c) 656 

Detroit,  Mich.,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.    Salt.    Proportional  Rates,  III  (aa),  Reason- 
ableness of  Rates,  §134   (a) 558,  687 

Detroit,  Mich.,  to  New  York  and  Atlantic  Seaboard  points.     Salt.    Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §134  (c) 687 

Detroit,  Mich.,  to  New  York  and  New  England  points.    Flour.    Discrimination, 
§9   (n)    262 


INDEX   OF   LOCALITIES  1047 


Page 
Detroit,  Mich.,  to  Patricksburg,  Ind.    Salt.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §134  (b) .  687 

Detroit,  Mich.,  to  Seattle,  Wash.    Show  cases.    Tariffs,  §7  (h) 815 

Detroit,  Mich.     Transit.    Discrimination,  §7  (p) 246 

Detroit,  Mich.    Transit.    Substitution  of  Tonnage,  §1  (c) 784 

Detroit,  Mich.     Transit  privilege.    Facilities  and  Privileges,  §14  (a) 396 

Devol,  Okla.,  to  Olney,  Tex.  Fence  posts.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105  (j) . .  666 
Diamondville,  Wyo.,  to  Anaconda,  Mont.  Coal.  Weights  and  Weighing,  §3  (a) .  900 
Douglas,  Ariz.,  from  Texas  points.  Oak  ties.  Reasonableness  of  rates,  105  (o) .  668 
Douglas,  Ariz.,  to  El  Paso,  Tex.  Scrap  iron.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §96  (i) .  657 
Douville,  Ga.,  to  New  York,  N.  Y.,  and  Milwaukee,  Wis.    Grapes.    Overcharges, 

§9    (p)    517 

Dragon,  Utah,  to  Mack,  Colo.    Gilsonite.    Narrow  Gauge  Railroads,  1  (d) 512 

Dubuque,  la.,  to  Sioux  Falls,  S.  D.    Doors.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §77  (a) . .  634 

Duluth,  Minn.    Free  Storage.    Facilities  and  Privileges,  §8  (c) 392 

Duluth,  Minn.,  from  Chicago,  111.,  and  Milwaukee,  Wis.    Petroleum  and  products. 

Procedure  before  Commission,  §2  (mm) 540 

Duluth,  Minn.,  from  Minnesota  points.  Milk.  Express  Companies,  §11  (9)  (a) .  380 
Duluth,    Minn.,    to    Andover,    S.    D.      Sawdust.      Evidence,    §64    (x).    Tariffs, 

§7   iii    (jjj)    359,  823 

Duluth,   Minn.,    to   Central  Freight  Association   territory.     Class   Rates.     Ad- 
vanced Rates,  §18  (10)    (a) 45 

Duluth,  Minn.,  to  Evansville,  Wis.  Pig  iron.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §96  (d) .  656 
Duluth,   Minn.,  to  Rhinelander,  Wis.     Pulp  wood.     Blanket  Rates,   §13    (h) . .     99 

Duncan,   Okla.,   to   Seattle,   Wash.     Broom   corn.     Reparation,   §4    (ccc) 759 

DuDgannon,  Va.,   to  Maugansville,   Md.     Lumber.     Reparation,   §4    (k) 753 

DuQueen,  Ark.,   to   Memphis,  Tenn.     Lumber.   Reparation,   §4    (ss) 757 

Durant,  Okla.,  to  011a,  La.     Oats.     Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,   §13   (1)  861 
Durham,  N.  C,  from  Chicago,  111.,  East  St.  Louis,  111.,  Louisville,  Ky.,  Colum- 
bus,  O.,    and   Cincinnati,    O.     Class   rates   and   certain   commodity   rates. 

Discrimination,    §8    (3)    (d) 249 

Dyersburg,   Tenn.     Transit.     Facilities   and  Privileges,   §20    (a) 406 

Eads,  Colo.,  from  Missouri  River.     Rate.     Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5   (ww) . .  456 
Eagle  Bridge,  N.  Y.,  from  Vermont  and  New  York.     Milk.     Interstate  Com- 
merce  Commission,    §1    (g) : 418 

East   Branch,   N.   Y.,    to   Weehawken,   N.   J.     Stone.     Equalization   of   Rates, 

§4     (2)     (s) 301 

Eagle  Bridge,  N.  Y.,  from  West  Pawlett,  Vt.,  and  other  points.     Milk.     Rea- 
sonableness   of    Rates,    §111     (c) 675 

East    Chicago,    Ind.,    to    Moline,    111.     Iron    bars.     Reasonableness    of   Rates, 

§96     (h) 657 

East  Dubuque,  111.,  to  Dubuque,  la.     Bridge  Tolls,  I   (b) 107 

Eastern  points  to  Nevada.     Class  Rates.    Blanket  Rates,  §7  (c) 85 

East  Moline,  111.,  to  New  Orleans,  La.     Chains.     Tariffs,   §7    (ccc) 823 

Easton,  Pa.,  to  Lake  View,  N.   J.     Locomotives.     Through  Routes  and  Joint 

Rates,    §8    (a) 846 

East   St.   Louis,   111.,    from   Arkansas,    Oklahoma,    Mississippi,    Tennessee  and 
Missouri    points.      Cottonseed,    §9    (e) 261 


1048  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 

Page 
East   St.   Louis,   111.,   to   Beebe,  Ark.     Buggies   and   wagons.     Reasonableness 

of    Rates,    §150     (c) 692 

East  St.   Louis,  111.,  to  Central  Freight   Association  territory.     Fresh  meats, 

dairy  products,   etc.     Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §118    (f) 682 

East  St.  Louis,  111.,  to  Omaha,  Neb.     Bituminous  Coal.     Evidence,  §29   (k) . . .  341 
East  St.   Louis,    111.,   to   Omaha,   Neb.     Coal.     Reasonableness   of   Rates,    §16 

(h),    §67    (j) 593,  626 

Eaton,  Colo.,  to  Decatur,  111.     Sugar.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §144    (b) . . .  690 

Eddy,  Ala.,  to  Columbus,  O.     Lumber.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §19   (e) 405 

Edgewater,  N.  J,,  to  Struthers,  Pa.     Oil.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §117   (d)  678 
Eldorado,    Okla.,    to    Fort    Worth    and    Dallas,    Tex.      Cement    plaster.      Ad- 
vanced Rates,  §5   (2)    (d).     Blanket  Rates,  §7   (bb) 15,    84 

Elk    City,    Okla.,    to    Columbus,    Ga.      Oats.      Overcharges,    §9    (j).     Weights 

and   Weighing,   §10    (d) 516,  906 

Elk  City,  Okla.,  to  Sioux  City,  la.     Broom  corn.     Through  Routes  and  Joint 

Rates,    §15    (pppp) 877 

Elk   Rapids,    Mich.,    to    Hamilton    and   Brantford,    Canada.     Pig   iron.      Long 

and    Short    Hauls,    §5     (nn) 456 

Elkhart,  Ind.,  to  Los  Angeles,  Cal.     Gocarts.     Tariffs,   §7   (o) 817 

Elkhart,    Ind.,    to    Milwaukee,    Wis,      Vehicles.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§150     (a) 692 

Elkhart,  Ind.,  to  Tacoma,  Wash.     Gocarts.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §88   (a)  649 
Elko,  Nov.,   to   San  Francisco,   Cal.     Passenger  fares.     Passenger  Fares  and 

Facilities,    §15     (c) 531 

Elkpoint,   S.  D.,  to  Anaconda,   Mont.     Sack  corn.     Reasonableness   of   Rates, 

§132     (a) 686 

EUisville,   Miss.,   to   Greenville,   Pa.     Lumber.     Demurrage,   §17    (e) 208 

El  Paso,   Tex.,   from   California   points.     Chili   pepper.     Tariffs,    §7    (tt) 821 

El  Paso,  Tex.,  from  West  Virginia  and  Pennsylvania  points.     Coke.     Through 

Routes   and  Joint  Rates,   §14    (f) 863 

El    Paso,    Tex.      Switching.      Switch    Tracks    and     Switching,     §2     (c),    §4 

(P)     (q)     788,  791 

El  Paso,  Tex.,  to  Bakersfield,  Cal.     Cattle.     Released  Rates,  §3   (a) 711 

El  Paso,    Tex.,    to    Douglas    and    Bisbee,    Ariz.     Alfalfa.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,    §92     (d) 652 

El  Paso,   Tex.,   to  Las   Cruces,  N.   Mex.     Barbed  wire,   wire   nails,   wire   sta- 
ples, and  wire  fencing.     Discrimination,   §4    (hh) 233 

El    Paso,    Tex.,    to    Las    Cruces,    N.    Mex.      Wire    products.      Proportional 

Rates,    III    (d) 559 

El   Paso,    Tex.,    to    Phoenix,    Ariz.      Class    rates.     Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§66     (b) 622 

El  Reno,   Okla.,  to   Calvin  Creek,  Ark.     Household  goods.     Procedure  Before 

Commission,    §5    (h) 542 

Ely,  Minn.,   to   St.   Charles,  Mo.     Lumber.     Reparation,   §7    (ii) 765 

Emaus,  Pa.,  to  Winnipeg,  Manitoba.    Iron.     Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 

§2     (b) 843 

Enfield,  111.,  to  Henderson,  Ky.     Ear  corn.     Proportional  Rates,  II  (d) 557 

England,  Ark.,  to  Houston,  Tex.     Cotton  linters.     Reparation,   §4   (t) 754 


INDEX   OP    LOCALITIES  1049 

Page 
Ensley,   Ala.,   to  La  Grange,   Ga.     Coal   tar  paving  cement.     Reasonableness 

of  Rates,   §68    (a) 630 

Ephrata,    Penn.,    to    Richmond,    Va.      Tobacco.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§66      (bb) 622 

Erath,  La.,  to  Miles,  Tex.     Snapped  corn.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §140  (a)  688 
Erie,    Pa.,    to    Central    Freight   Association    territory.      Roofing    paper.      Pro- 
cedure  Before  Commission,  §10    (2)    (c) 545 

Esmond,    S.    D.,    to    Minneapolis,    Minn.     Wheat    and    flaxseed.      Reparation, 

§26     (d) 723 

Evansville,    Ind.,   to   El    Paso,    Tex.     Furniture.     Through   Routes    and   Joint 

Rates,    §13    (e) 860 

Evansville,  Ind.,  to  Huntsville,  Ala.     Plows.     Commodity  Rates,  §3   (e) 160 

Evansville,  Ind.,  to  Huntsville,  Ala.     Plows.     Tariffs,  §7   (dd) 819 

Fairbury,  Neb.,   to  El  Reno,   Okla.     Apples.     Reparation,  §16   (sss) 739 

Fairmont  district,  W.  Va.,  to  Staten  Island,  N.  Y.     Coal.     Demurrage,  §4  (d)  197 

Fairview,  Mo.,  to   Terrell,  Tex.     Corn.     Equalization  of  Rates,  §2   (w) 290 

Fanshawe,   Okla.     Station.     Procedure  Before  Commission,   §10    (2)    (n) 546 

Fargo,  N.  D.,  to  Miles  City,   Mont.     Flour.     Reparation,  §16   (x) 736 

Farmington,    N.    Mex.,    to    Chicago,    111.     Goat    and    sheep    skins.      Classifica- 
tion, §14   (c).     Reparation,  §10   (a) 147,  770 

Fayette,   Ky.,   to   Superior,   Wis.     Lubricating  oil.     Equalization   of  Rates,   §2 

(s).     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §122   (f) 290,  683 

Fayetteville,  N.  C,  to  Carterville,  Ga.     Cottonseed  hulls.    Differentials,  §6  (c)  214 

Fenter,  Ark.,  to  Woodruff,  Mo.     Gum  Timbers.     Classification,  §11   (k) 143 

Ferguson,    Okla.,    to    Fort    Worth    and    Dallas,    Tex.      Cement    plaster.      Ad- 
vanced  Rates,   §5    (2)    (d).     Blanket  Rates,   §7    (bb) 15,     84 

Firth,  Neb.     Transit  Facilities   and  Privileges,  §21    (kk) 410 

Fishers,    Ind.,    to    Bartlesville,    Okla.      Oil    well    supplies.      Through    Routes 

and   Joint   Rates,    §15    (ss) 871 

Flagstaff,    Ariz.,    to    Arizona    Points.      Lumber.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§105     (k) 666 

Flat  Rock,  111.,  to  Findlay,  O.     Petroleum.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §122  (b)  683 
Fletcher,  Okla.,  to  Bovina,  Tex.     EmigTants'  movables.     Demurrage,  §8    (ff). 

Tariffs,  §7   (aaaaa).     Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (iii)..199,  825,  873 

Florida  points  to  the  North.     Oranges.     Reparation,  §2   (g) 715 

Florida   points   to   Northern   points.     Fruits   and   vegetables.     Reasonableness 

of  Rates,   §84    (q) 642 

Florida  to  the  North.     Citrus  fruits.     Blanket  Rates,  §11   (bb) 95 

Florida  to  the  North.     Oranges.     Blanket  Rates,  §11    (i) 96 

Florida  to  Northern  territory.     Fruit.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84   (x) 645 

Fond  du  Lac,  Wis.,  to  Colville,  Wash.     Bobsleds.     Reparation,  §16   (o) 736 

Fond  du  Lac,  Wis.,  to  Olathe,  Colo.     Alters.     Classification,  §4*^    (c) 135 

Fontana,  Wis.,  to   Chicago,  III.     Gravel.     Reparation,   §16    (i) 736 

Fordwick,    Va.,    to    Hope    Mills,    N,    C.     Cement.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§60     (b) 620 

Fort  Dodge,  la,,  from  Chicago,  111.    Various  commodity  rates.    Discrimination, 

§8    (4)    (b) 253 

Fort  Dodge,  la.,  to  Butte,  Mont.     Paint.     Classification,  §7   (bb) 138 


1050  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 


Page 
Fort  Scott,  Kan,,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.,  and  Lawton,  Okla.     Counters,  shelving. 

Tarifes,     §7     (q) 817 

Fort   Smith,   Ark.     Concentration.     Substitution   of   Tonnage,   §2    (b) 784 

Fort    Smith,    Ark.      Reloading    and    transfer.      Through    Routes    and    Joint 

Rates,     §19     (f ) 882 

Fort  Smith,  Ark.     Reshipping.     Discrimination,   §10    (j) 266 

Fort   Smith,   Ark.,    to    Texas   and    Louisiana    points.      Coal.     Equalization   of 

Rates,    §4    (2)     (u) 302 

Fort   Wayne,    Ind.,    to    Beloit,   Wis.     Triplex   cloth.     Classification,    §18    (10) 

(a).     Tariffs,  §7  (yy).     Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (j)   155,  822,  866 
Fort  Wayne,  Ind.,  to  Joliet,  111.     Bar  iron.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §96  (j).  657 
Fort  William,   Canada,  to  Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  and  Eastern  points.     Flaxseed.     Ad- 
vanced   Rates,    §5    (3)     (a) 16 

Fort  Worth,  Tex.     Back-haul.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §7   (b) 391 

Fort  Worth,  Tex.,  from  and  to  various  points.     Live  stock  and  packinghouse 

products.     Reasonableness   of    Rates,    §118    (b) 679 

Fort   Worth,    Texas,    from    Illinois,   Wisconsin    and    Minnesota    points.     Malt. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §106    (b)    (c) 672 

Fort  Worth,  Tex.,  from  Texas  points.     Live  stock.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§3     (a),    §103     (b) 572,  659 

Fort  Worth,   Tex.     Transit.     Facilities  and   Privileges,   §21    (hh) 409 

Fort    Worth,    Tex.,    to    Arkansas    and    Louisiana    points.      Fresh    meats    and 

packing   house   products.     Advanced   Rates,    §19    (c) 46 

Fort  Worth,  Tex.,  to  New  York  and  Eastern  points.     Fresh  meats  and  pack- 
ing house  products.     Through   Routes   and  Joint  Rates,   §13    (a) 860 

Fort  Worth,   Tex.,  to  Rocky  Mount,  N.   C.     Fresh  meats  and  packing  house 

products.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §18  (g) 682 

Fort    Worth,    Tex.,    to    the    Southeast,    Carolina    territory.    Trunk    Line    terri- 
tory and  Illinois  territory.     Proportional  rates.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§118      (b) 679 

Fort    Worth,    Tex.,    to    St.    Louis,    Mo.      Fresh    meats    and    packing    house 

products.     Advanced  Rates,  §1  (5)    (a).    Reduced  Rates,  §2   (a) 10,    704 

Fort  Worth,  Tex.,  to  Texas  points.     Live  stock.     Discrimination,  §11   (bb)    (c)  268 
Fort  Worth,  Tex.,  to  various  points.     Fresh  meats  and   packing  house   prod- 
ucts.     Reasonableness    of   rates,    §103    (b) 659 

Fostoria,  Tex.,  from  Huntington  and  Bonanza,  Ark.     Coal.     Evidence,  §64  (v).  359 

Fostoria,   Tex.,   to  Gary,   Ind.     Lumber.     Reparation,   §4    (kk) 756 

Fostoria,    Tex.,    to    Melrose,    N.    Mex.      Lumber.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§105      (V) 669 

Fourteen  Mile  Switch,  Tenn.,  to  Miamisburg,  O.     Hickory  rim  strips.     Repar- 
ation,    §4      (q) 754 

Fox  River  Valley,   Wis.,   from   and   to   Central   Freight   Association   territory. 

Rates.     Through   Routes   and   Joint  Rates,    §15    (www)    (yyy) 875 

Frederick  Road,  Md.,   to  Englishton,  N,  J.     Lime.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§102      (a) " 659 

Freemont,    O.,    to    Minneapolis,    Minn.      Stoves.      Through    Routes    and    Joint 

Rates,     §15      (ttt) 875 

Freeport,  111.,  to  Wheatland,  Pa.     Scrap   iron.     Reparation,   §7    (xxx) 767 

Fresno,  Cal.,  to  Bozeman,  Mont.    Dried  fruit.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §6  (d) . .  457 


INDEX   OF    LOCALITIES  1051 

Page 
Fresno,    Cal.,    to    Roundup,    Mont.      Dried    fruit.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§78    (a) 634 

Frontenac,    Kan.,    to    Chicago,    111.     Beer    kegs.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§8,     (2)      (f) 581 

Gainesville,  Fla.,  to  Savannah,  Ga.     Sea  Island  cotton.    Discrimination,  §9  (p)  263 
Gainesville,    Tex.,    from    Pauls    Valley    and    Ardmore,    Okla.      Cotton.      Dis- 
crimination,   §13    (e) 271 

Gallup,  N.  Mex.,  to  El  Paso,  Tex.     Coal.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §67   (1) . .  626 
Gallup,  N.  Mex.,  to  Temple  and  Mesa,  Ariz.     Coal.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§67      (a) 624 

Galveston,   Tex.     Concentration.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §16    (a) 401 

Galveston,    Tex.,    from    Southern    Kansas.      Grain.      Equalizatioa    of    Rates, 

§3      (gg) 295 

Galveston,   Tex,,   to   Magdalena,    Mex.     Cement.     Through   Routes   and   Joint 

Rates,    §15    (jjkk) 870 

Galveston,    Tex.,    to    New    Orleans,    La.     Liquor.      Reasonableness    of   Rates, 

§28      (bb) 602 

Galveston,  Tex.,  to  New  Orleans,  La.     Wine  bottled.     Evidence,  §30   (aa) . . .  343 
Galveston,  Tex.     Wharfage.     Special   Contracts,   §2   (z).     Terminal  Facilities, 

§1    (c)     (g) 775,  834 

Galveston,  Tex.     Wharf  Facilities.     Terminal  Facilities,  §1   (b) 833 

Garbutt,    N.    Y.,    to    New    York,    N.    Y.      Plaster    board.      Reasonableness   of 

Rates,     §124     (a) 684 

Georges   Creek.     Relative  rate.     Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §6    (b) 457 

Georges  Creek,  Md.,  to   Chesapeake  and  Delaware  Cape   points.     Small  vein 

coal.     Differentials,  §5    (i) 213 

Georges  Creek,  Md.,  to  Eastern  states.     Coal.     Blanket  Rates,  §8   (d) 89 

Georges   Creek   district,   Md.     Coal.     Equalization  of  Rates,   §3    (ii) 296 

Georges   Creek  district.     Relative  rate.     Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §6    (g) 458 

Georgetown,  S.  C,  from  the  Pocahontas  district,  W.  Va.     Coal.     Reasonable- 
ness  of   Rates,   §8    (3)    (c) 581 

Georgia  to  New  York,  N.  Y.    Cotton.    Any-Quantity  Rates,  I  (f ) 70 

Georgia    to    Northern    markets.      Peaches.      Minimums,    §7     (f).      Refrigera- 
tion,    §7     (a) 502,  710 

Georgia  points  to  Northern  and  Western  points.    Peaches.    Precooling,  III  (c)  534 
Gerster,  Mo.,  to  Kansas  City,  Mo.     Wood  and  coal.     Absorption  of  Charges, 

§2     (d) 1 

Gleason,  Ark.,  to  Dallas,  Tex.    Tent  pins.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §147  (a)  691 
Gleason,  Ark.,  to  Missouri  River,  Mississippi  River  and  Ohio  River  crossings. 

Cypress  and  hardwood  lumber.     Advanced  Rates,  §5   (3)    (b) 16 

Glen   Elder,   Kan.,    to   New   Orleans,   La.     Flour.     Export   Rates   and   Facili- 
ties,   V    (bb) 371 

Glenn's    Ferry,    Ida.,    to    Tacoma,    Wash.    Cattle.      Long    and    Short    Hauls. 

§5    (nn) 453 

Glidden,  la.,  to  Chetek,  Wis.     Corn.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §153   (c) 694 

Glidden,   Wis.,    to    San   Francisco,    Cal.     Lumber.     Reasonableness   of   Rates, 
§105    (mm) , 672 


1052  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 

Page 
Globe,   Ariz.,    from    Colorado,    New    Mexico,    Alabama,     Tennessee,    Virginia, 

West  Virginia,  and  Pennsylvania  points.     Coke.     Tariffs,  §8    (j) 828 

Globe,  Ariz.,  from  West  Virginia  and  Pennsylvania  points.     Coke.     Through 

Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §14   (f) 863 

Gobies,   Mich,,   to  Janesville,   Wis.     Buckwheat.     Through   Routes    and   Joint 

Rates,    §13     (h) 861 

Goldfield,    Nov.,    to    Omaha,    Neb.      Passenger    fares.     Passenger    Fares    and 

Facilities,    §8    (a) 523 

Goltry,   Okla.,   from   Oklahoma  points.     Coal.     Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §66 

(h)    624 

Goltry,    Okla.,    from    Weir    and    Midway,    Kan.      Coal.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,    §67     (y) 629 

Goshen,  Ind.,  to  Sullivan,  Wis.,  and  Sheboygan,  Wis.     Steel  tanks.     Through 

Routes  and  Joint  Rates,   §15    (rrr) 874 

Grafton,    W.    Va.,    to    Kalamazoo,    Mich.      Bituminous    coal.      Equalization    of 

Rates,    §4     (2)     (n) 300 

Grafton,  Wis.,  to  Chicago,  111.     Chairs.     Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5   (r) 454 

Gramercy,   La.,    from    New    Orleans,    La.,    and    Port   Chalmette,    La.      Sugar. 

Switch    Tracks    and    Switching,    §4    (k) 790 

Granby,   Colo.,  to  Chicago,  111.     Cattle.     Reparation,   §16    (dd) 737 

Grand  Haven,  Mich,,  to  Waterbury,  Conn.,  and  Rome,  N.  Y.  Metal  furni- 
ture.     Classification,    §10    (e) 141 

Grand  Junction,   Colo.,  from  various  points.     Rates.     Lorg  and  Short  Hauls, 

§5     (a) 448 

Grand    Rapids,    Mich.,    to    Copenhagen,    Tenn.      Gypsum    rock.      Reparation, 

§16     (u) 736 

Grand    Rapids,    Mich.,    to    Houghton,    Mich.      Plaster.      Through    Routes    and 

Joint   Rates,    §13    (k) 861 

Grand  Rapids,  Mich.,  to  Milwaukee,  Wis.     Plaster.     Reparation,  §17    (k) 742 

Grand  Rapids,  Mich.,   to  Newport,  Ark.     Beans.     Through  Routes   and   Joint 

Rates,    §15    (s) 867 

Grand  Rapids,  Mich.,  to  Official,  Southern  and  part  of  Western  Classification 

territory.     Gypsum  rock  products.     Equalization  of  Rates,  §8   (h) 311 

Grand  Rapids,   Minn.,  to  Allouez  Bay,   Superior,  Wis.     Iron  Ore.     Procedure 

Before  Commission,   §13    (f).     Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §24    (b) 549,598 

Granite   City,  111.     Switching.     Reconsignment,   §3    (o) 701 

Granite  Falls,  Minn.,  to  Chicago,  111.  Butter  and  eggs.  Reparation,  §2  (z)..  719 
Granville,    N.    Y.,    to    Eagle    Bridge,    N.    Y.     Fluid    milk.     Advanced    Rates, 

§18     (7)     (a) 44 

Graves  Mines,  Ala.,  to  Natchez,   Miss.     Brick.     Reparation,   §16    (gg) 737 

Greeley,    Colo,,    to    California    and    Pacific    Coast    terminals.      Canned    peas, 

beans,   etc.     Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §121    (a) 682 

Green  Bay,  Wis.,  from  the  East.     Rates.     Discrimination,  §8   (5)    (j) 257 

Green   Bay,    Wis.,    to    Pattonsburg,    Mo.      Vegetables.      Through    Routes    and 

Joint    Rates,    §13    (o) 862 

Green    Bay,    Wis.,    to    Poplar    Bluff,    Mo.      Vegetables.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,    §84    (y).     Reparation,    §2    (gg) 647,719 

Green  Bay,  Wis.,  to  Washington,  O.  Canned  vegetables.  Reparation,  §7  (ddd)  768 
Green  Bay,  Wis.,  to  Wetonka  and  Leola,  S.  D.    Coal.     Reparation,  §17  (d) , , ,  741 


INDEX   OF   LOCALITIES  1053 

Pa&e 
Greenneld,  Ind,,  to  Calico  Rock,  Ark.    Glass  fruit  jars.     Reparation,  §19  (r) .  744 

Greenville,   Miss.,   to   Cedar  Rapids,   la.     Box    shooks.     Through   Routes   and 

Joint    Rates,    §15     (sss) 874 

Greenville  Mine,  Ludlow,  Colo.,  to  Oklahoma.     Coal.     Reconsignment,  §3  (n)  700 
Greenwood    Lake,    N.    Y.,    to    New    Jersey    points.     Ice.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,     §94     (c) 653 

Gulf  Port,  Miss.,  from  Missouri,  Kansas  and   Oklahoma.     Com.     Reparation, 

§4   (vv)    758 

Gypsum,  la.,  to  Lemmon,  S.  D.    Stucco.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §143  (a) . .  689 
Gypsum,  la.,  to  South  Dakota  and  North  Dakota  points.     Cement.     Equaliza- 
tion of  Rates,  §6  (1) 307 

Hague,  Mont.     Traffic  index.     Tariffs,  §13   (a) 831 

Haines  City,  Fla.,  to  St.  Louis,  Mo.    Fish.    Express  Companies,  §11  (6)   (a) 380 

Hanna,   Wyo.,   to    Salt   Lake    City,   Utah.     Junk.     Reasonableness   of   Rates, 

§98    (a)     658 

Hanna,   Wyo.,    to   Nebraska   and    Wyoming    points.      Coal.     Blanket    Rates, 

§13    (g)    98 

Harper,  W.  Va.,  to  New  Haven,  Conn.    Lumber.    Reparation,  §7  (r) 729 

Harper,  W.  Va.,  to  New  Haven,  Conn.    Reconsignment,  §4  (c) 702 

Harrisburg  field.  111.,  to  Chicago  and  points  beyond.     Coal.     Advanced  Rates, 

§18    (1)    (c) 42 

Harrisburg   group,    Pa.,   to   New   York   and   New   England   points.      Potatoes. 

Blanket  Rates,  §18  (d) 101 

Hartford,  Mich.,  to  Rock  Island,  111.    Relative  rates.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§28   (bb)    604 

Hertford,  N.  C,  to  Ashland,  O.     Lumber.     Routing  and  Misrouting,  §2  (f ) 750 

Hartville,  Ohio,  to  Pittsburgh,  Pa.     Celery.    Express  Companies,  §11  (2)   (a) . .  379 

Harvey,  III.,  to  Groos,  Mich.     Machinery.     Reparation,  §16  (aaa) 736 

Harvey,  Va.,  to  Muskegon,  Mich.    Ties.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §148  (b) . . .  691 
Hattiesburg,  Miss.,  from  all  points.    Grain,  packing-house  products,  etc.    Rates. 

Blanket  Rates,  §2  (j) 79 

Haverhill,  Kan.,  to  East  St.  Louis,  111.    Cattle.    Reparation,  §7  (ss) 766 

Hawthorne,  Fla.,  to  Savannah,  Ga.    Sea  island  cotton.    Discrimination,  §9  (p) .  263 
Hays,  Kans.,  to  South  Tacoma,  Wash.    Flour.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (i), 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §2  (g) 450,  843 

Helena,  Mont.,  to  the  Coeur  d'Alene  district.     Candles.    Advanced  Rates,  §13 

(aa) ,   Evidence,   §1    (a) 31,  314 

Henderson,  Col.,  to  Breaux  Bridge,  La.    Hay.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §92  (b)  651 
Henderson,  Ky.,  from  Omaha,  Neb.,  and  Council  Bluffs,  la.     Corn  and  oats. 

Proportional  Rates,   II    (h) 557 

Henderson,  Ky.,  to  and  from  New  York  and  other  points.    Class  Rates.    Long 

and  Short  Hauls,  §9  (r) 463 

Hepler,  Kan.,  to  St.  Louis,  Mo.     Hay.     Reparation,  §2  (v) 718 

Hermanville,   Miss.,   to  New   Orleans,   La.     Cotton.     Long  and   Short   Hauls, 

§6    (c)    457 

Higgins,   Tex.,   to   Des   Moines,   la.     Broom    corn.     Reasonableness    of  Rates, 

§53    (a)    618 


1054  INDEX   OF    LOCALITIES 


Page 
Hines,  Minn.,  to  Inwood,  la.,  Parkston,  S.  D.,  Charles  City,  la.,  and  Chillicothe, 

Mo.     Staking.    Allowances,  §13   (c) 66 

Hinton,   W.    Va.,   from   Virginia   points.     Potatoes.     Long   and    Short   Hauls, 

§9    (k)    461 

Hoboken,  N.  J.,  from  Jersey  points.    Ice.    Transportation,  §8  (b) 891 

Hoboken,  from  New  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania  points.     Ice.     Reasonableness  of 

Rates,  §9   (i)    585 

Holyoke,    Mass.,    from    Pennsylvania    fields.     Coal.     Long   and    Short   Hauls, 

§9   (f) 461 

Hopkins,  Minn.     Switching  charge.    Discrimination,  §15  (e) 274 

Hopkins,  Minn.,  to  Abbyville,  Kan.     Machinery.     Through  Routes   and  Joint 

Rates,    §15    (jjjj) * -. 876 

Hopkins,   Minn.,   to   Dallas,   Tex.     Agricultural   implements.     Reduced  Rates, 

§5   (h)    706 

Hopkins,  Minn.,  to  Payson,  Utah.     Machinery.    Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §8  (b) . .   112 

Hopkins,  Minn.,  to  Sacramento,  Cal.    Garbage  incinerator.    Tariffs,  §7  (t) 818 

Hopkins,  Minn.,  to  various  points.  Agricultural  implements.  Evidence,  §51  (f) .  350 
Horatio,  Ark.,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.  Peaches.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84  (m) .  641 
Horicon    Junction,    Wis.,    to    Minnesota    Transfer.      Agricultural    implements. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §43  (a) 613 

Houston,  Miss.,  to  Cairo,  111.    Ties.    Blanket  Rates,  §13  (bb) 97 

Houston,  Tex.,  to  Galveston,  Tex.     Cotton.     Evidence,  §20    (d),  Export  Rates 

and  Facilities,  V  (a) 337,  371 

Houston  Tex.,  to  Lake  Charles,  La.     Packing-house  products.     Reasonableness 

of  Rates,  §118   (c) 681 

Houston,  Tex.,  to  New  Orleans,  La.     Packing-house  products.    Reasonableness 

of  Rates,  §118    (d) 681 

Houston,  Tex.,  to  New  Orleans,  La.    Rice.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §9  (h) 461 

Houston,  Tex.,  to  New  York,  N.  Y.,  Boston,  Mass.,  Baltimore,  Md.,  Philadelphia, 

Pa.,  tand  Providence,  R.  I.    Rice  and  products.    Differentials,  §7  (a) 216 

Houston,  Tex.,  to  the  North  Atlantic  Seaboard.    Rice.    Differentials,  §5  (d) 211 

Howe,  111.,  to  Aetna,  Ind.    Sulphuric  acid.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §145  (b) . .   691 

Huerfano  County,  Colo.    Mine  rating.    Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §24  (b) 121 

Humbird,  Ida.,  to  Basin,  Wyo.    Cedar  posts.    Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 

§15    (eee)    872 

Huntington,  Tex.,  to  Oelwein,  la.     Lumber.     Reparation,  §7  (j) 762 

Hurley,  S.  D.,  to  Chicago,  111.    Oats.    Through  Routes  and  Joints,  §15  (b) 866 

Idaho  points  to  Astoria,  Ore.    Wheat.    Differentials,  §6  (d) 215 

Idaho  points  to  the  East.  Lumber  and  forest  products.  Differentials,  §7  (h) . .  221 
Idaho  to  other  states.     Common  lumber,  cedar,  fxr,  etc.     Advanced  Rates,  §8 

(1)    (i)    28 

Idaho  to  St.  Paul,  Minn.,  Chicago,  111.,  Mississippi  River,  Missouri  River,  South- 
eastern Kansas,  Denver  and  similar  points.     Shingles  and  forest  products. 

Advanced  Rates,  §13  (k) 33 

Illinois   points   to   various   points.     Coal.     Through   Routes   and   Joint   Rates, 

§11    (2)    (x) 858 

Independence,  Kan.,  to  Milepost  679,  Utah.     Cement.     Demurrage,  §11   (k) 202 

Indiana  to  Kentucky.    Liquor.    Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  §2  (a) 429 


INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES  1055 


Page 
Indiana  to  Pittsburg,  Pa.     Cream  and  condensed  milk.    Advanced  Rates,  §13 

(e),  §19   (dd) 32,     47 

Indianapolis,  Ind.,  from  Chicago,  111.    Furniture,  woodenware.    Long  and  Short 

Hauls,  §5    (s)    454 

Indianapolis,  Ind.,  from  New  Orleans,  La.,  and  Atlantic  Seaboard  points.    Sugar, 

cofEee.     Discrimination,   §4   (q)    237 

Indianapolis,  Ind.,  to  Chicago,  111.    Class  rates.    Discrimination,  §13  (d) 270 

Indianapolis,    Ind.,   to   Chicago,    111.     Combination   rates.     Reasonableness    of 

Rates,  §28    (aa)    602 

Indianapolis,    Ind.,    to    Cincinnati,    O.,    and    Jeffersonville,    Ind.      Proportional 

Rates,   II    (1) 558 

Indianapolis,  Ind.,  to  Cincinnati,  O.     Proportional  Rates,  IV  (q)    561 

Indianapolis,  Ind.,  to  East  St.  Louis,  111.    Local  rates.    Long  and  Short  Hauls, 

§12    (2)     (g) 476 

Indianapolis,  Ind.,  to  Louisiana  points.  Relative  Rates.  Differentials,  §6  (h) . .  216 
Indianapolis,  Ind.,  to  the  Mississippi  River.     Rates.     Equalization  of  Rates,  §8 

(c).  Evidence,  §66  (b).  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §25  (a) 311,  361,  599 

Indianapolis,  Ind.,  to  the  Missouri  River.     Class  Rates.     Differentials,  §2  (b). 

Discrimination,    §4    (m) 209,  234 

Indianapolis,   Ind.,   to   Missouri  River.     Furniture.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§16    (m),   §86    (a) 594,648 

Indianapolis  to  Ohio  River  points.    Class  Rates.    Discrimination,  §13  (d) 270 

Indianapolis,  Ind.,  to  Oklahoma  points.  Class  rates,  coffee,  furniture,  kitchen 
safes,  iron  and  steel  articles,  stoves,  woodenware,  and  machinery.  Dis- 
crimination,  §4    (1) 234 

Indianapolis,  Ind.,  to  Southern  states.     Rates.     Procedure  before  Commission, 

§10    (2)    (e) 545 

Indianapolis,  Ind.,  to  St.  Louis,  Mo.    Iron  beds,  furniture,  etc.    Discrimination, 

§8   (3)    (j) 251 

Indianapolis,  Ind.,  to  St.  Paul  and  Winona,  Minn.  Group  points.  Discrimina- 
tion, §9   (s)    264 

Indianapolis  to  various  points.  Furniture,  chairs,  ladders  and  vehicles.  Mini- 
mums,  §8  (j)    (o)    509,  511 

Indianapolis,  Ind.    Transit.     Discrimination,  §4   (s) 240 

Indianapolis,  Ind.     Transit.    Facilities  and  Privileges,  §15  (r) 400 

Indianapolis,  Ind.     Transit.     Reparation,  §8  (w) 731 

Indian  Territory.    Land  grant  rates.    Land  Grant  Railroads    (b) 439 

Ingle,  W.  Va.,  to  various  points.    Lime.    Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §29  (b) 123 

Ingram,  Wis.,  to  Stevens  Point,  Wis.    Lumber.    Interstate  Commerce,  §1  (d) . .   418 

lola,  Kan.,  from  Perry,  Okla.     Lumber.     Reparation,  §9   (b) 769 

lola,  Kan.,  to  Gila,  Ariz.  Cement.  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §13  (u)  862 
lola,  Kan.,  to  Tekamah,  Neb.  Cement.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §28  (y) . .  604 
lola,   Tex.,   to    Texas   points.     Cement.     Equalization    of   Rates,    §4    (2)    (b). 

Evidence,     §47     (e) 298,  347 

Ionia,  Mich.,  from  Fort  Payne,  Ala.,  and  Chattanooga,  Tenn.    Hickory  spokes. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §93    (a) 652 

Iowa.    Feeding  in  transit.    Facilities  and  Privileges,  §15  (u) 400 

Iowa  points  from  Mobile,  Ala.,  and  New  Orleans,  La.  Bananas.  Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §84   (v) 645 


1056  INDEX   OF    LOCALITIES 

Page 
Iowa  points    to  Boston,  Mass.,  and  New  York,  N.  Y.     Hogs.     Discrimination, 

§9      (d) 260 

Iowa  points  to  Chicago.     Live  stock.     Blanket  Rates,  §9    (c) 92 

Iron  Ridge,   Wis.     Switching.     Switch  Tracks  and   Switching,   §7   (i) 794 

Iron   Ridge,   Wis.,   to   Michigan   City,   Ind.,   and   Louisville,   Ky.     Ground   iron 

ore.    Equalization  of  Rates,  §4   (2),  (1).  Routing  and  Misrouting,  §4   (xx). 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (hhh) 300,  758,  873 

Iron  Ridge,  Wis.,   to  other  states.     Iron  ore.     Classification,   §11    (1) 143 

Iron  Ridge,   Wis.,    to   Spokane,   Wash.     Iron  ore.     Reasonableness   of   Rates, 

§32      (aa) 607 

Iron    Ridge   Junction,    Wis.,    to    Denver,    Colo.      Iron    ore.     Advanced    Rates, 

§7     (2)     (d) 24 

Irving,    N.    Y.,    to    Burlington,    Vt.      Canned    goods.      Discrimination,    §4    (r). 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §57  (c) 239,  619 

Ivy  Rock,  Pa.     Spotting  cars.     Allowances,  §8   (5)    (a) 59 

Jackson,  Miss.,  to  Chicago,  111.  Lumber.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105 
(aa)     (bb)     (cc) 670 

Jackson,   Tenn.,  to  New  England  points.     Cotton.     Blanket  Rates,  §9   (aa) . .     90 

Jacksonport,  Ark.,  to  East  St.  Louis,  111.  Walnut  logs.  Equalization  of 
Rates,    §4    (2)     (v) 302 

Jacksonville,  Fla.,  from  Florida  points.  Fruits  and  vegetables.  Reasonable- 
ness   of   Rates,    §84    (b) 637 

Jacksonville,  Fla.,  from  Georgia  and  Alabama  points.  Cottonseed.  Rea- 
isonableness  of  Rates,  §75  (c).  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 
§2     (i)     633,  853 

Jacksonville,   Fla.,   from   Georgia   points.     Crossties.     Evidence,    §13    (6)    (c), 

Minimums,  §7  (d).  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §3  (e),  §105  (h) 327, 

502,     572,     666 

Jacksonville,  Fla.,  from  South  Carolina  points.  Cottonseed  oil.  Reasonable- 
ness  of   Rates,    §75    (d) 634 

Jacksonville,  Fla.,   to   Northern  points.     Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §84    (dd).  648 

Jamison,  Fla.,  to  Buffalo,  N.  Y.     Fullers  earth.     Tariffs,  §3   (1)    (aa) 806 

Janesville,    Wis.,    from    New    York,    N.    Y.      Clothing.      Reparation,    §4    (qq), 

§7    (o) 729,  757 

Janesville,  Wis.,  to  Cattaraugus,  N.  Y.    Sugar  beet  pulp.    Reparation,  §4  (pp)  757 

Janesville,  Wis.,  to  Chicago,  111.    Sugar  cane  pulp.    Proportional  Rates,  II  (f)  557 

Janesville,  Wis.,  to  Kansas  City,   Mo.     Rye  flour.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§83      (d) 637 

Janesville,   Wis.     Transit.     Discrimination,   §7    (b).   Facilities   and   Privileges, 

§21     (ee) 243,  409 

Jefferson  City,  Mo.,  from  the  East.  Leather  shoe  material.  Reasonableness 
of    Rates,    §101    (a) 659 

Jellico  Mines,  Tenn,,  to  Augusta,  Ga.  Coal.  Long  and  Short  Haul,  §10 
(dd).  Weights  and  Weighing,  §6  (d) 473,  903 

Jersey  City,  N.  J.,  from  New  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania  points.  Ice.  Rea- 
sonableness  of  Rates,   §9    (i) 585 

Jersey  City,  N.  J.,  from  New  Jersey  points.     Ice.     Transportation,  §8   (b) . . .  891 


INDEX   OF   LOCALITIES  1057 

Page 
Jersey   City,   N.   J.,   to    Jacksonville,    Pla.     Fresh    meats   and   poultry.     Rea- 
sonableness of  Rates,   §118   (e) 681 

Johnson   City,   Tenn.,   from   Eastern  points.     Rates.     Long   and   Short  Hauls, 

§9      (p) 463 

Johnstown,    Pa.,    to    Winona,    Wis.      Bar   steel.     Through    Routes    and   Joint 

Rates,    §15     (bb) 869 

Joliet,  111.,  to  Milwaukee,  Wis.     Brick.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §52   (h)...  617 
Joplin,  Mo.,  to  Little  Rock,  Ark.,  and  Alexandria  territory.     Wheat  and  com. 
Reasonableness   of   Rates,    §153    (b) 693 

Kalamazoo,   Mich.,   to   Blue   Mounds,   Wis.,   and   Mount  Horeb,  Wis.     Boilers. 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (ccc) 872 

Kalamazoo,    Mich.,    to    Fond    du    Lac,    Wis.       Cutters.       Evidence,    §28     (f). 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (n) 340,  867 

Kalamazoo,   Mich.,   to   St.   Paul,  Minn.     Cutters.     Through  Routes  and  Joint 

Rates,    §15     (qqq) 874 

Kalamazoo,  Mich.,  to  Wisconsin  points.     Boilers.     Through  Routes  and  Joint 

Rates,    §15     (jjj) 873 

Kalamazoo,  Mich.,  to  Wisconsin  points.    Engines  and  boilers.    Through  Routes 

and  Joint  Rates,   §15    (kkk) 874 

Kalispell  district,  Mont.,  to  North  Dakota.  Lumber.  Blanket  Rates,  §9  (b) . . .  91 
Kalispell    district    to    various    points.     Lumber.     Through   Routes    and   Joint 

Rates,  §11   (2)    (k) 854 

Kane,  Pa.,  from  New  York,  N.  Y.     CuUet.     Reparation,  §4   (rr) 757 

Kansas   City,   Mo.,  from  New  York  and  Eastern  territory.     Cotton  and  knit 

goods.      Long    and    Short    Hauls,    §9    (s) 464 

Kansas  City,  Kan.,  to  Kansas  City,  Mo.  Packing  house  products.  Absorp- 
tion of  Charges,   §2   (a) * 1 

Kansas  City,  Kan.,  to  New  York,  N.  Y.    Rate.     Crimes,  §26  (a) 192 

Kansas   City,   Mo.,   from   Alabama,   Mississippi,   Louisiana  and   Texas   points. 

Ties.     Tariffs,   §7    (m) 816 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  from  the  East.  Bananas.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84  (bb) .  647 
Kansas  City,  Mo.,  from  New  Orleans,  La.,  and  Mobile,  Ala.    Bananas.    Weights 

and  Weighing,   §7    (c) 904 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  from  Oklahoma  and  Texas  points.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§73    (b) 631 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  from  Oklahoma  points.  Wheat.  Procedure  before  Com- 
mission, §10   (2)    (j) : 546 

Kansas  City,  Mo.     Hay.     Reconsignment,  §4   (e) 702 

Kansas  City,  Mo.    Switching.    Reparation,  §7  (v).    Through  Routes  and  Joint 

Rates,  §1  (u) 730,  842 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Capo  Girardeau.  Hay.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §92  (f) . .  652 
Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Chicago  points.    Walnut  veneor.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§151  (a)   693 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Des  Moines,  la.     Oak  plank.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§105    (b)    665 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Dubuque,  la.    Hay.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §92  (h) 652 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  the  East.    Hay.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §92  (e) 652 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Galveston,  Tex.    Wheat.    Minimums,  §7  (v) 505 


1058  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 


Page 
Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Howard,  Wis.     Grain  Products.     Reparation,   §4    (eee), 

§10  (n)    759,  771 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Los  Angeles,  Cal.  Eggs.  Weights  and  Weighing,  §5  (b) . .  902 
Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.    Fresh  meats  and  packinghouse  products. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §103    (b) 659 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Milwaukee,  Wis.     Grain.     Reparation,  §9  (d) 769 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Oklahoma  points.    Petroleum.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§112    (d)    683 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Seymour,  la.    Hay.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §92  (c) 651 

Kansas  City,  Mo.    Transit.    Facilities  and  Privileges,  §21  (kk) 410 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Mississippi  River.     Cattle  and  hogs.     Evidence,  §13   (2) 

(c)    325 

Kansas  City  to  Mississippi  River.  Cattle  and  hogs.    Evidence,  §13  (5)   (b) 327 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  New  York.    Goods  for  export.    Crimes,  §7  (dd) 185 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Southern  territory.    Grain  and  products.    Discrimination, 

§8    (3)    (h) 251 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  to  Wisconsin  points.  Grain  and  grain  products.  Advanced 
Rates,  §19  (d) 46 

Kansas  Gas  Belt  to  Colorado  common  points,  etc.  Cement.  Advanced  Rates, 
§18    (4)    (aa) 43 

Kansas  points  to  Memphis,  Tenn.,  and  Little  Rock,  Ark.  Grain  products.  Pro- 
cedure before  Commission,  §10  (2)   (k) 546 

Kansas  points  to  Oklahoma  points.  Grain.  Procedure  before  Commission, 
§10  (2)  (1) 546 

Kansas  points  to  Oklahoma  points.    Petroleum.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §122 

(d)    683 

Kansas  salt  field  to  St.  Louis,  Mo.    Discrimination,  §7  (g) 244 

Kansas  to  Arizona,  New  Mexico,  Colorado,  California  and  other  points.    Dressed 

poultry.    Weights  and  Weighing,  §8  (c) 905 

Kansas  to  Fremont,  Neb.    Coal.    Differentials,  §5  (c) 211 

Kansas  to  Muskogee,  Okla.    Salt.    Blanket  Rates,  §17  (c) 100 

Kendallville,  Ind.,  to  Beaver  Dam,  Wis.     Water  tanks.     Through  Routes  and 

Joint  Rates,  §13  (q) 862 

Kendallville,  Ind.,  to  Gallatin,  Tenn.    Tanks.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §10  (ee) . .  474 

Kenmare,  N.  D.,  from  Washington  points.    Apples.    Discrimination,  §9  (m) 262 

Kentucky  points  to  Monterey,  Mex.    Tobacco.    Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 

§16  (h)   (i) 879 

Keokuk,  la.,  from  Arkansas  and  Missouri  points.     Staves,    Reasonableness  of 

Rates,  §142  (a),  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §15  (p) 689,  867 

Kiel,  Wis.,  from  Michigan  points.    Logs.    Reparation,  §9  (b) 732 

Kilbourne,  La.,  to  Pine  Bluff,  Ark.     Cottonseed.     Reparation,  §17  (i) 741 

Kingfisher,  Okla.,  from  Arkansas  and  Oklahoma  points.    Coal.    Reasonableness 

of  Rates,  §67  (z) 629 

Kings  Mills,  O.,  to  Muncie,  Ind.     Cartridges.    Reparation,  §8  (b) 730 

Kirkpatrick,  Miss.,  to  Davenport,  la.  Lumber.  Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (q) .  453 
Klamath  Falls,   Ore.,   to  Tacoma,   Wash.     Cattle.     Reasonableness   of   Rates, 

§103  (f)    661 

Knoxville,  Tenn.,  from  Newport,  Ky.,  and  Cincinnati,  O.     Sheet  iron  roofing. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §138    (a) 688 


INDEX   OP   LOCALITIES  1059 

Page 
Kokomo,  Ind.,  to  Arkansas  common  points.     Wire  products.     Discrimination, 

§9    (q)    264 

LaCrosse,  Wis.,  from  Atchison  and  Leavenworth,  Kans.,  and  Savannah,  Mo. 

Apples.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §28  (w) 604 

LaCrosse,  Wis.,  from  Sterling  and  Windsor,  Colo.    Sugar.    Reasonableness  of 

Rates,   §28    (z)    604 

LaCrosse,  Wis.,  to  Glenco,  Minn.    Beer.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (v) 454 

LaCrosse,  Wis.,  to  Tyndall,  S.  D.    Beer.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §47  (h) 615 

LaGrand,  Ore.    Commodity  Rates.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (1) 452 

LaJunta,  Colo.,  to  Milwaukee,  Wis.     Relative  rate.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§28    (aa)     .* 604 

Lake  Charles,  La.,  to  El  Paso,  Tex.  Lumber.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105  (u)  669 
Lake  City,  Ark.,  to  Springfield,  Mo.    Lumber.    Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 

§15    (111)    874 

Lakeside,  N.  Y.,  to  Earlston,  Pa.    Iron  ore.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §96  (b) . .  656 

Lake  St.  Claire,  Mich.    Hay  cars.    Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §13  (h) 116 

Lanette,  Ala.,  to  Chicago,  111.  Cotton-piece  goods.  Discrimination,  §10  (k) . . .  266 
Laporte,  Minn.,  to  Louisville,  Ky.    Poles.    Allowances,  §13  (b),  Long  and  Short 

Hauls,  §5  (bb).  Reparation,  §10  (j) 66,  455,  770 

Laporte,  Minn.,  to  Poplar  Bluff,  Mo.    Poles.    Reparation,  §7  (aaa) 767 

Laporte,  Minn.,  to  Poplar  Blufi!,  Mo.     Staking.    Allowances,  §8  (6)   (a) 60 

Laredo,  Tex.,  from  Eastern  territory.     Discrimination,  §9   (b) 259 

LaSalle,  111.,  to  Clinton,  la.,  and  Camanche,  la.    Cement.    Reparation,  §7  (f) . . .  728 

LaSalle,  111.,  to  LaSalle  Junction,  111.    Divisions.    Allowances,  §14  (i) ..... . 67 

Las  Animas  County,  Col.    Mine  Rating.    Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §24  (b) 121 

Las  Animas,  Col.,  to  Romero,  Tex.    Sugar.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (t) 454 

Laurinburg,  N.  C,  to  Birmingham,  Ala.  Cottonseed  hulls.  Tariffs,  §11  (a) . . .  830 
Laverty,  Okla.,  to  Millican  and  Navasota,  Tex.    Snap  corn.    Reasonableness  of 

Rates,  §89   (c)    650 

Lawrenceburg,  Ind.,  to  Milwaukee,  Wis.    Vehicles.    Through  Routes  and  Joint 

Rates,   §15    (pp) 871 

Leckrone,  Pa.,  to  Los  Angeles,  Cal.    Coke.    Reparation,  §7  (bb) 764 

LeCompt,  La.,  to  Omaha,  Nebr.    Lumber.    Facilities  and  Priivleges,  §19  (f ) . . .  406 

Leon,  Kans.,  to  Chicago,  111.    Cattle.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §103  (t) 664 

Leslie,  Ark.,  to  Chicago,  111.     Eggs.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §56  (b) 619 

Lewiston,  Me.,  from  the  West.    Corn.    Equalization  of  Rates,  §3  (mm) 296 

Lewiston,  N.  Y.,  to  Houston,  Tex.     Cabbages.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84  (h).  640 

Lilly,  Pa.,  to  Texarkana,  Ark.     Coal.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §67  (h) 626 

Lincoln,  Neb.,  from  points   South  and  West  of  Kansas   City.     Coal,   lumber, 

cement,  paving  brick,  glass  and  glassware,  salt,  egg  case  fillers,  rice,  and 

sugar.     Discrimination,  §4    (rr) 239 

Linton,  Ind.,  to  Chicago,  111.     Coal.     Demurrage,  §5  (b) 197 

Lithonia,  Ga.,  to  Chicago,  111.     Paving  blocks.     Overcharges,  §9  (f).     Weights 

and   Weighing,   §4    (d) 516,  902 

Little  Rock,  Ark.     Compression.     Allowances,  §8   (1)    (d) 55 

Little  Rock,  Ark.,  from  Oklahoma  points.     Cottonseed.     Through  Routes  and 

Joint  Rates,   §11    (2)    (w) 858 

Little  Rock,  Ark.,   from   Smolen  and  Falun,   Kan.     Wheat.     Through  Routes 

and  Joint  Rates,    §22    (s) 884 


1060  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 


Page 
Little   Rock,    Ark.,    to    Kansas    points.     Lumber.     Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§105     (a)     665 

Little  Rock,  Ark.,  to  Memphis,   Tenn.     Cottonseed  meal  and  hulls.     Claims, 

§6     (c) 129 

Little  Rock,  Ark,,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.     Lumber.     Blanket  Rates,  §12   (d) 97 

Little    Rock,    Ark.,    to    Oklahoma,    Kansas    and    Missouri.     Lumber.      Blanket 

Rates,    §7     (e) 85 

Little  Rock,  Ark.     Transit.     Facilities  and  Privileges,   §15    (n) 399 

Long  Island   City,  N.  Y.,  to  Shipman,  Va.     Marble.     Procedure  Before  Com- 
mission,   §2    (eee).     Released   Rates,    §5    (a) 539,713 

Longmont,    Colo.,    to   California,  and    Pacific    Coast   terminals.     Canned   peas, 

beans,   etc.     Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §121    (a) 682 

Lorain,    O.,   to   Oconomowoc,   Wis.     Gasoline   stoves   and    parts.     Reparation, 

§4      (aa) 755 

Los    Angeles,    Cal.,    from    the    East.      Lumber.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§105   (jj) 671 

Los   Angeles,    Cal,,    from    West   Virginia   points.     Blacksmith    coal.     Repara- 
tion,   §7     (o) 763 

Los  Angeles,  Cal.    Switching.    Switch  Tracks  and  Switching,  §5  (d)   792 

Lob  Angeles,   Cal.,   to   Grand   Rapids,   Wis.     News    printing   paper.     Bills   of 

Lading,   §5    (d).     Minimums,   §8   (e).     Tariffs,   §7   (ee) 76,508,819 

Los    Angeles,    Cal.,    to    Manistique    and    Sault    Ste.    Marie,    Mich.      Hides. 

Blanket    Rates,    §11    (cc) 95 

Los   Angeles,    Cal.,   to   Salt   Lake   City,   Provo   and    Ogden,   Utah.     Passenger 

Fares    and   Facilities,    §2    (f ) 519 

Los  Angeles,   Cal.,   to  Yuma,   Ariz.     Ice.     Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §94    (b). 

Special    Contracts,    §5    (f) 653,  781 

Los  Angeles,   Cal.     Transit.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §19    (h) 406 

Louin,  Miss.,  to  Peoria,  IlL     Rosin.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §131   (a) 686 

Louisiana  from  and  to  various  points.     Live  stock,  fresh  meats,  and  packing- 
house products.     Reasonableness   of  Rates,    §118    (b) 679 

Louisiana  to  Omaha,  Neb.,  and  Council  Bluffs,  la.     Lumber  and  forest  prod- 
ucts.    Advanced   Rates,    §5    (1)    (b) 14 

Louisiana   to   points   east   of   the   Illinois-Indiana    state   line.     Potatoes.     Ad- 
vanced   Rates,    §17    (b) 38 

Louisiana  points  to  Memphis,  Tenn.     Cottonseed.     Differentials,  §6   (a) 214 

Louisiana  points  to  Ohio  River  points.     Lumber.     Advanced  Rates,  §13   (f) . .     33 

Louisiana  points  to  Texas   points.     Commodity  Rates.     Tariffs,   §8    (g) 828 

Louisiana  points  to  Texas  points.     Corn.     Evidence,  §30    (f ) 343 

Louisville,  Colo.,  to  Kansas,  Nebraska,  Missouri,  Iowa  and  Oklahoma  points. 

Coal.     Discrimination,    §4    (k) 233 

Louisville,    Ky,,    from    Southern    territory.      Hardwood    lumber.     Equalization 

of    Rates,    §3     (i) 292 

Louisville,    Ky.,    from    Tennessee    points.      Logs.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§105     (r) 668 

Louisville,    Ky.,   to   and   from    New   Albany,    Ind.      Through   traffic.     Tariffs, 

§7     (yyy) 825 

Louisville,  Ky.,  to  Elkhorn,  W.  Va.,  and  Potsdam,  N.  Y.    Wooden  tank  mate- 
rial.    Classification,    §17    (b) 151 


INDEX   OF    LOCALITIES  1061 

Page 
Louisville,   Ky.,   to   Indiana,   Tennessee,   etc.     Advertising   premiums.     Classi- 
fication,   XX    §7     (d) 139 

Louisville,  Ky.,  to  New  Albany,  Ind.     Bridge  Tolls,  I   (d) i07 

Louisville,    Ky.,    to    Sacramento,    Cal.      Farm    wagons.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,   §8    (4)    (p) 583 

Louisville,    Ky.,    to    Wisconsin    and    Texas    points.      Wooden    tank    material. 

Througb   Routes  and  Joint  Rates,   §15    (i) 866 

Louisville,  Miss.,  to  Cairo,  111.     Ties.     Blanket  Rates,  §13   (bb) 97 

Loveland,    Colo.,    to    California   and    Pacific    Coast    terminals.      Canned    peas, 

beans,    etc.     Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §121    (a) 682 

Lowell,   Fla.,   to   Pittsburgh,   Pa.     Reconsignment,   §5    (c) 703 

Ludlow,  Colo.     Rates.     Tap  Lines,   §7    (h) 800 

Ludlow,    Colo.,    to    Trinidad    and    points    east   and    south.     Coal.     Long   and 

Short    Hauls,    §5    (w) 454 

Lynchburg,  W.   Va.,   from  Hartford  and   Mason  City,  W,  Va.     Salt.     Propor- 
tional  Rates,   IV    (g) 560 

Lyons,  Kan.,  to  Lusk,  Wyo.     Rock  Salt.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §134   (d) .  687 

Maiden   Lake,   Wis.,   to   Minneapolis,    Minn.     Cord   wood.     Reasonableness   of 

Rates,    §105     (ii) 671 

Maiden,  Mo.,  to  Minneapolis,  Minn.     Cotton  linters.    Minimums,  §8  (n) 510 

Malvern,    Ark.,    to    Milwaukee,    Wis.      Chairs.      Through    Routes    and    Joint 

Rates,    §15     (k) 867 

Mammoth  Springs,  Ark.,  to  Grainfield,  Kan.     Fence  posts.     Reparation,  §9   (i)  770 
Manchester,    N.    Y.,    to   Waterloo,    Wis,      Rates.      Procedure    Before    Commis- 
sion,    13     (j) 551 

Manchester,    Vt.,     to    Waterloo,    Wis.      Butter    boxes.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,    §55     (a) 618 

Manchester,   Vt.,   to  Waterloo,   Wis.     Through   billing.     Interstate   Commerce 

§3      (h) 420 

Manheim,   W.   Va.,   to   territory   between   Virginia  cities   and   Central  Freight 

Association  territory.     Cement.     Blanket  Rates,   §8   (aa) 87 

Manistique,  Mich.,  from  Paynesville  and  Alexandria,  Minn.    Butter  and  eggs. 

Facilities   and   Privileges,    §4    (c) 390 

Manitowoc,  Wis.,  to  Baltimore,  Md.     Rye.     Tariffs,  §7   (bbbbb) 826 

Marble    Falls,    Tex,,    to    St.    Louis,    Mo.      Insulator    pins.      Equalization    of 

Rates,     §5     (b) 305 

Marion,  111.,  to  Minneapolis,  Minn.     Coal.     Reparation,   §3    (p) 721 

Marion,    Ind.,    to    Oakland,    Cal.      Iron    beds    and    mattresses.      Alternative 

Rates,  I   (a).     Classification,  §7   (aa).     Tariffs,  §7   (i) 69,  138,  816. 

Marlow,  Okla.,  to  Amsterdam,  N.  Y,  Cement.  Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (ii)  456 
Marlow,  Okla.,  to  Amsterdam,  N.  Y.  Plaster.  Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (hh)  456 
Marlow,   Okla.,   to   Ft.  Worth  and   Dallas,   Tex.     Cement,   plaster.     Advanced 

Rates,  §5   (2)    (d).     Blanket  Rates,  §7   (bb) 15,     84 

Marlow,    Okla.,    to   Perth    Amboy,    N.    J.     Wall    plaster.     Reasonableness    of 

Rates,    §124    (c) 684 

Marshall,  Tex.,  to  Biddeford,  Me.  Cotton.  Equalization  of  Rates,  §4  (2)  (h)  299 
Marshall,   Tex.,   to   Holdup,  La.     Car  wheels   and   Axles.     Reasonableness   of 

Rates,    §58    (b) 620 


1062  INDEX   OP    LOCALITIES 


Page 
Martinsburg,    W.    Va.,    to    Portsmouth,    O.      Limestone.      Evidence,    §64    (a). 

Reparation,    §2    (h) 356,  716 

Martinsburg,  W.  Va.,  to  various  points.    Lime.    Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §29  (b)  123 
Martin  sdale,    Ga.,    to   Chattanooga,    Tenn.     Canned   peaches.     Reasonableness 

of  Rates,   §57    (b) 619 

Martins  Creek,  Pa.,   to  Brockton,   Mass.     Cement.     Reparation,   §3    (h) 752 

Martins  Creek,  Pa.,  to  New  Jersey.     Cement.     Evidence,  §17   (d) 333 

Martins   Creek,   Pa.,    to   Philadelphia,    Pa.     Cement.     Evidence,    §10    (a),   §17 

(d).       Proportional     Rates,     IV     (d).       Reasonableness     of     Rates,     §60 

■      (a) 319,  333,  559,  620 

Maryland  ports.     Trimming  and   leveling.     Facilities   and   Privileges,   §6    (b)  391 
Mason  City,  la.,  to  Minnesota  points.     Petroleum  and  products.     Equalization 

of  Rates,   §5    (c) 305 

Mason    City,    la.,    to    Ledyard,    la.      Petroleum    and    products.      Equalization 

of    Rates,    §5    (c) 305 

Mayville,    Wis.,    to   West   Chicago,    111.      Pig   iron.      Long   and    Short   Hauls, 

§5      (kk) 456 

McAlester,    Okla.,    to    Ft.    Worth    and    Dallas,    Tex.      Cement    plaster.      Ad- 
vanced  Rates,   §5    (2)    (d).     Blanket   Rates,    §7    (bb) 15,     84 

Mcintosh,    Fla.,    to    Pottsville,    Pa.      Oranges.      Through    Routes    and    Joint 

Rates,    §15    (kkkk) 876 

McKenzie,  Tenn.,  to  Evansville,  Ind.    Logs.    Facilities  and  Privileges,  §19  (a)  405 
McLean's    Spur,    Ky.,    to    Louisville,    Ky.     Logs.      Facilities    and    Privileges, 

§19      (b) 405 

McVeigh,   la.,    to   St.   Louis,    Mo.     Timothy   seed.     Reasonableness   of   Rates, 

§89     (f ) 650 

McVittys,   O.,   to   Tarentum,    Pa.     Lime.     Through   Routes   and    Joint  Rates, 

§15      (dddd) 876 

Medford,   Ore.,  to  California  points.     Class  rates.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§9    (aa) 584 

Medicine  Lodge,  Kan.,  to  Spokane,  Wash.     Cement.     Reparation,  §4   (u) 755 

Memphis,  Tenn.    Compression  charges.    Allowances,  §8  (1)   (c) 55 

Memphis,  Tenn.     Compression.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §3   (a) 389 

Memphis,  Tenn.,  from  Little  Rock  and  Pine  Bluff,  Ark.    Cottonseed  meal  and 

hulls.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §75  (e) 634 

Memphis,  Tenn.,  from  Missouri,  Oklahoma  and  Louisiana  points.     Cottonseed. 

Discrimination,  §4  (ee),  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §75  (a) 231,  632 

Memphis,  Tenn.,  from  Southeastern  Points.    Cottonseed.    Discrimination,  §4  (e)  231 
Memphis,  Tenn.,  from  various  points.     Cottonseed  products.     Through  Routes 

and  Joint  Rates,  §11   (2)    (t) 857 

Memphis,  Tenn.     Rebilling.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §18   (d) 404 

Memphis,   Tenn.     Switching  and  compression  charges.     Compress  Companies 

and  Charges,  II   (b) 168 

Memphis,   Tenn.,   to  Arkansas   points.     Fertilizer.     Reasonableness   of  Rates, 

§81    (d)    635 

Memphis,  Tenn.,  to  Junction  City,  Ark.    Cotton  fabrics.    Classification,  §14  (d)  147 
Memphis  to  Louisville,  Ky.,   Cincinnati,  O.,  and  Chicago,  111.     Cotonseed  oil. 

Advanced  Rates,  §17  (i),  §18   (5)    (a)    .' 41,  43 


INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES  1063 


Page 
Memphis,  Tenn.,  to  New  Orleans,  La.    Lumber.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105 

(ee),  Reparation,  §2   (q)    670,  718 

Memphis,  Tenn.,  to  Pueblo,  Colo.  Cotton  linters.  Evidence,  §47  (k),  Repara- 
tion,   §5    (a) 348,  760 

Memphis,  Tenn.,  to  Woodward,  Okla.    Egg  case  material.     Reasonableness  of 

Rates,  §79  (a)   634 

Memphis,  Tenn.     Transit.    Facilities  and  Privileges,  §21  (11),  Substitution  of 

Tonnage,  §2    (m)    410,  786 

Menasha,  Wis.    Transit.    Facilities  and  Privileges,  §17  (f)    402 

Mendota,  Minn.,  to  La  Crosse,  Wis.     Clam  shells.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§65    (a)    621 

Menominee,  Mich.    Class  rates.    Reparation,  §8  (ee)   732 

Menomonie,  Wis.    Class  rates.    Reparation,  §8  (ee)    732 

Meridian,  Miss.,  to  New  Orleans,  La.  Cotton  linters.  Released  Rates,  §2  (c) . .  711 
Merrill,  Wis.    Relative  rates.     Equalization  of  Rates,  §2  (q).  Long  and  Short 

Hauls,  §5   (rr)    290,  456 

Merwin,  Mo.,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.    Hay.    Commodity  Rates,  §4  (b)  161 

Mesa,  Ariz.,  to  Arizona,  Colorado,  New  Mexico,  Kansas  and  California  points. 

Base  rates.    Express  Companies,  §24  (c)   385 

Metropolis,  111.,  to  Chicago,  111.    Grape  baskets.    Transportation,  §11  (b)   892 

Michigan  City  to  Beloit,  Wis.     Cotton  overalls  and  jackets.     Through  Routes 

and  Joint  Rates,  §15   (x)    868 

Michigan   points   to  the   Pacifiic   Coast.     Lumber.     Reasonableness   of  Rates, 

§105    (c)    665 

Middle  Granville,  N.  Y.,  to  Eagle  Bridge,  N.  Y.    Fluid  milk.    Advanced  Rates, 

§3  (aa),  §18  (7)   (a)   11,  44 

Middlesboro,  Ky.,  to  Bristol,  Tenn.    Coal.    Discrimination  §8  (3)   (i)   251 

Middlesboro,  Ky.,  to  Knoxville,  Tenn.     Coal.    Discrimination  §11  (k)   268 

Midland,   Tex.,  to  Kansas   City,  Mo.     Live  stock.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§103    (e)    661 

Midland,  Tex.,  to  Kennebec,  S.  D.    Cattle.    Blanket  Rates,  §8  (g),  Proportional 

Rates,  II   (k)    90,  558 

Milford,  Nebr.    Transit.    Facilities  and  Privileges,  §21  (kk)  410 

Mill  Creek-Elk,  W.  Va.,  to  Central  Freight  Association  territory.  Coal.  Reason- 
ableness of  Rates,  §67   (q)    627 

Milwaukee,  Wis.    Delivery  service.    Express  Companies,  §2  (a)   374 

Milwaukee,   Wis.,   from   Iowa,    Minnesota   and   South    Dakota    points.     Grain. 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11  (2)   (n)   855 

Milwaukee,  Wis.,  from  Omaha,  Neb.     Empty  beer  packages.     Reasonableness 

of  Rates,  §48   (b)    615 

Milwaukee,  Wis.,  from  Omaha,  Neb.,  and  Kansas  City,  Mo.  Empty  beer  pack- 
ages.   Evidence,  §1  (k)   316 

Milwaukee,  Wis.,  to  Escanaba  and  Gladstone,  Mich.    Beer.    Reasonableness  of 

Rates,  §47   (c)    614 

Milwaukee,  Wis.,  to  Los  Angeles,  Cal.     Automobile  parts.     Reasonableness  of 

Rates,  §46   (a)    614 

Milwaukee,  Wis.,  to  McCook,  Neb.    Beer.    Reparation,  §16  (aaaaa)    741 

Milwaukee,  Wis.,  to  Pacific  coast  and  far  Western  points.     Beer.     Evidence, 

§29    (j)    341 


1064  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 


Page 

Milwaukee,  Wis.,  to  Powersville,  Mo.     Beer.     Reparation,  §16   (ww)    738 

Milwauliee,  Wis.,  to  Roswell,  N.  Mex.     Beer.     Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §9   (o), 
Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §47   (e)    462,  615 

Milwaukee,  Wis.,  to  Sacramento,  Cal.     Beer  kegs.     Commodity  Rates,  §3   (a), 

Tariffs,  §7   (ss)    159,  817 

Milwaukee,  Wis.,  to  Spokane,  Wash.     Chip  board.     Demurrage,  §8  (c)   199 

Milwaukee,  Wis.,  to  Springfield,  111.    Iron  castings.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§96    (a)    656 

Milwaukee,    Wis.,    to    Tacoma,   Wash.     Tanners'    outfits.     Reasonableness    of 
Rates,    §146    (a)     691 

Mineral,  Va.,  to  Passaic,  N.  J.    Lumber.    Reparation,  §7  (m)   762 

Minneapolis,  Minn.     Assorting  Packages,   §(c)    72 

Minneapolis,   Minn.,   from  Arkansas   points.     Relative  rates.     Equalization  of 
Rates   §2    (u)    290 

Minneapolis,  Minn.,  from  Chicago,  111.,  and  Milwaukee,  Wis.     Petroleum  and 
products.     Procedure  before   Commission,   §2    (mm)    540 

Minneapolis,  Minn.,  from  Duluth,  Minn.,  and  Superior,  Wis.     Bituminous  coal. 
Evidence,  §13   (2)    (i)    325 

Minneapolis,  Minn.,  from  Minnesota  and  other  points.     Cream.     Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §111   (b)    675 

Minneapolis,  Minn.,  from  Seymour  and  Cedar  Gap,  Mo.    Apples.     Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §84  (i)    640 

Minneapolis,  Minn.,  to  California,  terminals.    Malt.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§106   (a)    672 

Minneapolis,  Minn.,  to  Denver,   Col.     Class  rates.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§66    (a)    621 

Minneapolis,  Minn.,  to  Duluth,  Minn.    Elevation.    Allowances,  §16  (d)    69 

Minneapolis,  Minn.,  to  Marshfield,  Wis.    Bran.     Tariffs,  §7  (zz)   822 

Minneapolis,  Minn.,  to  Milwaukee,  Wis.    Elevation.    Allowances,  §16  (b)   68 

Minneapolis,  Minn.,  to  Milo,  Mo.     Oil  meal.     Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 

§15  (vv)    (WW),  §19   (c)    872,  881 

Minneapolis,   Minn.,   to  New   York,   N.   Y.     Agricultural   implements.     Export 
Rates  and  Facilities,  V  (e)    372 

Minneapolis,   Minn.,   to   New    York.     Flour.     Equalization   of   Rates,    §6    (n). 
Procedure  before  Commission,  §2   (v)    308,  538 

Minneapolis,  Minn.,  to  New  York,  N.  Y.     Wheat  and  flour.     Reasonableness 
of   Rates,    §27    (h)    601 

Minneapolis,  Minn.,  to  San  Francisco,  Cal.,  and  Seattle,  Wash.     Oil.    Reason- 
ableness of  Rates,  §8  (4)   (r)    583 

Minneapolis,  Minn.,  to  South  Dakota  points.     Oil  and  gasoline.     Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §117   (e)    678 

Minneapolis,  Minn.     Transit.     Discrimination,  §7  (b).  Facilities  and  Privileges, 
§21  (ee)    243,  409 

Minnesota  points  to   Rhode  Island.     Jewelers'  sweepings.     Procedure  before 
Commission,  §10   (2)    (g)    546 

Minnewaukan,  N.  D.,  from  East  Grand  Forks,  Minn.     Sawdust.     Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §136  (a)    687 

Mississippi  points  to  North  and  East  of  Ohio  and  Mississippi  Rivers.    Lumber. 
Facilities  and  Privileges,  §21    (p)    410 


INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES  1066 

Page 
Mississippi  River  crossings  to  Missouri  River  cities.     Class  Rates.     Through 

Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §13  (w)    863 

Mississippi  River  crossings  to  Southeastern  territory.    Class  rates,  fresh  meats, 
grain  and  products,  hay  and  packing  house  products.     Advanced  Rates, 

§5    (d)    13 

Mississippi  River  crossings  to   Southeastern  territory.     Hay,   grain  products. 
Differentials,    §3    (a).    Discrimination,    §10    (d),  JEqualization    of    Rates, 

§6    (u) 209,  265,  309 

Mississippi  River  to  Missouri  River.    Class  rates.    Advanced  Rates,  §7  (1)  (d)     21 
Mississippi  River  to  Missouri  River.     Local  rates.     Equalization  of  Rates,  §4 

(4)     (h)     303 

Mississippi  River  to  San  Francisco,  Cal.,  and  Pacific  Coast  terminals.    Lumber. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105  (p)    668 

Mississippi  to  Omaha,  Neb.,  and  Council  Bluffs,  la.    Lumber  and  forest  products. 

Advanced  Rates,   §5    (1)    (b)    14 

Missoula  district,  Mont.,  to  North  Dakota  and  Missouri  River  territory.    Lumber. 

Differentials,  §7  (f )   219 

Missouri  from  and  to  various  points.     Live  stock,  fresh  meats  and  packing 

house  products.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §118   (b)    679 

Missouri  points  to  Fremont,  Neb.     Coal.     Differentials,  §5  (c)    211 

Missouri  points  to  Minnesota  and  other  points.     Watermelons.     Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §152   (a)    693 

Missouri  points  to  Memphis,  Tenn.    Cottonseed.    Differentials,  §6  (a)   214 

Missouri  River  cities.     Elevation.     Allowances,  §8   (3)    (f)    (ff),  Facilities  and 

Privileges,   §21    (y)    58,  412 

Missouri  River  cities  from  Central  Freight  Association  territory.     Southeast- 
ern territory   and   Carolina  territory.     Rates.     Reasonableness  of   Rates, 

§7   (a)    575 

Missoui  River  to  the  Coast.    Rates.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §4  (i)  445 

Missouri  River  to  Grand  Junction,  Colo.    Class  rates.    Evidence,  §20  (b)   336 

Minot,  Miss.,  to  Davenport,  la.    Cypress  lumber.    Advanced  Rates,  §19  (e)   ...     47 

Minot,  Miss.,  to  Davenport,  la.     Lumber.     Blanket  Rates,  §8   (bb)    88 

Mobile,  Ala.,  to  Alabama  points.     Fish.     Express  Companies,  §9   (a)    377 

Mobile,  Ala.,  to  Kansas  points.    Bananas.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84  (cc) . .   648 

Mobile  Wharf.    Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  III  (b)   366 

Mobile,  Ala.     Wharfage.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §16  (e)    401 

Moline,  111.,  to  Kalamazoo,  Mich.     Buggy  bodies.     Minimums,  §7   (g)    502 

Monessen,  Pa.,  to  Lawrenceville,  Va.    Iron  wire.    Classification,  §18  (5)   (a) . . .   154 
Monroe,  La.,  to  Crowell,  Tex.    Shingles.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §139  (a)   . .  688 
Montana   to   St.   Paul   Minn.,   Chicago,   111.,   Mississippi  River,   Missouri   River 
Southeastern   Kansas,   Denver   and    similar   points.     Shingles   and   forest 

products.     Advanced  Rates,   §13    (k)    33 

Montana  to  other  states.     Common  lumber,  cedar,  fir,  etc.     Advanced  Rates, 

§8  (1)   (i)   28 

Montchanin,  Del.,  to  Pennsylvania  and  Ohio.    Powder.    Blanket  Rates,  §8  (dd)     89 

Monterey,  Mex.,  from  Kentucky.    Tobacco.    Minimums,  §7  (p)   504 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  from   Ohio  and  Mississippi  River  crossings.     Rates.     Dis- 
crimination,  §8    (5)    (f)    256 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  to  Lake  Charles,  111.    Candy.    Reparation,  §16  (v)  736 


1066  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 


Page 
Montgomery,    Ala.,    to    Meridian,    Miss.      Fertilizer.      Equalization    of    Rates, 

§4(2)   (t)    302 

Montgomery,   Ala.,   to   Minneapolis,   Minn.     Cotton   linters.     Released   Rates, 

§2    (b)    711 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  to  Mississippi  points.  Fertilizer.  Procedure  before  Com- 
mission,  §10    (2)    (h)    546 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  to  various  points.    Local  rates.    Through  Routes  and  Joint 

Rates,   §15    (iiii)    876 

Montgomery,  Ala.,   to  West   Point,   Miss.     Local   rate.     Through   Routes   and 

Joint  Rates,  §15   (hhhh)    876 

Montgomery,  Ala.     Transit.     Substitution  of  Tonnage,  §2   (d)    785 

Montgomery  County,  Md.    Telephone.    Special  Contracts,  §2  (o)   774 

Montpelier,  Vt,  to  Wells  River,  Vt.    Coal.    Crimes,  §5  (a)   183 

Montrose,  la.,  to  Rochester,  Minn.    Grapes.    Reparation,  §2  (1)    751 

Morristown,  Tenn.,  from  Eastern  points.  Rates.  Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §9  (p)  463 
Mound  Valley,  Kans.,  to  Bellevue,  Neb.    Brick.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (oo), 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §28    (v)    456,  604 

Mound  Valley,  Kans.,  to  Tecumseh,  Neb.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §9  (d)  460 

Moundsville   district,   W.   Va.,   to   Lorain   and    Sandusky,   O.     Coal.     Blanket 

Rates,    §6    (b)     82 

Mount   Pleasant  district,    Tenn.,   to   Chicago,   111.,   Indianapolis,   Ind.,   Dayton, 

O.,  Columbus,  O.,  Cleveland,  O.,  Canton,  O.,  Sandusky,  O.,  Detroit,  Mich., 

Buffalo,    N.    Y.,    and    Pittsburgh,    Pa.      Phosphate    rock.      Discrimination, 

§4    (00)    235 

Mt.  Pleasant,   Tenn.,  to  Newport,  Del.     Phosphate  rock.     Reasonableness  of 

Rates,  §28   (cc)    604 

Mountain   Home,   Ida.,   to   Tacoma,   Wash.     Cattle.     Long   and    Short   Hauls, 

§5   (nn)    453 

Muncie,   Ind.,  to  Arkansas   common   points.     Wire   products.     Discrimination, 

§9    (q)    264 

Munising,  Mich.,  to  Los  Angeles,  Cal.    Paper.    Reparation,  §16  (1)  736 

Muskogee,  Okla.,  to  Coffeyville,  Kan.    Petroleum  skimmings.     Reasonableness 

of  Rates,   §123    (a)    684 

Muskogee,  Okla.,  to  New  Orleans,  La.  Crude  petroleum.  Discrimination,  §9  (h)  261 
Mt.  Clemens,  Mich.,  to  Ripplemead,  Va.    Coiled  elm  hoops.    Reparation,  §2  (n) .  717 

Nashville,  Tenn.,  from  Pacific  Coast  terminals.    Canned  goods  and  dried  fruit. 

Long  and   Short   Hauls,   §9    (t)    465 

Nashville,  Tenn.,  from  Coal  Creek  field,  Tenn.    Coal.    Discrimination,  §11  (e) . .  268 

Nashville,  Tenn.    Elevation.    Allowances,  §8  (3)   (c)    57 

Nashville,  Tenn.    Rebilling.    Facilities  and  Privileges,  §18  (b)   403 

Nashville,  Tenn.     Transit.    Facilities  and  Privileges,  §20  (h)   407 

Natchez.    Relative  Rates.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §10  (aa)    472 

Natchitoches,  La.     Concentration.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §4  (b)   390 

Natchitoches,  La.,  from  Louisiana  points.    Concentration.    Concentrating  Rates 

and   Privileges,    (aa)    169 

Nebraska  City,  Neb.    Elevation.    Allowances,  §8   (3)    (bb)    57 

Nebraska  points  from  Louisiana,  Texas,  Arkansas  and  Missouri  points:  Lum- 
ber.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105   (n)    667 


INDEX   OF   LOCALITIES  1067 


Page 
Nebraska  points  to  Kansas  points.  Corn.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §153  (g) . .  695 
New  Albany,  Miss.,  to  Baltimore,  Md.,  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  New  York,  N.  Y.,  and 

Boston,  Mass.    Furniture.    Discrimination,  §8  (3)   (m)    252 

New  Albany,  Miss.,  to  St.  Charles,  Minn.    Lumber.    Reparation,  §10  (n)   771 

Newcastle,  Pa.,  to  New  York,  N.  Y.    Passenger  fares.    Passenger  Fares  and 

Facilities,  §14   (i)    530 

New  Castle,  Pa.,  to  Pittsburgh,  Pa.    Local  rates.    Through  Routes  and  Joint 

Rates,   §15    (bbb)    872 

New  England  points  from  various  points.    Grain  and  products.    Differentials, 

§6   (e)    215 

New  Jersey  points  from  the  Pocono  Mountains.    Ice.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§28    (e)    602 

New  Jersey  to  various  points.    Ice.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §94  (a)  653 

New  Mexico  from  and  to  various  points.  Live  stock,  fresh  meats  and  packing- 
house products.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §118   (b)    679 

New  Mexico  to  El  Paso,  Tex.    Barrels.    Blanket  Rates,  §8  (ff)   90 

New  Orleans  from  Central  America.    Bananas.    Import  Traffic,  I  (c)  416 

New  Orleans,  La.,  from  Henderson  and  Owensboro,  Ky.    Export  rates.    Export 

Rates  and  Facilities,  III  (e)    367 

New  Orleans,  La.,  from  Louisiana  points.     Export  traffic.    Export  Rates  and 

Facilities,  I   (c) 365 

New  Orleans,  La.,  from  Louisiana  points.  Staves  and  logs.  Interstate  Com- 
merce, §4   (f)    422 

New  Orleans,  La.,  from  Texas  points.     Cotton.    Export  Rates  and  Facilities, 

V  (b)    371 

New  Orleans,  La.    Reconsignment,  §1  (g)   698 

New  Orleans,  La.    Relative  rates.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §10  (aa)   472 

New  Orleans,  La.     Switching.    Facilities  and  Privileges,  §15  (q)    400 

New  Orleans,  La.,  to  Billings,  Mont.    Rice.    Reparation,  §17  (h)   741 

New    Orleans,    La.,    to   El    Paso,   Tex.     Bananas.     Reasonableness   of   Rates, 

§84    (w)    645 

New  Orleans,  La.,  to  Ft.  Smith  and  Fenn.,  Ark.     Nitrate  of  soda.     Tariffs, 

§7    (cccc)    826 

New    Orleans,    La.,    to    Gallatin,    Tenn.     Sugar.     Equalization    of    Rates,    §4 

(4)    (k)    304 

New  Orleans,  La.,  to  Galveston,  Tex.    Bananas.    Import  Traffic,  II  (d)  417 

New  Orleans,  La.,  to  Gramercy,  La.    Interstate  Commerce,  §3  (g)   420 

New   Orleans,   La.,   to   Kansas   points.     Bananas.     Reasonableness   of  Rates, 

§84    (cc)     648 

New  Orleans,  La.,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.    Ties.    Discrimination,  §4  (ff )    232 

New  Orleans,  La.,  to  Mobile,  Ala.  Local  rates.  Discrimination,  §8  (3)  (g)  ...  250 
New  Orleans,  La.,   to  Montgomery  and  other  Alabama  points.     Class  rates. 

Advanced  Rates,  §7  (4)    (b)    25 

New  Orleans,  La.,   to  Montgomery,   Selma  and  Prattville,  Ala.     Local  rates. 

Discrimination,  §8    (3)    (g)    250 

New  Orleans,  La.,  to  Pensacola,  Fla.  Local  rates.  Discrimination,  §8  (3)  (g) . .  250 
New  Orleans,  La.,  to  Pittsburgh,  Pa.    Canned  okra.    Classification,  §15  (aa)  ...  148 

New  Orleans,  La.,  to  Richmond,  Va.    Old  bridge  material.    Tariffs,  §7  (j)   816 

New  Orleans,  La.,  to  San  Antonio,  Tex.    Freight  wagon.    Classification,  §16  (d) .  150 


1068  INDEX   OF    LOCALITIES 

Page 
New  Orleans,  La.,  to  Sioux  City,  la.    Sugar.    Bills  of  Lading,  §5  (a)   (b),  Min- 

imums,   §8    (b)    76,  508 

.New  Orleans,  La.,  to  Texas  points.    Rough  rice.     Discrimination,  §13   (a) 269 

New  Orleans,  La.,   to  Texas   common   points.     Bananas.     Reasonableness   of 

Rates,    §84     (g) 639 

New  Village,  N,  J.,  to  Akron,  O.     Cement.     Tariffs,  §10   (a) 829 

New  Village,  N.  J.,  to  Williamstown,  Vt.,  and  Enosburg  Falls,  Vt.     Cement. 

Througb  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11   (2)    (e) 852 

New  York,  N.  Y.,  from  Georgia  and  Alabama.     Cotton.     Lighterage,  §2   (a) . .  439 
New  York,  N.  Y.,  from  Massachusetts  points.     Traffic.     Through  Routes  and 

Joint    Rates,    §9    (b) 847 

New  York,  from  Missouri  River  points.  Flour.     Evidence,   §13    (2)    (1).     Ex- 
port Rates  and  Facilities,  III   (ff) 326,  368 

New  York,  N.  Y.,  from  St.  Andrew's  Parish,  S.  C.     Cabbages.     Reasonable- 
ness  of   Rates,    §84    (r) 644 

New    York,    K    Y.,    from    the    West.      Grain    and    products.      Export    Rates 

and    Facilities,    III     (i) 369 

New  York,  N.  Y.     Export  flour.     Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  I   (a) 365 

New  York  City,  N.  Y.     Free  storage.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §8   (b) 392 

New  York  N.Y.     Lighterage.     §3    (b)    (h),  §4   (b) 440,441 

New  York,  N.  Y.     Lighterage.     Allowances,  §12   (1)    (c) 64 

New  York,    N.    Y.     Storage,    (a) 783 

New  York,  N.  Y.,  to  and  from  New  Jersey,  N.  J.     Commutation  fares.     Pas- 
senger Fares  and  Facilities,   §5   (a) 520 

New   York,   N.   Y.,   to   Atlanta,   Ga.     Boots.     Advanced   Rates,    §18    (3)    (a), 

§19     (ee) 42,    48 

New  York,  N.  Y.,  to  Boise,  Ida.     C.  O.  D.  shipments.     Express   Companies, 

§7      (a) 376 

New  York,  N.  Y.,  to  Boise,  Ida.     Rates.     Express  Companies,   §14   (a) 383 

New  York,  K  Y.,  to  Chicago,  111.,  and  Central  Freight  Association  territory. 

Burlap   Bags.     Discrimination,    §4    (o) 235 

New   York,   N.   Y.,   to   Chicago,   111.     Fleshings   and   glue   stock.     Minimums, 

§7     (zz) 508 

New  York,  N.  Y.,  to  Detroit,  Mich.     Iron  pyrites.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§96    (k) 657 

New  York,  N.  Y.,  to  Janesville,  Wis.     Clothing,     Claims,  §6   (f ) 129 

New  York,  N.  Y.,  to  Minneapolis,  Minn.     Brimestone  barrels.     Classification, 

§4      (a) 134 

New   York,    N.    Y.,    to    Minneapolis,    Minn.      Gum    olibamun.      Classification, 

§17     (i) 153 

New  York,  N.  Y.,  to  Pearsaw,  Tex.     Granulated  cork.     Tariffs,  §7  (g) 815 

New  York,   N.   Y.,   to   Reidsville,    N.    C.     Sugar.     Reasonableness    of   Rates, 

§144      (a) 689 

New   York,   N.   Y.,    to    San    Francisco,    Cal.      Bulk    shipments.      Forwarders, 

II     (d)     (f) 414,  415 

New  York,   N.  Y.,   to   San   Francisco,   Cal.,   and   Seattle,  Wash.     Oil.     Rea- 
sonableness   of   Rates,    §8    (4)    (r) 583 

New  York,  N.  Y.     Track  Storage,  II   (a)    (d)    (k)    (1) 885,  886 

New  York,  N.  Y.     Transfer.     Allowances,  §8   (7)    (a),  §15   (e) 60,    68 


INDEX   OF   LOCALITIES  1069 


Page 

New  York,  N.  Y,     Unloading.     Facilities  and  Privileges,   §8    (a) 392 

New  York  Harbor.    Lighterage.    Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  II  (q) 5 

New  York  Harbor,  N.  Y.     Lighterage,  Terminal  Facilities,  §2    (a) 835 

Newark,  N.  J.,  to  Seattle,  Wash.    Enameled  ware.    Tariffs,  §7  (v) 818 

Newark,  O.,  to  Baltimore,  Md.     Clover  huUers.     Export  Rates  and  Facilities, 

V     (F) 372 

Newell  Scales,  Pa.,  to  Buffalo,  N.  Y.     Coal.     Blanket  Rates,  §7   (aa) 83 

Newport,    Ark.,    to    East    St.    Louis,    111.      Walnut    Logs.      Procedure    Before 

Commission,    §11     (u) 548 

Newport,     Ky.,     to     Globe    Ariz.      Corrugated     iron.      Minimums,     §7     (hh). 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,   §15    (nnnn) 506,877 

Newport,    Tenn.      Transit    privileges.      Facilities    and    Privileges,     §15     (f) 

(m)      397,  399 

Newport  News,  Va.,  to  Associated  Railways  and  Southeastern  Freight  Asso- 
ciation   territories.      Rates.      Advanced    Rates,    §19    (b).      Discrimination, 

§7      (d) 46,  243 

Newton,  Miss.,  to  Kansas  City,  Mo.  Ties.  Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (ee) . .  450 
Nevada   from   the   East.     Commodity   rates.     Procedure   Before    Commission, 

§19     (c) 554 

Niagara   Falls,    N.    Y,,    to    Tennessee    points.     Phosphate   rock.     Reparation, 

16     (zz) 738 

Niles,  Mich.,  to  Chicago,  111.     Animal  traps.     Tariffs,   §7    (qqq) 824 

Ninnekah,  Okla.,  to  Clarkesville,  Tex.    Snapped  com.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§140  (b)  688 

Ninnekah,   Okla.,   to  Lettsworth,   La.     Corn.     Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §153 

(d)     694 

Nooksack,     Wash.,     to     Minneapolis,     Minn.       Apples.       Reasonableness     of 

Rates,    §84     (z) 647 

Norfolk,  Va.,  from  North  Carolina  points.     Logs.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§40     (a),    §112     (a) 611,  676 

Norfolk,    Va.,    to    Annapolis,    Md.      Cartridges,      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§91      (b) 651 

Norfolk,  Va.,  to  San  Francisco,  Cal.     Passenger  fares.     Passenger  Fares  and 

Facilities,     §15     (b) 530 

Norfolk,  Neb.,  to  Wyoming  points.  Cement  plaster.  Branch  lines,  §3  (c) . .  104 
North   and    South   Carolina   to   Wilmington,   N.   C.     Cotton.     Equalization   of 

Rates,    §8    (f ) 311 

North    Birmingham,    Ala.,    to    Philadelphia,    Pa.,    and    New   Brunswick,    N.    J. 

Lumber.     Through   Routes   and   Joint  Rates,   §15    (e) 866 

North   Birmingham,  Ala.,   to  Washington,   D.   C.     Chimney   brick.     Evidence, 

§64      (y) 359 

North  Dakota  to  Minneapolis,   Minn.,   Chicago,  111.,  and  other  primary  grain 

markets.     Wheats  and  coarse  grain.     Advanced  Rates,   §7   (1)    (c) 20 

Oakdale,  La.,  to  Port  Arthur,  Tex.  Export  lumber.  Advanced  Rates,  §5  (2)  (e) .  15 
Oakhurst,    Ga.,    to    Marietta,    Ga.      Canner    peaches.      Interstate    Commerce 

Commission,    §10    (f )     435 

Oconto,   Wis.,   to   Chicago,   Evanston   and   Elsmere,   111.     Wood.     Reparation, 
§8    (1)    731 


1070  INDEX   OF   LOCALITIES 


Page 
OflScial    Classification    territory.      Castings    japanned.      Advanced    Rates,    §8 

(1)    is)    27 

Official  Classification  territory.  Class  and  commodity  rates.  Advanced  Rates, 
§1  (b),  §6  (3)  (b),  §6  (4)  (a).  §7  (1)  (e),  §14  (a),  §15  (b),  §17  (f),  Inter- 
state  Commerce    Commission,    §9    (n)    9,  18,  22,  36,  40,  433 

Official  Classification  territory.  Hay  Fand  straw.  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§92   (a)    651 

Official  Classification  territory.  Single  packages  and  small  lot  rates.  Ad- 
vanced Rates,  §7  (1)   (aa)   20 

Ogden,  Utah,  to  Durango,  Colo.     Wbeat.    Demurrage,  §6   (a)    198 

Ogdensburg,  N.  Y.,  to  Boston,  Mass.     Grain.    Allowances,  §5   (b)    54 

Ogemaw,  Ark.,  to  Sodus,  La.    Sawmill  machinery.    Reparation,  §7  (s)  729 

Ohio  River  crossings  to  Southeastern  territory.  Class  rates,  fresh  meats, 
grain,  grain  products,  hay  and  packing  house  products.  Advanced  Rates, 
§5   (d)    13 

Ohio  River  crossings  to  Southeastern  territory.  Hay,  grain  products.  Differ- 
entials, §3   (a),  Discrimination,  §10   (d)    209,  265 

Ohio  River  crossings  to  Southeastern  territory.  Grain  products  and  hay. 
Equalization  of  Rates,  §6  (u)   309 

Ohio  River  points  from  the  South.    Lumber.    Reparation,  §6  (mm)   726 

Ohio  River  to  Southeastern  territory.  Proportional  rates.  Classification, 
§3   (h)    134 

Ohio  to  various  states.    Sample  brick.    Express  Companies,  §11  (11)  (a)  381 

Ohio  to  Pittsburg.     Cream  and  condensed  milk.    Advanced  Rates,  §13  (e),  19 

(dd)     32,  47 

Okarche,  Okla.,  to  Ft.  Worth  and  Dallas,  Tex.  Cement  plaster.  Advanced 
Rates,  §5  (2)   (d),  Blanket  Rates,  §7  (bb)   15,  84 

Okemah,  Okla.,  to  Terrell,  Tex.  Snapped  corn.  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§140    (c)    689 

Okeene,  Okla.,  to  Ft.  Worth  and  Dallas,  Tex.  Cement  plaster.  Advanced  Rates, 
§5   (2)    (d),  Blanket  Rates,  §7   (bb)    15,  84 

Oklahoma  City,  Okla.,  from  and  to  various  points.  Live  stock  and  packing 
house  products.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §118  (b)   679 

Oklahoma  City,  Okla.,  from  El  Paso,  Tex.  Live  stock.  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,  §103   (b)    659 

Oklahoma  City,  Okla.,  from  the  Kansas  salt  field.     Salt.     Reasonableness  of 

Rates,  §118   (b)    679 

Oklahoma  City,  Okla.,  from  Texas  points.    Cattle.    Discrimination,  §2  (bb)   . . .  224 

Oklahoma   City,   Okla.,   from   Texas   points.     Live  stock.     Reasonableness  of 

Rates,  §3  (a),  103   (b)    572,  659 

Oklahoma  City  to  Arkansas  and  Louisiana  points.  Fresh  meats  and  packing 
house  products.    Advanced  Rates,  §19   (c)    46 

Oklahoma  City,  Okla.,  to  Galveston,  Tex.  Walnut  lumber.  Discrimination, 
§8   (3)    (1)    252 

Oklahoma  City,  Okla.,  to  Kansas,  and  from  various  points.  Live  stock  rates. 
Equalization  of  Rates,  §3  (ff) 291 

Oklahoma  City,  Okla.,  to  Kansas  City,  Mo.  Live  stock.  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,  §103   (b)    659 


INDEX   OF   LOCALITIES  1071 


Page 
Oklahoma  City,   Okla.,   to  Oklahoma,  Texas   and  New  Mexico.     Peddler   Car 

Service,  (b)    532 

Oklahoma  City,  Okla.,  to  the  Southeast,  Carolina  territory.  Trunk  Line  terri- 
tory and  Illinois  territory.     Proportional  rates.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§118   (b)    679 

Oklahoma   City,   Okla.,  to   various   points.     Fresh   meats  and   packing  house 

products.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §103  (b)   659 

Oklahoma  City,   Okla.     Storage  charge.     Compress   Companies   and   Charges, 

II    (a)    167 

Oklahoma  from  and  to  various  points.     Live  stock,  fresh  meats  and  packing 

house  products.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §118  (b)   679 

Oklahoma  points,  to  Fremont,  Neb.    Coal.    Differentials,  §5  (c)  211 

Oklahoma  points  to  various  points.    Grain.     Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 

§11   (2)    (o)    855 

Oklahoma  to  Illinois  points.    Cement.    Interstate  Commerce,  §1  (h)   419 

Oklahoma  to  New  York  and  Eastern  points.    Fresh  meats  and  packing  house 

products.    Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §13  (a)   860 

Oklahoma  to  Texas  and  other  points.     Cottonseed  products.     Reasonableness 

of  Rates,  §75   (b)    633 

Oklahoma  to  various  points.     Cottonseed  products.    Reparation,  §2  (k)    716 

Olar,  S.  C,  to  Wilmington,  N.  C.    Cotton.    Equalization  of  Rates,  §8  (f)   311 

Clean,  N.  Y.,  to  Burlington,  Vt.    Oil.    Crimes,  §23  (a)   192 

Clean,  N.  Y.,  to  Norwood,  N.  Y.    Petroleum  and  products.    Crimes,  §11  (a)  ...  188 

Clean,  N.  Y.,  to  Rutland,  Vt.    Petroleum.     Crimes,  §11  (b)    188 

Olympia,   Wash.,   to  Nevada,   California  sand  Arizona   points.     Refrigeration, 

§3   (h)    708 

Omaha.     Elevation.     Allowances,  §8   (3)    (d),  §14   (d)    (e)    57,67 

Omaha,  Neb.    Back  haul  privilege.    Evidence,  §66  (a)  361 

Omaha,  Neb.,  from  and  to  Salt  Lake  City,  Ogden  and  Provo,  Utah.    Passenger 

Fares  and  Facilities,  §2    (d)    518 

Omaha,  Neb.,  from  Arkansas,  Louisiana,  Mississippi  and  Texas  points.     Lum- 
ber and  forest  products.     Differentials,  §7   (b)    217 

Omaha,  Neb.,  from  California  points.    Lima  beans.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§121   (b)    683 

Omaha,   Neb.,    from   Kansas   points.     Petroleum.     Reasonableness   of   Rates, 

§122    (g)    684 

Omaha,  Neb.,  from  South  Dakota,  Minnesota  and  Iowa  points.    Grain.    Equal- 
ization of  Rates,  §4   (2)    (d)    299 

Omaha,  Neb.,  from  the  South.     Lumber.     Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 

§13    (g)     861 

Omaha,  Neb.,  Reweighing,  Weights  and  Weighing,  §6  (a)    903 

Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Canton,  S.  D.    Lumber.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105  (w)  . . .  669 
Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Central  Freight  Association  territory  and  OfiBcial  Classification 

territory.     Poultry  and  Dairy  Products,  §56  (a)    618 

Omaha  to  Central  Freight  Association  territory  and  Atlantic  Seaboard.    Poul- 
try and  dairy  products.    Evidence,  §63  (n)  356 

Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Chanute  and  Erie,  Kan.    Petroleum  and  products.    Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §28   (gg) 605 


1072  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 

Page 
Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Colorado,  Kansas,  South  Dakota  and  Wyoming  points.    Lum- 
ber.    Equalization  of  Rates,  §6   (h)    306 

Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Council  Bluffs,  la.     Bridge  toll.     Electric  Lines,  I   (a)    (e), 

IV  (a)    (b)    279,  280,  282 

Omaha,   Neb.,   to   Denver,   Col.     Agricultural  implements.     Alternative   Rates, 

I  (d) 70 

Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Denver,  Colo.     Rates.    Express  Companies,  §8  (g)   377 

Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Fordyce,  Ark.    Corn.    Transportation,  §2  (g)   888 

Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Little  Rock,  Ark.     Grain  products.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§10    (bb) 586 

Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Little  Rock,  Ark.     Grain  and  products.     Through  Routes  and 

Joint  Rates,  §13  (aa)   860 

Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Little  Rock,  Ark.     Corn.    Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §11  (b)    114 

Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Texarkana,  Tex.     Grain.     Proportional  Rates,  I   (b),   Special 

Contracts,    §2    (jj)     555.  776 

Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Wisconsin  points.     Grain  and  products.     Proportional  Rates, 

II  (a) 558 

Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Wyoming,   Colorado  and  Kansas  points.     Lumber.     Reason- 
ableness of  Rates,   §105    (m)    667 

Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Central  Freight  Association  territory  and  the  Atlantic  Sea- 
board.    Poultry  and  dairy  products.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §40  (h)    ...   611 
Omaha,    Neb.,    to    Southern    territory.      Grain    and    products.      Discrimination, 

§8    (3)    (h)     251> 

Omaha,  Neb.,  to  various  points.    Cream  cans.    Express  Companies,  §11  (3)  (a).   379 
Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Wisconsin  points.    Grain  and  grain  products.    Advanced  Rates, 

§19    (d)     46 

Omaha,  Neb.     Transit.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §21   (bb)    408 

Onalaska,  Ark.,  to  Batchelor,  La.     Second-hand  logging  equipment.     Reason- 
ableness of  Rates,  §137   (a) 688 

Orange,  Tex.,  to  Eunice,  La.    Groceries.    Reparation,  §2  (oo)   717 

Orange,  Tex.,  to  the  North  Atlantic  Seaboard.     Rice.     Differentials,  §5  (d) . . .   211 
Oregon    City,    Ore.,    to   Cripple    Creek,    Colo.     Fir   lumber.     Advanced    Rates, 

§5     (2)     (f ) 15 

Oregon.     Cooperage.     Allowances,    §8    (2)    (a) 56 

Oregon  points  to  Astoria,  Ore.     Wheat.     Differentials,  §6   (d) 215 

Oregon    points    to    Calif  ore  ia    points.     Poles    and    piling.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,    §125    (a) 684 

Oregon    points    to    the    East.      Lumber    and    forest    products.      Differentials, 

§7     (h) 221 

Oregon  to   other  states.     Common   lumber,   cedar,   fir,   etc.     Advanced   Rates, 

§8     (1)      (i) 28 

Oregon  to  St.   Paul,   Minn.,   Chicago,   111.,   Mississippi   River,    Missouri   River, 
Southeastern    Kansas,    Denver   and    similar   points.      Shingles   and    forest 

products.      Advanced    Rates,    §13     (k) 33 

Ottumwa,   la.,    from   the    East.     Class   rates.     Proportional   Rates,   IV    (k) . . .   561 
Ottumwa,  la.,  to  Kansas  City,  Mo.     Pickles.    Equalization  of  Rates,  §4  (2)    (i)  300 
Ottumwa,  la.,   to  Kansas   City,  Mo.     Structural  iron.     Reparation,   §18    (e) . .  742 
Ottumwa,    la.,    to    the    Southeast.      Fertilizer    material.      Reasonableness    of 
Rates,     §81      (b) 635 


INDEX   OF    LOCALITIES  1073 


Page 

Owensboro,  Ky.,  to  and  from  New  York  and  other  points.  Class  rates. 
Long   and   Short  Hauls,   §9    (r) 463 

Ozark  district.  Ark.,  to  Eastern  points.  Strawberries  and  peaches.  Refriger- 
ation,   §4    (k) 710 

Ozark  district,  Mo.,  to  various  points  east  and  west.  Strawberries.  Mini- 
mums,    §7     (s) 504 

Ozark  district,  Mo.,  and  Ark.,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.,  Missouri,  Louisiana, 
Mississippi,  Alabama,  Georgia,  South  Carolina,  Florida,  Oklahoma  and 
Texas   points.     Apples.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §84    (u) 546 

Pacific   Coast   terminals   from   the   East.     Furniture.     Minimums,    §5    (d),    §7 

(m)     500,  503 

Pacific   Coast  points  from   Chicago,  111.   points  and   Mississippi  River  points. 

Lumber.     Reasonableness   of  Rates,    §105    (ff ) 671 

Pacific   Coast  ports   to   Salt  Lake  City,   Utah.     Import  rates.     Branch  Lines, 

§4     (b) 105 

Pacific   Coast   terminals   from   Chicago  territory.     Iron   ore.     Reasonableness 

of    Rates,    §96    (1) 657 

Pacific    Coast    terminals    to    intermediate    Colorado    points.      Sugar.      Tariffs, 

§6      (k) 814 

Paducah,   Ky.,   from   Tennessee  points.     Stave   and  heading  bolts.     Facilities 

and    Privileges,    §15     (h) 3&8 

Page,  W.  Va.,   to  Carondelet,   Mo.     Coke.     Discrimination,   §7   (n) 245 

Painesdale,    Mich.,    from    Wisconsin    i>oints.      Potatoes.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,     §127     (a) 685 

Panama,  111.,  to  Hannibal,  Mo.     Coal.    Advanced  Rates,  §3   (a) 11 

Paola,  Kan.,  to  Boonville  and  Holden,  Mo.     Petroleum  oil.     Long  and  Short 

Hauls,     §9     (m) 462 

Paola,    Kan.,    to   Kansas    City,    Kan.     Petroleum.     Reasonableness    of   Rates, 

§122      (e) tJ83 

Paper  Mills,   Ore.,  to  Queen  Junction,  Pa.     Minimums,   §4    (m) 499 

Paraffin,  Cal.,  to  Alturas,  Cal.  Roofing  and  roofing  coating.  Discrimina- 
tion,    §4     (gg) 233 

Park  Manor,  Chicago,  111.  Station.  Passenger  Fares  and  Facilities,  §13  (a)  527 
Pawnee  Junction,   111.,   from   Tennessee   points.     Cross   ties.     Reasonableness 

of    Rates,    §105    (dd) 670 

Paw    Paw,    Mich.,    to    Green    Bay,    Wis.      Grapes.      Routing    and    Misrouting, 

§2     (j) 750 

Paxton,   111.,  from   Tennessee   points.     Cross   ties.     Reasonableness   of  Rates, 

§105      (dd) 670 

Paynesville,  Minn.     Concentration.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §4   (c) 390 

Pecos,   Tex.,   from   Denver,   Colo.,   Chicago,   111.,   St.   Louis,   Mo.,  Omaha,   Neb. 

Class  rates.     Long  and   Short  Hauls,   §9    (q) 463 

Pennsylvania     to     various     states.       Sample     brick.       Express     Companies, 

§11     (11)     (a) 381 

Pensacola,   Fla.,   to  Alabama   points.     Fish.     Express   Companies,   §9    (a) 377 

Peoria,  111.,  to  Missouri  River  points.     Discrimination,  §9   (r) 264 

Peoria,  111.,  to  Portland,  Ore.,  and  Seattle,  Wash.  Peanut  roasters.  Classi- 
fication,    §41^     (e) 136 


1074  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 

Page 
Perla,  Ark.,  to  Louisiana  points.     Brick.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §52  (a) . .  616 

Peru,  III.     Switching.     Switch  tracks  and   Switching,   §7    (n) 795 

Perth    Amboy,    N.    J.,    from    Wyoming   field.    Pa.      Coal.     Reasonableness   of 

Rates,    §67     (c) 625 

Pewee    Valley,    Ky.,    to    Pittsburgh,    Pa.      Grapes.      Procedure    Before    Com- 
mission,  §2    (pp).     Proportional   Rates,   IV    (j) 541,560 

Philadelphia,  Pa.     Free  Storage.     Facilities  and  Privileges,   §8   (b) 392 

Philadelphia,  Pa.,  from  Pennsylvania  points.     Ice.     Transportation,   §8    (b) . .  891 

Philadelphia,    Pa.     Storage,    (a) 783 

Philadelphia,  Pa.,  to  Buffalo,  N.  Y.   Molasses.    Routing  and  Misrouting,  §2  (c)  749 
Philadelphia,    Pa.,    to    Chicago,    111.      Cotton    shoddy    lining.      Reasonableness 

of  Rates,   §74    (a) 632 

Philadelphia,  Pa.,  to  European  points.     Water  Carriers,  §2    (i) 897 

Philadelphia,   Pa.,   to  Gowanda,  N.   Y.     Glue   stock.     Procedure   Before  Com- 
mission,   §13     (i) 550 

Philadelphia,  Pa.,   to  Utica,   N.  Y.     Reparation,   §7    (c) 761 

Phoenxi,  Ariz.     Commodity  rates.     Equalization  of  Rates,  §3   (q) 294 

Phoenix,  Ariz.,  from  the  East.    Class  rates.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §66  (g)  624 
Phoenix,   Ariz.,   from   the   East.     Commodity   rates.     Procedure   Before   Com- 
mission,    §19     (d) 555 

Phoenix,    Ariz.,    from    Kansas    points.      Wheat    and    flour.      Reasonableness 

of    Rates,    §153     (e) 694 

Phoenix,    Ariz.,    to   Arizona,    Colorado,    New    Mexico,    Kansas    and    California 

points.     Base   rates.     Express   Companies,    §24    (c) 385 

Phoenix,    Ariz.,    to    El    Paso,    Tex.,    and    Los    Angeles,    Cal.     Horses.     Rea- 
sonableness   of    Rates,    §103    (g) 661 

Phoenix,  Ariz.,  to  Los  Angeles,   Cal.     Live  stock.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§103    (d) 660 

Phoenix,  Ariz.,  to  other  Arizona  points.     Barley,  bran  and  wheat.    Advanced 

Rates,     §17     (c) 38 

Pine    Bluff,    Ark.,    to    Ft.    Worth,    Tex.      Box    shooks.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,   §50    (a) 616 

Pine   Bluff,  Ark.,   to  Memphis,   Tenn.     Cottonseed   meal   and   hulls.     Claims, 

§6      (c) 129 

Pine  Bluff,  Ark.,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.     Lumber  and  products.     Reasonableness 

of    Rates,    §105     (g) 666 

Pittsburg,  Kan.,   to  Oklahoma  points.     Coal.     Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §67 

(X)     629 

Pittsburg,    Kan.,    to    Portales,    N.    Mex.      Coal.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§67      (0) 62V 

Pittsburgh,   Pa.,  district  to  Ashtabula  Harbor,   O.     Bituminous   coal.     Differ- 
entials,    §7      (aa) 216 

Pittsburgh,    Pa.,    from    eastern    points.      Grapes.      Reasonableness    of   Rates, 

§84      (n) 641 

Pittsburgh,    Pa.     Switching.     Interstate    Commerce    Commission,    §14    (i) 437 

Pittsburgh,    Pa.,   to   Ashtabula   Harbor,   O.     Coal.     Reasonableness   of   Rates, 

§12%      (a) 590 

Pittsburgh,  Pa.,  to  Cleveland,  O.    Hoop  steel.     Reparation,  §7   (dd) 764 


I 


INDEX   OF    LOCALITIES  1075 

Page 
Pittsburgh,    Pa.,    to   Denver,    Colo.     Iron    and   steel   bars,    plates,   etc.     Rea- 
sonableness  of   Rates,    §95    (a) 655 

Pittsburgh,    Pa.,    to    Southeastern    and    Mississippi    Valley    Freight    Associa- 
tion territory.     Window  glass.     Discrimination,   §3    (a) 225 

Pittsburgh,  Pa.     Track  Storage,  II   (b)    (e)    (h)    (i) 885,  886 

Pittsfield,    Mass.,    to    Millinocket,    Me.      Machinery.      Through    Routes    and 

Joint    Rates,     §13     (m) 862 

Piano,    Tex.     Transit.     Facilities   and   Privileges,   §21    (hh) 409 

Pocahontas  district,  W.  Va.,  to  Chicago  rate  points.     Coke.     Discrimination, 

§3      (i) 226 

Pocahontas  Flat  Top  district,  W.  Va.     Mine  rating.     Cars  and  Car  Supply, 

§22     (a) 120 

Pocahontas,  Va,,  to  Carolina  cities.     Coal.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §67  (r)  627 
Pocono    Mountains,    Pa.,    to    New    Jersey.      Ice.      Long    and    Short    Hauls, 

§12      (2)      (f) 476 

Pocono    Mountains,    Pa.,    to    New   Jersey   points.'    Ice.     Evidence,    §64    (dd). 

Reasonableness    of    Rates,    §94     (c) 357,653 

Pocono  Mountains,  Pa.,  to  New  York,  New  Jersey  and  various  points.     Ice. 

Reasonableness    of   Rates,    §94    (a) 653 

Point    Pleasant,    N.    J.„    from    Pennsylvania    points.      Coal.      Discrimination, 

§8      (4)      (a) 253 

Pomona,    Tenn.,   to   St.   Louis,   Mo.     Strawberries     Facilities   and   Privileges, 

§20    (e) 407 

Ponchatoula,   La.,    to    Chicago,   111.     Fruits    and   vegetables^     Reasonableness 

of    Rates,    §84     (k) 640 

Port  Arthur,    Can.,    to   Buffalo,    N,   Y.,    and   eastern   points.     Flaxseed.     Ad- 
vanced   Rates,    §5    (3)     (a) 16 

Port  Chalmette,  La.,  to  Gramercy,  La.     Interstate  Commerce,  §3   (g) 420 

Port  Costa,  Cal.,  to   Sacramento,   Cal.     Barley.     Reparation,  §7   (pp) 766 

Portland,  Colo.,  to  Denver,  Colo.    Cement.    Advanced  Rates,  §18  (7)   (b) 44 

Portland,  Colo.,  to  La  Grande,  Ore.     Cement.     Tariffs,  §7   (iiii) 827 

Portland,    Ore.,    from    Chicopee    Falls    and    Springfield,    Mass.     Gas    mantle 

material.      Tariffs,    §7    (hh) 820 

Portland,    Ore.,   to   Auburn   Wash.     Hay,     Through  Routes   and   Joint  Rates, 

§15     (mmmm) 876 

Portland,   Ore.,  to  Chester,   Mont.     Emigrants'  movables.     Tariffs,   §7    (x) . . .  818 

Portland,  Ore.,  to  the  East.     Rates.     Class  Rates    (b) 132 

Portland,     Ore.,     to    the     East.      Class     rates.       Reasonableness     of    Rates, 

§66     (ee) 623 

Portland,  Ore.,  to  the  East.     Distributing  rates.     Commodity  Rates,   §1   (d).  159 
Portland,    Ore.,    to    Tacoma    and    Seattle,    Wash.      Live    stock    and    packing- 
house   products.     Differentials,    §5    (b) 210 

Portland,    Ore.,    to   Washington,    Idaho,    Montana   and    Oregon.      Class    rates. 

Procedure    Before    Commission,    §19     (e) 555 

Portsmouth-Oak  Hill  district,  O.,  to  Birmingham  and   Southern  points.     Fire 

brick.      Discrimination,    §7    (j) 244 

Potomac   Yard,   Va.     Reconsignment,    §5    (c) 703 

Poultney,  Vt.,  to  Eagle  Bridge,  N.  Y.     Fluid  milk.    Advanced  Rates,  §3  (aa), 
§18    (7)     (a) 11,     44 


1076  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 


Page 

Powersville,  Mo.     Relatice  Rate.     Equalization  of  Rates,  §2   (o) 289 

Prague,    Okla.,    to   Warwick,    Okla.     Cottonseed.     Interstate    Commerce   Com- 
mission,    §9     (gg) 435 

Prairie    Grove,    Ark.,    to    Nashville,    111.      Elm    hoops.      Proportional    Rates, 

II  (j)    558 

Prairie  Switch,  Ind.,  from  Maryland,  New  York,  Tennessee  and  Ohio  points. 

Phosphate  rock  and  acid  phosphate.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §126   (a)  685 

Prairie   Switch,   Ind.     Transit.     Facilities   and   Privileges,   §20    (g) 407 

Provencal,   La.,   to   Santa   Rita,   N.   Mex.     Lumber.     Reparation,   §4    (ee) 756 

Pueblo,   Colo.,   from   Big  Four   Mine,    Colo.     Coal.     Reparation,    §7    (11) 765 

Pulaski,    Tenn.,     to    Birmingham,    Ala.      Eggs .      Express     Companies,      §11 

(5)     (a) 380 

Pullman,  Wash.,  to  Valley  City,  N.  D.     Apples.     Discrimination,  §9   (m) 262 

Quapaw,  Okla.,  to  Kansas  City,  Mo.     Hay.     Overcharges,  §2   (a) 513 

Quincy,  111.,  to  San  Francisco,  Cal.     Show  cases.     Tariffs,  §7   (ooo) 824 

Racine,  Wis.,  to  Abilene,  Tex.    Wagon.    Minimums,  §8  (m) 510 

Raynesford,    Mont.,    to    Spokane,    Wash.      Hay.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§92      (g) 652 

Red    Wing,     Minn.,     from     Trunk     Line     territory.       Class     rates.       Blanket 

Rates,     §8      (c) 88 

Red  Wing,  Minn.,  to  La  Crosse,  Wis.     Oil.     Reparation,  §16  (t) 736 

Reno,  Nev.,  from  the  East.    Class  rates.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §66  (f) 623 

Reno,   Nev.,   from   various   points.     Rates.     Long   and   Short   Hauls,    §4    (k), 

§10    (d) 446,  467 

Reno,  Nev.,  to  Alturas,  Cal.    Apples.    Narrow  Gauge  Railroads,  I  (b)  512 

Reno,    Nev.,    to    Alturas,    Cal,      Potatoes    and    onions.      Narrow    Gauge    Rail- 
roads,  I    (aa).     Reasonableness   of   Rates,    §84    (o) 512,641 

Reno,  Nev.,  to  Denver,  Colo.     Rates.     Blanket  Rates,  §1   (d) 79 

Reno,   Pa.,   to   Milton   Junction,   Wis.     Gasoline.      Through   Routes   and   Joint 

Rates,     §15     (zz) 872 

Reno,    Nev.,   to   various   points.     Rates.     Through    Routes    and    Joint   Rates, 

§13     (b) 860 

Reno,   Nev.,   to  western   points.     Rates.     Branch   Lines,    §1    (a) 102 

Retsof,   N.    Y.,    to   Central   Freight   Association    territory.      Salt.     Discrimina- 
tion,   §8     (5)     (b) 254 

Retsof,   N,  Y.,  to  Detroit,   Mich.     Salt.     Discrimination,   §15    (d) 274 

Rhinelander,  Wis.,  to  points  east  of  the  Mississippi  River.     Paper.     Blanket 

Rates,    §13     (h) 99 

Richland   Center,   Wis.,   to  Dodgeville,   Wis.     Cheese  boxes.     Reasonableness 

of    Rates,    §63    (a) 621 

Richmond,   Ind.,   to  Wichita,    Kan.     Wire   fence.     Through   Routes   and  Joint 

Rates,  §19  (b) 881 

Richmond,  Va.,  to  Knoxville,  Tenn.     Boat  spikes.     Classification,  §7   (b) 138 

Ridge,  Mich.,   to   South   Chicago,   111.     Lumber.     Overcharges,   §8    (e) 515 

Ridgley,   Md.,   to  Duluth,   Minn.     Reparation,   §7    (z) 764 

River  Falls,   Ala.,   to   Waynetown,   Ind.     Lumber.     Reasonableness   of   Rates, 
§105  (hh)  671 


INDEX   OF    LOCALITIES  1077 


Page 

Roanoke,  W.  V.,  from  Hartford  and  Mason  City,  W.  Va.  Salt.  Proportional 
Rates,    IV    (g) 560 

Roanoke,  W.  Va.,  to  Virginia  and  Carolina  cities.  Class  rates.  Reasonable- 
ness of   Rates,   §66    (ff) 624 

Rochester,  N.  Y.,  to  Western.  Classification  territory.  Letter  copiers.  Evi- 
dence,    §12     (21)      (a) 322 

Rockford,  111.,  to  San  Francisco,  Cal.     Furniture.     Tariffs,  §7   (aa) 819 

Rockhouse,  Ky.,   to  Brockwayville,   Pa.     Cross   ties.     Long  and   Short  Hauls, 

§9     (g).      Tariffs,    §7     (oo) 461,  821 

Rock  Island,  111.,  to  Hartford,  Mich.  Relative  Rate.  Equalization  of  Rates, 
§2     (r) 290 

Rock  Springs,  Wyo.,  to  Nebraska  and  Wyoming  points.  Coal.  Blanket 
Rates,     §13     (g) 98 

Rockyford,  Colo.,  to  Pittsburgh,  Pa.  Perishable  produce.  Interstate  Com- 
merce   Commission,    §14    (o) 438 

Rocky  Mountain  territory.     Car  door  board.     Allowances,  §6   (a) 54 

Roman  Nose,  Okla.,  to  Ft.  Worth  and  Dallas,  Tex.  Cement  Plaster.  Ad- 
vanced Rates,  §5   (2)    (d).     Blanket  Rates,  §7   (bb) 15,    84 

Rome,  Miss.,  to  Davenport,  la.  Lumber.  Advanced  Rates,  §19  (e).  Blanket 
Rates,     §8     (bb) 47,     88 

Rome,  N.  Y.,  to  San  Francisco,  CaL  Brass  and  iron  tubing.  Reasonable- 
ness  of   Rates,    §51    (a) 616 

Romona,     Ind.,     to    various    points.      Stone.      Weights    and    Weighing,     §4 

(b)     (c) 901 

Rotterdam  Junction,  N.  Y.,  to  Holyoke,  Mass.  Coal.  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,     §67     (f) 625 

Roycefield,  N.  J.     Station.     Passenger  Fares  and  Facilities,  §13   (b) 527 

Rugby,   Colo.,   to   luka,   Kan.     Reconsignment,   §3    (1) 700 

Rupert,    Vt.,    to    Eagle    Bridge,    N.    Y,      Fluid    milk.      Advanced    Rates,    §18 

(7)     (a) 44 

Ruston,  La.,  to  Eldorado,  Ark.    Fertilizer.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §81  (a) . .  635 

Sacramento,  Cal.,  to  Nevada  and  Utah  points.  Class  rates.  Reasonable- 
ness  of   Rates,   §66    (dd) 622 

Saginaw  Bay,  Mich.  Hay  cars.     Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §13  (h) 116 

Sagle,  Ida.,  to  Garland,  Wyo.  Cedar  posts.  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 
§15  (eee) 872 

Salem,  N.  Y.,  to  Eagle  Bridge,  N.  Y,    Fluid  milk.    Advanced  Rates,  §3  (aa). 

§18     (7)      (a) 11,    44 

Salem,  S.  C,  to  Washington,  D.  C.    Lumber.     Demurrage,  §16  (f) 207 

Salina,  Kan.,  to  Hugo,  Okla.    Bran.    Discrimination,  §4  (jj) 233 

Salt  Lake  City,  Utah,  from  the  Missouri  River.  Relative  rates.  Long  and 
Short   Hauls,    §4    (aa) 443 

Salt  Lake  City,  Utah,  from  Pacific  Coast  ports.  Import  rates.  Long  and 
Short  Hauls,  §5   (k) , 451 

Salt  Lake  City,  Utah,  to  the  East.  Catsup.  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§59     (a) 620 

Salt  Lake  City,  Utah.,  to  San  Francisco,  Cal.  Passenger  fares.  Passenger 
Fares   and   Facilities,   §    (d) 524 


1078  INDEX   OF   LOCALITIES 


Page 
Sandusky,  O,,  to  Detroit,  Mich.  Cement.  Advanced  Rates,  §18  (1)  (b) . .  41 
San  Francisco,  Cal.,  and  Pacific  Terminals  from  the  East.    Lumber.    Long  and 

Short    Hauls,    §5     (n) 452 

San  Francisco,   Cal.,   from   and   to   Ogden,   Salt  Lake   City  and  Provo,  Utah. 

Passenger   Fares   and   Facilities,   §2    (e) 519 

San   Francisco,    Cal.,   from   the   East.     Lumber.     Through    Routes   and   Joint 

Rates,     §15      (11) 870 

San  Francisco,  Cal.,  from  the  East.     Beer.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §16  (k)  594 
San  Francisco,   Cal.,  from  Grand  Haven,   Mich.,  Rome,    N.    Y.,    and    Water- 
bury,   Conn.     Metal  furniture  knobs.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §110   (a)  673 
San  Francisco,    Cal.,    from   Grand    Mere,    Quebec.     Newspaper,      Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §16   (a) 677 

San  Francisco,    Cal.,   from  New   York,   N.   Y.     Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §8 

(4)      (d) 582 

San    Francisco,    Cal.,    to    Alturas,    Cal.      Nails,    barbed    wire,    staples,    wire, 

syrup   and    sugar.     Discrimination,    §4    (gg) 233 

San  Francisco,    Cal.,    to   Chinook,   Mont.     Dried   fruit.     Through   Routes   and 

Joint    Rates,    §15     (w) 868 

San  Francisco,    Cal.,    to   East   St.    Louis,   111.     Walnut  logs.     Blanket   Rates, 

§11    (ee)    95 

San  Francisco,    Cal.,    to   Independence,    Mo.     Rope.     Equalization   of    Rates, 

§3      (nn) 297 

San    Francisco,    Cal,,    to    Manistique    and    Sault    Ste.    Marie,    Mich.      Hides. 

Blanket    Rates,    §11     (cc) 95 

San   Francisco,    Cal.,    to    various    points.      Rates.      Long    and    Short    Hauls, 

§5     (cc) 449 

San  Francisco,  Cal.     Unloading.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §10    (j) 393 

San    Jose,    Cal.,    to    Roundup,    Mont.      Canned    Goods.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,    §57     (a) 619 

San  Pedro,   Cal.,   from   the   East.     Discrimination,    §9    (i) 261 

San   Pedro,   Cal.,   from   various   points.     Long  and   Short  Hauls,   §10    (i) 469 

San  Pedro,  Cal.     Rates.     Equalization  of   Rates,   §3    (s) 294 

San  Pedro,    Cal.     Rates.     Evidence,    §33    (a) 343 

Santa  Rosa,  N.  Mex.,  from  Chicago,  111.,  and  similar  points.     Rates.       Long 

and    Short    Hauls,    §5    (aa) 455 

Santa  Rosa,  N.  Mex.,  from  eastern  points.     Rates.     Long  and  Short  Hauls, 

§9      (1) 462 

Sapulpa,  Okla.,  to  Acme,  Tex.     Oil.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §117   (a) 678 

Sapulpa,    Okla.,    to    Humboldt,    Kan.      Petroleum    oil.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,    §117     (b) 678 

Saron,  Tex.,  to  Altus,  Okla.    Lumber.    Reparation,  §4  (x)  755 

Sartells,    Minn.,    to   Los    Angeles,    Oakland    and    San   Francisco,    Cal.     Print 

paper.     Divisions,    §4    (b) 277 

Sault  Ste.   Marie,   Mich.,  to  Thiensville,  Wis.     Cross  ties.     Long  and   Short 

Hauls,     §10     (r) 470 

Savannah,  Ga.    Rebilling.    Facilities  and  Privileges,  §18  (c)  403 

Savannah,  Ga.     Reshipping.     Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §20  (f)    882 

Schenectady,  N.  Y.     Spotting.     Allowances,  §12  (2)    (e)    65 

Seattle,  Wash.,  from  California  points.  Sheep  and  cattle.    Minimums,  §7  (c) . . .  501 


INDEX   OP   LOCALITIES  1079 

Page 
Seattle,  Wash.,  from  Stavanger,  Norway.     Rate.     Special  Contracts,  §2   (ccc), 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §18   (c)    779,  880 

Seattle,  Wash.,  from  St.  Paul  and  Missouri  River  points.    Hogs.    Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §103  (q)    (r) 664 

Seattle,  Wash.    Relative  Rate.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §8  (4)  (j)   582* 

Seattle,  Wash.     Rates.    Equalization  of  Rates,  §3  (ff )   295 

Seattle,  Wash.,  to  the  East.    Distributing  rates.    Commodity  Rates,  §1  (d)   . . ;  159 

Seattle,  Wash.,  to  the  East.    Lumber.    Blanket  Rates,  §8  (h) 90 

Seattle,  Wash.,  to  the  East.    Rates.    Class  Rates,  (b)  132 

Seattle,  Wash.,  to  Oregon,  Idaho  and  Montana  points.     Class  rates.     Reason- 
ableness of  Rates,  §66  (ee)   623 

Seattle,  Wash.,  to  the  Northwest  and  East.    Passenger  fares.    Passenger  Fares 

and  Facilities,  §14   (g)    529 

Seattle,  Wash.,  to  Nevada,  California  and  Arizona  points.     Refrigeration,  §3 

(h)     708 

Seattle,  Wash.,  to  Washington,  Idaho,  Montana  and  Oregon.    Class  rates.    Pro- 
cedure before  Commission,  §19   (e)    555 

Seymour,  la.,  to  Kansas  City,  Mo.    Millet  seed.    Reparation,  §16  (p)   736 

Seymour,  Mo.,  to  Minneapolis  and  St.  Paul,  Minn.    Apples.    Evidence,  §29  (h)  .  341 
Sharon,  Pa.,  to  Wilcoe,  W.  Va.    Masurite.     Procedure  before  Commission,  §10 

(2)    (f) 545 

Sheffield,   Ala.,   to   Hutchinson,   Kans.     Pig  iron.     Reasonableness   of   Rates, 

§96    (f )    656 

Shreveport,  La.     Concentration.    Facilities  and  Privileges,  §4  (a)    390 

Shreveport,  La.    Storage  charge.    Compress  Companies  and  Charges,  II  (a)   . .  167 

Shreveport,  La.,  to  Arkansas  points.    Equalization  of  Rates,  §1  (v)   287 

Shreveport,  La.,  to  Hamburg  and  Crossett,  Ark.     Fertilizer.     Reasonableness 

of  Rates,  §81  (c) 635 

Shreveport,  La.,  to  Kansas  City,  Mo.     Cottonseed  cake.    Through  Routes  and 

Joint  Rates,  §13  (r)    862 

Shreveport,  La.,  to  Marshall,  Tex.     Sash  weights.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§135    (a) 687 

Shreveport,  La.,  to  Texas  points.    Equalization  of  Rates,  §3  (bb)   290 

Shushan,  N.  Y.,  to  Eagle  Bridge,  N.  Y.    Fluid  milk.    Advanced  Rates,  §3  (aa), 

§18    (7)    (a) 11,44 

Sioux   City,  la.     Back  haul  privilege.     Discrimination,   §3    (b),  Evidence,   §66 

(a)    225,  361 

Sioux  City,  la.,  from  South  Dakota,  Nebraska,  Minnesota  and  Iowa,  and  to 

various  points.    Grain.     Discrimination,  §14  (a)    271 

Sioux    City,    la.,    from    various    points.      Cream.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§111   (d)    675 

Sioux  City,  la.,  to  Gary,  Ind.    Rate.    Reparation,  §16  (j)   736 

Sioux  City,  la.,  to  Hinsdale,  Mont.    Corn.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §153  (a)  . .  693 
Sioux  City,  la.,  to  Lemmon,  S.  D.    Sash  door,  window  frames,  etc.    Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §105   (gg)    671 

Sioux  City,  la.,  to  Lismore,  Minn.    Corn.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §89  (d)   ...  650 
Sioux  City,  la.,  to  Minnesota  points.    Merchandise.    Discrimination,  §9  (c)   ...  259 
Sioux  City,   la.,  to   New   Orleans,  La.     Apples.     Bills   of  Lading,   §9    (1)    (a) 
Routing  and  Misrouting,  §3   (f)    77,  752 


1080  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 


Page 

Sisson,  Cal.    Switching  charge.    Absorption  of  Charges,  §3  (a)   2 

Sisson,  Cal.    Switching.     Switch  Tracks  and  Switching,  §4  (d)   789 

Soldani,   Okla.,   from   Dryden   and    Sanderson,    Tex.      Sheep.      Transportation, 

§11    (a) 891 

Somerset,  Md.,  to  District  of  Columbia.     Carfare.    Electric  Lines,  I  (aa)    280 

South    Amboy,    N.    J.,    from    Clearfield    district.    Pa.      Coal.      Discrimination, 

§14   (b)    272 

South  Canon,  Colo.,  to  Utah,  Nevada,  California,  Oregon,  Washington,  Idaho  and 

Montana.     Coal.    Branch  Lines,  §1  (h)   103 

South    Canon,    Colo.,    to    western    points.      Coal.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§67   (u) 628 

South  Chicago,  111.,  from  Wilcox  and  Ridge,  Mich.  Cross  ties.  Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §105   (y)    670 

South   Dakota   points   to   Omaha,   Neb.     Corn,   grain   and   wheat.     Advanced 

Rates,    §16    (b)     37 

South  Dakota  to  Minneapolis,  Minn.,  Chicago,  111.,  and  primary  grain  markets. 

Advanced  Rates,  §7  (1)   (c)   20 

South  Hammond,  Ind.     Relative  Rate.     Equalization  of  Rates,  §2   (v) 290 

South  Haven,  Mich.,  to  La  Crosse,  Wis.    Grapes.    Evidence,  §64  (r)   358 

South  Omaha,  Neb.,  from  Arkansas,  Louisiana,  Mississippi  and  Texas  points. 

Lumber  and  forest  products.    Differentials,  §7  (b)   217 

South  Omaha,  Neb.,   to  Cushman,   Mont.     Cattle.     Reasonableness   of  Rates, 

§37   (g)    609 

South  Omaha,  Neb.,  to  Kings,  111.     Cattle.     Reparation,  §16  (iijj)    737 

South  Portland,  Ore.,  to  Eastern  destinations.  Lumber.  Blanket  Rates,  §10  (a)  92 
South   Tacoma,  Wash.     Joint   rates.     Through   Routes   and   Joint   Rates,   §11 

(1)    (a) 848 

South   St.   Paul  to  Hammond,   Ind.     Cattle.     Cars   and   Car   Supply,   §8    (g), 

Minimums,    §3    (i)     113,  497 

South  St.  Paul,  Minn.,  to  various  points.     Cattle.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§103    (1)    662 

Southard,  Okla.,  to  Ft.  Worth  and  Dallas,  Tex.     Cement  plaster.     Advanced 

Rates,  §5  (2)  (d).  Blanket  Rates,  §7  (bb)  15,  84 

Southern    Classification    territory.     Locomotives.     Advanced    Rates,    §16    (c), 

Classification,  §6  (a).  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §104   (a)    37,  137,  664 

Southern  Missouri  to  Louisiana  points.  Staves,  hoops  and  heading.  Ad- 
vanced  Rates,   §6    (6)    (b)    19 

Southern  territory  to  New  York  and  Northern  territory.    Leather.    Advanced 

Rates,   §8    (1)    (cc)    26 

Southern  Missouri  to  various  Louisiana  points.     Staves,  hoops  and  heading. 

Advanced  Rates,  §18   (4)    (a)    43 

Southport,  La.,  from  Mississippi  and  Louisiana  points.     Ties.     Weights  and 

Weighing,   §8    (f)    905 

Southwestern  points  to  various  packing  house  territories.  Live  stock.  Reason- 
ableness of  Rates,  §103  (b)    659 

Spokane,  Wash.,  from  Chicago,  111.,  and  St.  Paul.,  Minn.    Class  and  commodity 

rates.     Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §10  (m)    469 

Spokane,  Wash.,  from   Chicago,  111.,  and  St.  Paul,  Minn.     Rates.     Long  and 

Short  Hauls,   §10    (s)    470 


INDEX   OF    LOCALITIES  1081 

Page 
Spokane,   Wash.,   from   Chicago,   111.,   and   St.   Paul,   Minn.     Commodity  rates. 

Reasonableness   of   Rates,    §8    (4)    (k)    583 

Spokane,  Wash.,  from  Eastern  points.    Rates.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §10  (u)  .  471 

Spokane,  Wash.,  from  Eastern  territory.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §10  (f)    468 

Spokane,  Wash.,  from  Eastern  territory.     Commodity  rates.     Long  and  Short 

Hauls,  §5   (kk)    452 

Spokane,  Wash.,  from  the  East.     Class  and  commodity  rates.     Procedure  be- 
fore Commission,  §10   (2)    (a)    544 

Spokane,  Wash.,  from  the  East.     Commodity  rates.     Procedure  before  Com- 
mission,   §19    (b)     554 

Spokane,  Wash.,  from  the  East.    Rates.    Equalization  of  Rates,  §6  (i)    306 

Spokane,  Wash.,  from  the  East.  Rates.  Procedure  before  Commission,  §16  (g)  . .  552 
Spokane,  Wash.,  from  St.  Paul,  Minn.,  and  the  East.     Class  and  commodity 

rates.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §10  (v)   471 

Spokane,  Wash.,  from  Mississippi  River  points.     Class  and  commodity  rates. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §28    (f)    603 

Spokane,    Wash.,    from    various    points.      Long    and    Short   Hauls,    §10    (aa) 

(b)     (c)     466,  467 

Spokane,  Wash.     Rates.     Equalization  of  Rates,  §3   (ff)    295 

Spokane,  Wash.     Relative  rate.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §8  (4)    (j)    582 

Spokane,  Wash.,  to  Medford,  Ore.     Household  goods.     Long  and  Short  Hauls, 

§10    (o)     470 

Springfield,  111.,  to  Kansas  City,  Mo.    Coal.     Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 

§22     (q)     884 

Springfield,  111.,  to  Leona,  Kan.     Coal.     Tariffs,  §7   (zzz)    825 

Springfield,  111.,  to  Missouri  River.    Equalization  of  Rates,  §4(2)  (e)  299 

Springfield,  111.,  to  Salina  and  Kipp,  Kans.    Rates.    Through  Routes  and  Joint 

Rates,  §15  (oooo)   877 

Springport,  Mich.,  to  Anniston,  Ala.     Dried  beans.     Routing  and  Misrouting, 

§2   (h)    750 

St.  Andrews,  S.  C,  to  New  York,  N.  Y.     Lettuce.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§84    (s)    644 

St.  Blaise,  Tenn.,  to  Riddlesburg,  Pa.    Phosphate  rock.    Reparation,  §19  (n)  ...  744 
St.    Joseph,    Mo.,    from    various   points.      Cream.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§111   (d)    675 

St.  Joseph,  Mo.,  to  Pacific  Coast  points.    Glucose  syrup.    Equalization  of  Rates, 

§3    (c)    291 

St.  Joseph,  Mo.,  to  Pullman,  Wash.     Syrup.     Reparation,  §19   (i)    743 

St.  Joseph,  Mich.,  to  Wausau,  Wis.     Paper.     Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 

§15   (yy)    872 

St.  Joseph,  Mo.     Transit.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §21  (kk)    410 

St.  Louis,  Mo.    Auction  company.    Exclusive  Contracts    (c)   364 

St.  Louis,  Mo.     Estimated  weight.     Weights  and  Weighing,  §5  (a)    902 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  from  Arkansas  and  Louisiana  points.    Lumber.    Reasonableness 

of  Rates,  §105  (t)   668 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  from  the  Kansas  salt  field.     Salt.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§8  (1)    (bb)    576 

St.  Louis,  Mo.     Fruit  auctioneer.     Terminal  Facilities,  §3   (j)    837 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Arkansas  points.    Grain.    Discrimination,  §8  (3)   (k)   252 


1082  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 

Page 
St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Cullman,  Ala.  Beer.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §47  (a)  ...  614 
St.  Louis,  Mo„  to  Denver,  Colo.  Cameras  and  stands.  Classification,  §4  (f)  ...  135 
St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Denver,  Colo.     Iron  hoops,  staves,  heading.     Classification, 

§4^    (f)    136 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Denver,  Colo.    Motorcycles.   Classification,  §18  (6)  (a)   154 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Denver,  Colo.    Wooden  bungs.     Classification,  §11  (g)   142 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Eastern  points.     Potatoes.    Minimums,  §7  (a)   501 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Ft.  Smith,  Ark.    Brick.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §52  (d)   . .  617 
St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Leadville,  Colo.    Beer.    Interstate  Commerce,  §3  (k),  Long 
and    Short   Hauls,    §6    (h).   Reasonableness   of    Rates,    §47    (b),    (d),    (s), 
Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §2  (1),  §11  (i)  (j)  . .  420,  458,  614,  615,  843,  849 
St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Leadville,  Colo.    Through  shipment.     Interstate  Commerce, 

§3  (i)    420 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Little  Rock,  Ark.  Grain  and  products.  Differentials,  §6  (g)  .  216 
St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.  Plate  glass.  Classification,  §18  (9)  (a)  ...  155 
St.   Louis,   Mo.,   to   Monroe,   La.     Apples.     Through  Routes   and  Joint  Rates, 

§22   (g)    883 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Monroe,  La.  Rates.  Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §10  (bb),  (cc)  ..  472 
St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  New  Orleans,  La.,  and  Mississippi  River  points.    Long  and 

Short  Hauls,  §10  (bb)  472 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Nogales,  Ariz.  Soap.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §8  (4)  (ee) .  582 
St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Pueblo,  Colo.  Cotton.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §73  (a)  ...  631 
St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  San  Antonio,  Tex.    Beer  bottles.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§48    (a)    615 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Spokane,  Wash.     New  cars.     Special  Contracts,  §2   (eee). 

Tariffs,  §3   (1)    (w)    779,  808 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  to  Texas  common  points.     Class  and  commodity  rates.     Ad- 
vanced Rates,  §15  (e)    36 

St.  Louis,  Mo.    Switching  charge.     Tariffs,  §7   (e)    815 

St.  Louis,  Mo.     Switching  service.     Terminal  Facilities,  §3   (c)    835 

St.  Louis,  Mo.    Switching.    Switch  Tracks  and  Switching,  §4  (c)   789 

St.  Louis,  Mo.     Switching.     Terminal  Facilities,  §7   (c)    838 

St.  Louis,  Mo.    Through  routes.    Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11  (2)  (b)  .  850 

St.  Paul,  Minn.    Assorting  Packages,  §  (c)   72 

St.    Paul,    Minn.,    from    Chicago,    111.,   and    Milwaukee,    Wis.     Petroleum    and 

products.     Procedure  before  Commission,  §2   (mm) 540 

St.  Paul,  Minn.,  from  Chicago,  111.,  and  St.  Louis,  Mo.     Rates.     Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §8   (4)    (t) 583 

St.   Paul,   Minn.,   from   Duluth,   Minn.,   and   Superior,   Wis.     Bituminous   coal. 

Evidence,  §13   (2)    (i)    325 

St.  Paul,  Minn.,  from  Minnesota  and  other  points.     Cream.     Reasonableness 

of  Rates,  §111   (b)    675 

St.   Paul,   Minn.,   from   Seymour  and   Cedar  Gap,   Mo.     Apples.     Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §84   (i) 640 

St.  Paul,  Minn.,  from  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  and  Chicago,  111.     Rates.     Reasonable- 
ness of  Rates,  §8    (4)    (u)    583 

St.    Paul,    Minn.,    to    Central    Freight    Association    territory.      Class    rates. 

Advanced  Rates,  §18  (10)   (a)   45 

St.  Paul,  Minn.,  to  Douglas,  Minn.    Plate  glass.    Minimums,  §7  (u)  504 


INDEX   OF   LOCALITIES  1083 


Page 
St.  Paul,  Minn,,  to  Lemmon,  S.  D.,  and  Hettinger,  N.  D.    Groceries.    Through 

Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §13  (j)    861 

St.    Paul    to    New    York.      Furs.     Express    Companies,    §4    (a),    §8    (e),    §11 

(10)   (a).    Procedure  Before  Commission,  §2  (u)    375,  376,  382,  538 

St.  Paul,  Minn.,  to  Reno,  Nev.     Syrup.     Divisions,  §1   (a) 275 

St.  Paul,  Minn.,  to  South  Dakota  points.     Oil  and  gasoline.     Reasonableness 

of    Rates,     §117     (e) 678 

St.  Paul,  Minn.,  to  Spokane  territory.     Rates.     Blanket  Rates,  §5    (a) 82 

St.   Paul,   Minn.     Transit.     Discrimination,    §7    (b),   Facilities   and   Privileges, 

§21  (ee) 243,  409 

St.  Paul,  Neb.,  to  Denver,   Colo.     Milk.     Express  Companies,   §11   (9)    (b) . . .  381 

St.  Petersburg,   Fla.,    to   Atlanta,   Ga.     Oranges.     Refrigeration,    §4    (1) 710 

Stanards,  N.  Y.,  to  Struthers,  Pa.  Oil.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §117  (c) .  678 
Steubenville,  O.,  to  Los  Angeles,  Cal.     Tank  blocks.     Classification,  §17   (j). 

Reparation,    §16     (oo) 153,  737 

Steubenville,  O.,  to  San  Francisco,  Cal.  Gas  grates.   Tariffs,  §7  (11) 821 

Steubenville,  O.,  to   San  Francisco,   Cal.     Grapes.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§90      (a) 650 

Stillwater,    Minn.,    from    west    of    the    Missouri    River.      Hay.      Proportional 

Rates,   IV    (m) 561 

Stockton,    Cal.,   to   Alturas,    Cal.     Pipe   nails,   wire,   etc     Reasonableness   of 

Rates,    §97     (a) 657 

Stoughton,    Wis.,    to    Passaic,    N.    J.     Tobacco.     Through    Routes   and   Joint 

Rates,    §15     (wv) 875 

Stoy,  111.,  to  Indiana  points.    Oil.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (w) 456 

Stroh,  Ind.,  to  Detroit,  Mich.     Cement.    Advanced  Rates,  §18   (1)    (b) 41 

Strong,   Colo.,   to  Milford,   Neb.     Coal.     Reconsignment,   §6    (b) 703 

Strong,  Colo.,  to  Quinn  and  Cottonwood,  S.  D.  Coal.  Reparation,  §7  (oo) . . .  766 
Struthers,   O.,   to  Worcester   and   Palmer,   Mass.    Iron   and   steel   rods.    Long 

and    Short   Hauls,    §9    (a) 460 

Suffolk,    Va.,    to    North    and    South    Carolina    points.      Vehicles.      Advanced 

Rates,    §8    (2)     (b) 29 

Summit,  N.  J.     Switching.     Switch  Tracks  and  Switching,  §7   (m) 794 

Sumrall,  Miss.,  to  Dayton,  O.     Lumber.     Reparation,  §4   (f ) 753 

Sumter,     S.     C,    to    Tampa,     Fla.      Cottonseed    meal.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,    §32    (c) 607 

Superior,  Wis.     Free  storage.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §8   (c) 392 

Superior,    Wis.,    from    Minnesota    points.      Pulp    wood.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,    §128    (a) 685 

Superior,  Neb.,  to  Lusk,  Wyo.  Rates.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (y) 455 

Superior,  Wis.,  to  North  and  South  Dakota.   Coal.   Minimums,  §4  (i)   499 

Superior  Dock,  Wis.    Vessel  facilities.    Tariffs,  §3  (3)   (d) 810 

Syracuse,    N.    Y.,    to    Boston,    Mass.,    and    New    York,    N.    Y.     Wall   plaster. 

Discrimination,    §8    (3)     (e) 249 

Tacoma,  Wash.,  from  Idaho  and  Oregon.    Live  stock.    Evidence,  §1   (d) 315 

Tacoma,     Wash.,     from     California.       Sheep.       Minimum,     §7     (1),     Tariffs, 

§15     (b)      503,  832 

Tacoma,    Wash.,    from    California    points.      Sheep    and    cattle.      Minimums, 

§7     (c) gOi 


1084  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 

Page 
Tacoma,   Wash.,   from   Nampa,    Ida.,    and    Ontario,    Ore.      Cattle.     Reparation, 

§7      (vv) 767 

Tacoma,   Wash.,   from   Ontario,   Ore.,    and   Nampa,   Ida.     Cattle.     Reparation, 

§7   (yy) 767 

Tacoma,  Wash.,   to  the  East.     Distributing  rates.     Commodity  Rates,  §1    (d)  159 

Tacoma,  Wash.,  to  the  East.    Lumber.    Blanket  Rates,  §8  (h)  90 

Tacoma,  Wash.,  to  the  East.    Rates.    Class  Rates,  (b) 132 

Tacoma,  Wash.,  to   Oregon,  Idaho,   and  Montana  points.     Class  Rates.     Rea- 
sonableness   of    Rates,    §66    (ee) 623 

Tacoma,   Wash.,   to   Washington,    Idaho,    Montana   and    Oregon.     Class   rates. 

Procedure    Before    Commission,    §19     (e) 555 

Tallulah,   La.,   to   Lime    City,    Tex.     Elm   hoops.     Through   Routes   and   Joint 

Rates,    §15     (v) 868 

Talmage,  Neb.,  to  St.  Louis,  Mo.     Corn  and  wheat.     Branch  Lines,  §1   (i) . . .  103 
Tempe,    Ariz.,    to    Arizona,    Colorado,    New    Mexico,    Kansas    and    California 

points.     Base   rates.     Express    Companies,    §24    (c) 385 

Tennessee  Ridge,   Tenn.,  to  Louisville,  Ky.     Ties.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§148     (c) 691 

Terre   Haute,   Ind.,   to   Cincinnati   and   Dayton,    O.     Bar   iron    and   steel,   etc. 

Discrimination,     §9     (o) 263 

Terre    Haute,    Ind.,    to    Davenport,    la.      Mussel    shells.      Reasonableness    of 

Rates,     §115      (a) 677 

Terre  Haute,   Ind.,  to  Louisville,   Ky.     Bar  iron  and   steel,   etc.     Discrimina- 
tion,   §9     (o) 263 

Texas   from   and   to  various   points.     Live   stock,   fresh   meats   and   packing- 
house  products.     Reasonableness   of   Rates,   §118    (b) 679 

Texas  to  Omaha,  Neb.,  and  Council  Bluffs,  la.     Lumber  and  forest  products. 

Advanced   Rates,   §5    (1)    (b) 14 

Texas  to  Pacific  Coast.     Rates.     Blanket  Rates,   §2    (b) 79 

Texas  to  points  east  of  the  Illinois-Indiana  state  line.     Potatoes.     Advanced 

Rates,    §17    (b) 38 

Texas   to   the   Southeast,   Central   Freight  Association  territory,   Illinois   terri- 
tory,   Pacific    Coast.     Rice.     Blanket   Rates,    §7    (a) 83 

Texas  points  to  New  Orleans,  La.,  and  Texas  ports.    Cotton.    Advanced  Rates, 

§19   (a)    45 

Texas  ports  from  Texas  points.    Cotton.    Export  Rates  and  Facilities,  V  (b) 371 

Thayer,  111.     Switching.     Switch  Tracks  and  Switching,  §4  (a)   788 

Thomas,  W.  Va.,  to  Tonopah,  Nev.    Coal.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §67  (g)   ...   625 

Tiger,  Ga.,  to  Hoboken,  N.  J.     Lumber.     Tariffs,  §7  (z)   819 

Tobico,  Mich.    Switching.    Discrimination,  §10  (1)   267 

Tobico,  Mich.,  to  Sandusky,  O.     Ice.     Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §20  (d)    119 

Tobico,  Mich.,  to  Toledo,  O.     Ice,     Discrimination,  §10   (1) 816 

Toledo,   O.     Rates.     Equalization  of  Rates,   §3    (y)    295 

Toledo,  O.,  to  Cedarburg,  Wis.     Wagons.     Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 

§15    (r)    867 

Toledo,  O.,  to  Detroit,  Mich.     Cement.     Advanced  Rates,  §18   (1)    (b)    41 

Toledo,  O.,  to  Gordo,  Ala.    Farm  Wagons.    Tariffs,  §7  (1)  816 

Toledo,  O.,  to  Ohio  River  crossings  and  Virginia  cities  for  beyond.     Vehicles. 
Discrimination,  §4  (d)    229 


INDEX    OF   LOCALITIES  1085 

Page 
Toledo,  O.,  to  Ohio  River  crossings  and  Virginia  cities  for  beyond.    Vehicles. 

wagons  and  carts.    Discrimination,  §4  (dd)   229 

Toledo,  O.,  to  Portland  and  Eugene,  Ore.,  and  Seattle,  Wash.     Farm  wagons. 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §8   (4)    (p)    583 

Toledo,  O.,  to  Smithville,  Tex.    Wagon.    Minimums,  §4  (b)   498 

Toledo,   O.,   to   the   South   and   Southeast.     Vehicles.     Equalization   of  Rates, 

§3    (h)    291 

Toledo,  O.,  to  Tonopah,  Nev.    Wagons.    Reasonabbleness  of  Rates,  §150  (b) 692 

Toledo,   O.,   to  Watertown,  Wis.     Wagon.     Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates, 

§15    (q) 867 

Tony,  Wis.,  to  Zumbrota,  Minn.     Lumber.     Long  and   Short  Hauls,  §5   (pp), 

Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §28   (x)    456,  604 

Townley,  N.  J.     Reconsignment.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §15   (k)    398 

Traverse  City,  Mich.,  to  Balcom,  111.    Fruit  baskets.    Evidence,  §28  (g)    340 

Traverse   City,   Mich,,   to   Horatio,   Ark.     Baskets.     Reasonableness   of  Rates, 

§44    (b)    613 

Traverse  City,  Mich.,  to  Horatio,  Ark.  Rebilling.  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission,  §10    (e)    435 

Traverse  City,  Mich.,  to  Montrose,   la.     Fruit  baskets.     Through  Routes  and 

Joint  Rates,  §15   (tt)    871 

Trenary,  Mich.,  to  Milwaukee,  Wis.    Tan  bark.    Reparation,  §4  (tt)   758 

Trinidad,  Colo.,  to  Amarillo,  Tex.    Coke.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §70  (a)   ...  630 

Troutville,  Va.,  to  Birmingham,  Ala.     Tomatoes.    Demurrage,  §7  (b)   198 

Trunk  Line  territory.    Oil.    Tariffs,  §15  (c) 832 

Tupelo,  Okla.,  to  Forest  City,  Ark.    Corn.    Equalization  of  Rates,  §4  (2)   (m) . .  300 

Turon,  Kan.,  to  Lake  Charles,  La.    Flour.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §83  (b) 636 

Tyro,  Kan.,  to  Iowa  points.     Brick.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §52  (b) 616 

t 

Upper  Clinch  Valley  to  Eastern  points.     Coal.     Differentials,  §5   (j) 213 

Utah   common   points  from   the  East.     Commodity  rates.     Reasonableness  of 

Rates,   §66    (e) 623 

Utah  common  points  from  the  East.     Class  and  commodity  rates.     Procedure 

before  Commission,  §19   (bb)    554 

Utah  common  points  from  the  Missouri  River.    Class  rates.    Evidence,  §20  (b) .  336 

Utah  common  points.     Import  rates.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §44  (a)    613 

Utah  common  points  to  Chicago,  111.    Class  rates.    Branch  Lines,  §4  (b)   105 

Utah  common  points  to  and  from  Chicago,  111.     Class  rates.     Reasonableness 

of   Rates,    §66    (e)     623 

Utah  common  points  to  Denver,  Colo.,   Omaha,  Neb.,  Los  Angeles,  Cal.,  and 

Coast  points.    Passenger  fares.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (k)   451 

Utah  common  points  to  Denver,  Omaha,  Los  Angeles,  etc.     Passenger  fares. 

Branch  Lines,  §4   (b) 105 

Utah  common  points  to  Mississippi  and  Missouri  Rivers  and  Chicago,  111.    Rates. 

Branch  Lines,  §4  (b) 105 

Utah  to  Missouri  and  Mississippi  Rivers  and  Chicago,  111.     Rates.     Long  and 

Short  Hauls,   §5    (k)    451 

Utah  points  to  Montana  points.   Fruit.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84  (e)   638 

Utah  points  to  NprtU  Dakota.    Fruit,    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §84  (f)  638 


1086  INDEX    OF    LOCALITIES 

Pa^e 
Vanceburg,  Ky.,  to  Carroll  Park  Siding,  Baltimore,  Md.    Chestnut  ties.    Repara- 
tion,  §4    (yy)    758 

Vaughn,  N.  Mex.,  to  Kansas  City,  Mo.     Sheep.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §19 

(d).  Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5   (j)    405,  451 

Vicksburg,  Miss.,  to  Monroe,  La.,  Rates.   Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §10  (cc) 472 

Vicksburg,  Miss.     Relative  rates.     Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §10  (aa)    472 

Vicksburg,  Miss.,  to  New  Bedford,  Miss.     Cotton.    Demurrage,  §9  (b)   200 

Vicksburg,  Miss.,  to  Northeastern  Texas.    Rates.    Discrimination,  §13  (b)   270 

Victoria,  Va.,  to  Alliance,  O.  Lumber.   Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105  (1)   667 

Vincennes,  Ind.,  to  Louisville,  Ky.  Bar  iron.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §96  (e) .  656 
Vincennes,  Ind.,   to  Owatonna,  Minn.     Watermelons.     Long  and  Short  Hauls, 

§5    (mm)     456 

Vincent,   Ark.,   to    Memphis,    Tenn.     Uncompressed    cotton.     Equalization   of 

Rates,  §4  (2)   (r) 301 

Vineland,  N.  J.,  to  Pennsylvania  points,  New  York,  N.  Y.,  and  Chicago,  111. 

Guinea  pigs,  rabbits,  rats.    Express  Companies,  §11  (7)   (a)   380 

Virden,  111.    Mine  Rating.    Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §27  (a)  122 

Virginia  ports.     Trimming  and  leveling.     Facilities  and  Privileges,  §6  (b)    ...  391 
Vista,   Mo.,  to  Kansas   City,  Mo.     Wood   and   coal.     Absorption  of  Charges, 
§2   (d)    1 

Wabash,  Ind.,  to  St.  Louis,  Mo.    Wood  pulp.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §155  (a) .  695 

Wabena,  Wis.,  to  Illinois  and  Iowa.    Lumber.    Blanket  Rates,  §8  (gg)  90 

Waco,  Tex.,  to  Cairo,  111.    Passenger  Fares  and  Facilities,  §2  (g)   519 

Walcottville,  Ind.,  to  Ft.  Wayne,  Ind.    Iron.    Equalization  of  Rates,  §4  (2)   (a). 

Special   Contracts,   §2    (k)    298,  773 

Walla  Walla,  Wash.    Commodity  Rates.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5  (1) 452 

Wallabout  Basin,  N.  Y.    Lighterage.    Terminal  Facilities,  §3  (k)   837 

Wallingford,  Vt.,  to  Denver,  Colo.    Agricultural  implements.    Minimums,  §7  (o) .  503 

Walsenburg  district,  Colo.    Reconsignment,  §2  (f )   699 

Walsenburg  district,  Colo.,  to  Kansas,  Oklahoma  and  Texas.    Coal.     Through 

Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11  (2)  (a)  850 

Walsenburg  district,  Colo.,  to  Missouri  River.    Coal.    Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§67    (e)    625 

Walsenburg    district,    Colo.,    to    Nebraska    and    South    Dakota    points.      Coal. 

Discrimination,  §8   (3)    (f)    249 

Walsenburg  district,  Colo.,  to  Nebraska  points.  Coal.  Discrimination,  §7  (e)  .  244 
Walsenburg  district,  Colo.,  to  Panhandle  of  Texas  points  and  Eastern  New 

Mexico.     Coal.    Differentials,  §7   (e)    218 

Walsenburg  district,  Colo.,  to  Texas  and  New  Mexico  points.     Coal.     Through 

Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11  (2)   (j)   853 

Walsenburg  field,  Colo.,  to  Kansas,  Nebraska,  Oklahoma,  Texas  and  New  Mex- 
ico.    Coal.    Blanket  Rates,  §11  (g)    96 

Warren,   Pa.,  to  Cadillac,  Mich.     Gas  machinery.     Reasonableness   of  Rates, 

§87  (a) 649 

Warren,  Pa.,  to  Cadillac  and  Jennings,  Mich.     Gas  plant  machinery.    Tariffs, 

§7   (XXX)    825 

Warroad,  Minn.,  to  Grand  Forks,  N.  D.    Poles  and  posts.     Reasonableness  of 

Rates,  §125   (b)    684 


INDEX   OF   LOCALITIES  1087 


Page 
Warsaw,  N.  C,  to  New  York,  N.  Y.    Dressed  pine.    Through  Routes  and  Joint 

Rates,  §19   (d)    881 

Warsaw  Junction,  O.,  to  Perth  Amboy,  N.  J.    Re  consignment,  §5  (d)  703 

Washburn,  Wis.,  to  points  west  of  Minnesota  Transfer.  Salt.  Discrimina- 
tion, §10   (e)    266 

Washington.     Cooperage.    Allowances,  §8   (2)    (a) 56 

Washington,  D.   C,  from   Maryland  points.     Telephone  facilities.     Telephone 

Companies,  §1   (a)    832 

Washington,  D.  C,  to  Bremerton,   Wash.    Merchandise.    Express   Companies, 

§11   (8)    (a)    380 

Washington,  D.  C,  to  Glenndale,  Md.     Manure.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§81    (f)    636 

Washington,  D.  C,  to  Laurel,  Md.    Fares.    Electric  Lines,  IV  (d)  282 

Washington  to  St.  Paul,  Minn.,  Chicago,  111.,  Mississippi  River,  Missouri  River, 

Southeastern   Kansas,    Denver   and   similar   points.     Shingles   and   forest 

products.    Advanced  Rates,  §13  (k)   33 

Washington,  D.  C,  to  Virginia  points.    Fares.    Electric  Lines,  IV  (e)    283 

Washington,  D.  C.    Telephone.    Special  Contracts,  §2  (o)   774 

Washington,  Okla.,  to  Arcadia,  La.    Corn.    Reparation,  §9  (h)  770 

Washington  points  to  Astoria,  Ore.    Wheat.     Differentials,  §6   (d)    215 

Washington  points  to  the  East.     Lumber  and  forest  products.     Differentials, 

§7   (h)    221 

Washington     points     to     Montana     points.       Lumber     and     forest    products. 

Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates,   §11    (2)    (c) 851 

Washington    points    to     various    points.      Lumber.      Through     Routes    and 

Joint  Rates,  §11  (2)  (p),  (q) 856 

Washington    to    other    states.     Common    lumber,    cedar,    fir,    etc.      Advanced 

Rates,    §8    (1)     (i) 28 

Watonga,  Okla.,  to  Ft.  Worth  and  Dallas,  Tex.     Cement  plaster.     Advanced 

Rates,  §5   (2)    (d).     Blanket  Rates,  §7   (bb)    ..15,    84 

Waukegan,  111.,  to  Carthage,  Mo.    Wire.    Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §12  (2)   (b)  475 

Waukesha,  Wis.,  to  Chicago,  111.     Beer.    Advanced  Rates,  §18  (2)    (a) 42 

Waukesha,  Wis.,  to  Minnesota,  Iowa.,  etc.  Beer  and  mineral  water.  Classifi- 
cation,   §7     (f ) 140 

Wausau,  Wis.,  to  Cravens,  La.    Machinery.    Reparation,  §16  (dd)  737 

Wautoma,  Wis.,  to  Springfield,  Mo.    Potatoes.    Reparation,  §7   (ccc).    Through 

Routes  and  Joint  Rates,  §11   (2)    (v) 768,  857 

Waverly,    N.    Y.,    to    Binghamton,    N.    Y.     Coal.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§67      (i) 626 

Webster,   S.  D.,  to  Manchester,  N.  H.     Foodstuffs.     Reparation,  §7   (y) 764 

Weehawken,  N.  Y.,  to  Linndale,  O.     Iron  pyrites.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§96      (g) 656 

Weiner,  Ark.,  to  East  St.  Louis,  111.     Walnut  logs.     Blanket  Rates,  §11  (ee)     95 

Wellington,   O.,  to  Evansville,  Wis.     Butter.     Reconsignment,   §5    (g) 703 

Wellston,  O.,  to  Manitowoc,  Wis.    Coal.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §67  (t)   628 

West  Edmeston,  N.  Y.,  to  New  Britain,  Conn.    Lumber.    Through  Routes  and 

Joint    Rates,    §11    (2)     (d) 851 

West   Pawlett,   Vt.,   to   Eagle   Bridge,   N.   Y.     Fluid   milk.     Advanced   Rates, 

§3    (aa),   §18    (7)    (a) 11,    44 


1088  INDEX   OP   LOCALITIES 

Page 

West  Virginia  to  Lake  Erie  ports.     Coal.     Advanced  Rates,  §17   (e) 38 

Westlake,  La.,  to  Towner,  Colo.     Lumber.     Long  and  Short  Hauls,  §5   (11) . .  456 

Wessington  Springs,  S.  D.,  from  Cleveland,  O.,  and  Bessemer,  Ala.  Cast 
iron    pipe.      Minimums,    §7    (nn) 507 

Western    Classification    Territory.      Commodity    rates.      Advanced    Rates,    §6 

(3)     (a),    §15     (d) 17,     36 

Western  points  to  the  East.     Wool.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §156   (a) 695 

Western  points  to  Mississippi  River  and  the  East.  Wool,  Blanket  Rates, 
§11     (a)     93 

Western  states  to  and  beyond  the  Missouri  River.  Stock  cattle  and  sheep. 
Advanced   Rates,   §18    (9)    (a) 45 

Western  territory  to  Eastern  points.    Wool.    Blanket  Rates,  §9  (a)  90 

Western  territory  to  Eastern  destinations.  Mohair.  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,    §115     (a) 677 

Wheeling,  W.  Va.,  from  various  points.     Steam  coal.     Discrimination,  §6   (e)  242 

Wheeling,  W.  Va.,  to  Beloit,  Wis.  Cotton  drills.  Through  Routes  and 
Joint   Rates,   §15    (z) 869 

Wheeling,  W.  Va.,  to  Nowata,  Okla.  Iron  roofing.  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,    §97     (b) 658 

Whiting,   Ind,,   to   Birmingham,   Ala.     Oil.     Crimes,   §7    (e) 185 

Wichita,  Kan.,  from  and  to  various  points.  Live  stock  and  packinghouse 
products.     Reasonableness  of  Rates,   §118    (b) 679 

Wichita,  Kan.,  from  New  York  and  Eastern  territory.  Cotton  and  knit 
goods.     Long  and  Short  Hauls,   §9    (s) 464 

Witchita  to  Arkansas  and  Louisiana  points.  Fresh  meats  and  packing- 
house products.     Advanced  Rates,  §19   (c) 46 

Wichita,  Kan.,  to  Kansas  City,  Mo.  Fresh  meats  and  packinghouse  prod- 
ucts.    Reasonableness   of  Rates,   §103    (b) 659 

Wichita,  Kan.,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.  Fresh  meats  and  packinghouse  prod- 
ucts.   Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §103  (b) 659 

Wichita,  Kan.,  to  Oklahoma,   Texas  and  New  Mexico.     Peddler  Car  Service 

(b)      532 

Wichita,  Kan.,  to  the  Southeast,  Carolina  territory.  Trunk  Line  territory,  and 
Illinois  territory.    Proportional  rates.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §118  (b)  . .  679 

Wichita,  Kan.,  to  Southeastern  territory.  Fresh  meats  and  packinghouse 
products.  Advanced  Rates,  §5  (2)  (b).  Reasonableness  of  Rates, 
§118      (a) 14,  678 

Willamette  Valley  points  to  San  Francisco,  Cal.  Lumber  and  lath.  Ad- 
vanced   Rates,    §13    (c) •. 32 

Willamette  Valley  to  San  Francisco,  Cal.  Lumber  and  lath.  Advanced 
Rates,  §13  (1),  Equalization  of  Rates,  §3  (aa),  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission,     §9     (a) 34,  290,  431 

Willamette  Valley  to  San  Francisco,  Cal.  Lumber.  Reasonableness  of 
Rates,    §105     (e) 666 

Williams,    Ariz.,    to    Arizona    points.      Lumber.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§105      (k) 666 

Wilkes-Barre,  Pa.     Switching.     Switch  Tracks  and  Switching,  §7   (e) 793 

Wilkes-Barre,  Pa.,  to  Carthage,  N,  C.    Axles.    Overcharges,  §9  (b)  516 


INDEX   OF   LOCALITIES  1089 


Page 
Wills   Point,   Tex.,   to   Stockton,   Cal.     Elm  hub   blocks.     Reasonableness   of 

Rates,    §80     (a) 635 

Wilmington,  Cal.     Rates.     Equalization  of  Rates,  §3   (s) 294 

Wilmington,   Cal.     Rates.     Evidence,   §33   (a) 343 

Wilmington,    Del.,   to   Diamondville,   Wyo.     Car   wheels.     Reasonableness   of 

Rates,    §58     (a) 620 

Windsor,    Canada,    from    points    north,    west    and    south    of    Detroit,    Mich. 

Differentials,     §4     (a) 210 

Windsor,   Out.,   from  West  Virginia   points.     Lumber.     Through   Routes   and 

Joint  Rates,  §15  (u) 868 

Windsor,    Colo.,    to    Louisiana    points.      Flour.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§83     (c) 636 

Winnipeg,   Can.,   to  New   Jersey  and   Pennsylvania.     Rail-lake-and-rail  rates. 

Crimes,    §10     (f) 188 

Winston-Salem,  N.  C,  from  Chicago,  111.,  East  St.  Louis,  111.,  Louisville,  Ky., 

Columbus,  O.,  and  Cincinnati,  O.    Class  Rates  and  certain  commodity  rates. 

Discrimination,    §8    (3)     (d) 249 

Winterburn,  W.  Va.,  to  Newark,  N.  J.     Lumber.     Reparation,  §9  (f ) 769 

Wisconsin   points    to    Chicago,    111.     Cabbages.     Through    Routes   and    Joint 

Rates,    §11    (2)     (u) 857 

Wittenberg,  Wis.,  to  Whittemore,  la.     Posts.     Reparation,   §2    (m) 751 

Wood  River,  Neb.,  to  various  points.  Grain.  Cars  and  Car  Supply,  §20  (e)  119 
Woodson,    Ark.,    to    Kansas    points.      Lumber.      Reasonableness    of    Rates, 

§105      (a) 665 

Woodson,  Ark.,  to  Memphis,  Tenn.     Lumber.     Blanket  Rates,  §12    (d) 97 

Woodson,    Ark.,    to    Oklahoma,    Kansas    and    Missouri.      Lumber.      Blanket 

Rates,    §7     (e) 85 

Woolam,  Miss.,  to   Owensburg,  Ind.     Lumber.     Tariffs,    §3    (3)    (c).   Through 

Routes   and    Joint   Rates,    §13    (c) 810,860 

Wooley's  Spur,  Ida.,  to  McKinney,  Tex.     Wheat.     Through  Routes  and  Joint 

Rates,    §21     (a) 882 

Worcester,  Mass.,  to  Chicago.    Old  canvas.    Classification,  §11  (n)  144 

Worcester,  Mass.,  to  St.  Louis,  Mo.     Rate.     Reparation,  §7  (n) 762 

Wynne,    Ark.,    to    Horatio,   Ark.     Fruit    baskets.     Reasonableness    of   Rates, 

§85     (a) 648 

Wyoming  district.  Pa.,  to  Baltimore,  Md.     Coal.     Through  Routes  and  Joint 

Rates,    §11    (2)     (1) 854 

Wyoming  district.  Pa.,  to  Perth  Amboy,  N.  J.     Coal.     Reparation,   §3    (c)..  720 

Wyoming  points  to  Fremont,  Neb.    Lump  coal.    Differentials,  §5  (c) 211 

Wyoming  points  to  Idaho  points.  Coal.  Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §67  (n)  627 
Yaden,  Ky.,  to  Cincinnati,  O.    Crossties.    Reasonableness  of  Rates,  §105  (d)  ...  665 

Yonkers,   N.   Y.     Lighterage,   §3    (f),   §4    (a) 440,441 

Yonkers,  N.  Y.,  to  Jersey  City,  N.  J.  Lighterage.  Allowances,  §8  (3)  (c) . .  59 
Yonkers,    N.    Y.,    to    San    Francisco,    Cal.      Electrical    machinery.      Tariffs, 

§7     (eee) 823 

Youngstown,    O.,    to    Liberal,    Kan.      Wrought    iron    pipe.      Discrimination, 

§8     (3)     (c) 248 

Youngstown,  O.,  to  Monroe,  N.  C.  Sheet  iron.  Classification,  §18  (5)  (a) . .  154 
Yuma,  Ariz.,   from  eastern  points.     Merchandise.     Reasonableness  of  Rates, 

§109     (a) 673 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 
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